THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 110315. January 16, 1998]

RENATO CUDIA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, The
HON.CARLOS D. RUSTIA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court Branch LVI, Angeles City, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
ROMERO, J .:
Petitioner assails the decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 1993
dismissing his petition and finding that he had not been placed in double jeopardy by
the filing of a second information against him, although a first information charging the
same offense had been previously dismissed, over petitioners vigorous opposition.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
On June 28, 1989, petitioner was arrested in Purok 6, Barangay Santa Inez,
Mabalacat,
[2]
Pampanga, by members of the then 174th PC Company, allegedly for
possessing an unlicensed revolver. He was brought to Camp Pepito, Sto. Domingo,
Angeles City, where he was detained. A preliminary investigation was thereafter
conducted by an investigating panel of prosecutors. As a result thereof, the City
Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information against him for illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11542, which reads as
follows:
That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the City of Angeles,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
his possession and under his control one (1) .38 Cal. Revolver (paltik) without
any Serial Number with six (6) live ammunitions, which he carried outside of
his residence without having the necessary authority and permit to carry the
same.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.
[3]
(Emphasis petitioners.)
The case was raffled to Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City
(hereafter the Angeles City RTC). Upon his arraignment on August 14, 1989, petitioner
pleaded not guilty to the charges. During the ensuing pre-trial, the court called the
attention of the parties to the fact that, contrary to the information, petitioner had
committed the offense in Mabalacat, and not in Angeles City. Inasmuch as there was
an existing arrangement among the judges of the Angeles City RTCs as to who would
handle cases involving crimes committed outside of Angeles City, the judge ordered the
re-raffling of the case to a branch assigned to criminal cases involving crimes committed
outside of the city. Thereafter, the case was assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City
RTC.
On October 31, 1989 however, the provincial prosecutor of Pampanga also filed an
information charging petitioner with the same crime of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11987. The case was likewise raffled to
Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC. This prompted the prosecutor in Criminal Case No.
11542 to file a Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw the Information, stating that thru
inadvertence and oversight, the Investigating Panel was misled into hastily filing the
Information in this case, it appearing that the apprehension of the accused in connection
with the illegal possession of unlicensed firearm and ammunition was made in Bgy. Sta.
Inez, Mabalacat, Pampanga, within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Pampanga
[4]
and that the Provincial Prosecutor had filed its own information against the
accused, as a result of which two separate informations for the same offense had been
filed against petitioner. The latter filed his opposition to the motion, but the trial court
nonetheless, granted said motion to dismiss in its order dated April 3, 1990.
On May 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Criminal Case No. 11987 on
the ground that his continued prosecution for the offense of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition for which he had been arraigned in Criminal Case No.
11542, and which had been dismissed despite his opposition would violate his right
not to be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial court
denied the motion to quash; hence, petitioner raised the issue to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court, stating that there was no double jeopardy, dismissed the
same on the ground that the petitioner could not have been convicted under the first
information as the same was defective. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied; hence, this appeal.
Petitioner points out the following as errors of the Court of Appeals:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE CITY
PROSECUTOR OF ANGELES CITY DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO FILE
THE FIRST INFORMATION.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FIRST JEOPARDY
DID NOT ATTACH BECAUSE THE FIRST INFORMATION FILED AGAINST THE
ACCUSED WAS NOT VALID.
We shall discuss the assigned errors jointly as they are closely related.
Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that (n)o person shall be
twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense x x x. Pursuant to this
provision, Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides in part that (w)hen an
accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged, x x x.
In order to successfully invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following
requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy
must be for the same offense or the second offense includes or is necessarily included
in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a
frustration thereof.
[5]

In determining when the first jeopardy may be said to have attached, it is necessary
to prove the existence of the following:
(a) Court of competent jurisdiction
(b) Valid complaint or information
(c) Arraignment
(c) Valid plea
(e) The defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.
[6]

It is undisputed that petitioner was arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11542, that he
pleaded not guilty therein, and that the same was dismissed without his express
consent, nay, over his opposition even. We may thus limit the discussion to determining
whether the first two requisites have been met.
As to the first requisite, it is necessary that there be a court of competent
jurisdiction, for jurisdiction to try the case is essential to place an accused in
jeopardy. The Court of Appeals and the Solicitor General agreed that Branch 60, which
originally had cognizance of Criminal Case No. 11542, had no jurisdiction over the
case. In the words of the Solicitor General:
The first jeopardy did not also attach because Branch 60 of the Regional Trial
Court of Angeles City was not the proper venue for hearing the case. Venue in
criminal cases is jurisdictional, being an essential element of jurisdiction
(Agbayani vs. Sayo, 89 SCRA 699). In all criminal prosecutions, the action
shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein
the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took
place (People vs. Tomio, 202 SCRA 77). Although both Branches 60 and 56
are sitting in Angeles City, it is Branch 56 which has jurisdiction to try offenses
committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga. Petitioner was arraigned before Branch
60, not Branch 56.
[7]

It must be borne in mind that the question of jurisdiction of a court over cases filed
before it must be resolved on the basis of the law or statute providing for or defining its
jurisdiction. Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 1983 provides that:
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 864 of the
President of the Philippines, dated January 17, 1983, the territorial areas of
the Regional Trial Courts in Region One to Twelve are hereby defined as
follows:
x x x x x x x x x
PAMPANGA
x x x x x x x x x
1. Branches LVI to LXII, inclusive, with seats at Angeles City comprising
ANGELES CITY and the municipalities of Mabalacat, Magalang, and Porac as
well as part of Clark Field U.S. Airbase.
x x x x x x x x x
Clearly, Branches 56 to 62 had jurisdiction over the respective territories as
apportioned. Consequently, notwithstanding the internal arrangement of the judges of
the Angeles City RTCs, Branch 60 indubitably had jurisdiction over instant case. Writ
large in lawbooks is the doctrine that jurisdiction is conferred by law and not by mere
administrative policy of any trial court.
With respect to the second requisite, however, it is plainly apparent that the City
Prosecutor of Angeles City had no authority to file the first information, the offense
having been committed in the Municipality of Mabalacat, which is beyond his
jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No. 1275, in relation to Section 9 of the Administrative
Code of 1987, pertinently provides that:
Section 11. The provincial or the city fiscal shall:
x x x x x x x x x
b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes,
misdemeanors and violations of all penal laws and ordinances within their
respective jurisdictions and have the necessary information or complaint
prepared or made against the persons accused. In the conduct of such
investigations he or his assistants shall receive the sworn statements or take
oral evidence of witnesses summoned by subpoena for the purpose.
x x x x x x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who
should prepare informations for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of
Angeles City. An information, when required to be filed by a public prosecuting officer,
cannot be filed by another.
[8]
It must be exhibited or presented by the prosecuting
attorney or someone authorized by law. If not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction.
[9]

Petitioner, however, insists that his failure to assert the lack of authority of the City
Prosecutor in filing the information in question is deemed a waiver thereof.
[10]
As correctly
pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioners plea to an information before he filed a
motion to quash may be a waiver of all objections to it insofar as formal objections to the
pleadings are concerned. But by clear implication, if not by express provision of the
Rules of Court, and by a long line of uniform decisions,
[11]
questions relating to want of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. It is a valid information signed
by a competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court
over the person of the accused (herein petitioner) and the subject matter of the
accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity in the information, such as lack of
authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by
express consent.
[12]

In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the
former prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient because
it was so defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been
sustained, its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the
fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first information would
not be a bar to petitioners subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy does not attach where a
defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the
prosecution.
[13]

Petitioner next claims that the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor was the error
of the investigating panel and the same should not be used to prejudice and penalize
him. It is an all too familiar maxim that the State is not bound or estopped by the
mistakes or inadvertence of its officials and employees.
[14]
To rule otherwise could very
well result in setting felons free, deny proper protection to the community, and give rise
to the possibility of connivance between the prosecutor and the accused.
Finally, petitioner avers that an amendment of the first information, and not its
dismissal, should have been the remedy sought by the prosecution. Suffice it to say
that this Court, in Galvez vs. Court of Appeals
[15]
has ruled that even if amendment is
proper, pursuant to Section 14 of Rule 110, it is also quite plausible under the same
provision that, instead of an amendment, an information may be dismissed to give way
to the filing of a new information.
In light of the foregoing principles, there is thus no breach of the constitutional
prohibition against twice putting an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense for the simple reason that the absence of authority of the City Prosecutor to file
the first information meant that petitioner could never have been convicted on the
strength thereof.
As the first information was fatally defective for lack of authority of the officer filing it,
the instant petition must fail for failure to comply with all the requisites necessary to
invoke double jeopardy.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 24958 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.



[1]
People v. Argawanon, 231 SCRA 614 (1994); People v. Quijada, G.R. Nos. 115008-09, July 24, 1996.
[2]
The Municipality of Mabalacat is approximately 10 kms. north of Angeles City, Pampanga.
[3]
Rollo, p. 12.
[4]
Ibid., p. 13.
[5]
Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 703 (1996).
[6]
Ibid.
[7]
Rollo, pp. 56-57.
[8]
42 CJS Indictments and Informations 67.
[9]
41 Am Jur 2d, Indictments and Informations, 41
[10]
See Section 8, Rule 117 in relation to Section 3(c), Rule 117.
[11]
See Estrada vs. NLRC, 262 SCRA 709 (1996); Amigo vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 382 (1996); De
Leon vs. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 166 (1995); Lozon vs. NLRC, 240 SCRA 1 (1995).
[12]
Villa vs. Ibaez, 88 Phil. 402.
[13]
U.S. vs. McClure, 356 F2d 939.
[14]
DBP vs. COA, 231 SCRA 202 (1994) citing Cruz, Jr. vs. CA, 194 SCRA 145 (1991).
[15]
237 SCRA 685.


2

PEOPLE VS. OBSANIA [23 SCRA 1249; G.R. L-
24447; 29 JUN 1968]
Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The accused was charged with Robbery with
Rape before theMunicipal Court of Balungao, Pangasinan.
He pleaded not guilty. His counsel moved for
the dismissal of the charge for failure to allege
vividdesigns in the info. Said motion was granted. From
this order ofdismissal the prosecution appealed.


Issue: Whether or Not the present appeal places the
accused in Double Jeopardy.


Held: In order that the accused may invoke double
jeopardy, the following requisites must have obtained in
the original prosecution, a) valid complaint, b) competent
court, c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge, d)
defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against
him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
hisexpress consent.

In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered
by the Trial Judge upon the defendant's motion to
dismiss. The doctrine of double jeopardy as enunciated
in P.vs. Salico applies to wit when the case is dismissed
with the express consent of the defendant,
the dismissalwill not be a bar to another prosecution for
the same offense because his action in having the case is
dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional
right/privilege for the reason that he thereby prevents
the Court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and
rendering a judgment of conviction against him.

In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed
provisionally not only with the express consent of the
accused but even upon the urging of his counsel there
can be no double jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule 113, if the
indictment against him is revived by the fiscal.

PEOPLE VS. COURT OF SILAY [74 SCRA 248;
G.R. NO. L-43790; 9 DEC 1976]
Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: That sometime on January 4,1974, accused
Pacifico Sensio, Romeo Millan and Wilfredo Jochico who
were then scalers at the Hawaiian-Philippine Company,
weighed cane cars No.1743,1686 and 1022 loaded with
sugar canes which were placed in tarjetas (weight report
cards), Apparently, it was proven and shown that there
was padding of the weight of the sugar canes and that
the information on the tarjetas were to be false making it
appear to be heavier than its actual weight. The three
accused then were charged with Falsification by
private individuals and use of falsified document. After
the prosecution had presented, the respondent moved to
dismiss the charge against them on the ground that the
evidences presented were not sufficient to establish their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on the motion,
respondent court issued its order dismissing the case on
the ground that the acts committed by the accused do
not constituted the crime of falsification as strictly
enumerated in the revised penal code defining the crime
of falsification which was charged earlier and that their
case be dismissed. People asserts that the plea of double
jeopardy is not tenable even if the case at bar was
dismissed because according to them, it was done with
the consent of the accused therefore waiving
there defense of double jeopardy. The accused on the
other hand, reiterated the fact that the dismissal was due
to lack of merits of the prosecution which would have the
same effect as an acquittal which will bar the prosecution
from prosecuting the accused for it will be unjust and
unconstitutional for the accused due to double jeopardy
rule thus the appeal of the plaintiff.


Issue: Whether or Not the grant of petition by the
court would place the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico
in double jeopardy


Held: Yes the revival of the case will put the accused in
double jeopardy for the very reason that the case has
been dismissed earlier due to lack of merits. It is true
that the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on a
motion of the accused however this was a motion filed
after the prosecution had rested its case, calling for the
evidence beyond reasonable ground which the
prosecution had not been able to do which would be
tantamount to acquittal therefore will bar the prosecution
of another case. As it was stated on the requirements of
a valid defense of double jeopardy it says: That there
should be a validcomplaint, second would be that
such complaint be filed before a competent court and to
which the accused has pleaded and that defendant was
previously acquitted, convicted or dismissed or otherwise
terminated without express consent of the accused in
which were all present in the case at bar. There was
indeed a valid, legitimate complaint and concern against
the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico which was filed at
a competent court with jurisdiction on the said case. It
was also mentioned that the accused pleaded
notguilty and during the time of trial, it was proven that
the case used against the accused were not sufficient to
prove them guilty beyond reasonable doubt therefore
dismissing the case which translates to acquittal. It
explained further that there are two instances when we
can conclude that there is jeopardy when first is that the
ground for the dismissal of the case was due to
insufficiency of evidence and second, when the
proceedings have been reasonably prolonged as to
violate the right of the accused to a speedy trial. In the 2
requisites given, it was the first on that is very much
applicable to our case at bar where there
was dismissal of the case due to insufficiency of evidence
which will bar the approval of the petition in the case at
bar for it will constitute double jeopardy on the part of
the accused which the law despises.

ESMENA VS. POGOY [102 SCRA 861; G.R. NO.
L-54110; 20 FEB 1981]
Wednesday, February 18, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioners Esmea and Alba were charged
with gravecoercion in the Court of Cebu City for allegedly
forcing Fr. Thomas Tibudan to withdraw a sum of money
worth P5000 from the bank to be given to them because
the priest lost in a game of chance. During arraignment,
petitioners pleaded Not Guilty. No trial came in after
the arraignment due to the priests request to move it on
another date. Sometime later Judge Pogoy issued an
order setting the trial Aug.16,1979 but the fiscal
informed the court that it received atelegram stating that
the complainant was sick. The accused invoked their right
to speedy trial. Respondent judge dismissed the case
because the trial was already dragging the accused and
that the priests telegram did not have a
medical certificate attached to it in order for the court to
recognize the complainants reason to be valid in order to
reschedule again another hearing. After 27 days the fiscal
filed a motion to revive the case and attached the
medical certificateof the priest proving the fact that the
priest was indeed sick ofinfluenza. On Oct.24,1979,
accused Esmea and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the
case on the ground of double jeopardy.


Issue: Whether or Not the revival of grave coercion
case, which was dismissed earlier due to complainants
failure to appear at the trial, would place the accused in
double jeopardy


Held: Yes, revival of the case will put the accused in
double jeopardy for the very reason that the case has
been dismissed already without the consent of the
accused which would have an effect of an acquittal on the
case filed. The dismissal was due to complainants
incapability to present its evidence due to non
appearance of the witnesses and complainant himself
which would bar further prosecution of the defendant for
the same offense. For double jeopardy to existthese
three requisites should be present, that one, there is a
validcomplaint or information filed second, that it is done
before a court of competent jurisdiction and third, that
the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to
the complaint or information. In the case at bar, all three
conditions were present, as the case filed
was grave coercion, filed in a court of competent
jurisdiction as to where the coercion took place and last
the accused were arraigned and has pleaded to
thecomplaint or the information. When these three
conditions are presentthen the acquittal, conviction of the
accused, and the dismissal or termination of the case
without his express consent constitutes res judicata and
is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged.
In the case, it was evidently shown that the accused
invoked their right to a speedy trial and asked for the
trial of the case and not its termination which would
mean that respondents had no expressed consent to
the dismissal of the case which would make the case filed
res judicata and has been dismissed by the competent
court in order to protect the respondents as well for their
right to speedy trial which will be equivalent to acquittal
of the respondents which would be a bar to further
prosecution.


9. Salcedo vs. Mendoza88 SCRA 811 (1979)
Facts: As a result of a traffic accident that occurred
atabout 9: 00 o' cl ock i n t he mor ni ng of Jul y 7,
1980 at Barangay Laguinbanua West, Numancia, Aklan,
Edgar lbabao was charged for slight physical injuries
throughreckless imprudence in a complaint that was filed
onSeptember 5, 1980 in the Municipal Circuit Court
of Mal i nao, Akl an. The case was docket ed as Cr i mi
nal Case No. 1028-N wherein a certain Crispin
Conananw a s t h e o f f e n d e d p a r t y . O n O c t o b e r
1 , 1 9 8 0 , a n information for serious physical injuries
through recklessimprudence was filed against the same
accused in theRegional Trial Court of Aklan. The case was
docketed asCriminal Case No. 1421 with one Eduardo Salido as
theoffended party. This second case arose from the
sameincident.A criminal information for homicide
through recklessimprudence against the petitioner Leopoldo
Salcedo wasfiled in Oriental Mindoro. Upon arraignment he
enterednot guilty and the case was set fort trial. The
provincialfiscal asked for and was granted postponement
becausethe accused failed to appear u until the 3
rd
hearing the prosecuting fiscal failed to appear.Issue: Can an
order of dismissal of a criminal case uponmotion of the accused
after arraignment for the failure of the prosecution to appear on
the first day of hearing be a bar to another prosecution for the
same offense?Rul i ng: Pet i t i on I s gr ant ed. I n t he i nst a
nt case, t hecomplaining witness and the prosecutor failed to
appear only in the first hearing. Even if the court did not
dismissthe case but merely postponed the hearing to
another date, there would not have been a denial of the
right of the accused to a speedy trial. The right of the accused
toh a v e a s p e e d y t r i a l i s v i o l a t e d w h e n u n j
u s t i f i e d postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when, without good cause or justifiable
motive, a
long per i od of t i me i s al l owed t o el apse wi t hout hi
s case being tried.
10
None of sai d si t uat i ons exi st s i n t he present case.
Surely, it cannot be said that there was aviolation of the
constitutional right of the accused to aspeedy trial. As we
observed, the more prudent step thatthe court
a quo
should have taken was to postpone thehearing to give the
prosecution another opportunity to present its case. The
court
a quo
had in fact reconsideredits order of dismissal of Criminal Case
No. 1028-N andreset it for trial. lt should have maintained
said actioninstead of granting the motion for reconsideration of
theaccused. The dismissal of the case by the trial court
onthe ground that the accused is entitled to a speedy trial
isunwarranted under the circumstances obt aining in
thiscase.Double jeopardy will apply even if the dismissal is
madewith the express consent of the accused, or upon his
ownmotion, only if it is predicated on either of two grounds,
i.e
., insufficiency of the evidence or denial of the right toa speedy
trial. In both cases, the dismissal will have theeffect of an
acquittal. Since the dismissal in this casedoes not fall
under either of these two instances and itwas made with
the express consent of the accused, it would not thereby be
a bar to another prosecution for thesame offense.



22.PEOPLE
vs
JABINAL
55 SCRA 607
(1974)
FACTS:
Accused was
found
guilty of the
crime
of Illegal
Possession of
Firearm and
Ammunition
(evolver Cal. .
22, RG8 Ger
man Made wi
th one (1) liv
eammunition
and four (4)
empty shells).
He claimed
thathe had an
appointment
as Secret Age
nt from thePr
ovincial
Governor of
Batangas and
an appointment
asConfidential
Agent from the
PC Provincial
Commander,an
d the said
appointments
expressly
carried with
themthe autho
rity to posses
s and carry th
e firearm inqu
estion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not
appellant
should be
acquitted
onthe basis of
the courts ru
ling in
Macarandang
and
Lucero
even if was
reversed in
Mapa
.
HELD:
Yes. The doctr
ine laid down
in
Lucero
and
Macarandang
was part of the
jurisprudence,
hence of the
law, of the
land, at the
time appellant
was found
in possession
of the firearm
in question an
d when hearrai
gned by the
trial court
(1964). It is
true that
thedoctrine
was overruled
in the
Mapa
case in 1967,
butwhen a
doctrine of this
Court is
overruled and a
differentview i
s adopted, the
new
doctrine shoul
d
be applied pro
spectively, and
should not
apply to
parties who
hadrelied on
the old doctrine
and acted on
the faith
thereof.This is
especially true
in the
construction
and
applicationof
criminal laws,
where it is
necessary that
an act
should be
punished
reasonably for
the guidance of
society.
The judgment
appealed from
is hereby rev
ersed, andapp
ellant is a
cquitted.

24.PEOPLE
vs
FERRER
48 SCRA 382
(1972)
FACTS
: Hon. Judge
Simeon Ferrer
is the Tarlac
trialcourt judg
e that declare
d RA 1700 or
the Anti-
Subversive Ac
t
of 1957 as a bi
ll of attainder.
Thus,dismissi
ng
the informatio
n of subversio
n against thefo
llowing: 1.)
Feliciano Co
for being an
officer/leader
of the Comm
unist Party o
f the Philippi
nes (CPP)agg
ravated by
circumstances
of contempt
and insult
to public
officers,
subversion by
a band and aid
of armedmen
to afford
impunity. 2.)
Nilo Tayag and
5 others,
for being
members/leade
rs of the NPA,
inciting,
instigating peo
ple to unite a
nd overthrow
the Philippi
neGovernment
. The trial
court is of
opinion that:
1)
TheCongress
usurped the
powers of the
judge;

2)
Assumed judic
ial magistracy
by
pronouncing
the guilt of the
CPP without
any forms of
safeguard of a
judicial trial;
3) It created a
presumption of
organizational
guilt by
being members
of the CPP
regardless of
voluntariness.
The Anti
Subversive Act
of 1957 was
approved 20
June1957. It i
s an act to ou
tlaw the CPP
and similar as
sociations pen
alizing membe
rship therein,
and for other
purposes. It
defined the
Communist
Party
beingalthough
a political pa
rty is in fact a
n organizedco
nspiracy to
overthrow the
Government,
not only
byforce and
violence but
also by deceit,
subversion
andother
illegal means.
It declares that
the CPP is a
clear and
present danger
to the security
of the
Philippines.
Section 4
provided that
affiliation with
full knowledge
of the
illegal acts of
the CPP is
punishable;
Section 8allo
ws the renunci
ation of memb
ership to the C
CPthrough
writing under
oath.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether o
r not RA 170
0 is
a bill of attain
der/ex post
facto law; (2)
Whether or Not
RA
1700violates
freedom of
expression.
HELD:
No. A bill of
attainder is
solely a
legislative
act.It punishes
without the
benefit of the
trial. It is thes
ubstitution of j
udicial determi
nation to a legi
slative
determination
of guilt. In
order for a
statute be
measuredas a
bill of
attainder, the
following
requisites must
be present: 1.)
The statute
specifies
persons,
groups. 2.)
thestatute is
applied
retroactively
and reach past
conduct.(A
bill of
attainder
relatively is
also an ex post
factolaw.)
In the case at
bar, the
statute simply
declares the
CPP as
an organized c
onspiracy for
the overthrow
of theGovernm
ent. The Act
applies not
only to the
CPP but also
to other
organizations
having the
same purpose
and their
successors.
The Acts
focus is on the
conduct
not person.
Furthermore, t
he statute
is PROSPECT
IVE in nature.
Section 4
prohibits acts
committed
AFTER
approval of the
act. The
members of
the subversive
organizations b
efore the
passing of this
Act is given an
opportunity
toescape liabi
lity by renou
ncing membe
rship inaccord
ance with
Section 8.The
law, does not
violates
freedom of
expression.
TheEXISTEN
CE OF SUBST
ANTIVE EVI
L
justifies thelim
itation to the
exercise of
Freedom of
Expression
andAssociation
in this matter.
Before the
enactment of
thestatute and
statements in
the preamble
, carefulinvest
igations by the
Congress
were done. Th
e
courtfurther st
resses that wh
atever interest
in freedom of
speech and
association is
excluded in the
prohibition
of membershi
p in the CPP
are weak con
sidering NAT
IONAL SECU
RITY and PR
ESERVATIO
N of DEMOC
RACY. The S
upreme Court
set aside ther
esolution of the
TRIAL COUR
T.



FIRST DIVISION


OSCAR Z. BENARES,
[1]
G.R. No. 173421
Petitioner,
Present:

Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
*

- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
**

Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
JOSEPHINE LIM,
Respondent. Promulgated:

December 14, 2006
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECI SI ON

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:


This petition for review assails the May 25, 2005 Decision
[2]
of the Court of
Appeals setting aside the Resolution
[3]
dated May 5, 2004 and Order
[4]
dated July
9, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 132, which set
aside the Orders dated June 11, 2002
[5]
and December 26, 2002
[6]
of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City granting respondents motion for
reconsideration of the Order dismissing the complaint for estafa for failure to
prosecute. Also assailed is the July 7, 2006 Resolution
[7]
denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration.

The following facts are undisputed:

Petitioner Oscar Beares was accused of estafa arising from two contracts
of sale executed in 1976 where he sold two parcels of land to
respondent. Records show that after respondent had fully paid the amortizations
and after the deed of absolute sale was issued, petitioner mortgaged the same
parcels of land to the Bank of Philippine Islands. Thus, when respondent
demanded delivery of the properties, petitioner failed to comply, thus respondent
was compelled to file a case for estafa against petitioner.

Trial thereafter ensued. After the prosecution presented its last witness, it
was given 15 days to formally offer its evidence.
[8]
However, the prosecution did
not make any formal offer of evidence, hence petitioner filed a motion praying
that the prosecutions submission of formal offer of evidence be deemed waived
and the case dismissed for lack of evidence.
[9]
Despite receipt of notice of
petitioners motion, respondent and her counsel failed to attend the hearing on
the motion set on December 4, 2001.

On January 28, 2002, the MeTC issued an Order
[10]
giving the prosecution
another 15 days within which to formally offer its evidence which petitioner
opposed.
[11]
On February 27, 2002, the MeTC issued the following Order:

In view of the oral manifestation of counsel for the accused, showing that the
private prosecutor received the Order of this Court dated January 28, 2002 on February
7, 2002 giving them an extension of another fifteen days to file their formal offer of
evidence, yet failed to do so; the court finds reason to deny the submission of formal
offer of evidence.

Acting on the Motion of the accused for the dismissal of this case, for failure of
the prosecution to prosecute this case, the motion is granted. This case is hereby
ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
[12]


Respondent moved to reconsider the order of dismissal and prayed for the
admission of Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits,
[13]
claiming that she had
difficulty securing documents from the court which were marked during
trial. Petitioner opposed the motion invoking his right against double
jeopardy.
[14]


On June 11, 2002, the MeTC issued an Order which states in part:

[I]n line with the long standing policy of the Courts to decide issues based on the
substantial merits of the case and not simply dismiss cases on technical defects, the
Court finds Merit in the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Prosecution.

Effectively, the Order of the Court dated January 28, 2002
[15]
is set aside and the
case is reinstated in the dockets of the Court. The Prosecutions Formal Offer of
Evidence is admitted by the Court and the accused is given 15 days from receipt of this
Order to filed (sic) their Comment or Opposition thereto. Thereafter, the incident is
deemed submitted for resolution.
[16]


Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
[17]
was denied, hence a
petition
[18]
for certiorari was filed with the RTC. In granting the petition, the RTC
noted that the MeTC Order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute had the
effect of an acquittal which is a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged.
[19]
The RTC denied respondents motion for reconsideration.

Alleging grave abuse of discretion, respondent filed a petition
[20]
for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals arguing that there was no failure to prosecute
and that double jeopardy did not attach as a result of the dismissal thereof. The
Court of Appeals reversed the RTCs Resolution. It held that contrary to the
findings of the RTC, there was no double jeopardy because the order dismissing
the case for failure to prosecute had not become final and executory due to the
timely motion for reconsideration filed by respondent. The appellate court also
held that petitioners right to speedy trial was not violated when respondent
failed to formally offer her evidence within the period required by the trial
court. The Court of Appeals thus ordered the MeTC to set the case for further
trial. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence this petition on
the following grounds:

I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RIGHT
OF THE PETITIONER TO SPEEDY TRIAL WAS NOT VIOLATED.

II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
DISMISSAL OF THE CASE BY MTC-61 WAS A DISMISSAL ON THE MERITS WHICH
RESULTED IN THE ACQUITTAL OF THE PETITIONER.

III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
NOT APPLYING THE RULE ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
[21]


The issue for resolution is whether the MeTCs Order dismissing the case for
failure to prosecute amounted to an acquittal which gave petitioner the right to
invoke double jeopardy.

Petitioner argued that the six months delay by the prosecution to formally
offer its evidence is vexatious, capricious and oppressive; that the private
prosecutors claim that the documents could not be found is untrue considering
that no manifestation was filed in court stating that fact; that the documents
were available as early as January 2002 but the prosecution never asked for
extension, nor explained the delay in filing its formal offer despite two orders to
do so.

Petitioner further argued that under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court,
failure to comply with a court order without justifiable reason may cause the
dismissal of the case, which shall have the effect of an adjudication on the merits
unless otherwise stated by the court.

Respondent, on the other hand, asserted that it was petitioner who delayed
the proceedings in the instant case, when he questioned the finding of probable
cause against him before the Department of Justice, the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court, which were all denied; and that the delay in the filing of a formal
offer of evidence is justified because as noted by the MeTC, the records were
missing.

Respondent likewise insisted that even without documentary evidence,
testimonial evidence were presented against petitioner; that petitioner admitted
the documentary evidence formally offered. Respondent refuted petitioners
invocation of double jeopardy because the case was dismissed with his express
consent.

The petition is without merit.

Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court states in part:

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.When an accused has
been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint
or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal
of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the
offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged
in the former complaint or information.

Double jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a
competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered,
and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminatedwithout the express consent of the accused.
[22]


In the instant case, there is no question as to the presence of the first four
elements. As to the last element, there was yet no conviction, nor an acquittal on
the ground that petitioners guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt,
[23]
but the dismissal of the case was based on failure to prosecute.

A dismissal with the express consent or upon motion of the accused does
not result in double jeopardy, except in two instances, to wit: (1) the dismissal is
based on insufficiency of evidence or (2) the case is dismissed for violation of the
accuseds right to speedy trial.
[24]


Petitioners claim that the prosecutions delay in filing its formal offer of
evidence violated his right to speedy trial is not well taken.

The prosecutions delay in the filing of its formal offer of evidence in this
case cannot be considered vexatious, capricious, and oppressive. It appears that
there was justifiable reason for the prosecutions failure to formally offer its
evidence on time, i.e., the documents which were previously marked in court
were misplaced. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals:

Truly, the prosecution had failed twice to file the formal offer of evidence within the
fifteen (15) day period set by the MeTC. Once was due to the fault of the MeTC judge
who expressly admitted in his order that the documentary exhibits necessary for the
formal offer of evidence were lost in his office. Thus, the prosecution was unable to
submit its formal offer of evidence on time. In short, there was actually only one
unjustified delay in the filing of formal offer of evidence in the proceedings below,
which cannot be described as vexatious, capricious or oppressive. There is no showing
that the criminal case was unreasonably prolonged nor there was deliberate intent on
the part of the petitioner to cause delay in the proceedings resulting to serious and
great prejudice affecting the substantial rights of the accused.
[25]


Indeed, delay is not a mere mathematical computation of the time
involved. Each case must be decided upon the facts peculiar to it. The following
factors must be considered and balanced: the length of the delay, the reasons for
such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the
prejudice caused by the delay.
[26]
In the instant case, the totality of the
circumstances excuses the delay occasioned by the late filing of the prosecutions
formal offer of evidence. Since the delay was not vexatious or oppressive, it
follows that petitioners right to speedy trial was not violated, consequently he
cannot properly invoke his right against double jeopardy.
[27]


Petitioners reliance in People v. Cloribel
[28]
is misplaced because in said
case, trial commenced almost four years from the date of filing of the
complaint. Such delay, the Court held, can hardly be ignored or disregarded by
any fair standard.

Neither can petitioner rely on the doctrine that when a judge dismisses a
case for failure to prosecute, the termination amounts to an acquittal as the
prosecution will fail to prove the case when the time therefor comes. In the
instant case, testimonial evidence were presented against petitioner. Thus, even
without documentary evidence, his guilt or innocence may be proven. Second,
petitioner appears to have admitted the genuineness and due execution of
respondents documentary evidence, thus the prosecution need not even present
such documents in view of his admission. With or without these documents,
therefore, the prosecution has enough evidence left for the trial courts
determination of his guilt. Thus

We agree with the OSGs contention that the trial court exceeded its authority
when it dismissed the case without giving the prosecution a right to be heard, hence
there was a violation of due process. Further, the failure of the prosecution to offer its
exhibits is not a ground to dismiss the case. Even without any documentary exhibits,
the prosecution could still prove its case through the testimonies of its
witnesses. Thus, we find that when the trial court reconsidered its order of dismissal,
it merely corrected itself.
[29]


WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
setting aside the Resolution dated May 5, 2004 and Order dated July 9, 2004 of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 132, as well as its July 7, 2006
Resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.


CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice



WE CONCUR:




MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice



MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice







ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.




CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Working Chairman, First Division



CERTIFICATION


Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.



REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice




[1]
Sometimes referred to as Beares or Bernares in the records.
*
Retired as of December 7, 2006.
**
Working Chairman.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 9-20. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and concurred in by Associate Justices Eliezer
R. de los Santos and Arturo D. Brion.
[3]
Id. at 271-273. Penned by Judge Rommel O. Baybay.
[4]
Id. at 274.
[5]
Id. at 113-114. Penned by Judge Selma Palacio Alaras.
[6]
Id. at 144-145.
[7]
Id. at 67-68.
[8]
Id. at 69.
[9]
Id. at 70-73.
[10]
Id. at 74.
[11]
Id. at 75-82.
[12]
Id. at 83.
[13]
Id. at 84-90.
[14]
Id. at 91-102.
[15]
Should be February 27, 2002.
[16]
Rollo, p. 114.
[17]
Id. at 115-129.
[18]
Id. at 146-169.
[19]
Id. at 272.
[20]
Id. at 260-269.
[21]
Id. at 36.
[22]
Almario v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127772, March 22, 2001, 355 SCRA 1, 7.
[23]
Malanyaon v. Lising, 193 Phil. 425, 428 (1981).
[24]
Philippine Savings Bank v. Bermoy, G.R. No. 151912, September 26, 2005, 471 SCRA 94, 105-106.
[25]
Rollo, p. 14.
[26]
Ty-Dazo v.Sandiganbayan, 424 Phil. 945, 951 (2002).
[27]
Almario v. Court of Appeals, supra note 22 at 10.
[28]
120 Phil. 775 (1964).
[29]
People v. Alberto, 436 Phil. 434, 443-444 (2002); emphasis added.



FIRST DIVISION



PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, G.R. No. 151912
Petitioner,
Present:
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
Chairman,
Quisumbing,
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.


SPOUSES PEDRITO BERMOY Promulgated:
and GLORIA BERMOY,
Respondents. September 26, 2005

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x


DECISION


CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review
[1]
of the Decision
[2]
dated 14 November 2001 of
the Court of Appeals denying the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner and its
Resolution dated 24 January 2002 denying reconsideration.

The Facts

Based on a complaint filed by petitioner Philippine Savings Bank
(petitioner), respondents Pedrito and Gloria Bermoy (respondent spouses)
were charged with estafa thru falsification of a public document in the Regional
Trial Court, Manila, Branch 38 (trial court). The Information, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 96-154193, alleged:

That on or about May 11, 1994, and for sometime prior and subsequent
thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then private
individuals, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Philippine Savings Bank a
banking institution, duly organized and existing under Philippine Laws xxx, thru
falsification of a public document in the following manner, to wit: the said accused
prepared, forged and falsified or caused to be prepared, forged and falsified an owners
copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 207434, which is an imitation of, and similar to
the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 207434 issued by the Regist[er] of Deeds for the City
of Manila, and therefore, a public document, by then and there typing on the blank
spaces thereon the title no., description of a parcel of land containing an area of 350
square meters, located in Malate, this City, the names of the accused as the registered
owners thereof, and then signing, falsifying and simulating the signature of ALICIA D.
GANZON, Register of Deeds, appearing on the lower right hand portion of the 1
st
page
of said document; the name EDGARDO C. CASTRO, Actg. Deputy, appearing on the
right hand middle portion of the 3
rd
page, and imprinting thereon several entries
purportedly showing that the annotation thereon was a mortgage in favor A. C. Aguila
and Sons, which was cancelled on February 17, 1994, thereby making it appear, as it did
appear, that accused are the registered owners of the said property, under said TCT No.
207434 which purportedly is the owners copy of said title, when in truth and in fact, as
the said accused fully well knew, the same is an outright forgery, as the owners
duplicate copy of said Transfer Certificate of Title No. 207434 is in possession of the
spouses EDGAR and ELVIRA ALAMO by reason of the previous mortgage of the said
property in favor of the latter since February 17, 1994 and which was later sold to them
on June 19, 1995; that once the said document has been forged and falsified in the
manner above set forth, the said accused presented the same to the Philippine Savings
Bank and used the said title as collateral in obtaining, as in fact, they did obtain a loan in
the sum of P1,000,000.00 from the said bank, and once in possession of the said amount
of P1,000,000.00 with intent to defraud, they willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to their own personal use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said Philippine Savings Bank in the aforesaid
amount of P1,000,000.00, Philippine Currency.
[3]


Upon arraignment, respondent spouses pleaded not guilty to the charge.

The trial court set the pre-trial on 11 June 1997. After the hearing on that
day, the trial court issued the following Order (11 June 1997 Order):

When the case was called for hearing, Atty. Maria Concepcion Puruganan,
who entered her appearance as private prosecutor and Atty. Albino Achas,
defense counsel, appeared and upon their stipulation, they admitted the
jurisdiction of the Court and the identities of the accused.

Upon motion of Atty. Puruganan, private prosecutor, joined by public prosecutor
Antonio Israel, without objection from Atty. Achas, let the initial hearing for the
reception of the evidence for the prosecution be set on June 18, 1997 at 8:30 a.m., as
previously scheduled.
[4]
(Emphasis supplied)



The minutes of the hearing, which respondent spouses signed, bore the
following handwritten notation under the heading remarks: Postponed. Upon
joint agreement of counsels.
[5]
This was the only notation made under remarks.
Nowhere in the one-page minutes of the hearing did it state that any of the accused
made any stipulation or admission.

During the hearings of 18 June 1997 and 3 September 1997, the prosecution
presented the testimonies of Felisa Crisostomo (Crisostomo), manager of
petitioners Libertad Manila Branch, and one Hermenigildo Caluag (Caluag),
also an employee of petitioner. Crisostomo testified that she came to know
respondent spouses when they applied for a loan in February 1994. Crisostomo
stated that respondent spouses presented to her Transfer Certificate Title No.
207434 (TCT No. 207434) issued in their name over a parcel of land in Malate,
Manila (Malate lot) which they offered as collateral for the loan. Crisostomo
further stated after the approval of respondent spouses loan application,
respondent spouses executed in her presence a real estate mortgage of the Malate
lot in favor of petitioner as security for their loan. Caluag testified that he was
tasked to register petitioners certificate of sale over the Malate lot
[6]
with the
Register of Deeds of Manila but the latter refused to do so because the Malate lot
had been mortgaged and sold to the spouses Edgar and Elvira Alamo.
[7]


After presenting the testimonies of Crisostomo and Caluag, the prosecution
rested its case.

Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed, with leave of court, a
demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to identify
respondent spouses as the accused in Criminal Case No. 96-154193. The
prosecution, through the private prosecutor, opposed the motion claiming that
Crisostomo and Calang had identified respondent spouses. The prosecution also
pointed out that as borne by the 11 June 1997 Order, respondent spouses
stipulated on their identity during the pre-trial.
[8]



The Ruling of the Trial Court


In its Order of 21 April 1998 (21 April 1998 Order), the trial court granted
respondent spouses motion, dismissed Criminal Case No. 96-154193, and
acquitted respondent spouses. The 21 April 1998 Order reads:

The basic issues to resolve here boils down on (sic) the determination of
whether the accused were identified by the prosecution witnesses as the perpetrators
of the act complained of during the trial of the case and whether they admitted their
identities as the accused named in the information.

After carefully going over the length and breadth of the testimonies of the two
prosecution witnesses, there is nothing in the transcript which would slightly indicate
that they identified the accused as the persons who obtained a loan from the Philippine
Savings Bank and executed the corresponding documents. The identification of an
accused [by the witness] may be made by pointing to him directly in open court xxx or
[by] stepping down from the stand and tapping his shoulder. If the accused is not
present during the trial, his identification may be effected through his pictures attached
to the bail bond or some other means. The identification of an accused as the
perpetrator of an offense is essential in the successful prosecution of criminal cases. By
the accuseds entering a negative plea to the allegations in the information, he denies
that he committed the offense. He cannot even be compelled to give his name during
the arraignment and for which the Court may enter a plea of not guilty for him.

As to the stipulation of facts regarding the admission of the jurisdiction of
the court and the identities of the accused, a cursory reading of the Order of June
11, 1997 reveals that their express conformity to the stipulation of facts entered
into by their counsel with the private prosecutor was never asked of them.
Considering that the admission of the identities of the accused as the perpetrators
of the crime here charged is a matter which adversely affects their substantial
rights, such admission must have to involve their express concurrence or consent
thereto. This consent is manifested in their signing the pre-trial order containing
such admissions. As to the minutes of the proceedings of June 11, 1997, suffice it
to state that there is nothing to it (sic) which would even hint that a stipulation of
facts ever took place.

WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, let this case be, as the same
is hereby, DISMISSED and accused Pedrito Bermoy and Gloria Visconde
[Bermoy] are, as they are hereby, acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de
oficio.
[9]




The prosecution, again through the private prosecutor, sought
reconsideration but the trial court denied its motion in the Order of 28 May 1998.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The
Solicitor General joined the petition.


The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision dated 14 November 2001, the Court of Appeals, as earlier
stated, denied the petition. It held:

In support of the demurrer to evidence, the defense counsel argued that neither
of the witnesses presented by the prosecution was able to identify the accused as
allegedly those who committed the crime they were prosecuted for.

xxx

Petitioner, however, argues that the testimonies of the two witnesses they
presented identified the accused spouses as the perpetrators of the crime. xxx

We are not convinced. The xxx testimony proves only one thing: that a couple
purporting to be the Bermoy spouses presented themselves to the Bank and obtained
the loan. Whether they are the same husband and wife accused in this case for Estafa is
a different story. The failure of the prosecution to point in open court to the persons of
the accused as the same persons who presented themselves to the Bank is a fatal
omission. They could be impostors who, armed with the fake title, presented
themselves to the Bank as the persons named in the title. The prosecution goofed. Had
the witnesses been asked to point to the two accused as the same couple who appeared
before the Bank to obtain the loan, there would have been no doubt on their criminal
liability.

Petitioner further argued that the law itself does not prescribe the ways to
identify the accused, xxx [.]

True, there is no standard form provided by law [for] identifying the accused.
Jurisprudence and trial practice show that the accused is usually identified by the
witnesses, prompted by the counsel, by either pointing at him or stepping down the
witness stand and tapping him on the shoulder, or by means of photographs. The trial
court correctly pointed this out. How else can identification be done, it may be asked.

The petitioner also argues that the identities of private *respondents+ were
clearly established as a result of the stipulation by and between the prosecution (thru
the private prosecutor) and the defense. It insists that the Order dated June 11, 1997,
is sufficient admission by the accused as to their identities, and [was] allegedly signed by
them and their counsel as required under Section 2 of Rule 118 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure. There is no merit to this argument. If ever stipulations were made on June
11, 1997, these must be made in writing, which must be signed by the accused and
counsel as their conformity to such stipulations. The records, however, show that the
Order dated June 11, 1997, merely stated what transpired during that particular hearing
and what the counsels signed was the minutes for the same hearing. Hence, the
identities of the accused were not stipulated upon for failure to comply with the
requirements under the Rules of Court. The trial court correctly ruled that there *was+
nothing xxx which would even hint that a stipulation of facts ever took place.

xxx

In fine, we are more than convinced that the trial court was correct in granting
the demurrer to evidence for insufficiency of evidence on account of lack of proper
identification of the accused. But even assuming that the trial court erred, the acquittal
of the accused can no longer be reviewed either on appeal or on petition for certiorari
for it would violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy. xxx

In the case at bench, it is clear that this petition seeks to review the
judgment of the trial court, which already had jurisdiction over the subject matter
and of the persons of this case. The trial court had jurisdiction to resolve the
demurrer to evidence filed by the accused, either by denying it or by dismissing
the case for lack of sufficient evidence. If the demurrer is granted, resulting [in]
the dismissal of the criminal case and the acquittal of the accused, this can no
longer be reviewed unless it can be shown that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. In this case,
assuming the trial court committed an error, the petitioner has not shown that it
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack [or] excess xxx of
jurisdiction. The error, if any, is merely an error of judgment.
[10]



Petitioner sought reconsideration claiming that the Court of Appeals
contradicted itself when it held, on one hand, that the trial courts error did not
amount to grave abuse of discretion and stated, on the other hand, that any error
committed by the trial court can no longer be reviewed without violating
respondent spouses right against double jeopardy. Petitioner also contended, for
the first time, that it is the trial courts duty to insure that the accused sign the pre-
trial order or agreement embodying respondent spouses admissions and that its
failure to do so should not be taken against the prosecution.

The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion in the Resolution of 24
January 2002 which reads:

The petitioner seems to have misunderstood our ruling regarding the issue
on double jeopardy in connection with [the] petition for certiorari. Petitioner
argues that our ruling has been contradictory for saying on one hand that even
assuming that the trial court erred, the acquittal of the accused can no longer be
reviewed either by appeal or on petition for certiorari for it would violate the right
of the accused against double jeopardy while saying on the other hand assuming
that trial court committed an error, the petitioner has not shown that it committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack excess (sic) or excess of
jurisdiction. Petitioner asks: Which is which then? meaning, it has not
understood what a petition for certiorari is for. If the petitioner read the decision
carefully, in between the above-quoted statements of the decision is the case
of People v. Bans, G.R. No. 104147, December 8, 1994, 238 SCRA 48, where the
Supreme Court explicitly explained that review of the sufficiency of the
evidence and of the propriety of the acquittal of the accused [as a result of the
grant of the demurrer to evidence] lies outside the function of certiorari. True, a
petition for certiorari alleges an error of the trial court but nowhere in our decision
did it mention that the trial court in this case committed an error. We merely
made an assumption, without saying that there was an error committed by the trial
court, to make a point. We meant that if the trial court did commit an error in
ruling that there was insufficient evidence resulting in the acquittal of the accused,
such error can no longer be reviewed since it would be one of judgment, which is
not within the ambit of a certiorari. xxx

The petitioner again asks us: Who has the duty of requiring the accused to sign
the pre-trial order, the prosecution or the trial court itself? It answers that it is the trial
court because it has the sole and exclusive duty of seeing to it that all requirements in
such proceedings be duly complied with x x x and that duty includes the act of requiring
or compelling the accused to sign the pre-trial order, [hence] it is plainly fundamentally
erroneous to suppose that such duty can be delegated by the trial court to the
prosecution. The petitioner further argues that the respondent Court was right off
ousted of jurisdiction when it deliberately and without legal basis refused to consider
the stipulation of facts made by the parties in the eventual pre-trial order x x x despite
the absence of signature of the accused in the said pre-trial order.

The arguments of the petitioner are baseless. Nowhere in Rule 118 on Pre-Trial
on the Revised Rules of Rules of Criminal Procedure does it require the prosecution or
the accused to sign the pre-trial order. All that is required for the trial court to do is to
hold a pre-trial conference and issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts
stipulated upon by the parties, and evidence marked. And if there were any agreements
or admissions made or entered into by the parties during the pre-trial conference, these
should be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and his or her counsel.
Otherwise, such agreements or admissions may not be used against the accused. xxx

Hence, it is not incumbent upon the trial court to require the parties to sign
the pre-trial order to make the agreements and admissions as evidence against the
accused. If the parties made such admission as to the identities of the accused in
this case, it is the look-out of the counsels, particularly the prosecutor, to require
the accused to sign. Why should the trial court remind the counsels what to do?
If the private prosecutor wanted such admission as an evidence against the
accused, then she should have required the admission in writing [sic] and signed
by the accused and their counsel as required by the rules. But, as the records
show, all that was signed was the minutes of the pre-trial conference. As already
discussed in our decision, the trial court committed no error on this point.
[11]




Hence, this petition.


The Issues

Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in:

I. HOLDING THAT SUPPOSEDLY IT IS NOT THE DUTY OF THE TRIAL
COURT TO REQUIRE THE ACCUSED TO SIGN THE PRE-TRIAL
ORDER;

II FAILING TO CONSIDER THE MATTERS STATED IN THE 11 JUNE
1997 PRE-TRIAL ORDER AS STIPULATIONS MADE BY THE
PARTIES AND SHOULD THUS BE BINDING ON THEM;

III. REFUSING TO RECOGNIZE THE FACT THAT THE ACCUSED WERE
SUFFICIENTLY IDENTIFIED DURING THE TRIAL BY THE WITNESS
OF THE PROSECUTION; [AND]

IV. HOLDING THAT DOUBLE JEOPARDY HAD ALLEGEDLY ATTACHED
IN THE CASE.
[12]

In his Memorandum, the Solicitor General joins causes with petitioner. The
Solicitor General contends that the trial courts dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-
154193 was tainted with grave abuse of discretion thus, double jeopardy does not
apply in this case.
[13]



The Ruling of the Court


The petition has no merit.


On Whether Double J eopardy is
Applicable Here


Paragraph 1, Section 7, Rule 117 (Section 7) of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure
[14]
on double jeopardy provides:

Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint
or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal
of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the
offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged
in the former complaint or information.


For double jeopardy to apply, Section 7 requires the following elements in
the first criminal case:

(a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction;
(b) The court had jurisdiction;
(c) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and
(d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express
consent.
[15]



On the last element, the rule is that a dismissal with the express consent or upon
motion of the accused does not result in double jeopardy. However, this rule is
subject to two exceptions, namely, if the dismissal is based on insufficiency of
evidence or on the denial of the right to speedy trial.
[16]
A dismissal upon demurrer
to evidence falls under the first exception.
[17]
Since such dismissal is based on the
merits, it amounts to an acquittal.
[18]


As the Court of Appeals correctly held, the elements required in Section 7
were all present in Criminal Case No. 96-154193. Thus, the Information for estafa
through falsification of a public document against respondent spouses was
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. The trial court had
jurisdiction over the case and the persons of respondent spouses. Respondent
spouses were arraigned during which they entered not guilty pleas. Finally,
Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Consequently, the right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense became vested on respondent spouses.


The Extent of the Right Against
Double J eopardy

The right against double jeopardy can be invoked if (a) the accused is
charged with the same offense in two separate pending cases, or (b) the accused is
prosecuted anew for the same offense after he had been convicted or acquitted of
such offense, or (c) the prosecution appeals from a judgment in the same
case.
[19]
The last is based on Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court
[20]
which
provides that [a]ny party may appeal from a final judgment or order, except if the
accused would be placed thereby in double jeopardy.

Here, petitioner seeks a review of the 21 April 1998 Order dismissing
Criminal Case No. 96-154193 for insufficiency of evidence. It is in effect
appealing from a judgment of acquittal. By mandate of the Constitution
[21]
and
Section 7, the courts are barred from entertaining such appeal as it seeks an inquiry
into the merits of the dismissal. Thus, we held in an earlier case:

In terms of substantive law, the Court will not pass upon the propriety of
the order granting the Demurrer to Evidence on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence and the consequent acquittal of the accused, as it will place the latter in
double jeopardy. Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal
made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not
place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two
exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to a speedy
trial xxx In the case before us, the resolution of the Demurrer to Evidence was
based on the ground of insufficiency of evidence xxx Hence, it clearly falls under
one of the admitted exceptions to the rule. Double jeopardy therefore, applies to
this case and this Court is constitutionally barred from reviewing the order
acquitting the accused.
[22]
(Emphasis supplied)


The strict rule against appellate review of judgments of acquittal is not
without any basis. As the Court explained in People v. Velasco
[23]


The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial
court cuts deep into the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the
rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State x x x x
Thus, Green [v. United States] expressed the concern that (t)he underlying idea, one
that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that
the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent,
he may be found guilty.

It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted
defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his
acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of
acquittals is part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the
protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction. The interest in the finality-of-
acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a
need for repose, a desire to know the exact extent of ones liability. With this right of
repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent,
even those whose innocence rests upon a jurys leniency, will not be found guilty in a
subsequent proceeding.

Related to his right of repose is the defendants interest in his right to have
his trial completed by a particular tribunal. xxx [S]ocietys awareness of the
heavy personal strain which the criminal trial represents for the individual
defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit Government to a single
criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal
laws. The ultimate goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal finds its
voice in the finality of the initial proceeding. As observed in Lockhart v. Nelson,
(t)he fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State
should not be able to oppress individuals through the abuse of the criminal
process. Because the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final
judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be
unfair.



On Petitioners Claim that the Trial Courts
Dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was Void

Petitioner, together with the Solicitor General, contends that the Court can
inquire into the merits of the acquittal of respondent spouses because the dismissal
of Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was void. They contend that the trial court acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
disregarded evidence allegedly proving respondent spouses identity.
[24]


The contention has no merit. To be sure, the rule barring appeals from
judgments of acquittal admits of an exception. Such, however, is narrowly drawn
and is limited to the case where the trial court act[ed] with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction due to a violation of due
process i.e. the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case xxx
or that the trial was a sham xxx.
[25]


None of these circumstances exists here. There is no dispute that the
prosecution, through petitioners counsel as private prosecutor, was afforded its
day in court. Neither is there any question that the proceedings in the trial court
were genuine. What petitioner points to as basis for the trial courts alleged grave
abuse of discretion really concerns its appreciation of the evidence. However, as
the Court of Appeals correctly held, any error committed by the trial court on this
point can only be an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. What this Court held
in Central Bank v. Court of Appeals
[26]
applies with equal force here

Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that the People of
the Philippines cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double
jeopardy. The argument that the judgment is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion and therefore, null and void, is flawed because whatever error may
have been committed by the lower court was merely an error of judgment and not
of jurisdiction. It did not affect the intrinsic validity of the decision. This is the
kind of error that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no
matter how obvious the error may bexxx. (Emphasis supplied)

On the Other Errors Assigned by Petitioner

The Court will no longer rule on the other errors assigned by petitioner on
who has the responsibility to insure that the pre-trial agreement is signed by the
accused, on the effect of the 11 June 1997 Order, and on whether respondent
spouses were identified during the trial. All these entail an inquiry into the merits
of the 21 April 1998 Order, which, as earlier stated, cannot be done without
violating respondent spouses right against double jeopardy.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated
14 November 2001 and the Resolution dated 24 January 2002 of the Court of
Appeals.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice


WE CONCUR:



HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
Chairman






LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Associate Justice





ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice



CERTIFICATION


Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.



HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice






[1]
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner, with Associate Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion and Juan Q.
Enriquez, Jr., concurring.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 84-85.
[4]
Ibid., p. 78.
[5]
Annex D of Petition; Rollo, p. 79.
[6]
It appears that petitioner foreclosed respondent spouses mortgage, bought the Malate lot during the foreclosure
sale, and obtained a certificate of sale in its favor.
[7]
Rollo, pp. 93-99.
[8]
Ibid., pp. 91-100.
[9]
Ibid., pp. 75-76. (Capitalization in the original)

[10]
Rollo, pp. 64-72.
[11]
Ibid., pp. 56-59.
[12]
Ibid., pp. 27-28.
[13]
Ibid., pp. 225-235.
[14]
Reiterated in Section 7, Rule 117 of the REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (effective 1 December 2000).
[15]
II F. REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 491 (10
th
ed., 2004).
[16]
People v. Bans, G.R. No. 104147, 8 December 1994, 239 SCRA 48.
[17]
Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, (superseded by Section
23, Rule 119 of the REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE) provides: Demurrer to evidence. After the
prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on
its own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed
with prior leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the
accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and
submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. (Emphasis supplied)
[18]
People v. City Court of Silay, G.R. No. L-43790, 9 December 1976, 74 SCRA 247.
[19]
II F. REGALADO, supra note 15.
[20]
Substantially reiterated in Section 1, Rule 122 of the REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
[21]
Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides: No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. (Emphasis supplied)
[22]
People v. Bans, supra note 16 (internal citations omitted).
[23]
G.R. No. 127444, 13 September 2000, 340 SCRA 207 (internal citations omitted).
[24]
Rollo, pp. 47-50, 225-235.
[25]
People v. Sandiganbayan, 426 Phil. 453 (2002) (internal citations omitted).
[26]
G.R. No. 41859, 8 March 1989, 171 SCRA 49.


People v. Ylagan
physical injuries
A defendant is in legal jeopardy when he was put to trial in the following conditions:
a. in a court of competent jurisdiction
b. upon a valid complaint or information
c. after he has been arraigned
d. after he has pleaded to the information

without the consent of the accused
does not mean over the objection of the accused or against the will of the accused ; mere silence or
failure to object

People v. Balisacan
homicide
Existence of a plea is an essential requisite in order that the accused may be in jeopardy. In this case, he
first entered a plea of guilty and subsequently, he was ed to testify on the mitigating circumstances and
he said he acted in self defense: this had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty;
court should have required a new plea.

Cudia v. CA
requisites in order to successfully invoke the defense of double jeopardy/ substantiate an claim of
jeopardy

a. a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second
b. first jeopardy must have been validly terminated
c. second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the second offense includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit of frustration thereof.
Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily
dismissed by the prosecution

----- Termination of jeopardy -----

1. Bustamante v. Maceren
reopening of a case
No re-opening of a case may be ordered of a criminal case after accused has
started serving his sentence; a judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served or the
defendant ha waived in writing his appeal; withdrawal of plea of guilty does not constitute waiver of
defense of double jeopardy timely invoked.

People v. Obsania
rape
In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of an accused, the following
requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution/ double jeopardy attaches when:
a. a valid complaint or information
b. a competent court
c. defendant had pleaded to the charge
d. defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his consent dismissal with express consent of the defendant constitutes waiver

Rivera v. People
transportation of marijuana
VERBAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL which was not reduced into writing may be set aside by the judge and
enter a new one duly signed by him, reinstating the case

Cuison v. CA
double homicide
The promulgation of only one part of the decision i.e. liability for civil indemnity, is NOT A BAR, to the
subsequent promulgation of the other part, the imposition of the criminal accountability doctrine on
double jeopardy same as in Cudia and Obsania cases.

People v. Velasco
homicide and frustrated homicide Requisites to successfully invoke double jeopardy (refer to
Obsania); Where an acquittal is concerned, the rules do not distinguish whether it occurs at the level of
the trial court or an appeal on a judgment of conviction. This firmly establishes the finality-of-acquittal rule;
An acquittal is final and unappealable ON THE GROUND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY whether it happens
at the trial court of before the Court of Appeals; doctrine that double jeopardy may not be invoked after
trial may apply only when the Court finds that the criminal trial was a sham because the prosecution
representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was denied due process.

Salcedo v. Mendoza
homicide through reckless imprudence
General rule: dismissal of criminal case upon motion or with express consent of accused will not be
a bar to the subsequent prosecution of the accused for the same offense. EXCEPTION TO THE RULE:
when dismissal is grounded upon the right of the accused to a speedy trial. This amounts to a judgment
of acquittal on the merits which bars the subsequent prosecution of accused for the same offense

Oriente v. People
homicide; lead pipe
It is well settled that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy; Courts have the inherent power to amend their
decisions to make them conformable to law and justice; change in penalty by the RTC did not involve
the consideration of new evidence but a mere correction

People v. Cajigal
homicide to murder

The change of the offense charged from homicide to murder is merely a formal amendment and not a
substantial amendment or a substitution;

----- Same offense; ordinance
and states -----

People v. Relova
theft of electricity; punishable by an ordinance and the RPC A person who was charged for violating a
city ordinance which was dismissed for prescription of the offense may not be charged again under the
RPC; claim of double jeopardy is available even if prior offense charged under an ordinance is different
from subsequent offense charged in a statue where both offenses spring from the same act; where an
offense is punished by different sections of a statute, the inquiry, for the purpose of double jeopardy,
is on identity of offenses charged. In contrast, where an offense is penalized by an ordinance and a
statute, the inquiry is on the identity of acts; Identity of offenses (examining elements of the two offenses);
identity of acts (examining the locus or such acts in time and place); For double jeopardy
to be available, not all technical elements of the first offense need be present in the definition of the
second offense; Damages, civil liability will continue to be heard

People v. City Court of Manila
the defense of double jeopardy cannot prosper when there is no identity of the offenses charged.
Evidence required to prove one offense is not the same evidence required to prove the other; An appeal
by the prosecution from the order of dismissal by the trial court SHALL NOT constitute double
jeopardy if:
a. the dismissal is made upon motion or with express consent of the defendant;
b. dismissal is NOT an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case;
c. question to be passed upon the appellate court is purely legal (if dismissal is incorrect, case will be
remanded to the court of origin)

----- Rule on supervening facts

Melo v. People
physical injuries; injured party dies; homicide The rule of identity does not apply when the
second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such
case, there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense
that was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction,
the injured person dies, the charged for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in
jeopardy.

People v. Buling
[less] serious physical injuries; X-ray; two physicians; two complaints -
The prosecution of the accused for less serious physical injuries is a bar for his prosecution with serious
physical injuries. If the X-ray examination disclosed the existence of a fracture when the second
examination was made, this must have been present during the first examination; There was therefore no
supervening fact which would justify application of the rule of double jeopardy.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-41863 April 22, 1977
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and ASST. PROV'L FISCAL F.
VISITACION, JR., petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, Presiding Judge, Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and MARGARITO FAMA, JR., respondents.
Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General
Alicia V. Sempio-Diy and Solicitor Amado D. Aquino for petitioners.
Fama & Jimenea for private respondent.

BARREDO, J :
Petition for certiorari; to set aside the orders of respondent judge dated
September 22, 1975 and October 14, 1975 dismissing Criminal Case No.
5241 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against private respondent
Margarito Fama, Jr., said dismissal being predicated on the ground of
double jeopardy, in view of the dismissal of a previous charge of slight
physical injuries against the same respondent for the same incident by the
Municipal Court of Janiuay, Iloilo in Criminal Case No. 3335,
notwithstanding that in the information in the first-mentioned case, it was
alleged that the injuries sustained by the offended party, aside from
possibly requiring medical attendance from 6 to 9 days barring
complications", as was alleged in the information in Criminal Case No.
3335, had left "a permanent sear and deform(ed) the right face of (said
offended party) Miguel Viajar."
The first criminal complaint filed against respondent Fama Jr. on April 15,
1975 (Case No. 3335) was as follows:
That at about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of April 12, 1975, at
Aquino Nobleza St., Municipality of January, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court
the above-named accused, while armed with a piece of stone,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault,
attack and use personal violence upon one Miguel Viajar by
then hurling the latter with a stone, hitting said Miguel Viajar on
the right cheek, thereby inflicting physical injuries which would
have required and will require medical attendance for a period
from 5 to 9 days barring complication as per medical certificate
of the physician hereto attached.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Pp. 93-94, Record)
Arraigned on July 7, 1975, the accused entered a plea of not guilty.
Meanwhile, on June 8, 1975, complainant Viajar filed a letter-complaint with
the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo charging Atty. Alfredo Fama, Raul Fama and
herein respondent Margarito Fama, Jr. with serious physical injuries arising
from the same incident alleged in above Criminal Case No. 3335. After
conducting a preliminary investigation, under date of July 28, 1975, the
Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo an information, but only
against respondent Fama Jr., (Case No. 5241) for serious physical injuries
as follows:
That on or about April 12, 1975, in the Municipality of January,
Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, and without any
justifiable motive, armed with pieces of stone did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and throw
pieces of stone at Miguel Viajar, hitting him on the lower right
eye which would heal from five (5) to nine (9) days barring
complications but leaving a permanent scar and deforming on
the right face of said Miguel Viajar.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Pp. 94-95, Record)
On August 1, 1975, Fama Jr. filed an urgent motion to defer proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 5241, claiming that since he was already charged and
pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case No. 3335, he would be in double
jeopardy, if Case No. 5241 were to be prosecuted. This motion was
opposed by the Fiscal and the Court required both parties to file their
respective memorandum on the issue of double jeopardy.
In the meantime, the Fiscal after filing Case No. 5241, sought the dismissal
of Case No. 3335, but the Municipal Court did not act on said motion.
Instead, the case was set for hearing, and in view of the postponements
asked by the Fiscal in order to await the resolution of the issue of double
jeopardy in Case No. 5241, on September 11, 1975, the following order
was entered:
Under our democratic and constituted system of government
litigants before our courts of justice, plaintiffs and defendants,
complainants and accused are entitled to the equal protection
of our laws. More is an accused, the trial of his case has been
repeatedly postponed for several times by this Court in the
exercise of its sound discretion at the instance of the
prosecution. So, when this case was called for hearing on the
afternoon of September 1, 1975 the accused through counsel
vigorously objected to another postponement and moved for
the dismissal of the case against him. To grant another
postponement as sought by the Fiscal against the vehement,
strong and vigorous objection of the accused is to the mind of
the Court, no longer an exercise of sound discretion consistent
with justice and fairness but a clear and palpable abuse of
discretion amounting to a serious denial to, and a grave
violation of, the right of the accused to a speedy trial to which
he is rightfully entitled to under Section 16 of Article IV, (Bill of
Rights) of the Philippine Constitution.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the above-entitled case is
hereby ordered dismissed. The Cash Bond posted by the
accused is hereby ordered cancelled and released (Pp. 96-97,
Record.)
Whereupon, on even date, Fama Jr. filed an addendum to his
memorandum in Case No. 5241 inviting attention to the above dismissal
order and reiterating his theory of double jeopardy. On September 22,
1975, respondent court issued the impugned order sustaining the
contention of double jeopardy and dismissing Case No. 5241. The
prosecution's motion for reconsideration was denied in the other assailed
order of October 14, 1975, respondent judge relying on the ruling laid down
in Peo. vs. Silva, 4 SCRA 95.
In brief, what happened here was that when Case No. 3335 was filed in the
inferior court of January, the charge against Fama Jr. had to be for slight
physical injuries only, because according to the certification of the attending
physician, the injuries suffered by the offended party Viajar, would require
medical attendance from 5 to 9 days only "baring complications." Indeed,
when the complaint was filed on April 15, 1975, only three days had passed
since the incident in which the injuries were sustained took place, and there
were yet no indications of a graver injury or consequence to be suffered by
said offended party. Evidently, it was only later, after Case No. 3335 had
already been filed and the wound on the face of Viajar had already healed,
that the alleged deformity became apparent.
Now, expert evidence is not needed for anyone to understand that the scar
or deformity that would be left by a wound on the face of a person cannot
be pre-determined. On the other hand, whether or not there is actually a
deformity on the face of Viajar is a question of fact that has to be
determined by the trial court. The only issue We are to resolve here is
whether or not the additional allegation of deformity in the information in
Case No. 5241 constitutes a supervening element which should take this
case out of the ruling in People vs. Silva cited by respondent court.
In Silva, there was no question that the extent of the damage to property
and physical injuries suffered by the offended parties therein were already
existing and known when the prior minor case was prosecuted, What is
controlling then in the instant case is Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766, in
which it was held:
This rule of identity does not apply, however, when the second
offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution,
for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for
the accused during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an
offense that was then inexistent Thus, where the accused was
charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured
dies, the charge of homicide against the same accused does
not put him twice in jeopardy.
So also is People vs. Yorac, 42 SCRA, 230, to the following effect:
Stated differently, if after the first. prosecution 'a new fact
supervenes on which defendant may be held liable, resulting in
altering the character of the crime and giving rise to a new and
distinct offense, 'the accused cannot be said to be in second
jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.
In People vs. Buling, 107 Phil. 112, We explained how a deformity may be
considered as a supervening fact. Referring to the decision in People vs.
Manolong, 85 Phil. 829, We held:
No finding was made in the first examination that the injuries
had caused deformity and the loss of the use of the right hand.
As nothing was mentioned in the first medical certificate about
the deformity and the loss of the use of the right hand, we
presumed that such fact was not apparent or could have been
discernible at the time the first examination was made. The
course (not the length) of the healing of an injury may not be
determined before hand; it can only be definitely known after
the period of healing has ended. That is the reason why the
court considered that there was a supervening fact occuring
since the filing of the original information.
In other words, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, the plea of
double jeopardy of private respondent Fama Jr., cannot hold. It was,
therefore, a grave error correctible by certiorari for respondent court to
have dismissed Criminal Case No. 5241.
ACCORDINGLY, the orders of September 22, 1975 and October 14, 1975
herein complained of are hereby set aside and respondent court is ordered
to proceed with the trial and judgment thereof according to law. Costs
against private respondent Fama Jr.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.


FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 95939. June 17, 1996]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. FLORENTINO BRACAMONTE y ABELLAR, MANUEL
REGINALDO y SAPON, and ERNIE LAPAN y CABRAL alias
ERNING BULAG, defendants-appellants.
D E C I S I O N
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J .:
Alibi, the plea of having been elsewhere than at the scene of the crime at the time of
the commission of the felony, is a plausible excuse for the accused. Let there be no
mistake about it. Contrary to the common notion, alibi is in fact a good defense. But, to
be valid for purposes of exoneration from a criminal charge, the defense of alibi must be
such that it would have been physically impossible for the person charged with the
crime to be at the locus criminis at the time of its commission, the reason being that no
person can be in two places at the same time. The excuse must be so airtight that it
would admit of no exception. Where there is the least possibility of accused's presence
at the crime scene, the alibi will not hold water.
Appellant Florentino Bracamonte y Abellar, Manuel Reginaldo y Sapon, and Ernie
Lapan y Cabral alias Erning Bulag, stand charged with the crime of Robbery with
Double Homicide under the following Information, dated October 6, 1987:
"The undersigned 2nd Asst. City Fiscal for the City of Cavite accuses Florentino
Bracamonte y Abellar, Manuel Reginaldo y Sapon and Ernie Lapan y Cabral alias
Erning Bulag of the crime of Robbery with Double Homicide, committed as follows:
That on or about September 23, 1987, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each other, with
intent to gain did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house
of one Violeta Sayaman Parnala, and once inside, by means of violence and
intimidation, rob, take and carry away a necklace worth P600.00 and ring worth
P440.00 belonging to one Jay Vee Parnala Custodio, son of Violeta Sayaman Parnala,
without the consent of the said owner and to his damage and prejudice in the total
amount of P1,100.00, Philippine Currency and that on the occasion of the said
robbery, and in pursuance of their conspiracy, the above-named accused, with intent
to kill, did, then and there, wilfully unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, scald
and stab Jay Vee Parnala inflicting upon Jay Vee Parnala Custodio 3 incised and 15
stab wounds and upon Teresita Minorca Rosalinas 1 incised and 6 stab wounds on the
different parts of their body, which ultimately caused their deaths.
Contrary to law.''
[1]

Ernie Lapan y Cabral was tried and convicted of the crime in a Decision of the
court a quo, dated February 13, 1989, and his case is on appeal with this
Court. Manuel Reginaldo y Sapon is at large.
Appellant Bracamonte had been at large until his arrest on October 27, 1989. He
had been in hiding for more than two years.
The present appeal deals solely with the conviction by the court a quo of herein
appellant Bracamonte.
Arraigned on November 13, 1989, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the crime
charged.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch XVII, rendered judgment
on September 21, 1990 finding appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of
the judgment reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Florentino
Bracamonte y Abellar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Double Homicide and he is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA, to
indemnify the heirs of Jay Vee Parnala and Teresita Rosalinas the amount of P30,000
each and to pay unto Violeta Parnala P1,100.00 corresponding to the value of the
articles lost without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
cost."
[2]

Hence, appellant interposed the present appeal, assigning the following errors:
I
"x x x IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PROSECUTION WITNESS' DECLARATION
CONCERNING THE POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT AS ONE OF THE THREE (3) MEN WHO ALLEGEDLY EMERGED
FROM THE GARAGE DOOR OF THE VICTIM'S HOUSE AND SPRINTED
AWAY THEREFROM ALMOST IMMEDIATELY.
II
x x x IN APPRECIATING THE THEN EXTANT CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCES AS INDICATIVE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S GUILT.
III
x x x IN ITS PRONOUNCEMENT THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT EVADED
ARREST BY HIDING AFTER HIS ALLEGED COMMISSION OF THE HEINOUS
CRIME IMPUTED AGAINST HIM.
IV
x x x IN DISREGARDING COMPLETELY THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI PUT UP BY
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT."
[3]

At the trial in the court a quo, the following facts appear to have been proven:
On September 23, 1987, at about 8:30 in the evening, Violeta Parnala and her
common-law husband, Clark Din, arrived home from the Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's
Witnesses. She rang their doorbell and when she got no response, she pounded on the
garage door while her husband went to the back of their house and stoned the window
of their son's room. Then, she heard somebody trying to remove the padlock of the
garage door and saw a man, prompting her to shout, "magnanakaw, magnanakaw."
After the door was opened, three (3) men rushed out, one after the other, whom she
recognized as appellant Bracamonte, Ernie Lapan and Manuel Reginaldo.
Upon hearing his wife shouting, Clark Din rushed to her and saw a man about to
turn at the other street. He ran after him but could not catch up. He thus proceeded
back to their house. By this time, some of their neighbors, roused by the shouting of
Violeta, came out of their houses, among whom were Pat. Sahagun and Pat.
Punzal. The two (2) policemen went with Clark Din inside the house and saw the
television set on. Din turned on the lights and started to look for his son. He tried the
bathroom but it was locked. He then went to their room, got the keys and opened the
bathroom where he saw their maid, Teresita M. Rosalinas, hands tied with her mouth
gagged, and bathed in her own blood. Thereafter, he saw their son, Jay Vee Parnala, in
the dirty kitchen, his head and body immersed in a pail of water, dead.
Dr. Regalado Sosa, City Health Officer of Cavite City, conducted an autopsy on the
cadavers of Jay Vee and Rosalina. His findings disclosed that Rosalina sustained six
(6) stab wounds and one (1) incised wound, while Jay Vee sustained thirteen (13) stab
wounds and three (3) incised wounds on different parts of the body.
[4]
In the case of
Rosalina, the most fatal wounds were wounds Nos. 6 and 7 while in the case of Jay
Vee, almost all of the wounds were fatal due to his age.
[5]
Jay Vee was only six years old
at the time of his death.
Appellant Florentino Bracamonte denied the charge and interposed the defense of
alibi. According to him, he was not in Cavite City at the time the crime was committed,
but was then in the premises of the RM Motor Works located in Paraaque, Metro
Manila. This shop is owned by Rafael Diaz. Appellant worked as an all around
employee, alternating as a mechanic and shopkeeper of Rafael Diaz.
We affirm the conviction of the herein appellant.
The defense of alibi is a handy but shabby excuse which indictees never seem to
tire of.
[6]
At the risk of sounding like a broken record, we reiterate once more the oft-
repeated rule that the defense of alibi is worthless in the face of positive
identification.
[7]
In the case at bench, Violeta Parnala, witness for the prosecution and
mother of one of the victims, positively testified that she saw appellant Bracamonte,
together with Manuel Reginaldo and Ernie Lapan, come out of their garage door,
obviously immediately after the incident in question. The situation was that the accused
were still inside the Parnala residence when the spouses Parnala arrived thereat. This
circumstance and the fact that the three accused left Violeta in a hurried manner and
without paying their respects to the house owner as would have been the case if their
presence in the Parnala house were legitimate, constitute circumstantial evidence of
their culpability. Violeta clearly saw the three (3) men because they were only about an
arm's length from where she was when they scampered out of the garage door. As they
came out, they were practically facing her. Moreover, although the light coming from
the electric post, admittedly, was dim, there was additional illumination coming from the
houses nearby sufficient to enable her to identify the malefactors: Thus:
"Q: Following your testimony, you were outside the small door knocking, then these
three persons came out from the garage?
A: They were still in the garage when suddenly they opened the door of the garage. I
thought he is our maid and I told him that I was knocking here for a long time
already why did you wake up just now.
Q: And the distance between you and the place where they came out was very short
distance?
A: Yes, Ma'am.
Q: What is the distance?
A: About an arm (sic) length.
Q: And you said they walked very fast?
A: Not so fast. When they were already outside they ran so fast.
Q: Mrs. Witness, is there a lighting facilities (sic) in your door?
A: There is an electric post that has a light.
Q: And would it be 8 to 10 meters from the door of your garage?
A: It could be not so far (sic) because our house is at the corner.
Q: Page 35 of your transcript of stenographic notes shows it is about 8 to 10
meters. What is the kind of light?
A: Electric bulb.
Q: Not the fluorescent?
A: Bulb.
Q: And it was about how high?
A: The height of an electric post.
Q: It could be about 20 feet?
A: I am not sure.
Q: And you will agree with me that that light was not sufficient enough to be able to
clearly see the faces of the persons going out of the garage?
A: The house nearby have also light. The place was also lighted by the houses of
the neighbor which has a light."
[8]

Violeta Parnala was unswerving in her identification in open court of appellant
Bracamonte as one of the felons who emerged from their house, considering that the
latter used to drive her son to school. As further recounted by Violeta, viz:
Q: In your direct testimony when you were asked this question. Q: Why do you know
the accused? A: Because my son used to ride in his jeepney on his way to
school. How young was your son Jay Vee Parnala Custodio when the incident
happened?
A: He was six years old?
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And during those times when this Teresita Rosalinas and your son Jay Vee
Parnala Custodio were going to school, you do not mind who the driver was of the
jeepney they were taking?
A: I also looked at him.
Q: But your concern was merely to reach their destination, not to identify the driver of
the jeepney?
A: Of course when my child leaves the house, I used to see who was the driver
because I have much concern about my son in case something might happen.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What is in the driver taking your son to school (sic) or the distinguishing feature
that made you say that you came to know the accused because he used to ride in
the jeepney of his?
A: Of course the feature of his face and the built of his body.
Q: Was there any distinguishing feature in his face or in his body, what is it?
A: His face a little bit round.
Q: If that accused is in the courtroom today, will you be able to identify him?
A: Yes, Ma'am (He is there, witness pointing to the accused.)
Q: How many times more or less did your son Jay Vee and Teresita Rosalinas ride in
this jeepney being driven by this Bracamonte?
A: I cannot remember already how many times but I could see them very often riding
in the jeepney.
Q: And this accused Bracamonte is not living in your neighborhood?
A: He is also living in that place but a little bit far from our place."
[9]

Appellant countered, however, that witness Violeta could not have known him
personally since her son and maid rode coincidentally on appellant's jeepney only on
occasions whenever he passed by the witness' house in the course of regular
work. Their relationship was impersonal, not conducive to close and regular
relationship thereby ruling out intimate knowledge of each other.
[10]
The implication is that
Violeta could not have positively identified him as one of those who emerged from the
garage door of the victims' house, they being complete strangers to each other.
This averment is of no consequence, because nowhere in the testimony of Violeta
did she claim that she knows the appellant personally. What she testified to was that
she used to see her son and maid ride in appellant's jeepney very often,
[11]
which is the
reason why she became familiar with appellant's physical appearance. There is nothing
in law and jurisprudence which requires, as a condition sine qua non, that in order for
there to be a positive identification by a prosecution witness of a felon, he must first
know the latter personally. If this were the case, the prosecution would rarely get any
conviction since, in most instances, the perpetrator of the crime is unrelated to the
victim. No further requirement is imposed by law on the prosecution than that the
identification made by its witness be direct, firm, unequivocal, and, most importantly,
credible. The witness' degree of closeness or familiarity with the accused, although
may be helpful, is by no means an indispensable requirement for purposes of positive
identification.
To corroborate his defense of alibi, appellant presented Rafael Diaz, owner of RM
Motor Works in Paraaque, where appellant used to work as an all around employee
and where he allegedly spent the night on September 23, 1987, the time when the
crime was committed. Diaz' testimony contributed very little, if at all, to his
defense. The direct examination of Diaz reveals the following:
"Q: Please recall the specific date of September 23, 1987, have you gone to your
shop?
A: As far as I know, I cannot remember. At that date because of too long to recall
(sic) but what can say is that I know that he stayed in the shop. He sleep (sic) in
the shop.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, you said that you used to visit, inspect your shop usually in the
morning. Now, tell us Mr. Witness have you done that in September 1987?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In your doing such inspection, where was Florentino Bracamonte?
A: He was in the shop.
Q: For the whole month of September 1987?
A: Yes, sir.
[12]

However, on cross-examination, Diaz became more ambivalent:
"Q: And you are definite that on September 23, 1987 as you mentioned earlier you did
not know if the accused left your shop or not?
A: In the afternoon.
Q: On September 23, 1987?
A: I am not sure.
COURT:
Q: You are not sure he did not leave?
A: Yes, Your Honor, I am not sure.
[13]

The above testimony, whose purpose is to corroborate appellant's defense of alibi,
failed to serve its purpose for it was hardly clear and convincing. Thus, the trial court
did not commit any error in refusing to give probative value to this piece of
evidence. Settled is the doctrine that the trial court's evaluation of the credit-worthiness
of the testimony given before it by witnesses must be accorded great respect.
[14]
It has
been said that the defense of alibi is inherently weak since it is very easy to concoct. In
order that this defense may prosper, it must be established clearly and convincingly not
only that the accused is elsewhere at the time of the commission of the crime, but that
likewise it would have been physically impossible for him to be at the vicinity
thereof.
[15]
In the instant case, appellant Bracamonte tragically failed to show, by clear
and convincing proof, that it was physically impossible for him to be at the victims'
house at the time the crime was committed, apart from his self-serving declaration that
he was at RM Motors Works in Paraaque on the fateful night of September 23, 1987,
seconded by the discredited testimony of his alleged employer, Rafael Diaz.
With marked relevance is the fact that there appears to be no motive on the part of
Violeta Parnala to falsely accuse appellant, other than her sincere desire to seek justice
for the deaths of her son and maid. Appellant himself admitted that he was not aware of
any reason or motive why Violeta should testify falsely against him.
[16]
Positive
identification by an independent witness who has not been shown to have any reason or
motive to testify falsely must prevail over simple denials and the unacceptable alibi of
the accused.
[17]

Appellant insists that, as proof of his innocence, he did not escape nor evade arrest
after the commission of the crime imputed against him. He contends that he stayed in
his place of employment in Paraaque, Metro Manila, from 1986 to 1989, regularly
performing his job, when he was apprehended on the strength of a warrant of arrest.
This is contrary to the finding of the court a quo which held that:
"Accused Florentino Bracamonte y Abellar also stayed at large until his arrest on
October 27, 1989 after more than two years of hiding to evade the scales of justice.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x [A]ccused chose to flee from the scene of the crime and to stay beyond the
clutches of the law x x x, thus spotlighting the legal maxim 'the guilty fleeth while the
innocent stands fast, bold as a lion."'
[18]
The evidence on record does not warrant
reversal of this finding by the trial court. It is this Court's bounden duty to refrain
from reviewing findings of fact by the lower court, considering that it has all the
opportunity to directly observe the witnesses and to determine by their demeanor on
the stand the probative value of their testimonies.
[19]

In any case, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that appellant's claim of non-flight is
true, there is no law or principle which guarantees that non-flight per se is proof, let
alone conclusive proof, of one's innocence and, as in the case of alibi, such a defense is
unavailing when placed astride the undisputed fact that there is positive identification of
the felon.
[20]

Finally, appellant claims that the evidence against him is purely circumstantial which
is insufficient to sustain his conviction. He submits that there is no solitary piece of
evidence directly linking him to the commission of the crime imputed against him, hence
he should be acquitted.
This argument is specious. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which
indirectly proves a fact in issue.
[21]
In this jurisdiction, direct evidence is not only the basis
upon which the guilt of an accused may be proved; it may also be established through
circumstantial evidence.
[22]
Under the Revised Rules on Evidence, circumstantial
evidence will support and justify a conviction if the following requisites concur:
(1) There is more than one circumstance;
(2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
[23]

In the case at bench, the circumstances pointing to accused-appellant's guilt are as
follows:
(1) He was not an inmate of private complainant's house and so, his presence therein
at a late hour in the evening indicate his and his companions' evil designs.
(2) He and his cohorts were seen coming out of the victims' house immediately after
the crime of robbery with homicide was perpetrated.
(3) After coming out, the culprits immediately fled.
(4) He and Sapon went into hiding for more than two (2) years. Bracamonte was
arrested on October 27, 1989.
The above circumstances, highlighted by the testimony of Violeta Parnala which
was straightforward and clear as to the identity of the appellant as one of the
malefactors, clearly point to appellant Bracamonte's guilt. Thus was overcome, by proof
beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence in appellant's favor.
In contrast, appellant merely relies on denial and alibi, weak defenses, to support
his claim of innocence, which defenses were overthrown by the prosecution.
The Court notes that appellant, together with his two (2) other co-accused, were
charged and convicted of robbery with double homicide. The charge and the
corresponding conviction should have been for robbery with homicide only although two
persons were killed.
[24]
In this complex crime, the penalty prescribed in Article 294(1) of
the Revised Penal Code is not affected by the number of killings accompanying the
robbery.
[25]
The multiplicity of the victims slain, though, is appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance.
[26]

Although Republic Act No. 7659 reimposed the death penalty for certain heinous
crimes, including robbery with homicide,
[27]
the capital punishment could not be imposed
in the case at bench. The crime here was committed way back in September 23, 1987,
while R.A. No. 7659 took effect only on December 31, 1993.
[28]
To impose upon
appellant the death penalty would violate the basic rule in criminal law that, if the new
law imposes a heavier penalty, the law in force at the time of the commission of the
offense shall be applied,
[29]
which in this case is Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code sans the death penalty clause by virtue of Section 19 (1), Article III of the 1987
Constitution which provides, viz:
"x x x Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua."
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
modification that the conviction is for robbery with homicide, and the indemnity for the
heirs of the two victims is hereby increased from P30,000 to P50,000
[30]
each.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.



[1]
Original Records, p 1.
[2]
Decision, pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 23-24.
[3]
Brief for the Accused-Appellant, p. 18.
[4]
Exhibits "K" and "L"; Records, pp. 79-81.
[5]
TSN, 19 March 1990, pp. 10 and 16.
[6]
People vs. Gamiao, 240 SCRA 254, 261 [1995].
[7]
People vs. Rivera, 242 SCRA 26, 37 [1995] citing People vs. Dominguez, 217 SCRA 170 [1993];
People vs. De la Cruz, 217 SCRA 283 [1993].
[8]
TSN, 19 December 1989, pp. 16-19.
[9]
TSN, 19 December 1989, pp. 9-13.
[10]
Brief for the Accused-Appellant, pp. 19-20.
[11]
TSN, 19 December 1989, p. 13.
[12]
TSN, 19 June 1990, pp. 9-13.
[13]
TSN, 19 June 1990, p. 20.
[14]
People v. Machete, 231 SCRA 272, 277 [1994] citing People v. Munda, 189 SCRA 425 [1990].
[15]
People v. Marinas, 248 SCRA 165, 174-175 [1995] citing People v. Madriaga IV, 171 SCRA 103 [1989]
[16]
TSN, 28 March 1990, pp. 22-23.
[17]
People v. Lamsing, 248 SCRA 471, 477 [1995].
[18]
Decision, pp. 2 and 8; Rollo, pp. 17 and 23.
[19]
People v. Gomez, 229 SCRA 138, 144 [1994] citing People v. Yadao, 216 SCRA 1 [1992].
[20]
People v. Amania, 248 SCRA 486, 493 [1995] citing People v. Desalisa, 229 SCRA 35 [1994];
People v. Parica, G.R. No. 80677, 21 April 1995.
[21]
People v. Ramos, 240 SCRA 191, 198 [1995] citing Gardner, Criminal Evidence, Principles, Cases and
Readings, West Publishing Co., 1978 ed., p. 124
[22]
People v. Merza, 238 SCRA 283, 288 [1994] citing People v. Cagadas, Jr., 193 SCRA 216 [1991].
[23]
Section 4, Rule 133, Revised Rules on Evidence; People v. Pajarit, 214 SCRA 678, 682 [1992];
People v. Iran, 216 SCRA 575, 580[1992].
[24]
People v. Vivas, 232 SCRA 238, 243 [1994].
[25]
Ibid.
[26]
People v. Timple, 237 SCRA 52, 70 [1994].
[27]
SEC. 9. Article 294 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons - Penalties. - Any person guilty of
robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer.
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the
crime of homicide shall have been committed or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape
or intentional multilation or arson.x x x."
[28]
People v. Godoy, G.R. Nos. 115908-09, December 6, 1995.
[29]
Reyes, Luis B., The Revised Penal Code, Book One, 13th edition, p. 14.
[30]
Supra, note 24 at 244.


FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 95939. June 17, 1996]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. FLORENTINO BRACAMONTE y ABELLAR, MANUEL
REGINALDO y SAPON, and ERNIE LAPAN y CABRAL alias
ERNING BULAG, defendants-appellants.
D E C I S I O N
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J .:
Alibi, the plea of having been elsewhere than at the scene of the crime at the time of
the commission of the felony, is a plausible excuse for the accused. Let there be no
mistake about it. Contrary to the common notion, alibi is in fact a good defense. But, to
be valid for purposes of exoneration from a criminal charge, the defense of alibi must be
such that it would have been physically impossible for the person charged with the
crime to be at the locus criminis at the time of its commission, the reason being that no
person can be in two places at the same time. The excuse must be so airtight that it
would admit of no exception. Where there is the least possibility of accused's presence
at the crime scene, the alibi will not hold water.
Appellant Florentino Bracamonte y Abellar, Manuel Reginaldo y Sapon, and Ernie
Lapan y Cabral alias Erning Bulag, stand charged with the crime of Robbery with
Double Homicide under the following Information, dated October 6, 1987:
"The undersigned 2nd Asst. City Fiscal for the City of Cavite accuses Florentino
Bracamonte y Abellar, Manuel Reginaldo y Sapon and Ernie Lapan y Cabral alias
Erning Bulag of the crime of Robbery with Double Homicide, committed as follows:
That on or about September 23, 1987, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each other, with
intent to gain did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house
of one Violeta Sayaman Parnala, and once inside, by means of violence and
intimidation, rob, take and carry away a necklace worth P600.00 and ring worth
P440.00 belonging to one Jay Vee Parnala Custodio, son of Violeta Sayaman Parnala,
without the consent of the said owner and to his damage and prejudice in the total
amount of P1,100.00, Philippine Currency and that on the occasion of the said
robbery, and in pursuance of their conspiracy, the above-named accused, with intent
to kill, did, then and there, wilfully unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, scald
and stab Jay Vee Parnala inflicting upon Jay Vee Parnala Custodio 3 incised and 15
stab wounds and upon Teresita Minorca Rosalinas 1 incised and 6 stab wounds on the
different parts of their body, which ultimately caused their deaths.
Contrary to law.''
[1]

Ernie Lapan y Cabral was tried and convicted of the crime in a Decision of the
court a quo, dated February 13, 1989, and his case is on appeal with this
Court. Manuel Reginaldo y Sapon is at large.
Appellant Bracamonte had been at large until his arrest on October 27, 1989. He
had been in hiding for more than two years.
The present appeal deals solely with the conviction by the court a quo of herein
appellant Bracamonte.
Arraigned on November 13, 1989, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the crime
charged.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch XVII, rendered judgment
on September 21, 1990 finding appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of
the judgment reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Florentino
Bracamonte y Abellar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Double Homicide and he is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA, to
indemnify the heirs of Jay Vee Parnala and Teresita Rosalinas the amount of P30,000
each and to pay unto Violeta Parnala P1,100.00 corresponding to the value of the
articles lost without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
cost."
[2]

Hence, appellant interposed the present appeal, assigning the following errors:
I
"x x x IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PROSECUTION WITNESS' DECLARATION
CONCERNING THE POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT AS ONE OF THE THREE (3) MEN WHO ALLEGEDLY EMERGED
FROM THE GARAGE DOOR OF THE VICTIM'S HOUSE AND SPRINTED
AWAY THEREFROM ALMOST IMMEDIATELY.
II
x x x IN APPRECIATING THE THEN EXTANT CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCES AS INDICATIVE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S GUILT.
III
x x x IN ITS PRONOUNCEMENT THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT EVADED
ARREST BY HIDING AFTER HIS ALLEGED COMMISSION OF THE HEINOUS
CRIME IMPUTED AGAINST HIM.
IV
x x x IN DISREGARDING COMPLETELY THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI PUT UP BY
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT."
[3]

At the trial in the court a quo, the following facts appear to have been proven:
On September 23, 1987, at about 8:30 in the evening, Violeta Parnala and her
common-law husband, Clark Din, arrived home from the Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's
Witnesses. She rang their doorbell and when she got no response, she pounded on the
garage door while her husband went to the back of their house and stoned the window
of their son's room. Then, she heard somebody trying to remove the padlock of the
garage door and saw a man, prompting her to shout, "magnanakaw, magnanakaw."
After the door was opened, three (3) men rushed out, one after the other, whom she
recognized as appellant Bracamonte, Ernie Lapan and Manuel Reginaldo.
Upon hearing his wife shouting, Clark Din rushed to her and saw a man about to
turn at the other street. He ran after him but could not catch up. He thus proceeded
back to their house. By this time, some of their neighbors, roused by the shouting of
Violeta, came out of their houses, among whom were Pat. Sahagun and Pat.
Punzal. The two (2) policemen went with Clark Din inside the house and saw the
television set on. Din turned on the lights and started to look for his son. He tried the
bathroom but it was locked. He then went to their room, got the keys and opened the
bathroom where he saw their maid, Teresita M. Rosalinas, hands tied with her mouth
gagged, and bathed in her own blood. Thereafter, he saw their son, Jay Vee Parnala, in
the dirty kitchen, his head and body immersed in a pail of water, dead.
Dr. Regalado Sosa, City Health Officer of Cavite City, conducted an autopsy on the
cadavers of Jay Vee and Rosalina. His findings disclosed that Rosalina sustained six
(6) stab wounds and one (1) incised wound, while Jay Vee sustained thirteen (13) stab
wounds and three (3) incised wounds on different parts of the body.
[4]
In the case of
Rosalina, the most fatal wounds were wounds Nos. 6 and 7 while in the case of Jay
Vee, almost all of the wounds were fatal due to his age.
[5]
Jay Vee was only six years old
at the time of his death.
Appellant Florentino Bracamonte denied the charge and interposed the defense of
alibi. According to him, he was not in Cavite City at the time the crime was committed,
but was then in the premises of the RM Motor Works located in Paraaque, Metro
Manila. This shop is owned by Rafael Diaz. Appellant worked as an all around
employee, alternating as a mechanic and shopkeeper of Rafael Diaz.
We affirm the conviction of the herein appellant.
The defense of alibi is a handy but shabby excuse which indictees never seem to
tire of.
[6]
At the risk of sounding like a broken record, we reiterate once more the oft-
repeated rule that the defense of alibi is worthless in the face of positive
identification.
[7]
In the case at bench, Violeta Parnala, witness for the prosecution and
mother of one of the victims, positively testified that she saw appellant Bracamonte,
together with Manuel Reginaldo and Ernie Lapan, come out of their garage door,
obviously immediately after the incident in question. The situation was that the accused
were still inside the Parnala residence when the spouses Parnala arrived thereat. This
circumstance and the fact that the three accused left Violeta in a hurried manner and
without paying their respects to the house owner as would have been the case if their
presence in the Parnala house were legitimate, constitute circumstantial evidence of
their culpability. Violeta clearly saw the three (3) men because they were only about an
arm's length from where she was when they scampered out of the garage door. As they
came out, they were practically facing her. Moreover, although the light coming from
the electric post, admittedly, was dim, there was additional illumination coming from the
houses nearby sufficient to enable her to identify the malefactors: Thus:
"Q: Following your testimony, you were outside the small door knocking, then these
three persons came out from the garage?
A: They were still in the garage when suddenly they opened the door of the garage. I
thought he is our maid and I told him that I was knocking here for a long time
already why did you wake up just now.
Q: And the distance between you and the place where they came out was very short
distance?
A: Yes, Ma'am.
Q: What is the distance?
A: About an arm (sic) length.
Q: And you said they walked very fast?
A: Not so fast. When they were already outside they ran so fast.
Q: Mrs. Witness, is there a lighting facilities (sic) in your door?
A: There is an electric post that has a light.
Q: And would it be 8 to 10 meters from the door of your garage?
A: It could be not so far (sic) because our house is at the corner.
Q: Page 35 of your transcript of stenographic notes shows it is about 8 to 10
meters. What is the kind of light?
A: Electric bulb.
Q: Not the fluorescent?
A: Bulb.
Q: And it was about how high?
A: The height of an electric post.
Q: It could be about 20 feet?
A: I am not sure.
Q: And you will agree with me that that light was not sufficient enough to be able to
clearly see the faces of the persons going out of the garage?
A: The house nearby have also light. The place was also lighted by the houses of
the neighbor which has a light."
[8]

Violeta Parnala was unswerving in her identification in open court of appellant
Bracamonte as one of the felons who emerged from their house, considering that the
latter used to drive her son to school. As further recounted by Violeta, viz:
Q: In your direct testimony when you were asked this question. Q: Why do you know
the accused? A: Because my son used to ride in his jeepney on his way to
school. How young was your son Jay Vee Parnala Custodio when the incident
happened?
A: He was six years old?
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And during those times when this Teresita Rosalinas and your son Jay Vee
Parnala Custodio were going to school, you do not mind who the driver was of the
jeepney they were taking?
A: I also looked at him.
Q: But your concern was merely to reach their destination, not to identify the driver of
the jeepney?
A: Of course when my child leaves the house, I used to see who was the driver
because I have much concern about my son in case something might happen.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What is in the driver taking your son to school (sic) or the distinguishing feature
that made you say that you came to know the accused because he used to ride in
the jeepney of his?
A: Of course the feature of his face and the built of his body.
Q: Was there any distinguishing feature in his face or in his body, what is it?
A: His face a little bit round.
Q: If that accused is in the courtroom today, will you be able to identify him?
A: Yes, Ma'am (He is there, witness pointing to the accused.)
Q: How many times more or less did your son Jay Vee and Teresita Rosalinas ride in
this jeepney being driven by this Bracamonte?
A: I cannot remember already how many times but I could see them very often riding
in the jeepney.
Q: And this accused Bracamonte is not living in your neighborhood?
A: He is also living in that place but a little bit far from our place."
[9]

Appellant countered, however, that witness Violeta could not have known him
personally since her son and maid rode coincidentally on appellant's jeepney only on
occasions whenever he passed by the witness' house in the course of regular
work. Their relationship was impersonal, not conducive to close and regular
relationship thereby ruling out intimate knowledge of each other.
[10]
The implication is that
Violeta could not have positively identified him as one of those who emerged from the
garage door of the victims' house, they being complete strangers to each other.
This averment is of no consequence, because nowhere in the testimony of Violeta
did she claim that she knows the appellant personally. What she testified to was that
she used to see her son and maid ride in appellant's jeepney very often,
[11]
which is the
reason why she became familiar with appellant's physical appearance. There is nothing
in law and jurisprudence which requires, as a condition sine qua non, that in order for
there to be a positive identification by a prosecution witness of a felon, he must first
know the latter personally. If this were the case, the prosecution would rarely get any
conviction since, in most instances, the perpetrator of the crime is unrelated to the
victim. No further requirement is imposed by law on the prosecution than that the
identification made by its witness be direct, firm, unequivocal, and, most importantly,
credible. The witness' degree of closeness or familiarity with the accused, although
may be helpful, is by no means an indispensable requirement for purposes of positive
identification.
To corroborate his defense of alibi, appellant presented Rafael Diaz, owner of RM
Motor Works in Paraaque, where appellant used to work as an all around employee
and where he allegedly spent the night on September 23, 1987, the time when the
crime was committed. Diaz' testimony contributed very little, if at all, to his
defense. The direct examination of Diaz reveals the following:
"Q: Please recall the specific date of September 23, 1987, have you gone to your
shop?
A: As far as I know, I cannot remember. At that date because of too long to recall
(sic) but what can say is that I know that he stayed in the shop. He sleep (sic) in
the shop.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, you said that you used to visit, inspect your shop usually in the
morning. Now, tell us Mr. Witness have you done that in September 1987?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In your doing such inspection, where was Florentino Bracamonte?
A: He was in the shop.
Q: For the whole month of September 1987?
A: Yes, sir.
[12]

However, on cross-examination, Diaz became more ambivalent:
"Q: And you are definite that on September 23, 1987 as you mentioned earlier you did
not know if the accused left your shop or not?
A: In the afternoon.
Q: On September 23, 1987?
A: I am not sure.
COURT:
Q: You are not sure he did not leave?
A: Yes, Your Honor, I am not sure.
[13]

The above testimony, whose purpose is to corroborate appellant's defense of alibi,
failed to serve its purpose for it was hardly clear and convincing. Thus, the trial court
did not commit any error in refusing to give probative value to this piece of
evidence. Settled is the doctrine that the trial court's evaluation of the credit-worthiness
of the testimony given before it by witnesses must be accorded great respect.
[14]
It has
been said that the defense of alibi is inherently weak since it is very easy to concoct. In
order that this defense may prosper, it must be established clearly and convincingly not
only that the accused is elsewhere at the time of the commission of the crime, but that
likewise it would have been physically impossible for him to be at the vicinity
thereof.
[15]
In the instant case, appellant Bracamonte tragically failed to show, by clear
and convincing proof, that it was physically impossible for him to be at the victims'
house at the time the crime was committed, apart from his self-serving declaration that
he was at RM Motors Works in Paraaque on the fateful night of September 23, 1987,
seconded by the discredited testimony of his alleged employer, Rafael Diaz.
With marked relevance is the fact that there appears to be no motive on the part of
Violeta Parnala to falsely accuse appellant, other than her sincere desire to seek justice
for the deaths of her son and maid. Appellant himself admitted that he was not aware of
any reason or motive why Violeta should testify falsely against him.
[16]
Positive
identification by an independent witness who has not been shown to have any reason or
motive to testify falsely must prevail over simple denials and the unacceptable alibi of
the accused.
[17]

Appellant insists that, as proof of his innocence, he did not escape nor evade arrest
after the commission of the crime imputed against him. He contends that he stayed in
his place of employment in Paraaque, Metro Manila, from 1986 to 1989, regularly
performing his job, when he was apprehended on the strength of a warrant of arrest.
This is contrary to the finding of the court a quo which held that:
"Accused Florentino Bracamonte y Abellar also stayed at large until his arrest on
October 27, 1989 after more than two years of hiding to evade the scales of justice.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x [A]ccused chose to flee from the scene of the crime and to stay beyond the
clutches of the law x x x, thus spotlighting the legal maxim 'the guilty fleeth while the
innocent stands fast, bold as a lion."'
[18]
The evidence on record does not warrant
reversal of this finding by the trial court. It is this Court's bounden duty to refrain
from reviewing findings of fact by the lower court, considering that it has all the
opportunity to directly observe the witnesses and to determine by their demeanor on
the stand the probative value of their testimonies.
[19]

In any case, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that appellant's claim of non-flight is
true, there is no law or principle which guarantees that non-flight per se is proof, let
alone conclusive proof, of one's innocence and, as in the case of alibi, such a defense is
unavailing when placed astride the undisputed fact that there is positive identification of
the felon.
[20]

Finally, appellant claims that the evidence against him is purely circumstantial which
is insufficient to sustain his conviction. He submits that there is no solitary piece of
evidence directly linking him to the commission of the crime imputed against him, hence
he should be acquitted.
This argument is specious. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which
indirectly proves a fact in issue.
[21]
In this jurisdiction, direct evidence is not only the basis
upon which the guilt of an accused may be proved; it may also be established through
circumstantial evidence.
[22]
Under the Revised Rules on Evidence, circumstantial
evidence will support and justify a conviction if the following requisites concur:
(1) There is more than one circumstance;
(2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
[23]

In the case at bench, the circumstances pointing to accused-appellant's guilt are as
follows:
(1) He was not an inmate of private complainant's house and so, his presence therein
at a late hour in the evening indicate his and his companions' evil designs.
(2) He and his cohorts were seen coming out of the victims' house immediately after
the crime of robbery with homicide was perpetrated.
(3) After coming out, the culprits immediately fled.
(4) He and Sapon went into hiding for more than two (2) years. Bracamonte was
arrested on October 27, 1989.
The above circumstances, highlighted by the testimony of Violeta Parnala which
was straightforward and clear as to the identity of the appellant as one of the
malefactors, clearly point to appellant Bracamonte's guilt. Thus was overcome, by proof
beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence in appellant's favor.
In contrast, appellant merely relies on denial and alibi, weak defenses, to support
his claim of innocence, which defenses were overthrown by the prosecution.
The Court notes that appellant, together with his two (2) other co-accused, were
charged and convicted of robbery with double homicide. The charge and the
corresponding conviction should have been for robbery with homicide only although two
persons were killed.
[24]
In this complex crime, the penalty prescribed in Article 294(1) of
the Revised Penal Code is not affected by the number of killings accompanying the
robbery.
[25]
The multiplicity of the victims slain, though, is appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance.
[26]

Although Republic Act No. 7659 reimposed the death penalty for certain heinous
crimes, including robbery with homicide,
[27]
the capital punishment could not be imposed
in the case at bench. The crime here was committed way back in September 23, 1987,
while R.A. No. 7659 took effect only on December 31, 1993.
[28]
To impose upon
appellant the death penalty would violate the basic rule in criminal law that, if the new
law imposes a heavier penalty, the law in force at the time of the commission of the
offense shall be applied,
[29]
which in this case is Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code sans the death penalty clause by virtue of Section 19 (1), Article III of the 1987
Constitution which provides, viz:
"x x x Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua."
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
modification that the conviction is for robbery with homicide, and the indemnity for the
heirs of the two victims is hereby increased from P30,000 to P50,000
[30]
each.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.



[1]
Original Records, p 1.
[2]
Decision, pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 23-24.
[3]
Brief for the Accused-Appellant, p. 18.
[4]
Exhibits "K" and "L"; Records, pp. 79-81.
[5]
TSN, 19 March 1990, pp. 10 and 16.
[6]
People vs. Gamiao, 240 SCRA 254, 261 [1995].
[7]
People vs. Rivera, 242 SCRA 26, 37 [1995] citing People vs. Dominguez, 217 SCRA 170 [1993];
People vs. De la Cruz, 217 SCRA 283 [1993].
[8]
TSN, 19 December 1989, pp. 16-19.
[9]
TSN, 19 December 1989, pp. 9-13.
[10]
Brief for the Accused-Appellant, pp. 19-20.
[11]
TSN, 19 December 1989, p. 13.
[12]
TSN, 19 June 1990, pp. 9-13.
[13]
TSN, 19 June 1990, p. 20.
[14]
People v. Machete, 231 SCRA 272, 277 [1994] citing People v. Munda, 189 SCRA 425 [1990].
[15]
People v. Marinas, 248 SCRA 165, 174-175 [1995] citing People v. Madriaga IV, 171 SCRA 103 [1989]
[16]
TSN, 28 March 1990, pp. 22-23.
[17]
People v. Lamsing, 248 SCRA 471, 477 [1995].
[18]
Decision, pp. 2 and 8; Rollo, pp. 17 and 23.
[19]
People v. Gomez, 229 SCRA 138, 144 [1994] citing People v. Yadao, 216 SCRA 1 [1992].
[20]
People v. Amania, 248 SCRA 486, 493 [1995] citing People v. Desalisa, 229 SCRA 35 [1994];
People v. Parica, G.R. No. 80677, 21 April 1995.
[21]
People v. Ramos, 240 SCRA 191, 198 [1995] citing Gardner, Criminal Evidence, Principles, Cases and
Readings, West Publishing Co., 1978 ed., p. 124
[22]
People v. Merza, 238 SCRA 283, 288 [1994] citing People v. Cagadas, Jr., 193 SCRA 216 [1991].
[23]
Section 4, Rule 133, Revised Rules on Evidence; People v. Pajarit, 214 SCRA 678, 682 [1992];
People v. Iran, 216 SCRA 575, 580[1992].
[24]
People v. Vivas, 232 SCRA 238, 243 [1994].
[25]
Ibid.
[26]
People v. Timple, 237 SCRA 52, 70 [1994].
[27]
SEC. 9. Article 294 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons - Penalties. - Any person guilty of
robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer.
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the
crime of homicide shall have been committed or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape
or intentional multilation or arson.x x x."
[28]
People v. Godoy, G.R. Nos. 115908-09, December 6, 1995.
[29]
Reyes, Luis B., The Revised Penal Code, Book One, 13th edition, p. 14.
[30]
Supra, note 24 at 244.