LEMON v. KURTZMAN, 403 U.S.

602 (1971)
FACTS:
At issue in this case are the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island
statutory programs.
The Rhode Island Statute
The Rhode Island Salary Supplement Act 1 was enacted in
1969. It rests on the legislative finding that the uality of
education availa!le in nonpu!lic elementary schools has !een
"eopardi#ed !y the rapidly rising salaries needed to attract
competent and dedicated teachers. The Act authori#es state
officials to supplement the salaries of teachers of secular
su!"ects in nonpu!lic elementary schools !y paying directly to a
teacher an amount not in e$cess of 1%& of his current annual
salary. As supplemented' however' a nonpu!lic school teacher(s
salary cannot e$ceed the ma$imum paid to teachers in the
State(s pu!lic schools' and the recipient must !e certified !y
the state !oard of education in su!stantially the same manner
as pu!lic school teachers.
In order to !e eligi!le for the Rhode Island salary supplement'
the recipient must teach in a nonpu!lic school at which the
average per)pupil e$penditure on secular education is less than
the average in the State(s pu!lic schools during a specified
period. Appellant State *ommissioner of +ducation also
reuires eligi!le schools to su!mit financial data. If this
information indicates a per)pupil e$penditure in e$cess of the
statutory limitation' the records of the school in uestion must
!e e$amined in order to assess how much of the e$penditure is
attri!uta!le to secular education and how much to religious
activity.
The Act also reuires that teachers eligi!le for salary
supplements must teach only those su!"ects that are offered in
the State(s pu!lic schools. They must use ,only teaching
materials which are used in the pu!lic schools., -inally' any
teacher applying for a salary supplement must first agree in
writing ,not to teach a course in religion for so long as or during
such time as he or she receives any salary supplements, under
the Act.
Appellees are citi#ens and ta$payers of Rhode Island. They
!rought this suit to have the Rhode Island Salary Supplement
Act declared unconstitutional and its operation en"oined on the
ground that it violates the +sta!lishment and -ree +$ercise
*lauses of the -irst Amendment.
The Pennsylvania Statute
Pennsylvania has adopted a program that has some !ut not all
of the features of the Rhode Island program. The Pennsylvania
.onpu!lic +lementary and Secondary +ducation Act was passed
in 196/ in response to a crisis that the Pennsylvania 0egislature
found e$isted in the State(s nonpu!lic schools due to rapidly
rising costs. The statute affirmatively reflects the legislative
conclusion that the State(s educational goals could
appropriately !e fulfilled !y government support of those purely
secular educational o!"ectives achieved through nonpu!lic
education.
The statute authori#es the state Superintendent of Pu!lic
Instruction to ,purchase, specified ,secular educational
services, from nonpu!lic schools. 1nder the ,contracts,
authori#ed !y the statute' the State directly reim!urses
nonpu!lic schools solely for their actual e$penditures for
teachers( salaries' te$t!oo2s' and instructional materials. A
school see2ing reim!ursement must maintain prescri!ed
accounting procedures that identify the ,separate, cost of the
,secular educational service., These accounts are su!"ect to
state audit. The funds for this program were originally derived
from a new ta$ on horse and harness racing' !ut the Act is now
financed !y a portion of the state ta$ on cigarettes.
There are several significant statutory restrictions on state aid.
Reim!ursement is limited to courses ,presented in the curricula
of the pu!lic schools., It is further limited ,solely, to courses in
the following ,secular, su!"ects3 mathematics' modern foreign
languages' physical science' and physical education. Te$t!oo2s
and instructional materials included in the program must !e
approved !y the state Superintendent of Pu!lic Instruction.
-inally' the statute prohi!its reim!ursement for any course that
contains ,any su!"ect matter e$pressing religious teaching' or
the morals or forms of worship of any sect.,
The Act went into effect and it appears that some 4% million has
!een e$pended annually under the Act. The State has now
entered into contracts with some 1'1/1 nonpu!lic elementary
and secondary schools with a student population of some
%5%'61% pupils ) more than 67& of the total num!er of
students in the State. 8ore than 96& of these pupils attend
church)related schools' and most of these schools are affiliated
with the Roman *atholic church.
Appellants !rought this action in the 9istrict *ourt to challenge
the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute. The
organi#ational plaintiffs)appellants are associations of persons
resident in Pennsylvania declaring !elief in the separation of
church and state: individual plaintiffs)appellants are citi#ens
and ta$payers of Pennsylvania.
Appellant 0emon' in addition to !eing a citi#en and a ta$payer'
is a parent of a child attending pu!lic school in Pennsylvania.
Lem! "#$ "##e%e$ &'"& 'e ()*+'"$e, " &-+.e& "& " *"+e
&*"+. "!, &')$ '", ("-, &'e $(e+-/-+ &"0 &'"& $)((*&$ &'e
e0(e!,-&)*e$ )!,e* &'e A+&.
Appellees are state officials who have the responsi!ility for
administering the Act. In addition seven church)related schools
are defendants)appellees.
1SSUE:
;hether or not the two statutes are unconstitutional for
violating the Religion *lauses of the -irst Amendment<
2EL3:
Inuiry into the legislative purposes of the Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island statutes shows that the intent to enhance the
uality of the secular education in all schools covered !y the
compulsory.
The two legislatures' however' have also recogni#ed that
church)related elementary and secondary schools have a
significant religious mission and that a su!stantial portion of
their activities is religiously oriented. They have therefore
sought to create statutory restrictions designed to guarantee
the separation !etween secular and religious educational
functions and to ensure that State financial aid supports only
the former.
All these provisions are precautions ta2en in candid recognition
that these programs approached' even if they did not intrude
upon' the for!idden areas under the Religion *lauses.
2O4E5ER &'e +)m)#"&-ve -m("+& / &'e e!&-*e
*e#"&-!$'-( "*-$-!% )!,e* &'e $&"&)&e$ -! e"+' S&"&e
-!v#ve$ e0+e$$-ve e!&"!%#eme!& 6e&7ee! %ve*!me!&
"!, *e#-%-!.
=oth statutes are unconstitutional under the Religion *lauses of
the -irst Amendment' as the cumulative impact of the entire
relationship arising under the statutes involves e$cessive
entanglement !etween government and religion.
>a? The entanglement in the Rhode Island program arises
!ecause of the religious activity and purpose of the
church)affiliated schools' especially with respect to
children of impressiona!le age in the primary grades'
and the dangers that a teacher under religious control
and discipline poses to the separation of religious from
purely secular aspects of elementary education in such
schools. These factors reuire continuing state
surveillance to ensure that the statutory restrictions
are o!eyed and the -irst Amendment otherwise
respected. -urthermore' under the Act the government
must inspect school records to determine what part of
the e$penditures is attri!uta!le to secular education as
opposed to religious activity' in the event a nonpu!lic
school(s e$penditures per pupil e$ceed the compara!le
figures for pu!lic schools.
>!? The entanglement in the Pennsylvania program also
arises from the restrictions and surveillance necessary
to ensure that teachers play a strictly nonideological
role and the state supervision of nonpu!lic school
accounting procedures reuired to esta!lish the cost of
secular as distinguished from religious education. In
addition' the Pennsylvania statute has the further
defect of providing continuing financial aid directly to
the church)related schools. @istorically governmental
control and surveillance measures tend to follow cash
grant programs' and here the government(s post)audit
power to inspect the financial records of church)related
schools creates an intimate and continuing relationship
!etween church and state.
>c? Political division along religious lines was one of the
evils at which the -irst Amendment aimed' and in
these programs' where successive and pro!a!ly
permanent annual appropriations that !enefit
relatively few religious groups are involved'
political fragmentation and divisiveness on religious
lines are li2ely to !e intensified.
A8L19A: v. RU1Z
FACTS:
Petitioner Aregorio Aglipay is the Supreme @ead of the
Philippine Independent *hurch. @e see2s the issuance of a writ
of prohi!ition to prevent the respondet Buan Rui#' 9irector of
Posts' from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative
the 55
rd
International +ucharistic *ongress.
In 8ay 1956' respondent 9irector announced that he
would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the
cele!ration of the 55
rd
IntCl +ucharistic *ongress organi#ed !y
the Roman *atholic *hurch' in 8anila. The stamp is descri!ed
as follows3
,In the center is chalice' with grape vine and stal2s of
wheat as !order design. The stamps are !lue' green'
!rown' cardinal red' violet and orange' 1 inch !y 1'79D
inches. The denominations are for 6' 6' 16' 67' 56 and
%7 centavos.,
Petitioner is contending that issuing and selling those
commemorative postage stamps are violative of the provisions
of the *onstitution' particularly Art. EI' Sec. 65.
1

1
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or
used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination, secretarian, institution, or system of religion, or
for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other
religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any
penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.
1SSUE:
4;N &'e -$$)"!+e / &'e +mmem*"&-ve $&"m($ "*e
+!$&-&)&-!"#. :e$, v"#-,.
2EL3;RAT1O:
=asic is the principle of separation of church and state.
It is almost trite to say now that in this country we en"oy !oth
religious and civil freedom. All the officers of the Aovernment'
from the highest to the lowest' in ta2ing their oath to support
and defend the constitution' !ind themselves to recogni#e and
respect the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom' with
its inherent limitations and recogni#ed implications. It should !e
stated that what is guaranteed !y our *onstitution is religious
li!erty' not mere religious toleration.
Re#-%-)$ /*ee,m, '7eve*, "$ " +!$&-&)&-!"#
m"!,"&e -$ !& -!'-6-&-! / (*/)!, *eve*e!+e /*
*e#-%-! "!, -$ !& ,e!-"# / -&$ -!/#)e!+e -! ')m"!
"//"-*$. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that
!inds and elevates man to his *reator is recogni#ed. The
elevating influence of religion in human society is recogni#ed
here as elsewhere. In fact' certain general concessions are
indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.
The respondent 9irector of Posts issued the postage
stamps under the authority of Act .o. D7%6. *ongress
appropriated funds for the costs of plates and printing the
stamps and authori#ed the 9irector' with approval of the
Secretary of Pu!lic ;or2s and *ommunications' to use the
amount ,as often as may !e deemed advantageous to the
Aovernment,. The printing and issuance of the postage stamps
in uestion appears to have !een approved !y authority of the
President of the Philippines.
Act .o. D7%6 contemplates no religious purpose in
view. ;hat it gives the 9irector of Posts is the discretionary
power to determine when the issuance of special postage
stamps would !e ,advantageous to the Aovernment., Ff
course' the phrase ,advantageous to the Aovernment, does not
authori#e the violation of the *onstitution. It does not authori#e
the appropriation' use or application of pu!lic money or
property for the use' !enefit or support of a particular sect or
church. In the present case' however' the issuance of the
postage stamps in uestion !y the 9irector of Posts and the
Secretary of Pu!lic ;or2s and *ommunications was not
inspired !y any sectarian denomination. The stamps were not
issue and sold for the !enefit of the Roman *atholic *hurch.
.or were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to
that church.
The officials concerned merely' too2 advantage of an
event considered of international importance ,to give pu!licity
to the Philippines and its people., It is significant to note that
the stamps as actually designed and printed' instead of
showing a *atholic *hurch chalice as originally planned'
contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the *ity of
8anila' and an inscription as follows3 ,Seat GGGIII International
+ucharistic *ongress' -e!. 5)H'195H., ;hat is emphasi#ed is
not the +ucharistic *ongress itself !ut 8anila' the capital of the
Philippines' as the seat of that congress. It is o!vious that while
the issuance and sale of the stamps in uestion may !e said to
!e insepara!ly lin2ed with an event of a religious character' the
resulting propaganda' if any' received !y the Roman *atholic
*hurch' was not the aim and purpose of the Aovernment. ;e
are of the opinion that the Aovernment should not !e
em!arassed in its activities simply !ecause of incidental results'
more or less religious in character' if the purpose had in view is
one which could legitimately !e underta2en !y appropriate
legislation. The main purpose should not !e frustrated !y its
su!ordinate to mere incidental results not contemplated.
51CTOR1ANO 5S EL1ZAL3E RO9E 4ORKER<S UN1ON
-A*TS3 EI*TFRIA.F' a mem!er of Iglesia ni Iristo >I.I? is an
employee of +li#alde Rope -actory >+RP? and a mem!er of its
1nion >+R;1?' the *=A of which included a closed shop
provision.
6
=y virtue of RA 55%7' which amended RA /H%
5
and
states that the ,agreement shall not cover mem!ers of any
religious sects which prohi!it affiliation of their mem!ers in any
such la!or organi#ation, >!asically means mem!ers of religious
sect li2e I.I' which prohi!its followers from "oining any la!or
org' canCt !e forced to comply with closed shop provision?'
EI*TFRIA.F tendered his resignation from +R;1 claiming that
as per RA 55%7 he is an e$emption to the close shop
agreement !y virtue of his !eing a mem!er of the I.I !ecause
apparently in the I.I' one is for!idden from !eing a mem!er of
any la!or union.
+R;1 wrote a formal letter to +RP as2ing the latter to
separate EI*TFRIA.F from the service in view of the fact that
he was resigning from the +R;1 as a mem!er. +RP notified
EI*TFRIA.F that unless he could achieve a satisfactory
arrangement with +R;1' the +RP would !e constrained to
dismiss him from the service. EI*TFRIA.F filed for an
in"unction against dismissing him' which RT* granted. +R;1
now uestions the constitutionality of RA 55%7 as it
discriminatorily favors those religious sects which !an their
mem!ers from "oining la!or unions and impairs o!ligation of
contract stipulated in their *=A. They further contend that
trade unionism in this country would !e wiped out as employers
would prefer to hire or employ mem!ers of the Iglesia ni Iristo
in order to do away with la!or organi#ations.
ISS1+3 ;J. RA 55%7 is constitutional. K L+S.
RATIF3
N 5-#"&-! / F*ee,m / "$$+-"&-!
RA 55%7 merely e$cludes ipso jure from the application and
coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees
!elonging to any religious sects which prohi!it affiliation of their
mem!ers with any la!or organi#ation. ;hat the e$ception
provides' therefore' is that mem!ers of said religious sects
cannot !e compelled or coerced to "oin la!or unions even when
said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers:
that in spite of any closed shop agreement' mem!ers of said
religious sects cannot !e refused employment or dismissed
from their "o!s on the sole ground that they are not mem!ers
of the collective !argaining union. It does not prohi!it the
mem!ers of said religious sects from affiliating with la!or
unions. It still leaves to said mem!ers the li!erty and the power
to affiliate' or not to affiliate' with la!or unions.
N ,-$+*-m-!"&-! -! /"v* / mem6e*$ / $"-, *e#-%-)$
$e+&$
2
Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for
all permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement.
3
the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor
organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if
such labor organization is the representative of the employees." !ompany had
liberty impose conditions as a requirement for continued employment.
RA 55%7 cannot !e said to violate the constitutional inhi!ition of
the Mno)esta!lishment, >of religion? clause of the *onstitution.
The purpose of RA 55%7 is secular' worldly' and temporal' not
spiritual or religious or holy and eternal. It was intended to
serve the secular purpose of advancing the constitutional right
to the free e$ercise of religion' !y averting that certain persons
!e refused wor2' or !e dismissed from wor2' or !e
dispossessed of their right to wor2 and of !eing impeded to
pursue a modest means of livelihood' !y reason of union
security agreements.
The e$emption from the effects of closed shop agreement does
not directly advance' or diminish' the interests of any particular
religion. Although the e$emption may !enefit those who are
mem!ers of religious sects that prohi!it their mem!ers from
"oining la!or unions' the !enefit upon the religious sects is
merely incidental and indirect. In enacting RA 55%7' *ongress
acted consistently with the spirit of the constitutional provision
!ecause it acted merely to relieve the e$ercise of religion' !y
certain persons' of a !urden that is imposed !y union security
agreements. It was *ongress who imposed the !urden >gave
power to ma2e closed shop agreements? and' certainly'
*ongress' if it so deems advisa!le' could ta2e away the same
!urden.
FT@+R .FT+S3
1nder RA 55%7' A conscientious religious o!"ector
need not perform a positive act or e$ercise the right of
resigning from the la!or union N he is e$empted from
the coverage of any closed shop agreement that a
la!or union may have entered into !y virtue of police
power of State to enact RA 55%7.
RA 55%7 doesnCt violate eual protection3
>1? there is su!stantial distinction !etween those part
of religious sects and those who are not >real and
psychological aspects?:
>6? it is germane to its purpose !ecause it avoids a
situation where wor2ers are deprived of their right
to wor2 and from !eing dismissed from their wor2
!ecause of union shop security agreements:
>5? it is not limited to e$isting conditions as !ecause
the law does not provide that it is to !e effective
for a certain period of time only:
>D? it applies eually to all mem!ers of said religious
sects.
Z"+"*-"$ 5-##"v-+e!+- v$ =)$& L).6"! e& "# (1919)
-acts3 0u2!an was the 8ayor of the *ity of 8anila. -or the !est
of all reasons and to e$terminate vice' 0u2!an ordered the
segregated district for women of ill repute to !e closed >they
had !een permitted to operate for a num!er of years?.
The women were initially confined to their houses !y
the police. The city authorities then uietly perfected
arrangements with the !ureau of la!or to send the women to
davao as la!ourers. The women were given no opportunity to
collect their !elongings. The women thought they were merely
!eing ta2en to a police station for an investigation. The women
were not as2ed if they wished to depart from the region and
had not given any consent whether directly or indirectly to the
deportation.
The women were placed on !oard the vessels
*orregidor and .egros. 1pon reaching 9avao' the women were
received as la!ourers !y -rancisco Sales >governor of davao?'
and !y -eliciano LOigo and Rafael *astillo >!ased from the facts
I thin2 these 6 are owners of a hacienda?. They had no
previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had
!een e$pelled from 8anila. Some of the women married' went
to wor2 in different capacities and assumed a new life.
=efore the vessels reached 9avao' a @a!eas *orpus
petition was filed in !ehalf of the women. This petition is the
su!"ect of the case.
Issue3 ;hether the *ity 8ayor had the power to e$pel the
women<
@eld3 .F.+P
S* noted that there are laws which allows for the ff3
an alien prostitute can !e e$pelled from the Phil in conformity
with law after the governor)general conducts a hearing: Act%19
and SecH55 of the Revised Frdinance of the *ity of 8anila
provide for conviction and punishment of any person who is a
common prostitute: Act/99 authori#es the return of any citi#en
of the 1S who have !een convicted of vagrancy. All the a!ove)
mentioned acts are pursuant to a law even health authorities
esta!lish a uarantine or place a leper in a leper colony.
@owever' S* finds .F 0A; which aurhori#es the mayor of
manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the
Philippines Islands >and these women despite !eing MlepersQof
society are not chattels !ut are phil citi#ens protected !y the
consti "ust li2e any other citi#en? to change their domicile from
8anila to another locality. Fn the other hand' phil penal laws
punishes any pu!lic officer who' not !eing e$pressly authori#ed
!y law or regulation' compels any person to change his
residence.
The privilege of domicile is deemed important as to !e
found in the =ill of Rights of the *onsti of Spain and Bapan.
1nder the American consti system' li!erty of a!ode is a
principle so deeply im!edded in "urisprudence and considered
so elementary in nature as not even to reuire a consti
sanction. +ven the Aov)Aeneral of the Phil or the Pres of the
1nited States have even !een often said to e$ercise more
power than any 2ing' has no such ar!itrary prerogative. 8uch
less then does an e$ecutive of a municipality have the power to
violate the li!erty of a!ode of a citi#en. If one mayor can' then
the mayor of all other municipalities can as well' and if they
can' then any official in power can have the right. And if a
prostitute could !e sent against her wishes even without law'
then officials can e$ercise the same power over any other
citi#en.
Fther issues dealt with the defences raised on the
petition for ha!eas corpus3 1? ;rong party: 6? "urisdiction of
the courts: 5? there was no restraint of li!erty. ;ith regard to
the 1
st
issue' the women could not have possi!ly signed the
petition on their own !ecause they were e$pelled. 6
nd
issue3
@a!eas corpus may !e granted !y the S* and enforci!le
anywhere in the Philippine islands. The rule that the petition
should !e filed at the nearest "udge of the *-I is not a hard and
fast rule. 5
rd
issue3 he forci!le ta2ing of these women from
8anila !y officials of that city' who handed them over to other
parties' who deposited them in a distant region' deprived these
women of freedom of locomotion "ust as effectively as if they
had !een imprisoned. Placed in 9avao without either money or
personal !elongings' they were prevented from e$ercising the
li!erty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of
li!erty which !egan in 8anila continued until the aggrieved
parties were returned to 8anila and released or until they freely
and truly waived his right.

M"!&+ v. CA
Ricardo 8anoto2 is a principal stoc2holder of Trans)Insular
8anagement and 8anotoc Securities. @e was in 1S' !ut came
here to file a petition with S+* for the appointment of a
management committee for !oth corporations' after a certain
stoc2 !ro2erCs flight from this "urisdiction.
Pending the disposition of the said case' S+* wrote to the
*ommissioner of Immigration to not clear 8anotoc for
departure. A memo to this effect was issued.
6 criminal complaints were later filed against 8anotoc as
president of 8anotoc Securities when a torrens title was
su!mitted to the latter' which was suspected to !e fa2e. The
fiscal then filed charges for estafa with the courts. 8anotoc was
admitted to !ail in the amount of 17%2.
@e then filed !efore the trial courts where his cases were
pending a motion for permission to leave the country' stating
he wanted to go !ac2 to 1S for !usiness transactions and
opportunities' !ut the "udges !oth denied the motion on the
ground that there is no urgency. 8anotoc li2ewise wrote to the
*ommissioner of Immigration' as2ing for the recall of the
latterCs earlier memo' !ut this was li2ewise denied.@e appealed
to the *A K denied. @ence this.
Issue3 does a person facing a criminal indictment and
provisionally released on !ail have unrestricted right to travel<
K .o' such right is not a!solute.
Ruling3 8anotoc argues that since he was admitted to !ail as a
matter of right' then the courts nor S+* could prevent him from
e$ercising his constitutional right to travel )1ntena!leP
A court has power to prohi!it a person admitted to !ail from
leaving the country. Remem!er that !ail is security given for
the release of a person in custody of law. That he will appear
!efore any court in which his appearance is reuired as
stipulated in the !ail !ond or recogni#ance. Its o!"ect is to
relieve the accused of imprisonment pending trial' while at the
same time putting the accused under the courtCs power and to
secure his appearance to answer the call of the court. T'e
+!,-&-! -m($e, )(! M"!&+ & m".e '-m$e#/
"v"-#"6#e "& "## &-me$ 7'e!eve* &'e +)*& *e>)-*e$ '-$
(*e$e!+e (e*"&e$ "$ " v"#-, *e$&*-+&-! ! '-$ *-%'& &
&*"ve#, /* -/ &'e "++)$e, 7e*e "##7e, & #e"ve, 'e m"?
6e (#"+e, 6e?!, &'e *e"+' / +)*&$.
If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal >accused?
from leaving the state' more so then has the court from which
the sureties merely derive such right. The courtCs "urisdiction
over the person of the principal remains unaffected despite the
grant of !ail to the latter. In fact' this inherent right of the
court is recogni#ed !y petitioner himself' notwithstanding his
allegation that he is at total li!erty to leave the country' for he
would not have filed the motion for permission to leave the
country in the first place' if it were otherwise.
Petitioner cites the Shepherd case' where the accused was
allowed to leave a!road. The difference lies in the fact that the
accused in that case was a!le to show the urgent necessity for
travel and the court was satisfied that she would comply with
the conditions of her !ail !ond. Petitioner here failed to specify
the duration of such travel or show that his surety has agreed
to it.
-inally' &'e 1973 C!$&-&)&-! e0(#-+-&#? (*v-,e$ &'"&
@T'e #-6e*&? / "6,e "!, / &*"ve# $'"## !& 6e -m("-*e,
e0+e(& )(! #"7/)# *,e* / &'e +)*&A.B T'e *,e* / &'e
&*-"# +)*&$ *e#e"$-!% (e&-&-!e* ! 6"-# +!$&-&)&e$ $)+'
#"7/)# *,e* +!&em(#"&e, 6? &'e (*v-$-!.
.ot so important3 ;hile S* case is pending' 8anotoc filed a
motion for leave to go a!road pendent lite' presenting proof
that he was needed to o!tain a foreign investment. @e also
insisted that the criminal cases against him had !een
dismissed' since he was not connected with 8anotoc Securities
as of the date of the commission of the offense K this was not
true.
S-#ve*- v. C)*& / A((e"#$
-acts3
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 67 >D?
of the Revised Securities Act filed in the RT* of *e!u. In due
time' he posted !ail for his provisional li!erty. 8ore than 6
years after the filing of the Information' respondent People of
the Phils filed an 1rgent e$ parte 8otion to cancel the passport
of and to issue a hold)departure order against accused)
petitioner on the ground that he had gone a!road several times
without the necessary *ourt approval resulting in
postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings.
RT* then issued an order directing the 9-A to cancel
petitionerCs passport or to deny his application therefore. It was
also ordered that the *ommission on Immigration to prevent
petitioner from leaving the country. This order was !ased
primarily on the Trial *ourt(s finding that since the filing of the
Information' ,the accused has not yet !een arraigned !ecause
he has never appeared in *ourt on the dates scheduled for his
arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused
Ricardo *. Silverio' Sr. has left the country and has gone
a!road without the 2nowledge and permission of this *ourt,.
Petitioner contends that respondent *ourt of Appeals erred in
not finding that the Trial *ourt committed grave a!use of
discretion amounting to lac2 of "urisdiction in issuing the
aforementioned orders on the ground that' among others' the
finding that the right to travel can !e impaired upon lawful
order of the *ourt' even on grounds other than the ,interest of
national security' pu!lic safety or pu!lic healthQ is erroneous.
Issue3
;J. petitioner right to travel may !e impaired for
causes other than the interest of national security' pu!lic safety
or pu!lic health< L+S' IT 8AL =+ I8PAIR+9.
@eld3
To start with' and this has not !een controverted !y
Petitioner' the !ail !ond he had posted had !een cancelled and
;arrants of Arrest had !een issued against him !y reason' in
!oth instances' of his failure to appear at scheduled
arraignments. ;arrants of Arrest having !een issued against
him for violation of the conditions of his !ail !ond' he should !e
ta2en into custody. ,=ail is the security given for the release of
a person in custody of the law' furnished !y him or a
!ondsman' conditioned upon his appearance !efore any court
when so reuired !y the *ourt or the Rules. The foregoing
condition imposed upon an accused to ma2e himself availa!le
at all times whenever the *ourt reuires his presence operates
as a valid restriction of his right to travel.
A person facing criminal charges may !e restrained !y
the *ourt from leaving the country or' if a!road' compelled to
return. So it is also that ,An accused released on !ail may !e
re)arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to
depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the
*ourt where the case is pending.Q
Article III' Section 6 of the 19/H *onstitution should
!e interpreted to mean that while the li!erty of travel may !e
impaired even without *ourt Frder' the appropriate e$ecutive
officers or administrative authorities are not armed with
ar!itrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose
limits only on the !asis of ,national security' pu!lic safety' or
pu!lic health, and ,as may !e provided !y law', a limitive
phrase which did not appear in the 19H5 te$t. Apparently' the
phraseology in the 19/H *onstitution was a reaction to the !an
on international travel imposed under the previous regime
when there was a Travel Processing *enter' which issued
certificates of eligi!ility to travel upon application of an
interested party.
Article III' Section 6 of the 19/H *onstitution should
!y no means !e construed as delimiting the inherent power of
the *ourts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into
effect in criminal cases pending !efore them. ;hen !y law
"urisdiction is conferred on a *ourt or "udicial officer' all
au$illary writs' process and other means necessary to carry it
into effect may !e employed !y such *ourt or officer.
Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. @e has posted
!ail !ut has violated the conditions thereof !y failing to appear
!efore the *ourt when reuired. ;arrants for his arrest have
!een issued. Those orders and processes would !e rendered
nugatory if an accused were to !e allowed to leave or to
remain' at his pleasure' outside the territorial confines of the
country. @olding an accused in a criminal case within the reach
of the *ourts !y preventing his departure from the Philippines
must !e considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel
so that he may !e dealt with in accordance with law. The
offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the
Philippines. It is to their !est interest that criminal prosecutions
should run their course and proceed to finality without undue
delay' with an accused holding himself amena!le at all times to
*ourt Frders and processes.
LE8AS91 v C151L SER51CE COMM1SS1ON
-A*TS3
This is a mandamus case filed !y petitioner Ealentin0egaspi
against *ivil Service *ommission to compel the latter to give
the former information on the *ivil Service +ligi!ilities of
several sanitarians in the *ity @ealth Fffice of *e!u K
Si!onghanoy and Agas. 0egaspi claims that Si!onghanoy and
Agas have allgegedly represented themselves as *ivil Service
eligi!le having passed the civil service e$amination for
sanitarians.
The solicitor general o!"ects saying that 0egaspi had no legal
standing !ecause he did not show that he had actual interest
in securing the information. Also' he contends that it is not
the ministerial duty of the *S* to release the information.
ISS1+3
;hether or not *S* may !e compelled to release the
information sought K L+S' it can !e compelled
@+093
Section H article 5 of the constitution which provides for the
right to information is a self)e$ecuting right. ;hilst congress
can impose reasona!le conditions and limitations upon the
access to information' it must !e consistent with the stateCs
declared policy of full pu!lic disclosure of all transactions
involving pu!lic interest. @owever' it cannot !e
overemphasi#ed that whatever limitation may !e prescri!ed
!y the 0egislature' the right and the duty under Art. III Sec.
H have !ecome operative and enforcea!le !y virtue of the
adoption of the .ew *harter. Therefore' the right may !e
properly invo2ed in a mandamus proceeding such as this
one.
0egaspi has legal standing. ;hile it is true that he did not
allege any specific interest in the procurement of the
information' the nature of section H article 5 which is a pu!lic
right confers even to dis)interested persons legal standing.
This is !ecause the people ta2en as a whole have legal
standing
A distinction has to !e made !etween power to prohi!it
access which only *ongress can provide and power to
regulate the manner of accessing the information which can
!e e$ercised !y agencies having custody of the information.
The authority to regulate access is to !e e$ercised solely to
the end that damage to' or loss of' pu!lic records may !e
avoided' undue interference with the duties of said agencies
may !e prevented' and more importantly' that the e$ercise
of the same constitutional right !y other persons shall !e
assured.
This is not to say however that administrative agencies may
not deny access. They can if the information sought is not of
pu!lic concern. =ut once they deny access' they have the
!urden of showing that the information sought is not of
pu!lic concern. This is !ecause the right to information is an
a!solute. -or instance' information may !e denied if it affects
national security.
In the instant' case while refusing to confirm or deny the
claims of eligi!ility' *S* has failed to cite any provision in the
*ivil Service 0aw which would limit the petitioner(s right to
2now who are' and who are not' civil service eligi!les. The
court too2"udicial notice of the fact that the names of those
who pass the civil service e$aminations' as in !ar
e$aminations and licensure e$aminations for various
professions' are released to the pu!lic. @ence' there is
nothing secret a!out one(s civil service eligi!ility' if actually
possessed. 0egaspi(s reuest is' therefore' neither unusual
nor unreasona!le. And when' as in this case' the government
employees concerned claim to !e civil service eligi!les' the
pu!lic' through any citi#en' has a right to verify their
professed eligi!ilities from the *ivil Service *ommission
S**?, $)(e* #!% +"$e.
AKCA:AN v. ADU1NO
FACTS:
Petitioners are filed this petition for mandamus and
prohi!ition to o!tain from the governmentNvia respondents the
full te$t of the Bapan)Philippines +conomic Partnership
Agreement >BP+PA?' I.*019I.A the Philippine and Bapanese
offers su!mitted during the negotiation process and all the
pertinent attachments and anne$es thereto.
It all started when *ong. Tanada called for an inuiry
into the !ilateral trade agreements !etween the Phil
government and Bapan. The @ouse reuested respondent
1ndersecretary Auino' who was the chairman of the
coordinating committee which studied the feasi!ility of the
BP+PA' to -1R.IS@ the @ouse with the studies it conducted'
copies of the proposed BP+PA and the latest draft of it. 1sec
Auino did not heed.
*ong. Agu"a later reuested for the same documents
!ut 1sec. Auino still refused and replied that the former will !e
provided a copy once the negotiations have !een completed' as
it was currently under negotiations.
Another congressman' *ong. Teves tried to get the
same documents this time from +$ec Sec +rmita. @e reuested
for all the drafts of BP+PA' including any other reuest and
offers e$change !etween the parties. +rmita wrote !ac2 to
Teves saying that it cannot comply' it undergoing negotiations
and that it will furnish a copy when the te$t is settled and
complete. There were other attempts to secure the drafts of the
BP+PA' !ut all attempts failed. This prompted the @ouse to
issue a su!poena for the most recent draft of the BP+PA.
The BP+PA is a !ilateral free trade agreement !etween
the Phil and Bapan' the first one entered into !y the Phil. It
covers topics such as trade' customs procedure' investments'
trade' intellectual property rights' government procurement'
and other things related to trade and !usiness.
9uring the hearing of this case' the final te$t of the
BP+PA was made accessi!le to the pu!lic. ItCs "ust that the
initial drafts were 2ept from pu!lic view. And this is precisely
what the petitioners are uestioning in this case.
Petitioners mainly contend that the continued refusal
of the government to disclose the documents involved in the
BP+PA negotiations violates their right to information on matters
of pu!lic concern and contravenes other constitutional
provisions on transparency. They also contend that the non)
disclosure of these documents undermines their right to
effective and reasona!le participation in social' political and
economic decision)ma2ing. Lastly' they proffer that divulging
the contents of the BP+PA only after the agreement has !een
concluded will effectively ma2e the Senate into a mere ru!!er
stamp of the +$ecutive' in violation of the principle of
separation of powers. In other words' the petitioners want to
2now the te$t of the BP+PA A.9 the Philippine' as well as'
Bapanese //e*$.
1SSUE: 4;N &'e (e&-&-!e*$< *-%'& & -!/*m"&-! -$
v-#"&e, 7'e! &'e *e$(!,e!&$ *e(e"&e,#? *e/)$e, &
,-$+#$e &'e ,*"/&$ / &'e =9E9A "!, &'e ("*&-e$<
*e$(e+&-ve //e*$. NO. 1&<$ (*-v-#e%e, -!/*m"&-!E
2EL3;RAT1O:
O! &'e -$$)e / $&"!,-!%Fthis petition is anchored upon the
right of the people to I.-FR8ATIF. on matters of pu!lic
concern' which is a pu!lic right !y its very nature' petitioners
need not show that they have any legal or special interest in
the result' it !eing sufficient to show that they are citi#ens and'
therefore' part of the general pu!lic which possesses the right.
Therefore' they have standing.
O! &'e -$$)e / m&!e$$FThe principal relief petitioners are
praying for is the disclosure of the contents of the BP+PA prior
to its finali#ation !etween the two States parties. =ecause of
pu!lic disclosure of the te$t of the BP+PA after its signing !y the
President' during the pendency of the present petition' the
relief prayed for has !een largely rendered moot and
academic. The te$t of the BP+PA having then !een made
accessi!le to the pu!lic' the petition has !ecome moot and
academic to the e$tent that it see2s the disclosure of the Mfull
te$tQ thereof.
The petition is not entirely moot' however' !ecause
petitioners see2 to o!tain' not merely the te$t of the BP+PA' !ut
also the Philippine and Bapanese offers in the course of the
negotiations.
M"-! 1$$)e: R-%'& & 1!/*m"&-!
To !e covered !y the right to information' the
information sought must meet the threshold reuirement that it
!e a matter of pu!lic concern. In defining what Mpu!lic
concern'Q S* held that it em!rances a !road spectrum of
su!"ects which the pu!lic may want to 2now' either !ecause
these directly affect their lives' or simply !ecause such matters
naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citi#en. 9ecided on
a case to case !asis.
-rom the nature of the BP+PA as an international trade
agreement' it is evident that the Philippine and Bapanese offers
su!mitted during the negotiations towards its e$ecution are
matters of pu!lic concern. This' respondents do not
dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are
covered !y the doctrine of e0e+)&-ve (*-v-#e%e ' thus
constituting an e$ception to the right to information and the
policy of full pu!lic disclosure. The respondents say that the
information sought is not simply a diplomatic matter' !ut it
pertains to diplomatic .+AFTIATIF.S which were then in
progress.
The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has
!een recogni#ed in this "urisdiction. The S* held in Chavez v.
PCGG that Minformation on inter)government e$changes prior to
the conclusion of treaties and e$ecutive agreements may !e
su!"ect to reasona!le safeguards for the sa2e of national
interest.Q MSecrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not
violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech
or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information.Q
>P8P- v. 8anglapus? The nature of diplomacy reuires
centrali#ation of authority and e$pedition of decision which are
inherent in e$ecutive action. Another essential characteristic of
diplomacy is its confidential nature.
A#$, &'e 9*e$-,e!& -$ &'e $#e *%"! / &'e !"&-!
-! -&$ !e%&-"&-!$ 7-&' /*e-%! +)!&*-e$. 1sually' when
negotiations are started' pressure groups attempt to Mmuscle
in.Q An ill)timed speech !y one of the parties or a fran2
declaration of the concession which are e$acted or offered on
!oth sides would uic2ly lead to widespread propaganda to
!loc2 the negotiations. After a treaty has !een drafted and its
terms are fully pu!lished' there is ample opportunity for
discussion !efore it is approved.
;hile the final te$t of the BP+PA may not !e 2ept
perpetually confidential K since there should !e Mample
opportunity for discussion !efore Ra treatyS is approvedQ K
the offers e$changed !y the parties during the negotiations
continue to !e privileged even after the BP+PA is pu!lished. It
is reasona!le to conclude that the Bapanese representatives
su!mitted their offers with the understanding that M'-$&*-+
+!/-,e!&-"#-&?Q would govern the same. 9isclosing these
offers could impair the a!ility of the Philippines to deal not only
with Bapan !ut with other foreign governments in
future negotiations.
A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations
should now !e open to pu!lic scrutiny would discourage future
Philippine representatives from fran2ly e$pressing their views
during negotiations. ;hile' on first impression' it appears wise
to deter Philippine representatives from entering into
compromises' it !ears noting that treaty negotiations' or any
negotiation for that matter' normally involve a process of quid
pro quo' and oftentimes negotiators have to !e willing to grant
concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to o!tain
more favora!le terms in an area of greater national interest.
O&'e* 1$$)e$;3-$+)$$-!
O! $-m-#"*-&? / +"$e 7-&' 9M9F v. M"!%#"()$ "!, &'e*
.-!,$ / (*-v-#e%e, +mm)!-+"&-!Fthe 6 cases are
su!stantially differentP 8anglapus case involved the 8ilitary
=ases Agreement which affected national security while the
present case involves an economic treaty' which is not so vital
to national security to disallow their disclosure.
S* e$plained that there are different 2inds of claims of
e$ecutive privilege. There are those grounded on the necessity
of safeguarding national security >i.e. those involving military
secrets?. There are those that we call MinformerCs privilegeQ
>privilege of govt not to disclose identity of personJs who
furnish information of violations of law. Another 2ind are
presidential communications which are presumed privileged
without distinguishing !etween those which involve matters of
national security and those which do not. This is to prevent the
chilling effect on the president. =ut the privilege accorded to
presidential communications is !& "6$#)&e' one significant
ualification !eing that Mthe +$ecutive +"!!& ' any more than
the other !ranches of government' invo2e a general
confidentiality privilege to $'-e#, its officials and employees
from investigations !y the proper governmental institutions
into ($$-6#e +*-m-!"# 7*!%,-!%.Q

This ualification
applies whether the privilege is !eing invo2ed in the conte$t of
a "udicial trial or a congressional investigation conducted in aid
of legislation. Similar to this is the privilege for "udicial
deli!erations.
O! &'e -$$)e / &'e *-%'& / mem6e*$ / C!%*e$$ &
,em"!, -!/*m"&-! ! !e%&-"&-!$ / -!&e*!"&-!"#
&*",e "%*eeme!&$ /*m &'e E0e+)&-ve 6*"!+'FIn Senate
v. Ermita it was held that Mpresidential refusals to furnish
information may !e actuated !y any of at least three distinct
2inds of considerations Rstate secrets privilege' informerCs
privilege' and a generic privilege for internal deli!erationsS' and
may !e asserted' 7-&' ,-//e*-!% ,e%*ee$ / $)++e$$' in the
conte$t of either "udicial or legislative investigations'Q implies
that a privilege' once recogni#ed' may !e invo2ed under
different procedural settings. It is the President alone who
negotiates treaties' and not even the Senate or the @ouse of
Representatives' unless as2ed' may intrude upon that process .
T'e -$$)e / 7'e&'e* (e&-&-!e*$ '"ve $'7! &'e
e0-$&e!+e / " ()6#-+ -!&e*e$& $)//-+-e!& & ve*+me &'e
(*-v-#e%e "%"-!$& ,-$+#$)*eFTo clarify' there are at least
two 2inds of pu!lic interest that must !e ta2en into
account. Fne is the presumed pu!lic interest -! /"v* /
.ee(-!% &'e $)6Ge+& -!/*m"&-! +!/-,e!&-"#' which is the
reason for the privilege in the first place' and the other is the
pu!lic interest -! /"v* / ,-$+#$)*e' the e$istence of which
must !e shown !y the party as2ing for information.
The standard is Msufficient showing of need.Q In e$ecutive
privilege controversies' the reuirement that parties present a
Msufficient showing of needQ only means' in su!stance' that
they should show a pu!lic interest in favor of
disclosure sufficient in degree to overcome the claim of
privilege.
C!+#)$-!: PetitionersC demand to !e furnished with a copy of
the /)## &e0& of the BP+PA has !ecome moot and academic' it
having !een made accessi!le to the pu!lic since Septem!er 11'
6776. As for their demand for copies of the Philippine and
Bapanese //e*$ su!mitted during the BP+PA negotiations' the
same must !e denied' respondentsC claim of e$ecutive privilege
!eing valid.
U!-&e, 9e($-HC#" S)(e*v-$*? U!-! (U9SU) v.
L"%)e$m", 8.R. N. 122226, M"*+' 2I, 199J
F"+&$:
1PS1 is a union of supervisory employees. Fn 8arch
67' 199%' 1PS1 filed a petition for certification election
on !ehalf of the route managers at Pepsi)*ola
Products Philippines. The petition was denied !y the
med)ar!iter on the ground that the route managers
are managerial employees and therefore ineligi!le for
union mem!ership under the 0a!or *ode. Sec. of
9F0+ 0aguesma affirmed.
1PS1 filed the suit challenging the order of 0aguesma.
1PS1 contends that the first sentence of Art. 6D% of
the 0a!or *od' insofar as tit declares managerial
employees to !e ineligi!le to form' assist' or "oin
union' is unconstitutional !ecause it contravenes
Section /' Article III of the *onstitution' which
provides3 MThe right of the people' including those
employed in the pu!lic and private sectors' to form
unions' associations' or societies for the purposes not
contrary to law shall not !e a!ridged.Q
1$$)e$:
>1? ;hether the route managers are managerial
employees ) L+S
>6? ;hether Art. 6D% insofar as it prohi!its managerial
employees from forming' "oining or assisting la!or
unions' violates Art. III' T / of the *onstitution K .F'
IT IS *F.STIT1TIF.A0.
2e#,
>1? Route 8anagers are 8anagerial +mployees >not very
important?
The term MmanagerQ generally refers to Manyone who
is responsi!le for su!ordinates and other organi#ation
resources.Q As a class' managers constitute three
levels of a pyramid K Top 8anagement' 8iddle
8anagement' -irst 0ine 8anagement >Supervisors?.
o -irst)line managers direct operating
employees only: they do not supervise other
managers. +$amples are the MforemanQ or
production supervisor in a manufacturing
plant. -irst)level managers are often called
supervisors.
o 8iddle managers direct the activities of other
managers and sometimes also those of
operating employees. Their principal
responsi!ilities are to direct the activities that
implement their organi#ationsC policies and to
!alance the demands of their superiors with
the capacities of their su!ordinates. A plant
manager in an electronics firm is an e$ample
of a middle manager.
o Top managers are responsi!le for the overall
management of the organi#ation' esta!lishing
the operating policies and guide the
organi#ationCs interactions with its
environment. +$amples are the *+F'
president' or senior vice president.
As can !e seen from this description' a distinction e$ist
!etween those who have the authority to devise'
implement and control strategic and operational
policies >top and middle managers? and those whose
tas2 is simply to ensure that such polices are carried
out !y the ran2)and)file employees of an organi#ation
>first)level managersJsupervisors?. ;hat distinguishes
them from the ran2)and file employees is that they act
in the interest of the employer in supervising such
ran2)and)file employees.
M8anagerial employeesQ may therefore !e said to fall
into two distinct categories3 the MmanagersQ per se'
who compose the former group descri!ed a!ove' and
the MsupervisorsQ who form the latter group. ;hether
they !elong to the first or second category' managers'
vis)U)vis employers' are' li2ewise' employees.
To ualify as managerial employee under the 0a!or
*ode' there must !e a clear showing of the e$ercise of
managerial attri!utes under paragraph >m?' Article
616 of the 0a!or *ode as amended. 9esignations or
titles of positions are not controlling. Burisprudence
has esta!lished that route managers are managerial
employees. 8oreover' their "o! descriptions clearly
reveal so. At the very least' the principle of finality of
administrative determination compels respect for the
finding of the Secretary of 0a!or that route managers
are managerial employees as defined !y law in the
a!sence of anything to show that such determination
is without su!stantial evidence to support it.
A review of the "o! evaluation made !y the Secretary
of 0a!or is supported !y su!stantial evidence. The
nature of the "o! of route managers is given in a four)
page pamphlet' prepared !y the company' called
MRoute 8anager Position 9escription.Q 1nli2e
supervisors who !asically merely direct operating
employees in line with set tas2s assigned to them'
route managers are responsi!le for the success of the
company(s main line of !usiness through management
of their respective sales teams. Such management
necessarily involves the planning' direction' operation
and evaluation of their individual teams and areas
which the wor2 of supervisors does not entail.
The route managers cannot thus possi!ly !e classified
as mere supervisors !ecause their wor2 does not only
involve' !ut goes far !eyond' the simple direction or
supervision of operating employees to accomplish
o!"ectives set !y those a!ove them. They are not
mere functionaries with simple oversight functions !ut
!usiness administrators in their own right.
;hile route managers do not appear to have the
power to hire and fire people >the evidence shows that
they only ,recommended, or ,endorsed, the ta2ing of
disciplinary action against certain employees?' this is
!ecause this is a function of the @uman Resources or
Personnel 9epartment of the company. And neither
should it !e presumed that "ust !ecause they are given
set !enchmar2s to o!serve' they are ipso
facto supervisors. Adeuate control methods >as
em!odied in such concepts as ,8anagement !y
F!"ectives R8=FS, and ,performance appraisals,?
which reuire a delineation of the functions and
responsi!ilities of managers !y means of ready
reference cards as here' have long !een recogni#ed in
management as effective tools for 2eeping !usinesses
competitive.
>6? Art. 6D% is constitutional.
In the 1nited States' as Bustice Puno(s separate
opinion notes' supervisors have no right to form
unions. They are e$cluded from the definition of the
term ,employee, in T6>5? of the 0a!or)8anagement
Relations Act of 19DH.
=efore the promulgation of the 0a!or *ode in 19HD'
the field of la!or relations was governed !y the
Industrial Peace Act >R.A. .o. /H%?. 1nder this law'
the right of supervisors to form their own
organi#ations was affirmed. -or its part' the Supreme
*ourt upheld in several of its decisions the right of
supervisors to organi#e for purposes of la!or relations.
@owever' in *alte$ -ilipino 8anagers and Supervisors
Association v. *ourt of Industrial Relations' the right of
all managerial employees to self)organi#ation was
upheld as a general proposition. It should !e pointed
out' however' that the case involved front)line
managers or supervisors.
-ollowing the *alte$ case' the 0a!or *ode dropped the
distinction !etween the first and second su!)groups of
managerial employees. Instead of treating the terms
,supervisor, and ,manager, separately' the law
lumped them together and called them ,managerial
employees., This general definition was perhaps
legally necessary at that time for two reasons. -irst'
the 19HD *ode denied supervisors their right to self)
organi#e as theretofore guaranteed to them !y the
Industrial Peace Act. Second' it stood the dictum in
the *alte$ case on its head !y prohi!iting all types of
managers from forming unions. The e$plicit general
prohi!ition was contained in the then Art. 6D6 of the
0a!or *ode. The 9epartment of 0a!or continued to use
the term ,supervisory unions, despite the demise of
the legal definition of ,supervisor, apparently !ecause
these were the unions of front line managers which
were then allowed as a result of the statutory grant of
the right of self)organi#ation under the Industrial
Peace Act. @ad the 9epartment of 0a!or seen fit to
similarly !an unions of top and middle managers which
may have !een formed following the dictum in *alte$'
it o!viously would have done so. Let it did not'
apparently !ecause no such unions of top and middle
managers really then e$isted.
A review of the real intent of the 19/6 *onstitutional
*ommission in including Section / of Article III shows
that *ommissioner 0erum >who proposed the
amendment? simply meant to restore the right of
supervisory employees to organi#e. 0erum(s proposal
to amend Art. III' T/ of the draft *onstitution !y
including la!or unions in the guarantee of
organi#ational right should !e ta2en in the conte$t of
statements that his aim was the removal of the
statutory !an against security guards and supervisory
employees "oining la!or organi#ations. The approval
!y the *onstitutional *ommission of his proposal can
only mean' therefore' that the *ommission intended
the a!solute right to organi#e of government wor2ers'
supervisory employees' and security guards to !e
constitutionally guaranteed. =y implication' no similar
a!solute constitutional right to organi#e for la!or
purposes should !e deemed to have !een granted to
top)level and middle managers. As to them the right
of self)organi#ation may !e regulated and even
a!ridged conforma!ly to Section /' Article III.
Thus' the present !an against managerial employees
is valid. This provision is the result of the amendment
of the 0a!or *ode in 19/9 !y R.A. .o. 6H1%' otherwise
2nown as the @errera)Eeloso 0aw. 1nli2e the
Industrial Peace Act or the provisions of the 0a!or
*ode which it superseded' R.A. .o. 6H1% provides
separate definitions of the terms MmanagerialQ and
Msupervisory employees.Q ;hen read in relation to this
definition in Art. 616>m?' it will !e seen that Art. 6D%
faithfully carries out the intent of the *onstitutional
*ommission in framing Section III of Article III.
.or is the guarantee of organi#ational right in Art. III'
T/ infringed !y a !an against managerial employees
forming a union. The right guaranteed in Art. III' T/ is
su!"ect to the condition that its e$ercise should !e for
purposes ,not contrary to law., In the case of Art.
6D%' there is a rational !asis for prohi!iting managerial
employees from forming or "oining la!or
organi#ations. The rationale for this inhi!ition has !een
stated to !e' !ecause if these managerial employees
would !elong to or !e affiliated with a 1nion' the latter
might not !e assured of their loyalty to the 1nion in
view of evident conflict of interests. The 1nion can
also !ecome company)dominated with the presence of
managerial employees in 1nion mem!ership.