IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA

Docket No. S14D1486

ANDREW BRANTLEY,
Applicant,

v.

VERA JONES, and
EFFINGHAM COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS AND REGISTRATION,
Respondents.


CANDIDATE VERA JONES RESPONSE TO
APPLICATION FOR DISCRETIONARY APPEAL



FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF EFFINGHAM COUNTY
CASE NO. SU14-CV-046-P


Steven E. Scheer
Georgia Bar No.: 629050
Craig A. Call
Georgia Bar No.: 825753
SCHEER & MONTGOMERY, P.C.
8 East Liberty Street
Savannah, GA 31401
(912) 233-1273

ATTORNEYS FOR CANDIDATE VERA JONES


[1]

IN THE SUPREME COURT
FOR THE STATE OF GEORGIA

ANDREW BRANTLEY, )
Applicant, )
)
v. ) Docket No.: S14D1486
)
EFFINGHAM COUNTY BOARD OF )
ELECTIONS AND REGISTRATION, )
Respondent. )

CANDIDATE VERA JONES RESPONSE TO
APPLICATION FOR DISCRETIONARY APPEAL

COMES NOW, Candidate Vera Jones, by and through the undersigned
Counsel, and pursuant to Rule 33 of the Supreme Court of Georgia, and files this
Response to Andrew Brantleys Application for Discretionary Appeal, stating the
following:
I. INTRODUCTION
A. PARTIES TO THIS APPLICATION FOR DISCRETIONARY APPEAL.
For clarity, Candidate Vera Jones will first address the parties to this appeal
and the style of the case proposed by Applicant Andrew Brantley. Applicant
Brantley appealed a ruling of the Effingham County Superintendent of Elections,
the Effingham County Board of Elections and Registration (hereinafter Board of
Elections), which found Candidate Vera Jones qualified to run for the Effingham
County Board of Commissioners District 2 seat. Applicant Brantley filed the

[2]

initial appeal with the Superior Court of Effingham County under O.C.G.A. 21-
2-6(e).
In the initial appeal, Applicant Brantley listed the Board of Elections as a
Respondent and Vera Jones as Candidate. In the immediate application
however, Applicant Brantley omits Candidate Jones from the Application. The
Application contains allegations against both the Board of Elections and Candidate
Jones. Thus, Candidate Jones believes she may be a proper party to this appeal.
B. CANDIDATE JONES FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.
Candidate Jones does not agree with the facts as set forth by Applicant
Brantley; the Application omits numerous and critical relevant facts regarding this
matter. This Application is a result of a properly entered Order from the Effingham
County Superior Court affirming the Board of Elections decision declaring
Candidate Jones qualified to run for the District 2 Commissioner seat in Effingham
County.
On March 14, 2014, Applicant Brantley filed a challenge to Jones
candidacy for the District 2 seat, alleging she was the holder of public funds
illegally under the Constitution of the State of Georgia, Article II, Section 2,
Paragraph 3. The challenge further alleged Jones was the holderof public
moneywho has refused or failedto account for and pay over the same to the
proper officer Based on the allegations, Applicant Brantley claimed Candidate

[3]

Jones was not qualified to run for the District 2 seat. The entirety of Applicants
claims is based upon a 2007 payment from Effingham County to DM Jones
Construction, Inc. (DM Jones). There is no dispute the monies were paid to DM
Jones, a corporation in good standing operated by Candidate Jones husband
Dennis Jones. No money was ever paid to Vera Jones.
In 2007, the Effingham County Finance Department issued a check to DM
Jones in the amount of $739,844.86.
1
Applicant claims Effingham County
erroneously paid the money to DM Jones Construction Inc., the evidence,
including the attachments to the challengers complaint, clearly establish the
money was paid to the corporation and not to Vera Jones individually. The work
served to benefit the citizens and residents of Effingham County. It is also
undisputed fact Effingham County paid DM Jones, a duly existing corporate entity,
and not Vera Jones individually. Applicants allegations included the slogan Pay
it Back, Vera -- a knowingly false political dirty trick. Effingham County owed
DM Jones the money for work performed by DM Jones to the benefit of Effingham
County. In fact, DM Jones expended private money well in excess of the money
received from Effingham County to construct the subject infrastructure.
The Board of Elections scheduled a hearing on Petitioners challenge for
April 4, 2014. Applicant and Candidate Jones appeared at said hearing, both

1
The payment was for water and sewer infrastructure located within two
subdivisions, South Effingham Plantation and Buckingham Plantation.

[4]

represented by Counsel. Prior to the hearings commencement, the Board of
Elections addressed substantive and procedural matters raised by both parties.
Applicants Counsel raised issues regarding procedure and the subpoenaing of
witnesses. The Board of Elections offered Applicant a continuance to further
address such matters; however Applicant elected to continue with the scheduled
hearing. Candidate Jones counsel raised issues as to the involvement of
Applicants counsel, and the viability of Applicants stated challenge. The Board
of Elections found the issue of Petitioners counsels involvement is better suited
for consideration by the State Bar of Georgia and denied Candidate Jones Motion
to Disqualify Applicants Counsel. The Board then considered the merits of
Candidate Jones Motion to Dismiss the filed challenge. All parties stipulated
2
the
only issue was whether Vera Jones was the holder of public monies illegally or
unaccounted for.
On a 3-1 vote,
3
the Board of Elections voted to dismiss the challenge filed
against Jones, and affirmed her qualification as a candidate for the District 2 seat.
The Board drafted and entered a final decision on April 14, 2014. On April 24,
2014, Applicant filed its appeal to the Superior Court of Effingham County. The
Superior Court held a hearing on May 15, 2014, and allowed the Parties to submit

2
Hearing Transcript, pp. 58-59, ll. 9-25, 1-16; April 4, 2014. (Attached as Exhibit
A.)
3
Board member Herbert Jones recused himself prior to any proceedings due to a
business relationship with one of the involved.

[5]

legal briefs. On May 22, 2014, the Superior Court entered its Order affirming the
decision of the Board of Elections. After review of the record, the Superior Court
found in relevant part:
Rather, other evidence in the Superintendents record
indicates that the money was properly paid. A letter from R.
Jonathan Hart, attorney, to Effingham County Board of
Commissioners, is contained in the record in which Mr. Hart
provides an analysis of the monies paid to D.M. Construction
together with the rights of Effingham County. On page seven of
his letter to Effingham County, Mr. Hart indicated that the
developer had been paid, to date, approximately ninety-six
percent of the costs it incurred under a Water and Sewer
Agreement entered into with the county. This appears to fall into
line with the March 18, 2014 letter from then county attorney,
Eric Gotwalt, who indicated that there was no question as to the
amount owed, only the timing of the payment which the Court
interprets as whether or not Effingham County should have paid
the entire amount at once or through payments. In reviewing the
record, nothing has been shown which supports the Petitioners
claim that any public funds are being unlawfully held by the
Candidate; and when you analyze the qualification paperwork
and materials provided, the Board was authorized to find that the
Candidate had affirmatively established her qualifications as a
candidate for District 2 Commissioner.
Turning to issues of legal error, the petitioner alleges that the
Election Superintendent failed to provide findings of fact and
conclusions of law in its final written decision and failed to
follow proper procedure when it considered and granted the
Candidates motion to dismiss. Under Georgia statute, the
Superintendent, upon receiving a filed challenge, is required to
notify the candidate in writing of the challenge and set a hearing
on the matter and inform the parties of the date, time and place of
the hearing. O.C.G.A. 21-2-6(c). The record shows that these
steps were followed in the present matter. All other rules and
procedures are within the sound discretion of the Board. In
reviewing the record, both sides were given an opportunity to be

[6]

heard and to present evidence. In considering the motion to
dismiss, particularly in light of there being no evidence to
support Petitioners claim that any money was being unlawfully
held, the Court finds that the Board was within its discretion to
consider and grant the motion to dismiss; and in doing so, did not
violate any legal rights of the Petitioner.
Applicant then secured a Certificate of Immediate Review, although
unnecessarily as O.C.G.A. 21-2-6 provides for appeals pursuant to law, and
O.C.G.A. 5-6-35(a)(1) provides for discretionary appellate procedure to review
local and administrative agency actions. Nonetheless, Applicant filed the
application within thirty days of the Superior Court Order, and Candidate Vera
Jones responds accordingly.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SUPERIOR COURT
O.C.G.A. 21-2-6(e) provides after a decision on a challenge heard by a
superintendent of elections an appeal may be had to the superior court of the
county in which the candidate resides. The appeal does not act as an automatic stay
of the superintendents decision. The superintendent must then transmit the entire
record of the challenge and any proceedings held thereon to the superior court for
review. The superior courts review is confined to the record, and does not involve
a jury. Furthermore, the superior court does not have the authority to review the
record and alter any findings of fact supported by any evidence. Handel v. Powell,
284 Ga. 550, 552, 670 S.E.2d 62 (2008).

[7]

The superior court may reverse or modify the Boards decision only if
substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the findings,
inferences, conclusions, or decisions of the superintendent are: (1) In violation of
the Constitution or laws of this state; (2) In excess of the statutory authority of the
superintendent; (3) Made upon unlawful procedures; (4) Affected by other error of
law; (5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence on the whole record; or (6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an
abuse of discretion or a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. Id.
III. STANDARD TO GRANT APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
Under Rule 34 of the Supreme Court of Georgia, applications for
discretionary review under O.C.G.A. 5-6-35 should only be granted
4
when (1)
reversible error appears to exist; (2) the establishment of a precedent is desirable;
(3) further development of the common law, particularly in divorce cases, is
desirable; or (4) the application is for leave to appeal a judgment and decree of
divorce that is final under OCGA 5-6-34 (a) (1) and timely under OCGA 5-6-
35 (d) and is determined to have possible merit.
The Applicant bears the burden to demonstrate granting the discretionary
appeal is appropriate.
5
The only criteria potentially applicable to this matter are 1

4
Applicant failed to address the standard for granting discretionary review.
5
Harper v. Harper, 259 Ga. 246, 246, 378 S.E.2d 673 (1989).

[8]

and 2. Criterion 3 is inapplicable as the law relative to this matter is statutory and
constitutional. Criterion 4 is inapplicable as this is not a divorce action.
Additionally, actions of local and administrative agencies are subject to
discretionary appeal procedures under O.C.G.A. 5-6-35(a), specifically because
it permits appellate courts an avenue for expeditious review of superior court
decisions which are themselves a review of matters already decided by another
tribunal.
6
This further affords appellate courts the opportunity to decline review of
such matters without the necessity of rendering a full blown opinion.
7

IV. ARGUMENT and CITATION OF AUTHORITY
Although Applicants application does not clearly state or identify the
specific bases which it contends are sufficient grounds to grant the application,
Candidate Jones will attempt to respond to what appear to be the main points.
8

Applicant contends Candidate Jones can, and should be, considered a holder of
public funds. Applicant also contends Candidate Jones did not carry her burden of
proof before the tribunals below. Applicant further decries the Board of Elections
decision to accept and consider a Motion to Dismiss filed by Candidate Jones. As

6
Citizens & Southern Natl Bank v. Rayle et al., 246 Ga. 727, 730, 273 S.E.2d 139
(1980).
7
Tri-State Bldg. & Supply, Inc. v. Reid, 251 Ga. 38, 39, 302 S.E.2d 566 (1983).
8
Throughout the proceedings and in the Application, Applicant refers to fraud or
fraudulent writings in reference to an invoice submitted to Effingham County on
behalf of DM Jones. However, Applicant has not at any stage of the proceedings
even begun to state or show how the submitted invoice is purportedly fraudulent,
offering zero evidence to support the obviously feeble claim.

[9]

will be shown below, none of these bases, nor any other, are sufficient grounds for
the Application to be granted.
A. CANDIDATE VERA JONES IS NOT THE HOLDER OF PUBLIC FUNDS.
Candidate Jones Motion to Dismiss filed with the Board of Elections
showed the legal authorities relied upon by the Petitioner are wholly inapplicable
to Jones individually and as a candidate. Assuming arguendo the legal authorities
do apply to Candidate Jones (which is denied), she went above and beyond by
establishing the money was not being unlawfully held.
i. The Legal Authorities Relied Upon by Applicant do not Apply
to Candidate Vera Jones.

The viability of Applicants underlying challenge hinges first upon whether
Candidate Jones is a holder of public funds. The plain and simple answer is no.
The holders referred to in the constitutional provision and Georgia statute relied
upon by Petitioner are persons acting in an official capacity and collecting money
on behalf of a governmental entity. For example, a tax commissioner who collects
taxes on behalf of a county.
9
Applicants claim Candidate Jones is a holder of
public funds is completely devoid of any justifiable basis either in fact or law. The
Application for Discretionary Appeal should be denied.

9
See Weems v. Glenn, 199 Ga. 388, 390, 34 S.E.2d 511 (1945), explaining, State
ex rel. Lennard v. Frazier, 48 Ga. 137 (1873) (an execution issued by the
Comptroller General establishes a default against the tax collector, and the officer
is presumed to be the holder of public money unaccounted for).

[10]

ii. The Money at Issue is not Being Unlawfully Held.
Even if Candidate Jones were a holder of public funds (which is denied),
there is likewise no basis in fact or law showing the money at issue is being
unlawfully held. For money to be unlawfully held as alleged by Applicant, the
holder must have collected such money on behalf of a governmental entity, then
fail to pay over the balance owed to such entity. Again, the authorities relied upon
have absolutely no application to Candidate Jones.
Above all else, DM Jones received payment from Effingham County as a
corporate debt, Candidate Jones received nothing individually. As Candidate
Jones Motion to Dismiss
10
explained, Effingham Countys failure to perform its
obligations under two separate Water/Sewer Agreements forced DM Jones to
construct the water sewer infrastructure at its own, up-front cost. The actual cost to
DM Jones far exceeded the money received, and Effingham County values the
infrastructure at over 1.5 million dollars. Secondly, Candidate Jones did not collect
the money at issue in an official capacity on behalf of Effingham County. In fact,
she individually never received nor possessed a dime of the money at issue. Lastly,
two separate attorneys hired by Effingham County to investigate the matter arrived
at the same ultimate conclusion; the County owed the money to DM Jones.

10
Attached as Exhibit B.

[11]

The Superior Court also found the record evidence supported this
conclusion, In reviewing the record, nothing has been shown which supports the
Petitioners claim that any public funds are being unlawfully held by the
Candidate With the inability to establish before first the Board of Elections, and
then second before the Effingham County Superior Court, Applicant should not be
afforded yet another opportunity to advance the completely meritless, frivolous,
and frankly sanctionable claim Candidate Jones is the holder of public funds. The
Application for Discretionary Appeal should be denied.
B. THE BURDEN OF PROOF AS STATED BY APPLICANT IS INCORRECT.
Also like the stance before the Superior Court, Applicant contends
Candidate Jones has the burden to prove she is qualified for the District 2 seat upon
Applicant filing the challenge with the Board of Elections. Applicant cited to the
case of Haynes v. Wells, 273 Ga. 106 (2000), as support for its contention.
However as Candidate Jones pointed out to the Superior Court, and it again agreed,
Applicants reliance on the Haynes case for its stated contention is misplaced.
The Haynes case involves a candidate who ran in an election but was
subsequently disqualified based on inadequate qualification paperwork. While the
Haynes decision did place the burden on Haynes to affirmatively establish his
qualification for office, the burden referenced in the decision was only that of
filing proper qualification paperwork.

[12]

As the Honorable F. Gates Peed from the Effingham County Superior Court
explained, the holding in Haynes establishes a burden on the candidate to
establish all statutory qualifications, it does not place the burden on a candidate to
defend an illegitimate challenge. (Emphasis added.) Applicant misreads and
misinterprets the actual holding of Haynes. Furthermore, reading the Haynes
decision in toto reveals the proper context in which this Court found Haynes was
required to affirmatively establish his qualifications for office.
Notwithstanding, Candidate Jones did affirmatively establish she was
qualified for the District 2 seat. As is shown in the record, Candidate Jones
submitted her properly completed Declaration of Candidacy and Affidavit to the
Board of Elections on March 3, 2014, affirmatively swearing she is eligible and
qualified to hold the District 2 seat. Upon the filing and initial review by the Board
of Elections, Candidate Jones was declared qualified as a candidate.
Apparently Applicant believes Candidate Jones must establish her
qualifications in the forum and format most desirable to Applicant. Again however,
Applicant completely ignores the fact the Board of Elections is permitted by law to
create and follow its own rules and procedures. The contents of Candidate Jones
Motion to Dismiss, and the argument presented by her Counsel at the April 4,
2014, hearing are by far clear and convincing evidence Candidate Jones is
qualified for the District 2 seat. The burden of proof violation presented by

[13]

Applicant is completely baseless in fact or law. The Application for Discretionary
Appeal should be denied.
C. THE BOARD OF ELECTIONS PROPERLY CONSIDERED CANDIDATE JONES
FILED MOTION TO DISMISS.

Applicant repeatedly refers to the motion to dismiss filed by Candidate Jones
with the Board of Elections as untimely. Applicant also took this same posture
before the Superior Court below. As Candidate Jones pointed out to the Superior
Court, and the Superior Court agreed in its Order, the rules and procedures
employed by the Board of Elections when faced with a qualifications challenge are
within its sound discretion.
11

Neither in the Application nor in the record does Applicant provide any legal
authority establishing the Motion to Dismiss was untimely. To the contrary,
Candidate Jones provided the local legislation and proper statutory references
establishing the Board of Elections may create and follow its own procedures for
candidate qualification contests. Applicant continues to ignore the clear law on this
point and the same should not be a basis for granting the Application. The
Application for Discretionary Appeal should be denied.



11
See Effingham County Superior Court Order, page 3: the Court finds that the
Board was within its discretion to consider and grant the motion to dismiss

[14]

V. CONCLUSION
The Application filed by Andrew Brantley does not meet any applicable
criteria for granting an application for discretionary appeal under O.C.G.A. 5-6-
35(a)(1). Applicant has not shown reversible error or the need for establishing
precedent. The actions by the Effingham County Board of Elections and
Effingham County Superior Court were appropriate and just. There is clear legal
authority in existence to determine the issues on their merits. Candidate Vera
Jones is without a doubt in fact or law not the holder of public funds as contended
by Applicant, the burden of proof stated by Applicant is incorrect, and her Motion
to Dismiss was appropriate and accepted by the Board of Elections. Based on
Georgia statutory and well established case law, and the foregoing arguments, the
Application for Discretionary Appeal should be denied.

Respectfully Submitted, this 27
th
day of June, 2014.
/s/ Steve Scheer
Steven E. Scheer
Georgia Bar No.: 629050
Craig A. Call
Georgia Bar No.: 825753
Attorneys for Candidate Vera Jones
SCHEER & MONTGOMERY, P.C.
8 East Liberty Street
Savannah, GA 31401
(912) 233-1273
(912) 233-6584 facsimile



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that I have this day served counsel for all parties in the
foregoing matter by electronic mail, hand delivery, and/or by placing a copy in the
United States Mail with proper postage affixed addressed to the following:


Warren Ratchford
1571 Highway 21 South
Springfield, Georgia 31329
wratchford@werlaw.com

Richard Rafter
P.O. Box 176
Springfield, Georgia 31329
Rick@rafterlawfirm.com

Thomas L. Cole
Cole, Fleming & Clark, P.C.
337 Commercial Drive, Suite 500
Savannah, Georgia 31406
Tom@Cole-law.com


This 27
th
day of June, 2014.


/s/ Steve Scheer
Steven E. Scheer
Georgia Bar No.: 629050






Exhibit A


Transcript of Proceedings
Before the Effingham
County Board of Elections
April 4, 2014

Exhibit B


Candidate Vera Jones
Filed Motion to Dismiss
with Exhibits