Anda di halaman 1dari 432

REPORTOFTHE DEPARTMENTOFTHEARMY REVI DN

OF THE
PRELI MI NARY I NVESTI GATI ONS INTOTHEM Y LA1 I NCI DENT(hl)
VOLUME II I
EXHI BI TS
BOOK 2 - Dl RECTIVES
BOOKS 1 & 2 C ONT AI N A L L D I R E C T I V E S E NT E RE D
I N T O T H E 1 , NQUI RY RECORD I N C L U D I N G T HOS E
DESI GNATED AS MI SCELLANEOUS EXHI BI TS. . a
14 MARCH 1970
CONTENTS
ORGANI ZATI ON
Exhibit
Title
No. Page
I11MARINEAMPHIBIOUSFORCE(I11MAF)- Continued
ForceOrder1560.1A,CommandInformation
andIndoctrinationProgram,11Sep-
tember1967(Extract) ..................... D-20 4'71
ForceOrder3040.3,MinimizingNoncom-
batantBattleCasualties,13December
1966..................................... D-21 475
ForceOrderPO3121.5,SOPforGround
andAirOperations,10November1967..... D-22 479
ForceOrder03330.1,ConductofArtillery/
MortarandNavalGunfire,3February
1967..................................... D-23
ForceOrder3460.3,TreatmentofCaptured
Personnel,8September1966.............. D-24
ForceOrder3461.2AtProcessing,Exploiting,
EvacuatingandAccountingforPrisoners
ofWar,8July1967,withChangeI....... D-25
ForceOrder5080.5,PropertyDamageand
DeathorPersonalInjurytoVietnamese
Civilians,3October1966.%............... D-26
ForceOrder5820.1,WarCrimesInvestiga-
tions,3June1967....................... M-8
Spot/SeriousIncidentReports(Letter) , 2
March1967............................... D-28
MessagefromCG,I11MAFtoAllCommands,
0100542,January1968,Subj: NewYear
Resolutions.............................. D-29
TASKFORCE(TF)OREGON
Regulation335-6,ReportsofSeriousCrimes
orIncidents,21March1967..............
D-30
iii
Exhibit
Title No. Page
MessagefromCG,TFOregontoCG,I11MAF,
Subj: OperationalControl(U),Cite5ZZ,
221600Z,Aprll1967.................b....
OrientationandTraininginArtilleryTech,-
niques,MessageAVDF-AT1483,May1967...
ReportingandInvestigationofErraticAr-
tilleryRounds,Message,AVDF-AT2859,
July1967... .. ...... .. .. .. .......... .....
FieldSOP,21March1967(Extracts)........
InvestigationofArtilleryIncidents,7May
1967......................................
AMERICALDIVISION
Regulation335-8,CombatActionReports,
28January1968..........................
Regulation525-4,CombatOperations,Rules
ofEngagement,16March1968.............
OperationsOrder2-68,23January1968,with
FragmentedOrders1and2(Extract) ......
OperationsOrder20-67,December1967,with
FragmentedOrders1,2,and3(Extract)..
ArtilleryItemsforCommandEmphasis,12
October1967(Letter) ....................
InvestigationofArtilleryIncidents,15
January1968(Letter) ....................
TheSafeguardingofNoncombatants,24
March1968(Letter') ......................
GunneryChecklist,5February1968(Let-
ter)...... . .................. .......... ..
PhasedScheduleof11thInfantryBrigade
(U),7December1967(Letter) ............
Title
InformationOfficeStandardOperating
Procedures (SOP)7April1968(~etter) . . .
CombatSOP,15April1968(Extracts) .......
ArtilleryFieldSOP,1December1967
(Extracts)... . .. . ... ;... . .... .. .. .. .. . ... .
FragmentedOrder24-68,DisbandingTFBar-
ker,April1968(Message) ................
Reporting,2December1967(Message) .......
DoubleCheckProcedureforArtilleryUnits
(U),July1967(Message) .................
llTHINFANTRYBRIGADE
Regulation1-3,Aeministration- Reporting
ofSeriousIncidents,31March1967......
Regulation525-1,CombatOperations- Rules
ofEngagement (U),9February1968.......
TrainingMemorandum350-2,Education
andTraining.............................
FragmentedOrder3-68,January1968........
FragmentedOrder8-68,24March1968,
11thBrigade.............................
AdministrationOrder1-68,February1968...
OperationsOrder1-68,February1968.......
OperationsPlan.7-68,March1968...........
PreparationforOverseasMovement (POM) ,
1November1967(Letter).................
TacticalSOPforCounterinsurgencyOpera-
tions (Extracts) .........................
CombatBOP,18November1967(Extracts) ....
Exhibit
No. Page
D-51
D-16
D-35
D-36
M-53
M-56
M-74
T i t l e
E x h i b i t
No. P a g e
MISCELLANEOUS DIRECTIVES
A c t i v i t y Gu i d e l i n e s f or Co r p s T a c t i c a l
Zones w i t h D i r e c t i v e from GEN Vi e n
( L e t t e r , 15 February 1 9 6 8 ) . , . . . ......,... D-54 909
CONTENTS
I I. EXHl BI T NUMBER
~xhibit
No. Title Page
Directive525-4,16March1968,CombatOper-
ations- AmericalDirective"RulesofEn-
gagement".....................................
llthInfBdeRegulation525-1,including
Change1,CombatOperations- "Rulesof
Engagementn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
llthInBdeRegulation1-3,31March1967,Ad-
ministration- ReportingofSeriousInci-
dents.........................................
AmericalDivisionArtillery,Investigationof
ArtilleryIncidents...........................
FRAGORD:3-68,llthInfBde,DucPho(BS814385)
RVN221700January1968.......................
ADMINO1-68,llthInfBdeLZBronco.(BS812383),
261600February1968..........................
I11MAF,ForceOrder1560.1At11September1967
(Extract).....................................
I11MAF,ForceOrder3040.3,13December1966...
I11MAF,ForceOrderP03121.5,10November1967,
SOPforGroundandAirOperations.............
I11MAF,ForceOrder03330.1,ConductofArtil-
lery/MortarandNavalGunfire.................
I11MAF,ForceOrder3460.3,TreatmentofCap-
:. . . . :. . . . . . . . . : . turedPersonnel.. .....;.......
I11MAF, ForceOrder3461.24,Processing,Ex-
ploiting,Evacuating,andAccountingfor
PrisonersofWar..............................
vii
Exhibit
No. Title Page
I11MAF,ForceOrder5080.5,PropertyDam-
ageandDeathorPersonalInjuryto
VietnameseCivilians..........................
I11MAF, Spot/SeriausIncidentReportsLetter...
MessagefromCGtoallCommandingOfficersJan
68,Subj: NewYearResolutions...............
TFOregon,Regulation335-6,21March1967,Re-
portofSeriousCrimesorIncidents...........
AmericalRegulation335-8,28January1968,Com-
batActionReports............................
AmericalDivisionOperationsOrder20-67,De-
cember1967...................................
AmericalDivisionOperationsOrder2-68,23
January19.68,withFragOrders1and2(Ex-
tract)........................................
MessagefromCG,America1DivisiontoCO,llth
Bde,Subj: FragOrder24-68,DisbandingTF
Barker0705102 April1968....................
llthBrigadeOperationsOrder1-68,041200Febru-
ary1968......................................
llthInfantryBrigadeOperationPlan7-68,
March1968.,. ..................................
MessagefromCGTFOregontoCGI11MAF,Subj:
OperationalControl(U),Cite522,2216002
April1967.,...,..............................
FragOrder8-68,24March1968,llthBrigade....
ActivityGuidelinesforCorpsTacticalZones
withDirectivefromGENVien(Letter15Feb-
ruary1968)...................................
I11MAF' ForceOrder5820.1,''WarCrimesIn-
vestigation....................................
AmericalLetter,24March1968,Subj: "Safe-
guardingofNoncombatants......................
Exhibit
No. Title
Page
HQ,llthInfBde,XIOP,1November1967,
Subj: PreparationforOverseasMovement
(POM)(Letter) ................................
HQ,America1Division,AVDF-GC,7December
1967,Subj: PhasedScheduleofllthInf
Bde(U)(Letter) ..............................
TrainingMemorandum350-2,HQ,llthInfBde
(RecordCopy,Undated)(Ttainingofllth
BdeinRVNonArrival)........................
11thInfBdeTacticalSOP(Extracts) ............
AmericalDivisionArtilleryFieldSOP,1De-
cember1967(Extracts) ........................
GunneryChecklist,AmericalDivision,5February
1968..........................................
ArtilleryItemsforCommandEmphasis,Americal
DivisionArtillery,12October1967...........
AmericalDivisionMessage,AVDF-GC6660,2Dec-
ember1967,Subj: Reporting..................
InvestigationofArtilleryIncidents,TFOregon,
7May1967....................................
TFOregonMessageAVDF-AT,2859,July1967,Subj:
ReportingandInvestigationofErraticArtil-
leryRounds...................................
BackChannelMessage,KnowlestoMatheson,Lin-
nel,WearandYoung,July1967,Subj: Double-
CheckProcedureforArtilleryUnits(U).......
TFOregonMessageAVDF-AT1483,Maf1967,Subj:
OrientationandTraininginArtileryTech-
niques
........................................
6thBn,11thArtyCombatSOP,18November1967
(Extracts)
....................................
TFOregonFieldSOP,21March1967(Extracts) ...
AmericalDivisionCombatSOP,15April1968
(Extracts)....................................
Exhibit
No.
Title Page
M-112 America1 Division Information Office SOP,
7 April 1968 (Extracts) ....................... 631
HEADQUARTERS
I11 Ma r i n e Amphi bi ous , Fo r c e
Mi l i t a r y A s s i s t a n c e Command, Vi e t n a m
C / O PPO, Sa n F r a n c i s c o , C a l i f o r n i a 96602
F o r 0 1560. 1A
l c / f h p
11 Se p 1 9 6 7
FORCE ORDER 1560. 1A
From: Commandi ng Ge n e r a l
To: D i s t r i b u t i o n L i s t
S u b j : Command I n f o r ma t i o n a n d I n d o c t r i n a t i o n Pr o g r a m
Re f : ( a ) MCO 1510. 2D
En c l : (1) S. t a t e me n t o f S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e Dean Rus k
( 2 ) I n d o c t r i n a t i o n S u b j e c t s
1. P u r p o s e . To r e a f f i r m t h e c o n t i n u i n g n e e d f o r t r a i n i n g
c o v e r a g e i n t h e c a t e g o r y o f Ge n e r a l Mi l i t a r y T r a i n i n g t o
i n c l u d e i n f o r ma t i o n a n d e d u c a t i o n s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l a t e d t o t h e
I11 MAF t a c t i c a l a r e a o f o p e r a t i o n s .
5. P o l i c y . I t i s t h e p o l i c y o f t h i s command t h a t a l l p e r -
s o n n e l a s s i g n e d t o I11 MAF a n d i t s s u b o r d i n a t e commands w i l l
b e p r e s e n t e d i n s t r u c t i o n s p e c i f i c a l l y d i r e c t e d t o Vi e t n a m
o r i e n t a t i o n a n d e d u c a t i o n . T h i s o r i e n t a t i o n s h o u l d n o t b e
a o n e t i me e x p e r i e n c e , - b u t o n e o f r e c u r r i n g f r e q u e n c y w i t h
c o n t i n u e d command e mp h a s i s .
6 . O r i e n t a t i o n To p i c Ar e a s . The f o l l o w i n g l i s t o f r ecom-
mended s u b j e c t s w i l l b e i n c l u d e d i n t h e t r a i n i n g s y l l a b i of
a l l I11 MAF commands. Th e s e s u b j e c t s a r e c o n s i d e r e d t o me e t
t h e minimum b a s i c r e q u i r e me n t s . The a d d i t i o n of o t h e r s u b -
j e c t s i s s t r o n g l y e n c o u r a g e d .
a . "Why we a r e i n Vi e t n a m. "
b . "Our r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e Vi e t n a me s e p e o p l e . "
( P e r s o n a l Re s p o n s e )
c .
I!
Vi e t n a me s e H i s t o r y , C u l t u r e , a nd Cus t oms . " ( P e r -
s o n a l Re s p o n s e )
F o r 0 1560. 1A
11 S e p 1 9 6 7
d . "The Code o f Co n d u c t ; D i s c i p l i n e a n d Co n d u c t . "
e . "The Mi l i t a r y A s s i s t a n c e Command, Vi e t n a m; M i s -
s i o n s a n d O b j e c t i v e s . I '
f . "The F r e e Wor l d E f f o r t i n Vi e t n a m. "
g . "The Na t u r e o f t h e V i e t Cong. "
h . " Mont hl y R e c a p i t u l a t i o n s o f Mi l i t a r y A c t i v i t i e s i n
Vi e t n a m. "
i. " To p i c s o f L o c a l I n t e r e s t . "
j.
I t
War Cr i me s . I '
11. I n d o c t r i n a t i o n . The u n i q u e o f s e r v i c e i n -- c h a r a c t e r
Vi e t n a m makes i t ma n d a t o r y t h a t p e r s o n n e l r e p o r t i n g f o r d u t y
r e c e i v e a n e a r l y i n d o c t r i n a t i o n i n t h o s e r e g u l a t i o n s wh i c h
g o v e r n t h e a c t i o n s o f i n d i v i d u a l s , u n u s u a l c o n d i t i t i o n s u n d e r
wh i c h t h e y mu s t s e r v e , a n d t h e g o a l s a n d mi s s i o n s o f t h e
Un i t e d S t a t e s a n d t h i s command. The d i r e c t i v e s l i s t e d i n
e n c l o s u r e ( 2 ) c o n t a i n s u b j e c t ma t t e r wh i c h i s r e q u i r e d t o
b e i n c l u d e d i n t h e i n d o c t r i n a t i o n p r o g r a m.
1 2 . A c t i o n . Commanders a t a l l l e v e l s w i l l c o n t i n u e t o
i mp l e me n t t h e i r Ge n e r a l Mi l i t a r y S u b j e c t s t r a i n i n g p r o g r a ms
w i t h a d d i t i o n a l s u b j e c t s s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l a c e d t o t h e com-
mi t me n t of t h e F o r c e t o m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s i n Vi e t n a m.
s / ~ u a n eL. Faw
s / ~ u a n eL . FAW
De p u t y Ch i e f of S t a f f
DISTRIBUTION:
Ca s e 2
For O 1560. 1A
11 Sep 1967
INDOCTRINATION SUBJECTS FOR NEWLY ARRI VED PERSONNEL, CHECK LIST
SUBJ
-
REFERENCE
10.
11.
Unt owar d I n c i d e n t s I n v o l v i n g Vi e t n a me s e Na t i o n a l s
Re s p e c t f o r t h e Law, P r o p e r t y , I n s t i t u t ' i o n s , T r a d i -
t i o n s a nd Cus t oms o f t h e RVN
I C C I
I C C I
1610. 1
5370. 1
14.
15.
P r o c e s s i n g , E x p l o i t i n g , E v a c u a t i o n a nd Ha n d l i n g o f
POW'S
" Ni ne Ru l e s " (MACV Car d- i s s u e o n e p e r i n d i v i d u a l )
Fo r 0 3461. 2
HeAl wARaks
111 Marine kphi bi our Force
Mi l i t ary AariJtance Coaaend, Vietnam
C/O FPO San francisco, Cl l i f or ni r 96602
f o r / S~I Cow. - J e y w
3hpa ,
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
From: Comunding General
Tot Di st t i but i on L i s t
Subjr Yinimizing noncornbrtant Bat t l e Casualties
Ref 8 (8) WACV Directive NWr 525-3
1, -. To publirh policy designod t o mi nWze nonccmbatant
b r t t t r cr eual t i er and t o provide gui dmm f or t he effect i ve iaplo-
mnt r t i on of t he policy, i n rccordanm with r ef ennco (8).
r. The pri nci pl e8 of t he law of nations, a8 t h y r es ul t f r m
tho u r r ~ a s ertrblirhed among ci vi l i zed peoples, thr, l a m of hr un-
i t y, and t he di ct at ar of t he public conrcience obl i gat r thoro rrho
conduct mi l i t ar y operations i n popuhbd a mr r t o muse rr few
noncombatant casual t i or a r possibler Tht naturo of tha rrrr i n
Viotnaa ot r engt bns the rrgrannt r for t he. ur e of only tho minima
nqui nd for- f or the rccomplishawnt of t he mi l i t ar y miasion.
The r ur al and ma l l t o n Vietnuwre )uw ruffered g n a t l y with the
ebb rml flow of nr through t hei r f i el ds md homes. mi8 poorly-
educated, unsbphirticrted peasant understands l i t t l e of tho rer-
roning bhi nd the act i ons of ei t hor tho Viet Cang or t he Gown-
mn t forcer rr t h y coa, md go# hi # only l egl cy is one of &$true-
t i on or pi l f e r a w of hi 8 property and ckrt h o t Injury t o hi 8 family
and frlendr. Our ure of unnecersry force lording to noncd.tJtrnt
bat t l o cr r ur l t i or i n the r n r tempozrrily c ont t ol l ~d by tho Viot
Cong t nkO the long range goal of rural conrtlr uotion mro dLifiault
and more costly.
b. Thou circumrtrncer d-nd an unusual r os t r r i nt upon Mariner
trrimd t o m l o y t o the f ul l e s t tho nrp6nr r t their coarnd. Cati
un&rr a t orch echelon must strike r br l r nm betwon tho for-
nrcecsrry t o rccoapl i rh t hei r mi as ion^ with duo nwrd t o tho safet y
of t hoi r oor unds and tho high ilsportanco of reducing t o a rinlmum
t ha wsul t i er i nf l i ct ed on t he noncMlbrtrnt populace.
D(HIBIT D-21
c. The Viet Cong w i l l expl oi t f ul l y any lncidmntr of noncom-
bat ant cas ual t i es and dest r uct i on of property by Marinor, wi t h tho
obj ect i ve of f ost er i ng a resentment agai nst t he b v o n # n t of Yk h m
and t he American troops.
Action
a. Caarsandess a t every echelon ar e d i n c u d topl ra a d uoAdwt
operat i ons i n accordance with t he following gui de l i wr r
(1) Consider both the mi l i t u y andpeyt hol ogi crl o b j e c t i n s
of each phase of each operation. Excassiva mi l i t ay form which
would tend t o cause unnecessary casual t i es among the c i vi l i a n pop-
ul at i on dl1 not be used.
( a ) Pr est r i kes and preparat ory f i r e. s w i l l not k put
on a n a s populated by ci vi l i ans.
(b) Reconnaissance by f i r e i nt o amas populated by
c i vi l i a ns i s prohibited.
( c) Harassing and i nt er di ct i on f i n s will not kpl at ed
on ar eas populated by ci vi l i ans.
(2) Comandors will maintain and conduct 8 thorough and
continuing program toemphasize both thes hor t arid long ran- lb-
portance of minimizing noncombatant casual t i er . Troop i ndoct r i m-
t i on br i ef i ngs willk held before each operation. fhsy wi l l in-
clude the l ocat i on of noncombatants and ot her f t k n d l y f o ~ ~ ,
~ a s u n s t o pnve nt mutual i nt e r f e nnc e , saf et y pmcaut i ons f or f i r ,
cont r ol support, r ul e s of engagement, i dent i f i cat i on and recogni-
t i on si gnal s, emergency procedures and o t h r appr opr i ab matters.
(3) TIM proper sel ect i on of l andi ng zones, t ho car ef ul
planning and execution of a i r s t r i kes , and t ho. pmpor e a t p l o p n t
of a r t i l l e r y and a m d hel i copt er s will pMvent wl mcesssry damage
t o l i ve s and property of noncombatants,
(4) A1 1 persons involved i n t he cont r ol and coordination
of supporting arms must bebri efed on ar eas t o k avoided because
of t he presence of f r i endl y or pot ent i al l y f r i endl y pbpulation.
Such information must be sought from l ocal of f i c i a l s a t province
and d i s t r i c t level.
(5) with due regard t o u c u r i t y and s uc c r uof'* idsoion, /
uhmnovwr p s s i b l e *,people w i l l bo,nnwd ,bg Jeaflo&m+&uad-
cas t s of w n d i n g a i r s t r i kes or operations. Tho anus f or I J l i t u y I
Y
act i on i n the area should rest with thoViet Coag..
I
f'-,
(6) A ci vi c act i on plan dl1bodomloped t o support: web
operation, e wn if t he erea hasb w n .cmfrOlled by theViet.Comg.
Plan f or the use of a l l avai l abl e as s ob, toinclude ttu di r pandng
of wd i c r l supplies and emergency rat i ons, evacuation of ward or
si ck r egr r dl esr of pol i t i ca1affi l i at i on, .and l i ght oagbmziag wrk
within th. capabi l i t i as of t act i cal units.
( 7) Specified skilut oms dl1kt onf i gund ta r r t el Pb pb
pul rt ed a n a s except those i n accepted Viet C o ~ gbw8t
(8) @orations w i l l be plannad krcoor di ~t i enda prevtnco
and d i s t r i c t chi efs i nsofar a s securi t yallous. CoordiarfiiRI dl1k
df f e c t e d through est cbl i shed Marlne l i ai son c)unrwts osm g h advls-
or s &en Marine l i ai son isnot pr eunt .
( 9) ~ s s i g me n t t o h r i n e f or ms of qual i fi ed R W lir%ron
gf f i cer , from appropriate R Wcaaaond.rs i s ereonUr1and retU k
arranged kt -en brine corpmenders and advisors f ~ r each oLwi mnt
-ration. Thesel i ai son offi cers, t hrough. t hei r k n o wh t p of tho
a n a of operations and t he population, cm a s s i s t i n i dent i f i cat i on
of fri end from foe and can help ensun cl ose caordinrtion with a l l
Vietnamese forcos.
(10) Part i ci pat i on of Vi et na~ese forces i n opr nt i ons , prr,
t i cul ar l y i n populated areas, should be encouraged so that thr.r
doesnot appear t o be an h r i c a n z c t i o n agai nst tho VietrUuw p . ~ l
ple. b ~ i o n a l Force and Popular Force part i ci pat i on should ksought
a t bat t al i on or even company level so t hat they may a s s i s t i n th
march of pri vat e dvrellings, obtain i nfomat i on, and c o n t r i m t o
t he desi md ef f ect of t h e cooperative wu ef f or t .
(11) . Include i n each operation plan orr o d e r a psychologitrl
warfare annex and a c i vi l a f f a i r s annex, and 8SuIrO t ha t a l l concer-
ed. are f ami l i ar wi t h their provisions.
Fragnentrry orders rillin-
clude reference t o SOP1s, including force orders, onc i vi l a f f a i r s
and psychologica1warfare.
b. Advisors w i .wqe. every..q$for t . So, . $o~~i nce their
iv*
Viettumw
ountcrpa t A ~ b & ~ ~ ~ ~ P & & i 9 B ~ ~ T ~ g ; & 6 ~ h e nd pee
pert y of noncombatants. Counterparts.wi11- bencour ags dto
prollulgate and i r pl emnt di r ect i ves pr r a l l a l t o this order.
c. Nothing i n t he above shal l k con8tmed t o i nhi bi t the in-
herent r i ght of a Marina or ot hr r U. S. uni t t o defend itself
agai nst hos t i l e act i on f r oa my source. It i r absol ut el y essential
t ha t our forces est abl i sh t he val i d nput at $on of k i n g abl e to
move a t will throughout Vietnam and to defeat any e m y force an-
countered. This reput at i on f or invincibility rill produce inn-
erabl e psychological benefi t s and ha s kn t ha end af tho rrr. Q(
t he ot her hand, t h o u amre forces must constantly downst r at e
their concern f or tho s af r t y of n t mc h t a n t s , their colpassion
f or t he injured, and t he i r r r i l l i nqnas to r i d ths sick, the hungry,
and t he dispossessed.
3. J ml ens nt at i 4 l me n t i n g i nst ruct i ons and SOQ'a concorning
t hi s order and n%ence (a), f i r e cont rol *upport and wfoty
cautions w i l l be pramrlgated by major coaundors, Counnnderr will
atsure di st r i but i on t o the l o ws t echelons.
6. Wi c a b i l i Q . This order i s applicable t o a l l ferees under
coarund or operational cont rol of tho Gemanding Gorwnl, I11 Unrin
Amphibious Force and t he Senior Advieor I Corps.
DISTRIBUTION8
case 1
- - - -
.-- -
HEADQUARTERS
111Harind Anphibiour Force
nilimry Arsirtanco C d , Vietnam
G+yC4
c/o FPOSea Plrncirco, California 96602
PO& P03121.9
CONFIDENTIAL
pRCS (RDW P03121.q & 1 &I
S&C FILES cU1"l *f
Prom: C-diq General
EEADQUARTEM P MA$
To: Di st ri but i on Li st
p-!036686-C
SubJ: Standing Op n t i a g Procadure f or Groundand A i r Op n t i o n s ( SOPL
&## 6{
Encl: (1) Locotor Sheet
1. Puruore. Thlr order t ~ a mp i r s t r procedure$ andpolicies f or G r o d
4,v Op- 7
and A i r Opmt i ons of t he XI1#rim Aaphibiour Force while oper at i w
1
i n theI Carps rhctical Zone ( I CTZ).
u&; c; ~ 8
2. Recmadat i or r r . are encouraged t o submit Subordimte C ~ ~ ~ n d e r r
r e c mnda t i ol r r far changes o r lrodificationr for t he iaaprwelrant of
t hi s Sundi w Q~a e r a t i uProcedure. Rt s a e n d a t i mr w i l l be rubai t t ed @ f @ 71. I
t o this headquarters, Attn: G-3.
1.'!
A('
A
3. Cer t i f i cat i ar . Reviewed end approved t hi s date. l?@E&/c:
Chiefof Staff 63
I-Corps Advirory Group 10
366th T N 2
C O n ~ M N A N O 3
36 WCB
2d R O M Brigade
\ ) \ \ J \ 15
5 - CO
', 2
' CO 620th SS "\2
GO LegSubdlrsrr Conmaad 2
00 *"5th SI C "A" Pearag .-' 2
huag S i p 1 8. (USA STRATCW) ( PLI r i - 1)
CO Ian# Li ma A r e a DNG USA STRATCOn \
W 37thS-1 Bn \l--.-
60)! 1972ad C-d 2-
A h l d Fucam Radio and W 1
Central ?i l ea SO
EXHIBIT D-22
HQ M P a c
HQ WPa c (Fm)
5th HarDiv
9th HAB
3d ForServRegt
Camp Butler
Transient Faci l i t y C a p BUTLER
CINCPAC
CINCPACFLT
COH 7th PLT
COUU S ACV
C ~ S F B V P A C
COHCRPhC
CTC-79
7th A?
COMCBLANT
COHNAMrCIRV
CtBfNAWORV REP DANANG
HQ I FFORCEV Arty (Rd)
1fitMarine Division
3d Marine Diviaion
1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Force Logistic Ccmmand
Sub-Zone Coordinator Southern Scctor
America1 Division
mc
HT, S QUA!!
I)ClrLANT
l et Mar Brig
HCFL, HCS, QUAW
HCLPW, MCS, OUANT
HCCSC, MCS, QUANT
' lorh.pr, WFPac
ForTrpe, WLant
-
1. - no;&br mr;'th.- ?eq~irWmhtfor 8 p c Ui c Ruler of -go-
h n more netdssaty t wn in Vietnam. 'The mr in VLot-
m " i 8 8 'gcrlitical war as -11 as a 'rriiitawwar. It is political
kcauso thesu1tirsab wl'i e to'rdga'in thb loyalty and cooperation of
the &lit and t o &ate' tondi ti ons' pi ch prrlt the pbople to go about
t b i r nnraa1liv.r i n *t& and e i t y . 1 bt the fnrmtho, largo
goographical areas of Vittnap arb domihated by the VC. Solas areal are
c~mplolklycontrolled, wh+& in ot brs, people live. under. the ohdm
of VI: Irilibry forces an# terrorists. Because of the aKttmtion Ws r W
and the conduct
fhthe one
chi wbdi no rationsapeinsttho
E r* t o dni -
aha d#.truetSon of t hi r
bf loadstship phq:
the exerci u of judgmnt and unusual ns t r ai nt . Tho following con-
r t i t ut r the crrrnnt Rules c-rids, .
with the exception of those MU Uw RVN
boundaries, which are c w m in, r a k diroatfws.
y;., ,,, :*
d.
Specified strikezones should kconfigured t o exclude popu-
l at ed areas except those i n accepted VCbares.
303- gWLOY=m QF R 'JUT CCNTROL AHD DEFENSEAGAINST CHEMICAL
BIQtOGICALANDRADIOLOGICAL ATTACE.
1. In t he Vietnam conf l i ct , t he enemy i sfr6quently.intermixed wi t h
noncombatants. The use of RCAi sa par t i cul ar l ya,ppropriateapplica-
t i on of measured force in such si t uat i ons. The agents have been proven
useful i n many t act i cal oper at i ons such as cl earant e of f or t i f i ed
posi t i ons and underground f a c i l i t i e s , reconnaissance f or concealed
forces, capture of pri soners f or i nt el l i gence purposes, pr epr at i on of
landing zones and defense of fixed positions.
1.
I n~l l i gut nc e est i mat es i ndi cat e t hat there ar e cer t ai n basi c i t e m s
which ar e, es s ent i al t o t he VC f or t he i r operations which we can effect -
i vel y deny t o them - money, foodstuffr,. s a l t and medicines. Economic
warfare measures ar e designed both t o s epar ak t he Viet Cong from t hei r
sources of supply and t o di srupt di st r i but i on of suppl i es t hey al ready
have onhand.
1.
See Section VII (Air Operations) of t h i s SOP.
1. theMt ur e of t he war i nVietnam has plaoed anunusua1 r equker ~ent
on l ow ranki ng leaders t o carry out sensi t i vecoabat operations, oftm
i n an, envirmrmnt uhere lax* numbers of ci vi l i ans ar epresent. The
hi st ar y of nsrfare enbraces many exaapbs of tbptoper andimpropox
use of force i n deal i ngwith both noncoRlbatanto and priconers of
~s t er ml hat i on of right and wrong in thes!e cases has hadito bema& an
t he spot, and oft en i n t he heat of bat t l e. Such deci s i ms requk.
keen, swi ft , deci si ve anal ysi s of the f act or s involved and mst be
basedon a thorough understending of tlq#hgal and moral pr i nc i phr
conceznad.
Sn. t he V i e t n a m Conf Uot , t he rrqim.of this docision ofton
f al l p or\ tb shoulders' of t f p. aatv O ~ U - i wv l d u a l s nho, hca!a8o
of t he i r r el at i ve youth and short time i n servi cearq l oas t abl e t o
exerci semature,del i berat e Sudgmnt under thepressure of combat.
Neve~hml ess,uni t lm&s, mgwc(1ers 9f rrnk, n#t 4f ul l ya r s n
of their responsibilities, %Lr condpci, qnd th,conduct of thrir
subordinates.
2. Detailed guidance concern&~9;.liqusaq and wc i f $ c c r & , . a c ~ S ~ in-
st r uct i ons on t h i s subj ect a r e contained i n Few aRDW 01610.2 dabel
28 Wr Pbe r L366,
3m C ~ D U C TCE ARIILLERY/MORTAR AND NAVALGUNFIQ
NOV 101967
1 The nat ure of operat i ons and of t he b a t t l e ar ea i n Vietnam, and
the frequent conduct of combined o' perations involving US, FW, and RVIJ
Forces r equi r e t h a t speci al emphasis be placed on procedures f o r t he .
cont r ol of a r t i l l e r y and nava 1 gunfire.
2. Res t r i ct i ve cont r ol s should be held t o t he minimum necessary t o
ensure t hat :
a. Fr i endl y f or ces and c i vi l i a ns a r e not endangered.
b. Property of f r i endl y f or ces, RVN and f r i endl y c i vi l i a ns i s
not destroyed or damaged.
c. National and oper at i onal boundaries a r e not vi ol at ed.
3. Care and a t t e nt i on must be exerci sed continuously i n t he applica-
t i on of a l l a r t i l l e r y gunnery techniques. The f u l l range of a r t i l l e r y
gunnery techniques which ensure accuracy should be appl i ed t o t he
ma x i m ext ent ' permitted by t he si t uat i on. The wpl i cat i on of t hese
techniques and t he exer ci se of sound judgment on tb part of a l l per-
sonnel involved i n sol vi ng t he a r t i l l e r y problem provide t he best assur-
ance agai nst endangering f r i endl y f or ces and c i vi l i a ns or dest royi ng
or damaging RVN, f r i endl y f or ces and f r i endl y c i vi l i a ns 1 property.
4.
Det ai l ed guidance concerning courses of act i on and s peci f i c in-
s t r uct i ons t h i s subj ect a r e contained i n ~o r c e / % I Corps Order
03330.1 ',Coriduct of Ar t i l l er y/ kor t ar and Naval Gunfire and Task Group
70.8 Gun 11 Operation Order 320.67.
308. CONTROL. DISWGITICWJ AND SAFEGWRDING CF VIETNAMESE PROPERTY
AND FOOD SUPPLIES
1. In car r yi ng out search and dest r oy operat i ons i n k cont r ol l ed
ar eas, US and FL f or ces must t ake a l l pr act i cabl e measures t o minimize
t he dest r uct i on of indigenous pr i vat e propert y and t o i nsur e proper
cont r ol , di sposi t i on and safeguarding therof.1 That people haw l i ved
under VC cont r ol does not make t b m i r r evocabl y hos t i l e, nor i s it
necessar i l y of t h e i r o m choosing. To t r e a t them a s t he enemy and
deny them e s s e nt i a l resources i s incompatible with long-term GVN and
US obj ect i ves.
2. Minimizing dest r uct i on of pr i vat e propert y and suppl i es, coupled
with proper cont r ol and di sposi t i on of excesses, =qui res continued
c o mn d emphasis. Plans must include procedures for t he pr ot ect i on
of pr i vat e propert y and t he report i ng, securing, and di sposi t i on of
excess suppl i es.
&&. r\74,~,: ',' , -
"*<', "-'.
"fX?W
3. Det ai l ed guidance concerning courses of act i on and s pe c i f i c in-
s t r uct i ons on t hi smsubj ect a r e contained i n I Corps ' coordinator: lnst
05530.1 of 5Jan67, Cont rol , Di sposi t i on, . Safeguarding of VN Property
and Food Supplies.
309. CAMPAIGN PL4N
1. The i n i t i a t i v e achieved i n t he 1966 Campaign w i l l be r et ai ned
through a s t r a t e gi c a l and t a c t i c a l of f ensi ve csndt ~ct ed i n consonance
with pol i t i c a l , economic and soci ol ogi cal propam5 of GVPI and iff agen-
ci es. RVNAF, US and FW Forces w i l l be employed t c accomplish the mi s -
sion i n accordance with t he obj ect i ves est abl i shed and t asks assigned
f or t hi spr oj ect . RVNAF w i l l have the primary mission of supporting
Revolutionary Dew lopment a c t i vi t i e s , defending g we r mn t a l cent er s,
pr ot ect i ng and cont r ol l i ng n-t iona 1 resources, pa r t i c ul a r l y rice and
s a l t , and conducting cl ear i ng and securi ng operat i ons i n and around
t he National Pr i or i t y Areas. US f or ces will r ei nf or ce R V t U ; operat e
with ot her FVMF; and a s necessary conduct uni l a t e r a l operations.
p r i mr y mission of US and FW Forces wi l l be t o dest r oy t he VT;/NVA
rmin f or ces, base ar eas, and resources and/or dr i ve t he enemy i nt o
t he s par s el y populated and food scar ce areas; secure t h e i r base area8
and c l e a r i n t he vi c i ni t y of these bases; and a s di mc t e d, a s s i s t in
t he pr ot ect i on and cont r ol of nat i onal resources.
2. Det ai l ed guidance concernine cours.es of act i on and specific in-
s t r uc t i ons on this subj ect a r e published year l y by COMUSHACV and up-
dated as di r ect ed.
SECTION IV
TACTICAL CONTROL h(EASUiES
1. Ta c t i c a l c ont r c l measures est abl i shed i n UShC doc t r i na l publ i ca-
t i ms a r e gener al l y appl i cabl e t o combat oper at i ons i n RVN. However,
t h e l ack of an i de nt i f i e bl e f r ont , tb need t o minimize destruction
of pr oper t y and casual . t l es t o non-combatants, and t hs presence of
ot her f r i e ndl y combatant i' orces not under posit3,ve cont r ol of a s i ngl e
over al l comander , combine t o r equi r e modi f i cat i ons and sune new
de f i ni t i ons f o r t a c t i c a l cont r ol measures whose primary purpose is t o
coor di nat e f i r e s del i ver ed wi t hi n speci f i ed ar eas. The fol l owi ng
t a c t i c a l c ont r ol and coor di nat i on measures a r e appl i cabl e t o combat
oper at i ons i n RVM.
402.
TAGTICAL AREA CF RESPONSIBILITY ( TAOR~. A TACR i s a cont r ol
measure h i c h is employed t o desi gnat e a l and ar ea i n which respon-
s i bi l i t y/ a ut hor i t y i s s pe c i f i c a l l y assigned t o t he c o mn d e r of t he
ar ea f o r t he conduct of t a c t i c a l operat i ons. The comnander of a uni t
assi gned a TACR i s r esponsi bl e f o r cont r ol and coor di nat i on of a l l
a c t i v i t i e s wi t hi n its . periphery.
1. A TACR i s ci ~cumscr i bedby a boundary. The boundary may be l ocat ed
al ong i de nt i f i a bl e t e r r a i n f eat ur es o r may coi nci de wi t h a GVN pol i -
t i c a l or mi l i t a r y boundary t o f a c i l i t a t e loca 1 coordi nat i on.
2. Hi t hi n RVN, t he term TACR is reserved f o r descr i bi ng an ar ea
wi t hi n which t he assi gned u n i t conducts oper at i ons on a cont i nui ng
basi s. The term i s not t o be used i n del i neat i ng ar eas i n which opera-
t i ons of a temporary o r t r a ns i t or y nat ur e axe conducted.
3.
A l l f i r e and manewer conducted wi t hi n t h e T AU or t he e f f e c t s of
which impinge upon it a r e coordi nat ed wi t h t he comnander of t he f or ce
assi gned t h e TACXi* Exceptions t o t h i s a r e t he f i r e and rnanewer of
GVlJ sub- sect or / di st r i ct e r c e s . It i s t h e r e s pons i bi l i t y of t h e TACR
commander t o e f f e c t coordina tl on wi t h t he sub- sect or / di st r i ct of f i c i a l s .
4.
At t endant t o t he responsibility/authority f or coor di nat i on assi gn-
ed t o t he commander of a TAU?, is t he a ut hor i t y t o d i r e c t f i r e suppor t
mans and manewer el ement s t he r e i n t o i nsur e t he s a f e t y of f r i endl y
forces.
The cor mnder assi gned a TACR has t h e addod r e s pons i bi l i t y t o
insure the f i r e support by hi s f or ces, e xt a r na l t o t he TACR, is del i ver -
ed onl y subsequent t o proper coor di nat i on wi t h ot her i nt er es t ed forces.
--
t-te fami.Liarlty of & c l ' i ~xkJt . : L;Ic' ! ; , C. L~ .it:;' s . ; t uat i ~r .dri(i ~: . : . t . i ~
of c i vi c &c-;ion,taunt e:.;;der?ii ;a aa1. a t l o n s a.;d 0i;r.e- Frcgl-L ;.s ~f a
cont i nui ng nat ur e.
s.
dperat i ons,conducteG wi t hi n assigned TA.3ii.s neeci n3t ae cir3Nirlld~5d
above t he s ub- s ect or / di s t r i ct l z v ~ l .
7. I n r e ~ u e s t i n g TkklRs or chanzes r hcr et o, t he de t a i l e d t s i c e ai tk:e
boundary w i l l be submitzed t o t he Co r n - ~ n d i i ~ TI1 ?iiF wnc, General , i n
t ur n wi ll m;-ke recorxii~encti t i ons the Conml;i)rlingGe:.e:r&l, I: ;or?.-.
B'hen appmved by t i l e Cormiinciing haer a; , I Cor ps , t r , e co;.r:lr.oc:!- of tie
u n i t assi gned t he T l \ 3 h;\s f r eedos of act i cn t o conciuzt u:ticiii
operat i ons t her ei n, i n keeping with the R ~ i z s of lalzd \;j'a,-f'..r&ar,c ap;3-^0-
p r i a t e rules of engagement a s conxi ned i n Sect i on I11 of t h i s S G P or.
a s published by hi gher aut hor i t y.
493. I:LCONKAILS \NCE ZOKE ( ~ 2 1 . An H i i sa c o ~ t r o lrrLaslrr3 k t l ~ c t is
employed t o des i gnat e a l a ~ dar ea I n which iS/Fs%FIZF o x e s mv carddct
r eco&~i s s anceo r ot+e r ,comtxit oj xr at i ons, iirstkr ef f ect i ng cc:iiritir.ation
a t t he ~TX/ s peci al military'zone l evel . Wi t hi n t h e l i r i t a z l o n s imposed
by the requirement t o coordinatu . i i s owr at : ons wi t h ~~A, / s, >et l a. ; qilii*
zone o f f i c i a l s and GVN sob-sect or/ di st i -i ct f or ces concur r ent l y >peracing
. ~ i t n i nt he Ii2, t he com. . nder of a uni t <~ s s i pe d an KZ i s rcs?on.;ible fcr
cooni i nat i or- and zontr o l of a l l d c t i v i t i e s wi t hi n i t s peri phzry .
1.
An It:. i s circumscribeti by a boundary which i s'normally loch-zedal ong
i d z n t i f i a b l e t e r r a i n f eat ur es .
2.
A l l f i r e and mneuver conducted wi t hi n t he KZ o r t he ef f ect s of
which impinge upon i t a r e coordi nat ed wi t h t he .cormunder of the f or ce
assi gned the RL. h c e p t ~ o n st o t h i s are t h e f i r e and maneuver of-GVN
sub- sect or / di st r i ct f or ces . 3t i s t he r e s pons i bi l i t yof the RZ corn-
nrander t o e f f e c t coordi nat i on wi t h ' t he sub- sect or ydi st r i ct of f i c i t l s .
3. Mil j or uni t oper at i ons' ~ i RZ nee.d no*i Sc coordin- t hi n che assi gned
a t e a above +ie I)?'~/speci.al mi l i t a r y zone l evel .
4. kequest s f o r ti14 est cl bl i s!l nc~t . of an :cL or ihkngcs t o an 1rx2s:ing it,
w i l l be submitted thraugf: t.?e Ccrrzanding &n,-ml,
1:;: ?tiF t o 2.e
mrxilng Ckncrai, I Cor?s f o r r L ~ ~ u - ~ ~ v a l .
4 . . ~ "I .Ani A3 is a ~o. r z. - ol measure 41:ici is
employed t o des i gnat e land , i x a i r , ~hi ck,US/h'i4rHA Forces nay c:.:r,i:a:t tac-
tical o ~ i . a t . i o n s a f t e r coorciixnt:ic,r.i s i:f:^e:.tedwith exs :)''.a /spec.a;
qi i l i t ar y zonz c o ~ mn d c r .lnd aft.el.recz-vir.;: a?pravai f ~ o mt . l e I. CTZ
eomr.;mder. 'Fhe comrrande? of n c n i t as s i r ned an 63 - s' reswnsi t : . ~
' - .
fnr
...Coordi nat i ar. and c ont r ol of..a l l a c t i v i t i e s . ,::..: T,h>? .-
peri..b)hz:y..
.--..:&:* :...-, &:,,-=;:: s,i:chin;:ics
,* *,, ,, -.~' r - , , x.*
z ! =
&:":$@<-:.. ,.*vp+ .. ., . - 'g ',~~~~:..tk%&F
For0 P03i21.5
pOVJ $1967
1, An A0is curcumscribed by a boundaq which is normally ocat e a ong
i dent i f i abl e t er r ai n f eat ur es o r broadly defined by t he coordinates. of
t he cornera of a ml t i l a t e r a l fi gure.
2. Tact i cal operat i ons wi t hi n an A 0 a r e t r ans i t or y i n nature. There
i s no i nt ent i on of r emi ni ng i n t he area once t he prescri bed mission has
been accomplished.
3. Tbe abbrevi at i on A0w i l l not be used i n any comtunication i n which
it could be d a t a k e n f o r t he t e r n " Ai r Obsewer."
4. When approved, the comarander of a uni t assigned an A 0 has the same
authority/responsibilityt he r e i n as pmscri bed f o r a TAUR. A l l f i r e
andmaneuver conducted wi t hi n an Ad or t he ef f ect s of which impinge
upon it a r e coordinated with t he comander of the f or ce assigned t he
AOo It is t he r esponsi bi l i t y of t he A 0 comaander t o ef f ect coordination
with t he sub-rect or/ di st ri ct of f i ci al s .
5. For major opirations, . bat t al i on s i z e or l arger, of an expected
durat i on of 7 days o r more, a request f o r an A 0 must be submitted t o
t h i s Headquarters no l a t e r than 4 days pr i or t o the comncement of the
operation. For l e s s than bat t al i on s i z e operat i ons, or those of expected
durat i on of l e s s than 7 days, not i f i cat i on t o this Headquarters by means
of a standard concept of operat i ons message (see sect i on V, para 3.e.)
submitted 48 hours i n advance is suf f i ci ent . I n such cases, pr i or coor-
di mt i on m u s t be effect ed with theappropri at e sub-sect or/ di st ri ct head-
quart ers.
6. This Headquarters is r e q u i n d t o provide a concept of operat i on (see
sect i on V, para 3.8.) t o COMUSMACV and t o CGj F*PACj by separat e a s -
sage,. wi t hi n 48 hours pr i or t o t he cormnencemnt of major planned opera-
t i o n ~ . For t hose operat i ons generated on shor t not i ce, such as t hose
i n response t o enew act i vi t y, t he required i nf omi t i on must be sub-
mi t t ed a s soon as it becomes avai l abl e.
405. NO FME ZdNESfSPECIFIEDSTRIKEWNES. The danger t o noncolPbatants
posed by unre' rt ri ct ed uat of supporting ams has rendered t he t e r n No
Fi r e - Line. Fozwal0dBo d Line and Tact i cal B d Lineless meaninnful in t he
col bat ski r o- nt i n RVNo .These term8 w i l l not- be used with-the si ngl e
exception of t he Forward Bomb Line which is established as t he l i ne run-
ning from t he coast l i ne west along t he nort hern boundary of t he DMZ t o
S gr i d l i n e XD 90, then al ong the I6 gri d l i ne XD 90 t o the provisional
dl l t arp demr kat i on l i ne. (PMDL) t o t he Laotian border. A l l support*
a r u f i r e del i vered i n accordance with procedures est abl i shed f or t he use
of supporting ararrequi res pr i or cl earance e i t he r by a t a c t i c a l uni t
operat i ng wi t hi n an AO/RZ/TAOR, . or GVN pol i t i c a l cl eamnce or both. In
p h c e of-those te.r,,tt zone designations have been assigned.
*> j;4;;,.&;gj;:#$$;;&:$;:;:k.;i.$,$2&>#
1.
N o - l i r e Zome. ire Zone i s a n area c l m r c r i b e d by a boundary
i n which no supporting arms f i r e willbe del i vered. Religious establish-'
rrentr, f
population or ot her pol i t i cal l y s i gni f i cant obj ect s a r e
normally fwnd within these areas. Friendly forces may o r may not be
located within t here mmr. Wa-ci~+ Zonts ar e ert abl i shed by t he CTZ
c o m e r . No auppor t i q al ar fire wi l l be delivered i nt o t hese roner
under any ci mms f mcer , berignation of a Noa i m Zone dot s not pn-
dude mneuver ground forces thmugh t he area.. Dtrignated N6-F'Ire
Zones may be l ocat ed within TAORa, RZs, and Ms.
2. Svecified St r i ke &nee Certain a n a s containing no f r i endl y pap-
ulat'ion nor rel i gi ousl y/ pol i t fcal l y si gni fi cant a t r uc t unr and vhich
a r e used by t he VC/NVA; and wherein t he ci vi l i an popl at i on i n the
area, i f any, act i vel y rapparto t he vC/IWA, may be desi grat t d as
Specified St ri ke Zones by the CTZ caamander upon request of CO 111 )UP.
%pportiry arms f i r e may be delivered i nt o these area8 withcut f ur t her
clearance. However, a i r ' st ri ker in an SSZ must be under posi t i ve
cont ml of FAC (airborne or ground), TAC (A), or TPQIlO. berignation
a s a Specified St ri ke Zone by t he CTI commander const i t ut e8 pri or
pol i t i cal clear.qce. Conduct of supportir# am8 f i r e i nt o Speci-
f i ed St ri ke Zones w i l l be in accordance with t he est abl i shed rul e8 at
engog-t *
406. SPECIAL BOMB ZONE. A Special Bomb ZMn i a m ar ea w l t a
derignated TADR,RZ o r AO, and m designated by the reaponsib e g r a d --W"
c d e r , i n which air s t r i kes may be conducted without f ur t her coor-
di nat i on wi t h t he g r a d co-der, ' St r i ker muat be under t he posi-
t i ve cont ml of a TAC ( A) o r FAC and be conducted i n accordance wi t h
the norm1 ml e r of engagement PI st at ed i n sect i on 111 of t hi a SOP,
CAUTIOW~ A s pe c i d ~ a b strike &me, Zone i.a not a w c ~ i e d
term not i n UACV-wide or USC-wide use and w i l l wt be ured i n
context with operation8 involving ot her than 16)fC uni t s assigned t o
nr w.
407. COORDINATIO# WI TH CIDG
1.
In addition t o US- Forces, TAORs have been arsigned t o CIDG
c u p s i n I CTZ. USIPWUA Forcer deri ri ng t o maneuver o r f i r e i nt o
CIDG caap TACRs v i l l coordinate ruch arurewer or f i r e vl t h the Special
Forcer USISSF lGDetrchrrsnt in t he mime maaner i n which coordinrtion
would be effected with t he cormunder in m y US/IW)IA Force ?MR.
-
I1 1 IAarille Amphibious For m
Mi l i t ar y Assistance Command, Vietnam
C/G FPO San Franci!;co, Cal i f or ni a 96602
For SA 1 Corps0 03331~.1
3B/spw
S0~1027967
3,Fob1967
From: ' Cmn d i n g ~ e n e r a l / ~ e n i o r Advisor
Tot Di st r i but i on Li s t
Sobjt Conduct of ~r t i l l e r ~r / Mor t a r and Naval Gunfh e (u.)
Ref: ( a ) C(;YAUSkACV Di rect i ve Numlmr 525-18, 19 October 1966 (C)
.
Encl: . (1)Locator Sheet
1. qcfxm. To provide guidance concernjny t he cont r ol of a r t i l l e r y
and naval gunf i r e gupport provided by 05;/kiik~Forces. The terms
a r t i l l e r y and a r t i l l e r y f i r e as used i n t h i s o' i rect i ve i n ~ l u d e ~ mo r t r r s
and mortar f i r e .
a.
The nat ure of omr at i ons aml of t h e b a t t l e ar ea i n Vietnam,
and t he frequent conduct af combined operat i ons involving US, Fk,
and RVN f or ces r equi r e ttut speci al emphasis be placed'on procedure0
f or t he cont r ol of a r t i l l e r y and naval gunfire.
b. l i est r i ct i ve cont r ol s sfrould be held t o t he minimum necessary
t o i nsur e t he t 8
( 1) - Fri endl y f.0rce.sand c i vi l i a ns are not-Unneces:';arily en-
dangered.
(2)
Property of f r i endl y forces, kVN and f r i endl y c i vi l i a ns
isnot destroyed or dameged.
(3)
~ a t i 0 ~ l and operat.iona1boui dari es a r e not . yh~l ot ed.
c. Cam and a t t e nt i onmust Is exerci sed.continuou&lyi n the ap-
pl i cat i t rn of a11 a r t i l l e r y gunnely techniques. The l ul l ran* of
a r t i 1 lery gun1lel.y t echni qi r s whiiitr ensure accuracy .jt~ould be appl i ed
t o l.he aax h u ~ : e x t e n ~ h @ ~ d $ f ~ ~ : ? i ~ ~ @ j % T ~ 4 i ~ n . Tta appllut l on
crf these . t ect u~i <l ues. -~". be exerci aBe of so"-& .judgement on thpar.t
GROUP-4
Downgraded a t 3 year i nt er val s;
Decl assi fi ed a f t e r 12 years.
~or/!jk I I;orysC) !)3330.1
3 Feb 1907
of a l l personnel involved i n solvirig the a r t i l l e r y pZob1.h proulde
t he bt!st assurance agai ns t endarirjering f r i endl y forkes and ci v4l i r no
or de<t royi . ngor dan;a.ringHWJ, f r i endl y f or ces and f r i endl y ci vi ' l i -
i ans ' ~ J I oper t y .
d. Thi s ol Jerwi l l ser ve i35 ;I b, ~si : ;i or t he prey~drat i on of stand-
i r l i l oper. i t i ng r.l.ocedures for t h e c.lnduct of a r t i l l e k y and rraval gun-
f i l e .
3. c n Comrila~dcrs arrd 1):3A, I i;orl:s w i l l a
a. 111 coor di nat j on w i t h appr opr i at e hVI-IAF conmanders, develop
procedu:;-es f o r t l w ee; fecti ve cont r ol ~ n d c wr d i nat i on of a r t i l l e r y and
naval gunf i r e support based upon est abl i shed a r t i l l e r y and M M ~gun-
f i r e procedures as modifl ed by gi ~i danceI.~erci n.
b. In coor di nat i on wi t h appr opr i at e kVI.JAF colnmarrder6, develop
posi t i v o t a r g e t cl ear ance procedurt;s t o i nclcde a system' of double
checl:s t o precl ude e r r o r o r mis~!ndcl star:uinij.
c . m d u c t of Fi r g
!1 ) Procedurss apl 1 i ~ a i ) l et o tlte cont r ol ofnaval qunf i r e a r e
c o ~ ~ t a i n ~\craticlrr Urder 322-6'7 Conmjrlder Task Group i . 1 6 (1 (Gun 11),
70.C dat ed 22 Jul y TI i s dacu~~l e~r t the f or ae of Wi!jriCV lC!ch. tms a l J i -
1.4: t i vc.
( 2) Swcificd St r i ke Zones
( a )
Rec, ue~t sf o r s l c c . i f i t ~ 1s t r i k e zoner, w i l l t ~ esubmitted
t o t !~j : . Headqudrterc. These r e q~~e s i - s then kforwarded .tobomn.ln- wi 1 . l
din!] Gerleral, I Cory.!; f or a pp~ . o v , ~ l .
(1)) !Jnobser\.etl Si r c 1:l;cybe dikecte,cl a c ~ j i n s t a31 t ayqet s
al.rd t.irt:t?tar ehs 10(:;11~ci wi f t ~ i r ~ !,~.c:cifit:tis t r i k e zcjnes.
(: )
mt r , ) i r i l &ar c?sr ; outside :;~!ocJ f ieci strike zones
( a)
Fira ria\. be di r ect ed ; ~ q d i r l ~ t force!; Incont. lct VC/NVA
i i ~' ~ C ~ G I M I t t ~ \ u'ince !rc~T. n~. l L i ~ r t i l l e ~pri)c;ed~lr&s.
( b)
1;rint)served f i r e s rl.ay I<P C!i rect ~!Jal . t a r ge t s arid tax-
get .)rc.'i:;,O~I I CJ . :. * ; 1 , 1 V C / ~ < V ~f or ces i r r , : o n t ~ c t ,only af t er Province
.
Cl i i et , ui st si ct Cllit.! , ST;(.t or Corlsria~lde~ , 01. 5u1,sectJr Co~l~~lani]e~, ap!,l ov-
a l d s ;rl.l.r?y:lriate.
~ o r / ~ i \ I Corps0 03330.1
3 Feb 1967
(c)
CbserYled f i r c may 1.c birected a ~, a . i ns t tjlr5ets of opportu-
,ii ty which. are c l e i ~i . ' r ~ as h a s t i l e wi t hout oht ni ni ng t'rovince i eent i f i od
Ch i ef, Pi s t r i c t Ch'ief, Sect or Cono!iander, rr Suhsect or Cmi l i ~ndt r r l t pr~vi t l .
( d)
Appr0pri.at e 1: rovince Chief, Tlistrj.ct . Clrief, Sect or Comnan-
der, o r Subrector Comnandcr approval i s re,:luircd bef or e d i r e c t i tlq f 5 rc.
an t a r ge t s of opport!rnity not c l e a r l y idcntifi.c!d a8 ho8til.c-.
.
Fire. n~i s s i ons~ i i r e c ted agai ns t know1
v i 1l ; ~y+sand hanil et s occupied hy noncom-
b ~ t a n t swill be contltrctcd as fol l ows:.
( a)
A3 3 such firc rwi.ssicrns w i l l be controlled by an observer
and wl. 1:I he ,executed onl y nft er Province Chi ef o r Di s t r i c t CIll e f npprov-
a1 as appropri at e.
(b )
Vil.laqcs and lian!'l.ct s 110 t ;I ssaciated wi t h maneuvt!r of
vrounc! fcrrces will 110tbe fi.red 11yo11wi t l l ot l t pr i or w; i rni n~ 1hy l e a f l c t s
and/or speaker systcnls or by ot !lor appropri at c means, 'even thouah f i rc:
is recei ved from tllcni.
.
( c)
Villagcs ,:mi l\i~mIt.tsn\iny be at t acked wi t hout pr i or wi1rnj.w
i f the a t t pck is i n con.junction wi t 1 1 n ground opera t i on itivo1vi.nq ma-
neuver of grol ~ndforces t11roirgl1 th(. area, and i f i n t he ,judqemnt of tile
crotrnd comn~i~nder, 11i s n~i s s i on1.~o1tZdbe - j coyar di . zed by such warn.1 IIP .
(d)
Tile usc oaf i ncendj i ~r ytype at ~ny~~ni t i on w i l l he iivoided nn-
3 es s al ~sol utel y necessary i n t l ~raccompli shment of tile colrminnder's
mission.
Chief of ~ t r k f
3 CODV of copies'
HEADQUARTERS
I11Marine Amphibious Force
Mi l i t ar yAssi st ance Comnand, Vi6tnasn
i / o FPO, San Franci sco, Cal i f or ni a 96602
3yLo.3
' Far0 m.
?/ ref
8 September 1966
From: Comnanding General
To: Di s t r i but i on Li s t
Subj:Treatment of Captured Personnel
1. -. To reemphasize the personal r e. s pons i bi l i t yof
each membar of this command' f a t he proper handl i ng of c a pt i ve s .
2. -. Force Order 1060.2.
3. &&cnordPp. The United States has o f f i c i a l l y not i f i ed
t he I nt er nat i onal Cor ni t t ee of t he Red Cross t h a t t he United
St a t e s would cont i nue t o fol l ow t he Geneva Convention of
1949 f o r t he pr ot ect i on of war vi ct i ms i n Vietnam. Thi s
agreemept makes itan offense under appropri at e a r t i c l e s r , ~
t he D J t o t r e a t capt i ves i n an inhumane manner.
a. The fol l owi ng s peci f i c pol i cy guidance f or t he t r eat - .
ment o f capt ured personnel w i l l be brought t o t he at t ent i on
-of each member of t h i s comnandr
(1) Capt i ves are i n t he pawer and custody of t he de-
t ai ni ng power, but not of t he i ndi vi dual s or n i l i t a r y uni t s
who have capt ured them.
'
. (2) Each U. S. . uni t i sresponsi bl e f o r t he handl i ng
of capt i ves whom itapprehends.
(3) Capt i ves w i l l i n a l l circumstances be t r eat ed
-humanelywhi l e i n t he custody ofU. S. f or ces and U. 6.
personnel , and must be prot ect ed pa r t i c ul a r l y agai ns t a c t s
of vi ol ence.
(4) No vi ol ence w i l l be done t o t h e i r l i f e o r person,
no ou%rages of any ki nd committed upon them, and, pending de-
liv6ky.t o hi gher headquart ers, t he wounded and s i ck w i l l be
cared for.
EXHIBIT D-24
3940.3
For0
8 Sep 1966
b. A continuipq grogram of indoctrination 'is essent i al
so that each replacement i s apprised of the contents of t hi s
Order as soon as he joi ns the Force. '
J. M m PLAT1
Chief of St af f
DISTRIBUTION:
Case 2
--
6; ?3%1
PORE3 dfiDiER 346t .a
Fma: Cormandin$ General. '
To: bMWonUs t
-
, p u a t i q ,mci iieca-tmtiz,g%r =iis~w:r
sub;' : Prixessing, ~ l o i ~ ;
ofWar
3 -
.
I
d
r I(
/
Ref: (a)*YACV?ir190+
(b) FSARV~eg-Eo.3-2
( c ) W V 20-5
(d)YiCV IXk 31-71
( 8) CWSPl ACV msg 2502202 Hay 67
h c l ;
(I) htaijnee"port Form 364) Fosm ( U ~ V
(2j b b i n g e Car & (USE-RV %rrp 365) -
-
-
(3) 20rua-tofWeekly Repdo f -bWases
'Reports Required:
I. UtlalIntemmgation%purt,'pz7*b.
33. FoIIBw- ~I~~@.Po&BW~ 7.c -r.Et
1x4Wsekjby Wd,pas?*g
I . m e e , Toestablishresponsibilicieaand pmcedures f or
pmcessing, aqd~fti ng,B V B C O U ~ ~ ~ and accoun- COT p r i s ~ ~ % ~ ~f
wa r captured byordelivered e t a mdar operational c m~ p 1 of,
l4cri.w Azaphibiarra PO*.
2, j&&Ja%Qg. Fcwe Order34.67.2 and'QUb0.2. '
a.
Reference(8) .seiignatothe CommaGeneral, Meed S b ~ s
Army, Vietnam,r e s pr ~~f bi l i t y~f or theadxdMstrat%ou anti opra~23aP
sapendsfon oftkaU. S . Forcea Prisonerof WarPmgrzm mder exi st i w
policy fnVfe$Kum* 6
be
Reference (b)establidies policfen, -m~yjonsibilit3 es ~r . 6?TO-
cdt nes forthe evacuation,p r o c c s s ~axit! C W ~ ! ! I'OT ac~omt kg
?fisoners ofwar ctrptuLIwZi byorCieUvereci toU. S* F f i P t t ~ p ~ ~ 30rees.
YWereltce (5;fur-r s t a t e s that t&e Comaz~Ciqy Generd, I;T ~%F&B
Aspkdbious Borce isresponsibleforeata'blistS;ci~, procoLwas inoonsori-
ancewi th reference (b).
c.
Reference(c) p r i S a a polieies an6pee* for dek&Zbg;
whetherpersonnelincusbdlp ofthe l'ldted St abs who heve connuitM
belligeren+--eta are entitled toprisoners 02war st at us.
- 2ni:-.L-,ees. 2cyso-% iifl:o I.ave bee2 de-ij&n& >&-;1,&080 :%~i1'
C"
secti;s i13 20% yet been dete~m-ed.
The r'aUa?.d&ig cazego~l esC e
s i , yt s I"im2 statxs of de-i;&ees:
(1 ) Prisoners of Wa r .
- .
5 .
;.;.;.~o;zn-m. O? ::Jay., 'Tersons 7,rko @ifij d e = . Ar%isPe, ! , of
>he Csi~e-;r. 1:o:'~ventio3 relative to the'-Treak:ient or P r i s o - ~ e ~ .oC
ddi t j . 05, the foilocJin,? persow s1s;a13 , . ..be exkei~dedt he ,
-.;zoSactior, 0;"the GP;J in TTie-hnam.
. .
(?\ I ?ersor?s vho are ca!3"su~6dwhi l e ac.t;ml?y cagaging i~
co-5r.y; oar.z -xlliyerent act other t l i sn act of t e~f or i s m,sa'potage
5:- s ,-JL~LZ xraimt -the Repbl i c of Vi et i nan (RV~T oy US and o a r Bee
-.
. ~c- r l d:/lili%ry Assistance Forces (F~J:-).
(2) 2-i~czptiive mnber of the Yorth Vi e t ~a i i s ek m d Forces
(171.4) or '1io-t Conz ('Jc), whezher cantured ia c o d a t or no%, except:
(a) Te~:orists, sabotcws o r s7.3ies.
(b) 1:exhem of the in;t'rast r uct ~~r c, various ass oci at i o~l s ,
:I;-. ..:rj'-:--,ica;. co,~?,ye, i;i-aft e~r,zrler.3, desgrters, i?.?ld t.'r,ose s?:s. ~@ctd
,, . . , - ' \ \
Q i, , .,-,,-r -y;T,TLG.!.~,<;C<-;-,he la7..n of ?A,!. (sac? ::;:i-Pag:-E 1 ; : 6.2. {: ).(3.1 .1
. , ,?.
c: . . ;,,,:w:..:;. :,ersc;-~cI.?M -ml . ~nt ari l yreturl r, *Lo the CovnJXL-
- 7: - . y- , . .,*-.;; o" -[C:?~T-) CO~Z~; ~Q: L i;i;2o:j.~h C:Tiieu. Ibi ?TO;-rcLm ilf t~
:mcz.~in!.::.:cti-re?;r s:lr;y~edt:;-.e.I2 in some fowl o r ?oli' cicrl or
r ; j l - i t r i ~ ~ 2.ct : i Wur / Ci e s.,
. . . . , .:
, r;5-Th;lde.e+:cL<,<;.;its,.
J
,+:c: SCT;<$~~&> bf' i;.:i:;G' ":jEL\r;:: -7 ;'~~Tq~g@;,.;:Ffr~~,
- .
+
d ,
+* tamcr-+";s o ; ; &-+:
. . . . . .
.,y+.~i+. CI: : L: . _
- , .
J :+s .' . . : ; ~ ' ~ : ~ o - t ,
i)-. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
.:. - .
- -*
. < 4 :' . " . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.,,y*7 .* ,
I.. .
. . :- . . , * > . . . . . . . I".. "
. . . . . ."...,'.. ,';- : . . . . . . . r . . . . . . . . :...
. .
. ,. . . . .~. L, . .
;,,,:.. ......,. ..,:
. . . . .
. . I . . : . . . . . . . I
, . . ,-- ; "..c;".',;" .,' ' , . .
,,,.<,,. ; ; >
:Cases .I:'' ,$+yay f i p~&; ~$&f<6..,5e3~g~2eqi-L., ; ~ + + ~ , ~ ~ ~ . : ; u ~ , ,
,. .?.
*..:. . . . . . . . y. . .
hq+, .,iIh0$~,Bii+;$z+f&. ::&:;$~9~l;i~~!;-q~;;~,B2$$3,e:r'~ - 2. b ., ,..o$jd' a i.* in ect . . . . . .,
q;*sy4:
,~~5:y<;;~y$$:w&:~~-;~ 20z-bti, ~q*. . erx . . a ~ e s . ~~: &~$: . , . . ?+. : 1; ~, . . .. . , , -. . . . . '' ,' 7;;:'
. . . . . . .
. . : I., '
8 .beldu.* : .
--
. ! . '
, .
(1 ) xo~th7~52-hTaese':A,&- 6,w-k> Enttc# . 's:LL?:.s z ~: ~; c c , ,
,;i& a e s - j pt & Vi &pm
9
zxd CG:;:- 95~ v T ' .
co!r,l.,letol;r or sr bar i l y 'of;':orti? lfie'cmc@so.
--
tjsc,ps, !zi',r,Eer '.Iq$
or :rbTA ?:;nitsakd M i v i d d '~e$xtcemnts q;~j&azi-"- :~ri5ts'5?.%zre
.r,reciominmtiy hVA or ' VC at'the c o d l e~rel ,
JL-Q ,- 7 Sg. ~~~~' i l px 1i7JL.~.:z-if;
-
a, A l l US militasy peYrsorplel who ta?m or have ccstcd7 of a
prisoner of w, returnee, *ocent civlJlizrt,. 02 c i ~ r l l f mcic.?edmLs
will:
h
(Ij Ca ~ l ywith Yne provis5ons 0: $'%e Ge~eve.uori-~ertiors05
d949.
Vi ol at i on of the humane px-ovisiom ci? t 4 i k z ~ e v aCcmre-,5io?s
is ~7 offense under the 'u1bCJ. 05 Fersdns who comAt , Tme ST~ BC~ CS
t he Comer;t,im rmy be tried fop w e ccbd.
(2)uford to eauh detainee in t'nefr c u ~ t &~ r.Lseat3ent
consI~+&?~t priisoner' of wa,' ml ess or ?aitllit :has -&th that of a
-=ex d e . t ; e ~ ~ kry cmpettmt z~thorjtyin accordace with ~ U Y C -
< ~ a ? h 6 '&& %hatthe de+aims is not a msaer of mr.
( 3) Lm~.rethat prisoners o f w c remb iE :!?e a~storl;. of
- TC
orces rersolmel ~~nti!. fhd.sol-oasc 5-3r~.J-ieto tlzc 7 COT::
Cc,r;l.SS:,(,(lr:~l,e1~o,yf,.1;i~;2 CeriJ;or (CIC) or to the C-P;.. : ?' ; 3-1 7 C o ~ s
X3T' ,'?-isor,t?.rc J ? 'c:cr~ C m p .
( 4 ) D1s;:csltion or"~ ; r k o n a sor"war, c5vli 2e- re-L~~i ees,
7.::3, cz-d irznoce::t civillau in zccordance xith t he . r t r ~ v i s la
or" -!arcgra:il? 4 . f belov.
For0 3461.28
8 J u l 1967
e. The I nt er r ogat i on Of f i cer o r Noncommissioned Of f i cer :
(1) W i l l determine whether t he s t a t us of a det ai ned person
i s t ha t of a pri- of war, r et ur nee, c i v i l de.fendant, i nnocent -
c i vi l i a n, o r doubt f ul case, and complete and si gn t he appl i cabl e
por t i on of Par t I and I1 of t he Detainee Report Form, USARV Form
364.
(2) W i l l r e f e r t he fol l owi ng cases t o t he appr opr i at e St af f
Legal Of f i cer :
(a) Doubtful cases.
(b) Cases i n which he has made an i n i t i a l det ermi nat i on
t h a t t he s t a t us of t he det ai nee i s t ht of a c i v i l defendant .
(3) W i l l , i n doubt ful cases or i n t hose cases i n which he
has made an i n i t i a l det ermi nat i on t ha t t he s t a t us of a det ai ned
person i s t h a t of a c i v i l defendant , forward t he Detainee Report
Form and a summary of t he r el evant f act s upon which h i s deci si on
was based (or a copy of t he prel i mi nary i nt er r ogat i on r epor t ) t o
t he appr opr i at e St af f Legal Of f i cer f or review.
6. Procedures
a. Determination of St at us
(1) The det ermi nat i on of s t a t us of a det ai nee w i l l f a l l
wi t hi n one of f i ve cat egor i es a s follows: Pri soner o f war, r e-
t urnee, c i v i l defendant , innocent c i vi l i a n, or doubt ful case.
(a) Pr i soner of War. I n t he c l a s s i f i c a t i on of pr i soner s
of war, uni t s w i l l be governed by t he following i n det ermi ni ng t hose
persons t ha t w i l l be extended pr ot ect i on i n accordance wi t h t he
Geneva Corwent ion:
1. Persons who qual i f y under Ar t i c l e 4 of t he
Geneva ~onvent i oFs r e l a t i ve t o t he t reat ment of Pr i soner s of War.
2. Persons who a r e capt ured whi l e a c t ua l l y en-
gaging i n combat or a bel l i ger ent a c t ot her t han t er r or i sm,
sabotage, or spying agai ns t t he r epubl i c of Vietnam, United St at es
o r ot her FWMAFs.
3. Any capt i ve member of t he North Vietnam Armed
Forces o r of the-following t ype Vi et Cong uni t s :
For03461.2A
8 Jul1967
-
aVietCongMainForce.
-
bVietCongLocalForce.
-
cGuerrillas.
-
dSelfDefenseForces.
-
eSecretSelfDefenseForces.
-
fInfiltratingUnits(NVAUnitsandregroupees).
-
4MembersoftheVCinfrastructure,various
associations,politicalcadre,draftevaders,desertersandthose
suspectedofhavingviolatedtheRVNlawswillnormallybeclass-
ifiedascivildefendantsunlesstheyareactuallyengagedinan
overthostileactatthetimeofcapture.
(b) Returnees. Thosepersonswhovoluntarilyreturnto
GVN controlafterhavingactivelysupportedtheVCinsomeformof
politicalormilitaryactivitywillbeclassifiedasreturnees.
(c) CivilDefendents. Nofmally,unlessmeetingwith
criteriaforclassificationasprisonersofwar,membersoftheVC
infrastructure,variousassociations,politicalcadre,draftevaders,
deserters,RVN lawviolatorsorthosesuspectedofbeingspies,
saboteurs,orterroristwillbeclassifiedascivildefendants.
(d) DoubtfulCases. Incaseswheretheclassification
ofadetaineeisdoubtful,actionwillbeinitiatedbythedivision
orseparatebrigadelregimentStaffLegalOfficerinaccordancewith
paragraph8 ofthisorder.
(e) InnocentCivilians. Thosepersonsthatdonotmeet
thecriteriaforclassificationinoneoftheotherfourcategories
willbeclassifiedasinnocentcivilians.
b. Processing
(1) ThecapturingunitwillcompleteUSARVForm365(Detainee
Card)onallcapturedpersonnel. TheDetaineeCardwillremainwith
capturedpersonneluntilfinaldispositionisaccomplished.
(a)
TheVCinterrogationofficerornoncommissioned
officeroftherespectiveInterrogaterTranslatorTeam,orMilitary
IntelligenceTeam,willmakestatus-determination andcomplete
applicableportionsofPartIand11, USARVForm364. Finalstatus
willbedeterminedasprisonerofwar,,returnee,civildefendant,
For0 3461.2A
8J u l 1967
o r innoncent c i vi l i a n, a s set f or t h i n paragraph 6.a. above. I f
s t a t us i sdetermined t o be c i v i l defendant o r doubt ful case,
f ur t her act i onwi l l be taken by t h e St af f Legal Of f i cer a s provided
iiparagraph 8 below.
(b)
Innocent c i vi l i a ns must be i dent i f i ed a s soon a s
possi bl e t o minimize hardshi ps a d f a c i l i t a t e t h e i r r et ur n t o t h e i r
vi l l a ge o r poi nt of capt ure.
(2) Segregation. As a minimum, a l l det ai ned personnel wi l l
r ecei ve t reat ment commensurate wi t h t ha t f or pr i soner s of war u n t i l
act ual s t a t us isdetermined. I n addi t i on t o t he normal segregat i on
procedures employed f or pr i soner s of war, a l l r et ur nees, c i v i l de-
fendant s, innocent c i vi l i a ns , and douttful cases w i l l be segregat ed
: as soon a s i dent i f i ed.
(3) Personal Ef f ect s. The r et ent i on of personal e f f e c t s by
det ai nees must be emphasized. Helmets, pr ot ect i ve masks, and l i ke
a r t i c l e s i ssued f a r . personal pr ot ect i on, remain avai l abl e t o det ai nees
i n t he event of an emergency. Pr i soner s of war a r e e nt i t l e d t o
r e t a i n a l l personal e f f e c t s and badges of rank and nat i onal i t y.
(4) Returnee Weapons and Documents. r e c e i pt s f or con-
f i scat ed weapons and documents w i l l be i ssued t o t he r et ur nee by
t he recei vi ng uni t pr i or t o t he t r ans f er of t h e r et ur nee t o a CHIEU
HOI cent er .
(5) Reporting. Reporting procedures a r e contained i n
paragraph 7 below.
c. Expl oi t at i on.
(1)
Detainees w i l l be screened expedi t i ousl yby t he capt ur-
i ng uni t f or t he purpose of segregat i ng knowledgeable sources,
est abl i shi ng i nt er r ogat i on pr i or i t i e s , and determining t he s t a t us
of det ai nees i n accordance wi t h paragraph 6.a. above. Di vi si ons or
separ at e bri gadesl regi ment s w i l l mai nt ai n records i ndi cat i ng di s -
posi t i on of each source who is i nt er r ogat ed.
(2)
I nt er r ogat i on of sources may be accomplished a t a l l
l evel s of command, however, det ai l ed i nt er r ogat i onw i l l formally be
l i mi t ed t o t ha t i nformat i on which i s of i me d i a t e val ue t o t he
t a c t i c a l commander or h i s subordi nat e uni t sl agenci es.
(3) The normal evacuation of sources i s from t he capt uri ng
uni t , vi a t he chai n of conrmand or di r ect , a s appropri at e, t o
di vi si on o r separ at e brigadelregiment t o t he I11 MAF Pri soner of
War Compound. S t r i c t account abi l i t yw i l l be maintained throughout
t he chain of evacuation.
ndocpatc cooperatic&
pocled far scr~LcLug'
~ c c o ~ ~ , ~ , ? c s WikL c 0 h t t S g ,
PLC.iilLrient of w p t id%$* 'me+, .~@c~+s.oc& ~~ayef~f!f:w~, ts
s h o ~ l dbe made fc&* snba@wtt acosss Dc1'scry3assi;;r f ~~. eO~op~~y, , or,
other agencies' rep-swm$ta%i~w'~ sq~hq4% '&%.&ft+r&%Q5@meenLt f ,
Et?? l ~%l i t 7uy Seou-zZty' +mi* &SSP,, @r,e,$@i+,ap-.c.t;o .@E-@&LX ~ P G I S ~ .
Z-,eci& S-~mch,lTatiiol?as *P&%ae .I, .. _ +S&rci& .&$&heE&~~~,~:tb -$%w&bb%$:
. * ., ." ,xx4- , % " ,<. ! * ;+y3.)-.,
ad visa^ wd Sect07 S 2 : -. &; ..
(7)i5aen it is ~t feasible f b ~ x&p~ese;'~'egrt3xp~' 6: ~ie:
$no-~c uxits/ager,cies to i nt ecogat e. s o W a f -tWdiwiats ssr: 9p.p ,
zra-ke br i gade/ r eg~nta,vhen condith;7s3 ' pa; 7s3t %9- $n$,~m~&&&
l ~ol . ~l edycai >l e so'mcez, based -qon %be yeo,a5rim@z.eS: --.. of .%&-, -=I%/
. ,
.',
, r <
22e?lcics
(C) If it is ~ae~essery t o r~inl;em~@%e a ppi,smer ~ r $ *
'
...-- .-w
,-,,- kc 23 ti~mmfOVOT 4% Yfs I COTS 'f:IC 02' % ' h q ~ e .LRVhT aisw
o l liz- tfie rm--az% ;~JfUbe &B' to ZIT 115&d 4-2. .
(9) ?*-~ces yay 'be detalicii ?"or' i n t e ~ o ~ n L i ~ n ; Bm-revery
. - .
:r~e ---,9~?-o:~.tio.. s h b s d i~ accoq,?.is?~ed e ~e di t i ous 2ya;s;
- 7 .
G z ,e . 52;er. kte2-A.i*ronceexplai-latiol? o;? a r)el nsree is gmt..le+Je,
7,* -
. --.- fie t r a x l f e ~ ~ ~ e 5 to f , h ~ne3~ec.tCKriY E;I;)T Center.
.
r e . - ; - ...,, ;y3'; .:;i'
::.~:,?.:?:-l? ; >><: , d. L> " . ?: , : ! . ; - : . ,-.,,C(Jr;., , ,,;:?-." , . - A :
. .!.
,,c2:-.>2
.
- .~
. . .
. :<..L.;.; ;;, . , .,.
* .:.. . ,
.: ..<.(.;.., L! .r(;; !;,<;ti,-;:?,!; ,.. , ".%LC,. o< -:<:?.> ,:.l?c< bkqki fFjEL~q::>3,~,~~i:7 ;;?&a:?7:- ,.._.A .,:,..
:-.. -.
, 1 : . ; ,
y;;, .
I
..
. .
<;:):;;.:;,o:J;,~ t9 x Go?y:>s ' YLG
,::.,< , '
n;.i :,;::,..;, 0 .% :. , 7-js5yii5c 03: q<:c.~?ei e~, ~i &
.-.
::e t;-!nl.c:;.-:L,,ns~:..,flif,;~~ $'arceb CIC~, i?ile of ys -oers~pz:ol at' s : ~
'<,he - .,rl~'i::lcyo P 7.19.r 5s at t he fccility.
;.. .,o~;r^";b,;t ' :.' &? -. - . ' t t c :mfL$.de:;Li;fiz.i-.cd : ' ! I ; . ?:c
. -..
-
..
.. .-
-.;F:.r- r,-alrds t o s e c ~ ~ y ;.:r-ison&rs0:; wFL- GI.9.5;181. .LJ
. Ye,:.,-LA -*:
i C L - ' 7 p e ~ . X ; . L . L d
For03461.2A
8 Jul1967
(g)
Prisonersofwarandotherdetaineeswillbetreated
byUSmedicalfacilitiesuntilonlyminimalfollow-upmedicalattention
isrequiredor,inthecaseofchronicconditions,untilthecondition
isconsideredstable,atwhichtime:
1 Ifprocessinghasnotbeenaccomplishedduring
hospitalization,detaineeswillbeevacuatedbyMPescortguard
teamstothenearestdivisionorseparatebrigadelregimental
PrisonerofWarCollectionPointortheI11MAJPrisonerofWarCom-
poundfordeterminationofstatus.
2 Inthecaseofthosepreviouslyprocessed,or
forwhomaDetaineeReportFormhasbeencompletedandtheindividuals
identifiedasprisonersofwar,thehospitalwillcontacttheunit
designatedbytheI11MAFPMOtoarrangeforescortguards. Prisoners
ofwarwillthenbeevacuatedfromthehospitaltotheappropriate
prisonerofwarcollectionpoint/compound.
(h) Detaineeswhosestatushasbeendeterminedtobe
otherthanprisonersofwarmaybereleasedtotheappropriateGVN
hospitalwhenambulatory. Determinationoffinalstatuswillbe
madeonalldetaineespriortoreleasetoGVNhospitaltoinsure
prisonersofwararenotreleasedtothesefacilities whileinUS
custody.
(4)
Prisonersofwarofspecialintelligencevalue
(a)
Escortguardteamsasdesignatedbythe111MAJ
PMOwillevacuateprisonersofwarofspecialintelligencevalue
(veryimportantsources)fromcapturingunitordivisionlseparate
brigadelregimentcollectionpointstotheICorpsCIC. Thecaptur-
ingunitordivision/separatebrigadelregimentrequestingevac-
uationwillinsurecoordinationwiththeICorpsCICpriorto
requestingMP escortguards.
(b)
USForcespersonnelatICorpsCICwillreceiptfor
prisonersofwar,retaintheDetaineeReportFormwiththeprisoner
ofwar,andwillberesponsibleforinsuringpropertreatmentof
theprisonerofwarinaccordancewiththeGenevaConventionsuntil
returnedto111MAFPrisonerofWarCompoundorturnedoverto
ICorpsARVNPrisonerofWarCamp.
( 5 ) Evacuationflow. Prisonersofwarwillbeevacuated
fromdivisionsorseparatebrigadelregimentsdirectlytoI11MAF
PrisonerofWarCompoundexceptforthoseevacuatedthroughmedical
channels. AhelicopterlandingpadislocatedadjacenttotheI11
MAFPrisonerofWarCompound(gridcoordinatesAT978728).
e. Treatment
(1) Detaineeswillbeaccordedthesametreatmentas
prisonersofwarundertheGenevaConventionuntilsuchtimeas
theirstatusisdeterminedotherwisebytheunitsInterrogator-
TranslatorsoraU.S.'~ilitar~ Tribunal.
(2) Detainedpersonswillbetreatedhumanely. Noviolence
willbedonetotheirlifeorpersonnorwilloutragesofanykind
becommitteduponthem.
(3) SickandwoundeddetaineestakenbyU.S. Forceswillbe
providedmedicaltreatmenttotheextentnecessarytosavelifeor
limb(seeparagraph6.d.(3) above). Woundedorsickpersonsunder
medicalcaremaybeexaminedforinformationwhenpermissionis
grantedbycompetentmedicalauthority.
( 4 )
Onceapersoncapturedoracquiredisdeterminedbythe
capturingunittobeareturnee,hewillbeaccordedfavored
treatment.
(5) Returneeswillnotbeboundorseparatedfromtheir
belongingsorotherwisetreatedascaptivesexceptthattheywill
bedisarmedwhileinU.S. custody. Foradditionalinformationsee
paragraph6.~.(9)through6.c.(12) above.
(6)
SincetheCHIEUHOIProgramstressesrewardspaidby
theGVNforweaponsbroughtin,areceiptfortheweaponscon-
fiscatedbythecapturingunitmustbegiventothereturneeso
thathecanclaimhisreward. Theconfiscatedweaponwillbe
returnedtothesamecollectionpointasthereturnee. Inthe
eventthereturneeclaimshehidhisweaponpriortorallying,
reasonableeffortstorecoversameshouldbemade.
(7) ExceptforcompletionofCaptiveCard@SARV 365)and
forDetaineeReportForm(USARV364), returneeswillnotbe
documentedasacaptivenorwilltheybereferredtoaMilitary
Tribunal.
( 8)
Thegreatmajorityofdetaineesareeventuallycleared
andreturnedtothevillages. Propertreatmentofthoseindividuals,
especiallyuntilthdyarecleared,willehhancetheGVN/USCivic
ActionProgram.
( 9 )
Onceacapturedoracquiredpersonhasbeenscreened
andtagged,thatpersonisofficiallyinthecustodyofI11MAF
andwillbereleasedonlyinaccordancewithparagraph6.fbelow.
f. TransferofCustody
(1)
Upontransferofcustodyofprisonersofwarduring
.evacuationfromdivisionsorseparatebrigades/regimentstothe
I11MAFPrisonerofWarCompound,theindividualwhoineachin-
stanceassumescustodyoftheprisonerofwarwillcompletethe
appropriateprotionoftheUSARV364Form.
(2)
Othercategoriesofpersonnelwillbereleasedas
follows:
(a) ReturneeswillbereleasedtotheCHIEUHOICenter
inthereturneeshomedistrict.
(b) Civildefendantswillbetransferredtocivil
authoritiesintheirhomedistrict.
(c) Innocentcivilianswillbereleasedtothedistrict
chiefintheirhomedistrict.
(3)
Whenreleasingcustody,PartVoftheUSARV364Form
willbecompleted.
(4)
UScommandersmayacceptcustodyofprisonersofwar
capturedbyFWMAFsduringcombinedUS-FWMAFoperations.
(5) Accountabilityfordetaineepersonaleffects. Any
propertytakenfromdetaineespriortoarrivalatdivisionor
separatebrigade/regimentalcollectingpointswillbelistedonthe
detaineeCard (USARV365Form).
(a) Personaleffectsofdetaineesareclassifiedas
01 lows:
1 RetainedProperty.Thisincludespropertywhich
mayberetainedbytheindividualsuchasclothing,messequipment,
andbadgesofrankandnationality.
2 ImpoundedProperty. Thisispropertywhichmay
facilitateescapeorbeconsidereddangeroustothesecurityof
USForcesandincludescameras,radios,andmonies.
-
3 ConficatedProperty. Thisincludesitemssuch
asweapons;ammunition;militaryequipmentexcludingmessequipment
metalhelmets,andgasmasks;militarydocuments;signaldevices;
andcontrabanditems.
Confiagatei!- ;;')-.< ?-ops;4i;y , A .L.L~.;3 w l x 'w
evacuated asnormalcaptured equipxmt,
a.
The numbar of decdneeg and -Lose chs s i f i e2 as pr1~3xi ~r8
ofwar,retmnees, civildefecdunts, ~i ndhriocen't clvilim: d ~ k ~
-
a twenty-four ho- 0 period u i l l ber e ~ r t e din Lk &itr ~n-LEiLigoace
summary.
b.
Ini t i al i nt er r ogat i on r e p i - t s willbei2e.cti.fied asfoll01~rs:
originator's nmerical a t desl grmt i on; t l e r~mIjerof +A(:m:lclrt
assigned serial& bycalendar par ; md the U t IXOdicit3 oft h e
cal endar year. Ifcapt~lredinaspeciiiic operc~ticnthe nameof the
oper at i on v i l l be i ndi cat ed i n parelithesis.,
(1)Examples:
3d ITT, I11MU', 3.3847
569th3iI bt,TFO,13.8-6'7(Y!AU~I;;EI~)
c.
Follow-up interrogationre-ports w i l l boBdsnJcified bya
seqmntfal alphabeticaldesignationafter thenuraericd serial
number,
d. I n i t i a l inlcerrogrition r e ~ r t sof veryi . r l p ~ w. c:<,WSO::
w i i l be t r ansmi t t ed elec3ricallyas soon aspssi312, glv2ni; snL
~ ~ K ~ ~ U T I ; the fa^^^^ i nf omt i i ; n; (1)gme and
1 ,.-,.. '
(2)
...'
':...-;- A -LC--
arid p o i t i - , n (1n~orvC); ( 3) O r i t i dent i f i caJi i on '(1) dfi j , 'LC , ! " c;r
i n c h d e coxple*ue s ubo~di na t i oc of ui t ; ( 4) Za.t.e, t l ~ s m.?,dcc.ti-,n
ofczptVe/ret-m,; (5) Ccgtxnin~ or w:~icii ~%- i t i r ~e~5;
( 6 ) Statezent ofsubsthlltiv~i ~ o ~ . i ; i ~ ~ r i Zror; 0 3 - ~ ~ i n e d sowe2 9
e.g., unitmissionandplans;(7) Majorareasanddepthofknow-
ledgeability;(8)Presentlocationsofsourceand;(9)Originator's
comments(statusofinterrogation,planneddispositionofsource,
recommendedfurtherevacuationandexploitation,etc.).
e. Wheninformationgainedthroughinterrogationsisincluded
inIntelligenceSummaryorPeriodicIntelligenceReport,originators
willasaminimumgivethefollowingidentifyingdata: (1) Name
andalias,(2) Rankand/orposition(NVAorVC), (3)Unitidentification
(NVAorVC), toincludecompletesubordinationofunit,(4)Date,
timeandlocationofcapture/return,(5) Capturingunitor
unittowhichreturned;and (6) Dispositionofsource.
f. AlladministrativereportsandcompletedUSARVFomsper-
tainingtocustodialproceduresrequiredbythisorderwillbe
forwardedtotheCommandingGeneral,111MarineAmphibiousForce
(Attn: PMO) forreviewpriortobeingsenttotheCommanding
General,UnitedStatesArmy,Vietnam.
g.
AweeklyreportbyDivisionorseparatebrigades/regiments
asof1200eachSaturdaywillbemadetothe111 MarineAmphibious
ForcePMO toarrivenotlaterthan1600eachSundayindicating:
(1) Numberofdetaineescaptured;(2) Numberofdetaineesclassified
asprisonersofwarandreleasedtotheICorpsPrisonerofWar
Camp;(3) Numberofdetaineesclassifiedascivildefendantsand
releasedtoGovernmentCivilAuthorities;(4) Numberofdetainees
classifiedasreturneesandreleasedtotheCHIEUHOT.Centers;and
(5) Thenumberofdetaineesclassifiedasinnocentciviliansand
releasedtotheirDistrictHeadquarters. Inordertomeetthe
deadline,reportsmaybemadebytelephoneandthenconfirmedin
writingintheformatshowninenclosure(3).
h. ReturneeswillbereportedtothelocalCHIEUHOIofficials
assoonastheycomeintoUScustody.
i. ThelocalseniorUSintelligenceofficerwillestablish
continuedliaisonwithARVNandGVNCHIEUHOIofficialstoensure
thatreturneeswhoreportdirectlytoCHIEUHOIcentersare
properlyidentifiedandreported.
8. MilitaryTribunal
a. Article5,GPW,providesfortheconveningoftribunalsby
adetainingpower. Thesolepurposeofatribunalistodetermine
indoubtfulcaseswhetheradetainedpersonwhohascommitteda
belligerentactisentitledtostatusasaprisonerofwar..
b. The r e s pons i bi l i t y f o r det ermi ni ng t he s t a t u s of persons
capt ured by US f or ces r e s t s wi t h di vi s i ons or s epar at e br i gades/
regi ment s. Before any det ai nee i s r el eas ed o r t r ans f er r ed from
U.S. cust ody h i s s t a t u s a s pr i s oner of war, r et ur nee, c i v i l de-
fendant o r i nnocent c i v i l i a n , must be det ermi ned.
c. Some persons obvi ousl y a r e pr i s oner s of war; e. g. , NVA or
Vi et Cong r egul ar s t aken i n t o cust ody on t he b a t t l e f i e l d on which
t hey a r e engaged i n open combat. Ot hers obvi ousl y a r e not pr i s oner s
of war; e. g. , c i v i l i a n s who a r e det ai ned as s us pect s , found t o be
f r i endl y, and r el eas ed; o r r et ur nees who r ecei ve favored t r eat ment
under t he CHIEU HOI program. I n ot her cas es ent i t l ement t o pr i s oner
of ' war s t a t u s may be doubt f ul ; e. g. , when a person has committed a
be l l i ge r e nt a c t and was not wearing a uniform o r ot her r esponsi bl e
i ns i gni a, and i t i s quest i onabl e whether he was fol l owi ng t he laws
and customs of war. I n such doubt f ul cas es t he neces s i t y f or a
det er mi nat i on of s t a t u s by a t r i bunal may a r i s e .
d. A det ai nee w i l l be r ef er r ed t o an Ar t i c l e 5 t r i bunal onl y
when :
(1) He has committed a be l l i ge r e nt a c t , and
(2) Ei t her of t he fol l owi ng condi t i ons e x i s t
(a) There i s doubt a s t o whether t he det ai nee i s
e n t i t l e d t o pr i s oner of war a t a t us , o r
(b) A det er mi nat i on has been made t h a t t he s t a t u s of
t he det ai nee i s t h a t of a c i v i l defendant and t he det ai nee or some-
one i n h i s behal f cl ai ms t h a t he i s e n t i t l e d t o pr i s oner of war
s t a t u s .
e. The Tr i bunal w i l l :
(1) Consi st of t hr ee or more o f f i c e r s . Where pr act i cabl e
t he members should be judge advocat es o r ot her mi l i t a r y lawyers
lawyer f ami l i ar wi t h t he Geneva Conventions. The s eni or member
s h a l l a c t a s p e s i d e n t of t he t r i bunal .
(2) Follow t he procedures s e t f o r t h i n r ef er ence (c)
and may make such addi t i onal r u l e s of procedure cons i s t ent wi t h
t he Geneva Conventions as a r e deemed necessar y t o i ns ur e a f u l l
and f a i r i nqui r y i nt o mat t er s bef or e them.
77"mq'FJj7im:
- JL3A, 1
Case 2
HXAIQJA2T2ZS
I11M~rinekmphfbicusForce
MilitaryAssistanceCo;zvd!-id, Vbetraxt -..
c/o FPO, SanFrancisco,California 9r;;>~/,r
3'039 3467 .aCh3
2ITT/dUh
' 16 Sep4967
FORCEORDER'&61,2A Ch1
Fro=: CommandingGeneral
To: Di st r i but i on Li s t
Subj: Processing, Ec2loiting,Evacuatingand Accounting,for
' Pri soners of-War
Encl: (1)InitialInterrogationReport Form
1.
Puppose. To tpansmit new . inserts andriirect penchanges . page
-to basicorder.
2. Action
a. I nser t enclosure (1)asenclosure (4) t o basic oraer.
. b.
On page1t o basi c order add enclosure: (4)Initial
Int errogat i on ReportForm.
c.
T o parawaph 7,b. add ney firstsentence t o read,
"InitialInterrogationr epor t s willfollow the format set forth
, inenclosure(4)".
DI ST3I ZUTI ON
Case 2
DETAINEE CARD
,2pd s ~ ~ t ~ , ' : ~ ~ ~ * J
i
i 2. Farso:y&:se ~jy$&:e Ln*O?e:-<y I
t
,.&I?.notbe t r t mn 'qcai>tiohgzrtit. !,..z -
1
*IT.-,' -' - - .
2 Jj & :
.. =q@?;Jlm D.3TkIEE: (2tl" TA7m =ON none, SO
r mdicate)
I
1
I : (Print;
i i
' p p y ~ ~ y ~
. I
3 ~ :
I
3IIT:(Print)
I
i
, '.,.-',T, - - 3
, -lor;; 355(213ez66j
L ~ ~ c ~
.\ '.. .:. .> ...
. . ~.
. .
I
;
:---. - o
r>!;<-: z ' ~ ; : , : ~ ; ;:i?,.]> :;>c cc>fi>&y&2 2;;- !;:.p;) ,y:;-,.::,35 'kr :,';:::. ; : : : . v~.;~~:~!..
. .
i ,
'i.;-.
,...
.,::,I.-, :,:> >,>,mor&ol >:;t; ! : i-,,-<,s i , 7 ~ ~ 5 (-J SQ-~&ZY>&.%~. , ~2y~; : - t ~~~: , ~: j ~?; ~~L~~eK. ~*
k!s:; . f . L, *'C.,,<,,:. .,, . ' -
G,j* ; .> ,
, -4. & : . ;. . - - : . r;a:$'>
Gt?a
. . , . : , , . " !,+.A A . ..
. . . . <
,;<by ::; a:.,.;: :, ( j e. L8i nw- ; 7J , 1; ; , $Jrcw c , L :. , y. ;-.-':I , ..... ..:..., .&+ .: .OX.$~p-~;. ;;G: ;I~;.~~~B~F~~~:.;;,~:~L -
V
col l oc. t bg p a k I ~Lw"LPd 011 81.1pison&- btyiflm.' :t'f<kci+w$ J;r., ?a' >o.27Ces '+y
. . .
.-,. ...,
..: .<A .:2? ci;ckig c ~ r & i r , & ~ ~ p t . ~ t i o ~ i ~ I.w.303~: :rLX: %..: ~i : ak&d by;.dLvis$on . ' .
. .
ke?zmte brj.gade/mgi.rrentim -1%& , 'o,P'u= , . .. . 8.-- L ~ ~ ~ ~ h.%t@js.fo=
Se coin;??e-le a nt legible. If i : eomat f on :k. witi -.$$!mo"L. ~ b t ~ e d
ei?',er WX. ";he f c y ~d U no; .befor ha^&:'% ,,%?$a,' . . h w i q ~ & ? ym*uil
fi ml sstckris d e t e r ~ ~ x i t i o n har been ' ~ e ;
, .
' 1
-. -
&.
5j - ~ 2 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ c . ~ p Jy-~; 2~;j6c o pm, 9~ ~mjim;3%;?cz~TZ?~:; 21~::~3
>-; ; flI;LC? .s: . .
2. CI<,,II ,I.:OI :,-rnec1 S i r y t w of ap~,;r,;-cjp:-hto A~JT5 Z T f c T ~ l
Se o j t a k d in ?,a& V or, both conies; by division or sq&rrc?-e isrlzade/
re~1:::cnt.
h e copy ~;fi7J.be ret ai ned by divisiolls oz acpzzzk b~L&e/
: -e~Lqen~.
W e col i ~' 1.- be Z o ~ ~ md o d to thS k&qw*Lem (4~5%: ~ 4 3 )
3y d i ~ s i o nor separates , brigade/regLion.t.
b. Civil def enda~t . Both copies wii.1 be ret~ized6di vi s i ai
o r seyarate b ~ ~ a d e / r e ~ h n t until final dakezmhatioa is at e r e d in
2zrt 11 si,pature of appropri at e LP'J1q o$f&cid' is obtairzeii in Pwrt P.
h e cow w i l l be retabed by di vi si or , or separate ' c- ~~~de/ r s&pent , C%e
c o y 7,.6115e f o md e d t o this headqm-ters {Alim?: ?$a)k y Civi3loz or
sccarate Srigade/regiLrient;.
-
c. mote:;t clvfj.ic3& Sigaataq of person ~rpki agdlsr,os5ticn
s" 2-5 p 0 ~ ~ 0 ~ 1 ~ ~ 6 i . 2 be ectered in ?=t V, Detaiqee report Fo-v.. Gne corn
- S T - ,.&LA 7- t,e re",&zed +J d i e i o n or separate brigade/re~ir~enz. One co?y 1.Ii,13.
',e :+r,~",r:i+cx2 to YnLs headqmr%i;ers(B'PEY': P ~ D ) by di - i s i on o r sa-purato
h,.,-- ,,,,-. , %, , e/ ~e@xz~, -2
, -
..., . ._..
d. ~TzacJnexo r l,~,-r, Division or sapxra-te L?rfg&e/reginent F ~ L
o3-lzi.z s::~~c?.tvpe of escort eun, ~on both copies o f Detainee R-e:?o?t Fom
. - .
, -
;..;,ax '2.- DI?rLsion or sepzrate 3~9~?1r?e/reginen'i. will retaLn or e cony
- .
...-: y~y, - e % .. .;i:e ot her co?y t o -:he e s c od yumtc be f cr ~- ~, && 50 this head-
n-.!:rriers ;I-.on r el oz se O? t?!e r ; i - i ~ o r ~ e ~ of irar t o $XU?.: X Cows Pr i ~c ne rof
. .
, - T':ir; corn C & ~ Lye;.r,in lri-D: ~ 2 2 r-'* $ , L,,oner 01" :.r:tr i ~t i l siF??.ki-.-e
; - 5 - 1 3e!;a..ince ?~po,+ Torn, l'rorn the AR'ZI I C o r ~ s
I
f i i ~~l ? ~? of '..kc C?&?;n 2% l,-JIiTch"i~e-his cony *i.iiibe fo3qari:eci. t o this
:?cad~i:aters (LTTT: E-D) by e s c o d i n g irY unit,
.
L W Z T OF D m -
t
g. ?aport - f o r week of
a.
Iim5er of detainees t&eh during week
b.
Ihmber oi' detainees dlassSfied as PlJ and relamed to Corps'
Prisoner oi" ilm C a q .
c.
!Tm'r~erof detainees classified as civil deferdata BIId r a w & ' ,
to GWI! ci vi l authorities e
d.
TTwnber of detainees classified as retuxmes add releeqed to the
Chieu !bi30gram
e.
:yu.~iocr of detainees classified as innncent c i ~ ~ aEd reieased
-.
to3;.. ,,tric t :.eadqartmS

::.jl-.bcp 0 f det ayecs c i a s i i ' qd as PI A and tms?ered
1x1 :im
L.
; ' C! . , ; f a c ~ ~ i *~
a. Name ( X h ) .
b. RankL Serial Po. ( N V A ~ .
c. JobHeldwi t h VC or NVA.
e. ParentsName.
f. Date& Piace ofCapture.
g. Ca pt ur i w Unit.
h. Ci r cuwt ance of capture.
1. i?iespons& docurnents capt ured and di sposi t i on.
j. Zdendar used.
a* -
Unit.
EX'S,Ah' s, Code #I s.
c. St r engt h.
e. Areaofoperation.
h. Personal i t i es.
i. Knowledge ofother enem Forces.
3 . Morale.
k. ~osses/replacements.
3. ,?T;DITIQV,'L * (IhFien icplicablo i nci uCe :' ilz I:FG;Q<kTIm in
mut es , i nf i l t r a z i on group #I s, h o u p i l d st at i ons, caches, mstipply pci;?';~,
tactics,training,etc. )
Enclosure (L)
c h 1(46Sep, 79673
b.
5. Int erronat ort s comments.
6 . current arid.futme discositionof captive.
Int errogat or Reviewed by
DTG interrogation Coql et ed
.-drcrM-
m mralM Am#wlkoru ?&
M~U- l u r W C- , Vi e t m
FPO,SaaFrrrPbirda, kllforab96602
. . Paro 5086.5
?l/J=
3 Wt l 9 6 6
Pram: c-ing Csneral
T6: Diatribirtlon Mat
Subj: Property Damage dDeath ar ~&saaal Injury t o V i e t ~ s
ci pi uanr
1,
P u r w , To wt abUh p o l l c h and)xrooedures t o ainimire the .
sifoerae,effects reoulting ikon pa.opa%y dannge, death, arinjury t o
Vietna&sa civlllaM.
a. The conflict Inwhiah we are engaged is unllke~any ve have
fought before. Our goal i r notsimply t o Infl l ct mi l i t a q defeat upon
anumedenemy. muat .also win the heerrt8 and mind of the ViCrtmmse
people, i f our sffortshere are tohavearry laeting wmi ng. We 'facie
anen- who haathe same goal. To auhlevehisenda, he urea thf
ai vi Um coramurity as a shield against our weapanrg and thenturns the
matrltant damage t o hi s awnadvantage wing it t o fashion a wdgo
betveen the Vi e t ms e populatih andour forcer. We cam& %gamethecre
tacfi cr, nor oan we reme t o rmo@ise the* potential far harm t o m
cause. We can a d mu&,-however, ampby the powerof amvea- vifh
skillandreetraint t o amid, ineofar a8poaaible, areatlag aituatlonr
uhlch are subject t o easy exploitatim by the enemy. By~ e h t l
aoordiaation of supwrting fi res andt hei r judicious employment, we can
avoidinflicting unnecessary injury uponthe people whose oonf'idence aud
mpport we soak. It is too mwh t o axpeat the Vietnamese ai ri l l an whose
hame i r destroyed aawhose fanrilf ir injured, t o recognize anymmln@ul
dicrtination betveenthe d-e we Infl i ct and t h a t imposed by our ememqp.
b, 'The follovlng prsotlaer areuel l af eat i ng and w i l l not be
tolerated:
(1) The omploymnt of mob- and mregistred hsraes1n.g asd
krterdiatian firesupon a popl af ed area,when attack from thatama I8
not -<rated thOa-ble hf-tim.
(2) The use ofhaav suppartlng armupanpopl2atd mew whtnr the
=is-e k e i v e d 10not arch as t o impede t he maneuverof a ~ r rf mm
t o the objective or the caconpllabmsnt of the mission.
EXHIBIT
8.
(3) The wb of naa-o&&ant ci+fllras as the'paint fmcombat
patrols or for a unit in the.a m h rrareh. .
3. Act-. fn a confllut subb,ar thid v b n eney rorces frequently
lodge themeelves among thenon-codmtant community, erne incidentr are '
inevitable. Uhen t h q o c m, we muat do werythlng poasible t omi ni dze
t hei r adverse effects. To this end, the following actione are directed
whenever seriousinjury, death, or sewem property damage i sInflicted
upon the non-combatant popllatlm bg our weaponry:
; a. '&ether the damage or inj-ury mcurs through error or I s the
miavoidable coneequmce of combit, the dirLsion/wiDg commander concerned
will prepare a personal l et t er to theappropriate province chief con-
t dni nzat leaat tho follawlng i n i o ~ t l o ~ :
(1) The deepregrets of theu o ~ d e r concerned,
(2) A statement of the atepe taken or t obe taken t oi de nt i e the
cause of t heinci3mt and prevent r rcrourrence,
(3) A statemntthat the comsndor concerned will provide a l l relief
possible froin ~ l i t a r yresources avatlable t ohim, upon recefpt of a
damage assessment fram the sector addsor.
" ~ x ~ l e sappopriate masures vhich ahould not be detailed
i nt hel et t er , brlt which xay be vi t hi n the c a ~ b i l i t i e s of u ~ i t s under
the coiinnanderlscontrol, are: '
,
b.
of
(1)Medical evacuation
(4) Bovlsion of omrgency food atocks through coordination with
=AID and other organizations
(5) lcpl determination M t o whether the incident iscoxbat or
noncombat related, with advice as t oprocessing claim, i f approp~*iate
(6)-Rpeditious solatiurn payments
c.
Imedlate action t orepair damage and alleviate sufferl.ng will
be taken on the spot by the offiaer i n command of theperation wi t hi n
the lldtof U s capabilitiee.
d.
In any ease i n wbfoh the di vi si on or d n g cora~~der believea the
olrcumtancea t o be s u ~ hthat 8 persaaal lettar from higher authority
vuuld be appropriate, he wi l l so reconnuendand forward a f u l l report of
the circumstances upon wflidh t o b e the l etter.
DISTRIBUTION:
Caae 6 ( 7)
L. W. WALT
--
- -
--
fIEllDQUARTERS
111Marim Arnphibiaus Force
Mi l i t aryAssistance Commard, Vietnam
o/o FPO, San Franaisco, California 96602
Boro 5620.1
17/ ~ab
. 3 Jon19611
POBCE ORDER 5820.1
From: Commanding General
Po: Mst ri but i on Li et
Subj :WaxCrinea Investigation
'Ref: - DA F'M 27-10, The Lawsf Land Warfare, July1956
MACVM r 20-4, 27 April 1957
C- - I CCI 5830,lA
'1. p o s e . To provide uni fnm procedures i n compiling and submitting
r epor t s of i nvest i gat i ons where alleged or apparent war crimes have
-been.counitted. ,. .
. .
2. Backround. References (a) aid (b) s e t f or t h the defi ni t i ons of
:a crime. I naddition, reference (b) preecribee procedures for
r e p o r t i q , alleged war crimes. The a i m of these procedures i st oas-
sure accurate and timely report s which can be acted.udonpromptly..
j.
Scope.
This di rect i ve i sapplicable t oal l a l l e g a or apparent
war crimes, whether i nf l i ct edby hos t i l e forces unon U. S. mi l i t ary
or ci vf l i onpersonnel, or by U. S. mi l i t ar ypersonnel uoon host i l e
mi l i t ar y or ci vi l i anpersonnel.
4.
Respolisibilities. f t i s the reanonsibili_$yof al l mi l i t ary per-
aollml having knowledqe of or r ecei vi r ga reno& of an incident
thoughtt o bea wa r crime, t omake s uc?~ incident known t o hi s com-
maadiw of f i cer as soon aepraoticable. Peraona di scoveri wwar
crimes will take al l reasonable act i on t o preecrve ~h y s i c a l evidenoe,
*t o note witnesses present, a d to record (by photograph, sketch or
deecri pt i ve notes) thc! circumstances and surroundings t o the extent
poasible.
5; Action
. .
a.
Upon r ecei pt of a report of analleged war crime, the' c b - ' ,
ding of f i cer t owhom the report h a been submitted w i l l submit a
' eerioueincident report i n accgrdance with referenoe (c) t o the I11
MarineAmphibious Force Combat Operationa Center (parchment cOC)..
b.
Upon r ecei pt of the i n i t i a l report , tbCoxunending General,
111 Marine Amphibious Force w i l l d e s i ~n a teanappropriate commander
t o appoint anI nves t i gat i wof f i cer t o prepare and submit areport
EXHI BI T M-8
5'67
,For0 5820.1
3 Sun 1967
of i nmat i gat i on.
I f appropriate, a qual i fi ed criminal i nves t i wt or
or CI D agent w i l l al s obe annoi nhd as technic81 aseiatrmt.
a. .The report of i nvest i gat i on w i l l include t&following:.
(1) Ident i t y, orlpmization, and etatua of victim.
(2) Nature of vi ol at i on committed.
(3) &.use of i nj ur y or death and manner i n which, injuryo r
denth oacurred.
(4) Time and pla-, of 'cammisaion.
( 5 )
I dent i t y of individuals or organiza4iona suspected of
cod-%ion of the act .
(6) Name, i dent i fi cat i on, addresses (or uni t s ) of witneesea
or etmpected witnesses.
(7) Medical or autopsy r e ~ o r t s .
(8) Phot oeaphi c evidence, preferably takenat t he s a n e of
di saamry, and properly i dent i fi ed as t o time, n l a a , subject, wit-
nessea, and photosapher.
( 9 ) Statements of witnesses of any of the ciroumatances sur-
rounding the i nci dent and the diacoveqr of evidence regarding the in-
cident. Whenever pract i cabl e, statements should be under oath.
(10) Wl i tary report s, including after-action report s and
those from i nt el l i &encesources, t o i dent i fy auapecte'd individuals
and mit a .
(11) Physical evidence,
such as weapons, cl ot hi ng, bul l et s,
ahel l casings, rope, etc., pert i nent t o t he case.
d.
The Camanding General, 111 Marine Amphibious Force wi l l
make. appropriatereport s t ohigher authority.
R. B. r?Eviiu
DISTElBUTICXr
Deputy Chief of StafP
Case 2
- -
h m 'WGeneral
Tor D3sffibutiaa .Lbt
r e f ~ c o (b) of tb basic Order t o mad "MCV Dir 20-4
b. - 3bngt) reference (c) of the baaic Order t o read nICCX 5830,1BA,
. .DISTRIBOTIONr
~ a s ~
DEPUTY CJIEF OF STAFF
2.
Ref: (a) l-:CO0571kOe2 , .
(b) I i A W Dinurctjmvs335-1 ' . .
(c) KACV It!isa~+:~%ue 3.35-12
. (d) Fl.PTac r?~c!e?57A?Iof
( e ) Force Order 5SCi3,lA
-- .
2.7.
C ; . ~ i ! , ~ ~ ~ j , , , , O. 5 .cijr& C6~$di pa$0r~cStil~Ct~sE ;59-3rj Jj ';sld'z.'~rc..:;
' m-~. Y-T*x. l l l . , , *~n~ r-..-"a
<-)rc?-y. a- . . . . .
. .
2.)
.... , G 2itbVI.jW. ,
-
..
. ,
. .
. .
( 5):ayd (c i ~j necz at eTeporr.fP
;
r ~ ~ e y ~ f i ~ &s (1) ) ~ ~ ~ i ? l : ~ I ~ . ~ '
r,
t.cl hi.rh3~ j p & ~ ;w-+-* - cfz,pyifi,zidezJir.tha';' rc.si;l$s. 2;s ~1.rstkr;.y s~?:.iou ,,if3 .j
.Y 5.
t;~,'fz ~ c n , ~ ~ y 2;"'li&r,c~~a~,P;art:S;"- +- ../ d.L .-.'. j.yajyci:y ' f t - ~ ~ ~ . ~ + ~ . - &!$ L : . ~ L - A ~ C - , ~ , J .-" !:>.--" +:? -2A.5Gurr.;~?; a i - t ~.??.,-.-. '-:<* a
. .
a ~ . : r s r s a ~ ~ q o n 3..-SpGFCBiind.ahz-2''&.ssl.6n iqiJFe<-,;.1-~13.: a7d a::.;?:
?~lei&l~t. . .. .- ...... .... m ~ . . : ~ c g ~ 7 ~ - ~ ~ :.; -. -<-~. . ;+.&&sp~+d.~ad;icssa: - .cdjxcj.";g.?-Thz -:ce.;j :L~.T~:<.$;:;E-!
..., -... e h ~ . ~ L. .
.. .... .-
-. .
- ''
zzb~y' ta l l t , ~ &' o~. . ' r $ r i d e z t r s , ~ ~ (.i ) ael 5~us 5aoxq:es pui-Fis& 72,
scj.roi%ss ~ m d@d;r;rz2fidsupert5 -, ., l;ha& .c;(;ailae13t;e(?i ~~. t Le>as s.z,
ap120~pL&$&'cor,"ectppe Ir,oasclp$s cay be:.ta]&, For eX-xi$le, the ~~u~~si .
. .s?iov~?~d ..t;.e.deic.~rrzTe&' y
..... . .
, ~aj . sdj . ~C- e&ol;&~x9.;-ce' . a3;3riia &'53t:o;;l$e&i-!jn,
.
aFl~bea,(2j :3so~ .mu: --+* - s , . . he; . sp, ~1*~3~- . i ; ; ~e~1~ -<T~,.' . ~ ~ ~ ~ & < E ' ~ . .eFda~; s 2; ; ; s
ikgtrG-c%ions a$e$esf;ed. 2;~.or;2i.?~inci&yL$+ '((j) i<epcFbs.2s.y ~~:, d_i ' ~; i J . ?.&- '
.b
%x&cguak &fp;*ts. -lo:agsjs$ T.i;:z~;lzzs.t .ec$5.n$ ofos+crx,:.~na:! - 2 ~ad:~;j.nj.s-:-
. --
. .. . . . .:The~ i n sf.: <~~esa.....;yocgdt;~~~s .- . I s 'i.~ P3&$Lb.lF'+',.- . . . .. .- =
-
. .
s;lSUp+kj&l;r md aci:i?rrs;e' ?i ghe~st;.~h&z~,~,ies $>ciT; : ~ ~ ~ , p o ~ . + : ~ ; . .ino:;~d:-f;"
. . . . .. . .. .... ..
>. . . '., ?.< &: . : . , ..:; i,3--& .eyz ;: y3' ki.,i1 -. ;3;T<;i; .-...
. .
- n- s; ;.I .. ; ; - ; ,..... ..: .;. .**:.-., .. .: .*..... .,..-., -
..dl , &'
J
.:kQej 'i.iayiile&$ * r,y.3,; cn' ~: - . ; - ~. q~?. . ~. ~o~ -..&:p=i+. .a J d - ~ - , ~ y u - >:a t p .r t - wd.?-...a - ;j ;* >,...&Fj.e.$z
. . . .. A-...- .--+. - .,.
l&..ys.. ;;a. pi];.i.y-- --y"&+-.- ..cA<fi.->-Td;.
..,-.. .
,
; , ; **: , >-. -<
- c2;.d:;>-Lbi~~S3.i?~, ., .., . . ; : W>T:!::~~..-~:~.;
- ..
. u...,cA - '
- - - .
fi:a:?xna jr.:;jh55jjj,.r$j.s toray;o-jl.t.;.i,~. ,Pojy:,~,haz i ) ? ~ :, di ~e~. >, e~;
..
Gep~c:i-~l, &.ci.; :
..
~ ~ i r : ~ d e r ~ ~ . 62: ~k z a i z r L i :::i<;h k?~>>-ij.t$di!jeyhi; r.ap;?tl:J?-cnal.coll-t,:;-ol ,>
A P 2 4 0.- .'
L* 7 c%:z'?<:.z:;-
. . . . .
. . . . '. ,
5.
jsit
-.,
<h, ( ~91iei1&j.8,, -ns- Divi'sYon, ' j rj , i.'ayi ! ; l ~~i si qn, I
7 <.,'!'
.,,
; . $ <> c,
-..
-:
..
.::, ..' .) ;
....>...A
. . . .
cs..; ?.i
*- '-
gf
,
Cc.;:e;:Ei:d~-~l;--
c,
Gcr;'<:lB2d, J - ~ ~ j - ~ %i f i Fc77:q3 i ~ . y ~ i ~ 2 ~ ~ t J;j 3L:l :;l l r , ~ _..
'
.??? . . . I
/..-
L.,
-
'
-!. .,
, A , SOT, ~ : ~ ; x ~ > ~ T # , s;zri2:>:?/,,+,i c ~ r p s k l i ~ !c~:r~::zn~Ji:cg :!,85;-;j-say.&>c;::;;
.
i>c:?:;,;s - '
. .
.5 (-7
L)P<.L.E; 5 ~ r : j I:;;<, 7:::~:rJ...r ~ ~ f i t p ~ ] . Ii.T-3: I' .nrice A:yi::hs.i<>?2.5 C~.~:ZZB.L cf
. .
EXHIBIT D-28
,
~c &e 21% z e ~ p ~ s i b l e foi* b e ~ S P O T . L ~ ~ of a-U bci de?~bsrequ.ifrci t o 'oz
repcz.";kt3heremdems ari si ng ost 02 o-=rations conducted by the* cor!~?afids,
ox- othsr,~cisemlate&to ps r s nqe l and units unr l e~&ir operatiioml con-
ti-;>]., ;:-,:I p:j-:il ta!,s s ~ c b ' ~s:,j-cn3s is d?e,;zd ~ ; ~ a ~ s . s ~ : * ~ k.; ~T]:'-'E?:T~~~&> 'uli.533
. . . -
. . - . - 9 -
13Cv~. ~i ~. ~; L~_r : s , 2 2 ~ ~ 5 Z,-&.:QI; t : ~l . & &323-413,.;*3j1 c: a s i y i z p<j:;&
cf :;flfita.3t cn t . 2 1 ~ ~ 5ba.(fs e3 l.;;~3;:1 '2-nq?A:i3s C ~ A bd 2$[jffs~~3ti, i # ~
&tsy~&r;: V,',;2 s$z~<. E. 0.r 2 j?~z-'i,j~~;il%* im.es%igakioi1as to sec;& such oL!zr
j;z.So?;.:eti~~as 1,:a:~be r i ~329~cy7 a d C '
'
. .
b, ComienZe~scf ot hs r iJ.S, Amed F~r c e aC~P; nnds, 1: Ccrps s!~c~Zc!
pro?.i,b~t he Cni:d:zn&ir-g Cemr~l ,XTf i.hririe F~[!?bIbicus Poxace a copy of ths
r;:gce-;i; r e ~ u ~ e d by t h e b ~es:>ec-i;iq;eservice instrucblons. , In.this
connection 2 i;i7..9?-7 a*t s l c ~ i i i ) ~ repo::t to TIT !.;!F' Ca::.bat O,-erztTons
C z n t s ~(l''nrc~x!entCGC) be ia ctr3e-d. &~e n c E~f : 01.1 the sa%=iousnessuP bha
situation, The Lelephons call, sho~i'-clbe foilc/,red by s~~.bi!-lTssio;~ GI a ~ 1 2 ~
QI *.3.7..itt,zni ~ p ; " < ~
ca Tiis C~; . y; a i i ? i q~ 5, O_'flc5;-r, %2;irlqua?~erss nu SerzIcs CC~ : : ~ Z Z ~ ,1x1
...
i'arj.r,e ~'.?ql~:?j.bj.o&. rsrca is a.ss~c;?sib3-et o report all i r . ~i G: ; f i ' r ~s , T E ~ %? ~ I ~ z < ~
J-
. .
. -
L,.? 52 re;:~;~tedhe1-31mde- Fc.cszng cut .3r" the o;?waL2nns :%I";,ST O~%:T?~.:Z
relrtecl ts, $zi-so;.,i?~Pof his cc~ixssicl,,
(2)
US css1lalbies, r egadl ess of ca*2seo
- .
(3) Dotmzd or rissw f r l . e~dl ysircsaf"L. .
. .
- .
~.
(4) .PeIocatpon 01i5ajG? f ~ . e @d l yc~I?bilt/c@rn'u2% sa~:;ortuni t s
(cornsany or - 3:x~ger) .
. .
(5)' &-sra$ ir&ti~.4;eci ~~.ht;.cks'ax US or fY~l~~,-dl.y forces and .
-
*.
. i \
faci E-t2es- . - . , - . - I
. . i
-(61,- ,Ts~X'OC:L:3~??%,C~~C$S. 3i? :&I;' 3d.Q ~ G C + ? ! ~ ; ~ Z S .E-i;ess~plce> .
..- - * - - -
- - .-- =, ,.- - - - .- - - . -
@-j;-:B.,g 2*i~--;@-:-,,g~-&e~~~ 2.- 2: f
0.1:' i ~ f j.li;l.a"vio:1 GI* ;,?. tli:.?5
( 8 )
Vc 2ir..oa.',.&i:y QU ;;zq3~yj ::~es~
(9)
Evieence 02 t i e YC use 0-0 mlli~tzryequiprcent ~f new ' t J ~
or VC' adopt.ion of new tactics*
(10)
Ca~tw:-s of sar::io? ep.+mg officers or !'!: czd:?~.,
9 1 .
(15) Air to cont3At, pound -Lo a5-? AS s3-gncsxz?gs.,
(22)
I ~ j u qor <6~,-i:.:.j1 iloncqi.;+a%;1i?,s opsi.2- :
iiions due $0 U .:;. o:.~5~?z,ni;i..
o: du~5n;; - : , ~~ct i ca
{
Reports of seri ous i nj uq; < 0;. deat h of iirrcliv.iid>i~l Ph~1z~;s
nced not 3.o.~-aal-ly bc report ed as sar i o~l sincident.^, s5.nze t he det si l s
aTe rep&kec?, to higher o,ut'r.opi*t.t$3 t hz Ca5uhl.i,j; Rapo&,,
IMP33,..r.093.,.t ' SRV R I A
J'#lI RIrnfA RIrnIB l Ml I C Rl MHl D mm1c
I.
$#E WMPIIJM 8803 LI)OlIC034
I
ia#R uwuu
I .
mbibB947JAN 68 -
fl CG IIZ NAPPAHA140
111 MF
I
I
(in
rmcw
1
I ) ~ RIU COIMMUDSNO OITICEI
wA= oxagcmTO BRING mxs MESSACE
!
mJtmm Awn STAFF NCd'Sr
TRADXTImAL FORUSTO
I
'8UXp
WAQA.I& tnh I C R t116UTTLE TRIRCS Yh DOORFAILTO
I
' m?#XU. WOTa?IMPRUVE I l l EEFFICIENCY OFOUR D1PIIS BUT
I & & ~ ~ ~ ~ P A T W~ D Q I D L I XRUtmC SIIVSD BuntCN AWD OFF THE 0 A n t E l
EXHIBIT.Do29
537 '
A* TO ~TICUt af SLY~SVPERVISE ALL SUBORDINATES' IN ?HE CARE AND
I UNDLI RC OF INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS, UITX PARTICULAR EWRASIS UPON
STRICT OBSERUANCE OF SAFETY PROCEDURESI.
B e TO b EMND STRICT FIRE C@JTROL DISCIPLINE XlU rtlE EMPLOYMENT
OF &LL WEAPmS, NOT OIQLY TO INSURE THAT THE RULES OF MGAGEMD?T
&aroT VILOAITD, BUT ALSO TO-rNSifm THAT =RE IS NO WEEDLESS
~ DMGER~ NCOF turn-COMBATANTS PARTICULAR mmmc ~ G A G E ~ T S .
CARE IS REQUIRED I N THE TARGETING AND LAYfWC 01: IRDIGZCT FIRE
rUPoMS.
C* 70 IMSIST \tWN CjBEbIENCE TO ALL SAFETY PR6mRES BY THE OPERA*
OF MOTOR tranmES, MACHfNER? UBD HUV? EQUfPMEIOT, AND TO
T&KE IHMEDZA'IE CORRECTIVE ACTIW WHEN SAZZT? REGOUTIONS9 IMd
CWDMG ntUSE DEFWVDED BY COMPfOIB SERSE, ARE B m G VILOATED,
7'0 BE 1)JTDLERNT,OFHISTAKES AND CA-S 014 TlFlE PART
OF YOOBSELF OR YOUR SUBORDIIATES AND TO DEWOlZ TIME TO THE
PACE 'fit= R?JMf.IWM0083 UBCLAS
QIOfT LEADER CAN ADOPT TO IMPROVE TOUR EFFfCfmCI AND 7'0 M E
?WR UNIT FORE EFFECTIVE AND PRODUCTIVE. I AH CONVINCED 'HAT
II[ESE, COUPLED WITH OTHER mOLURONS Y a t MAY XMPOSE UPQ
TWRSELF, WIL GO FAR TOWARD SAVI l l O HUYJLN WVE3 IDCONTRI Bm
Xt9kEASURABI.Y TO THE ACCOMPLISHPENT OF OUR MfSSION.
ll? BEST WISHES FOR COMn[h'UED SUCCESS TO PW AND YOOR ?EN
=RI NG ='NEW YEAR.
BT
(Reports of Serious Crhss or Xneidents)
a,, To i ns: ze t ha t t h i s headquarters i s inmediately i nf or ed of all
55,-Lous c r i ~ n a l ofzenses or seri ous di sci pl i nar y i nci dent s occuri ngwi t hi n
.
t h e c o r md ,
be To est abl i sh uniform procedures f or report i ng, cri mi nal offenses
o r seri ous di sci pl i nar y i nci dent s occurring. within t he command t o t h i s Head-
quarters.
a, Tack t'l;rcr Personnel: Unitsd States mi l i t ar y or c i vi l i a n personnel
who .=..-2cssigned, at,%zched, or on t enpora-y duty rr~ith Headquarters ,Task a'orce
G15,XX c r a sut or df n; ~t eunit o r comand, and l oc a l nat i onal employees of Task
.;z 97-3 when dut y s t at us
5. Serious heide;?%s : Any. , incider& involving Task Force OREXlN
>e:-so;inel:, property or equipment which mar.:be, reasonably expected t o arrouse
... ' .;zili 2atli.c intores' i, cause continued or wide spread publ i ci t y, embkrass
..-.s US Goverrxnent o~ military forces or which, othezi.' . . wponant consiaerir-
?;ions, rnaywarrm.t t h e parsonal at t ent i on of t he CG, Task Force OREGON,
3 js?CiZT&B?S IiS~n.T3EK"P:, Crimes, ...t.~-. offenses ,or i nci dent s t o be reported
i n c l ~d e ,but ar e r,ot Exi t e d tot-
a.
Death from ot her t han nat ur al causes.
b.
Volw.targ or involuntary. mansiaughte.r or assaul t with i nt ent t o
c o r ~ i L tma?slaughter,
c Rape or assault with t he i nt ent t o commit rape or other seri ous
sex ofCa2h~s.
d . Aggr ~vzt ai~?.ssai.lts, uri z~t hori zed discharge of f i r e- unlawful OF
~L-XS, or h i t and runeccide:lt,s r esul t i ng i n ssrious i nj ury or involving C ~ Y -
c. mt ances l i ke l y t o came unfavorable publicity,
e. Burglary, robbery, arson, and niisappropriation, fraud, or
extortion or" roajoi- s i gni f i cace.
D(HIB IT D-30
541
" jy,-:.: ,,......' .
-
p o s t d vi oi at i ons, L O .,. ..,.J.L..:.,..:c;:-.~r ..- * . . sz~:,;gring, c71rrenr:.yix.?ipuPation,
. "
ar,d of f e~l ses irL.:.cl.,ing A~ . T . . : ~ - ; L ; ~ S ,
T o3 ... --.
. . -
personiiel of power
he
eil~tn%cwi t h mi l i t ar y or ~ ; ~ ~ i l . i ~ a fore:.gn
in i nci dent s of Wad.';ata or ?ct,enfia>y t e ~r c i l sshgr&fican:e from a pol i t i c a l ,
militmy, or pu3hc r ei at i ona st ar~dpoi nt ,
i. T e ~ r o r i s t a c t i v i t i e s in-7ol.zlng US personnel and/or US Government
propert y,
3. Airc:.ai"r. crashes, riot involved i n or r es ul t . i ~g, . from wki ~al
operat i ons.
1. Acts i . nvol vL~g insral t ur pi t ude eonsideTed or' s uf f i ci ent importance
t o warrmt t h e a t t mt i o n of t h e CG, this h e a d q ~ ~ t e r s ,
a. Seri ous bxic?.en%s h v o 1 ~ g p r f s o n e , - s of war, det.ainees csptured
o r i n cust.cdy of US Pol ~ces-or ot her persons' for which t h e US has r es pons i bi l i t y
under t he Gefievz Con-~en!:.icn.a, i ncl udi ng. dezt h, ser i ous injuq,-rf o t ,and success-
fiL escage.
4,
g?ORTTN"I PRgCgCKC&. , %?re are ",ee tees of ser i ous i nci dent r epor t s : I
I n i t i a l , k", erb, an.& ?sal e
( I )
Tui t i a ] seports by &ig.&e !-'F.?s~&!-s w i l l be sub~!i?:.tcd PTC:~OS~
a d Cornlanders of ot her uni'i.s on dl,serio-us crimes or i nci dent s as defined by
t h i s regulat.ion, Submit. by t h e ,1110ste xpdi t i ous means avai l abl e, t o t h e TF
Provost 1.iarsha.l. If tiiose repcl%s me unclassified, t hey wi l l be report ed by
telephone.
(2)
T".~rovoj;t >,;:.a:kl.ji b j i L . l . :ljij.<y tile P;.:.
IJ!Y.JiN, 4.ILVN;
telephone 31475 or Arqy bktf,
(3 ) The Provost ;,iarsha:l ill. s u y ~i i tYeylou~.1r:oident
Reports t o t h e Provost Karshal, USMV, brnsdiateeiy apon r ecei pt ,
( 4)
The i n i t i a l repork will be a s ccmplete as possi bl e but
r epor t s will not be delayed awai t i ng ~e c e i pfoC d d i t i o s ~ a l i nformat i on o r
r e s ul t s of i nvest i gat i on.
C5)
I?t hose cases i n which f ~ u l pPag is not probs%be, such a s
sui ci de, or acci dent al deaths, and i n all czses wr;on s u f s c i a n t information i s
avai l abl e t o asezr J~af n t ha t any i ~di e a t e b. cor r ect i ve act i on has been accomplished,
t h e i n i t i a l and fin& r epor t s rnay be combin&, I n such eases, t he combined
yepor t w i l l cont ei n a statement t ea t h e ef f ect thax. 9X0 fuZ"r;her r epor t w i l l be
submitted on t h i s i nci dent unl ess l a t e r ir1vastigc;Lf or; v?qrra!ts
,Reg, Ko 335-6, H q Tr" OI WON, 21 Parch 1967 'r
b. Interim Reporterl
(1 )
Interim reports w i l l . .be: submitted by tt)e:.*ovost Marahel
'
aa informationbecones available.and as qminimum, each30. daysunt i l f i na l
action has been accomplished and',a f i na l report i s submitted.
(2)
Interim report s w i l l r ef l ect t he current st at us of t he in-
cident, pereomel involved, and i n applicable cases, changes i n l ocal public
reaction or at t i t udes.
c. Fi nal Reports:,
. ...
( 1) Final report s will be submitted by t he Provost limshal
. .
Inmediately upon completion of appropriate action.
. . .
(2)
Final report s w i l l include t he following:
(a) Report of any discipldnary action taken against per-
sonnel involved.
('b) Corrective administrative act i on taken t o preclude a,
similar type of incident.
a. Major subordinate commanders are responsible f or t he reporting
serious crimes or incidents inaccordance Kith this regulation.
b. Any agency or person having-knowledge .of a serious crime or
incident i s responsible f or t he reporting. of t he f act t o t he nearest Provost
Marshal, Base Commander, or his cornmadding offi cer.
c. The TF Provost Marshal i s responsible f or . notifying
higher headquareers of any serious incidents.
6. SECURITYIMPLICATIONS:
a. Provost ,Karshal will consider securi t y implications when incidents
as outlined i n t h i s regulation ar e reported- The last paragraph of t he r e orting
format requires t he st at emnt : G2 or Intelligence Officer ( as appropri'ate P
(has) (has not) been apprised of t he incident,
b.
A l l incidents reported as serious cr i nes or incidents remain
open cases a t Headquarters, USABV, u n t i l a f i na l r epor t is submitted.
L/
7. Format : , . ormmat for reportw.,geriouscrimes or incidents i sattached.
6. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION:wp, B,eport,asubmitted under the provisions of
this res l at i onw i l l be classified according.t othe nature of the incident;
however,
ONLY.
as a minimum, written reports wi l l be u s i f i e d (IFOROFFICIAL USE
9. REFERENCES:
a. USARPACReg 1-55
b. MACV Directive335-1
c. USAap Reg335-6
(AVDF-W)
FOB THE c(xmANDm:
EDGAR R, POOLE
COL, GS
Chief of Staff
LTC, AoX(/
Adjutant General
APPENDIX I -
F'ORb!AT FORRPORTING SERIOUSIZIDENTS - .
INITIALREPORTS :
1:. b e of Incident:.Use. appropriatete m ; e.g., ,..suicide, robberg, .
etc,
2. Time.and Date of Incident,
-
3. .Location of Incident: Report t he exact location, usingidenti-
fiablelandmarks, miles t o ne&est tdwn, ci t y, or village, and gri d
coordinates,
4. Name of gerson(s) involved, t o includedct i m(s), subject(s),
and witnesses, includinginformation as t o fheir:
a. . Name: Last name, f i r s t , middle initial, and DOB,
b, Grade or t i t l e .
C.
Service number or IDnumber,
d; Orgwzat i on or address..
e,
If US ci vi l i an, indicate hisstatus; e.g.,, DAC, dependexit,
etc.,inplace of g,ade ort i t l e ,
f. If BVNc'ivilian, i ndi cat ehis age andsex; e.g., VNh/24, i n
place of grade or t i t l e.
' 5. Bctent of InAuries: ,Fhwlain-concisely, i f applicable.
6,
Narrative Sumnary of Factual Information Goncerninnt he Incident:
a. Disposition of remains.
b. Location of conf i nmnt ,
. c. Proposed actions, eitherd n i s t r a t i v e or judicial, t o insure
t hat ailpossiblemeasures have been taken immediate* by conmranders t o
reduce t he impact of incident of US^relations.
d.
Statement t hat thel ocal G2or intelligence offi cer. has /
has notbeen not i fi ed of t he incident.
7, Reaction of Civil Populace. '
APP I; RegNo 335-6,Hq TF OfBCON, 21Mar 67
8e N'~:.C>~
(7p-S c
Organization of Individual Renderine. Report.
9.
Na:e and Grade of Individual Recei vi n~ Report b d ~i me h a t e .
10. ~ersons/Agencies Notified: Applicable t o R4, t h i s headquarters,
.-
3nly
I f . Investigating A~ency.
IN'rkXRJI R Z P O ~ ZThese report s wi l l be submitted i n t he same format as
i n i t i a l reports. '&en t her e i s no change i n th'e information ori gi nal l y
reported, t he l a t t e r s "NAB' will be used for t hat speci fi c parapgraph.
F1NP.L EDOIITS. These report s will be submitted in t he same format as
i n i t i a l reports. I n incident report s, wherein t he initial and f i na l
reports ar e co~ribined, para 6 (Narrative Suriunary) will include as 'af i n a l
statement: "No furt her peports will be subdt . t ed oh this incident unless
l at er i nvest i gat i on warrants ,R
U P I, Reg No 335-6$ Hq TF OREGON, Nar 67.
TF.Oregon Reg 335-6
C- 1
H&Cn,U&iT&S
Ti,SiC FORCB O;bJCO?j (PROiJlSl ~ i < f i ~ )
kPO San Francisco 96374
14 August 19'67
(~ e p o r t s of Serious Crimes or Incidents)
Regulation ?:umber 335-6, t h i s headquarters, dated 21 Karch 1967, i s
changed a s follows:
-
3. Add n. Suicides, attempted sui ci des, a d sel f - i nf l i ct ed gunshot
~iro~md s.
4. a. (?) (Superseded) The TF Frovost bbr shal w i l l not i f y SIR Section,
18th 18' f i r i ~ade, Tele-hone Lens Binh 4775/4611.
4. a. The TF Provost I kr shal t r i l l s ~ ~ h mi t (3) (superseded) Serious,
Incident Ilecorts t o t he Frovost I'arshal, U S d V , t he 18th1T; Eriaade t h r o ~ ~ ~ h
SIiI Section, immediately upon r ecci ct .
FOR WE COF9-;iiIiDiR:
OFFICIAL:
BEAR . POOLE
Colonel, GS9
Chief of St af f
/ s/ ~at t hewTi:. I r vi n
1~iATTU:IX. LYVIN
LTC, AGC
Ad j ut ant General
[See c l e a r copy on f ol l owi ng page]
S
IMMEDIATE
CG T F OREGON CHU LA1
e G I11 MAF DA NANG
S E C R E T CI TE
Subj : O p e r a t i o n a l C o n t r o l ( U)
1. (U) CONFIRMING PERSONAL REPORT, CG, T F OREGON TO CG,
I11 MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE.
2 . ( S ) T F OREGON UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL I11 MARINE
AMPHIBIOUS FORCE EFFECTI VE 2 0 0 0 0 1 H APRI L 1967.
GP4
4 0 3
GEORGE M. WALLACE
C o l o n e l ,
G3
I nf ant r y
.;r:28! , J. ZAHM,
.A.,?+LA, .,..& ws~momGmED
LTC, AGC, A d j Ge n
AT 3 YEAR INTER
VALS. DECLASSI FI ED AFTER 1 2 YRS DODDI R
5200. 10
PRIORITY
CO,TF OREGON ARTY
CO,2DBN,9TH ARTY
CO,2DBN, llTHARTY
CO,2DBN,320TAARTY
CO,3DBN,18THARTY
CO,3DBN,82DARTY
FouoEFT0AvDF-AT . r4%5
SUBJECT: Orientationand.TraininginArtilleryTechniques
1. Reference: Letter,HqTF Oregon,subject;Investigationof
ArtilleryIncidents,AVDF-ATdated17May67.
2. Asstatedinthereferencedletter,."Asystemofdouble
checks,inaccordancewithstandardartilleryprocedures,willbe
utilizedinallgunnery, operations. Detailedinstructionsarein-
cludedintheTaskForceOregon~rti1ler.y ~ield SOP,Appendix2
(Gunneryprocedures)andAppendix4@ire SupportCoordination)t o
. .
AnnexA (Operations)."
3. InadditiontotheTF OregonArtilleryFieldSOP(including
change1) fromtimetotimeotherartilleryproceduresandtechniques
May 67
aredisseminated,usuallyastheresultofa.formalinvestigationof
1 3
428
/s/~ason J. YoungJr.
MASONJYOUNGJR.
Colonel,Artillery /s/o.A. GernerJr.,CPT,ACC,AsstAG
Commanding /t/O.A.GERNERJR.,CPT,AGC,AsstAG
EXHIBIT M-73
PRIORITY O.A. GERNER JR. MASON. J. YOUNG JR.
an artillery incident. This is normally done through artillery
channels as it is not desirable to emphasize these incidents outside
of artillery channels, and the questionsinvolved are normally ohes of
techniques. When the question involved is one of infantry - artillery
tactics, the instructions will be dispatched by CG, TI? Oregon through
command channels.
4. It is essential that these lessotk learned, and detailed
knowledge of proper artil'lerytechniques, be disseminated down to
each officer, NCO and key enlisted man in the gunnery chain. This
is particularly necessary due to rotation of personnel, and is a
continuing task.
5 . One direct support artillery battalion of.TF Oregon has a
most effective method of getting the word out. "Redleg Tips" are
published, which include items such .a$ t& following:
a. One sec'tion'ina battery fired a wrong charge - Re-.
sult one infantryman killed, 3 wounded. What: standard artillery
techniques will prevent this?
b. An FO on a high hill is adjusting in a deep valley in .
front of him. He calls for drop 400. The rounds catch on the hill,
resulting in nmerous casualties to the infantrymen he is supporting.
What can be done to prevent this?
PRIORITY O.A. GERNERJR: MASONJ. YOUNGJR. '
EachofficerandeachkeyNCOintheappropriatepositionofthatDS
artillerybattalionisrequiredtowriteoutananswertotheseques-'
tionsandsubmitthemthroughhis'chainofcommandtothebattery
commanderforreview.
6. Eachaddresseeisrequestedtoinsurethatorientationand
trainingin,artillerytechniquesisconducted,usingmethodsconsidered
appropriatebytherespectivecommanders. Theobjectivesisthat
soundartillerytechniquesareknownandpracticedthroughoutTI?
Oregon.
(For clear copy see following page)
1. Reference: TaskForceOregonArtilleryFieldSOP.
2. Allerraticartilleryroundswillbereportedto'the
TFOregonFSE. Ifnocasualtieshaveresulted,aninformal
investigationofsuchincidentswillbemadebythebattalion
firingtodetermineiftheerraticbehaviorwasduetoan
erroringunneryorduetofaultypowder.
3. Whenanerraticroundisreportedtotheprimary
FDC,cannoneerswillberequiredtofallintotherearof
thepieceinaccordancewithpara8f,Appendix2(Gunnery
Procedures)toAnnexA(Operations)toreferencepara1.
Ifnoerrorsaredetermined,thelotnumberofthepowder,
orsemi-fixedammunition,asappropriate,willbereported
tosupportingordanceasbeingsuspect. Awritteninformal
reportwillberenderedtothisheadquarters.
4. Referenceismadetopara,d, Appendix2toAnnex
oftheTFOregonArtilleryField'SOPconcerningthehandling
andstorageofammunition. Particularcaremustbetakento
avoidunnecessaryhandlingandexposureofpowderincrements
tomoisture.
EXHIBIT M-I05
. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
These standing operating procedures are published for the euidance
ofTF ORtCOEand att:~chedor sup-orting ,@ts. .
Thisdoc wnc :.rill be revised 2nd chanced as necess-7 t o izcor-
pr a t e hproved.procedures and concepts. The formt isdesi-ycdt o
-able changes t o be made as required.
Commanders ami General a d SpecialStaff Officers arerequiredt o
review thisSOP on a continuing basi s andt o submit recomiiendationr for
itsin$rovement.
. RoSOX .
m
OFFICIAL: . .
TSN, %W
21March 1967
Field Standfng'Operating Procedures
I. GEiJUhLo hisSOP has been compiled following t he guide-
l i nesof Field SOPs currentlyin use i nSouth Vietnam.
11. U S This SO? establishes routine arid recurring field
operatf.cnal proxdures xi t hi n Task Force ORZGGN and applies except
when modified by Tr" order,
.
III. SCO?E. These procedures apply t o all units -andm the com-
mand or operational control of t he Task Force. Supporting units
will be familiar with t hi s SOP and, where applicable, w i l l comply.
a, Conformity: Subordinate unit SOPs w i l l conform.
6, Revision: Recommendations for re' dsi onor char.ge w i l l
be forwarded t o t he general st af f section havhg pr i mr y st af f
.
.. r espnsi bi l i t y. Following-coordinationd t h t hegeneral s t af f and
apsroval by t he Chief of St aff, changes wiil be forkarded t o the
Adj ut a~t Cezeri; for a chagenumber and ?ublication,
~7N%XES: A - Operations
E- I nt el l i gence. -
C - Personnel and Administration
D - Logistics
E' 2 Army viation
'F - Engineer Combat Support
C - S l g d
. H - Chemical, Biological and Radiologica: ~ ~ e r a t i o n s
1 - Information
J - Civil Affairs
DISTRIBUTION: Special
OFFICIAL:
*",*>ws;<;&, @,i;>:*i$*:G~2%~%,*~%@@
-::i*f=<~-..&.". L.. ..... .
-
562
TF OBZGN
TSN, XV?I .
ThSK FORCE Oill;%ON
FIELD STANilING 0I;EIXTLiG P i W C ~ ~
TffiLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword
Record of.Changes
Table of Contents
~ i s t r i t u t i o nList
Abbreviations
Definitions
BNNEXES AND BPPrnDITCES
Standing bperst i ng Procedures
A - Operatlcns
Appendh 1- Ccr'z=ti Post
Appendix 2 - ?hsk ?orce 'i'aGtical Operatio:: Center
Appenhix 3 - Close Air Support '
Ap?sx~;i: L - .?re Su?sorz Coordination
A ~ ~ e ~ d i x j - Airmobile Operations
Apper~dk6 - Ai r l i f t Operations
Appendix 7 - Ease Area Securi t y
kppezdix 8- PsychologicalOperations
Appendix 9 - Reports
B - Int el l i gence
C - Persomel . and Administratior.
Appendix 1- Adjutant General
Appendix 2 - Daily Strength Report
AppendFx 3- Int erpret er Control
Appendix 4- Finance
Appendix 5 - Graves Regi s t r di on
Appendix 6 - Command Post Arrangement
Appendix 7 - Reports
D - Logi st i cs
Appendix 1 - Wedical
Appendix 2 - Heports
Appendix 3 - Aerial:.Resu~ply
E - Amy viation
Appendix 1- Search, Rescue and Recovery Operations
Appendix 2 - Org&niz&tiona?d Control
Appendix 3 - Enplojzefit of Arned Helicopters
F - Zn@neer ,Conbat Su2port
Appendix 3 - Landing Zones and . ExtractionZones
Appendix 2 - bridging
Ap?endix 3 -, Barrier and Denial Operations
Appendix 4 - Flinefields
C - Signal
H - Chemical, Bi ol ogi cal a d Radiological Operations
I- Information
J'- 'Civil:Affairs
Appendix 1 - Civil kf f ai z s .Supprt of Sevakti!Yary
Z.eveLc.~,er~t
.AppendL; 2 - Ci-riI .\fklrs 3 e pr t s
AppendL~3 - r;ivil~ Z S i i r sSoapplies
CC
TF ORECON
TSNI ItVN
21 March 1967
TF ORECON
FIELD STANDING OPERATING P~CEDUim
DISTBIbUTION WST
1 USFACV
c/s
1 USARV
G1
4 7thAir Force
G2
b NAVFOHV
'
G3
5 I11 YaF
G4
4 IFFV
G5
4 IIFFV
AG
50 1stmi ne Div
Avn
1 TF XRAY
chap
1 1stLog.Comd
Chem
1 1stAvn Bde
Engr.
1 1st Si gEhle
Hq Comdt
1 18th MP M e
I0
2 34th GS Gp
PI1
1
Si g
1
Finance
1
Yi1 Hist
2
-
swg
HHC, TF 3- mN
Bde
tide
Bde
Sqdn, ACR
Engr Bn ( ~ b t )(-1
Spt Comd
TP Arty
Arty Bn (155T)
ArtyBn (8"/175m (-1
Si g~ n .
A m Bn
$.r;i#Av ja?.:L*.n :;l i . r:. ~i l
. ;ilmrjAviation Contrril Center
Assault;.ircrai' t Coordination bffi cer
Assistc;rr! Task Force $.viation Officer
!iir :31cof %m,~:~:ir,ation
..:.:F5> 52 . . j p~: -: . t ~c, ~
1' 1
iask ?cI*(:c;.-riation Cif fi cer
Cluster LomC Dni t
Col i ~rmd& Co~trol
3 i v i l i an I r regclar gefense Group
Cs t r a l Of5icc, SouthVietnan
Corps Tactlc,a,L
---
Zone
7
mginee- 31~~- ,4,;GdAb
Fcjris'uii Gist:jL.;iion Poi nt '
Free k!orlb Plilitarjr ;\ssist&nceForces
Gr.2~;.:. Re&str&t.ion
C~ v c ~ ~ L : I ~ Y ~ t ';f L'ie:.nar~
I;r..+;c.ry ntt:-p-.?tztion
..r2azcrj;
-
i n t c r ~r e t a t i onH~por t
..-
:m3e2&.z;t? ?t:otcs in'ca,-~.*z.tatir;nZewrt
.jr:in~sidtc.; 3,at?5 Pl;?iic Iff::.irs'jff i ce
L.t'.2 I , i n 3;- c~r:~::Q-~:c&:iofi
gc: , ~. ~ o al:ar.~si-.-.e.;ofifiaieszrice:"atrc;l
' . -.
:~!s~.~c,xJI rri-;n-,for' i ha LiLerzti~rrofSouthVietnam
:is.?L;.fe H:a~iet.
?iozt,h ?'iatnri??.eseAmy ..
Pqjul=* por.:es
Pick-upZ GYL ~
i.:.i&onal Foycea .
l~&&o ~ ~ e s e ~ ~ ; ~ vni t
,;iepcSlic 0:' 'Jietrxn .*xed Forces
..-
;jih~ti~.~ ;";ei>crS
SideLooking I:irbor;le
Tn c t i c c ~ lhlrCont rol Faey
Pact l cai Area of Ersponsibility.
Tzctioal ;;irSu$33rt Elm.efit.
United States A m y Vietnam
-
L',;',"u S t ~ t e sAgency fcr~ n t e r n ~ : i c ~ i l Dwelopment
Viotnamczd !.ir Force . .
?Vi.IAF
SITriYP
..'.
d- . . ~A<
TX: : ~J
'1;'!uR
I-' c-
l.:idfi
u:;.;r&'
USAID
WAF
VNMC ;
VietndesaMuine ::: . : . .>s
- 7. .
t ;u?i
V .~e:;maeseI.'.:;,:!
----
DEFINITIONS
-
Area of Gnerat i of i s (AO)- An ar ea out si det h e ThOH in which US or
FiJL44F oper zt s t a c t i c a l l y f or prescri bed ~ e r i o d s of time. T'nese
areas, and t he r es pons i bi l i t i es and aut hor i t yof US o r Ed&W within
t he area, w i l l be coordinated with RVNXF o f f i c i a l s in t h e course of
operat i onal plznning.
Assault k i r c r s f t Coordinat,ion Offi cer -L).c~) - The U C O isa r at ed
pi l ot and air operat i ons of f i cer on' dut ywith t he TACi. H i s func-
t i on i s t o adv',se 3nd a s s i s t t h e commander and his stafl" ati airlir' t
mat t ers, He works pri mari l y with t he G3 A i r on t a c t i c a l l i f t and
t he Gk and on l o g i s t i c a l l i f t .
Chieu Hoi Profiram -. The "open arms" program of t he RE; t ha t p e d t s
VC and a f f i l i a t e s t o ret urn' t o GVlicontrol of t h e i r o-m f r e e will
under f u l l amnesty anda promise of ret rai ni ng.
Combat S b Spot - Eombhg r a i d by r adar cont r ol l ed bombcr a i r c r a f t
during darkness o r U t e d vi s i bi l i t y.
E a ~ l eFl i eht - Xeliborne i nf ant r yt roops on air a l e r t t o yerform
immediate r eact i on rzissions f or a ground cornander.
.-.
rxtr&czion- The lii' 5ing of combat t r oops byheZc2;%ers f r onter-
r a i n in xhich t he enemyhas t he capabi l i t yt o r e s i s t .
s
Firefl~- A hel i copt er (Kq-i) equipped with sear chl i ght s used t o
i l l u r i n a t e t ar get s ,
Heaw Fi r e Team - Three gunships operat i ng as a t a c t i c a l elenent.
h.sertr'.on - The l i f t i n g of combat t r oops by hel i copt er i nt o a land-
ingzone. Di f f er s from c o ~ b s t assault in thti ns er t i on i s nor nal l y
used i n r ef er ence t o s ecr et i vemovement of a pa t r ol i nt o a smal l ,
i nsecure LZ.
E ~ h t Fi r e Team - TWOgunships operat i ng asa t a c t i c a l element.
Ral l i er - An i ndi vi dual who renounces support of t he JFLSN a d who
vol unt ar i l y surrenders t o GVrj cont r ol under t he "Cm HOIn Fr ogan.
-
Sect or - The mi l i t ar yorgani zat i onal a r e a equivzientGG t he pro-
.
vince. The s ect or chi ef i sa military of f i c e r charged wi t h t h e
s ecur i t yof t h e sect or.
-
SLAR- Si de l ooki ng ai rborne r adar e qui pe nt AN/APS-94 mounted in
OV-1B.
b, 2kf?xlc.. cr at i ng wi t h US:-Llrines, t h ws i s a re.-:uirenent t b a t
- ?.zvan.:.i>warr?ir.g of alla r t i l l e ~ j f i r es be qiven t o t h e TP
Sir.? ;ju;,.;ort Gemsnt 01' t kri ! TOC,which Int ur n :asses t he
i n l',>fimtl.m t o t he USX l i r ect A i r Support Cent er [J),?.SC).
. Thi . 3 j ni ' omt i or , i s the:.!-applied t o t he U3:C Ar t i l l e r y
'v.5:.a3rrg Systs~ncal l ed "i .;iv-a-Plane': , A "Sav-a-Flane"
z7araer isas s i geci t o t;2 nlssionhndret urnsd t o t h e
,.P:L
. Tna u n i t ; g i l l ni4, f i r s unless it b s rsceived z
..j;*-,?-s -- '5'
3 asa
.,..
,.aze" r.mSer except inansz;r-ter:.=y, ~ ; i c h
i'7e:i.j. enmy cont act , I n s uch caszl;, s af et y t o a i r c r a f t
wf1.L be i nsured by postingan a i r s e nt i ne l att he pi ece
and byal er t nes s of t he forward observer o r a i r o b s e - ~ e r
t o ai ypl anes whi ch could cr oss t h e t r aj ect or y. Appendix
' A (TireS u p ~ o r t Coo~ai nat i on) , Tab B(Safeguarding Air-
trart from Ar t i l l e r y
c. S?ca;:tlon@ns a r e coordi nat ed u i t h t h e next hi gher head-
q ~ r t e r s ,
d. Co o r d i r ~a t i ~n with 3VNAFand ot her F:C:;UP:
(1) @: erat i ons o-itside of TAO5:
(a)
I n i t i a l coordi nat i on requi red f o r a l i Task Force
oper at i cns is accomsliahed byt h i s headq~ar t er s .
(b)
Suborclin=te uni t s a ~ c o n ~ l i s h contin- Cet ai i ed a ~ d
uingcox~i i . nat i on -&tk s ~ r o p r i z i e ;ie;kents-l,
kt t a' ; i on and ~e c t or / ~ub' - i e c t a r Acivisors i n
as s i gr ~ed!,!I,
(2j0r:eratioris i z i TXGR: Co ma d e r s :.riii bsure t h a t direct
and c o n t i r ~ ~ o u s coardi nat i on i s sl ai nt ai r~edwi t h ap-
pl i cabl e ~ect oz-/ sub-sect or Advisors. To assi st in
accomplishing tnis end, L1;Os iiill be ezplo;7ea at
Sect or and Sub-SeEtors,
3 ) RoadSecuri t y:
. Route cl earance and s e ~ u r i t yfo: s e p r a t e , Sr i g a a e . :
operat i ons hnd resupsl y cofivoys w i l l be coordi-
x t e wi t h t he TF(33, ap2ropri at e Se~i i or Advisors arrd
c o mn d e r s of F;Z-%I"zorice, ~ed,
( L )
RF~ : ! uI S~ f or TAO201"XO:
( s )
Recuest f o r change t o psmansfit '2liO3 is f o mr d e d
t o t h i s headquart ers i n fi ve ~cpl es-wi t h justi-
f i cat i on f o r change,
(b)
Recuest f o r b ~ i g a d e A0 i s suS,Pitted in f i v e copi es
t o t h i s heacquart ers a n k h u z or' fi ve days
pr i or t o t h e start of t h e opera" ciOn.
5. F R o c ~ 3 ~ t L ~ ~ >
a. A::i.;anah 1( ~ o n ~ a n d Fost )
b.
Ap!.lcndix 2 (TI? Tact i cal Operations Cent er)
c. k ~ i endix 3(Cl ose Airsupport )
d .- AT; endkr 4 ( Fi r e Supi:ort coordi nat i on)
e. ;:,\;.endj~: 5 ( ~ i r mo b i l e Operation)
, . ire)
f. Appendix 6 ( Ai r l i f t operat i ons)
g. Appendix 7 ( ~ a s eArea secur i t y)
6. TRAINING.
Units not part i ci pat i ng i n operations and t hose conduct-
base ar ea securi t y missions cond'uct uni t t r ai ni ns- programs.
hpha s i s i son squad, sect i on and platoon t a c t i c s in ac-
cordance with appl i cabl e trainiq di r ect i ves and l essons
learned.
7. MGSILITY: Appendices 5 and 6.
8. REPORTS: Appendix 10.
ROSSON
MG
APPENDICES: - Command Post
- TF Tact i cal Operations Cent er (TFTOC)
- Close A i r Support (CAS)
- Fi r e Support Coor di yt i on (FSC)
5 - Airmobile Operations -
6 - Ai r l i f t Operations
7 - Base Area Securi t y
8- Psychological Operations
5 - Reports
DISTRIBLTION: Special
W*
WALLACE '
TSN, RVN
21March 1967
.Appendix4 iire Support coordination) t o Annex A (operations) t o
.TFOREGON Field SOP
1. TASK FORCEFIRESUPFORT ELENl3NT (FSE).
a. Composition: The Task Force Fi r eSupport Element (BE)
i s composed of t he f i r e support coordinate-r, duty team
chief, operations and i nt el l i gence representatives from
HQ Task Force Ar t i l l er y, and l l af son of f i cer s from fi re
support agencies asrequired.
b. Location: Component of Task Force Tact i cal Operations Center
located adjacent t o t he operations element.
c. The FSEcontains those elements necessary t o control t he
f i r e s of t he Task Force Ar t i l l er ywhich arenormally found
i n a Division Ar t i l l er yFi re Direction Center.
2. TAXEX m3m-GSYSTEI4.
a. Task Force prefix: The l e t t e r (Y) is assigned t o Task Force
a s an i dent i f i cat i on prefi x f or allt arget s.
b. U n i t prefixes: The originating d t or agency i s indicated
by a second l e t t e r . The assignment of t h i s l e t t e r is as
follows:
A - DS Arty Bn ( ~ d e A) N - ACR Sqdn
B - DSArty Bn( ~ d e B) P - Inf Bn A ( Me A)
C - DSArty Bn ( ~ d e C) Q - Inf BnB ( ~ d e A)
D o * R- h*3nC ( a e A)
E- GS Arty Bn (1551;mn)(T) S - InfBn k ( ~ d e B)
F- GSArtyBn (8"/1?5m)(~~. ) T - I nf Bn B(Bde B)
G - * U - I nf BnC (0de B)
H e * V- Inf BnA ( ~ d eC)
J - Task Force FSE W - Inf Bn B ( MeC)
K- Brigade A X- Inf BnC ( Me C)
L- Brigade B . Y - *
M- Brigade C Z - *
*Assigned by FSE t o attached units asrequired.
c. Numerical designations: Units assigned a l e t t e r pr ef i x use. .
t ar get nmbers 001through 999. Units al l ocat eblocks 'of
numbers t o subordinate units, Targets aredesignated by
two l e t t e r prefixes and t hree di gi t s.
EXAMPLE: YE 005 - ' a t ar get planned by t he GS155mm Bn.
YK102- at ar get planned by Bde A.
d. Groups of Fires: Originating units assign a number preceded
by Task Force pr ef i x and followed by t he unit's i dent i f i -
cat i on l e t t e r . (Example: ' P~J- t he f i f t h groupof f i r e s
planned by t he FSE).
3. s m .
a. Air Safety:
c. Shore Fi r e Control Part i es normally c o n t p l and adj ust naval
gunfire. Adjustment of naval gunfi re by A r q observers i s
done ordy i n emergencies.
d. Combat servi ce support of naval par t i es is by units t o which
attached.
e. I f A i r Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (AFGLICO)is attached,
ANGLICO channels through FSE ar e employed f or naval gunfi re
f . Task Force Apt i l l ery 1s responsible for necessary survey t o
l ocat e urg r ~ v d gunfi re radar beacons,
6. BATTLEFIE23 I LUECKATI ON.
a. No r est pi ct i on on illuminatior, by organic weapons of maneuver
uni t s except f or pri or co~r di nat i onwith adjacent units.
b. I l l ui dnat i on by a r t i l l e r y on aut hori t y of di r ect support
a r t i l l e r y,
7. MI NI MI ZI NG NONCCfiiBATANT CASUALTIES.
It i s obvious t hat us di r ect ed or unwarranted artillery tires
i nt o areas occupied by noncombatants adversely affect t he
Government of Vietnaxi ef f or t t o win t he pmpl e. Artillerymen
at every echelon wi l l plan and cor;duct f i r e support i n accor-
dagce with t he f o l l ~ ~ n q guidelines.
% l ) Both t he mi l i t ar y and psychological obj ect i ve of each .
operation w i l l be considered, Prest ri kes in popula-
t ed areas, reconnaissance by f i r e i n t o h d e t s , and
poorly sel ect ed harassing and i nt er di ct i on ' i res are
examples of militarg measures which will be counter-
productive.
(2)
A thorough and cont hui ng program t o emphasize both
s h o x and long range importame of ninircizing, non-
combasant casual t i es w i l l be cozduct ed within each
a r t i l l e r y wit, Troop i ndoct ri nat i on bri efi ngs will
be held before each operation ts include: l ocat i on of
noncombatants and ot her f r i endQ forces, measures t o
prevent kat uai f nt er f e~ence,s a f e ~ yprecautions f or
fi re support, d e s of mgageniez;, ides+,ificstior, of
rec;agnit$oc si gnzl s, une=gency procedures3 ad ot her
appr op~i at e matt e x .
(3)
The proper aployment of a r t i l l e =y w i l l cont ri but e t o
t he prevention of unnecessary darage co l i ves and prop-
er t y of noncombatants. Fi r e scpporc of operations
should be planned in coordina',ion wi t h province and
d i s t r i c t chi efs with due regara so ~ ~ l ~ i t y of plans.
A US APtfllw Liaison Offi cer shouid be ut i l i zed for
this purpose, US Advisors ean be asked t o p e r f o d
this Function i n t he absence of ot her l i a i s on personnel.
TF OFLXOii .
TSN, RVN
21lJmch 1967
Annex B ( ~nt el l i gence) t o TFOREGGN Field SOP
1, REFERENCES:
a. FM 30-5
be FM 31-22
C. MACV D i r 38i-21
d. USARVReg 190-2
e, USARVReg 643-20
f , USkRV Reg 117-5
2, MISSION.
To provide accurate, timely arduseful i nt el l i gence on t he enemy,
weather and t errai n. and t odeny t he e n e q access t o similar in-
formation on fri endl y forces.
a 3, GENZRAL,
a. El ect r i cal l ytransmitted intelligence messages are i dent i fi ed
by i nser t i ngt he word nSPHII\TX" between the secur i t y cl assi f i -
cat i onand the message c i t e number,
b, Assessment of enemy ki l l ed in action:
(1)
The number of enemy conf2med t o have been killedinact i gn
i s deterrcfned by body count, Body count, hob-everoi snot
synmmouswith body recovery but i sa r e a l i s t i c appraisal
of circumstancest hat leavesno do& t hat a speci fi cnum-
ber of enemy haye bezn killed,
(2)
The num5er of ecemy p~obabl y ki l l eddoe, * no%include:those
who were confimed t o have been kill&. Probable k i l l s
are based on the q e q being i n sspeci fi c areaa t a.
part i cul ar time when effect i ve f k e s werebraught t o bear
on t he area and t he evidence i ndi cat esths-; a number
were killedalthough no bodies were recover&,
4. CAPTUREDMATERIEL,
a, DefMtion: Includes a l l wespocs, m- d t i o ~ s , focd 3f'2ff9
medicine, clothing and other equipment taken frm t he en-.
b, Evacuat.ionr h U weapons, except US Brd thcas authorized
t ~ophi es , areevacuated through i nt el l i gsnr e char~16Lst o G2,
Samples of mmitions, two quart sof f o d st uffs, and saniples
of medical supplies, wearing appareland u ~ ~ L equi pent
ar e al so&acuated, Spotr epar t sar-o, subnStted deseribing
f ul l yallmateriel andthe circuns,*ices of captcre.
c, Trophies: Certain captured rl at eri el =eet,~rg, the c r i t e r i a pre-
scribed i n USARV Reg 643-20 may be retained by unitsor bdi -
viduals a s wartrophies. Processingw i l l be i n accordance
with referenced regulation.
5, CAPTUREDDOCUMENTS:
. a.
Captured documentsar ebatzhed together, described on a t ag
accompanyingt he docwnents, t o include t he c i r c ~l s t a nc e of'
capture, and forwarded through intelligence channels toGS,
t%EJlr'sterial and are
delivered t o the nearest Radio Research Unit,
c,
The capture of film arid tape recordings i s reported immediately
by spot report,
6, DETAINEES.
a. Detainees w i l l be segregated and cl assi fi ed as prisoners of
war, returnees, c i vi l defendants, innocent ci vi l i ans or
doubtful case%
b, A l l detainees will be treated humanely in accordance with
the rul es of the Geneva: Conven~ion. A J l will be tagged
using USARV Form 36& and af t er p r e l h b a r g q u e s t i o n i ~f or
Wormation of immediate t act i cal value, w i l l be released
t o the Military Intelligence Detachment interrogators
accompanying each brigade, After completion of i nt er r o-
gation by MD personnel, detainees will be disposed of
a s directed by . the Provost Marsha3,
c, Sick or wounded detainees w i l l be provided medical treatment
t o the extent necessary t o save l i f e or limb, Seriously
wounded personnel will be treated or evacuated through
normal medical evacuation channels,
7- AI R RECONNAISSANCEo
a, Maximum use i s made of organic, -attached and di rect support.
a i r reconnaissance resourceso
b, G2 Air coordizates the a i r recon?aissance ef f or t within
t he Task Force,
c, Air reconnaissance requests wi l l be submitted on YAW Fom
248, through chEt ~e+ t o t he C2-Air,
8- LC4JC RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS0
a. Long range reconnaissance patrols operate under the staff
supervision of t he G2, and when employed in brigade o p e r e
t i ons are placed under'the operational control of the
,
brigades,
b, Pat rol s axe normally i nf i l t r at ed and exfi l t rat ed by means of
helicopter and are planned f or a maximum st ay of fivedays.
c, Reports are transmitted by radio t o the forward operating
base from where they are immediately passed t o the G2 Oper-
at i ons Officer i n the TF WC,
90 MAP DISTRIBUTION AND STORA(3E;o
a.
Uni t requisitions for maps are processed through i n t e u e n c e
channels t o t he G2-Air, who exercises st aff supervision aver
the map distribution and storage program,
b, U n i t conrmanders are responsible for maintaining a basic load
of maps in accordance with USARV Reg U7-5,
or Waps f o r Task Fccce Headquarters elements will bebproc&,
stored, and issued by the G2-Air,
Appendix3 (Bnployment of Aried HeUco?~er.~; tto Ar~snE(A:=,- 6. . ~~at i dnj
to TFOREGONField S9P
1- GENERAL,
. ,
a. . pdssion~.:iiLssic.nsfc:: ,cy. :,-y-z ~ y . 5.<ls.-j~.< i i e 2 ir,;; ;=-:.-1e jj.sz-... - - A *
types, ;
.-
y . , - - :.: .;--c ' ;1. *?0?
(1) 3scorh,,
(2) Retonz.-,issan,: G 2nd ~er:?j*--~t.y,
(3) Fi r e zupporz,
aym~:d-,,x~-:-i. 3r
:,;
: . : + f 321<, ~= b, A-en:.: Aliiircraf<2-4 :.h9 5;
ing sgsswAs,f i r ed jyt k e pi:>?. z- .:..--pc
(1) x-3 (43 2,';5.'- ~~o:.;i.;-,~),
(2)
E-5{huto;catic. ~C;zj. gr.cj-;~.-.z..: la:--.c..ne..:.!,
,(3) x-6( c ud' 7,- :&.s2C; : : , : ; . Fr -15 r!,;..; ,
(4) x-16( ~ . : ~ b : ~ ~ ~ar.:i ;IIj *. ;..< s.:! .::, - :- - ! <: : c,.: 7 :,>-. '7
(5)
ComSi~tinnol'2.;:: ~y:! j~:., T: , :-;;2; iy.;,: L.., <a
( 6 )
Inaddit:~r,eazh i;ir:--a",. 23 ayz sl .>;;r^*
. .
r. 7 x 0 7,,fem.
guns b. fi ~h~ 2 9f'i:-e8 f,-&x .:,azgc < - , 2 ~ 5 :,-
-'J
5,k.o ?=?-+;
chief anda d o x g : r ~ ? ~ ,
2. H!.PLOrnST*
a Requsst for jxpport.: &,y;; s!: f.:r s.zc< fi?-.:.-,;t.?~ mprjr.; is
mad'e though MCC X!.J LCC n>c::5 5fi.- dzr pre:?LPGds s i or :
..
exeeui;ion, %er.genzx Fequas--A:TACU. p-J :essez &?r/ r u * , 3: AT
b, Eseop4ds s i ons ; zscsr:. m:ssi~:~-;- =.r,-..i -,- .f02fZght 3 ; ~-.;..21c r - w. -nC::
heucopter f X7iar.s ;r< t:"?~.,:; -.?.:bLr.l,~i:3rA:::;; = ,
(1)l m l e 2':. !o,-t=cg ;;.!1e~ . ~ : : ~ . : l ~ g'z liftfcp~t.;~n;;,
-
ci
heEcupt.er.;. 5 f.2's-J,.sFrez : ;
<
~.>a4.==.~.1,:rs.5sy,-;;rL
f i r e strffic,es-Ly ?.c ez;!w?'fi:~ ;if% f'b,ri-;-~,oz5.2 2555
~t -erOP -83a.inrl t he dargr:.- t;:.= .. --&
. .
(2) For ve&clg aor,.::,j- .:~.5:;r.' :?; :.. 5:; -,? ::;*. :ie:: ,ql;ser< Ls
of recr~11~,ai
The
-.LC.::-;z::.:.~Lcs;.;
-
tY : : :l . : 3: ~ 5 6 55.2n.j.=
ij-...--...- : . A.. ,-,,--L,d :i 5y;.;,:>-:::;-A:,:
. -.
I.: L;;..:
-
.
.,.-<j:itsy:,- --I;;:-+
.
" ax '?; ...- -. -
~ C L ~ ~ ~ S ; indude st,&rt-p i n t , -21 ,,,. ,._. .. :i;e;i-: 2:. i
cri t i cal paf ct s 07 .3r3a?*
c,' Reconnaissance ap,d s%,>urit,vg,TI^.: 2%:-..--5;=z , ; ~ ; .2 a:..-, -. J .: ?-::-jri+~
mission ise~~bir>>C) vLt.i;65332$. ... ~ ; , : 2 ~ ~ ~ f . ~ + ~ ~ ~2;'..:b 57i ~. -
Thea-amez!.
.. -
. .
dependent firet.emz, :-.-:+'.;'5.5 p: :r,:~..:- :f i g T.E:--
essaxy9ems forr z ~or ~a f ~s &r : . e AC.L fi.r+ by f.iye ,i-i.fficisirr
p e r toer'fectlveljz engagr "31: F . E P T ~ fargi-:' ;-~~
d', Firesuppol-t.: s~:.t-,de< 'fv~m21; Two z y p s off i . r e 5~1:U
copters: are&fb? bqs &L';& p=L~t;&-:gey; ' ; f ; ye, ?:S+ Ab A... 7 ?.
contact between p,;'v;indt ; ~ o ? p ~ .
' - -.nda-
LY, ~ ai.-;craf'.:*::.I-I.-.~-
-.
' ;
tory priortoirLtihti7lg gbx: .:his .lur;?z?, e,~,>;.i ..:,- -35
"..5--
.
marktheir poai t i o~2t o inst.,-%:ha% .:.&, gua
*m-;uL, AJ. . A .
- 7
I--;.:ation on'the ground {tr.o:Np$
' .
i;! l i n e ma:rir o?, h :.:;-r,>:s i : 6
center p=;;it.ios:), Cur. :;;-:l~s ;,.upp:.rt; &::our.,:'. .. wiIL ";t";opi : y
d e u v e ~ yofo-je~haa<firs$ikk2hl,-.f r . 2 ~a h0:f.r ,. :':c.
. -
6.-k~ . l 1 5
forwa~d' ?ugh%, Gro?.!nd ~nc ~. z ; n~c i * rs c..ri5;;.:, a,.:-I. per s :.:~z:~:ci 2:
the'fact, that, expends? bras3m y fal l . Ir?", iir.i.lnd!.:r f~-, :;c. ?;
when overhed i u deli.vereci, Sro.ad .C.TO:$:; =eke <;,ri.??;.,
i f feasible, during pe~ioC.;fovsrheari Cir2go
eo Rules of engagacnt,:: . - . .
51; : : t ke +*.-.a.&'r-t;::., - ..
-r -. .. 4.
(1)
One s c o r t missior, l.,~t.'n z.r.aj,s.:c;?91> -
suppy3.,secLd ?:::?pEY+
s k c . 5
.*..
...
;-.-. z t ..
''7 ~ ~ ; ~ ~ , j ~ ,,,_ :: :=, ,
C
- ' ~ ~ 7 , ~ -,'r;? g,-.s;;$ Tjr:.+, %her. .2nl$ .,&cr, al;p----:.5a d ; : : : . L- ~&"L~~; - . a Y
*...,9.....,. ,.. --.,---.*..,?, '
w v 7,qher. .infret) ffl;+ 2 . 3 ~ : ~ L. ..' - . ...j ...Ac;t:~ z::,~,=,
..-J.:-
--,-i .+A?.
. , ~'$1- engaged ~ t h ~ i f :.>r, app:c.c.a',. 3 -,-
(2)
Arne& hexcopt,ers2 ~ 2
.
n&,
.
pe:-d.t,tc.~,7.3 :ci,srf's.rs ~2%;:
art i l l eryfi res ;indj,:.? ';i;t.;cs:, a<r str.',ker; 5c. t arcj
pe dt t e d-to ~ e l o : . t ts-gste: cz cpi;3::.;~i.:;y &ridwit.?-
dpawir-op enemy' . f ~~ces t h e pk?' r.ezy .:"* f i * ~ ~ ex&cf
a i r strikes 3r x=ii21eri,fi:r=e,
..
(3)
On si ngl e team&ssions er;g2gemsn'; 3: r.&rgF,Psi ~ e r r;%
+,&e piace ur,til aleaysdwi t . 5 ~ ~ ? p f . ; - ~ & .., ..c a;.o g"at=;i -.--rids.-
(4)
In 9uppcr.t ofg ~ c a ~ f,-;.;ps, SLY . * , : t . ~ ~ g e t . ~ ~ a t t.h$ t5 p=j:-iq"
identff i ed a s horti& bef o x engagasn:*
DISTRIBUTION: Special
TF OPSON
TSN, RVx
21Ifarch 1967
~ ~ ~ e n d i x ~e p o r t s ) t o Annex J ( ~ i v ' i l ~ f f a i r s ) t o 2 ( ~ i v i 1 ' ~ f f a i i - s
TF OMZON Field SOP
FtwEXmJCISS.
a. USXRVRegulation 515-1 ( ~sychol ogi cal Operations-Xilitary
Civic Action),
b. I11XAF Grder 175G,1( ~ a s i c Ccxept s f or Civic hction).
c. IIIf&F Order 5&03 ( Cr i t er i a f or Civic Action projects).
d. 111I~IF/I?CC\: 5081, lf-(policy and Requireaents f or Reporting
Civic Action ~r o g r a m) ,
8. 11114AFOrder 5m, 7 (~ol!.cyon Sol at i un~ay'xiientj .
f* F O ~ C ~ / S AICorps Order 3043,2 (~oncocbatznt Casualties,
Civic ~ct i on/ ~sychol ogi cal Operation Plans).
m R T S*
Itisimportant t hat each unit docuaent c i v i l a f f a i r s zct i vi t y,
and keep t he commander informed of?progress and accomplish-
ments.
a. Referenced publications, para 1,and' r e p r t f or m willbe
di st r i but ed as required.
b. Re ~o r t schedule:
~40rt -R-* Due Date
Daily Civic Action Act i vi t y Para l c Daily
~ o n t k ~ Fi f t h day of month Civic Action ~ e p o k . Para 2e
I n i t i a l BACKLASH Para If As required
InterimBACKLLSH Para If A s required
Mil5tar-y Civic Action Pro-
j ect Request Formzt Para 2g As rec;q&ed
c. Units t o report. Battalions.?nd sepa-rzte com?ulies submit
reports through connand channels. Xonthly Civic Action
Report only submitted by brigade an6separ i t e bat t di on.
d. aiail^ Civic Action Act i vi t yRepcrt. T: B A (Daily Civic
ActionAct i vi t y~ e p o r t ) . 2ecords t he det ai l s of aaily
act i vi t y. ~ a r r a t i v eportion inclxdes informition not
covered elsedhere i n r e ~ o r t . Reporting period 0600-0600
hours dai l y.
e, Monthly Civic Action Report. Reports act i vi t i es perfomed
by units duringmonth. Brigades submit re2ort in accor-
dance with reference la, above, through co;mnand channels.
f. Initialand InterimBACKLASH. TiB B (Fornut f o r Serious
~ncident/%ACKLEiS~ . Furnis hes i nfo mt i o n on ~ e p o r t )
i nci dent involving injuryt o T?ictnamesenationals.
Re-
port as soon as possible.
g. Proj ect Request. TABC (Military Civic Action Proj ect
Request ormamat). Advises of det ai l s of p r o p s ed proj ect
d establishes basi s f or i ssue of ci vi c act i onsupplies.
ROSSON
bc
TABS: A - DailyCivic Action Activity Report
B - r ' omt for Serious I ~ C ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ / B A C K L A S H Report
C. - Military Civic Action Proje.ct Request Format
OFFICIAL:
CONKLIN
G5
TF OREGON
TSN, RW
21&rch 1967
Tab B ormamat f or Serious I n c i d e n t / ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i ? ~ ~ ~ e p o r t ) t o Appendix 2
(Civil Affairs Reports) t o Annex J ( Ci vi l ~ f f a i r s ) t o TF
OREGON Fi el d SOP
1. Type of incident.
2.
Time and date of incident,
3. Location of incident. Re ~o r t t he exlict bocatlos, 2s- zap
gr i d coordinates and i dent i f i abl e lad,.zzrks, d e s t o t he
nearest t om, cit.y o r vi l l age,
4. Name, grade, and organisation of i n a i v i d d r enaer bg report.
5. Name of person(s) involved, t o include victims, si bj ect s and
witnesses, including i nfomat i on a s t o t hei r :
a. Grade o r t i t l e .
b. Fi r s t name, mi ddl einitial, lastname,
c. Service number,
d. Organization or address,
e. Sex 'and dat e of bi r t h,
f.
If ci vi l i an, i ndi cat et he i r st at us, i, e,, DhC, dependent,
etc., i n place of servi cenumber,
6. A complete narrat i ve srmsllary of f a c t wl information concerning
t he incident, \ hen indicated because of t he nature of t he
incident t he extent of i nj ur i es t o personnel and e s t i mt e a
dol l ar value of dainages or l os s i d L l included.
7.
Status and l ocat i on of ~er s onnel involved,
8.
Designation of t he organiza$ion or office, mi l i t ar gand civ-
ilian,conducting t he investigation,
9.
Statement as t o act ual o r anticipated reaction, by t he c i v i l
populace, t o t he Gci dent and news items r el at i ve t o t he in-
cident.
10. Include a statement $ k t the l oc s l ~ 2 / ~ 2 o r Int el l i gence Officer
haso r hasnot been not i fi ed of this incident,
11. Additional information if applicable,
ROSSON
MG
DISPRIBUTION: Special
OFFICIAL:
COmN
05
*AMERICALReg335-8
HEADQUARTERS
AMERICALDIVISION
APOSanFrancisco 96374
REGULATION 28January1968
NUMBER335-8
CombatActionReports(RCSAVDF-GC1)
1. PURPOSE. Toprescribepoliciesandproceduresgoverningthe
submissionofCombatActionReports.
2. GENERAL. a. Thisregulationisapplicabletoallunits
assigned,attachedorundertheoperationalcontroloftheAmerica1
Division.
b. Theinformationcompiledfromthesereportswillbeused
foranalysis,publicationoflessonslearnedandhistoricalpurposes.
c. ACombatActionReportdoesnotsupersedetherequirement
foraCombatOperationAfterActionReportattheterminationofa
namedoperation.
3. RESPONSIBILITIES. a. G3isassignedstaffresponsibilitiesfor:
(I)
CollectionofCombatActionReports.
(2) Disseminationofinformationofaninmediatevalueby
CombatNewsletter.
(3) Publicationofaquarterlysummarypamphlet.
(4) InclusionofCombatActionReportsinappropriate
historicalfiles.
( 5
CirculationofCombatActionReportstodivision
commandandstaffagenciesforinformation.
b. UnitCosmanders:
(1)
Submitareportonactionsinvolvingalessonlearned,
asignificantengagementorasdirectedbythisheadquarters.
W h i s regulationeupersedesTFOReg335-8,21March1967
EXHIBIT D-31
AMERICALReg335-8
(2)'-Submit reportstotheCommandingGeneral,America1
Division,-ATTN:
AVDFLGC:(DOT) infivecopieswithintendaysofthe
action.
(3) SubmitreportsinaccordancewithformatatInclosure1.
(4) DisseminatepublishedCombatActionmaterialtolowest
possibleechelon.
4. REFERENCE. MACVDir335-8.
(AVDF-GC
FORTHECOMMANDER:
OFFICIAL:
ROBERTH. HUSSER
Colonel,GS
Chief.ofStaff
DONALDY. B. CHUNG
LTC,GS
AdjutantGeneral
1Appendix
FormatforCombatActionReport
DISTRIBUTION:
BPlus-
50- AVDF-
APPENDIXI
COMBATACTIONREPORT
Theformatindicatedbelowwillbeusedasaguideforafteraction
reportsofdesignatedcombatactions. Paragraphsnotapplicabletoa
particularactionmaybeomitted.
SUBJECT:CombatActionReport(RCSAVDF-GC1)
TO : CommandingGeneral
America1Division
ATTN: AVDF-GC(DOT)
NAMEORTYPEOFOPERATION.
2. DATESOFOPERATION. (Inclusivedatet i e group).
3. LOCATION: Nameorcoordinatesasapplicable.
4. CONTROLORCOMMANDHEADQUARTERS. (Nexthigherfromengaged
force1.
5. REPORTINGOFFICER. Listthenamesoftheunitcommanders
engagedinthisoperation.
6. TASKORGANIZATION: Indicatecontrolheadquartersandunits
attachedordetached.
7. SUPPORTINGFORCES. Listall.supportingforces,bothplanned
andactuallyused,andindicatetheireffectiveness. Supportingforces
includeart-i 1lery,navalforces,USAlVNAFairandUSHC/USAaviation. If
airwasrequestedstatewhetherpreplannedorimmaediaterequest,reaction
timeandeffectiveness. Stateforall: Sizeorquantityofforce(s1,
howandwhenemployed,resultsoreffectiveness,andtimeliness.
8. INTELLIGENCE. Givebriefestimateofenemystrength,location,
dispositionandsituationanticipatedinobjectiveareapriortoopera-
tiontoincludecurrentoperationand,withinclassificationlimits,
thesourceofintelligence. Makebriefstatementofenemystrength
andsituationactuallyfoundasoperationwasconducted. Nameenemy
unitsidentifiedandanyothersignificantintelligencegained. Include
overlay,ifappropriate,anddescribetheterrainintermsofcoverand
concealment;obstacles,criticalfeatures,observationandavenuesof
approachandweatherintheareaofoperations. IncludeCAIPSYWAR
evaluationofthepopulationandattitudes,whenappropriate.
APPENDIXI,AHERICALReg335-8
9. MISSION. Statemissionasdirectedbyhigherauthority. Ifthe
missionwasself-initiated,statededucedmission.
10. CONCEPTOFO P - .
Includewho,what,when,where,andhow
fororganic,attachedandsupportingunitstoincludefiresupport. Include
sketchofoverlaywhenappropriate.
11. EXECUTION. Giveinchronologicalorder,anarrativestatement
ofevents. Startwithreceiptofissuanceoforderandendwithtermina-
tionofoperation. Indicatetimelapsebetweendateoperationwascon-
ceivedanditsimplementation. Highlightsignificantactionsandlist
losses,bothfriendlyandunfriendlyastheyoccurred. Indicatethedura-
tionofaction(contacts)andstatecoaarnicationcapabilityduringcon-
tact. Staterangeinmtersatwhichtheinitialcontactoccurred. Indi-
catethedurationofactionandaveragerangeofengagement. Include
unusualtacticsandtechniques,civilaffairs,psywaractivities,deception
andimportantdecicionsincludinguseofsupportingforcesbythecommander
toinfluenceaction. Supplementwithsketches,pictures,mapsasappro-
priate.
12. RESULTS. S e r i z e personnelandequipmentloeseb,bothfriendly
andenemy. Indicatewhetherenemyequipmentwasdestroyedorcaptured.
Regardingfriendlyforces,indicatenumberofpersonnelandquantitiesof
equijmentlostseparatelybyAWN, CIDG,RF/PF,US,FreeWorldForces,
andotherappropriateforces.
13. AIXINISIRATIVEHATTERS. Noteadequacyofadministrativeplans,
coPoentingonproceduresoractionswhichhinderedoraidedtheoperation.
Indicate,asappropriate,thefollowing:
l
a. Supply,includingmethodsandtechniquesorresupply. Comment
oncombatloads,anmudtionandweaponscarriedbyassaulttroops.
b. Maintenance
c. Treatmentofcasualtiesandevacuationandhospitalization.
d. Tranrportation
f. Medicalevaluation
14. SPECIALEQUIPMENTANDTECHNIQUES. Cowtentoneffectivenessof
specialequipmentortechniquesusedsuchasscoutdogs,personnelcarriers,
air-groundmarkingsystem,grenadelaunchers,a r i m r supportboats,etc.
1 COMMANDERSANALYSIS. Includeananalysisoftimeliness,effec-
tivenessandadequacyoflessonelearnedwhicharenotcoemontomostoper-
ations, Thereportshouldincludecoverageofplansoractionstakenwith
noncoaabatante,innumbersaffected,controlled,evacuated,medicallytreated
relocated,tec. Includeanyknowncorrectiveactionstaken.
16. RECOMMENMTIONS.
SignatureBlock
APPENDIXI,AMERICALReg335-8
HUDQUARIXRS
AMEUCAL DIVISION
APO Sun Franoiaoo 96374
1. (U) PURPOSE. Thi s regul at i on eet abl i ehes o r i t e r i a f o r employ-
ment of f i r e ower i n support of combat operat i one wi t hi n t he Republio of
Vietnam (INN7 and i s appl i cabl e t o al l fire. regardl eas of del i ver ymeen.,
2. (u)SC~PE. Thi r ngr r l . t i on i r appl i oabl e to illc a r k t and a a a h t
eupport n n i t r assigned, a t h e b e d o r i n support of t he l be r l oa l gi vi rl on.
3. (u)JSETHITIOP~. a. Tact i aal Area of Ebegonsi bi l i t y (TAOR).
A land ar ea i nvUoh reeponeibility/8uthorityi sv o i f i o a l l y arri gned t o
t he commander of t h e ar ea f u r oonduot of t a o~oa . 3. oper at i me. The
cnrm~nder of t he TAOR i r reuponri bl a f o r oont rol end ooordination 61 all
a ot i vi t i e e wi t hi n i t sboundary,l e s s t hoee a a t i v i t i e s r p a o i f i d l y ret ai ned
under di vi si on o r hi gher herdquart ers oont rol .
b. Area of Operations (AO). A l and area inwhich u S / W uni t s
may oonduot t a a t i oa l operat i ons a f t e r r e o e i v i q approval from t he ICTZ
oarmander. The conarander of t he A0i s responsi bl e f o r ooordination and
oont rol of a l l a o t i v i t i e s vitbin i t r bollndaq. An A0i e t r a n r i t o q i n
nat ure. There i e no i nt ent i on of rrpainlng i n tha am. once t h e prosaribed
miseion has beenaaoomplilhad.
o. Speoi fi ed St r i ke Zen0 (SSZ). An arod by YC/WA whioh
cont ai ns no popul at i on nor di mt i nct i vel ymarked hoepi t al e o r rsl i . gi ourl y
o r pol i t i oa l l y si gni f i cant st ruct ures. A S9Z i s d e e i p t e d by t he ICTZ
commander on request t hr u ooarand ohannels andoons t i t ut es pr i or pol i t i oa l
cl earance; h o me r , t he conduot of f i r e mud, be inaoaordance wi t h t he
est abl i shed r ul e s of engagement.
d. Free Fi r e Zone (FFZ) . An ar ea deeignated by t he reaponei bl e
pol i t i c a l aut hor i t y ( ~ s t r i c t / ~ r o v i n c e chi ef) i n whioh pol i t i c a l cl earance
has been grant ed f or t he peri od 8peciTied. Mi l i t ar y olearance and
compliance wi t h t he est abl i shed r ul e s of engagement ar e required.
e. No q i r e zone (NPZ). An area est abl i shed by t he ICTZ commander
i n which no mpport i ng armsf i r e w i l l be del i vered under anycircumstancee.
DOWNGRADED AT3 YR
INTERVALS;DE~ASSIFIED
AFTER 12 YRS
DOD DIR5200.10
587
Religioue establishments, f r i endl y population o r ot her pol i t i oa l l y al gni f-
i oant obj ect s are n o ~ l l y 'found within t hese areas. No-Zire Zonee m y be
-
l ooat ed wi t hi n AOt s and rsy o r ray not hnve f r i endl y foroes l ooat ed witpin
them. Designation of a No a i r e Zone dues not pmolude raneurer by ground
f or oes through t he ar ea if pr i or mi l i t ar y and pol i t i c a l cl ear anai ha8 been
obtained. . Wi t h t he exception of t he uae of supporting fi ree, rules of an-
gagement f o r ground aanewer uni t s a s eet abl i ahed herei n apply vhi l e inside
a NFZ.
f . Observed Fi re. &pl oyrent of f i r e support under .thodi r eat
obeervation and cont rol of an a r t i l l e r y fonsard/ ai r observer, PAC or
ot her oompetent i ndi vi dual .
g. Unobeemed Fi re. Rp l o p e n t of fire aupport wi t h no obmrver
oapable of adj ust i ng o r determining t he ef f ect o r aoouracy of t he fire.
h. In Contact. A unit i s oonbidered "in oontaotn whan it is'
engaged wi t h an enemy f or m. Sni per f i r e o r mortar f i r e i e not aonridered
" i n cont act n unleea moh f f r e i nt er f er e* wi t h t he roheme .of maneuver or
i e i nf l i ot i ng oa ma l t i e s o r d-e t o f r i endl y forcee. The t a c t i oa l unit
cormander i a reaponeible f o r making t h e "in cont act H determination.
1. Pol i t i oal ' Clearance. t o f i r e by t he appmp&ate ~ ~ ~ r o v . 1
pol i t i c a l aut hori t y, normally t he Di &ri ot o r Provinoe Chief. Thie
olearance may be obtained through US Ar t i l l er y l i a i s on teams a,aeigned t o
d i s t r i c t and prot i noe headquarters.
j. Mi l i t ar y Clearance. A roval t o ' f i r e by t he mi l i t ar y cm-
mander of t he ar ea of operation8 (AO 'P. l eaessar y t o i neure t h a t f r i endl y
mi l i t ar y pereonnel are not brought under f i r e .
4. ( C) GI-. a. The uee of unneoeaoary f or ce r es ul t i ng i n non-
combatant oaeual t i ee a d propert y l oaa M l l embi t t er t he population and
make t he long term goal of paoi f i cat i on more di f f i oul t and oort l y.
. b. The V C ~ A expl oi t i nci dent 8 of non-combatant oaeual t i es and
deet ruct i on of propert y RVNAF/US/FUMAF t o f oet er rerent gent and t o
al i enat e t he people agai nst t he Government.
c. The circumstanoes of t he conf l i ct c a l l f o r r e s t r a i nt not
normally requi red of s ol di er s on t he bat t l ef i el d. Commanders muet Btrike
a balance between t he force neces s aq t o accomplish t he mission, wi t h
due regard t o t he saf et y of t h e i r commende, and t he importance at t ached
t o minimising non-oombatant casual t i es. This r equi r es t he higheat order of
l eadershi p and judgement.
d. An unusual reqnirement i s placed on j uni or l eader s t o ' carry
out eenei t i ve oombt operat i ons, oft en i n an environment where l ar ge nimbere
of ai vi l i ane a r e present . The det er r i nat i on of r i ght and wrong 5s t he
heat of b a t t l e requi re6 a keen, avift, and deoi r i ve andl ysi s of all con-
t r i but i ng f a c t or s and must be based on r thororgh understanding of t ho
l e ga l and moral pr i noi pl es involved.
e. A wr i t t en s e t of rules oannot bo provided t h a t will appl y t o
e v e q s i t uat i on. Therefom, t h e f i n d deai ai on on dnga,gement vill be at
t he di s cr et i on of t he eeni or t a ot i oa l o r d e r pr er ent who mrt oonri der
t he mission and t he ei t uat i on as we l l as hi e r es pons i bi l i t y t o miniaim
both f r i endl y and non-combatant oaeual t i es and deot mot i on of pr i vat e md
publ i c property. I n orees where doubt exi ot a ooncerning appl i cat i on of
firepower, t he c-der w i l l reqnelrt guidanoe from hi gher headqnarters.
I f t he oomander omnot cont act hi gher herdquart err o r t h e doer not porait
cont act i ng hfgher headquartere, t he ooraul der wi l l t ake t he aot i on hs
deens appropri at e and not i f y hi gher headquart ers of his deei ei on and nrb-
sequent act i ons a s soon ae poeaible.
f . l ot hi ng shall i nf r i nge on t h e i nherent r i ght of a ooa~aander
t o exemi ae self-defenee. The conmander may take imnediate aat i on agr i nr t
an r t t aaki ng f or oe wi t h a l l means1 avai l abl e; however, every posr l bl e
safeguard shor t of endangering l i f e vill be a wd t o avoid non-cmmlmtant
aarrnal t i es and t he dest nl ct i on of pr i vat e property. Firepower wi l l be
brought t o bear on enemy i n poprl at ed ar eas only t o t he er t ent reqwired
t o aocomplish an assigned miseion.
5. ( C) CONDUCT OF FIRE. a. Indi vi dual and craw served -pone :
(1)
Pi s t ol 8, r i f l ea, grenade launchers, hand grerndes,
claymores, machine guns, and r ecoi l l es e rifles-pray be employed by
cammder s under t he condi t i on8 i ndi Qat ed below:
( a)
Against t ar get a t ha t are observed and pos i t i vel y
i dent i f i ed a s enemy.
(b)
Against poi nt t a r ge t s fram which f i r e i.s being
reoeived. (Indi scri mi nat e f i r e i nt o populated ar eas i s pr ohi t i t ed. )
( c) Againet suspected enemy l ocat i ons whe.,~non-combat- -
ant s would nqt be endangered.
(2)
Personnel pos i t i vel y i dent i f i ed a s enemy who demonstrate
an i nt ent t o surrender shonld not be engaged by f i r e .
b. I ndi r ect f i r e s~:pport weapons ( a r t i l l e r y , mort ars and naval
gunfi re) :
(1) Unobserved f i r e may be di rect ed again5 a l l t ar get ar eas
l ocat ed wi t hi n speci fi ed s t r i ke zones (SSZ's) and f r e e f ' e zones (FF'Z's)
and provided cl earance i s grant ed by t he mi l i t ar y comman.,r i n whose A0
t he SSZ or FFZ l i e s .
- -
AMERICAL Reg 525-4
(2)
Uninhabited area8 out si de SSZtr and FPZts:
( a)
Uhen IH CONTACT, f i r e may k di reot ed agai nat
VC/NVA f or oes at t he request of a uS/FWHBF uni t . Thi r r i t uat i on l r
oonridered observed f i r e even though an artillerg ai r/ forvard obmrver
may not be t he reguest or.
(b)
Uhen HW I N CONTACT, obsen8d f i r e ra;l k
di reot ed agai nst t ar get 8 of opport uni t y which are ol ear l y i dent i f i ed
a a hoet i l e, without pol i t i c a l and mi l i t ar y olearsnce.
( c)
When HOT IH COBTACT with vC/NVA forces, unobserped
f i r e s may be di r ect ed a t hoet i l e t a r ge t s and target u e a s , onl y dt e r
pol i t i c a l and mi l i t ar y ol eamnoe i s obtained.
(d)
Pol i t i oal and mi l i t ar y olearanoe i r required, b f o r e
di r ect i ng e i t h e r observed o r unobserved f i r e on t a r ge t s not ol ear l y
i dent i f i ed a e . hos t i l e.
( 3)
Inhabi t ed area8 (Occi~pied groilpr of dwsfl i ngs ) :
( a)
The fol l awi ng condi t i ons m a t be met in each
i nat anoe before a r t i l l e r y , mortar, o r naval gnnf i r e i a di r ect ed agai nr t
eneqy t ar get e i n i nhabi t ed areas.
obtained.
.
Pol i t l a a l and r i l i t a r y olearanoe mi l s t be
di r ect t he f i r e .
29
A . obrerver (FO, AO, PAC) muet be on s t at i on t o
2.
Inhabi t ant e muat be warned i n advance
l e a f l e t s and/or l ol ~dspeaker tagsterne or by ot her appropri at e merna t hat
a r t i l l e r y , mortars, and/or ni val gunfi re- w i l l be di r eat ed agai net en-
t a r ge t s i n t he hamlet or vi l l age. The one exception i s that pr i or
warning i e not requi red when t he at t ack by f i r e i e in conjunction wi t h a
ground as s aul t by f r i endl y forcee and t he ground c m d e r daterminee
t ha t pr i or warning of i nhabi t ant s would jeopardfse mission accaapliehment.
(b)
The employment of any ordnance which would cause
i nt ent i onal burning of dwelling e will be avoided, unl ess abeol ut el y
necessary i n t he accomplishment of t he commander's mission.
( c )
Vi l l age and hamlet defensive f i r e s w i l l be
executed when r e q ~~e s t e d such f i r e s do not by GVN/RVNAF aut hor i t y i f
i nt er f er e wi t h or mat er i al l y redilce s ~ ~ p p o r t of ' ot her f r i endl y operat i ons.
- --
( d)
Ar t i l l e r y a i r obeervers w i l l be br i ef ed on ar es8
cont ai ni ng f r i endl y or p . o t ~ t i a l l y f r i e n d l y , opul at i on, apd w i l l ampl y
v i t h r ul es of ehgagement l i a t dd i n para 5a(37.
( e )
Unobserved ma 1 gunf i r e w i l l be employed only
when obaemed f i r e i s not possilble beaause of geography, weather, o r l aok
of t r ai ned obeemer. Unobeemed naval gunf i r e should not be undertaken in
ol ose proximity t o f r i endl y foroea or area8 knm t o be ' i nhabi t ed by
non-oombatante.
c. Ai r cr af t Del i very Systems:
(1)
Forward A i r Cont rol l ers (FAC) and armed hel i oopt er
oommanders All be br i ef ed on l ooat i ons of f r i endl y and pot ent i al l y friend-
l y populated areas. St r i kea w i l l not be executed where i dent i f i cat i on of
f r i endl y elements i s i n doubt. FAC1s and hel i oopt er oomanders vill r8connoiteX
t he Bt ri ke ar ea f o r f r i endl y personnel and non-combatants pr i or t o strike
execution.
(2)
A l l al oee a i r sypport mi ssi ons t ha t involve a i r e t r i ke s
not cont r ol l ed by r adar w i l l be aont r ol l ed by. a FAC. Aa a port i on of t he
FAC1s t a r ge t br i ef i ng t o t he s t r i k e pi l ot s , he w i l l inclrrde t he l ocat i on
of t he neareat f r i endl y element&!.
( 3)
Close a i r aupport missions t h a t i nvol ve et r i kee on
hamlets o r vi l l agee must be cont r ol l ed by a FAC. I f t he at t ack on a hamlet
o r vi l l a ge i a deemed necessary and i s e x e c ~ ~ t e d i n conj l ~not i on v i t h a gronnd
operat i on i nvol vi ng movement of ground foroea throrlgh t he area, t he at t ack
may be without warning; however, appropri at e pol i t i c a l and mi l i t ar y cl ear -
ance i e r eql ~i r ed. I f t he at t aok on r, vi l l age or hamlet i s not in
conj unct i on wi t h any immediate ground operat i on, t he i nhabi t ant s must be
warned by l e a f l e t 6 and/or loudspeaker aystem pr i or t o a t r i ke execution and
must be given adequate time t o evacuate t he ar ea.
( 4 )
I f an ant ed hel i oopt er operat i on i nvol ves non-combatants,
such a s i n an oooupied hamlet or vi l l age, p o l i t i a a l and mi l i t ar y cl earance
must be obtained unl eas t he ai t uat i on cl ear l y preeent s an immediate t hr eat
t o t he l i v e s of t he crew.
( 5 )
A l l a i r c r a f t recei vi ng ground f i r e from f r i endl y or
pot ent i al l y
f r i endl y populated areas. -wi l l r et ur n t he f l ~ o ~ ~ w h % n : ~ - -
( a)
The sources of f i r e can be vi eual l y i dent i f i ed.
( b)
The s t r i k e or f i r e can be pos i t i vel y ori ent ed
agai nst t he source.
( c )
The f i r e i s of s?l ch i nt ens i t y t ha t c omt e r act i on
i s requi red.
&msiGG
*,?
A13EIIICAL Reg 525-4
6. (C) RULES GOVERNING DESRUCTION OF DUELINGS BY GRDUISD FORCW.
a. As a gener al rule, oi vi l i a n dwelling8 or pr i vat e propertyf
i ncl udi ng l i vest ock, w i l l not be-de-=ijSd e x o e ~ tas an unavoidable QQD-
sequence of oombat aot i ons.
b. The de s t mc t i on of dwel l i xus ond l l v e s t o o ~of noncarb. t ant r
as a deni al meaeure l a t o be l e f t t o G V l a l ~t h o r i t i e so r RVNAF nni t n.
a. If US personnel are r eoei vi ng f i r e from a hourre, t h e f i r e
w i l l be r et ur ned even though dest r uct i on of t h e house r e d t e . Deatruotion
of s t r uc t ur e s i n areas ueed as PC base campa, o r t hose obviously b u i l t by
t he VC t o f i g h t from, i s aut hor i sed.
7. ( c) INDIRECT FIRE SUPPORT UEAPONS CLEARANCE PROCEDURES. I n ad-
di t i on t o t h e pr evi oael y mentioned r e s t r i c t i ons and r u l e s of sngrgmsnt,
t h e following cl ear ance prooedurea a r e eat abl i r hed f o r all a r t i l l e m,
mortar, and naval gunf i r e:
a. Mi l i t ar y ol earanoe w i l l be obtained from t h e RVNAF/US/W
uni t i n whose TAoR/AO t he t a r ge t i s l ocat ed. The appr opr i at e l i a i s o n
team or FSE vlll be cont act ed f o r t h i s ol e a r uc e .
b. Any i ndi r e a t f i r e s pl umed wi t hi n 500 met ers of an adj aoent
TAOWAOw i l l be coordinated wi t h t h e oorresponding commnder .
c. SAP-A-PLANE dat e f o r all i ndi r e c t f i r e mi ssi ons must be
aubni t t ed t o FSE o r AUCC i n acoordanae wi t h TAB B (Safeguardi Ai r or af t
from Ar t i l l e r y Fi r aa) t o Appendix 4 ( Fi r e S ~ ~ p p o r t Coor di nat i oz t o
Annex A (Operat i ons) t o America1 Division Fi el d SOP.
8. ( C ) Pld3VENTION OF MUTUAL INTERFERENCE ON IMAND AND COASTAL
WATUWAYS.
a. The i nor ease of t he F W i n t he Manket Time (Coast al wat er s
of F-vN) ar eas r equi r e t ha t t he fol l owi ng measures be implemented t o
prevent i nci dent s i n which f r i e ndl y wat er cr af t a r e at t acked by ma l l
arms, a i r c r a f t , mort ars and/or a r t i l l e r y .
b. Wat ercraft on coast al waterways a r e not t o be at t acked unl ess
ona of the following condi t i ons i s s a t i s f i e d:
( 1) The wat er cr af t i s f i r i u g on f r i endl y f or ces. The
r esponsi bl e Coast al SurveiPlance ~ e n t e r / T O~ soon w i l l be not i f i e d a s
a s t he s i t ua t i on permits.
(2)
The wat er cr af t i s condllcting hos t i l e maneuvers or ot her
act i ons and coordi nat i on has been ef f ect ed wi t h t he r esponsi bl e Coast al
Sur vei l l ance Center,
+%*F,>?
WWICAL Reg 525-4
( 3 )
The wat er cr af t has been c e r t i f i e d 88 nanfri endl y by t he
Coast al Sur vei l l ance Center.
c. Clearance from t he Coast al Survei l l anoe Center, DP H w y
oan be obt ai ned through Coast al Division 12, Chu Lai e el: SHELLBACK
115/217 or' FM; OXCLIFF 37.50 Mq).
d. Watercraft on i nl and waterwaye a r e not t q be at t aoked without
pr i or pol i t i oa l and mi l i t a r y clearanoe. Clearanuer a r e a f unct i on of t he
col or coding of a l l i nl and waterways a s e i t h e r BLUE ( c i vi l i a n t r a f f i o re-
s t r i c t e d duri ng est abl i shed curfew hours) or RED ( o i r i l i a n t r a f f i c r e s t r i ot -
ed 24 hours per day) and a r e t he r es pons i bi l i t y of t he ground oomander Fn
whose A0 t he waterway i s l ocat ed.
(1)
Boats moving i n unr est r i ct ed wat er s may be ohallenged a t
any t h e , brlt w i l l not be destroyed unl ess pos i t i vel y 2dent i f i ed as hoe t i l e
wat er cr af t .
( 2 )
Boats moving a t any time i n 24 hoi ~r r e s t r i c t e d waters,
t h a t a r e not properl y l i ght ed and boat s moving a f t e r t he establ. iehed c ~ r r i ~
i n any i nl and waterway may be &wed and destroyed withorlt t he benef i t
of a chal l enge. I f t he s i t ua t i on permits, a l l boat s shoilld be challenged.
9. ( u) MPLEMENTATION. Implementing i ns t r uct i ons and SOB w i l l be
developed by major subordi nat e comaandere t o provide f o r cont r ol ,
coordi nat i on, and cl ear ance of f i r e s .
10. ( u) REFS-RiCES. a. U S U C V Di r ect i ve ( c) 95-4, Aviation - US
A i r operations'-), g d 28 June 1966 wi t h ohange 1dt d 14 Febnrary
1967.
b. U m C V Di reot i ve (C) 525-3, Combat Operations - Minimizing
Noncombatant Casual t i es ( u) , dt d 14 October 1966.
. . . . . . . . . -- - ...... .
c. U S U G V Di r ect i ve ( c ) 525-9, Combat Operations - Control,
Di sposi t i on, and Safeguarding of Vietnamese Property, Captured Mat eri al
and Food Suppl i es (u),dt d 10 Apr i l 1967.
d. USMACV Di r ect i ve (C) 525-18, Ccnabat Operations - Conduct of
Ar t i l l e r y - Mortar and Naval Gunfire ( u) , dt d 21 January 1968.
AMERICAL Reg 525-4
e. I11 MAF Foroe Order (C) P03121.-5, SOP f o r Ground and A i r
Operat i ons ( u) ,dt d 10 November 1967.
(AVDF-GC )
FOR THE COMMANDER:
OFFICIAL : NELS A. PARSON, J R
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff
f or :
DONALD B. CHONG
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General
DISTRIBUTION:
B Pl us
4 - AVDF-GC
30 - AVDF-AGA
TRUE COPY
LTC, USA
Assi st ant I nspect or General
EXTRACTSOFOPORD2-68
* *
America1Division
ChuLai(BT533094), RVN
230700HJan68
OPORD2-68(RedeploymentandRealignmentofForces)
Reference: MAPS,VIETNAM,1:50,000,SeriesL701A;Sheets66381,
11;6639I,11,N ; 664011,111;6738I,11,111,IV;6739I,
11,111,IV;6710111;838111,IV.
Taskorganization:
11thLtInBde
3-1In
1-20In
(-)2COTF
Trp-, 1stCav
6-11Arty(-)
B/2-11Arty
C/3-18Arty
2Sect/C29Arty(SLT)
C/26Engr
6thSptBn
*
EXHIBIT D-33
*
1. SITUATION:
a. Enemy For ces. Cur r ent INTSUMS.
b . Fr i e ndl y For ces.
( 1 )
1st Mar Div cont i nues c u r r e n t ope r a t i ons .
( 2 )
2d ARVN Div cont i nues c u r r e n t oper at i ons .
( 3 )
2d ROK Mari ne Bde cont i nues c u r r e n t ope r a t i ons .
( 4 )
7 t h US A i r For ce pr ovi des TAC a i r s uppor t .
( 5 )
1st Marine A i r Wing pr ovi des TAC a i r s uppor t .
( 6 ) Cur r ent SITREPS.
c. At t achment s and Detachments. Task or ga ni z a t i on.
2. MISSION. America1 Di vi s i on execut es r e l i e f r e l i e f of 3d Bde,
1st Cav Div (AML) wi t h 3d Bde, 4t h I n f Div commencing 23 J a n 68
and r e l i n q u i s h e s OPCON 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AML) t o 1st Cav Div
(AML) upon c l o s u r e PHU BAI a r e a .
3. EXECUTION.
a. Concept of Oper at i on.
( 1 ) Maneuver. America1 Di vi s i on cont i nues c u r r e n t
ope r a t i ons ; execut es r e l i e f of 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AML) wi t h
3d Bde, 4t h I nf Div, and r e l i n q u i s h e s OPCON of 3d Bde, 1st Cav
Div (AML) t o 1st Cav Div (AML) upon c l os ur e a t PHU BAI a r e a . l l t h
L t I nf Bde cont i nues c u r r e n t ope r a t i ons and forms a two company
t a s k f o r c e f o r OPCON t o 198t h Lt I n f Bde. 196t h Lt I n f Bde con-
t i n u e s c ur r e nt o p e r a t i o n s i n ext ended AO. 198t h Lt I n f Bde, r e-
i nf or c e d by a two company t a s k f o r c e from l l t h Lt I n f Bde, con-
t i n u e s c ur r e nt ope r a t i ons and e c o n t r o l of MUSCATINE
AO.
b. l l t h Lt I n f Bde
( 1 ) Cont i nues c u r r e n t mi s s i on.
( 2 ) 24 J a n or ga ni z e and depl oy a two company TF wi t h
a TF he a dqua r t e r s t o MUSCATINE AO. OPCON t o 198t h Lt I n f Bde
upon c r o s s i n g s out he r n MUSCATINE Boundary.
( 3 ) On o r d e r be pr e pa r e d t o assume p r e s e n t MUSCATINE A0
of 3d Bde, 4t h I n f Div.
* * * *
d. 198t h Lt I n f Bde.
( 1 ) Cont i nue c u r r e n t o p e r a t i o n s .
( 2 ) O/ A 25 J a n 68, be pr e pa r e d t o assume coni pl et e
MUSCATINIl 1.10 Z'rom 3d Rae, 4t h I n f Diu.
( 3 ) On deployment of 1- 14 I n f t o WHEELER/WALLOWA A0
be pr e pa r e d t o assume t h e 1- 14 I n f A0 i wt h TF pr ovi de d by l l t h
Lt I n f Bde.
( 4 )
Be pr e pa r e d t o assuem OPCON of a two company TF
wi t h TF he a dqua r t e r s f r om l l t h Lt I n f Bde. OPCON e f f e c t i v e
upon TF c r o s s i n g s out he r n MUSCATINE boundar y.
( 5 )
Or gani ze and be pr e pa r e d t o depl oy a p r o v i s i o n a l
a r t i l l e r y b a t t e r y t o LZ UPTIGHT t o s uppor t o p e r a t i o n s i n p r e s e n t
1 - 1 4 I n f AO.
( 6 )
Be pr e pa r e d on o r d e r t o r e l i n q u i s h o p e r a t i o n s i n
s out he r n p o r t i o n of MUSCATINE A0 t o l l t h Lt I n f Bde.
Acknowledge
KOSTER
MG
Annexes: A - Oper at i on Over l ay
B - Si gna l
C - Di s t r i b u t i o n
OFFICIAL
/ s/ Balmer
/t/ BALMER
G3
Annex C ( Di s t r i b u t i o n ) t o OPORD 2-68 (Redeployment and Re-
al i gnment of For c e s )
COPY COPY
CG 1 Chap 37
ADC-A 6 I G 38
ADC-B
7 Div Spt Comd 39-40
C/S
8 Div Pr ovos t Mar shal 4 1
G 1 9 1 1 t h Lt I n f Bde 42-43
G2 10 198t h Lt I n f Bde 44-45
G3 2-5 198t h Lt I n f Bde 46-47
G 4 11 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div
(AML) 48-49
G5
12 3d Bde, 4t h I n f Div 50-51
AG 13-22 1st Sqdn, 1st Armd &v52
Am Off
23 1- 14 Ar t y 53
Cm1 24 1-21 Ar t y 54
Engr
25 2-9 Ar t y 55
I 0 26 3-82 Ar t y 56
M i l H i s t
27 6- 11 Ar t y 57
Si g 28 1 4 t h Cbt Avn Bn 58
Div Ar t y
29-30 123d Avn Bn 59
FSE 31-32 26t h Engr Bn 60
TOC
33 523d Si g Bn 6 1
Div ALO
34 1st Mar Div 62-63
DASC
35 I11 MAF 64-68
#% Sur g
3&.;mJ* m->.. .lwe-
KOSTER
MG
OFFICIAL
/ s / Balmer
/t/ BALMER
G3
EXTRACTSOFFRAGORD/I1TOOPORD2-68
* *
2310002Jan68
FROM CG,AMERICALDIV,CHL
TO CG,llTHLIB,DPO
CO,3DBDE,4THINFDIV,CHL
INFO CG,USARV,LBN
CG,I11MAF,DNG
AVDF-GC 012
SUBJECT: FRAG0!I1 TOOPORD2-68(REDEPLOYMENTANDREALIGNMENT
OFFORCES)
1. llTHLTINFBDE.
ON24JAN68,DEPLOYTFCONSISTINGOFTFHQS,TWOCOMPANIES
ANDONEPLATTRPB,1STCAVTOMUSCATINEAO. UPONTFCROSSING
SOUTHERNBOUNDARYOFMUSCATINEA0(BS633810) OPCONTO3DBDE,
4THINFDIV.
2. 3DBDE,4THINFDIV.
ON24JAN68, ASSUMEOPCONOFTFFROMllTHLTINFBDEUPON
TFCROSSINGSOUTHERNBOUNDARYOFMUSCATINEA0(BS633810).
E XT RACT S OF F RAGORD // 2 OP ORD 2- 68
* * *
2 6 0 7 5 5 J a n 68
FROM: CG, AME RI CAL D I V , C HL , RVN
T O : C G , 1 9 6 T H L T I N E B DE , CHARGER H I L L , RVN
C O, 1 S T S QDN, 1 S T CAV, H I L L 29 ( C O U R I E R )
I N F O : C G, US ARV, L B N , RVN
C G , I11 MAE, DNG, RVN
C G , l l T H L I B , D P O , RVN
* *
AVDF- GC - 015
S U B J E C T : F RAG 0 / / 2 T O OP ORD 2 - 6 8
CONF I RMAT I ON O F M I S S I O N S D I R E C T E D
* J; *
2 . 1 9 8 T H LT I N F BDE .
ON 2 5 J A N 6 8 , AS S UME P I US CAT I NE A 0 AND OP CON O F 4 - 3 I N F AND T F
BARKER FROM 3 D B DE , 4 T H I N F D I V E F F 0 7 0 0 HR S .
* k * t
4 . 3 D B D E , 4 T H I N F D I V .
A. ON 2 5 J A N 6 8 , R E L I N Q U I S H MUS CAT I NE A 0 AXD OPCON O F 4-3
I N F AND T F BARKER T O 1 9 8 T H L T I N F BDE E F F 0 7 0 0 I I KS.
J-
*
*
*
FROM: CG, AME R I C AL D I V I S I O N , CHU L A 1
TO: CO, 3 D B DE , 4 T H I N F D I V , DUC P HO ( C O U R I E R )
CG, ~ I T HLT I NF BDE, DUC PHO ( COURI ER)
CO, 1 9 8 T H L T I N F BDE , CHU L A 1 ( C O U R I E R )
, CO, AME R I C AL D I V ART Y, CHU L A 1 ( C O U R I E R )
CO, 1 4 AVN ~ BN, CHU LAI ( COURI ER) ~
CO, 2 6 T H ENGR BN , CHU L A 1 ( C O U R I E R )
CO, 1 2 3 d AVN BN, CHU L A 1 ( C O U R I E R )
CO, 5 0 9 t h S I G BN, CHU L A 1 ( C O U R I E R )
INFO.: CG, USARV, LONG BI NH ( AI RMAI L)
CG, 111 MAF, DANANG ( COURI ER)
CG, 2 D ROK MAR BDE , QUANG N G A I ( E L E C T R I C A L )
CG, 2d ARVN D I V , QUANG N G A I ( C O U R I E R )
CO, 3 D BDE , 1 S T CAV D I V ( AML) L Z BALDY ( C O U R I E R )
CO, 1 9 6 T H L T I N F BDE , H I L L 35 ( C O U R I E R )
CO, AME R I C AL S P T COMD, CHU L A 1 ( C O U R I E R )
S A, 2 D ARVN D I V , QUANG N G A I ( C O U R I E R )
CO, ST SQDN, ST CAV, HI LL 2 9 ( OOURI ER)
CO, B T R OOP , 1 S T S QDN, 9 T H A I R CAV, CHU . L A 1 ( C OUR I E R )
CO, C T R OOP , 7 T H S QDN, 1 7 T H A I R CAV, CHU LAI ( C O U R I E R )
S P A , QUANG N G A I ( C O U R I E R )
1 9 1 7 1 5 2 D e c 6 7
C O N F I D E N T I A L AVDF- GC 7 1 1 1
S U B J E C T : OP ORD AME R I C AL 2 0 - 6 7 ( OP E R AT I ON MUS C AT I NE ) ( U )
R e f e r e n c e s :
a . AVDF- GC 7 0 3 6 , 1 5 2 2 4 8 2 D e c , s u b j e c t : OP ORD AME RI CAL 1 9 - 6 7
( OPERATI ON CHECKERS) ( u )
b . AVDF - GS 7 0 5 9 , 1 7 0 6 0 7 2 D e c , s u b j e c t : S i g n a l I n s t r u c t i o n s
f o r O p e r a t i o n CHE CKE RS .
1. ( U) S I T U A T I O N . UNCHANGED FROM R e f a .
2. ( C ) M I S S I O N . A m e r i c a l D i v i s i o n r e l i e v e s 2 d ROK M a r i n e
B r i g a d e i n c u r r e n t AO, a s s u m i n g p h a s e d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e A 0
and an e x t e n s i o n t h e r e o f , a n d c o n d u c t s O p e r a t i o n MUS CAT I NE t o
e x t e n d GVN c o n t r o l t h r o u g h o u t t h e A 0 and A 0 e x t e n s i o n .
3. ( C ) E XE C UT I ON.
a . C o n c e p t o f O p e r a t i o n . A m e r i c a l D i v i s i o n , i n c o o p e r a t i o n
w i t h t h e 2 d ARVN' D i v i s i o n ,
-
w i l l c o n d u c t a s i x - p h a s e o p e r a t i o n t o
r e l i e v e t h e 2 d ROK M a r i n e B r i g a d e i n t h e c u r r e n t AO, n o r t h o f
Q u a n g N g a i , as f o l
* * * * * * *
EXHI BI T D-32
603
( p a g e 1o f 2 p a g e s )
PHASE V I ( 2 8 J a n - i n d e f i n i t e ) -- On 28 J a n 68, 1 9 8 t h Lt I n f Bde
a s s ume s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e r e ma i n i n g p o r t i o n o f t h e A0 a t a t i me
mu t u a l l y a g r e e a b l e t o t h e C G, 2d ROK Mar Bde and CO, 1 9 8 t h Lt I n f Bde.
Wi t h p a s s a g e o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f f i n a l p o r t i o n o f 2d ROK Mar Bde
A0 t o 1 9 8 t h L t I n f Bde, t h e r e l i e f w i l l b e c o mp l e t e . 1 9 8 t h Lt I n f
Bde a nd 3d Bde, 4 t h I n f Di v w i l l c o n t i n u e o p e r a t i o n s t o d e s t r o y enemy
f o r c e s a nd e x t e n d GVN c o n t r o l t h r o u g h o u t t h e ne wl y a c q u i r e d AO.
d. 1 1 t h Lt I n f Bde.
( 1 ) I n i t i a t e t r a i n i n g o f Bde i n t h e DUCPHO AO, on
c l o s u r e .
( 2 ) Be p r e p a r e d , o / a 2 J a n u a r y 1 9 6 8 t o a s s ume r e s p o n s i -
b i l i t y f o r t h e n o r t h e r n p o r t i o n of t h e DUC PHO A0 a s p a r t o f a
t r a i n i n g pr ogr a m i n a c o n t r o l l e d combat e n v i r o n me n t .
KOSTER
MG
RELEASER
L. W. CUNNI NGHAM
2LT, AGC
ASST AG
( p a g e 2 of 2 p a g e s )
FROH:
CG, AMERICAL DI VI SI ON, CHU LA1
TO: CO, 3D BDE, 4TH I NF D N , DUC PHO
CO, 198th L T I NF BDE, CHU LA1 (CO'JRIER)
I NFO: CG, USARV, LONG BINH (AIRPIAIL)
CG, I11FIAF, DA NANG (COURIER)
CG, 1 l T H LT I NF BDE, DUC PHO (COLTIER)
CG, 2D ROK MAR BDE , QUAKG NGAI (ELECTRICAL)
CG, 2D ARVN DI V, QUANG NGAI (COURIER)
CO, AMERICAL DI V ARTY, CHU LAI (C9URIER)
CO, 1 4 THAVN BN, CHU LA1 (COURIER)
CO, 39TH ENGR BN, CHU LA1 (COURIER)
CO, 2 6 t h ENGR BN, CIW LA1 (COURIER)
CO, 1 2 3 d AVN BN, CHU LA1 (COLRIER)
CO, 509th S I G BN, CHU' LA1 (COURIER)
CO, 3D BDE, 1 S T CAV DI V (AML) LZ UALDY (COURIER)
CO, 196TH LT IN?BDE, HI LL 35 (CCLZIER)
CO, APERICAL DI V SPT COPID, CHU IAI (COURIER)
CO, 1 S T SQDN, 1 S T CAV, MILL 2 9 (COURIER)
CO, B TROOP, 1 S T SQDN, 9TH AI R CAV, CHU LA1 (COURIER)
CO, C TROOP, 7TH SQDN, 17THAI R CAV, CHU LA1 (COURIER)
SPA, QUANG NGAI (COURIER)
2 0 0 4 0 5 2 De c 67
CONFIDENTIAL AVDF-GC 7116
SUBJECT: FRAGO #1(OPERATION MUSCATINE) (U)
R e f e r e n c e : AVDF-GC 7111, DTG 1917152 De c 67, subj : OPORD 2 0 - 6 7
(OPERATION MUSCATINE) (U)
1. (C) 3d Bd e , 4t h Inf Di v .
R e l e a s e one (1)addi t i onal r i f l e c o mp a n y t o OPCON 198th L t Inf
Bd e eff 2 1 0 8 0 0 H De c 67, a t l ocat i on t o be m u t u a l l y agreed b e t w e e d
c~mmandersconcerned. Y-' .
2. (c) 198th L t Inf Bde.
Assume OPCON of c o mp a n y i n para 1,above, eff 2 1 0 8 0 0 H D e c 67,
f or e mp l o y me n t i n O p e r a t i o n MUSCATINE.
S l f e s mo n d D. B a l me r Mr. s/K KAMBELL
JESMOND D. BALFER, JR. f or L. W. CUNNINGHAM, 2LT, AGC, ASST AG
LTC, GS
FROM: CG, AMERICAT, DI VI S I ON, CiIL
TO:
CG, 1 1 Tl I L T INF RDE , DPO
CO, 198th LT INFBD2,Ci i L
INTO: CG, USARV, L32J
CG, I11 ?.:4F, DKG
CG, 2D ARIJ?J DI'J, QNG (COURIER)
CO, 3d 53E,4t h IIV DTV, LZ EAI.DY
CO, 1st SQDN, 1 S T &??aCAV,HI I J , 29 ( CGLXI ER)
CO, Al!XRICi;L DI V ARTY, CIIL ( COL! I ER)
CO, h?. ERI CAL SPT COPD, CHI, (CCLRSZR)
CO, 14TI! C 3 T AVN BN,Cl i L (C@UT.IEiZ)
CO, 12% Am! EN, C I E (COW.IER)
CO, 26t h EP:GT: F?T, CIL ( COI , ~I E; ?, )
CO, 523D SIG ZI.1, C' r 5 (CO!lXmX)
0 4 0 9 2 5 2 Feb 68
SA , 2d CiZV!; CIV,CjNG ( CCmEX)
SF.!, QIJG (CGC?IE1?)
SUSP..CT: F9J.S 0 2 TOO?OYD 2 0 - 6 7 (OPEiICITICl NUSCATINS) (U).
1. (C) IKF ?BE. l l t 5?,'I
a.
h.SSL?X P.ESEE!S IIEI1,ITY FORNJ SCATI PE A 0 FROM 198t h LTIXF
EDE EFB0 4 1 2 0 0 FED 68.
b. F.E.21RE CONTP.OL OF 4- 3 I N F P.ND TF E4RKER FriO?l 193THLT IWP ZDE
EFF 0 4 1 2 0 0 F'E3 65.
RELZ:!?IJISII t.flJSCATINS A 0 A I D O K OPT OF 4- 3 INF AI D TPB:IR!%R
TO 11TI-l L T INFBJE SPY FEB 68. Of.~1200
3. (!J) OVERLAY FGLLaJS SOOI\TEST.
DPViFTER RELEASER
s/CARL S. ISZEBS s/F. H. GENZL, 2LT,AGC, ASST AG
X3J, GS
Asst G3 , Plans
A t r ue co
FROM: CG, AMERICAL D N , .CHL
TO: CG, I11 M F , DNG
CO, 196t h MFBDE (LT) , LZ BALDY
CO, 198TH INFBDE (LT), LZ BAYONET
CO, 1 S T SQDN, 1 S TCAV, HAWKHI LL
CO, D N ARTY, CHL(COURIER)
CO, SFI COMD, CHL (COURIER)
CO, 14TRABT AVN BN, CHL (COURBR)
CO, 1 2 3 DAVN BN, CHL (COURIER)
CO, 26TH ENGR BN, FAT CI TY (COURIER)
CO, 39THENGR BN, CHL (COURIER)
0 9 0 9 5 8 ZJ u n e 1968
CO, 523D SZG BN, CHL (COURIER)
CONFIDENTIAL AVDF-GC 6028
SUBJECT: FRAG 0 11 3 TO OPORD 20-67 (OPERATION MUSCATINE) (U)
1 (C) TERMINATE OPN MUSCATINE EFF1 0 1 2 0 0 JUN 68.
2.
(C)
THEGEOGRAPHICAL AREA I N OPERATION MUSCATINE WILL BE KNWN AS
MUSCATINE AO.
,gad$
3.
(C) BOUNDARY WITH+&ItINF BDE (LT) WILL REWIN UNCHANGED.
4. (C) CONTINUE PRESENT FORCE LEVEL OPERATIONS.
AC KNWDGE DTOC
DRAFTER
RELEASER
CROSBIE E. SAI NT
F. H. GENEL, l L T , AGC, ASST AG
MAJ, GS
ASST 63
A t r ue copy. A t t e s t .
FROMi; CG, AMERICAL DIV, CHL
?.
TO: CG, I11 W, DNG
CONFIDENTIAL AVDF-GC 5979
SUBJECT: OPERATI ON MUSCAT1NE 081020 June 1968
1.
(C)
Operation l hs c a t i ne was i nf t i a t e d t o e f f e c t r e l i e f of 1st
ROK Bde and extend GVN cont r ol i n t ha t ar ea previ ousl y operat ed i n by
t he 1st ROK Bde.
2. (C) The mi ssi ons of oper at i on muscatine have been accomplished.
3. (c) Thi s heqdquart ers i nt ends t o t ermi nat e operat i on Muscatine
101200 June 1968. That ar ea w i l l become know a s t he Muscatine ar ea
of Operations.
DRAFTER RELEASER
CROSBIE E. SAINT F, H. GENEL, lLT, AGC, Asst AG
M J , GS
ASST G3
A t r ue copy, Attest,
Lli;FhI1T:.Li.IT OF T i e ARXY
mAD:Uj?TZRS A?ZfLICl:iDI VI SI O?J A ~ T I L ~ A R Y
kt'O San Francisco 96374
, . .
-
.-.
12 October 1967
. . .
.1
..-- -
. . L :
>. -t i l l ery I t ens f or Co~~nEnd Enphssis
,-,-
Si.5EISPRIBUTION . G:
1. Keep your powder dry. This .has been a car di nal r ul e f o r a r t i l l e r . p e n si nce
t he f i r s t cannon f i r e d t he f i r s t s ol i d cennon bal l .
It rerrains equkl l y val i d today.
The mr i n e a r t i l l e r y i n t h i s ar ea reported a number of e r r a t i c rounds during t he
last winter monsoon season whicli t hey al t ri bi l t ed t o damp ~o\lrder.
The fol l owi zg r ~ea-
sures must be followed:
a. Powder ( or seni-fixed lO5mm armunition) cones i n a sea.led cont ~i f i er
and should r enai n st:.c?ied u n t i l j us t before f i r i n? , consi st ent ; d t h t he ant i ci pet ed
expenditure r at e.
b. ',%terproof bankers f or am=!unition ( i ; a r t i c u l a ~. l ~ ~mide;.) sl?oulc! 5e con-
s t urted a s soon as f eps i bl c i n each posi t i on. A canvas co. e ~ i n g t o keer out blcii-
ing r?.in should be over 4 he cntrc.nce. Ihnnhze sl ~oul dbe used t o k ~ e p enmunition up
of f t he ground.
c. The p 1 . a c t . i ~ ~ on a of removing r;he lO5m s h e l l from t he car t r i dgz casi
few ready :-ounds ( f or speed i n cut t i fi g charges) s h ~ u l d not b3 t ol er et ed durin.2 t he
nonssan season.
d. Ear,h Chief of Sect i on should ver i f y t ha t hi s poiidvr b ~ g s zr e dr y before
put t i ng them i n t h e breech. Fowder which bas once becone wet should not be f i r ed,
evtn a f t e r it has dr i ed out , It should be ret urned t.c t ha ASP with a wi t t e n ex-
~ k n e t i o n .
2.
"Danger Closef1 shcd:! r eqi l est by t he f or - be inclu.ded i n any "Fire YE ~ s i o n ~ ~
ward observer i f nosm.1 d i s ~ g r s i o n could bri ng ro~unds wit%-n 200 n2tei.s; of f r i endl y
t r o o ~ s . N o I ~ ? ~ d i s p e ~ s i c ni s a funct i on of cal i ber znd t ype of wcqon, rsrige, cnd
t he r cl nt i onshi p of t h s gun t er get l i n e t o t h e f r i e r dl y t r oops, For instcnce, a
17Srm gun f i r i n 2 di r e c t l y ovsr t roops a t a 30,030 z t e r rr rigs bzcom. s "Dsn,:er Closef1
'.;i!.;n f i r e i s brought 1rsiti.li11 500 m~' rs . Cn t he other hcnd, a iO5mn hak,ritzer f i r i r *
frbm t he fln!lks such t hat ttie di spersi on i n t he di r-ect i on of fr.i.t.ndly t roops co~, es
1:,.~.,ye1~i n def l ect i on (i.e ., an an,@! T of 1100-2!0G mils) does not become "Dcngar
k
lo sell u n t i l f i r e i s bx.ou,.;ht closc;r than 200 meters.
EXHIBIT M-68
AVDF-AT 12 October 1967
SUBJLCT: Ar t i l l e r y Items f o r Co mn d Emphasis
3. The IJIkCV r ul e s o r engagement w i l l be s t r i c t l y observed i n t h e America1 Di -
vi s i on. Thi s a p r l i e s equal l y t o f i r e s a t t he' r equks t of ARnJ uni t s . The r ul e s a r e
de t a i l e d i n t h e Task F o ~ c e CI?iGON Fi e l d SOT, Annex A ( oper at i ons, ) Appzndix 4 ( Fi r e
S u p ~ o r t Coordinc?tion) p a r a g r c ~h s 3b(3) nnc! 7. I n t he Task Force C%GCM Ar t i l l e r y
Fi e l d SOP t he y a r e de t a i l e d i n Annex k (Operat i ons] Ap~endi x 4 ( Fi r e Sup. o r t Coor-
di na t i on) , para 3.
4 The Task Force OI~LGON R~ * t i l l e r yFi e l d SOP, Annex D ( ~ o g i s t i c s ) , k p p ~n d i x 1
(Op*ratoional Loads of Clzss V) pr escr i bes s bcs i c l oad which wi l l be mi nt ni ne d a s a
minimum by ba t t e r i e s . Thi s i s 1500 rounds ( a l l t ypes) f o r a 105mm ba t t e r y end 1200
rounds f o r a 155rxm bbc.l.ttery. Thi s SO: does ap;;ly t o e r t i l l c r y a t t a c ht d or o. gani c t o
brig?.des :,nd t o n r t i l l e r y b. -: t t eri es being s u r ~ l i e d b;y hel i copt er i n an LZ. Of course
nny SOP i s onl y cz gui de and mny bc cnv.ended by t h ~ cornxnder on t he ground f o r cpgent
t c c t i c a l reasons. For ~. x ? q - l e , t!le b r i g ~ d e o r ba t t a l i on comznder may di r e c t t: l e
vol of 1000 rounds bi?c:!use of 1z.ck of hel i copt er l i f t 01. ~ l a n st o di s pl ac, i n t he
near future. Nor ml l y, we pl an t o " f i r e dovmtf i n a f i r e base bef or e di spl acement ,
so 2s t o ?.void "back haulingll l a r ge cnlounts of a ~x u n i t i o n . Suf f i c i i nt amnunj-tion
must rltvays be on hmd t o aci.ornplish t he a r t i l l e r y r i s s i o n of pr ovi di ng cl ose c:n%
cont i nui ous su? por t t o t h e inf;.ntl.j.. On sever ol occzsi ons i n t h z A~ e r i c a l Divisior:
a bnt t e- y h?.s f i r e d ovelb 1000 rounds duri ng t ho ni ght i n s ur por t of one i nTant r y i l e -
nient md e r ?tLeck. A s c ru1.e of thun;b, z t z c t i c c l emcr g~ncy e x i s t s i f t he amuni-
t i o n l ev31 of a b a t t e r y f . ? l l s belot; 700 rounds. There i s c? f i r m r*c.uireti;.l;nt i n t h e
SOP t h a t t hc Di vi si on ,Irtilli r y 84 o r t he FSE be irrncdietc;ly n o t i f i c d .,;hen ammuni-
t i on stocka, ge f z . 1 1 ~ below t h e pr escr i bed minimurn l e ve l o r hns not :ret re3cht : d t 5 a t
l e v e l .
5 . k Chief of Sect i on .?nd c bc t t e r y execut i ve of f i c e r o r CM5f of Fi r i ng Bat-
t e r y must be PI-escnt and f r e e t o suyervi.sc duri ng f i r i ng. Thcy shoul d not be tit:d
t o 3 t el zphone,
6. The Task Force O:LGO?j Ar t i l l e r y Fi e l d SOP r equi r es t h z t & f i v e m2.n s h i f t
( i ncl udi ng t he Fi r e Di r ect i on Of f i cer ) b~ prss' cnt on dut y i n a b?. ttory f i r e di r e c t i or
cent er e t a l l t i n t s . Thi s i s st i l l n r eoui r en- nt f o r b n t t e r i t s bquippcd wi t h FADriC,
BP: t t al i ons rnust ?.ugrncnt b r t t c r y FDCls t o a t t c i n t h i s l e ve l .
7.
hxper i t nce hcs sho,!:n thr. t 6. minimum of s i xt y 0Tfi.cer.s cnd mc:n a1.e r equi r ed
t o s ~ . f e l y oper ct e a 1051nin s i x howitzcr bc t t e r y from c h s l . i c o ~ t e r s u p ~ o r t e d f i r e bzse
Vhen s t r mg t h s f211. below t h i s l evel , a r t i l l e r y cor;~~~r.ndt.rs shoul d advi se t h e i r ns>:t.
supcr i or i n t h e chain of conm;..nd t ha t zn unsnfe s i t uz t i on has de~el oy. ~od, 2nd t hc t ,
st : : t i st i czl l 7, based on c x ~c r i e n c e i n Victnnm, t hb chances of an z r t i l l t r y f i r i n g
cr r ol , hzve been incrs:: sr;d.
8. Zach f i r i n g i a t t e r y and bnt t i ?l i on CP should hnvi: r.. h e l i c o y t ~r . p d . It
should be sc~loctacl i n an cr*2 f r ~ ofrom obs t r uct i ons t o f l yi ng such z s overhead
wLrus. Any wi r es t h 2 t could bc ii ha m: d t o ei r cr r i f t should be fi?~.lctidGO t i i ot the::
AVDF-AT 12October 1967
SUBJXCT: Ar t i l l e r y I t e m f or Comnd Emphcsis
a r e vi s i bl e usi ng ms t er i zl such es s t r i pof white cl ot h.
In seni-perm. nent ~ o s i -
t i ons t he hel i copt er w d should be covered wi t h pnt -a-pri ne i f necessarv and fec!c-
i b l e .
9.
This l e t t e r w i l l be f i l e d i n & fol der ?long with t h6 o t h ~ r l e t t e r s r=qui red
t o be present i n bat t al i on 2nd bs t t dr y f i r s di r ect i on cent er s f o r ust; wi t h t he Di -
vi si on Ar t i l l e r y gunner;^ Checklist.
J. Young Jr.
J. YOUNG J R.
Colonel, Ar t i l l e r y
Co~wndi ng
DISTi3IBUTION:
12 - 2d Bn, 9t h kr t y
12 - 2d Bn, 1l t h Arty
12 - 3d Bn, 16thkr t y
12 - 3d Bn, 16thArty
12 -. 3d Bn, 82d Arty
12 - 2d Bn, 320th Arty
12 - . l s t Bn, 14thArty
12- 1s t Bn, 21st Arty
10 - S1
30 - s3
4 - s4
1 - G3
1 - G4
1 - Comm 0
1 - Avn 0
AVm4T
8tb-t buaeLig(C%aud Ar t i l l e r y Irmtdanta
8. U S Wdent r hwd+iry Lmar k t h
u 91, Al wow rarrrr m%uw).mnml .rm. -0. 8 Mi . a r
l?Lll k hm8rrtWtdb .Il)lbJILYa ldtb the Rat-. k-
&mmakrr*rJt*mmaaRa6L#n. mhmmLa-CLs
S n w w t ~ ~ ~ - - 4 . c ) r r v L . i n u + i 4 1 l 1 5 4 r l l l k r r t ~ h U
~ u p 4 a & S e n r i t ~ u ~ ~ r MvUL# V@dD,-
&8&SI rn~.
rartal- 'hddat~m m d La ) . r ~2 .b.8.
rr- b t h e r l L 1 k i.nt.tb.lby tbe i r nt er cwi n$ of t her
~ r w o h ~ ~ ~ 0 a ~ y r s t h . a 4 d a p & l ~ ~ U h -
tUn r, Um b t t a l h to -Sat sir irnrertmtSwe m .
Ihr clam + w e t.w p e ~ r l b e dLn Inulonuo 1.
d dl
ahildh dl k att- to .OCb eopy of the imtsqfi g m t i q *ifiuer'a
*lo+tt.
EXHIBIT
4
S. lmeatfgaeienr rhmld L ~ ~ i u d e takenm morn (rttt~dz~enta
11BU 19-241 -st, report8 ahodd net bedel.uped b ~ aot e
i srW1t t y tehave mtrSaments tmed tar t cro obtainstgmturaa. State-
mewefver b9 test* oer t l f i edbythe%martigatinseffCaet
a trw capla#.thndwr i t t e n Dtatemantabythei ndi vi dual oon-
earned-1 &flue. Xnanyaaec, pexem.t.:lrel&dag t~~stLB. ny d l
bewarned oftbafr ri@r wder Artaole 31, UeUJ andttretr teeti-
mmy mwrn t o. Whererql i [l arms is1nzlt.cated one * b part efan
b d S a h w1 be-18 bea i r e d oihUrF@t t a lam1 e a s e l .
6. If the lc~+.tigatiwefficer'a fbd* indieate &at W
Ar t i l l - orIkd&%re mire mt t he crwa a9 t he inelleat, an
l n f e d r e rillk made to theCummobLng Wfl cer, her l eal
DfvfsA~t~ ~rrru. ArtUlecgwlChb48 bounbythe aort expediti.ur
kprt d mj d &mtulefbdtnga, eonduoirous arid puai bl e emma
L f $ t e u r b e b a t d d . 8#+m8tat~dntmmayllbtBCre~irdLA
thir -0.
wO#J. Yam a.
Crlenel, Art i l l ery
-iag
D' IIITUBUIX~I
M
2 4 3
IO-kedmJ M v Arty
I-td Ba,9tbA m
Mt h Bn, 11thAr t y
5-art ror, MthArtr
3-SbBa,&6tb,Arty
5-# Plr, 18thArty
5- t at Bn,2latArty
3-36Bn,824 Arty
yv7J ,Uf?-,I;\ :.>
. I LL. riS
*G,i,;R.i(,*L D-jyJ-1"~~'
AFO S.il il'r ncisco 96374
1. Xafarenca ri mri cal D5.v i bg .525-4, Rules of' Xngzgement.
(u)
2. The recent sm~l~asis on tho CVB/VC obj;:ctives of soizing c o ~ t r o l
of t ha li:;mlz'cs, villrbgr:s ZJ I ~t oms has caused incr.:aso in tha
fre?.uoncy of US combat ojjerat~.oi~s in t bs vi ci ni t y 02 built-up ramas
wh3r~i1onc;ornk~-.t,.;l.i;s 2.r:>kmowll t o r\?sida. The r as vl t ai t lilizlillood
u-ad~i g. ring iimocent ci vi l i ma must S3 a mt'kcr , , , Of of ~ r c a L concern
'LO ::vdry C O ~ J L L ~ C : . ~ T , ;n.d war y 90s sib13 sdegu !.rd sliorl; of 011d:;nger-
i ng
7.'
dS l i v ~ ssri3.l B& us..:6 t o c ~ o i d nonco&a.i;i~t czsualtias.
3. I - L %ha-i;n tl~csrovghm<-contjnuinf: prograd Sr; de- is i~1>a~?..i;5-ve
v=:lo;:sc:
- w
a t -Lk: I.o:,resL coilliiu.ilcl l.:val \11~.ch w i l l kopij?avory sol di er
m~l : ;.:$iof .i;i12 iuportmce 0.i" s&::guadjzL~ noiicoIlib. ~~t~~ts, . d- Soti1 from
a h~~i t i ' i : ~. : ' , t ~rj -i ~ 2s from *i;llss t ~*nd; ; , o~~b s-i;:!.nG:~oint 2s WSU of $he
>r:,~ t 5 - g ~ o l 'VLo'cnem, of US Forci~said ti19 Gove rAullor;t
3. kf a~u?. r ds crgi:5nst of -khn nktc.:dl~:ss d ~ s t n ~ c t i o n privc.to property,
. . c. A clvbiiL:~:co:~i;ral p l ; : ~f or ; i l l grow12 oprat i oi i s h'' l xr i l t - ~~
c..rjas S U ~ : ~ C - L , ? ~ t o j. ncl~de 02 li~usiiinonc o~l bi ~bt s :
(2)
RouJc? 02 !r.ith&x,wal f or civi1i;ns i n cas9s idlors pri or
.
wc:z-;;=k~g of would h v e jc;opmdiz.:!d ~ c c o r i ~ i s l u ~ ~ t the pop~iL~ics 02
'Lho xission.
(3)
~2s-i;,;Slishn:,nt of nw!;5.ng a?.d ovi;cw.tlon yroceitwss,
~o:~.locti,ng po kt s mcl mcifr-cLlt rezt ncnt f or wotrxc?.3C.: ci vi l i ms .
982
EXHIBIT M-9
( 4 )
Control ?rocodvros for ci vi l i answithin d b t t l o ~ ~ 0 8
tt!:icS w i l l C ~ O I Jt;hi:n t obocollsct3d mL ciatain3d without WUW.
5 . A tho~otxh !rllowlbCga ~'112s t ri ct al &emrc~ to
rcl es of cn-
gz.g.-.i.znt co;lccr.Led <>ffo&on the; p-t 02 dvcry soldiort o
mi-tljloieo~ol ~cor~l bat a~t 5.3 81-0 to 'bzttlo c@.sualtj.~s ijssantid. if 'do
$,;->.:I th;!1oydt.j coq:rz-Lion of ths popl o-,andcrsato ths Con-
. Litions r u c c . ; s ~ r ~ in Lo' pormittham Lo go cbout thoirnorad. UVQS
p~ c c oa:!. sacurity.
--
-- ---
.-----
T --'----
HE.Fs)~uARTEXS Jr:. l ??CIL DIVISImI
APO SanFrzpcisco 96374
AVDF-CS 5 February 1968
. \
SUBJECT: Gunnery checkl i st
TO: Commanding General, 11th Light Infant ry Brigade
hPOSan Francisco 96217
Commanding Officer, 196th Light Infant ryBrlqade,
APO San Francisco 96256
Cammandirg Officer, 198th' Ljght Infant ry Bripade,
APO San Francisco 96219
Comna:?.?dj.ngOfficer, 3d Brigade, 4th Infant ryDivision,
APOSanFrancisco ?6262
1. Attached as ~ncl os ur e #l i s a l e t t e r published by'Headcuarters,
America1 Division i ~r t i l l e r y, with a Gunner3 Checklist attached. Thil-tr-
copieswere provided t o each di r ect support a r t i l l e r ybrt t ol i on.
2. It i s reguested t hat act i on be taken t o insure t hat :
a.
i i rt j -l l erybat t al i ons organic or attached t o bricades co7,.ply
with t hei ns t r uct i ons ' f or t he use of t h i s checklist i r ~ccordance t dt h
Inclosure #l.
be !ill references, with changes, of t he attached Gunnery Checklist
are on f i l e i n al l Fi re Direction Centers of a r t i l l e r yorganic or attached.
t o t he brigades,
c .
The inspections recuired on a nonthly basi s by t he Battery
and 9atta.lion Comanders be conpleted, and a mi t t e n record of deficien-
. c e s noted be posted i n anpropriate Fi re Direction Centers.
3.
Inspecting Officers from Headquarters, Imerical Division Ar t i l l er y
w i l l spot check uni t s from time t o time, u s i ~ g t hi s checkl i st t o eval-
uat e t he r es ul t s of t he i ~s pe c t i ons required by para 2c.above.
PrnTHE. COwumDm:
1 Incl NELS A. P&ISON JR ' ?
1
as Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff
DISTRIBUTION:
30-Each' Addresses:
1-c/s
143
1-w
DE?.!IRTlm!T. OF TEE uJ.T
HEI.DiTiU;X;r&S rJfiZ.1 C!iL DNISIO?.TARTILLZRY
i.POSan Fra.ncisco 06374
A' T DF-AT
5 Februsry 136g
SUBJECT: Gunnery Checklist
TO:
Cor,wanding Officer, 3d Bettalion, . 16t h ,2rtil&3rg,. APCI $6374
Comndi ng Officer, 3d Battalion, 18t h ixtilleryr,..LPO 9637k
Ib
The attached ltGur~nery.Che$~Li...st" fcr your use, i n is--fm.erded
checking t he f i r e di r ect i on cent ers and f i r i n g bat t er i eo under your ~~mik%?d.
2. Each Ek-ttel-y 2nd Bat t al i on .Cr?mzn&y i n h e r i e d . .Division ~ ' r t i a r y
will pe~sonzP1-y i nspect each f i r e di r ect i on center and f i r i 3 g bet t er y
under h i s coiiimnd, us i r ~g t echni =l a s s i s t a nt s -as a ~pr c pr i a t e , once each
month. ,using t h i s chec!::list, A copy of - t he checklist, wi t h c?eficien-
c i e s noted thereon, will. bc posted i r r t h e FDC and a t the..baJfiery exe-"
.t,ive,post until. t he next inspection is made.
3.
Inspect i ng off j-cers from .Hezdquarters America1 Di~.sisn' P r t i l h W
3fiUspot check uni t s fTom t i ne t o ti--e usinc t hi s checklist, i n ~r der ;
t o evaluate t he r e s ul t s gf t'x i n s wt i o n s r eqkked by ~ ~ l - 2 ma p h above* 2,
1Incl
8s Cole'nel, - Ar t i l l er y
Commarding
DISTRIBUTI0 ' :
~ . & c h
30-50, 2d 3n, 9 t h
30-02, 6th 3n, 1l t h Arty
30-40, I st, B ~ ,d&th . r t y
30-CO, 34 Rn, 02 Arty
I-S1
8043
1 4 4
A. Are t he following references on hand'
a
1. FM 6-40 dated October 1967 or Fit 6- 40. d~t edfJover?-ber1960
vrith changes 1, 2, 3 and DL Training Circu3z.r 6-1.
2, bner i cal Division l l r t i l l e r y Fi el d SO?
3. CO, TF OZCIO;? Lr t i l l e r y message LVDF-!,T 279C, subj ect :
Sel ecti on of ; muni t i on, DTG 26083C2 Ju1.67.
4. CO, i . ~ ~ I C L I J DIVISIO?? Ar t i l l er y l e t t e r s , subject: Lr t i l l e r y
Items f or Comrr,and % ~ h nsis, - d2ted:
b. 13 June 1967 3
c. 20 June 1967 k.
d. 12 October 1967 1.
e. 15 October 1967 m.
h. 2 December 1967 P
5. CO, TF OXnG8;".T kxt i l l erymessage, NDF-AT U53, subject:
Orientation and l kei ni ng i n :. rtillery Technioues, DTG 2015212 Ihy 67.
6. CG, TF 0K;GQ.i messc.p (to b r i p d e commanders) :;!WIF-LT
1669, subj ect : AdjustKent of !:rtillery Defensive Concentrations, DTG
2703302 Eky 67.
7. CG, TF OPL::CO?? mess?ge( t o bri g3de com.nders) iiVDF-f..T .'
2128, subj ect : Doilble Check Procedures f o r Pxt i l l er y Units, DTc 0608067
Jul 67
8. CC-, TF ORBcOIJ r essaf e ,'!TmF-!.T 2859, . subject: Reportine and
I nvest i gat i on of Er r at i c I..rtillery Rounds, DTC 30C:810:! J u l 67.
9.
Sxt i l l e r y Incident Fi l e. t o -include:
a. Headquarters, TF' OF3GOV l e t t e r , subject: I nvest i pat i on
of I: rt i l ' l ery Inci dent s, dated 7 IGy 1867.
t. Headpuarters, 111&.rine )mphibious Force l e t t e r
subj ect : ~ p o t / ~ e r i o u s Inci dent Reports, un:inted.
Iunerical Division' Gunnery Checkl i st
c. i.11CO, !-merical Di vi si on Ar t i l l e r y messapes, subj ect :
k t i l l e r y Inci dent .
10. CG, TFO l e t t e r , subj ect : 3afet.y i n Ar t i l l e r y Fi ri ng, dat ed
26 A U ~ 67.
ll. CG, TF OBZGO!? messa.ge :VW-/-T 1570, subj ect : !i dj ust i ns
wi t h Shel l Smoke pr i or t o f i r i n g Shel l FZ,DTG, 2307402 ' ap 6?.
B. FDC Checkl i st :
1. ).re standard Gunnery procedures and t he "newn t ermi nol om
used? (i3ef 1 )
2. Is a complete FDC team of f i v e rr-en on dut y 24 hours a
day? (aef 2)
3. Does t he FDC possess a l l t he requi red eoui-elent t o perform
i t s mission? (chap 16, Ft.i 6-40; TOS)
4 . Is t her e adequate l i ~ h t and workinp s p c e i n t he FDC?
5. Is a thorough br i ef i ng conducted bet-xeen personnel when
s h i f t s a r e changed?
6. Is t her e an over1e.p of t o i nsur e cont i nui t y' s h i f t ~ e r s o n ~ e l
7. Is t her e an adequate syst en of checlts i n t he FDG t o prevent
e r r or s from bei ng t r a ns r i t t e d t o t he p n s ? (,Qp 2, !innex A, SC?; Ref 7)
8. Is a Fi r e Order i ssued f o r each misdion? (pars 18-15,
FM 6-40)
9. Are f i r e c o m~ n d s tr;.l.nsmitted i n proEer seouence" ( ~ e c
IV, Chap 4, Ft.4 6-40)
10. Is a. cornplete and consol i &t ed record of amuni t i on
kept i n d i c ~ t i n p r0und.s on hand md expended? (~Ecra18-32, 9.I 6-40)
11. Is an independent check of c m. p ~ t ~ . t ! o ~ s md e a t a l l
t i nes, ? (i+p 2, Annex A, SOP)
12.
Is a f i r e ccpabi l i t i es o v e r l ~ y m?intained3 era 24-40,
FIf 6-40)
13. Is t he s i t uat i on m p kept carrent , t o i ncl ude l ocat i ons
of 211 fri endl y. forces, pa. trols, LTiFts observetion p o ~ t s , embushea, no
f i r e areas, f r e e f i r e area.3, f i r e coordination l i nes , b u i l t up press,
vi l l a c e s and h ? J i ~ i S ? Is t he cap updeted t o r e f l e c t current inh?bit,ed
ar eas? i r e t he l i mi t s s.f vi l l ages, cznps, et c, ccrrect ed e s r e f ~ i ~ e e
i nforrwt i on i s recei ved fro^ t he d i s t r i c t or by a e r i r l reconnai.ss.-~.cc"
(f~nnexL. SCi' )
b r i c a l Division GunneryCbckl i st
. Ist he @'id of a l l f i r e requests checked ~ 6 t h t he s i t uat i on
map t o assureanunsafe condition does not e d s t and then clearedwith both
the U.S. DS Ar t i l l er yLiaison Officer, t he l ocal >RWJ aut hor i t i es ( ~ i s t r i c t )
and/or ot her a l l i e d troops i nt he area, a s appropriate?
15. Are f i r e di rect i on records' properly m5ntd.ned? (Para
3.23-32, FH6-40;MjrA, SOP)
16. Doest he HCOdetermine t i gl e T t o t he neerest 10mils and
announce itwhen i t svalue is500 mils or greater? (Para 18-21, FJX6-40)
I.
!.re defxection indexes properLy constructed and i dent i f i ed
f or 6400 miloperation? (para 16-18, FX6-40; Lmex A, SOP)
18. Does t he FDCalways f i r e with t he best &t a available?
(Para 7f,App 2, kmex b., SO?)
19.
t r e GFT corrections beinp kept current by r e p i s t r ~t i o n and/or
.MET pl us VZ?
20, iwe r e ds t r a t i ons being conducted, asa dnlmum, every
t hi r d day, 2ndupon occupa.tionof a new position? (For 105mhowitzers a
dai l yr egi st r at i on. i sdesirable.) Is t he "f ul l fork" method of refi st rat i on
beingused? (Para 9i,/innex A, SOP)
'
21, Are .lZT liessages being received on a requ1a.Pbasi s?
(hbery6 hours) ( ~ a r a %, ,:vex A, SOP) '
22.
Ist he MET >lessage comwted immediately uron r ecei pt f or
al l ' appr opr i at eranges and directions?
23.
Ist here ani nde~endent check of each bat t er y computer
by t he chief computer or bat t er yFDO, asapproprist e? (App 2, fanex sl,
'SOP)
24.
Are a t l e a s t 2 independent computations beinpnzde of
each 1.ZT l.:essa~e?(kpp 2, Annex fi, SO?)
25. Durinc computation i s each computer extra.ct5npdet af r om .
t he f i r i ngt abl es independently of t he other conputers?
2'6; Isa check made betiqeen ba.ttalion ~ n d b' attery mCtsi n
order t o compare met computations?
27.
Isa l l &codine/de&6dinp verx'k-d independentlyby a t
l eas t two individuals?
28., /.re -repi at rat i ont ransfer limits adhered t o a t 211times?
(chap 20, FI:6-40)
. America1Di vi si on Gunnery Checklist
.
. 29. /.re c o r r e c t i o ~ s f o r t a r ge t s out si de t r ~ n s f e r l i x d t s
computed usi ng l!et pl us 8Z technicue? (Para 21-15, FK 6-43)
30. Are comparative VEfs known f o r a l l \mns?
31.
h e a l l t a r c e t s pl ot t ed neat l y and accurat el y? (para
16-3, FI< 6 - 4 ~ )
32.
Ist he 1 0 0 / ~ f act or used properl y i n Time acd VT missions?
--
(lOO/h..determined a t i n i t i a l chart range) era 18-26, Fi' 6 4 0 )
33. Is :bat t er y Executive Officer f e x i l i a r wi t h t he Fxecut i ve' s
!4igh Burst ? (Para 4-25, ~ib!-6-40)
34. Aft er t he second and any subseauent r e gi s t mt i on,
r egar dl ess of t he poi nt registered on ( i t may be t he sene poi nt i n i t i e l l y
r egi s t er ed on), does t he F30 assure t h z t t he def l ect i on index i s not
moved? ( ~a , r a . 20-12, F14 6 4 0 )
35.
Xre a l l FDO's f ar t i l i ar with hich bur s t ' r egi s t r at i onand
r egi s t r at i on by radar? (Sec IVY Chap 19, F1.'. 6-40)
36.
?.re computers 2ble t o sol ve a high bur s t r egi st r a. t i onusfng
logarithms? ( ~ e c I V, Chap 19, F14 6-1:O)
,
37. Are F3C1s f a n i l i z r ~ L t h t he basi c survey onerat i ons ?
38.
Are F301s asking observers i f tlAdjust Fi r e" ~ Ls s i o n s ar e C!.o,f
Da~pt : r Clnse nr Dq~l' i f appropri at e? If fIC10se'~ a.re t hey ~ski npr lfKow
Closen? It should be remembered t ha t a t vm way channel e xi s t s over t he
r adi o t o aclvise of unusual si t uz. t i onsa ~ d di f f i c ul t i e s which mipht produce
saf et y hazards, sucha s f r i endl y t roops forward of t he FO, on h i s f l a ~ k s ,
jungle which hmper s observation, et c, The FDO has a r es nons i bi l i t y t o
quest i on t he FO i f t her e i s any i ndi cet i on th2.t f r i endl y t roops or ci vi l -
i ans nay be endangered.
39. Isan of f i cer present and awake a t a 1 l t k . e ~ i n t he FEC?
40. Are a r t i l l e r y defensive concent rat i ons pl ot t ed and have
t heybeen f i r e d i n pr i or t o darkness unl ess a cormnd deci si on has been
made not t o do so f o r cogent reasons? (para 9i (7), SOP and ref ~ b ! .
41.
Do t he FDC personnel know t he proper procedure f o r
properl y conputing an ad.justment with shel l s: smoke, base ej ect i on and
!.T and t hen changing t o s h e l l IG?( ~ e cI, Chap 24, FH 6-40)
h e r i c a l Di vi si on C.unaery Checklist
, 42. Is t he FDC properly prot ect ed acai nst rr,ortar/s-ill
arms f i r e t o i ncl ude overhead cover? (para 9c, SOP)
43.
Does each DS 1, r t i l l er y Bat t al i on maintain a l i a i s on of f i cer
wi t h t he. U.S. advi sor t o a l l d i s t r i c t s i n hi s brigzde AO? ' (para 6b,
. ;,ppendix 4, t nnex A, SOP)
44.
a e new forward observers given a thorouph or i ent at i on
and a t e s t (as appl i cabl e) pr i or t o bei ng sent up on t he h i l l ? ( y ~ r e10 .!.nnex
SGp and rcessage reference A 5 above) . , . , .
45.
h e new FDOfs given a t hor ou~hor i ent at i on, and an
apprent i ce peri od ayder an experienced FDO pr i or t o roi nq on s h i f t ?
(itof orcnco i,5)
46. Does each bat t al i on have an FDC t e s t which all of f i cer s
i n t he gurnery chai n ar e requi red t o pass?
47. Is t he prohi bi t i on agai nst beer i n t he FDC or ?xecutive
Post s t r i c t l y enforced?(aef 4b) . , '
48.
Do sorne H&:I f i r e s commence promptly a t dusk? ( ~ e t t e r ,
" hr t i l l e r y I t e ns f o r Comand Fmphasistf, dated 13 June 1967)
49.
Is r esponsi bi l i t gf i xed with 9 s peci f i c i fi di vi duel on each
s h i f t f o r ea.ch li.nk i n t he gunnery chain, and i t s i ~dependentcheck?
( Let t er t l i . r t i l l er y Items f o r Command Fnphasis", dat ed 20 June. 1967)
50.
Does t he bat t er y FDC compute the' mininum ?Z t o cl ear
a l l intermediat.e cr es t s occupied by f r i endl y troops, and have on f i l e
t he mi nhm, !:E t o c l e a ~ ~ s k s vi s i bl e from t he bat t er y posi t i on a s
cornputed by t he bat t er y' execut i ve of f i cer ( Sec 11, Chap 3, FF 6-h(?)
51.
Does t he FDC have -wi nd' dat a cards and a r e t hey usi ng them
correct l y?
52.
Does t he FDO noni t or t he read back from t he puns t o i nsure
t ha t t he cor r ect dat a was received?
53. . Are propram t e s t s of FLDAC made per i odi cal l y t o check
computer funct i oni ng?
54.
Is t he dat a on t he computer vi s ual l y checked by a second
i ndi vi dual before t he' operat or presses t he !tEl,!T?B" but t on?
.
55.
A?.re current r egi s t r at i on correct i ons (deflection, time,
range) bei ng determined and ent ered i n t o Fli.DhC?.
. .
56.
Is a primary check of d a t a produced by. FLD;".C made by
e i t he r a second FFI.DI,C or by t he manual system?
57.
Is t he sol ut i on of a 1.ZT check poi nt f o r a t ar get a t
maximum ranee checlced-between two di f f er ent F!iD!iCt s t o i nsur e t ha t 211
appl i cabl e IET l i n e s have been ent ered correct l y?
Americal Di vi si on Gunnery Checkl i st
10. Is the i a s t motion i n s et t i ng C! i n t he di r ect i on of
gr eat es t r esi st ance? (Para 5-4, FFi 6-40)
.11. Is t he Gunner's Cjuadrant used properl y?
12. . Are t he guns loaded onl y a f t e r ' ' E i s announced?
13.
Is t he hand wheel touched a f t e r announcing l1F?ea.dyIr?
U. Are t he bubbles l evel ed' aft er f i r i n g ?
15. Is t he "read back" accomplished properly? . .
16. Does t he Chief of Fi r i ng Bat t ery and/or t he Executive
Offi cer i n s ~ e c t a l l pi eces da-iljj for' maintenance,. s er vi cepbi l i t y, saf et y
and cl eanl i ness?
17. Does t he ~ g e f of Sect i on i ns me t ha t h i s pri ne naver
and h i s porti, on of t he bas i s l oad of amuni t i on i s p r o ~ e r l ymaintained?
18. Does t he Bat t ery Zxecutive Offi cer check t he azimuth of
t he or i ent i ng l i n e f o r general di r ect i on by s e t t i ng up h i s aiming c i r c l e
and It fl oat i ng a needle11 over t he OL? (pafa 4-5, F?: 6-40)
19.
bre h i n g c i r c k properl y decl i nat ed? (!,gglicable 3:)
20. Is t he "basi c peri odi c check11 performed on a r e c l a r
bat. i s ?
21. me powder p i t s or cont ai ners of s uf f i ci ent s i z e t o prevent
over f l ow duri ng peri ods of heavy f i r i ng? (Para 8d(2) ,App2, Annex A, SO?)
22. Is unused powder burned regul arl y?
23.
Are azimuth markers placed around each howitzer t o provide
a visual check of t he cor r ect azimuth of f i r e ? (Para 8b(3)r~$F2,2nnex A,SOP)
24.
Is proper pr ot ect i on provided f o r personnel, weapons and
muni . l ; i on? (para 9c(2) (a), Annex A, SOP) Is overl~ead pr ot ect i on provided
'
f o r a l l personnel i n t h e i r sleep in^ and work in^ ar ees v,6thin a reasonzble
t i ri e here defi ned a s 3-5 days?
.
25.
Is an air s ent i nel post ed a.t Vne f i r i n g ~ , o s i t i o nduri ng
missions? ( ~ e t t e r ,"Ar t i l l er y I t ens f o r Comand 3 h ~h a s i s V, dated. 23
l:-pril 1967)
26. Is mu n i t i o n st ored ir? accordance wi t h t he l e t t e r ,
t t hr t i l l e r y Items f o r Cornrand Emphasistt, dat ed 13 Zune 1967?
27,
Is r es pons i bi l i t y f i xed on a s peci f i c i ndi vi dual a t a l l
t k e s (i ncl udi ng chow t i ~ l e s )f o r each l i n k i n t he pynnery c!i.ain, t o
i ncl ude- - r es?onsi bi l i t y. .f-or supervi si or? - ( ~ e t t e r ,It Art i l l ery I t ens f o r
Corm-:'.and &:hasi s", d: t e d 20 June 1957)
28. Does t he bat t er y Executive Offi cer com?ute t he minimum
GE t o t he vi s i bl e ;ask, adding t he r e q ~ s r e ds af et y f a c t or i f it i s occupied
---byf r i endl y t roops? ( ~ e c11, Chap 4, Fl< 6-40)
29.
Does t he Executive Officer ins~1.t-et 5a t t he maxiiilaq r a t e
of f i r e of t he veepon i s not exceeded? (F'ara 2'1-6, F?4 6-40)
30.
h e t he. .powder increments removed f r un each semi-f ixed
round t o ve r i f y t32t t he covplete a ~ d ccr r ect incremevts e r e ?resent
before t he charge i s cut ? ( ~ s ~ l e 11, FZ 6-75)
31.
Does t he' X0 or Chief of Fi r i ng Bat t er y vi s ual l y check t he
powder i ~cr er nent shel d up by t he Chief of Sect i on t o i r s ur e t ha t t he
cor r ect charge hzs been cut ? ( ~e f e r e nc k4d)
32.
Are procedures est abl i shed t o i nsur e t ha t a round 5s not
allowed t o sit 5.n a "hottt c h a b e r an excessi ve peri od of time, %.e,
.not more t han 2 minutes, without unl oadi rg by f i r i n g i r t o a "safe" ar ea?
33. Are t her e frequent , short , br i s k peri ods of."Cannoneers
D r i l l t t witin checks f o r accuracy, t o i ~ s u r ehigh st andards a r e mi nt ai ned?
34,
l z e personnel provided prot ect i on, t o inc!.ude overhead
cover, before ammunition, i n accor da~cewi t h t he p r i o r i t i e s est abl i shed
i n Para 9c(2) hmex A, SOP?
35;
Is armunition properl y prot ect ed from wea,t!?er an:! r ai n?
36.
>xe wooden gun platforms rrovi-ded f o r heavy a r t i l l e r j a s
soon a s pr act i cabl e? ,
37.
:?re a l l rersonnel i n t he f i r i n g bat t er y f ami l i ar wi t h
t he pl an t o defend t h e i r gun pos i t i on a g a i ? s t pound at t ack?
38.
3ave bunkers i n f r ont of lO5m howitzers been provided
wi t h %ndb~. g? r o t e c t i o ~t o t h e i r r ear so a s t o al l ow t he s af e f i r i n g of
ttBeehivett m~::unition overhead i n defense of t he f i r e L sse?
39
Is t her e a s;?stern of i ncent i ves t o reward gun sect i ons
wi t h an unbroken record of accura.cy i n f i r i ng?
40,
Is t he br t t e r y yosi t i on neat and orderl y?
41. Ha e howitzers been el ect r oni cal l y ~ a l i b r a t ~ e d ? lJow recent l y?
Are cal i br at i on cor r ect i ons recorded and a v e i l a b l ~ ?
42.
h e 1;Ets recorded a t t he pi ece by ezimuth of f i r e t o
bbst r uct i ons such a s t a l l t r ees, towers, et c?
p o R 0 COPY
;UF-?&
7 December1967
:;U!3LOcT: ~! i aeedScMul eof Ut h LtI nf 868 (0)
CormdingOffl oer
3d Brigade, 4thInfantry Di vi si on
APOSarn Fr.ancisco 96374
Commanding Officer
l l t h Li ght Infantry mgede
APOSanFrancieco 96374
:L (U) Reference W V Ragulatian 331-1wi tn Change 1,
- :C) Then t h LtInfBde will conduct r phased in-cawtry,y
A ,.:,:I,. J I ~7ro;;ran afterarri val ot itsmainbody oftroops. TI-e3d
at^%, 4 t h Infant ry Mvieion dll assist the l l t h ~ r L ~ & e inthe
af tills propain. Thepurposeoftheprogramistobring . . - r l + ~ , - t
I 11c 11t - q Brigsic toairximum ccanbat readinessino minimum oftke
s+j , , i n thents.jor e,slphaaie tonardt act i cal cordit;tons asencountered
5 CT?, Or1 conpletian ofthe training phase thellthBrigade w U
. IS~L~- G?t.ne rdssion ofoperalingintheDuc Ph3 AO.
1 1 1
a=
Carinandera ( t o c a w : y level) arxl staffs.
(1)
Developoperational t d mi < ; u e e ino ~ e rt o permit
' i ~ ? bx.ig,ade t o oess!iineit8r umt i on aepu-t af the Americnl Di vi si on.
.
(2) Prodt i e tr;rin&: on t t l c cwduct a d teeimiqws of
..irnotti 1.c ~ p e ratl.ons .
<;% .,
, , ! ; ' l + ... ~ 1 3 i J ~ I G ~ ~ n i j ~ L 1 j YR
..:.
r\T
,
, . Lk t i - b r n ~ r I I , , ~ L ~ L A Y ~ ~ S F I ~ HHI B I T M-54
,.PT!:R 12x2 LO3DIH
.VW7lI?.
N C L %I 627
(b) tlmltk url uni tati on
( 0)
Act i Oq %OO@SOWJTt o O O p r i t h 0n.i-t of
Vietram (t s r d n ud. weattwr).
(d) Xad;Lv$&ml-tiara a w & t i ~ .t o Ci vi c Aa-
Hetrap and ~aycbhq$aalwmtiaw.
(e) woqrp6nt of CSj up8 protective .9bko
- ( f ) PdLi arl as t i cm on a d 1 axn8 and cmraerved
#:capons, t o inclrde nabrrtewe'.
(g) Haintronance qI bdivldutil and orgadsatianrrl
~l o t hi ngard equipmnt.
( h) Loai aatigstion.
(I)Cmvq pmedures ud safety
(3) Battlefield pollca
(1) ~ d j ~ t m e n i of artillery and mortar are
(m) C~ t . mi c ~ t , i o n e tecnniqws and procedure8
(n)
Sentry duty ( 5. rr::iucil.ng prinrabr defenspe of
st at i c pi t i orl s . j
L
D
MI
w
: .
. .
Mm'LDtic . . . . Pho -.
. ,
Slonbd- at Duo Pho
b. E Trp/lut Cav
u 4 8 y
LltI
Relieve 3/4 Bde and e s s w re-
apomibility for dealgmted A 0
AFI?~WAX DUC Ph0
Standdown at D* Pho
A ~ J D P ~ 7 Dsc 67
SUEJST: swbor nth it ztd W. (U)
W Wl k l e tkhntat.4 an ai d uni t training
D-Day Arrival Buc Pho
!hl S t d - d o wn at Duc Pho
Orientation and unit training
Dnc Pho
D+lY t o M Y Train d t h 3/ k Bde
6. (C) RaepamibiUlxlcrs.
a. Tkre U t h Li @t Infantry Brigade wi l l develop a detai l ed
train.i,ug program w3t b. h the parmYtm-6 stated he r s i n, arrd, +dl l be pre-
.pared to r ul l eve the 3d Itrigeda, bth hffarrtry Divb ion in piace at the
+-i t em i ndi cztw .
b. 3a Sm,r,sde, 4th Jc f al t ~yDivision wi l l assist tne Utn
IAg~i tInfant ry 13fii:ace 5. n the prep~rrat5.mmd conduct of the tra5nh.g
p:'oEi-an.,;
Infoimation Offi c e
APO Sen Francisco 96374
AVDF-I0 . 7 April 1968
SUBJECT: I~?F' OF@~LTION ' ST3:NDLRD OPERfLTING PROCEDURES (SOP) OFFICE
a.
The Information Officcr, fmerical Division, i s responsible t o
t he Comncting General f or planning, executing, supervising and evalil-
at i ngt he Americal Information program.
b.
This SOP provides' guidelines f or Information act i vi t i es hi t hi n
t heRepublic of Vietnain f or Americal Division uni t s and personnel,
2, OBJECTIVES
The objectives of t he Information program are, within t helimits of
mi l i t ary securi t yand good t ast e, t o release completk, accurate and timely
i nforml i on concerning t he accomplishments of i ndi ~i dua l s ancl uni t swithin
t he lunerical program and t o develop public awareness'and understanding of
t he aims, missions, obj e~t i ves , and professionalism of the Jmerical Di v i -
sion, This includes, . -. . but i s not necessari l y' l l mi t edto:
a.
Preparing and disseminating general.newsrel eases t o appropriate
news media.
b, Preparing and disseminating hometown news rel eases and taped in-
terviews t o insure t hat indivicluals receive r egggni t i o~ i n t hei r hometowns.
c,
Assisting accrcditab orrraspondents in securingfacLs f or prepL1.a-
at i on of news st ori es, 1,ssisi.ance includestran,+rting, bi l l et i ng, brief-
ing, and pr ovi di ~g escort swhen required.
3.. POLICY
a,
The Informt i on program isa cornand responsibility.
EXHIBIT M-112
f
The basic principle soverning the public release of mi l i t arx informa-
t i on i n Vietnam i s t hat t he maximum amount of i nr omt i on w i l l be mde
available, consistent with the requirement for security,
I n past wars a great deal of information could be, end was, denied t o
the enerqy on the basis t hat 'he did ~ n t h?.ve ready access t o it, .This i s
not t he case in Vietnan, By t hei r vory nature, sdversion and guerri l l a
vnrfare make it i q~os s i bl et o safeguard many types of information t hat
once were ca.refu3ly protected, Thus, the ar r i val of a major US unit i s
announced irm~tcdiately, rathgr than weeks or even months l at er , Pin-
point datelines are p e d t t e d , In-country strength figures, by service,
are released a t regular intervals, Casualty figures are released weekly.
I n Vietnam the greatest problsm in achieving a f u l l flow of informa-
t i on to newsmen znd thence t o the public i s not t hat of dectding whether
infomation i s releasable, but t hat of physically gathering, transmitting
and checldng hformation from widely scattered locations linked together
only by ai r transportation and an almost saturated comunications system.
I n t he ' past, cert ai n ground rules have defined the items of informa-
t i on t hat ar e not releasable and those.that are relcasable. The ground
rules have been reviewed t o insure tinat they arc clcarly stated, t hat
they are limited t o thoserequired t o preserve military secirrity and t hat
the principle of .paking the maximum amount of infomation available t o
the public i s being followed,
Tho si t uat i on i n South Vietnam i s such t hat corresponderrts may come
into possession of information which has not been released offi ci al l y under
the ground rules set fort h herein, Such information i s not t o be trans-
mitted o r released t o the public unt i l of f i ci al l y released by Vietnamese,
American or other ~ r e eWrl d spokesmen i n r e ~a r d t o t hei r respective
national forces. Offi ci al Government of Viemt;nhm (GVN) and US BUt z r y
E~ssistance Comznd, Vietnam (FJ,cV) accreditztion i s issued on t hi s
condition, Deliberate violation of these conditions or ground rul es by a
correspondent will be regarded as B basi s for suspension or cancellatian
of accrcdiL?tion.
Corresponderits may find that, a t times, t hei r movements my be
rest ri ct 3d i n certain t act i cal areas, These rest rzct i ons aremkept t o a
minimum but they my b e applied by .a commanding offfcer when i n -his
opinion t he nature of an bperation warrants such actton, Carrespundents
w i l l be advised of such rest ri ct i ons by t he commanding offi cer of the uni t
or by the I0 rep~wesentativeof the headq,uarters involved, or by t he unit
~ 2 / ~ 2 i f there i s no I 0 representative present.
1,
The Cormnander, U3 Ilrjlitary Assistance Cammand, Vietnam i.8
t he sole 'releasing authority f or a l l information material, including photo-
grq?hy, per t ai ni ngt o US military act i vi t i es of Vietnam and gathered or
pmduced by military inZ.ividuals or organizations,
Local commanders are
delegated t he authority t o release hometowr, news material, As authorized
hr COl4JSKdCV, t he Chief of Information or hi s duly appointed represen-
Wi v e is t he officiAl E4CV milikary spokesman.
2.
Xnfomtion =Leared for release will be made ava-ble t o t he
press by MACV through one or more of t he following means,
a, Daily prsss release.
b. Daily press briefing.
c, - C a l l outs,
dm Special press handouts.
3,. Releasable Infomation
I -
a. Genera?.
(1)
k ~ r i v a l of major units in country when of f i ci al l y
annomced by COMJSACV.
(2)
Strength figures sf US forces, by semrice, when
~MIOMC ed by 'cansihCv
(3
Offi ci al t ot al casualty f$gmes on a weekly and cumula-
tive basia, as furnished by Department of Defense on t he basi s of reports
from t he Services.
(4) Eneqy casualty figures ror d c h action or operation,
daily and c ~ 1 ~ i v e l . y . ~
b. ~roundfiavalOperations
(1)
Casualties suffered by friendly uni t s in an announced
operationin term of nunber ki l l ed inaction (KIA) or wounded i n action
( l a*
(2)' Sase of friendly farces Wolved i n anaction or opera-
tion wing generalterms such as nmulti-battalionn,
(3.)
~ o ~ t t o n regarmi det ai l sof a t act i cal operat*
men release hasbeen authorizedby CG31USlACV (See paragraph lo, General
Nptes).
c. PAr Operations
(1) Target ort ar eet shi t , t o include general location and
category of target.
. .
(2)
1der;tj.Cicationastowhether itwas VNAF, US or a
j oi nt W/US strike,
(3) lhether ai r cr af t were land-based or carrier-based.
Names of carri erswhen their ai r cr af t ar einvolved,
(-4) Time of,attack i n general. terms,
( 5 )
General evaluation of success of t hemission.
( 6)
Types of ordnance expeaded i ngeneral terms, such a s
250-pound.fragmentation bonbs, !5OO-pourad general purpose bombs, rockets,
.5;0 caliber amnunition,-2CBE cannon;fire.
(7)
W e s of es s i ons over North Vietnam; number of
sor t i esover t he Republic of Vietnam (I3.W).
(8) Types of ai r cr af t involved.
( 9)
Weather enroute and over t he t arget during a strike.
(10)
Pi l ot sightings of unfriendly ai rcraft ,
(11)
Periodically, t he number of ai r cr af t downed:
(a) By host i l e f i r e3n South.v&etnam.
(b) By host i l e f i r e Sn North Vietnam.
(12)
Volume of enemy ant i - ai r cr af t f i r e i n general terms,
.4,
Infarmationgn6t rel easabl e under any circumstances.
(1)
Future plans, operations, o r st ri kes.
(.2)
Information on or confirmation of Rules of Engagement,
(3)
Amounts' of ordnance and f ue l moved by support uni t s or
on hand i n conbat uni t s, unless cleared by PACOI.
b. ~r ound/ ~a va l Operations
,.
(1)
During an operation, uni t designations and t r oop mve-
ments, depxopents, name of operation and si ze of fri endl y
forces involved, unt i l of f i ci al l y released by IIACV,
'(2)
1ntaM.gence uni t act i vi t i es, , methods of operation, or
specific. l ocat i on,
(1)
The nurcber of sort.L:,~s and t he amount of ordnance
expended on s t r i kes out si de the RVN,
(2)
Information of a i r c i * ; A f t t aki ng off f o r st r i kes, enroute
to,. o r ret urni ng from ' t arget zrea, I::i;or:ration on s t r i kes while they
are in progress .'
(3)
Id-entity of uni t s and l ocat i ons of a i r bases from which
a i r c r a f t are launched on combat operations.
(4)
Number of a i r c r a f t damaged o r any ot her i ndi cat or of
effect i vwos s o r h e f f ectiveness of ground ant i - ai r cr af t defenses.
( 5 )
Tact i cal speci fi cs, such a s al t i t udes, course,
or a we of at t ack, (General items such a s "low and f as t t t may be used,
( 6 )
Informat'ion of or confirmation of planned s t r i kes which
do,not t ake place $or any reason, including bad weather,
(7)
Speci fi c i dent i fi cat i on of enemy weapons system used
to down fri endl y ai r cr af t .
(8)
Det ai l s ,concerning downed ai r cr af t while SAR operations
are i n progress.
GENERAL NOTES
1,
The i n i t i a l r el ease of information pert ai ni ng' t o any t a c t i c a l
operation i n t he field w i l l be made by t he 1.IACV Office of Inforpation
(EucoI) when, i n t he opinion of t he Field Force commander concerned,
t he rel ease of such hf or mat i on wi l l , not adversely af f ect t he securi t y of
h i s c omnd, Thi s condition trill exi st when it can be presumed t hat
t he enenry i s aware of t he general strength and location of t he fri endl y
force($), and may occur ei t her before or a f t e r t here has been si gni fi cant
contact. The Fi el d Force coaunander s re.comlendation f or rel ease
does not const i t ut e ant hor i t y f or commanders subordinate t o MACV t o
ef f ect rel ease t o news n~zdia. I n i t i a l announcement of an operation w i n
be made only by MACOL,
2,
Casualty Wormat i on, as it r el at es t o t he not i fi cat i on of t he
next of kin, i s ext rsmel ~r sensi t i ve. ~y Executive direction, next of ki n
of a l l mi l i t ar y f a t a Ht i e s must be not i fi ed i n person by an of f i cer of t he
appropriate service. There have been instances i n which next of ki n
have f i r s t learned of t he death or wounding of a loved one through news
media. The problem 5 s part i ct i l erl y di f t i c ul t f or vi sual media. Casualty
photographs can show a recognizable face, name tag, jewelry o r other
identifying feat ure or item. The anguish t hat sudden recognition at home
can cause i s out of pmport i on t o t he news value of t he photograph or film,
'Although t he causal t y report i ng and nctfification system works on a
priority basi s, correspondents ar e urged t o keep t h i s problem in mind
when covering an act 5. m in t he f i el d. ?James of casual t i es whose next -of
ki n have been not i f i ed can be veri fi ed by t he MACV Information Office
and by the..Di rect orat z of ~ c w s Services ifit he -0fTice of t he Assistant
Secret ary of Defense (Public Affairs).
3.
Only t wo enemy . casualty fi gures a r e released - "ki l l ed i n
act i on and detainedu, There i s no way t o get a lIwoundedtt fi gure
although t her e ar e i ndi cat i ons t hat f or every enemy ki l l ed, one-and-
one-half eneqy ar e vmtanded seri ousl y enough t o require hospi t al treatment,
The t ot al i s a f i r m figure, ., Any "cnem,y ki l l edt 1 f i gur e released .byFdCV '
M11 have been verif5ed on t he scene by US personnel ' t o t he extent
F~.-9'?lii;'tcd by t he milktary si t uat i on. It cannot be an e k c t figure, but
it i s probable t hat duplications' and other er r or s on thehigh side are
more than of f set by t he number of enemy dead who ar e carri ed away or.
buried nezrby, by those who subsequently di c of wounds 'and by those
ki l l ed by a r t i l l e r y concentrations and a i r s t r i kes not followed up by
ground action. thus, when t he br i ef er announces a speci fi c number of
enemy ki l l ed i n a par t i cul ar opercstion ormover a given period, t ha t
fi gure i s not as preci se a s t he popular term Ubody count" would Imply.
Neither is it a guess or loose estimate, It i s t he best f i gur e. t hat can
be developed and, a s noted, probably i s conservative i n t he long run.
4,
Merbers of theXi l i t ar y Assistance Command Information Office
ar e avai l abl e t o di scuss any questions which mayar i s e concerning t he
rel ease of mi l i t cry information.
5.
Roq-iests f o r information concerning non-military act i vi t i es and
Republic cfVietnam mi l i t ar y act. tvitics should be addressed t o tfie
Governme~t of Vietnam, t he Republic of Vietnam firmed Forces, t he US
Mission or t he Public Information representative of t he appropriate
Free World Force or act i vi t y.
6,
Whenever possible, changes t o t h i s memorandum w Q l be brought
t o theat t ent i on of correspondents before they ar e put i nt o effect ,
.
6
Incl 1
&ERIC!& DIVISION
IUFORMmON OFFICE
1 - 5505 Major Information Officer
1 - 5505 Captain Deputy Information Officer
1 - 71Q50 EL8 Info mation Supervisor
2 - 7ls20 33-4 Clerk Typist
t
I
r
PRESS OPERATIONS
comcsm I NFOR~~~TI ON ILEMENT
9.- 5505 CPT,, As s t Info Of f 1 - 5505 Cm, Asst Info O f f
P - 71Q50 E-7,
Info Supv 1 - 7lW e6, roadc cast Supv
1 - 71E0 E-5, Sr Broadcad Spec 2 - 71W0 E-5, Sr Info Spec .
1 - 71920 E-5,
Sr Info Spec 2 - 71Q20 E-4, Info Specialist
1 - 7lR20 E-4; Broadcast Spec 1 - 71820 E-4, Clerk Typist
1
Excerpts f r o m nWes Governing ~ubl ' i o Release of IUlitary ' I nf omt i ont ~
(31 Oct 1966 & 29 Birch 1967)
I
The follovd-ng information is relearn-ble, unless and until
released by l&CV:
- . .
. . .
1. Future plans, operations, or strikes.
2. I nf or mat h on .or conf i mt i on of Rules of Engagement,
3.
Imwts of ordnance and f uel nmved by support uni t s or on
hand i n combat units ( o r ~ n c eincludes weapons or weapons systems).
4.
k i n g an operation, unit designations and troop moveaents,
t act i cal deployments, name of operation and si ze of friendly forces
involved.
5.
Intelligence uni t activit5es, methods of operation, or
specific locations, - - _
6.
Ewct number and type of casualties or damge suffered by
friendly units,
7.
N d e r of sor t i es and the amount of ordnance expended on
st r i kes outside of RIT?,
8. Infomation on ai r cr af t taking off f or strikes, enroute
to, or returning f h t arget area. Information on st ri kes while
they .are i n progress,
9,
Ident i t y of uni t s and locations of a i r bases from which
ai r cr af t ar e launched on combat operations,
10. IIumber of ai r cr af t damaged or any other indicator of
effectiveness or ineffectiveness of ground ant i ai r cr af t defenses.
ll.
Tactical specifioe, such as al t i t udes, course, speeds, or
angle of attack, (General dcscriptiOns such a s lllow and fastt1mby
be used,) .
12. Information on or confirmation o$ planned st ri kes which do
not take place f or any reason, includihg bad weather,
13. Specific i dent i fi cat i on of encny weapons systems used .
t o dobm ?riendly ai rcraft .
3.4.
Details concerning domed ai r cr af t while Sf* operations
are i n progress.
15.
Lerial photos of fixed installations.
.- -- .>-=+-*w.%
M ICAL DIVI SIOI!
- d - - **L- - ~+. ~*
m. 7 .
CHU LAI , RWI
15 Apri 11965
FIELD 3TANDING CFEFUTIBC PROCEDmES
These st andi ng oper at i ng procedures a r e publ i shed f or t he guidance of the
America1 Di vi sron and at t ached or suppor t i ng uni t s .
Thi s document w i l l be r evi s ed and changed a s necessar y t o i ncor por at e i m-
proved procedures and concepts. The format i s desi gned t o enabl e changes
t o be made a s r equi r ed.
Commanders and gener al and s pe c i a l s t a f f o f f i c e r s a r e r equi r ed t o revi ew
t h i s SOP on a cont i nui ng b a s i s and t o submit recommendations f or i t s i m-
provement.
KGSTER
OFF1CIAL: MG
AMERICAL DIVISION
FIELD STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
-
Ti t l e
Record of Changes
Table of Contents
Di s t r i but i on Li s t
Def i ni t i ons
ANNEXES AND APPETJDICES
St andi ng Operat i ngProcedures
A - Operat i ons
Appendix 1 - Command Post
Appendix 2 - America1 Di vi si on Tact i cal CP
Appendix 3 - Closo A i r Support
Appendix 4 - Fi r e Support Coordination
, Appendix 5 - Airmobile Operations
Appendix 6 - A i r l i f t Operat i ens
Appendix 7 - Base Area Securi t y
Appendix 8 - Mational Pol i ce Fi el d Forces
Appendix 9 - Report s
B - I nt el l i gence
Appendix 1 - Captured Mat eri al
Appendix 2 - Captured Documents
Appendix 3 - Detainees
Appendix 4 - A i r Rsconnaissance and Aer i al Sumoi l l ance
Appendix 5 - Long b n g e Reconnaissance Pa t r ol (LRRP)
Appendix 6 - l hp Di s t r i but i on and Storage
Appendix 7 - Weather and Terrai n
Appendix 8 - Radio Research Company, Fr ovi si onal
Appendix 9 - C ~ ~ t s r i n t e l l i g e n c s
Appendix 10- Enemy Body Count .
Appendix 11- Ot her I nt el l i gence and Secur i t yReports
iii
BPiERICAL DI VI SION
CHU LAI, RVN
15Apr i l 1968
i
ii
i i i - i v
v
v%
vi i - vi i i
Table of Cont ent s t o America1 Di vi si on Fi el d SOP (continued)
C - Per sonnel and A&~i ni s t r at i on
Appendix 1 - Adjutant General
Appendix 2 - Daily St rengt h Report
Appondix 3 - I nt er pr et er Control
Appendix 4 - Fincnce
Appendix 5 - Graves Regi s t r at i on
Appendix 6 - ComLmd Poet Arrangement
Appendix 7 - Ci vi l i an Labor
Appendix 8 - Nomppropriated Funds and Related Act i vi t i es
Appendix 9 - Reports
D - Logi s t i cs
Appendix 1 - Me d i a l
Appendix 2 - Report s
Appendix 3 - Aer i al Resupply
E - Arny Avi at i on
Appendix 1 - Employment of Aero Scout Conpany
Appendix 2 - Sa r c h , Rescue end Recovery Operations
Appendix 3 - Employment of Anned Hel i copt ers and Rules of Engagement
Appondix 1, - Avi at i on Report s
F - Engineer Cornhat Support
Appendix 1 - Landing Zones
Appendix 2 - Bridging
Appendix 3 - Bor r i sr and Denial Operations
Appendix 4 - Mine Fi el ds
Appendix 5 - Fi el d Const ruct i on
Appendix 6 - Fi ol d Water.Supply
Appendix 7 - Reports
G - Si gnal
Appendix 1 - America1 Di vi si on Radio Nets
H - Chemical, Bi ol ogi cal and Radi ol ogi cal Operations
Appendix 1 - CS Contamination Report
I - Informat i on
J - Ci vi c Act i an
Appendix 1 - Ci vi c Action Reporta
Appendix 2 - Psychol ogi cal Operations
AMERICAL DIVISION
FIELD STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES
DISTRIBUTION LIST
c/s
C1
G2
(33
C4
G5
AC
AVN
CI!AP
CHEM
ENGR
HQCOMDT
I0
PM
SIG
Finance
HIST
SURG
HHC, America1 Mv
196th L t . Inf Me
198th L t InfBde
11th L t Inf Bde
1-1 Cav
26th Engr ' ~ n
39th Engr E3n
S T COMD
DIVARTY
523dSig En
123d AvnBn
14th Cbt AvnBn
ABBIBVIATIONS
AAx
AACC
AACO
ADA0
ALOC
A0
DASC
DAVNO
CBU
mc
CIDG
coSVN
CTZ
ENGRE
FD?
m4AF
GRREC
CVN
I1
I I R
IFIR
JUSPAC
LLOC
LRRD
NFLSN
NLH
NVA
PF
FZ
GU1
RF
RRU
RVNAF.
SITREF
SLAR
TACP
TAOR
TASE
usm
USA1D
VNAF
VNMC
VNN
Army Avi at i on Elonent
Army iiviati on Control Center
Assaul t Ai r cr af t Coordination Of f i cer
Assi st ant Gi vi si on Aviation Of f i cer
A i r Line of Comuni cat i on
Area of Operation
Di rect A i r 3upport Center
Di vi si on Avi at i on Of f i cer
Cl ust er Bomb Unit
Co mn d & Control
Ci vi l i en I r r egul ar Defense Group
Cent ral Of f i ce, South Vietnam
Corps Tact i cal Zone
Engineer Element
Forward Di st r i but i on Poi nt
Free World Mi l i t nr y Assi st ance Forces
Gravos Regi s t r at i on
Government of Vietnam
Imagery I nt er pr et at i on
Imageiy I nt er pr et at i on Roport
Inmediate Photo I nt er pr et at i on Report
J oi nt United St at es Fubl i c Af f ai r s Offi ce
Land Line of Comr~unicat~ion
Long Range Recomoissanca Pat r ol
Nat i onal Front f or t he Li berat i on of South Vietnam
New Li f e Hamlet
North Vietnamese Ar my
Popular Forces
Pick-up Zona
RVN Nut i oncl Route Number
Regional Forces
Radio Research Unit
Republic of Viotriam Armed F o r c ~ s
Si t ua t j on Report
Side Looking Airborne Radar
Tact i cal A i r Control Part y
Tact i cal Area of Responsi bi l i t y
Tact i cal A i r Support Element
United St at es Army Vietnam
United St a t e s Agency f o r 1ntol. national r;cveloptlent
Vietnanese A i r Force
Vietnamese Pfarine Corps
Vietnamese Navy
--
DEFINITIONS
Area of Oper ~t $ons (no) - An A0 i s an ar ea where a Commander i s t emporari i y
aut hor i zed t o conduct t he neco3Yur-y oper at i ons f or a c e r t a i n peri od o f t i ne.
An A0 i s l ocat ed out s i de of TAORs and RZs.
Assaul t Ai r c r a f t Coor di n~t i on Of f i cer (AACO)- The U C O i s a r at od p i l o t and
air oper at i ons of f i c e r on dut y with t he TAW.
H i s f unct i on i s t o advi se and
assist t he commander and h i s e t a f f on a i r l i f t mat t er s.
He works pri ni ari l y
wi t h t he G 3 A i r on t a c t i c a l l i f t and t he G4 and TO on l o g i s t i c a l lift.
Chieu Hoi Program - The "open arms" program of t he RVN t h a t peraflts VC and
a f f i l i a t e s t o r e t ur n t o GVN cont r ol of t h e i r own f r e e vlllunder f u l l am-
ne s t y and a promise of r et r ai ni ng.
Com3at S b Spot - Bombing r a i d by r adar cont r ol l ed bomber a i r c r a f t during
dar kness o r l i mi t ed v i s i b i l i t y .
&al e Flip& - Heliborne i nf a nt r y t r oops on a i r a l e r t t o perform i me d i a t e
r e a c t i on mi ssi ons f or a ground c omnde r .
Ext r ect i on - The l i f t i n g of combat t r oops by hel i copt er s from t e r r a i n i n
which t he enemy has t he capabi l i t y t o r e s i s t .
F i r e f l y - A hel i copt er (UH-1) equipped u i t h sear chl f ght s used t o i l l umi nat e
t a r ge t s .
Xeavv Fi r e Team - Three gunships oper at i ng a s a t a c t i c a l element.
I n s e r t i o n - The l i f t i n g o f combat t r oops by hel i copt er i n t o a l andi ng sene.
Di f f e r s from combat a s s a ul t i n t ht i ns e r t i on i s nonual l y used i n r ef er ence
t o s e c r e t i ve movement of a pa t r ol i n t o a smal l , i nsecur e LZ.
Li e h t Fi r e Toam - Two gunshi ps oper at i ng as a t a c t i c a l element.
Ra l l i a r - An i ndi vi dual who renounces support of t h e N n S m and who vol unt ar-
i l y sur r ender s t o CVN cont r ol under t he ttCHIEUHOIt' Program.
Revol ut i on>r y De v e l ~me n t Area ( R D A ~- An RDA i s a n ar ea where t he c i v i l and
_ Y
d l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s aim a t r es t er i ng, consol i dat i ng and expanding GVN-con-
t r o l l e d a r e a s i n or der t o l i b e r a t e t h e l oc a l people from t he VC yoke, r e s t or e
p u b l i c s ecur i t y, dovelop pol i t i c a l , economic and s oc i a l a c t i v i t i s s t o gai n
t h e peopl e' s support and st r engt hen t he Nat i onal Government.
Reconn~i ssn. nce Z0n.e ( RZ) - An RZ i s a n or.- adj acent t o a TAOR, i n wfiich t he
TAOR Co ~m~n d e r i s aut hor i zed t o expand hls reconnai ssance e f f o r t s by means
of n o m l reconnai ssance operat i ons.
Se c t or - The mi l i t a r y or gani zat i onal a r e a equivalent t o t he province.
The
s e c t o r chi ef i a a mi l i t a r y of f i c e r charged wi t h t h e s e c ur i t y of t he sect or .
v i i
DEFINITIONS (Continued)
-
SLAR - Side looking ai rborne radar equipment AN/APS-94mounted i n OV-1B.
-
Sl i ck - A UH-ID (or UH-1B) u t i l i t y hel i copt er used pri mari l y f o r carrying
troops, equipment or supplies. Used t o di st i ngui sh t hese ai r cr af t from
ot her UH-1s used a s gunships.
Sub-sector - The mi l i t ar y organi zat i onal area di r ect l y subordinate t o t he
sect or and comparable t o t he GVN di s t r i c t .
S t a r l i ~ h t Missioq - A ni ght reconnaissance or survei l l ance mission employing
a l i ght i nt ens i f i er scope.
Tact i cal Area of Re s ~ons i bi l i t y (TAOR~ - A TAOR i s an ar ea i n which respon-
s i b i l i t y i s especially ent rust ed t o a Commander f or conducting t a c t i c a l
operations.
v i i i
Fi el d Standing Operating Procedures
I. GENERAL. Thls SOP has been compiled following t he gui del i nes of
Fi el d !BPS cur r ent l y i n use i n South Vietnam.
IIJ PURPOSE. This SOP es t abl i s hes r out i ne and recurri ng f i e l d oper-
at i onal procedures within t he America1 Division and appl i es except when
modified by Mvi si on order.
SIX. SCOPE. These procedures apply t o a l l units under t he command or
oper at i onal cont r ol of t h e Mvi si cn. Supporting uni t s wi l l be fami l i ar
with this SIP and, where appl i cabl e, w i l l comply.
IV. RESPCNSIBILITIES. a. Conformity: Subordinate uni t SOPs w i l l conform.
b. Revision: Recornendations f or r evi si on or change wi l l be forwarded
to- t he gener al s t a f f sect i on having primary s t af f r esponsi bi l i t y. Following
coordi nat i on with t ho general s t a f f and approval by t he Chi ef - of St af f ,
changes will be forvarded t o t he ,Adjutant General f or a change number and
publ i cat l ol h Changes. . wi l l be on a page f or page bas i s only.
i:OSTER
ANmEXES: MG
A - Operat i ons
B - I nt el l i gence
C - Personnel and Adni ni st rat i on
D - Logi s t i cs
E .- Army Avi at i on
F - Engineer Combat Support
C - Si gnal
H - Chemical, Bi ol ogi cal and Radiological Operations
I - Information
J - Civic Action
DISTRIBUTIOr4: Speci al
OFF1CIAL:
ANNEX A
AbfERICAJ_. DI VI STGN
'cfm LiZl, RvN
15 Apr i l 1968
ANNEX A (Operations) t o Americal Di.visTon Fi el d SOIJ
1. REFERENCE:;.
MACV Di r ect i ve 525-3
MACV Di r ect i ve 525-4
MACV Di r ect i ve 525-6
DA TC 101-2
FM 101-5
FM 33-5
MACV D5rective 10-1
MACV Conbined Campaign Plan AB 142
2. COMBAT ORDERS. a. 'then pr act i cal , wr i t t en or der s a r e published.
Maximum use i s made of overl ays, t abl es , and char t s. During t he conduct
of oper at i ons, ver bal fragmentary or der s a r e followed by wr i t t en orders.
b. Subordinate u n i t s submit t o this he ~dqua r t e r s5 copi es of operat i ons
~ r d e r s / ~ l a n s f o r br i gade oper at i ons a minimum of 2.4 hours pr i or t o s t a r t i ng
t he oper at i ons. Operat i ons of smal l er than bri gade s i z e a r e included i n t he
pl ans sumnary of t he SITRE?.
3. LIAISON. a. Americal Division provi des l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s t o t he next
hi gher headquart ers. Li ai son i s provided t o di vi s i ons and a l l i e d f or ces
a s r equi r ed. Li ai son w i l l be est abl i shed with appr opr i at e ARVN u n i t s when
oper st i ons a r e conducted i n t h e i r ar eas.
b. Brigades and separ at e manetlver bat t al i ons , not under t he cont r ol
of a major subordi nat e headquart ers, mai nt ai n l i a i s on wi t h Americal Division
Headquarters.
c. Li ai son o f f i c e r s t o t h i s headquart ers a r e under t he supervi si on of
t he Chief of St af f and at t end da i l y s t a f f br i ef i ngs.
d. - Li ai sonbetween subordi nat e u n i t s i sfrom support i ng t o supported,
from subordi nat e u n i t s t o t h e i r cont r ol l i ng headquart ers and l a t e r a l l y be-
,tweenu n i t s from l e f t t o r i ght .
. 4. CGGRDl NATI ON. a. When f or ces of adj acent bri gades a r e oper at i ng i n
cl ose proximity, maximum coordir?ationi s accomplished between bri gades t o
i ns ur e t h a t converging o r adj acent f or ces have c l e a r l y dofined ar eas of re-
s pons i bi l i t y. Boundaries between u n i t s cons t i t ut e FCLs. Addi t i onal FCLs
a r e est abl i shed a s needed.
ANNEX A ( ~ ~ e r a t i o n s ) t o America1 Di vi si on Fi el d SOP (cont i nued)
b. When oper at i ng wi t h US Marines, t he r e i s a requirement , t h a t advance
warning o f a l l Ar t i l l e r y f i . r es be gi ven t o t hk Americal Di vi si on Fi r e Sup-'
por t Element of t he DTOC, which i n t ur n pas s es - t he i nf or nat i on t o t he USMC
Di r ect A j r Support Center (DASC). Thi s i nformat i on i s t hen applied t o t h e
USMC Ar t i l l e r y Warning System cal l ed "Sav-a-Plane". A "Sav-a-Plane" num-
ber i s assi gned t o t h e mi ssi on and r et ur ned t o t h e uni t . The u n i t w i l l not
f i r e unl es s it has r ecei ved a "Sav-a-Plane" number except i n a n emergency,
such as a f r e s h enemy cont act . I n such cases, s a f e t y t o a i r c r a f t will be
i nsur ed by post i ng a n a i r s e nt i ne l a t t he pl ace and by. a l e r t ne s s of t h e
forward obser ver or ai r observer t o a i r pl a ne s which could c r os s t he t r a -
j ect or y. Appendix 4 ( Fi r e Support Coordi nat i on), Tab B (Safeguardi ng A i r -
c r a f t from Ar t i l l e r y ~ i r e s ) .
c. 3ecept i on pl ans a r e coordi nat ed wi t h t h e next hi gher ' headquart ers.
d. Coordination wi t h R'JNAF and ot her FWMAF:
(1) Operat i ons out s i de of TAOR:
( a )
I n i t i a l coor di nat i on r equi r ed f o r a l l h e r i c a l Di vi si on oper at i ons
i s a c c o~? l i s he d by t h i s headquart ers.
( b)
Subordinate u n i t s accomplish de t a i l e d and cont i nui ng coor di nat i on
v i t h appr opr i at e Regimental, Eat t al i on and ~e c t o r / ~u b - s e c t o r Advisors i n
assi gned XU.
( 2)
Operat i ons i n TAO8: Commanders w i l l i ns ur e t h a t d i r e c t and con-
t i nuous c oor di mt i on is mei nt ai ned wi t h appl i cabl e ~ect or / sub- sect or s.
( 3) Road Securi t y: Route cl ear ance and s ecur i t y f o r s epar at e br i gade
oper at i ons and r esuppl y convoys w i l l be coordi nat ed wi t h t he Di vi si on G3,
appr opr i at e seni or Advisors and commanders of FWhF concerned.
.
( 4 )
Request f or TACR o r AO:
( a )
Request f or change t o permanent TACF. i s -forwarded t o t h i s head-
qua r t e r s i n f i ve copi es wi t h j us t i f i c a t i on f o r change.
( b)
Request f o r br i gade AC i s submitted i n f i ve copi as t o t h i s head-
qua r t e r s a mi ni ma w of f i v e days pr i or t o t he a t a r t of t he oper at i on.
e. WUBLE CIIECI; FRUCEDURE3 FOR NITIT,LERY UNITS. The counterinsurgency
envi ronqent i n Vietnam r epr es ent s a cont i nui ng chal l enge t o a r t i l l e r y u n i t s
t o r ender accur nt c, r esponsi ve, r e l i a b l e f i r e s wit,hout i nj ur y t o f r i endl y
t r oops cr non-com5atants.
The appl i cabl e pr ovi si ons of Appendix 4 ( Fi r e
Support Coordinqtion) and t he h e r i c a l Si vi s i on Ar t i l l e r y Fi el d .%IF as ar-
t i l l e r y t echni ques, gunnery procedures and t a c t i c a l oper at i ons w i l l be
ANNEX A (Operations) t o Ameri c a l Division Fi el d 3lP (Continued)
adhered t o by a l l a r t i l l e r y uni t s under t he cont r ol of ~ i e r i c a l ilivision
t o i ncl ude di r e c t support a r t i l l e r y bat t al i on organic t o brigades.
a. Appendix 1 (Command post ) .
b. Appendix 2 ( Arneri c a l Division Operations Center
c. Appendix 3 (Close A i r support)
d. Appendix 4 ( Fi r e Support coordination)
e. Appendix 5 (Airmobile operation)
f. Appendix 6 ( Ai r l i f t operat i ons)
g.
Appendix 7 (Base Area secur i t y)
h. Appendix 8 (National Pol i ce Fi el d Forces)
i. Appendix 9 (Reports)
6 . TRAINING. Uni t s not par t i ci pat i ng i n operat i ons and t hose conducting
base ar ea s ecur i t y missions conduct uni t t r ai ni ng programs.
Emphasis i s
on squad, sect i on and platoon t a c t i c s i n accordznce with appl i cabl e t r ai n-
i ng di r ect i ves and l essons learned.
KOSTER
AF'PENDICES: MG
1 - Command Post
2 - Division Tact i cal Operations Center (DTOC)
3 - Close A i r Support (CAS)
4 - Fi r e Support Coordination (FSC)
5 - Airmobile Operations
6 -, Ai rl i ft Operations
7 - Base Area Securi t y
8 - Psychological Operations
9 - Reports
DISTRIBUTION: Speci al
Appendix h ( Fi r e Suppcrt coor di nat i on) t o Annex A (Operat i ons) t o America1
Di vi si on Fi e l d S F
1. DIVI SIGN FIRE SUFIJCRT ELRCNT (FsE) . . a. Composition: The Divi si on
Fi r e Support Element !FsE) i s composed of t he f i r e support coor di nat or ,
dut y team c h i e f , oper at i ons and i nt e l l i ge nc e r epr esent at i ves from Ha Div
Ar t i l . l er y, and l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s from f i r e support agenci es o s r equi r ed.
b. Locat i on: Component of Division Tact f cal Operations Center located
adj acent t o t he oper at i ons element.
c. The FSE cont ai ns t hose elements necessary t o cont r ol and coordi nat e
t he f i r e s o f t he Di vi si on Ar t i l . l er y.
2. TARGET NUt.lsERING SYSTEM. (TAB Z )
( 1)
Re s t r i c t i ons on a r t i l l e r y and/or mortar f i r e a r e not r equi r ed duri ng
a i r s t r i k e s unl ess r i s k t o f r i endl y a i r c r e f t i s s uf f i c i e nt l y gr eat t o j us t i f y
t he l o s s o f such f i r e s . When r e s t r i c t i o n s a r e necessary t hey a r e planned and
coordinated by t ho f i r o support coordi nat or and i ns t r uc t i ons a r e i ssued through
f i r e suppor t channels. I t i s necessary t o e f f e c t coordi nnt i on between t he for-
ward a i r c ont r ol l e r (FAC) and t he appr opr i at e f o r mr d obser ver / f i r e support
cocr di nat or t o i ns ur e a i r c r a f t saf et y.
( 2) Ar t i l l e r y :
( a )
Brigade Fi r e Support Coordtnstion Cent ers (FsCC) r e por t a r t i l l e r y
advi sor y warning dat a a s pr escr i bed a t TAB B (Safeguarding Ai r c r a f t from
Ar t i l l e r y F ~ . r e s ) t o FSE f o r a l l n r t l l l e r y f i r e s or i gi nat i ng i n a bri gade
a r e a of oper at i ons ( APRj.
( b)
Anytime a br?gade nperot cs i n an ar ea of oper at i ons not contiguous
t o t he Di vi si on t a c t i c a l ar ea of oper at i ons (TAOR), bri gade FSCCs will. es-
t a b l i sh Ar t i l l e r y hlarning Control Sub Cent ers .\WCSC) . Fur t her !ns t r uct i ons
w i l l be i ncl uded i n oper at i on or der s es t abl i s hi ng t he separ at e AOR.
( c )
' h e n oper at i ng an lndependant AIJCSC j n a DSMC Ta c t i c a l Zone, t he
I J 3C Di r ect A i r Support Center (DASC) w i l l be not i f i ed of oper at l ng f r e-
quency and c a l l si gn of AWCSC. .AUCSC r ecei ves dat a from l o c a l a r t i l l e r y
u n i t s i n format shown a t TAB B (Safeguarding Ai r cr af t from Ar t i l l e r y ~ i r e s )
and pr ovi des a r t i l l e r y dat a t o a l l a i r c r a f t . on i ndi vi dual r equest .
3
Cor r i dor s a r e n o r r i l l y assi gned only f or hel i bor ne a s s a u l t s and on
f i xed wing approaches. Ai r c r a f t c o n t ~ c t appr opr i at e a i r warning cont r ol
cent er f or a r t i l l e r y advi sor y when out si de est abl i shed cor r i dor s.
Appendix L ( Fi r e Support coor di nat i on) t o Annex A ( oper at i ons) t o
Arneri c a l Di vi si on Fi el d ST: ( cont i nued)
( 4 )
Ar t i l l e r y and mort ar u n i t s w i l l post ai . r s e nt r i e s dur i ng a l l
f i r e mi ssi ons and suspend f i r i n g when ai i - cr af t which w i l l cr os s l i n e of
f i r e a r e si ght ed. A i r s e nt r i e s must be a l e r t f or a i r c r a f t approaching
from any di r e c t i on. I f more t han one f i r e mi ssi on i s bei ng conducted by
t he ba t t e r y, an a i r s e nt r y w i l l be provided f or each mi ssi on i.n progress.
I n addi t i on, each forward observer or ai r obser ver w i l l f ol l ow t he same
pr ecaut i on wi t h r egar d t o t he forward end of t he t r a j e c t or y dur i ng adj ust -
ment of f i r e .
( 5) VT ( ~ r o ~ m i t y ) f uze i s not used dur i ng per i ods when f r i e ndl y a i r
might be endangered.
( 6 )
Ant i a i r c r a f t suppr essi on f i r e s a r e coor di nat ed by FSE wi t h Di vi si on
Ta c t i c a l Air Support Element (TASE) and/or Army Avi at i on Element (AAE) . I m-
pl ement at i on w i l l be accomplished by FSE.
b. Ground Safet y:
(1) No f i r e l i n e / f i r e coor di nat i on l i n e (NFL/FCL).
( a ) Locat i on es t abl i s hed by d i r e c t suppor t a r t i l l e r y ba t t a l i on commanders
i n coor di nat i on wi t h commnders of support ed uni t s . Normally TAOR and A 0
boundari es a r e NF'L,'s unl e s s ot her wi se desi gnat ed.
( b)
A l l f i r e s t o i ncl ude a r t i l l e r y , naval gunf i r e and a i r s t r i k e s del l v-
er ed or having p o s s i b l , ~ e f f e c t acr os s a NF'L/FcL w i l l be cl ear ed wi t h t he re-
sponsi bl e d i r e c t suppor t a r t i l l e r y unit. Pos s i bl e e f f e c t w i l l be consi dered
t o be f i r e s del i ver ed wi t hi n 500 met er s of a boundary.
(2)
No F i r e Areas: No f i r e a r e a s a r e es t abl i s hed around i s ol a t e d uni t s ,
out post s, f r i e ndl y v i l l a g e s and ot he r i ns t a l l a t i ons / uni t s where pos i t i ve saf-
e t y measures a r e r equi r ed.
( 3) Cl earance of Fi r es :
( a )
Ar t i l l e r y, naval gunf i r e, and ai r mi ssi ons a r e conducted i n accor-
dance wi t h t h e fol l owi ng r ul e s :
1. Harassi ng, i n t e ~ d i c t i o nand pr epar at or y mi ssi ons l yi ng out s i de of
f r e e f i r e a r e a s a r e executed onl y a f t e r r oc e i pt of Government c f Vietnam ( e m) /
Army of Vietnam (ARVN) cl ear ance a s appr opr i at e.
2. Tar get of oppor t uni t y mi ssi ons, c l e a r l y i de nt i f i e d a s h o s t i l e (wi t h
t h e Gsi on under t h e cont r ol of a f or mr d/ a e r i a l observer or FAC) r e qui r e
no cl ear ance. Tar get s not c l e a r l y i de nt i f i e d as h o s t i l e a r e cl ear ed by cW/
ARVN agenci es a s appr opr i at e pr i or t o f i r i ng.
-
Appendix 4 ( Fi r e Support Coordination) t o Annex A !Operations) t o
America1 Di vi si on Fi el d SOP (continued)
2 Missions agai ns t know or suspected enemy t a r ge t s i n hamlets tin2
e l l a g e s occupied by ' noncombatants a r e conducted a s follows:
a. Kay be f i r e d when def ensi ve f i r e s a r e requested by an appr opr i at e
G>1i OTARVN aut hor i t y.
-
b. A 1 1 missions on hamlets or vi l l a ge s a r e cont r ol l ed by a forward/
a e r i a l observer or ?or mr d A i r Cont r ol l er ( FAc ) .
c. Hamlets o r vi l l a ge s not associ at ed with ground oper at i ons a r e not
a t t n c g d by gunf i r e vi t hout pr i or warning ( l e a f l e t s and/or speaker systems
o r other appr opr i at e means) even though l i g h t f i r e i s bel ng recei ved from
them.
d. Hamlets and vi l l a ge s may be at t acked without warning i f t he at t ack
is i ne onj unc t i on wi t h a ground operat i on i nvol vi ng t he movement of ground
f or c e s through t he ar ea, and i f , . i n t he judgement of t he ground commander,
h i s mission mu16 be j e o~a r di z e dby such warning.
e. None of t he above cont r ol s abr i dge t he r i ght of s e l f defense.
~rtilzr~ con- may f i r e without cl earance a t t he r equest of any uni t i n
t a c t when t he seni or co;nmander pr esent di r e c t s .
(b) The seni or d i r e c t support a r t i l l e r y commander pr esent i n a TADR
o r A0 i s t he f i r e support coordi nat or. H i s r e s pons i bi l i t i e s i ncl ude, but
ar e not l i mi t ed t o t he following:
-
1. Est abl i shi ng NFL/FCL.
2. Coordinating a l l f i r e and a i r support missions conducted wi t hi n
t h e T ~ R / A O .
3.
Providing an a r t i l l e r y Li ai son Cf f i cer (LNG) t o t he seni or ARVN
ccnrmander, province, or d i s t r i c t chi ef a s appr opr i at e. The dut i e s of LNG
w i l l i ncl ude, but a r e not l i mi t ed t o t he following:
-
a. Obtaining cl ear ance t o f i r e .
b. Keeping US Forces infortned a s t o a c t i v i t i e s and di s pos i t i on of
~ e ~ i o E 1 Fopular Forces and ARVN Forces. Forces,
c. Keeping ARVN commanders informed as t o di sposi t i on and a c t i v i t i e s
of ~ ~ T o r c e s .
I
Appendix L, ( Fi r e Support coor di nat i on) t o Annex A ( oper at i ons) t o
America 1 Uivis i on Fi el d S l ' (Continued)
( c )
Fr e e Fi r e Areas may 'be est abl i shed by CVTi and ARW a ut hor i t i e s .
When so e s t a bl i s he d, accur at e l ocat i on and ot her per t i nent i nformat i on i s
forwarded t o Di vi si on Ar t i l l e r y FSE f o r di s s e ni na t i on' t o a l l i nt e r e s t e d
agenci es. When a free f i r e a r e a has been est abl i shed no ot her cl ear ance t o
. f i r e i s necessar y.
( d)
A l l f i r e s from out s i de TAOR/AO which e nt e r or have possi bl e e f f e c t
as des cr i ked i n ( b) above, on t he TAOR/AO a r e cl ear ed wi t h t he appr opr i at e
f i r e suppor t coor di nat or .
4. TACTICAIAIR SUP:-'ORT (USAF). a. TXSE i s r esponsi bl e f o r informing
r equest i ng u n i t of f i n a l a c t i on t aken on reconnai ssance or cl os e ai r sup-
por t r e que s t s.
b. PACs a r e br i ef ed a t Di vi si on TASE or by supported uni t . Alloca-
t i o n i s made by TASE.
5. NAVAI. GUh'PIRE XI'PORT (KGFS). a. Naval gunf i r e i s f i r e d by d i r e c t
support s h i p s of t he echel on concerned. I f addi t i onal . nava1gunf i r e '
support i f r equi r ed, iti s request ed from next hj gher FSZ through naval
gunf i r e channel s o r through normal a r t i l l e r y f i r e support channels.
b. Request s f o r F!CPS w i l l i ncl ude:
(1)
Type oper at i on (t r ooF s i ~ppor t , Ife:I, e t c . 1.
( 2) Locat i on of AC o r t. arget. (s) (by gr i d coor di nat es) .
( 3 ) Rat ur e of t a r ge t ( s ) ( i f enemy f or ce, i.nclude size!.
( L )
Q7 e of anurlunitionand fuze.
( 5) Cornencement and dur at i on of oper at i on, o r t he t i n e t hat f i r e i s
desi r ed.
(6) Radi o f' rcquencies and c a l l si gns of supported element t o be c3n-
Lti:;ted 3y US Ravy spot t 5ng team qr s hi n( d".
c.
Shor e Fi r e 2or. t rol l' artjes normally c o ~ t r o l and a dj us t naval gunf i r e.
Adjustment of naval gunf i r e by Ar my obser ver s i s done onl y i n emergencies.
d . Comhst s er vi ce suppor t c f naval ?&t i es i s by u n i t s t o which at t ached.
e. f Air Kaval Gunf i r e L i s i son Conipnny (.~!:GI,T 3)i s at t ached, XKCLICC!
ckannel s t hr ough F7:3 arc emplcycd f or naval gi nf i r e .
Appendix L ( Fi r e Support Coordination) t o Annex A t o ( ~ ' ~ e r a t j o n s )
- Amcrical 1):vision Fi el d 3 ' T ' (Continued)
f . Di vi si on Xrt Bl l eqr i s responsi bl e. f or necessary survey t o l ocat e
any naval gunf i r e r adar beacons.
6 . BilTTLEFIEI.3 1LLUICIKATIO:;. a. No r e s t r i c t i o n on i l l umi nat i on by organic
weapons of maneuver mit,s except f or pr i or coordi nat i on with adj acent uni t s.
b. Tllumination by a r t i l l e r y on aut hor i t y of d i r e c t support a r t i l l e r y .
7. MINIMIZING NGNCOMBATANT CASUALTIES. I t i s obvious t h a t mi sdi rect ed o r
unwarranted a r t i l l e r y f i r e s i n t o ar eas occupied by noncombatants adversel y
a f f e c t t he Government of Vietnam e f f o r t t o win t he people. Artillerymen
a t every echelon will pl an and conduct f i r e support i n accordance with t he
fol l owi ng gui del i nes.
( 1) Both t he mi l i t a r y and psychol ogi cal obj ect i ve of each oper at i on
w i l l be considered. Pr es t r i kes i n populated ar eas, reconnaissance by f i r e
i n t o hamlets, and poorl y sel ect ed har assi ng and i nt e r di c t i on f i r e s a r e ex-
amples of mi l i t a r y neasur es which w i l l be counterproductive.
(2)
X thorough and cont i nui ng program t o emphasi ~e both shor t an? long
r ange importance of minimizing noncombatant cas ual t i es w i l l be conducted
wi t hi n each a r t i l l e r y uni t . Troop i ndoct r i nat i on br i ef i ngs w i l l be held
bef or e each oper at i on t o i ncl ude: l ocat i on of noncombatants and ot her fri end-
l y f or ces, measures t o prevent mutual i nt er f er ence, s af et y pr ecaut i ons f o r
f i r e support , r u l e s of engagement, i dent i f i cat i on of r ecogni t i on si gnal s,
energency procedures, and ot her appr opr i at e mat t ers.
( 3)
The proper employment of a r t i l l e r y wi l l cont r i but e t o t he prevention
of unnecessary damage t o l i v e s and propert y of noncombatants. Fi r e support
o f oper at i ons should be planned i n coordi nat i on with province and d i s t r i c t
c h l e f s wi t h due r egar d t o s ecur i t y of plans. A US Ar t i l l e r y Li ai son Of f i cer
should be u t i l i z e d f or t h i s purpose. US Advisors can be asked t o perform
this h n c t i o n i n t h e absence of ot her l i a i s on personnel.
8. DEFPYNSIVE TARGETS/CONCENTMTIONS. Defensive t ar get s/ concent r at i ons w i l l
be f i r e d i n r out i nel y p r i o r :o darkness. It i s recognized t h a t t her e w i l l
be s i t ua t i ons when t h i s procedure i s not appr opr i at e. However, t h i s should
be a judgement of t he commander f ami l i ar with t he exi s t i ng s i t uat i on.
In t he
absence of f a c t or s t o t h ~ cont r ar y, defensi ve t ar get s/ concent r at i ons wi l l he
f i r e d i n pr i or t o darkness.
9. CCC!NTEFJ~:CRT~AK3 CC1LJNTERROC???T PilGCPA!:. a. ,:on f i de nt i a l l e t t e r , Head-
qua r t e r s Task Force OREGON, subj ect : Countermcrtar and Counterrocket Hea-
surcs (u!, dat ed L h i y s t 1967.
Appendix 4 ( Fi r e Support Cocrdi nat i cn; t o h n e x A ( Oper at i ons) t o
America1 3ivi s! on Fi e l 4 Sf,! !~ o ~ t i n u e d )
h. OPLAN .2me~ical15-67 (3efcnse Against Rocket o r Mortar ~ t t a c k )
(U)dated7November1967.
KOSTh?.
MG
TAaS:
Landing Zone P r e p r a t i o n - ; .
B - S e f e p r d i n g Al r c r a f t fromAr t i l l e r y Fires
C- Target Numbering%stem
DTSTRI SYTION:
Sp e c i a l
TAD A (Landing Zone ~ r e ~ a r a t i c n ) irekppor t Coordinatioa) t o Appandix 4
t o Annex A ( ~ i ~ e r a t i o n s ) t o America1 Eivision Field ?GI'
1. CONrvl..'". The decision t o prepare a landing zone !LZ) i s made h~t he
c ~s mn d e r based on hi s evalyatior. of t h e enemy si t uat i on. A preparat i on
m6y be conducted on t he as s aul t LZ by a r t i l l e r y, a i r , naval gunfi re and/
or hel i copt er gunships or any conbination thereof. ?he pr e ~a r a t i on i s
vi ol ent , continuous and terminated only on order of t he cornmender. Seg-
ments of l ar ge LZs a r e sel ect ed f or concentrated preparation. Feriphery
f i r e s t o preclude enemr reinforcements a r e maintained throughout t he
assaul t .
2. ARTILLSRY. a. When securi t y operations prevent r egi s t r at i on on t he
L5, t he a r t i l l e r y preparat i on i s observed and suf f i ci ent time 'allowed f or
f i r e s t o be adj ust ed f or maximum effectiveness.
b. Upon completion of t he preparation, a r t i l l e r y f i r e s a r e shi ft ed t o
l i kel y ar eas of entrance and exi t t o t he as s aul t area.
3. CLOSE AI R SUPPCRT.' a. Close a i r support f i r e s w i l l be car ef i l l y planned
t o i nsure t hat t r e e l i ne s a r e adequately covered.
b. Caution i s exercised i n sel ect i ng incendiary ordnance when seasonal
dryness might cause f i r e s which could r e s t r i c t maneuver of t he assaul t i ng
force.
c. The rraximum amount of crdnance i s placed on t he LZ i n t he short est
time possible.
d. CAP i s on s t at i on t o at t ack t ar get s of opportunity t hat develop
,
during t he as s aul t phase.
e. The at t ack i s continuous throughout t he assaul t , s hi f t i ng t o l i kel y
rout es of reinforcement or withdrawal when t he assaul t landing commences.
4 . ARMED HELICOFTERS. a, Armed hel i copt ers a r e used f or suppressive f i r e s
pr i or t o and during t he landing phase of t he assaul t . Fi r es a r e placed on
approach and depart ure l anes and i n t he t r e e l i neunder t he canopy bordericg
t he LZ.
b. Door gunners of troop carrying. hel i copt ers' f i r e s u~pr es s i ve f i r e s
on i n i t i a l l i f t only or a s di rect ed by t he ground commander.
5. COORDINATION. a. Colnmunication i s maintained between t he commander of
assaul t i ng elements, t he f i r e support coordinator, ALO/FAC, and t he troop
lif t commander.
TAB A (Landing Zone Preparat i on) t o Appendix 4 ( Fi r e Support coordination)
t o Annex A (Operatibns) t o America1 Division FieldSF'(Continued)
b. Concurrent a r t i l l e r y f i r e s and cl ose a i r support r equi r e cl ose
coordi nat i on of t he gun t ar get l i n e and at t ack di r ect i on of a i r c r a f t .
Area of r es pons i bi l i t y of a i r / a r t i l l e r y i n concurrent preparat i ons must
be c l e a r l y defi ned by t he commander.
c. Freparat i on of LZs a r e planned with s uf f i ci ent f l e x i b i l i t y t o
support t he assaul t i ng force most ef f i ci ent l y. Consideration i s given t o
del ays i n a r r i v a l of t roop l i f t a i r c r a f t a t t he LZ,and t he necessi t y f or
modi fi cat i on of t he preparat i on because of t he delay.
KOSTER
MC
CISTRIBLTION :
Speci al
OFF1CTAL:
&
BALMER
G3
Appendix 8 (Nat i onal Pol i ce Fi el d Fcrces) t o Annex A (operat i ons) t o
Americal Di vi si on Fi el d SOF
1. GENERAL a. Purpose. The purpose of t h i s S? i s t o s e t f or t h t he
oper at i onal concepts f or use of Kat i ona1: Fol i ce FLeld Fofces (NFFF) assi gn-
ed or at t ached t o t he America1 Di vi si on f or counterinsurgency. operat i ons.
b. General. A pr i nci pal mi ssi on of t he Americal Di vi si on i s t he
el i ni mat i on of t ha VC i nf r as t r uct ur e. Experience has shown t h a t i n , order
t o accomplish this mi ssi on i n populated ar eas where t he VC i s i n st rengt h,
t he Di vi si on succeeds i n i t i a l l y by waging count er-gueri l l a combat operat i ons.
A s t he VC i s reduced i n numbers and ef f ect i veness, he "goes underground",
f'rom where he wages a war of t er r or i s m and ot her covert t a c t i c s . A t this
s t age of f i n a l el i mi nat i on of t he VC i s ef f ect ed by conducting popul at i on
and resources cont r ol operat i ons. NPFF a r e of s i gni f i cant val ue i n assist-
i ng t he Division i n carryi ng out t hes e operat i ons.
c. NPFF. Nat i onal Pol i ce Fi el d Forces a r e s peci al l y t r ai ned t o execut e
popul at i on and resources cont r ol measures i n GVN cont r ol l ed and cont est ed
areas. Their gr eat es t a s s e t when employed wi t h t he Di vi si on i s t h e Mvi -
s i o n l s gr eat es t l i a b i l i t y - communication wi t h t he Vietnamese people. By
el i mi nat i ng t he l i ngual and c ul t ur a l bar r i er , t he NPFF can more e f f i c i e nt l y
obt ai n i nt el l i gence through screeni ng t he people and' searchi ng t h e i r dwell-
i ngs and vehi cl es.
2. ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES OF NPFF. a. The basi c NPFF u n i t i s t he
company. It cons i s t s of two pa t r ol pl at oons of s i x ( 6) man teams each and
a company headquarters. I t ' s aut hori zed st r engt h i s s i x o f f i c e r s and 89
enl i s t ed men. It i s or i ent ed t o t h e ar ea i n which it oper at es by r ecei vi ng
attachment of Speci al Pol i ce and Mi l i t ar y Secur i t y Servi ce personnel from
l oc a l d i s t r i c t s .
b. The NPFF a r e bas i cal l y Nat i onal Policemen who have recei ved ad-
di t i ona l t r ai ni ng i n i nf ant r y t echni ques and t a c t i c s . They normally serve
as a para-mi l i t ary f or ce t o augment t he a c t i v i t i e s of t he Nat i onal Pol i ce
throughout GVN cont r ol l ed areas. Within t he pr ot ect i ve s ecur i t y of mi l i t ar y
f or ces t hey w i l l operat e i n cont est ed and VC cont r ol l ed areas. They a r e not ,
howsver, i nf ant r y men and wi l l not be used as such. They have nei t her t he
requi red t r ai ni ng nor adequat e equipment t o engage i n combat operat i ons with
t he VC or NVA.
3. COMMAND AND CONTROL. a. A s appropri at e, Pol i ce Operat i ons Centers
wi l l be est abl i shed a t di vi s i oq s r ; ~/ or bri gade l e ve l t o monitor and coordin-
at e t he a c t i v i t i e s of t he WFF. The Di vi si on Pol i ce Operations Center (DPOC)
i s headed by t he Provost Marshal and i s s t af f ed by NPFF supervi sers, pro-
vi nce Speci al Pol i ce and Mi l i t ar y Secur i t y Servi ce r epr esent at i ves, mi l i t ar y
i nt el l i gence and G5 r epr esent at i ves. The Brigade ?ol i ce Operat i ons Centers
( ~ 1 ' 0 ~ ~ s ) a r e headed by t he Provost Marshals a t each brigade. BPOC's a r e
s t af f ed by t he IPFF company commander or pl at oon l eaders, d i s t r i c t nat i onal
Appendix 8 (Nat i onal Pol i ce Fi el d Forces) t o Annex A (Operations) t o
America1 Division Fi el d SOP (Continued)
pol i ce, S2 and s peci al pol i ce r epr esent at i ves, and Brigade T4T and S5 rep-
r esent at i ves. cl ose' and continuous coordi nat i on i s necessar i l y maintained
with GVN o f f i c i a l s a t province and d i s t r i c t l e ve l and wi t h TOCts a t each
l evel . FC?s provi de an operat i ons and i nt el l i gence cent er f o r NPFF op-
er at i ons at each l evel . A major t ask of t he POCts i s t he compilation of
bl a c kl i s t s used t o i d ' e n t i e VC during search and screening operat i ons.
b. For s ~ e c i f i c oper at i ons M'FF elements a r b at t ached t o maneuver
bat t al i ons , usual l y f o r use i n conjunction with a r i f l e company.
c. The hTFP company i s commanded by n Vietnamese Nat i onal Foliceman
equi vel ent i n rank t o a capt ai n. A US c i v i l i a n pol i ce advi sor i s provided
by GCC). The Provost Yi r shal of t he bri gade t o which t he IFFF company (pla-
t oon) i s at t ached doubles a s t he mi l i t ar y advi sor and poi nt of coordination
between t he bri gade and t he hTFT company,
d. Americal Ws should habi t ual l y accompany NTFF elements during t h e i r
operat i ons.
4. EMPLOYfGiXT OF hTFF. a. !*en at t ached, t he di vi si on has oper at i onal
c' ontrol of t he hTFF and r es pons i bi l i t y f o r supporting t he IJ'FF with Class
I suppl i es and Cl ass iT i t ems t h a t a r e corcmon t o 3 S and IFFF needs. Hospi-
t a l i z a t i on, evacuation end t r anspor t at i on i s providsd by t he Division.
A l l ot her cl as s es of supply and di s ci pl i ne, law and order and personal ad-
mi ni st r at i on a c ' t he r es pons i bi l i t y of t he at t ached NPFF uni t .
b. hTFF wi l l normally be employed i n e i t he r one of two t a c t i c a l mis-
si ons - attachment t o a bri gade or ot her major command -or gener al support
of t he 3i vi si on where t he element i s at t ached t o t he Americal MF Co.
5 .
USE OF hTFF I N EECUTIKC F~PUUTION AND RESOEWCES CONTROL NEASURES.
a. Cordon and &arch. This type measure i s car r i ed out i n GVN cont rol -
l ed, cont est ed and VC cont r ol l ed ar eas. Usually $ US r i f l e company w i l l
e s t a bl i s h t he cordon around a t a r ge t hamlet pr i or t o dawn.
A t dawn, a NPFF
pl at oon (or conpany, depending on t he s i t uat i on) i s a i r l i f t e d t o a secure
LZ o r LZs on t he cordon and f'rom t her e commences det s i l ed searchi ng of t he
hamlet f o r VC suspect s, weapons,. r adi os, ammunition. and supp3.v caches, and
scr eens t he popul at i on on t he scene. These oper at i ons a r e normally sched-
ul ed f o r one day' s operat i ons. When t he s i t u ~ t i o n r equi r es, a bat t al i on
can cordon a group of hamlets while up t o two NPFF companies search.
On
t he spot i nt er r ogat i on of t he popul at i on and of VC suspect s hel ps t o develop
t he enemy s i t ua t i on a s t he operat i on continues. Ci vi l Af f ai r s teams conduct
si ck c a l l s and i s s ue commodities t o reduce t he negat i ve aspect s of t he in-
convenience t o t he popul at i on of t he t a r ge t hamlet, pa r t i c ul a r l y if i t i s
i n a GVN cont r ol l ed or cont est ed area. Meanwhile, psyops and armed propag-
anda teams can conduct p o l i t i c a l psyops e f f o r t s toward t he capt i ve audiences
~ p ~ e n d i x 8 ( ~ a t l o n a l Pol i ce Fi el d Forces) t o Annex A (operat i ons) t o
America1 Di vi si on Fi el d SOP (continued)
wi t hl n t h e cordon. Theus e of f or ce i n i nt er f ogat i on must be more di s cr et e
i n GVN cont r ol l ed ar eas i n order not to al i enat e t he popul at i on agai ns t t he
GVN.
b. Checkpoints.
(1)
Fixed checkpoint=a r e est abl i shed by NPFF on l i n e s of l and and
water communications i n GVNcont r ol l ed ar' eas t o check t he flow of contra-
band' and unr egi st er ed ci vi l i ans . Normally, a NPFF team mans a checkpoint
*24ho4ursa day. On r out es where US t r a f f i c i sregul ar, US MP1sa r e rep-
resent ed at each checkpoint. NPFF should search a l ar ge percent age of t he
vehi cl es and persons t h a t pass through t he checkpoint t o conf i scat e con-
t raband and check f o r permi t s i ssued by l oc a l di s t r i ct s ' .
(2)
Mobile o r spot checkpoints can be est abl i shed by mobile pa t r ol s
on a l t e r n a t e r out es of communication and a t varyi ng l ocat i ons and t i mes
throughout t he GVNcont r ol l ed area. Hel i copt ers a r e used Eor f l e x i b i l i t y
and s ur pr i s e by i nt er cept i ng suspect vehi cl es and i n f i l t r a t o r s .
c. Rai ds and ambushes. h?FF a r e used i n varying si zed f or ces t o con-
duct pol i c e r a i d s and ambushes of t a r g e t s developed through i nt el l i gence.
US Forces a r e used f o r s ecur i t y i n VC cont r ol l ed and cont est ed areas, while
WFF provi de t h e i r om s ecur i t y when conducting r a i ds and ambushes i n CWl
cont r ol l ed areas.
d. Pat r ol s . Pa t r ol operat i ons a r e conducted i n reasonabl y secure
ar eas t o ga i n i nt el l i gence, i nt er cept i n f i l t r a t o r s and make a show of GVN
presence. The pa t r ol moves from hamlet t o hamlet over a Z i g - ~ s ~ rendom
r out e t o reduce t he pos s i bi l i t y of ambush. Hamlets a r e thoroughly searched
and a l l i nhabi t ant s questioned. Each evening, t he pl at oon w i l l es t abl i s h
an anbush a f t e r dark, away from t he immediate proximity of hamlets, t o i n-
t er cept i n f i l t r a t o r s . Curfews imposed by l oc a l d i s t r i c t a ut hor i t i e s a r e
enforced by NPFF as t hey conduct each t ype measure di scussed above.
D I STRIBUT1OK:
Speci al
OFFICIAL:
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x

(
~
e
~
o
r
t
s
)
t
o

A
n
n
e
x

T
I
T
L
E

O
F

F
E
F
O
R
T


-F
O
R
M
A
T

1
.


S
p
o
t

R
e
p
o
r
t
s

N
A

2
.


G
r
o
u
n
d

C
o
m
m
a
n
d
e
r
s

T
a
b

D
a
i
l
y

S
i
t
u
a
t
i
o
n

R
e
p
o
r
t

3
.


O
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n

R
e
p
o
r
t

U
S
A
R
V

R
e
g

L
e
s
s
o
n
s

L
e
a
r
n
e
d

1
-
1
9
.

a
n
d

(
O
R
L
L
)

D
i
v

R
e
g

1
-
1
9

4
.


C
o
m
b
a
t

A
f
t
e
r

M
A
C
V

R
e
g

~
c
t
i
o
n
R
e
p
o
r
t

3
3
5
-
8

F
M

3
0
-
5

6
.


R
E
D
O
P
S

U
S
A
R
V

R
e
g

3
3
5
-
1
9

T
A
B
:

-
h
i
l
y

S
I
T
R
E
Y

D
I
S
T
R
I
B
U
T
I
F
K
:

S
p
e
c
i
a
l

O
F
T
I
C
I
A
L
:

w

B
A
L
M
E
R

C
3

(
~
~
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
s
)
t
o

A
m
e
r
i
c
a
1

D
i
v
i
s
i
o
n

F
i
e
l
d

S
O
P

S
U
B
M
I
T
T
E
D

B
Y

!
P
,
T
H
C
D

C
F

T
R
A
N
S
K
S
S
I
C
X

A
l
l


U
n
i
t
s

F
a
s
t
e
s
t

m
e
a
n
s

t
o

G
3

M
e
t
j
o
r

s
u
b
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
e

R
T
T

o
r

L
N
O

c
o
m
d
s

a
n
d

s
e
p

b
n
s

u
n
d
e
r

M
v

c
o
n
t
r
o
l

H
i
s
t
o
r
i
c
a
l

S
e
c

L
e
t
t
e
r

C
o
m
d
r

o
f

G
r
o
u
n
d

F
o
r
c
e
s

A
l
l


U
n
i
t
s

D
a
i
l
y

a
s

P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y

M
s
g

A
p
p
l
i
c
a
b
l
e

K
O
S
T
E
R

M
G

3
~
b
m
i
t

w
i
t
h
o
u
t

d
e
l
a
y

a
f
t
e
r

i
n
c
i
d
e
n
t

o
c
c
u
r
s

o
r

b
e
c
o
m
e
s

k
n
o
w
n
.

S
u
b
m
i
t

f
o
r

e
a
c
h

2
4

h
o
u
r

p
e
$
-

i
o
d

e
n
d
i
n
g

2
0
0
0
H

b
y

f
a
s
t
e
s
g
;
,

m
e
a
n
s
,

n
o
r
m
a
l
l
y

t
e
l
e
t
y
p
e
,

;
.,
r
e
a
c
h

G
3

K
L
T

Z
O
O
H
.

i
:

,
*
\.

?
$

I
.

G
3

w
i
l
l

m
a
k
e

A
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n

t
o

o
t
h
e
r

a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s

o
u
t
s
i
d
e

t
h
e

C
i
v
i
s
i
o
n
.

F
a
s
t
e
s
t

m
e
a
n
s

t
o

D
S

A
r
t
y

B
n
3

S
2

a
n
d

D
i
v

A
r
t
y

S
2
.

C
a
n

b
e

8

s
e
n
t

t
h
r
o
u
g
h

~
2
/
~
2
c
h
a
n
n
e
l
s
;
R

D
u
e


U
S
A
R
V

h
Z
T

1
2
'
h
r
s

a
f
t
e

"
a
s

o
f
"

t
i
m
e
.

TAB A (Daily SITREP) t o Appendix 9 ( ~ e p o r t s ) t o Annex A (operat i ons) t o


America1 Division Fi el d SOP
Issui ng HQ
Place i f i ssue
Date-time group
S I T ~ NO.
?eri od Covered: (Date - 2000Ht o dat e - 2000~) .
Reference:
Maps (Country, Scale, and sheet numbers of maps)
1. EhTI4Y: a. Units i n contact.
b. Enemy reserves which can af f ect t he accomplishment of uni t mission.
LZ-
45- t
c. Brief est i mat e of enemy st rengt h, mat eri al means, morale, and h i s 9'
B
$probable knowledge of our si t uat i on.
8
F
.
d
OWSITUATION: a. Location of forward elements by report i ng two s i x I
%igitcoordinates (each fl ank).
a 2:
'
b. Location of a r t i l l e r y bat t al i on by s i xdi gi t coordinates, i ndi cat i ng'
bat t al i on headquarters l ocat i on.
: c. Location of brigade and Division reserve uni t s. Reserve reported by
s i x d i g i t coordinates i ndi cat i ng cent er mass.
: d.
Location of bri gades and bat t al i on CPby s i x d i g i t coordinates.
6.
;e.
Location of brigade and bat t al i on l i mi t i ng poi nt s, COPL,and FEBA
b y s i x d i g i t coordinates.
+
$
,f
f. Bri ef descri pt i on and r e s ul t s of operation during period. .t
t
g.
Statement of t he combat effi ci ency of t he command, t o i ncl ude any
.
per t i nent changes during t he period. Consider morale, st rengt h, s t at us of i
t pai ni ng, s t at us of suppl i es, and equipment.
5
$
h. Summary of act i ons planned f or next 24 hours.
3. ADMINISTRATION: General statement oft h e adminis t r a t i v ~ si t uat i on,
i f ot her than normal, a s itdi r ect l y af f ect s t he t a c t i c a l si t uat i on.
: %
TAB A nil^ SITREF) t o P-ppondix 9 ( ~ e p o r t s ) t o Annex A ! oper at i ons) t o
AnerScol Di vi si on Fi el d sl' ( Continued)
4. GENERAL: Any s i gni f i ca; l t items not pr evi ous l y discussed.
DISTRIYJTICK:
Speci al
CFFI CIAL:
CHU LA1, R W
15 Apr i l 1968
Annex B ( I nt el l i gence) t o A~ e r i c a l Di vi si on Fi el d SOP
1. RWr nCES:
a. F)c, 30-5
b. FN 31-22
C. FM 101-5
d. MACV D i r 381-21 (C)
e. USARV Reg 190-2
f . USARV Reg 643-20
g. USARV Reg 117-5
2. G U N . a. Combat i nt e l l i ge nc e i s eval uat ed i nformat i on of t he
eneny, t o i ncl ude concl usi ons a s t o h i s capabilities, vul ne r a bi l i t i e s ,
and i nt ent i ons ; geographic f eat ur es of t he t e r r a i n; and t he weather.
Rel i abl e and t i n e l y combst i nt e l l i ge nc e i s e s s e nt i a l t o comanders a t
all echelons i n or der t h a t t hey may est i mat e t he probable e f f e c t s of
t hese f a c t or s on t h e i r avai l abl e courses of act i on. Without this t ype
of- i nt el l i gence, a c o mn d e r i s unable t o determine t h e bes t method
of employment of h i s avai l abl e f or ces t o accomplish h i s mission and
mai nt ai n t h e s ecur i t y of h i s mit. . .
b. Col l ect i on c a pa bi l i t i e s avai l abl e t o a corndnd c r e sel doa suf-
f i c i e n t t o s a t i s f y a l l i nt e l l i ge nc e requirements. Therefore, it i s
i mperat i ve t h a t a l l possi bl e sources of i nf or nct i on be expl oi t ed t o t he
rcaximum ext ent and f ur t he r t k o t n l l such i nf oms t i on be i ma d i a t e l y
r epor t ed t o a l l l e v e l s of i nt e l l i ge nc e a c t i v i t y wi t hi n t he Americel
Di vi si on i n or der t h a t it my be col l at ed, eval uat ed, and di sseni nat ed.
3. KISSICN. To obt ai n t i n e l y and usabl e i nf oma t i on of t he eneny,
weather, and t e r r a i n t o s a t i s f y t he com:anderts i nt e l l i ge nc e r equi r e-
kent s and t o deny t he enmy access t o s i mi l a r i nforo, et i on of our f or ces.
4. CCNCEPTS. a. General
(1)
ACofS, G2 coor di nat es and provi des s t a f f super vi si on over a l l
i nt e l l i ge nc e a c t i v i t i e s or gani c t o t he h e r i c s 1Division.
(2)
Brigade and separa t e u n i t com.anders r e t a i n oper at i onal con-
t r o l over i nt e l l i ge nc e a c t i v i t i e s of t h e i r r ezpect i ve comLend.
(3)
I nt e l l i ge nc e a c t i v i t i e s of subordi nat e coc.z:ends a r e responsi ve
t o Di vi si on requirercents f o r col l ect Son, di sser i na t i on, and f or mr di ng
of a l l informa t i o n recet ved concerning compos! tlon, di s pos i t i on, st r en-
gt h, t a c t i c s , t r a i ni ng, l o g i s t i c s , combat ef f l ciency and ot her ~ i s c c l l -
aneous dat e on t he enesy.
(I,)
Moximm. i nt erchange of i nt . el l i gence i nf oms t i on a t a l l echelons
i s r equi r ed.
AnnexB(~ntell igence)toAmericalDivisionFieldSGP[continued)
b. Responsibilities:
(1)
AcofS,G2wi1.1estsblishintel:igencsreportingrequirements
forallDivisionelementsconsistentwithrequirementsleviedbyhigher
headquarters.
(2)
Brigadeandseparateunitcomanderswillreportsignificant
intelligencebymostexpeditiousmeensavailabletoDTOCG2represen-
tativeasprovidedinAppendix11.
5. CAPTUREDNATERIELkiJDLGUIPXENT. Appendix1. andlling andprocessing
ofallmaterialsndequipment.
6. CAPTUREDDOCWBJTS. Appendix2. Handlingandprocessingofall
captureddocuments,written,printed,drawn,engraved,soundorvoice
recording,photographsexposedfilmsorreproductionofsame.
7. DETAINEES. Appendix3. Levelanddetailofinterrogationfor
properfulfillnentofinte!ligencerequirementsandclassificationof
detainees.
8.AIRRE;COXNAISSANCE. Appendix4 . Proceduresforrequestingaerial
surveillanceandreconnnissence:andtheplenningandcoordinetionincident
tothecollectionprocessinganddisseminationofinformationobtained
byaerialmeans.
9. LOKGRANGERECOMNAISSANCEPATROLS(LRRP) .Appendix5. Provides
reliableandtirrelyintelligenceontheenemy,weather,andterrain.
Assetsorganictoseparatebrigadesremainassuchandareresponsive
torequirenentsleviedbyG2.
10. YAPDISTRlBUTiONANDSTORAGE. Appendix6. Policiesandprocedures
fortheprocurement,storage,anddistributionofmapswithintheFaericsl
Division.
11. YEATHER AfjDTERRAIN. Appendix7. Policiesandproceduresfor
obtaining,reporting,anddisseninatingweatherandterraininfomation.
12. COMmICATIOfiII~TELLIC~~CE/SECUR~TY. Appendix8. Providerapid
comunicationinsupportoftheA~erical Divisionondco~ldcrt research
intonaturalelectromagneticphenomena.'
1 . CCUNTER;I;TEl,LIGET;CE. Appendix9. Responsibilities,policies,and
proce2uresasapplytocounterinteliigenceoperatjonsintheAmerical
Division.
H.;EMY BCDYCCLST. Appendix10. Policyandprocedureswithinthe
Arr.erica1Division.
4
5
Annex B ( 2nt e l I i gence) t o Ancri cnl Di vi si on Fi ei d SOP ( cont i nued)
GTHm INTLLLICLNCE AND SE;CURIITY ~ P C R T S . Appendix 11. Pol i cy,
pr ocedur es , f or mat s 'of r e p o r t s 'byHqs, h e r i c o l Dl vi si on.
KCSTER
I.'IC
Appendi ces: 1 - C~ p t u r e d Ka t e r i e l cnd Equipment
2 - Capt ured Documents
3 - Det ai nees
4 - A i r Reconnei ssance
5 - LtRRF
6 - Nap Di s t r i but i on ond St or age
7 - Weather and Ter r ai n
8 - ~o m, u r i i c a t i o n / ~l e c t r o n i c !ntell.igenc-e and Secur i t y
3 - Count er i nt el l i gence
10 - Enemy Body Count
11 - Ot her I nt e l l i ge nc e and Se c ur i t y Repor t s
DlSTRIBUT3CN : Speci ai
CFFI CiAL:
L+-
Appondjx- 3 ( ~ e t a i n e e s ) t o Annex B (Int el l l gonce) t o h o r i c a l Divfsi on
Fi el d SOP
1. REFERENCES:
a. FM 19-40
b. MACV D i r 20-5
c. MACV D i r 190-3
d. MACV D i r 381-11
e. USARV Reg 190-2
2. STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES. a. ACofS, G 1 coordinetos and suporvises
handl i ng. of det ai nees.
b. Phi develops pl ans, pol i ci es, end procedures f o r t he handling of
det ai nees and operat es PW col l ect i ng poi nt s.
c. ACofS, G2 coordinates and supervi ses i nt errogct i on end cl as s i f i -
cat i on of det ai nees.
d. ACofS, G4 coordinat e s and supervi ses l ogl s t i col end t rensport a-
t i on ser vi ces f o r det ai nees.
3. DEJ?INITIONS. See reference c.
4 . TREAlME2JT OF DETAINFZS. a. A 1 1 persons detaihed by America1 Division
uni t s w i l l be afforded treatment consi st ent with t ha t of a pri soner of war
unl ess o r u n t i l ithns been determined t ha t t ho det ai naa i n not a pri soner
of war.
b. A l l detainees w i l l be t r eat ed humanely i n accordance Hith t he
Geneva Convention. Vi ol at i on of t he humane provi si ons of t he conven-
t i on i s an offense of t he Uniform Code of Mi l i t ary Just i ce.
c.
Sick o r wounded debl noes w i l l be provided medical treatmen' and
care a s required. Detainees under medical cars may be i nt errogat ed f o r
i nt el l i gence information whon permission i s granted by competent medical
aut hor i t y .
d.
Once a det ai nee i s t ent at i vel y determined t o be a ret urnee, he
w i l l be accorded favored t r eat nent .
e.
Since a l or ge percentage of de bi ne e s ar e eventually cl as s i f i ed
ac innocent ci vi l i ans and returned t o t hc l r vi l l ages, Droper treatment
whi l e i n US custody w i l l enhance t he G-N/US ci vi c act l on and psychological
operat i ons programs.
Appendix I ( ~ e t a i n e e s ) t o Annex B t o America1 Division ( ~ n t e l l i ~ e n c e )
Fi el d-SOP (Continued)
5. SCKEB~ING. a . I n i t i e l screeni ng fihould be done a t t he poi nt
of capt ur e whenever - pos s i bl e t o pr ecl ude t he unnecessary and undesi rabl e
evocuation of l a r ge nurtbers of i nnocent c i vi l i a ns . Mere Dresence i n
an ar ea does not neccsarily qilflllfy a porson a s a det ai nee.
I n par-
t i c u l a r , ol d men, wonen and chi l dr en should not noma l l y be det ai ned
unl ess t h e r e is r eason t o bel i eve t h a t t hey a r e , o r have a s s i s t e d,
Vi et Cong, o r t h a t t hey have i nformat i on of i nt el l i gence val ue.
b. Maximum use should be made of WI D i nt er r ogat or s and i nt e r pr e t e r s
t o conduct i n i t i a l scr eeni ng a t t he poi nt of capt ure. Nat i onal Pol i ce,
Mi l i t ar y Secur i t y Ser vi ce, ARVK HI Detachments and ot her GVN o f f i c i s l s
and agenci es nay a l s o be of assi st ance, both i n i n i t i a l scr eeni ng and
i n c l a s s i f i c a t i o n .
6. INTN3RSGATIC.N OF DETAINEES. a . I nt er r ogat i ons a t a l l l e ve l s w i l l
be lidt ed t o t he i nf oma t i on r equi r ed t o meet . t he needs of t h a t command.
b. Capturing u n i t s w i l l normally not i nt er r ogat e det ai nees unl ess
i nt e r r oga t or personnel a r e pr esent . Capturing u n j t s mey i nt er r ogat e
det ai nees f o r 1nf cm. et i on of immediate t e c t i c a l val ue i f necessi t at ed
by t h e t a c t i c a l situation.
c. I nt er r ogat i on a t bri gade c o l l e c t ~ n g poi nt s w i l l be l j mi t ed t o
t h a t necessar y t o obt ai n i n f o m~ t i o n of immediate t a c t i c a l val ue end t o
at t empt t o c l a s s i f y t he det ai nee.
d. I nt er r ogat i on o t t he Di vi si on col l ect i ng poi nt w i l l be l i mi t ed
t o t h a t necessar y t o obt ai n inforrcation of t e c t i c a l val ue t o t he Divi-
s i on and t o c l a s s i f y t hose det ai nees not c l a s s i f i e d by , t he bri gades.
e. Ret urnees i n t he custody of GVN w i l l be made avei l . abl e f o r i nt e r -
r ogat i on by US Forces upon r equest . Li ai son should be maintained with
Chieu Hoi Cent er s and ot her GVN agenci es l i ke l y t o r ocei ve r et ur nees .
t o i ns ur e t h a t knowledgeable r et ur nees a r e i nt er r ogat ed.
7. HAKDLINC AND LTACUATION. a. Capturing u n i t s will t a g det ai nees usi ng
USkRV Form 365 (Detainee Card) ae soon a s they have been disarmed,
secured, and segreget ed.
The Detainee Card w i l l remain wi t h t he det ai n-
ee u n t j l f i ne ? di s pos i t i on I s accomplished.
Captul-a dat a must be a s
complete a & pos s i bl e t~a s s j s t i n i nt er r ogat i on end c l a s s i f i c e t i on.
b.
Upon c o ~ p l e t i n n of i nt er r ogat i on, MI D i n t e r r o g ~ t o r sw i l l cos-
pl . et e Ftlrt. I and appl i c ~b 1 . e por t i onr of Fa r t TI of USARV Form 364
(Detainee Repnrt ~ n r d ) .
Thi s forn: dl1 be prepared i n t r i p l i c a t e f o r
PWE end jn duplicate f o r a l l ot her det ai nees.
Ttem 1, Pa r t I J must
be rigned by en of f i c e r .
I f t her e i r no o f f i c e r i n t he Brigode )!ID,
: : Appendix ( ~ e t ~ i n e e r ) ( ~ n t e : ?i t o Annex L? t o America1 Di vi si on
Fl el d SCP (Ccr.tj.nued)
no e n t r i e r wi l l kc r a d ? i r. F ~ r t ST bef or e f o r mr d i n g t o t h e Di vi si on
col! e c t j ng po:nt.. Upo:~ c ~r r ~p l e t i o n of i nt e r r oga t i on a r d c l a s s i f i ca t i c n
a l l copi es wj 11 be gi ven t o t h e C I C c f t he PW c o l l e c t i n g poi nt .
c.
Dj s p o ~ i t . i o n of det Fi nees from br i gade c o l l e c t i n g p o j n t w i l l
be 1rle2e by Ki1.i t o r y Pol i c e ~ , cf ol l ows :
(1 )
l nnocent c i v i l i a n o wj 11 be r et ur ned t o t h e poi nt of capt ur e
and r e l e a s e d cr r e l e a s e d t o GVh' o f f i c i a l s j n t h e d i s t r i c t where t hey
were ca f t ur e d.
( 2)
Pr i s oner s c f war wi l l be evacuat ed t o t he Dj vl ei on c ol l e c t -
i n g p o i n t f o r f u r t h e r i n t e r r o g a t i o n and evacuat i on t o t h e I11 VAF
col l e c 2 i n g poi nt .
( 5)
Ci v i l def endant s w i l l be r el eas ed t o CVn' o f f i c i a l s f o r t r j a l .
Er i goder wi t hout an SJA avni 1r; bl e w i l l forward USARV Form 364, one
copy cf t he i n t e r r o g e t l o n r e p o r t and any o t h e r r e l a t e d paper s t o t h e
Di v5si on EJ A f o r nct i on. Upon conTurrence of t h e SJA, t h e de t a i ne e
wi l l be r el eac- 4 t o SVN o f f i c i ~ l sby t h e Eri gade. I f t h e SJA does
not concur , t h e de t a i ne e w i l l be r e c l a s s i f i e d and handl ed i n accord-
ance wi t h h i s new c l a s s i f i c a t i o n .
( 4 )
Ret ur nees vil?. be r el eas ed t o t h e ne a r e s t Chieu Hoi Cent er
upon n o t i f i c a t i o n by ACofS, G2 t h a t f u r t h e r i nt e r r oga t i on by Bri gade
o r Giv i s i o n E.:! D per sonnel i s not r equi r ed. Pr e l i r J na r y i nt er r oga t i o n
r epc, r t s sllbrci t t o d i n acccr dence wi t h yaragreph 9c below w i l l be exped-
i t e d t o el l ow a r a pi d 6et er r . i nat i on of t h e need f o r f u r t h e r i n t e r r o -
ga t i on.
( 5 )
Doubt ful cas es w i l l be r e f e r r e d t o Bri gade o r Di vi s i on SJAs
who wi l l g r a n t PiJ s t a t u s o r r e f e r t he ceEe t o e Mi l i t a r y Tri bunal i n
accor ds nce wj t h MiCV Dir 20-5. Di s pos i t i on will be i n accor dance wi t h
t h e c l n s s j f i c a t i o n as s i gned by t h e Tr i bunal .
( 6 )
PYs and, i f t h e Bri gade does not have an SJk a va i l a bl e , c I v i l
def endnnt s end doubt f ul cas es wi! 1 be evncua t e d t o t h e Di vi s i on col l ec-
t i n g p o i n t wi t hi n 48 hours frcm t h e i r a r r i v a l a t t h e Bri gade c o l l e c t i n g
poi nt . Uni t s d e s i r i n g t o r et , ai n de t a i ne e s I n excess of 48 hours f o r
expl oi t o tl on wi l l r eques t aut hor i zat i o n frorr ACofS, C2 America1 Di vl -
s i on. Re q u e e t wl l l cont ai n fu11 i d e n t i f y i n g det o, a summary of
l n f n ms t i c n o b b i n e d and r l o n s f o r end exyect.ed r eeul t s of e xpl oi t a t i on.
d. Det ai nees nny vol unt nr i l y accor,pnny u n i t ? on oper ot i ons f o r t h e
purpose of I endi ng therr t o encrly u n i t s , i n s t n l l a t j ons, caches, e t c .
o r t o i d e n t i f y enerny per connel . However, o l l p o x ~ i b l emeasures w i l l
Appendix 3 ( ~ e t a i n e e e ) t o Annex B t o America1 Di vi si on ( ~ n t e l l i ~ e n c e )
Fi e l d SOP (Cont i nued)
be t aken t o pr event t h e i r escape si nce- escaped de t e i ne e s ' a r e a val -
uabl e source of i n t e l l i g e n c e t o t he enemy. As a minimum, pr ot ect i ve
r eas ur es wi l l i ncl ude keepi ng t h e det ai nee under t h e per s onal super-
vi s i on of an arrred p a r d . The guard w i l l be a s s i ~ n e d no d u t i e s ot he r
t hen guardi ng t h e det ei nee and w i l l be i ns t r uc t e a t o us e a l l necessary
f or c e t o pr event t h e det ai nees ' escape.
e. Nomal l y, det ai nees r equi r i ng medi cal car e wi l l be t r e a t e d by t he
f i r s t nedj cal f o c i l i t y i n t h e r , edi cal evacuat i on system. The Pr ovost
b!arshal wi l l der i gnat e units t o prcv5de t he r equi r ed guards dur i ng t he
per i cds of medi cal t r e a t c e n t and/or kospi t a l i z a t i o n . If USARV Fom
365 hes not been completed, l!Y guard personnel w i l l compl et e t h i s f om
R P ~ o o na s pract ! cal . Eubrcequent evaci ~at i cn w i l l be r ade a s f ol l ows:
(1)
F%F r e qui r i ng addi t i c na l and/or d e f i n i t i v e rredi cal car e w i l l
he evacua t.ed t hrough normal medi c31 channel s.
( 2)
,411 ot he r arcbulot.ox-y det ai nee: w i l l be r el eas ed t o Gm'o f f i c i a l s
f o r d i ~ p n i t i o n fo1low:ng f j n a l ~ t a t u sdeterxriinntion.
(3)
Fi nel ~ t s t u c d e t e r n i ~ e t i o n w i l l be made cn a l l det ai nees p r i o r
t o r e l e a ~ e t.c ::VN c f f i c i a l s t o pr ecl ude r e l e e s e of Pds.
t?. C?.ITL?iX FOR CLkSS:FICATiCh'. a. 9et ai nees wi l . 1 be c l a s ~ i f i e d i n
accordance wi t h t h e d e f i n l t i c n s jn para 3 above. I!owever, it n u s t r e a l -
i zed t t ~ t c l a s s i f i cat j or . map be d i f f i c u l t t o appl y i n c e r t a i n cases.
A degr ee of j udgenent by t he i nt e r r ogs t i ng o f f l c e r w i l l be required.
Thi s j udger ent rhould be based on cn appr eci at i on of a l l t h e f a c t s gai ned
from t h e i n t e r r n g a t j c n and ot he r source:. I n ques t i onabl e cases, consi d-
e r a t i o n shou:d be gi ven t o:
(1)
Whether t h e i ndi vl dual performed wi l l i ng1. y o r under dur ess.
(2)
i l het her t h e i ndi vi due l performed cont i nu8 I l y o r i n i s o l a t e d
i nct ances .
(3!
Whether t h e i ndi vi dual r.ade any at t empt t o avoi d a s s i s t i n g
t h e Vi et Cong.
(1)
Whether t h e i ndi vi dual was cooper at i ve and t r u t h f u l o r evas i ve
i n answeri ng que s t j ons.
(5) The Rge of t he i ndi vl due! . ~ t t h e t i me of t h e a c t ( s ) .
( 6 )
Any ot - her f n c t r which t end t o i n d l c a t e t he i ndi vi dua l ' s degree
of i n v o l v e ~ e n t I n Vie.L Ccng act : vl t i es.
Appendix 3 ( ~ e t n i r ? e e ~ ) ( ~ n t e l l i g e n c e ) t o America1 Di vi si on t c Annex B
Fi el d SGP ( ~ o n t i n n e d )
b. A r o j o r f a c t n r f o r de t e mi not i on qf s t a t u s i s t h e a c t bei ng
perfonzed bj t he det oi nes a t t h e t i me o f capt ure. Capture dat a on
Detaince Cards nus t be completed i n s u f f i c i e n t d e t a i l t o al l ow i n-
t e r r ogs t or s t o ~xake 8n i n t e l l i g e n t det em. i nat i on a s t o t h e s t a t u s of
t he det ai nee. I nt er r ogat i on r e p o r t s should c0ntai.n t h e de t a i ne e ' s
ver si on of t he c i r c ms t z n c e s o f capt ur e.
c. P a x i ~ m.us e should be made of b l a c k l i s t s and GVN agenci es such
a s hat i onal Pol i c e and t he Yi l i t a r y Secur i t y - er vi ce t o a s s i s t ir!ver-
i f y i n g t he i n f o r mt i o n obt ai ned f r o n t h e det ai nee.
d. Cl a s s i f i c a t i on shcul d be riade by Brigade i nt e r r oga t i ng o f f i c e r s
p r i o r t o forwardi ng t o t he Di vi si cn c ol l e c t i ng poi nt . Thi s can nor-
mally be done wi t hi n t h e t i n e l i m i t s es t abl i s hed by para 7c( 6) above.
I f c l e s s i f i c a t i o n cannot be made wi t hi n t hes e time l i mi t s , t h e det ai nee
should be s e n t t o t he Di vi si on c o l l e c t i n g poi nt f o r more d e t a i l e d
i nt er r ogat i on. '&en det ai nees a r e forwarded i n t h i s manner, t h e
classification and signst u r e bl ocks on USARV Form 3f& (Det ai nee Report
Form) should be l e f t blank and a d e t a i l ec! i nt e r r oga t i on r epor t f or -
warded wi t h t h e det ai nee.
9. HLPGRTE. a . The number of det ai nees t aken i n an a c t i o n will be
r epor t ed a s p a r t c f t h e spot r e p o r t of t h a t act i on.
b. Ret urnees cnd ver y i mpor t ant human sources wi l l be s pot r epor t ed
t c t he DTCC usi ng t he format i n Tab A.
c. Bri gades wi 11 p e p z r e pr el l ml nar y i nt e r r oga t i on r e por t s (PIR)
on e l l WA snd VC r ds , r ; ; i l i t a~- J r et ur nees , r e t ur ne e s i d e n t i f i e d a s
p o l i t i c a l cadr e and a l l ot her det ei nees possessi ng i nf or mat i on of
i n t e l l i g e n c e o r count er i nt el l i gence i n t e r e s t . PIRs w i l l be prepared
cn PXCV Form 370-lLV. ( I f f o ms a r e not a va i l s bl e , PIRs w i l l be
prepared i n t h e same format and cont ai n t he same i nf or mat i on a s lUCV
Form ;70-1EV).
( I )
FIRS w5l l be nunbered accor di ng t o t he st andar d PACV i n t e r -
r ogat i on r e por t numbering system. Report numbers wi l l cons i s t . of t h e
or i gi na t . or l s nmer i cal u n i t desi gnat i on, t h e number of t h e r e por t
assi gned s e r i a l l y by cal endar year , and t h e l a s t two d i g i t s o f t he
cal endar year , fol l owed by t he name of t h e oper at i on dur i ng which
t hey were capt ur ed, i f appl i cabl e. For example, r e p o r t number 181-
401-67 (Kalheur) would r epr es ent t h e LOlct PIR prepared by t h e 181s t
P-ili t e r y I nt e?l . i gence Deta chnent dur i ng 1967 and i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e
det ai nee was obt oj ned dur i ng Cper at i on Kalheur.
( 2) FIRS wi l l be forwarded t o t h i s headquer t er s ATTN: ACofS, C2
i n t hr e e copi es by t h e f a s t e ~ t means avai l abl e. One copy w i l l accompany
t h e det ai nee when evacua t ed t o t h i s headquart ers.
Appendix 5 ( ~ e t o i n e o r 1. t o Annex B ( 1 n t e l l i gerlce) t o kner i col Di vi si on
Fi el d SCF (Continued)
d. Si g n i f j c a n t i nf or nat i or i o b t ~ i n e d from dct oi nces d' l be s pot
report . ed tc DTC:C C2 represent . at 3vc nnd
i ncl uded i n t h e next ILTSUI.'..
These r e p o r t s w i l l coxitoin a s 8 mjnirium, t h e f ol l owi ng i de nt i f yi ng
dat a :
( 3)
Uni t (I!VA o r VC) t o i ncl ude complete s ubor di nat i on of u n i t .
( 5 ) Capt ur i ng u n i t .
e. Res ul t s of e;:ploite t i o n cf i nf or mnt i cn f ur ni s hed by d e t o i n e ~ s
and/ or t h e us e of d ~ t n i n e e s t o ].cad US Forces t o enalny i n s t o l l o t i o n s ,
u n i t s , caches, et c. , w i l l be spot. r-ort ed t o t h e DTOC C2 r epr esent n-
t i v e and i ncl uded I n t h e next IMTSUk.
f . Det ai nees w i l l not be i ncl uded i n u n i t tot el^ unl cs s t hey e r e
a c t ~ a l . l ye v a c u ~ t e d t o t h e Bri gade o r Di vi si on c o l l e c t i n g poi nt . Ret urn-
e e s wi l l not be i ncl uded i n u n i t t o- t a l s unl es s t hey a c t u c l l y t u r n them-
s e l ve s i n t o t h e US ri3. i t ary uni t , . TJnj:ts will. not tolte c r e d i t f o r
r e t ur ne e s whc t u r n t he: i : sel ve~ i n t o GVI! o f f i c i a l s o r , agencl es . Ret urn-
e e s will bo r epor t ed t c l o c a l Chieu IIoi o f f i c i e l e a s soon 6s t hey corm
i n t o US cust ody.
10. REQUESTS FCR AUG?C.UITATICN. a. Request f o r pennnnent l ot er r ogo t or /
I n t e r p r e t e r augment8 t i on w i l l be submi t t ed t hrough S1, G 1 channel s i n
accor dance wi t h c ur r e nt d i r e c t i v e s . Infom, a t i o n copi es w i l l be forworded
t o ACofS, G2.
b. Re q u e ~ t s f o r t emporary augzent et i on w i l l be forwarded t o t h i s
headquarter!:, ATTN: ACofS, C2. Hequest wi l ! gi ve a s much advonce
n o t i c e as pos s i bl e and cont ai n, a s a minimw., t h e f ol l owi ng i nf oma t i on:
(1)
Kurber and t ype c f perronne3 r e q u c ~ t e d .
(2) Dat e r equi r ed.
( 3)
E;rt.jrrot.erl 1en!:t.h of t i r e r.eilui r ed.
Appendjx ' ( ~e t e i r - e e : ) t o Annex B ( ~ n t e l l i gence) t o Ame r i c ~ l Di vi s i on
- F i e l d 921. ( ~ n n t i ~ i u c d )
4 I h'urber of i n t e r r o ~ o t . c r s and i n t e r p r e t e r s ~ v a i l e b l e wi t hi n
t h e br i ga de .
5 Pl anned r, ct hc. d cf employnent..
( 6' Ct he r r e s m ~ r c e ~ ( Count e r i nt e l l i ge nc e Per s onnel , cval l obl e
k3Vh ! Dctschr-er.t.r, N~ t l o n a l Po!ice, Yi Ii t , ar y Yecuri t y Se r vi c e , et c. ! I
! 7 ' Cocpl et e i u s t i f i c e t . i o n f o r r e c u e ~ t t o i n r l c d e :
( a )
l i mbe r s nd t ype of de t oi ne e r on hand.
{t)
L ~ r . b e rand t ype of d e t s i n e e s expected.
( c ) Any ~ d d i t i one! ?art.:: which r u ~ r c r t t h e r e que s t .
Tab?: h - Very Jn. r or t , ant F~i 7, hr: ?:*rtiiepcl-t. O C ~ ~ E T
Teb A (Very Irr, port ent Hman Sources ~ e ~ o r t )
t o Appendix ? ( ~ e t a i n e e s )
t o Annex B ( l nt e ; l i ge nc e ) t o Aver l col Di vi r i on Fi , el d SCP
?. Uni t / Cr gnni zat l on ( NVA o r VC) ; compl et e ~ u b o r d i n a t i o n of h i s u n i t ;
i . e. , co~rpan:~, b a t t e l i o n , r e g i r e n t , di vi s i on, o r i n f l l t r a t i c n group.
4. Dat e of CnFture/Retl;rn.
6. Capt ur i ng Uni t .
7. Pr e s e nt Locnt i on of Source.
8. St at ement of : ut ; st ant i ve j nf or xa t i on obt ai ned from sour ce.
9. blaior area. - end dept h of r ol ~r ceknowl edgcsbl l i t y.
10. Cr gi ne t o r ' s c o r r ~ e n t(P t e t u a of i nt e r r ogs t i o n , pl.anned di s pos i t i on of
sour ce, reccnnended f u r t h e r evecuat.ior! and exp?oi t at . i or. , e t c . )
DIZTXIEUT: GI;: Spe c i a l
CFFI CTAL :
Appendix 10 (Ene1lry Body ~ c u n t ) t o Annex B (Int e3. l i gence) t o Aneri cal
Di vi si on Fie1d SOP
1. REFERENCES. There a r e no known r ef er ences.
2, PURPOSE. Tc accur at el y account f o r eneny cas ual t i es and t o provide
t h e bas i s f c r an est i mat e of enemy st r engt hs, l osses, c a pa bi l i t i e s and
vul ne r a bi l i t i e s .
3, FfhSPONSIBlLITY. Each bri gade i s r esponsi bl e f o r re;.orting a l l
eneny ki l l e d wi t hl n i t s A0 o r TAOR by orgeni c, at t ached, and support i ng
units, and by uni t s under t h c i r operat i onal cont r ol .
4 . DEFINITIONS. Eneny ki l l e d i n act i on w i l l be accounted f o r a s e i t he r
NVA o r VC Kil!ed I n Action (KIA). The terc. KI A i s r eser ved excl usi vel y
fcr ener~y whose bodies have been confirmed. Confirmation w i l l consi et ,
a s a minimum, of vl r ua l exardnat i on of t he body from a di st ence of l e s s
t h a n 50 f e e t . There i s no l onger a category of "PROBABLE" kills.
5. PROCEDURZS. a . The' of f i c i a l a c c ~u n t i n g dccuplent f o r enemy ki l l e d
i nact i on i s t he America1 INTSm. The fol l owi ng accounting procedures
w i l l be used:
( 1)
Enexxy I dl l e d w i l l be cr edi t ed t o t he brigade whcse at t ached,
a s si gned, or f uppor t i ng uni t s make t he k i l l s. Ki l l s made by uni t s
ucder operations! cont r ol will be cr edi t ed t o t he bri gade which has
oper at i onal cont r ol . The par ent brigade may r epor t klllsmede by an
or gani c uni t under oper at i onel ccnt r ol of anot her uni t but t he r epor t
w i l l be preceded by t he r t at enent : "FOR INFO OidLY, NOT CRLDITJD.'I
( 2)
Ki l l s made by uni t s under Division cont r ol ( a s opposed t o
Br f p d e cont r ol ) w i l l be cr edi t ed t o t he Brigade i n whose A0 t he
k i l l i s made, o r t o t he A0 near est t he kill.
( 3) Enemy ki l l e d by Americal uni t s . Ar t i l l . er yand/or a i r i n
suppor t of non-di vi si onal (US/~;T~~BUF/RV~~F) c r in r eact i on operat i ons
t o a r equest f o r as s i s t ance from t hese f or ces and r epor t ed by t hese
f o r c e s w i l l not be cr edi t ed t o l rneri cal uni t s . Such kills may be
r e ~ c r t e d by t he bri gades involved but w i l l be preceded by t he s t at e-
xrient: "FOR INFO CNLY, HOT CREDl'i'ED." The above r u l e appl i es unl ess
t h e supported f or c e s f a i l t o r epor t and claim c r e di t f o r t he k i l l s .
I n t h i s event , t he Azer i cal br i gr de providlina support and/or near est
t h e act i on ( i n case of a r t i l l e r y / a i r support ) w i l l claim c r e di t and
r e p o r t t ho k i l l s .
4
Eneny kj l l e d by a r t i l l e r y o r a i r w i l l be cr edi t ed tc\ t he
Bri gade r espcnsi bl e f o r t he sr ee or near est t he oreo where t he
bedi es ar c l ocat ed r egor dl ese of uhat u r t i l l c r y uni t f i r e c t he
ni c s i on or sir support provided. When iti s possi bl e t o i de nt i f y
enemy bodies o s hevi nc been ki l l e d by a r t i i l e r y o r a i r t he r epor t
w i l l r e f l e c t "KILLED 5Y ARTILLliiiY" cr "KIId.I9 BY A1R.I'
Appendix 10 (Enesy Body Count) t o Annex B ! ~n t e l l i g e n c e ) t o A~ e r i c o l
Di vl si on Fi el d SOF (Continusd)
6. OTHER. Cases not covered Jn t h e procedures s peci f i ed obcve will
bereferred t o theG2 TOC Duty Gf f i cer .
DISTRIBUTION: Speci al
OFF1CIAL:
T%f-- G2
Appendix 11 (Ot her I nt c l l i ge nc o ~ n dSecur i t y Repor t s) t o Annex B ( ~ n t c l l -
i gence) t o Arxericol Di vi ei cu Fi e l d S3P
1. WERE3CELS.
a. I11 PXF Force 0 443820.2, dt d 1 Apr 67
b. III K U Fcr ce 0 5213.2, dt d 1 2 Apr 67
c. YACV D i r 335-22 ( s )
d. UShRV Reg 380-5
e .
I11 14AF Ksg, Uncl es, DTC 0501522 J ul y 1967
f . 111 IUF k g , ( c ) , DTG 1807062 Feb68
2. INTEILIGE7:CE SU~C~ILRY, SHOET TITLE (INTsu?~). Cut o f f e f f e c t i v e 1900H
d a l l y , and forwarded t o r each t h i s l i esdquart erc NLT 2300H. (Soe Teb A ) .
3. TELEPHCMIC INTLLLIGZiCE RYPCRTS, SEORT TITLE (SFCT FUPORT). Sub
mi t t ed t o ACofS, G2 (ToC) cn s i g n i f i c a n t i nci dent s a s t hey occur. (See
Tob B) .
4 .
LGNG FLiiGr", FLCCIU' SI TRP RU'OZT.
Subxi t t ed t o r each t h i s hecdqusr t er s
NLT 2400 doi l y. Kegat i ve r e por t s a r e r equi r ed. ( s ee Tab c).
5 .
MSE ARLA DE2iIAL. A c oc s ~l i de . t e dr e por t of EIACIJ Assigned Bese Aress
t o be s u b ?t t a d t o 111 EYJ COC G2 , t h e f i r s t dey of each month e s of t he
l a s t day OF t he pr ecedi ng rrcnl:ho (See Tbb D.) ( publ i shed s e pa r a t l y)
6. LOC F&T.G2T.
Gvei-lay (11500,~30) c u b ~ J t t e don f i r s t day of each ncn.2h
a s of t h o lot dny of t he p;-occdj.ng month, cur r ant c l n s s i f i c c t i o n os r ed,
amber, o r grzen. For d e f i n i t i o n s o f c l o s s i f i c s t i o n s e e Teb E.
7. KIT CARSOX SCOUT RL'FCJiT.
Report on pFoFan f o r ernployillg returnees
on t o c t i c e l o p o r e t j o r , ~t o be sut!:::r!itted by t he 1st and 1 6 t h of each month
t o ACofS, G2. Roupor'tiilg qer i ods or e 1st - 15t h ond 1 6 t h - l a s t da;.
of t h e nont h. ( see Tab I?).
8. DETAIF!LX PLTORTS. Cover o 24-hour per i od o s of 1700H b i l l be sub-
mi t t e d t el ephoni cal l y t o t he Di vi si on G2 (TOC) by 18008. Negat i ve
r e p o r t s r equi r ed. (See Tab G ) .
9. CUTLRDJT E,lS<YHOLDING E?ORTS. Incl uded i n paregrep11 8 of unit
i nt el l : ' ~genct ?s umor i c- s ( I I ! TS~<: ~) on a weekly Ll s i s , evely Tuesday, ( s ee Tab H)
10. CL!L\RF-!ICE, ACCIiSS, Al!D hi-'I"OII~'flLY?~T ROSTYA. Ros t cr w i l l be sub-
mitte.i on US:';KV Fo:-,q 152R t o t h i z hcadquort crs, ATTf:: ACofS, G2 IbXT
t h e 10t!i cf cnch r!?c~. t. I:s nd cor; . cct HS of t he filmst of each nont h.
These r c s t c r s v i l l r c f l c c t co::l:.:!rr.lc:;.s, exccut i vu cf ' f i cer s, koy ~ t a f f
of Ti ccr s , l5.:?ison o f f i ccr: j , su' i hcri sccl courier:., and ot!!er i ndi vi dual s
whose d u t i e s ri : qui ra frcquc!lt vi si t : ; t o t h i s I l csdqumt er s t o disc::ss
c 1 a ~s i f : o d i nfoi -cot i on. (See Tob I ) .
Appendix 11 (Ot her 1nt el l . i gcnce and Secur i t y ~ c ~ o r t s ) ( I n t e l l - t o Annex Il
i gence) ' t o Aobr i cul Divj-sionFi el d SOP (Continued)
Tabs A - INTSUb: Forn:at
B - Spot Report For r a t
C - Recon S I T m Fcrmot
D - Base-AreeDeni al F o r mt ( publ i shed s eFar at l y)
E - ~ i n e s - of Corfiunicatlcn C/A
F - Kit Carson Scout Repcr t For not
C - Det ai nee Report Forrnat
H - Cur r ent Uni t Holdings Report P o r ~ a t
I - Cl ear ance, Access, and Appointr:ent Rost er
DISTRISUTION: Speci al
OFF1CIAL:
L+C2
Tab A ( I NTS~J , ~ 1orrr.at ) t o Appendix 11 (Other Intelligence and Secur i t y
- ~ e ~ o r t s ) ( ~ n t o l l i ~ e n c e ) t o hnncx B t o An:erical Di vi si on Fi el d SOP
1 .
I ssui ng Unit and IKTSRC Number.
42.
L o c ~ l DTC f o r beginning and end of r epor t i ng period.
'3. SUh34fiY OF E3E;I.Y ACTIVITY.
*a. Ground Act i vi t y.
*( 1) . Area of operat i on (includ,-s t he t o t a l number of i nci dent s i n-
vol vi ng a ~i y cont act wlt h tllc enemy. Incl ude a l s o t he t o t a l number of
enemy i n i t i a t e d i nci dent s, and t ho nun.ber of enemy i n i t i a t e d by type.
I n each sub-paragraph, e. g. )
( a) DTG, Uni t , Coordinate, complete smmry of each i nci dent t o
i ncl ude a l l equi paer t , weapons w/ ser i al numbers, r i c e , s a l t , t o b c c o ,
t unnel s, s t r uct ur es captured and whether itwas evacuated o r destroyed.
" ( 2)
'then nore t han one nren of operat i on.
*b. Gther
( 1) A i r a c t i v i t y
( a ) A i r St r i kes : Preplanned Esns( s o r t i e s ) ;I m~e d i s t e
;Missions ;( s o r t i e s ) ;Sky Spots Msns (
s o r t i e s ) .
(b) B0v.b Dncage Assessment.
(c) Vi sual Reconnaissance: Sor t i es : 1W Coverage:
Pnr t i a1:
( d) Si gni f i cant Si ght i ngs.
( 2) Ant i - Ai r : l nci dcnt s of enery ground f i r e agai ns t a i r c r a f t .
Report t h e , A/C u n i t , t ype A/C, type mission, coordi nat es, a l t i tude,
type and i nt e ns i t y of f i r e , number of h i t s , number of cas ual t i es ,
s t a t us of b/C ( cont i nues t o f l y , forced t o land, crashed, et c. ) .
( 3) Administration: A l l cor r ect i ons t o pa s t INTSUNS w i l l be made
wi t h r ef er ence t o t he item being correct ed.
i . e. , Ref INTSU'N #36-61
para 3 a (1)(6)n s r eads 2 VC KIA i s cor r ect ed t o read: 1YC KI A.
4 . E;NG:Y FQUIFI;U!T AND I'ERSI~I.!EL AKD EQUIFliD!T LOSSES.
++.*a. KIA
(1) NVA
(Total, , for, Reporting Per i od)
*,;,:,T?2;r&::-fl?.*,+'
..- ,,.;*<. ?7~?,.:.> -
. ..
.:s:~.:..+ : : .2".,.-.;x , &. . , . >
B-55
654
Tab A (INTSLrM Format) t o Appendix 11 (Other I nt e l l i ge nc e and Secur i t y
Report s) t o Annex B ( I nt e l l i ge nc e ) t o America1 Division. Fi el d SOP
(Continued)
(2). vc
( Tot al f o r Repor t i ng per i od)
b.. Det ai neee (Tot s1 f o r Report i ng per i od)
c . NVA PflC PW/NVA ~et ur nee/ VC ~ e t u r n e e / ~ i v i l Def endent/Innocent
Ci vi l i a n (Det ai nees not c l a s s i f i e d dur i ng r epor t i ng per i od. ) ( ~ o t a l f o r
Repor t i ng per i od)
**d. Weapons, lndividual/weapons, Crewserved. ( ~ o t a l f o r Repor t i ng
Per i od) .
e. Equi p~ent / Pa c i l i t i e s ; Captured/Destroyed.
(1) Weapons: DTG, Uni t , Coordi nat es, Number and t ype of wpns wi t h
s e r i a l nm.ber
(2) Equipment : Captured : A l l equipment capt ured and eva cua t ed :
Destroyed: A l l equi paent d e ~ t r o y e d dur i ng t h e r e por t i ng per i od.
( 3) F a c i l i t i e s Destroyed: A l l f a c i l i t i e s dest r oyed dur i ng t h e
r e por t i ng per i od.
**These t o t a l s , bot h d a i l y end cw, ul at i ve, must agr ee wi t h S3s d a i l y
SI TRQ.
5 . NEd OBSTACLES AKD BARRIERS: Report de s c r i pt i c n of obs t acl es enpl aced
dur i ng t he r e por t i ng per i od, l oc a t i c n, es t i mat e of demsge, whether o r
not road i s passabl e.
6. ADNIIC; STRP.TIVE ACTIVITIES: I ncl ude i nf or mat i on on enemy l o g i s t i c s ,
i n f i l t r a t i o n r out es , l i n e s of corcmunicstion.
7. NhW IDEKTIFICBTIONS: R e ~ o r ta l l new u n i t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s of pl at oon
s i z e o r gr e a t e r obt ai ned from "hardt ' sour ces (FWS, Docw.ente, Hoi
Chanhs) and r el i l r bl e low l e v e l agent..,
I ncl ude a l l i n f o n n ~ t i o n of
i n t e l l i g e n c e val ue i ncl udi ng: unl -+ i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , l ocat i on, mi ssi on,
s t r engt h, major weapons, pe r s ona l i t i e s ( cadr e onl y) , i n f i l t r a t i o n
da t e (when e ppl i c obl e ) , equipment and un5forms (if ot he r t hen normal
TOBE* i . e . , i de nt i f yi ng i ns i gni a s , f l a g s , s pe c i a l coma equiprcent,
e t c . j , ComFosition h Subcrdin:.tion nntl train!ng and t a c t i c s ( i f ot her
t han norn.el n i l i t e r y t r s i n i n g and t n c t t c s ) . Add appr opr i at e S2-OB
cosment evalue t i n e above informa t i c n .
Tab A (IKTSL?.!Format) t o Appendix 11 (Ot her I nt e l l i ge nc e and Secur i t y
~ c ~ o r t s ) ( I nt e l l i ge nc e ) t o hmeri cni Di vi si on Fl cl d SCP t o Annex B
( ~ c n t i n v e d )
a .
Ener,y rovement s (Eoverent of an eneKy u n i t out s i de of i t s normal
AO)Report a l l enemy r.ovenents of pl at ocn s i z e and l a r g e r obt ni ned from
"hard" s our ces (PAS., Docments, Hoi Chanhs, SLAR, I R) and r e l i a b l e low
l e v e l agent s. I ncl ude a l l i nf0m. st i o n of i n t e l l i g e n c e val ue i ncl udi ng:
u n i t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n l oc a t i on, mi ssi on, s t r engt h, ma:or woapons, person-
a l i t i e s ( codr e onl yj , i n f i l t r a t i o n dat a (when a ppl i c s bl e ) , equipment
and u n i f o r r s (i f o t h e r t han n o ms l T GU; i . e. , i de nt i f yi ng i ns i gni a s ,
f l a g s , s ~ e c i a lcom~o equipment, et c. ) , Composition and s u b r d i n a t i o n
and t r a i n i n g and t a c t i c s ( i f ot he r t han norms1 mi l i t a r y t r a i n i n g and t ac-
t i c s ) . Add appr opr i at e S24B corment eval uat i ng above i nf or nat i on.
b. Enmy ~ o c a t i o i s ( Fur t her conf i r mat i on of an enmy u n i t a t a
s p e c i f i c l o c a t i o n wi t hi n i t s n o ma l AG o r t h e r e l oc a t i ng of an enemy
ymit wi t hi n i t s nomal AO). Report a l l encmy l oc a t i ons of pl at oon
s i z e and l . orger obt ai ned from I1h3?d" sour ces (Ptls, docw-ent s, Hoi
Chanhs, SLAE, IR) and r e l i o b l e low l e v e l s gent s . I ncl ude a l l i nf or -
n a t i o n of i n t e i l i g c n c e val uc j-ncluding: n i t i d s n t i f i c c t i o n
l ocat i on,
r i s s i o n , s t r e ngt h, a e j o r weapons, pe r s ona l i t i e s ( cadr e onl yj , i n f i l t m-
t i o n dot n (uhen e ppl i c a bl e ) , e q u i p ~ e n t and uni forms ( i f o t h e r t han
normal TUX: i . e. , i d e n t i f y i n g i ns i gni a s , f l a g s , s pe c i a l como equl p-
n e n t , et c. ) , composi t i on end subordi net i o n ond t r a i n i n g and t a c t i c s ( i f
o t h e r then n o ma l mi l i t a r y t r a i n i n g and t a c t i c s ) . Add appr opr i at e
524B c c r ~z s n t eval us t i ng n b v e j nf or nat i on.
fiOTE: Cont oct wi t h enezy uni t s . Subor di nat e u n i t s , when pos s i bl e, shoul d
s p o t r e p o ~ i any i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of eneay u n i t s i n cont act t o DTOC; this
5ncl udes pr el i mi nar y s cr eeni ng of docunent s and f i e l d i nt e r r oga t i on
o f PWs, Hoi Chanhs, et c. Thi s i nf or mat i on shoul d be ent er ed wi t h
INTSU!!.I e nt r y denot i ng cont act .
9.
ESTABLISKD NTXBL! AND TYPE OF VEHICLES OR CRAFT:
10. WEATHL? AND TEit.?XNCONDITIONS:
a. Weather: ( I ncl ude t emper at ur e range, aver age humldit y, pre-
c i p i t a t i o n , wind ve l oc i t y and di r e c t i on, v i s i b i l i t y , and gener al
s t a t e n e n t of weat her f o r per i od) .
b. Ter r ai n:
( I ncl ude t h e e f f e c t of t he weat her on t h e t e r r a i n ) .
c . As t r o n o ~ i c t ~1 Dn t a :
W.NT:
SR:
Tob A (INTSWFo: -rr~t )t,c Appendix 11. ( C :.lrer Inte1.ligcrlce a nd Le c ur i t y
Report s) t o knnsx 13 t o A~r e r i c a lDi vi s i on Fic?ld XI ' ( ~ n t e l l . i ~ e n c ~ ~ )
( Cont i nued)
11. DlSCUSSlCK CF CAI ABI LI TI ES Xh'3 LIb:I?'ATJCI!S ;
12. CC1~CLU~I C~! ~S :
13. FAJI. : . : E~C'F IESTAKCLSCF VIET~~J: ESEIILTICHALZ VC~LUI\;TEERINGINFCRJATICN
ABCUT VC,/liV;. DI!!ECT TC; US A1U.T: (Tncl-udcde s c r j pt i on of ci r cur : r t anccs,
t o lnc l ude DT:;, friend!:; u n i t i d e n t j f j cai:i.on, 1ocat. ion by coord5 n n t e ~ ,
det s i l s of i nf c, r r . : at j on f ~ ~ r n i s h e d , f ol l cw- up a c t i o n ) . nnd ar,;-
1 . OT Hi 3 : ( I n c > ~ d e weekly Cilj chcr.i;e.-., s p e c i c ? ~ ,mop-ups, e t c , 8s
appr opr i o t e.
* There itercs wl11 be inc:l::dc:d i n each IFi?LL71:-: rcgsrdlerr- of vhct her o r
nct , t her e i s i nf c ; ~s t ; or ! t,o r epor t . Ste?.c.-r,ent.ssuch E. C "7-0 Kegot j vc"
wi 11 be 11scd. A l l it c r ~S n t he fc;.rr:ct nn?, r nar ?~d"*" '87 be del et ed
from t . he t cr l y cf t h e l::T.';:i.P.'. i n t h e i r e n t i r e t y i f nc i nf or mot i on i s
r epor t ed. karsgr.ny.Ils Will t e rerLm?>eredt o r c t a i n n nmcr i ca1
sequence.
Cn t h e f i r s t d a y cf each cal endl i r mont h, t h e pr evl ous n o n t h ' c cwnul nt i ve
t o t a l s w i l l lie rhown i n pe r a gr a ph 14 o~ :horn below:
b. Tot al VC K I A
c. Tot al month1;i onerr,:r k i l l e d
(1) Tot a l NVP. k:Ili
( 2 ) Tot a l VC )i l k
Tab A ( I N T S ~ or met) t o Appendix 11 ( ot her I nt e l l i ge nc e end Secur i t y
~ e ~ o r t s ) t o AnnexB ( ~ n t e l l i ~ e n c e ) t o America1 Di vi si on Fi el d SGP
( cont i nued)
e .
NVA PW/VC PW/NVA ReturneesflC Returnees/CD/IC
f . IWC/CSdC
Thi s SGP format d e t a i l s t he minimum requi remont end formet . Report i ng
u n i t s mey i ncl ude a ddi t i ona l i n f o ma t i o n of an i n t e l l i g e n c e value i f
des i r ed.
KCSTER
MC
D l STAIBUTION : Speci al
OFF1CIAL :
G2
Teb B (Spot Re o r t or mat) t o Appendix 11 ( ot her I nt e l l i ge nc e and Secur i t y
Reports7 t o Annex B ( I nt el l i gence) t o America1 Di vi si on Fi el d SOP
SPGT WO R T
I n i t l a l FOLLW UP
a. Report i ng HQ d. TOR
b. Source e. Coord
c. TO1 f . Coord (EN)
I nci dent :
Resul t s :
KHA VC KIA (c) Jour nal No
WHA (evac) NVa KI A [C) Not i f i ed:
'XHA ( ni nor ) IW/CIA
CS/CIA
Report t aken by
DI STRIBUT1ON :
St andard - G2
(hard Copy) - C3
KGSTER
HG
DISTRIBUTION : Speci n1
OFF1CI AL :
...
Tab C ( ~ e t a i n e e Report ~ 0 m 3 t ) t o Appendix 11 ( ot her I nt e l l i ge nc e and
Se c ur i t y ~ e ~ o r t s ) t o America1 Di vi si on t o Annex B ( ~ n t e l l i ~ e n c e )
Fi e l d SOP
1.
Nmber of' Aet ai nees r ecei ved t h a t day.
2. Nmber of det ai nees c l a s s i f i e d as pr i s oner s of war.
3.
Tot a l number of det ai nees i n PW c ol l e c t i ng poi nt .
4 .
Kuxcber of PWs i n P'A c ol l e c t i ng poi nt .
DISTRIBUTION: Speci al
GFFICIAL:
ANNEX C
Appen'dix Adminis t r a t i on)
1. CC:it51EI> P,S?I~CESJB;LITY. h i t s evacuat e r.>mainst o c l os e s t col l ect i on
poi nt by ve!liclesJ ei r cr aft not car r yi ng t roops.
2. GFAVSS R5GISTRiiTICI'! S=VT:S. Zol l ect i on and evacuat i on teems from
3 S an, Support Command, and ar i gades. Teams r ecei ve remains, assemble
identifying media and per sonal e f f c c t s and p r ~ p a r e remains f o r evacuat i on
t o t he Zi vi s i on c ol l e c t i on poi nt . Brigades and Di vi si on Ar t i l l e r y a s s i s t
teams and ar r ange f o r ai r / l and t r ens por t at i on of requl rod.
3. SErLSCH MID RECCilERY OF RD,ViINS. a. A l l u n i t s and, i ndi vi dual s a r e re-
sponsi bl e f or conducting' sear ch and recovery of US r enai ns.
b. iJhen i . n i t i a l l y rnovjng remains u n i t s be airare of booby tre. os. Remcve
weapons and ammunition from remains p r i o r t o evacuat i on.
c. Uni t s guard remains t o pr event improper handl i ng, dssocr at i on o r
pi l f er age.
d. Remove Goverrmect pr oper t y, except cl ot hi ng and i t ems o f i d e n t i f i -
cat i on from remai cs a t Divi ion cl ooect i ng poi nt .
e. 3el i vor enen? d;?adt o near es t ;ZE?T.! uni t .
f. Del i ver e l l i e d drad t o near es t u n i t of ds cedant l s country.
4.- 13ZF?iT?IC;LTTOF. a. I ' dent i f y remaips es soon a s ~ o s s i b l e .
b. ?orward ?hen r os s i bl e , of y o s i t i v e i d e n t i f i - t r i t t c n c o n l i r ~s . t ~i o n
cat i on ( vi z , by an acquaint;.,ncc) : d t h remains. 23 Form 565, Statement o f
R,?cognition, i s t i v e i l ~ b l e a t a l l c ol l e c t t ng snd evacuat i on poi nt s.
5. FERSCKXL XFFSCTS. a. 30 not rcmove ner sonal e f f e c t s from r e m~ i n s ,
except i t ems of val ue : ~hi ch may S z pi l f e r e z . Iiesy:onsible inc!ividual m.y
remove such i t ems p r i o r t o a r r i v a l a t c ol l e c t i ng acd evacuat i on ~ o i n t .
b. l.!aps, ot her paper s or i t ems of t ~ c t i c n l importacce, may be removed.
c. Record remove1 o f i t e c s from remains on per sonal e f f c c t s form.
d. If' p o s i t i v e i dc nt i Pi cat i on i s i m~ o s s l b l e , ner sonal e f f e c t s eccom-
Fany remeins t o mortuary f a c i l i t y located. a t 32.ki ng Air Base.
6. TiCIqCPXRY BLRIRI..S. a. ijury t empornrl al y onl y i f t a c t i c a l s i t ua t i on
does not permi t evacuct i on of tjcccased.
! : t q Annex s t r a t i o n ) Rcgi ( ~ r a v c l s 5 Appendix ( Fer sonnel and Admi r, l st r. et i on)
t o Artlcri c a l 3i v i s i o r Pi el i l SCI ( ~: or. t i nued)
1. I ~ d i v i d u e l s rr.n::i.nl.; t;c!nr;crilry b u r i a l s r q: or t d a t e , l oc e t i on, i c!; ?nt i t y
of ?, ?cease1 ( j f ?rir:m) ; ?xi c i r c 7ms t a nc e s t o t h i s hendcuar t : ?r s.
c. ?.ecovrrr r . - . m. r i nc tcr?!:oreril:r hurier! as soor. a.s possj . bl e.
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x

(
~
e
p
o
r
t
s
)

t
o

A
n
n
e
x

(
P
e
r
s
o
n
n
e
l

a
n
d

~
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
)

t
o

A
m
e
r
i
c
a
1

D
i
v
i
s
i
o
n

F
i
e
l
d
.
S
O
P

S
U
B
N
T
T
T
I
N
G

M
E
T
H
O
D

O
F

-
-
T
I
T
L
E

C
F

R
E
F
O
R
T

F
O
W
4
4
T

U
i
J
I
T

T
R
P
.
?
I
S
M
l
S
S
I
O
N

R
E
M
A
R
K
S

1
.

G
I

m
P
a
2
T
S
:


a
.

k
T
T
N
:

A
V
D
F
-
A
G

Y

1
)

D
a
i
l
y

S
t
r
e
n
g
t
h

U
S
A
E
V

F
o
r
m

A
l
l

U
n
i
t
s

C
o
u
r
i
e
r
,

r
a
d
i
o

D
a
i
l
y

-
a
s

o
f

2
4
0
0

h
o
u
r
s

R
e
p
o
r
t

1
7
5

&

1
7
6

R
T
T
,

T
e
l
e
p
h
o
n
e

N
L
T

1
2
C
0

h
o
u
r
s

'
i

?

P
'
(
2
)

S
p
o
t

C
a
s
u
a
l
t
y

D
D

F
o
r
m

1
7
3

A
l
l

U
n
i
t
s

M
o
s
t

E
x
p
e
d
i
t
i
o
u
s


'
h
e
n

u
n
i
t

s
u
f
f
e
r
s

m
a
s
s

c
a
s
-
t
u
a
l
t
i
e
s
,

r
e
p
o
r
t

u
i
l
l

c
o
n
t
a
i
n

.
"
1'.
o
n
l
y

e
s
s
e
n
t
i
a
l

e
l
e
m
e
n
t
s

o
f

i
n
-

f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
r

t
o

i
n
c
l
u
d
e

t
i
m
e

c
a
s
-
u
a
l
t
i
e
s

w
e
r
e

i
n
f
l
i
c
t
e
d

a
n
d

e
s
t
i
-

,
:
m
a
t
e

o
f

c
a
s
u
a
l
t
i
e
s

i
n

p
e
r
c
e
n
t
.

r
i'
F
o
l
l
o
w

u
p

d
e
t
a
i
l
e
d

r
e
p
o
r
t

w
i
l
l

i?
b
e

s
u
b
m
i
t
t
e
d

w
i
t
h
i
n

1
2

h
o
u
r
s
.

I
n
i
t
i
a
l

r
e
p
o
r
t

w
i
l
l

b
e

i
r
n
e
d
i
a
t
e
.

"

=
.


p

(
1
)

C
a
s
u
a
l
t
y

R
e
p
o
r
t

T
A
B

B
,

A
p
-
M
a
j
o
r

C
o
r
n
-
C
o
u
r
i
e
r
,

A
R

6
C
O
-
6
,

-
5
7
,

-
6
5
,

h
e
r
i
c
e
l

R
e
g


L'

L

p
e
n
d
i
x

t
o

m
a
n
d
e
r
s

T
e
l
e
p
h
o
n
e

6
0
0
-
6

'3

A
n
n
e
x

(
2
)


L
e
t
t
e
r
s

o
f

S
y
m
-
T
A
B

2
,

k
p
-
I
n
m
e
d
i
a
t
e

~
o
u
r
i
e
r

'
r
l
i
t
h
i
n

3

d
a
y
s

a
f
t
e
r

c
a
s
u
a
l
t
y

p
a
t
h
y
/
~
i
r
c
u
m
-
p
e
n
d
i
x

t
o

U
n
i
t

C
O

A
R
6
0
0
-
6

o
r

p
a
r
a

1
0
,

A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x

s
t
e
n
c
e
s

A
n
n
e
x

C

B
d
e
s

r
p
t

d
i
-

V
I
I
,

i
d
3

6
0
0
-
6
7
.

L
e
t
t
e
r

o
f

r
e
c
t

t
o

U
S
A
R
V

t
r
a
n
s
m
i
t
t
a
l

w
i
l
l

c
o
n
t
a
i
n

s
t
e
t
e
-
m
e
n
t

o
f

a
n
y

p
e
n
d
i
n
g

a
w
a
r
d
s
.

(
3
)


h
i
l
y

C
a
s
u
a
l
t
y

T
A
B

A
,

A
p
-
M
a
j
o
r

C
o
m
-

T
e
l
e
p
h
o
n
i
c
a
l
l
y

D
a
i
l
y

a
s

o
f

2
4
0
0

h
o
u
r
s

t
o

a
r
r
i
v
e

u
%
~
~
~
r
y

p
e
n
d
i
x

t
o

m
a
n
d
s

N
L
T

O
4
C
O

h
o
u
r
s
.

C
o
n
f
i
m
t
i
o
n

A
n
n
e
x

w
i
t
h
i
n

2
L

h
o
u
r
s
.

A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x

(
~
e
~
o
r
t
s
)


e
l

a
n
d

~
d
r
n
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
)

t
o

A
m
e
r
i
c
a
1

D
i
v
i
s
i
o
n

F
i
e
l
d

(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
t
o


S
O
P

V
E
P
Z
I
T
T
I
N
G

M
E
T
H
O
D

O
F

T
I
T
1
2

O
F

R
E
F
O
R
T

F
O
R
W
T

L
U

n1
~

T
R
,
U
l
S
:
C
t

S
S
I
O
N
~
p
-
7


R
E
M
A
R
K
S

(
4
)


R
&
R

R
e
p
o
r
t

L
e
t
t
e
r

F
f
a
j
o
r

C
o
m
d
s

C
o
u
r
i
e
r

M
o
n
t
h
l
y

-
N
L
T

5
t
h

o
f

e
a
c
h

m
o
n
t
h

C
.

A
T
T
I
I
:

A
V
D
F
-
A
V
N

A
i
r
c
r
a
f
t

A
c
c
i
d
e
n
t
,

A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x

I
,

M
a
j
o
r

C
o
l
c
d
s

C
o
u
r
i
e
r

A
s

r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d

A
i
r
c
r
a
f
t

C
r
a
s
h

1
1
,

1
1
1
,

T
F

F
a
c
t
s

M
e
s
s
a
g
e

O
R
E
O
N

R
e
g

N
O

3
8
5
-
1
0

d
.

A
T
T
N
:

A
V
D
F
-
G
A

A
c
c
i
d
e
n
t

R
e
p
o
r
t

D
A

F
o
r
m

2
8
5

A
l
l

U
n
i
t
s

C
o
u
r
i
e
r

W
o
r
k
i
n
g

d
a
y
s

a
f
t
e
r

t
h
e

a
c
c
i
d
e
n
t

3
8
5
-
4
0

A
R

3
5
5
-
6

e
.

A
V
D
F
-
C
A

A
c
c
i
d
e
n
t

E
x
p
o
s
u
r
e

A
m
e
r
i
c
a
1

D
i
v

A
l
l

U
n
i
t
s

C
o
u
r
i
e
r

W
i
t
h
i
n

w
o
r
k
i
n
g

d
a
y
s

a
f
t
e
r

t
h
e

R
e
p
o
r
t

F
o
r
m

7
1
3

e
n
d

o
f

t
h
e

r
e
p
o
r
t
i
n
g

p
e
r
i
o
d
.

A
R

3
8
5
-
6

2
.

P
R
O
V
O
S
T

M
A
R
S
H
A
L
:

a
.

A
T
T
N
:

A
V
D
F
-
P
M

(
1
)


S
e
r
i
o
u
s

I
n
c
i
d
-

A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x

B
d
e

P
W
s

a
n
d

I
f

U
n
c
l
a
s
s
i
f
i
e
d

I
n
i
t
i
a
l
-
e
x
p
e
d
i
t
e

e
n
t

R
e
p
o
r
t

D
i
v
i
s
i
o
n

R
e
g

a
l
l

o
t
h
e
r

T
e
l
e
p
h
o
n
e

I
n
t
e
r
i
u
m
-
e
a
c
h

3
0

d
a
y
s

a
f
t
e
r

a
c
c
i
d
e
n
t

3
3
5
-
6

C
c
a
u
m
n
d
e
r
s

O
t
h
e
r
s
-
C
o
u
r
i
e
r

F
i
n
a
l
-
u
p
o
n

c
o
m
p
l
e
t
i
o
n

o
f

f
i
n
a
l

a
c
t
i
o
n

,,Jd
6
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x

(
~
e
~
o
r
t
s
)
t
o

~
&
e
x
~
~
~
.
'
(
~
e
$
i
o
h
n
e
i
"
Z
A
:
;
i
d
"
~
&
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
l
o
'
n
)t
d

A
m
e
r
i
c
b

%
v
i
s
i
o
n

F
i
e
l
d

S
C
F

(
~
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)

S
L
'B
K
i
T
T
I
N
G

=
T
H
C
9

C
F

- T
I
T
L
E

O
F

P
S
P
O
R
T

F
O
W
A
T

L
%
I

T

T
P
J
N
S
F
I
S
S
I
O
N

R
S
Y
J
B
V
S

(
2
)


L
o
s
s
,

T
h
e
f
t

M
e
s
s
a
g
e

A
l
l

U
n
i
t
s

T
e
l
e
p
h
o
n
e

h
r
i
t
h
i
n

L
S

h
c
u
s

u
p
o
n

t
c
n
i
n
n
t
i
o
n

o
f

a
c
d

R
e
c
o
v
e
r
y

o
f

T
a
c
t
i
c
a
l

o
p
e
r
a
t
i
c
n
s
.

R
e
p
o
r
t

f
a
c
t
s

F
i
r
e
a
r
m
s

a
n
d

c
i
r
c
u
i
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
s

o
f

l
o
s
s
.

S
e
n
-
C
o
m
b
a
t

l
o
s
s
e
s

r
e
q
u
i
r
e

D
A

9
0
1
-
2

;
C
5
6
-
R

u
p
o
n

t
e
r
m
i
n
a
t
i
o
n

o
f

o
p
n
r
a
t
i
o
n
.

(
3
)


O
f
f
e
n
s
e

R
e
p
o
r
t

T
o
t
a
l

C
l
a
s
s

B
d
e

P
X
s

T
e
l
e
p
h
o
n
e

i
r
'
e
e
k
l
y

b
j
.

1
2
C
O

h
r
s

S
u
n
f
a
y
'

a
s

o
f

I
,

1
1
,

I
1
1

2
4
0
0

h
o
u
r
s

S
a
t
u
r
d
a
y

a
n
d

T
r
a
f
f
i
c

A
c
c
i
c
i
e
n
t
s

(
L
)


P
r
o
v
o
s
t

M
a
r
s
h
a
l

U
S
m
V

R
Z

R
d
e

P
M
s

C
o
u
r
i
e
r

C
u
t
o
f
f

2
5
t
h

o
f

L
e
s
t

K
o
n
t
h

c
f

q
u
a
r
t
e
r

A
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s

R
e
-
1
8
0
-
$
6

s
u
b
m
i
t

t
o

H
q

i
n
d
i
c
s
t
e
d

i
n

:
'
S
>
-
?
-
!

E
e
g

p
o
r
t

(
R
C
S
P
t
4
G
-

1
3
0
-
L
6
.

S
k
i
h
i
t

I
n
f
o

c
o
p
y

o
f

R
e
p
o
r
t

C
)

2
(
R
6
)

t
o

P
i
v
i
s
i
o
n

H
e
a
d
q
u
s
r
t
e
r
s
.

I

2

5
)

U
S
A
R
V

O
f
f
e
n
s
e

U
S
A
R
V

R
e
g

B
d
e

P
M
s

C
o
u
r
i
e
r

C
u
t
o
f
f

2
5
t
h

o
f

L
a
s
t

M
o
n
t
h

o
f

q
u
~
r
t
e
r

C
o
r
n
a
n
d

S
t
a
t
i
s
-
1
9
0
-
4
6

s
u
b
m
i
t

t
o

H
q

i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
d

i
n

l
i
S
P
-
F
L
!
J

9
e
g

t
i
c
s

(
R
C
S
A
V
H
P
H
-
2
)

1
9
3
4
6
.

S
u
b
i
n
i
t

i
n
f
o

c
o
~
j

t
o

C
i
v
i
s
i
o
n

H
e
e
d
q
u
a
r
t
e
r
s

(
6
)


D
a
i
l
y

P
W

S
t
a
t
u
s

M
e
s
s
a
g
e

B
d
e

P
l
4
s

o
p
e
r
-

T
e
l
e
p
h
o
n
e

D
a
i
l
y

b
y

1
6
0
0

h
r
s

r
e
p
o
r
t

b
y

c
a
t
e
g
o
r
y

R
e
p
o
r
t

e
t
i
n
g

C
o
l
l
e
c
t
-
G
a
i
n
s
,

L
o
s
s
e
s
,

o
n

h
a
n
d

o
n
d

e
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e

i
n
g

P
o
i
n
t
s

t
o
t
a
l
.

(
7
)


P
r
i
s
o
n
e
r

o
f

W
a
r

U
S
A
R
F

F
o
r
n

B
d
e
s

o
p
e
r
a
t
i
n
g

C
o
u
r
i
e
r

W
e
e
k
l
y

a
s

o
f

2
4
0
0

h
r
s

e
a
c
h
'
A
'
e
Z
n
e
s
3
a
y

R
o
s
t
e
r

3
3
9
-
R
,

U
S
A
R
V

C
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
r
i
g

d
i
r
e
c
t
l
y

t
o

U
S
L
i
l
V
,

A
T
T
K
:

F
!.:
R
e
g

1
9
0
-
2

P
o
i
n
t
s

D
I
S
T
?
.
I
B
U
T
I
O
N
:

S
p
e
c
i
a
l

.
"

c
:
.&
I

h
l
/
/
'
3


'>
&

,,..-C'".
.
.
-
-
.:.;..:.:
s
,

6
1

Appcntlix 3 ( ~ ~ n ~ l o y ma n t t o of Armec! Hcl i copt er s and Kules of Engagement;


Annex 6 (Al.rny ~"i vi ct l cn) t o America1 3l vi s i on Fi e l d 3%'
1. G e i ~ c r ~ l .a. >l.I!.ssion. EJLssions f o r ar med h e l l c opt e r s a r e c l a s s i f i e d
i n t o t h r e e ba s i c t ypes . Oper at i ons nay i ncl ude any combi mt i on of t he
t hr e e .
(1) Escor t
( 2) Reconnai ssance and 3 e c ~ r i t y
( 3 ) l i r e k p p o r t
b. Armament. A11 a i r c r a f t a r e armed w i t 3 one o r more of t h e f ol l owi ng
systeras:
( 4 ) M-16 (Comt~itititicn1*:-6 hn3 two 2ocke.t !'ads).
! 5 ) I.!-21 (CcnS5r.otion I4ini-gun and two 7 Rocket r ods ) .
(6)
Zn a.ldit5.cn each a i r c r o. f t i s armed wi t h two 7 . 6 h m 14-6P p n s (Y-23)
which e r e f i r e d fro13 t h e door s ?jy;, t h e crew ch5.ef and. doer gunner.
. Zs c c r L rr.issicr.s f c r ke1ico;;te.r formation:: and ground ve hl c l e convojrs.
(1;
Is'l.~ilc cr;ccrt!ng l j f t f or na t i c ns , t he m-issior; or" thc: arrned Aelicop-
t e r s 5 : +.c r uppr cr s 9:- r . eut r al i zc enemj groun:! forcc-s and f i r e s u f f i c i e n t l j ~
t o al l ow t:;e lift f;:rinaticr, t c puss over or around t he dacger a r e z .
r:. R~:ol.:l:ri: csaxzt., erl-1 s1;::;rl t y . The rl?ccr:r,ai csancc! ar d s e c ur i t y ml s s i on
m y :>t cc-.:.llr:e:! v! L!; c s - or t cr !:,a;? Sc uc:onl-!lishec! !,e i nddpendant f i r e teems.
Tke nrlcri!:!r::t ;;;.stc,z~:: n: -.vi?.,. t!~t.I-.c?ces:;aly means f or r econnai ssance by f i r ?
a32 a - i f f l c l c1.t f.:ri -cw.-.r L ? e f r e c t i v c l y cr3g3t70 j ~ ? tallerl;;. t arg-ot s.
Xpp'?nc!i x 3 ( E k ~ ~ ~ l o ~ mc n t of krrncd I!cli c c pt e r s and i ?ul es of !:rAgog:.cmcnt) t,o
Xn~.le>!E '(Army h v i c t ~ o r ~ ) t o America1 ' 3i vi si on Fi e l d 3?(2ont t nucd:
d. F i r e suy!:ort. t ypes of Si r e s a r e provicied by ~ ~ l ? ; i ? d Twcl hnl i copt r : r s;
a r e a f i r e and l i . xi ter! poi nt Tire. ; s s i t i v e rodicl cormi~~n: c ~ t i o nbe t ~~( : c r ?
ground t r oc ps and a i r c r a f t crews i s mandatory p r i o r t o i ni t , i a t i ng nrned
h e l i copt or sup?ort . Ground t r oops nmrk t h e i r positions t o i nform t he r i -
l o t s of t h e armed h e l i c o p t e r s t h e i r 1. ocat i onc. Ground. commanders i.nforrr,
a l l per s onnel of t ho f a c t t h a t ex;jenc3c?d b r a s s my f a l l i n t o f r i e n d l y f or c e s
when overhead f i r s i s del ?: vered.
e. Rul es of engagement.
( 1) Cn e s c o r t mSssi ons wi t h a n a i r mobi l e f c r nnt j on, armed he l i c opt e r s
s uppr es s and pre:.are LZ, u n t i l f i r s t t r oop l andi ng and t hen c nl y when ap-
proved Sy t h e ground commander. Only when i n f r e e f i r e zones a r e t a r g e t s
o f opportunity engaged.
(2)
Armed hel . i copt or s ar e not pe r ni t t e d t o i n t e r f e r e wi t h e r t i l l e r y o r
t a c t i c a l a i r s t r i k e s but or e per nTt t ed t o e xpl oi t t a r g e t s of oppor t uni t y
f or ced frcm t i ~ c ?ar i r , her y of thc! a r e a of a i r s t r i k e s o r a r t 5 l l ~ r : r f i r e s .
3. Targets w i l l Se engaced onl y when: a. The crew has d i r e c t rad! o cont act
w i t b e s.:;.,norter? u ~ i ie;;lg:it:t&d c ont r ol agency o r . t.
b.
The crsw car, v i ~ ~ n l l ; . S.?cantif;r t?ie t a r g e t o r t o r g e t marker:;.
-
c. ~nr i e ndl yan;? c f i r i l i a r , y c s i t i o n s zr;?? o s i t i v e l y ? i!cnt! fie!. I.l;!ntS -
by r ~ d i ~ cod.- an.!
s i g n a l s a s lis t e 3 i n cur r cn t ~.sI/;(' I.
f i c a t i c n w i l l be cs.la';li.-!:c.+ cont nct an? rrnrsl reccgn: t i or.
:3)
The f 5 r e i s of slick: i i nt ens l t y t c war r ant c ount . e r a c t ~on.
e. Tar get s o r nyycrt uni t ; , , acqi.~i:.e? i n o.n une x? e c t 4 e r e a , tire c l ~a r l - . !
tj7tkle ground connar,dt-:r respcnsf. ?\ l c f or i?:at a r c s .
'?or t h i s r e a c r n :-;el '-
c o ~ t e rcrews shoul d Ire thorougkii;; !:,~*ic!fe,I! on t he z.!l sl >n-, j'u'l or n f :T' e~-!l:-
f c r c a s in z r e c s ov.?r wklj ch t hcy f?&;:.
Apnrcyr:nte fre~1~ler::icjs 3"~' c a l l
31GY, S
wi l l be c a r r i e d c:! the p i l o t s pelsson secur ed i n such s nancer i . ? ~a ti t - car.r.o!.
be mi spl aced.
f. T ~ r g + ? t s of oppc r t uni t y acq::lre,I Sn n s pc c i f i c d s t r i k c zone ( ?r e?
F i r e Area) a r c cl enre,! by TZE.
!' erni ssl on t o Fi re has l ~ c r n r r c . a r r a n~c . 1 :lurir.g rrlisrlol; hr i eflr:(: For
g .
s pe c i . f l c t roor, s u r , ~ ~ r - t I?! :;ci 0::s.
P
Appendix 3 (Err.ploy~.ent of Armed Hel i copt er s and Rul es of Engagenent) t o
- Annex E viat ti on) t o h e r i c c l l Di vi s' on Fi e l d SOP (Cont i nued)
f
4.
Door gunners f i r e onl y on corI:-nand of. t he a i r c r a f t commander.
5.
Act i on upon n o t i f i c a t i o n of i ~ c i d e n t s i nvol vi ng f i r i n g from Army he l i -
copt er s.
a. Upon n o t i f i c a t i o n of an i nc i de nt i n which f r i e ndl y t r oops o r ot he r
f r i e ndl y per sons have been f i r e d on from hel i copt er s , t h e c o mn d e r of t h e
u n i t t o which t h e h e l i c o p t e r s cre;ls a r e assi gned vi l l cause an immediate
i nve s t i ga t i on o f t h e i nc i de nt UI' 15-6.
b. An i nt e r i m r e p o r t e i t h e r mi t t e n o r ve r ba l w i l l be submi t t ed t o
Commnding General , America1 Di vi si on, ATTN: G-3, wi t hi n t went y f our (24)
hour s f ol l owi ng n o t i f i c a t i o n c f t h e i nci dent .
c. Wi t hi n t went y f i v e (25) deys f ol l owi ng t h e i nc i de nt , a copy of t h e
completed r epor t o f i nve s t i ga t i on k i l l be f or l ar ded t o Cornlanding General ,
America1 Di vi si on, hTTli: G-3.
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x

4

(
A
v
i
a
t
i
o
n

~
e
~
o
r
t
z
j

t
o

A
m
e
x

E

(
A
m
y

A
v
i
a
t
i
o
n
)

t
o

A
n
s
r
i
c
a
l

D
i
v
i
s
i
o
n

F
i
e
l
d

S
O
P

T
h
o

A
r
q

A
v
l
a
t
i
o
n

E
l
e
m
e
n
t

(
A
A
E
)

r
e
c
e
i
v
e
s

p
e
r
i
o
d
i
c

r
e
p
o
r
t
8

f
'
r
o
m

s
u
b
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
e

a
v
i
a
t
i
o
n

u
n
i
t
s
,

a
s
s
m
b
l
e
s

A
v
i
a
t
i
o
n

I
n
f
o
r
z
t
i
o
n

f
o
r

t
h
e

C
o
r
n
a
n
d
i
n
g

G
e
n
e
r
a
l

a
n
d

h
i
e

s
t
a
f
f
,

a
n
d

s
u
b
n
i
t
s

r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d

p
e
r
i
o
d
i
c

r
e
p
o
r
t
s

t
o

H
e
a
d
q
u
r
t
o
r
s
.

T
B
:


A

-
I
n
c
o
G
i
n
g

R
t
p
o
r
t
s
-
4

B

-
O
u
t
.
g
o
l
n
g

R
a
p
o
r
t
a
0

F

D
I
S
T
R
I
B
U
T
I
O
N
:

S
p
e
c
i
a
l

'
i
;
B

(
I
n
c
o
d
n
g

R
e
p
o
r
t
s

t
o

A
A
E
)

t
o

A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x

4

e
r
i
c
a
l

D
i
v
i
s
i
o
n

F
i
e
l
d

S
G
P

I
T
X
<


t:G

T
I
T
L
E
.


~
~
/
F
O
P
M

C
R
I
C
I
N
A
T
O
R

D
L
2
3

R
E
F
E
R
E
N
C
E

P
U
R
P
O
S
E

R
E
?
.!
!
.K
S

1
.


A
/
C

S
t
a
t
u
e

R
e
p
o
r
t

e
l

D
v

A
l
l

I
n
f

E
d
c
s

1
2
0
0

I
n
c
l

S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s

f
o
r

F
o
r
a

8
1
8
A

D
l
v

h
t
y
,

1
4
t
h

<
a
l
l
y

A
A
E
'

s

r
e
c
o
r
d
s

&

1
2
3
d

A
n
B
n
s


2
.


X
/
C

A
s
s
i
g
n
e
d

&

A
m
e
r
i
c
a
1

M
v

A
l
l

I
n
f

R
d
e
s

0
7
0
0

I
n
c
l

I
n
f
o
m
a
t
i
o
n

f
o
r

F
l
y
a
b
l
e

R
z
~
o
r
t

F
o
r
m

7
5
2

D
i
v
A
r
t
y
,

1
L
t
h

d
a
i
l
y

C
o
m
n
d
i
n
g

G
e
n
-

&

1
2
3
d

A
v
n

F
n
s

e
r
a
l

&

S
t
a
f
f

3
.


I
z
f
o
r
r
?
t
i
c
n

o
n

U
S
m
V

F
o
r
m

A
l
l

I
n
f

I
M
o
s

A
S
A
P

I
n
c
l

I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n

f
o
r

?
o
~
-
;
.
.
:
f

A
~
s

1
9
3
-
3

D
i
v

A
r
t
y
,

1
L
.
:
h

C
1

S
f
s
t
y

O
f
f
i
c
e
r

&

1
2
3
3
.

A
v
n

B
n
s

4

4
.

J
o
i
n
t

S
e
m
i
c
o
s

k
c
r
i
c
a
l

D
l
v

A
l
l

I
n
f

m
e
3

A
S
A
P

I
n
c
l

I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n

f
o
r

C
.
7

X
z
t
i

A
/
'C

F
i
r
e
,

7
3
2
'

D
i
v

A
r
t
y
,

1
4
t
h

C
2

A
i
r

r
<

S
n
c
t
d
s
n
t

&

P
a
6
9

&

1
2
3
5
,
h
E
n
s

'
.
c
;
o
r
t

5
.

L
'
n
s
?
t
i
s
f
a
c
t
o
r
y

A
l
l

I
n
f

B
d
e
s

A
s

I
n
c
l

%
t
h
e
+

D
i
s
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n

n

?
X
s
s
i
o
n

F
i
e
p
a
r
t

D
i
v

A
r
t
y
,

1
4
t
h

r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d

o
f

t
h
i
s

r
e
p
o
r
t

w
i
l
l

&
.

l
2
3
d

A
m
B
n
s

b
e

d
o
t
e
r
m
i
c
e
d

b
y

D
i
v

N

A
v
n

C
f
f
i
c
s
r
.

6
.


l
i
c
u
s
x
i
l

I
n
c
i
d
e
n
t
8

v
e
r
~
.
-
.
l
/

A
l
l

I
n
f

B
d
e
s

I
n
t
e
r
i
m

r
e
p
o
r
t

F
v
t
h
e
r

M
s
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n

I
n
r
o
l
v
i
n
g

A
/
C

L
e
t
t
e
r

M
v

A
r
t
y
,

1
4
t
h

m
i
t
t
e
n

o
r

v
e
r
b
a
l

o
f

t
h
i
s

r
e
p
o
r
t

w
i
l
l

&

1
2
3
d

A
m
B
n
s

u
i
t
h
i
n

2
4

b
z
n
;

f
l
n
a
l

b
e

d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
e
d

b
y

D
i
v

w
i
t
h
i
n

2
5

d
e
.
y
e

A
v
n

O
f
r
i
c
e
r
.

7
.


C
o
n
s
o
U
&
t
e
d

1
2
3
d

A
v
n

B
n

W
O
O

I
n
c
l

S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s

f
o
r

t
i
i
s
s
i
c
n

R
-
d
y

d
a
i
l
y

I
1
1

W

C
O
C

H
s
l
o

R
e
p
o
r
t

P
t
I
I

Inclosure:. 6 (Conr:ol%datedMi:::,j.on nendy Helo Report) t o Tab A ( ~ncoxni n~


Reports to MJ3) t,o -4ppendlx 1, ( ~ d a t i o n1leports) t o Annm
E (Arny viation) t o Amorical Division Fi el d SOP
.!Cora S ~ L I nxJ!nc!sSSj-O?.I- nwJv I ~ J ~ O RTPOE
FFLOW: N,ZERICAL DIVISIOR TOC
TO: I11 IAF COC (ATTN: G 3 ~ i r )
C O N F I D E N T I A L at e / ~ i n eCrp
TYPE A/C ACFT AS S I C S MSN READY
I ns t r uct i ons :
1. Tot al $ Hi ssi on rasdy 2. Tot al Mission
ready i f crew were
avai l abl e.
Col G: GM i ncl udcz A/c on s pc c j r l one time i nspect i on, awai t i ng t ur n i n,
awai t i ng accspt nnce i nspect i on, and smiting t o s t f l i ght .
Col J: CODE: Cro;r E/A--NC XI.1-21 Am lnop--In Avionics doficiency--AV
M-16 Am Inop--MS 1.1-5 Ar m inop--In Ilot Amcd--NA
Col K & L:
Show t he proj2ct::G xltuuber of n.;n rdy a/ c which t h e com~andcr
f e e l s \dl1be avni l cbl e a t 0703 hrs t he day following this r pt .
T
X
3

3

(
C
u
t
g
o
f
n
g

R
s
p
o
r
t
s

&
o
n


A
A
E
)

t
o

A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x

(
A
v
i
a
t
i
o
n

~
e
~
o
r
t
s
)

(
A
r
m
y

A
v
i
a
t
i
o
n
)

t
o

A
m
e
r
i
c
a
1

D
i
v
i
s
i
o
n

F
i
e
l
d

t
o

A
n
n
e
x


S
O
P

I
T
E
N

L
O

T
I
T
L
E

l
Y
i
i
E
/
F
O
R
M

O
R
I
G
I
N
A
T
O
R

3
U
E

E
C
I
I
'
I
E
M
T


C
S
p
,
~
i
'
~
~
i
r
~

R
E
h
L
U
i
K
S

3
.


A
/
C

A
s
s
i
g
n
e
d

a
d

A
m
e
r
i
c
o
l
m
v

A
A
E

0
4
0
0

C
C
,

I
L
D
C
's

I
n
c
l

1

9


F
k
a
b
l
e

R
e
p
o
r
t

F
o
r
m

7
5
2

D
a
i
l
y

C
/
S
,

G
3

.$r
'"
'
2
.


;
c
i
:
f

S
e
r
v
i
c
e
s

A
n
t
i

k
~
e
r
i
c
a
lM
v

A
l
l

I
n
f

E
d
e
s

A
S
P
I
P

G
2

A
i
r

I
n
c
l

A
/
C

F
i
r
e
,

I
n
c
i
d
e
n
t

F
o
r
n

7
3
2

D
i
v

A
r
t
y
,

1
L
t
h

a
n
d

k
g
e

R
e
p
o
r
t

&

1
2
3
d

A
v
n

B
n
s

3
.


I
n
f
o
n
a
t
i
o
n

o
n

U
S
P
R
V

1
9
3
-
R

A
l
l

I
n
f

B
a
e
s

A
S
k
D

D
i
v

C
1

S
a
f
e
t
y

I
n
c
l

',
2
3
;
x
c
d

A
/
C

M
v

A
r
t
y
,

1
L
t
h

O
f
f
i
c
e
r

&

1
2
3
d

A
m
B
n
s

O
U
T
G
O
I
N
G

R
E
P
O
R
T
S

T
O

O
T
H
E
R

H
E
A
D
Q
U
A
R
T
E
R
S

IT:':
:
:
3

T
I
T
L
Z

T
Y
?
E
/
F
C
R
M

O
R
I
G
I
N
A
T
C
R

D
U
E

R
E
C
I
P
I
E
N
T

R
E
F
E
R
E
N
C
E

R
E
Y
2
.R
K

>
P

3

4
.
$

C
o
n
s
c
l
i
d
a
t
e
d

F
d
s
s
i
o
n
a

A
A
E

P
t

1
-
1
8
0
0

D
a
i
l
y

1
1
1

M
A
F

T
O
C

I
n
c
l

E
x
t
r
a
c
t
e
d

f
r
o
m

-
r
:

:
;
-
?
.
E
s
!
'
,
:
.

i
!
o
l
o

R
e
p
o
r
t

P
t
I
I
-
0
7
3
0

D
a
i
l
y

(
A
l
l
%
:
G
3
,

~
i
r
)

L
n
e
r
i
c
a
l

P
c
n
.

7
5
2

3 .
$

s
.
,
.


e
r
:
2
.

A
/
C

O
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
a
l

R
p
t

A
A
E

2
4
0
0

D
a
i
l
y

1
2
3
d

A
v
n

B
n

S
3

I
n
c
l


E
x
t
r
a
c
t
e
d

f
r
o
n

$ v
1

A
z
e
r
i
c
a
l

F
o
r
m

7
5
2

*;
4
5

"
2

2
*

3
.


O
p
r
e
p

(
w
e
e
k
l
y
)

U
S
A
R
V

2
6
5

A
l
l

I
n
f

B
d
e
s

0
1
0
0

e
a

T
h
u
r
s

C
C
,

U
S
A
R
V

I
n
c
l

1
-
5

D
i
v

A
r
t
y

&

U
S
W

R
e
g

9
5
-
1

1
2
3

A
v
n

E
n

M
s
g

?
8
5
9
5

4
.


O
p
r
e
p

U
S
A
R
V

2
6
5
-
3

A
l
l

I
n
f

B
d
e
s

0
0
3
0

d
a
i
l
y

C
G
,

U
S
A
R
V

I
n
c
l

(
k
i
l
y
)

(
b
a
c
k
)

M
v

A
r
t
y

&

U
S
A
R
V

R
e
g

9
5
-
1

1
2
3

A
v
n

E
n

M
s
g

3
8
5
9
5

ANNEX I
ICAL DIVISION
CHU LAI, RW
15 Apr i l 1968
ANNEX I ( I nf or r at i on) t o h e r i c a l Division Fi el d SOP
1. OBJECTIVES. The obj ect i ves of t he Information Program a r e , wi t hi n
t he limits of d l i t a r y s ecur i t y and good t a s t e , t o r el eas e complete,
accur at e and t i mel y i nformat i on concerning t he accomplishnents of i ndi -
vi dual s and uni t s wi t hi n t he Division, end t o develop publ i c awareness
and understanding of t he aims, missions, obj ect i ves, and professi onal i sm
of t he Division. Thi s i ncl udes, but i s not necessar i l y l i n i t e d t o:
a. -Prepari ng and di ssemi nat i ng news r el eas es t o appr opr i at e news media.
b. Prepari ng and d i s s d n a t i n g hornetown news r el eas es t o i ns ur e t ha t
I ndi vi dual s receive r ecogni t i on i n t h e i r honetonns.
c. Assi st i ng accr edi t ed correspondents i n securi ng f a c t s f or pr epar at i on
of news s t or i es . Assi st ance t o i ncl ude t r anspor t at i on, bi l l e t i ng, and pro-
vi di ng es cor t s when it does not i nt e r f e r e wi t h t a c t i c a l operat i ons.
d. Prevent i ng pr e mt ur e di scl osur e of unannounced oper at i ons through
embargo procedures determined by ElACV-10.
e. Cont r ol l i ng t he movement of news correspondents t o oper at i ons a s
pr escr i bed by UCV-10.
2. POLICY. a. The I nf or i mt i on Frogram i s a command r es pons i bi l i t y.
b. The I nf or mt i on Of f i cer , Militziqi Aosistnnce Cornand, Vietnam i n
t h e s ol e r el eas i cg aut hor i t y f or a l l ncus s t o r i s s cr i gi nat ed by US Mi l i t ar y
Personnel i n Vietcm.
c. The I n f o mt i c n Of f i cer , i s t he r el easi ng aut hor i t y f or a l l news
s t o r i e s or i gi nat ed wi t hi n t he Division, unl ess otherwise di r ect ed, and
dl1coor di r at e a l l i nat er i al f or cl ear snce ~ n d r el eas e wi t h MAW-10. News
correspondent st eakr goed mat er i al s w i l l r e r a i n i n US/F~?@LFcont r ol and
forwarded t o MACV-I0 f or f ur t her di s t r i but i on t o t he appr opr i at e agency.
d. The I nf or mt i on Program of t he Division w i l l be di r ect ed t o focus
a t t e nt i on on t ho professi onal i sm of act i ons and occomplishrnents of i ndi vi -
dual s and units and t h e i r r ol e s i n t he Division r n i s ion.
e. Enbargoed news mt . e r i a l s w i l l be cont r ol l ed by processj ng envelopes,
packet s and f i l m thrcugh US/FT~~;.L~F hands t o PID, UCV-10, AFO 96222.
3. PROCEDLmS. Major mbcr di . mt e ~o: : ~. ~ndo e. Ki l l mei nt ei n Information
Sect i ons f or col l ect i on and pr epar at i on of news i t ems f or cl csr ance and
di ssemi nat i on thrcug!i t he Divisioil ' Infomt l on Office. News val ue, time-
l i ne s s , find pr cpr i et y u i l l be det crrai ned by t h e Division I nf or mt i on Of f i cer ;
AT!NEX I ( ~nf or mat i on) t o h e r i m 1 Division Fi el d SOP (continued)
however, every e f f o r t w i l l be nnde, includiny: r e\ i r i t i ng i f nocenmry, t o
pl ace each st or y wi t h news media most l i ke l y t o use it.
b. Awards f or Valor below t he Si l var St cr , Awards f or Merit below t he
Legion of Mcrit, promotions t o of f i c e r grades below Colonel and enl i s t ed
grades below E8, assignments and ret nssi gnpmt s wi l l n o m l l y 'be r el eased
only t o mi l i t ar y j our nal s and honetowns. DA Form 1526 (~ometown. News Re-
l eas e) wi l l be mbnl t t e d wi t h a l l s t or i e s of t h i s nat ure.
c. I n i t i a l announcornants of Code Hamsd oper at i ons w i l l be md e by
Mi l i t ar y Assi st ance Comnd, Vietmmr on recormandation of t he Comaanding
Genernl, America1 Division. Mews s t or i e s , i ncl udi ng f eat ur e typo mat er i al
and hosetown r el eas es which a r e di r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o s peci f i c oper at i ons
may not be made pr i or t o IUCV announcement.
d. Comnznders and s t af f of f i c e r s wi l l insure cooperation with ac-
oxedited news media r epr esent at i ves and vill provide Information consis-
t e n t wi t h t he mi l i t a r y s i t ua t i c n and secur i t y. Contact with nclss media
r epr cs?nt at i vcs w i l l be conduct,od i n a di r e c t pos i t i ve mmer wi t h naxinum
cander.
e. The Di vi si on Information e f f or t i s concentrated i n t o two major
ar eas of rosponsibf l i t y :
( 1)
Publ i c I nf or nat i on (Di vi si on Rag 360-1).
(2)
Command I nf or mt i on oion Reg 360-41 ) . ( ~ i v i
5. AD:fINISTRATIOtJ MID LOGISTICS. a. Required Comand I n f o mt i o n sup-
por t i ng n3torials, as avai l abl e, w i l l be suppliad by t he I n f o mt i o n Offi ce,
Bmerical Division.
b.
DA Form 1526 (Homcstown tiaws R, elease) wi l l be request ad through nor-
mal publ i cat i on channels.
KOSTER
DISTRIBUTION: MG
Speci al
OFFICIAL:
ANNEX J
WJRICAL DIVISION
CHU MI, RVN
15 April 1368
ANNEX J (Civic ~ct i cj n)t o h e r i a l Iilvision Field SOP
a. R.1 41-5 J oi nt P!nul?,l f or Ci vi l Affai rs
b. FM 41-10 Civil Af f si r s Operations
c. Combined Cmpnlgn Plan 1967
d. USI?RV Reg 515 Seri es
e. I11 PILAF Orders, 5080 Serios
f. MACV D i r 37-13, US/FEFW? Piilitary Civic Action and PSYWAR Fund
g.
Anerical Division Rag 27-21, Solatiurn (condolence) Payments
h. I C C I TOSO.2E3, Designation of C i v i l Affai rs Coordinators.
2. RESPOlISIBILITIES. a, The ACofS, C5 plans, coordinates, and provides
s b f f auparvision f or ci vi c action.
b. Brigade comnanders and coimanders indicated i n paragraph 2x3, below,
plan, coordinate and supervise ci vi c act i on i n t hei r ci vi c act i on areas of
responsi bi l i t y.
c. Brigade ci vi c ect i on areas of responsi bi l i t y coincide rdt h TAORf s,
with t he exception of speci f i c orecs i ndi cat ed i n paragraph 2d, belov.
d. Comandors of Mvi si on ccmb~tsupport and combat servi ce support
units, and cozwnders of USlIC and U.91 uni t s located i n t he Chu Lai base
plan, coordinate and supenrise ci vi c act i on i n t he ci vi c act i on areas of
r esponsi bi l i t y assigned t o then bj the sub-zone coordinator, southern sect or
I Corps Tact i cal Zone.
e. 29th C i v i l Affai rs Coinpony, I11 KG, p r ~ r i d e sc i v i l a f f a i r s platoons
t o Divisional area support and f' unctloml t e a s as required f o r speci f i c
surveys and evaluations (egri cul t ure, education, publ i c safet y, l egal , refu-
gee)
f . CORDS ( c i v i l Operations and ~ e v o l u t i o n a eDevelopment support)
Provi nci al Add sory Teams provide l i mi t ed food comodi t i es and building
suppl i es f or refugee r e l i e f and ci vi c act i on projects.
g.
111 MAF provides l l mi t ed supplies f or ci vi c act i on proj ect s and
a c t s a s purchasing agent f or US/F'M.IAF ci vi c act i on funds.
3. PROCEDURES. a. Comnnders w i l l , consi st ent with t he accomplishment
of t hei r mission, conduci; a ci vi c act i on program t o strengthen t he CVN
and pronote tho securi t y and econoriy of the c i v i l population i n t he TAOR.
ANNEX J (Ci vi c hction) t o Anerical Divlsion Fi el d SOP (Continued)
b. During conbat operations ci vi c act i on functions include:
( 1)
Emergency medical assi st ance t o ~ncombat ant s.
(2)
Emergency care and evacuation of refugees.
( 3) Eslergency r epai r t o d mg e d st r uct ur es and roads.
(4) Extraction of captured food comodi t i es and equipment of great
value t o c i v i l economy.
c. The ACofS, G5, w i l l coordinate refugee operations and ci vi c act i on
programs with CORDS Province Advisor Toams.
d. Civic act i on program and pr oj ect s i n secure or eemi-secure areas
include:
(1)
Construction and r epai r of publ i c building0 and f a c i l i t i e s (school-
houses, dlspensaries, mrket places, water wells, &&inage systems, and roads).
(2)
I ni t i a t i on of agr i cul t ur al pr oj ect s (vegetcble gardons, pi g farms,
r epai r of r i c e paddie di kes, and r ecl ai ml i on of fallow land).
(3)
I ni t i at i on of soci al and educational . r.ograns (English cl asses,
publ i c hetilth ai de t rai ni ng, a t hl e t i c teams ans l e a y e s , and development
of cottage i ndust ry).
4 MZDCJW ( ~ e d i c a lCivic Action Progr'm) a c t i vi t i e s t o provide out-
pat i ent nedi cal service t o t he c l v i l population a t a hanlet or vi l l age lo-
cation.
e. Pr opans and pr oj ect s w i l l be i ni t i a t e d a t t he request of t he c i v l l
population and approved by el ect ed or appointed GVPJ govorncent of f i c i a l s a t
hamlet, vi l l age, d i s t r i c t and province l evel s (See Tab D, Appendix 1, Civic
Action Reports).
(1)
US Forcos supply 111 1Nr cr CORDS provided ci vi c act i on mst eri al s
and t he Viotnanese people supply t he labor (see Tab D, Appendix 1, Civic
Action ~ e p o r t s ) .
(2)
Civic act i on pr oj ect s will not bo conducted i n hanlets where GVN
Revolutiomry Developsent Teas a r e etutioned.
(3) Credit f or progrm or proj ect w i l l be given t o appropri at e GVN
of f i ci al s a t i ni t i at i oi l or dodim' iion cerenonios.
f. Close coordinntion vill 'oo naintnincd with t h e Di s t r i ct US llrry
Advisor Te a - t o czsure pr i or i vy of ef f or t , coordination of program, and
equitably dlst r i but sd supplies.
AlQEX J( ci vi c ~ c t i o n ) t o America1 Division Fi el d SIP(continued)
4. SUPPLIES. a. Hl t ary suppUes all be used only as an emergency mea-
sure when CORDS r e l i e f suppl i es are unsveilsble.
b. CORDSProvince Advisory Teams provide emergency food comodi t i es
and building mat eri al s (cement and roofing tin).
c. I11MAF provides food, school supplies, self-help ki t s , clothing,
and ci vi c act i on suppl i es avai l abl e From Int ernat i onnl Voluntesr Agencies.
d. C I V I C act i on suppl i es and mat eri al s Fron CORDS and I11MAFw i l l be
requested through t he ACofS, G5; (See Tab E, Appendix 1, Civic Action
~ e p o r t s ) .
8. Supplies and mat er i al s w i l l be provided t o t he c i v i l populace
through GVl? of f i c i a l s a t di s t r i c t , vi l l age, and hamlet l evel .
f. Captured food suypl i es w i l l be ext ract ed fiom operat i onal areas when
ever possi bl e anddol i vered 'GO theappropriato GVI? d i s t r i c t chiof. Ifex-
t r act i on of captured food supplios i n excess of 4000 pounds i s beyond t he '
operat i onal capabi l i t y of thecapturing unit,t he ACO~S, G3,w i l l advise t he
c omnde r on ext ract i on or destruc-Lion procedure.
g. MEDCLPsuppl i es a r e providsd through mi l i t ar y modical supply channels.
h. Civic act i on suppl i es m y bepurchased using US/PW Civic Action
Fund i n accordance with reference I f , above. Upon request , 25th CA Co,
111MAF, w i l l a c t as pu-cbzsicg ngont, f or both i n andout of co-mtry i t e m.
i. Sol et i ua (co~.dolenco) popent s t o ci vi l i ans i nj ured by nonccnbst
dcci dent s or ni sdi rect ad f i r e ~3.11 be mde i n accordance with reference I g,
.above.
5. ADXINISTRATIO?!. a. N o ml chnnnols a r e used f or report i ng.
b.
Reports ( ~ ~ ~ e n d i x 1, Civic Action ~ e ~ o r t s ) .
Appendices: KOSIm?
1 - Civic Action Reports MG
2 - Psychological Cperstions
Appendix 2 (Psychol ogi cal Operations) t o Annex J ( c i vi c Action) t o
, Americal Di vi si on Fi el d SIP
a. FM 33-1 Psychologicnl oper at i ons US Army Doctrine
b. FM 33-5 Psychol ogi cal Operations Techniques and Procedures
c. I11 MAF Force Order 3121.3 SC? f or County Fai r Operations
d. IJI MAF Force Order 3410.1A SOP f or Psychological Operations
e. 111 MAF Force Order 3410.2 Ehploy~lent of t he 244th PSYO? Co.
f . I11 MAF Force Grder 3410.3 "Chieu Hoi" Psychologicnl Operations
Campaign
2. RESFGNSIBILITIES. a. ACofS, G5 p r o ~ i d e s over al l s t a f f supervi si on t o
PSYOIJ Section.
b. The P S XP Of f i cer pl ans, coordi nat es, and provides s t a f f supervi si on
f o r psychological operat i ons.
c. Brigade ccrp~::andersand separ at e bat t al i on comanders pl an and imple-
ment psychol ogi cal oper at i on pro,grems i n t h e i r ar ea of operat i on.
d. 7 t h PSYOF Bn, provi des t a c t i c a l psychological oper at i ons support t o
Americal Div i n t he form of quick r eact i on l e a f l e t s , post er s, newspapers,
loudspoakors, and audi o vi s ua l t earns.
e. CGRDS Province Advisory T e a s provide l i mi t ed l e a f l e t , post er , ma-
gazi ne, and nexspeper support. Tho t o ms a l s o provide Cul t ur al Dr ma t e r ns
on r equest .
f. 9 t h Air Comando Squadron provi des C-47 a i r c r a f t f o r l a r ge l e a f l e t
dr ops and ni ght broadcast s, and 0-20 a i r c r a f t t o broadcast messages and .
dr op l e a f l e t s on smal l er t ar get s .
3. PROCEDUPSS. a. PSYOP expl oi t at i on i s most ef f ect i ve when a s i t uat i on
i s s t i l l fresh i n t he minds of t ho t a r ge t cudience.
Rapid response mat er i al
I s avai l abl e on c a l l from 7 t h FSYOP Bn or can be developed and del i ver ed
v i t h i n 24 hours. N o m l reproduct i on time f o r l e a f l e t s and post er s i s f i ve
t o seven days. See TAB A (procedures f or r equest i ng psychol ogi cal rcat eri al
and a i r c r a f t support.
b. Expl oi t at i on. Following a r e s i t ua t i ons which can be expl oi t ed by
t h o use of I'SYOP:
( 1)
Explnin t he presence of hncr i cal and f r i endl y powers and show that
t h e VC cannot match t he CVIJ, US and Al l i ed conmitments.
(2)
Exp3.oit t he CHIEU HGI program t o encourege VC r n l l i e r s a t every
opport unl t y.
Appendix 2 (Psychologicnl operat i ons) t o Ariaex J (Ci vi c Action) t o ,
Ameri cal Division Fi el d SOP ( ~ o c i i ~ u e d )
(3)
Expl oi t vi c. t or i ss by both ARV1.I 8.nd f r i endl y f or ces t:, r a l nt a i n a
winnicg s p i r i t wt t hi n t ho lJ(Vii and f r i endl y populace.
(4)
Take advantage" of VC/ITVA vul ner abi l i t i es , such as nounting casual-
t i e s , al i enat i on of population due t o i ncreased t er r or i sm, t axat i on, impress-
ment, low l i vi ng condi t i ons, low morale, and i ncr easi ng defect i on.
( 5 )
Expl oi t information from VC/MVA r a hl i e r s o r POW.
c. Mobile PSYOP (HB) Teams. PSYOP HB ( ~oudspeaker ) teams a r e avail-
a bl e f'rom t he 7t h PSYOP Bn. Ca ~a b i l i t i e n i ncl ude the following:
( 1) Support of c i v i l a f f a i r s and t a c t i c a l operet i ons wi t h appr opr i at e
PSYOP media.
(2)
Assi st i ng i n t he preparat i on of a campaign, based on t he National
PSYOP pl an and t he Net i onal CIIIEU HOI pl an, which i ncl udes themes, t a r ge t
groups, vul n6r abi l l t i e s , and ph~. ses of expl oi t at i on. Fhch campaign i s aimed
at s peci f i c obj ect i ves and s ~ p p o r t s t he t a c t i c a l concept of t he cormandor.
(3)
Pr epar at i on of loudspezker appeal s, and ot her propaganda i n coor-
di nat i on wi t h US and GVIJ agencies. A l l media are ut i l i z e d t o t he ma xi m.
( 4
Coordination wi t h US, ARW, and GVN i nf or l i l ~t i on egenci es concern-
i ng l oc a l implenenting procedures. Conto.ct ~ 5 t h r g e ~ c i o snot under cont r ol
of Di vi si on i s mcde by coordfr?sting u i t h M. ~j . si on PSL'OP Of f i cer .
d. Catalogs f r o n t he 7 t h PSYOP Bn, and JUSPAO, r e f l e c t i ng the t apes,
l e a f l e t s and post er s pr esent l y i n use a r e avai l abl e. Uni t s a r e encouraged
t o develop and/or suggest addi t i onal PSYOP ma.terial designated t o f i l l
pa r t i c ul a r requirements.
e. A l l r equest s f or exi s t i ng l e a f l e t s and post er s a r e forwarded t o
Di vi si on PSYOP Sect i on, i ndi cs t i ng cat al og nmiber and quant i t y required.
f. When a new l e a f l e t or post er i s desi r ed, t he following information
i s requi red:
( 1) Terget audience.
(2) Obj ect i ve and theme.
(3) Suggested wording of t ext .
( 4)
Type of r cat er i al request ed, i . e. , l e a f l e t , post er , recorded t apes
(nomially 45 seconds).
Appendix 2 ( ~ q c h o l o g i c a l ~ p e r a t i o n s ) t o Annex J ( c i vi c ~ c t i o n ) t o
America1 Division Fi el d SOP (cont i nual )
( 5 ) Amount aad dat e requi red.
( 6 ) Type of del i ver y
(7) Other i nformat i on t h a t m y be hel pf ul i n designing, producing or
del i ver i ng t he mat er i al .
g.
Requests f o r l e a f l e t s , post er s and recorded t apee should be foruarded
t o PSYOP Sect i on a t l e a s t f i ve dhys pr i or t o an operation.
h. Information r equi r ed f or a i r c r a f t support of PSYOF missions:
(1) Date and time requi red.
(2)
Type o f mission, i . e. , loudspeaker, l e a f l e t or both.
( 3)
Location of t a r ge t area ( gr i d coordi nat es).
(1;)
Name, u n i t and telephone number of requostor.
(5) Other i nfomi at i on a s appl i cabl e.
i. Requests f o r a i r c r a f t support a r e su5ai t t ed t o PSYOF Sect i onpr i or
t o 1700 on t h e day before t he planned mission.
4 . ADMIMIS~ATIOi~.a. N 0 m 1 c h a n n ~ l sareused f o r report i ng.
b.
Reports (Tab A, PSYOP ~ e ~ o r t s ) .
KOSTER
Tabs: MG
A - PSYOP Reports
DISTRIBUTION:
Speci al
TAB A (PSYOP Reporl;s) t o Appendix 2 (Psychol.@gical Operations) t o Annex J
( Ci vi c Action) t o h e r i c a l Division Fi el d S P
1. DAILY REPORT. a . Re por t by telephone ( ~ h u Lai 159/hmerical 497) by
1700 hour s of t he r s por t i ng day. Negative r epor t s a r e requi red.
b. Repor t s w i l l cont ai n t he f ol l oui ng:
(1) Pr i nt e d mat er i al : Tot al number of l e a f l e t s , post er s, JUSPAG news-
paper, o r s pe c i a l mat er i al s di s t r i but ed by t he uni t .
( 2) Loudspeaker: Tot al number of hours of ground loudspeaker t h e .
( 3) Themes and audiences.
. ( 4) Speci al event s: Any performance out of t h e ordi nary, i.e. Cul t ur al
Dr k Team o r MEDCAP.
( 5) Remarks and/or comments: This must be a s i gni f i c a nt act i on which
occurs a s a r e s u l t of a FSYOP program. Incl udi ng number of Chieu Hoi r et ur n-
ees.
( 6) Pr obl ea a r e a s and recoirmendations.
2. SPECIAL REPORT. a. Two copi es of FSYOP annex t o oper at i ons or der s f o r
BDE si zed units.
b. Tvo copi es of PSYOP a f t e r a c t i on r epor t of EN & BDE si zed uni t s
(Submit ASAP fol l owi ng t e r d n a t i o n of oper at i on) .
c. Ext r aor di nar y PSYOP feed-back such a s oper at i on r e s ul t i ng i n l ar ge
number of r et ur nees, surrender of VC/NVA, expl oi t at i on of major vi c t or i e s ,
enemy l os s e s , or PSYOP which produce s i gni f i c a nt response, i.e. r epor t i ng
of VC mines, caches, VC a t r oc i t i e s , et c.
DISTRIBUTION:
Speci al
OFF1CIAL:
.I.\ ' r
i " '
'-LC dLtcx.<cc
AN1 STRAIJSKI '-
.
.
-
.
-.,
.J
.
' I -
, 1 :-..
7 1.7
EXHIBIT M-66
,a:. <,..*. , : >. . *
. ..
.,,<
>.<? 2:c : d $ e
.+. -r.*.-+*.:-
. : . ; . ; - < -c.:&<>. ,.
;,... >*. -L
-' . - .* .,-,.- : ; . . , : ; x- - . 5; 2;
. . . . . .
!
.-.-:
-e.*:;-%qk?! ?*m.:~+.wyz*:w,* .-.>
HUmUA~TL,Jf~~.~
- ' 1) I VI SI ON ARTILI.XRY A I ~ ~ I C A L
Republic of Vietnam
SllBJRCT: Ameri CP.lPi-rision J. r t i l 1 ery Fi el d St,and,inp h e y a t . i n? Pro-
: cednres
T?: See ms t r i but i on
I . Thi s st,andiru! orerat i . np procedure i . s rr?h?ieh.ed forinforma-
t i on and ~ui da nc e t o t h e 11nj.t.s of t he Americl.1 Wvi pion. Artillery and.
at t ached o r s u n r o r t i n . ~ uni t, s, Art i ?l . erv bnt t al . i ons oroani c o r a t -
tached t,o b r i ~ a d e s wi.11 comrlg with.this SOP. I n event, t,ha ~ro1r; si ons
of thisSOP - conf l i ct wi t h t he brj pade SOP t he di f f er ences wl l l be re-
ported t o t,he Di vi si on Arti l l e r y Cor n nder, who wi.11 ei.ther waive the
reoui renent - t o comply wi t h t h i s SnPor r e f e r t he matter t o t.he M.vision
Comander - f or dec!sion,. a s a~r r onr i at ~e. '
2. ,It is i nt ended t h a t t bi s , SOPbe revi serf- andchartred as neces-
sar y. t,o i ncorrorat , e improved rrocedures and new con cent,^. Covmaqders
and s t a f fs arerecuest' ed t o revi-ew t . hi s SOPon a contf nuo11s ha. si s and
make recot n~endat i on f or i +,simro-remer?t.
Colonel, &ti1.1er v
I
THISt.IA',iKINC IS CkNCdLE,D XHZN
Republic of Vietnam
1 December 1967
APSfiICAL DIVISION ARTILLERY
.FIELD STANDIFX: OPE_R!\ TINGITtOCEDURES
TABLE OF COIJThiNTS
Ti t l e
-
Foreword
Record of Changes
Table of Contents
Di st ri but i on
Fi el d Standinn @eratine:Procedures
ANhUhS AND APFEJDIC-JS
.. ..
A - Operations
Appendix 1 - Command art^ Control
Appendix 2 - Gunnery Procedures
Anvendix 3 - Fi r e Tanni np
Appendix 4 - Fi r e Surport Coordination
Appendix 5 - Airmobile and A i rli f t @erat,ions
Anpendix 6 - Adjustment Procedures f or ?Java1Cunfi r e
I)- Lopi st i cs
Appendix 1 - Cnerational Loads of Class V
E- Arny Aviation
Appendix 1 - Countervort2.r C ~ @ M
P.ppe%dtx.2 - Recovery of bwner! Ai rcraft '
G - Signal
Appendix 1 - %die Comnunicetions
Ayr~endix2 - Wire Ci. rcuits
I - Informztion
CANCdLLATION DATS OF FROTSCTIVG
l.<.';AKKI!G FOYOFFICIAL US!<ONLY
CAWNCT,Bd !'IijJ)>,TM.[IN>J) 111
J - PsY ~ p s / ~ i v i c Action ( t o b e nublished)
K - lhplo-pent of Sroeial !*!earons (hni t t ed)
America1 Division Ar t i l l e r y
Republic of Vietnam
1 December 1967
DISTRIBUTIOFT LIST t o America1 Division Ar t i l l e r y Fi el d SQP
.tJ1GICkL DI VI SI ON A H T I U L
C0
%Y
S1
S2
s
s4
FSF
Corm0
Avn
LMO
2dgn, 11t h Arty
3d Rn, 16th' Arty
3d Bn, 18t h Arty
IlliS, XVArtg
C2
c3
3d Ade, 4t h Ir,f Div
2d 3n, 9 t h Arty
11th Lt I nf Bde
6t h Rn, 1l t h Arty
196th I, t In?3de
3d Dn, 52dArty
19Rt.h 1.t Tnf Me
1s t 9n, 1lrt.h Arty
3d Rde, 1s t AirCav %v
1s t Bn, 31st Arty
,..>
:5.*-&->
I;;i\2Kl?G FOh OFFICIAL USE OiJI,Y *4
CAt.l!>JC'i 3 r~ :"H 11,UbT:~;!ir;lI PJED
Americal Division Ar t i l l e r v
Republic of Vietnam
1 December 1967
Fi3 D STAIdDING OP4t ATI NG PROCEDURISS
1 . G5FILWI..
a, Purpose. This SOP cons t i t ut es t 5e Americal Division Ar t . i l l er v
Fi el d SOP and es t abl i s hes r out i ne and r ecur r i np f i e l d opera-
t i ona l procedures wi t hi n Americal Mvi.sion Ar t i l l er y. Thi s
SOPappl i es e x c e ~ t when modified by k~er i . ca1 ni vi s i on or h i ~ h e r
aut hor i t y.
b. Scope. These apnlv t o all1 uni t s under t he comma.nd
o r operat i onal cont.rol of Amer!.cal K v A ~ t y a.nd t o a r t i l l e r y
bat t al - i onsorgani c or at t ached t o br i r ades of 4meri.cal Division.
c. Ses pons i bi l i t i es .
( 1 ) Conformitv: Subordinate. uni t SOPS will conform.
( 2) Revision. f o r r evi si on wil.1 be forwarded Re~omendat ~i ons
t c HG, America1 Div Arty.
2. llS9.
a. This 'SOFfol.1 ows t he format of the. Divisi.on SOT' i n s o f a r as
i spr act i cabl e.
b. l?here a mr a . ~r a yh does not shov t he words l l %vi si on SOP1', a l l
necessary info r mt i on i s cont,ained i n t he nara.nranh.
c. The Table of Contents r er l ect 8st hose annexes and amendi ces
which a p e a r i n t h i s SOP. See annexes and/or a . r ~e ndi c r s of
%.vision SOP i f omj.tt,er! i n this SOP,
YOUNC
Annexes: A - Opera.tions COL
B - I nt el l i pence
C - Personnel and ~d v i n i s t r a t i o n
D - h i s t i c s
E- Aviation
F- E n ~ i ne w Combat Sunrrort (omi.tted)
(2 - Sipnal
H - Chemical we r a t i ons ( t c be r t ~bl i s hed)
I - Information
J - PSY Ops/civic Actj.on ( t o be riibl.ished)
K - !' mrlo~pentof Snecial T*-'ea~ons ( t o be ni)bl.isbed)
DISTRIRilTIO?.!: Speci al
1-'.PHKING FOli OFFICIAL USF; ON1,Y
Americal Di vi si on Ar t i l l e w
Republic of Vietnam
1 necernhor 1967
Annex A (()perations) t o Amr i c a l Division Artil?ergFi el d SOP
1. RWERENCES.
a. Americal Di vi si on Fi el d SOP
b. FM 6-20-1 w/ chan~es
c. FM6-20-2w/chanres
d, FM 6 4 0 w/chanpes
e. FM 101-5
2. PURPOSE.
This annex es t abl i s hes t he r epnl ar pol i ci es, nrocsdures, andt echni -
aues t h a t t he Di vi si on Arty w i l l f ol l ow i n conduct of t, acti. cal
dner at t ons i n Vietnam or i n a s i mi l ar count er i ns ur ~encp en~rironmerlt.
3. ORG.4NIZATION: (Div SOP).
a.
!!orma1 Mv Arty orparlizat5,on f o r combat:
(1 ) 2dBn, 9t h Arty - 9S3d Rde, l!.th Tnf Di.v
( 3) 6t h Bn, 1l t h Arty
-
nS11t,h J,t ' 1nf Rde
( 3)
,
1 s t h,14th Arty - 9S198th J,t I n? Bde
( I r ) 1 s t Bn, 31st Arty - 9s3d Rde, 1st Air Cav T)i l r
~ ( 5 ) 3d Rn, R2d Arty - DS 196th J t I nf Me
( 6) 2dBn, 1 lt,h Arty - r e i n r o r c i n ~
(7) 3d Bn, 16th Artv - r e i n f o r c i n ~
( 8 ) 3d Bn, 18th Arty - GS
b.
For t h e purpose of t h i s SOP, a r t i ? . l e r ybatt. ali. ons oraani-c or
.
at t ached- t , obri padas will. herez. ft er be cal l ed nShat, t, alions
or DSa r t i l l e r y .
4. COMBAT ORDERS ( gi v SOP).
One cony of 03er at i on r l ans and or der s t hat a r e r l ~bl i s hedi n sun-
-
~ o r t ' of ba t t a l i on or la. rqer si zed operatlions w i l l he suhmitt,sd
by 3.7 ba t t a l i ons t o Mv Arty twelvehours pr i or t o beprinins of
o ~ e r a t ~ i o n .
When publ i cat i on of nl ans and or der s i sdelaved, t h e
c o n c ~ p t of oper at i on and supr or t r a n u i . r e ~e ~t . s wi l l he c&rrn~~nicat,ed
t o Div Arty S3 a s soon as possi bl e. '
5. . TYP5rlFTATIO?!S (3j.v SOP).
6. L'IAISObI.
a. %vi si on Ar t i l . l sr gwi l l rrovi.de l j a i s o n nersonnel t o fiQ!r?J 2s
necessary.
b.
I n addi t i on t o normal s u n ~ o r t ~ i n ~ ! anr! r ci nf or ci np t,o s u ~ v o r t ~ s d
t,o r ei nf or ced l i a i s a n renuirernent,~,QS hat.t.al.ions7.6 1.1f ~ r n i s h
LNO t o al l Ms t r i c t Searinuarters wi t hi n t . hei r AO, uqlessa.n
except i on i s anrroved bv t he Mvi s i on hearloilarters. %is i n- .
cl udes Sreci-a1Forces CR.IIIPS where t.4e S ~ e c i a 1 F o r c ~ s Covnanf:
i s t,he 9i s t ) r i c t Advisor.
C.
I n si . t uat i ons~mrherr? s ~ ~ n n o r l , i n a / s i ~ ~ ~ o r t e d r a l a t i o n s h i ~ 5 are:
chanred duet o temporary ,c\?aqpesi n orpnn;satj.on fm covbat.,
1, NO' s and FOs wj l l remain lsrith t he unit,t,hev normal.3.v SllD-
por t .
Coordinat,ion wi l l be made wi t h new a ~ l n n mt , i n ~ srt,tl-
l e r y uni t a t e a r l i e s t onpor t ~l ni t v.
a.
k t i l l e r y l i a i ~ o n of f i cer s a t &i,gade Ha ar e responsi bl e f or
cont rol and'cpor,dination of a r t i l l e r y Lb!Os a t ' i nfant m bat-
t al i ons . Likewise, a r t i l l e r y LNOs a t i nf ant r ybat t al i on
l evel a r e r e s ~o n s i b l e f or cont,rol and coordination o f a r t i l -
l e r yFOs s u p r o r t i n ~ +.hei nf ant r y compnies.
7. COORDINATION (Div SOP).
Fi r e support coordination, Appendix l+ .
8. PROCEDURES.
a. Command and Control. Apnendix 1.
b. Gunnery Procedures. Ap~endix2.
c . Fi r e Plannine. Aprendix 3.
d. Fi r e Suprort Coordination. Aprenaix 4.
e. Airmobile and Ai r l i f t 0perati.ons. Appendix 5.
f . Adjustment Procedures f or Naval Gunfire. A~cendi x6 .
9.
TACTICAL OP.ERATIONSTXHI\IIQUES(NV SOP).
a. General.
( 1)
Units w i l l conduct dai l y stand-to of a l l perimeter de-
fense personnel immediately pr i or t o -BWTand F~J T.
When oper at i w away fro:^ base carn~s cormiianders' w i l l
have a l l ~e r s onne l stand-to a t those times when t he
s i t uat i on di ct at es . Bat t l e s t at i ons wi l l be ma.nnsd
during t hese periods t o i nsure maximum st.at,e oPreadi.-
ness.
(2)
A l l personnel a r e reauired t o . carrv t hei r i ndi vi dual
wea.oon wi.th am-unition or have itwi t hi n anns re?.ch
a t a l l times.
(3)
Commanders wi11i nsure t ha t personnel a r e - t hor ou~hl y
f ami l i ar with the operation and canabi l i t i es of i ndi -
vi dual and'crew-served vtearons orpanic t o t hej r Dar-
t i c ul a r uni t .
(4)
For t he curposes of t h i s SOP r epor t s t,o be ren4ered t o
. t he Div Arty S3or S2 wi l l be rendered t,o t he FS?of
t he Div TOG.
b. Reconnaissance.
' ( 1)
Normallyi n i t i a l reconnaissa.nce of r?osit,ion areas must
be made from t he a i r . necention measures mlist be taken
t o prevent ~ r e mt u r e di s cl os r r e of i nt ent i on t.0 occnm
t h e posi t i on.
(2)
When movement t o ~ o s i t ~ i o n i st o be made by road or t r ai l . ,
car ef ul rout e r~connai saance must be made and li.ke1.y
ambush areas noted.
( 3)
Every a e r i a l fl.'ight made bya r t i l l e r y of f i cer s should be
considered a reconnai.ssance, and maps of t he ar ea t o be
covered, 1:50,000 scal e or l ar ger , wil.1 be carri ed.
(4)
Observations of suspected or act ual VC a c t i vi t v and/or
unusual s i ~ h t i n ~ s . w i l l be reported t o Div Arty S2 a s
soon a s possible.
( 5 ) Location of possi bl e a r t i l l e r y posi t i on ar eas observed
durin,e f l i e h t wil.1.be recorded and coordinates for-
warded t o Div Arty S3upon termination of f l i e ht .
10. TaAINIPXI (DIV SO?).
a.
U n i t s not act i r al y eqaged i n s u p p r t of t a c t i c a l operat i ons
w i l l conduct unit t r ai ni ng program.
-
b.
Maximuin advantage must be taken of every opportunity t o con-
duct on-the-job t r ai ni ng and t o i nt egr at e t r ai ni ng wi t h
conduct of t a c t i c a l operations.
c.
Bat t al i ons wi l l i nsure t ha t l i ai s on and forward observer
personnel a r e thoroughly i nst ruct ed i n t h e i r duties prfor
t o report i ng t o t he sapportM unit, A car r y over period
wi t h t he ol d FO or LNO w i l l n o ml l y l a s t at l e a a t 24 home.
d. Accuracy and t hen speed w i l l be emphasirted i n al l a r t i l l -
t r ai ni ng with speci al emphasis bsing given t o FDC, S mo g
and Howitzer sect i on t rai ni ng. Periodic t es t i ng of uni t
f i r i ng capabi l i t i es and accuracies w i l l be a c e m~ l i s h dby
a l l l evel s of corn.~andt o include Mvi si on Ar t i l l er y.
e. The Division Ar t i l l er g Gunnery Chzcklist wi l l be used f or
month17 i ~3pe c t i onsby t he Eat t al i on aad Eattery conkandern,
and f o r spot check3 by represmtaLives of Mvieion Ar t i l l e ~ a .
A l l references speci fi ed i n t he chaekl i st w i l l be on hand
i n each' FDC.
f . Shel l i ng Report Team Raining. FM 6-121.
g.
Frequent t r ai ni ng w i l l be conducted i n a l l FDC1s i n high. a ~ > l e
f i r e so t hat t h i s capabi l i t y is always ready f or use.
11. NAVAL GUTFIRE SWPORT.
a. Naval gunfire i s f i r ed by di r ect support shi ps of t he echelon
concerned. I f addi t i onal naval gunfi re snprort is r mui r ed,
it i s requested from t he nmt higher FSE t hrot qh naval ~ m -
f i r e channels or through normal a ~ t i l l e r yf i r e supnort chan-
nels.
b. US Naval shi ps a r e capable of providing naval punfi re sunport
as f al l om: MlrJnII.TuM FAXDm4
SHIP
-
A R F U m SROZE A'?i2Oj.C.CH Fr'FECTIVE RA:%E
Destroyer 973-1 guns - c G e 13,700 meters
511/5i+ c a l guns 16,LW meters
Light Cruiser 6"/47 c a l ms 10 fathom curve 19,100 meters
Heavy Crui ser 8"/55 c a l gllns 10 fathom curve 23,600 rnaters
Bat t l eshi p 16"/50 c a l ~ u n s 10 fat hox curve 39,bOO meters
Landing Ship 5" rocket No r es t r i ct i ons 2280 - 9096
Medim ~ o c k e t / meters
Inshore Fi r e Support
c. The f ol l owi w sel ect i on of mu n i t i o n and fuzes i s nomal l y
avai l abl e.
(1 ) Ammunition: IIE, hT, AP, CP, and I11m ( 5" Pc 6n mrls onlv).
(2) F u z t ~ : BD, FD, ?.ITS9 and VT.
d. Requests f o r FGFS w i l l Includc :
(1 )
Tvpe operat i on (t roop support, P&I, et c).
(2)
Location of AOX or t ar get ( s ) (by gr i d coordinates).
( 3)
Nature of t ar gct ( s ) ( i f e n q force, i ncl ude s i s e) .
(4)
Tgpeof mu n i t i o n and fuze.
( 5 )
Comsncezent and duration of op3r~. t i sn, or t he t i n e
t ha t f i r e i sdesired.
(6)
Radio frequencies and c a l l 8%- of onppopted e1c;nant t o
be contacted by US K3vy spot t i ng team or ship(s).
e.
Shore Fi r e Control F' arties n o ml l y cont rol and adju2.t nmal
gunfire. Adjustment of naval gunfi reby Armrg obeer ve~a i e
done i n an emergency only. See Appendix 6 (Adjustment
Procedures f o r Naval~ u n f i r e ) .
f. Cosbat ser vi ce support of naval par t i es i s by unit t o which
attached.
g.
If A i r Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (AIZLICO) i satteched,
WLICO channels through PSE a r e ernployed fornaval PM-
f i r e .
YorflG
COL
Appendices: 1 - C0mr.d and Control
2 - Gunnery Procedures
3 - Fi r e Planning
4 - FireSupport Coordination
5 - Airmobile and Ai r l i f t Operations
6 - Adjustnant Procedures f o r Ilaval Gunfire
DISTRIBUTION: Speci al
OFFICIAL:
America Wvi si on Ar t i l l er y
Republic of Vktnam
1 Cacenbsr 1967
Appendix 2 (Gunnery ~r ocedur os) t o Annex A (Operations) t o Anerical M;
Arty Field SOP
1. GENERAL. Gunnary procedures i n America1 Division Ar t i l l er yW i l l
confom t o FM 6-40 and t hi s di rect i ve. The new f i e l d aptil-
l e r y observation torminology as prescribed i n DA Training .
Ci rcul ar 6-1 dtd 17May 1966w i l l be used by a l l obscrvers
and f i r e di r ect i on centers wkn processing f i r e missions.
Accurate and timely del i veryof a r t i l l e r y f i r e i st he mis-
si on of t h i s comand. This mission can only be accoql i shed
by s t r i c t adherence t o the norins of accuracy which have beon
t r adi t i onal i n t he f i e l d ar t i l l er y. Constant and continuous
checks w i l l be i ns t i t ut ed and observsd t o insure f i r e where
and when t he maneuver el emnt s de3ire. Every ar t i l l er ynan,
of f i cer and enl i st ed, i n this.comnand w i l l seek t o broaden
hi s knowledge of gunnery and s t r i ve t o maintain t he t r adi t i on
of accuracy and t i mel i ness char act sr i st i c of United St at es
Ar t i l l er y. Each a r t i l l e r y of f i cer i n the p n e r v chain of coilvlt.
w i l l check f i r e missions against a map and question dat a t hat
apparently would be unsafe.
2. STANDARDSFOR ARTILLERY OFFICERS. Each comnisioned e r t jl l e r y
of f i cer who parforms duty i n an a r t i l l e r y f i r i ngbat t er y or
i n a bat t al i on FDC w i l l be suf f i ci ent l y profi ci ent i n t he
f o l l o wj n ~ a r t i l l e r v techniques t o i nsure t hat he can ade-
quat el y perform t hese dut i es i f reauired. It isrecognized
t ha t speed of performance comzs only with dai l y pract i ce
and wi l l be found i n those of f i cer s whose primarv duty
c a l l s f o r such operations.
a. Lay a bat t er y by azimuth and ori ent i ng angle.
b. Check t he l ay of a bat t ery bt ~azimuth and ori ent i ng anple.
c. Measure adjucted azirmth and ori ent i ng angle.
d. Check the measurement of angle of si ght t o mslc and t he
computation of minimum elevation.
e. Compute a simple observed adjustment of f i r e on a t ar get
of opportunity.
f . Check a record of precision f i r e t o insure accuracy of
GFT set t i ng.
g.
Re s uf f i ci ent l y fami l i ar with t he computation of l!et+VE
t o i nsure t hat gross errors have not been made.
h. Supervise a bat t er y FDC for a short period during observed
f i r e adjustments or t he computation of unobserved dat a
such a s H&J f i r e s .
i. Check t he 3ccuracy of a f i r i nc chart , pa-t i cul arl y t he
map inspected l ocat i on of t he f i r i ngbat t er y o r re-
gi s t r at i on poi nt .
j.
Be s uf f i ci ent l y fami l i ar ki t h tbField Ar t i l l er y Di gi t al
Automatjc Computer (FADAC) t o insure t hat t he operat or
ent er s dat a correct l y and accurat el y and t hat p r o p r
care and f i r s t echelon maintenance is performad.
CANCELLATION DATE OF PHQTECTIVE
IARAIIJG FOR OFFICIAL IIST~T@(IY-
CANNOT RE PREDETSR$iINBD,
72--i
k.
h c a t e a t a r ge t from t he a i r on a 1/50,000 map t o an
accuracy of 100mt e r s .
1.
Be fami l i ar with t he new f i e l d a r t i l l e r y observation term-
inology.
me
Bring f i r e on a t ar get of opportunity from t he airo r grour?d
i n a reaoonzble period of t i ns using correct obsarvor pro-
cedwes .
n.
Conduct a dest ruct i on mission or preci si dn r egi st r at i on.
0.
Provide s ur r ei l l ancea f t e r visualr e c mo r a f t e r completion
of a f i r e mission.
3.
STANDARD5 FOR ATTIUEilY NONCOI-XISSIONED OFFICERS.
a. A chi ef of f i r i n g bat t er y xiiust be ablet o accomplish dl
dut i es of t t , ~=x~c ut i vcofTicer i n a f i r i ngbsktery.
b. A chi ef of s ect i on niust be profi ci cqt i n l ayi ng t he bat t er y
bv azimuth o r or i ent i ng angle i n addition to . hi s dut i es
a s chi ef of sect i on.
4. DEFINTTIONS.
a. Technical FirsDirection (para 243, FIP6-40): Conversion
of f i r e missions t o ap?ropriate f i r i npdat a and f i r e
comands.
b. Tect i cal Fi r e Direction (para 2&3,FM 6-40): b e r c i s e of
t a c t i c a l c o mn d of one or more uni t s i n t he sel ect i on
of t ar get s , designation of uni t s t o f i r e, ard t h e al l oca-
t i on of mu n i t i o n f o r each lillssion.
c. Contr.01 Fi r e Di rect i on Center (FDC): The FDC which has
asswned o r has been delegated tkr esponsi bi l i t yt o
convert a f i r e mission t o appropriate f i r i ngdat a and
f i r e conmnands. ( ~e c hni c a l Fi re Direction).
d. Pri ~nary Check: An independent check of dat a and commands
produced wi t hi n a cont rol FDC. F!o mission w i l l be f i r ed
wi t hi n t h i s c o mn d without a primary check.
e. Secondary Check: An indepzndent check, always i n addi t i on
t o a primary check, conducted i n an FDC ot her t han t he
control FDC.
5 .THE BATTALION FDC. ,
a. Each a r t i l l e r y bat t al i on i sprovided minimGuru es s ent i al
personnel t o conduct t echni cal and t a c t i c a l f i r e di r ect -
t i on. Bzt t zl i on c o mr d e r s w i l l sugmnt t he f i r e di r ect i on
cent er from sources avai l abl e t o them t o i nsure a t mnt y-
four hour c a p b i l i t y achieving minimum standards of
spezd and accuracy as s e t fort h herein.
b. The bat t al i on cor,;nanderw i l l decide, based on tkdi s-
p s i t i o n of hi s bat t er i es, whether lie w i l l operat e both'
a t a c t i c a l and t echni cal f i r e di rect i on cent ero r onl y
a t a c t i c a l f i r e di r ect i on center. In t he l a t t e r case he
w i l l b t i l l mi n t a i n t he cepabi l i t y of exerci si ng t echni cal
f i r e di r ect i on, and of makinp t he secondary check on t he
cont r ol f i r e di r ect i on center i f j t i slocated a t t he
b a t t e q .
c.
The bat t al i on FDC when owr at i ng as tb cont rol FDC w i l l be
capable of conducting pri nary checks ori a l l dat a itpro-
duces.
The mt h&dof conducting t he priclary check will
conform t o t he following standards.
(1)
A check char t will be mi nt ai ned att he sams scaleas
t he primary chart and w i l l be m n e d by an operat or
independent of the primary chafi . Tha char t s w i l l bs
i dent i cal and wi l l be pre-checked t o inszlra minimum '
accuracy of comparison t o wi t hi n 2 mils i n def l ect i on
and 20 H i n range, The check chart may be maintained
by t he ver t i cal cont rol operat or (VCO) o r may be i n
addi t i on t o t he VCO. If FADAC isbeing used t o c o q u t e
dat a, t he primary chart w i l l be used t o check defl ec-
t i o n and range,
(2)
A separat e GFT Ki l l be used t o check a l l dat a prepared
by t he computer. This.check may be nada byanot her
computer i f hi s bat t er y i snot firing, by t h e chi ef
computer, or by t he FIX. Each FW w i l l i nsure t ha t
a posi t i ve system i sest abl i shed t o i nsure t ha t th
check computer iscl ear l y i dent i f i ed f or each mission
f i r ed.
(3)
The FDO w i l l check t he i n i t i a l pl ot on t he primary and
check char t s, t he computation of s i t e by t he VCO,
and the i n i t i a l ori ent at i on of t he t ar get p i d . Dur-
i ng preci si on r egi st r at i ons, a separat e record of
preci si on f i r e w i l l be maintained by a check conputer.
( 4 )
Following i sa guide t o FDOs f or i n i t i a l check of
f i r i n g char t s:
( a)
Check pl ot of bat t erv cent er(s) and ot her survey-
ed poi nt s with.coord square.
(b)
Check i n i t i a l defl ect i on index and i nsure it
corresponds t o base defl ect i on; i nsure t ha t de-
f l ect i on corresponds t o azimuth of f i r e .
( c) Check supplemental i ndi ces.
(d)
Insure t hat range defl ect i on r r ot r act or isnumbered
properly.
( e)
Double check pl ot of b a t k e n using 1125,000 or
1'50, 000 map. Ilouble check rough di r ect i on of
f i r e and corresponding azimuth by vi sual ob-
servat i on.
( 5 )
The FDO w i l l i ns i r e t hat old GFT s et t i ngs have been re-
moved i f reouired and new s et t i nps placed on each GFT.
(6)
Metro correct i ons, hiph burst r egi st r zt i ons, et c. , w i l l
be computed independentslybv two i n3i vi ducl s.
d. Each bat t al i on FDC w i l l be capable of conductin3 seccndary
checks on dat a produced by bat t s r y FDC1s. FIormally,tk
Bat t al i on FDC w i l l check i n i t i a l dat a on a l l f i r e missions.
The method of conduc;ting t he secondary check w i l l conform
t o t he following standards.
( 1 )
cted by #ire, t he secondary
. check at bat t al i onw i l l a p p r o x h t e t he d e t a i l of ' t he
,prirrargr check discussed p&vlously.
(2)
When firirlz, I q bsing conducted e x c l u s i v ~l y by radi o,
bat t al i on FDCw i l l mni t or t he f i r e mission and
sub88qu:nt correct i ons t o i n a u r ~ t hat accurat e and
tin31.v f i r e i s bsing dsi i versd.
(3)
Secondary checks do not rap1e.c~ pri nary chacks and i n
no way relievet he cont rol FDC of ttz responsibility
of conducting pr i mr y checks.
(4)
If t he bat t al i on FDO, conductinp secondary checks,
bel i evss a t any time t hat dat a may havs been t rans-
mi t t ed or computed i n er r or , he w i l l com. ~nd HOLD
and su3pnd f i r i ng until h e - i s s at i s f i ed t hat correct
dat a ha3 bean obtained.
( 5 )
Since t he secondary check i n many i nst ances ist he
onl y di r e c t assurance the cormandor has of t he
accuracy of f i r e s , such checks Kill beabanddnedTddy
by t he eejrprnss order of t he bat t al i on commarrder
concerned. A report of such act i onw i l l be made t o
t h i s badquar t er s as expdi t i ous l y as possi bl e.
6 . THEBATTERY FDC.
a. Fach bat t er y i s provided minimum es s ent i al personnel t o
conduct t echni cal f i r edi rect i on. Augmentation i s re-
qui red t o enablet he bat t ery FDC t o operate con~i nuousl y.
The bat t er ? FnC i s not capable of cor~puting f i r i ng dat a
f or mr e t han one bat t er y l ocat i on at a t h e . I n t he event
t h a t t he bat t er y i ss pl i t , t he FDC must be nugrr.ented by
bat t al i on FDC o r one s e p n t of t he bat t er y r ay be cont rol l ed
di r e c t l yby bat t al i on FCC.
b. The bat t er y FDC, when o p r a t j n g as t he Control FDC, w i l l
be capable of ccnducting primary checks on any dat a it
produces. The bat t er y FDC > r i l l be p~epar ed and w i l l
conduct secondary checks on dat a producsd a t bat t al i on
FDC(whenbat t al i on i s t he cont rol FGC)and t ransmi t t ed
t o t he bat t er y f or f i r i ng. Jntk eventt hat t he
bat t er y FD@disa' srees t o a marked degree ki t h dat a
t ransmi t t ed bybat t al i on FDC,t he bat t er y FD3 w i l l com-
mand HOLD and will not i f yt he bat t al i on FDO of t he
discrepancy without dolay. The bat t al i on FDO wi l l decide
on thecor r ect dat a t o be fi red.
c. Primary and secondary ch2cks wi11 be conducted a t bat t er y
FDC when operat i ng as control FDC i n t he samegen5rd.
manner and wi t h the Sam guidance ac: a t bat t al i on l evel ,
as speci f j ed i n paragraph 5 .
d,
A bat t er y f i r e di r ect i on center, when owr at i ng a s a cont rol
FDC, Ki l l haveas a minimm t he follo?lin:: f i ve personnel on
duty at a l l tines:
one FDO;a chart o p r a t o r ; a FADAC
operat or; a con~puter; and n RTO, who may al s obe a check
computer. When FADAC is not operat i onal , a eheck ~Pi ~. r %' b$er at o~
w i l l be used.
Ratt al i ons w i l l augment bat t er i es a s
nscessary t o mect t h j s reqni remnt on a s h i f t bas i s 24
hours a dzy.
7. STANDARDS FOR THEFIA%DIlC3CTICN C3iT3.. Thssastandards ar a
equallyappl i cabl e=t o t he bs t t zr y and bat t s l i on FDC. Ce-
vi at i ons from t hese s t ar l ar ds m y be mado only by aut hor i t y
of t he Division Ar t i l l er y Coimndsr or h i s r;prc,,szntativo.
a. Accuracy. Speed w i l l never be givan a s an .s:tcuso f o r l ack
of accuracy. Proper techniqu-3sof pl ot t i ng andCG::I~I~S-
t i o n willbe maintained and constznt,lyyract i cad i h dl.
FDCgs. Iti s recognized that accuracy requared f o r pre-
ci si on r egi s t r at i odi s gr eat er t han t hat requi r3d f o r a
t ar get of opportunity i n a VC-held jungle araa. k mv o r ,
t he accuracy requirzdof t he ch-3.~:ope.~+z'cor end conpukr
w i l l be constant; t he FDO q y usa accoptzd "s hor t cut sni n
t he i nt e r e s t of t i mel y f i r s . A t no t j new5-11 pr-y
checks be del et ed i n t he i nt cr cs t of sped,
b. Speed. True speed comes only rrith const.2nt and r 3, pt i t i ouo
d r i l l i n sound procedwos.' Each bat t al i on ma t ~s i nt a i . n
t he a b i l i t y t o provide tinv31-y f i r es . YWls and S3s mst
remain a l e r t f o r sloppy FDC, obea-ver, or fil-ing b>ttergr
procedures which give a falarj and tenporary h?r as s i on of
speed.i n f i r i ng.
c. Firing Charts* Both p r L - r y and check chart 3\;illbe d n -
t ai ned on pl a s t i c gri d sheato. The n9r4?,~l o c z k used
on t he gr i d sheet i s :
(1)
lO5m howitzer FDC - 1/25,000.
(2)
Tne155mand 8" How FDC - 1/25,000 (1/50,0~0 accept-
abl e).
(3) 175m gun - 1/50,000.
The same f i r i n g char t wi l l not be used a s both pr%cs?y
and check char t o Grid sheat s w i l l be changad asfrequent-
ly'asrequi red t o mdnt al n a nszt, rcad2blc ap; s; sr~ncs~
d. Bat t l e Haps. Each FDC wi l l nai nt ai n a 1/!33,000 ba t t l e map
on which. t hefollowing i t e mwillbe pl ot t ed: '
( 1
General l ocat i on of f r i endl yforces.
(2) Bat t er y l ocat i on(s).
(3) No f i r e areas, FCLs. FSCLs, and Fres Fire aroas.
(4)
h c a t i o n s of f r i endl y pat rol s, US, F W , and WiVNor
RF/PF out ppst s.
( 5)
Bui1.t up areas, vi l l ages and hamlets willbe makcd or
out l i ned t o be r eadi l y recognizable, baaed on t he l a t e s t
data. These naps wi l l be up dated t o represent act ual
condi t i onsby frequent checks with t k e Di s t r i c t and by
a e r i a l r e c ~ n n a i s s ~ n c e .
e.
Such dat a from t he ba t t l e map a s i spract i cabl e vriU be
placed on t he f i r i ng chart . Fel-inanant idYL ari l l norixtlly
be-so out l i ned.
f. CFTSet t i ngs, Data. Me t Corrections, and Re gi a t r ~~t i on FDCs
w i l l always f i r e with t he best dat a a- ~ai l abl o. The
bat t al i on FDC willi nsure t h a t cox*rections are avai l abl e
f o r a l l ba t t e r i e s i n every di rect i on. Thisrequj ros mot
computationsconcuuyent
Anerical Division Ar t i l l er y
Republic of Viot~mm
1 DeceZor 1967,
Appendix 3 ( Fi r e ~ l e mi n a ) t o Annex A (Operat$ons) t o America1 Division
Ar t i l l er y Fi el d SOP 9
1. CENrnL.
a. Fi r e planning i sconducted a t a l l l evel s and i e continuous.
,
b. The det ai l with which f i r e plans w i l l be- mdei sdenendent upan:
( 1 )
The time avai l abl e f or planning.
(2) The ext ent and accuracy of t ar get infornxtion.
(3) Thet ype operationbein? conduoted.
4 The f i r e support r eaui r nent s of higher achelons.
(5) Thef i r e support maann avai l abl e.
c. Target listsw i l l s uf f i ceas f i r e plan unt i l com~l et i on of
detail.ed plan.
2. RES?OiiSIBILITIES.
a. Direct Support Ar t i l l e mbat t al i ons prepme e r t i l l ~ f i r s vl ans
t o support t h e schens of mneuver of s u ~ ~ o r t c d brinados.
b. Reinforcing a r t i l l e r g f i r e s are planned byrei nforced e r t i l l e r y
unit.
c. General support and GSr e i n f o r c i n ~ f i r e s a r e planned by Mvl si on
Artill ei-y.
3. TARCET DESIGIiATION SYSTE?A.
Tab A.
4. LANDIZE ZOXfl PXJPARATIO!IS.
a. P r e ~ r a t i o nof LZs a r e f i r ed uuinp best data avai l a%l e.
b. The prepmat i on w i l l beobserved and f i r e s adj ust ed f o r mxirm~m
effect i veness ~lnenever j ~osai bl e.
c. LZpreparat i on fires shou1.d bc:
(-1) Aeavjr I n volume i ni t i al l y.
(2)
Adjusted t o t he schexc o'f maneuver.
(3)
Planned around t he periphery of' t he LZi n t he fo~;i-ard e d ~ e
of t h9 treel i nes and expanditq outtmrds.
d. Upon coinpletion of t he pr s p~r at i on, a r t i l l e r y f i r e s ape s hi f t ed
t o lilcelg ar eas of entrance and exi t t o t he aosaul t al-ca.
5. SIPPORTPEG FIRES.
a.
Supporting f i r e s i n t he d ~ f ense should be vlanned on 13kely'
avenues of approach such a s roads, t r a i l s andst roanl i nes.
Targets should alsobe planned on cl ear l y i dent i fi c' ol e t or -
r ai n fe2t vres from which f i r e s mav be cn.lck3.y shi ft ed.
b.
Close-in supporting firesw i l l be shot-in prior t o darlcncss.
A singler owd w i l l ha used as ani ni t qal check. A f u l l
bat t er y sheaf' w i l l besubsequently f i r cd i f time ancl e?:,mrli-
t i o n p3rmit.
Individual piece corrections, i f kno;m, ~ d l l
be appl i ed.
c.
Speci al sheafs should be u t i l i a s j t o i ncreaso t he effectiveness
of f i r e s placed upon roads, t r a i l s , s t r exi l i nes or si mi l ar
t a r ~ $ i % W V i h ~ ~ ~ ~
b r i c d M; i si on ~ r t i l l e r g
RepubUc of Vietnam
1 December 1967
Appendix 1, (Fi re Support coordination) to Annex A ( ~ps r at i ona) t o
America1 Division AiIAllery Fi el d SOP.
1, mu .
a.
The Fi r e Support El emnt (FSE) operat i ngwi t hi n t he Div TOC
represent s t he Division Ar t i l l er y Comnder a d ischarged
wi t h carryi ng out hi s pol i ci es and guidance with respect t o
f i r e support coordinationwi t hi n t he Division Ar t i l l er y,
b. The di r ect s u p p r t a r t i l l e r y corrsnandar i n t he brigade IiO is
t he f i r e support coordinatoro
2, RESsPoN3I3IILITIEs.
a.
The r es pons i bi l i t i es of the f i r e support coordinator include
but ar e not l b i t e d t o t he f ol l mi ng:
(1 ) Planning, al l ocat i ng, coordinating, and i nt egr at i ng a l l
avai l abl e f i r e support means i n accordance with t he
di r ect i ves, pol i ci es, and pr i or i t i es of t he supported
force con-mndar,
(2)
Establ-ishing110 Fi r e Lines and Fi r e Coordination Lines i n
coordi nat i onwith conmanders of supported units.
(3)
Providing a LNO t o t he seni or ARW coz~rander,and t oeach
d i s t r i c t chi ef i n hi s AO. The dut i es of t he WO w i l l in-
a ) Obtaining clearance t o fire.
Ib) clule:
Keeping US Forces i n f o r ~ d of a c t i vi t i e s and disposi-
t i on of Regional Forces, Popular Forces, and ARVN
Forces
( c)
Keeping ARVN comanders 5nformed of di sposi t i on a d
a c t i vi t i e s of US Forces,
(4)
-
Maintaining l a t e s t t arget i ng i nf or mt i on f o r l n c ~u s i o n i n,
f i r e plans and/or H&Iprograms.
3. CLEARANCE OF FIRES.
a. Art i l l ery, naval gunfire, and a i r missions wi l l be conducted i n
accordance with the following rules,
(1)
Harassing, i nt erdi ct i on, and preparatory missions l ocat ed
out si de of f r ee f i r e areas a r e executed onl y a f t e r GVN/
ARVN approval a s appropriateo
(2)
Target of opportunity missions cl ear l yi dent i f i ed as
hos t i l e with t he mission under cont rol of an AO/FO o r
FAC requi re no clearance, Target s not cl ear l y i dent i -
f i e d a s hos t i l e must be cl eared by CVN/ARVN agency pr i or
t o f i r i ngo
(3)
Missiocs a ~ a i n s t known or suspected VC t ar get s i n hamlets
and/or vi l l ages occupied by noncombatants w i l l be con-
ducted a s follows:
A-4-1
CANCELLATION DATE OF PROTECTIVE
KING POR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CANJOT BE PREDETERblI
(a)
Defensive f i r e s w i l l be f i r e d a8 reauest ed bya p
pr opr i at e GVN or ARBWaut hori t y. ?roper cl earance
must stillbe obtained.
(b) A l l missions on hamletso r v i l l a ~ e s w i l l be con-
t r ol l e dby ei t her an FO, A 0 orFAC.
(F)
Hamlets o r vi l l ages not associateC with ground oper-
at i ons willnot be at t acked without pr i or war ni w
( l e a f l e t or loudspeaker) even though l i n h t f i r e Ip
beiw recei ved from them.
(d)
Hamlets and vi l l ages may becattacked without narniw
i f t he at t acki si n conjunctionwlth a ground oper-
a t i on involving t he movement of eround f or ces t hr owh
t he area, and i f i n t he opinion of t he ground can-
mander, h i s mission muldbe jeopardized by such
warning.
(e)
None of t he above cont rol s abri dge t h e ri eht of self-
defense, and a r t i l l e r ym y be f i r ed without cl ear-
ance at t he request of any uni t i n contact. The
deci si on t o do sow i l l be made by t he seni or of f i cer
present .
c. Fi r es near i nhabi t ed areas willbe governed by t h e fol l awi ng
addi t i onal guidance:
( 1)
Tarqet pl ot s w i l l be conpared withbest avai l abl e dat a on
l ocat i ons of inhabited areas.
(2)
Unobserved f i r e s wi l l not be planned cl oser t han 1000
meters from f r i endl yvi l l apes o r hamlets unlessspecifi-
c a l l yrequested by ARVN or cl ear l y i dent i f i ed as hos-
t i l e and cl eared f or f e i n g by AR'JN/GWaut hor i t i es.
d. Free Fi r e Areas areest abl i shed by GVNor ARBNaut hor i t i es. .
America1 Division Ar t i l l er ywi l l d i s s mi mt e t o appr omi at e
agenci es and uni t s.
e. k f i r e ar eas may be est abl i shed byCV??/AWNaut hor i t i es or
US Forces connanders. No Fi re Areas wl l l be dissemjnated
by America1 Division Ar t i l l er y t o a l l i nt er est ed agencies
and uni t s and w i l l be graphi cal l y portrayed on a r t i l l e z y
s i t uat i onmaps, ( f i r i ng chart s when f eas i bl e) i f wi t hi n
range of orgenic,attached, or supnort i ns a r t i l l e r y.
f . Allf i r e s t o i ncl ude a r t i l l e r y, naval r unf i r e and a i r s t r i ke s
del i vered or havinq possi bl e ef f ect across a ~~FL/ FCL dl1be
cl eared with t he f i r e support coordinator of t h e TAOR/AO
effect ed by t he f i r e s . Possible ef f ect wi l l be considered
t o be f i r e s del i vered within 500 meters of a boundary.
q.
Fi r es out si de e bri qade TAOR wi l l be submitted t o FSF, f o r
cl earance l ri t h propel. aut hori t i es.
4, BATTLEFIELD ILLUIFNATIOM,
a. Il l umi nat i on by a r t i l l e r y w i l l be f i r e d on aut hor i t y of DS
Ar t i l l er y commander.
b. Consideration should be given t o pat r ol a c t i vi t y of adj acent
uni t s pr i or t o f i r i n e i l l u n i x t i o n except i n cesn of emer-
gency.
734
5. SIGNALSMOKE,
a.
Iti s imperative t hat ar t i l l er ypersonnel, particularly F b ,
AOs and LNOshave a thorough knowledge of t he uee of eanoke,
b.
Division SO1 outlines use of smoke.
c. Whenever possible, confirmation of use and meaninn w i l l be
obtained by radio.
6. SAFETY.
a. Safeguarding ai r cr af t from A r t i l l s r g Hre: Tab A (Safeguarding
Aircraft from Art i l l el 7Fire).
b.
Artillery units wi l l habitually post an ai r eentryduring all
f i r e missions. Piring wi l l be suspendedwhen ai r cr af t cross
lineof f i r e. Air sentriesmust be al er t f or ai r cr af t ap-
proaching from any direction. If more than one f i r e mission
i sbeing conducted by t hebattery, an a i r sent mwi l l be
provided f or each mission i n progress. In addition, each
forward observer or a i r observer w i l l follow t he same pre-
caution with regard t o the forward end of the tra.jectcry
duringadjustment of f i r e.
c. VT fuzewill not be used durinp;periods when ai r cr nf t are
endangered.
d. Restriction on ar t i l l er yf i r e isnot reauired durily!ai r-
st r i kes unless r i s k is excessive. When rest ri ct i ons are
necessary they ar eplanned and coordinated by the Erigade
FSCC on MvFSE, asapnr0priat.e. Positive coordination
wll-1be effected t oinsure ai r cr af t safety.
e. No Fi reAreas should be established around isolated units,
outposts, friendlyvillae;es, and ot,her i ns t al l at i onswhere
positive safetymeasure6 are reauired.
YOUNG
COL
' Tab A - Safeguarding Aircraft from Artillery Fire
1 - Countermortar and Counterrocket Wagram
DISTRIBUTION: Special
WOODY
Americal Division Ar t i l l e v
Republic of Vietnam
1 December 1967
Annex B ( ~nt e l l i ge nc e )t o Americal Division Ar t i l l er y Fi el d SW
1 RPErnNCES.
a. FM 30-5.
b. F'M 31-22.
c. FM 101-5.
d. MACV D i r 190-3.
e. MACV D i r 381-11.
f . MACV D i r 381-22.
g. Americal Di vi si on Fi el d SOP.
2. HIRPOSE.
To establ-ish procedures f or t he execution of t he i nt el l i pence
funct i on wi t hi n t he Division Ar t i l l er y.
3. MISSIObJ.
To provide accurate, timely and usef ul i nt el l i pence on t he eneiiiy,
weather and t en- ai n and t o deny t he enemy access t o similar In-
formation on f r i endl y forces.
4. CAP'IURED MATERIEL.
a. Incl udes a l l weapons, munitions, foodst uffs, medicine,
cl ot hi ng and ot her equipnent taken f r m t he enemy, h i s
bases, h i s caches or t hat policed from t he bat t l ef i el d.
b. Evacuation.
(1)
Captured mat eri el having i n t e l l i ~ e n c evalue i s evacuated
through i nt el l i gence char ~l el st o G2, Americal Division.
(2) The f o l l o d n ~ar e evacuated:
(a)
A l l weanons, except US, and those aut hori zed f o r
r et ent i on as war t rophi es.
(b)
Samples of a l l munitions except common US and
forei gn hand grenades, mines, mortar and a r t f l -
l e r y pr oj ect i l es. .
( c )
TWO quar t s of r i ce, s al t , fl our, wheat, corn ~ n d
ot her foodstuffs, from each cache.
( d)
Samples of each t,ype of medicine and medical sup-
pl i es .
( e)
Samples of clothing, f oot t ear , bol t s of cl ot h,
pl as t i cs and ot her mat eri el .
( f )
San~vlesof a l l unusual equinnent.
( 3)
Evacuated mat eri el i s tapped and i dent i f i ed a s t o t he
time, dat e, and place of capture, c a ~ t u r i n ~ uni t , and
complete descri pt i on of t he mat eri el .
( 4)
Mat eri el t ha t camot be evacuated i s described thoroushly
and photographed or sketched, i f possi bl e, pr i or t o
dest ruct i on.
c.
War h.ophies (USARVRegulation 643-30).
5. CAP'IURED DOCUBENTS.
a.
Captured documents ar e batched along with a batch s l i p and
. B-1
C-4NCELLATIOlJ DATE OF PROTECTIVE
MARKI NG FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CANNOT B3
evacuated t o S2. A docwcent inventory sheet i b prepared
i n dupl i cat e (one copy accompanies t he documnt and one i s
f i l e d ) .
b.
Cryptographic docurcnts ar e handled as SEClBT and del i vered
pr o~i pt l y t o t he newest supporting Radio Rasearch Unit.
6,
PRISONEXtS OF WAR, SU3PECT3, CIVIL DZFDIDA:iTS AND RETUXIEES ( ~ i vSO?).
a.
PWs will be evacustod t o t h3 naarest Fd col l ect i on point
on organi c t ransport at i on of t he c a p t u r i x unit. d l 1
det ai nees are accorded t ho sau t r e a t mn t as pri soners of
war unt i l t h e i r s t at us i sdetermined.
b.
Capturing unit di s ar m, searches, si l ences, and segregates
pri soners i nt o groups: offi cers, noncominiesionod of f i cer s ,
enl i s t ed Zen, dopsndents, ret urnsas, and suspscts. RYa
wi l l not be al l omd t o eat , dri nk, o r smle pr i or t o i nt er -
rogat i on by IPW pr s onnel unl ess t h e l engt h of tim3 would
make such pr act i ce i n h mm.
c. The capt uri ng uni t t ags each person with a Captive Card
(MACV FOITI 340).
d. Wounded and ser i ousl y illcapt i ves are evacuated through md-
i c a l channels. Inforrat i on on l ocat i on of t he medical
f a c i l i t y t o which tho captive isevacuated isreport ed t o
t he Division Ar t i l l er y S2 a s a spot report .
e. Handling of capt i ves wi l l te i n accordance with t he pro-
vi si ons of t he Geneva t r eat l es .
7. MAPS.
a. Div Arty S2 has s t a f f r e s p n s i b i l i t y f o r di s t r i but i on and
at orage of naps.
b. Requests f o r maps o r a e r i a l photographs w i l l be processed by
t he Div Arty S2. These request s m y be made t el ephoni cal l y
o r by wri t i ng. DS Ar t i l l er yuni t s obt ai nmaps through
Brigade S2.
8. C0UNTERINTELLIC;ENCE.
a. Complete operat i ons orders #ill not be car r i ed forward of
bat t er y posi t i ons. Forward observers, airobservers, and
l i a i s onpar t i es w i l l u t i l i z e need t o know ext ract s.
b. A l l i ns t al l at i ons w i l l be searched pr i or t o evacuation t o
insura no pri nt ed material, ammi t i on, o r itoms usable
by t he enemy a r e l e f t behind. Whensver possi bl e, post
evacuation searchw i l l be by C I personnel assigned t o t he
MID. Speci al car s should be t aken t o m i d l eavi ng any
t ype of dr ybat t er i es , cormunication wire, food, and metal.
A l l C r at i on cans should be perforat ed and fl at t ened.
c. Known or suspected l os s o r compromise of cl as s i f i ed l eat eri al
w i l l be i medi nt el yreported t o t he Div Arty SL.
9. REPORTS.
a. Spot Report. By telephone or over t he Div Arty I nt el l i gence
Net. Reports answer t he questions WHO, WHAT, UHEN,WBX!3,
HW and WHY.
I
.-.-.
Americal Div!ision ~rtillery
Republic of Vietnam
1 December 1967 "
Annex C (Personnel and Administration) t o Arnerical Division Ar t i l l er y SOP
1. REFEXl!3CES:
' a. Americal Division Fi el d SOP.
, b. USARV Regulation 614-30.
c. USARV Regulation 360-81 .
d. Americal Division Regulation 22-1.
e. America1 Division Regulation 27-20.
f. Americal Division Regulation 335-6.
g. Americal Division R e ~ l a t i o n 690-5.
h. America1 Division Regulation 6'72-1 .
i . Americal Division Repulation 630-1.
3. Americal Division Repulation 28-1
k. Americal Division R e ~ l a t i o n 230-60.
1. Arnerical MvSsi on Repulatiop 60-5.
rr.. Pmerical Division Bepl at i on 670-5.
n. Americal DivSsi on Repulation 385-8.
o. Americal Divjsion Regulation 355-10.
2. PURPOSE.
To prescri be pol i ci es and procedures f o r conduct of personnel
and admi ni st rat i ve servi ceswithin Americal Division Ar t i l l er y.
3. CEFFAAL.
I n order t o minimize administrative t r a f f i c of troops t o t he
r ear CP, mobile AG and finance teams rdllbe provided periodi-
cal l yor on an on-call basi s. Sfs and per s onxl ser f eant s can
reduce t h i s adni ni st rat i ve t r a f f i c by frequent v i s i t s t o the
forward areas.
4. NAINTENANCE OF STREWGTH.
a. Mass Casualty Reportinp. Sj xt Casualty Reports d l 1 be sub-
mi t t ed i m-edi at el yfollowingat t acks producinf mass casu-
- a l t i e s i n t he uni t s (bat t ery s i ze or l ar ger ) t o t he Arnerical
Div'si on GI. Format f or report s w i l l be USARV Form 1'73 o r 173-1.
An information copy of a l l spot casual t y r epor t s w i l l be provided
immediately t o the Division Ar t i l l er y Sf. (see P.merical Division
Fi el d SOP). .
b. Casualty Reports. (See P.merica1Division Fi el d SOP). Information
copy of casual t y report s t oDivjsi cn Ar t i l l er y S1 ASAP. Accuracy
must be emphasized. A not at i onw i l l be made thereon of any pend-
i ngawards f o r deceased or wounded personnel.
c. Replacements. (see A~e r i c a l Division Fi el d SOP). Req~l i si t i ons f o r
replacements f or separat ea r t i l l e r y bat t al i ons w i l l be processed
through Divisi on AG.
d. Strenpth Reports. (see Pmerical Division Fi el d SOP). An informatior
Cory of a a i l y s t r e n ~ t h repclrts w i l l be submitted t o Djvision
Ar t i l l er y S1 NLT 0930 hours dai l y. Norninp Reports w i l l be
C- 1
CANCEL1,ATION DATE OF PROTECTIVE
MARKING FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CANNOT BE P R Z DE ~ I UN~
' submitted through ~r e v i o u s l y est abl i shed channels.
. DISCIPLINE, LAW A& ORDER.
a. Commanders ar e responsible t o properly or i ent newly assigned
personnel concerning t hei r expected high standards of con-
duct and di sci pl i ne. Iti s considered t hat as a minimu!!
t h i s or i ent at i on should include information on t he l ocal
customs, proper conduct toward t he ci vi l i an population, and
t he r ol e of t he US Army i n RVN. This or i ent at i on w i l l b&
given by t he bat t er y comnander and w i l l meet a l l requirements
of US,QRVRegulation 360-81.
b. Ylilitary J us t i ce.
( 1)
See Amerj.ca1Division Repl at i on 22-1.
( 2) Claims processed IAWAmerical Division Re,gul.ation 27-20. ,
(3)
Legal assi st ance-and servi ces w i l l be provided by teams
from t he SJA Americal Division t r avel l i ng t o t he f i e l d
on anannounced basi s.
c. Provost l hr shal . See America3 Division 3eeul at i on 335-6.
6 . PERSONYEL VANAGEbXNT.
a. US Ki l i t ar y Personnel.
( 1 ) Persohnel Actions. A l l 1049s t o i ncl ude r equest s f or
extension, or curtailment of forei gn servi ce t ours,
ITTS or ot her t r ans f er s w i l l be processed t hr u parent
organi zat i ons.
(2)
Hotiitinp personnel w i l l be ret urned t o parent uni t base
camps a t l e a s t one week pr i or t o DEROS. In-country
t r anspor t at i on w i l l be coordinated through Division AG.
b. I ocal Nationa'l Personnel.
( 1) Ci vi l i an Personnel. Bat t al i ons w i l l submit requirements
tsAmerical Division GI.
(2) Imprest Fund. Americal Division Regulation 690-5.
(3) I nt er pr et er Control.. (see Americal Division Fi el d SOP).
7. GIiAVES FBGISTRATION. See Anierical Division Fi el d SOP.
8. MORALE: AND PERSOWJZL SERVICES.
a, Finance. See Pmerical Division Fi el d SOP..
. be Awards and Decorations. Americal Division Regulation 672-1.
c. Leaves. Anerical Division Repl at i on 630-1.
d. her pency and Compassionate Leaves,. Einergency and compas-
si onat e l eaves willbe processed through h ' r i c a l Division
AG sect i on. Personnel, with approved emerpency or compas-
si onat e l eaves w i l l d e p r t f or CONUS from DA NANG.
e. Speci al Pervices.
( 1) h'ovies: Anerical 16~mmovie accounts w i l l be est abl i shed with
. .
t he Americal Divi.sion Speci al Servi ces Offi cer,
.(2)
A&R and ot her s r e c i d servi ces equipnent w i l l be drawn from
t he A-.~erical Division Speci al Servi ces Offi cer.
f. Chaplain. America1 Divjsion Fi el d SOP.
EXH I BIT D-34
--
.3..
TO: C(-)r;3DEDZ. lSTG:i1!2ii' ib:'L) LZIL.iLDY
(CGLIRUcj
COP3l3 PIj.3, !-T;I i kr ' .;)I; C'.IZ P!fS ( CO' G~ I ~ Z~ )
Cc), l9&T:! LT .?Tt. jl'- 3t: :CobxLbZ)
Cu, 1932dLI2;:' f ,.LA2 ,;I: U I (Zf'akij d.
COP AiGKICAL $I\';LEV, Xl?LAIfC0LkIEii)
COPPGLULS ST'? C,-2, C:iU L,I (~c);l~Lk!!)
CO, U T SkDli, 1Si' C- J , :IT& 29 (Ci)UltUR)
CO, UTd AL'Li Ls,CLiC L.41 [ c o U , - ~ Y )
Iln.0: CG,.l!LTd L X k F EELj>.Fi*F L K GP), CdU LiI
(COWX4)
1
1. (FOUO) 4rie foEek,%ngdataise.,!.;zc:ed S x mAu~pe.?dk9
I ( ~e pur t s ).toAnne,: .A aperatio.?^) tcref 1.-r i:Z?.%tion arrd cos-
I priancc:
I
r e Spot Reports:
I
.
! I- -r,w,*JAf .Kg3-;ii'5 *Q.E . .
I 1
t--
----
g :
-----
.
. .
G. '
21
i
LTC-GS
CLIIT&; L. Gk%?;C;Lk, JR,
1
1 , :
...
-.:! ' -;.
.
..,
-
---- r.--- - .-.-- .-.- -.-
,, f.,.. - . : z a - 4 , K2,Z 3-r-F
ACoPS, C3 .// A . li,iii.;;inTA, CPT, AGC, ASST bBG j
-48";
-- -- - ------'.
: <! ,
..- -- . --..- ,-.-.. ..--.-.-..-------
,:;~!.?ic+4
.-- -
'-..!>. Td :-A!:> ' .,-*SF.'= . r . , TRbKi ; L*
... EXHIBIT M-69
. .
U N C L A S S I F I a D
j;kne/ ,;y
3 . i I 4 . v c r i7G
743
a-
7-
I
(2) Submittkg uni t : a l l its
(3) ~ e t h a i qft;;insxisd n: f i st f i at .m.~r.st o b3 (Toc)
(4)hmarks: sub!ilit witilmt delay ~ f - r i ~ c i d e n toccurs
cr be c os s h~cwn.
b* Hourly SI TI ~P:
1 Fonsat: i
a
i
..
' <
(a)
Line1- bitidentificilt:lz.l -. unit, SITREP as
. . . ..
ofhour.
7 :9 I
i
-
(b) Uke 2- Centercf::izss c i e<ch cmpariy si ze
J
4
cnnn,oed h n ! prevl ouss' repwt ,
..
. '
Line 3 c ~ n k t - coo:dinates
(c)
- Poi nt s offr5~~jjlj-
i
(d) Line 4 - C c m d locatiw, . . - cnan~esinCPloca-
+;ians.
(e) Line 5 - Actices 6i:za Zast~upcx-t;actions anti -
cipated fornext, hour,
3 . (U) Spotreports v&ll be=endereci; w t a.&imm, on the
/'
I ;
. .
Irritial cmt act withan ena:x:,r farce..
. .
..
1'
. ..
.
...
.,
.
. .
1
.
,. .. , ..
..
- & . ' " ; ~ > ~ ~ :
.--.-- --
:t:>. 1 : ;;'1
'"fl;rlCATIOK
! ;-:-.:. ,
-.--.-. -...- /
!
- - . - - . .
2' , L;....
.
;
-.-..-
? :
-.-.--I-.-- - . - .- -- . , -.--,--
.'.I
F ~ A I ~ I ! ' .! ~ q . i ~ ~ t KT1 0 7 i 5 ! ;:i . Ll ci l 7:' C;AjjiFICATIO>I
.
>
/
I U ? i C L a S S I F I h U
----- -- . - - - f.
.
- ---.-
!:sXxy f Cr A ?
,75-I
?.W, l r or n
i-
1 ,LN :5
74 +?:~..- . -.1...---., -.-. --. ...-
- 0 n
.--i
- .-- ,. ... ..:- .. t :.I:'. .
,
..
.
.---.- - .- - - .---.-. .- - -.
-I
. -
-
-.. -.- . .-
1
._-. , - . - . . --.
----- . ____-I ..---. - - - - - - .
As3Xr $I AnO f,>1),T ?E?>?1.;
;W. t U I i V (1ASSlFIC47lC%
;,4z5!.!
I
apd,lcr CQNilNUATiO" !CHEET
D N C L A S S I F I A D
!
.
-----.-.
. 1
-.--.---
-i
K, KaiiZbL'fA, CPT,.CC
I
!
s. Heavy f r i e ndl y orc i \ i l i an csuw;tlcz wcuriri ir.a 7
short wriorl c1ti.=,
3. (U) Spot repceLsw i l l not I.=. d9k.x.': p k i r c o??tain2.~
d d i t i c n e l i n l m~ a d o n ~ xi t h rueh i ~ f ~ r -
I
but. w i l l bere52srcd yroxpt:;~
d
'rr3tion 38yay ba available, P.ercrtn ell be c?xi.;222tdor co,-rect,d as
additi-1 infornation becowskr.;~.:~.
ST
, .
4
,>
i
I
I
,tP
i. ..-- -- . ..
---
T i ,...2T-cT--..-----.. --.---
,..7 a MC!:Ai-E !DZNT!FICAIION IN^rlC.1 i
,,.J.R3L ;a:
1""'"
-- - -..- --.--.
?
.
__. ........ --.- - . ---...- ----
- !ECL'Rm CLA55IF!f*TqC;td
ZZ:Mlhh!G I USmf f I OXS
7 4 b . - - - .
M
PRIORITY
CG,TFOREGON,CHULAI,RVN
CG,1STBDE,lOlSTABNDIV,DUCPHO,RVN Copiesfor:
CIS
CG,196THIN' BDE(LT), CHUMI, RVN G3
G1
CO,3DBDE,25THINFDIV,W C PHO,RVN Arty
CO,TFOREGONARTY,CHULAI,RVN
INFO: CO,3DBN,16THARTY,CHULAI,RVN
CO,3DBN,18THARTY,CHULAI,RVN
CO,2DBN,llTHARTY,DUCPHO,RVN
CO,2DBN,9THARTY,DUCPHO,RVN
CO,3DBN,82DARTY,CHULAI,RVN Concurrence:
CO,2DBN,320THARTY,DUCPHO,RVN 63
SUBJECT: DoubleCheckProceduresforArtilleryUnits(U)
KNOWLESSENDSFORMATHESON,LINNELL,WEARAND YOUNG
Clearedfor
1. ThecounterinsurgencyenvironmentinVietnamrepresentsa Dispatch:-*
continuingchallengetoartilleryunitstorenderaccurate,responsive,
reliablefirewithoutinjuringfriendlytroopsornon-combatants.
DetailedinstructionsareincludedintheTFOREGONFieldSOP(Appen-
dix4,FireSupportCoordinationtoAnnexA,(Operations)andtheTI?
OREGONArtilleryFieldSOP. Compliancewiththesedirectivesis July 1967
essential. 1 4
/s/MasonJ.YoungJr.
/t/MASONJ. YOUNGJR.
Colonel,Artillery ls10.A. CernerJr.,CPT,AGC,AsstAG
Commanding 1tlO.A.CERNERJR.,CPT,AGC,AsstAG
74 'i'
. . ..- ;. . . . . . .
. .
t i , , a -.-..-
\
. . . . .
..
. . .. ..
. : ..
...
. .
- .-..
-
.,
. r ~ : . .:
L,:J. i,, ,.j z c c
:<.:-:'-;.i.'-:.:-;- -.-- a d ; - i,2 -
.-
.
.
..:._ .I
.
- .-
,. ,,,:,-:,-
.,
-
.,:.
.a
.-
,..
.
.,
.
.
,,
.,
..
:..
c.r:i
,::.Fir_?
c . ;
... . - > .<.
.;::.:> ..,-,--
.,
;L ;,. ..,- .,!?:
, ,
- - : , . ; ,
I'/.' *Reg No. 1-3
HmDQUARTERS
llTH JIWANTRY BRIGADE
APO San Francisco 96557
31 March 1967
ADMINISTRArnON
Reporting of Serious Incidents
.1.-. PURPOf33: This regulation est abl i shes procedmes and respon- '
s i bi l i t y t o i nsure prompt and uniform report i ng of seri ous i nci dent s i n-
volving 11t h Infant ry Brigade equipment, personnel' and t he i r dependents
when such i nci dent s ar e not reportable a s "Blue Bell" under t he provi-
si ons of Brigade Regulation 1-1.
2. INCIDENTS TO BE mPORTED: An incident which adversely af f ect s
community or public r el at i ons and may r es ul t i n derogatory press, radio
or t el evi si on coverage on a l ocal or nat i onal l evel , or r ef l ect s adversely
on t he capabilLty and effect i veness of t he U.S. Army w i l l be reported.
'Pypes of i nci dent s t o be reported include:
a. Deaths from ot her than nat ur al causes t o include deaths of
foreign nat i onal personnel when U.S. Army personnel .or equipment ar e
involved.
b. Burglary, robbery and mu-hiny.
c. Suicides and attempted suicides.
d. Sel f i nf l i ct ed gunshot wounds.
e. Mass escape from U.S. Amy confinement f a c i l i t i e s .
f. Aggravated assaul t s when aommitted againsAa foreign national.
g.
Terroriist a c t i vi t i e s involving U. S. personnel and/or U. S.
Government property.
h. Any incident meeting t he c r i t e r i a of paragraph 5b, l l t h
Infant ry Brigade Regulation 1-1("BLUE BELL" Reports, RCS CSOCS-62) and
not considered report abl e a s a "BLUE BELL" under t he provisions of AR 1-55.
3.
REPORTIHG PROCEDLmES WI l XI N THE llTH INFANTRY BRIGADE:
a. I nci de- ~t sreported as "Blue Be l l " uhde r t he provisions of
l l t h Infant ry Brigade Regulation 1-1w i l l not be addi t i onal l y reported as
a seri ous i nci dent .
- -- -
-his regul at i on supersedes Regulation No. 600-3,HQ, l l t h Inf Bde, 26 Oct 66.
EXHIBIT
Reg No.. 1-3
b. During duty hours t he person first receiving information on
a serious incident w i l l immediately bring it t o t he di r ect at t ent i on of:
(1)
3Srigade Sl , or i f not present,
(2) Adjutant General.
c. The responsible person a s l i s t ed above wi l l noti* Head-
quart ers, USARHAW a s soon as possible af'ter t he occurrence.of a. report abl e
incident, but no l a t e r than ei ght hours t hereaft er. During' duty hours,
r epor t s . wi l l be forwarded t o t he Office of t he Provost Marshal, Head-
quarters, USARI-@\l.
d. The 11th Infant ry Brigade St aff Duty of f i cer wi l l be not i fi ed
during non-duty hours, who w i l l i n-t urn not i fy USARHAW St aff Duty Officer.
e. I n i t i a l Reports:
(1) Reports ( a s i ndi ci at ed i n Inclosure 1 ) ar e required from
t he reporting uni t s a s soon a s possible a f t e r t he reportable incident.
occurs, but not l a t e r than ei ght hours a f t e r occurrence. I n those cases
where a death, from ot her than nat ural causes occurs a t some time subse-
quent t o t he incident, t he reporting requirements of t hi s regulation w i l l
be followed.
(2) Speed i n t ransmi t t i ng i n i t i a l report s i s stressed.
Reports w i l l not be delayed awaiting t he recei pt of addi t i onal informa-
t i on or t he r es ul t s o$' investigation. Rep.orts may be made by telephone;
however, a ' mi t t en report w i l l be submitted t he following duty day.
(3) I n those cases i n which f oul play i s not probable (such
as suicides or acci dent al deaths) and i n a l l other cases when suffi ci ent
information i s avai l abl e t o i ndi cat e corrective act i on has been accomplished,
t he i n i t i a l and f i na l report s may be combined. I n these instances paragraph
13, of t he combined report, w i l l contain a statement t o t he ef f ect t hat "no
Aucther report w i l l be submitted on t he incident unless l a t e r investigation
warrant st'.
f. Supplementary Reports :
(1)
Supplementary report s wi l l be submitted a s information
becomes avai l abl e and, a s a minimum, each 45 days until final act i on has
been completed an? r. terminal report i s submitttd..
(2) 'Phese r.eports wi l l r ef l ect t he current s t at us of t he
incident, personnel involved, and, i n appl i cabl e. cases, changes i n l ocal
public reactions or at t i t udes.
Reg No. 1-3
g. Terminal' Reparts :
(1) Terminal. reports will be submitted lnrmediately upon
completion of apprrvpriate action.
(2) Termha1 reports w i l l include t he following:
(a) Report of any disciplinary action taken against
-psrsonnel involved.
(b) Corrective administrative action taken t o 2reclude
a similar-type incident.
h. Reports submitted under t he provisions of t hi s regulation are
unclassffied except when t he nature of t he incident requires classification.
i. Instructions or Standingoperating Procedures -1ementing
t he procedures outlined i n t hi s regulation w i l l be sulnnitted t o this
headquarters., A m ; n PE.
b. USARHAW Reg No. 1-55.
c. U f MH A W Reg No. 1-10
FOR !ME C O ~ E R :
1I ncl C. KAS=UM
as MAJ, AGC
Adjutant General
DISTRIBrnON :
B plus
. 2 - CG, USARHAW, AT!CN: AG
5 - CINCUSARPAC, A m : GPAG
FORMAT FOR REPORTING SERIOUS INCBIrnS
m!rIALREPORTS
1. Security cl assi fi cat i on.
2. Date of report.
a. Cite symbol "serious Incident."
b. ..ReporbsControl SumbolPPE-22(~2).
. - .
- I
3.5 Nature of incident. A synopsis, t o Snclude such'fact ual ' data' .'
available a t time of reporting as t he answers t o what, how and why. . .
. . - . .
. .
4. PGce where incident occurred. Report exact location; using
identifiable:.A.andmarks,miles t o nearest town, ci t yor village.
Do not
report location by map coordinates. : ' '
. .
' ..
.
.
.
. . .
.. i .
' '
5. Date of incident.
6. , . Personuel involved
:.a.: .:Military: Name,. graae, senrlcenumber,secur i t y clearance,
duty'assignment, organization and station.
b. Civilian:
. . '
(1) DA:. Name, grade, position, security clearance rind
st at i on. assignment.
. .
(2) Individual: Name and address.
(3) Business firm: mame and addPess.
(4) Dependents overseas: mane, locationand sponsor.
. . .
, . . .
7. .source of:' ~slformationi': . .
. ..
. .
. . .
8. Any otherpertinent canrments t o include, but not limited t o:
a. Degree of access t o cl assi fi ed information of those involved
when relevant t o incident.
b. Agencies investigating.
c. DisposLtion of remains.
I ncl 1 t o MeReg 1-3, 31March 1967
7 5 4
d. Locatiofi '03confinement.
e. Bail establishment.
f. Proposed actions, ei t her administrative or judicial.
9. An opinion as t o whether widespread or continuing l ocal publicity
of a derogatory nature can be expected.
10. Statement as t o whether or not t he incident mig;ht embarrass or
otherwise be of concern t o t he Department of Defense, Department of t he
Army, or USARPAC. If affirmative, st at e t he reason(s).
ll. ' Notification: . 02 or Intelligence, Officer (as appropriate) (has)
(has not) been apprised of t h i s incident.
12. Name, grade and st at i on of commander making t he report t o '
USARPAC.
SWP- REPORTS
-
Pertinent Mo mt i o n submitted i n t he sameformat as I n i t i a l Reports.
Pertinent information submitted i n t he same format as I ni t i a l and
Supplementary Reports. A paragraph 13 w i l l be added t o each terminal
report or combined report submitted pursuant t o t he provisions of para-
graph 3e(3) of t h i s regulation as follows: "NO furt her report w i l l be
submitted on t h i s incident unless l at er investigation warrants. "
NOTE: When t here is no information t o be reported in a paragaph, t he
term "NA"w i l l be used.
. . . .
I ncl 1t o Bde Reg 1-3, 31 March 3967
Rmpls OF. WGAGEIRRT (u)
l. - (U) Ruposer Thig mgulatlcm establisher cr i t ar l a for an@&krg
target8 bp di rect snd indirect fire i n c o h t o ~ t i e n r ,
2, (U) Scope: Apnlicabb t o a l l canbat and mf@up& unit8
msigned, attached or in emmort of the 11th Ugh%Id Me.
a, Indiscrimintltim in eragaghi tatgoto t hat a m not alearu
d e f i e d as being hostile which resul t i n rnmmnm -battle catmaltier
and pmextr loss ell tend t o imbitter the ~ ~ b u l a t i o n Mb make tho la^
term goal of paciflcat,ioa mom di fffcul t and oo&lf,
b, The O C P A eml oi t inoideslts of n m b a t a n t caazaltler
and ~rq,ertydestruction by Froe World Forces to allenate the peopls
fram the government,
c. Thi s si t uat i on crest- an snviranent not normally foMd an
the bat t l e field.. Commandere muut we #Hmd w v t when deteradnty
the type and amount of caub~t pomr in accoawlishlnq a miss la^, Wicuhrc
ly in popuhted areas, so a8 t o preclude wooer killm on a target whi&
could result i n unnecesesry non-battle c a d t i 3 8 and proprty d-,
d. Nothing shall inirlnge on the r i ght of a caPmMder to
exercise self defense. 'f%9 c o d e r mu& take h e d i a t e action a*&
an sttackins force wlth all available mans i n unpopulnted area, how-
ever, ev?m possible safeward short of endangering f'riendly Uvea wi l l
be ueed t o avoid nan-combstant casualties and indifferent and i n d i e
criminate destruction of ~r i v a t e property when such action is being
conriu=ted in populated areas.
he ( C ) Pmplogment of smcrl l arms and automatic weapons:
a e Individual and crew. served weawne t o Include: M-16, M-60,
M-79, MIA1 claymore, M-26 grenade, 50 cal MG, 9GM and 106RR may be
employed by colranand ere against:
(1) Enemy personnel observed with wesoone who demonutrate
hostile l nhnt either taking a h.iendly unit under fi re, - taking
evasive action, or who occu~y a firing position or bunker.
EXHI BI T D-7
(2) Targets which are observed and positively i dent i fi ed aa
'=emye
(3) Point target8 fim which f i r e l a being reoeivsd. (This
wi l l not be conatrued ae ~enni ssi on f or i ndi mr l mhat r firing into areas
inhabited by nan-combatantcr ),
( 4) Suspected enem lacatims when non-ocnrbatants wlll not
be endangered,
bo Artillery, mortar, naval gunfire, t act i cal air and alrmsd
bl i oopt ere:
(1) General; Restriatitw contml should be applied only
t o Inmt hat danger to nan-oonrbatmts and private property is kewt t o
the ~ 4 mmlnbmm Md that nat1ma.l basderr are not violated, W r
gunnery t schi ques wlU be amlied t o insure ateudm\rm accurscy a8 this
is tb bast aasurmce agrPinst endangering non-eanbatante, and private
P ~ Y *
(a) Exoludve of populated are-, .tambeenred rircsa
may be direated againat enemy fbrces In contact In eecordance wlth normal
procedures. When not in cmt act unobeerved flre wlll be directed #rly in
areas dechrsd host i l e by GVN/RVNAF/IWW authorftiese
(b) Unobserved naval gunflre wi l l - not be emploged
when there Is a means of oberermtim lee., NGLO, FAC, o r artillery
observer.
(a) Specifled st r i ke zones must. be a ~ ~ r o v e d by GVNWAP
as ap~r opr i a te.
(b) Unohsermd flrss t o include naval gunfire may be
directed against a l l t ar get s and t ar get areas located within s pc i f l e d
strike zones.
(4) Uninhabited areas outside specifled st r i ke zones:
(a)
Fire may be d i r e c t d against -VC/IJPA Forcqs in aaabat.
(b) Unobserved fires m y be directed ~t trsrqets and
t a r ~ e t areas, other t h m 71C/NVA Forcos i n contact on
with Province Chief,
ni s t r i c t Chief, ,%ct,orComsndor, or Sub-sector Comnanclsr ng pr ~ f a l * as
s~prop?i4ta..(thkeinaludcs l l t h - h i t Bde Recon Zone).
(c) Observedf h m y be directed againsttarget8 of
oowrtunitv which are cl earl y d e f i e d as hootile withoqt obtainingapproval fm
Province Chief, Di st r i ct Chiaf, Sectm Camnmder, or Su b md o r CnwunAer.
(d) *ppropriati R P P ~ C ~chief, Ms t r i c t chief, %&or
Ccmancior, or gub-sector Comnander approval is required .betfore directing
f%re on t.areste of op~ortunit, y not c l e a r l ~. i da nt i f l s d sshostile.
( 5 ) Vi l l aws snd hamlets: Pi re mimions directed mot
knownor sumectecl VC/NVA target6 in vi l l ages end hamlets occupied by
non-combatants willbe conducted as follows:
(a) A l l euch firendssiatls will be cantrolled by an
obaorver andwillbe executed onlvwlth Province Chief or 9i ot r i ct Chief
approval ae aporopriate.
(b) V i l l s p s ani haralds not associated with maaswor of
groundforce6 Wi l l not be fl red upon wi t hod pri or warning & l eafl et and/or
loud wa k e r swtenm or by other means, ewn thou* isrecslped fbn fb?
them.
(c) Villages andhamlrste rmry be attacked without polio?
warning if t he at t sck is In c m ~ t i o n wlth a qramd wrBfla~1inmlving
mansuver of ground forces thmugh t he area,and ifin t he wgemenf of t he
g r n d commander, N s mission wnulcl be jeopardirsc\ b7ouch
as
epeciflsd i n (b) above.
(d) The use of incemdiplrlv type axnmmitim will be avoin-
ed unlnsla abaolutelv nscessarv tar,oucaeesful accom~ehment of t he misrim,
(e) pollming crit,eria w i l l be ueed again& knmor
suspected anmy t ar get s inamas oocupiefl bv ncm-mmbatantd:
10mfl rea - no c b s e r than500 mehers olus 4rMlp Ws (pmb errors).
1 5 W fires - no closer than g00 mt e r s plus 4 range ISm ( ~ m bermra).
8" 6( 175MM f i r e s - no cl cser than 1 0meters plus 4 range PEs (pmb emr #) .
(f)
Fires w i l l be placed no closer than 200 metsrs of
mv main~aver l~ 8 d .
When target,^ ardlocated on or.near a rnad VTf'Uae
willbeused tothema&m extent possible.
d. T h e FYm Zones!
A l l t arget s may bs engageda t anytime by
any f i r e deliverymans available t c ? thecnmsder .
e. No Pirs Zone:
No f l r i ne permitted by anywespon without
pri or apnrovrsl Prom t hi s badquar t er s.
f. Pacified Areas:
(1) Units may conduct cordan and aearoh at m e s t or 4 t h
a~pr ovalof the di s t r i ct or village dhief and t he appPQPPl of t h l b bad-
warters. VN of f i ci al s arxl/or advibar p e r m e l ar st aa0-y US Forcer
on such an operation.
(2) C d e r s will exerciw utmorrt earn to l nma wdnum
non-canbat ant casualties and property damage,
(3) W e discipline w i l l be etrictAv o b v e d . Ruler of
engagement and tvpes of weapons t o be used w i l l be caordinatad by t he
cmmnder and sector/eub-sector &visor, ii posribls, prior t o cammclng
t he operation.
a.
Commanders a t a l l echelcna w i l l p h gd conduct operaMars
in accordance with t h i s directive,
6, (C) Mlscellaneau8:
a. Imediatel, , follcming the attack of area6 inhabited by nar-
canbatants, the forco comnander will insure that an explanation is given
t o t he ~oprrlace of t he need f or flring, i t ressl ng the point t4at tb
en- fbrced t he action.
5, If non-caubatant casualties occur regardless of safeguardr,
medicaltrebtment and emuat i an should be provided by the rerrpansible
comander, subject t o t act i cal considerations ' and resource8 avedlable,
c, Destruction of fort i fi ed villagee, structures in VC baee
camps, or structures t hat are obviously VC flghting poritions is auth-
orized without a~provcslfrom t hi e headquarters,
d,
Coordination must be made with ARVN/civilian aut hori t i as t o
determine the exact hour of curfew. Movement outaids of t he me d i a t e
perimeter af t er those hours will be conatrue4 as hostile.
Villagers
nay move around within confines of a vi l l pge after curfew, therefore,
this mud be taken i nt o consideration i f a unit is located adjacent to a
village.
e,
Indivirluals t hat appear t o be attempting to. escape o r evade
may be frfghtend, innocent civtliana.
The corm~M.er on the s i t e muat
exercise judgment a s t o whethsr t o engRge these inctivirluals or not. Thg
commancler mud base hi s decisions on his wor al l knowledge of t he area,
situation, mission, enrl safety of hi s ccmEu~d,
f, Persnnnel who attempt t o evade and areidentif'i& asmembers
of MI A or VC Forcer bythe wearhe of a Uniform, web gear or mck and/or
have possession of a wapnn m y be engaeed,
$Pewattempt w i l l be made t o
halt these pereonnsl by' gyting the ~cmnemdhalt ( n ~ n ~ h i ) Md f l r i g
h i n g shotsoverhead. I f attempt8 t o hal t evading oersonnel f a i l they
wlllthen be engapd by Mre wi t h Intent t o mund byf i r i ng a t lower
extremities. The wound& c n~t i ve , wi l l then be treated d evacuated aa
rapidly as possible for emloitation of lntelllgence he maypossese,
g, Hanewer or f i r e supb&-t elomate willnot expand the Bde
A0 without apprcval of t hi s headquarters: pr i m coorrllnatic?n with the
ad3acent A0 ccrlrmander; and America1 Division Hsdquarters, wl l l be made
by
h, Perimeter eefenm (as opposed t o a maneuvering force),
(1) A perem not belonging t o any Free World kmwi Force
observed carrylng sueamn wl 1 1 be hnediatoly engagerl. It mst 6q-
rernmbered t hat within the ~ ~ r l c a l AO thereare FrDTeamewhich have
civllian personnel assign@, These ci vi l i ans who belongt o GVN,normally
wear blackpajamas andare legally am& with carbine8 . These personnel
~dl l not beenga*, Coodination with Ms t r l ct Chiefs of the area is
directed in olYIer t o aaertain identification of, and how t o identlf'y
theee personnel.
(2)Anyperson attempting toenterthe perimeter by&her
than reco~yliaed routes willbe challenged, aoarehended, or identified as
enqv and~ 2 1 1be engaged immediately.
(3) Unidentifhd mrsonnel insidethe perimeter w i l l not be
Mred on unless positively identifled as enemy.
A l l measures wlllbe
taken t o establish Ident i t y of personnel, i.e., challenging, apprehension
of unidentified persons, sealing andsearching t he area, andsounding the
alert.
FOR THECCMMANDYR:
MAJ, Inf
Adjutant
Distribution: A
525-1
D w m OFmARMY
Hcmdquartere, 1 t t h Infantry Brigade,h r i c a l ~ v b l a n
k f O SenFranciaco 96217
Cbnge 1 10 April1968
Regulation
11thInfantryBrigadeRegulation 52bl , dated 22 Mar68, i s changedas
follows:
(c) Unob8ervedf i e 8 willnot be
firedcloser than 1OOO netem tonon-ccnnbatanf- aririendly trooplocations
whenengagingharm or suspected targets. Theanly exceptiont o thispolicy
ieasoutUned i n paragraph 5, conPidentia1 letter,America1 Division,
SubJectt eauatermortar andCounterrocket Ma.ures (D), dated 29 Msr68.
Page 4, paragraph &(5)(e).
( ~u~e~ceded)
Major,Infantry
AdJut ~nt
CROUP 4
Darngraded at 3 Year Intervals
Deolasalfied A F t e r 12 Yeara
I EPAR' l YmT OFTH!I A M 81,BdeReg52%
H 4 A ~ ~ ~ l R ~ i l S , INFANTRY IRI^II.l.Y! ll'J'?l
@-POS w Francisco 9621'
BrigadeReguJation 525-1,t hi s headquarters, 30 January 1968, i s
changed as foliowa:
4. (c) of ~ p l o ~ n t smallarms andautamatic weamns.
f. * * u
(2) (superseded) Commandersall exercise utplbst care
t o insureminimum rum-combatant o a d t i e s and pronerty damage.
mmH R. n m m
MJ,Tnf
!.dJut ant
- . * > -
-----
.Jr.u;gkir~ms
urn 32;FItzx;a DFUGIWE
h'm Sm Franciisco ,96355
Trabdng I. ~man<un
3S!j-2
z~uciyxosa111T&IUR;
1,
(C) Turpase: To prescribe poE.cias 2nd guidance f or units of
this cw8rri;pndin? l a m u and concluctiii a p1:asoc'. ii+country t r a h i r g .
prozrarl af t er arrival of the Brigade i - a i t ~Body c?'b h c Pho, fWl,
2,
(C) Scope: W s Trai~dngiiemorancb~, i sapplicable t oa l l unite
assigned or attachecl -Lo e. . s heaclqualbrs arid peFtains to 9l cUvA. U and
uni t -trainingrcquiraimn%sdurh~p;We f b s t * days of the Brigade in
the Ulc Pho areae
3, (C). 1.2Lssion:
a,
The llth hPzntryB a a & trainingmission i s.Lo a.ttain a
.mxbm st at e of combat readinessin an h b m m amount of time w i t h
rmjor empl~asistoirard tacti cal conditions aa encoilntercd in 1.ClZ,
b. Upon cm-detion of *he program t h e Uth mant r y
Brigade Nil1asmae the rrl3ssion of operatine in t he h c Pho .AOa
11. ( U) i ksyonsi bi l i t i es:
a.
3d Brigade bth Infantry I)ivieion ~rlllprovide assistance in
v
the conckct of train&,
a
b,
3 a t Wi o n and separateunit corI~mlders Kill develap a detailed
t r a i n i n g pmZreJa based on t he ,&hcc provided int h i s traiiling rnefiiora~bn,
I.copy of witt r a i ni ngprozrms ;Jill be for~r&.ecl t o this head--aariiers,
-
c, Brigac1.c :.'3 nonitor a?d supervise t3ie c~i l dactof all
t;-cainLn.: aild w i l l assist co1,3sanclcrsin sciied.uling specialized tr-g
not 1ril21inutlit capabili.i;ics.
( t e r r &~and ~.rcot;~cr),
, a. Individuals mcl Juni or. Leaders
/
(1) hines and booby tr2.p~.
(2) 2:eal.i;h and Senitation, ..
(3)
f-ctionsnecessary .Lo COi,e :;ii;h envii-omen.t ol" irietnaa
I ( I ! )
IndivicI.ut3. ac.(;;ions relztive -Lo Civic ActionJ i;~edcq
--
.u:8 P ~ c h o l ~ , p . $ ~ ~ l F;;aLions.
~nl oy11ent ol" q.use of protective illask,
( 6;
aq%..,%d
ccc:~-serve~l WeWons,
Fanili?zc&%a~$ion;~niyc.+l,. . ..::+: . . -
to include ~ ~ n i e n ~ c e . a
(7) ~dntenanoe of inZiivf. d~~al andoi ~ani zat i onrlclothing'.;
andowpi81ent,
(8).. LanZnavigation,
(9) .Convo:; proceduresand safety,
(10)j!nttleficlcl police,
(11)P: h u l a h e ,
(12)
Adjust~~lent 1 of ailA.llei-y s l ~ dillortarf i re,
(13)C O I T : ~ C ~ ~ ~ O ~ ~ S t ochi queo and proce&?res,
(111) Sentry iluty (incluGii!g perli,tc.i;cr.C6fcnaeof static
positions).
b, U n i t Trainiilg: .
Ainiibi3.e opcraJdsns,
Iketing engagements.
Advanoe t o colltacti
Use of s uppor t f ~h o ,
Hightoperations,
Patroltechniques and planiig.
~'lmbushai ~dco~inter-ambmh,
Operaidone.1.dth..more
6 , (c) UnitT;.~liryProgram, As general guidance tile f o l l o w
phasing ol' trcinlng vci 2. l govern ( b h y triU. be 24Decanber 1967)r
a. - ! Vnits:
D-Day Arrival'kc. Pho
J-HI -!;t~.nd-d~;-in ai; .&IC i'ho
.his2 tof l 7 Inc:iviriud ai d junior lec?clcrtraining
rvi3 .tod-:.llr ',,nitr!.'r?L?i-5,ng
j l +f i t o ~ ~ " 3 0 llrain ~ d t h'l'ipC1/l0C ~ V
i)b 31 .:.se~L.~c cor8b~. t xi 33i 0i 1
J: - O .LO d+l p L'nit T r & u
B20
- ' ~~sIL~u w h a t mission
. fa6t h ;p.t ~ h ,3%;P!C, aidattach,lents
I
r;mw:lo ~ o T s . : ! ~ cdssisn - s u p p o ~
W.!. .TI..; c&;j:;;:J:.;&
i)I3T-:miJTIOI$:
1. plus 3 ::.;~;U(;:J, I)IV
1036. We 4thI f !Kv
Ce -6 0 t b tbgll tbrt aham w g w e ab+
scheduled byunits I A L ; thsbd4 sllpwmdtm.
Inf-- Wentation C1: tkimQbt4.m W.
A.try - Mentatim C&7 Ifam Nare
(4) Airmobilearielrtation w i l l . beconducted from0800 t o 1206.hrs
and cwer thef o l l hmg subjecb: 1hrSliak,1k QmsMpct..2hrPtibr
(5)InPunitsdl1 not,parMcipte inCAI8 prior t o r e c e i q
+#heorientation,
(6)Artyunits &Q~ W &:oriontiation prior t o -'JW&i&d'-'f
C1&7 inetruction.
(1)Conducted by2dhRVrJ Div.
(a) Bde tQG - OOiOO bm
b) XTr p- 1OOObM
t
a ~ h l h g r - 1 3 0 0 b ~
(d)
6th @t - 1 ~ 1 7 0 0hrs
(2) P l r r . t ~ ~ W t o P O O , a P # p t ~ W k t o r r WsBQ,
w l l l p i r a p r r e . o ~ ~ b t o f n s g l r s r a u a t ~ c r a d ~ ~ o ~ ~ . ~ ~
the al l ot ed tintr~
- n~rcPPO(~~?143&5) RW
:'221700Jan' 68
'. sp7 . . '
.
. . .
.
?.eference :Ma~sVietnam, 1:5fi1000. Seri es L70U;, '67381; 673P11,
6 ~ 3 ~ 1 1 1 , a d 6~3onr.
a. %e.qv forces. Currant IN'i.SlE!S..
b. ~r i e r i i l yforces. '
. .
(1)
km?rical Division executes reliefof3d We, 1stCa;! Div(Ap%)
d t h 3d We, 4f h Infniv corrasncing 23Jm 6P and relinquishes Cr"V1J 3d Rde,
1stCav niv( X G ) t o 1st Csv Div(2%)upon closura,Phu Raieroa.
(2)
2d.1Q7W nivcontinu-?i.present operntions.
(3)
2d90KM?.rine Bde continues prasent, o ~ r a t i o n s .
(4)
142th LtInf 9de assuxes cor:~li?f,econtrol of F?JSC?-TIZX!.O
froln 32 Eda, I+'ch Inf.,r)iv @/C 25Jan6S.
c. !t,tac~nrlants md nct rchnnrl t . ~. OP&D 15-67. to. TPQ ~ T K V ~ R I Z - ~ . S C , ~
i n i t i a l O93GY 3d Rde, LthInf,eff2ctivn21, Jzn 6Poncrossing Southen1
boi~nd;\.yr'of TP'$t:t"I:n '10.0.1 order C?C(iX passc3 to19SthInfRi l a. fl ?/ ' . , P ...'
\ -
f --.-
.<
. i * . L . 2. : . : : , r ;
3 . ..-- * .p . , . .. 6
I ::,.$:!,:s?~,,
,:. ,,. ti,-;;,< .:
. - .
. . ;
,l'?>->, .
c.';:,'
@::(;l.:,..,
-.'&; ..- *?
0.
. . . I ..
;
r ;. i b :',<. ..
773
? yi:: i!:),:,; . ,
q;*:Ia:; .:;.
' . ' . . ~ fzf::,
.;.
7: v. , . , i
11th I nf We cofitinues current operations; forms and r al eaess a two
comoany t as k force t o OrCCX 3d ?he, 4th I nf md on orclsr assumes r esponsi bi l i t y
f or So-&hem oort i on of llUSC"Im !.O.
a. Concept of operption. pnnex \ mer at i ons Overlay.
(1) Manauver. W e cont i nues current operations with ?-1Inf (-)
and 1-20 Inf (-) 5x1 sect or; fo.ms 'FRf:P.mS with 6-3-1, R-L-3, C-1-20,
combat, s u p ~ o r t clement,^ C-26 %gr, Rde HHC ma a ~r o v i s i o n a lTP . headquarters
drawn fro^ 9de resources, and r el essas
F?!,RFP t o i n i t i e l OPCOH 3-lr Inf
f or em~lo:pnant i n lflrFC.*.?INE !.O.
On .order Sde w i l l assume r esponsi bi l i t y
for Southern portfon of FnT;SCfiTINPI t0 with 4-3 Inf P&. TP Q,lPm continuing
orzol-~tl.onnin a s s i pkd' sect or.
(2) Fi res, No change.
(1) ~ ~ n t 3 n u e present operations.
(2) Release A-3-1 'V RE.~RV Inf t o O?CON ef f ect i ve 'on 24 Jzr. 68 a t
a n;utually agreeable time,
(3) Rssu.me cont r ol of 4.2--3-1 et pect i ve 271W3 Jan 68.
c. 4-3 Inf,
(1) Effectf. ve on r3t urn t o Rde cont r ol be nrewxed t o continue
oper3tions i n assigned AO.
(2)
Provide c o n b ~ t servi ce suoqort t o TP ?lAF;lCTT' a s reaui red t o
sust ai n thoir comb& ooprations.
d. 1-2@ Inf.
( 1) Continue qrasent oner ~t i ons .
(7)
Pelease G1-20 I nf t o @'TON TF BAWEF)..
(3)
Terminst4 datehs3 of UOr) (997~7371)and fithclrsw defensa f wc ? s
on com~l et l on of withdrawal of 3-1 I nf 3.n4 6-11 Arty elzrnents on 27 Jan 68.
(
PelinquLsh rPCr!l! of 4.2-T-1-1 t o control of ocrent uni t 3ffect i ve
271300 Jan 6P.
1.
(1)
Assume OPCQET of designated' Tp units e f f e e t ~ k24 Jan 6~ at a
t h e mutually agreeat19 wi t h commders. . of C-1-20 concarned e x c s ~ t(??CON
rt fft kt i ve -240900Jan 6Q.
(2) Organize and orenare T f ~ rsustained combat 0~3r at i ons .
(3)
Move 'F (-) t o A0 GSAWT by r0.d on 24 J?n 6' and be ~ r a p a r ? d
f or release t o WCON 3d We, lith I nf uwn cmssing Pout hen ?!lJ$C9TIFF, F.C
boundary.
( 4 ) Relen.se C-1-2Q Inf t o %I= W Jan 65; cont r ol epfnct i vo 2
(5)
Bs or9psred t o resume cnnt r ol of C-1-20 Inf st+'ective on crder
f o r deployment i n dosignst?c! sect or of A0 V!.??.
(3: Relocat,s ceunter-mnrtar r~x3.wsecticn fram fZ t o ( ~ 8 7 ~ 3 ' ' l )
~ s l e c t s dsi t e a t LZ 9nOl.!CG (~~8l f+3f?5) ~ l ? n s and revise counter-mortar
acccrdingl~.
(1) 9ontinue or e sent i psrat i ons.
(2)
Sc prenwed t o rnlesso cnz ar qvi si cnal ~ l a t w n incbid:.:lg 4.2
mnrtsr Sousd, (5n~~!,to OPCON crf 4-3 cr ?w QLPKE.R on order.
(1) Cnntinue present qp.?rations.
(2)
Relssrs Pncr Pqct with mine c l wr j n g ~ n d oipn.?er c1.c. ' - i l i t y
t n OT GN Tp R:,~K"V a.t a at ua. l l - v*?nreeablc!time on 34 Jm68.
(1) Ccntinue mas ent nonrstions.
(2)
4 ~ @ n a i t4-3 I nf with o9rsnnnel find equipment nRcr :?rv to
mstain cmbnt s. ~r ?r i c? s v ~ ~ o r t ; nf "* 9.' ?ER.
(?) (h orcigr, bo ~repam3t n s17mnrt coxhst par qt i ms 92 4-3 Inf
md RnnICW In Southern portion of HrJSC'TIP, EO.
(1) Continue vmsent npsratinns.
(2) Release ~ n kW squad t o PPCOPI B:niEFi rn 24 Jan 68.
(1) ni rect cwnlination between cr;mcL?aere c ~ncerne?i s nuth~riz:?d '
and rlirected.
(2) 1m1menting qlms t r i l l be ?repared dnr! forwwdsd t n Toach this
HQ vdthin I2 hours f ~ l l e wi ngreceiot cf.t h i s v4or .
. .
4. (V) !lm UMS~SCS. !,9YIf.!O 5-67. ~ ~ ~ D M~ ? I s ~ ~ ; T I o N
a.
/ .
Signal.
(1)
fnnsx 2, Signal,. t o OPOPD 15-67.
b. Cormanrl.
W..e PP LZ C>c3.1Tf,bT (9~fllJ370)di sol acee to LZ QPC!t%O
(QSRU~PL;) cn nrder.
~eibranoe : ~ a p s ,southV i e t i r j 8eri.i.17014; 8hnt8 67981, M381IL m*
and6838IV.
Task Orgenieation: No changeexcept:
'vB A r n
3-1 IN?
'B/r(r3 A/*t
C/1-20 Pl a t k f C a r .
D/&ll Arty (m)
W/e26 mtw
W/23d M= Pl a t
1 . (s) SITUATION
b. FriendQ forceax hari cal Divlelcm rdlsaaes OPCCN 2-35 Inf andCD-9
Ar%yto36Rde 4thInf 2J.v.
Ma continuer current operatione andmisdons i nDU: PHOmd MUSCA~NEAOt r
an3 releases 2 3 5 I:lf -:;a OFTON 36Me 4th Inf D l r cm or about 26 Mar68 and
redistribute8 organicfcrcee inDllC PHOandEIIISCAl'INr;: AO's.
a. Concept of Operation:
( 1) Maneuver: Bde continues present operatima md missime i nllUC
W O AC with 3-1 Infand inYtJSY.TIP'P1 A0with 4-3 Inf end TF8.2MER. Bderelsase8
2-35 Inft o OPCON 3-4 Inf Div on or about 26 68. 3-1 Inf aesumes resparrs-
i bi l i t yfor entire nlTPRO AO, anorder,prior todeparture of 2-35 Inf.
TF
BA?KFR rehasae A/3-1 t oOFCON 3-1 Inf,
EXHIBIT D-51
(1) Continueaessent merations andndsdons andaemm tactiaal
reaponaibillty for entire W PHO.to.
CROUP 4
m a d e d A t 3 Year Intenale
&*,,9p;k
Oeclassffied After12 Yearr
-
E&- S- 8-k:c9
(2)
Assumes resomni bi l i t v for plannir:!: an3 executing OP W 1 4 8
(~el i e~/ Fi efnforcamnt of T I T PHO-YqO WJC r)iatric?. Headquarters. n C A ~ m w ) .
(3)
Assume OPCm of ~ l ' Z . 1 from V W R R F on or about 26 Mar .68
effective on departure from FrlJSC9TINl3 AO.
- \ r
, ,,sordr:r, 25 Mar 66, assum! OPCON of ~41; Cav Pl a t fran E/1 Ca r .
I
,,:)
~EZLTT? .nemaining bridge ei t es rn )Iwg 1 in DIE PHO !,O at^ o u t b e d
in Annor; .\ , ' r 1.5ge 79c~r i t y.
( 6)
Secure l ogi st i cal base a t SA HUYMI (~($32222) with nat less than
one r i f b platoon.
(7)' Conduct day and ~?:ci!t:lecurity or>erntims v i c i n i t y LZ BRCNCO with
not. lees than one platom.
(8) 38tabUsh OP on I2 'VtIPOU with not less than one fire team to
include qucrllied FO.
( 9) Rellnquiah remoneibility for planning and execution of OmAP 4-6$
( c ~ L W~ T ~ ~ AI ~ I EY) to b 3 Inf (-).
(1)
Cont.5.nue plu~.sn.?,rjperaiions and mleslans.
(2) 4as:m .;smn3ibIllty for plannfng and exeouticm of OPLAN 4-68
(fiILa&# VALTRY) 3 ..,I 3-1 Inf.
d.
2-35 Inf: Ee p.emred, on -)rdr?r,26 Mar 68 to move by airuf'tt 0
destination emxifled by 3d M e 4tin Inf DLv urd ,wlease to OPCON 3 4 Inf D$v
ef fcotive upon d epwture f r o m DUC PHO AO.
e. l'aak Force R4K:XTR:
(1 ) Cort:;hue present miasions snd operations.
,(2) Be prepared t o move ~/ %l by airli.et,on order, 26 Mar 68 to IZ
'rKUMnB! #or release to OFCON 3-1 Inf effectioe an departurn of MUSCATDJTr, AO.
f. 6 1 1 Arty:
(1) Ccmtinue p~gsentmissions.
(2) I4lpby C/&ll Arty in 3-1 Inf.
I
f2) ReLerse me pbtoon (7 petsane1 car r l ws) to OFCOU 3-1 Inf, apr
order, 26 Wa r 68.
4
year ~ n t e ma ~ s
- h i f i e d After 12 Year.
3. Coordkrat?.ng Irrtructionsr Direct coordination between c d e m
concerned ismt t hori zed md d i ~ c t e d .
4. (c: j ~ $ ! l ? -2YXS'f'ICS L~i~.i~i3l'tiA':'ION
Ad7- h@ '-.M.
5. (C) Crn! . VW AND SImAId
a. S i g a l t Current LSOL
b. C d r
(1) BdeCP&s LZBRmO(EEl812383).
Annex A - Bridge jecuri.l;y
D-ONI Spe dd
Doungraded A t 3 Year Intervals
g l kl asdf l ed Aft- . l 2 Yearr
NO fdC& coollnmA?'Z3' 7 { b -
.- ----.
825
115 ~2;:*1;; -.
S28 17.2 -ti.,l.i368
S~C! 110 El6815359
9 1 109 E382.1347
532 106 W1ro330
s33 107 FA4!1:3%'7
.3b ld6A BS855322
85867311 ,
BS88330k
BSM5288
BS8W268
-1267
W d ?o.m
, ?; ;:eei~i.r/wood
cc~: redrr/tin
gteel w/ wd
aovdred w / t h
Wood Ream
Bel eySridge
RaileyRridge
Steelw/mod
CQveredw/tin
%eelCulvert
Steelw/mood
'coveredw/tin
Bailey
BTPASS
Fordable West
dvringdry seeson
Mff-urreIn?
by pass %st
E~y- uueRRbridge
Bsw*e&
D i f flcult
D i f f-rice paddy
Mff-Rsd
Mff-rice paddy
Diff dest
I @
1 -
Easy-%&-by pa-
has60" culvert
Reinf concrete/ Easy2ast-RR 1Sqb
wood w/tihplating bridge
Woad w/tinplate Rasy-;Rast- inuse 1 Sqd
p i s -
HIKEFORCE
85915215 Wo a d w/tbplat Raay
we i deck
~5911264-+;i+&wm if?-steep slopes
BS-3 Bailey Fssy.Iwest 1 S9d
borngraded At 3 Year I nt enah
783
Declsaqifled Arter 12 Yearn
Cony 3 of 32copies
11thInfuntry Brieade
U BRONCcl .
Sf312383
261600 Pe k l 68
Reference: Maps, Vietnam 1: 000; Seriesb'7Ol.4; 6738 11 ( AN MC),
6'739 I(BINH SONP.6739 I1(QUANO WI),6'739 111(SONHa),
6739 IV (Tilh BONG!, 6838 I11(TAMCUIN), 6838 IV( Tl r i i N~
CIEN)
This ADHINO provides f or the abni ni et rat i onend l opi s t i cal support
fort he Uth LIBJ i n t he MODUCj DUC THO and MISCATIN3 AOta. Thehi-
Wde BaseCamp !dl1remain a t l@ BRONCO and continue t o support operations
inboth LO'S a& iequirod, R k y source of l opi s t i cal eupport for 4-3
Infantry and TFBMUCUi will,be 9t h Spt Bn, 198th LIB, Chu hi,VN.
(1)classI. -
(a) Bat t al i ons and Separate Companies wi l l malntain 3
days' mtlorrs, WealCombat IndirLdual.
(b) 6th Su'pport Hattalionwilldintsin (10) daysrat i ons,
contbnt type C fbr,+ll organic, attached and/or.dl rec t support elements
oftbe**do*
(c) 6thSupport Battalion w i l l provide Bri pde Class I
rntion,brdrdom mint operations.
4
(d)
Class Imethodof i ssue w l l l be uni t pi l e breakdown
t!? brttalions a d eeparate ccapniea/detachxmnts.
: , (2) Cl ara IfAnd IV.
;as
Requbltione for I1and I V type supplieswi l l be
&tkb u=*
' Bttalionqand separate conp~nies/detnchments
bc?cluft ud mlntainthirt). @O) clap expsndable supplies andt hi r t y
W) fapu,
EXHI BI T D-16
. (b) IIIISCATrn AO,
GROUP4
m r a d e d mt 3year inhn*
- War r i f i od after 12 y o r 5
(1) Limited I1and IV type supplies (~arl.iers t e r i a l )
w i l l be provided through 3S0 9 t h Suyar r Bat t al i on, 198th L2.
( 2 )
TX? itemsand limited I1 - IV equipmen.t/mter-
iaLs w i l l be provided throuqh 8.50 6th Supor t k t t a l i v n .
(3) Elattalions-andseparat e companies/detaco~:'71ents kd.11
accrue and maintain t hi r t y(30)days expendable suppl i es and t hi . r t g (1.5)
days PLL.
( 3) Class 111, IIIA and JP-4,
( a)
Bat t al i ons and separate companies willmi nt ai -rfi a (15)
day l e v ?lof POL packaged products i n thekr respectiveAO' s.
(b)
tn t he 143 DUC- DUCPHOAO, Class 111Ki l l bc. i i s t r i -
buted (Supply point di st r i but i on) vi ci ni t y 13S8173R7.
(c) ClassIIIE. supplp pointdi s t r i but i on by tho 1st. Lm
FSA,vi ci ni t y coordinates BS815386.
(d)
In t he l~lUSCAT1IEA 0 Class111, fIIA dl1be di s t r i -
butod asrequired by t he 9t h Support ht , t al i on, 198th LIB,vi ci ni t y Chu
Lai.
( e )
J P 4 w i l l be ~ o v i d e dby the 1stLOCr irSA i n WC PHO-
DUC A0 Md t he 9t h Support Battalion, 198thLIB f or uni t s i n t he
WSCATIUE AO.
(4)Class V.
(a) 140 DUC - Du:PHOAO,
-
1. Supply poi nt di st r i but i on a t c o o r d h t e s 812385.
iUSCATINE AO, supply pai nt d i ~ t r i b u t i o n a s est a-
blished-by the 9t h pport Bat t al i on, 198thLIB,Chu Lai VN, To 4-3d
Combat Trains.
To bf ur t her broken-down and del i vered to 4-3 Inf and
TPw=R,
(b) Ar t i l l er y bat t er i es willmaintain 2000 rounda per
firirq bat t ery, on position.
..(c) 6-llth' Arty Bnw i l l maintain 100rowtdeperf i r i n g
battery, paddqred and preparedf b r s l i q ~ o u t for Lmmdhte resupplyas
necarOsrye,
(d) Artillery &t t a c b t sor provfsi oml bat t er i es formed
a'folJow the ebom procedurae.
Intho140 DIE- DUC PHOA 0 *waterpoi nt s are l ocat ed a t
(a)
.~2Ma~~~~,
GROUP--4
Downarrdec! a: 3 vearint
-
- , - -
Declassified af hr 12ye
7 8 2
-
( hl mar y) BS817376 ( ~ l t e r n a t c ) BS&.,O330. These water poi nt s ar e opera-
tod by1stWG FSA,
(b) In t he HUSCATIhE A! mter points est abl i shed by t h e
9 t h Support Bat t al i on, 190th LIBwillbe j oi nt l y used by t he 4-3 I9f
and TF BARKFX.
( a)
Units.w i l l t ur n i n prn-xkty t o be salvafed t o "B" Co'
6 t h Spt Bn for cl as s i f i cat i on, Equipment damtreed t h o u & ot her than
f a i r wearand tear w i l l be accompanied by ~ r o p u r docwnentation, i.e. re-
l ease f r o m Survey Officer, statement of c h a r p s et c. Brigade Supply
Officer and/or Dde Maintenance Offi cer w i l l be contacted a f t e r cl as s if i-
cat i on t o f a c i l i t a t e moper turn-in.
.(b)
Units are responsible t oa r r a n p f or t he i r own evacu-
at i on but a l l i t em f or s a l v a ~ or turn-in dl1be processed through
"Bn Co 6thSpt Bn.
be Transportation.
(1)
U n i t requirements i n oxcess of TCEcapabi l i t y willbe re-
quested through S-36thSpt Bn. .
(2)' Yhen pf j sl bl e, theBde PPD w i l l be not i fi ed 24 hours in
advance of conmya requirinp; escort . PlSO wi l l provide secur i t yand
eoardimte support a s requi red f or i nt r a A0 corrvoys.
(1)To provide primmy mdi c a l care hoth i n the fieldand a t
basec a waraerrs f or uni t s operating in t he MUSCATINEAO.
(2)
To provide medical evacuation i n the MUSCATINE kO.
(3) Toprovide lrredical supply in t he MJSCATINEAO.
b, Primary HedLcal Care*
(a) Conpany.aidmen. Rwlde by r i f l e companies attachsd
toTm.
' (b) A i d et at i on. A p r o v i e i o a l bat t al i on a i d s t at i on w i l l
be o w t a d in t he T.sk Force CP areaby one medical offi cer, one MU,
and 3& spechl dutyMnr 6/ U Ar t i l l er y (nredical of f i cer ) , Co C (M3D)
6tb apt Bn(NCO a d 2 m),andHHC l l t h Inf Bde(1&).
(2) 4th~ n . 3 dfni. Willuse or@ic md i c a l platoon f or Pull
c. Medical Evacuation.
(1) Routine.
(a)
TFB w i l l be evacuated by ground ambl.3snce t o Chu Lai
as the L3ctical si t uat i on permits.
(b) 4-3 w i l l be evacuated by available ai : t o Chu hi.
(2) Pr i or i t y and Urgent. W i l l be evacuated by L ir ambulance t o
Chu Lai ~mvl de dby Chu Lai Dustoff.
d. Hospitalization. Quarters pat i ent s map be held fcr 7 days.
e. Medical Supply. W i l l be requisitioned throuefi n o ma channels
from l l t h Bde Medical Supply a t iIl1ONCO Base. Supplies $11 be trans-
ported by avai l abl e ai r cr af t .
f. Miscellaneous.
(1) Revontive Medicine. Battalion sur qone will pr ~vi depre-
ventive medical care supmrt ed by America1 Preventive Medickhr, Officer.
( 2) A l l mdi cal reports wi l l be submitted by usual auapnse
dates to the l l t h Br i s de %rr?eon8n Office.
5, CI VI L APFAI HS.
a. kttachrmnte and Detachmonte.
(1)
PSYOP detnchmnt (3 men) DS 11th Inf Me effect i ve data
m.
. (2) 4 AA C i v i l Affairs Platoon - Area suppart DI E AO,
OPCOt( b Armrical Divieion.
b, Viotnrarese Ci vi l i an Penomel .
(1)
Ci vi l populace in RD ( ~evol ut i omxy De wl o p n t ) areas gen-
erally friendly.
(2) ., Civil populace outside fiD aroas generally sympathetic to
the emmy.
(3) Bnem tekea even opportunity t o expl oi t c i vi l populace
t oi nrpp. ~oeof a n typea.
(4) Ci vi l population in A 0 aupmxiPlates 225;000, aapraximately
22- of thmse ua refugees.
C. Mission.
To pmvide CAsupport for militaryoperations, insuro th.!.cow
mandere legal reepolwibilities towards the ci vi l i anpopulation ar\+com-
plied with, insure effs-ctivepopllation and resaurce? cont ml and support
revolutionary developaent 1:y conductingan active Pacification Prcqram.
d, Execution.
(1) Concept of Operstion. CA personnel w i l l conduct normal CA
act i vi t i es i n tho ItDareae. Priority for assi st ame w i l l 80torefupes.
Priraary: eoals should be t o h u r e refu,+pes haw the basic necessities of
lh. U C A P , construction projects and impppvamnt of r e f u p internal
ormnizationleadership w i l l be agmessively pursued. Pacification pro-
gramw i l l be conducted i n contestedareasas t act i cal situation permits.
Primary ma1 i a tohave theVi et n~mse i dent i rpthemelves wi t h and SUP-
port*GvN.
(2) Codnnt - Ins- tions.
(a) IhpOrt any mfugees to Bde3-5 ior placement i n a re-
fugeecanp, Collection point8 w i l l not beestablished unless a derel- '
opine t nct i cal aitwition so dictates.
(b) Curf ew int heA0 isdusk bdam.
Excaptiorre a& tb
areas (b~maxA ovsrby) hn,the ct~iewis2100.
(c) All Coomandera w i l l brief their troop8 concerning
proper canduct tomrds civilians.
( dl ~ . o u ~ tPSYUP ~ ~ ~ p ~ ~ - t . ( i r m . t ~ tor L ioud.pealna~.j
will be coordinatedt h r o e S 5 , I l t h InfBde (Lt). S- 5 4-3 reqlrests
leaflets f or hit! Bndirectlyf l o m G-5 PSYW in' Chuhi,reoonmsnded
theme6 will be furnished byBdeS-5.
(e) IftlSmllitar~~ act i vi t y cau.eeci vi l i an property loss,
in&ry .or dmth mt i Q BQ5-5 itriediately. deport nuat include brief
descripdaonof incident, mnm of indiridlrals (US and~ietnameee)iq-
vol hd, pemoml statisticald a b of individuals, location of incident,
ham &ddressobVietneawse inrolmd ardnaxt of k,h, d i s p i t i o n of
Ix~Uvidualimol+ed, othar pertinent datac o mi d e d necessary. A l l
r o b t i ' t l q p a ~ n t 8. a 1k m& BdeS-5. Excepting those i n 4-3 A0
and TI AO; Solati- p.paentr int h e e area8 will bemade by
.4-3, S-5.and?E BARU!!S-5 ' wpact i vel y.
(a) Unite obtain mney for civilIan labor throu Bde S-5.
C i r i l i m kboram rpybehireda t ther at e of 80 VN (piasters!?per day.
k t nofib l~bofwrrbr utllised for filling mndbaga, comtructing
d e f m i . mi t i o m, etu. bxw dllbe hired-aspersonal servants or t o
perform Kitchen Polico duties.
(b)
Except i n e mr Fnc y cases, t h e use of vol.lmteer ci vi -
l i an labor for CA pro jecte i s mndat nr y i f it is d t h i n the\ r capabil-
i t . USas ai s knce should bel i rl i t ed t o he;~vyequipment,bui l di ng
material, and technical supervision.
( c)
Ci vi l i ans should use t hei r o m supplies fo I- s e l f hel p
nroj ect s if they area ~ i l a b l eandsui t abl e f or h e intended project.
( d ) Noci vi l i ans, supplies or equipment w i l l be used for
mi l i t ary purposes e-wept by order of t hi s Headquarters. Civ..lian labor
is l h l t e d to dailyh i r e .
(a)
Thare w i l l be no food di st ri but i on to ci vi l i ans from
mi l i t ary st ores except in cases of planned CA act i vi t i es or mreency
situations.
(b) Contact M e 5-5to coordinate theevacuation of cap-
turad faodstuffs f or r t or a ~e . Captured foodstuffs w i l l later be redis-
t ri but ed on a mt needed basis.
(c) N5bCAP is supervbed by theBdeSurmon. An act i ve
X3DCAP program wi l l be conducted by a l l units a s the t act i cal si t uat i on
permits, Requestf or mdi cal suppliee submitted t o Medical Corspany,
6thSpt b.
(3) Ibportr.
( 8 ) h h S- 5 m a w i n a l og of hi s dailyact i vi t i es.
(b) Effsctivm 2 Jan 68, each unitconducting CA act i vi ' t i es
will a\Mt thefblloning reports. A dai l y telephonic report to S-5
nlt 1400 b r a wilth t he follawina information:
. N&ter of re-es generated.
2. b u n t of r i ce captured,
f,h u n t of r i c e des troged.
h.
k n t of r i ce evacuated toGVN control.
jl.
Civilian casual t i es due t o conrbat operations.
4.
Ci * i l i u r casualtiesdue to non-co*t oneratiom.
(c) A mk l p wi tben CA Report covering period i r o m R i b y
-thyo Due mT1- hra each Saturdry. 3hw information a s
i a U ~ w o r
GRQVP-4
~ t uraded at 3 yahr
786
DLd. hrI *rrr
A." Medical and Dental' assisL?ncc, nam of haml:?t,
vi l l ap: and coar di mt es (6 di gi t s ) where as s i s t mce rsndered.
2.
Total number of pereo'ns recei yi nc mdi cal ,and den-
t a l treatment.
1.
Numbor of sur,sical operations performsd.
A.
Mrmber of Vietnanrese haal t h nurses and workers
~ s s i s t i n ~ Indi cat e how many, *&ich were volunteers, *&ich i n the :E!X;iiP.
Horep i d by GVN funda.
(d)
Persoml Aaaistance.
hube r of Vietnaraese mdi c a l workera i n t rai ni ng,
2,
Tot al nuadbar of persons aasi st ed durinf!week.
2.
Amountof each carmodity di st r i but ed and numberof
persom towhom di s t r i but i on ismade.
,
Amnmt of anymoney di st ri but ed, (does not include
dally hires)s o me of money, t o whomdi st ri but ed.
(e) Wc u ~ t i o nAsaistancu.
2,
bberof adul t e, and ahildren (beparate categpries).
h a t i o n (6 di gi t coord) of where evacuation orid-
mted a d dare terminated.
.
-8 of conet rmt i on, a t itis, bow constructed,
whdn comtrueted, where camt r uct ed (6 d i g i t $oord), s a n e of nat er i al ,
sax%? of labor. IfR& completed, give per cent ap of completion.
2, Englishcl asses, where, m&er of hours,m b e r of
students,
Vocat i oml training,tvpe, where, number of houre,
&cr 02 students*
A,
Contact with l ocal oft i ci ql a. (US & GvN) who,
then, (6 &fit coed) h e n , why,
3. Self Help Fmj ect s, Nhat, where(6 Di gi t cmr d) ,
rrhen, b.'done, aaount of U3It.llitarypnrt i ci pat i on,
If not ,conplet6d give
piwwntrr* ot a o ~ t i o n ,
4,
Otbr US arpency support, agency, item,amount,
A t t r at i vo descri pt i on
of people8 attitude, attitude c'-angee; K c e m m, m t c a
8. A narrative report. Briefly describe :.bat-above
f i v s do not clGrlyportray.
Acknowledpe .
DISTRIBU'flON
Special
OFFICIAL:
Tark Br;r?zlioation: Currant ta& or&l!mtion e%c@p%'88
4-3 (-1 flRAm I I
BAll L . 7 (DS)(-) AmSl *
a<--6 4rgr -3
c-12[)
&sme$lte 0 % ~ -dlL mtrn)
wkn 6 a ~ (-1
w r p y c
. .Bq&@& MPPlat
,
I . . STmlATIa4
. 8, ' & A q forces. clmenk may*
2. wI9.9fOU: l l t h k.fI&'Dl9&uo..opsrafAona i.IXk FW- 110 IJUC Ao,
assumea mnpoheibiU6y f b v ) s ~ h q U BA0 tros198thInf Me (LT)aad
oaanences OIWATIOIJ ~m!"jEes&
(1) Ken-#
Me continma apetatlaas in the DUC pH0A 0 with
3-1Inf(-) and 1-20Inf
aeames rerpardbility for CBERATIm
HUSCA'Qm d t h 4-3 Inf (-
BARKER inseotar.
(2) Piree: lbrnex B, Artillery rircet h~nortPlan.
be
1 f - Ca nt he c resent mlaabne i n WC PHOAO.
c, b 3 Inf (-1. EXHl BI T D-35
(3) Ctmduct defmsive endoffensive owrations to locate atld
destroy W.E.unitr, asinFbme wits, local for00 uni te,
in*ast.h&&e
guerillas and cS)(
the
-g.\,:'."' -4..
*. .&:<*?7 ,=4
<;I.;>.. .-
-*. -.zr.* ,,,.-.,
--.sZ& -ar,w.:aP&
? : - ,
ORUIP-4 \
Damgraded at 3 year intern
Daolarsified after l2p a
v
(2) Coordlr~atewi th amromiats GVN nmvlnaial and disfriet
authorities t o assfst l n' t hs training and surnork of RF ~ d l PF foraer
as directed.
(3) Ccmduct onerationo for tho harrasment and Interdiction of
amroached t o US ?ad GVN installatic!na %nMJX'.TD!E 1.0 arr3 . l i kel y rocksf
and mortar f f i b g ~ i t e ethreatening base areas.
(4) Provide rnaxbm eummt of B e v o l t r t i ~be~telo-t (Rb).
( 5) r)eny needad food s t Ws to the asmy.
(6) Proteot fRt nationals again& ~ i s a l s ,
(7) Inorease USWinfiumnae over Wt areas,
(1) 3 d u a t defenslva anU offensive oberatims t o locate and
rleutrop 1WA mliJ;s, mjn iome unite, locd forae Mitr, guerillsr and tba
Vi et Cang inf;*sstr*m.i;w.
(2) M - e taet1aa.I wcurity for fbr), #1and insure that
Ul
ir available and useable for tactical and l d r t i d a l m-nt Within
EIUSCfbTTIJE AO.
(3) Caanlinste wlth amovriste GVll pmvlncial W' di etri at
authoritis8 to srsi st in tha training and maport of BP and PF forces
as di rect d.
(4) Cduct onerationr for the harrajslllr?nt intefliction of
amroachee to US and (ZVN installations in MUBCITW, A 0 strt l i kel y rocket
and mortar firing s i t s o thr-iatejling bare are-.
(5) Provide d m u m uumort of ~evomi araryDevelowment (RT)).
( 6) C&uct counter i nfl vrati on operatima in ooastal aroa
within lFlX>.T'IT.TEAO.
(7)
Wnv neded foo6 stuffs to tabenmy.
( 8 )
Protect VN nati mal s against rewi sal s.
( 9) Incrssee US/ M influonce over hamlet arms.
(10) Corrtuat pbpchological operations In sunnort of tncti cal
(2) Orgmiao ani c m b i t e Btry of not b a s than f a~rftod%mm
t o TF BARKER.
' (3) Ccn33uc msemt Fmisrims In J)UC P)IO and 8emne I 5 oontm%.for
WUSCATINE A 0 st3 ewn ae ~racti cai s
g. 1El Cav. Conti nu8 mr mt miaskffls I n WC Ht O AO,
(2) Be tamare4 to mart oanbat owmdianr and bus drmlooe-
m t in MrSCATIm A 0 88 -e*
(2) Provl.de ?.bat aml last light rufreillmice of C89CAaWIC AO,
(2) Ccnwmnflers are aut!!riaed direct cmrdinstioa with CVN offfoialr
far the oaxllunt of o d a t omretlans d RD aotlvitler.
(3) Th i s onfer e m h oral .hetrudtidtrcl Md i b effedtive OJd.200 plebe
a, Signal: SOI, Inflex 1-1,
be Cdarmand:
(1) Bde CP remains IZBRCNCO (~~812383).
40bo~l el i p.
A s n 8 x ~ e A - Opmationa'Over14.
B - Artillery'Irirr almc!rt Plar (TIP).
GROUP4
b n & d at 3yew Inten*
OPLAN 7-68 (GOLDEN F U Z E Support and Security f or Rice ~a r v e e t )
Reference: Paps RW, 1 r50,OW Seriee L7014, Shoeta 67381, 673011,
'6838111,6838N.
Task Orgulisationt rFZiG0 8-68
f. SITUATION:
a. bcqp Forces: I mex B, Intelligence
b. Friendly Forces: FmCO $ 4 8
c. Attachments and Detachments: F a G O &&I
(1)
bemy force8 w l l l col l ect and harvest. lmze qumt i t i ea
of r i c e i n the 3.bsence of sccuritp operations designed t o protect
l oyal f mr s f r om VC intimidation cu;d interference w i t h harvest ae-
t i vi t l es .
(2)
Cultivzted ricelznds nezr -9D areas, GVN and US i nst al l -
at i ons will reapire rdninum e e c wt y operations during t he harvest
season.
(3) GV?J forces end laborers wi l l corduct the harvest with
minimum assistance from US forces.
(4) Dispositions of friendly units w i l l . remain r el at i vel y
unchznged during the r i c e harvest eeason.
2. HISSIOl4. l l t h Inf Bde conducts securi t y and d-1 operations
covmrencing H-hour, M a y t o p d e c t t he Spring r i c e krvegt.
a. Concept of Operation. Annex A, Operaticns Overlay.
(1) lkneuver t Brigade provides protection f or t h e r i ce
harveat w i t h 3 1 Inf', 4-3 Inf arid TF Erxker i n c o o ~ t i o n with
GVN of f i ci al s, t o enable lo* citirjens t o ent er riceland areas
controll& or influenced by the enemy to hamrest the spring r i c e
crop. Operation8 w i l l be conducted a t varying times and in those
areas whsre GVN aut hori t i es ant i ci pzt e mczy i nt i ni dat i on of hzrvest
act i vi t i es. Security operations w i l l be conducted by units in t he i r
assigned A0 a d wfll consist of l oczl securi t y in t he hme dht e
harvest area and d l unit pat rol l i ng and ambushes along prirPsrg
EXHIBIT
Group 4.
aded at 3 Year Interval
aified After 12 Yema
$
appmhes t o prevent VCinterference with t he collection of tb .
hamost. Denial operations w i l l be cxecuted by each r i f l e conpaqy
mploying notlessthantwori f l e plz.toons during day1Qh.t hours
t o screen and i nt er di ct prhry i nf i l t r at i on and exf i l t r at i on routes
I nt o h we s t areas. Saturation &ush t act i cs w i l l be mployed
by equadMd fire t eam si ze elements atnight inthe sane amas.
(2) Fires: Pr i or i t i es t o units i n contact. If axhum
=I fires wFllbe plannedd u t he harvestperiod to supplonent
securityand denial operctions.
(1 ) Conduct localsecurity opernticols as Mi c a t ed in Duc Fho
and 110 Duc Di st r i ct s t o protect fieldworkers duringt he h me s t period.
( 2)
h t c r d i c t p r b ~ i nf i l t r at i on andexfi l t rat i on routes into
principalharvest areas with not l es s thantwo platoons fros each r i f l e
comp7-ulydw- the harvest season t o dcny the VC accass t o crops and
m e s t e d rice.
(3) Corduct pat rol s andemploy saturation anbush t act i cs to
destroyenemyforces, theirroutes oi' comunic:.ticm, t o detecS P&
recovertheirsu~p1.ycachesand t o re vent movmmt of hamrested rice
i nt o VC dominated areas.
(4) Provide sacurity and as s i s t in mvemmt: of ricei nt o secure
areas.
( 5 )
Establish mo5ile checkpoints i n coordination vdt ?? GVIJ
aut hori t i es t o interrupt novmentandconfiscate unauthorizedsupplies
enmute t o VCareas.
( 6)
C d u c t operations in Duc Pho anl 1.10 DmDistrictswithin
assQnnd A0t o p r c q t host i l e elements and theirsympathizers :?lmzl ..a
cam* out harvest aati vi ti os.
( 1)
Int erdi ct primary l nf i l t r zt i on and exf i l t r at i on routes i nt o
t he principal harvest;reasouth of Tra Bongr i ver a d west of Highway 1
t o denythe VC ~ c e s s t o crops and harvested rice.
(2) Conduct patrols and enploy eaturation Globush t act i cs t o
destroy anemyforces,t h e i r m t c a of comunicntion, todetect
recover t h e i r su:.,ly cache8 and toprevent movement of br vest ed r i ce
i nt o VC dominated areas.
(3)
Conduct operations in Song Tinhand Bi nh Son Di st r i ct s
within assipped A 0 t o prempt host i l e elementsand t he i r aynpathizers
f r o m carryingout havest activities.
(4)
Pravide security and assist in mwcmmt of ricetosecureareas.
( 5 )
Establish nobile check p i n t s i n c oor dht i on with
GVPl aut hori t i es t o i nt errupt n?wment and confisczte unauthorized
supplies enroute t o VC areas.
( 1 )
Int erdi ct primary i nPi l t rat i on md exfi l t rat i on routes
i nt o the pr i nc i ~ a lharvest area vic Binh Son RD area with one r i f l e
aompany, t o deny the VC access t o crops and harvested rice.
(2)
Conduct pat rol s a d employ saturation abush t act i cs
t o destroy enem; forces, t he i r routes of comunication, t o detect
end recover t he i r suypl y czches, and to prevent mvament of harvested
r i ce i nt o VC dominated areas.
(3) Conduct operations i n Son Tinh and Bin Son Di st r i ct s
within a s s t p d A 0 t o preempt host i l e elements and t hei r sympathizers
from c my i n g out harvest act i vi t i es.
aut hori t i es t o interrupt mvenent and confiscate unauthorized supplies
(4) P r h d e security and as s i s t i n movement of r i ce t o secure
weas.
( 5)
Establish mbi l e check points in coordination with GVN
enroute t o VC areas.
e. 6-11 Arty:
(2)
Plan and axecute an intensified HecI proersn during t he
harvest season t o supplemetlt ground ccnnbat and security operations.
f. El Cav: Provide securi t y forcos as required.
h. H : Provide MP control and escort vehicle8 f or movement of
rice along Hwy 1t o cent r al oollccting pain:.
3. Coomiinat- instructions :
(1 )
This plan effective f or planning on receipt and f or
execution as Indicated in Annex A, Operations Overlay.
(2)
Direct cwrdinacian between c o ma ders concerned and GVN
offi ci al s i s authoriegd and directed.
(3)
Physical security and complete i nt erdi ct i on of VC
harvest md col l cct i m ef f or t s is impractical. However, extensive
day and night operations w i l l bo conducted to cover p r h r y triils,
water-crossing sites md near rural hamlets which offer the greatest
probability of Interception.
(4) kdmm use w i l l be made of night reconnaissance opwat i ms
t o det ect hostile element8 attempting nig!!t harvest of t he r i c e crops.
( 5 )
Intelligence reports of VC attempts t o levy r i c e taxes and
incidents of VC t hr eat s and intimidations will receive prmpt attention
and subsequent c o ~ t of~US tforces if indicated by t he nature of the
report.
( 6 )
H&I inpact areas w i l l be searched as practicable f or hasty
caahes and damage assessment.
('7) Milltary age males participating i n t he r i c e harvest will
receive olose scrutiny.
(8)
Operations wi l l be planned and conducted in the PJ ard other
i sol at ed ardas after t ho harvest i s well und-y in an attempt t o l ocat e
r i c e atoros.
( 9 )
Uni t s w l l l subnit daily report s t o Include size of area
protected (Sq in), dally a d cuumulative t ot a l s of r i c e hmvestcd (lbs),
W/PFprrt i ci pat i on, ~imbwof civilians engaged in harvest act i vi t y mi
other i nformt i on resulting from Golden Fleeca opw~t i ons .
(10)
Responsible units conduct a e r i a l reconnaissance of
cultivated areas not included Jn attached overlay i n concert w i t h the
appropriate Di st r i ct Chi ef and develop scheme f or h me s t of these areaa
upon oarnpletion of or simultaneous with those areas i ndi wt ed herein.
ADNIliISTPLtITIO1.I AN) LOCISTICS.
b. 6t h Spt Ein provides transportation as indicated i n Amex A,
Operatione Overlay,
5. COb%UIJDAND SIGIBL.
a. Signalr Current SO1
b. C d r Brigade CP remains a t LZ Bronco (~~812383).
HET.IDiiRSON
COL
Annexee t
A - Operations Overlay
B- Intelligence
Distribution t
Special
HEADQJARrnS
UTH INFANTRY BRIGADE
APO San Francisco 96557
XIOP 1 November 1967
SUBJECT: Prepilratian far Overseas Movement (POH)
TO: See Mstribution
1. Attached i a Appendix I1 (overseas orientation) t o h e x A (Training)
to I l t h Inf M e Reg 220-10.
2. This appendix is cl ossi fi sd wWROFFICIAL USE ONLY* (FOUO). It must
be fi l ed separately from basic regulation or the entire iegulrtian must be
protected es e o d for POW)inlormrtion.
FllR THE c- 1
EXHIBIT M-53
nppendix XI ((iverseas ~r i ent r : t , i on)toAnnex k (Traininr ! t o l l t h I nf Bde
;;el-; %SC-10
1. Commanders dre ' responsible f or i nsuri ng t hat personnel being moved
overseas recei ve asa mi ni l nun, 2 hours of formal i ns t hc t ; ons i n t he subj ect s
l i s t e d i n para 14d (I),(a) Sect i on 111,AR 360-81 change 4.
2. The following ar e references t o be ut i Uzed as +. . i es i n preparing
andpresenting t h i s ori ent at i on.
* b, AR 350-30 -- Code of Conduct
c ..
DA Pamphlet 360-5, 8 k c h 66. wKnow Your Enemy: The V i e t Cone,"
d .
DAP w h l e t 360-230,Sep65. Troop Topics. "Priscners- of War1'
e;
DAPenphlet 27-1, Dec 56, llTreaties Governing LandWarfareu
g ,
DA Pmphl et 20-198, Pocket Guide t o Vietnam
g..
QL Pam@l& 360-206Why HaServem
h . DAPamphlet 36CbZI.4 "our Msei on i d Vietnsldl
j
Let t er HQ11t h InfW e 2l+ Ock 67,Suoj: Ci vf l Affairs-Civic Action
';
Inet ruot i on
k.
Mttw HQl l t h InfBde 24 Oct 67,. SubJtC i v i l Affairs-Civic Action
Reference Materiel
1..
LetterHQl l t h fnfBde 24 Oct 67, .How t o Behave i n Vietnamw
m ,
Let t er HQUth Inf Bde 30 Oct 67, SubJ:
Legal Rights of US
Mllitery Perronnel i n anOversew Area
EXHIBIT M-56
INDEX
PACE
1
CHAPTERXI. ARRXEVIATIONSANDD E F I N I T I ~
CHAPTER111. PERSONNELANDADIIINISTRATION
Section1
Section2
Section3
Section4
CHAPTERIV. COMRAT
Section1
Section2
Section3
Section
Section5.
Section6
Section7
Section8
Section9
ProvostMarshall
MedicalService
HeadauertergManagement
Graves~e~istretion
' INTELLIGENCE
Counterintelligence
CanturedWeterial
CanturedDocuments
Det~inees
GroundReconnaissance
AerialReconnaissance
TechnicalIntelligence
Con;municationsandElectronicIntel
MapsandPhotographs
Section10 .,Weather
CHAPTEFtV. COMBAT:OPERATIONS
Section1
Section2
Section?
Section4
Section5
Section6
Section7
Section8
Section9
Section10
Section11
Section12
Section13
section11.
Section15
OnerntionOrders
TacticalOrerationsCenter
FireSunoortCoordination
TecticalandStrategicAirSuoport
ArmyAvi~tion
AirmobileOnerations
ArmedHeliconterSunnort
AirmobilePlanningFactors
AirSnaceControl
CivilAffairsandCivicAction
ChemicnlOnerations
EngineerOnerations
PsychologicalWarfare
SignalCommunications
OnerationsPlanningData
&A&:b.
."
**.- =-: ~:+&4$md: %&, ~f$+&:L~>5ia;c2~*;*,*~-*..;L*, -w-
-
%. . +
CHATTPRVf h & ~ & T ~ $ C ~ ~ ~ ~ 3 s : q + & ~ ~ .**Ri%@@ +
Section1 Sunnly
Section2 Trnnsnortation
Section3 MovementplanningD p t ~
Section WeightandDimensionD ~ t a
Section5 StandDOGTI
CHAPTERVII. REPORTS
Section1 SlRenorts
Section2 S2Benorts
Section3 S?Reports
Section11 Sh Reports
CHAPTERVIII. LESSONSLEARNED
---
3
CHAPTER I.
L?ITRODUCTION
a. Purpose: This SOP st andardi zes rout i ne r ecur r i ng operat i onal and
combat ser vi ce support porcedures t nt hi n. t he bi-igade and appl i ee except
when modified by di vi si on order.
b. Conformity: Subordinate uni t SOPfswill conform.
c. Recommendations f o r changes a r e encouraged and shoul d, beforwarded
5 k . t wo copies t o t he brigade S3. Recommendations will r e f e r t o a speci f i c.
paragraph, sect i on and chapter.
d'. This SOP w i l l be reviewed and changed a s necessary t o incorporate
improved procedures, new concept, and l essons learned.
2. SCOPE: h i s SOP u p ~ l i c a b l e t o f i e l d combat onerations i n a non-
nucl ear, counterinsurgency environment when opposed by an unsophi st i cat ed-
---
o r seni -sophi st i cat ed e n e ms Procedures f or t he accomplishment of requlre-
nant s pecul i ar t o base campqoperat,ions and t hese admi ni st rat i ve and l ogi s-
t i c a l mat t ers not concerned with t he immediate support of combat operat i ons.
a r e covered i n. br i gade regul at i ons, memorandums, pol i cy l e t t e r s , and i n the'
r egul at i ons of hi gher Headquarters.
OSJECTIVES: Within t he context. of t h e speci f i c procedures o u t l i & e d r \
i n t h i s SOP,.subordinate commanders w i l l i n i t i a t e programs and pr oj ect s,
es t abl i s h goqls, develop new procedures and techniques' and make comments
and recommendations t o a t t a i n o r a s s i s t t he. br i gade i n a t t a i ni ngt he follow-
i ng obj ect i ves:
a. Find, f i x, and dest roy o r capt ure the,enemy, h i s equipment, sup-
pl i es, ' bases, and i ns t al l at i ons .
b. Maintain pressure on t he enemy. Give him no r espi t e. Est abl i sh
and maintain cont act . Pursue!
2. Maxiniurn i nt egr at i ons of mi l i t ar y, parami l i t ary and ci vi c indi-
genous f or ces t o imnrove t h e i r t r ai ni ng, increasg t h e i r confidence, stimu-
i a t e aggressive act i on; and, a t t he same time provide bur forces with
ar ea i nt el l i gence, i nt er r ogat i ons capabi l i t y, s t a t i c secur i t y forces; and,
ncrb importantly,, maximum economy i n t he employment of forces.
d. Promote confidence i n t he l oc a l ' and nat i onal government.
e. Assist i n t he r evi val of t he l oc a l economy and avoid i nf l at i on-
a r ypressures by enforcing pr i ce cont r ol measures.
f.
Win t he hear t s and minds of t he people through ef f ect i ve. ci vi c
act i ons, p.sychologica1 warfare and.infoxmationprograms.
I -"
1
CHAPTER I1
COKION AbSflEVIkTIONS AND DEFINITIONSUSED I ' N THIS SOP PYD DIN RVN
Ant i -Ai rcraft
Ar r i val Ai r f i el d Cont rol
Group
Arny Avi at i on Klenent
Ar r i val Ai r f i el d
ArmyAssaul t Tern
Ai r cr af t Conmrder
Ai r cr af t
Allowable Cargo Load
A i r Cont rol Poi nt
As s i s t ant Di vi si on Avi at i on
Of f i cer
A i r Force
Assaul t Hel i copt er Co~r pa~y
7.62 Kalashnikov Assaul t
Ri f l e
AKA
Also Known A s
kLCE
A i r . Land Cont rol Elenlent
kLO
Air Li ai son Of f i cer (AF)
!it-1
Airmobile
k.iTF
Airmobile Task Force
A0
Area of Operations
AK
Agent Report s
AltA
Aer i al Itochet Ar t i l l e r y
a1VN
A r n y of Kepublic of Vietnam
AS
A i r Speed
ASk
Army Secur i t y A2ency
ASAP
A s Soon A s Possi bl e
ASCC
A i r Support Coordination
Center
ASHC Ass=,-lt Support Hel i copt er
Company ,
Air Traf' fic Cont rol
kvkat i on
C i v i l Affairs/Combat Assaul t
Combat Avi at i on Bat t al i on
Combined Action Group
Combined Action Conlpany
Combined Action Platoon
Close A i r Support (nF)
Close A i r Support Duty Of f i cer
Corntat k i r l i f t Support X1en:ent
Combined Action Team
Command and Cont rol
Chemical, Bi ol ogi cal , Radi ol ogi cal
Element
CUU
CCP
CCT
CDZC
CFA
CI C v
CKC
ChIDR
CNA
coc
CORDS
CHD
CTZ
DACC
D i b
DIGCC
DKZ
DOc:
DO1
DS
DTA
DTOC
Cl ust er Bomb Uni t
Communications Check
Poi nt .
Combat Cont rol Team
Combined Document
F'zploitation Center
Cal l Forward Area
Combined I n t e l Cen-
t e r Vietnam
Ci vi l i an I r r egul ar >
Defense Group
Chicom Carbine
Cornma.r,cisr
Coordimt e s Not
Avai l abl e
Combat Operations
Center
Ci vi l Operations and
Revolutionary Devel-
opment Support
Cont rol Of f i cer f o r
South Vietnam
Cont rol Regi st ry.De-
tachment
Combined St udi es De-
t nchmn t
Corps Tact i cal Zone
Departure Ai r f i el d
C~nt1.01 Group
Di rect A i r Request'
Net
Di rect A i r Support
Center
Detainee
Di s t r i c t I n t el/Oper-
a. t i onsCoordination
cent er
Recoi l i eso Ri f l e
Date of Capture
Date of Ini' orriution
Di rect Support
Di vi si on Tact i cal Area
Di vi si on Tact i cal
Operations Cent er
Drop Zone (parachut e)
ELI
T<\".'
-L\bltz
;;Ti
E'liC
FCC
FCL
F!:hil
F'I'.J
F?;U
FRAGO
FSI;
I,'SCC
i?SCi)ilD
F'SZ
Ycv
Fi:,pd'&'
,.,.,
bi i ~ AG
(j=
iiLL
li 6. I
i i i :
I C
11
1x2
ItiTS
1i;'l'SI;~
IGL'
d?Ii i
i ' i r
JCS
JUSP2,O
e-4.4
KCS
KIiY
&2;
Li?
iub
i1GO
. UH
UL; X
LRF
E s s e n t i ~ l Ele:i:~nLsof
I nf on!,cltion
Enzineer F:lement
Es t i ~i e t e d Tixe of i ~ r r i v s l
Forwrirci A i r Cont r ol l er ( i ~ 7 )
Fl i ght Ccor di r nt i or ~ Center
%i r e Goordination Line
Fol di ng Fi n Aer i al Rocket
Fi el d Force i l i ct nm
Fi r stJ: ;:lne Ullltnotn~
Fragm-.nto1-j. Order
Forward Support i,rcil
F i r e Support Coordim. t i o n
Cerlter
Fi r e Support Coordinotor
Fi r e Support 2lement
Fixed ki ng
Free I.',.orldk i l i t a r y Assis-
t ance Force
Gr=ves Eegi st r - ht i on
eener al Sap! #art
i i el i copt er
t1o.rrossing and I n t e r d i c t i ~ r .
I n ~ c c o r d ~ n c e l;;ith
Innocent Ci vi l i ans
Imagery I n t e r p r o t ~ t i o n
I nt e l l i ge nc e I nf orrrlation
Report
I nt er r ogzt i on
I nt el l i gence Surrifltry
I nt el l i ger i ce Cpar;i~io;is
Di vi s i ol ~J2
Irxnediate Photo I n t e l l i -
gence 2epor t
I ndi vi dual \, ezpor.
J oi nt Genertil St ef f
J o i n t US Publ i c Af f a i r s Of f i ce
?.62r::r, Fil9l.4 Ri f l e (Zhicom or
ussri 14ocikl)
K i t Carson Scout
Conf i dect i al (Vietnamese)
Le t t e r box I\;unber
Local Force
Vietnamese Speci al Forces
Li ai son Cf f i c e r
Line of Cornr~~unicction
Li ght Observation Hel i copt er
Low Level T,xLraction
Landing Zone Rel ease Poi nt
PSS
NFL
1.F Udbl
FE'
P I 2
Lor,!; Iliaqc Iieconnais-
s;:ricc i ' ; l t rol
Landinr: Zone
K;,rshallin,? Area Cont r ol
Gi'ficei-
Islclnifestin:: and Gutload-
in:: Croup
Secr et ( ~ i u t r r a ~ ~ c s c )
isiedical Ci vi c Action
Prograni
?:pin Force
b!ilitary I nt ol l l ge nc e
Cai t al i on
; <i i l i t ar yI nt e l l i ge nc e
Detachment
Ei l i t a r y Region (+?.!u-
mer i cal Des i qmt i on)
IiiliLary Secur i t y Ser vi ce
h o Fi r e Erie
l i at i onal Fr ont f o r t h e
Li ber nt i nn of South Viet-
nam
90 l i r e Zone
Nat i onal I nt er r ogat i on.
Center
Net: Life Hml e t
KO Lzt zr Than
Oper at i onal Cont r ol
Objcct i ve
Opdrations ( o f f i c e r )
Cper2t i ons Order
f ' sr i odi c Intelligence
Report
F' athfinder/fopulor Force:
Pr cvi nci al 1nt er r oqo. t i on
Cente:.
F o l l t i c a l Of f i cer
Pl.ace of Capt ure
Fickup Zone Rel ease Poi nt
Pr ovi nci al Reconnaissance
Uni t .
Psycho)~ ? i c n l @per - t ' 10ns
?ici.:up Zone
Ri ver Assaul t Croup
Ri;:qin~ Area Operat i ons
Center
Ri ot Coxitr o l Agent
~ e v o l u t i o n o r y Develop-
rner~t
Fib'
.RP
I&
PTFL
HYI'
8m
RIrr~ap
R\/
SICR
SIB:
SKS
SOhG
SP,&
SUPIIR
TAC
TACC
ThCF
T A U
TASE
,T2C
TCP
TIItiIi
TOC
TOI-. ~A&T
TOT
TZ
U/l
UShID
USMv
USi'LCil
($~%CV)
ire
VCC
v2;c
V1kILM'
Revolutionary Development
Cadre
Regional Foltces
Release Poir4t
Radio Relay
Rough Te r r Ln Fork Li ft
Radio Teletype
Republic of Vietnanl
Republic of Vietnam Armed
Forces
Rotary Wing
Speci al I nt el l i gence Collec-
t i on Requirement
Sect or I nt el l i genceAdvisar
7.62mn1 Soviet Semi Automatic
Carbine
Si t uat i onReport
Side-Looking Airborne Radar
St udi es arid Observation
Group
River ( ~i et nar nese)
Speci al Agent Report
Supplernentsry Photo Imagery
I nt er pr et at i on Report
Tact i cal A i r Comnland
Tact i cal A i r Control Center
Tact i cal A i r Control Part y
Tact i cal Ai r l i f t Liaison
Of f i cer
Tact i cal Area of Responsibi-
l i t y
Tact i cal AirSupport ?<lenient
Tr af f i c Control Center
Tr af f i c Control Post
Province ( ~i et namese )
Tact i cal OpernationsCenter
Top Secret ( ~i et nanl eso)
Tiirie on Target
Tact i cal Zone
Unidentified
U. S. Agency f or I nt er nat i onal
Developnlent
US Army Vietnam
U. S. f.Lilitary Assistance
Co~i ' md Vietnam
V i ct Cong
V i et Cong Captive
Viet Montangnard Cong
Vietnarr~eseA i r Force
Vhl-1C
Vietnamese Marine
Corps
V&14
Vietnamese kiavy
VR
VisualReconnaissance
1.
A i r Al er t -- Ai r cr af t on s t a t i on in t he a i r over a desi gnat ed ar ea o r poi nt .
2,
Air Cont rol Poi nt (ACP') -- A geographic 1oc; i t i onalon:: a fli[;(:ht r out e used
f o r cont r ol of nuvernent of ai r el e~nent s.
3.
Ai r cr af t Com.lnder ( AC) -- An avjat,or ntipointed on con:pst,ant. or der s a s
a i r c r a f t corrnanber. He i s rosponsi bl c f or t11eact i ons of tiis a i r c r a f t and
crew and a l l mat t ers per t ai ni ng t o s u c c c s s ~ l mission acc(,111p3 isl,ment.
1'.
Airmobile Combat Assaul t (CA) -- Tile l i f t of t roo: j s i nt o an L'L in which
t he enemy has t he capabi l i t y of of f er i ng r es i s t ance d u r i n ~ approach, land-
i ng and/or depart ure.
5.
Airmobile Ext r act i on -- The l i f t i n g of combat t r oops by hel i copt er s
from t e r r a i n i n which t t ~ eenemy has t he capabi l i t y t o r e s i s t . Resi st ance
can be expected t o i ncr eas e a s each l i f t i s made and t he f r i e ndl y f o r c e t s
peri met er becomes smal l er.
6 .
Airrcobile Raid -- A combat a s s a ul t f o r tP.e pur-pose bi' qui ckl y s ei zi ng
and/or dest royi ng l i mi t ed obj ect i ves and k i l l i n g o r capt ur i ng t he enemy,
followed by an ext r act i on. A s hor t dur at i cn a i r ~c obi l e operaation.
7.
bi rmobi l e Task Force (Al4TF) -- The ai r l i f t and ~jronndnianeuver elercents
requi red t o -conductan ai r mobi l e operat.ion.
8.
~ i i mo b i l e Task Force Commander -- The corr*n;inrierl-illa ejiercises corl t rol
of a l l elernents of an AMTF; us ual l y t h e ground f or c s cc;nun;irde:-.
9.
Ai rmobi l i t y -- ~ a c t i c a l mobi l i t y affori j ed a grour:d r..3rleuver-f or ce by
hel i copt er s ; t he capabi l i t y of a ground f or ce t o t i i c t :tally dt-!:lci;. ti-.rough
. t he ai r; i mpl i es t a c t i c a l i n t e mi t y i n loadin,:.
10. A i r Kovement -- Movenent of t r oops, su1.1pllesand/or ei.;\;ir!lnent; by a i r
from one l ocat i on t o anot her; i i r pl i es adf i i ni s t r at i ve l oadi ng.
11.
Allowable C a r ~ o Load (ACL)-- The t o t a l weight and/or 1ii:eher of tr-oops
t h a t can be l i f t e d under exi s t i ng condi t i ons by one a i r c r a f t i n one l oad.
12.
Area of Ope~. at i ons (AO)-- The ar ea of col;bat ol.i~:r.;~i t o iocs a s s j ~ ~ n e d a
combat uni t . The ar ea of oper at i ons rnay o r may not be i 1. 1 a 'l'Z : a d be wittiin
o r out s i da of a TAOR.
13.
Army Avi at i on Element (AAE) -- A l i a i s on eleoerri fro!a tl!e s~l l l por t i ng
Army Avi at i on element t o be t he supported unit f o r coor ci i nat i o~~ and pl anni ng
of avi at i on oper at i ons.
14.
Armed ~ e l i c o ~ t e r -- A hel i copt er equipped wi t h an at t ached (Gunship)
weapons systemwhich i sf i r e d by t h e p i l o t o r co-pi l ot .
!
I
1
15.
i\rr:~ed Escort . Acco:npanyi.n,f! armed h c l ico!)ter use(\ f or e s c 0r t j . n~ he1-
i co: >t er s, ,?round convoys, or pr ot ect i on of ~ersori nel and eciuipnent or da-
raced a i r c r a f t .
16.
l ~t t nchment-- Uni t s a r e bound tern,~or.:r:il:rt o ;i com:.and ot her tl-an
t h e i r assi gned coruand.
t hen a uni t i s ntt,zck:.ed t,o mot he r uni t , tl!e
,Fainins comr:.and as5:lrr.e~ conunand of t he at,t:lch ed uni t . . Thi s i ncl udes f u l l
r es pons i bi l i t y f or supply, adni ns t r at i on, t r ni ni nr ; and operat i ons. '
17.
Cal l Forward , l rr?s(CFA)-- An ar ea i n wh icky vehi cl es, pelssonneland
equinnent a r e i n i t i a l l y assembled f or di spat ch.
1 . Cent ral Offi ce, 5VN (COSW)-- The hi ghest VC mj l i t a r yHa; i n Sm4.
Ithas ove1.al1r es pons i bi l i t y f or VC mi l i t a r y oper at i ons i:~RVIJ ant1 exer ci ses
f i i r ect cont r ol over c e r t a i n lJC uni t s . The 1,TPLSVN i sa p o l i t i c a l f r ont f o r
COSVTL'.
19. . Chieu Il oi Program -- The "open arms" program of t he RVN t h a t permi t s
VUand VC a f f i l i a t e s t o r et ur n t o GVNcont r ol of t h e i r f r e e ' wi l l under
f u l l arnnesty and a promise of r et r ai ni ng.
20. Ci vi l i an I r r egul ar Defense Group ( cI DG) -- Indigenous personnel r e u n i t e d
t r ai ned and equipped by 7ietnarnese Sbeci al Forces wi t 11 hel p, advi ce and
equipl;?entfurni shed by US Speci al Forces.
21. Ci vi l i ah Po l i t i c a l Geo~r aphi cal 0r. rani zat i on. Ci vi l i an pol i t , i cd
or mni zat i on geographi cal l y pa r a l l e l s t he mi ; i t a r y organi z: i t i on. The Chief'
of each di vi si on, from corps through d i s t r i c t , i snorrnnlly mi ' i t a r y and h i s
deputy c i vi l i a n. Ci vi l i an and mi l i t a r y e ~ u i v a l ent or gani zat i ons a r e a s f ol -
lows :
Mi l i t ar y Ci vi l i an
-
Rank Rank of US. ~ d v i s o r
CT% Cory) ar ea RVhI:ii(n Gen Of f Colonel
Sect or Province Col o r LTC LTC
Sub Sect or i ) i st , r i ct NAJ or CFT K ~ j o r
None Vi l l age Ci vili an None
None I!amlet Ci vi l i an None
22. Close A i r Support (CaS) -- Any t a c t i c a l a i r 10is:;ion wi t hi n cl os e
proxirflity ( l e s s tiran 5,OCO met ers) of f r i endl y t roops. 1\11 CiiS.mi ssi ons .
rnust be direct,ec! 11y a FAC.
CAY f a l l s i nt o two c; i t ei wri es, pr~eplanned rriissio~ls
and 21rnediat e rnissions.
. Preplanner! Hel:uc>sts. Used when t he <round f or ces have s uf f i c i e qt
t j v ; , t o pl an t a c t i c a l a i r i n support of a f ut ur e operat i on.
Fi s s i ons sucl ~
a s a i r cover f or hel i bor ne as s aul t s , . colurm cover f br ~r ~o t o r l andi ng convoys,
zone nr epar at i ons 2nd suppressi ve f i r e s a r e preplanned re:;uirements.
. In-mediate Requests: Re1, uest s f or irnrnediate a i r support a r e desiiyned
t o meet s pe c i f i c rei.juirements which a r i s e duriny: t he coukse of bat . t l e
which cannot he planned i n advance.
23.
Combat : ~ i r l i f t Support Element (CASE) -- A US.4F t r oop c a r r i e r orcani -
zat i on est -abl i shed on an ai r f i el cj t o provi de mover!~ent cont r ol and uni t '
ground support dur i ng t r a i n i n e . or combat oper at i ons. It norrr~al l y iricludes
an oper at i onhl f unct i on, a l i a i s o n f unct i on f o r t h e s u p ~ o r t e d~ r o u n d / a i r '
f or ce uni t , and an a e r i a l por t oper at i ons f unct i on. The CASE i nforms t h e
DACG a s t o t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of a i r f i e l d l ocat i on, depar t ur e tiirle, and
f l i g h t forrcation of a l l a i r c r a f t support i ng t h e ground f or ce.
24.
Combat Cont rol Team (CCT) -- A team of USAF personnel ; organi zed,
t r ai ned, and e q u i ~ p d t o e s t a bl i s h and oper at e navi gat i onal o r t e r ni na l
guidance a i d s , com~~uni cat i ons , and a i r c r a f t c ont r ol f a c i l i t i e s wi t hi n t h e
obj ect i ve ar ea.
2.5.
Cojq-nand and Cont rol Ai r c r a f t (c.&C) -- .in ai r bor ne c o mn d pl at -
form ut i l . i zed by t t e AKTF and mi ssi on comn:ondcr t o monitor. and cont r ol
ai r mobi l e oper at i ons.
26.
Company Li f t -- A unit, of l i f t hel i copt er s , capabl e of l i f t i n g t he
a s s a u l t el ement s of s r i f l e company i n one l i f t .
37.
Corps Ta c t i c a l Zone (cTZ) -- The rmj or mi l i t a r y suLdi vi si ons of RC'N.
There a r e f our CTLs numbered I, 11, 111, and I V from nort h t o sout h, pl us
two independent mi l i t a r y ar ; as, t he c i t i e s of Saigon and fi al at . ' Each CTZ
i s r"urt,l!er subdivi.ded i n t o r ni l i t ar y s ect or s which ar e i n t ur n subdi vi ded
i n t c sub-sect ors.
28. Det ai nee -- An . i ndi vi dual who, through h i s behavior i n (I pa r t i c ul a r
s i t ua t i on, provolces suspi ci on t k a t he i s a VC o r i n a c t i v e support of t he
vc.
I
29.
Di r ect Support (DS) -- A ndssi on o r t a s k r equi r i ng one uni t , under
cormand of i t s par ent uni t , t o support anot her s peci f i c uni t . The sup-
port-inp: u n i t i s aut hor i zed and r equi r ed t o answer d i r e c t l y t h e supported
u n i t s requi rement s f o r support .
30. . Dust Cf' f -- The code name by which medical e v a c u ~t i o n ki el i copt ers
a r e i dent 5 f i ed;
31.
Eagl e Fl i ght -- Hel i borne i nf ant r y t r oops on a i r aLer t t o perform
i r ~r ~edi a- l e r eact i on mi ssi ons f o r a .ground commander.
32. bs cor t Ai r cr af t . tin a i r c r a f t which accor a~ani es irnother f o r t h e pur-
pose of provi di na weapons support and/or pickup of crew and passengers
.in t h e event t h e escor t ed a i r c r a f t i s forced down.
53.
Fi r e Fl y Shi p -- k hel i copt er equipped wi t h s ear chl i ght s t o i l l umi nat e
t a r p e t s , PZs and/or LZs.
34.
Fl i gl i t -- Two o r rr:ore a i r c r a f t wi t h a corr,a.jon riiission under t he cornrr~ancl
of a desi gnat ed f l i &t l eader .
3 5 .
General Support (GS) -- A mi ssi on o r t a s k r equi r i ng one u n i t , under
comr2nd of i t s pi r e nt headquar t er s, t o support more t han one s peci f i c
uni t . :'he suppor t i ng wit i s aut hor i zed a:?d r equi r ed t o answer r eques t s
f o r support accor di ng t o p r i o r i t i e s assi gned by hi pher headquart ers.
36.
Ground Cont rol -- A c ont r ol elernent l ocat ed i n a PZ/U t o t r a n s n i t
changes i n t he t a c t i c a l pl an o r mi ssi on and t o coor di nat e t h e or der l y fl ow
of a i r t r a f f i c i n and about t h 2 PZ/L".
37.
Harclet o-i Ci vi l Guards -- Par a- mi l i t ar y personnel r e c r ui t e d a t v i l l a g e
and kar?l et l e v e l who r ecei ve rudi i aent ary nl i l i t ar y t r .inin:: and wi!o a s s i s t
i n t h e def ense of t h e i r har;llet o r v i l l a g e agai ns t VC a t t a c ks . i;orrnally a r e
arn:ed wi t h smal l arms and crenades onl y, a r e wi t hout uni f or r r . ~ and perform
n o r m1 c i v i l i a n f unct i on when not on f i ar d.
38.
Heavy Fi r e Team -- Three arrned hel i copt er s oper at i ng as a t a c t i c a l
elernent.
39.
I nt c r di c t i on -- Ik!issions conducted agai ns t enemy t a r g e t s which i n time
w i l l reduce h i s combat c a pa bi l i t i e s . I i wr ~pl es of i nt e r di c t i on t a r g e t s a r e
suppl y depot s, suppl y r out es , br i dges and t r a i n i n g a r e a f a c i l i t i e s . I nt er -
d i c t i o n @~i ! i s s i o n s i n RVN must be di r ect ed by a FAC -and a r e us ua l l y preplanned.
40.
Laager -- A has t y perilrleter t ype def ense f o r l o c a l s e c ur i t y of equip-
ment, a i r c r a f t , and vehi cl es on t h e ground, es t abl i s hed by crews i n conjunc-
t i o n wi t h f r i e ndl y t r oops in t h e ar ea. Armed a i r c r a f t and vehi cl es a r e
pos i t i oned where pos s i bl e s o t h a t weapons systerns fi.Ly be enployed i n t h c
defense.
41. Landing Zone (LA) -- A desi rri at ed a r e a on t k e ground f o r l andi ng hel -
i c opt e r s t o disembark t r oops, equipment, and cargo i n support of an ai r mobi l e
oper at i on.
42.
L i f t Hel i copt er ( Sl i ck) -- k he l i c opt e r used f o r t h e purpose of l i f t i n g
t r oops and/or cargo.
43. Li ght Fi r e Team -- Two arfied hel i copt er s oper at i ng a s a t a c t i c a l el ement .
4 .
Xi1it:lr:r l i efi ons -- The si xVC 111i l i t ar y and p o l i t i c a l sub di vi s i ons of
t h e RVN. Tt.:ese sub di vi s i ons a r e equi val ent i n orrgani zat i onal importance
t o RVIJ CTZs.
45.
Nat i onal Front f or tile Li ber at i on of South Vietnam (N17LSVN) -- An organi -
zat i on of t h e cor:lmunist p o l i t i c a l el ement s opposiny: t he GVN.
I
1+6.
Operat i onal Cont rol ( OPCC~~) f o r -- Uni t s a r e pl zced under a conu:ander
assir,ner:ent of t a s k s and a u t h o r i t a t i v e di r e c t i on t o accofilplisk~t1.e mi ssi on.
O'COM does not f o r admi ni s t r at i on, i ncl ude r e s pons i bi l i t y o r s u t t ~ o r i t ~ lo-
g i s t i c s , di s c i pl i ne , i nt er r l al or::anization o r trainin::.
47.
Piclcun Zone (PZ) -- A t a c t i c a l l a ndi r ~g s i t e u t i l i z e d t o pickup troo!,s
and/or cargo.
48.
Popul ar Force (PF) -- A mi l i t a r y (para-mi . l i t ary) f or c e organi zed into
pl at oon- si ze eleri:ents, equipped and t r a i ne d s i mi l a r t o RF uni t s , nomml l y
employed excl usj . vel y j.n a d i s t r i c t (sub-sect or).
49.
Pre-St ri ke -- A i r Force, a r t i l l e r y o r arined he l i c opt e r f i r e pl aced on
an LZ and/or ohj a r e a p r i o r t o t h e a r r i v a l of t h e AI4TF.
50.
Rar!rp Al er t -- Ai r cr af t l oads prepared znd h i r c r a f t ready f o r take-off
wi t hi n 15minutes.
51.
React i on Force -- Airmobile or. ground r eser ve.
52.
Regional Forces (RF) -- A mi l i t a r y f or ce organi zed normal l y i n t o 132
man cornpanv s i z e u n i t s l i ght l : , arriied, and desi gned f o r employment t hrou&-
out a provi nce ( s e c t or j . They a r e not norrral l y a s wel l t r a i ne d o r e q u i ~ p e d
as HVIIAF t r oops and are' us ual l y employed exclusive1:r wi t hi n a s e c t o r o r
sub-sect or.
53. Hele'asc Point -- ti gao~ra1;hicpoi nt , recogni zubl e from t he a i r and on
t h e ground a t which f i i gt , t or ground el ement s a r r i v e i n proper format i on
and t hen proceed t o desi gnat ed a r e a s under l e s s cent r al i zed cont r ol .
54.
Returnee -- An ind. ividua1 1,ho renounces support of t h e NFLSVN and who
vol unt a r i l y s ur r ender s t o Cr f l < cont r ol under t,5e ItC!~i.eu 1 i 0 i ~ ~ !. -rocran.
55.
Revoi ut i onar ; ~ Develonr!~entCadre (1iljC) -- Speci al l y or&::lnized, t r a i ne d
and equipped u n i t s of squ:~d and plat,oon s i z e which coliduct : ; peci al i n t e l l i -
ger.ce and ps:~cholo!:icrrl w:irfare oper l t i ons .
Norsl~ally cont r ol . l ed at. s ect or /
provi'kice l e ve l .
56.
Ei ver t ~s s a i l l t Group (RAG) -- Vietnarr,ese Nay: uni t s , elr~ployed p r i n a r i l y
i n ttie Del t a area ( I VCTZ) . USIV advi sed.
57. So r t i e -- One t,a':e-off and l andi ng by one a i r c r s l t i n !.,erforr.:nnceof a
r ~i s s i o n .
5s.
St aze Fi el d -- ?L pre-det,errr~ined a r e a wticre personnel iissei:ible p r i o r t o
ccnduct i ng ali oyerat,ion.
59. :;t~.r:ifilit bTission -- A mi ssi on fl ol m wi t l : t h e l ead he l i c opt e r u t i l i z i n g
a s t a r l i g h t scope t o s pot enemy moverbent.
Ilsua1l:r escor t ed by a i l el i copt er
f i r e team. .Lead hel i copt er marks t he t a r ge t and t he gun hel i copt er s . des t , r oy
by fii-e.
60. St r i p Al er t -- Ai r cr af t loaded and ready f o r t ake-off wi t hi n f i v e min-
ut es .
61.
Su?pressi ve Fi r e ( ~ i r n o b i l e ) -- Fi r es by t r oop c a r r i e r s o r gun hel i cop-
ters duri ng t h e l andi ng phase of a combat a s s a ul t .
62. Ts ct i cal Area of Responsi bi l i t y (TAOR) -- The ar ea assi gned t o a spec-
i f i c uni t f or which t h a t uni t is responsi bl e.
N o r ~ l l y adj acent t o t he as-
s i me d u n i t ' s base area. Af t er coordi nat i on wi t h appr opr i at e RVNAF and RVN
province or f i c i a l s , comdrs concerned may conduct oper at i ons wi t hi n t h i s
ar ea wi t hout f ur t he r coordi nat i on wi t h IFm.
The TAOR i s norrml l y di vi ded
i nt o t hr ee zones.
1'. Zone 1.
A perimeter-type defense t o provi de close-in s e c ur i t y f or
t t i e base ar ea agai ns t sabotage, i n f i l t r a t i o n and d i r e c t at t ack.
2. Zone 2. An outposted and pzt r ol l ed zone of such dept h a s t o
reduce t o a ~.inir;um t he t hr e a t of 81mm mort ar at t acks wi t hi n zone 1.
3. Zone 3. An out er zone (extended TAOR) pr ef er abl y extend in^ out
t o l i g h t a r t i l l e r y range and coveri ng t he most l i k e l y a r e a s of assembly
and avenues of approach f o r enemy f or ces.
63.
Tact i cal Zone (TZ) -- The ar ea cont i guous t o an assi gned TAOB which
i ncl udes known o r suspect ed VC bases and concent rat i on a r e a s regarded a s
a pot ent i al t hr e a t t o i ns t a l l a t i ons wi t hi n t he TAOR. A Ti? i s a n ar ea not
wholly under GWJ cont r ol , al t hough vi l l a ge o r hamlet ni s l ands ' l of cont r ol
,my e xi s t wi t hi n it.
64,
Viet Cong (vC) -- An i ndi vi dual of e i t he r SVN o r UVN or i gi n who act -
i ve l y suppor'cs t h e a c t i v i t i e s and programs of t h e NFLSW znd/or COSW
through a c t i ve par t i ci pat i on i n o r support of armed a t t s c ks , ot her forms
of t e r r o r o r i n t bni dat ion, subversion, sabotage, and/or espionage d i r -
ect ed . agai nst nat i onal s , f a c i l i t i e s , i ns t a l l a t i ons o r ~ n i l i t a r y f or ces of
t he RV?.J/US/F~I.WF.
(1)Wilbbetreatedilt thelowestpossiblemedicalechelonand
returnedtodutyassoonastheirconditionpermits.
(2) idillnotbeairevacudtedwithoutpropersedation,restraint,
and/oraccendacts.
5 . PROCESSINGDECEASEDPEBSONNEL:
a. Isn quartermasterresponsibility(GravesRegistration).
b. Willbeevacuatedbyznymeknsavailable,toincludemediaal
evacuationvehiclesifnecessary.
c. Deadonarrival(DOA) andDeadofWounds(DOW)atBatta-lionAid
Stations,willbre transportedtoGravesRegistrationbytheparentunit.
6. KANAGEXENTOFWOUNDEDPWl s..
a. PWlswillremininnr-dicalchannelsuntilthefrphysicalcondition
pennitstransfor. TransferofwoundedPWlswillbe coordinatedwiththeBdeS- 2 .
b. MedicalpersonnelwillnotbeusedtoguardPWls.
UnitCommanders
willfurnishguerdsfororganicaidstst.io.ns.ThePMfurr.ishesguardsforthe
Brigade ClearingStation.
7. MEDICALSUPPLY:
a. Allunitswilldeploywitha15daymissionload(BdeRegTBA).
b. Medicalresupplywillbeonea asrequiredbasis,informal
during-conbatoperations,byformalrequisitionwhilein'basecamp.
c.
Propertyexchangewillbeutilizedatalllevels.(i.e. stretcher
forstretcher).
d. Medicalmatntenaneesupport(secondechelon)willbefurnished
bythemedicalcompanyinsupport.
8. PREVENTIVEMEDICINEANDFIELDSANITATION: SeeBdeReg40-17.
9. EDICALRECO3DSA M REPORTS:
a. Healthrecordsw l i l be storedandmaintainedinthefieldby
BattalionBaseCampDispccearies.'
b. Dentalrecordswillbo storsc:andmaintainedintheBrigde
ClearingDentalFacility.
c. PC:SOZS~ a2E.:;:~s r o t evacuetec! wi:h re:.-ins :?ill be dci i vered
t o t ke uni: 1s mi n t e n a x e and holLic2 crea zt t k ~ Gzi~rLklsBase C a q Arca.
d. Thz cezn 1c:dcr 02 t he uni t 1s xca.lr.tc:.:~.ze znd hcidirrg tecm w i l l
col l ec2 and Lnve~.eory t he t kceesedt s personal efC-;ts on Di l Form 1676. Af r er
iavs:xory, hc w i l l peckage the p e r s o ~ a l e f f e c t s f:2 :-.:.illr3 acd dcl i vzr the=
with two copi cs of G3 Form 1076 t o t he Personael X:CL47& 3rncch, AG Sect i on
f o r f ur t hor dis?os:tion.
Csrazrcph 13c, 33-?V Rc ~ u l z t i o n630-33, Pr (5 7 &y 1966, l i ~ i t st h e
r . xScr of e.=eiq deed ( up t o 20) t Zet \$ill be t ux c , .zr "L LPW Graves Regis-
t r c t i o a UnLts. Gzoaps of zaz-3 than 20 wi l l be t ur ns. . over t o t he l oc a l
provi nce chzef o r h i s desigcezsd i e?r csencat l ve f c r a; i proprl &t e bur i al . Enemy
remains wi l l . b e processed exps2i t i ousl y.
g. YSSCV Directive 33:-:!.
3. :AXSSIOIJ: To provicia t he Co-dor a c r c a t c , t b a l y x:c! usci"u9 irLL*o>
mtion c o n c e ~ . ~ g ihe eneay, tcrrcin tcd weathe:, a d ct t h e sane t k o dezy
t ha enercy &ccoss t o siznik i nf cr mt i on e o 2 c o m~ 2 ~ ~ 3 f r i e ~ d * f ~r c c 3 .
a.
l Uezt r i ca?a trtx7smi-lt ,-. ?- nt cl l i ge~co - axxd repor'cs, cc~rczpondanc~
nossages erz. idcrAf,Ff'iedby i ~3erLi rrgt he word JISP;IIXX"b-"lclcan t he secwity
classsicstion nzd the mcssaga c i t e y&,ar.
b, i?r~Cycowit procedures.
. .
( 1 )
'rhe number of confirmed cnerq t o h ~ v obeen EC2 d . i n act,io;? i a
dotermined by body c o u t . %dy i s not syconyxous :clth bcdy recovery, c o ~ ~ t
but is a r e d2s t i c e?pralsal oi clrcusS~?cestihct leavc'sodoabt -Li?st c,
cert ai n number of t he enorny ' c.x bee,-: ki l l ed.
(2)
Probable kFUs are based 02 t he e n a y baing i n a speci f i c area
a Adthe ev,dence i ~ d i c a t e st h a t o. r~urborwere ki Es d a1Lhoiigh no bodies wcrc
recovered.
6, . Cmu!-c:) r'"-~~Q~~E, 355io32
7. C p L U m ~,":~~~P, S~r ; t i oa3
8, J h m S Sscl too 1,
9. G3CTJ:ID 3?2C:.3L'5,'2_"iL<J,02iF;c;tCcn 5
10,,W~IAL' ~ CC~ ! J ~ I I ~ SPXCX. 6 2 r : ~ t i ~ ~
b3. TEGWICi:.L P?Z2EGBISE, S~c5Jos7
92. C014iCU%TCP.TTIC31S i2:D EIEGTEELCS IXTSILZG~IC~, EPGLIOSL8
13. PWS ANDPEOTGS:%,r)IlS, Eoctica9
14. kF&T:Sh, Saction/ O
15, &wHTLxG B T U a < C E &A$Q~ EJ,ss&ji~a2
. ,
g, Tk.,::keeping cf p e r ~ o ~ s i t v5l l diaries i a discouraged, In no ease
&Wca~-yacti.vi'ciea bo xeri?kBowed,
40
b,
Cc?tucd c z t a r i n l tri12 not bs des';zbjed ~4l ; houtpri or ~ p p ~ c v a l
of t i de hc~dqa--i;c-rcthrough 'S2o S2,
c. Xis cc$urc 02 zxitetrial La rk?orto2. t o Ed3 52 3j 6p-L r t ] x~%~ TIi0
repx-$includaa a cezplotcj Casc?h$%or 02 'i;i1~nsatokial, tha c o u - ~ t ~ g or oriZfi?,
~ r l & ~ E ~ & > . ~ ~ - ~ ; , ~ ; ~ -.. Gc t ho C-.L>>&*~.. . .
-e.
50 Eopx-t GCR.Sor g ~ ~ c c ~ ~ l c nqy ~ q u i p c ~ b , a~~-a2:1%GT @3 agcntc and for-
i':~?. izz1cdi~t63~ to X o S1 \nth COT,TII&~ dsaari?",eon, C3ptwc9 or do-med
enw aircrzfk L ~ U t?o r 0 ~ 3 ~ t ~ d hz=CxL.crl-~ t o t he s o 32 u.d rs i U ba guarded
by s-ccovcrL~gCI*L,
a, The &lo S2 is dole~;E.:c.5the a'i?t?lorL%y t o csAQ captwod weaponaura
WXC ~ F O~ ; ) > ' CZ
I
co
1.5tcr19!,chsei3icd cs lo&. ' ;tbto pfW t r o ~ x a sm y bs r ot t med t o .
hdi vi &acI &te t ho itca ha3 ~ a r - : m oi ztaa:ence oclepdngo
0 a
...
IP it is to bS rotWc2, so ste", on tha s~~.izrlaLion tag c*=ueckedto tb
itcia. . . I ~c l udo~u;o,p i s J' acrvi ca s&u, ~d &?itof thc hdivOduale
.. .
Tab:
A - Captured Material/Weapon Data Tag
T -jA (~agturod~?.tt-r~ial/!'!eapanOata Tzg) t o Sect i on 2 (Captored i 4i l i ori al )
to Chaster 4 ( C O Z ~ ~ L I ni el l i zzi i ce) t o 11th Infarrt;y Bri2a.de ( Li ght ) SOP
1. ~ C ~ I I ; : ? ~ St.r",Ube t agg~dwi-ch IjS:EV Fora 36&,
Locc.:,.ion or" ca7tura date
a d the of capture ere 1;3si, iaprt~?t.
D3c~8,z'ss~ho12. dcot be dcfaccd.
2.
~ ~ c ~ f i t s . ~ ~ i ~ f a t e l i i ~ o n c cchsnnela to the Ed0 S2 be evacuated t hr ou~h
23 kxi p&j , t i ousl y 2s ps s i bl e . i-t t E 2 ??inL,
&C- ~LTCO~~; Zk . 5 n bo scaraeci
at great Xe~gLhto dctorrLne r h&hc r i ~ , ? ~ ~ L i o n & t a c t i c e l i i $ X' e of i3
cci?'csined in tho docuezLs,
5.
~ r ~ ? ~ o ~ r z ~ ! ~ i c u t o r i z l ; n c i docm$~~Ls c~ntebLnginfornlation on nuclear,
chcaical, zrid biolocricrl r-raa;x~s to the Bde 52. a t Ll l bo delivered b~e di c l t c l y
1, pm.pQS~; To prescribe poXcias, r es~ons2. 3i l i t i os,L::d prcceduoes for
the handlir.g, p r c c e s s k ~,uc;;lcl'Lr-lio.? a d xpc2'cing of
pe2sCzJ
detain& by 3 e .
2. AWPONSIBILITY: St aff responsi bi l i t y f or hmdling, p-..cessing, and
di s ~os i t i onisvested i n t he Provost Xsrshal. The Pr cvos ~ k r s h a l op-
erat es the Bde PW col l ect fqgpoint.
a, A l l peiesons captured by 5's Forces a s enemy or suspected enercy sshall
be referred t o a s a "detainze" unt i l hi s s5atus i s det erxhed by a brigs&
i nt er r ~gat or , as one of t he categoriesdescribed below:
(a) A n y captive of t he North VieALnameseArmed Forces (&MIA)
or
Viet Cong Main Force (vCPG') *whethercap3ued i n conbat or not.
(b) A n y person captured while act ual l y engaged i n combat or ina,
'
Selliger' ent act (other tha:. 2s ionage, sabotage, or t er r or i sn) agai nst .
t hs Gwerrswnt of Vietfiam (CVN!, US Forces, or other F r e a . ~ Wc ~ ~ d - Mi U. ~ j
Arxied Forces( FL~ ~ AF,. j ,
(2) C f b i l Dzfendznts. Those persons having comdttsd 02 suspected of
hsving cormitted zct s of espionage, sabotage, terrorism, or even crimifial
acts. Persons of t h i s category are not ent i t l ed t o fri sbner of War st at us .
provided byt he Geneva ConvenCic.1 r el at i ve Lo Treatment of Prisoners of \Jar.
(3) Retwnees. A person vol unt ari l y ret wni ng t o t he coat rol of GVN
artel; having ac5lvely supported t heViet Cong i n p o l l t i s l or mi l i t ary
act i vi t i es. NVA personnel ar eaccepted a s returnees.
(F,) D~a' otfulCases. of or known t o have c o ~ d t t c d Persons su~pect ~sd a
bel l i gerent act (other than espionage, sabctage, terrorism, or cr i ~ai nal )
and whose enLitl~xsn6, t o ?\/ s t at us i s Fn queseion. Boubtful.cases mast be
resolved by a triSu:?al i n accordance wi t h Article 5 of t he Geneva Convention
(GPw) as implezented by Y' CV Directive 20-5.
(1)A person lacrun t o bo an innocent ci vi l i ana t t he t i ne of capture
does no6 i a l l t i +, hi nthe l'detcineen category ebave ' ai d does'not r aqui r e
handling es suc;;~.( p y a 4c, be1~:i).
(2) A refugee is person ot her than t ha' i disc3:':bsd i n para 23,
abovo, who has f l e d o r has beenZorccd f ramk.Ls 2'j:ie tsc;cnps r i l l t a r y o r
pol i t i ck1 persezut i on.
(2) Tag detzinee wi t h KACV P c m3l+O c? U%!: ?or= 36.., Cep?;fve Cardu.
' f t i srranda0,ory t h a t t h e f ~l Lo; . ~~i ng ii?i'o:~xz-Llor. 'c" dat e, miri~m efiterzd:
time, pl ace, cii-ciz~skances of capt ure axd ca$, uri xg u r i t ,
(4) d l i docil'zenLs, monies, weqons, ridst be ai d of her i ~ ~ e 2 i r . ~ ~ t s
J- sc;,ged r,, . . s,cii;h descri g' i i on and r~lskedt o t k e <cteicae, L4;ez,s ,mnsl; be foi-xardea
with det ai nze, Those F$ums des i r ed m d ac%cc,-ize2a s t:Lr sou;re;li~-3should bo
marked f o r ? ~ t u x i ~ T t h i dzi ~t i i i yof :-eo,uzs4c-. Y o-~ve?A-ser e not act hor i zeb -LO
t o be rekai ced p2io? t o proczssi ng by brigede i:.lter.rogetors.
( 5' ) Svazuat sdetainees inaccordance iCi,:J i b e c t i v e s 20-j
2nd 19C-3.
(6) Ser i ou3l y\rou;:dcL d z t a i ~ e e sa r e t o be e-$acuzted ti?~s*agh ~ e c l i c a l
channels 'to Bds L l e ~ r i r ~ g , Ex?edi t i aasl y in2u;rn 36s S2 of E L t o EGL l e z - i n g .
Bae Cl ex-i n&x i i l cc~pl e. Lea duplic*-iis Captive Tag if de';ai-e musk ba
evzcuat ed oct of ljde ~or i - l ~ol ,
' ,
\7) E ~ G i nt er r ogzLor s1.611i n t e r r a g ~ t e , categorize, a d process
detaiz-ieess i n a c c or da ~c ewi t h l ! C V direc' civeu citeci i n p u a 42(5) above.
2, PX!s s d l l be s ent t hrough Pi-ovost. l hr s ha l c h a ~ n e l s t o t he
ARVN Coda2 C?,ptive Caq,
b, Ci vi l beEendw,ka w i l l bt? 2rocessed t hraugh Prcvost k r e h e i
charvlels t o Sect or Tor disposiLior,, Bde SJX nust wl cur . i n t h e i ~ t e r r o g a t o r ' s
det erai mnat i on of Ci vi l Defendants. I n cases whe-2e t h e SJA and 3de i nt er r ogat or
di sagr ee i n t h e .categorSy of a a e t a i ~e e ,a t r i b w ~ l est abl i shed and conducJ;ed
i n accordance wi t h IACV Di r ect i ve 20-5 will resoi ve. tk,e citse,
c. I r docent civilians a r e ral ebsed t hrough S5 channel s f o r r et ur n t o
t h e i r boxes.
a.
Coordination bot:seen ' is iix: LC:
. .
C G . ~ X ~ E L ~ ~ S o
be E&nda2~es aye F@Lso
j. h c e contact i s eataxfd-.id, rr~Lr..tzinc o z t ~ c tcad ~lzn?wscit.
(d) Doubtful cases must b e . resolved by 2 t r i bunal est abl i hed
and conducted as mentioned above.
b. The Provost Marshal is resi.Jo.?siblo f o r t he preparat i cn and
subrdssion t o t he JUCV Provost kirshal, bfi.C'J Form 3430"13etairtee Report,"
h he Bdo Int errogat i on Section y i l l assist i n prepzration of this f om.
c, Returnees w i l l be evacuated t o di vi si on ai?d w i l l be ~ceo?ded
favored treatment uzder t he CUeu Hoi Progrm. he$:2nres r dl l be processed
and turned over t o GVN Ci vi l Aut ho~i t i e s a t t he n e z ~ e s t Chieu Hoi Center,
as rapi dl y a s i s consisterit with t he t a c t i c a l si t uct i on.
a. Spot Reports, lnterrogat i on personnel a t any ir,terrogat i on echelon
w i i l i r dt i a t e a spot, report concernbg any i i f or r mt i on geined of i medi at e
t a c t i c a l wrpiaZ;akie vc ue . Hepcrt w i l l contain as a mi ni mi mt he following:
(I) Source and s t a t us of source.
(4) Information (who, .what, where, when, how),
b. I nt er r ogat i on Reports.
(1) I nt e r r og~t i on personnel at any i nt er r ogat i on e &elon below
Brigade w i l l prepare t hr ee (3) copies of an i nt er r ogat i on r epor t ?n each PW,
C i v i l DeScnd2i-1t*'&Re t ~r a e e interrogated. one (1) ccpdl w i l l be forwarded wi t h.
i ndi vi dual when evacuated. Ona(l) copy w i l l be given t o support S2, one (1)
C O ~ J ; ~ will be forwarded t o 52d MI D, I nt er r ogat i on bection,
(2) . Int errogat i on personnel a t Brigade will prepaye i n t errogation
r epor t s on a l l LDW s, Returnses, k~owlegeable Ci vi l Def e ~ d a n t s ,and lnnocent
Ci vi l i ans i nt er r ogat ed i n sui ' fi ci ent copies t o meet exi st i ng r e qui r e ne ~t s ,
c. Iieckly Ca ~ t i v e s t a t us Report. Briga&e I nt er r ogat i on Sect i on w i l l
pixpars w.is!ily reporbs f or the Bde S2 accounting f o r a l l PTd's, C i v i l Defen-
ant s; Iw~oceni; Civilians, and Returnees ' detained by Brigade during
the r a p o r t i ~ g period a 0 1 Sunday t o 2400 Saturday.
. -.
, KO e s c o o S t :~i-o::~rt,jr..lii'~Le~~ ~2sc;;..:.t2l-y
----- :'-.,,-- - --
essent i al t o accor, ~l 5. sk: ~~~1s' c 02 %?is 2
-
dd,
Vehicles w i l l be sar~Cca~:edLo 2c2uce person~~l i nj cci es Troa
enery rdca s.
QP
Repxxt CP cndt&riit l oc a t i a l s k.6thoat d~Lny.
, .
gg , DesL?uc%Lon 02 ele$~enCs reski cl e6 to i xoao s IL(-- J T c
m';e?lal' i n knom VC c o a t x i l e d arcas znci/02 e c c o m~ n i c c ! 3;r 2eco-:L~-
. able VC.
. .
* I n country ver i f i cat i on required,
ii. CowterinkolPlgsnco plen. 3csferenea a~~":s::/~pperidlxor
listpoint3 ofplzn.
&&. R~ f ~ s c i l z e . . to ph7;scs (.sd~...pi~s~~~t\*>g r'3fGL*:'3Cc&d. .., v
.
. .
. : . . .
.. .
3. OPERATION PL4NS: ' . . , . , . .
a*. ,, O p r a t l c n s F-2v;8.- "*6 for' . ' . - 5 :;-r-qp..>:?-nw
- -.->-'. * .r-. .-.?*,'
L- " L, ":. <+.;>..a; "bb~: >b,L."L bJde2's-
. .
, i on onorder.
...
be H-hour, L D q , tobeanco~~ccc!d
,
P
c.
Cpiqatfo;? pl z~zswiP?- be ai ~~barzd dwl ngCi e cor.sect%l-~@2y
calendar gear andassignedn'ecdo nx.2.
>\
d. Opcat i on pLans w i l l be,prspar,mc!farcll. c c ~ t i ~ g c n c y ~Lssior;.~.
e,
)-.: each l e v e l 0: cor?p;r.c', t > c Pi1-e ?Lons of szb~i-diT. Etec i l f Lk ~
., ...=
i.,-.%. -.-
t h e
-.,. .'.
,-, ,,,, .;gLL,eb azd cooydinated ;.:iJ;:? Tiye p122 ol' t he rc.zjo? u1-iit.b
5 .
v:lr2 S;~>?JO:.; $2:-Ls Wilrbe forv,:ai-ae~t o ';i;e next :?ighe.-r echel on of'
C O . ~ ~ ~ ~ !
Forv:arding of r ecues t s f o r pl snned Ti r e snppp.ri
wiihout, del ay.
1y. l l l te del ayed awai t i ng ccn;, leLion of t he en'i,l~-e su??or t plar..
f, Xi; co::.pany l e v e l t ke f i r e support pl an x l l l ~orrn;-liycons i s t of
L t a r z z L. l i s t gr e72r ed by 'ihe a r t i l l e r y 3crwa-i.d o'usel-vel- i n coordin;tion . .
t h e ke,zvy n c r t a r plst,oor. foi-vara obsel-ver 'and t he ccx?..;;any corndr.
. .
F'-
...,
>
,-
-
foi -~; r~rd ~ ~ l l e r y observer f or var ds t h i s l i st by t he rnost expedi t -
. <; -
i s u s rr.eans t o t $e a r t i l l e r y ba t t a l i on l i a i s o n o f f i c e r wi t h t he I nf znt r y
bci;talicr, .
Ci r r c t Sup?crt hr-Li l l ery,
The 6t h En, 11t h Arty hi l 1r. ormal i . y be i n
2 i 2 e ~ tsu?part (93) of t he bri gade.
Thi s Sat t zl i on provi des a forward
obsarver ( FO) s ect i on t o each r i Zl e comnany znd a l l s i s o n s ect i on t o t he
krl gzde FQ and each i nf a nt r y t s t t a l i o n HG,
'3, Fi r e Requests.
Fi r e yequest s w i l i r,~r::~?lly be addressed t o t h e -
DS o r at kached a r t i i l e r y bnt t al i on TDC on a r t i l l e r y PDC n e t s by t h e srt-
i l l el - y 70 0;- l l a i s c n s ect i on. Fi r e r eGues t s ~ a y be or i gi nat ed by any
eledki-it of t h e support ed uni t and t r a n s n i t t c d t o t h e a r t i l l e r y FDC by
any avzi,a Sl e means. . .
c. Qcic:: Fi r e Chanpcl. A "Quick Fi r e Charinel" w i l l be ~ a l n t a i n e d
bel:.!sen t h e a r t i l l z r y FDC and as s oci at ed. i nfai ~t . ry heavjr mor t ar pl at oon
Pi r e d i r e c t i c n cent er s on a r t i l l e r y ba t t a l i on FDC ne t s whenever possi bl e.
6. Rei nforci ng Ar . ~i i l e r y , The f i r e s of r ei nf or ci ng a r t i l l e r y s r e
~ S t a i ~ e d t hrough t h s DS a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n FDC.
e. Cl ose-i n1Xre Proceciure. Close-in f i r e i sdef i ned a s any i ndi r e c t
f i ye I ~t e i i d e dt o impact wi t hi n 60G met ers of f r i e ~ d l y t r oops. Such f i r a
should not be en?loyed unl es s t h e tlirea-c present ed by t h e t a r g e t j u s t i f i e s
t he r i s k i ~ v o l v e d . !!.'hen cl ose-i n f i r a i s request ed, t h e f i r e r eques t w i l l
i ~ c l u c l e t h e words, CLOSFyIM FIRE/CLOS-%IN FIRS, fol l owi ri g t he ns t ur e of
t z r gc t . it i sincurtbent upon c o ~ d r s of f or ces empl oyi ng' cl ose-i n f i r e t o
i ns ur e t h a t t r oops t a! t e necessary pr ot ect i ve nsasU3est o r i ~ i r n i z e t h e
p o s s i b i l i t y of sust ni ri i ng c a s ua l t i e s from such f i r s . A s a minkxum,ti-oops
should be i n t h e prone pos i t i on when cover i s not a va i l a bl e o \Then cl ose- i n .
f i ?? i s t o be adj ust ed wi t hi n 200 met ers of f r i endl y t r oops, a l l pi eces t o
be f i r e d i n e f f e c t w i l l aTcso f i r e i n .zdjusJcmen.t.
2vxs cF 5Nbp,GEyLxT
1
! ~ l z > ~ ~ E - ~ ~ ~ *.lGD 46 : . .
2. I n aceas excl usi ve c f v i i l s z e s scd : ~aml et s, oSservcd z r t i l l ~ r y fi
I
and nzval gmz i r e m y bc di rect cL 2.sairisS Y.~X/VCfa-ccs i~ coctac!, i n
rccor&r.ce \$ch nori.l&l p,-occ<xrzs? xa.nlav"-, ~;:ob;~:-rcd Ti r e will be
d l r e c t e d ozlly s.; t a r ge t s so ttarge5 srozs dec!::rcd hos'cfZc by GFI , Bde
..
ka-get. zi-eas fro3 t he GLrN TR s act ar ?*;d-\risor p i o r -LC &;.larir-., -I ,,':- hoa-
t i l e ,
. .
' b e PLssiocs 2gai zsi op s ~ e ; > c ~ ~ . ~ d ST,'P~/'~.:\= ';-:.-. ;\ ;;bS -.- &.A -:."--'-.+.- ....-..--.la
. . .
acd vi l l ages occuplccl by ~ o ; i - ~ ~ ~ 3 ~ t . ~ r ; ~ \()?._I1 jL+~~r - ~: c- ; c~ i s . p- - ; ,VA,O;:-S i
..T
( )
A X . f i r e missions 03 hamlets o r ville2:s :,rii~ 5e co;..'zollsc?
by 2.3 ai rkorne o r growd observsr (FG) a d sill ha execzte? cnly ~ 2 5 ~
.
t?.e t argct hhas b~e : ldeclaaec! hostiiia by GTfi!, X e TSSC, ar,ci/a- Bn k t y Lit'3,
' . I
(2)
2 ~ d e S s ' oa vi l l ages not eesociaJied vrik:? 32oc:.,d o?ei-ations
willnot be at t acked by g ~ n f l r ewLthoct p?lor warning (Ly LrafLs5s and/ or,
speaker systems 0;-o 3 a r a;>paopriate r:e~i:s) eY?en though :inkt a- ffrz i s
received f r o3 tkec.
(3)
E!a&ats: 2nd v i l l ~ g e sr - - ybe atti&& v; i t h~zb pri ci - >.crni;zg
If tlze at t ack i s i f i c onj ~qc t l on it:^ a . a nmmd o~-i.-?-" ,. . , & Ir.vol~.~ing .Lke
movenent of groaid f or ces thi-ocgh t he zrea, 22, in t he &5ge;;.;an$ of
t he grour~dcox?2nde? ( ~ n or kibgkar), hi s r i cel cn would be jeopardized
by such wa:*nings.
. . '
c: A l l missions f i r e d on t ar get s ' o r targzt &r eas- t hat are' ir.. t he
coast al waters of R J must Se cleared by the H e FSCC (clearance Tr oi
GVN Sector US Advi s o~ requi red),
d. Free-fire 2 x 2 s a r e cooz.iinatzd wi t 5 t h e sec- ~oi c/ s~3 s e c t or ,US
. &visor and hi s VN counterpert, t he provi nce/ di st ri ct chref,
The pr o- . ,
~vince/dis*ti-ictchief w i l l es t ebl i s h t he xcs",ictionu oa fi ri cg i c t o t 3sse
. .
areas
ej
Temporery free-Tire ar eas my be nzgoklcted f or a ~ 7 e c l f i c
op&ation ef f ect i ve f o r t he pe-iod of t he opara-Lion, and are mz3:aily
more ~ e s t r i c t i v e ~
-2
:b. In the I1 CTZ request s for NGF 1.1-1150 farwarded t o t he P;ille7r
Ebction, I PPV, or t o 11 Corps TDS, , v"C'NC31 !:I 2So+;
c. Cutside the II CTZ, l i a i s on must 52 tie wikh t h o mar e$$ YiC:?
IiQ t o obt ai n request procedures' and locz-lion of .KG?LO.
d. .Tila following .inPor:;u"ston isreq~:ired rihcn requesq:icg XZ7:
( 1 )
Type of opsration. .
. .
SECTION 6
~ I O ~ L X OPSRATIONS
1. G E ~ P L :
a. Th i s sect i on the responsi bi l i t i es and tecnriiques t o
be followed i n t he plannins, coordination, control, and executlo.r, of
i mo b i l e operations.
b.
This mission and ground comnander1.s concept of operations and
scheme of maneuver ar et he b s i c f act or s i n determining the.pat t ern of
the operation and t he support forces t o be employed.
c. Theairmobile force is organized i nt o f l i ght s andelepents. Tha
t act i cal i nt egr i t yof t he squad, platoon,. and compariy ismaintained when-
ever possible.
d. The major p u n d force cormnder of t he ai rpobi l e force is respon-
si bl e for theent i r eope. ~ation.
e. The airmission corimancferis responsible t o t he ground force com-
'
mander f or the techniques of accomplishment of t he a i r movement phase of
the operations.
a. Noqal planning f or airmobile operatgons i sthe responsi bi l i t y of t he
next higher headquarters t o the ai r l i f t ed' f or ce. The.pl vl of maneuver will
be coordinated with t he headquarters of higher, lower, 'and adjacent upi t s.
b. Detailed plaMing for binnobile operatione i s osseritial. Th. bhvk.-
ward planning s.jquence sli0~1.d beutilized.
(1) Sequence:
(a) Ground t rLct i cal plan.
(b) Landing pl an.
(c) Air movement plan (Cwrd with f i r e support plan).
(d) G~aangplan.
(2) Upon recei pt of airmobile mission orwarning order.
(a)
The ground force comanders w i l l :
1, Submit t o t he Aviation offi cer:
r
a. Number andl o c a t i y s of pick up weas.
.-
b_.. Number of troops, crew-served ucapons ( 8 Lx mor t ar
tlnd up) and pallets of cargo a t each pick up area.
90
835
planned.
-
c. Pick up seqcence desired.
-
d . . Number and l ocat i ons of Us t ent at i vel y
-
e.
Expected time of pick up.
2.
I n i t i a t e ground maneuver pl ami hg; f i r e sup-
por t planning; i ssue warning order . t o subordinate. uni t s; and make sup-
por t requests t o Brigade staff/supportin(: agencies.
2. Est abl i sh time and place f or a j oi nt plaiing
conference and inform S3 and Aviation Officer,
(b)' The Aviation Offic6r w i l l :
,
1. Al ert supporting avi at i on uni t , giving info r-
mation received from grzund uni t ,
2. Arrange f or t he avi at i on uni t comm=nder or hi s
designated r epr es ent at i G t o be present at planning conference.
. ( c)
The avi at i on uni t w i l l :
-
1. Move t o an a l e r t posture di ct at ed by t he si t ua-
tion.
2. Have uni t LNO a t brigade t o L-eceive a br i ef i ng
on enemy and f r i endl y s'ituotion, procure maps and keep t he uni t ported as
t h e si t uat i on develops, . .
( 3)
A planning conference w i l l be held, normally a t t he CP
of . t he ground uni t commander.
. .
. . ( a) Personnel t o at t end.
. .
a
-
1.
Ground uni t commander and sel ect ed s t af f .
-
2.
Aviation- uni t commander and be1.e~ t ed s t af f .
2.
Ar t i l l er y LNO/FSCOORll of ground uni t .
4 A]~X)/FAC ~ i t . ! ~ p!-.und uni t .
2.
NGF off fker ( i f appropriate).
(b) Procedure.
1. Ground uni t commander presents ground t act i -
c a l plans, f i r e s ~ ~ ~ o r t - ~ l n n , and desired landing and loading plans.
2 Itviation uni t commander st at es numberbof ai r cr af t
available, 1" +a$bility, and recornends f l i ght routes and any changes
he believes ap, , prfat e: i n pick up-areas or LZs,
2,
The planning group list,ed i n 3c ( a) above w i l l
cona~ctan a e r i a l reconnaissanco wi t hthe principals in one ai r cr af t , Tne
reconnaissance will permit the conmandars and st af f t o make f i nal det er -
mination on:
..dentificationof objective,
-*
b
*
Ground maqeuver plan,.
c Ident i fi cat i onof pick up areas, LZs and alter,nate
.I*
d Flight routes,
-*.
-*
e Fire support plan, t o include;
(1 -) Iacation of artillery/mortar l i ri ri gpositions
and t arget s,
(2) Timing of fires,
(2.1 Directions of at t ackby USAF ai r cr af t and
armed helicopters,
) Targets for NGF and locating of f i r h g ships.
&, A finalcoordinationmeeting wi l l be held upon
loading, The ground.unitcomnder wi l l subsequcntlyissuean or21or
*itten OPORU o r FRAGON); Coordination i s continlious Wilcompletion..
5, Weather, the enemy si t uat i on, and ai r cr af t avail-
. abi l i t ymayforce changes in the routes flown, loading zones, f i r e
support plans and ai r cr af t loading plans, Alternate plans must be made
t o minimize t he efr'oct of these changes,
(4) Special..considerations,
(a) Time:
1 When the lack of time will not permit the f ul l
pl&nning sequence o ~ k i n e d above, t he ground uni t commander w i l l not i fy
a l l - personnel concerned by t hemost expeditious means of. the essent i al
el went s, of the plan. As a minhun, ai r cr af t f l i ght leader wi l l be
briefed and given time t o bri ef his pi l ot s,
2, Ilil 'times c oor dkt e dar e cr i t i cal .
' u
2, lieather delays should be planned,
(b) Evasion and escape, Personnel ' part i ci pat i ns i n
t he operation nust be briefed on actions t o be taken i f ai r cr af t goes
down a t other than intended IZ,
(c ) Counterintelligence.
I . Conduct planning in a socue area,
-
2 Cond-act mininlunl reconnaissance essent i al t o
-
~k n n i n g .
2.
Dissenunate orders a t l a t e s t .time feasi bl e
and on need t o know basis,
1 .
Prohibit mrked mzps, OPOILDs, overlays and
sketches. i n assault-echelon.
(d) Fire Support plaming,
1. ..Preparat,oryf i r es on and around ZZ shoulcl
be intense a ~ d of sxort duratipn,
Napah a d other incendiary ordnance
may be used on alzd near t he LZ j ust pri or t o landing, when required
against appropriate t arget s, provided that t he aimlobile force corn-
mnder has considered t he possible undesirable f i r e s and reduced
vi szbi l i t y,
2,
To gain surprise, i nf i l t r at e, when possible,
speci al rcconnaissa~ce/combat pat rol s i nt o the area 24-48 hrs i n
advance t o secure Us and preclude requirement f or h r t a r / a r t i ~ e r y
preparation and/or air st r i kes,
2*
Gunships may be used imriediately a f t e r the
preparatory f i r e s t o recon approach routes t o the Uj screen and block
eneny moverilefit, and provide limited a i r c a l l f i r e support f or t he
ground force e l e ~e nt s , Close coord i s essent i al -and fri endl y positions
must be posi t i vel y i dent i fi ed,
c, , ha d planning fact ors Al l vary with weather, al t i t ude and
condition of ai r cr af t . (section 16)
dm Execution. Inverse of Plenning sequenqe.
( 1 ~ o a d i n ~ .
(a) kr acge loads La pick up area 80that ai r cr af t
app~oach in';o hdhd.
(b) One man i n charge of loadin: area.
He she-Ad be
cl earl yi dent i fi ed by di st i nct i ve rarking easi l yrecognized by aii.
Crete and ground per s cr ~e?
(c) Loads \Jillbe positioned in accordance t dt hp u b
i i shed or announced load plan and spaced 40-60 meters apart, au-
jaccnt to, but n ~ t on touchdown point.
(d)
ChaUc Leaders starid; other chalk members l i e
dom OF crouch as ai r cr af t approach, Cnallc leader i dent i f i es his air-
cr af t i n formations, rai sed his r i f l e horizontallyoverhead and di rect s.
ai r cr af t in.
(e)
Personnel in following chalks as s i s t i n loading
bulk equip and supplies.(mortars, amino, etc).. . Car8.ratbe talcen not t o
damge ai r cr af t when loading heavy equi pent ,
( f )
Cargo t o be ext ernal l ytransported tdllbe pre-
pared f or hook-r;; rdt'n experiepced guide t o di r ect ai r cr af t , 'Tllo:fol- .
lowing method ishelpful ii-dc;;i-~i~.hgsupplies and e qa i pnt , following
i n i t i a l assaul t when preplanned. .
1 Pave loads i dent i s ad bycolored panel or smoke.
-0
2 Di ~e c t ai r cr af t t o lead by color designation,
-0
2;
IIave ai r cr af t deliver load t o same color smoke
on LZ.
(g) Safetymeasures emphasized,
1 Approach ai r cr af t from front or di r ect l yfrom si de j
rr@
-.avoid t a i l rotor;
2 A~ pi ua;ii, ai r cr af t from downhill si de i f on a
1 0
slope,
3,. Outside personnel, as a ninimum, s t r api n,
'A.
CCLLO secured inai r cr af t by lashin$blocking.
(h) The following t i nes. with UH-ID ai r cr af t shouldbe
normal.
-.
1 Troops only: 10Seconds
2 Boops and cargo:. 60 Seconds
.Ie
(2) . In-flight,
( ) Perso~islfol;ott orders of aircraft cocma5or.
( 3)
kircraft comnmder follow^^ prescribed fl l ght ro-xte
and altitude. NotifiesfZght ieader/gmund. c ~. de r / a r t i l . l e r y
ifhemustdeviate t o an al t ernat e f U8ht route.
. .
.
(c)
The sounduni t commanders will make the dicision t o
chmge t o an al t ernat e I Z andi ~ f o m t h ea i r l i f t comar~der ar,d f b e sup-port
elerhents,
(3) hnding*, . %
(a)
LZc o r ; ' u r o ~/ s e c ~~i t ~ party(on grouad or in f i r s t l i f t ) .
keep f l i ght leader edvised of eneroy sctivi%y,
(b)
E'e:*sorxai ciaload rapfdly afi e r ai r cr af t touches
down and clear U.
(c)
N1a v,zill&le ~c' somei assi st in 022-loacling bull<
7. cargo,
(d) &gilt landings.
-
I.
Nilen possible..+thfkxIer personnel vL5h erne?-.
gency, ai r f i el dlight2. g set, ~ s e das foliot.3: Fivz Li$-:t" T ~ ~ fo2let:;
ai r cr af t and a siagle f c r each roilaining airbra:?;.
-*
2 Flashlignts maybeused, Place :2i fll"uer.csC
l i ght 20 meters 2rom edze a% i'c-lr poiats defbizghL~.7 .,.. aj.ca, Zlrcct
lead ai r cr af t ~ L t h two flashlights, using hand sad a m" ' 3 ; i ~ ~ ~ i s 0
. .
2. Singie f hshl i ght ' my be used. Bl i r I c l i gni
t o pei-mit identification, pointl i ght t o spot rihei-e aircraf.; $3t o land
, ' as ai r cr af t approaches
L
&all fibes in sand and gas f i l l edfL:..cans can
-0
bousedt o mr kLZ mtin emergency,
. .
'2. Eqerienced personnel on radio ciirecSin,a ai r cr af t
isessential.
2 Tabs:
A - ~ y p eLoode
B - Sequential Operation Order
Tab ~ ( T p e Loads) t o Section 6 ( ~i r mobi l e Opergtions) t o Cl.r.r,,i.or '!
'
operat i ons) t o 11th I nf ant r y Brigade (Light) SOP.
CIi-47
The following type li;rnlb arc some examples of
ACL 8003 LBS (1+50 BXSFuel)
loads which can be ~ilrrictl on the v;rrious types of
Cargo Weight
Army aircraft normiil in
53pgrsonncl 7'320
undcr co~i di t i o~~sVietnnm.
Weight limitations will vary from one mission to an-
20 personnel 4800
other as;itmos;)hcric conditionschirilge. Iteducing fuel
1ca A22 Container
loutis on the aircrirfl will ;\Is0 increase carrying capn-
(Sling Load) 3000
bilities. Other variables suck its the sizei nd shnpeof
14 personnel 3360
PZs anti LLs will trffect allowable cargq,bads (ACL).
1mule (loirdcd) 2000
Thefollowillg cxiiml)les areon;y n guide. Theavi at i o~
'3 ea81mm mortars 282
LNO can provide exact ACLs for a given mission.
160 rds Ammo (Sling)
Loud) i 2250
ACL 1000 ( 2 GOHI S ~ u e l )
10 personnel 2400
1vLT trk w/I/S Tt!r 3500
TYpe -Cargo. Weight Total
Cargo (Sling) 2000
1. 4personnel 060 060
7 personnel lGX0
, 2. Bulk Cargo 1000 1000
1'Ig102 HOWw/sect
. 3. 1ea Mule:(Sling) 000 900
cquipt :1:150
4. 1ea. g. tonTLR (Sling) 565 60 rtls ammo 2760
Cargo
400 965
6 pcrsonnel 1440
1ca :fi.T trk w/w 5917
UU-1D Cirrgo 600
3 per s o~l ~~el 720
. .
ACL1200 (2+30 HRS Fuel)
8 eitnluics in4stacks 7200
TYpe Cargo Weight Total 4pcrsonr~el !)GO
1. ti pcrsonrlcl 1200 1200 2 eii 1/1. T Front Line
2. Bulk Cargo 1200 1200 Ambulances 7000
3. 1en Mule (Sling) 900 7 personnel 1680
Ci1l.g~ 300 1200 1ea 152T cardoTlr 5400
4. 1eir I/I( ton TLR' (Sling) 565 #tlr mnx height 74 in.
Cargo 500 1065 Cargo (In jenlal or
Sliap) 8000
ACL2LOO (l+0 HRSFuel)
5. 8pcrsonnel 1020 1920
6, 1ea Mule (Sling) 0QO
.. Cargo 600
ACL1920 (2+00 HRS Fuc!)
2 personnel 580 2080'
7. 1en 1/(ton TLK (Sling) 565
Cargo H'cight Tolirl
Cargo 600 , 8personnel 1020 1!)'20
4 personnel 960 2025 Cargo 1020 1320
8. 1ea;~tton*TLH(Sling) 1340 4 persor~nel 960
Cargo 750 2090 Cargo 960 1920
('l'llc Stbcli~c~i:inl O]sri:tio:~ Oi-tlcr ciui be 11sc;l Lo siml~lify L!IC issu;r~~cc of ncc.i.ss;tl.y ortlcra for i I I I i i i t -
n~c~ltilc crl~rr;:tio~~. thin t r ~ ~ ~ ~ o t r i t i ~ ~ p rhiiliges ;rltrr Llic ortlcr hits I ~ccr ~ ~~t ~l ~l i shcc!). It ;ilsr, nin::lliticrc of
S;in~p!?:
-
!b("i'i:j&'
oy. ..d a .?: FO!t?<iA'i'iOh.
1
-,
0530- i3ui) l62ti w/i~tlirch co~rc~i ~ct s
( I )
l-'it #I , ISL 11I;it i.S?(l5 Uli-11);
;i:11!)1 iis!t w/!i Irif from Ia'lt #2, 2d l~iirt1G2tl 5 Uli-1I ) ;
QiJAl: 1.01 to 1.Z I::.:i) Flt.#:I, 17:!(! 5 UII-11). 1 L:*"I'
(S'I'G45GX!));25 sorties Col~lrcrhc:itls,1 I.I'T Crossbows.
2 lifts.
time (21,; 1i11e up Chi~lk 1)iet.e~ & IGr. -
>
O7:I0,
St ; i l i o~~ (2)
'
N\\'sitlc li\V;f i ~~; r l Lricf-
I
FIL # 1 Ycllow 1-5
i u ~ . t'c11r1;icL(21. 'l'ivr 5 I:IL #2 Wnitc 1-5
I I for 1 i i 1 i i i . Flt $3 Grcc11 1-5 I
I
O?J5 ('olrj)crhciitlx&(.~rossbows
(3)
(:ol)pcrkci~tls1.: ;Crossbows W
tlrl)forLZ HISi). (;u~ishij)s sitlc or LL. No j)rep fires by
j)rc]) 3n i i ~ ~ art y or TAC iiir.
I
prior toagrivdl
of slicks; Col)l)crhcatls
I
miirk LZ w/yc.llow smoke. I
0748 F l t , ~ 1 , $ 2 , # 3 d r p QL ' (4) 1.:11 route & lantli~ig formi~tion Hcavy
for L%1:ISD. Right; Flt route as briefed; 30
scc sc'p between fl t s; 1500'/HOk.
Normal rulcs of cl~g;rgcmcritenroutc.
5 OYOO 1 ' l t ~ l Al : l l LZI ~ I S D.
(5)
Landing AZ 030; su]);)rcssivcfirc
I.'ollowetl by FlL 2 2 , 3. by tloor gunners Flt +1 only. Usc
only outbo;irtl guns. All i l l s rpt
itrr & dcp I,Z to C&C.
0313 ' Plt ;yl B # 2 AItIt ()I.;
' (6) POL avail QL. liearm at IION QUAN.
-v
I'/U 2tl l i ft ; dcpimnctl
Aid st a loc QL. Dust Off avail
for LZ RISL). Fl t #3 on'call.
refuci ant1standbyQL.
'
0S26 Fit +1 8: $2 AHR LZ
(7) AKi"i' Cnitlr: CO, ! i Inf (Dasher G)
.ILISL):rcturn QL, refuel
Missioa~ Cmdr: CO, 1G2tl (Vulture 6)
& sianc!by. Col~l)crhead
Alt hl i ssi o~~ Vulturc Lcad. Cmdr:
6: Crossbows rci urct~QL
8 1000 AllorderCL:C; s t ndby
parent unit control. Prini Phi: 66.30 Alt: 60.2
Gunships VIiE': :22.5
QL TWR: 47.3
Dust Off: 45.7
' bn fits released to QL
(Y) Prirn iTI:F:'%48.6 Alt: 360.4
1. C.~J';A.AL: This sect i on p:.ovi(ics guid;ncc itnd eot:,t!-ishcs'r e: : ~: onni t i l i t i cs
f or e:i:ployi~is~lri,led ~ i o l i c o ~ t c r s ~pc ~~; : t . i or : ~. i n sui:;.ot-t of r~~*cj',.ifiu
E'I.~1-110
provides Sonerirl i n f o r ~ ~ ~ t , i o n c;~plcyll;cnt. or1 nrlr:t>d hi.licol;tt:r
2.
A i A l l Uli-1 gun helico!t e r s sr? ;rmcd1. it h one oraIr.orc of t.he
fol l oki ns syst a1,s:
a. I : 2.75" Rocket Launcher, 48 tubs.
b. M5: &OIIPJN75 Grcntde Launcher, nose laounted.
c. h6: Cu2.d 7.C2cm 1.i60~ Plachine Gun.
d. 6 : m;d 'i .62~snMGOC Machine Gun: 2.7511, ,
Rocket Launcher, 14tube.
e. X1.121: Dual 7.62r1ii high r ~ t e mini-,sn: 2.75'1,
Rockct Launcher, 11, tube.
f.
Other conbinations are possible, 1.5. ~3/i55, 1.!5/idi6.
a.
Theb a s i c orgarAzationa1element is t he plstoon, consi st i ny of 5
UH-1hel i copt ers. Sach plrrtoon consi st s of tr;o l i ght f i r e t e m~ s of two
hel i copt er s ecch. The f i f t h hel i copt er i sflohn by t he pletoon 1e:tder.
b. 1;ormally t he c i r c r a f t wi l l not be operated si ngl y, Gut i n teems
of not l e s s t han two ai r cr af t . h'hen t h e ph. toon l aader i i ~ ~ ~ e n t s t he f i r e s
02 li&tf i r e t e a itbdcoaes a. heavy f i r e team.
4, WOiiSIbIKTiZS:
..
a. Ground u r i t comander.
( 1 ) ~The s u~por t e d uni t COI-Cer w i l l provide t he f i r e t e r n leecier
t ~ t hf r i endl y t roop l ocat fons bynuirking cent er of msss' t1i1;h smoke, panels,
distin&shable Land marks, or.ot her s u i t ~ b l e device,
(3.1 Coordinr-,to with ot her support i ns, f i r o s t o enable si l nul t on~ous
employment of a l l f i r e s .
(3)
The t.-nrc:et rcust be.posi t i vel y i dent i f i ed and reco-qized pr i or
t o at t ack.
L. Aviation Platoon Leeder.
(1) ha p1cl.oorb l oader uiust thoroughly underst2nd t.11~c u ; ~ mt ground
si t ust i on, and i nsur e t h ~ l ; h i s crok~(s)itrs colnpletcly aware of f r i ondl y t roop
di sposi t i on md l ocat i on.
(2)
ijlzn attncl, so esnot t o r e s t r i c t ti.e conu.landcrsl L;I.VLLIILL
use of otilcl* ~u~) ~; or . t f i r es .
(5)
Obtain i~lfor~.x?.tion : ~r t i l l e ~; i l i nes c;f t::rl;ets ;;adt ~ r z c t
t!lrou;;h z i r cont rol net fror.1 zone coiltrol sti:tic,ii of thc cont rol zone
i n ' vilich operating.
( )
Ireop pound C O I , L : W ~ I ~ ~ ~ ststuoof f uol andord- aP1.sc.stof
r.ance duriiig the attzck.
c .
The emcil llelicogter i n n grouid supi3ort role i s a iiie~nsof
eAen2ing the f i ye~ot r er cvailable t o th8 ~ilound carilllander.
b.
To cxideve the best r es cl t s i n the ei,~plo;q.~~n$ ileli- of el?:.ed
copters ground coz~mnders sllould mal.;e Ll a Xi . r i l ~~ of preplanned r;lissions. use
( 1) heplanned missions.
(a)
The f i r e team leadel-/airciz.f t co~mnder should be
briefed on:'
ground plan-
-
2 Restrictions for ground move~ilent
2S~?por t i ng f i r e s
Frequencies and cal l s i gi ~s
2 l dcnt i fi cat i on: ~nd prearranged s i gi ul s
-
6 Fligiit roct e
2 Target area
-
8 Alternate plans
(b) Point t nrget f i r i ng i s norr;lall:r used. Area f i r e s are
too i naccwzt e f or use i n close support of fri endl y elements. .
(a)
12ini;;iu.l infonil; . t i on recuired f or an inrr~ediate r i s s i on
lust include :
(1)
Supported wit l ocat i on
(3) I'roop di sposi t i ons
a.
2~21-,:5!1g 211d 1-ef~l~l!-iigPL~.:L~ i:ic Z C C G; : ; I ~ ~ . S ~ ~ ~ ~ 2t b&jc CZLp f0r
o~~erc?'Lions i n t he brigcdc T;.W.
b.
PL?.-r;:inz Tor. u t l l i z a t i o ~ i of ~pi l shi ps 1:~ust ~1l or. r c 1.5ainum of
t h i r t y r&ut,er, t o reen1 znd r e f ue l (vi . ri es 1ri.ti1 di st cnce fro:?. bese caip).
c.
Xlen opclc.tii~g1,it;ii1i 10-15 ;,xi.tes c;f base calp t he n i r c i - ~ f t
;.;illII:LY;~U;' be in a r eact i on role on :-row;ci stc.ndby.,
7. hqccst o f o r G~ml l i ps.
a.
Freplaililed &u?stLp ;.issions oub~xit~l;cd t o 8via.tion Cf f i cer bjt 1600
ilows daily.
be
I i , ~. ~di c ? t e t o b i i ~ a d c request? trill be scnt by raciio o r lc?nclliiie
TOG f op pracessing.
4
:. F14 lil-10 Ci vi l Af f ai r s 0perattnr:s Map 62 .
1.
EEF~I ; ~?I C~; S
2. GENERAL:
a.
This h n e x provides guic!.m ce f or Ci vi l Lf fairs (CA) p1anni.n~ a d
operations .~.rit;hin the 11t h Tnf Dde.
b.
Unit emphasis w i l l be pl.aced on CA problems , aid Civic Action di -
r e c t l y contributi.ng t o t he accomplishment of the assipncd mi l i t ar y mission.
c.
The primary aim of a l l CA prozrans i s t o enhame Revolutionary
Deaelopment (RD) . I
CA operat i ons w i l l be coordi.naLed v i t h Pzerican nj.lLtzry and c i vi l i a n
advisor, t h e i r counterparts, and province, vil1n:;e and h a d e t o f f i c i a l s
at t he appropriate l evel .
PilINCIPTl3S OF CIVIL AFFAIRS OPEC.ATIOI\IS :
.a. Liaison w i l l be est abl i shed at each echelon of comnland by uni t
c,o~rmanders, and/or s t a f f sect i ons with t he US c i vi l i a n or f or ei gn ni l i t a r y/
c i vi l i r m coun'cerparts f o r t he purpose of exchangi?g information, requests,
complaints and ef f ect i nc coordination.
be Command Responsibility:
Responsi bi l i t y and aut hor i t y f o r t he ccnduct of CA operat i ons is
vest ed i n t he seni or mi l i t ar y commander, who, ;yided by di r ect i ves from
higher aut hor i t i es, nat i onal policy, i nt er nat i onal law, and apnl i cabl e 51:rec-
ments conducts CA operations as ordered o r a s he deems necessary t o a s s i s t
i n acconlpU.shini; t he .nission, Ma x i mu m emphasis i s placed on i.ntei:rat.ed pl ans
coordinated between US and CIVW aut hor i t i es,
c.
Ci vi l Affa-irs' Plans and .Orders: Com. aders at, a l l l evel s 1411i n-
clude Ci vi l Af f ai r s guidance t o i nsur e acconiplishment of t he assikned Ci vi l
Af f ai r s Mission. C i v i l Af f ai r s area of operations I$. 11include both t he
Brir;ade t a c t i c a l gl ci admi ni st rat i ve ar ea of .opercrtions.
5. RESPONSIBILITIES:
a. Ci vi l Af f ai r s i s a command r espgnsi bi l i t y.
~
I
( 2 )
!'cu.:foi-UI Civ3.c ;Ictj.o? .in RT";::.s 0.f L~ct . i c: ~l rr)s~)o, ~~~. I~i l . i . t, ;f.
Trib A t o Sect i on 10 t o Chapter V.
a.
Itcq-.,csts f or CA assj.s.Lm ce r . ~ i . l l bt: ~~i k ~i . t . Le d ' t o t!-:c SS.
b. F!mctio:~s :
~ (1) (.iovcrnmcn.l; 11r.fn.i.rs: A 1 1 (;Io!xr.n.t,ions tri ll .be coorciinaLed
with the 3 octal. ~ o v c r ~ me n i; o f f icla1.s. . . . .
(2)
Lahor -)ICw i l l ensi l l . Lf t c c t i ve ut i l i z a l i on of ?!ON-'!2 labor.
Units ti. 11r ~ q u i s i t ~ i o n labolsers by number from IITC.
( 3 )
When t a c 6i c a l req?li.res:enLs dictaLe ent r y i.nt;o a nev ar ca of
ope~.ation.s i n i t i d con.tact; ~i11be accon~:,lishocl tri1.k t h e ;'overnrr.cl~t of f l -
ct al s . Tab b t o Section 10 t o Chapter 'J.
(l r) Pkdi cal : Tzli C t o Sect i on 10 t o Chapter V.
( a)
Uni.Ls w i ll assj -st i n ,t.he prevention of di sease t o ' t he
ext ent necessary t o pro.l;cct I!S troops. Conta::eous $i seases ~r i l ' l . he re-
.por t ed t o t he 3ril:ade .Sur;rcon i.mmediaLe1.y..
jb)
Civi.1i.m cns11a.lties wi. 11be evacnal..ec! throu:!h , t' r~em i l i -
1,az-y e ~~z c ua t i on sys'l;sm.
( c ) - Ilead ci-.~3.li.ans 161.3 not tie Surfed by m i l i t , n r y persormcl,
r.xcept; ~. ~hf ?n sa?it:i.ry condit:i.o~?s dict,at.e. Ci . vi l i m de2d w i l l nor r al l y be
e v ~c ~~a c . e d i;o 'Ll~enear est vi.llcl.:.e, CVN o!' ficial, di.st:ri.ct or nrovince.
(t i )
!!on-contbat.~nt si ck, woundcd, or i njurcd wi 11 hc I.rc:;' ed
.:rlt.hin s ecur i t y and resource capczi)ilitics afl,cr needs of 112 t r o o ~ shaT.rc
been met.
( 5 ) Public Safety:.' !' !nits t r i l l n ~ s i s t l ocal CVM o' ' fi. cials :in
maintaininp o r r.esi.orl.nr. order arld safet.;y as necessary .l.o .insurSe success
of the r ~ i l i mi. ssi.on. tar;;'
(6)
A r k , Noni.rmen1-s and Archives.
( a) :!a t i anal. trlon~ur.en.l..s, r eposi t or i es o r arcllives, and f i ne
cri es w i l l r ~ o tl;e .~lsr:c! for ! l ~i l i t . ar yp~~r oogcs .
..
( b) 1'1-otec.li.ve ~: , o: ~s ~~r * c ~nbs e,:eci~.t.c:d at cncl! C C ~ ! C ] . O : ~
of conlnlallti I;" ? ~ c r \ . ( : ~ i ; and ~: *F?~: cI . I I. I.ooI,~.rlf~: of f i.ne artis, t.rlc;ast l r b~: ~, :fid
d.,-~l!j vr:s
(a)
Tnsuri. t h : ~1.. ;>ro;>cr conc,i.rlcr.a?,!on arid def crerlct? i;i.vc;n b/
f or ces Lo re! i;rious a!l.riries, bui.i.dini>sarid s p ~ ? : o l s.
(b)
Ycducc t h e ;xw.sibil.il,y of act i ori s by o:lr t 0 z . c ~ ~ ti-.ich
wou1.c be of f ens i ve o r cont r ar y t o rel.i;:ious ci~s.Lorns2nd pr ac; l i ces o r t he
mea.
r(.?.)
i l mccessar y dmape, use, removal OT C1cs Lr ~ct i . onof' CCO-
noni c r esour ces, f aci l i ' Li es , and pui )l i c utilities t - i l l be p:-e~rcnt..edby
c o t r m m i e r ~
(b)
Uni.i;s w i l l iz?ound and di spose of pr oper t y bel.c~~l:inf: t o
Viet Con,: as provi ded f o r i n appropria.t;e l'r'c di r ect i ves . A l l cnpt.ured r i c e
and s21t w i l l he evncurLed t o t'ne I3de Ci v i l PLf f a i r s Of f i c e r i f {:,he l;act, ical
si t uat j - on p e r ~ i . ts. !.!hen evacuat,ion i s i mpossi bk a s-amplc t r i l l be tal-en
f r m each cache. TIIS sample, al onp wi!.h one of each ' c i i f f e r e ~ t+,~7. r.;? ?i ce
bag in t.he cache TG%!-I. be t ~ ~ me d over t o t he I?dc Ci vi l hf f aj - r s Of f i cer . I n
a2.L i ns' t ances q:;anti-L3.c~of c~pt.urc.:dfood s t i l f f s :.:ill be report, ed %o t he
Ci vi . 1 Af f ai r s 0f.f.i cer i n ci2il.y r epor t s . IJn2t.s desir.ir.v t o r et . ai n c z pl , ~~r e d
food s t u f f s f o r llse i t 1 Ci vi c Action proj cc-t . s w i l l r eques t permi ssi on f r ob
Lhe B r i ~ a d eCi v i l Af f ai r s Of f i cer . .
( c)
;32ch i mi t t r i l l mai nt ai n a st.ock of r i c e !xq.s (avai . l abl e
froni Civil Af f a i r s 0ffj . csr) and i ns ur e their a1-e, cva. i . l ~hl con t . act i cal opera-
Lions t o co3.l.ect cnplii~redr i c e .
(9) Nat ur al Rcsoi ~rces: Pro::rams mcl pr oj e c t s .lo devel op a?ci
- . conserve nat l i r al r esour ces o r conl.rit.)ute t o' t h e phys i cal r e l i e f of l?:e
c i v i l popul at i on wi . 11 be encourared and a ~ s i s t e d .
(10) Pri.ce Con.i;rol: l3de ' Ci vi l Af f ai r s Of r i c e r wi l l :..$LC co0rd.i rls.-
Lion ~r f ' t hl o c a l o f f i c i a l s , es t ahl . i s h pr i c e c ont r ol s and - s ~ ~ p e r v i s c t h e pr-o-
:,ram fuo i ns ur c complj. . mcr.
c .
ti e: i ~r?~l . i'ol'i c i e s :
(1)
I'!x:i.rr,llrn c ? T u r k 1.111.1 he n~adet o :;,hirrd?,c non-comhni.;mt ba.l.l.lc
casunl . t i es (1crr.i t acl , i . cal operaLi ons.
1 ( 2) Troo?s w i l l be i nrorn~ndof imporl.nnce of i;;injmisin;: c i v i l i a n 1
casual tic:^ 2rid dcst rucLi on of propor.ty, i ncl udby: l i vsst . ock,
I-
I
I
~ e
i
( 3) De s t r n ~ t i o n of dwe1lir.l;~and Ii vest ocl c as a de ni a l measure '7
i st he r es ; j ons i bi l i t ; y of ~ V Na u t h o r i t i a s , o r AI1VN mi l i t a r y u81i . t ~ uri l ess
speci f i c a 1 4 aut hor i zed by t h i s headquar t er s,
I.
( 11)
i>ist r i but i on of emeri:eficy r.a.l;ions f o r CA purposes i s autho-
r i z e d o n l j t o r e l i e v e undue s uf f er i ng.
( 5 )
Li;:ht: en; ; i ncer work wi l l be pl.anned and exscut ed vi t hi n t h e 1
c s p a b i l i t i e s of t he t a c t i c a l u n i t s t o assi st t h e c i v i l po2ul ace i n t h e r e -
1yx2.r of darila~cd sliruc t ur es .
2
-7
7( 6 )
S o c ~ l r i t y bsrnis const, r~ic. ted i n tbe a; . a of oper ~; Li ons w i l l be
l cvul ed t o thc: ext . ent time arid t eci . i ca1 s i Luat i on p e r n i t s a t t hc comple-
t i o n of t h e i r use. Thi s i s done t o f a c i l i t a t e r epl ant i ng of t hos e por t i ons
of l and.
( 7 )
Traclted o r wheeled ve hi c l e s v i 11not be dr i ven over pl ant ed . '
r i c e , pi neappl e, o r manioc f i e l d s except as a t a c t i c a l . n e c e s s i t y .
(8)
Uni t s b r i l l appoi nt cl ai ms o f f i c e r s on or der s and i ns ur e t h a t
s u f f i c i e n t s t ocks of cl ai m forrns a r e on hand at a l l t l mes.
A I
L
7, CIVIL CONTROL:
!
a.
Ef f e6t i ve c o n t r o l of t he movemekt of t h e popul at i on i sof t h e ut -
most i mpori ance dur i ng t a c t i c a l oper at i ons , Di sorpani zed masses i mpai r
t h e maneuver abi l i t y of mi l i t a r y uni t s , endanger s ecur i t y, and t h r e ~ t e n t h e
he a l t h of t h e corqand; Co f i t r o l i s a l s o necessar y t o minimize c a s u a l t i e s
t o non-combatants and t o reduce i nc i de nt s which may be e xpl oi t e c by t h e
enemy.
I -b. Pol i cy:
(1)
US commanders a r e norinally not . r ~ s p o n s i b l e f o r t ha c o r ~ t r q l of
c i v i l i a n s duri nl ; operations ,Thi s responsi bi l . i t v i s nnrmall,v ret,ained a n i
di schar ged by Provi nce o r I'IVNAF I;~-r- porces. - - \ h e n GVN arfenci es a r e ul at ) l et o -
.. ---
d i s c h a r y e t h i s f unct i on due t o l ack of secur i t v o r r es our ces t he (J:? comrnan-
- d e r i sr equi r ed t o implement c ~ T~ L I;onLrol,
t
(2)
Unl ess a c i v i l i a n evacuat i on i s preplar-ned and coor di r ~at ed
wi t h t h e pr oper G VN aut bor i t i i es,u n i t s t r i l l riot f or cef ul l ?r ev2guatc: c i v i l -
iansf r o n t h e i r homes except i n emerl:encies which reqlli ret . h ~ i r e ~ i ~ ~ ~ a t i o n
.f o r t h e i r own s af Tt y, o r t o provi de t a c t i c a l s ecur i t y. Uni t s a r e aut hor i zed
t o conduct emergency temporary r e l oc a t i on wi t h n o t i f i c a t i o n t o tais head-
qua r t e r s as soon as pos s i bl e expl ai ni ng t he ci rcumst ances. When r el ocat i . on
-
i s necessary, n a t i o n a l pol i ce shoul d he u t i l i z e d t o t he' maxi mm t o accon-
p l i s h t h ~ screeni rl g and cont r ol of c i v i l i a n s . Ci vi l i a ns may be t z ~ p o r a r i l y
'
rel ocnt , ed t o a Bri eade c ol l e c t i ng poi nt o r poi nt s ~ ~ . i c x - a
b a t a r e a and r et ur ned t o t h e i r - h ~me s as soon as t h e t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n per -.
c,
l1:uidl.i.n~- of V i l 3.3;.:f:rs:
(1)
Vill.n.:.t;rsw i l . 1 t)c screerled .t,o d~t~errrrine thci.? t,rlic s!z!.:ls
( i , ~ . ,- q i J . 1 ~ o 1-c.!s:i.clent,:.;uspc?ct. VC o r con?i~-rned VC) .!;ur)nortini! !JaI.ionnl.
-
'ln-ica w i l l t;ll:~sscrer~n'i.n::. nc:c:oa~!>l.:'~sli
(a)
1'ermi.t:Led t o r et ur n t o t l i ei r place of residence a f t e r
appropriate idcr1'Ll.f i cat i on.
(b)
Those found without or irnpmper i dent j . f i cat i on wi 3 3 hc
dct-atnet1:!ndr)l~1(:ed511custody of !.I%VbJ df:icia1.s a f t e r inte1li;:ence explora-
t i on i s s at i s f i ed,
( c )
Corrunar~(lers are en,joined t o k s u r e .that t h e rirrh.1;~
bonnfj.de vi1.lq.e r e s i de ~i t s cre protect,ed.
d. Refugee Control:
(1)
Brigade w i l l establi.sh a refuf!ee cont r ol poi nt f o r handling
r ef ui yes t:ener:itcd durin::' t.he conduct o.? tncl;i.cnl opera.l;.ions .
'
(2)
At, nminimum, Lhe Refurrce ~ o n t . r o lpoint should be op.erated by:
( a) $5' rcpresenlal-ive
(b) A r n y medical ser vi ce representat:i.ve
( d) National pol.ic&represon. tative
(G)
(I1i~d5-f i ed i . nt erpre. t ersas needed.
( 3)
Coordination w i l l be rnade with appropri at eCIVN o f f i c i a l s
for. t he di sposi t i on of refu:!ces i n thr. province.
k - Civic Action
3 - Civil Af f ai r s I ht r y C1-~cckl.ist
C - Mecl.icnl Ci vi c Action Proc;r:un
Tab A (Civic Action) t o Section 10 ( C i v i l E f a i r s kcd Civic Action)
t o Chapter V (Operations) t o 1 1t h I nf Bde (Light) SO?.
1,
PURP0S.i: ' ThTs ~ncl osuy= est abl i shes guidance t o be fol!.o~?ed by a l l
uni t s of the 11t h I nf Dele i n conducting Civic Action 1'rof:ra;r.s.
a,
Mi l i t ar y Civic Action m,ay be defined as par t i ci pzt i on i n or support
.
of, economic and soci ol cgi cal prograis usef ul t o t he local populatLcc.
Ai n;s
concurrent wi th t h i s . def i ni t i on include, but are. no% l i mi t ed t o :
(1)
Improving l i vi ng conditions of t he l ocal populace.
( 2) . Support of GVN of f i c i a l s ( ~r ovi nce, d i s t r i c t , vi l l q; e and hmi-
l e t chi ef , and t h e i r s t a f f s and Nat i ond police).
b,
The Brigade' s Civic Action proera1 supports t he Revolutionary De-
vc1ol)hent Progran by construction and repair. pr oj ect s, arid i n establishment
of public services. . I n t hi s par t o f . t he procram as s i s t i ng t he pr ovi nci al
Government with t h e i r proerarns and pr oj ect s i s an s s s e nt i a l char act er i s t i c
of mi l i t ar y ~ l v i c Actionc
c,
Brigade uni'ts'wi.11include RF/PI? suppor t i n t h e i r c i vi c Action
Programs, The support rendered t o t hese uni t s w i l l include supply of bar-
r i e r material) cornodity support, NEDCAP, and improvement of outpost and
. ,
dependent a r e as.
a,
Military Ch i c Action Proi.;ra .j w i l l be conducted i n coordination
with l oc a l government of f f c i a l s and advisors. Unit programs should be with-
i n t he limits of' resources avai l abl e t o include l abor, mat er i al s and funds,
The di s t r i but i on of r e l i e f commodities by US f or ces i s accomplished through
t he GVN of f i c i a l s when possible. Mi l i t ar y Civic Action while on operations
emphasizes medical car e 'and r e l i e f f or non-combatant.
b,
Civic Action pr oj ect s w i l l be cl as s i f i ed i ~ t o t hr ee cat egori es,
(1) Clc:aring: Civic Action pr oj ect s during t a c t i c a l operations
should be of shor t duration and have an im.ediate i npact on t he l oc a l popu-
l ace, Examples i r e :
( a) MEKIP
(b) Ci vi l r e l i e f suppl i es di s t r i but i on
( c) G i f t s
( d)
Minor r epai r s t o roads, briJ1:es and public f a c i l i t i e s
(2) Securing: Once t he ar ea i s decl.sred cl ear , uni t s can pa r t i c i -
pato i n more sophi st i cat ed civic_action pr oj ect s t o f i t t he needs of tlle
l ccal i nhabi t ant s, providinl: these pr oj ect s have t he approval of %he pro-
vi ncc, di st r i . ct and vi l l a, : e o r hamlet chi ef, and . t hat t hey a r e coordinated ,
i . ~ i t hthe ~~CV/ Pr ovi nci al r epr esent at i ves i n t he area.
Exmpl es of t h i s
pr oj ect :
( a)
A~ r i c u l t u r d and Natural Resources improvement
(b) Major Rozd r epai r s
' ( c) Ruildint.; of di spensar i es ai d classrooms
( d) English cl as s es
(e) h32DCAPS
( 3) Development: Once t he ar ea i s secured and t ne population is .
supporting t he obj ect i ves of t he National Coverament, long range construc-
Lion pr oj ect s w i l l be put i nt o e f f e c t by t he l oc a l GVN of f i ci . al s and Province
.
of f i ce of Ci vi l i an Operations. Units working with GVN o f f i c i a l s should
'
promoLe good r e l a t i ons between US Forces, CVN o f f i c i a l s and t he c i vi l i a n .
populalion. During development, uni t s w i l l a s s i s t t he over al l development
pl an with t echni cal advice, equipment, and power,
( l ) , h i t s assigned civic' act i on r es pons i bi l i t y w i l l e s t a b ~ i s h
l i a i s on with t he MACV advi sors at. Province/sector and di st r i ct / subsect or .
( 2)
Di rect coordination tri. t h vi l l a: f e and h,amlet o f f i c i a l s , i s en-
couraged provided planned Civic Action pr oj ect s are approved by t he . l oc a 1 -;
d i s t r i c t of f i c i a l ,
(3)
Units, ihe goverrment, o r pr i vat e agencies shouM not be r e l i e d
uno.1 t o f ur ni sh a l l t he equipment, sugplies, and l abor , The people them-
sel ves must be encouraged t o par t i ci pat e.
4 ) Loccl people t r i l l be encouraged t o or i gi nat e pr oj ect s.
, (
Cr edi t f o r r e s u l t s should' be a t t r i but e d t o both l o c a l r i i l i t ar y
and t he civi. 1 admi ni st rat i ons , '
. ,
, , MILITARY eIVIC ACTION SUPPI,Iss:
a.
Requests f o r assi st ance i n rnaterial/or money wil,l' be,made t o t h i s
heaciquarters, ATTN : S5
b.' Captured Supplies
Maximun~use w i l l be made of captured suppl i es i n support in^ the
Mi l i t ar y Civic Action Program, . .
c. Provi nci al o Trice of C.ivilial.i Operat,:i.ons
(I.) Whcn uni 1.s opc-:rnl,e o~i . : j . i . d~of Ddo 'l',IOR, . di r ect coordi.nai;ion
i s auL!loi-i>;edd:Lh of.fi.ce of ' ~ b h ~ ' ~ r ~ ~ v i n c - i a 1 Ci vi l i an 0porat.ions t o oS1,aj.n
sll~)l)~.i(:s*
cl. I ' Ui:j.,Ls ohou1.d jncluclo i.:Ai.?.G j.tema in . t hei r rnont,k:ly plmn!-ny:
rc!,or'Ls to i.nsilj..e arlcc,tla.Le sup:)l.y is on hand a t 'ine Ilde $5 warchoi~sc..
a.
All cons'truc tioil pr oject.s md major (:A pr oj ect s w i l l be photo:graphed
2nd Lhree copi es of each pic't.ure forwn.;tdcd t o S5; wiLh t he monthly CA r epor t .
The follow'klg inforroai;i.on w i l l l ~ ca't'tac1ls.d.
(1). Loca!.ion
( 2) St;~rti.n;: date
( 3 ) Conlpk t i on cl at, r:
(L) L:lbor Sou~c e
(5)
?mj e c t 'dencrip.\.ion t o include i dent i f i cat i on of individuals.
c .
Provfnci al of rice o f 0:i.vi.12a.n O;)eral,l.ons
(1.)
\>!hen i ~ n i 1,s opt-:rn l,e ~?~i.:i.i.dt:: o f Ddc TAOR, ' d i r e c t coordi . nat i on
is nu.Lhoris:ed wi.l;h t he p~ovi nc ' i a lo.f.fj.cc o f Civilian 0pcrat. ions. t o obLa5.n
:;llp!)l.ic>s,
d, CFI RK: Unf ts sho?:I.d j nclu:!e f:iS!!,6 items in their monWily pl mni np:
1.cimr.l.s to i.nsui.-e2 1 ar!eq~:n.l.e sup:)l.;/ is on lland at t h e Bde S5 warohousi?.
a.
A l l cons. t ruct i oi l pr oj c c t . ~md major (:A droj e c t s will be photo::ra?hed
2nd Lhree topics of each pict.ur.e forwarded t o SS wi t h t he monthly CA r epor t ,
c ,
1hc .fallow.irl[: ' information w i l l be att. achcd,
(14) Labor Source
(5)
Pr oj ect hos cr i pt i on t o i r cl ude i d e n t i f i c a t i o n if
SECTION 13
PSYCHOLOGICAL MFARE
1. REFZZENCES: . ,
a. Fi4 33-1, Psychological Operations - US Amy ~oct ri ne,May 1965.
b.
FM 33-5 , Psycholoqical 'Operations October 1966,
, .
c. UShlACV Dir 515-1, ~ s y c h o l o ~ i c ~ l Operations--Psycholo~ical Warfare,
26 Apri l 1966.
d. USI.UCV ~ e t t e i ,Subject : National ~ s ~ c h o l o ~ ~ c a l Operations Plan, 4
March 1966,
e, JUSPAO Phamphlet, Chief Hoi Guidance, 10 Oct 66,
f , JUSPAO General Br i ef i ng Book, (revised) Mwch 1967.
8. This annex prputdee @/dance ibs pl ami q Bnd implementing Psyoho-
'logic81 Operatione (PSYOP) within the Brigade,
3, HESFOMIbILITIES AND ORGANIZATION:
# .
YOP,~I'i r o&IYPU;d resp,dneibility at a l l l;$e&.' &mumden will plan
and rnqorporat~' PSYqPq i nt o all t act i oal operatione. a d act i vi t i es i nvol vl n~
oontaot :w&h, the leal populace, ad1A f f ' a l r ~Olf'lcer i r pqmcmible for
&ciomiin,at~ PSYOP act i vi t i es within t he Brigbbe, .
. .
a, In acoordonce with the guidance contained i n the US Usai on Council
approved fiatiwal PSYOP Pl an, a l l PSYOP act i vi t i ee wi t hi n the Brigade w i l l
,$e directed gt achieving . . these objectiyqs: .
(1) ~&vi nce a l l audiences that QVN vi ct ory i e inevitable wi t h
the sppport of, t he US and W.
, .
(2) Persuade al l audiences that the tastest wv t o end the War
rurd srch,igve puo e iuuj a.ocuq4t.y is t o sumort Prse Vietnam end appose the
vi et Cqg,
(3)' . O&vinceA. ll mdiencea t hat Up P R O M O ~ I n Vbtm I t 3 to help
the RV?4 ud l a t mp o r ~ yi n nature,
(4) Oonvince the kt Oonj~that attqmeoe *ll ba oboerely welconsd
" TI?
gent8thsrnea usdi n FSYOl's within t he Bri?t.de all mpport
thea m j ect i va. A 1 1 propaganda disseminated willuse . cl ear and
sinpie alpkachea toineura understandinc by- t he t ar s et wdier,ce.- ?W-
mum v f f o r t willb e modeto. i nsure thijt. the subj ~ c tmatter- appeals t o
t he .t5i ~ge t sinner ' emotions, and maximurn useof st n~pl e i l l ws t r at ions on
leafll! tr wi l l be ut i l i zed t o i nsure atleast11, i rt i al iir~dcrat~ridinr! by
thbt 1 {wt i on of t he . t ar get audience who i s i l l i t e r a t e . Pr*imry t ar ?et
audien.13~w i l l be:
(2)
The local populaci., p a r t i ~ u l a r l ~ ~ t h o s e subdect t o me t Cone
ccuhtrol .
(,2)
The Viut Cong, t o include Hain Force, l ocal force, atrl par t i -
- ,
cu3rati\e .dUa!{eguer r i l l a,
( 3,
NVAunits i n t he ~ r i ~ a d e ' TAOR.
o.
P8YOPs withinan operational area w i l l integratea l l i R ard SVEf
eywbi l l t i es , both mi l i tary and ci vi l i an. To Insure maximum dffective-
nrw, plane w i l l be coordinated with t he U C V seot or and aubsector add-
sow authorihies and t hei r counterparts bef or e implement at i on,
d. WPJor subordinate uni t PSYOPplans w i l l povi de f o r t he earploy-
mn t ofal l aytlilable and pr aat i cabh PSYOP techniques a ur bq allphases
of eeeb operation, Co~mandersst a l l l evel s wi l l i nsure t he timely ex-
p&t&$ibt&on otqS'IDDP opportunlttua that tucom. apparentduringan.operation.
b St& og t he most commonlyused l eaf l et s are maintained on hand
a?#L. t h o Qhril.Aifaira CKficsri These areusedf or
. ;rwpnnm ka rQqueats,for l e a f l e t alpport erd'f or preplamed i -
m*. . ;..&aafleteml ch are not bstockand spocial l e a f l e t s
d- -nab commnd. may be ordered *ou@ theC i v l l i f f a i r s
wf&uW~ t he upanhisa ~ p r k l . Delivery timef or IeofLets ordered throlrfh
8(ivi1Aftdm OjYicer w i 11vary deperding on t he press load of t he 'TSYOPs
+- fbrnirhing pr i nt i ns support t o t ho Brigade.
: -,.; hsi; ,#mbpipraia& meg&cw p u b ~ s h o dby-30sPAO arrd OCO are elatonlati-
i dt o theBrigade. Requeste for additional copies orreprirlts of
. wt i warticLee willlocoordinated through the Ci vi l Affai rs OSficer.
a. Poeters, bQllDttra and ILigna m y be ord&d' fromOCO t h o u @ tire
Mdl *. Af f ai rs Offioer.
,do m,broadsqate~$'m foudaperka l i s a i ms willbe pr od ded .-?v
@
8 00- wrppg~t i ngthe Brigade. Tapes of camonly us ud
m8041398 aremaintulned by63 PSYOPAmerlcal Division.
T h e w
1W
are.ilac~ediiltelyavai l abl e upon. roques t . Other standard tapes may be re-
questpd thrcru~h the C i v i l Affairs Office who i s also capable of producing
speci al tapes of simple t ext s. Special tapes with advanced t ext are avail-
8bb from t he PSYO1.s company furnishin? audio support t o t he Brimd0.a
16.OPAGANDA DISSUUK~~TION.SUPPCRT:
a,
Aerial l eaf l et drops and loudspeaker broadcasts are avai l abl e t o
t he Br i pde throu,qh the FSYOPs co~~ipeny taaked t o support t h e Brippde.Civi1
Affairs Offl cer, i s capable of providinc aer i al l eaf l et drops and loud-
r pa ke r broadcasts within 1hour when ai r cr af t are available.
I.
C i v i l Affairs Officer con provide vehicle mounted or hand held
loudspeaker support on cal l .
c.
The PSYOP company tasked t o support the Brigade wi l l provide mobile.
'
PSYOP teams f or speci al operations upon request. The teeme capabi l i t y i n-
cludes loudspeaker support, the production of rimple taped messages, and
a l i mi ted l e a f l e t dissemination capability. Requests f o r these t eam should
reach t he Ci vi l Affairs Officer two weeks wi o r t o the parat ti om.
\
7. RSr nTS:
8, Changes i n en- vyl ner abi l i t i es capable of immediate or long term
q l o i t a t i o n , s i eni f i car t chanp,es In en- PSYOP act i vi t i es , i nci dent s of
M~~P(Sterrorism against t he ci vi l l ar. population, end i ndi cat ors of resyonsea
to t he Brigade PSYOP effort by my t a r e audience wi l l be repcsted t o the
C i v i l Affairs (rfl i csr without delay.
' be Om copy of a i l PSYOP P b s w i l l be-foruardetd t o t he Ci vi l Affai rs
OSaaer by each unit,
o, C-nders w i l l include i n t he i r combat operatione af'ter action
reports eos~nentson PSYOPs, t o include a sumwry of the PSYOP act i vi t i es
oopduoted, eat i a~at edeffectivene as, reoormendations and l e ssons learned,
+ Verifl4aatlon. required in-country .
TUr rect i m prescribe8 the i nt dLgence reporting procodurer to bo
f ol l a r d b~ al l elements of the 11th Lt Inf Bde,
.. 1 - 1 .
a, spot R.port.
(1) PPrpose: The spot report w i l l be utiliced t o report t o Bde 92
all i ai oxnt i on of i mdi at e intelligence value. Th l r report will be wed
foe lrportilrg the fol l adng Me h i r not ell inclusive, and ir only a @do
far the t y j ~of,iaiorlytian t o -b.tranWtted4
(a) Approach of en- amor,
(b) Attack by aired, 8hip ar .irborn.troapa.
(c) fnitirl m q contact or q t i ~ ~ r y fire.
(d) Chmge in diqxmltioa or uounter attack ibdiootionr.
(a) Chenge in on- brrrlers, S d i i i e a t b n e and rbna fleldr.
m E M Form 1355 rill k utillmad to follaw up inran
bdJ1. attar iaitirl-port bu Men rubdttd.
(2) ? m t of ht Boparts The f o m t rrill k u o u M i n
T & B t o m 0 r r 3 t o e b @e V n .
. ..
(3) Txwtmissiorr, The rpot report wi l l be traa8.dtt.d d o
4 o e talmpbona (eo~~WrsP1.de with ramdt l conridexationr). Yhsrr u t i h
irgtbia farm, 8md. r id- t he repa%u fntolligrrce rpot rrport.
b . ? U ~ ' p p .Report. lollawtp reporting ef infamation wi l l be con-
-aad w i l l be m&mdu accditid~ylinfornstiaa im obtained, Whore
$@Aeabla, C h ~ a report8 wl l l l ael * rketo8am and photographs whmover
p U . 0
8. f r t dl Qa c e After A a a Ilspartr, IatelUgence 'After Action Beport s
d l bo rrrbdtted to Bdm 52 lPIT r.rra (7) d.yr follaring the completion of
k U 4 8 m t a OpOntim O r rrhm othanri- dim&& by
t hU hd@ut . r o. After Actlm I@ortr w i l l 00ntd.n u a Idai nns
(1) V..fher Tamal a. Info-tion concuPiag t errai n and raather
-%it'- i n Y) opi r t i oar r ~ aff.rrts of t arrai n .advaather m troapr a d
(2) krol i mi nary Inteliigence. The infomation received by the writ
cozmsming the en- situation i n A0 prior t othe operation,
(3) kel opment of Inte.lligencei(;hronologicalp'rogmssionof .8-8-t
Incid.lrts t h x t increased t hb intelligence of the rreaof operation8,
- (4)ConcLudans. Reeulte or' t h e operation on the eneq.
( 5 ) hew lossea. Losses inflicted by the uni t on tb enangr during
tb opentior..
d, trtel UgenceSummry (1WSUM) prepared as of 0600 and 1800 hours
d U y , mbmitted NLT WUl and 1900 h a r s daily.
(For forrrt of ZRTSUW
see Tab A thi o rodion),
Tab A - I l 0SUH r o d
(2) PmliPainsty Intelligence. The informtion received by t he
unlt concerning t he enemy aituat.ion i n A 0 prior t o the operation.
(3) . of Intelligence ~hronological porbywnsion of ~ e v c l o ~ e n t
significant Incident8 t hat increased the intel.riflence bar. of the area of
operat ions.
(4) Conclusims. Results of the oparation on t he, enemy.
( 5) Enormylosses. Losses inflicted by the unlt or the enemy
d u r i n ~the o~er at i on.
d.
@t l mr Bde S2 reports required by higher headquarters will be
prepared i n consonance with pert j nent r ewl at ions, directives and circulars.
TAB A toSmt l oo2 toChepter '/;I, Beportr
1 , Iemuiag U n i t (Alwryr -,licluded).
2, T?wand &to of ieeuc, (Alwwincluded).
3. hmmmqof Q- activityduringthe pzdod.
a. Ground actirity
b. Trace of f o ~ r c i o l t r
c. Potential nuc1,wrtarget8
d. lvir activity
0. Wuclear actirity
f 0th- ( new tactier, CS, gwmilla activity &c.)
8. IIILLtm
b . t onol ul l t i or
8. Ruqy wv-tr.
9. m t o d z m k w 8nd typo of vohiclor.
10. uutborUd tuT4Jlcet l amm.
11. c4pablUtl.a ud -ti- ( A l r q ~ , hc19dd) m
12. C11,amdomu (Alxyriacl-1.
mra 8-t a d wmp4t. 004puwr*b ma..
22k
H
a
?

S
E
N
T
R
E
P
O
R
T
-
O
F

s
n
m

A
l
l

U
n
i
t
s

A
s

o
f

1
8
0
0

b
y

k
g
r
/
R
T
T

1
9
0
0

d
a
i
l
y

P
a
g
e

A
l
l

U
n
i
t
s

A
s

r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d

.

P
a
g
r
/
R
T
T

F
&
d
i
o
/
T
e
l

S
u
b
m
i
t
t
e
d

u
p
o
n

s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t

a
c
t
i
v
i
t
y

f
r
i
e
n
d
l
y

o
r

e
n
e
m
y

t
o

i
n
c
l
u
d
e

c
o
n
t
a
c
t

o
r

l
o
s
s

o
f

c
o
n
t
a
c
t
.

?
a
z
e

.

R
o
u
t
i
n
e

.
;

I
T
X
P

H
o
!
i
r
U

d
u
r
i
n
g

b
!
s
g
r
/
R
T
T

a
o
n
t
a
c
t
.

'
O
t
h
e
r
;

3
a
d
i
o
/
T
c
l

2

k
r

~
e
r
i
o
d
e
'
o
n

t
k
e

e
v
e
n

h
o
u
r

A
l
l

U
n
i
t
s

P
a
g
e

A
l
l

u
n
i
t
s

o
v
e
r
l
a
y

o
r

p
o
k
t
s

o
f

o
r
i
c
i
n
,

s
u
b
m
i
t

u
p
o
n

s
e
i
z
u
r
e

o
f

o
k
j

o
r
.

c
l
o
~
e
i
n

n
e
w

a
r
e
a

T
r
o
o
p

C
i
s
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n

X
U

U
n
i
t
s

A
l
l

U
n
i
t
s

A
l
l

U
n
i
t
s

A
l
l

U
n
i
t
s

I
n
c
l
u
d
e

t
h
e

o
f

o
p
e
n
k
-
g

a
n
d

c
o
o
r
d
;

l
o
c

o
f

a
l
t

C
P

C
h
a
n
g
e

i
?
C
F

t
i

H
e
l
i
p
a
d

L
o
c

I
m
m
e
d
i
a
t
e

W
r
m
T

R
a
d
i
o
/
T
a
l
b
?
l
o
y
m
e
n
t

o
f

R
e
s
e
r
v
e

L
o
s
s

o
f

C
o
n
t
a
c
t

w
i
t
h

A
d
j
a
c
e
n
t

b
i
t
s

I
m
m
e
d
i
a
t
e

&
g
r
/
R
T
T

R
a
d
i
o

T
i
m
e

S
P
,

'
R
P
,

?
L
,

L
D

o
r

O
b
j

i
s

R
e
a
c
h
e
d

A
s

I
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
d

H
S
~
F
/
R
T
T

i
n

R
e
u
n
a
r
k
s

R
a
d
i
o
/
T
e
l
.

R
p
t

t
b
e

o
f

5
0
5
9
,

7
0
%

a
n
d

9
0
%

a
s
s
e
m
b
l
e
d
.

A
i
r
h
e
a
d

S
t
r
e
n
q
t
h

A
l
l

U
n
i
t
s

S
U
B
b
l
I
m
n
'
G

- R
E
P
O
R
T

- U
N
I
T

1
0
.

A
m
b
u
s
h

A
l
l

U
n
i
t
s

h
d
i
a
t
e

l
f
s
g
r
/
R
T
T

R
a
d
i
o
/
T
e
l

h
)

1
1
.

A
f
t
e
r

A
c
t
i
o
n

A
l
l
,
U
n
i
t
s

W
i
t
h
i
n

7
2

h
r
s

h
)

a
f
t
e
r

o
p
e
r
a
t

i
o
r
.

O
I

1
2
.


D
e
v
i
z
t
i
o
n

f
r
o
m

A
l
l

U
n
i
t
s

E
d
e

O
r
d
e
r

1:.
B
o
o
b
y

T
r
a
p

A
l
l

U
n
i
t
s


X
i
t
h
i
n

1
2

h
r
a

W
o
/
T
e
l

a
f
t
e
r

d
e
t
e
c
t
i
o
n

M
s
.
&

l
.
4
.


S
h
e
l
l

K
a
r
t

R
e
p

A
l
l

U
n
i
t
s

I
m
m
e
d
i
a
t
e

P
&
g
+
I
R
T
T

R
a
d
i
o
j
T
e
l

1
5
.

l
l
i
n
e
f
i
e
l
d


A
l
l

U
n
i
t
s

A
s

r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d

M
S
G

A
l
l

a
m
b
u
s
h
e
s

i
n
i
t
i
a
t
e
d

b
y

V
C

a
g
a
i
n
s
t

f
r
i
e
n
d
l
y

f
o
r
c
e
,

r
e
g
a
r
d
-
l
e
s
s

o
f

s
i
z
e

w
i
l
l

b
e

r
p
t

b
y

t
h
e

n
o
s
t

e
q
e
d
i
t
i
o
u

m
e
a
n
s

t
o

t
h
e

T
O
C

,

i
n

t
k
e

f
o
r
m
a
t

p
m
s
c
r
i
b
e
d
.

I
t
a
m

m
r
k
e
d

b
y

*

c
o
m
p
r
i
s
e

t
e
l

o
r

r
a
d
i
o

r
p
t
.

A

c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e

f
o
l
l
o
w
-
u
p

r
p
t

w
i
l
l

b
e

s
u
b
m
i
t
t
e
d

t
o

a
r
r
i
v
e

w
i
t
h
i
n

4
8

h
r
s
a
f
t
e
r

o
o
c
u
n
m
e
e
.
-
P
A
g
e

,
L

P
a
g
e


T
h
o
r
o
u
g
h

d
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n

o
f

D
e
d
t
h
.

C
o
d
e

w
k
e
n

t
r
a
n
s

e
l
e
c
.

P
a
g
e

&
r
R
a
q
u
e
o
t

&
a
t
*
,

g
i
t
e

a
n
d

e
a
e
n
t

o
f

e
n
-
m
i
n
e
f
i
e
l
d

a
d
'
-
F
o
l
l
o
w
-
u
p

w
i
t
h

w
r
i
t
t
e
n

r
e
p
o
r
t
.

*16. Ar t i l l er y SITREP. Submitted t o I FFV not' l a t e r than 24 hours


following t he cl ose of each report period. Submit t o brigode in accordance
wi t h OP SITREP schedule by DS a r t i l l e r y unit. Page
17. ENGINEER SITREP. Road d m r e and repi r bill be reportad ASAP. Reports
w i l l include descri pt i on of damage and bypass conditions. When a b r i d e
or road rect i on has been repaired, t hi s infoormattion will tlro be reported
t o t h i s HQ t o include t he new vehicular cl assi f i cat i on of t he repaired
br i dm or road. Submitted by organic and attached Engineer uni t s as of 1200
hours each Saturday. Pam
Wonf innsd a f t e r ar r i val in-country.
10.faber
A - Opbrationa Si t l vp
B - Spot Report
C - B a u t h Si t r ep
D - Ambuoh Rsport
IL - Aftmr Action Report
P - Boob Trap Report
' ' 0 - S h e h p , H&m, 0-p
H - Jbafiddr Reports
I -. 'Artillex7 Sitmp
J - tnginer Sitrap
.lab A (operat i ons Si t r ep) t o Sect i on 3 ( ~ 3 (Reports.) ReporUa) Ub Chapter P;rl
t o 11th Infant ry Brigade (Li ght ) SOP
OPERATIONS SITREP
1. OPERATICNS SUMMARY.
a. This paraqraph w i l l be a cl ear concise s wmr y of t he dayt s
a c t i vi t i e s jn chronological sequence. A s a minimum t he following infor-
lration included when appl i cabl e.
(1)
bttalion/company area of operations.
( 2)
hi gni fi cant enemy cont act s and fri endl y' a c t ion; time of
initialcont act , durat i on of t he engaeement and time cont act was broken,
l ocat ion by 6 d i g i t cqordinate and friendly/enemy personnel and equipment
l osees.
( 3)
Location and di sposi t i on of si gni f i cant enemy supply and
equipment caches.
(4) Joi nt US-ARVN/GW operations. Include ARVN uni t desi mat i ons,
(5)
Overnight posi t i ons and cl oai ng times.
(6)
The mr r a t i v e w i l l cl ear l y di st i ngui sh between t he a c t i vi t i e s
t h a t oocured between 1801.and 2400 h mr s t he previous day, and t he a c t i vi t i e s
b b t wwn 0001 Bnd 1800hour8 t he day of t he report .
be Plans Suarmsry. This pamgraph will include a c t i v i t i e s p l a ~ e d
f or t he next 24 hour period. Operations forecust s w i l l include, a s a
$minimum, t he uni t , type of operation and l ocat i on ( c t r of mass).
c. Ma o r Unit Operations. Use one s~bperagraph f or each major
operoti on co or l ar ger ) . i
2. STTUATION AT aDOF PERIOD. I statement of t he s i t uat i on a s it
exi at ed a t h e end of t he period t o include any speci al conditions t hat
ehould be brought t o t he at t ent i on of higher HQ, t he l ocat i on of mj o r
t roopuni t s, and pert i nent a c t i v i t i e s of each. _( As much of t he de t a i l
ar possi bl e is i ndi cat ed gr a phi i hl y on a s i t uat i on overlay.
'3. ~ RMAT I CNOF ADJACENT UNITS AND SUPPORTING TROOPS. Any information
r el at i ve t o a c t irit%esof adj acent and supportb e uni t s during t he period
which a r e of importance t b tire operations of t he comrand t o include
operatione of air,' naval and pround uni t s and support rendered.
= ~ T S OF OPERATICHS. A statement bf t he r bs ul t s of operations con-
ducted by t he command a s a whole and by major subordinate c&t uni t s
a6 appropri at e t o include any speci f i c r es ul t s t hat would have an ef f ect
on t h e assigrnsnt of fut ure missions t o t he command.
Any de t a i l s of
successes o r f ai l ur es of i nt er es t t o the next higher c o mn d wi l l . be
inclrtded* 1
MSCELLANEOUS. Details not appropri at e t o above paragraphs, such a s
weather, road condi t i ons of importance, and any ot her f act or s which have
865
5
had a hexri ng on operat i ons of t he command.
6. ADI.IL! ISTFUTI ON. General statement of t i ! e admi ni at rat ive s i t uat i on,
i f ot her +han normal, as it di r e c t l y a f f e c t s ' t he t a c t i c a l s i t uat i on.
Tab B(spot Report ) t o Section 3 ( ~ 3 Re~ort s) t oChapter VII (Reporto)
t o llthInf::.ntrybriende (Li pht) SOP
SPOTREPORT
*Alpha: (date;time of action, i nci dent , acti vi ty):
*BravoI ( ~ c t ivity):
B1 Xlament involved:
.
B2 type action, acti vi ty, etc:
B3 Location!
Charlie: ( ~ne my)
Cl
Type enemy ( Redar, werri l l a, armor, VC, NVA, etc):
c2 KIA: ( ~c t udlbody count):
C3 KIA: (Eat):
cl, Pow:
C5 Equipment Losses:
C6 Direction of Movement:
Delta:
(Friend1y Forces i n ntmerical. cdde) :
D l KI A:
D3 MIA:
Dl, PW:
D5 Equipment:
Echo:Remarks:
*Foxtrot; (use): F 2 ( ~ o t h i n ~ R (Woret o follow) follows)
*Mnst be;!.:: i~ltledi n every rCBp0rt
867
Tab C ( ~out i ne si t rep) t o Section 3 ( ~ 3 Reports) to'Chapter VII ( ~e por t e ).
t o 11th Infantry Urigede (Light) SOP
ROUTINE SITREP .
This report s\il!mitted every 2 hours on the even hour. Submit every
hour when i n contact.
ALl'flA -- Who i s reporting
BRAVO -- Enemy si tuati on
CHARLIE -- Location of forward combat elements
DELTA -- Helipad l ocation
ECHO - Other circumstances ooncerning operations of intereat
t o t hi s HQ.
----
TabE ( ~ f t e r Action ~ e p o r t ) t o Section 3 (53 Reports) t o Chapter VIf (Fteporte)
t o 11t hInfantry-Brigade ( W~ h t ) SOP
AFTER ACTION WORT
1. MISSION. A complete statement of uni t missibn(s).
2. TASK ORGANIZATION. Li s t a l l f or ces avai l abl e f or t he operation which
were used i n carryi n8 out t he mission. Show o r i ~ i n a l oreani sat i on and all
c ha n~e sduring t he course of t he operation.
3. OPERATIONAL SWARY. This par a~r aph will out l i ne events chronologically
f or t he e nt i r e operation from s t a r t t o fi ni sh. Narrative should be speci fi c
as t o maJor and subordinate uni t i dent i f i cat i ons, t ype act i on undertaken,
enemy react i on, time of occurance (DTG), use of supporting f i r e s and l ocat i one.
4.
INTELtICENCE SUl.iMARY. This par a~r aph provides a br i ef summary of t h e
enemy's mj o r combat a c t i v i t i s s t o include marked changes in morale, st rengt h,
t a c t i c s , conhat ef f i ci encyand equipment. Data which a r e lengthy or can
conveniently be shown graphi cal l y a r e represented i n appropri at e annexes.
5. ACTIVITJES STATISTICS.
A; Personnel. K I A 'VIA W I A KC
Enemy
b. Equipment Losses. duant i t x QE!?
Friendly
Enemy
c . Weapons t osses. '2uanti t y ZJ!l?!?
Friendly
d. Other' Losses.
' Friendly
Enemy
6. COMBAT ~ F i : ~ C ~ C Y . statement of t he comt~ateffi ci ency of t he command A .
t o .include any cer t i nent changes durine t he period.
Consideration a s ap-
propri at e; w i l l be given t o morale, st rengt h, s t at us of trainin^, s t at us
of heal t h, s t at us of suppl i es and equipment.
7. Civic Action. A statement of ci vi c act i on undertaken 'ind accomplished '
during t h e operation. Include a t t i t ude of population toward ~rneri can uni t s.
869
Out,lina recomme:rdations f or civic act i ons t o he accomplished i n t h e f ut ur e
within t he area. T i s t :ill act,ions whi-ch Pay have tended t o alienate the
p o p - ~ l ~ t i o n e f f o r t . I n respect, t.o t he WS/G!IN
CHAPTER VIXI
LEESONS IEARNED
This document constitute6 guidance t o cmbat uni t cmander s i n t he
t act i cal employment of theiruni t s. The many t opi cs which follow are placed
i n 11general groups: Tactical Guidance, Viet Cong Tactics, Infantry Oper-
at i ons, Ar t i l l er y Operations, Sig,lal Communication, kkapons, liedical Service,
Ar my Aviation and Airmobile operatlons, Logistics, C i v i l Af f ai r s / ~i vi c Action
and Personnel.
The lessons resented here represent t he experiences of a ,
F o -
LessonLearned may not be,a ~ ~ J &a b l e t o the brinade AO, but they do offer
w b l e guidance and a frame of reference f or orrerations i n a counterin-
w encye n v i r o mn L
2.. TACTICAL GUIDANCE.
a. Individual,&ieunall @t,t rai ni n8 must be constantly emphasized
by conmBnders. Tearrrwcgk mustbe st ressed t o the point t hat t act i cal execu-
tima isaccomtplishgd nith the saae precision asdismounted drill; t hat de-
livery of effect i ve-fire i sasButomatic as r i f l e drill; and t hat supply
t o t he t act i cal unit i sa e responsive i n bttbas i t i s i n garrison.
b.
In the qbrence qf strcang conmend,influence, exercised through a
strong chain of c o d , soldieqs dU.beaorne canplacerit ard grow lax. I n
counterinsurgencywarfwe ole, can neverrejax. me alert sol di er can save
a' bat t al i on. Training must i n s t i l l i n our men an understanding of'theneed
f or al er t ness, To have al er$ sol di erswe must have a l e r t leaders who never
ylaxandwho check, check, check . .. . . .
c, Too many l eadersar e ei t her blind toc-on er r or s or l ack the
t-ce, drive ar&rgy to aee that they ar e corrected, Theee er r or smust
corrected with preaiaion and accuracy. Every opportunity f or t rai ni ng
.-~tbe used, Each combat missioni sa training mission, a s -11 a s a
patrol, . an at t s ck oran assaul t . When possible, leaders correct mistakes
noted during bat t l e, W , i n a l l cams a t the f i r s t respi t e following the
battle, t o prevent rec\)rrmcee. Take maximum advantage of reserve, mar-
'&allins and standdam periods. Duringthese periods of training, the
wder mu8t d e v e l ~ pthe attitude that "the more sweat on the t rai ni ng
b&e&d, thehas b)ood onthe battlefield. " The habi t s developed i n t rai n-
iqg, good qebs& a p the same habi t s trhich w i l l be used i n combat. Good
hb$trand proper.faopanee mrt be so.mil dr i l l edi nt oour troops t hat
r;;dor: t he 8tae.88 of bottle tbeywilli nst i nct i vel yand immediately do
t4B-*t *ing.
d, The baalc difference betmellia proficient, crack unit and one t hat
ismediocre,i a t he at t ent i on paid to the det ai l s and fundamentals of marks-
manship, f i re and maneuver, camouflage arrd concealment, commnications,
maintenance, administration, and a l l the obher a r t s and skillsof warfare
t ha t contribute t o success i n combat. The lkader must cmst ant l ycheck t o
see t hat these fundamentals ar e followed. A l l coxanders
dll dovota their pr-1 .t'tsntion 6ottrainiryat every aml hbl e
l hpbsi a willbea t thc oquul, section, platoon level.
lbcpmim and lees& leanedmust be w h e d down by, brigade, bat-
U r n Dcompany, troopandbattow coamalnderm through animaglnrrtive,
c o n t ~ , aggressive training program, Nothingw i l l be taken for
w e
a. urtod below are gometechniquer to. be .knplopd dwim training
end trotical operations:
'
(I)Mo riflecceplpr inthe Uth Wgade w i l l advance either
inopenorclose terrainwith three platoonson line. ~~ndersa t
c-rp and battallon level wi l l almays have a reserveelementinhand,
'under central,urd pepred forIPP06aahA t me n t .
( 2) Troops antiuipetetbttmmtiRgengagementswith t he
1P;dil iarolvo ahr v y rohmm d iaiWVC fin. A t thistime, coa-
mmiers and troopsw i l l not be abbt owrrlk freely8l oPl g the battle f m t .
Hawever, t h q will'not regardthemselvesas upinned down# but rather w i l l
accept this aor#tition a8the nogaral aad naturali ni t i at fon of closein-
f * combt, Farward elerents c l ~ e l yongaged willautanatically be-
.'- 8 bassof firs. Ca ma mWa at-.squad,urdplatoan l evel willadvance
their anaintothe baw of i W '
Ur ns' &crawling i f neceusary. A
''MW'roltsa~of f i r e wi l l be re$tzdW. 11handsandat arpr time the
' a 8 bifher'6hckOn6 Ol' 8 t 0 ~ the' be'sa 0f fsm?dl1-8 i t 8 PO-
ritiai moving torwarde m i f iar+ardmvemnt ismly a mt t e r ef
5 m&ew ata tiar, andthe rode of advance i s bg.crawling, Under
'E-anceb willforward el-a tn mtabt.withd?m i norder to
;biqattillmyfireon the VC. h.bebbt firerlllstandfast and
ifneosssar~..Carf.6t bbmaihtulnedi f necerserg through-
+&
- -
&&-*t;'.
(3) Upem initialmt a c t , c d q h y c ~ e r a wi l l inanediately
,ea&t t hei r rswrve toonearound flankorthe otherand w i l l h-
&&JB-4b& artiln" eiy ah3 martsr ffre'totheiriront. In the jungle,
t&!b' mny Mstartha soabdidtsntei hfront of the position and walked
barrardth-podtionmtdl mfsbrHqtiiz-eathat itbe bra\l@t no further.
Thfa 6rti Uqi?b, uvma thou& f t rat-be--nc$ theforward VC elemsnta
'all.becontirhpd, Itwill&tit theVC franreinfcarcin&,
hneuveihg, CQIAilrder8 tdU retain control of t hei r for-
rr(rii - * 8X9nrsntu 66 that mubum.f* #dwer-eln beh g h t intothe VC el^^^.
-44)Wing the f-t' 5 of.'10mries of a meeting engagementt
wa6f&&g alld &e VO- dkl haw-+hecrdvMts@. He w i l l i ni t i at e combat
'W rtWcrrid plaeu-of hi14eh6odag -- wmUf Srappawpared positions.
Aif* th..m@t 5 f;6 16rdnittesl thecmbnt abrantage nil1begin t o s h i f t
npdd* indrr)"'Ihvar as additional fire i sbrought t obear. The
camnlw -wing mapons are light, mdium and hawartillow
(rtdrir 0-8. Ca r a n d e m of canpaiee andbattalions, u p e a a v n t ,
I
I
di2 We di a t e l y anaus s the si t uat i on 'onthe n p and by rlaul obeervation
axmi w i l l bring a i r st r i kes and a r t i l l e r y f i r s i nt o all areas through which
the VC may be withdrawing, reinforcing or maneuvering,
(5)' Once the VC i s engaged, o U c m e r s w i l l use i ni t i at i ve
and hagi nat i on t o connnlt all available forces .and block a l l possible
routes of withdrawal within t hei r capabi l i t i es, Unt i l such Ur n s as
routea of at hdr awal can be physically blocked, they wi l l be blocked by
i nt er act i on. Enciraleinent w i l l be maintained unt i l the VC is eliminated.
There w i l l be no pulling baak i nt o a perimeter a t night during such an
action.
( 6 )
Bat t al i me w i l l be assigned tho mission of aaturation
patrolling i n extensive areas, Prograesiw'ly, units wl l l learn t o oper-
a t e independently 4awn t o platoon leuel, . Ini t i al l y, platoon operatione
Hi l l be done i n t he daytime pllling back . i nto oompany perimeters a t night;
and a f t e r a Peaamably short period of mcgmienas i n this mode, platoon
wlU operate indepndeptly night and day, The aafety of a r i f l e platoon
operating 'independently depends, on two thingst
(a) depeated rnoven$nt, .including rnavmnt a f t e r dark so
t hat VC torces cannot conduct a p h m d at t ack but rat her nust conduct
an open t s c t i c a l maneuver. This is not t hei r most effective msthod of
operating and dusing such engagement8 they are extremely vulnerable t o
artilleryryand mortar fi re, All'pletoon leader&and platoon sergeantr
will di r ect l and &Just a r t i l l e r g f i r e d wn g such operations,
(b) While opr a t i ng Mepehdeently, where contact i s always
InUwd,, platoon leaders dl1 contml alrd maneuver t hei r elements so t hat
at' 3Ceeet a rqpad bare of f i r e covers a l l advance8 acroas open t errai n
t-d positions a i c h rnay or my not b9 occupied by the VC.,
(7)
I n temporary defensive positions, two-man emplacements w i l l
b' emat r uct ed so that there i a' a bra!t o- $he f r ont and fi ri ng pasiticna
ap! dhe r 85th with about a 15 ddgrea ahgls of cross fire, Thi s will per-
.&. #a rdQplqhgsof f i r e-6uperiarity without exposing each soldier to
d h b t tim frdm t he, f r ont nherr an attuek i s i t i at ed by the VC vdth a
hmrp volume of ma l l anae a d recoi l l ees riflP f i r e ,
( 8) It d3.Ibe a W-l upmating ~mcdwei n the 11th Brigade
t o podt i on a r t i l l e r y bat t er i es and aingls r i f l e companiee i n forward
b- 9 of fire, These positicna wl l l be moved with suffi ci ent frequency
BU %ha*' they 1&11 !l~HB.llgnot be eusceptible t o c o o r d i ~ t e d attacks by
foroes. Hmewr, they wl l l be subject f hquent l y t o probes and
attach of up t o cornpow siss. These troop must be cautioned t o expect
md ko handle this . s i M enghganent,Additiofrally, combat reconnaissance
&platoon end c o w sise 6lene- #ill!tm normal, ~ i f l eplatoons are
w c t e d t o be able to handle OC canpaniesj canpantee t o handle bat t al l om;
and bat t al i ma to handls regiment8 unt i l rsinforcenients can be brought in,
f The fpllcw inc procedi~r.es,or .Ittipat', demand the intncdiatd q d con-
tinu;inf: attention of'-al l leaders.
(1)
f:I;?~:(.i$.~-Eine :15nttry :into the Tla+,tlofi e l d: Move i n t o the bat t l e-
f i el d by foot 'rathertAan by hel i copt or, the noim and sir-111,of *j.ch redllce
t h e possi bi l i ty of surprise. Ln tcr f l i e hnt.tlefj.eSd at, ni l , , ht .
(2)
Nj.l:ht 0 ~6 r a t i o n s : St eal f;he nilrht awcy f ram t h e cl ~er r i : l l n.
Nieht .airnoble assault.^, arribl~shps, pat r ol s, r~ndmo\rcment ~ 1 1 6 t. become r ol l t i ne.
( 3 ) Stay ~e h 4 . n dPorcco: When :.I un:it, is cxtrncted followiny an en-
[:qerncnt, leave o r j . n~l ~t - t a ~ 1 . 2 ~ behind f 0 t . c ~on {.he baletl.efiel-d,
(4)
Reinforce ,Rather thm Ext r act , : l aen a ct ay behind force or- ?
IRIS' make$ coptact, plan to r ei nf or ce prompt,ly rai.her UIW extract,.
Far t h ' .,
emplw n hnedi~larea~t i onforce (pla1, wn) on air strip al ert with hel i -
copt ers -anstand-by, o r insert platoons &n advmce on t he ,;round concl rrrent,-
ly wi t h t he IRR,P on .stcty.behind u n i t ,
( 5 ) Reaction Force: Since bhe hel i copt er reveals +,he presence of
US Forocs, oohunarid and sont,rol ,skj.ps shouM not be t h e f i r s t helicopt:.ers i n
the m m - b n d$c h a reaction fomi is to ha commi tt~d. As l o n ~a s t here
i s exkell9trt. ~ a d i o~am~linioat ion8 t he filmsthel i copt er in the area should
carry.komhat hroops, Upon arrival at an T;: t he T-cactionforce s houl d prompt,-
ly more cpqt to block enemy escape routes while f i na l coordi nat i on is beitit:
made between t h e wrk$ on We- ( f ~ l m dand the reaction force commander.
( 6 ). r; W t e d ,Hel.j.*opw Traffic: , ' ~rovi desLay hehind forces, LRRP,
.khakte-entating:bnt t l ef' i dd clpndpsli'noly wi t h a mini n111rn of 3 t o 5 days
ratiomi .:to dMaCe. nned for heJ.&copter.. .?wupply which promptly tele!:rclphs
' to the enemy tbei!prasenc&-of ; oj u-forc,m, - Pr i o r ' t o c o ~ t ~ a c t with the e nc w.
use helicoptcr f or medevac o r ' t a c t i c a l ernen: enci.r:s only.
- -
.I&) . ~ e s n ~ y i ~ y . 'I'f&hquec': . lInl/ke the VC e ue r r i l l n who I.ives n?f
Cke'zl.ihd9 weiare 3M tied j.n our cliyldctstiae oper:;tions by t he bul k and
wdight .bf:0 mLiDn5 ,yhil&!;3.4lnJ:l1 the n?unbrof clays mir t roops c; u~0perat.e
wi t ~&: ~ebuppl $b j h ~ , i b h t , ~ e r ... :Ithe.fo?$owin:~~ art: s~.lj:i~r.:;l,c-dtlay:i t ~ . solve
t hi s problemt
fa) :Il se~di fW:~i tl . i ons rhpn ,,3yud&-al il o 01- j.n cnr,il~i.natiol~ w i! h (:
rat,i&&
' &$ GkUh $+@pik%rS mG opera& cZandt?st.ineLyfrom a l.l;lse
ca8;Fkiri~:-'& ifhy IAl g~pnIy: W, the d d l e r .
( d)
Resupply by helicopter at night,
(0). Resupply during the day with the hel i copt er flyingnap
of the eart h and supplies "kickodll out,ontoa DZ,
(8) silence the Bgttlefield: Eliminate a r t i l l e r yII Rc I f i r es ,
long range d i l l e r y , and TAC Air s t r i kes near fri endl y troops unless.
promptly exploited ,byground forces,,
(9) DummyPositionq: Construct and occupy obvious positions dur-
ine dwl i eht hours and then abandbn them during the hours of darkness t o
movet o ambushs i t e s or tqat t ack suspected enemy'positions,
(10)
Doubling Back': Move out froma position in the afternoon and
af t er darknessfalls,radically chance direction of
..
.march t o attack a pre-
seleoted t ar get before d&rn. -
(11)UseofTrails r WeaL the bruehn rather than move dong main
t r ai l e, The enew enploye.trai1watchere along mi n . t r a i l s where he can
gen'erally observeadvanaim troope, S e mh alon~secondary endt er t i ar y .
trd$8wedbygame which.of f er t he guer r i l l a axcel l mt cmcealment as well
w anesoape. route,
(12) Spt ngi ng the Trqc When feasible, follow or observe a single
OF amaU pa* of memg to.Wcate larger tones or determine c r i t i oa l intel-
ligence euch as meagr positions,eupplg' points, CP8, ate, Then maneuver
f ore~~b toenbure oloain&the .trap andki l l i ng or capturing the enenly force
in+o%red, Hove on a wlde front ruppartsd reserve8 and firepower,
(13) C~r don and Search: Enoircle gvi l l age at nightqe secret l y as
possible, thw 8earOh at- flpst light- using PF,RF, or ARVN forces. Rehearse
wtng samefomee mt%tbhilr type operation c a be acdomplished effectively,
Cdna%deruee of staybehtnd forcesafter thesearch,
H~&wanrrN;Harkonanship isextremelyimportant i n
Ua~ra1l . yfhe hanomy w i l l of f er onlyf l eet i ng glimpses
of himelf a k l e trcplng toeachpe the advaming US aoldiera, Therefore, i f
8 o@~$ir)Uouaandellpemlmd marbmanahip pragrm isestablished each man
f l r k W O romds daisy u c e p t on clWeetino operatione the enmy casual-
t g r t 4Uet l cswillrislst emmy morale w3.Ubelower, and the enemy w i l l be
fomed t o engag6 US troops at mwimum' range. This wl11 reduce the effective-
nessof hie flre and giveustime to c d t imnediate reaction forces,
i d h e d 'hainin&; Tobe suocessful as guerri l l as, sol di ers
ldtbpat$.mtCe and taught t he fundamentals of c mo u f l ~ e ,
.
.UW#tahW%,3&&ty;id,w.badiwiplim, andt o remainst i l l forlong periods
&&bOl T6o #'poksutblly 6 f h O t l ~mbush ieprematurely disclosed
@~JOIJ~NM, ac- wbohhg, . 8bWmnk toruviv$ oneselfand other r est l ess
%tdM@Br.. b V txWYp0 a mma a g e ' rsligtou8lyatni ght but seldom camouflwe
?OFd q opar)aMon&, ' 3- ahould ginadded smphaeiat oproper conduct
of the'i ndi vi dual duringd u s h operatima,
g,
011cecontact '1s, ntgd$.- rcac.l.,..fnpid~g.!wi tire Jih.:ill avai1.&d41.c power
'andreinforcements wi Ulout f'ur.Lhc!rre[-ardLo rleceptiah, stealth, 01. sur-
pI.6se.: : Fol l t ~5: n~; t w i tll tt!e ,er;er!gr, the cn!:a:e~ncr~ revcr't to serni-!:i)er.r.il1.a
t act i cs unt i l a suh~cq~ient corll.:tct. i s tflads.
.h
Ifat every echelon,l from :i?urrd t o bati a1 i on, each conm,anderai>olie:;
the s h i d a r d techni.ques* of , - rot ~ndcmhat.'-andI J ~ i.ll.zesthe fuUPi.repower
nvai l dl l c. tohi m, the, opt:t..:1.; :rls oI' 1.t,!? 1.34.h nde wi llbes i , ~ c ~ e ~ s f u l ,
,
I
If, on the othert ~ a n d , corl:n.ztncI ! : r : 1n;ulctrver I;heir t.roops and handle t.l;eir
firepower:80 t.h:lr (.he ft117.wt i , . ht. o!' tht! combirled alms team isnot. o r can
not be brought i.ohear, thert sektlacks wi . 1. 3 he experienced andunnecc::sary
casualties Killbe taken,. S;L ery commander is c:xpttc Led t o do hj . sjob i n a
cool, . pr of c . s s i o~~~l niu1nt.r a t : ) I 1 1.imt.s.
a, Thcbasic tact.i.ca1 cotle nf t,hc V!: i s: "\Then t.I\t.enemy advances,
wibkdrau; when,' .~edcf'ortds, hnr.r.;irjc; tlhenhe i s t. i red, at,lack; whenhe, wit.11-
draws,.-put-suu.!' Enph~s j sisplaced v~pmspeed, security, surprise andde-
cept$qnW- The UC exhi hi t rr.reat.skillia malcinr the moatof their enemyI s
w~&nesees;
b,
Enemy opcratio~isare pl;lnnt?ct i n det ai l andare based lipon carefnl
.reoensaiesanoeand co&l ec~i , m' af inkllilvence, Troopsare prepared fora
niqsior),withdatailed.,mhearsels, i nchudi n~t ho use.of~~ockups , sand t abl es
d, +W. l a rterrain+ m e .-a.pIqnha8 be11 -preparedandrehearsed, the VC
., waa r,%@uctanttq ,(4cp*t f rom. . i t . . .A-oartain inflexihtlityi sapparent i n
laarUr @ mr.akior)81b& msow ocamicnr, YL: forceshave shown themselves
to be capab'ie of improvisation.
. o,
The V-6are vesy cautious and attmpt t6det.emine indet ai l t he
-dm,,&pai$ion autdbwo&ionoP.rpvwmtof their opponent. before en-
them, Theywoqwrather letgpapportusitys l i pby thm act has t i l y
without proper intelligerlce and preparation. For t hi s. reason, a meetiny,
.@nwe,, yM~b-~qunl' Ly datas no$.provicle a aarkod advent* e to theVC, i s
,+vY'.t@d.a&.aJ&@cats,- Jkwevar, s W -euch an&4h.on.take place, theyare
t a~hb- . k, . %etha Cfrat:b deploytmops tocriticalterrain, be tho f i rst
hpq f$ra, 'beU e .f%rst. t o. uaarrl t u. Thepurpoaa of t hi s srlressive ac-
g& tr 40 saizs.UW WA i a t i w t todelay di s o ~a ni s ct.hs enqy hy
mw:Ah,.b&pl y ,-4ly5 rmder Pi=. D\winfvtheresult.in[;confusion
:YC, t ~w md. withb.sw. ~ o ~ k o t
d.
Localp l o t Cow: forces tend tooperate ntac roade and vi l l a- e r s
,*
mW 9 ~ b mL ~ t ; S r ~ 3ocril populace end assi at the r q u l ar11n1t.s
rikw: C W ~ e=Uak.prjokd . ds kt i on. MainPorce andNVA uni ts normally
? -
w p WwW1%&b d n m m mumtoeareas, urnally almp ntat\rrt~llines
+@f,wJ#@$ #t~ededj., They take maximumnd- .48 itnd vallays,
..w** c & ~ b ~ % l ~ - ? f ~ f i a k i t,e#nin whid prorides them conccalmont from
*n,pressed by our forcerwl l l theymove deep
~ l c hss.dense junele or steepmountains.
e.
Tile VC w i l l rl;roljllly make use of every opporLunity t o har r as s ,
del ay, and di sor ym. i zc our f or ces by t, he ure of sni pers, mines, t!oohy-
t r aps, probing at t ack, et c. . 'l'hey w i l l , usual l y nLtcyrrpt t.o rlisen;.ajc nriti
withdraw when .facet1with s uper i or fl.repower, o r when t hey no lon:.er. en-
joy an advsnt,al:r. Irl cont, rast. , ;.l\lA ~ ~ r l i t s tray defcrid t j enaci ousl y o r
vi[:orouslypr es s an aLtack eveh i n I.he face of ovr rwhel~ninfvI!$ firepov;e:*.
!+hen heavi l y e n ~ q r e dby a US force, {, heenenty i.KLl f r e q~i e nt l yemploy t h e
" huc ~i ng t echrl i q~l e" t o s t a y i n cl os e proximity w i t h f r i e ndl y t r oops i n an
ef f o ~ t t o make it d i f f i c u l t . t o ernp1.0~ leort>ar,a r l i l l e r y , and cl os e t a c t i c a l
a i r support . 'I'hey of t en diseny~ape and withdraw or11.yaf l;er sufferi ri p severe
l os s es .
f a Offensi ve 'Tnct i cs:
(1)
Arl i mport ant VS of f ens i ve t a c t i c i sthe r a i d. It, ruay bc
conducted by u n i t s from squad t o re&irnentalsize and i s most of't.en
executed d u r i n ~ t he houra of darkness, Two bas i c t ypes of VC r a l ds .
have been not ed. The s ur pr i s e r a i d i s t h e most common. . Secrecyand
speed a r e . ke ycons i der at i ons i n t h i s t ype of act i on s i nce t he VC r ai di ng
party may have l e s s numerical etrencth t han t h e dt'qndir-q: force. The
power r a i d i s one i n which thelVC employ ovr:rwhelnl-nf: s t r e n ~ t ~ h and f i r e -
power i n or der t o annihil.ate a defendin?! u n i t , The time t he rai d be vi ns
may.be a clue t o i t snat ure. Raids bef;un after 0200 hour8 are r ar el y
powvr raids.
(2)
Theanbusk is -0aeof the most effectiue VC offensive t a c t i c s .
Ambushes a r e normal l y established a l o w roads, trails, streams, and ot he r
natural of movement. Patterns of f r i endl y f or ces art3 st udi ed i n
d e t a i l and t hen ambushes a r e es t abl i ahed alony),r e ~ u l a r l y t r avel ed rotiteg,
VC ambushes are us ual l y s hor t , v i o l r n t act i ons followed by a r api d with-
drawal, On accaai ons, t he VC have observed fri endl y patrols depar t i ng
t h e i r pat rol . hrsea end have s s t a b ~ s h e daarbuahes near t he base qrea on
the same mu t e used by t he pa t r ol , 'lihiiq t echni que t?ives t he VC the element
of s ur pr i ee and enables him t o hit t h e f r i e ndl y p a t r o l as itnear s i t s
baa@area 011 t h e r e t ur n route at a time on s e c ur i t y i e a p t to be lax.
(31
The Itlure and ambi~shll is a c o n l y used VC t a c t i c . The hqsic
prLncipLe- i st o draw t h e at t enbi an of f r i e ndl y f or cea and lure them i n t o
prepared ambustres, Many var i at t one of t h i s t a c t i c have been noted:
(a)
The..UChawe attaoked an oirtpost o r , vulnerable u n i t and
t hen. at t empt ed to ambush rrrlief f or ces a t nearby l a n d i n ~nones o r al ong
pr i nc i pa l avenues of approach.
(b) .Wt3ihdzawht: .VC nni t a have at t empt ed t o lead frierldly
'flwoes I nt o ambushe of other VC I I I I ~ ~ C ) .
(4)
Snigers have drewri.the attention of' friendly hnita
and ent l ced them into ilpbushes,
(d) The VC 3 Wa,mrbared f r i e ndl y base cne;lla arid then
ambushed frLeqd.4fo+cse8 Waearch of 'mortarpos'itione.
(e). The VC.have used some of t he above methada t oentdCe
friendly u n i t s i.r~tohenvi1.y t)noby-trapped or mined areas,
(11) l l nrrasm~ntf a t act j c o f VC j ruerri l l a~. Sniper a h ~ ~ s i c
act i vi t y wid probes are used to d~norallve, confus$ and mi sl ead friendly
forces, Diversionary harrassinl atCbCka have been usedt o draw frl endl y
forces awayfrom vulnerable VCi nst al l at i ons, .Local guerri l l a forces
are oftenused as delaying or hamassing element3 t o permit Main Forces
or NVA unitst odthdraw from an area.
(5) TheVCare expertsa t i nfi l t rat i on. They have Infi l t rat ed
friendly positions during periods of reduced r i s i bi l i t y andadverse weather
andhave C) f hcombinedthei nf i l t r ' at i m wiMr'a fei nt or mee, Frequently
they havei-ltrakd friWlyp~ei t i madisguised as localci vi l i anr,
ObJectiveebt-W3 ~ ~ l t ~ e t t c m amcrahota,go, asrassination, ~demr al i ~at i on
of friendly. col l aManof intelfiipanagend disorganization of
friendlyWt$,)Repiddeteridrcrtion 01' o ~ c l m i ~ d befenuea andmanyaccidental
casuatim have hewn eaosdd Weare i nf i l t i at i at ,tacticrr.
. (6r 'Pk.UC havb bnhhowl to f o+xd~.a. fri endl y .nitt o a hc1icopt)er a
o r truck pfUk-up point, %fwkI3.allmtheWoriby OP+;he friendly force
t o depart the,area thua providing the VC with thesuperior force; the VC
willnorrrollf launch aviolent attackj ns t as the lastelmento areloadinf
thed&&&s Yfi 'Eu2faopbe#U;.l' kbir missilak $8 bdrrstrey the troops and
t r m w br& utth&a+butom.rei$tfq%eawnrte m6.'ftectedw
, -
##:- D&Eikafim e43cM~t
:(S) ..BrW! -&id -.moi.d.( b.a&mei t- t m c t withstandf r i h d l g
~i x&@, L~-.WU@P, &tmd.vb2qa&Sa rtnIta, basee, W e f l ~ ~ r - hospitals
d w 8 l ~ d % i d n s of ther -fbr'aN&cH#4edr
I
T&Jva . pri pd: 8 ~ t t ~ ~ 8 f ~ e pouitiohe thmughoh t h e i r * ~f enei ve
op~&&analareas, If eurprised by frfendly forces,they will,i f possible,
riU4&&+$0 pat t i an Uh i e n d until theycan break a.*i&y:qibp&d
6nf
.#W bu?Ygbt.afdmkdss. ',VC poaft&err$are4 uhclrabterlaed by defense
depth, a - eqport, l:ood+herd c&etcb u l d ; ~ i t mwe of natural cover
md e o ~ ~ ~ e d Re n t , Ikfense8 are oriented along t r ai l 8 and otherobvious
c n - ~ wp~ Wb. * Wo+f -61 &r&often.h~or por at edi n the defenae,
o f h cboerad bf.autamntic weapons ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ # ~ . . C , a s t ~ i l l Y Q s ~ ~ ~
f i r e d
V$# ' &~ ~ i h J W~ h c t + n &l y fl$ aS31KIbSh'opratibnb, . the VC have
pmpamd pi tions at .the m3~e.aof.prcaindt~'l!Qldin~ t m a i n t hei r operational
'amus. I n.soma instandes have remainedtovered'i n a second l i ne df
. ,
f W i a a ~ . U w ' h - w r Mm.thelundinp sonsu h i h friendly
artillsrpmdTAGairwwe esployed.atpi nat th+iland$n~sons.. .When,the
.
pmparrrtion a:dcr+the VC moved famrardt odefend at *heedge of t he landing
torre PWI ~ . f ~ t g l ~ ~ ~ f a : t b ) P L i whennecessary, ~ d ~ * f i f i 8 ) ~ 6 f - ~ ~ h e e
.
The VC 4.11.frequen. al l ow t he f i r s t liftof: . hel i ooptersto l and and +.he
t r oops to disembark pr i or t o t ri ggeri ny, an ambueh . or launching ah attack.
h.
Withdr :r& Twhni ques r
(1)
le Viet Cong i ncl ude a withdrawal plan with every offensi ve
and defensive pl e As soon as t he situat.ionbcomea unfavorable t o t he i r
forcde, they witiujrw rapidly alonf: preplanned, concealed escape routes,
They of t en break down into emall r!roups and withdraw iilonrr t he same rout,e
they used i n t hci r approach,
( 2)
During the withdrawal, t h e VC make ext ensi ve use of r e a r
guard.geraonnel whose mission i e t o delay t he p u r s u i n ~ f r i endl y f or ce u n t i l
withdrawal of t,he VC main f or ce i a acconiplished. Ambushes desiened t o slow
f r i e ndl y f or ces a r e al s o frequently employed.
I
/ 3)
A t ypi cal .withdrawal technique used by smal l VC f or ces i n
dW;r of an unfavorablq, c2o.c ran(:. cont act i e t o drpp t hei r packs and run.
Friendly fotces have been i nol i ned ' 1 el & thsFr pursui t i n order t o inspec'
t he packs,
On occasi on t he VC havo employed'boahg-trans i n the packs.
(4)
The V C , . w ,dmb ~ L d dcapture by hi di ng o r by blendinp i n
dth i h o . l o c d populace. wing placca.rised by bhg VC aorr almost linitlesl,
dt hqygh underground locat ans are frqqyntly used,
Under~roundmethods of
h%dirlQI.troops and equtprqn
t range from simple "spider holeeft t o el abor at e,
rdnfg aed moms, Frqm y e ,ayface these ~dergroundi ns t a l l a t i ons are
~ R D S $ ~ b.,dqtwt, which. lfflduIb Cr l t Sc dpobhs are entrance8 and exi t s,
~8uaLl.yaoncealed i n' gardens, animal Fens, mdar pi l es of straw o r dl mr,
in qr under stsucturss an@ Sn stream \mnks.
~ 9 .t ,.
.
. ,
.
. . . . 1 I I , , . , , e
' ? : p,-, :I,,($) !.Extwip. and;'i&eniously donatructsd underground t u n n e l
'kyobms ate =,ct&,blqt ;up&,qup..: f ~eitkes.d.undprhroundhi di m places. Most
a # % $ 8 . ~ M ~ b d , in,, perml$,+hbr& !termu n d e r ~ r o ~ d e,p m r .$ habi t at i on.
- .,tmey an . uaralQ. . ~u&$, :lnr e $ q - e q , Nt i - l e ve l form with yent i l at i on
.
*~o%@J:
.
int,er~&~ a;$. i~slr5@~ .:AThib.typo,.of cqns t ruct i ~nprovi des protection
.!fpgtl~rdaak$~. . m~ $ $ p c \:'hen aina*cl;t fir&?.andTAC air*s t r i ke s ,
' &&&?&rjpw~e,.#s: griejidly.for-, the V C dl1ofteent oss. a erennde
-s?r&mp b W of,,We6&h ~ l * -and@t$empt.hemapeithrowh a n o ~ e re x i t during
.I~f:Me~.rebultin(:- ,aho&!.e@, .&h,; . . . ,
i. Booby-Traps and Mines:
(1)
Rooby-traos ar e favorit,e d e ~ r i c ~ s theVC ,
Grenades,
of
I(+apik&wpe, wl.~q?,~T.pY&: a variety of uqxplod,e$ ordnance (duds) and
-c&hm.~$qaej: are W-Q -M.h.harrase,. 4loy down, confuse, and k i l l friendly
, . f 6 t l ~ B @~ ~ : -.. ..> a r e limited onl y by t he imacination of T i q ZOVW .bt-@pa<iwpons
the designer.
34:'I :h
..(P) .&p&y~kappr ~ e , . m o s t oft en been ssed a o n c roads and t r a i l s ,
i n moats and ent rances t o v i l l a ~ e s ,i n gaps i n fences or t hi ck bush, a t
fordi ng s j t c: : . , 3t bypasses t o obst acl es, i n doorways md on .?bandoned bodies,
weapons and eql~ipment~.
( 3) - Grsn4dea 'are amonly u8ed r a boobp%rap8beaauae tw are
l i g h t b i g h t , d e y t o a&* a d conceal, and are readily adeptable,
'They
we frequently placed i n t r ees or bushes along t r a i l e which friend&
forces ar e expected t o use; t he rrlost commonly used det onet i m devige i s
t he t r i p wire.
(4) PwJf stake* andl man t raps are coma1 types af booby-trapa
found throughgut Vietnam,' The punji stakes may be ehorpened bamboo etakes
or they may be barbed wood or metal stakes, e9igped i n poison or exarkmnt,
eclplaced i n wooden, concreto or metal blocks.
The spike devices are placed
i n hole8 along routes of movement and ar e careful l y aanouflaged t o prevent
detection. They huve been-found i n strdam; ri ce' paddi es, tunnels, and
ot her places. 'They are ofteh employoa 'as obstacles I n conjunction with '
ambushes.
( 5 ) ,The VC al s o e~l~ploy crude but ef f ect i ve t r i p wire devices
along t r d l s ' a h d path's a c h m1e:lse arrowso bmbo whipe, and other swing-
ing, barbed, 6lut)-type ob~'eets. Biirbs are often dippod i n poison or ex-
crement t o comp&dl kastilj;ltr' *f,fects.
i . I .. .
( 6) . @ti-personnel (ItP) i~ndanti-tank (AT) mines ar e used exten-
ri;e13, In VCYCbpeiatiohri.' fiej' mbj bs of t he cruse honemade vcri et y or
similw t o t hose i n t he vs inveht'tbry. The h..ha+= been known t o m$x AT and
AP mines i n t he i r minefiexds'. ,AT'mines are q5loyed along major routes t o
destroy friend& vbhicles'%hil'e' AB' mineb a5e placed an c r i t i c a l t er r ai n i n
the- inmedQet s a,ma.t o Gflict ' e~sua1tibs"onfri endl y personnel attemptin,:
t o b c c u p ~ ~ . pound; ., . or t d secure v t hi c l e d i s ~ b l e dby t he AT mine. the -hic$ - . ,
(7)
AT mines ar e placed i n hollmed-out ydaces on bridges or i n
holes which have been dug i n roads. I n order t o make t he hole di f r i cul t t o
det ect , the @ m y s c a t t e i 3 d i f tBsroas t he r od for s we r a l hundred meters
of7dig &+ral h u m hol es fi?r decrptioh ar for &ne deployment a t a l a t e r
datb. Atrrfb~fdo~\m~habals'b'~enua'edtoi?amouflugeAT~nee~nplace-
mntg l ' $?muideys alang roads are often ndned and occ-eeimally t he VC w i l l tun-
m%h Siov the shoulders t o yqmt 'eletricaily amtrolled d n e e di r ect l y i n
the'center of t-h road. this latter proctice p e d t s mseloctive tarqetingn
of vf?hiq;lrt hf f l c' . Gn' ~omoocaslans the H: have buried bdre leadinq t o
a %d 'but'hhvb nat br,tplecd'*iidne. Whm friendly troope f ai l ed t o discover
the Wir3, t h e 'fl then -laced the nine and &tmyed the next t ar qet of t hei r
oosing.
. -
i n Ma e they believe are safe. l hey
-mti.:d.h~a n i r security is vcrg lax. \:#%emthey know
' t ho' an 'area they . w i l l s hi f t from mJor t r e i l a t o
tortimy trails and atream beds.
I
I.&etomd
t r a i L a t night
;(2j:; , gwi * !w8~ . i r i to -iw
. . I . , , .
. .
and conducting ml l rehecrsed night attaclis or probes in f a d l i a r t er r ai n,
.
thoy ar e not experienced i n ni ght co~nbatand ar e often surprised and confused
wllen engapd unexpectedly by f r i endl y forces a t night,
(3) !&pica1 aims of' enemy presence ar e dead f o l i a p , which
may be cmlouflage f or a t r ap, t i ed doim brush, rrhich may be a f i r i ng lane
f or a. defensive or amb~~sh p s i t i o n ttrld villages which have been recent l y
abandoned by women mid children, La.r~ellerdo of cat t l e 2nd well tended
crops i n unpopulated arcas 111aybe an indic:!tion of enemy presence, Tho
VC have attempted night i nf i l t r a t i on oSf US t u l i t s by i n t e r ~ ~ d n ~ l i n g wi t 1 1 herds
of cat t l o and lnoving then1 i nt o f r i endl y posi t i om, Cat t l e do not move ~t
night unless herded by someone, bo al er t 1
(4) Jlhomy caches ar e usually placed e.t convenient loca.tio1.18i n
close pr oxbdt y t o sec6hdnry t r a i l s , l' ypical hiding places f or VC equipncnt
are r af t or e, thatched roofs, ri ce bins, h ~ y etacka, dung-piles and wel l s,
. .
( 5)
Local guerrillas profcr t o Uve Invillages with t hei r
fami l i es a t night. blovement of guel-ri1.las out of vil1al;es a t dmm and i nt o
v i l l a ~ e sa t dark i s a pat t er n i n many ereaa,
(6)
Tlie VC attempt t o l ocat e distinguishing feat ures of f r i endl y
forcee when engaged, They will fire most of t en upon personnel distinguished
by rr di o antennas or back paclts, i n s i d a of rank, or automatic weapons rdth
bi pde , They wi l l concontratc f i r s t upon arursne ' rvho a$pears to be giving
camm~d8
(7)
In preparation for an an~agchront, t he VC will prestoclc the
ti'c~ttlbarea and r a w points with resupplies of ammi t i on, nledical supplies
'bna' .. equipnent.
(8)
Tim tCC ef t en pr >epr ecav&t mortar f i r i ng positions f or use
without a base pl at e. An angled (preai wd) cyl i ndr i cal hole i s dug P-tt he
mortar p s i t i o n ,
Duf.ing t he attack tilo VC illove forwmcl to tile hole, emplace
th morthr hub f i r e the' dcsired nu~~ibor. of r o w and then hide t he tube ~t
another, l ocat t on or( withdraw wi t h t he tube,
(9) The VC of& une a cmeping pat&n i n support of ground
at t acks. In ot her words, t he I ~ L o ~ ~ P . ~ rounds f al f vory closoly i n f r ont of the
ddvmcing .. troops,
(10)
9M.W a.1-e w r i e n c e d in bi-eaching unobserved obstacles
'-'which Mvb not Wen eu@leknenhd t dt h detect5on devicas.
(ll)
1,s nn EdJunct t o their opelbations orders, the VC prepare
z-w&ratel pl- t o ensure the secovew of qeacl, v~otulded, weapons, urnunition,
&U' wqQhmt frm the b ~ t t b f de.M.
- ..
1 , .. . t , . ; d;,-2s?yiG
a, occur>:itionof I.iip.ht 'l'os.iUonao
c\\u.ing,tAro Ilous of ..
posi tai l s . s i d d ba
of darlcrese ;never 4
Good imhsh lxltrola tnt4 :G
nmnd&ay* . .
' b. Ur n of the
c m weatlj. rsclucc the ocoureilbe?of. s\r~hM-!:..~,W m h b j d tmbb
p Av ~ r i l yi'or punji sUl;org baotyttmw
snipem $&&ag &cm-lrq(M- w.
wl ~i l ehis 'J&d;c aearchoe the .tmcs. UsQ ma, to .- $zyptr#& ;,
anii~crs. Ti l i s sc.rilo buc;cly systcnl shod appb on claim. 1rbAlgs 1~.*:3 kltm
i n each poeftic4.11, e s pe t hl l y . chrk~&Boaee.af
c. . Lesction to sni&rs* l u ~ . & t b r wt 6 p r r t o
.illmt gL,&tsrc 1
ieod by violenco, a rcpid retum of b&vyv i r bl . o f fM and f ~ t mdoaPsnt.
The 1.4-79 is excdbnt fort use a-t U W y tcncgsb h:tmw. ;a tree
,qvwths, e i e r s must, roailise;%ha$mmd$.&-,dat~w ifr-w-kit;--
inmredla*ly after being fire& ; :
d. 1;ffect of CP5w. l t i ~. T& O.d- soldier bas .tendem, tq i i i i di rrt e4
being t o tile aid of a tmuncied aoldior, VC snipers hhm cap%taUeedon thib a d
purposely wound r man t o k i l t t t ~ bw tbrw othem,&,to h b 8id. The h
-
mediate responee s W d be Chat d..3@bg dorm r Wvp:bwa ef.f-.b&&mdag
and tree spray, in t l l e direction of the sni]wr arid ~RN#- fo-. t O . w h
,
a .secw;.e area for tilo munded r a n . Faraoramcll ocrrad st* fi@ting *d d the
*,romcied, kid menmwt coma forw;r$.bpolice t)rs.,hdhfb&L
e Use oZ ktidhttm.TOC~IM. BIW~CSAW o ~ + t & V O ~ V ~cleerLy
destruction of Vi ot brig f a c u t i e s f kawhf, f d~l se, , i~ooeirns], a - -
forces on tho outside of tlic eotabJ58id p e r b w kesp tim Vie6 Coqe crfi
balance and preclude posoiblo snipor action [.gainst forcos r d m are f!ehbtivdb
stati onam i n the pcdxet or. canduct* c l c e o h t i ma .
f. Use of APC. Lniiorod pci.sonrmel csl-riel= a n be used ao ~Ba,uhces
resupply vcilicles if necessary.
'Li~eset ram veidclsa provide p~ot eet i onfor
~~ouncleci \rI~iloc=:l xdi ti as~ ret- t i l a to ~lmlie-dtreahrh.
The ;&POi8
able to ra;)idly c r r i y bull: iLons such as diead end c~.s~roUtiorrs to the opel-ational
area,
g.
Use of ' i' um&l Tern,
Traincd twb~lteam dll hi - ease ti10 effectiveness
of d- t o;lcrat-ions. @pee trainod, these pc r s oml can e y s t e ma t i a searoh
tho base ~21.13trca fol- ouspocted Vict Cow tunnels a d mylore and destroy those
loc:.tecl.
'
1 inj1r.m of three ;leu nre recluired per team-olrn above p u n d and two
:.:en illsicie La,,, , i t . ~ ~ e l ccAuippeclwith pi stol , flashlight telephone c d wire plus
co. qlass h11d bt~yonct.
I
1 . Gse of Clr.y.lores.
Cl e y .orcs c:!n be used cifectively i n the offense in
t he jungle, u l C H and I r ol e or fapmteot thi e b o r htb.. de f . w .
all4 is breaking contact during tihe vd- or o&ra&@,phaa~;m?.,ar
op6ratiop. On BPPbusherr, . t here b a tendency to dbbonrW - 8 lWke ,-.
t he enew has entered t he
ldlling mne. mmt hmuw b&f.\i
uaing troops underetand t he maxima effect i ve range of thr Claymores,
3, Pm.urm~nt to-be Car- e. -.,
.. . , .
. (11 sq&d i6adsi9.s boa' ;&axtri *$. pi)p.llentnt LO^ th&
scluad, foot pod&, water:pur i f i a t i on ,t&.bleU', .wrs. t $ ' , two razom,.
(2) I.hdi08, should carry mihi& pills, rxtrklbmxlrjeaa, utra,tep
t o tag personal gear, and/or :$apons. o f l JA, IUIA,,
, (3) Squad.baid t a ;ipoludol t roi aers, shorbr ub socks $or e o ~ h .pas:
should be prepcred' f or etch operation i n event req- t o be ' ai r~f t ed. .
(4) Illumination ~s nt r de ashould be.cqri cd to: wark lielipads a t
night,
( 5)
L;*imemm&t carqr a nm;dmupn l oxl .of 'demolitdona and power
sat:s .
)
( 6 )
Grappling hooks should be fnLlricated i n each company f or use i n
ext ract i ng c ~c he sand eql odi nl ; boobptraps.
1; . Coi.onand Crou~e, Comind p u p a w e rec.dily i dent i fi abl e by their
col l ect i on of a n t e ma , : nl i l b .tilore ;ire cr number of wt hods t o camouflage
tiiese raclios, tile p:.~.mmunt l;equi~.ementis t o I mp t he m b c r i n t he conmnd
group t o i i i i i . n i m~ ~ ~ l and well dispeysed. Catmind p u p s .re primary t arget s
for observcd i ndi rect f i ~ e 'and cammatld ddGontlted rdnes, Ell teanrs should
keep adecluate clicitmce from t he commanders but should be close enough to
provide ir~iiediateresponse. ;;owsmen, ?hoto~~;rphers, e t c.,acc- the
uni t should not c r t t ; ch thcxselvcs t o t he cor.n~nndkoup and cornpliczte the
problem,
1,
iJsc of Sr-~ol.:ot o I ark * hcb. t i ons, ;. L~i i ~-r~r il uni t i s iarkhg a l ocat i on
:;ith sl.~ol.ct ncy siiould 1- oqui re the iolll.LnC; elenant (E'Ac, Airborne Obcerver,
::cdici?l :.;t~e.c, etc. ) t o i dent i fy t he color 0: w k e ,
The Vici; Con6 : r i l l throw
s::7o!re t o coilfwge t he issue or luro an eva.cuat'ion ilalicopter in ar;llusn,
.
i .'.,couJii;r: for-Personnel.
A fire tomu doas not ~mvei f e i . i an i s nissing,
c 3,..u;,d doesn. t ;.:ovc if r.. 2ii.e tee:;, is ;.tissiii~, o ?l:~toonc?oesn't, tiove i f a sr;u:-d
- .
. .
is :.lSSL:,z, ;.id c~rqm. rqr!oesn t I.lrjve if c. plc.toon is ~dssinl.;.
:A' ke leaders
a bs ol . ut e l ~i,,:s+;~siblclo;- Llbc a.ccountebility of a l l Ijerso~lnelr-ta l l tines.
n, Haltinr ibr t h m . \&en stopping at night, scarohoubir +&am
o insure that the emhy i s hoto b s s ~
preparationof your defensive poeitions.
of400 meter6tothef n the
, -
o.
imbushwtrole . Patrols canandshoulduee on-callihuk5ng mupdq
st prcedetorminsd point&along'their route to.assistthem, k a b ~ ~ ' p a t r o ~ s
should pl bt their mbWh ~Steaa a cencentration and flw uponitafter
rbeturning totheir l jnee,
Aircraft f or Anti-Ambush Purb~s6~. liturlatmuse ofairobeervation '
p.
byfixedandrotarywingaircraftshodd bemade hcon3Ihction with troop
movementer These ' eiraraft tthould car* traA~edtorwardobservers t ho are
capable of thed u ~ 1Polewf ilbtactftng a M m ~ w g possible Wus h eitesand
of adjustirq artilleryfireonany resulting targetr, Aerialobservation
should bewtained fop the eht* movengent, Wra araexamples trf I J U C C ~ I ~ ~
VietCow ambwhes occurin8 ai'tlr the ZrteMfy comm~ndertlad feltthat hie
mieaion wasaccompliehd ond bhad nofurtiler need forhisaedal eyes,
Anasb. rotaryomai+crm dddd1d bs.onrtat$& wtfi a l l vehicle. have completed
the mi'
q, . Dattl6f$eld FbUCe; ISothhg thab 6an'b&ofvaXueto the enemyshould
beleftbhindr Evena burned-out Padio battery e t i l l has enoughjuice to
detonats'an e3~ploaivgcharm if properly set ineeries,
TheViet Cong w i l l
p1ica.W am-,.
. A R T I ~ Y'OPERATI~IS
s i e f h ~ ~ o f Themsjr mnuab bekbpt h a r e ofthe si ttati on Canno-,
be brlaied on the ,. rpeubl end owrent
lbbenmchbbtbdt. nhrn ' a,Crtdkheei-0 should
~n tati&
maulta of nam dsrion.
w&&ed.&~
oftiu t&&t'ud th
bf Fomsd observers
wt ii
euchas "VC in
ue e Control To
Nof3.m Ul Yd pnb firecoordinationlitlM)
c-er ~hould
betma battaUozm
I
For cloetd-in f i r h g , t he first round in d j u s ~ n t '
missiona must be white phoephomus (WP).
TW
will i nsure t hat t he f i r e is ttafe Bnd w i l l greatly reduce pasoible ossualtjss
if t he maneuver element is disoriented. Be g u n to apply oor nct i ons to
HE round when switching from I.Pr Forward obaemr a mast )je prepared to adjust
by sound a9 yel l cs si ght r During dayUght hotare, oombined adjursttaentq with
t he a i r OP bringing f i r e close ho the ground obeervbr f or f i nal ad$iebrent
wi l l prove invaluablea ''Creeping" has not been a di r t y word in Vietll~m, For
close i n f i r es , it ie dr must due to map innccuraoies and.difficulUse in.
locclting oneself, Drops of l ese t han 50 metem nillsonastimas be nboeadmy.
f , Counter-Fbrt:~r Radar, Couriter-mortar radar i s very effect i ve but
Uni t ed equipnent permits covorage of only a small sect or t o the brigade
perimeter a t one time. ~hel beps / mr t r epa are r seent i al and reporting
upon recei pt of t he first incoming round is of extreme .bportsnce, Tharough
t r ai ni ng in reporting i s md a t o r y pri or t o arrival ikcountrp.
g, Wr a Nr e Control. Ecrdimnt. Flxira f i r e control equipnent euch a4
aimink posts, bulbs and aiming post U&te should be carried, Toggle snitches
f or remote cont rol of a4min.g post li&ts are very he l phl i
h, Pl ast i c Mrinp Charts. Pl ast i c' t arget grids and f i r i ng charts shrink
and expand under t he temperature and h d d i t y c o p d i t i m fowd i n V i e w , thus
affect i ng t he i r aCCUr8Oyr Grid sheets ahould be kept covered when not Inuse.,
i Fi ri n Charts, 6400 dl chart, Sequre 25 OOCIrm chart8 eince smaller
charts t * produce aom inaccwacy. ~Bke cloth t o cover t he chart
when not i n user Terrycloth or towels are i deal . t o cover t he, chart because
when they ar e pulled back f or a f i r e mission, t he chart ' operat ors rest t hei r
stveaty arms on t he towels thus protecting the chart.
Do not try t o rehve
t he refl ect i on indexes with onch new adjusted deflection.
EJon!lally, regi st rat i on
i s with a l l 7 charges and i s do- too frequently t o move a l l deflection indexes.
The defl ect i on correction i s applied from tlle s t i ck by the computer on F7;I:
missions.
3. L;ap Scales,
The use of taps, scal e 1:5Q,000 f or posting the situation,
fri endl y front l i nes, patrols, etc,, ie unacceptable as i t i s not suffi ci ent l y
accurate t o post these with pe a s e pencil arrd adequately control a r t i l l e r y
f i r e r The most successful system is f or each UJO t o have 1:25,000 ovorlay
which i s then posted in colored pencil on a pl ast i c f i r i ng chart,
i:, Bottomiq, Firing bat t ery personnel k t be continually a l e r t f or
evidence of bottoming vhen f i r i ng i n s of t ground.
!Men this conditio'n i s
detected the hordtzer should be moved and rel ai d imnediately.
6 , SIGNAL COM!RIMICATI~~JS
a. Importance of Radio Operators. Theimportance of radi o operators
monitoring t h e i r net s a t 111times cannot be empt~asircedenough,
fndtructions
must be passed from t he eender t o t h e commander cqncerned and not the operator,
O,Iektended operations, a radi o operator' s al ert nese can be sustained by
commanders havinpr an extra RTO i n t he command groltp who catl carry t h e radio
when the operator tires.
b. of-eg, fieenemy e h r c i a e s h i s ,jamming capabi l i t y only durina .
e r i t i cal pha9ss(i.a., a i r strikes, d u r i n ~a r t i l l e m preparations, medical
evacuation, e'tc, ), Units must be al er t t o switch t o t h e al t er nat e frequency
on order.
c. -Tanmi s8i ons ari'Radko; 'Ahen reporbing bkbming f i r e over t he radio,
commande~~houl d i 'aecuracf dl. t hi s fiN as the Piet Cong a t times d
appear t o be monitoring unit i r equs ~cl eeand adjastfnfl t he i r firebased on
friendlycommanders, reports.
3. Conmntnications SbCii i .&- Cor~ecth d i o pracedureg, use of approved
code, and encoded map c6U&ea (excbpt for met@+infarnation) w i l l prevent
t h e Viet Congfrom knowled~eof the operation.
RadbW+s m~kat I m.
Until Brirais helicopters and other
ai mraft' used inhiMt/'~t~upp&tdf' 6he Brigadb ar b. equipped withthe new f ami l g
of PWradios 511 airborne observers should uset h e AN/PRC-25 radio f or ai r /
~r ouhdcarimnic&ions.
. :'TheFe '38 a telrderrdy t o formt about
25. fib6 extreme ' h a t and lackof wf r i k-
brat iori 'for df 5 c e l l battoriscr :r'edudsa thdr-lit?,. ?be f &re&&I-fI r s t ' out
mdthod of iesue. #JO/F%0-25 bat t er i ea aftm last lonp,er Wan the?O hour
&ftbc~ncybut new batcerier Cr);oiuld'bb put in . r adi os just ptPor t o operation.
g, Rem~tingRadioa,
It is desbahl d t o remote radios i nt o t h e 'IW: and
t.0 centrallise the radi os-on high rround under t he control and di r ect super-
wid$& 'of qwvallfbdraaio nibomel.
Su2h uki l i pt i on shplilL. maintenance,
ke&#s utitrqinsd hands dfi'-thu wimt- a d r duc e r the wear an assaciat,ed
qseure * q2ci ~ ~ u i $ k n t . ' &ttf j '5 y a k bat t &pi es 3nremote cets FuM caused
?me un4t.i $roblqns p i g ' 9 o f . ht t a i e c ~on a scheduled basisw i l l 6 - c anfig
eliminata t hi s p ~ ~ e m. . ' ' &b ) +aul d he n k e mcmntd and powered btg 28 vol t
generators through veh-!$le bat t er i es.
Si x radios can be ef f ect i vel y run off
oneset: c@ 'b4iterid&'i@-2,- t e4s llhnnPir anif t.he !no53d; of the &enerator i e removed
fromthd"f623 ar&, '
I
0 - b.
I
h,. Transmissions. Radio net s ~ e t stranqlod by i nar t i cul at e RTD's.
Keep a i r open durine helicopter ilssault. RTOts ahould l i s t e n t o rsldio
t , raffi c arid cet a f eel f or what is ~oinp;on b r f ~ r etransmitting an ad-
mi ni st rat i ve or nonessential type messaRe. Dur5hg t.eliborne operations
a sepekate frequency should -be al l ocat ed f or c o n h l of helicoptere.
i, Panels and Smoke, Use of Dust Offe" and mrking, l i nes f or a.ir
.upport misslons can re%ul t in a heavy demmd f or smoke grenades, Companies
-should carry one smoke grenade per man on operations, a t l eas t two panel
cet s, plue a l l t he pyrotephnica l i s t ed in current SOI,
j,
M-23 9 . 8 Comaend and Control (w)Sh*. The O)I-23 is not considered
a pmd command and cont rol ship. .. It has onlp one radio channel avai l abl e and
use of PRC-25 as a supple"nt is not favorable since one cannot l i s t en t o the
.PRC-25, haridaat while wearm a Mi &t helmet. Mher mor e, it is di f f i cul t t o
understand: anyane , . transmitting over . the radio 'int he OH-23.
k, ~e l e pha r ePoles, non't count on readfly obtaining mod bamboo lance
poles . f or overhead wire. Many uni t s a r e using long e n~i ne e rstakes kl de d
top,sthap t o qet the wbe off t he mb d . 2 x 1, "AM frames ar e al so a ~ o o d
subst i t ut e and creat e lesr of a l i &t ni ng problem,
Telephoner am a t a pvmium due t o t he needs f or perimeter,
Gqt- a l l you can. W' s , i f you can find them, w i l l
br. a meah,help.
Also uoe 'of TA-l18 3rd squad radi os for p e r h t e r communica-
&imswill,reduce t h e m d ~ ~ , of TA-3Uta required.
'obtain deiiaicant t o pack with radios f or overseas
f or Fi re qontrol equipment and boxed weapons).
a, T !!-a6 B e8 Toxet he~. The pract i ce of tap in^ a second
& ~ t L M ~ e magaz? $.the M-16 r s f l e (tha, turning the two over quickly
at$ .$asd.$ng t he second. for a. ra1.U loading) often r esul t s i n t he second
~iziyl pi q etuck in t he ~I+XUI~. This gettr thhp magazine di r t y and causes
edhlpetians. Such ~ k c t k e should be avoided.
b. Maelline Gun munition . Keep a short bel t of machine gun ammunition
.out and r&dy t o fi re--carry a l l ot her mchine w a mn i t f o n i n cans t o protect
' trim cormsi on and d i r t ,
snence . ok~d&s .
The hi* &enhe humidity i n t h i s area r us t s
r and 'mloed )t9spona each ni @t and each morning t o prevent
rounds stick' ing in chambers,
Leaders must cpnduct weapons inspect ions daily.
, > &. I J
4. .'61,. ~t&&to'aoc- Cmn nibs t o objects .and lamove
anlJ &UP, .- ,4pproaohb& I _ .
b Rdnks and v b l ~ l Lh s ~ c t b l ( .
.@i :t q I , ,
- - a .Gr -e. ' 4' ~iemdedmit be securely fastened t o t he harness t o
a . F%~d llu. be bpe' d t o p n v e ' t gepr at i on of grenade .
body and i be,
264
88 7
f . arht M n a .Personnelshould aim low at nig11tto..mi&hitting
'
enemy t ha t may becraw- in.,
e. use of C Q w n t I-.. Following points are stressed the w e of
Slay;110re l l dnes l '
.{I)
;,void prermture detonations prior to enemy-knterkthe killing
zone.
(2) Secure Clayhrore minee t o fixed object6 suchastreesor stakes;
(3) sscw s i ei ~t ri calwires tol ep' of .the mine topreventa r ~ ma l ~
f rbm trippingt l i kdr e '&ndseparating the h a . h r n the m.
. . , . . ,
[4) Inclividualh -mi.aallyreceiving,aClaymore should carry the '
hand.generator i na'pocket' toavoid accidents. flecovery party should approach
mine from theflpks
. . a carefulvisualinspection prior t omvament of
t hU3ayn~ma . C, ,
( 3 ) l3ap1dy ~ia$&r&do ohha they-'banbe tmllngmrd?d andunder
constant observationby fri- ' t roop,
f I$ you ,ever,Icve,,a situationwherethe:squad i s understrength, make
wit' fill $86 pbdi &$o~~&nac~er.
3.. . 14-72 LX.1. The IS-72 $8 useful a g w t Ughtly f ort i f i ed positioris.
&vy bunker8 andentrsndmrent~w i l l , hokver; withtand the explosive pmj eci j k.
Q.en;r&r 'mnsn Melof the hand grenade,
ing no194 a6 did it8 predecessor, the IX-11,
an e;rplgdivesucll as the p n n d e whenever
.Xnt& ni01 ambush, for instance,tlw '
grenade isvexy effectiveai m8ithas a b l q b Id!ling mdius and doe* not
qPj=&w: w We* pqlt- -- -.
.Operation planniry: sllould include
who baaam aasueltias asthishappens
f ~r ethan co&enl;ional varf;re.
I
of thc operational areasr
hut,off heUcoptelbscannot take improvised st ret chers i f they er e
too ion:: so be prepl *cdt o s l df t \sounded t o l;lle st ret chers t i l i l t are on
the evac\iationI~elicopbers.
c, L~;c!ical Evacuation.i n i #C1 s. Tlic use of armoredpersonnel car r i er s
i n a ~nedic,;.l. evacuation r ol e in alaenssubject t o snipor fL. e and booby-tmps
has provenhighly sat i sfact ory, The opthum number .of Am's t hat siloulrl.be
made availt. \. let o a bat t al i on f or nlcclic 1evacuation i . 3 tlwce. lbdical
evacuation i s I J ~ s ~ s i11cv i n ~ casual t i es horn handled ut i ua i ng attac'hed !,PC
the front li. . tosto t he f i e l d l i t t o r mbul mce under batta.Uon control t o z
Forward Kedical Zvacuation Center from where theyare evacuated t o tile
bat t al l on aidst at i on, Wdes s ho~dd be ::,vailable a t t he Forward Xeerlical
Xvacuation CenLer t o lead t he AN t o the cor~lpany col l ect i ng point. f~ersomlel
manning this p~intshould mark the p o h t wi t h smnol.:e onorder,
dm =cuat:;.on of.Dcad. Preparati 11s' i n the f0.mof evacuation b?. psand
a vehicle shoul d' be on handi n t he vicinityof the Fo m~r dI4edical Evacuation
Center.t o evacuate KI A' s as quickly as possible without utilizing f i el d l i t t e r
ambulernms which I M ~ be needed f or the'wounded,
0. ' Xs s i s t i n~Casualties. Ovcr at t ent i ont o a s s i s t i wcasual t i es can
sometime8 det r act f'rom- 'a unitce ~ggressi venessresulting i n addi t i onal
caeualtieafrom sniper fi reand. aggressive. -maneuver. t o adequately clear tbs
areawheretile, inititibil casualties weyo talcon, There iea tendency f or
pe: some1to rush t o , t hea-iciof orouncled cor~lrpdes during tho assaul t . This
reditces !;he volune of f i r e power beingdeltvered on the enemy, provides ad& ,
t i o a t arget s f or t he eherny and1.esults i n greater*tzunrbcr of fric!ndly casunl t i cs.
f4 The Irldividual Solclicr:
, .
(1)
Preventive nasasures myst be employed t o avoid becornin&a. rion-battle
c&s*lt*.
.. ( a) ent ery cad IX~.i-rhea: Cau.sed by.contexnimted. f d a:cl'writcr,
llon6'6f~!%,he 1occ~wItrsatsd$torinfht~otnamh~pnsi der ed safe f or dr:nLing.
To makethevrcter pot-.ble elviays add two iodine or halazone puri fi cat i cn
t abl et s per canteen of vrater,
.*.
' (b).Tydloid. CliibLera, and ikpal;itis:
Caused by conte.r,&n:.tec food
dter,.
:&.voidoo.tingsly l ocal rcw vegetation, fruits or. idlkproduc;~.
'
Eesp.itobhuliaatlons upto'clci..tc a t a l l tlrms.
-
c a :
Od(ured bythebiteof cn infected mnosquitoe.
:2us
diseasbn& be fats1and ehe f ol l o~dng precaut$ons mt wt boobserved;
a,
Thed d l y and weekbant i - ~nal ~r i a billsfiust he talcen
" k ~ t w- . - ,
b.
S1ir.t sleeve's'must be railed ciown.dur.ing t he iiou:.s of darkness
anrl when operating i n dense Jungle.
266 ,
0
c,
UseinsLrrt.repellantr e@r Q and aeresol bombsfres3y
w, ,en t he t act i cal si t uat i on pndt s.
(d)
h e r s i o n Foot: Caused by constant o..:psure t owet boots and
soc1.s ?ad cnn result i n Inas of f eet and toes. To prevent innorsionfoot-
dryyouf eet at evs~yo,>imrtunity, massage feet, applyfoot powder and put
on dr y socis. :ilvri-.jls carry aAra socks; if a t a l l possible do not sleep i n
wet boots,
.
(e) Ru~l,us:h~lmoni nfect i on whenopercdbgIn jungle terrain,
Trle cmlpits, groin, f eet and arms3.1% most susoeptible t o infection. Tlle
Lest prevention.fstoloeeg t he body dry andclean, Use of foot povder on
suscoptable at eas i a helpf'ul.
( f ) Hieat ~ a k l t i e s : Ths body becomes accl hat ed t o t he heat of
Vi c t n a ~after a pociod.of.2-3.~~%ek.s,However,d l 0 cnnteens of water nmy
be ~-eq~*J.l ani n d i v W while conducting ambat operntions during ed f or
periods of intome i * . Food,frmstbe eatenre@rly t o mintainstron&h
and salt intakce. :LdditionaUy, sn&t tabletsmust be takenwhen pol-.spiration
i sprofuse, never ti?l;e s a l t t abl et s vdthout drinldng water,
(2)Use of ,Me,~ m . t i a a :
Two of themostoomnon &uses of friendlg.
c ~s ua l t i e sw e .boobptjram;Lnd dpema.
'She useof two man tears can reduce
the r e c c u r r e ~ e of theole imicbW,
Onemn 8honld &h primarily f or
punj i al&es a, ruci. b&y4mt~a l e his bud& s e c r c h thearea( t oinclude
i t ~ c o s ) Zor anfpara.
AMY I?J~TIOFI !.ND P~INJJDIUO~ILfi ~TIQdS
a, r Ladder. Wirg o~mr at i omi n 1~envil.y wooded ancl :nountc5nous
lev- &F-pst- Wl er -iswcd. i noperation?, ranging fromfire team s i ze
t o e n b e companies.
Tlie ladder i s36n wide seriesof aluruinum rodsarranged
as a ladder and is100f eet long,
'i'ileladder hEs h e n successful~ly used
boylQt ;+J& dw.Sy:.thedl ~yt h ~ r
Units ehul dplan for the use of trooper
l a ddq; andakauld,,#hen practipble practice tl ti o me& of deployment on the
bat t l efi el d,
b.
PositionSnr.Tmops I.Joar the Onerational Area, Ifthe operational area
' i s IQ-, scaensSrlerablle dis6emce from ti.3 stagingarea, troops :3houldbe
reposit$& tea $olvmrd ht mmdi ab-saginr ai w, which t U al l evi at e lengthy
t u n a d timeand, thereby, acldevomaes.lRorequicl:lyi nthe objective area, ,
reduce dak, and decrease t i me t onccafilli"ri-tte airi.mvement.
If the i nt e r n-
di eto &,&g&+w s&$w:5g apapared-, tho repositioniryshould be
acmmpliahedby:$L:~@-B- qjrcl*& toconserve Mm 11hor.ec o s t b and cri ti ccl
helfcopter,
I
- 1- ... I
cI siloct&n i;oms. itisd a t o r y tliat tile airmission comxm&r
(or 1- rep;.osolltn,t5.~andthe1 r?.imobileforce comander j oi nt l y reconnoiter
t - &'c, mf ~ wa , * the. qarm hlicop*.
267
!
1
I
i
d, Il i at ri but i on of Ground . TacticalI'L?, Overlays of t he supported. .
uni t Is T!~oE, objectivoa, and dircctioil o f movement ]nustbe rovided t o avi at i on
uni t s i n tinte t o incorporate tho plan i n t ~ avi at i on ml i t br!efinga,
e. ~i el i copt er Troop Jtktraction, !bol.dination bet wen tho Uft comnder s
and t he pound eleulents must be accon~plisl~ed early, preferably prior t o be-
g i n n i n ~t he operat.i.on and must include preparatioh of a det ai l ed f i r e support
plan, The loading zone s ocwi t y forbcc must be positioned i n cloge proximity
t o tlie landing zone, but f or ei~ough out t o prevent snlall a ~msand di r ect
f i l e t,ealmns from f i r i ngon t he cl ment s involved i n t he lift,
Pathfinders
should be i n posi t i on a cllnin~umor oile hour prior t o ext ract i on tinlo, t o
accofilplish Recessary coordinationvrltll t he ,pound conn~andors,a s s i s t i n
poai t i mi ng troops, and a s s i s t i n prcp~.ringt he loadinp, zone,
f , LZ Proparation' Flres, Ifiien t he area i n and around anLZ i slikely t o
burn, reatl.ic'f the- t n e ordnance t o be used during pzaoparation t o t hat l eas t
likely t o cauee f i r s , i,e., fragmentation boruba, cannon, f i r e, HE wi t h fuze
VT, &d the l i ke,
g, I dent i f i cat i on of LZ. In a n l u l t i - l i f t operation iti soft en di f f i cul t
f o r silbsaouent r1emente, flights or companies t o locilte tha cxact position
of the LZ because of pre-strike smolce and dust, or bocauso of.excessive time
i nt er val betrveen a i r c r a f t %fi ght s. This pi-~blefilcon be el l mi mt ed i f t he lend
s hi p i n each element d r o p yellow srml:e 011 t he LZ, upon dclmrture.
h, I' rewiratoe and Su~mrt i n~ Combat asscul t s Fi res, !'~iimobileAssaults.
must be oreU planned and cooivlincted \ri ththo Ar t i l l er y IAO and t he Air Force
'WO toinaure t ha t suf f i ci ent f i r e support is available, For example, when
a landing eon8 i s t ob8 prepared l)y fire, t he air strike should be scheduled
from IS30 t o K.15; t he c z t i l l c ~* y pi-bpar~:tionshould be H-15 t o 11-5; and betzmcn
t1-5 and iLhour, t he armed hellcoptalv should recon t he 12, mLdc t he lailcting
point, end place pr-tiifindc;~on tilc LZpr i or t o clrrivc?lof t he f i r a t troopships.
l hen a conbat asscul t is schodulecl i nt o an unpre~ml.cdU,on-c:nll- f i r es by a r t i l l e r y
a d 8j.r r~dtbe preplanned, If r zmd helicopters Zind the LZ hot, t he t r o o p
-
- s hi ps Hill or bi t out of the aro:. ~ ; l ~ i l e ;trtillol-;r or zir sct ur at es t he LZ,
The optimum al t i t ude t o fly i n the opcl.ational t r ea i s2500 f cct .
Th i s places
t he ai r cr af t ah0r.e ef f ect i ve sria11an.13fii. e but aU.ovrs t he o:>servelq t o l~erfonii
ids r.lission,
. .
i.~ t i n n He l i c ~~t ar e 1ta4ci.au Troop ' 4 lipon edting
hellcopter, troops should take three or few*and h d i a t e l y hiL the
grouni unti l the heUcopter d a p r t s , This avoids the possi bt l i t y f or t h Cr
get t i ng h i t by t he rear rot or blades, gives the isader time f or ori ent at i on
before he moves off the E,p b d t s the helicopter $0 f h expressive firea,
and clears the heljcopter' g takeoff mut e,
loaded, Tr' 5 . He@- oom, loaded troops should load last,
This enables'ot br trbbpe' in the hrLioopter to help load their gem. It
al so posittone the heavier equiguaent near the door, facilitating rapid
debarkation a t t he LZ,
k, Security.Po-re. d.Aircraff,. X$ is desireable t o form a
small nrepe wit . t o p ~ p d z w r i t yfor dauned TNs phmnt u
tasking a uni t in the v i ~ ~ . ~ c h rrlwady has ti t act i cel plan and miarion
t o accomplish, A s dt abi e ~ o l u t i o nis t o keep a portion of t he base security
force on ground alert to provide securi t y f or downed ai r cr af t .
.' - ^ I . . . . .. .. - .
' ' ' bob; tlnu4. &,r*tisb ** tactical
. depniky pate,is'.mqdsb',to'dete
lldayei-suppl;r't f or anirmnith' and 'to ihitfate actLon
atooks 4re qv@%lable,, :Weapon..dsqaity~ ~ t i o n . s h o u l d be provLded by
t a c - k i r ; g S ' o ~ e ~ ~ ~ . . .
at:W.-t8;* . .. p&r. I . _ . . _
.tp.wt& . . ,-e ~~Bagt f i ms .:
00 p-kterials should be
'a, uni t , as cont ai ne~sa d
Ipai~$dnance .. . . operatiom by
. . . I : ,
" ' S-' ?'
+--
: . . ww dtqxtbga w%h o i l based.preoervative
are p - - %&i @ ' *8 6 - improparl~. S t o n sandbags
dtb,. , a @sqw+ ventilation add .lDrac&pil propsi. tire protection.
. .
dz' 0o&hction - . Prior t o 'depar&ura.from COITUS, units ehould
d o plane for s d=t locations upon arrival in-country. They
abould alclo augment thir TAT RED e qdpmnt with b & a h hard t o gek i t e m
iuoh as light fixtures, oht r l c . outlate, and p k mb i ng fixtures as well ae
' other % h m which they can iirlprodse and improve t h e i r living conditions.
e .dive S W ~ ~ of . c t i v e&s&d be kept i n waterproof begs
until &%knoodd. If thex are removed!nDP these bags pri or t o an
&tack u U h g TrCA, *y Illrut be kept out of the water t o be of any value,
f -tie and Trpfirinq. Drihk t rai ni ng and proper .lubrication
of the clutch assembly (3/4 ton prbdrUy) must be einphesised,
\hen travsllng
ha soft send, .drivere all we l o w gear.
\hen descahding st eep hills, they
dl1 use ths ran nurge gem.
8. and coznpoliente
ar e aubj ion8 t hat b e m i l
i n Vietnam, Sealing these componente in plastic bags, which are rekdily
a va l a bl e through re-we or on the comr ci al mar ket , w i l l provide protection
acai nst the dust and moisture which are so commonr
he S c h e d u l b ~of Or~ani zat i onal1,Iahtenance. Due t o the intensive dai l y
requirement for vehicles, it m y prove uns at i s f ~ot or yt o ~. dequat8lyperfolm
scheduled maintenance of vehicles when due, It mag be necessary t o pel-form
schedulecl maintenance a t dg ht when maximum nunbnr of vehicles and drivers
ar e available with only emergency or mJ or repai rs on deadllned vehicles i n
the daytime,
i Univemal JoUtd and t heel Dew-, . Current l ubri cat i on orders (LOs)
c a l l f qr l ubri cat i on every 3000 miles or once every six rnonthe, Thdb i nt er val
i a inadequate due t o road conditions .and rein. Vehicles should be 1ubrice.ted
asoutlined in the ~pproprinteLO each 1000 miles or every two months, which-
ever comes f i r s t , ' '
Jr Gensl?tof F o i l we Continuous operations, extr'eme c h t i c conditions,
-andduet contribute to a high 6~ner et ordeadline rate. Generators should be
converted t o 3-phaee otrtput whenever possible. Thia redul t s i n smoother operation,
lower i nt er nal heating, and a si gni fi cant reduction i n generator fai l ure.
k~ Vehicle .Ov.erW. The sllr6wab;te 10% overload f or combat vehicles
e h d &pp& only when *hey a m drivel1 dn Htrtd, smooth-surfaced made, \hen
o p e m t h ~on secondary roadti, , car go' t r ucb, , loaded above rat ed capacity, kill
swtsfn dapege t o the fraam, springs, and steering linkagcb Vehicles wed t o
-port. mth~am of specifla ~ i , W r t I r IImt tms Of muni t i on will
;tmorlea# s vehicle before the volumetdc capacity ia mached.
i n prmmnei without bomfi.de -6s often
. M00ret Ioh~mwtbe used in issuing free I4EDCAP
8opgW to hal t & who request treabmt' and tlmmby delay treatanent
of $he bonafide s i &r
br r ~ &a bfor... MEDCAP ' The necerssity for adequate i nt er pr et er
remdm
lap pr og~m.i EEe nt i a l . The best of b r i c a n aid is nbar
worthhs without the preesnce of ski l l ed Int erpret ers,
Valuable.medical tims
w i l l be l oat because of foi l urn to'have qualified I . i nt erpret er pe ~onne aprssexit,
0. ~b come~t ia eesemtia~,t o establFdh Refugee control points
near t f i , scal owmtionl areaasand t o evacuate nf egees t o theee collection
point8 80 peon uation releases
the atxmumder o
ana in the operat-
ida ~ a ,and
dr ih. liE*CV W I N 3 Rule*
-7
(1)
Ihmbar w me guest8 hem: W. ladie r k .demands nnd seek no
rpeo;isl trratcPsnt.
- ..-
(2) !.trdfd #+rat- -39 frbsg W'paow*kdtap3ryr.d -:;
wealth or privilagb;
5 . a -
'-.
( 9 ) iihve@Ue~ art, membem of th. ~ d .
1
a dif ftcult ntiasim, responsfLla fop W' p ~ a d f f i s $ ! ! - a c W
1:etlact honor u@fi youmall and %b, at ' . . Wt d ~ S t a t a
13. EJSONI~~L
. - .. . ' * :.,,.
b . D;;;LOS IIun~s The input of nmerolw units in 6 e h o ~ tperiod of tlm.
i i u ' cauoed unfavohbB pea%: Zn Db(h; l'bbl-lpdc ab ) : @ g ~ ~ - = t o - kamfer
::.nd receive.3@&35$ of 'thit. dQq- etwn6.thh..-. $t%& .. ?bag .in-
country. TfJ.s pficedurs causes -Imr~sat opera- ,bapsbltl;ity
of old .arid nau uni t s and asei st s in r o d u c b ~ ~ leak&' tl-s
. . . .
I ; ,.;I
EXHIBIT M-74 .a a,
HEAljQUAIcTDS, 6'1'11 B~LTT~GIOH, 11% IJ~TITJLEFE'
$PO San Francisco 96557
"8 =AT-2
SUWZT: Combat SOP
TO: See Distribution
'1, Tho 6td Battslion, I l t h ~rti XL& Combat Standing Opehting Procedure
i s 2ublished for the guidance of a l l concerned,
?
2. ilecomilcndations f or changes, ad..'itions or deletions should -be made to
t hi s Beadquarters, hTTN: S3.
A l l chenzes r d l l be posted and recorded on recoad
of chanf,es shcet, attached t o Combat SOP.
l a i ~ ~01a.r,?~rn:
' . .-
1I nc l
, 6/11 Arty coizbat SOP
DIS~IBUTIOl1: . . .
Seo Annex P
SO? f o r Combat
t-.- ,.
Paragraph
-4,. ..:3 I. c e n e r a
kefcre1. c~and Rescission
m s ' =
11. Personnel
Ccneral 1
. 3nt enance of Unit St rengt h 2
r ' ~ r ~ o x l e l 3 ianagement
Avclo?megt 2nd i ~ai nt enance o r l.iarale
Ir
izintinance of ai sci yl i ne, Law andOrder 5
:. iscellaneous
6
1 . I nt el l i ger ce
.!screllces 7
.YQO se 8'
i . i ssi on 9
. . .
LeJL c i z l Inst ruct i ons 10
JLzssifi cd Iidornlation Il
So:.lnter Int el l i gcnco 17 ..
C:,turcd Jocunents 23.
Int el l i gence
:!:xZLin~ of Cl assi f i edi i a t e r i d 12
;r:.ccipt o i Cl assi fi edi i aj ~er i al - 13
i c?or t i ne Coinproinisc o r PossiSle Cocqromise lb
..dillcryObsel-vation i'ost 15
:.:Caps 16.
i iiscellaneous 18
ti a i s on O f f i cer t sBes?onsi bi l i t y 19
2or:arJ Obscrvcr Proceciures . - 20
:.ir Chsenration 21
Ji t ai nces 22
:;<ather 25
Yo:-~xuiicationsandEl ect roni c 26
Tact i cal :<issions . 27 .
:'in Support 28
..
. ' i ~.' lxlning
29
:.arrass:ncnt an2 I nt er di ct i on Fi r e s 30
L2fcnsive C~ncent ~r at i ons 31
.TargetDesignations
FireRequests
#I r e Direction .
Registration
Survey
Gunnery Procedures
Fire SupportCoordination
l h h e s
BSOP
Security
Aviation
Howitzer ACcuracy,'Conditiona&.
Haintenance Checb
Prevention of Errors Due t oBatique
Safety
Action After Firing rncident
C i v i l Affairs
00 Logistics
bneral
Duties of BattallonSIJ
Duties of PBO
Class I NormalOperaf$ona '
FieldQ~aratiens
. b n g %ation d)p.g%%%ctn
~i O3. dHie*P.P$v
classIT& nr
Un i t DistriWion
. . Long-ti- Opexoi a
class111
RosuPplY
Claas V .
Water - Special Instructions
Short Duraf,icmOperattans
AerialRegupplg*
Bequest ~ri oyi t i ca
Services
Graves RegSstrattan
Salvage
Evaluation and Hospitalieatkon
FieldSanitation
Latrines
Ydntenance Setvi ces
Reports
Paragraph
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
11
L2
43
4 i*.
VI.
Commznd and Co!Ix~..J:~c&.o~s
. .
Comwnd Post , .. . 72 39 "
Wire bi ~- - -
73 39
Radio Conixunic&tions
74 39
Lessage Center
75 h0
Com~1~i cat i ons
76 L1
-
Security
~ f i s c c l ~ a n e o ~ s 77 , 4.l
f i W ! A Personnel Actions
APImlDIX I Recurringireports
I1 Personnel DailySummarg
111Periodic Personnelheport
N casual*^Feeder Report
V Sympat'ny Let t er
ANFEE B Tact i cal tiissions
ANKXC Target Murtlbering Summary
u cm
&KKX E SurveyOperations
AiUK F Radar Operation
' APPBT3IX f ~a *i hl Consideration .
I1 s i t e Evaluation
N!EXG EmergencyDestruction of ~e e hi ve Amni t i on
m?EXH GunneryProcedures
fi?iJEX I Support Coordimtion
ANITEX J AirnobUe Operation
PSPhTDIX I
ANIm K Hire Systsms (Headquarters)
~~~~ L I3!ire Systems (105hm~ a t t e r y )
&YMM Radio B&s (Battalion)
ANNEXN - Reports
APPmTDIX I Period OperztionReport
I1 Hourly OralSutiimary
. 111 Exec~t i veReport
IV spot Eieport
V Intelligence Surmary(ISUII)
V I Ar t i l l er yCounterfire I n f o mt i o n Form
V I I Prisoner of liar
VIII Document Fag
M. Record of Nissions
X DailySi t uat i onfie?ox-t
X I Shel l beport
. XI 1 . Unit Locations
XI 1 1 Da-ily LogisticsReport
. XIV Aerial YuppLy Reguest
hKpIEK P ~ i s t r i b u t i o n '
iii .
SSCTION I
a. References:
,1) 11th 1nfdx-yBrigade Tactical SOP f or Counterinsurgency Ope-
a t l x - .:,raft).
b. ' Becission.
Toctical Stacding Operating Procedures, 6t h Battalion,
lithArtillery, 6td31 August 1967, i s rescinded.
2. Pii:.?ll,'Z: This SOP standudizes routine cpersticnal 2nd x?ministrative .,
p?occ~ur cswithin t!;i.s battzlion. It 2pplies t o or ga i c and attzched units'
urlcss ottervise steted.
1. G : Thj-s chepter prescri'oes the :3olicfes md procedures r el at i hg
t o p r : r s c ~ ~ c l ~dr,;cn5st,rstion. (US~;;V Eegulaiion references i n hi s SOP =cl
r.ii1.l bedissc.~ir.aledas received)
a. Strength:
(1). Cwient policy is t o maintsin mcneuver bat t er i es a t 1005strength.
(2) U n i t s areresponsible f or lersonnel accountcbility. This is'
cont;i?.uous snd 5iuicdia-Le.
b. Eeports:
5
(1)Pzrsoni~el dai l y s w- ~i qy (EBFLA) See Ajjgendix I&'I1t o Amex A* '
(a) Ke:,orts w i l l be i s of 1260hows f or previous 24hour period
t o be subnittec! bybati;cries t o ar r i ve' at Battalion S-1a s soon a s 20ssj-ble
but cot Interthan l.400 hours .daily.
.
(b)
Ecjorts may be subrAtted by message or wirei , In my case,
sfo1la.r up co2y. of i37 44 must be submitted.
(2) Casualty Kegorts t
( a) Hcjorting of casual t i es within the Brigade i s &overned by
AX 600-10 2ndUZGY I:sc,uJ.a%ion 600-1.
. I +
90G
. .
. .
f' '.in-persons capturld byUS For c ~sos enemy or suspcctsd enemy s ha l l be
ref.
. ri t o 2sa "detainee" unt i l hi s st at usi s determined by a brigade
i nt p- . -3ator. 8s one of the categories described below:,
(2;risoner of War:(RJ)
(a) h y captive of t he North Vietnamese Armed' Forsce (WA)o r
.
Viet Gong Main Force.(vCMF) whether captured incombat o r not.
(b)An y porson captured while actually engzged in combat o r ina
belligerent a c t (otherthan.espionage, sabotage, or terrorism) against
the Governernet of Vietnan(~VI$), US Forces, or bther Freekorld Military.
dmed Forbs -fFkVUJ?) .
(3') ci vi l Defendants.) Those persons having committed or suspected of
having cormnitted act s of espikonage, szbotage, terrorism, c r even criminal
act s. Pcrsons of thks catogory ar ecot ent i t l ed t o Prisonsr of kar st at us
provided by the Ganevz Convention r el at i vs t o Tc$atment of Zrironers of War.
. '
(43 Returnees. 3. person voluntarily returning t o t he control of GVN
af t er having act i vebj supported the Viet Cong inp%l i t i cal or military
act i vi t i es. NVA personnel ar eaccepted a s returnees.
( 5. ) Daubtful Cases. Persons suspected of or known t o have committed a
belligerent act (other thzn espionage, sabotage, t errori sn, or c r h h a l )
and whose entitlemsnt t o Pds t ~ t u si si nquestion. uoubtful casesm t s t be-
rnsolved by a t ri ~bunzli n accordance with a r t i c l e 5 of t he Geneva Convention
(GW) a s ir,lplementedby WLCVDirective 20-5.
(6)Other Categories.
6,)A person knom t o be an innocent ci vi l i ana t t he time of capture
does not' f al l within the "detainee' category above and does not require
handling as such, ,(g-cr&c, below).
- \-
(L)irefuge6 i s person other then that described in pa n 2a, 'above
who has fled, or has beenforeed from hi s abode t o esciape mi l i t ar y or
po@.&&;il tpeysecut ion.
(3)FFrOC3DUTES FCR IIANDLING ANDBROCESSING ET~NEES:
(r )capturingunit.
(11, Must'sear. ~h, segrezte, silence, safeguzrd, and speedily evacuate-
detainees t otho Bde cbl l cct i onpoint. .
(2j,Tag dctainee-withMACVFow 34.0 or USAVForn 3 4
Captive C$dW;
Iti s ~ ~ n d n t o r y t hat t he foU~win, o
minir~umi nf o mt i o n be entered: date,
w
timo, place, circumstances of oapiure and capturing unit.
(3.). Interrogate f or immsdiate t act i cal ,value.
(&).
documents, monies, weapons, and otnerimpediments must be
tagged with description .and rolatcd t o t he aetainse. Items must be forwarded
wit'. debinee. Those items desired and authorized as war souvenirs should be
marl-
:or return with i dent i t y of requestor... ' Souvenifs arc not atuhorized
t o kc xtained pr i or t o processing by brigade interrogators.
(53. Evacmte detainees inaccerdance with M@V di rect i ves 20-5
and 190-3.
. ..
. .
( 6) . Seriously wounded detainees a r e t o be evacuated through nedical
channels t o Bde Clearing. Expeditiously inforin Bde S-2 of ETA t o i3de Caaaring.
BDE Clearing w i l l complete a duplicate Captive Tag ifdetainee must, be. . .
evaquated out of Bde concYrol.
(1)
=,&on offi cers w i l l submit artill::ry Ex's t o B~t t a l i o n
FDC MLT 1200hours dai_ly.
(2)
Ezt t al i on D C w i l l consolid+teid.requests adding t ar 6et s'
received from S-2:,nd t he Zrigade l i zi s onoi' ficcr 2nd subni t t o FSCENEI
l b OO hours.
(3)
H u g s w i l l be distributed t o tile firingbat t erys rtt he dis-
cre4'on of t he S-3.
(4)
B a ' s r i - i l l be f i r e don a r.-r,dom s c he dd.
( 5) H;:IIs K=1Unot be f i r ed cl oser th 1000meters t o friendly
tr ISor t o h o ~ m fri endl y pr sonnel ,
(6) Dzylic.htH a t s may be requested a t 'anytime.
GEl,!'EN~rn CoYCrnMTI ONS:
a.
Defensive concentrations plemed kyerch.forwz.rdobsei-vet in
coordir,ztion vi t h S L ~ ~ O ~ ~ C G c on;xnjr corrnanders.
b. Whenever possible, t h h e f i r e s w i l l be sCjustc-2during daylight
hours.
32. Tk2G5.T C!?C.IG?TATIOIT SYSTD4: (sac Annex C) '
I (1)
Sent t o 6i r ect Supi30rt Bnttery f or Processing Upon recei pt of E f i r e
missian by 2 br??r;t,?ry,the mission w i l l be computed a d t he azimuth, range,de-
f l ect i on 2nd quadrznt v i l l be scnt' t.o the Bzt t r l i oa AXIC. The mission w i l l not
be f i r e dunt51 t he Eat kl i on give t he br t t er y 2- gosi t i vecl esr mce t o firs.
(2) Shec c: Ti y e nlission received by E bsltt3l-r~isi n su?:)ort of contcct,
t he ' o ~? @t ~~? r c o~~mnc e t ri l l .c c ~ n l y f i r i ng and,son6 thobat t r l i on
f i r e di r e c t i on centr? the dct s required by r . a ( 1
Above,
(3)' Monitored ;11d fri enCl y ground cl ecrmce c.3tzined byBattalion. .
. .
FDSa
(4) Bzt t cl i onFEC not i f i es Brigade UTO who obteins RVII cnd
z. irclizrc.nce.
(1)Sent t o SattclTon l i ei s on officer;
(2) Pon~c"i-ded t o Bettclion FIX.
(3) Cle2zed ~n&cssigned t o c-jpropriete f i r i ~ g bnt t ery by S-3.
3b. FILE DI,,ECTLGi'l :
a. Generd: Technicrjl f i r e dii-ection i s decentr2lized t o bt t t e r y
level. Fi re cont rol cnd t r c t i c z l f i r e directior! i s 2erformed by i3c.tt:lion
FDC.
Li ni t ed t echni ct l checks w i l l be perform26 r.;loc ~r oxi mi t yof locc-
t i o n per f i t s.
7 ons :
b,' Definit:.
(1) T e c h ~ i c dPire Direction: 'Conyersions of f i r e missions t o
, p r i ~ t cfiriii~det c 2nd f i r e coinm:nds.
(2) Tect i ccl Fi r e Girection: Exercise of t:.ctical c o mn d of - '
- -
c: . or more uni t s in t he .-electior. of t arget s, CecXgnc t i on of units t o
f i r e, 2nd t he el l oczt i on of ;.munition f or crch nussion.
(3) Prim.ru check: An independent check of <zt c rnd coilntnds
produced wi t i d zn FDC.
(4) Secordtzy check: An inSe2endent chcc's, clwzys i n e2di t i on '
t o primc?~'t;chkck, c.:nducted by bzt t zl i on FCCo
c. iring Chat s :
(1) Two (2) f i r i ng chsr t s (1:25,000) ill be mcintained et eech -
m. Chzrts will 'oo cons t ~uct edt o permit 6b00 mil, coverage,
(2) P,nobserved f i r i ng chr r t w i l l be coils<ructed i n t he zbsence
of survey or sui t cbl e meps. When s mp i s zvzilzble, .zn obscmcd bct t l e
I I E ~ rdll be used.
.
(3)
Bat t al i on acd Battery FIX'S will excheixe i nf or i at i on - . . nece-
82ry t o keep f b i n g c h a t s current 2nd conplcte.
(1) FM= bz t t l e mrps w i l l show t he follor.rin; mi ni mum information:
no f i r e zone, frec f i r e zona, nofi re l i nc, accurztc fri endl y uni t lo-
cat i ons znd mneuvcr uni t opcrstionel zrcas. . .
(2)
.3-3 &ll' mintrin En operetional x~s;?which w i l l r e f l e c t f r e e
fire zoned, no f22 e zon~s , 11th 3rizada TXCB, Pro~5ncobounddos ?&th antin . .
. ,
lery rcngo, AXVN zncl paci fi ed villages.
% REGISTRATION:
a. ~ o ~ i s ~ r a t l o n s w i l l be conductcd immediately qlon occuptling h ney
posi t i on end z t su>,:crqucnt times as deemed . ne c e s s q- 'qt ho .Fj.Ce. . .
1. ~ c t t e ~ y ( s ) f irix f or XI ?is 3bsmrc.r :.illf i r e z t the ai r
--observers czn8i:nd. unlcss the LO requests "tficn i szd?).
m,
Apprsp~i zt echecl;rs ?rillbe :zdc-. :t e ~c l i b ~ t t e i yt c insuze
tht t he dzta ccqutcd. cnG f h e d i s ccz~ect .
.
a,
mots must :.skcbservc:rs if "lidjust Firs' nisslons zr e clclse
to friendly trocps.
If ltClc.selt, t l ~ e ~ &l ust rsk :Wcw Closett? twc r.zy
/
ch- .a1exi st s cvc; the rzrlic t o cdvisc ' the cbeervcr =c! the FDC .of unusud
sit:;-~ihns 2nd h b fi cul t i es which ~?i&ht,rcc'.ucc s d c t y hczzrcs, i,e., fric-nd-
ly
: .iops fonisrC ~f the FO, on his fItnLs, jmslc ~~Iricf;. haper s ~bss~vetion,
-0tc.
. .
.o. kll socticn chiefs 151-1r n z i n k ~kr &-cct fire r2rGc cerd 2t
-. t hei rhcr.fitzers. Included cn this rar.ge c a d TZUbe the ixxhun s d e Cs
(foe, the 053 rthich, if exceeded, w i l l cause a round to cl ezr the msk vi si bl e
from t he hcrritzer i ~csi t i on).
p,
Elbor7 si eht s 1TiI.l be boresighted e?ch tiiie t'ne p a n c r d c
t el escol p' i s boresi;ht "6.
q.
151 hm6tzc.r s e c t i c ; : ~~ w t l l ccr~duct,(;TI 2 c~nt i nuzusbzsis,
i nst ruct i on ca clirect fb e pr ~cel ar es T3Ls i i i t r~!ct . i cns k c ~ l 2inclu6e
. practicr. l ucr'..: rrit:? si t uct i cns included the &illtkt vi l l require
-pa-t i cul ar rtt3ntis.n t o sdcty t cchi r. ues i n sct-tk; the luzc f o ~ the
beeb.70 rc;une- si t uzt i cns requiring the use cf the beehive r c u ~ ,Kill
d s o be given einphasis.
' 4 ACTIONS jJ"j'~:FmC.IG E:CII:E!nS.
a, ??:en check f i r e is i-eceived by 2 bct t cq, 3-offi cer >.ill
i nmei 5~t el yi-ispect e'cch hacitzcr f i r i i l g tc; vzr',Cy' ?.ad reccrcl the dct z - i ; ~
include a physiccl ccuilt zf the ~ ~ u s c d p ~ ~ d e i . clxnrges. I n zddition, t he
azh,uth cf f i r e TJ~Ube nezsured ad -recoreeC. Si ~ul t ai aousl y,the bz t t c q
FGC k . 1 check t ho &tz. ccqut ed '*tine. DC ax2 Geterahe the rezscn f o r
t he chec!c f i r e,
b.
M t ~ i n chcck f i r e i s recc-ived, it rry be c2nceUed by t he
st at i on (perscn) :111c in5ticotcd t he comnznd, I ~ c . ? E~ c ; : ,the bzt t ery %rill a o t
--resume f i r i ng trit'n:.-at zccc~pl i shi ngt he checks Ciscusscd in pcpzgraph
above unless it i s Cct emi cd t hzt the c>ec!c f i r e is ~ &5 , - 5 s t r ~ t i v e in
nature; i.e., Eed Bcze, terminction cf prep,-rzt;cil, &crest cn the GT
l i ne etc,
. , .bur-
c. IJhen I' rie~ully t r x p s cre injure2 zr&i:ileryormcrtzr f i r e,
.aspot reportr r i l l be t z a s i ~i t t e d t c t hz b.ttdiaq qe r a i ons by the k s t
.expeditiousncms. Fol~a~-u;, r e2d- t ~will'Dt: foIT~21dedos additimzlinior-
-tion beccnes avdzbl e-'
d. A t the BrigzCe Ccamnderts discretioc, zn ofPicer.wiUbe
.qpointeGt oinvestigcte indirect firing incieents. bF.?ileo she= report
-shoul6 be incluced PS p21Tt of the spct/follmr-up reL2crt,itisimperative
tha- ,he shellcrzter(s) 21.e nct tlisturbcd until ths investigzthg cfficcr
&;;-st c d c e a crzter andysis. then kn incident results fraila tree
carea u s t be tzken not t odisturbthe a e 2 inwhich the burst oc- .
bCW 3.
a. The S-2 i sassigned the a w t i ~ n dduties cf bcttalicn
civil&fairs ~f f i cor .
b. A l l ci vi l cffiirs act i vi t i esenc! projects w i l l be coordimted
=tdth the brigcde ci vi l cff&s cfficer- (s-5)
c i I n t e r p e t s s assigned tctSc bzttalicn w i l l be under the
cmt r ol of S-5.
a
p
w

t
o

&
m
t
r
.

(
R
e
o
u
r
r
i
n
g

~
e
p
o
r
t
a
)
t
o

T
a
c
t
i
c
r
l

S
O
P
,

6
t
h

B
n
,

U
t
h

&
t
g

S
E
C
T
I
O
N

S
1
R
E
P
O
R
T
S

T
D
E

H
O
W

R
E
P
O
R
T
S

S
U
B
M
I
T
T
I
N
G

U
N
I
T
- 1
.


P
e
r
s
o
n
n
e
l

D
a
i
l
y

A
n

b
a
t
t
e
r
i
e
s

B
a
t
t
e
r
i
e
s

S
e
o

L
i
p
p
e
n
d
i
x

1
1

S
\
Z
-

N
L
T

l
b
O
O

S
u
b
u
i
t

i
n

t
h
r
e
e

c
w
i
e
a
:

2
.


~
e
s
i
o
d
i
o
P
e
r
s
o
n
n
e
l

A
l
l
b
~
t
t
e
r
l
o
'
s

I
2
0
0
S
@

N
L
T

0
6
6
0

S
u
n

S
e
e

I
.
.
p
p
o
n
c
l
k
c

f
I
1

R
e
p
o
r
t

S
u
b
m
i
t

:
n

t
h
r
e
e

c
o
p
i
e
s

-
A

3
.


S
p
o
t

S
t
r
e
n
g
t
h

R
e
p
o
r
t

A
l
l
b
a
t
t
e
r
l
o
s

A
S
I
S
u
p
o
n

r
a
m

c
e
i
v
i
n
g

1
s
o
r

n
o
r
o

c
d
t
i
e
s

o
r

q
o
n

k
e
y

l
o
s
-
s
e
s

4
.


M
o
r
n
i
n
g

R
o
p
r
'
b

(
F
e
e
d
e
r
)

A
l
l
B
a
t
t
e
r
i
e
s
.

2
4
0
0

d
a
l
l
y

0
6
0
0

f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g

S
e
e

A
r

3
3
5
6
0

5
.


C
a
s
u
a
l
t
y

F
e
a
d
e
r

d
a
y

R
e
p
o
r
t

A
U
b
a
t
t
e
r
i
e
s

A
S
A
P

A
S
A
P

s
e
e

I
&

6
6
0
-
6
6

S
u
b
i
n
i
t

d
t
h

I
@

6
.


W
i
t
m
e
o
s

S
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t

G
-
.
'
.

'

A
U
b
a
t
t
e
r
i
e
s

A
S
A
P

A
S
A
P

S
o
o

1
i
R

6
6
0
-
6
6


S
u
b
m
i
t

x
i
t
h

7
.


S
t
r
a
g
g
l
e
r

a
T

h
r
s

a
f
t
e
r

R
Q
O
~
W

C
m
d
r

i
s

-
0

o
f

o
c
c
u
r
o
n
c
e

8
.


R
e
p
o
r
t
s

o
f

C
r
i
m

~
l
lb
a
t
t
e
r
l
e
a
,

&

S
e
z
4
.
9
1
~
I
n
o
i
d
e
n
t

- Ccnunander, I Corps Tact i cal Zone


- Coramander, II Corps Tact i cal Zone
- Commander, I11Corps Tact i ccl Zone
- Cocrmander, I V Corps Tact i cal Zone
SUBJECT: Act i vi t y Guidelines f or Corps Tact i cal Zonsr
1. In order t o quickly r es t or e t he norm81exl at enee of t he Amy and t he
people, i t i s r eqwr t ed that al l Corps Tact i cal Zqae Commanders urgent l y apply
t he following a c t i vi t y gui del i nrr.
a. I n al l ci t i em 8nd toma that have rrp.1l.d t he enemy, ent r us t
the secur i t y mi rri on t o i he Eolice, regi oaal f or t e8 and operation81 unf to
pulled back from deutroy opbt r t i oar .
Iiowevk, a11 c i t i r r - tbvns nr nt l acr ear e i nt el l i gence a c t i vi t i a r
t o t he maximum, refnforce defmnae ryrtems, prepara w. r pa ns , amnunition, food,
and take vi gi l ant p r e c a u t i w t o deal wfth t he VC second a t t mk wave.
b. Inall c i t i e r .od towns where t he e n a y huyet t o b t repel l ed,
endeavor. aurt be r d o t o rattle t he r i t uat i on quickly. I n t he meantima,
ha l t al l addf tion81 i n f l l mt i o n by t he enemy.
c. Regularly raviw t he r ecur i t y status of al l provinces. Depending
on t he qegional r i t u t i o n , pr er cr i be green and red a r w, di scoat i oue or
reduce t he curfew hourr, par t i cul ar l y i n t he province townr and c i t i e s , s o t hat
the people my r et ur n t o t he i r normal l evel of exiot*nce,
d. Let all t i r ed oparat i onal uni t s be a1t.hS.t.d t o obt ai n re8 t and
recuperation, repl rcmmnt r and equipment.
e. Xafntain cont rol of vi l l ages and hml e t r , u p e c i a l l y hamlets
which have j us t caapl et ed t . conrt ruct i on. l bve regul ar forces h i c h have
been supporting thm RDpr ogr h out of al l townr at t he e a r l i e a t 80 t hat they
maycontinue t he i r mi rri on of RDsupport.
f. I n regard t o are- which have received di r ect i ves from Cent ral
l evel i n t he matte- of 8 d a g c i vi l i a n groups,am well uareas where the
people have 8 r t r o y l anti-Caanunist r p i r i t , dct i vel y a r a i e t i n the task of
equipping than and bui l di ng t he i r morale.
; EHI BI T D-54
Regraded b y -
$'!.if;
authoritymessageDAin
.358111DTD
1611212
,/.-
-. .
h. In a b r t , activ81y maintain t he I n f t i r t i n on all fronts; upa c i 8l l y
aince the r j o t part of t he u i n e n a y forcer luva boon put out of rction:
hat i ng tho pod& f r a 300600/1/68 t o 111600/02/68, tho lC r uf f a od the lor8 of
32,109 i n Mttl., i n daitiaa t o l ar ge number, ki l l ed bly rtr and a r t i l l e r y
~ t r i k c r ,which caaoot be counted; 6;386 have been a p t - a d 8,617 uraponr
of v8r%oru have k e n rei t ed. The ensay '8 a bi l i t y to oppore ur i r gone,
and t hi r i r an ar cel l ent opporturrity f or t he R W 8 4 A l l i d Torcer t o f ul l y
take t he idciatin, rt rangt han t he RD rupport ulk, .ad ruriaise dmt r oy
operatioar W m t t he r d n i e g eneay w i n force orrim.
2. Aloe at thir opportuoity, Corpa Tact i cal Zone Qorwod*re are raquaated
t o di r t r i but e to all territwkl l evel caaa8ndon and op+t.tioaal urdu concerned
the fol l 4vi ag df r wt l voo 'and rrp.timeu Wch hwr b..n -lid i n the Ttra
Hung baa ' %a i n 8aim ud Cia Pldr:
B. of tha uq.mut probl- to.*& al l lawela of ~ o v n d
mu,t pay regular attatti- lbm operatiq i n citlw .ad tomr i r the matter
of l ourri ng tho lwr of, lif. rory civili.ar to tbo 1-t 1 ~ 1 .
- Amid tho two of .nror rupport f i n i f it . i oo' t nacerrary.
- broad -tic fi t . ; uhmn t i r i ng' them rort be c1.u t8rg.t.
..
- rw n t u ~ ~ i w upo m i n houi.l./- i n o* to
W d ti-.
- k court.ou, ad pol i t e wfth tbe people rind b&&vo preperl y
tmmrd upwrr.
- Po not -taka the property of tb.pooplo, aa wtter how ul l .
I n rbort , h c l lwel t o . b imdivfdull rof'dier, every
.pmrrocr awt b.dat ezdnd to lovrt ci vi l i an c u v r l t i u by . ney mua.
If not,
t hm an a d d i t i d burdon d l 1 bo creat ed f or the g o wt n r n t I n the p t ~ b l mof
giving arrirt.oco. A d lo tho meantime tho people w i l l be di aaat i r f i ed ud
wi l l have no furthar.oonf&b.W. i n t he Goverment mad the Amy,
' (2)
thr r ol di er r -dirpulre tbeeuolvm, i nf i l W&t r i n r d l
group., and poritioa thauelM) at high poi nt s (moftopr, #tori* of buildiage. . ,)
for ambushes at al l cont act pot nt r of a l l i a , The mimaion of t her e di rgui red
i nf i l t r a t e d gtoupe f a t
- Destroy l one Viet Cong.
- Uncover placer of deployment and every movement of the enemy
and inform t he uni t .
- Support t he forces out ei de t he area when t hey advance i nt o
i t f or a search.
The most emportant point of t hi s technique is l i aison and signals
between the di sgui sed group and t he cl ear i ng uni t . I f possi bl e, then t he
di sgui sed group vlll be developed i nt o a uni t wi t hi n a uni t w i t h t he cl ear i ng
uni t s o t hat t he r ecei pt of murages may be eaai er.
( 3) Af t e r t he di rgui red group hm campletad i t 8 i n f i l t r a t i o n and
deploylllent use Pot- Croup t o c a l l t he VC t o rurrender. I f the,VC ore rtub-
born, then c a l l the people t o t anporari l y leave t ha ar ea (give a deadl i ne f or
t he cmpl et i oa of the evacuation). Aft arurrdr, the c l u r i r q f or ce advances
i nt o t he area; d i v i d u i nt o poupr of t hree; advances f r an por i t i on t o poei-
t i on, one group gi vi ng support t o another and caapl et ol 7 avoiding t he middle
of t he s t r eet . A11 gnnrpr of t hree vill be equipped u f o l l o n : 1 U79 grenade
l wacher , .ad 2 Ml6 r i f l e, ot 1 IAU rocket urd 2 Ml6 r i f l e r .
(4) At ni gbt , d t s E U S ~ organize I U~ O~ OUI 10.11 &h groupa i n
t he ar ea of r upol r r i bi l i t y. Apply area -bush techniques, meaniry mb u r h u a t
al l highway8 trhete tha enmy might be abl e t o e r a p a o r i n f i l t r a t e i nt o t he
area.
(5) Ia mgbt d t o tba problan of rupport , avoid the we of
u t i l l e r y i n bewily populated u m a be c a ue i t i r mot effective i n dest royi ng
t he 8 a q .nd only eurier ca#urltiu t o t ha ci 9i l i . a pop;ulation. Avoid tha
ure of It113 &amrod htronarl Clrrierr t o rupport i n f a t r y i n towns. Thir
type of NC cra bo m i l y dut r oyed by ensny B4O a d b b l rocket f i r e . The
mo ~ t ef f ect i ve t o dr r t r oy t he mrPy a l e f t ~ h t i n g i n towns i s t he
bl79 ere&* lwaclwr, rocket, 57- r e c o i l l u r r i f l e aad i ndi vi dual veapona.
In addi t i on, rei nforcad by amr, t he M1 La& only my ba wed. But t a d
murt be defaadod by i af ant r y .
t pe c i a l l y u reg8rds support by amed hel i copt et r , do not
ure t hen i n heavi l y populated bream. h e Corpr Ta c t i c a ~ Zone bQ.radsr 18
the r ol e perron who h u t ho aut hor i t y t o determine the use of armed hcl fcopt ero
i n t he above c i r c u a t u r c e r .ad spaci al rurroundingc. The Corpa Tact i cal Zone
zorrmander may dal egat e t hi r aut hor i t y onl y t o M A Comander.
(6) Therefore, 8. careful when usi ag firepower i n hut areas i n
~ r d e r t o avoid fir-. Hnr t here is a f i r e r t a r t e d by t he YC i n t he ar ea of
Jur search, cl or e o f f the arr., rcreen t he c i vi l i a nr l a v i n g t he ar ea, defend
:
the f i ght i ng perronmol and continue t he search and doat ruct i on of the enemy.
t8> h$part'iortr .-ention to nf@i &d*ittln)*&k wrzolr
and uaktr- mmy fra tho r t at i aai ng area and at- tk llor,
u p e c h l l y i n bordering an the uu of r t r poa r l bi l ~t p, to Wt t he
.nrrjr, ud d a r t m rcat t ered tlC element8 i a f i l t r a t i s g into c f t i w a d tonu.
L
c. DefePd Valuable tktehouser and Other Important Agenciaa.
~ . f e mi at a11 cant. e- &apon, i.nitioai food, .ad I O ~
itor-. aru, t d l a ot at i oar , port offi ces, clrrprrrrcatiosr canterr, telephone
ruitchboudo rad pouar and wrrter r a t i o o r which are moat r r ent i . 1 .tot he
.vcryday l i f e of the popul.ca,
-
, .
- Et a b l i r h f1te.-.upport plam, rucrw pl& i a c u e of attack.
- ' 8at al i . I; ~a~nt8rattaclc plam t o k out by 80ldiem of
. .
thb ual L"coscM. . Wr &a to be W Qncua the fll: at t ack
a8f-0 SP~U.
- lf t he l- nrpcv aqut pnot a t my . -, t hme!
i t mt k dm8emy.d i medt at el y r o that they -11 not f a l l
t nt d the h d of fbr'arwap (requeacar and metho& of dertruc-
t l on h8vo b..a @+.aprevlowly).
a* m1ittca -fare. !
I
&rt- rod eokUluto the forcam of all d l l t a r y and govern-
I
'mental 4mel.r m-.d f68 m,Civil Affair8 rad civi1i.o iadoctrtru-
'
t i on Irirrioar, hub of a c t f wt t y f a protecting thm peace of the people,
CMru liot ampalmfor IE odre, l r i l i t ar y -gar and .srimuuce for
refuge88 .
(1) rrrwtu Activle a j e c t i v e r t Dut t nr r t he eonfid.nce of the
r l l i t r r y - cadre -
!am1 - and the people. Create r er mt aent a8ainrt
t he rct i oar ef t he VC. Demtray the fi*ting r p i r i t of tho .nay.
(2) Cfvil' AffaStr Activity Objectiveat h r a e n the rufferings of
t he refugoeo and sol di err' dopendento; maintain recuri t y, order and public
health.
(3) Ml i Ur y CI.p.ign Activity ~ j e c t i v o r
Puure t hat rol di ers
correct l y exacutr tholr mlaatonr. Avoid sing the property of the people.
Eagerly fi ght t,d ~ t r o ytha lX. Actively p. rt i ci p. t a I n the t u k of main-
tainiag public order.
1
3
a t gi idhted (hit c&p8 Tactic* Zt~na m#, dm&ng a the
regional situation, quactrly prcspde~appw#~a"te-*"'f;'r wecute the g\ti&-
Lines brought out in paragraph 1 of thi s directive. I n the muntlme, wld.ly
di s t r i but e all di racti ver and operational experiancer brought out to
'paragraph 2.
GBNeRAt W UAN VXEN
Chief of XS/ R=?
/SLgned and Sealed/
. .
W O l R 1Sr P-ry
SUBJWT: Act i vi t y ~ u i d e l i n e s f or coipe Tactical Zones (U)
1 (u) ~ t t a e h dt r a ns l a t i on of irpor~at'jOl/~vm~
I-.
Dlrectlve I)SOS/TIII/?~/KH i r of i nt e r e s t t o US Ocmmnders
and Advisors. ~ C des i r es Y t hat al l tacti-1 wit
. i-
camanderr. bsMtb' k t k a l i o n l evel and seni or d v i o o r r t o
RVMP uni t s and CVN province and d i r t r i c t chief; be fmilfar
wi t h i t s contentr. 71
crrB a
2. (U) Division and Province Seni orA4+i wra will check
t o d e t e mi y i f caunt rrpart o have received the di r ect i ve.
If they have not , rdvinorr wi l l r epor t f act t o b r p r Sent or
Advisor who w i l l urge hi b count erpart t o ravke vLde dl s t r i bu-
tion.
rnnnam#&m:
(JJ 0( t gr r I aA: - - : .
WALmT. ICRVI#, 'a.
Major General, I SA
-
*#Y$
ED when goparated
. itoar cl aas i f l ed i ncl orure