ARTICLE 3

JOY LEE RECUERDO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 168217, June 27, 2006, First Division, Callejo, Sr. J.
Facts:
In September 1994, three separate Criminal Informations charging Joy Lee
Recuerdo of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code
involving 18 worthless bank checks were simultaneously filed by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan. Evidence adduced by the Prosecution tend to
establish that herein private respondent Yolanda G. Floro is engaged in the
business of buying and selling of jewelry since 1985. Herein accused-
appellant/petitioner Joy Lee Recuerdo, on the other hand, a dentist by
profession, who was introduced to Floro by the latters cousin Aimee Aoro in the
first week of December 1993, became her customer. Sometime in the second
week of December 1993, at around 7:30 in the evening, Recuerdo went to the
house of Floro and purchased from her two pieces of jewelry, to wit: a 2.19 carat
diamond round stone in white gold setting worthP220,000.00 pesos, and one
piece of loose 1.55 karat marquez diamond with a value of P130,000.00 pesos.
For the 2.19 carat diamond stone, accused issued and delivered to the
complainant then and there ten post-dated checks each in the amount of
P22,000.00 drawn against Unitrust Development Bank. For the 1.55 carat
marquez loose diamond, accused issued and delivered to complainant then and
there ten (10) postdated checks, each in the amount of P13,000.00 drawn
against PCI Bank, Makati. In yet another transaction that transpired in the early
evening of February 7, 1994, Recuerdo once again proceeded at Floros house
and bought another set of jewelry, this time a pair of diamond earrings worth
P768,000.00 pesos. She was given seven (7) postdated checks one for
P168,000.00 as downpayment and another six (6) postdated checks drawn
against Prudential Bank, Legaspi Village, Makati Branch, each for P100,000.00
representing the balance in the aggregate amount of P600,000.00 pesos. Floro
deposited the aforementioned checks at Liberty Savings & Loan Association,
Meyc[a]uayan, Bulacan. Upon presentment for encashment by said depositary
bank with the different drawee banks on their respective maturity dates, the six
(6) Prudential Bank checks were all dishonored for having been drawn against
closed accounts

Issue: Is Recuerdo guilty of estafa under Art. 315 par. 2(d)?

Ruling: The crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised
Penal Code has the following basic elements: Postdating or issuance of a check
in payment of an obligation contracted simultaneously at the time the check was
issued; The postdating or issuance was done when the offender had no funds in
the bank, or that his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the
amount of the check; and Damage to the payee thereof

The existence of the foregoing elements of the crime was concretely established
by the prosecution through convincing evidence, warranting petitioners
conviction of the offense of Estafa. The trial court found private complainant
Floros testimony that petitioner issued the subject checks as payment for the
purchase of pieces of jewelry simultaneous to their transactions to be categorical
and credible. There was sufficient evidence established by the prosecution that
the checks were issued by the accused to the complainant in exchange of the
pieces of jewelry given to her on two separate occasions.


Loney vs. People
G.R. No. 152644, Feb. 10, 2006

Facts:
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid and Pedro B. Hernandez are the
Pres. and CEO, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations,
respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corp., a corporation engaged in mining in the
province of Marinduque. Marcopper had been storing tailings (mine waste) from
its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a
drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makulapnit rivers. It appears that
Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnels end. On March 24, 1994,
tailings gushed out of or near the tunnels end. In a few days, Mt. Tapian pit had
discharged millions of tons of tailings in to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. In
August 1996, the DOJ separately charged petitioners in the MTC of Boac,
Marinduque with violation of Art. 91 (B), subparagraphs 5 and 6 of P.D. No. 1067
or the Water code of the Phil., Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 984 or the National Pollution
Decree of 1976, Sec. 108 of R.A. No. 7942 or the Phil. Mining Act of 1995, and
Art. 365 of the RPC for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Damage to Property.
In the Consolidated Order of MTC, granting partial reconsideration to its Joint
Order quashing the information for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC
maintained the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and Art. 365 of the RPC.
Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC assailing that
the portion of the Consolidated Order maintaining the Informations for violation of
RA 7942 and the petition was raffled to Br. 94 while public respondents appeal
assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order quashing the Info. for violation of
P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984 and this appeal was consolidated with petitioners
petition. MTC Br. 94 granted the public respondents appeal but denied
petitioners petition. Petitioners then filed for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
alleging that Br. 94 acted with grave abuse of discretion because 1.the
Informations for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942 and the Art. 365 of the
RPC proceeded from are based on a single act or incident of polluting the rivers
thru dumping of mine tailings, and the charge for violation of Art 365 of the RPC
absorbs the other charges since the element of lack of necessary or adequate
protection, negligence, recklessness and imprudence is common among them,
2. the duplicitous nature of the Informations contravenes the ruling in People v.
Relova. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Br. 94 ruling.

Issue: 1. Whether or not all the charges filed against petitioners except one
should be quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand
2. whether or not Br. 94s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
contravenes People v. Relova.

Ruling: The petition has no merit. Duplicity of charges simply means a single
complaint or information charges more than one offense, as Sec. 13 of Rule 110
of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. As early as the start of the last century,
the court ruled that a single act or incident might offend against two or more
entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of
the accused for more than one offense and the only limit is the Constitutional
prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishing for the same
offense. In People vs. Doriquez, the court held that two or more offenses arising
form the same act are not the same. And so, double jeopardy is not an issue
because not all its elements are present. On petitioners claim that the charges for
violation of Art. 365 of the RPC absorbs the charges for violation of PD 1067,
PD 984 and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Damage in Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita
crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984 and RA 7942). What makes the
former felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa) and what makes the
latter crimes are the special laws enacting them. Petitioners reiterate their
contention in that their prosecution contravenes ruling in People vs. Relova. In
particular, petitioners cite the courts statement in Relova that the law seeks to
prevent harassment of the accused by multiple prosecutions for offenses which
though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a
common set or overlapping sets of technical elements. Thus, Relova is no
authority for petitioners claim against multiple prosecutions based on a single act
not only because the question of double jeopardy is not an issue here, but also
because, as the Court of Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted for an
act or incident punished by four national statutes and not by an ordinance and a
national statute. In short, petitioners, if ever fall under the first sentence of Sec.
21, Art. III which prohibits multiple prosecution for the same offense, and not, as
in Relova, for offenses arising from the same incident.

ARTICLE 4

GARCIA VS PP
Facts:
The Fozes were having a drinking spree at their apartment when Chy asked
them to quiet down to which Garcia commented that Chy was being arrogant and
that one day he would lay a hand on him. Two days later, the group decided to
drink at a store owned by Chys sister, Esquibel. Chy was about to come out of
his house and upon being summoned, Garcia suddenly punched him. Chy
continued to parry the blows and when he found an opportunity to escape, he ran
home and phoned his wife to call the police regarding the mauling. He also
complained of difficulty in breathing. He was found later unconscious on the
kitchen floor, salivating.

Cause of death is heart attack to which Garcia appeals that the injuries he
caused were not as violent in nature as to have caused the death of Chy. Garcia
pleaded not guilty to the crime of homicide. The autopsy doctor confirms that the
boxing and the striking of the bottle beer on the victim could not have caused any
direct physical effect to cause the heart attack if the victims heart is
healthy. What could have caused said heart attack is the victims emotions
concerning the violence inflicted upon him.

ISSUE:
Whether the circumstance of having no intention to commit so grave a wrong as
that committed should be appreciated

RULING:


The circumstance that the petitioner did not intend so grave an evil as the death
of the victim does not exempt him from criminal liability. Since he deliberately
committed an act prohibited by law, said condition simply mitigates his guilt in
accordance with Article 13(3) of the Revised Penal Code. Nevertheless, said
circumstance must be appreciated in favour of the petitioner. The fact that the
physical injuries he inflicted on the victim could not have naturally and logically
caused the actual death of the victim, if the latters heart is in good condition.
Considering this mitigating circumstance, imposable penalty should be in the
minimum period, that is, reclusion temporal in its minimum period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the trial court properly imposed upon petitioner an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.

URBANO VS IAC
Facts:
On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield.
He found the place where he stored palay flooded with water coming from the
irrigation canal. Urbano went to the elevated portion to see what happened, and
there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted that
he was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier
on the right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg with the back of the bolo. On
October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid
P700 for the medical expenses of Javier. On November 14, 1980, Urbano was
rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found
the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in
his palm. He died the following day. Urbano was charged with homicide and was
found guilty both by the trial court and on appeal by the Court of Appeals. Urbano
filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain who
stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on
November 5. The motion was denied; hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the
latters death
Held:
A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."And more
comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting
the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom."
If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus
germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been
infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus
appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after
the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than
six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more
credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the
appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present.
Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the
hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his
wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days
before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are
dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's
death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical
findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound
by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier
was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and
foreign to the crime.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may
have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had
nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if
such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between
such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and
efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened
but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause.
And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the
instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."

PP VS VILLACORTA
FACTS
On January 22, 2002, Danilo Cruz went to a sari-sari store to buy bread. Out of
nowhere, Orlito Villacorta appeared and thereafter stabbed the left part of the
body of Cruz with a sharpened bamboo stick. After that, Villacorta fled.
Cruz was helped by bystanders and he was brought to a nearby hospital where
he was treated as out-patient. He was discharged on the same day but on
February 14, 2002, or 21 days after the stabbing incident, he returned to the
same hospital where he was treated for severe tetanus. The next day on
February 15, 2002, Cruz died. The medical report states that Cruz died of
tetanus infection secondary to stab wound.
The trial court as well as the Court of Appeals convicted Villacorta for murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villacorta is guilty of murder.
HELD: No. In this case, the proximate cause of the death is not the stabbing
done by Villacorta upon Cruz. There was an efficient intervening cause which
appeared between the time of the stabbing and the time of the death of Cruz.
In explaining this, the Supreme Court took into consideration the fact that severe
tetanus (the kind of tetanus which causes immediate death) has an incubation
period of 14 days or less. In this case, the stabbing made by Vilalcorta could not
have caused the tetanus infection as 22 days already lapsed from the time of the
stabbing until the date of death of Cruz. Something else caused the tetanus other
than the stabbing in short, Cruz acquired the tetanus 14 days or less before
February 15, 2003 and not on the date of stabbing.
The court explained further:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are
dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victims
death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical
findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound
by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time
[Cruz] was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore,
distinct and foreign to the crime.
Villacorta is however guilty of slight physical injuries based on the facts. Neither
is he guilty of attempted nor frustrated murder, his intent to kill was not proven by
the prosecution.


G.R. No. 162540 July 13, 2009
GEMMA T. JACINTO, Petitioner vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent PERALTA, J.:

Facts
A petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto seeking
the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming petitioner's
conviction of the crime of Qualified Theft, and its Resolution denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration. Facts: Baby Aquino handed petitioner Gemma
Jacinto a Banco De Oro (BDO) Check in the amount of P10,000.00. The check
was payment for Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and
petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam. Somehow, the check was
deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of
Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the sister of petitioner and the former pricing,
merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam. Later, Rowena Ricablanca,
another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an employee of
Land Bank, who was looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to
inform Capitle that the subject BDO check deposited in his account had been
dishonored. Ricablanca then called and relayed the message through accused
Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam, because the Capitles
did not have a phone; but they could be reached through Valencia, a neighbor
and former co-employee of Jacqueline Capitle at Mega Foam. Valencia then told
Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca to
ask Baby Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of
a plan to take the cash and divide it equally into four: for herself, Ricablanca,
petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega
Foam's accountant, reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph
Dyhengco. Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to
confirm that the latter indeed handed petitioner a BDO check for P10,000.00 as
payment for her purchases from Mega Foam. Baby Aquino further testified that
petitioner Jacinto also called her on the phone to tell her that the BDO check
bounced. Verification from company records showed that petitioner never
remitted the subject check to Mega Foam. However, Baby Aquino said that she
had already paid Mega Foam P10,000.00 cash as replacement for the
dishonored check. Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) and worked out an entrapment operation with its agents. Ten
pieces of P1,000.00 bills provided by Dyhengco were marked and dusted with
fluorescent powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to Ricablanca,
who was tasked to pretend that she was going along with Valencia's plan.
Ricablanca, petitioner, her husband, and Valencia then boarded petitioner's jeep
and went on to Baby Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca alighted from the jeep
and entered the premises of Baby Aquino, pretending that she was getting cash
from Baby Aquino. However, the cash she actually brought out from the premises
was the P10,000.00 marked money previously given to her by Dyhengco.
Ricablanca divided the money and upon returning to the jeep, gave P5,000.00
each to Valencia and petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were
arrested by NBI agents, who had been watching the whole time. A case was filed
against the three accused, Jacinto, Valencia and Capitle. RTC rendered its
Decision finding them GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
QUALIFIED THEFT and sentenced each imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE
(5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS, EIGHT
(8) MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS, as maximum. The three appealed to
the CA and the decision of the trial court was MODIFIED, in that:(a) the sentence
against accused Gemma Jacinto stands; (b) the sentence against accused Anita
Valencia is reduced to 4 months arresto mayor medium, and (c) The accused
Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted. Hence, the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari filed by petitioner alone,

Issue:
Held: Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft. As may be
gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal Code, the
personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of
the accused is to gain from the thing stolen. This is further bolstered by Article
309, where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the accused is
dependent on the value of the thing stolen. In this case, petitioner unlawfully took
the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was apparently
without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on
whether the crime of qualified theft was actually produced. The Court must
resolve the issue in the negative. Intod v. Court of Appeals is highly instructive
and applicable to the present case. In Intod (see doctrines laid out in Intod), the
Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual
impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the
intention to steal the latter's wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is empty.

Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual
impossibility given in Intod. In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to
consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against property.
Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the
check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched.
Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face
value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the
extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to
petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from being produced. The thing
unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the
check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to
replace the value of said dishonored check. The fact that petitioner was later
entrapped receiving the P5,000.00 marked money, which she thought was the
cash replacement for the dishonored check, is of no moment. The Court held in
Valenzuela v. People that under the definition of theft in Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code there is only one operative act of execution by the actor
involved in theft the taking of personal property of another. As of the time that
petitioner took possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had
performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it not been
impossible of accomplishment in this case. Obviously, the plan to convince Baby
Aquino to give cash as replacement for the check was hatched only after the
check had been dishonored by the drawee bank. Since the crime of theft is not a
continuing offense, petitioner's act of receiving the cash replacement should not
be considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that petitioner was
caught receiving the marked money was merely corroborating evidence to
strengthen proof of her intent to gain. Moreover, the fact that petitioner further
planned to have the dishonored check replaced with cash by its issuer is a
different and separate fraudulent scheme. Unfortunately, since said scheme was
not included or covered by the allegations in the Information, the Court cannot
pronounce judgment on the accused; otherwise, it would violate the due process
clause of the Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent scheme could have been
another possible source of criminal liability. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, are MODIFIED.
Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as
defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal
Code, respectively. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months
of arrresto mayor, and to pay the costs.

ARTICLE 6

BALEROS VS PP

FACTS:
Martina Lourdes Albano (Malou), a medical student of the University of Sto.
Tomas, stayed at Room 307 with her maid Marvilou.
December 12 10:30 pm: Malou slept. Her maid Marvilou slept on a folding
bed right in front of herbedroom door.
December 13, 1991 1:00 am: Chito left the fraternity party with Robert Chan
and Alberto wearing a barong tagalog, with t-shirt inside, with short pants with
stripes lent by Perla Duran and leather shoes.
December 13, 1991 1:30 am: Chito arrived at the Building wearing a white t-
shirt with fraternity symbols and black shorts with the brand name Adidas from
a party. He requested permission from S/G Ferolin to go up to Room 306 leased
by Ansbert Co but at that time only Joseph Bernard Africa was there. Although
Chito could not produce the required written authorization, he let him in because
he will be a tenant in the coming summer break. Joseph was awaken by Chitos
knock so he glanced the alarm clock and let him. He saw him wearing dark-
colored shorts and white T-shirt.
December 13, 1991 1:50 am: Renato Baleros, Jr. y David (Chito) forcefully
covered the face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of cloth soaked in
chemical with dizzying effects. This awakened Malou. She struggled but could
not move because she was tightly held and pinned down on the bed. She kicked
him and got her right hand free to squeeze his sex organ causing him to let her
go. She went for thebedroom door and woke up Marvilou. She also
intercommed S/G Ferolin saying: "may pumasok sa kuarto ko pinagtangkaan
ako". Malou proceed to Room 310 where her classmates Christian Alcala,
Bernard Baptista, Lutgardo Acosta and Rommel Montes were staying and
seeked help. She saw her bed in a mess and noticed that her nightdress was
stained with blue. Aside from the window with grills which she had originally left
opened, another window inside her bedroom which leads to Room 306 was now
open.
December 13, 1991 3:30 pm: Christian and his roommates, Bernard and
Lutgardo were asked by the CIS people to look for anything not belonging to
them in their Unit when Rommel Montes went inside and found a grey bag.
o Christian knew right away that it belonged to Chito. It contained white t-shirt
with fraternity symbol, a Black Adidas short pants, a handkerchief , 3 white T-
shirts, an underwear and socks.
Chito pleaded NOT Guilty
13 witnesses including Malou and her classmates, Joseph Bernard Africa,
Rommel Montes, Renato Alagadan and Christian Alcala
o Malou: Chito was her classmate whom he rejected a week before
o Chito: He only slept and at about 6 to 6:30, Joseph told him that something
had happened and asked him to follow him to Room 310 carrying his gray bag
and since no one was there they went to Room 401 where Renato Alagadan
was. He left his grey bag at Room 306 the day before.
handkerchief and Malous night dress both contained chloroform, a volatile
poison which causes first degree burn exactly like what Malou sustained on that
part of her face where the chemical-soaked cloth had been pressed
RTC: guilty of attempted rape
CA: Affirmed

ISSUE: W/N Chito is guilty of attempted rape

HELD: NO. REVERSED and SET ASIDE. ACQUITTING Renato D. Baleros, Jr.
of the charge for attempted rape. GUILTY of light coercion and is accordingly
sentenced to 30 days of arresto menor and to pay a fine of P200.00, with the
accessory penalties thereof and to pay the costs.

Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man
who has carnal knowledge or intercourse with a woman under any of the
following circumstances: (1) By using force or intimidation; (2) When the woman
is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) When the woman is
under twelve years of age or is demented.
Under Article 6, in relation to the aforementioned article of the same code,
rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly
by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance.
o whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-
soaked cloth while on top of Malou, constitutes an overt act of rape.
o Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed,
indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning
or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural
course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary
desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense
Chito was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to undress
Malou, let alone touch herprivate part
Verily, while the series of acts committed by the petitioner do not determine
attempted rape, they constitute unjust vexation punishable as light coercion
under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code.
o As it were, unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint or
compulsion for the reason that this term is broad enough to include any human
conduct which, although not productive of some physical or material harm, would
unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person
o That Malou, after the incident in question, cried while relating to her
classmates what she perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she filed a
case for attempted rape proved beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if not
distressed

ARTICLE 8

PP VS LARRANAGA
FACTS:
On the night of July 16, 1997, victims Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong failed to
come home on the expected time. Two days after, a young woman was found
dead at the foot of a cliff. Her pants were torn, her t-shirt was raised up to her
breast and her bra was pulled down. Her face and neck were covered with
masking tape and attached to her left wrist was a handcuff. The woman was
identified as Marijoy. After almost ten months, accused Davidson Rusia surfaced
and admitted before the police having participated in the abduction of the sisters.
He identified appellants Francisco Juan Larraaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen
Adlawan, Alberto Cao, Ariel Balansag, James Anthony Uy, and James Andrew
Uy as co-perpetrators in the crime. Rusia provided the following before the trial
court:
1) That at 10:30 in the evening of July 16, 1997, he met Rowen and Josman and
told him to ride with them in a white car. Following them were Larraaga, James
Anthony and James Andrew who were in a red car. Josman stopped the white
car in front of the waiting shed where the sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline were
standing and forced them to ride the car. Rusia taped their mouths while Rowen
handcuffed them jointly.
2) That after stopping by a safehouse, the group thereafter headed to the South
Bus Terminal where they met Alberto and Ariel, and hired the white van driven by
the former. They traveled towards south of Cebu City, leaving the red car at the
South Bus Terminal.
3) That after parking their vehicles near a precipice, they drank and had a pot
session. Later, they started to rape Marijoy inside the vehicle, and thereafter
raped Jaqueline.
4) That Josman intructed Rowen and Ariel to bring Marijoy to the cliff and push
her into the ravine.
The claims of Rusia were supported by other witnesses. He was discharged as
an accused and became a state witness. Still, the body of Jacqueline was never
found. The trial court found the other appellants guilty of two crimes of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention and sentenced each of them to suffer the
penalties of two (2) reclusiones perpetua. The appellants assailed the said
decision, arguing inter alia, that court erred in finding that there was consipiracy.
James Anthony was also claimed to be only 16 years old when the crimes were
committed.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not there was conspiracy.
2) Whether or not the trial court erred in characterizing the crime.
3) Whether or not the trial court erred imposing the correct penalty.
HELD:
1) Yes. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the
offense was perpetrated, or may be inferred from the acts of the accused
themselves, when such point to a joint design and community of interest. The
appellants actions showed that they had the same objective to kidnap and detain
the Chiong sisters. The Court affirmed the trial courts finding that the appellants
indeed conspired in the commission of the crimes charged.
2) Yes. The rule is that when the law provides a single penalty for two or more
component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of R.A. 7659, provides
that in the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, when the victim is
killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or is subjected to
torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. Thus, the
resulting crime will change from complex crime to special complex crime. In the
present case, the victims were raped and subjected to dehumanizing acts. Thus,
the Court held that all the appellants were guilty of the special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape in the case
where Marijoy is the victim; and simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention in
the case of Jacqueline.
3) Yes. Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides that by reason of minority,
the imposable penalty to the offender is one degree lower than the statutory
penalty. James Anthony was only 16 years old when the crimes were committed.
As penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with homicide and rape is death, the correct penalty to be imposed
should be reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, the penalty for simple
kidnapping and serious illegal detention is reclusion perpetua to death. One
degree lower from the said penalty is reclusion temporal. There being no
aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed on him
should be reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years
of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of
reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. With regard to the rest of
the appellants, the statutory penalty as provided above should be imposed.
Therefore, trial court erred in merely imposing two (2) reclusiones perpetua.