The Relation between Virtue and Pleasure in Aristotle and Kant

Introduction
Every action and choice is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the
good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim.' (Aristotle: 1094a1-
3). Philosophy has always been concerned with trying to determine why we do the
actions we do: what are we hoping to achieve by performing certain actions? The
above quote is Aristotle's opening sentence in the Nicomachean ethics, but how are
we actually meant to achieve this good that we are aiming for? Many people in the
world would be happy to support the claim that the good is achieved by being
virtuous - but what exactly does this entail? For Aristotle, moral excellence comes
about as a result of habit' (Aristotle: 1103a16-17) and happiness is an activity of soul
in accordance with complete excellence' (Aristotle: 1102a1-2). It then seems we are
safe to claim that the good, (moral excellence), corresponds with happiness, but
was he right? And does this happiness include pleasure, or is it excluded? Are virtue
and pleasure synonymous? Can they even exist harmoniously at all?
Throughout the history of thought, philosophers have attempted to discern that
element of human nature that can be most aptly described as the action of taking
pleasure in doing certain actions, and in the consequences that arise from any given
action. The role of virtue in this pleasure process has been assessed and criticised
for hundreds of years; does being virtuous give us pleasure, or does pleasure
distract us from doing virtuous things? Is happiness the key to a moral life?
My aim in this essay is to address these questions, and related questions, according
to the philosophies of Kant and Aristotle. In doing so, I aim to discover what the
relation between virtue and pleasure really is, according to these two philosophers.
My aim is to discover what the role is of both virtue and pleasure, and the connection
between them, in the works of both philosophers, and try to establish where the two
philosophies align, and where they are incompatible.
At first, it seems as though both philosophers are wholly incompatible in their views
of where our morality, our motivation to strive for the good, comes from. Even how
the two define what the good is seems to differ too much to offer any similarities. As I
briefly mentioned in my opening paragraph, for Aristotle, the purpose of human life is
the good, and the highest of all goods achievable by action ... is happiness. And
[many] identify living well and faring well with being happy' (Aristotle: 1095a16-19).
For Kant however, the question of morality is wrapped up in the concept of duty -
he ... does the action without any inclination, simply from duty; then the action first
has its genuine moral worth' (Kant 1997: 4:398).
In this essay I will explain exactly what both meant, and critically assess their ideas,
with the ultimate goal of somehow reconciling the two seemingly opposing
viewpoints. In the process of doing this I will first give an explanation of the
foundations of these views - what part of each philosopher's life's work these ideas
about morality have arisen from.
Background
When examining any philosophical theory I think it is of vital importance to
understand how those particular ideas have been formed - what part of the writer's
thought and theories have these ideas originated from? In this section, I will give a
brief overview of whereabouts in their respective works do Kant and Aristotle
expound their views on morality, in reference to both pleasure and virtue.
Aristotle's Nicomachean ethics is part of his practical philosophy (along with his
Eudemian ethics), and is primarily a search for what the ultimate goal of human life
is. Aristotle was a student of Plato, and as such was likely to have been influenced
by his philosophy. It is nothing new to philosophy to be preoccupied with morality.
Arguably Plato's greatest work, The Republic is fundamentally an inquiry into
morality and justice, and what sort of society would be best for cultivating the moral
man. In book II of The Republic, Plato tells a story of the mythical ring of Gyges,
which is a ring that renders the wearer invisible. Glaucon (the teller of this story in
the dialogue) claims that no man, no matter how virtuous or just he is, could resist
acting immorally if there was no danger of punishment (Plato: 359c-360c). Glaucon
does not believe that any man who had no consequences to face would be moral -
his claim is that we are moral because society forces us to be so, through fear of
being reprimanded. In this case, morality becomes a social construct, and has
nothing to do with the singular man - who would dismiss moral behaviour in an
instant if he believed he could avoid castigation.
Aristotle's ethics do not follow this way of reasoning, he believes that man can be
moral within himself, and also that a man is not virtuous simply by performing
virtuous actions, his action must [also] proceed from a firm and unchangeable
character' (Aristotle: 1105a32-33). Aristotle is often misquoted about what he really
meant, due to a mistranslation of the original Greek. Aristotle describes the goal of
human life as eudaimonia, which is oft translated as happiness. However, the
original meaning of this word is something more akin to being blessed as regards
one's own spirit' (Pakaluk 2005: 47), or more literally, human flourishing. Pakaluk
(2005) goes on to explain the fundamental differences between our commonplace
definition of happiness and how we must understand it as a translation of
eudaimonia. Most importantly we must understand that Aristotle's happiness is not a
hedonistic happiness where pleasure is regarded as the chief good, or the proper
end of action' (OED 1989). Eudaimonia is a stable, lasting condition, one that does
not fluctuate according to day-to-day events - it is an ultimate goal rather than a
temporary one. It is also objectively universal - it is not a subjective condition based
upon the wants of each individual - it is a state of being, not a mood or inclination,
which is similar for all human beings and is characterised as living well - the happy
man lives well and fares well' (Aristotle: 1098b20).
Aristotle's definition of virtue is also similarly misunderstood. The original Greek is
arete which means any sort of excellence or distinctive power' (Pakaluk 2005: 5).
Thus being a virtuous person means possessing a certain sort of excellence (of
character) which leads us to act virtuously. This form of morality bases the value of
any action on the character of the agent - an agent must be a certain type of person
who will no doubt manifest his or her being in actions or non-actions' (Pojman 2002:
160). We cannot take morality from the actions in themselves, because virtue can be
demonstrated through the conscious omission of any certain action - morality must
instead be based upon the agent.
For Kant, his views of how pleasure can affect the goodness, or virtue, of any action
can be found most clearly in The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. The
Groundwork (1786) comes between the two different versions of the Critique of Pure
Reason that were published (1781 and 1787), and there is certainly a crossover of
concepts, with Kant utilising some of the arguments of the Critique in the
Groundwork. Namely, his distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds,
respectively, the world as it is in itself and the world as it appears to us. This
distinction between the true essence of things, and their appearances provides us
with two standpoints from which [man] can regard himself and cognize laws ... for all
of his actions' (Kant 1987: 4:452).
The aim of the Groundwork is to proceed analytically from common cognition to the
determination of its supreme principle' (Kant 1997: 4:392). In other words, Kant
wants to start from the common perception that every action has some sort of moral
value and discover what the underlying principle of morality is, that causes this
presupposition.
This supreme principle that we uncover must be a synthetic a priori one - we must be
able to deduce it from what we already know, because we are trying to discern how
we ought to be from the evidence of how we are. The Groundwork is the quest to
discover what this principle is. According to Kant a virtuous person is someone who
performs the right actions for the right reasons (which seems to be similar with
Aristotle's view - the action itself does not hold any value - the value instead lies
within the agent's intent). A person who acts thus demonstrates a good will, which is
the only thing to which we attribute total merit - It is impossible to think of anything ...
that could be considered good without limitation except a good will' (Kant 1997:
4:393).
This good will possesses worth completely independently of any circumstances, both
the means and the ends are good. Even if ... this will ... should yet achieve nothing,
then [it is still] something that has it full worth in itself' In other words, the good will
does not need to achieve its end in order to be good, merely the attempt is so.
Kant then introduces the concept of duty in order to explain how we are able to
manifest the good will in our actions. The concept of duty contains that of a good will
though under certain subjective limitations and hindrances, which, however, far from
concealing it and making in unrecognizable, rather bring it out by contrast and make
it shine forth all the more brightly' (Kant 1997: 4:397). If we do our duty from duty (i.e.
for its own sake, because it is the right thing to do, rather than due to some other
inclination or motivating desire) then we are doing the right actions for the right
reasons - we are being virtuous.
Kant uses formulations of his categorical imperative in order to demonstrate how we
can determine what our duty is, although I will not go into them in this chapter. Kant
shows that any system used to deduce our duty must be categorical, and not
hypothetical, because a hypothetical imperative tells you how to achieve a certain
end - if you will x, then you must also will y in order to be able to achieve x. A
hypothetical imperative is conditional, it depends on something else. A categorical
imperative cannot be so - it tells us what we ought to do unconditionally, not on the
condition of something else. Kant uses his formulations of the categorical imperative
in order to demonstrate when we can say an act is done from duty or not. If an act is
done from duty for duty's sake, then it is a virtuous action, if not, then it is not, even if
the action is not necessarily bad.
Virtue and Pleasure in Aristotle
Virtue can be taken to have several different meanings; the dictionary definition is
conformity of life and conduct with the principles of morality; voluntary observance of
the recognized moral laws or standards of right conduct; abstention on moral
grounds from any form of wrong-doing or vice' (OED 1989). For Aristotle the idea of
virtue is the mean between two vices, stray but a little from the middle, and you are
no longer being wholly virtuous. This Aristotelian view of virtue is often seen as in
direct opposition to the Kantian view of virtue - that the virtuous man is the man who
acts solely from the motivation of wanting to do his duty, without enjoying the act at
all. I will explain in full whether this common view of Kantian ethics is correct in the
following chapter, and in this chapter I will explain what I mean by my definition of
Aristotelian virtue, and exactly what that signifies in relation to pleasure.
Aristotle's ethics are usually defined as virtue ethics - they are agent centred, and
depend (like Kant) not on the act that is done, but instead on what sort of person we
need to be, what sort of character we need to have, in order to be able to commit
virtuous acts. Aristotle starts off the Nicomachean ethics by trying to discern what the
goal of human life is, and in book one manages to come up with what standards he
thinks this goal must adhere to - what are the characteristics this ultimate goal must
have in order to be classed as such?
Aristotle states that we call complete without qualification that which is always
desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else. Now such a thing
happiness, above all else, is held to be: for this we choose always for itself and
never for the sake of something else' (Aristotle: 1097a34-1097b1). Our ultimate goal,
the highest good, must be desired for itself only, and not as a means to something
else. Aristotle refers to this ultimate goal of human life as eudaimonia, but what does
this really mean? Does eudaimonia equate to hedonistic pleasure? Accordingly to
Aristotle, eudaimonia is not synonymous with pleasure, he states that happiness is
an activity of soul in accordance with complete excellence' (Aristotle: 1102a1-2), so
happiness is the achievement of pure excellence, or of complete virtuousness.
Human flourishing is what we achieve when we successfully fulfil the human function
- when we excel at what it is that makes us distinctly human.
This means, that in order to understand this human flourishing' which is the ultimate
goal of human life, we also need to understand the function of human beings -
Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude,
and a clearer account of what it is is still desired. This might perhaps be given, if we
could first ascertain the function of man.' (Aristotle: 1097b22-25). Aristotle believed
that everything in the world has an ergon, a function, which is that for the sake of
which it exists; therefore the achieving of this work, or, more precisely, its doing so
well, is its good; but only a good thing of a kind achieves its function well' (Pakaluk
2005: 75). For example, the function of a knife is to cut things, so a good knife must
be able to cut things well, therefore a good knife must be sharp. If there is to be a
human function, then it will be what makes us essentially human - what it is that
separates us from everything else in the world - the thing that we are best capable
of. But what makes Aristotle believe that humans necessarily have to have a
function?
Aristotle claims that it is merely common sense that man should have a function,
because everything else in the world does - Have the carpenter, then, and the
tanner certain functions or activities, and man has none? Is he naturally
functionless?' (Aristotle: 1097b29-30). It seems clear that man must have a function
just as any other thing does. So what is this function? If something only achieves its
function well if it possesses the certain virtues that make it a good thing of its kind
(like sharpness for the knife) then the human function must be something that is best
achieved by humans more than anything else in the world. Or even, it may be
something that is only achievable by human beings. A virtue is a trait that makes a
thing of a certain kind good and in view of which we call a thing of that kind good.'
(Pakaluk 2005: 75). In this way, Aristotle's function argument follows on to an
investigation into what qualities human beings possess, what virtues they possess in
their character, that makes them distinctively human.
In order to find out what the human function is, we need to find something that is
distinctive to humans. It cannot be merely living, as that is shared with even plants,
and it cannot be perception, because although that rules out plants, it still includes
the animal kingdom. Instead the human function must be an active life of the
element that has a rational principle' (Aristotle: 1098a3-4). In other words the human
function, that element of human beings which is characteristic to us alone, is our
capability to reason; our rationality.
Of course, this definition of the human function as rationality causes some problems
in the case of people who have diminished rationality - what does this mean for
them? Take, for example, the mentally handicapped who have reduced capacities of
reason through no fault of their own - are they really less capable of living fulfilling
and flourishing lives than normal people? Are they less good? It seems as
though, according to this argument, we are required to count them as worth less.
However, I will not dwell on this problem, as I am more concerned with what this idea
of a function implies for the role of pleasure in Aristotle's ethics.
What then, does it mean that the human function is our capacity to reason? The
human function is what we must achieve excellence in, in order to be good (just as
the knife must achieve excellence in its function of sharpness, in order to be a good
knife). This means that morality, and consequently virtue, are intrinsically linked to
the human function, to our rationality - it is our reason that allows us to achieve
virtue. We must use our reason in order to discern what is virtuous. Our function of
rationality is what allows us to achieve our excellence, to achieve our virtue.
So how does our reason allow us to achieve our virtue? It allows us to choose
whatever course of action we feel would allow us best to achieve our happiness, our
telos (ultimate goal). Hursthouse (1991) reads Aristotle as meaning that an action is
regarded as right because it is what a virtuous person would choose to do, but is it
not the other way round? Does a virtuous person not choose to do certain acts
because they are good? This problem is obviously reminiscent of Euthyphro's
dilemma from the platonic dialogue of the same name - is a certain act considered
good because God says it is so, or does God say it is so because it is good.
For Aristotle the ability to choose the morally right action in any situation is an ability
to follow the moral mean - that moral excellence is a mean, then, and in what sense
is it so, and that it is a mean between two vices, the one involving excess, the other
deficiency' (Aristotle: 1109a1-3). So for example, the virtue of bravery is the mean
between cowardice and rashness. Aristotle also states that virtue is dependent on
our character - if we have the right character we will be predisposed to commit
actions of the right sort. Moral excellence comes about as a result of habit ... states
arise out of like activities. This is why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain
kind' (Aristotle: 1103b20-22). Therefore, if we habitually perform the right sort of
action, then we will generate the right sort of character, thus enabling us to almost
automatically choose the correct action, which sits in the middle of this scale
between virtue and vice. Our eudaimonia is more and more fulfilled by each instance
in which our character automatically chooses the virtuous action.
Does this idea of virtue as the mean between two vices imply that pleasure is then a
vice, being the vice at one end of the scale of the virtue of moderation, whilst the
other end is despair? A virtue can be best described as the course of action that
allows us to achieve our eudaimonia. So is pleasure more suited to this task than
despair (if we take despair to be the other end of the scale)? Would the mean on the
scale in actuality lie closer to the end of pleasure than the other? Is this a purely
arithmetical mean, the exact midpoint between two extremes, or is it something more
flexible? Just as everyone requires different amounts of food in their everyday life
(such that everyone's mean between scarcity and gluttony differs), would it not
make sense that the mean of enjoyment is different for everyone as well? Such that
enjoyment of life, whilst it does not mean a slavish commitment to complete
hedonistic pleasure, could mean that pleasure does play an important role in our
lives. I believe that Aristotle would agree with me here, since he states that no one
nature or state is or is thought the best for all, neither do all pursue the same
pleasure' (Aristotle: 1153b29-30). In other words, we do not all desire the same
pleasures to the same degree, instead we pursue only those pleasures which are
best suited to helping each of us, as an individual, to achieve our eudaimonia.
We can therefore agree with Sherman's reading of Aristotle, that moral habituation is
the cultivation of fine (or noble) pleasures and pains' (Sherman 1989: 190). In this
way, virtuousness does not mean a complete abandonment of all pleasure, but
instead tells us that we should be interested in only those pleasures which are
worthy of the rational mind. In some ways this bears similarity with Mill's
recalculation of Bentham's utilitarianism - that some pleasures (of the intellect) are
worth more in the hedonic calculus than mere physical pleasures (Mill 2001).
However, appreciation of the right pleasures is a taught skill also. By that I mean one
of habit, such as virtue is according to Aristotle, and as such we ought to have been
brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to
delight in and to be pained in the things that we ought' (Aristotle: 1104b11-13).
What is slightly problematic is that Aristotle gives two seemingly wholly different
accounts of what pleasure is. In Book II he states that it is on account of pleasure
that we do bad things' (Aristotle: 1104b10), by this meaning that a love of pleasure
for itself will lead us to ignore the virtuous path and live a life of pure hedonism, thus
failing to achieve our telos of eudaimonia. In Book VII he states that the view that
pleasures are bad because some pleasant things are unhealthy is like saying that
healthy things are bad because some healthy things are bad for the pocket'
(Aristotle: 1153a17-18). This view is nonsensical, and would lead us to having to
avoiding almost every type of activity. Some pleasures are bad, but this does not
necessarily make all pleasures bad.
However, whilst these two accounts do differ, there is a common theme between
them, which is that pleasure is not necessarily bad, and can exist in harmony with
virtue. However, we need to qualify exactly what pleasures we mean here, as not all
pleasure can be called good. Annas (1980) interprets Aristotle as believing that
pleasure is only good when done by the virtuousness man, because the habit of his
character will lead him to only choose to act on those pleasures which are virtuous -
it is right for the good man to seek pleasure; pleasure will point him in the right
direction.' (Annas 1980: 286). Whereas the man who is immoral in habit will only
persue those pleasures which confirm the deplorable tendencies of [him], since it
will strengthen his habits of wickedness and weakness' (Annas 1980: 286-7). Here,
the important point is not that we need to avoid pleasure, but that we need to be sure
that we are pursuing the right kind of pleasure before we act upon it - the pleasure of
the virtuous man, not the deplorable man.
The obvious problem with this interpretation is that Annas at first glance seems to be
claiming that only a good person can access pleasure in a good way. Where does
this leave the immoral man who wishes to reform his character? Is there no
possibility that he will be able to choose those pleasures that are good for his
character? Is this what Aristotle is really saying when he claims that virtue is a matter
of habit, of character? If the things [the good man] finds tiresome seem pleasant to
someone, that is nothing surprising; for men may be ruined and spoilt in many ways;
but the things are not pleasant, but only pleasant to these people and to people in
this condition.' (Aristotle: 1176a19-22). This quote for one certainly seems to be
suggesting that the virtuous man will be able to steer clear of immoral pleasures,
whilst the immoral man will not.
Aristotle emphasizes several times the fact that his ethics is based upon repeated
behaviour, on habit, and a short time [or virtuousness], does not make a man
blessed or happy' (Aristotle: 1098a18-19). What this means is that a period of
immorality in a man's life does not necessarily preclude him from ever achieving his
eudaimonia, and similarly, a brief period of virtuousness does not make a man
wholly virtuous. Aristotle's ethics is a system of right and wrong that demonstrates
itself through habit, and habits can change, although it may be hard to dispose of
bad habits, of immoral habits, because it has grown up with us all from our infancy;
this is why it is difficult to rub off this passion [for immoral pleasures]'
(Aristotle:1105a2-3). This does not mean that it is impossible, indeed it must be
possible to change our character, otherwise what we are taught in our youth would
be how we remain for life, meaning that whether we become a good or a bad person
depends more on our teachers, rather than any attempt at morality by ourselves.
We cannot be deprived of a chance at our eudaimonia just because we fail to
receive the right training of character in our youth. It must be possible to reform and
for the immoral man to pursue good pleasure - or how else can he become a man
who chooses only good pleasures out of habit? Some might claim that this seems
unfair. If moral virtue is merely an act brought about by habit, then it is far easier for
the good man to be virtuous that it is for the bad man to be so - so where is the
incentive for the bad man to change his ways and attempt to cultivate the right sort of
character in order to be good by habit? But even the good is better when it is harder'
(Aristotle: 1105a10), and the bad man will be rewarded if he perseveres. If a bad
man successfully changes his character to that of the virtuous man, then he is
satisfying the human function, the human ergon, and he will be able to achieve the
ultimate telos for human beings - eudaimonia - his human flourishing. The incentive
for the bad man to change his ways, no matter how difficult it may be, is that he will
achieve the ultimate goal of complete happiness. In this way does the right sort of
pleasure, lead first to the cultivation of a habit of character of complete excellence or
virtue, which in turn then leads to ultimate happiness.
However, as Hutchinson (1986) points out, there is a problem with this idea that,
ultimately, restraint over which pleasures we decide to pursue is how we describe
virtue. If discipline produces virtue and, when misguided, defect of character, by
means of pleasure and pain, the virtues (and vices) are dispositions for enjoying and
disliking things' (Hutchinson 1986: 79). Hutchinson goes on to state that this cannot
be so, because children are rewarded in the study of arithmetic through pleasure and
pain. So then arithmetical skill is a disposition to enjoy or dislike certain
mathematical operations. And that is not true; it is simply a disposition to come to the
right answer' (Hutchinson 1986: 79). For Hutchinson Aristotle's argument is
unsuccessful merely because it is too vague, a vagueness which allows for the
arithmetical comparison to be made, and this would not be a fault suffered if the
argument was constructed with more care. Ultimately, this means that although the
argument is open to criticism, it leaves Aristotle quite confident in his claim that virtue
is a form of character, created by the repeated habit of choosing the correct moral
path - that of the virtue at the mean point between two vices. And it is this mean
point which will ultimately lead to eudaimonia. As long as pleasure is taken in
moderation, it can still be synonymous with virtue, and allows for pleasure to be a
part of our eudaimonia, the ultimate goal of human flourishing.
Virtue and Pleasure in Kant
For Kant being virtuous means acting in accordance with duty, for duty's sake, and
not due to some other motivation in the place of duty (even if the same action would
result).There are some philosophers (I will go into detail further on) who have
claimed that Kant's notion of duty eliminates the possibility of pleasure - that is, if you
take pleasure in any said action, it eliminates any dutiful intent that was previously
present. However, I do not believe this is actually what Kant meant, and in this
chapter I will explain why I believe this and attempt to elucidate exactly what Kant
meant when he talked about duty, and the implications this has for our conception of
pleasure.
For Kant, an action can only have moral worth (i.e. be virtuous) if and only if it is
done from duty, for duty's sake. So, in order to understand exactly when we can
claim under Kant's theory that we are being virtuous, we need to understand exactly
how we are meant to do our duty, and to do this, we need to examine the categorical
imperative. Although Kant does state that there is only one categorical imperative,
he offers three different formulas of that law' (Sullivan 1989: 149) so sometimes in
philosophy the term is used more generally to describe these three formulas (and
their associated examples) as a whole, rather than just the first formula by itself.
Kant states that there is, therefore, only a single categorical imperative' (Kant 1987:
4:421), but what is it, and how does he come to this conclusion? As I mentioned
before, any categorical imperative must be synthetic because defining our morality
depends on being able to formulate a synthetic a priori principle. A synthetic principle
adds something new to our knowledge, and if it is also a priori, it means that this new
knowledge does not depend on experience - we are able to deduce this synthetic
principle independently of any particular experience; we are able to deduce it by
examining what we already know to be true about the world. This is because, for
Kant, moral judgements are based on how the world ought to be, not how it is, so we
cannot depend on our experiences of the world as it is to show us how the world
should instead be. Morality cannot be based on experience, because we need an
ethical theory that is capable of telling us what we should do, even in entirely new
circumstances.
The categorical imperative is essentially a law, because while everything in the world
is subject to the laws of nature, only rational beings possess autonomy, possess a
(free) will, so are capable of choosing to act according to any given law. The idea
of an objective principle in so far as it is compelling to the will, is called a command
of reason, and the formula of the command is called an imperative.' (Russell 2007:
644) Therefore, a theory of practical morality would be a theory of commands about
how to act according to certain laws. A theory of morality would be a theory
consisting of imperatives. Kant refers to his categorical imperative as the only one,
because logically there can be only one ultimate moral law [although] each of the
three formulas emphasizes a different aspect of the same moral law' (Sullivan 1989:
49).
The aim of the Groundwork is to prove that such a principle (what Kant calls the
categorical imperative) does exist. Such a principle would be 'the supreme principle
of morality' (Kant 1997: 4:392), in other words, the categorical imperative is
synonymous with morality. Kant describes the categorical imperative, through three
different formulas. The first is the formula of the universal law - act only in
accordance with the maxim through which you can at the same time will that it
become a universal law' (Kant 1997: 4:421). This law is Kant's single categorical
imperative' (Kant 1997: 4:421); however this is not exactly what our duty is, since the
universality of law in accordance with which effects take place constitutes what is
properly called nature.' (Kant 1997: 4:421). This means that in order for something to
be our duty, it must be determined in accordance with universal laws, because duty
is not subjective to each individual, but is something that is the same for all rational
beings, in so far as we are rational. This means that our duty can and should be
phrased as: act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a
universal law of nature.' (Kant 1997: 4:421).
Kant uses four examples to demonstrate how this universal law of nature maxim can
be put into use; the suicide candidate, the man who needs to borrow money, the
man who gives in to pleasure, ignoring his natural gifts, and the man who is
concerned only with himself. Here I will only go into more detail for the man who
needs to borrow money example to demonstrate how Kant believed our duty should
be understood. Kant also uses the examples to divide duty into two categories -
perfect and imperfect duties, a distinction which he explicates fully in The
Metaphysics of Morals. However, since Kant himself notes that the division here
stands only as one adopted at my discretion (for the sake of arranging my
examples)' (Kant 1997: 4:421), I will not go into the intricacies of the distinction here,
as both types are still classed as duties, and my concern here is with duty in general
and how it relates to pleasure.
Imagine that you need to borrow some money urgently and you will not be able to
pay it back. However, the only way you will be able to secure a loan is if you make a
lying promise that you will be able be pay the money back. Is this permissible? If we
decide this course of action is permissible, then the maxim for this action would be
when I believe myself to be in need of money I shall borrow money and promise to
repay it, even though I know that this will never happen.' (Kant 1997: 4:422). But can
this maxim become a universal law? And the answer is quite clearly no, because if
everybody made promises that they had no intention of keeping, then of course, no
one would ever believe someone who made a promise - the whole concept of a
promise would become null and void.
We also need to take into account that the maxim of the universal law requires not
only that we would be able to allow our course of action to become a law, but at the
same time, also will that it is a law. Some actions are so constituted that their maxim
cannot even be thought without contradiction as a universal law of nature ... in the
case of others that inner impossibility is indeed not to be found, but it is still
impossible to will that that their maxim be raised to the universality of a law of nature
because such a will would contradict itself.' (Kant 1997: 4:424). So even if the idea of
the law does not cause a contradiction (unlike the lying promise example where this
is the case), still a contradiction in the will may arise. Take the example of the man
who is concerned only with himself, and will never come to the aid of another human
being. While Kant agrees that such a maxim would be universalisable and such a
society could exist, it is still impossible that one should will it to exist. Since a will
that decided this would conflict with itself, since many cases could occur in which
one would need the love and sympathy of others and in which, by such a law of
nature arisen from his own will, he would rob himself of all hope of the assistance he
wishes for himself.' (Kant 1997: 4:423).
The universal law of nature is, in Kant's view the most important principle of morality,
and although he does formulate two other laws, all three are claimed to be
reciprocally equivalent and to represent one and the same principle from different
sides' (Wood 1999: 18), but I only mention them here. The second law is formulated
as such: So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person
of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.' (Kant
1997: 4:429) The third law is: Every rational being must act as if he were by his
maxims at all times a lawgiving member of the universal kingdom of ends.' (Kant
1997: 4:438).
In summary, our duty is whatever actions we can commit to, whilst at the same time
willing that they become a universal law of nature, so that everyone acted as such in
the given circumstances. For Kant, we are virtuous when we do our duty, which we
discern by utilising the categorical imperative. Our actions can only have genuine
moral worth if and only if they are the manifestation of doing our duty, for duty's sake,
i.e. if we are motivated by any other reason other than duty, to do the actions that
duty would require, then those actions have no moral worth. However this is not to
say that these actions must be condemned instead. But where does pleasure come
in all of this? Is it related to our duty, or is it completely independent of it?
Kant is often quoted as believing that if we take pleasure in an action, then we are no
longer doing it for duty's sake, so the action no longer has moral worth. The passage
that leads people to believe this is when Kant discusses the case of the
misanthropist. Imagine a man who has great sympathy for his fellow human beings
and is as such moved to aid others from the goodness of his personality, and he
takes great satisfaction in doing so, conforming with duty in his actions. However,
this type of action although it may conform with duty ... has nevertheless no true
moral worth' (Kant 1997: 4:398) - the sympathetic man's actions are not virtuous.
Compare this man with the misanthropist, who takes no pleasure in helping others.
He merely helps others because his duty requires it, and if this man does the action
without any inclination, simply from duty; then the action first has its genuine moral
worth' (Kant 1997: 4:398).
It seems as though Kant is claiming that the man who enjoys his duty is actually no
longer doing his duty at all - he is doing the right actions but for the wrong reasons,
so we cannot attribute any moral worth to his actions, because only actions done
from duty can be said to have genuine moral worth. But is this the same as claiming
that pleasure nullifies the dutiful intent that was there initially? Certainly some critics
in the past have claimed this to be Kant's view, some even going as far to claim that
compared to an agent that does his duty with pleasure, Kant must prefer an agent
with strong desires that run contrary to the moral law who does his duty ... with
resentment towards the moral law which thwarts his desire' (Weber 2007: 66).
However, it is not right to claim that an action which is done out of motivation for
pleasure, is the same as an action done out of motivation to do one's duty, which
then causes pleasure in the undertaking of that act, as an additional side-product. If
an action is embarked upon because of the motivation of duty, but the agent then
gains pleasure in the undertaking of that action, I do not think this means that the
resulting pleasure causes the action to be no longer done from duty, and so cannot
be said to have moral worth. It seems absurd to claim that any unintentional resultant
pleasure would nullify the dutiful intent that caused the action in the first place,
especially since the rightness or wrongness of a volition depends wholly on the
nature of its motive. It does not depend on its actual consequences' (Broad 2000:
177). In other words, duty does not need to be successful in order to be present - the
moral worth of an action is based on whether or not it was done from a motive of
duty. So as long as the action is done from a motive of duty, then even if the act is
not successful, or the desired consequences are not achieved, still the moral
judgement stands, because the motive was right.
Henson (1979) claims that Kant is misunderstood in this way because he fails to
address what Henson calls overdetermination, which he defines as cases in which
one has two or more logically independent motives for x-ing, and does x, and would
have done x from any one of those motives even in the absence of the others.'
(Henson 1979: 42). What this means is that duty is not actually needed in the face of
these other motives in order to achieve the desired end that duty would produce, but
both are present in sufficient amounts, and would each be sufficient to cause the
action if the other were not present. This is an example of acting in conformity with
duty, but not necessarily from duty - how do we know which inclination was
strongest, and so thus caused the action? Does the presence of any other motives
mean that there is no possibility that we are still acting from duty?
Henson criticises Kant for failing to address the idea that cooperating inclinations
may be present in sufficient degree to cause action, but it is not necessarily so that
they are the cause of the action, rather than duty, which is also present in sufficient
amounts. He goes on to claim that if Kant were to answer this criticism then he
believes Kant would come up with three possible responses:
1. That duty by itself would have sufficed, so we can say the action was done from
duty (whether or not any cooperating motives were present).
2. Cooperating motives were present, so the act was not done from duty.
3. We cannot know for sure which motive was strongest, thus we cannot determine
the cause of action. (Henson 1979)
Henson does not wish to condemn Kant by insisting that he believes 2), that the
presence of any cooperating motives nullifies the dutiful intent. He states that it is
possible to have a motive or reason for acting, but never acting on it. For example, if
your brother is to leave you all of his money in his will, this is a reason to kill him, but
it does not mean you are ever going to act upon that reason. Ross agrees, stating it
can be maintained that it is possible to have a direct inclination to do a certain act
and yet do it purely from a sense of duty.' (Ross 1962: 17). Just because cooperating
inclinations (such a pleasure) are present, does not mean that we are not doing the
act out of duty, for duty's sake. Taking pleasure in an action does not necessarily
mean that it cannot at the same time be done from duty and have moral worth. A
pleasurable action can be virtuous.
I agree with Henson and Ross that it is possible that pleasure can interact with duty
without detracting from the moral worth of the dutiful action. In fact, Kant himself is
open to the idea that pleasure can actually be caused by your duty, which Kant
describes as the susceptibility to feel pleasure or displeasure merely from being
aware that our actions are consistent with or contrary to the law of duty.' (Kant 1996:
6:399). Here, pleasure is an indicator that we are indeed doing our duty, and the
absence of pleasure would mean the absence of duty. Therefore, pleasure and
virtue cannot be mutually exclusive, as many in the past have mistaken Kant to
believe.
Just because an action has no moral worth because it is not done from a sense of
duty, but from an inclination of pleasure or enjoyment, is not to say that it is a morally
bad act and should therefore be condemned. It is rather that it should not be
praised as being a virtuous act. It is important to remember the distinction between
acting from duty, and acting in conformity with duty. Acting from duty means doing
the action that duty requires, for duty's sake. Acting in conformity with duty means
that you do the action that is required by your duty, but you do it for some other
reason, a cooperating inclination. This second type of action, whilst it delivers the
desired consequences is done for the wrong reasons, and from the wrong
motivation, and so therefore the action possesses no moral worth.
If an action is done from any motive other then duty, then it has no moral worth.
However, this is not to say that if there are other motives present alongside duty,
then they cause the duty to no longer be valid. It is only when no cooperating
inclinations are present that we can be sure that an action is done solely from a
motive of duty. Even with other inclinations present, the action may still have been
done from duty. Other inclinations, although they may be sufficient to have caused
the action had the motive from duty not been present, could quite easily be weaker
inclinations than that of duty. So even though both are sufficient to cause the action if
the other were not present, in some cases when both are present, duty is still the
motivator, because it is the stronger of the two. But of course, there is no definite
proof in situations such as this, that duty is in fact the true motivation, so we can only
say for certain that an action has moral worth, that it has been done from duty, if no
other inclinations are present. This does not mean that pleasure nullifies duty, but
merely that it muddies the water for anyone trying to discern what the true motivation
for the action is.
Are they compatible?
I believe that the ethical theories of Aristotle and Kant are, to a degree, compatible.
The first obvious similarity between the two is that whilst both believed that pleasure
was not the ultimate goal of human life, or the point of morality, it nevertheless has
some import in both their ethical systems - pleasure cannot be quickly, or easily,
discounted by either of them. Many philosophers are quick to state that Kant
believed that if we take pleasure in any action then we nullify the original dutiful
intent that was present, but as I have argued in the previous chapter this is not
actually the case.
Even though the moral law cannot be based on happiness for Kant, in order to be
able to claim this of Aristotle, it would be a gross mistranslation of his use of the
Greek word eudaimonia, if we say that it merely means fleeting arbitrary pleasure-
induced happiness, thus making happiness the ultimate good. Although the easiest
translation of eudaimonia is happiness, it is a life, enjoyable and worth while all
through' (Ackrill 1980: 19), and all agree in using the word eudaimonia to stand for
that which is the highest of all practicable goods, and that all take the expressions
living well and doing well to be equivalent to it.' (Ackrill 1980: 17).
What this means is that Aristotle's happiness (eudaimonia) is not equivalent to Kant's
happiness (that emotion which is brought about through pleasure). Instead we need
to compare Kant's account of happiness, with Aristotle's account of pleasure, in
order to appreciate where they both stand with regard to its relation with virtue.
Whilst Kant is not opposed to happiness as some claim (because, some claim that
an act done from happiness precludes it from being done from duty, so that act can
have no moral worth), neither is Aristotle opposed to its counterpart in his
philosophy; pleasure (in so far as the right pleasures, in moderation, can in fact be
the mean between two vices in his theory of morality). But whilst neither requires the
absence of these elements, both deny that it is the ultimate good, or the ultimate
reason for morality.
For Aristotle, as I have shown, it is acceptable to enjoy pleasurable activities, so long
as they are to the right extent, at the right time, with the right aim, and in the right
way' (Aristotle: 1109a27). For Kant also, the presence of pleasure does not
necessarily mean that duty cannot be present also, although in cases where other
inclinations are present, it means that we cannot be certain whether someone is
acting from duty or not - though much may be done in conformity with what duty
commands, still it is always doubtful whether it is really done from duty and therefore
has moral worth.' (Kant 1997: 4:406).
Just as Aristotle sees pleasure as a good by-product of virtuous activity - as the
completion and perfection of virtuous activity - so Kant sees happiness as the rightful
corollary to the attainment of virtue'. (Murphy 2001: 277). In other words, pleasure for
both can be caused by the attainment of our virtue, and the enjoyment which that
achievement brings with it. Pleasure does not necessarily have to mean that we are
either being overly hedonistic, or that we have failed to do our duty - it can in fact be
the product of the completion of virtuous activity.
However, there are areas where the two are not so harmonious. Although neither of
them propose an action-based form of moral accreditation, and both lay an emphasis
on doing the right sort of actions as dependent upon the agent (the agent for Kant
must be doing his duty, the agent for Aristotle must have the right sort of character),
they do not wholly agree. For Aristotle, we can learn to desire higher and finer things
so that the virtuous man takes pleasure only in the higher and finer things.' (Murphy
2001: 278). However, even though we are not wrong in claiming that Kant does not
require the complete absence of pleasure in order for us to be able to do our duty,
the truly virtuous man does not act on his desires at all. For Aristotle the challenge
of moral development is not so much to repress one's desires: a virtuous person,
Aristotle says, is not without desires' (Murphy 2001: 278). However, for a true
Kantian, this should be the case - the universal wish of every rational being is to be
altogether free from them [our desires]' (Kant 1997: 4:428). We should aim to
repress our desires, so that we can act purely from duty, with no other motivations
present leading to doubt over whether we have actually been motivated by duty or
not, so we can be sure our actions do possess moral worth.
Although for Kant, if an action is done out of motivation for pleasure, for enjoyment of
the act, rather than out of duty, it means that the act has no moral worth, this does
not at the same time mean that the act therefore should be condemned. Such an act,
in conformity with duty, but not done for duty's sake would deserve praise and
encouragement, but not esteem' (Ross 1962: 15). In this way, Kant's view of
pleasure is once again similar to Aristotle's. If the wrong kind of pleasure is pursued,
then the resulting action is deplorable and should be condemned. However, if the
right kind of pleasure is pursued, then the action can be virtuous. Although for Kant
the act cannot actually be virtuous even if the right kind of pleasure is pursued (that
kind of pleasure that is in conformity with duty), the similarity lies in the fact that the
wrong kind of pleasure must be condemned, whilst this is not necessarily true for the
right kind of pleasure (although even the right kind of pleasure could be condemned
for Aristotle, if it is done in excess and the path of the mean is not adhered to).
I think the main similarity between the two lies with the fact that both lay a great
amount of import with the intentions, or mindset, of the agent. For Aristotle, a man is
able to commit a virtuous act if he is virtuous in character - if his mind is set on
virtuous acts. For Kant, the same is true - a man is able to commit virtuous acts if he
aims to do them in accordance with virtue, i.e. if he aims to do those actions which
duty requires, which means the resulting actions will possess moral worth. For both,
pleasure may or may not be involved, and for Kant, as long as it is not the ultimate
motivation for the action, then the action can be virtuous. The difference with
Aristotle is that the act, and the man, can be virtuous even if pleasure is the sole
motivator.
Conclusion
In conclusion, although often in philosophy, people are quick to claim that Kant's
deontological ethics are the polar opposite of Aristotle's virtue ethics, I do not believe
that this is a wholly correct interpretation of either of the two philosophers. Whilst it is
true that the ultimate principle of morality for Kant is that it must be done according to
our duty, and for the sake of our duty, with no regard for pleasure, this is not the only
relevant part of his ethics.
The main criticism against Kant that would refute my conclusion is the claim that
when Kant wrote and suppose that now, when no longer incited to it by any other
inclination [he] ... does the action ... simply from duty; then the action first has its
genuine moral worth' (Kant 1997: 4:398), he was actually claiming that only when an
act is done from the motivation of duty, with no supporting inclinations or motives,
can it be said to be truly done from duty, for duty's sake, so only thus can it possess
any moral worth. However, I believe this to be a misinterpretation of what Kant
actually meant. I agree with Ross (1962), when I claim that instead Kant meant that
we can only be sure that an act is done solely from the motivation of duty when it has
no supporting motives - Kant maintains that we can be sure that a man is preserving
his own life from a sense of duty only if his own life is so wretched that he has no
inclination to preserve it.' (Ross 1962: 15). This does not mean that an act cannot be
done from duty, if there are supporting motives present, merely that we will have no
certainty over the matter. And if this is true, that pleasure can be present during an
act of duty, then no longer does Kant's theory wholly contradict that of Aristotle,
whose claim is that it is possible for pleasure to lead us to the ultimate goal of
complete happiness.
For Kant an action can only have moral worth, can only be virtuous, if it is done from
duty. Contrast this with Aristotle, where an action can only be virtuous if it is the
moderate mean between two vices. For Aristotle this means that pleasure can in fact
be virtuous, as the virtue of pleasure would be the mean on the scale between pure
hedonism and despair (to use my earlier example). For Kant, whilst pleasure is not a
virtue it itself, it can be a by-product of our virtuous action, and can indeed be an
indicator that we have in fact achieved our duty. Kant states (as I quoted earlier) that
happiness can be an indication that we have done our duty properly, for duty's sake,
and so thus our actions can be said to have moral worth - for Kant happiness can be
an indicator that an action is virtuous (cf. Kant's Doctrine of Virtue, Book II, as quoted
in my fourth chapter).
Similarly, for Aristotle, pleasure can be present at the same time as virtue. Indeed,
the most virtuous action in any given situation may in fact be the most pleasurable
one, although this is not always the case, and sometimes wholly non pleasurable
actions are what is required by virtue. The obvious difference is that for Kant, if
pleasure is the motivation, then an action cannot be virtuous, whilst this is simply not
true for Aristotle. For him, pleasure can be the motivation that causes a virtuous
action, although this does not mean that pleasure is always synonymous with virtue.
Here, Aristotle can claim similarity with Kant, in that pleasurable actions done to
excess would no longer be the mean on the scale for virtue, and so thus these
actions done from pleasure have no moral worth. Both also claim that actions done
solely from a motivation of pleasure may have absolutely no relation to what course
of action would be virtuous in any given situation.
I think that the two theories have a lot more in common than many people give them
credit for, since many look no further than the obvious difference that Kant does not
allow for pleasure to be a motivation, whereas Aristotle does. Whilst there are many
differences in the two theories, for example Kant's belief that a motivation of
happiness is not virtuous, contrasted with Aristotle's belief that we can be motivated
by pleasure, and still achieve virtue, there are fundamental similarities which cannot
be dismissed. Kant and Aristotle both believed, that whilst happiness and pleasure,
respectively, could not be the ultimate good, they could equally not be completely
passed over in any ethical theory.
Although they are often misinterpreted, I think if we take Aristotle's pleasure (instead
of his happiness, his eudaimonia) to be synonymous with Kant's happiness (that of
enjoyment), then we are able to see far more similarities in their theories than many
first believe. In this way, Aristotle's pleasure and Kant's happiness are defined as
enjoyment, which can co-exist with virtuousness for both. For Kant, because we are
able to take enjoyment in the fact that we have our achieved our duty, and because
pleasure as a motivation can co-exist with duty, as long as it is not the true motivator,
and for Aristotle, because pleasurable acts can be virtuous ones, as long as they are
done in moderation.
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