PEOPLE VS. BAJAR, 414 SCRA 494 P.

28
FACTS: On or about the 16th day of August 1999, at about 8:00 oclock in the evening, at sitioMohon,
Barangay Mambayaan, Municipality of Balingasag, Province of Misamis Oriental, Republic of the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, then armed with
a sharp bolo, with intent to kill, and with evident premeditation, and treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously stab one 85 year old AquilioTiwanak, accuseds father-in-law, hitting him on the
different parts of his body, which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs
of AquilioTiwanak in such amounts as may be allowed by law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in awarding P30,000 as burial expenses for lack of receipts to
prove the same.
HELD:On the matter of damages, we agree with Alejandros contention that the trial court erred in awarding
P30,000 as burial expenses for lack of receipts to prove the same. It is necessary for a party seeking the
award of actual damages to produce competent proof or the best evidence obtainable to justify such award.
Only substantiated and proven expenses, or those that appear to have been genuinely incurred in
connection with the death, wake, or burial of the victim will be recognized in court. Nonetheless, in line with
new jurisprudence,[44 we shall award temperate damages in the amount of P25,000 to the victims heirs,
since they clearly incurred funeral expenses.

We observe that no moral damages was decreed by the trial court. Lolita testified that no monetary
consideration could equal a daughters loss of her father. In recent jurisprudence,[45 we held that the award
of moral damages is mandatory in cases of murder and homicide, without need of allegation and proof
other than the death of the victim. We therefore award moral damages in favor of Aquilios heirs in the
amount of P50,000. We reiterate what we said in People v. Panado:

Unlike in the crime of rape, we grant moral damages in murder or homicide only when the heirs of the
victim have alleged and proved mental suffering. However, as borne out by human nature and experience,
a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the
victims family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes
the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of
the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves
them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them. For this reason, moral damages
must be awarded even in the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs emotional suffering. Verily
Hilda and her son Louie Gee would forever carry the emotional wounds of the vicious killing of a husband
and a father. With or without proof, this fact can never be denied; since it is undisputed, it must be
considered proved.[46

We affirm the award of P50,000 as death indemnity, and the award of P25,000 as exemplary damages by
virtue of the attendance of three aggravating circumstances, pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the 17 July 2000 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, in
Criminal Case No. 99-942 is hereby AFFIRMED with modifications. Appellant ALEJANDRO BAJAR is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death.
The awards of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P25,000 as exemplary damages in favor of the heirs of the
victim AQUILIO TIWANAK are affirmed. The award for burial expenses is deleted; however, in lieu thereof,
an award of P25,000 as temperate damages is hereby adjudged, payable to the heirs of the victim. The
appellant is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim moral damages in the amount of P50,000.

MELBA QUINTO VS.DANTE ANDRES and RANDYVER PACHECOG.R. No. 155791. March 16, 2005
p.26
FACTS:An Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court that the accused Dante Andres and
Randyver Pacheco, conspiring, confederating, and helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault,and maul Wilson Quinto inside a culvert where the three were
fishing, causing Wilson Quinto to drown and die. The respondents filed a demurer to evidence whichthe
trial court granted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It also held that it could not hold the
respondents liable for damages because of the absence of preponderant evidence to prove their liability for
Wilsons death. The petitioner appealed the order to the Court of Appeals insofar as the civil aspect of the
case was concerned. The CA ruled that the acquittal in this case is not merelybased on reasonable doubt
but rather on a finding that the accused-appellees did not commit the criminal acts complained of. Thus,
pursuant to the above rule and settled jurisprudence, any civil action ex delicto cannot prosper. Acquittalin
a criminal action bars the civil action arising therefrom where the judgment tof acquittal holds that the
accused did not commit the criminal acts imputed tothem.
ISSUE:Whether or not the extinction of respondents criminal liability carries withit the extinction of their civil
liability.
HELD:When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery ofcivil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others
from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate himfrom society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in
general, to maintain social order. The sole purpose of the civil action is the restitution, reparation or
indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the
delictual or felonious act of the accused.The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of thecivil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there
is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from where the civil liability may
arise does not exist. In thiscase, the petitioner failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of either
respondent to kill the deceased and as held bythe trial court and the CA, the prosecution failed to adduce
preponderant evidence to prove the facts onwhich the civil liability of the respondents rest, i.e., that the
petitioner hasa cause of action against the respondents for damages.
PEOPLE VS LOPE VIENTE, 225 SCRA 361 p.23
FACTS:On the 29th day of January, 1989, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the accused Lope Viente,
conspiring and confederating with two others whose true names, identities and whereabouts are still
unknown and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of (sic)
gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by then and there poking a gun at the nape of
one NarcisoCabatas y Limora, driver of an Isuzu passenger jitney with Plate No. DVB-424, with Motor
Number 386028 and Chassis Number SPMM-10408-86-C, valued at P150,000.00, owned by
LucilaCrespino y Manzalan, grabbing the wheels (sic) of the said vehicle and pushing the said driver off the
same, take, steal and carry away the said passenger jeepney, against the will of said NarcisoCabatas y
Limora, to the damages and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid sum of P150,000.00, Philippine
Currency.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing upon the appellant a straight penalty of
imprisonment for thirty years.
RULING:We agree with the Solicitor General that the trial court erred in imposing upon the appellant a
straight penalty of imprisonment for thirty years. The carnapping in this case was committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons. The penalty prescribed therefor under Section 14 of R.A. No.
6539 is "imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years."
Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 46 if an offense is punished by a special law, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by the said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the
same. The proper penalty to be imposed should not, therefore, be thirty years, but an indeterminate penalty
which is hereby set at seventeen (17) years and four (4) months as minimum to thirty (30) years as
maximum.
WHEREFORE, except as to the modification regarding the penalty, the appealed judgment is hereby
AFFIRMED in all other respects. As modified, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from seventeen (17) years and four (4) months as minimum to thirty (30)
years as maximum.
Costs against the appellant.

PEOPLE v BATES, 400 SCRA 95 p.17
FACTS: On November 28, 1995 at around 2:00 in the afternoon, Edgar and Simon Fuentes and Jose
Boholot left Barangay Esperanza, Ormoc City to deliver copra to a certain FelyRodado at Barangay Gren
Valley, Ormoc City. After the delivery, the three men headed back to Barangay Esperanza. While they
were along the way, leading to the house of Carlito Bates, the latter suddenly emerged from the thick
banana plantation surrounding the trail, aiming his firearm at Hose Boholot who was then walking ahead of
his companions. Jose grabbed Carlitos hand and try to wrest possession of the firearm. The gun fired
hitting Carlito who immediately fell to the ground. At that instant, Marcelo Bates and his son, brother and
nephew of Carlito, respectively emerged from the banana plantation, each holding a bolo. They
immediately hacked Jose several times. Marcelo then returned to Simon and Edgar and shouted, huwes
de kutsilyo, upon hearing the same, Simon and Edgar ran.
ISSUE: That the trial court committed an error in imposing the penalty of "forty (40) years of reclusion
perpetua"
CRIME COMMITTED: Murder
HELD: Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender which is not offset by any aggravating circumstance, the maximum period of the penalty to be
imposed shall be taken from the minimum of reclusion temporal which is 12 years and 1 day to 14 years
and 8 months; while the minimum period shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is
prision mayor or 6 years and 1 day to 12 years.

For the guidance of both the bench and bar, it must be mentioned that the trial court committed an error in
imposing the penalty of "forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua". We reiterate our earlier pronouncements in
a number of cases that while Section 21 of RA No. 7659 amended Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code by
fixing the duration of reclusion perpetua from 20 years and 1 day to 40 years, reclusion perpetua remains to
be an indivisible penalty in the absence of a clear legislative intent to alter its original classification as an
indivisible penalty.25 Hence, in applicable cases such as the present case, "reclusion perpetua" should
simply be imposed without specifying its duration.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City, Branch 35, is MODIFIED. Appellant
Marcelo Bates is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide and is sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as the minimum to
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as the maximum; and is ordered to pay the Heirs of
Jose Boholst the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the latters death, P50,000.00 for moral
damages and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.