G.R. No.

L-28841 June 24, 1983RAFAEL YAPDIANGCO,

petitioner-appellant,vs.
THE HON. CONCEPCION B. BUENCAMINO and HON. JUSTINIANO CORTEZ,
respondents-appellees.
FACTS:
On February 1, 1965, the City Fiscal of Quezon City filed before the City Court an information for
slight physical injuries allegedly committed by the petitioner-appellant on December 2, 1964 against Mr.
Ang Cho Ching. The petitioner-appellant moved to quash the criminal prosecution on the ground that the
information having been filed on the 61st day following the commission of the offense, the sixty days
prescriptive period had lapsed. The City Court of Quezon City denied the motion to quash stating that the
60th day fell on a Sunday and considering the rule that when the last day for the filing of a pleading falls on
a Sunday, the same may be file don the next succeeding business day, the action had not prescribed. After a
motion for reconsideration was denied by the City Court, the petitioner-appellant filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction before the CFI of Rizal. CFI of Rizal dismissed the
petition. A motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied. Hence, this appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a Sunday or a legal holiday is a legal efficient cause which interrupts the
prescription of an offense.
HELD:
The rules contained in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 1, Rule 28 of the
Old Rules of Court deal with the computation of time allowed to do a particular act, such as, the filing of tax
returns on or before a definite date, filing an answer to a complaint, taking an appeal, etc. They do not
apply to lengthen the period fixed by the State for it to prosecute those who committed a crime against it.
The waiver or loss of the right to prosecute such offenders is automatic and by operation of law. Where the
sixtieth and last day to file an information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the sixty-day period cannot be
extended up to the next working day. Prescription has automatically set in. The remedy is for the fiscal or
prosecution to file the information on the last working day before the criminal offense prescribes.
Footnote:
Section 1 of the Revised Administrative Code provides: Pretermission of holiday- where the day, or the last day, for doing
any act required or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may be done on the next succeeding business day.

Section 1, Rule 28 of the former Rules of Court provided:
How to compute time-In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by order of court, or by any
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be
included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the time
shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Sunday nor a holiday.


Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services vs. NLRC
125 SCRA 577 (1983)
Facts:
Certain seamen entered into a contract of employment for a 12-month period. Some three months
after the commencement of their employment, the seamen demanded a 50% increase of their salaries and
benefits. The seamen demanded this increase while their vessel was on route to a port in Australia
controlled by the International Transport Federation (ITP) where the ITF could detain the vessels unless it
paid its season ITF rates. The agent of the owner of the vessel agreed to a 25% increase, but when the
vessel arrived in Japan shortly afterwards, the seamen were repatriated to Manila and their contract
terminated. Two motions for reconsideration filed with Second Division were denied by said Division.
Another motion for reconsideration was filed with the Supreme Court en banc which gave its due course,
after finding that there was a need to reconcile the decision of the Second Division with that of the First
Division with the Wallen Decision. In that decision, the First Division had ruled that the termination of the
seamen was illegal.
Issue:
Whether or not the termination of the seamen was illegal.
Held:
The termination of the contract of the seamen was illegal. A manning contract involves the
interests not only of the signatories thereto, such as the local Filipino recruiting agent, the foreign owner of
vessel and the Filipino seamen in general as well as the country itself. Conformably to the power vested in
the NSB, the law requires that all manning contracts shall be approved by said agency. The stringent rules
governing Filipino seamen abroad foreign ships are dictated by national interest.













Reagan vs. CIR (G.R. No. L-26379, December 27, 1969)
Facts:
William Reagan imported a tax-free 1960 Cadillac car with accessories valued at US $ 6,443.83,
including freight, insurance and other charges. After acquiring a permit to sell the car from the base
commander of Clark Air Base, Reagan sold the car to a certain Willie Johnson Jr. of the US Marine Corps
stationed in Sangley Point, Cavite for US$ 6,600. Johnson sold the same, on the same day to Fred Meneses,
a Filipino. As a result of the transaction, the Commissioner rendered Reagan liable for income tax in the
sum of P2,970. Reagan claimed that he was exempt as the transaction occurred in Clark Air Base, which as
he contends is a base outside the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Reagan was covered by the tax exemption.
Held:
The court ruled in the negative. The Philippines, as an independent and sovereign country,
exercises its authority over its entire domain. Any state may, however, by its consent, express or implied,
submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. It may allow another power to participate in the exercise of
jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. By doing so, it by no means follows that such areas
become impressed with an alien character. The areas retain their status as native soil. Clark Air Base is
within Philippine territorial jurisdiction to tax, and thus, Reagan was liable for the income tax arising from
the sale of his automobile in Clark. The law does not look with favor on tax exemptions and that he who
would seek to be thus privileged must justify it by words too plain to be mistaken and too categorical to be
misinterpreted. Reagan has not done so, and cannot do so.














Tanada v Tuvera
G.R. L-63915, April 24, 1985| 136 SCRA 27
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations
and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case,
contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen
for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be
officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general
application which have not been published have no force and effect.











G.R. No. 79732 November 8, 1993
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HENRICO UVERO, ET AL., respondents.
HELD:
The Republic of the Philippines has sought the expropriation of certain portions of land owned by the private
respondents for the widening and concreting of the Nabua-Bato-Agos Section, Philippine-Japan Highway Loan (PJHL)
road. While the right of the Republic is not now disputed, the private respondents, however, demand that the just
compensation for the property should be based on fair market value and not that set by Presidential Decree No. 76, as
amended, which fixes payment on the basis of the assessment by the assessor or the declared valuation by the owner,
whichever is lower. The Regional, Trial Court ruled for the private respondents. When elevated to it, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition by the Republic.
Presidential Decree No. 76, as well as related decrees, including Presidential Decree No. 1533, to the contrary
extent, as unconstitutional and as an impermissible encroachment of judicial prerogatives.
ISSUE:
Whether the declaration of nullity of the law in question should have prospective, not retroactive,
application.
HELD:
There are two views on the effects of a declaration of the unconstitutionality of a statute.
The first is the orthodox view. Under this rule, as announced in Norton v. Shelby, an unconstitutional act is
not a law; it confers no right; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been passed. It is therefore stricken from the statute books and considered
never to have existed at all. Not only the parties but all persons are bound by the declaration of unconstitutionality,
which means that no one may thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in subsequent cases. It
is, in other words, a total nullity.
The second or modern view is less stringent. Under this view, the court in passing upon the question of
constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to
recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence. The court may give its
reasons for ignoring or disregarding the law, but the decision affects the parties only and there is no judgment against
the statute. The opinion or reasons of the court may operate as a precedent for the determination of other similar
cases, but it does not strike the statute from the statute books; it does not repeal, supersede, revoke, or annul the
statute. The parties to the suit are concluded by the judgment, but no one else is bound.

The orthodox view is expressed in Article 7 of the Civil Code, providing that "when the courts declare a law to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.




ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.
FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix
William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on
the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives
Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The
House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"
but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report
to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23,
2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed
with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the
House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,
another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of
the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President
Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2,
2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on
October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.






DIOSDADO LAGCAO,DOROTEO LAGCAO and URSULA LAGCAO, Petitioners vs. JUDGE GENEROSA G. LABRA and CITY OF
CEBU, Respondents G.R. No. 155746, October 13, 2004
Facts: The Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. But then, in late 1965, the 210 lots, including Lot
1029, reverted to the Province of Cebu. Consequently, the province tried to annul the sale of Lot 1029 by the City of
Cebu to the petitioners. This prompted the latter to sue the province for specific performance and damages in the
then Court of First Instance. The court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the Province of Cebu to execute
the final deed of sale in favor of petitioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. After
acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to discover that it was already occupied by squatters.
Thus petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against the squatters. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)
ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCCs decision and issued a writ of
execution and order of demolition. However, when the demolition order was about to be implemented, Cebu City
Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters to the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the ground that the
City was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters. Acting on the mayors request, the MTCC issued two orders
suspending the demolition. Unfortunately for petitioners, during the suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod
(SP) of Cebu City passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA
7279.Petitioners filed with the RTC an action for declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 1843 for being
unconstitutional.
Issue: WON the Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it sanctions the expropriation of their property for the
purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the concept of public use contemplated in the
Constitution.
Ruling:
The enactment of Ordinance 1843 contravenes the Constitution and other applicable laws.
First, Ordinance 1843 contravenes the constitution because condemnation of private lands in an irrational or piecemeal
fashion or the random expropriation of small lots to accommodate no more than a few tenants or squatters is certainly not the
condemnation for public use contemplated by the Constitution. This is depriving a citizen of his property for the convenience of a
few without perceptible benefit to the public
Second, the ordinance is violative of the petitioners right to due process since petitioners had already obtained a
favorable judgment of eviction against the illegal occupants of their property. The judgment in this ejectment case had, in fact,
already attained finality, with a writ of execution and an order of demolition. But Mayor Garcia requested the trial court to suspend
the demolition on the pretext that the City was still searching for are location site for the squatters. However, instead of looking for
a relocation site during the suspension period, the city council suddenly enacted Ordinance No. 1843 for the expropriation of
petitioners' lot. It was trickery and bad faith, pure and simple.
Third, RA 7160 itself explicitly states that local appropriation of property must comply with the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws. Relatively, RA 7279 mandates that local expropriation of property must comply on the order of the
priorities on the expropriation of property under section 10 for which private property ranks last in the order of priorities provided
under section 9.