AAP2014 Abstracts Booklet

Conference 2014
S U N 6 T O F R I 1 1 J U L Y 2 0 1 4

2

Table of Contents

Welcome..3

Keynotes, Presidential Address, Alan Saunders Lecture.........4

Information Sessions5

Abstracts A-Z..6

Streams..74

3

Welcome

Welcome to the Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference for 2014!

This booklet contains information about all of the sessions at the conference. We hope you save a
PDF of the booklet and keep it handy throughout the conference.

AAP2014 Organizing Committee

4
Keynote Addresses, Presidential Address, Alan Saunders Lecture

(For abstracts, please look under Abstracts A-Z.)

Catriona MacKenzie, Macquarie University: The Dimensions of Autonomy
MCCT1, Sunday, 6.15-8 (AAP Presidential Address)

Christian List, London School of Economics: Emergent Chance
MCCT1, Monday 11.30AM-1:00PM (Keynote Address)

Ccile Fabre, Oxford University: Remembering War
MCCT1, Tues 11.30AM-1.00PM (Keynote Address)

Philip Pettit, Princeton University/ANU: A Brief History of Liberty And its Lessons
National Gallery of Australia, Tues 7-8.30PM (Alan Saunders Lecture)

John Hawthorne, Oxford University: TBA
MCCT1, Wednesday 11.30AM-1:00PM (Keynote Address)

Philip Pettit, Princeton University/ANU Group Agents are not Expressive, Pragmatic or
Theoretical Fictions
MCCT1, Thursday 11.30AM-1:00PM (Keynote Address)

5
Information Sessions

Information Session #1: Graduate Careers and Professional Development
MCCT2, Thurs, 4.30-6.30

Session convenors: Jeanette Kennett, Catriona Mackenzie
Presenters: Rachael Brown, Kim Little, Trevor Pisciotta, Jacqui Poltera, Gabriel Rabin

If you are a current postgraduate student in Philosophy or a recent PhD graduate and wondering
what to do next, you should attend this session. The five presenters have recently completed
postgraduate degrees in Philosophy and are pursuing a range of different career paths both, within
and outside of academic Philosophy. The presenters who are pursuing careers in academic
Philosophy (Rachael Brown and Gabriel Rabin) will talk about their recent postdoctoral experiences
and how they secured their current academic appointments. The presenters who have chosen careers
outside Philosophy (Kim Little, Trevor Pisciotta, and J acqui Poltera) will talk about their transition
from Philosophy to other careers; the relevance of their Philosophy qualifications to their current
professions; and how to present yourself as a Philosophy graduate to prospective employers. We
will also provide information about postdoctoral and job opportunities in Philosophy and what you
need to do to develop a competitive track record.

Information Session #2: The Australian Research Council (ARC)
MCCT1, Thurs, 4.30-6.30

Session Convenor: Paul Patton

Does the whole process of getting grants and applying to the ARC seem a complete mystery to you?
Unsure how to respond to assessors reports? If so, please come along to this session!

6

Abstracts A-Z

Miri Albahari, University of Western Australia
MCCT2, Wednesday 9-9:55am

Metaphysically framing Huxleys Perennial Philosophy
Aldous Huxley has noted a theme that has recurred for over 25 centuries from the ambit of many
principal religious traditions throughout Asia and Europe. The Perennial Philosophy, as Huxley
calls it, is the idea that our innermost conscious nature is identical to the immanent and
transcendent Ground of all being the thing immemorial and universal. Directly realising this
identity, through various meditational practices, is said to bring about an unsurpassed level of peace
and happiness. I will approach this Perennial Philosophy not as a topic in the philosophy of
religion but as one in metaphysics and philosophy of mind the goal being to try and make sense of
it. What could be meant by this innermost conscious nature is it something to which we could
feasibly gain first-person access? How might it be identical to the ground of all being, underpinning
the multifaceted world of objects we perceive? And if such oneness of nature were to indeed ground
our minds and the universe, what could be inhibiting our apprehension of this unity? And might the
Perennial Philosophy cohere with contemporary metaphysical positions such as priority monism
and panpsychism?

Muralidharan Anantharaman, National University of Singapore
MORG009, Friday 11:30am-12:25pm

Bargaining Advantage and the Veil of Ignorance
Rawlss veil of ignorance is supposedly justified because it makes the initial choice situation
procedurally fair. It supposedly does this by preventing parties from using morally irrelevant
information about the persons they represent to obtain an unfair bargaining advantage over others.
The success of this argument rests crucially on the idea that at least some rational mutually
disinterested parties without a veil of ignorance would in fact successfully use information about the
persons they represent to obtain an unfair bargaining advantage over other parties. I will argue in
this paper that even in a choice situation identical to Rawlss Original Position except for the lack of
a veil of ignorance, no party has any bargaining advantage over the other. I analyse the notion of a
bargaining advantage in terms of the best alternative to negotiated agreement (BATNA) and the
propensity towards unacceptable outcomes. Using the above analysis of bargaining advantage and
of the Original Position I will argue that, there is no reason to think that a choice situation without a
veil provides some parties a bargaining advantage over others. The analysis of Rawlss argument
suggests that the veil must be justified on purely formal terms.

Erik Anderson, Drew University
MCCT2, Monday 3-3:55pm

Nature Aesthetics and the Scientific Image
The Korean electronics giant LG is planning to build a giant office building right smack in the
middle of the last remaining unblemished stretch of the iconic Hudson River Palisades overlooking
Manhattan. This is no way to appreciate nature. A better way is via an appreciation informed by our
best scientific theories of nature as it is in itself, apart from its usefulness for various industrial or
commercial purposes. So says the thesis of Scientific Cognitivism. I consider what I take to be the
7
strongest argument in favor of this thesis, subject it to critique, and then assess whats left to see if it
provides guidance on questions about development in our remaining natural settings.

Ashley Atkins, Princeton University
MCCT4, Monday 9-9:55am (Cog.Sci Stream)

Modality as a Window into Cognition
There are some modal expressions in natural language that announce themselves loudly and
unmistakably. There can be no question that when I ask myself, searchingly, What could I have
done? I am wondering about those actions that were possible for me and not about any actual
course of action. But there are other, more reluctant, expressions in natural language and it can be
difficult to tell whether they express modality. So, for instance, if I swam all afternoon and am
reflecting on the progress of that activity---I think, I was swimming earlier---have I, in thinking
about the progress of that event, introduced a layer of modality into my thought? The latter is, in
fact, a very polarizing question among theorists who are interested in the contribution of the
progressive (used above to characterize an event as in progress). The dominant view in the literature
is that the progressive does have a modal meaning. There is, however, a significant contingent that
denies this and claims instead that its contribution is much more modest. I argue that modal and
non-modal theorists have equal claim to being half-right. Progressive sentences are split between
those that give rise to modal interpretations and those that do not. However, once we discern the
environments that trigger these modal interpretations, it becomes apparent that they cannot be
explained in terms of modal meanings. What these interpretations reveal, on my view, is the
structure of modal cognition, not the modal structure of language. I conclude with a discussion of
how this result bears on the nature of semantic explanation and on the connection between natural
language modality and modal cognition.

Derek Baker, Lingnan University
MCCT2, Tuesday 4:30-5:30pm

Verdictive Rationalism about Self-Knowledge
I propose using a Verdictive Model to explain the special nature and status of self-knowledge. On
this model, judgments about ones own mental states function in a manner similar to judicial rulings
about the content of the law. Such judgments are responsive to evidence and are about an
independently existing given, but in some cases at least will function to determine the content of the
law, rather than merely describe it. Drawing on HLA Hart, I argue we would expect the rulings of
legal authorities to play a verdictive role with respect to the legal facts, if legal facts have a
normative aspect, but are also sociological facts with a role to play in causal explanations. Mental
states similarly play both causal-explanatory and rationalizing roles in their owners psychology.
This parallel gives reason to think self-reflective judgments will have a verdictive function. I
compare the resulting theory to other Rational Commitment Models of self-knowledge (especially
Richard Morans), and argue that it does a better job accounting for the tie between self-knowledge
and rational agency, while avoiding some of the standard objections.

Peter Balint, UNSW

Defending Racial Tolerance
Tolerance, the non-hindrance of things you object to, is commonly considered to be a virtue: those
who behave tolerantly are behaving well and displaying good character. But if this is true, then
racial tolerance seems paradoxical. How can it be good to refrain from negative interference (the
key feature of tolerance), when the reason for your initial objection (racism) is far from good? On
this understanding, we should not be tolerant of race because we should not have negative attitudes
8
about race in the first place. Such a view seems to rule out racial tolerance altogether. In this paper,
I argue there several problems with this view, one of which is practical. Rejecting racial tolerance
does not seem to offer much help in actual crisis points where tolerance seems a useful minimum.
This problem of lack of application also occurs with the alternative transformative approaches to
tolerance which want to get rid of objection altogether. I conclude that in political contexts, at least,
it might be better to stop thinking of tolerance as a virtue and simply as a useful practice, and one in
which objection is both maintained and not acted upon.

Dirk Baltzly, University of Tasmania
MCCT2, Wednesday 2-2:55pm

Divine Immutability for Henotheists
If gods are immutable, then they are neither created nor destroyed. In addition, they do not undergo
change either by their own agency or by the agency of another. Henotheism is a form of polytheism
that acknowledges multiple orders of divinities, but makes them all subordinate to one god.
Henotheism seems to be incompatible with immutability in both ways. First, it suggests that lower
gods are the causal products of higher gods -even if there was no time at which the higher god
created the lower god. Mere dependence might seem to be a threat to divine immutability. Second,
the acknowledgement that some gods are superior to others seems to leave it open that a more
powerful god could change a less powerful one. This paper considers the development of
henotheistic defenses of divine immutability through a dialectical development from Xenophanes to
Plato to Proclus (d. 485 CE).

Alma Barner, Australian National University
MORG010, Thursday 3-3:55pm

Imagining Qualia
Sometimes I imagine seeing a red panda. Sometimes I imagine hallucinating a red panda. And
sometimes I visually imagine one without imagining any visual experiences. Let us say these
imaginings differ in their contents, yet what is visually represented is phenomenally
indistinguishable - in each case I conjure up an image of a red panda. In this talk, by focusing on
these cases, I bring out a puzzle about imagining qualia and their roles as vehicles of representation
in imagination. The puzzle follows from what seems like a natural analysis of the cases: in (1) and
(2) red quale that appear when visualizing represent the red quale of the imagined experience and
the redness of the panda. The red quale of the imagined experience also represents the redness of
the panda. In (3) instead the red quale that appears does not represent a quale but merely the redness
of the panda. I explain this puzzle further and give an account of imaginings of qualia that solves it.
In the final part of the talk I draw out some implications of this account for the relationship between
conceptual and sensory representation in imagination.

Sam Baron, University of Western Australia/University of Sydney
MCCT2, Monday 9-9:55am

Explaining Mathematical Explanation
There has been a recent surge of interest in the notion of extra-mathematical explanation (the
explanation of physical phenomena, in part, by mathematical entities). A number of putative cases
of extra-mathematical explanation have been identified, and used to provide support for an
explanatory version of the indispensability argument for mathematical Platonism. As yet,
comparatively little has been said concerning the nature of extra-mathematical explanations.
Picking up on a suggestion from Baker (2005), I explore the prospects for expanding the deductive-
nomological account to accommodate explanations of this kind.

9
Craig Barrie, Monash University
MORG009, Tuesday 3-3:55pm

The Socratic elenchus as aetiological lens: implications reading Platos Socratic dialogues
This paper outlines a new approach to understanding the role of Socrates in the Platos Socratic
dialogues. I begin by unpacking the notion that what the young Plato learnt while sitting at
Socrates feet was how the Socratic elenchus reveals the aetiology of specific character types. I
argue that Platos Socratic dialogues employ this elenchtic lens to forensically portray Socrates
interlocutors as the products, conduits or agents of specific modes of pedagogy. By focussing his
readers attention on this aetiology, Plato presents his critical assessment of the modes of pedagogy
of his day, pointing us to what further education is required to create well-round citizens. I argue
that when reading Platos Socratic dialogues, we should begin with the dramatic portrayal of
Socrates interlocutors, employing the Socratic elenchus as an aetiological lens, before we turn to
questions concerning the positive beliefs of Platos Socrates. I call this the Interlocutor-Based
Approach (IBA). Using highly-contested passages often cited as evidence for Socrates positive
beliefs by authors such as Irwin, Nussbaum, Kahn, and Vlastos, I show that the IBA can provide a
more stable evidence-base to decide questions of Socratic irony or sincerity, including when he is
being constructive, ad hominem or protreptic.

Christian Barry, Australian National University

The Moral Inequivalence of Enabling and Allowing Harm
Some philosophers have argued that instances in which agents enable harm are morally equivalent,
all else being equal, to instances in which agents allow harm. Samuel Rickless and Matthew Hanser
have argued for this view on intuitive grounds. They present cases where the moral status of the
conduct of an agent who enables harm seems to be no different from a moral status of an agent who
allows harm. Rickless tries to explain away intuitions about other cases in which enabling harm
does not seem to be equivalent to allowing harm. I argue in this paper that these arguments for the
equivalence of enabling and allowing harm are unconvincing, and that these categories of reasons
are normatively distinct. In particular, moral reasons based on enabling harm are more constraining
and demanding than those based on allowing harm.

Michael Barton, University of Melbourne
MORG008, Friday 10-10:55am

A Levinasian re-reading of the life of Socrates
Socrates is thought to have exhibited virtues such as courage and temperance. I argue that these
virtues come easily to him on account of his relation (or lack of it) to his embodiment in the
world, and that what is considered to be remarkable by his friends and acquaintances is a product of
the particular metaphysical notion of soul that dominates. In this sense he is truly other-worldly, and
indeed remarkable in that way, but those virtues are thereby problematized. However, the Socratic
virtue which should be lionized is that of humility, the disciplined humility of the elenchus, where I
argue he demonstrates a Levinasian-type responsibility to and for the other. This account renders
Socrates life as a distorted version of Levinass ethical relation, with this perhaps leaving him (and
Platos presentation of him) all the more philosophically fascinating on that score.

Saba Bazargan, University of California at San Diego
MORG010, Friday 9-9:55am (Ethics of Force Stream)

Proportionality and Partially Culpable Combatants
10
The death of innocent civilians should obviously be awarded substantial weight in determining
whether a war satisfies the constraint of proportionality. But how should we weigh the deaths of
combatants fighting in furtherance of unjust aims? I argue that such deaths should receive
substantially greater weight than has been thought. I ground this argument by presenting a novel
account of liability according to which an unjust threatener is liable only to the amount of harm
concomitant with the degree of responsibility she bears. Accordingly, the severity of the harms to
which unjust combatants are liable will often be low, since mitigating circumstances often diminish
their culpability. Thus by killing such combatants we wrong them. This makes satisfying the
proportionality constraint problematic, even in waging a war with a just cause.

Matthew Beard, University of Notre Dame Australia
COPGO31, Thursday 9-9:55am (Ethics of Force Stream)

Teaching Double-Effect Theory for Resilience: Perpetration and Moral Injury
Perhaps one of the most pressing challenges for todays military practitioners are the immense
numbers of veterans suffering from moral injury, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and other
non-physical maladies as a result of their involvement in war. There is growing evidence in
philosophical and psychological literature that associates the moral and psychological trauma
suffered by veterans with their involvement in acts of "perpetration," most notably, acts of
intentional killing against other human beings. For many, it does not matter whether or not the
killings they performed were administered permissibly or not. From a psychological perspective,
moral justification is only one morally salient factors to consider. Also relevant to the
psychological and moral experiences of veterans will be, I contend, the soldiers intentions: the act
of intentionally killing another person contains inherent psychological risks, even when it is
justified. Those who believe themselves to have killed another person will be more liable to moral
and mental post-war trauma then those who do not. I will turn to the doctrine of double-effect as a
framework that, if taught well, can provide moral and psychological defences for soldiers who are
required to take another persons life in the performance of their duties.

Sara Bernstein, Duke University

Omission Impossible
I give a framework for understanding causal counterpossibles, statements in which a counterfactual
imbued with causal content has an antecedent that appeals to a metaphysically impossible world; for
example, "If the mathematician hadn't failed to prove that 2+2=5, the math textbooks wouldn't have
remained intact." Such statements are generated by omissive causal claims that appeal to
metaphysically impossible events. I give an account of impossible omissions, and argue for two
claims: (i) impossible omissions are causally relevant to the actual world, and (ii) the correct
analysis of causal counterpossibles provides further evidence for the nonvacuity of counterpossibles
more generally.

Sharon Berry, Australian National University

Mathematical Objects and Ordinary Objects
In this talk I will develop and defend a parallel between our access to mathematical objects and our
access to "ontologically inflationary conditionals" involving ordinary objects like holes, shadows
and marriages -- principles like `if there are particles arranged like then there's a hole'. Drawing
inspiration from Frege, Carnap and Amie Thomasson, I will argue that one can explain ordinary
speakers' ability to choose true mathematical axioms by appealing to the same phenomena (helpful
11
metasemantic facts and human insight regarding logical possibility) which are already needed to
explain their accuracy about ordinary objects.

John Bigelow, Monash University

Translucent semantics
In the tradition of Frege and Russell it has been thought that the reference of a compound
expression is a function of the referents of its components. Yet there are "opaque contexts" in which
it seems that sameness of referents for components is not enough to ensure sameness of reference or
truth value for the whole expression. There are various techniques for getting around this problem. I
will propose an approach that has a high degree of generality. And I will apply this new approach to
the problem of negative existentials, and of negation more generally, as discussed in Plato's
'Sophist'.

Russell Blackford, University of Newcastle
MCCT1, Friday 11:30am-12:25pm

The Moral Landscape Challenge - Reflections on the Contest and the Public Role of
Philosophy
In 2013 I accepted an invitation from Sam Harris to judge his contest, The Moral Landscape
Challenge, for which entrants were required to submit a 1000-word essay arguing for a fundamental
weakness in his best-selling book The Moral Landscape (2010). The contest carried substantial
prize money, attracted over 400 entries, and was eventually won by a young philosopher from
Atlanta, Georgia. As planned, the three of us have since entered into a written debate about the
issues raised in the winning entry (I expect a version of this to be published online by the time of
the AAP conference). For me, the experience raises important issues about the public role of
philosophy and the seeming intractability of philosophical problems. How should professional
academic philosophers respond to the work of popular authors such as Sam Harris and Alain de
Botton?

Ben Blumson, National University of Singapore

Fact, Fiction and Fantasy
This paper argues that all knowledge from fiction is modal knowledge in other words, knowledge
about necessity and possibility. The argument is as follows: (1) all knowledge from fiction is from
imagination, (2) all knowledge from imagination is modal knowledge; so, (3) all knowledge from
fiction is modal knowledge.

Piotr (Peter) Boltuc, University of Illinois, Springfield
MORG008, Thursday 9-9:55am

On Non-Reductive Machine Consciousness
Assume that we accept non-reductive theory of consciousness. Also assume that we are naturalists
(non-reductive materialists broadly defined). Then first person consciousness must be generated by
some mechanism in the brain (or, if one accepts Chalmers panpsychism, collected by it). One day,
as neuroscience develops, we should get to know how this works. To know well how generation of
first person consciousness works in animal brains means to understand in detail its engineering
details. Once we know those details we should in principle be able to generate non-reductive
consciousness. Material science may bring in additional questions (e.g. whether stream of
consciousness can originate only in organic matter); ethics may bring other questions (about moral
12
status of such conscious entities). Those issues do not affect the gist of the argument: when we get
to know how first person consciousness is generated, in principle we should be able to build it. Such
consciousness is unlikely to be just an algorithm; it is more likely to require us to /bio/engineer
something like a projector (like a projector of holograms). Specifications of such projector of
consciousness can be put in an algorithm, then executed in reality, say by Autocad or some future
3D printer. This argument does not solve, or butcher, the Chalmers hard problem of consciousness.
It just shows that we can build a projector of non-reductive consciousness. Producing it does not
amount to explaining it out.

Pierrick Bourrat, University of Sydney
MCCT6, Thursday 2-2:55pm

Heritability and the concepts of Gene and Environment
Heritability estimates; the quantitative genetic method of apportioning the genetic and
environmental influences on a phenotype, is plagued with both conceptual and methodical
problems. One such problem is the existence of gene-environment covariance; whereby different
genotypes assort non-randomly among different environments. This can often (although not always)
be thought of causally, where individual differences in genes within a population causes there to be
systematic variation in the environments that those individuals experience. As a result, it is not clear
whether those differences in environment should be attributed to the phenotype of an individual or
to the environment. This presents a problem for quantitative geneticists wanting to partition genetic
and environmental variance as separate causes of phenotypic variance; as in these cases one
indirectly causes the other. We show that this problem can be partly resolved by using consistent
definitions of gene, phenotype and environment. By defining precisely these concepts we show
the limits of heritability estimates and illustrate a novel way of looking at the covariance problem.

David Bronstein, Georgetown University
MCCT5, Friday 11:30am-12:25pm

Aristotle's Critique of Innatism
Aristotle famously argues, against Plato, that we do not possess innate knowledge. His argument is
surprisingly brief. He claims that if we had innate knowledge, we would have certain items of
knowledge without noticing. However, we cannot possess the relevant items of knowledge without
noticing. So innatism is false. To understand Aristotles argument, we need to understand why he
thinks we cannot possess the relevant items of knowledge without noticing. I present two different
answers to this question and two different readings of his argument corresponding to them.
According to the first, if we had innate knowledge, we would exercise (or manifest) it and thereby
notice it. However, we do not exercise (or manifest) it, and thus we do not notice it. So innatism is
false. I argue that this reading relies on a problematic premise, namely, the claim that if we had
innate knowledge, we would exercise (or manifest) it. I then present a second, improved reading of
the argument, one that does away with the problematic premise. If we had innate knowledge, we
would notice it when we are in certain mental states. However, we do not notice it when we are in
the relevant mental states. So innatism is false.

Rachael Brown, Rotman Institute of Philosophy (University of Western Ontario)/ Macquarie
University
COPGO31, Thursday 2-2:55pm

Just-So Stories and Parsimony: Evolutionary Plausibility As Desiderata in Cognitive Science
Evolutionary plausibility is frequently cited as a desiderata in theory choice within cognitive
science. Despite the ubiquity of references to evolutionary plausibility in this domain, however,
such claims are frequently made with little or no empirical support. Using examples from the
13
literature, here, I give a critical account of evolutionary plausibility as it is standardly used in
cognitive science. I point out a number of empirical hurdles that claims about the past fitness
benefits of cognitive mechanisms must overcome, and then offer some as-yet overlooked alternative
ways of conceiving of evolutionary plausibility that are less difficult to achieve. Ultimately, the
paper offers a broad critical assessment of evolutionary claims in cognitive science and serves as a
guide to both assessing and making claims to evolutionary plausibility in cognitive science.

Justin Bruner, Australian National University
MCCT4, Tuesday 4:30-5:50pm (Cog.Sci Stream)

Epistemic vigilance in the testimonial game
Biologists have long been puzzled as to how communication is possible when the interests of those
involved conflict. If the sender often has incentive to deceive, then the receiver does best to simply
ignore her counterpart. Communication breaks down. Recently, Dan Sperber has argued that
communication is possible because receivers are in some sense vigilant. Using the so-called
testimonial game introduced in Sperber (2001) we investigate (with basic tools from evolutionary
game theory) three distinct means by which honest communication is possible. First, a la Frank
(1988) and Gauthier (1986), we consider the case in which types are partially observable. In other
words, the receiver can with some probability distinguish between deceitful and honest senders.
This favors honest-types, even when deceitful-types can with a high probability pass themselves off
as an honest agent. Next, we explore the effect reputation-tracking has on honest communication.
We find that reputation-tracking can result in high levels of honest behavior, even when interactions
are all one-shot. Lastly, we consider vigilant agents who pay some cost to check the content of a
message. Honest and deceitful senders co-exist in equilibrium, and this is in part due to a hitherto
unnoticed free-rider problem.

Nicolas Bullot, Macquarie University
MCCT4, Thursday 2-2:55pm (Cog.Sci Stream)

Explaining Person Identification: An Inquiry into the Tracking of Human Agents
In this paper, I examine the ability of an agent (a tracker or learner) to track a human person (a
target) and distinguish this target from other individuals: the ability to perform person
identification. First, I discuss influential models of the perceptual recognition of human faces and
people, which describe the mental mechanisms that control the perceptual recognition of a person.
These models are incomplete theories of person identification because they do not explain several
identification behaviors that are fundamental to human social interactions. Furthermore, they tend to
refer to the controversial concept of the identity of a person without explaining what determines
personal identity. To overcome these limitations, I propose to integrate the face-recognition
program into a broader causal-historical theory of identification. The causal-historical theory of
identification complements models focused on perceptual recognition because it can account for the
types of non-perceptual identification overlooked by the latter. Moreover, it can decompose
identification behaviours into tracking processes that succeed or fail to be sensitive to causal
characteristics of a target. I illustrate these advantages with a discussion of the difference between
the tracking of a person understood as either a causally continuous biological organism or a
continuous mind.

Wendy Carlton, Macquarie University
MCCT5, Friday 9-9:55am

Interpreting the past. The role of narrative distance in self-integration.
To characterize the role of narrative in the constitution of selfhood and diachronic agency as merely
the telling of causally unifying stories under-describes the work that narrative does. Narrative can
14
help us achieve self-integration, but more needs to be said on the structures inherent in narrative
that facilitate the self-reflective activities undertaken by agents to achieve diachronic self-
integration. I believe that the concept of narrative distance is of explanatory value for this task,
because it captures the two essential dimensions of selfhood - temporality and reflectivity. However
the concept remains under-specified for use in philosophical discourse on selfhood and agency.
Narrative distance needs to be unpacked by elaborating its different dimensions (temporal,
hermeneutic, perspectival and evaluative) and their role in the process of self-integration over time.
In this paper I show how the reflective space provided by narrative distance shapes the dynamics of
autobiographical memory and past-directed reflection, and facilitates our agential capacities to
respond emotionally in ways that are integrative and future-directed. A better-developed account of
the role of narrative distance complements existing narrative theories of self and agency with a
temporalized account of self-reflectivity.

Glenn Carruthers, Macquarie University
MCCT4, Friday 10-10:55am (Cog.Sci Stream)

What makes us aware of the sense of agency?
Existing accounts of the sense of agency tend to focus on the proximal causal history of the feeling.
That is, they explain the sense of agency by describing the cognitive mechanism which causes the
sense of agency to be elicited. However, it must also be possible to elicit an unconscious
representation of own agency as demonstrated by the occasionality problem. We are faced, then,
with a need to distinguish instances of the representation of which the subject is aware from
instances which they are not. This corresponds to a specific instance of what Dennett calls the
Hard Question, once the representations is elicited, well, then what happens? In other words, how
is a representation of own agency used in cognitive system when the subject is aware of it? Two
possibilities are considered. Perhaps the representation of own agency enters into the mechanisms
of attention. This seems unlikely as, in general, attention is insufficient for awareness. Perhaps,
then, a subject is aware of their sense of agency when it is available for verbal report. However, this
seems inconsistent with evidence of a sense of agency in the great apes. When it comes to the sense
of agency, the Hard Question remains.

David Chalmers, New York University/Australian National University
MCCT1, Thurs 4:30-5:30

TBA

Richard Chappell, Bowling Green State University

A Non-Natural Reason by Any Other Name...
Are non-natural properties worth caring about? I consider two (related) objections to metaethical
non-naturalism. According to the "intelligibility" objection, it would be positively unintelligible to
care about non-natural properties that float free from the causal fabric of the cosmos. According to
the "ethical idlers" objection, there is no compelling motivation to posit non-natural normative
properties because the natural properties suffice to provide us with reasons. In both cases, I argue,
the objection stems from misunderstanding the role that non-natural properties play in the non-
naturalist's understanding of normativity. The role of non-natural properties is not to be responded
to, but to mark which natural properties it is correct for us to respond to in certain ways.

Colin Cheyne, University of Otago
MCCT6, Tuesday 10-10:55am

15
The How and What of Belief
The term belief is ambiguous. It can mean the mental act or state of believing, or the propositional
content of such a believing. I expose the resulting confusion that can arise with respect to
fortuitously true belief and probably true belief. I then explore the interacting roles that believing
and belief-content play with respect to justified belief and the acquisition of knowledge.

Kasper Hjbjerg Christensen, Victoria University of Wellington
MORG007, Monday 2-2:55pm

Validity in Kripke Semantics
Hintikka and others have criticized standard Kripke Semantics for not being able to give a
satisfactory account of validity when the box operator is meant to represent a purely logical
modality. I will suggest that this diagnosis completely neglects the interpretational character of the
model-theory: a validity, it is standardly assumed, is meant to be one such that it is (necessarily)
true under all interpretations of the non-logical terminology; and for a propositional language
augmented with a logical modality operator, Kripke Semantics adequately models this notion of
validity. When we turn to quantified languages, however, there are formal sentences which seem to
be true under all interpretations, yet are not validities in accordance with the standard Kripke
Semantics for such languages. Two broad options are therefore available: (1) explain away the
troublesome sentences, or (2) admit that further restrictions must be put on the underlying model-
theory in order for it to adequately reflect a validity as one which is true under all interpretations. I
will sketch some possible solutions along these two lines and relate them to the criticism.

Lars Christie, University of Oslo

Collective liability in war
According to Revisionist just war framework (RJ WF) all concepts of collective liability should be
rejected. On this framework, soldiers are not legitimate targets in war simply by virtue of their
membership in a military organization. Instead, soldiers and civilians liability to defensive harm is
claimed to solely depend on their individual moral responsibility and their degree of causal
contribution to the unjust war. This article question the conceptual clarity and moral relevance of
the notion of degrees of causal contribution to collective action. As an alternative, I propose a
renewed focus the conditions under which group membership (in a state or an army) can give rise to
moral responsibility and liability to defensive harm. I argue that when group membership reflects
members' intentionally overlapping intentions, all members of a group share the responsibility of
the collective outcome, regardless of whether or not every member actually causally contributed to
the outcome. Finally, I highlight the shortcomings of the frequently employed analogy between war
and individual self-defence. In particular, I argue that it disregards the political and collective
context in which wars occur in a way that ignore morally relevant distinction between the
motivations of collectively acting combatants from their alleged analogous counterparts in cases of
individual self-defence.

Millicent Churcher, University of Sydney
MORG010, Tuesday 9-9:55am

Transformative Imaginings: When Adam Met Sally
Early modern sentimentalist philosopher Adam Smith (1759) argues for a conception of morality
grounded in sentiment rather than in pure reason. Our ability to sympathise with others is what
binds us together as moral agents and motivates us to act ethically. On Smith's account, sympathy
refers to the psychological mechanism or capacity through which we understand and identify with
what another person is feeling. In this paper I defend the value of sympathy and by extension,
16
Smith's moral sentimentalism - against those who argue that our capacity to feel for devalued social
groups is too limited for sympathy to have any real ethical and political import. I argue that the
scope of our fellow-feeling can be dramatically enlarged in instances where sympathy with another
disrupts and transforms one's imaginary body. Drawing on Sally Haslanger's (2005) reflections
upon her lived experience of transracial parenting I conclude that sympathetic identification with an
individual whose body is marked as 'different' within a society can be deeply transformative for the
sympathiser, which sees feelings of good-will generated in intimate contexts of parenting, romantic
partnerships or friendships extend out towards wider socio-political groups.

Steve Clarke, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University

Buchanan and the conservative argument against human enhancement from biological and
social harmony
In his recent Beyond Humanity? (2011), Allen Buchanan takes issue with a slew of arguments
against human enhancement put forward by prominent conservatives. I discuss Buchanans
treatment of the conservative line of argument against human enhancement from biological and
social harmony (Buchanan 2011, pp. 161-2). I will identify a version of this line of argument that
has more going for it than Buchanan allows. I will not argue that it is a strong enough to warrant the
banning of the use of all human enhancement technologies, as many conservatives (and some
liberals) might urge, but I will argue that it gives us reason to be very cautious about the widespread
adoption of some possible human enhancements. I will also show that there is nothing distinctively
conservative about this line of argument. It deserves to be taken seriously by both liberals and
conservatives.

Hannah Clark-Younger, University of Otago
MCCT3, Tuesday 3-3:55pm

Imperatives and Logical Consequence
As first pointed out by J orgen J orgensen (1937), sentences in the imperative mood pose a problem
for standard ways of defining logical consequence (as necessary truth-preservation), because they
can be the relata of the consequence relation but are not truth-apt. In this paper I present a formal
logic of imperatives, which has the proof theory of the normal modal logic KD45 and a semantics
that makes declarative sentences, but not imperative sentences, truth-apt. I then present a
corresponding non-truthy (but general) definition of logical consequence.

Dylan Clements, Australian National University
COPGO30, Tuesday 3-3:55pm (Continental Stream)

The Rousseauian roots of Habermas emancipatory interest
This will be a reconstructive reading of Rousseaus account of civil liberty in which I will construe
Rousseaus citizen as a subject with a rich ontological structure, and political society as ultimately
predicated on this strong notion of selfhood. I will show the Rousseauian subject to have structural
complexity such that a public interest can be plausibly attributed to it. Specifically, this public
interest is to be understood as an objective interest in the maintenance and optimisation of the self-
legislating character of political society, and I will argue that it insinuates an open, participative
public sphere, the purpose of which is the instantiation and evaluation of concrete laws. Here one
senses the influence of Rousseau mainly via Kant, Hegel, and Marx on Habermas. I will identify
Habermas emancipatory interest as correlating with Rousseaus public interest, and will finish
with an attempt to show that the realisation of the concept of the public sphere lies not in its
consummation of democratic procedural principles, but in its asymptotic orientation towards the
17
realisation of a particular, contentful end instituted by the very structure of selfhood: the goal of
human emancipation.

Simon Coghlan, Australian Catholic University
MORG010, Wednesday 9-9:55am

Wittgensteinian Ethics: Creativity and Contemporary culture
Moral philosophy influenced by Wittgenstein has been both ignored and attacked in "mainstream"
analytic philosophy and applied ethics. One criticism is that it is incapable of generating serious
ethical creativity and cultural innovation. For example, Singer and Leist recently appear to suggest
that Wittgenstein's philosophy lends itself to moral relativism, subjectivism, conservatism, and
aestheticism. In arguing against each of the four three complaints, this paper contends that, on the
contrary, Wittgensteinian ethics promises very radical and creative perspectives on ethical issues.
This argument is given depth and substance through an examination of three (past/present/future)
examples from our culture: homosexual love; animal ethics; and artificial intelligence (as in the
current film "Her"). The paper goes on to examine the ways in which this approach, or any ethical
approach, can be radical and creative. Although Wittgensteinian ethics possesses a freedom which
hampers other ethical approaches (especially "theories"), I also discuss how serious moral creativity
is not only consistent with, but necessarily depends upon, certain restrictions on freedom in moral
thought. This point is then cashed out with regards to the guiding ideas and restrictions
characteristic of Wittgensteinian ethics.

Mark Colyvan, University of Sydney

Mathematical and Musical Notation as Models
Since the demise of formalism in the philosophy of mathematics, notation has ceased to be a topic
of philosophical interest. But within mathematics there are lively debates about notation, it's just
that philosophers typically don't weigh in. I hope to take a small step towards correcting this neglect
on the part of philosophers of mathematics. I will look at the roles musical notation plays in
composition, performance, and arranging musical pieces and I will argue that there is a great deal of
similarity in the functions of mathematical and musical notations. I will argue that both notational
systems serve as models of the target system in question (mathematical structures or musical pieces,
respectively).

Richard Corrie, University of Tasmania

Did Climate Change Cause That?
After the devastating and unseasonable NSW bushfires in October 2013 there was much discussion
in the media about whether the fires could be attributed to climate change. Prime Minister Abbott
was criticised by many for saying that the suggested links between these fires and climate change
were complete hogwash. But at the same time, climate scientists have repeatedly stated that It is
impossible to say whether any single weather event was caused by man-made climate change. I
argue that there is some confusion in this debate as a result of insufficient attention being paid to the
concepts of causation at play. In this paper, I consider what is (are) the appropriate concept(s) of
causation to apply in this case, and, given this understanding of causation, whether we can have
good reason for claiming that individual events, such as the NSW bushfires, were caused by man-
made climate change.

Ryan Cox, Australian National University
MCCT5, Tuesday 4:30-5:30
18

Knowing What and Knowing Why
There are striking similarities between the typical way a person knows what they believe and the
typical way a person knows why they believe what they believe. Most importantly, neither way of
knowing requires that the subject be aware of independent evidence for what is known. Such
similarities should lead us to expect a unified account of how a person typically knows what they
believe and how a person typically knows why they believe it. I argue that most existing
philosophical accounts of self-knowledge cannot provide such a unified account. I close by briefly
sketching an account which can.

Jillian Craigie, University College London

Mental capacities and the legal person
It is a long-established principle in law (English and Australian) and in philosophy that a mental
incapacity can justify restricting a persons rights and responsibilitieswhat is referred to in law as
their legal capacity. However, recent developments in international human rights law have called
into question the moral and legal legitimacy of mental incapacity as a basis for restricting legal
capacity. At the center of these developments, Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities requires that legal capacity should not be limited on the basis of disability
(including mental disabilities). Article 12 has been used to call for a radical lowering of the mental
threshold for the right to make ones own personal decisions. However, it is understood to also
apply in the criminal law, raising a question about its implications for mental incapacity-based
defenses. In this talk I will focus on the relationship between these two aspects of legal capacity: If
there should be a low mental threshold for legal capacity in the context of personal decisions,
should there be a symmetric low mental threshold for criminal responsibility? And what are the
implications for the notion of a legal person?

Garrett Cullity, University of Adelaide

Ross and the Foundations of Morality
W.D. Ross provides a model for a distinctively pluralist style of theory in normative ethics. On
this model, when we ask what makes right actions right, the answers to that question can be traced
to several separate foundations. When different foundational contributors to rightness conflict, there
is no master-principle determining which ones prevail. In Rosss own version of this view, the
foundational elements are thought of as prima facie duties these are usually interpreted as pro
tanto reasons (reasons which have some weight, but need not be decisive) for and against the
rightness of an action. In this talk, I discuss five objections to Rosss own version of pluralism: it is
too self-contained, too narrow, too shallow, too unqualified and too simple. The focus will be on
identifying the kind of thing that a pluralist normative theory will need to have at its foundations if
it is to avoid those objections.

Anya Daly, University of Melbourne
MCCT4, Monday 2-2:55pm (Cog.Sci Stream)

The Social Matrix: An interrogation of human destructiveness and ethical failure
The Social Matrix: A neuro-phenomenological interrogation of human destructiveness and ethical
failure in terms of the I and we perspectives. This paper seeks to better understand human
destructiveness and ethical failure, by definitively bringing to the fore Edmund Husserls claim that
subjectivity is an intersubjectivity as it corresponds to developmental psychologist Colwyn
Trevarthens three tiered account of subjectivity. In the current literature, the notion that at the level
19
of primary subjectivity there are both the I perspective and the we perspective, is again garnering
attention. Vittorio Gallese has also argued for a we-centredness at the heart of subjectivity. And so
we need to go beyond ipseity, the me-ness of experience to interrogate the us-ness at this
primary ontological level, when identification expands beyond the atomistic individual I am to
encompass a belonging to and this comprehends race, family, culture and species. I argue that it
is this expanded first person perspective that underwrites all ethical motivation.

Paul Daniels, Monash University

Events & Mereology: The Life of the Party
Mereological Essentialism for ordinary objects is widely thought to be false. Most, that is, think that
ordinary objects can at least survive minimal change of partsthe car survives the replacement of a
tire, the tree survives the loss of leaves, and so on. The status of mereological essentialism with
respect to events is far less clear. Do events have parts? If so, to what extent can an event survive
the replacement, or loss of, some of its parts? We argue that the standard arguments against
mereological essentialism for objects do not carry over to mereological essentialism for events. We
examine, further, the extent to which there are satisfying arguments against mereological
essentialism which apply solely to events. Ultimately we show that, unlike with objects,
mereological essentialism for events is plausible and explanatorily useful. We conclude by
examining why -- given the close connection between objects and events -- mereological
essentialism regarding events is so much more plausible than is mereological essentialism about
objects.

Roger Dawkins, University of Western Sydney
MORG009, Monday 9-9:55am

Blind spots are the new black of creative inspiration
Next time you have a migraine take note of how youre suddenly paying much more attention to the
world around you. It's true: as you try and actually see what you are working on, those blind spots
are making you look a whole lot more closely at the world. Glitches in digital TV have the same
effect, and so do discontinuity edits in film, or dead air in audio. They make you stop and take
notice, not so much of the blind spot or glitch itself, but of everything else all around. These blind
spots are a positive emptiness referred to by Gilles Deleuze as 'empty squares.' All material
structures have them and theyre how we interpret the world around us. The empty square isn't an
absence and so we don't add meaning to the structure by filling them in. Instead, we think
something new from what is there before us. Some texts draw attention to empty squares in the
world (and so can migraines). But if we follow Deleuze's ideas a little more literally than we first
thought, we can practice seeing the empty square wherever we want. We can practice thinking more
creatively every day.

Kate Devitt, QUT
MCCT4, Thursday 10-10:55am (Cog.Sci Stream)

Bayesian virtue epistemology
Reflective knowledge is the pinnacle of human functioning, traditionally conceived of as the
reservoir of the a prioria revered, almost mystical mental faculty through which Platonic ideals,
truths, and axioms depart the heavens and settle on the brow of mortal man. In contrast, reliabilist
beliefs are merely dumb associations, forged by mechanistic repetition of limited cognition creating
impoverished models of the external world. In this paper, I splice together these apparently
conflicting processes by examining Ernest Sosas higher order reliabilist account of reflective
20
knowledge within virtue epistemology. To resolve deficiencies within Sosas account I draw on
another agent-centred, normative and reliabilist epistemologyBayesian epistemology. Critics of
Sosa's view argue that reliabilism is too weak to do the work of reflective knowledge. I respond that
reflective knowledge may be forged from low-level beliefs according to Bayesian mechanisms
found in hierarchically nested probabilistic models (HNPM). HNPM explain a child's development
of higher order beliefs about abstract concepts such as causation, natural laws and theoretical
entities. A hybrid Bayesian virtue epistemology emerges as a robust, empirically promising means
to defend Sosa against his critics. Bayesian virtue epistemology is a higher-order reliabilism capable
of generating genuine reflective knowledge.

Michael Devitt, Graduate Center, City University of New York
MCCT2, Friday 10-10:55am (Devitt-J ackson Stream)

Philosophy is not Conceptual Analysis
(I) Conceptual analyses are supposed to be a priori. I argue that we have no good reason to suppose
that there are any such a priori analyses. Hence the view that philosophy is conceptual analysis is
false. What then do philosophers do in their armchairs? The intuitions that philosophers come up
with in thought experiments are not a priori ones about concepts but empirical ones about kinds.
(Furthermore, even if there were some conceptual analyses it is not likely that they would provide
interesting knowledge.) The view that philosophical beliefs are conceptual analyses rather than bits
of empirical folk opinion is likely to lead to complacency about those beliefs. (II) Frank J ackson has
a much more positive view of conceptual analysis. I shall explore this view, highlighting its
differences from mine.

*This paper is part of a symposium on Conceptual Analysis within the Devitt-J ackson Stream.

Sidney Diamante, University of Auckland
MCCT4, Tuesday 3-3:55pm (Cog.Sci Stream)

Reaching out to the world: Octopuses and embodied cognition
The octopus occupies an interesting position in the study of animal cognition because of its
complex nervous system and versatile behaviour. The latter is unexpected due to the octopus
nervous system being radically unlike those of other animals with behavioural capacities
comparable to its own. The nervous system of the octopus is divided into three hierarchical parts,
two of which are autonomous yet capable of processing information to a high degree. These parts
are also able to remain functional even though they have been neurally disconnected from the
central brain. Cognition in an octopus thus appears to be dependent not only on the brain but on the
body as well, making the octopus an excellent case study for embodied cognition, or the view that
the physical body (or parts of it) is essential to an organisms cognitive processes. The octopus is
especially suited to this purpose, since its arms and eyes do not only receive information, but
neurally process it as well. It can thus be aptly said that the octopus uses its body to learn about the
world. In this paper, I present a number of octopus capacities that lend support to embodied
cognition.

Christina Dietz, Kings College London

The Structure of Emotions
In this paper, I explore the relationship between emotional feelings and intentionality. The notion of
intentionality I have in mind roughly refers to the phenomenon of mental states being 'about
something'. Before launching into discussion, I begin by introducing some preliminary distinctions
about the ways we talk about the emotions. In section one, I discuss emotional verbs (V) in their
21
propositional constructions (S V's that-clause) and emotional verbs in their noun- phrase
constructions (S V's noun-phrase). I then explore the differences between factive and nonfactive
emotions. In section two, I discuss the relationship between the feelings associated with V-ing and
V-ing that P. In section three, I present something of a curiosity (or puzzle) concerning the emotions
and offer a solution. Ultimately, the goal of this paper is to offer a decisive structural framework for
rigorous theorizing about the emotions.

Scott Dixon, University of California, Davis

Grounding, Determinables, and Supplementation
Partial grounding is often thought to be formally analogous to proper parthood in certain ways. For
example, both relations are typically understood to be asymmetric (hence irreflexive) and transitive,
and as such, are strict partial orderings. But how far does this analogy extend? Proper parthood is
often said to obey the Weak Supplementation Principle. In this paper I argue that partial grounding
does not obey a ground-theoretic analog of this principle. The case that causes problems for the
supplementation principle for grounding also serves as a counterexample to another principle,
Minimality, defended by Paul Audi.

Ned Dobos, UNSW Canberra
COPGO31, Tuesday 2-2:55pm (Ethics of Force Stream)

Punishing Non-Conscientious Disobedience: Is the Military a Rogue Employer?
The military threatens to punish soldiers that disobey orders to preserve their own lives. The
Uniform Code of Military J ustice (UCMJ ) in the US, for instance, makes it a crime for a soldier to
disobey a directive from a superior unless it is clearly unlawful. The qualification is usually
interpreted narrowly to cover orders to commit war crimes or to victimise civilians, not orders that
would require sacrifice of life or limb. Under the UCMJ , a soldier that disobeys an order simply
because he expects that obedience will maim or kill him faces execution. In other words, soldiers
are afforded some right of conscientious disobedience, but no right of non-conscientious, self-
regarding disobedience. Yet we would not think it morally justifiable for any civilian employer to
demand and enforce obedience unto death. Civilian employees cannot contract away their right to
self-preserve at work, even in the context of inherently dangerous occupations. For convenience,
call this position "inalienability". My aim is to find an argument for inalienability that allows us to
make a general exception for soldiers, or that has the resources to resist the implication that the
unlimited liability contract in the military context is invalid.

Henry Dobson, Monash University

Can Neutral Monism solve problems for Neo-Darwinism?
Neo-darwinism as a philosophical theory is widely seen as being materialistic and therefore best
explained by physicalism. However, physicalism has serious difficulty accounting for the
manifestation of consciousness in complex organisms, along with other mental features such as
phenomenological experience, teleology, moral value and ethics judgements. William J ames
famously asserted that "If evolution is to work smoothly, consciousness in some shape must have
been present at the very origin of things". If this assertion is indeed correct, then consciousness
must somehow play a fundamental role in the natural order and evolution of life. The philosophical
project then is to ask which metaphysical framework best explains the origins of consciousness
along with its manifestation within the natural order and evolution of life. I will argue in my
presentation that Neutral Monism is the best metaphysical theory to work with when trying to
understand a J amesian/Darwinian view of Nature, a view which takes seriously the reality of mind
22
and consciousness, and which also sees mind and consciousness as playing a fundamental role is the
evolution of life. Committing to Neutral Monism does, however, require us to see consciousness as
a fundamental feature of physical reality, which raises a number of philosophical issues mainly to
do with the combination problem. I will highlight these problems and suggest how we might
overcome them.

Andrew Donnelly, University of Sydney
COPGO30, Wednesday 9-9:55am (Continental Stream)

From Existential to Moral Conscience
Heidegger spends a substantial portion of 'Being and Time' defending a puzzling conception of
conscience. For Heidegger, the conscience is not an internal voice which directs us towards good
and away from evil, but a call to authenticity. Usually, Heidegger's conception of conscience is
thought to be an account of existential, rather than moral, conscience. However, at certain points
Heidegger refers obscurely to the way in which an ordinary interpretation of conscience, an account
of moral conscience, can be modelled on existential conscience. In this paper, I fill in the details for
a Heideggerian account of moral conscience. Modelled on the accounts of both Heidegger and his
student Arendt, I argue that the moral conscience is the capacity to judge that some action is
contrary to one's self-conception. To act in accordance with conscience is to be true to self.

Michael Duncan, University of Sydney
MORG009, Tuesday 4:30-5:30

Composition as Identity
Composition as identity is the view that objects are identical to their proper parts. More carefully,
the theory states that any composite object is identical to its proper parts collectively (and not to
each individually). I will briefly discuss the most common objections to composition as identity and
show that they have little force. I will then present some arguments in favour of the view.
Specifically, I will attempt to undermine other realist theories of compositionthat is, other
theories of composition which posit the existence of composite objects. In doing so I hope to show
that composition as identity is the best realist theory. Given that there clearly are composite objects,
and therefore that realism about composites is true, I take these arguments to show that composition
as identity is the best theory of composition, period.

Antony Eagle, University of Adelaide

Domesticating Metaphysical Indeterminacy
Metaphysical indeterminacy indeterminacy arising not from linguistic or epistemic indefiniteness
has been regarded by philosophers as rather disreputable. Recent attempts to rehabilitate
metaphysical indeterminacy, notably in the work of Elizabeth Barnes and co-workers, have not
quite managed to assuage the suspicion that it is at root incomprehensible. In this paper, I offer a
straightforward example of metaphysical indeterminacy, expressed using metaphysical resources all
parties accept and find intelligible. This example may not make all purported examples of
metaphysical indeterminacy familiar it does not give a ready explanation of so-called ontic
vagueness. But if I'm right, cases of metaphysical indeterminacy have lain, unnoticed, under our
noses, and the general category cannot be rejected on grounds of conceptual dubiousness.

Edward Elliott, Australian National University

Ramsey's Representation Theorem without Ethical Neutrality
23
Ramsey's 1926 paper, 'Truth and Probability', sketches an approach to the empirical measurement
of credences and utilities, along with a corresponding set of axioms for an unproven representation
theorem that characterises the preference conditions under which this measurement process is
applicable. Ramsey's approach is distinctive, deriving first an agent's utilities and then using this to
construct their credence function. In specifying his process and axioms, Ramsey makes central use
of a so-called ethically neutral proposition of probability 1/2, the assumed existence of which forms
the basis of his whole approach. A number of later, Ramsey-inspired representation theorems have
also made appeal to ethically neutral propositions. However, the existence of such propositions has
often been called into questionin fact, there seem to be good reasons to suppose that no such
propositions exist, seriously undermining Ramsey's approach. In this paper, I present a new,
Ramsey-inspired representation theorem that avoids any appeal to ethical neutrality, as well as
patching up some other minor flaws in Ramsey's formal system.

Lina Eriksson, Flinders University
MCCT6, Monday 10-10:55am (Brennan Stream)

Social norm compliance as a signal
Social norms are sometimes analysed as the result of signalling behaviour: complying with a social
norm signals that you are a particular kind of person, and we often have incentives to send such
signals. The most famous, but not the only, advocate of such a theory is Eric Posner, who argues
that social norm compliance signals a low discount rate for future benefits, which makes the
complier a reliable partner for long-term cooperation. However, I will argue that the theory of
costly signalling, on which Posners claim is based, does not explain social norm compliance very
well. The reason is that the signalling value of social norm compliance is frequency dependent in
ways that make it implausible that social norm compliance should be understood mainly in terms of
signalling.

Ccile Fabre, Oxford University
MCCT1, Tues 11.30AM-1.00PM (Keynote Address)
Remembering War
War remembrance is a particularly salient issue, of course: as we are approaching the centenary of
WWI, we - descendants of those who lived through that war and fought and died in it are already
and repeatedly told that we ought to remember it and are given instructions on how we should do it.
Above and beyond episodic moments such as centenaries, war remembrance is central to the
construction of political identities. Standard arguments for remembrance duties appeal to the special
relationship which binds together members of the same political community, or of political
communities which were enemies and who must now learn to live together. Moreover, it seems that
it is precisely in so far as war remembrance is tied to such special relationships that it makes an
especially powerful normative demand on us. My aim is to offer a justification for war
remembrance which transcends national and political borders and yet is appropriately sensitive to
the specific historical and personal importance which the remembered war has for those who
remember it. I first explain what I take war remembrance to mean in this context. I then argue that
notwithstanding their strengths, standard justifications for war remembrance are on the whole not
sensitive enough to the fact that wars are fought and suffered by individuals, to (relatedly) the
interplay between individual and collective memory, to the diverse fabric of the supposedly
homogenous fabric of the community which engages in remembrance, and to important moral
features of those wars. Finally, I offer a justification which avoids those pitfalls and construes war
remembrance as a vehicle for discharging our general, relationship-independent, obligation to
promote peace.

24
Mirko Farina, Macquarie University
MCCT4, Wednesday 3-3:55pm (Cog.Sci Stream)

Culture in Embedded Contexts: A Psycho-Historical Theory of Cultural Learning
Recent research has introduced multidisciplinary models (e.g., Heyes 2012, Sterelny 2012,
Tomasello 1999) to explain (i) the unique evolution, history, and development of human cognition
and (ii) the roles that cultural learning and expertise play in the evolution of human cognitive
capital. In contrast to nativist accounts, these theories argue that researchers must develop dual-
inheritance models of cultural learning and transmission to explain the unique characteristics of
human social, technical, and artistic intelligence. Thus far, such theories have unfolded in
fragmented research projects, which investigate cultural learning from the standpoint of different
temporal, geographical, historical, psychological, and physiological scales. To contribute to the
unification of these projects, we advance here a psycho-historical theory of cultural learning that
aims at representing fundamental causal relations between the different contexts in which cultural
learning occurs. Based on the integration of bio-psychological and social sciences with idiographic
research in the humanities, our psycho-historical theory combines ontological principles about the
context-specific ontology of the carriers of cultural information (behaviours and artefacts) with
psychological and epistemological principles about the brain/mental processes constitutive of how
agents interacts with such carriers of cultural information.

Anya Farenikova, Australian National University
MCCT4, Tuesday 9-9:55am (Cog.Sci Stream)

Expect surprises
Experiences of the unexpected involve immediate reactions to novel, unanticipated, or atypical
features or events: e.g., seeing an elephant disappear in the circus trick, or spotting a new building
on the way to work. There is, however, a question about whether perceiving the unexpected is
always a result of unsuccessful or suboptimal predictions. At a circus, ignorance is bliss; we delight
in the unforeseen. In life, the unexpected can bring harm and demands fast responses. This sets
certain optimality conditions: we ought to maximally predict and prepare for the unexpected. But is
the latter possible? Can an observer expect the unexpected? Can the novel or the atypical serve as
targets for perceptual prediction, or are they always consequences of prediction failure? I focus on
two forms of perceiving the unexpected: experiences of change and experiences of absence. I show
that the optimization of these forms of perception is both implied by predictive coding approaches
to perception (Rao & Ballard, Friston, Clark), yet presents a challenge for those approaches. I offer
a solution to this puzzle and discuss implications for predictive coding and expectancy paradigms in
animal and infant cognition.

Joanne Faulkner, University of NSW
COPGO30, Thursday 9-9:55am (Continental Stream)

The Figure of the Child at Play in Philosophy and 'Life'
The child at play has been a touchstone of philosophical texts in the modern era, through which a
new humanity is imagined and tested. From J ohn Lockes use of observations of children and
recollections of childhood to illustrate how knowledge is formed in the mind, to Sigmund Freuds
focus on the child as the forge of the self, the child and particular the boy child exploring the
world through play has occupied a pivotal, if heretofore relatively neglected, role in the key texts
of European thought. While to this point the observation of boys at play has been central to
negotiating understandings of the human, recently girls have come under scrutiny, in ways that
arguably also attempt to delve a deeper truth about the human condition. Particularly discourses on
25
the sexualization of girls have grown in cultural importance, to narrate the demise of innocent
childhood. This paper will develop the conceptual connection between current anxiety about the
sexualization of girls, and former articulations of childhood. This will help shed new light on what
is at stake for contemporary conceptions of childhood in discourses that emphasise the importance
of innocence and the urgency of its demise.

Lin Feng, National University of Singapore

Faultless Disagreement
Faultless disagreement is such a case that we disagree with something, while neither makes a
mistake. Relativism endorses the possibility of faultless disagreement by arguing that the truth-
value of the same proposition can be relative and varies in different perspectives. Contextualism
holds that the truth of a proposition is dependent upon the context in which the proposition is
asserted; hence, disagreement can be faultless in that sense. Absolutism accommodates faultless
disagreement in such a situation that ideal critics fail to converge on both p and not-p. Huvenes
provides an alternative account for faultless disagreement that in some cases disagreement involves
conflicting nondoxastic attitudes. I will discuss the arguments above, and try to justify the
viewpoint that fautless disagreement is possible only if there are conflicting attitudes involved.

Giles Field, Deakin University
MORG010, Tuesday 3-3:55pm

Can a functionalist definition explain the functionlessness of art?
In this paper I aim to outline the benefits of a functionalist definition of art (that is that art has a
necessary and sufficient function) over proceduralist definitions such as George Dickies Artworld
theory. Secondly, I will argue that a hypothetical version of such a functionalist definition (using a
placeholder function of function a) explains why clear cases of art are seemingly functionless and
why most functional household artefacts, in their unaltered state, cannot be typically seen as
artworks. While it seems there exist examples of functional art, such as architecture, I aim to show
that such cases are borderline, rather than clear, examples of art. Art being seen as a purely
functionless activity dates back to what is, arguably, the original coinage of the term fine arts in
1746 by Charles Batteux. It is therefore at least plausible that this original use is the same
understanding of art as we commonly have today. As a result it can be argued that it is really the
nature of the hypothetical function of art (function a) that is elusive, rather than a definition of art
more broadly.

Anthony Fisher, University of Manchester

John Anderson, Samuel Alexander, and Twentieth Century Metaphysics
In the middle of the twentieth century, metaphysics drastically declined and went out of fashion
across the English-speaking world. In this period J ohn Anderson along with Donald C. Williams
(and a few others) constructed metaphysical systems against the anti-metaphysical trend. I outline
the origins of Andersons metaphysics and explain his connection with Samuel Alexander. The
story that unfolds allows us to reconstruct an interpretation of twentieth century metaphysics that
involves strong threads of continuity of metaphysical doctrine and argument from the early to late
periods of the twentieth century. I conclude that our standard understanding of metaphysics in
analytic philosophy is not solely about a fall and sudden re-birth in metaphysics.

James Franklin, University of New South Wales
MORG010, Monday 9-9:55am
26

Aristotelian realism in the philosophy of mathematics
Platonism and nominalism have fought each other to a standstill in the philosophy of mathematics.
Aristotelian realism provides a new start based on applied mathematics. It claims that mathematics
is about certain real features of the world - quantitative and structural features such as ratio,
symmetry, order, continuity. The paper develops some of the themes of my new book, An
Aristotelian Realist Philosophy of Mathematics: Mathematics as the Science of Quantity and
Structure. It replies to the two main objections to Aristotelian realism: Aren't some mathematical
structures such as infinite cardinals too big to be realised physically? and Aren't mathematical
models about idealizations, not literally about the properties of things? No technical knowledge of
mathematics or logic is needed to follow the paper.

Helen Frowe, Stockholm University
COPGO30, Monday 2-2:55pm (Ethics of Force Stream)

Droning Ondo drones raise any interesting moral questions?
This paper will explore whether there are any good arguments for the view that there is something
inherently wrong with using human-controlled (i.e. not closed) remote weaponry as a means of
carrying out targeted killings, as either an alternative to, or part of, a war. It argues against Paul
Kahns claim that riskless warfare is in tension with the moral underpinnings of jus in bello, since
the absence of risk undermines the moral basis of a combatants permission to kill, and that such
killings therefore fall under the remit of policing rather than war. It also argues that J ai Gaillotts
claim that greatly asymmetrical conflicts are unfair, and therefore unjust, is mistaken. At best, we
probably have consequentialist arguments against the use of remote weaponry. But the
consequences of such weapons would have to be dire indeed to render them an impermissible
alternative to war.

Rebeca Furtado de Melo, Universidade do Estado de Rio de Janeiro/ University of Tasmania
COPGO30, Wednesday 3-3:55pm (Continental Stream)

Nietzsche and Hermeneutical thinking: Finitude and Truth
The question about whether Nietzsche should or at least could be incorporated in hermeneutical
thoughts has being a debate to many scholars is the last decades. Different claims, against and in
favour that, have being done for some people as Vattimo, Davey, Babich and even Grondin. This
work attempts discuss some of this claims, addressing the hermeneutics background to Nietzsches
thought focusing on two key concepts of his philosophy: finitude and truth. I argue that Nietzsches
philosophy can be understood as a hermeneutical thinking once it assumes the radical proposes to
think our finite situation in epistemological and existential senses in a way really close to the
hermeneutical circularity of human understanding. I defend also that this interpretation allows some
polemic thesis as will to power, perspectivism and theory of errors become comprehensive as a
whole and mutually compatible.

Adam C. Gastineau, Australian National University
COPGO31, Tuesday 3-3:55pm (Ethics of Force Stream)

On Threats and Bystanders: A Presentation of Some Distinction
In Noam Zohars "Innocence and Complex Threats: Upholding the War Ethic and the
Condemnation of Terrorism." Zohar argues that because certain sets of bystanders cannot be
distinguished from innocents threats, killing many members of military institutions violates the
principle of distinction, in particular, non-combatant immunity. He concludes that in order to
maintain our support for the idea of non-combatant immunity, and with it our moral rejection of
terrorist attacks, we ultimately must reject the idea that the morality of war can be grounded in a
27
properly restricted doctrine of individual self-defense. While Zohar may be correct in his overall
conclusions, I reject his analysis of threats and bystanders. I argue that his analysis fails to
distinguish between risks and threats. I first offer an account of what it is to be a Threat in cases
of individual self-defense. This account allows a distinction to be drawn between threats and risks. I
then go on to demonstrate why members of military institutions, in most cases, should be
considered threats rather than risks: allowing for the preservation of at least some form of the
traditional distinction between combatants and non-combatants, even from an individualist
perspective.

Anca Gheaus, University of Sheffield
MCCT5, Thursday 4:30-5:30

The right to parent and duties concerning future generations
Several philosophers argue that individuals have an interest-protecting right to parent; specifically,
the interest is in rearing children whom one can parent adequately. If such a right exists it can
provide a solution to scepticism about duties of justice concerning distant future generations and
bypass the challenge provided by the non-identity problem. Current children - whose identity is
independent from environment-affecting decisions of current adults - will have, in due course, a
right to parent. Adequate parenting requires resources. We owe duties of justice to current children,
including the satisfaction of their interest-protecting rights; therefore we owe them the conditions
for rearing children adequately in the future. But to engage in permissible parenting they, too, will
need sufficient resources to ensure their own children's future ability to bring up children under
adequate conditions. Because this reasoning goes on ad infinitum it entails is that each generation of
adults owes its contemporary generation of children at least those resources that are necessary for
sustaining human life indefinitely at an adequate level of wellbeing.

Michael Gilchrist, Victoria University of Wellington
COPGO30, Thursday 2-2:55pm

Reflections on deflationary ontology
In his 2009 article, The Deflationary Meta-ontology of Thomassons Ordinary Objects, J onathan
Schaffer presents a number of challenges to Amie Thomassons neo-Carnapian approach to
ontology. I review these (and related) challenges, construct some possible replies, and then consider
what light this imaginary dialogue sheds on the broader deflationary project in ontology.

Micha Glaeser, Harvard University

Reasons and Duties
While both reasons and duties or obligations play a prominent role in many current debates in
practical philosophy, the relation between the two concepts rarely receives explicit attention. With
this paper I hope to make some progress on this front. Specifically, I argue that there is a deeper
distinction between reasons and duties than is often assumed. The immediate target of my
discussion is a family of views that I call reasons reductionism. Reasons reductionism holds that
all normative truths reduce to truths about reasons. While not all moral philosophers expressly
subscribe to reasons reductionism, it is a commonly held view nowadays that the concept of a
normative reason is the central concept of normativity. I argue that truths about what I call
deontological concepts, such as rights and duties, do not reduce to truths about reasons. I also
argue that the concept of a normative reason sits less comfortably with a Kantian conception of
practical reason than is ordinarily thought.

Peter Godfrey-Smith, CUNY Graduate Centre
28
MCCT2, Thursday 2-2:55pm (Devitt-J ackson Stream)

Devitt and Scientific Realism
In 'Realism and Truth' and other works Michael Devitt has defended a distinctive form of scientific
realism. I'll assess this version in the light of some recent arguments (probably: structural realist
arguments, Kyle Stanford's pessimistic induction, and underdetermination arguments).

Ian Gold, McGill University
MCCT4, Monday 3-3:55pm (Cog.Sci Stream)

A Model of Persecutory Delusions
A number of evolutionary psychiatrists have proposed that persecutory delusions are an effect of
social threats in the evolutionary past. I explore this proposal in the context of a general approach to
delusions and develop a model of persecution that can provide coherent answers to the questions of
how delusions develop and why they are retained in the face of conflicting evidence. I suggest that
one consequence of this model is that some beliefsat least some pathological beliefsare
modular.

Ivan Gonzalez-Cabrera

Did morality emerge from big-game hunting?
Chistopher Boehm has developed an intriguing hypothesis about the evolution of human moral
conscience. According to him, moral conscience evolved as consequence of selective pressures
derived by big-game hunting in archaic bands of hunter-gatherers in the Late Pleistocene. More
recently, Mateo Mameli has developed this idea further to provide an expressivist account of moral
judgment. In this talk, I will explain why big-game hunting cannot be the whole story of the
evolution of moral thinking, and I will provide a different, more incremental account of its
evolution. Finally, I will examine the implications of this view for debates about the nature of moral
judgment.

Dana Goswick, University of Melbourne
MCCT1, Thursday 10-10:55am

Why Being Necessary Really Isn't the Same As Being Not Possibly Not
In standard modal logic, ~~ and ~~. In standard tense-logic, where is taken to stand for
"always" and is taken to stand for "sometimes", these equivalences are also taken to hold. In Time
and Modality, Arthur Prior argues that -- despite their prima facie plausibility -- these equivalences
fail to hold. In particular, he argues that not sometimes not is weaker than always and that not
always not is weaker than sometimes. I'll, first, examine the motivation for and plausibility of
Prior's rejection of the standard equivalences. Then, I'll present analogous motivations for adopting
a modal logic which denies these standard equivalences, and examine the plausibility of such a non-
standard modal logic.

Niels Gottschalk-Mazouz, University of Bayreuth/Germany

Power and domination as challenges of an emerging internet of things
It is too nave to sketch dystopian futures of computerization as surveillance societies. Rather,
they should be sketched as control societies. But, other than Foucault or Deleuze who coined this
term would have thought, control is exerted in this context not only indirectly, i.e. by incorporation
of standards and rules, formatting of thought and anticipation of ex-post sanctions by the actors, but
29
by directly intervening in individual actions. This is becoming possible because we rely in our
actions more and more on a robotic infrastructure of smart networked things (smartphones, cars,
door locks are just the first instances, according to the vision of the internet of things). These
things are not only means of communication but means of action in a more general sense. I argue:
(1) To control these smart things is to exert power (in the sense of being able to provide or to
withhold someone the means to desired ends). (2) To exert control according to ones own interests
is to dominate. (3) control is usually morally neutral and inevitable, whereas domination is usually
morally bad. (4) The real dystopia should be the domination society. (5) The most probable
scenario for such a society is oligopolistic domination.

Preston Greene, NTU, Singapore
MORG010, Tuesday 4:30-5:30

Non-Classical Theories of Rational Decision Making
Consider a simple game in which you receive a large benefit now if and only if you would willingly
submit to a small cost at some point in the future. According to standard decision theory, it is not
rational to willingly submit yourself to pure costs. Therefore, adherents of standard decision theory
do not receive the benefit. The possibility (and actuality) of this sort of game has spawned several
theorieswhich I label non-classical decision theoriesthat reject one or more core principles of
standard decision theory. These include Gauthier [1986], McClennen [1990], and Meacham [2010].
These theories have generated some interest, but none have gained acceptance. In this essay, I argue
that the difference between standard decision theory and non-classical alternatives need only
involve a perspectival distinction; specifically, a distinction regarding the epistemic or temporal
perspective an agent should adopt in deciding what to do. If so, there is no reason to reject standard
accounts of utility functions, credences, expected utility, or even the recommendations of standard
decision theory in cases that do not involve reliable prediction. Once this is clear, the motivation for
non-classical decision theories becomes hard to resist.

Christian Griffiths, Monash University
MCCT4, Friday 9-9:55am (Cog.Sci Stream)

Interpersonality and the Social Sphere of Literature
Recent studies in evolutionary criticism have offered the conclusion that humans are able to
comprehend up to 150 interpersonal relationships, which represents the limit of what the human is
able to accept as socially meaningful. This implies that the larger social bodies that are accepted as
the basis of the human sciences, such as society, nation or populace, exceed the limit of
human experience, and can therefore only be accepted as fictional constructs that are produced
within that limit. The primary methodologies used in the study of literature take these larger social
bodies as their premises. We may therefore regard these methodologies themselves as fictional, and
as perhaps representing little more than imaginative extensions of the texts we study. If the study of
literature is to be considered oriented to some notion of truth that reaches beyond the fictional,
then this can only be sought within the interpersonal networks that ground and limit human
experience. In this article, I offer the hypothesis that the experience of literature takes place
primarily within the context of the interpersonal, and argue that an awareness of this idea can
influence the ways in which we study literature and expose it to new engagements.

Yuhang Guo, Munster University

The Problem of Emptiness in Kantian Moral Philosophy
There have been numerous critiques of Kantian moral philosophy on the basis of emptiness. These
critiques come from a variety of thinkers, Hegel and Mill for example, and from many different
30
schools of thought. Mill's critique derives from the Introduction of Utilitarianism, where he makes
the claim that Kantian ethics, and all a priori abstract concepts of ethics, derive from first principles
that go unstated, leaving an actual description of action as elusive, and thus the prescriptive ethical
determinations derived from the Categorical Imperative unable to inform action . Hegel's critique,
as articulated by Sally Sedgwick, is framed as a critique of formalism, which Hegel claims is based
on principles that are assumed in the concept of moral law ,.this prevents any analysis of action
from being possible, preventing any direct ethical determination of action from being derived from
the Categorical Imperative. Many of the articulations of the emptiness critique follow a similar
argument, but for different philosophical reasons and in different literary contexts. I intend on
investigating the various versions of the emptiness critique and how they relate to one another.

Alan Hajek, Australian National University

Begging to Differ with Similarity Accounts of Counterfactuals
Widespread agreement among philosophers on a given topic is rare. However, it is enjoyed by
similarity accounts of counterfactuals. Roughly, they say that the counterfactual if p were the case,
q would be the case is true iff at the nearest p-worlds, q is true. I disagree with such accounts, for
many reasons.

Katie Hamilton, Victoria University of Wellington
MORG009, Tuesday 9-9:55am

Experimental Philosophy and Definite Descriptions
How are definite descriptions such as the present King of France is bald to be understood? The
analyses of Russell and Frege-Strawson give contrasting truth-conditions for these kinds of cases.
And now, over 100 years after the publication of Russells ground breaking paper On Denoting,
there is still no clear consensus among philosophers about which analysis is right. In this paper, I
use the experimental method to illuminate this on-going debate. By appealing to the evidence from
a number of different experiments, I argue that definite descriptions, as used in natural language, are
ambiguous between a Russellian, Strawsonian, and at least one other possible reading.

Kelly Hamilton, Macquarie University

Feeling together: towards an account of collective emotion
Groups are often attributed with emotions: sports fans are said to be happy when their teams are
victorious, and, from the insider perspective, individual sports fans report that we, meaning the
group, are happy. Yet the view that groups can feel emotions as groups seems to be open to the
objection that emotions are phenomena that only individuals can experience, as emotions are
feelings. The challenge is to show that there is a sense in which groups have emotions in a way that
does not simply amount to an aggregative account of individual emotion. Is there a way in which
people can have an emotion together, such that the explanation for the emotion amounts to more
than the sum of individual emotions? Bryce Huebner argues that collectives can hold genuinely
collective emotions if that emotion is the explanation for the groups behaviour. He opposes
arguments such as those presented by Margaret Gilbert and Hans Bernard Schmid who offer holistic
accounts of collective emotion in which individuals in relationship with others hold an emotion. I
will examine these arguments and taking insights from the collective intentionality literature, argue
that individuals can come together to form a we, a plural-subject, that is the primary subject of
emotion.

Richard Hamilton, University of Notre Dame Australia
31
MORG007, Thurs 10-10:55am

The Suitably Qualified Agent Theory of Right Action
Whether Virtue Ethics should be in the business of formulating theories of right action is a moot
point; few these days seriously disputes that virtue ethics has something distinctive to say about
right action. The most influential theory of right action- Hursthouse's Qualified Agent theory-faces
a significant problem with professional roles, where simply being virtuous does not obviously
equate with doing the right thing. The theory offered here is a response to this problem. It is a
Suitably Qualifed theory in two senses: firstly, it is a qualified version of Hursthouse's original
theory; secondly, it places high store on the acquisition of professional competence. Rather than
being an objection to Hard Virtue Ethics, the necessity of acquiring and maintaining professional
competence is shown to be a direct consequence of the demands of practical wisdom.

Matthew Hammerton, Australian National University
MORG010, Wednesday 2-2:55pm

Schroeder on agent-relative teleology
Mark Schroeder has recently argued that we should reject the notion of agent-relative value because
we have no pre-theoretical grasp of it and cannot justify it as a theoretical posit. I defend agent-
relative value by demonstrating that agent-centered constraints have two different readings, one of
which requires agent-relative value. Because both these readings are part of our pre-theoretical
grasp of an agent-centered constraint, agent-relative value is vindicated.

Richard Hanley, University of Delaware
MCCT2, Thursday 9-9:55am (Devitt-J ackson Stream)

Devitt on Empty Names
In Designation (1981), Michael Devitt produced one of the earliest attempts to accommodate empty
names within a broadly causal theory of reference. I'll examine and evaluate that attempt in light of
the last three decades of work on the semantics of empty names.

Elizabeth Harman, Princeton University

Ethics is Hard! What Follows?
It is hard to figure out the moral truth. People who care about morality may still get ethics badly
wrong. What follows from this? Some have argued that it follows that these people are not
blameworthy when they act morally wrongly, because they reasoned about morality in good faith
and tried to do the right thing. I argue that, on the contrary, although ethics is hard, moral ignorance
and moral false belief are not exculpatory. Non-moral false belief is exculpatory, of course. I argue
that the fact that non-moral false belief is exculpatory gives us no reason to think that moral false
belief is exculpatory. Furthermore, I argue that when we examine cases of wrongdoing due to false
moral belief, we can see that the agents are blameworthy. I develop a view on which wrongdoing is
blameworthy even when agents have false moral beliefs that permit their actions, and I argue that
false moral belief is usually itself blameworthy, even when it is the result of an agent trying hard to
get morality right. Ethics is hard, and some people are luckier than others in realizing the moral
truth. In my view, this involves genuine moral luck some people are unlucky to find themselves in
positions in which they are morally bad people and are blameworthy. But nevertheless, I claim that
everyone is capable of realizing the moral truth about her situation, so my view does not hold
people blameworthy for anything out of their control or for anything that they couldnt have
changed.

32
John Hawthorne, Oxford University
MCCT1, Wed, 11:30AM-1:00PM (Keynote Address)

TBA

Laura Henderson, The University of Melbourne
MORG010, Tuesday 10-10.55AM
The Neural Architecture of Film
The landscapes of cinema are undeniably moving, in spite of being wholly fictional. Several
theorists such as Giuliana Bruno and Tom Gunning have likened film viewing to a kind of
imaginary journey. However, while developing these concepts around cinematic spaces, few have
considered the impact of neural processing, and in particular the strong associative responses the
brain has to geographical places. My research aims to bridge the gap between the philosophy of
virtual worlds with recent areas of psychological research. By invoking the counter-relationship
between these two fields through analogy, the way the spectator perceives films landscapes is
better understood. The major finding presented is the ways in which filmic spaces are
communicated in such a way as to mirror the neural processes of cognition. This construction
indicates a direct and intimate relationship between film text and audience. I suggest that a film
circumvents the spectator's psyche, and speaks directly to their senses and other processes of
bottom-up cognition. This in turn allows us to consider a postmodern film spectator, unbound by
preconceived notions of gender, race or class.
Adam Henschke, National Security College, Australian National University
COPG031, Wednesday 9-9.55AM (Ethics of Force Stream)

Cyber-Siege: Limiting Cause For WarCan a non-violent event be just cause for war?
Can a cyber-attack, one that does no direct harm at all, can be considered a crime of aggression,
justifying a military response? In 2007 the Estonian capital was faced with an organised and
sustained cyber-attack that brought down government and banking services. Some in Estonia called
for a NATO military attack on Russia as a response. This paper explores the notion of siege to
argue that in some limited conditions, an organised and sustained cyber-attack can be a just cause
for military response. Exploring the notion of a siege can help us understand non-violent cyber-
attacks as aggression. Conceptualising the notion of a siege allows us to recognise a cyber-attack as
aggressive, thus potentially being just cause for war, despite recognising that the attack itself is not
directly violent. The paper looks at conceptual and moral elements of a siege to identify (a) when
something counts as a siege, rather than sanctions or a blockade, (b) why a siege is morally
problematic, thus justifying as a crime of aggression, while (c) limiting the concept of a cyber-siege
such that a simple cyber-attack is not seen as a crime of aggression.
Stephen Hetherington, The University of New South Wales
MORG007, Monday 10-10.55AM
The Gettier Problem Non-Problem
The so-called Gettier problem should never have gained the hold over epistemologists that it did. I
will argue that there has long been a conceptual incoherence in how epistemologists have sought to
use descriptions of Gettier cases to establish, explicate, or understand there being a preclusion
relation between a beliefs being Gettiered and its being knowledge. Maybe there is such a relation;
maybe not. But we cannot use descriptions of particular Gettier cases to explicate or understand, let
alone establish, the existence of that preclusion relation.
Johannes Himmelreich, London School of Economics
33
Responsibility for Distant Actions
I present a problem for a naive understanding of moral responsibility and agency. Suppose Anne, a
military commander, orders a soldier, Bert, to shoot an innocent, Collin. It is common to hold Anne
responsible for Collins death. It also seems plausible to suppose that responsibility requires agency
broadly understood. However, on the face of it, killing Collin is not something that Anne did. So we
have a contradiction. How might we respond to it? Should our conception of agency be expanded so
as to include Anne as an agent of Collins death? Or should our conception of responsibility be
extended to include those who are not agents of what they are being held responsible for? I present
different ways of avoiding the contradiction. It turns out that the concepts of agency and
responsibility are more inclusive than often thought.
Adam Hochman, The University of Sydney
MCCT5, Monday 9-9.55AM

Why Philosophy of Race Needs Philosophy of Language
The debate about the biological reality of race is raging once again. In this debate scholars draw
primarily on biological literature to make their case for or against the reality of race. Interestingly,
there is an emerging consensus about the facts about human biological diversity, but this is not
moving the debate toward a resolution. The primary difference between race naturalists and anti-
realists about race appears to be semantic. Given the emerging agreement about the science, the
race debate needs to be refocussed on the different definitions of race on offer. Drawing on
philosophy of language (in particular some of the critical work on theory of reference) I make a
case against the most popular definition of race used by race naturalists.
Katrina Hutchinson, Macquarie University

Social justice and surgical innovation: the case of the Da Vinci robot
Surgical innovation can bring about improvements to quality of life, for example where a new
procedure cures disease or significantly reduces symptoms such as fatigue or pain. Sometimes
innovations might improve the situation for marginalized individuals in comparison with those who
are better off economically or have better access to social goods. However, in some cases surgical
innovations entrench patterns of injustice. This can happen, for example, where innovation leads to
a two tier treatment pathway in which richer, less marginalized individuals have access to new
treatments, whereas those who are worse off do not. The barriers can be financial (if the new
treatment is more expensive) or geographical (if the new treatment is only available in certain
places). In this paper, we explore a number of social justice issues associated with surgical
innovation through a case study: the use of the Da Vinci surgical robot for robot-assisted radical
prostatectomy (RARP). Using this example, we identify features of surgical innovation that might
impact upon geographical access to treatment, social support for patients undergoing treatment, and
financial access to treatment.
Heikki Ikaheimo, UNSW
MORG008, Monday 9-9:55AM
From the Old Hegel to the Young Marx and Back; Two Sketches of a Normative Ontology of
the Human Life-Form
There has recently been a revival of interest in Karl Marx as an object of serious philosophical
debate in Germany and in the Anglophone philosophical world. One of the strands of the most
recent debates on Marx concerns his relationship, and possible philosophical debt, to Hegel, and the
recently intensively discussed Hegelian theme of recognition is one of the angles from which Marx
has been interpreted. My aims in this paper are twofold. First, I wish to lay out what I think are the
main elements of Hegels concept of recognition, and spell out how it relates to another, even more
34
fundamental concept in Hegels Philosophy of Spirit, namely the concept of concrete freedom.
Secondly, I aim to provide a clear picture of how exactly the concept, or concepts of recognition, as
well as the Hegelian concept of concrete freedom figure in what is probably the most prominent text
for a reading of Marx from this point of view, namely the Comments on J ames Mill written in Paris
in 1844. Here I wish to clarify what exactly of Hegels conception is present and what remains
absent in Marxs Comments. Eventually, my aim is not merely scholarly, but also systematic since I
believe an idea that both the old Hegel and the young Marx shared, namely that of a normative
ontology of the human life-form in which the concepts of recognition and concrete freedom are
central is something worth a serious philosophical scrutiny and perhaps even rehabilitation. In this
presentation however, rather than trying to defend or develop this idea further, I will concentrate
merely on reconstructing the two articulations of it by Hegel and Marx.

Liz Irvine, Australian National University/University of Cardiff
MCCT4, Tuesday 2-2.55PM (Cog.Sci Stream)
Method and evidence: Gesture and iconicity in the evolution of language?
Gesture-first hypotheses about the evolution of language make a good case for preferencing the
gestural channel over the vocal channel in the evolution of complex communication, based largely
on research on primate communication and physiology. The idea is that early (proto-) languages
incorporated pantomime and iconic gestural signs, since they were supposedly easier to
comprehend than arbitrary signs. As with all evolutionary hypotheses, and about language in
particular, one problem is how to use empirical evidence (often indirect) to evaluate them. So, first I
will outline some methodological avenues and pitfalls with regards to using findings from the
developmental psychology of contemporary hearing and deaf infants, and the development of new
sign languages, to inform hypotheses about language evolution. Second, I will use this evidence to
challenge some underlying assumptions about the cognitive faculties pre-linguistic individuals are
likely to have. Finally, this will inform an account of the form that early languages were more or
less likely to take, here, one where gesture and iconicity may not have played a particularly strong
role.
Frank Jackson, Australian National University
MCCT2, Friday 9-9:55am (Devitt-J ackson Stream)
Three Grades of Involvement in Conceptual Analysis
(Apologies to Quine.) The first is a thesis about the a priori determination of patterns or common
properties. The second is a thesis about our ability to represent the properties at the personal level, i.
e. in thought and language. The third is a thesis about our ability to spell it all out or anyway a lot
of it in words we understand.
*This paper is part of a symposium on Conceptual Analysis within the Devitt-J ackson Stream.

Monique Jonas, Auckland University
MCCT6, Friday 10-10.55AM
Resentment, Respect and the 'Advisory Stance
Advice-giving is one of the commonest ways in which we influence others. It is standardly viewed
as agent-respecting, in contrast to manipulation and coercion. Advice is distinguished from
commands on the basis of the discretion it preserves to the agent and carries an implicit guarantee
that the advisor will not enforce compliance. Despite these features and the benign reputation they
support, advice is often received with resentment. But if advice is essentially agent-respecting, why
should it provoke resentment? This paper develops the concept of an advisory stance and aims to
35
show why adoption of this stance is necessary for advice to be agent-respecting. The argument is
developed within a context of relationships characterised by a mutually recognised unidirectional
warrant of control: where one party (the senior) has authority to instruct and direct the other (the
junior). The existence of a warrant of control can undermine a would-be advisors ability to sustain
the advisory stance, leading to resentful receipt of advice. This is so regardless of whether the
advisor is the senior or junior party. Noticing the importance of the advisory stance makes
resentment comprehensible and allows us to approach the ethics of advice-giving anew.
David Kalkman, Australian National University
MCCT6, Wednesday 10-10.55AM
The Nature of Animal Communication
I will look at the issue of what, if anything substantial, demarcates animal
signalling/communication from other aspects of animal behaviour. Concepts such as information,
encoding and content are often employed here, but they give rise to both theoretical and
empirical concerns. Of special importance will be the issue of whether the above concepts are
useful as metaphors for partial comprehension of animal communication or whether they play a
genuine explanatory role in understanding animal communication. Another important issue is
whether understanding animal communication in terms of a competing idea, mere
mechanical/causal influence, is too liberal in incorporating behaviours as intuitively far-removed
from communication as killing, giving birth, etc.

Robyn Kath, The University of Sydney
MORG007, Friday 10-10.55AM
Risky Population Decisions and the Value of Nonexistence
The population ethics literature has so far focused on acts with known outcomes. However, a useful
moral decision procedure must arbitrate between risky acts. I will address the extension of
utilitarian moral theories to risky population decisions. In particular, I will discuss the significance
of claims about the value of nonexistence. Should we assign a utility value (for example, 0) to
nonexistence? To answer 'No' at first seems to undermine the use of standard decision theory in
population decisions. I will show that this is not the case; and indeed, that not assigning a utility
value to nonexistence leads to better conclusions in some risky population decisions.
Simon Keller, Victoria University of Wellington
MCCT1, Monday 3-3.55PM

Empathizing with Skepticism about Climate Change
Skepticism about anthropogenic climate change is widespread, influential, and, from one point of
view baffling. Why do so many people reject the scientific consensus? Why does skepticism about
this strictly scientific question so often go along with right-wing political views? One promising
answer calls upon the phenomenon of cultural cognition: our reactions to evidence are partly
determined by pre-existing evaluative commitments. Usually, cultural cognition is regarded as a
non-rational influence upon belief, but I argue here that it can be underwritten by a rational belief
forming process. Skepticism about climate change is often the culmination of a coherent train of
reasoning beginning from certain non-crazy premises. The skeptics reasoning, I suggest, is indeed
analogous to the reasoning followed by most of us believers in climate change, or at least to the
reasoning we would follow under some not-too-distant possible scenarios. In light of my diagnosis,
I make some suggestions about which strategies are likely to be successful in forging agreement
about climate change, which strategies are likely to make things worse, and what all of this tells us
about our scientific beliefs and our relationship with experts.
36
Jeanette Kennett, Macquarie University
MCCT1, Tuesday 9-9.55AM

Compelled, Coerced or in Control? Does addiction diminish responsibility and if so how?
In recent years neuroscientific studies have suggested that drug addiction involves complex, gradual
and enduring changes in the brains reward circuits and control centres. These findings have been
used to support the claim that drug addiction is a disease of the brain albeit an acquired one that
reduces or removes the moral and criminal responsibility of addicts. In response to these claims,
Stephen Morse has argued that neither the disease status of drug addiction, nor the causal role that
implicated brain changes play in subsequent criminal misconduct, can diminish addicts criminal
responsibility. On Morses account, drug addiction has minimal impact on criminal responsibility
because it does not involve compulsion, coercion, or irrationality, and because addicted people are
responsible for becoming addicted and for failing to adopt diachronic techniques of self-control. We
argue that a clinical sub-group of addicts do count as compelled or coerced and that responsibility
for becoming addicted is rare in this group and cannot support later criminal responsibility.
However there may be both pragmatic and moral reasons for treating addicts as responsible.
Cameron Keys, Center for Nanotechnology in Society at Arizona State University
MCCT4, Thursday 4.30-5.30PM (Cog.Sci Stream)

Wireless mechanisms in nano-scale neurobiology: report of philosophical fieldwork
Locating philosophical research within the scientific laboratory, this paper applies topics in
philosophy of science to analyse a cluster of recent developments in biophysics regarding "wireless,
non-radiative energy transfer" in nano-scale neuronal structures. Long-standing questions in
philosophy of science related to mechanistic explanation, single-neuron electrophysiology,
computational neuroscience and mathematical representation are considered through a narrative
account of three months of laboratory collaboration in J apan, the US, and Holland, sponsored by the
US National Science Foundation. The main thesis is that focusing attention on laboratory fieldwork
and exotic features of biological hardware can be a fruitful resource for critique and conceptual
precision.
John Keyser, University of Otago
MORG009, Thursday 10-10.55AM

Twin Earth and the Normativity of Meaning
Horgan and Timmons (1992) argue that a revised open question argument, based on Putnams Twin
Earth thought experiment, is effective against synthetic ethical naturalism. They claim that a so-
called Moral Twin Earth reveals that, contrary to Boydian semantics, Earthers and Twin Earthers
would not speak cross purposes when they use the word good even though their use of good is
regulated by different natural properties. That is, Earthers and Twin Earthers would have a
substantive disagreement about the meaning of moral terms such as good. The deepest reason for
this according to Horgan and Timmons is the normativity of moral terms. I pose a Semantic Twin
Earth and consider whether we are led to a similar result against the modern synthetic versions of
semantic naturalism, such as the dispositionalist theories of meaning. If so, then the best
explanation of this result is the putative normativity of meaning.
Sibel Kibar, Kastamonu University
COPG031, Wednesday 10-10.55AM (Ethics of Force Stream)

Is It Possible to Discuss the Problem of the Universality of Human Rights without the Present
Constraints and
The problem of the universality of human rights is far beyond the realm of pure philosophy. Yet it
is still important to debate on the foundations since how we deliberate on the foundations will
37
determine how we react on the current humanitarian interventions. The distinction between
negative and positive rights fulfils two crucial political functions. The first; the so-called
developed or welfare states have begun to give up some of the requirements of being a social state
and their duties towards their own people on the justification that the economic and social rights are
not basic. The second function serves a ground for developed countries in order them to interfere
in developing countries internal affairs and humanitarian intervention. My point is that both
positive and negative human rights must be regarded as universal. Human rights must be explained
by the conditions of their existence. These rights either negative or positive would be meaningful
and valid on a moral and political ground. The present legal human rights are developed by
international consensus but it should not be ignored that the tough struggles of people made
possible these covenants. This discussion itself indicates that human rights are determined by
struggles.
Anton Killin, Victoria University of Wellington

Vocal musicality, tracking, and cognitive niche construction
We explore the idea that our lineages vocal musicality is a very ancient pre-Homo form of
communication, tightly linked to social complexity and established by 3.5 Mya. We trace bio-
cultural stages of its evolutionary career as social/emotive vocalization, then singing increasingly
combined with intentional mimetic and gestural communication, until fully-fledged music emerges.
Levels of co-operative culture achieved throughout these stages provide synchronous inductive
evidence in support of our model. The cognition behind musicality utilises and builds upon
simple, opportunistic recognition of individual and/or group vocalizations, and we define music as
intentional systematic/speculative musicality. Our simple/systematic/speculative calibration of
Homo cognitive evolution is based on the cognition needed to glean the information contained in
trackways. While hunting/gathering tool-kits remained quite simple until about 0.5 Mya, tracking
skills were fundamental to hunter/gatherer lifeways right from its inception. Like learning tracking
skills, learning how to make music is highly intentional, reward driven-and-seeking, extremely self-
aware, yet also a highly co-operative reading or listening to others behaviour the ultra-social,
creative and emotional expression of our systematic and speculative mind-reading and mental time-
travel capacities.
Suzy Kilmister, University of Connecticut
MCCT3, Thursday 2-2.55PM

What Coherence can do for Autonomy
Amongst the contending theories of autonomy, a central fault-line falls between those who argue
that some form of reflective endorsement is both necessary and sufficient for autonomy, and those
who argue that autonomy requires fulfilment of some or other external condition. In this paper I
suggest a reconciliation between these views, drawing on the epistemological notion of coherence. I
argue that reflective endorsement, appropriately understood, requires coherence both amongst the
agents commitments, and between those commitments and her intentions. Moreover, provided the
agent has some commitment to acting in light of how the world is, we get everything we might want
from an externalist account of autonomy without importing a problematic conflation between
autonomy and orthonomy.
David Kinkead, The University of Queensland
MCCT6, Monday 2-2.55PM (Brennan Stream)

What's the Problem with the Boundary Problem?
Democracy begins with the people; democratic theory simply presupposes them. But democratic
theory is silent on who ought be included amongst the people. It can't, because any democratic
38
process first requires the identification of some determinate group of agents - the demos - in order
to act democratically. So how should the demos be defined? It can't be done democratically
because that would require the identification of some prior demos to decide this question, and an
infinite regress of who should vote on who should vote ensues. The question of who is logically and
temporally prior to the question of how and what. In this paper, I attempt to overcome these
methodological obstacles by taking a generative approach to political philosophy. Using
mathematical modelling and computer simulation, I demonstrate that the Boundary Problem
primarily affects certain types of democratic accounts that rely on difference making claims, and
show how the clustering of agents and beliefs across and within polities plays a critical role in its
manifestation.
Kirsten Knight, The University of Melbourne

Respecting Autonomy in Health Care, What is there to respect?
Respecting peoples autonomy is one of the cornerstones of ethical conduct in health care, but what
is meant by autonomy is often not well defined in this setting. Philosophy offers many different
interpretations which may bring the idea of autonomy to life in relevant ways and thus there are
many different ways in which the notion of respecting someones autonomy can be instantiated.
My paper deals with a number of different prominent philosophical ideas of personal autonomy
applied in the setting of advance care planning and consent to treatment. I seek to identify which
types of autonomy concepts appear operative in current medical and medico-legal practice and try
to show how the application of different philosophical interpretations of the concept of personal
autonomy can lead to significantly different practices and outcomes. On the one hand this poses a
problem in health care and health care governance, where consistency of approach is expected,
deemed virtuous and necessary for the avoidance of conflict and on the other hand it directly
questions the nature of philosophy and how much our philosophical ideas should be governed by
the demands of practical life.
Iurii Kozik, University of Bergen, Norway

Rethinking G.A. Cohen's criticism of Robert Nozick's Lockean proviso
The Lockean proviso is a principle which is supposed to draw boundaries on just appropriation in
Robert Nozick's "Anarchy, State and Utopia". G.A. Cohen claims that, while Nozick is committed
to the idea of human autonomy as the highest value, appropriation itself affects human autonomy,
even if the proviso is satisfied. I argue that not only a violation of human autonomy should be taken
into account, but an impact which the proviso itself, if applied, makes on an individual.
Compensation, presupposed by the proviso, is an imposition of a certain scenario of life which
might be alien to an individual and therefore should be understood as an act of harm. However, I
think that these points of criticism don't lead to a complete rejection of the Lockean proviso.
Pramod Kumar, College of Commerce, Kankar Bagh, Patna,India
MORG009, Wednesday 3-3.55PM

Ambedkar's Neo-Buddhism and Social Action
Buddhism is one of those religious doctrines that have persisted for about 2500 years. During this
period, the last century has seen a revitalization and expansion of Buddhism throughout south and
south-east Asia. Ambedkarite Buddhists espouse an eclectic version of Buddhism, primarily based
on Theravada but with additional influence from Mahayana and Vajrayana. On many subjects, they
give Buddhism a distinctive interpretation. Of particular note is their emphasis on Sakyamuni
Buddha as a political and social reformer, rather than merely as a spiritual leader. They point out
that the Buddha required his monastic followers to ignore caste distinction. Ambedkars followers
39
do not believe that a persons unfortunate conditions at birth are the result of previous karma, an
idea which is accepted by almost all other Buddhist groups. Ambedkars redefinition of Buddhist
liberation as the amelioration of material conditions and social relationship in this life did not find
ready acceptance among Buddhist intellectuals in India. One of the critics opined that Ambedkar
chose Buddhism for its moral strength and egalitarian principles for a quality social change and not
for its use as a political tool.
Ten-Herng Lai, Australian National University

The Extended Virtue Hypothesis
Both traditional virtue ethics and situationism share a common ground: a dichotomy of the person
who is independent and autonomous and the situations in which the person should be virtuous.
By accepting this dichotomy, situationist experiments show that rare if any pro-social dispositions
are stable enough to meet the requirement of being a virtue. In response, I argue that this dichotomy
should be rejected. According to the extended virtue hypothesis I propose, the manifestation of a
virtue is no longer understood merely as the person resisting situations, but should include how the
person employs, chooses, or creates external factors or situations to make her pro-social
dispositions more stable. The person can still take credit for the outcomes of these external factors
or situations, due to the fact that those factors or situations are stably produced or chosen by the
person.
Christie Lars, University of Oslo
MORG010, Friday 10-10:55am (Ethics of Force Stream)
Collective liability in war
According to Revisionist just war framework (RJ WF) all concepts of collective liability should be
rejected. On this framework, soldiers are not legitimate targets in war simply by virtue of their
membership in a military organization. Instead, soldiers' and civilians' liability to defensive harm is
claimed to solely depend on their individual moral responsibility and their degree of causal
contribution to the unjust war. This article questions the conceptual clarity and moral relevance of
the notion of degrees of causal contribution to collective action. As an alternative, I propose a
renewed focus the conditions under which group membership (in a state or an army) can give rise to
moral responsibility and liability to defensive harm. I argue that when group membership reflects
members' intentionally overlapping intentions, all members of a group share the responsibility of
the collective outcome, regardless of whether or not every member actually causally contributed to
the outcome. Finally, I highlight the shortcomings of the frequently employed analogy between war
and individual self-defence. In particular, I argue that it disregards the political and collective
context in which wars occur in a way that ignore morally relevant distinction between the
motivations of collectively acting combatants from their alleged analogous counterparts in cases of
individual self-defence.
Holly Lawford-Smith, University of Sheffield

Externally Just and Internally Unjust? How To Punish Collectives
When a collective agent causes serious harm, it is appropriate to punish it, just as it would be
appropriate to punish an individual agent. But how are we to balance an 'externally just' punishment
of the collective, which is indifferent between members, against an 'internally just' punishment of
the collective, which takes seriously the relative contributions to the harm of different members? In
this paper I argue, contra- ordinary intuitions about collective responsibility, that 'external justice'
takes priority, and that while a member might have a complaint of internal injustice against the
other member of the group, that complaint matters very little.
40
Seth Lazar, Australian National University
COPG031, Wednesday 3-3.55PM (Ethics of Force Stream)

Just War Theory and Political Philosophy
Recent work in just war theory has used the techniques of moral philosophy primarily; in practice
this means focusing on moral reasons that apply to individuals, and developing theories of
permissible killing in war out of theories of permissible harm by individuals, in other contexts. But
political philosophy too has something to offer to the field. In this paper I consider the possibilities.
Christopher Lean, Australian National University
MCCT5, Wednesday 3-3.55PM

The Evolution of Failure: Explaining Cancer as an Evolutionary Process
One of the major developments in cancer research over the last 10 years has been the construction
of models which treat cancer as a cellular population subject to natural selection. We defend and
expand on this idea. Cancer is a product of selection on the cancer cell population and a by-product
of selection at other levels of organization. Cancer is a by-product in two senses. First, one can treat
cancer as a by-product of lineage features including the quasi-independence and modularity,
plasticity, and functional division of labour characteristic of metazoans. Second, cancer cells co-opt
signalling pathways that are otherwise adaptive at the organismic level. Further, the functional
complexity of the cancer tumour development indicates that we should treat some tumours as
undergoing a multilevel selection process in which the fitness of the tumour can become distinct
from the aggregative fitness of the cells. In doing this we amend some of the general scepticism,
discussed by Germain (2013), as to whether cancer can have adaptations. The extent to which
cancer fulfils the conditions for being a paradigmatic Darwinian population depend on the scale of
analyses and taking a multilevel selection perspective to cancer clarifies some of the complexities.
Christian Lee, University of Western Australia
MORG009, Wednesday 9-9.55AM

There are no Possible Worlds
My Thesis: The truth of the title of this abstract does not entail that things could not have been
different. Though I reject possible worlds I believe things could have been different. Many think
this would be a mistake. In this talk I consider philosophical motivations for introducing possible
worlds as objects to be talked about. I raise worries for thinking that we need to talk about possible
worlds and then advance reasons to reject talk of possible worlds altogether. (And no, I am not
merely rejecting a particular conception of possible worlds; e.g. concrete or ersatz or whatever,
what I am rejecting is the idea that we need anything like a possible world to make sense of the
world.)
Chad Lee-Stronach, Australian National University

Risk, Rights, and Defeasance
Do we have a moral claim right against bearing risks of harm? If so, under what conditions can it be
overridden or defeated? In this paper, I critically examine three accounts of the defeasibility
conditions that apply to the right against bearing risk (Hansson 2013; McCarthy 1997; Zimmerman
2008). In light of various decisive objections to their accounts, I offer an alternative approach to
developing a defeasible right against risk.
Leon Leontyev, Australian National University

41
My Beliefs, Your Beliefs, and the Parity in Their Evidential Force
If you and I have the same evidence for some proposition P, and if we're both fairly reliable and
reasonably believe that we are, then the fact that you believe that P, seems like evidence (for me) in
favour of P. On the other hand the fact that I believe ~P seems to not be evidence (for me) in favour
of ~P. To take both these seemings at face value is to adopt the view I call disparity, and to reject
either one (but not both) of these seemings is to adopt what I call parity. Unfortunately disparity
leads to unacceptable consequences. It entails that facts concerning the evidential relationships
between propositions have no evidential bearing on how I'm likely to assess the evidence. So
Sherlock ought not think that, on the supposition that his evidence supports that Moriarty has
planted a bomb, that he (Sherlock) will (or is likely to) evaluate his evidence in that way.
Maintaining parity leads to an uncomfortable choice: we must either deny that disagreeing with
reliable agents can require any conciliation from us, or we must accept that facts concerning our
own beliefs count as evidence (for us) in favour of those very beliefs.
Chris Letheby, University of Adelaide
MCCT4, Thursday 9-9.55AM (Cog.Sci Stream)

On the Philosophical Foundations and Significance of Psychedelic Science
Since the early 1990s, scientific study of psychedelic drugs in human subjects has resumed with
intriguing results. After decades of neglect, these remarkable substances have shown impressive
potential as psychotherapeutic agents and have been found capable of occasioning highly
meaningful experiences in healthy subjects followed by significant and durable personality change.
The multidisciplinary study of psychedelic drugs and their short- and long-term psychological
effects raises several philosophical questions. First and foremost, we might ask: what is the nature
of the transformative process engendered by a psychedelic, and in particular, what happens to the
self during this process? Attempting to answer this question, however, rapidly raises questions in
the philosophy of science about the methodological strategies required to explain psychedelic
phenomena. In my paper I draw on empirical and philosophical considerations to outline arguments
for two propositions. First, that multidisciplinary psychedelic science is an illuminating case study
in the need to pursue multilevel, mechanistic, integrative explanations of cognitive phenomena
generally. Second, that psychedelics represent a distinctive kind of psychopharmacological
intervention in that their mechanism of transformative action ineliminably involves personal-level
mental states and is, as such, somewhat transparent to the person being transformed.

Neil Levy, Florey Institute of Neuroscience and Mental Health

Implicit attitudes and moral responsibility
Implicit attitudes are, roughly, attitudes that agents appear to possess and which affect their
behaviour, but which they do not endorse. There is a burgeoning literature on the extent, if any, to
which agents are morally responsible for features of events that owe their character to their implicit
attitudes. However, this literature has paid little attention to the nature of these attitudes: for most
the part, assuming that they are unconscious beliefs. This assumption is open to question. In this
paper, I explore different proposals concerning the nature of explicit attitudes and show how
different proposals have different upshots for our responsibility.
Hanti Lin, Australian National University/University of California, Davis

Some Bayesian Students Expect to Be Fully Surprised by the Exam
In the surprise exam paradox, we have an apparently cogent argument that runs counter to our
42
intuition, i.e. that it is possible for a rational student in a normal condition to believe that the
upcoming exam will be a surprise. I propose a new approach to solving the paradox. Surprise comes
in degrees, because it correlates with sudden change of belief, which comes in degrees. Following
this line of thought, we can easily use probabilistic degrees of belief to construct a model in which
an idealized agent expects to be almost fully surprised by the exam (namely, for the agent, the
degree to which the exam will surprise her has a very high expected value). This probabilistic
model, as I will explain, can help us identify what's wrong with the argument in the paradox: it is
wrong for the same reason as why Keith Lehrer's no-false-lemma Gettier case is possible at all (in
which one has justified true belief that does not count as knowledge and that does not rely on any
false lemma). This is a new solution to the surprise exam paradox that results from (consistent!)
collaboration between traditional and Bayesian epistemologies.

Christian List, London School of Economics
MCCT1, Monday 11.30AM-1:00PM (Keynote Address)

Emergent Chance
The aim of this talk (based on joint work with Marcus Pivato) is to defend the claim that there can
be non-degenerate objective chance in a deterministic world. Using a simple model of the
relationship between different levels of description of a system (such as "micro" and "macro"
levels), we show how objective chance at a higher level can coexist with its absence at a lower
level. Unlike previous arguments for the level-specificity of chance, our argument shows, in a
precise sense, that higher-level chance does not collapse into epistemic probability, despite higher-
level properties supervening on lower-level ones. We show that the distinction between objective
chance and epistemic probability can be drawn at every level of description. There is, therefore, not
a single distinction between objective and epistemic probability, but a family of such distinctions.

Erick Llamas, UNAM

The Physical Concepts Strategy
In this work I analyze and defend what I dub the physical concepts strategy. This strategy has been
followed at least by Maxwell (1978), Lockwood (1989), Stoljar (2001) and Chalmers (2009), to
defend a kind of physicalism, all inspired in Russell's Analysis of Matter. In this work I focus on
Stoljar's solution and argue that the distinction between two kinds of physical properties proposed
by Stoljar leaves the notion of a physical property completely open ended. I argue that this problem
does not let him have his defense of physicalism. I propose another way to pursue the physical
concept strategy by appealing to the way our concepts reveal the essence of the property they refer
to. With this new notion I solve the problem that Stoljar's two notions cannot handle and follow the
same strategy. I argue that my account is better for two main reasons: (i) the properties we are
dealing with are (essentially) physical properties, and (ii) I propose a reductive analysis of what a
physical property is. The kind of physicalism that we are left with is again a Russellian view, and to
my mind, the only physicalist view that is worthy of being pursued.
Yurly Loboda, Institute of Philosophy of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine

Cognitive roots of warfare: modern inglorious wars (Ukrainian experience)
Nature of war is changing, and during the age of post-heroic warfare (E.Luttwak) we can see new
kind of war which is possible to name as inglorious wars, waged by V.Putin. The essential
features of modern inglorious wars are: - Non-conventional usage of military force (war crimes
43
against non-combatants as a substitution of military operations (Chechnya); maneuvers of
unidentified armed forces (Crimea), arming criminals for political purpose (cooperation with
invaders), attacks with covering by non-combatants); - Total informational warfare, especially
against own citizens; - Administrative cooperation with collaborants on captured territories; - Total
legal nihilism; - Wide range of provocations. Strategy depends on the academic preparation,
cultural background, psychological features of decision-makers. V.Putin, as former officer of KGB,
fully reflects methods of soviet security service in modern Russian strategy. Putin learned that
military force failed in Chechnya in 1994-1996, and he started to use non-military means: he
created political force loyal to him (Kadyrovs family) which divided and weakened liberation
movement of Chechnya. Putins KGB background showed itself obviously during contemporary
action in Crimea. Military forces of Russian Federation did not wear Russian insignia, but used
exclusive Russian weapons and vehicles. They captured Ukrainian military bases and ships,
provoking Ukrainians for wide-scaled armed conflict. Putin prefers to use specially trained agents,
but not armed forces directly; army just assist them. Thus, Russian army turned to Putins agents,
but not conventional military power. This makes modern Russian wars inglorious, because Russin
supreme command forces its army to do work, non-inherent to army.
Manuel Losada-Sierra, Griffith University
MCCT3, Thursday 4.30-5.30PM

Thinking from the Margins: Levinas and Metz on Biblical Time
In the modern consideration of historical time, reason is the driving force of progress through a
homogenous, linear and continuum time. In fact, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
humanity was witnessing a history of progress in which it appeared that history was progressing
towards a better world. However, the tragedies of the twentieth century indicate the opposite.
Western reason proved unable to stop the barbarism of war. At the heart of this panorama,
according to Emmanuel Levinas and J ohann Baptist Metz, was the idealism of the Greek logos
presented in the philosophical and theological mode of thinking. Theology and philosophy would
share in this way the same idealist vocation towards totality which, in Levinas categories, is the
forgetting of singularity and their concrete situation in favour of universality. I will show how by
resorting to the J ewish legacy, and particularly to the concepts of eschatology, apocalypse, and
messianism, Levinas and Metz define a new relationship with historical time. In this way they not
only oppose the mainstream consideration of history as a vector of continuous progress towards its
own realization, but also introduce in history the contingency of individual experiences and
particularly those of the victims of such history.
Kirk Lougheed, Monash University
MCCT6, Tuesday 3-3.55PM

In Defense of Anti-Revisionism: The Benefits to Inquiry Argument
In the epistemology of disagreement there are two prominent schools of thought. First, the
revisionist position holds that when I encounter such disagreement equal weight must be given to
both views and hence I should revise my belief in P. This could require lowering my confidence in
P or withholding belief in P. Second, the anti-revisionist view claims that there are cases in which
disagreement does not require changing my belief in P. Thus, the revisionist denies that there can be
rational disagreement between epistemic peers, whereas the anti-revisionist claims that epistemic
peers can rationally disagree. I explore an underdeveloped argument in support of the anti-
revisionist position. It could be that there are epistemic benefits if researchers remain steadfast in
the face of peer disagreement. If continuing to develop and defend a proposition in light of peer
disagreement is ultimately more truth conducive than lowering confidence or suspending judgment
in that proposition, then there is a good reason to endorse anti-revisionism, at least with respect to
inquiry. I provide the framework for how this argument might go along with some potential
objections.
44
Andres Luco, Nanyang Technological University

The Definition of Morality: One to Rule them All
The task of defining morality, or "the moral point of view, has been an embarrassingly elusive
one for meta-ethicists and moral psychologists. A number of proposals have been offered, but none
has won complete acceptance. The lack of consensus on a definition of morality led several
prominent philosophers to conclude that there is in fact a plurality of defensible definitions.
However, I shall argue that this conclusion is premature, and likely mistaken. I contend that the
proper way to arrive at a single, unified definition of morality is to (1) list platitudinous uses of
moral concepts, (2) identify what, if anything, explains these uses, and (3) develop a theory of the
origin and development of whatever explains the platitudinous uses of moral concepts. This
procedure for defining morality is an inevitably empirical inquiry. And currently, there is sufficient
empirical evidence to establish that a moral system is a system of norms that is action-guiding,
publicizable, revisable through collective deliberation, and that bears the function of promoting the
well-being of everyone within its range of application.
Craig Lundy, University of Wollongong

Counterfactuals and 'What If' Accounts of History: A Critique of Possibility
The use of counterfactuals in historical analysis, or what is other referred to as what if accounts of
history, is a point of contention amongst historians and philosophers of history. While some have
argued that the positing of counterfactual possibilities are a part of all explanations into what
actually happened, others such as E. P Thompson and E. H. Carr have denounced the
contemplation of counterfactuals as unhistorical crap, or at best a parlour game. Common to
both advocates and detractors, however, is a conventional conception of possibility, whereby an
occurrence is said to be possible before it is realised. This paper will forward a critique of the
paradigm of possibility that is presupposed by all sides of the debate over counterfactuals. By
drawing on the metaphysics of Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze, I will outline an alternative
understanding of counterfactuals as virtual but not actual, real and ideal but not possible or abstract.
As such, this paper will suggest a new role for counterfactuals in the analysis of historical reality.
William Lycan, University of North Carolina

Attention and Internal Monitoring: A Farewell to HOP
For many years Lycan has defended D.M. Armstrong's "higher-order perception" (HOP) theory of
state consciousness. But Sauret has shown that _attending to_ a mental state of one's own is not the
same as quasi-perceiving the state, and attending is itself not intentional at all, but only an enhanced
property of the state attended. Lycan recants HOP in favor of a purely attentional view.
Aidan Lyon, University of Maryland

The Marrow of Belief: Return of the Bayesian
Contemporary epistemology offers us two very different accounts of our epistemic lives. According
to Traditional epistemologists, the decisions that we make are motivated by our desires and guided
by our beliefs and these beliefs and desires all come in an all-or-nothing form. In contrast, many
Bayesian epistemologists say that these beliefs and desires come in degrees and that they should be
understood as subjective probabilities and utilities. What are we to make of these different
epistemologies? Are the Tradionalists and the Bayesians in disagreement, or are their views
compatible with each other? Some Bayesians have challenged the Traditionalists: Bayesian
45
epistemology is more powerful and more general than the Traditional theory, and so we should
abandon the notion of all-or-nothing belief as something worthy of philosophical analysis. The
Traditionalists have responded to this challenge in various ways. I shall argue that these responses
are inadequate and that the challenge lives on.
Catriona MacKenzie, Macquarie University
MCCT1, Sunday 6.30-8.00PM (APA Presidential Address)

Three Dimensions of Autonomy
Over the last decade relational theories of autonomy have significantly advanced our understanding
of the social conditions for individual autonomy, and of how individual autonomy can be impaired
by social oppression and injustice. Yet, significant disagreement remains concerning how the
concept of autonomy, and the social constitution of individual autonomy, should be understood. In
this paper I argue that one reason for the persistence of these disagreements is confusion over the
kind of concept that autonomy is. Rather than understanding autonomy as a unitary and context-
invariant concept, I propose that autonomy should be understood as a multi-dimensional and
context-sensitive concept. To develop this claim, I distinguish and explicate three distinct, but
causally interdependent, dimensions or axes of autonomy: self-determination, self-governance, and
self-authorization. Each of these dimensions involves distinct conditions, which may be satisfied to
varying degrees. I suggest that even if this taxonomy doesnt necessarily resolve long-standing
debates about the meaning of autonomy, it does help to make sense of our complex, and sometimes
conflicting intuitions about autonomy, and our diverse autonomy-related social practices.
Ishani Maitra, University of Michigan

Lying, Acting and Asserting
Theres a long history of supposing that lying to someone requires saying (or asserting) something
with the intention of deceiving them. More recently, theres been a decisive move away from this
tradition, in response to examples of what are called bald-faced lies. In this paper, I argue that
bald-faced lies arent lies, because theyre not assertions. I begin by arguing that lies must be
assertions. Next, I briefly sketch a view of assertion according to which a constitutive rule of
asserting is being responsive to evidence in a particular way. Then, focusing on two well-known
examples of bald-faced lies, I argue that those speakers dont assert anything; rather, they do
something more like what an actor (or parodist) does. I finish by responding to some objections to
my central claims. My argument removes an important objection to intend-to-deceive conceptions
of lying. But more importantly, it offers a different way of thinking about lying. Defenders of bald-
faced lies sometimes describe them as attempts to go on the record with something known to be
false. I argue against this conception, and defend an alternate view according to which lying
involves taking a kind of (epistemic) responsibility for the content of ones utterance.
Raamy Majeed, University of Otago

Conceptual Instability and the New Epistemic Possibility
We tend to think that our concepts are stable in the sense that, while their extensions may vary
across distinct epistemic scenarios, the reference-fixing conditions by which we discover these
extensions remain fixed. This paper challenges this orthodoxy. In particular, it aims to motivate and
clarify the position that some concepts are unstable in that their reference-fixing conditions
themselves vary across distinct epistemic scenarios. Furthermore, it aims to draw out the
implications such instability has for epistemic possibility and apriority. I shall argue that when
46
unstable concepts are concerned, epistemic space will be widened, which in turn will restrict our a
priori knowledge.
Ali Mamouri, Australian Catholic University
COPG030, Monday 2-2.55PM (Continental Stream)

The adoption of phenomenology in contemporary Islamic theology
The phenomenology of religion has been positively received by many contemporary liberal Muslim
theologians since its formulation by Edmund Husserl in the early 20th Century. They have accepted
it as a methodological or epistemological approach in a variety of different ways. Its main
ideological use is as a tool to criticise and oppose the growth of religious fundamentalism which has
been rapidly developing in Muslim societies globally. Typically Islamic theologians reacted to
modernity in one of two ways. One group retreated into fundamentalist ideology, aiming to turn
back to the origins of Islam. The second reaction to modernism was adopting different modern
schools of thought and approaches which phenomenological approach fits into this category. The
acceptance of phenomenology within modern Islamic theology can be classified into two
categories: Traditionalist and Hermeneutic approaches. They both have aroused strong interest and
criticism within the academic communities of Muslim countries. The quantity of papers written on
this topic, in both Farsi and Arabic languages is substantial, with the greatest attention focused on
the Quran, as the paramount text of Islam. This paper aims to describe and classify the efforts of
modern Muslim theologians who have adopted a phenomenological approach; then analyses the
outcomes of this theological approach.
Dan Marshall, Lingnan University

Humean Laws and Explanation
A common objection to Humean accounts of natural laws is that they cannot account for the role
laws play in explanations. Briefly, the objection is that, given Humeanism about laws, it is the
collection of all the particular matters of fact that explain why a certain regularity is a law. But if
this is the case, the objection continues, laws cannot help explain particular matters of fact, as they
need to if they are to play their required explanatory role. After rejecting recent replies to this
objection that appeal to the distinction between metaphysical explanation and scientific explanation,
I argue that the objection fails by failing to distinguish between two types of fact: the regularities
Humeans should regard as laws, and related second order facts, such as the fact that certain
regularity is a law, which Humeans should not regard as laws. While the latter kind of fact is
explained by all the particular matters of fact, and hence cannot help explain any particular matters
of fact, the former kind of fact isnt so explained, and hence is able to help explain particular
matters of fact. As a result, Humean laws can play their required role in explanation.
John Matthewson, Massey University/The University of Sydney

When less mechanistic information produces better mechanistic explanations
Mechanistic explanation can be characterised as conveying information about the mechanism that
underlies a particular phenomenon. Given this characterisation, we might think that any given
mechanistic explanation will be improved by the addition of more detailed information regarding
the relevant mechanism(s). This type of view is often at least implicitly held in the literature
regarding mechanistic explanation. However, some commentators have questioned whether
increased mechanistic detail will always generate a better mechanistic explanation. For example,
Levy and Bechtel (2013) argue that explanations may sometimes be *enhanced* through the
omission of such detailed information. I agree with Levy and Bechtel in principle, but their claim
will only go through if additional mechanistic detail at least sometimes imposes a cost in
47
explanatory power. And once we outline what is required for such a trade-off to hold, it is not clear
how often the appropriate circumstances will arise. Time permitting, I will also consider what this
issue might show us about the status of mechanistic explanation as a distinctive type of explanation.
Nadia Mazouz, ETH Zurich
COPG031, Monday 3-3.55PM (Ethics of Force Stream)

Facing Dissent: On the Morality of Defensive Violence and War
In contemporary philosophy, a dominant thesis states a consensus on a theory about the morality of
war: just war theory, according to the thesis, not only expresses the convictions of scholars, it also
grounds international law and is widely accepted by public opinion. Its core propositions are: that
the only just cause for war is defence and that the moral status of all combatants is equal. Now, just
war theory in its contemporary form has no foundation in a moral theory. in fact there are even
clues that such a foundation may be impossible. Hence, if the consensus thesis is correct, a widely
recognized normative theory lacks justification and might even be wrong. I will argue, however,
that, on a closer look, the consensus thesis is false. A new ansatz is needed to understand the
morality of what formerly was just war theory an ansatz in which dissent on moral criteria under
conditions of war are taken at face value. In this paper I explore how a Scanlonian type of
contractualist theory can be used for that task, thereby taking up the particularly difficult case of the
equal status of combatants.

Claudio Mazzola, The University of Queensland

Discrete Space-Time: Necessary a Posteriori?
General relativity dictates that the macrogeometrical properties of space-time, such as curvature and
metric, are a purely contingent affair. This paper shows that, nevertheless, there is currently no
evidence that microgeometrical properties such as discreteness or continuity could not be a
necessary a posteriori matter. More precisely, a Kripkean argument is offered to the effect that,
according to some theories in quantum gravity, space-time is essentially discrete. Therefore, if any
such theory was right, space-time would be finitely divisible as a matter of metaphysical necessity.

Doug McConnell, Macquarie University
MORG009, Thursday 3-3.55PM

Narrative, Self-Governance and Addiction
I argue that self-narratives can undermine or empower self-governance in several ways. Certain
self-narratives can entrench addiction while changes to such narratives can promote recovery. To
make my case, I begin with Bratman's account of agency where the agent self-governs if they form
and follow plans and policies according to norms of practical reason. I then explain what a narrative
account of self-governance adds to Bratman's view, drawing on first-hand accounts of substance
dependent people. The primary difference is that narrative views consider not only plans and
policies but also agents interpretations of the contingent aspects of their self-concepts. If my
account is correct then we should consider self-narratives and not just plans and policies when
assessing and improving self-governance. Furthermore, Bratmans view of self-governance needs to
be adjusted to accommodate the possibility of agents competently enacting alienating self-
narratives.
Jane McDonnell, Monash University
48

The Convergence of Physical and Mathematical Content
Our physical theories contain a lot of surplus mathematics which has no obvious physical correlate.
Many people have thought that our understanding of physics would improve if we could identify
the physical part of the mathematical structure of our theories (i.e. the part which has empirical
support and/or corresponds to physical structure) and separate it from the surplus part (i.e. the part
which provides logical and instrumental support). Hartry Field tried to do this in his nominalisation
project but, effectively, he ending up adding a lot of unwanted pseudo-mathematical structure to his
nominalised theory. This led to a counter-productive blurring of the physical/mathematical
boundary. Others have attempted to address the issue of surplus mathematics by actively seeking a
convergence of physical and mathematical content. In this talk I will discuss various approaches
(e.g. restricting the mathematical foundation of our current physical theories; equating the universe
to a digital computer; equating physical and mathematical structure). I will address the role that
mathematics plays in our physical theories and question whether we can really identify a surplus
part and whether it is desirable to remove it.
Dennis McEnnerney, The Colorado College
COPG030, Monday 10-10.55AM (Continental Stream)

Using Sartre in Poststructuralist Critique: Shaping Discourses of Resistance
With the rise of structuralism, J ean-Paul Sartres work became rapidly pass. Dubbed by Michel
Foucault a man of the nineteenth century [attempting] to think the twentieth century, Sartre came
to be marginal to late twentieth century continental political philosophy, which came to be
dominated by structuralist and poststructuralist approaches. Recently, some scholars, such as
Thomas Flynn and Bill Martin, have attempted to bring Sartre into dialogue with poststructuralist
thinkers like Foucault. Somewhat in the spirit of those efforts, this paper seeks to make use of
Sartre, taking as its starting point the critical philosophical approach of J ames Tully. Understanding
Sartres arguments as both evoked by the milieu of the Second World War and Occupation and
giving, sometimes unintentionally, direction and meaning to the post-war generation, the paper
argues that Sartres enduring influence arises not so much from his explicit arguments about
authenticity or ontology as from his impact on the vocabulary and culture of the post-war West.
Michaela McSweeney, Princeton University
MCCT3, Tuesday 4.30-5.30PM

Logical Options
I argue that there are only two tenable positions in the metaphysics of logic: first, logical anti-
realism, or the view that there are no worldly entities (or worldly structure) which our logical terms
refer to (or reflect). Second, logical humility, or the view that there is some such underlying worldly
structure, but that we lack epistemic access to it.
Neil Mehta, Yale-NUS College

The priority of non-alethic perceptual experience
In alethic perceptual experience, we perceive that certain things are true. In non-alethic perceptual
experience, we simply perceive objects, properties, and events. Which type of perceptual experience
is metaphysically prior? Non-alethic perceptual experience, I say. I first examine two extant
arguments for this conclusion. The first is unsuccessful; the second requires a highly controversial
premise. I then provide a better argument for this conclusion based on the systematicity of
perceptual experience, i.e., the fact that the truths which we can perceptually experience are
systematically related.
49
Melissa Merritt, The University of New South Wales
MCCT3, Thursday 10-10.55AM

The Prospects of Kantian Moral Realism
This paper weighs in on recent Kantian metaethical debate between realists and anti-realists
(constructivists). It has not been adequately acknowledged that the distinction between theoretical
and practical reason has received lopsided attention in this debate: moral realists scarcely mention
it, whereas recent constructivists (Korsgaard and Engstrom) base their arguments for anti-realism
on Kants claims about the essential *efficacity* of practical reason. I accept the efficacy principle
but deny that it entails anti-realism. Only an unwarranted further claim gives this impression:
constructivists assume that practical reason must be more radically self-determining than theoretical
reason since it is not condemned to judge about objects that are there anyway, independently of its
exercise. The crux of my paper lies in a proposal that offers a principled Kantian way to reject it.
Namely, we distinguish the object of practical reason (the good) from the moral facts (the existence
of any person). This allows to appreciate how any sound exercise of practical reason involves
attention to the relevant moral facts i.e. to what is there anyway. This leads me to conclude that the
moral realism that a Kantian can and should endorse is empirical in nature.
Rishabh Kumar Mishra, University of Delhi
MORG010, Tuesday 2-2.55PM

From Monologue to Dialogue: Interpreting Social Constructivism with Bakhtinian
Perspective
In present it is well established idea that the construction of knowledge is a process of co-
construction of meanings through the participation in socially negotiated and discursive activity.
The pedagogic translation of this idea owes its root to Vygotskian perspective of development and
learning. It envisage teaching-learning as a dialogic process. However it is identified that the idea of
dialogue as used by proponents by social constructivist theorist is limited to its methodological
implication as a pedagogic tool. The present paper argues that dialogue is not a pedagogic tool
rather it is an ontological construct. Against this backdrop the paper argues that for developing a
substantial theory of social constructivist pedagogy Bakhtins ideas can be deployed. The paper
elaborates the vistas of Bakhtins idea of dialogue. Further with the help of this elaboration it tries
to interpret the epistemological assumption of social constructivist approach to learning. This
understanding will enable us to see the agency and the voices of individuals in teaching-learning
process. Drawing upon the Bakhtinian perspective last section of the paper discusses tenets of
dialogic pedagogy which help us to transform the pervasive monologic discourse in to dialogic
discourse.
Liam Moore, Monash University

Ethical Wolves
The widespread revival of virtue ethics in modern philosophy began in 1958, but by 1998, other
philosophers began to criticize virtue ethics. They did so on the grounds that virtues may not exist
and they cite evidence from a contemporary debate in psychology between social and personality
psychologists to support their criticism. They argue that empirical evidence shows that character
traits do not exist, and therefore, neither do virtues. Consequently, they claim, we should be wary of
our own weaknesses of character. I examine the virtue ethicists reply to this argument and then the
psychological literature, both the articles the situationist philosophers cite and otherwise. I argue
that the situationist critique is not successful at eliminating the possibility of character traits or
virtues. However, I also argue that the situationists have a point: we do have weaknesses of
character. If so, then people we interact with will be prone to manipulations which target those
50
weaknesses, and in fact, recent work in applied sociology suggests that people manipulate one
another regularly in service of their aims. I explore the possibility of ethical manipulation.
Bryanna Moore, Monash University

Grief, Love and Morality: A Reading of Robert Solomons On Grief and Gratitude
The moral status of grief has garnered little recognition in philosophical literature. Robert
Solomons essay, On Grief and Gratitude establishes an underlying moral structure to grief that is
grounded in virtue ethics. In my paper I build upon Solomons idea of grief towards an
understanding of it as a gateway or intermediary emotion that enables an unparalleled reassessment
and revaluation of the selfs relation to the other. This fundamental moral revaluation is a result of
the phenomenological absence of the part of ones identity that is linked to the departed. The nature
of grief reveals something vital about the way in which we relate to the other it is a fundamental
reaffirmation of the inescapable separateness of the self. It is also a reaffirmation of the relationship
that existed and, ultimately, of love. The process of grieving masks the underlying process a sort
of Hegelian double-movement that is really taking place, whereby we accept the permanency of
loss and move past it only through assimilating an intangible part of the other into the self. Thus I
provide an account of grief that conceptually links it to love and virtue, allowing a positive reading
of an often negatively considered emotion.

Robert Mullins, Oxford University
MCCT6, Friday 11.30-12.25PM

The Relationship of Authority
The paper examines the recent debate about Raz's service conception of authority. In particular, I
respond to Stephen Darwall's argument that the service conception of authority cannot capture the
sense in which authorities claim a right to obedience and impose an obligation to obey on behalf of
their subjects. I concede that Raz's account, unadorned, does a poor job of capturing the relationship
of authority. I offer my own account of the relationship between authority and subject. I then
suggest that if a relationship of authority does exist, the service conception can be successfully
adapted to account for this relationship.
Nick Munn, University of Waikato

Capacity, Consistency and the Young
Young people are treated differently from other citizens in a wide range of domains. Others (often
parents or guardians) are entitled to make medical decisions in their stead. Young offenders are
held to different standards of criminal responsibility than are other offenders. In most democracies,
all those under eighteen years of age are systematically excluded from formal political participation
through voting. In each of these domains, the medical, criminal and political, the motivation for
this differential treatment is the same: an attribution of incapacity to the young people affected.
This paper presents the case that the capacity requirement is, at its core, shared between these
domains. As such, the differential attribution of capacity to young people in each of these domains
generates problems of consistency. I outline possible approaches for resolving the apparent
inconsistency.

Graham Nerlich, Adelaide University
51

Missed opportunity: what Einstein [1916] missed in Minkowski [1908]
Einsteins (1916) first survey of General Relativity is philosophically important because of Part As
excessive empiricism. Salient features of the new theory, especially general covariance, are
introduced as lifting restrictions on special relativity as Einstein conceived it in 1905. Minkowski
(1908) developed a different conception of the theory, dependent only on the relativity of motion,
independent of light and signalling. Spacetime is its immediate and central consequence. To have
developed general relativity from that basis would have to avoid the many errors into which
Einstein fell in Part A.

Will Newsome, Macquarie University
MCCT4, Thursday 3-3.55PM (Cog.Sci Stream)

Doing Distributive Cognition
Edwin Hutchins has recently attempted to clarify what exactly distributed cognition is by
contrasting it with Clark and Chalmers' (1998) extended cognition. His vision for the future of
cognitive science is one in which distributed cognition is more fully embraced and the importance
of cultural practices in human cognition is more fully recognised. While not raising critiques of
Hutchins' vision for the future of cognitive science per se, I raise some practical concerns that will
likely arise in attempting to fulfil the empirical project associated with distributed cognition.
Despite Hutchins' hope to study full-blown, culturally distributed cognitive systems rather than
just individual-tool extended systems, I note that a well-posed and properly planned empirical
study (under the constraints of a human ethics committee) invoking the framework distributed
cognition must often limit its guiding question(s) to micro-interactions, thereby lending to extended
cognitive systems, or mid-sized systems as Hutchins terms them, being more commonly observed
than wider cultural cognitive systems. While this need not be the case necessarily, a confluence of
research funding, approval, and ethics practices lead to the likelihood of this trend continuing.
Beyond these, however, lie real practical problems concerning how to conceive of persons within
these distributed systems.
Suzanne Noel-Bentley, University of Otago Bioethics Centre
MCCT4, Wednesday 2-2.55PM (Cog.Sci Stream)

Harmonies of the Arts and Cognitive Science in Ethics
I am bringing together Susan Hurleys Shared Circuits Model, which is based in concepts from
contemporary Cognitive Science regarding mirroring, imitation, mindreading and socialisation, with
the processes intrinsic to learning and engagements in the Arts. Their resonances with the
philosophies of Levinas, Watsuji, Wittgenstein and Alexander, along with the writings of Mark
Johnson, Alva No and Luce Irigaray, inspire an alternate bio-logical conception of the ethics of
human engagement. This also undermines the Cartesian mindset that still pervades Western science
and culture, and challenges the reductionism of techno-scientific processes as applied to human
relations (Ziarek). Arguments against brain-centric conceptions of mind, and ideas of extended
embodied meaning-making as intrinsic to our ways of being-in-the-world shine a critical light on
scopic, propositionally structured, subject/object bound philosophy (Gillett). Ethics, as the practical
interconnection of acts (Watsuji), is better informed by narrative-somatic metaphors that reflect the
synergy of corporeal experience and meaning-making that is the foundation of human relationships.
Daniel Nolan, Australian National University

Chance and Necessity
52
A principle endorsed by many theories of objective chance, and practically forced on us by the
standard interpretation of the Kolmogorov semantics for chance, is the principle that when a
proposition P has a chance, any proposition Q that is necessarily equivalent to P will have the same
chance as P. Call this principle SUB (for the substitution of necessary equivalents into chance
ascriptions). I will present some problems for a theory of chance, and will argue that the best way
to resolve these problems is to reject SUB, and similar principles e.g. for the chances of outcomes
or the chances of events. Objective chance, it turns out, carves things more finely than necessary
equivalence does.
Andre Okawara, Monash University
COPG030, Tuesday 4.30-5.30PM (Continental Stream)

Nietzsche: The well-constituted human being and her virtues
I will discuss two related issues that arise in virtue ethical readings of Nietzsches physiological
account of evaluative virtue, namely, Nietzsches immoralism, and the development of human
beings. Addressing the first issue, I will question whether Nietzsches non-moral prerequisites for
virtue based on the idea of well-constituted individuals produces truly radical and fearful
substantive outcomes. I suggest that resistance in attributing support for such outcomes to him can
be grounded on his insistence on good conscience in Beyond Good and Evil, and on an account of
human development reflected in the allegory of the metamorphosis of the spirit in Thus Spoke
Zarathustra. The engagement with traditional ideas of moral goodness during the camel stage of
development can be compared with the Aristotelian account of upbringing. The lion stage can be
read as a rejection of the limitations of traditional ethical approaches, and provides much of the fuel
for immoralist readings. However, the child stage constitutes an affirmative aspect of the
overcoming of morality. The continuity of the spirit through these transformations betrays
Nietzsches hope that the belief in, and the search for, ones own virtues can result in good
evaluative outcomes.
Ross Pain, La Trobe University
MCCT4, Tuesday 10-10.55AM (Cog.Sci Stream)

Is Perceptual Experience Metaphysically Disunified?
Traditionally it has been held that the phenomenology of perceptual consciousness is unified, in that
it is composed of one fundamental type of psychological state or event. Recently this has been
challenged (see Bengson 2013, Brogaard 2013, Reiland 2013 and Tucker 2011) by those who claim
that our visual experiences are disunified. Typically, this involves the claim that there is a low level,
non-conceptual and non-propositional sensory aspect to experience which determines phenomenal
character, and a high level conceptual and propositional judgment that is representational in nature.
As neither constituent can be reduced to the other, perceptual consciousness must be metaphysically
disunified. All this recalls Wilfrid Sellars two component analysis of perception. Whilst I believe
Sellars two component model is sound from a third person perspective, it is less so from the first
person. This is because the argument (called the subtraction argument) used to motivate first
person perceptual disunification is shaky at best. I will look at ways in which the subtraction
argument is employed by contemporary thinkers (such as Paul Coates, 2009), why the argument is
problematic, and suggest a new argument that might replace it.

Salman Panahi, The University of Melbourne
COPG030, Thursday 10-10.55 (Continental Stream)

How logic is analytic? (Consequences of different accounts of analyticity)
In this presentation, I will explain how three different notions of analyticity apply to formal logic.
53
The three approaches to analyticity I will consider are Epistemic Analyticity (EA), Metaphysical
Analyticity (MA), and Syntactic Analyticity (SA). The first two concepts of analyticity are due to
Paul Boghossian but he has given only an account of the first one, Gillian Russell has developed the
second. The third kind of analyticity is defined in terms of a notion is used in the contemporary
discussion of logicality of inference rulesthe subformula property. I will argue that in the case of
EA, the meaning constructing aspect of logical rules requires that the connectives defined by such
rules have truth conditions. In the case of MA, as Russell argues-in her 2013 Metaphysical
analyticity and epistemology of logic-that we cannot perform the baptism/stipulation by pointing
to or describing each instance [of logical rules] we will have to find some other way. An obvious
approach is to identify the instances by their form I will show what consequences this will have for
finding forms of logical rules, and what kinds of logical concepts could count as Metaphysically
Analytic. Finally, I will discuss the consequences of SA, by explaining the structures of arguments
formed in a Natural Deduction system based on Gentzens Sequent Calculus, and showing how the
subformula property for a particular class of those arguments gives rise to a distinct kind of
analyticity. I will end by discussing the relationships between these different forms of analyticity.
Claudia Passos, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro

In defense of empathy: a response to Prinz
A prevailing view in moral psychology holds that the cognitive abilities of empathy play a key role
in morality and prosocial and altruistic behaviors. Recently, J esse Prinz has challenged this view.
Prinz has two major theses. First, he argues that empathy is not a necessary precondition for moral
approval and disapproval. Second, he argues that empathy is prone to distortions in moral judgment
that render it potentially harmful and frequently produce morally undesirable results. His
conclusions are that empathy plays no essential role in morality, and that it interferes negatively
with the ends of morality and should not be cultivated. I will argue against both theses. First, I will
argue that empathy plays a necessary role in human moral development. I argue that empathy
understood either as vicarious sharing of emotion or as affective perspective-shifting through
simulation and imaginative reconstruction is fundamental to the development of moral agency.
The absence or deficiency of these processes leads to the absence or deficiency of a crucial element
of our morality. Second, I will argue that there is a moral benefit associated with empathic feelings,
and there are certain morally demanding situations in which empathy is our best guide to moral
judgment.
Knox Peden, Australian National University
COPG030, Tuesday 10-10.55AM (Continental Stream)

What Should We Do with Catherine Malabou's 'Brain'?
In recent years, the French philosopher Catherine Malabou has called for a renewed dialogue
between philosophy and the neurosciences centered on the concept of plasticity. Proffering a
heterodox style of deconstruction that privileges the materiality of form, Malabou grounds her
engagement with the neurosciences in an equally heterodox understanding of Hegels conception of
temporality as fundamentally plastic, that is, equally given to the bestowal and the destruction of
form. Among her many publications, her short book What Should We Do with our Brain?, argues
for a new conception of subjectivity adequate to the brain plasticity neuroscience has made
manifest. This paper will investigate the adequacy of Malabous concept of plasticity in light of its
ambitions, and will also assess her timely effort to integrate metaphysical insights into subjectivity,
grounded in the continental tradition, with a contemporary vision of the brain that is prima facie
totally foreign to it.
Philip Pettit, Princeton University/Australian National University
MCCT1, Thurs 11.30AM-1.00PM (Keynote Address)
54

Group Agents are not Expressive, Pragmatic or Theoretical Fictions
Group agents have been represented as expressive fictions by those who treat ascriptions of agency
to groups as metaphorical; as pragmatic fictions by those who think that the agency ascribed to
groups belongs in the first place to a distinct individual or set of individuals; and as theoretical
fictions by those who think that postulating group agents serves no indispensable role in our theory
of the social world. This paper identifies, criticizes and rejects each of these views, defending a
strong realist position.
Philip Pettit, Princeton University/Australian National University
National Gallery of Australia, Tues 7-8.30PM (Alan Saunders Lecture)

A Brief History of Liberty And its Lessons
Liberty remained the paramount ideal through the ruptures of political thought that occurred in
ancient Rome, medieval Italy, seventeenth-century England, and the centers of eighteenth-century
upheaval: America and France. It emerged from that history as an ideal of personal independence,
achieved under a shared rule of law. This concept of freedom celebrates the un-dominated man and
woman, not just the individual let alone. It equates freedom with being able to look others in the
eye, without reason for fear or deference, thanks to political equality, legal status, social security
and personal effort. Although it was lost to sight in the fog of later ideological conflict, eclipsed by
struggles over social planning and economic rationalism, it is there still to reclaim and rework. It
offers a beacon by which to orientate in thinking about social and political organization.
**For information about this paper please visit http://www.aap-conferences.org.au/aap2014-alan-
saunders/

Cindy Phillips, The University of Maryland

The Balancing View: Scanlon's Ad Hoc Mistake
If you were forced to choose between saving one or ten other strangers in a lifeboat from certain
death, which would you choose? Most people believe that one should save the lifeboat with the
greater number of lives. Thomas Scanlon justifies this verdict with the Balancing View which
demands that the person in the one-person lifeboat has her interests balanced against one person on
the opposing side; those that are not balanced out in the larger group are used as tiebreakers. The
Balancing View entails that we must save the lifeboat with the larger group from certain death.
Moral theorists have argued that the Balancing View is inconsistent with core tenets of Scanlons
contractualism. At the current state of this debate, we should accept the most charitable reading of
the Balancing View, which side-steps these attacks. However, I demonstrate that the Balancing
View is inconsistent with core tenets of Scanlons contractualism even if we grant Scanlon the most
charitable reading of his view.
Luke Pistol, Australian National University
MORG009, Tuesday 10-10.55AM

Jack Smart and Quines Antirealist Metaontology
According to a currently popular interpretive tradition W. V. Quine is best read as an ontological
realist; J . J . C. Smarts discussion (in 1968) of Quines 'Word and Object' serves as an important
example of this exegetical tradition. In this paper I offer what I take to be compelling reasons for
rejecting such a reading of Quine. Whilst many contemporary ontological realist metaphysicians
55
(such as Theodore Sider) accept the popular reading of Quine, the better view seems to be that
Quine (early, middle and late) was an ontological antirealist with views akin to those of Nelson
Goodman.
Paul-Mikhail Podosky, Monash University
MORG009, Monday 2-2.55PM

The Problem of Composition
In 1987 Peter van Inwagen gave to the metaphysics community the Special Compositional Question
(SCQ), which treats the question of parthood as a question of composition. Inwagen asks, what
would one have to do what could one do to get the xs to compose something?. His response,
to get the xs to compose something you must get them to stand in the multigrade relation R.
What spawned was a new area of metaphysical enquiry where a wealth of literature was advanced
providing explanations of R. My contention is that the nature of R has been misconceived since the
SCQ was proposed. That is, the nature of R is determined purely by the something that one is
trying to compose. It is the whole which determines the relations which parts must stand in and not
the whole being a function of the relations which the parts stand. For example, a game of chess is
not determined by the relations of the legal moves of the pieces because it is the game itself which
determines what the legal moves of the pieces are the legal moves of chess are legal because they
are the moves of the game of chess.
Margaux Portron, University of Paris 8 / Auckland University
MORG009, Monday 3-3.55PM (Ethics of Force Stream)

Drone warfare - genealogy of military desexposure
This paper seeks to look at drone warfare through the lens of political philosophy and especially
the philosophy of Michel Foucault. The question is here to understand what makes a political
community accept drone warfare. The methodology used will be the one used by Michel Foucault
his work, that is to say a genealogical approach. The thesis which I will defend is that contemporary
warfare doctrine can find its roots not in war treaties but in public policies, and that desexposure
serves political economy. What we call in this paper contemporary warfare is a doctrine which has
appeared since the Kosovo war and has increasingly developed along with the war on terror. This
doctrine corresponds to a pattern of desexposure and has been first developed by the NATO forces
in Kosovo. Grgoire Chamayou states in Thorie du drone that the Kosovo war sees a shift in the
underlying subordination of the use of military force to the political imperative of the preservation
of national military lives. This new military policy finds its strongest embodiment in drone
warfare.
Alexander Prescott-Couch, Harvard University/Australian National University

The Rational Reconstruction of Group Attitudes
Scientific investigation is typically taken to have two primary goals: to discover what is the case
and to explain it. It is therefore notable that important aspects of work in the social sciences do not
fit neatly into the categories of discovering facts or explaining them. This talk focuses on what I
will call the rational reconstruction of group attitudes. Rational reconstructions are idealized
constructions of group views such as the schemas of cultural communities, the worldviews of
ancient civilizations, or the spirit of social movements. I provide an account of this aspect of social
scientific practice and argue that it is crucially different from other sorts of idealization in the
sciences. Moreover, I argue that these idealized attitudes should be properly thought of as attitudes
of these groups qua groups because they may differ quite radically from the attitudes of the
members of the group.
56
Max Rabie, The University of New South Wales
MORG009, Tuesday 2-2.55PM

Ghostly Subjects
Anders Schoubye has recently argued that any semantic theory for any determiner D that holds that
sentences of the form D is/are assert the existence of things that satisfy faces a severe
problem. In fact Schoubye suggests that the problem is so severe that, radical changes to our
semantic systems are needed, if a proper semantic analysis of the existence commitments incurred
by various natural language determiners is to be devoid. If Schoubye is right, then something is
very rotten in the static state of semantics. Fortunately, however, we think we can show that
Schoubyes argument falls well short of establishing what it purports to establish. In this paper we
will try to show that the occurrence of Schoubyes examples does not license his conclusion. Two
lines of attack bear this out. Firstly, we show that Schoubyes argument is too strong: were it correct
it would pose a problem for clearly unproblematic cases including or and and. Secondly, we
show that Schoubyes argument is too weak: the phenomena he notices would still occur in
communities that speak languages the relevant determiners of which are stipulated to be Russellian
or Fregean in their semantics.
Gabriel Rabin, Australian National University/New York University Abu Dhabi

Toward a Theory of Concept Mastery
Concepts are the basic units of thought. The thought OSTRICHES LIKE CHOCOLATE is
composed of the concepts OSTRICHES, LIKE, and CHOCOLATE. An agent possesses a concept
when he or she can think thoughts containing the concept. An agent has mastery of a concept when
he or she fully understands that concept. One can possess a concept without having mastery. Many
people use technical concepts that have worked their way into public consciousness without fully
understanding them (examples include DARK MATTER, CHAOS THEORY, CLOUD
COMPUTING, FRACKING, and HEDGE FUND). A theory of concept mastery must answer the
following question: Under what conditions does an agent have mastery of a concept? I hope to
answer this question, at least in part, in this talk. I argue against three views of concept mastery,
according to which concept mastery is a matter of holding certain beliefs, being disposed to make
certain inferences, or having certain intuitions. None of these attitudes is either necessary or
sufficient for concept mastery. I propose and respond to objections to my own ``meaning postulate
view'', according to which mastery of a concept is a matter of taking certain core rules to govern the
use of the concept.
Brentyn Ramm, The Australian National University
MORG009, Wednesday 10-10.55AM

First-Person Experiments
First-person approaches to investigating experience are often criticised for their inability to resolve
phenomenological disputes. Are reliable first-person methods available to decide what shows up in
experience? The goal of this paper is to: (1) illustrate an experimental first-person methodology,
and (2) make some progress in mapping out the structure of visual experience. Here I introduce the
use of first-person experiments, which manipulate experience so as to clarify its structure. These
experiments involve the use of phenomenal contrast and apparatus for producing refined
phenomenal data. Philosophers often disagree over questions of visual experience such as whether
distant things appear smaller in some sense, and whether tilted plates appear elliptical, while there is
broad agreement that the world appears stable despite head and bodily movements. I present first-
person experiments in support of the first two hypotheses and challenging the third. Finally, I argue
that first-person methods do not need to resolve disputes in the interpretation of experiences in as
57
much as provide repeatable methods for producing robust first-person data. The same is true of
cognitive science in general.
Paul Redding, The University of Sydney

Modality without intuitions: Problems with Brandoms modal KantSellars thesis
Robert Brandom has recently attempted to develop an approach to modal concepts within the
framework of his anti-representationalist, strong inferentialist semantics. While Brandom sees
this account of modality as drawing on, and as in the spirit of, the philosophical approach of Kant, I
point to a difficulty with this purported Kantian dimension of his modal KantSellars thesis.
While Kant appealed the role of sensory intuitions in distinguishing actuality from mere possibility,
Brandom has effectively abandoned Kants conceptintuition distinction and in this context has
offered no alternative to play the role played by intuition in Kants treatment of actuality. Here I
examine Brandoms approach to modality against the background of recent possible worlds
approaches to modality, and in particular the differences between the approaches of David Lewis
and Robert Stalnaker. In contrast to Lewiss Leibnizian understanding of modal notions,
Stalnakers, I suggest, shows distinctly Kantian features. But in comparison, Brandoms modal
account, I suggest, shows more affinities with Lewiss approach in these regards.
Huiming Ren, Shandong University of China

Experience as Knowledge: a Reply to the Knowledge argument
I propose a new response to the knowledge argument in the spirit of physicalism by arguing that
experience is knowledge. According to this proposal, when Mary is released from the black-and-
white room, she does learn something new but her new knowledge is nothing but her new
experience of red. I would first argue that experience is representational and therefore has
representational content. Experience, if veridical, carries correct information about the external
world. This would give us the right reason to view experience as knowledge about the external
world. Then, I would argue that Marys new experience of red is the new knowledge she acquires:
by having this new veridical experience of red, she comes to know red or what red looks like. I
would further show that this claim is the correct interpretation of our knowledge intuition.
Massimo Renzo, The University of Warwick
COPG031, Wednesday 2-2.55PM (Ethics of Force Stream)

The Role of Forfeiture
I argue that any attempt to justify punishment or self-defence by appealing to the notion of
forfeiture will give rise to a dilemma. Theories that aim to justify these practices by relying
exclusively on this notion are incomplete, as forfeiture cannot do significant justificatory work
unless we invoke some more fundamental moral principle to give substance to it. However, once
we employ some other principle in this way, the notion becomes redundant and can be dispensed
with at the level of justification. This is not to say that forfeiture should be banned from the
philosophical discourse on the justification of punishment or self-defence. I argue that the notion
plays two valuable roles within this discourse: first, it performs an important heuristic function, in
that it marks the difference between two distinct ways of justifying the infliction of harm; second,
the notion works as an intermediate conclusion in justificatory arguments that ground the
permissibility of inflicting harm in suitably fundamental moral notions, thereby facilitating the
discussion among those who disagree about how such fundamental moral notions should be
identified. These functions are by no means trivial, but they should not be confused with the
justificatory role often attributed to forfeiture.
58
Jack Reynolds, Deakin University

Phenomenology and Naturalism: A Heretical Proposal
In this paper, I attempt to show that a revised version of phenomenology is compatible with both
liberal naturalism, and with weak forms of methodological naturalism.
Louise Richardson-Self, The University of Sydney
MCCT3, Friday 11.30-12.25

Resolving Paradoxes: Critiquing Feminist Critiques of Rights
With same-sex marriage on the political agenda in many countries, it is right to ask what effect this
formal equality will have on general discrimination toward LGBT people. The Netherlands was the
first country to introduce same-sex marriage (2001), and yet 30% of Dutch respondents to a recent
survey the EU LGBT survey (2013) reported feeling discriminated against or harassed in the
last 12 months based on their sexual orientation. Why have equal rights been unable to redress the
issue of LGBT inequality? Some feminists have criticised that rights rhetoric is unable to
adequately ensure the equal treatment of those people and groups who are systematically
discriminated against. Rights are paradoxical for such marked persons simultaneously
challenging and reinforcing their subordination. In this paper I argue that systematic discrimination
against LGBT people can be eliminated through the employment of rights rhetoric, but that the
notion of rights will have to undergo a radical shift. The paradoxes of rights only present
themselves because a benchmark man is implicitly assumed as the normal human Subject. As
such, I aim to revise the structures by which human identity is perceived, which can allow for a
reconstruction of the form and substance of rights.
David Ripley, University of Connecticut

What do the liar and the sorites have in common?
The liar and sorites paradoxes both seem to lead us from tempting premises through tempting
reasoning to offputting conclusions. I will present an approach to them both that relies on valid
argument failing to be transitive: there are valid arguments that cannot be validly linked together.
Such an approach dissolves both paradoxes in the same way. But it is not committed to the liar and
sorites being manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Indeed, I will argue that they are
not; the nontransitive approach I recommend allows us to see the two very different phenomena that
give rise to these paradoxes.
Michael Robillard, University of Connecticut

On Moral Exploitation
Accounts of wrongful exploitation have typically been formulated in terms of an agent taking unfair
advantage of another partys vulnerability. Oftentimes, this unfair interaction includes some kind of
unfair transfer involving goods and/or services that are exclusively physical in nature. Despite the
many ways in which wrongful exploitation has been formulated in material terms, I argue that such
accounts fail to be exhaustive. In addition to the array of instances of wrongful exploitation
adequately captured in physical terms, I contend that there exists yet another species of wrongful
exploitation best described in terms of an unfair transfer of moral responsibility from one party to
another. In this paper I refer to this unique kind of exploitation as moral exploitation. The defining
feature of moral exploitation, I argue, involves an exploiter leveraging an agents vulnerability not
to acquire any particular material good or service but rather to compel that agent to consent to
shouldering moral responsibilities and moral decision-making that she would not otherwise consent
59
to take on, were she no longer vulnerable. Accordingly, the result is a sort of out-sourcing of
moral responsibility to disadvantaged parties whose unique vulnerability precludes them from
reasonably rejecting its acceptance.
Alison Ross, Monash University
COPG030, Monday 9-9.55AM (Continental Stream)

The Problem of the Dialectical Image in Walter Benjamins Arcades Project.
Benjamins thinking is defined by the impulse to escape from forces of totalisation. In Goethes
Elective Affinities he defines sensuous form as totalised form and he counters it with the word of
God, i.e., the Revelation. However, in The Arcades Project he counters historys totalising force
with the idea that sensuous forms bear redemptive meaning potential and that this potential is the
mode of escape from the false completion of myth. This paper argues that Benjamins notion of the
dialectical image brings together aspects of the two schemas of myth and the Revelation that his
early thinking had opposed.
Matheson Russell, The University of Auckland
COPG031, Thursday 3-3.55PM

Kant's Idea of Public Reason Revisited
In her seminal essay The Public Use of Reason (1986), Onora ONeill remarks upon the curious
way in which Kant draws the distinction between the private and the public use of reason.
Individuals in public positionssuch as clergy, officers, civil servants and taxpayersare said by
Kant to exercise a private use of reason, whereas private individuals speaking on their own
behalfsuch as scholarsare said to exercise a public use of reason. ONeill resolves this
apparent idiosyncrasy by observing that the official addresses a limited audience, whereas the
scholar addresses an unlimited audience, the world at large, and in this sense reasons publicly.
However, I show that, on closer inspection, this reading of the distinction (which I call the
audience conception) papers over some crucial features of Kants analysis. I argue for an
alternative reading of Kants distinction (which I call the fiduciary conception), and demonstrate
how this re-reading leads to a rather different conception of the public use of reason. In conclusion,
I reflect on how this conception might lead to a reframing of the recent debates concerning the idea
of public reason (after Rawls and Habermas).
Luke Russell, The University of Sydney

Forgiving While Punishing
What is the relationship between forgiveness and punishment? Leo Zaibert has claimed that when a
victim forgives the perpetrator, the victim resolves not to inflict any punishment on the perpetrator.
Eve Garrard and Glen Pettigrove hold the conflicting view that it is always possible for a victim to
forgive a perpetrator while still endorsing the punishment of that perpetrator, or even personally
administering that punishment. In this paper I explain why these philosophers make the claims that
they do, and I reject those claims in favour of a more complex middle-ground position: Forgiving is
sometimes but not always compatible with endorsing or enforcing punishment. What makes the
difference, I will claim, is the perpetrator's attitude to the prospect of his being punished.
Sometimes we really do forgive while punishing, but if the victim knows that the perpetrator rejects
the punishment, then the victim cannot simultaneously forgive him and punish him. When a victim
mistakenly says "I forgive the perpetrator but I punish him nonetheless", that victim might be in the
grip of wishful thinking, and might be falsely assuming that forgiving is a morally permissible
response to any and every instance of wrongdoing.
60
Thomas Ryan, Monash University
COPG030, Tuesday 9-9.55AM (Continental Stream)

Nietzsches Epicurean Irritability
In The Gay Science, Nietzsche favourably compares the Epicureans subtle irritability to the
impassivity of the Stoics. He claims that this irritabilitya sensitivity to the accidents of
existenceis essential for those who fate permits to spin a long thread. In the same volume he
attacks Epicurean philosophy as essentially Romanticserving the needs of impoverished life.
If he has sympathies for the Epicurean temperament, Nietzsche nonetheless does not endorse the
Epicurean way of life. Nietzsches argument is that a sensitivity to the world is a necessary, but
insufficient, condition for human flourishing. He rejects the Epicurean means of coping with their
sensitivitytheir negative hedonismand consequently reverses Epicurus recommendation to flee
into the garden: counselling to build your cities on the slopes of Vesuvius! and live
dangerously! In this paper I set out Nietzsches developed position regarding Epicurus and show
how his appropriation of the Epicurean sensitivity informs his account of the dangerous life.
Mary Salvaggio, Rutgers University
MCCT4, Wednesday 10-10.55AM (Cog.Sci Stream)

Justification and Reconstructive Memory

Our memories are not simple recordings of past experiences; they can be affected by our current
context as well as background beliefs and other memories. Almost all of the things we remember
are not explicitly stored, but are instead constructed or reconstructed when we attempt to recall
them. This poses a problem for one of the dominant views of the justification of memory beliefs,
preservationism. Preservationism is the view that memory cannot generate justification, but only
preserve any original justification a belief had when it was first formed. Since reconstructive
memory is an inferential process, the beliefs it produces are justified in the same way that other
inferential beliefs are justified. I will argue that we can retain a preservationist account of
reproductive memory as long as we supplement it with an inferential account of reconstructive
memory. I will provide just such an integrated account based on a process reliabilist framework.
Finally, I will consider alternative views and respond to several objections.
Alex Sandgren, ANU

Intentional identity and the problem of too many
There is intentional identity between two or more intentional states (beliefs, wonderings etc.) when
they are (i) empty (prima facie, not about anything that exists) and (ii) about the same thing in some
sense (distinct agents may fear the same witch even when there are no witches; distinct scientists
may have beliefs about phlogiston even if there is no such stuff). (1) is a well-known example of a
sentence ascribing intentional identity:
(1) Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether she (the same witch)
killed Cob's sow
Hob and Nob may, it seems, have the same witch in mind though witches dont exist. How should
we make sense of this phenomenon? I aim to make trouble for a certain family of accounts of
intentional identity, transparent accounts. According to transparent accounts (defended by Nathan
Salmon and Terrence Parsons, among others), apparently empty intentional states really are about
entities of some stripe (possible, mythical or non-existent) and there is intentional identity when
there is an entity such that both apparently empty intentional states are about that entity. I present an
61
argument against such views. These accounts face a problem that stems from the sheer size of the
set of possible, mythical or non-existent objects: the problem of too many.
Nafise Sate, Qom University
COPG031, Thursday 10-10.55AM (Ethics of Force Stream)

Existence from the perspective of Religion, Philosophy, Ethics and Art
Religion is guideline for human beings to aware of the reality of existence. The existence is the
reality that includes truth, goodness and attractiveness. Philosophy is the rational efforts to
understand the truth. Ethics is practical efforts to profit by goodness. Art is the effort to present
attractiveness. The purpose of this article is to argue that philosophy, ethics and art have a common
aim. In this article the history of philosophy in human life will be reviewed; the ethical schools will
be analysed; and a concise description of art will be provided to conclude that religion moves
human beings towards truth, goodness and attractiveness. The following issues discuss in this
article. 1) All of activities in the daily life are the efforts to understand truth. However, individuals
may not pay attention to this purpose on occasion. All of activities in humans life are voluntary.
Therefore these activities can be worth as good or evil. The essence of religion, philosophy, ethics
and art is to achieve the highest level of existence which is love.
Ryoji Sato, Monash University
MCCT4, Friday 11.30-12.25PM (Cog.Sci Stream)

Is perceptual presence perceptual?
Alva No (2002, 2004, 2006) drew attention to the notion of perceptual presence and used that as a
support for his own enactivist theory of perception. No invokes perceptual presence in different
places but one typical example is the perception of the back of an object. However, the nature of
perceptual presence as perceptual itself is sometimes cast in doubt (e.g. Prinz 2013). At least, it
seems true that there are important differences between the perception of the front and that of the
back: we only actually see the color and the shape of the front of an object. Ill address the question
if perceptual presence really is perceptual in this paper. Specifically, Ill try to identify the plausible
mechanisms of the representation of the front of an object, the representation of the back of an
object, and the representation as of the whole object. My answer to the question is rather
revisionistic. Perceptual presence doesnt fall within any obvious sort of folk pychological category;
it is neither purely perceptual, purely cognitive nor imaginative.
Sebastian Schneider, University of Lucerne
COPG031, Tuesday 10-10.55AM (Ethics of Force Stream)

Rethinking the concept of war, a philosophical approach
War is constantly changing its nature: in former ages it was characterised by the clash of similar
armies and decisive battles, whereas today we talk about asymmetry, terrorism and atrocities to
civilians. In my paper, I want to outline some ideas about a new conceptualisation of war from a
philosophical perspective, which may be helpful for further debates and conceptual clarification. I
will proceed in three steps. First, I will look at what the point is of having a concept of war and
from this determine the requirements for such a concept. Second, I will have a brief look at some of
the most common definitions of war to delineate the span of approaches and the criteria that are
used to characterise the concept of war. In the third step of my paper, I will take a closer look at
three of these criteria: Should we see war as a state, act or event? Is war something that can only be
carried out by States? How can we measure the intensity of a conflict? I shall discuss whether the
proposed approaches and criteria can be maintained or have to be customised or left aside to satisfy
the requirements developed earlier.
62
Vanessa Schouten, Princeton University

A Pick-A-Path Taxonomy of Welfare
Welfare theories are usually divided in two three main categories: mental state, desire satisfaction,
and objective list. However, this classification of welfare theories is confusing some theories of
welfare fit into more than one category, and some theories fit neatly into none of the categories. In
this paper, I propose a new way of classifying theories of welfare, based on a pick-a-path model.
This model helps us to divide theories of welfare according to the answers they give to a series of
fundamental questions about what really matters for welfare.
Anne Schwenkenbecher, Murdoch University

The responsibility gap
In recent years, there has been a growing philosophical interest in cooperative action, particularly in
ethical aspects of collective action dilemmas. One question that has especially puzzled philosophers
is how individuals can have moral duties to contribute to a morally desirable or mandatory joint
goal if their individual contributions make no difference to whether or not the goal is achieved.
Some collective action problems seem to confront us with the following kind of puzzle: it is morally
mandatory to solve them and they can be solved if enough individuals contribute; however, there
are theoretical challenges to justifying individual duties to contribute to that cooperative endeavour.
It appears then that common notions of moral (remedial) responsibility have a gap: there exist
morally pressing problems that could and (arguably) should be solved, but those who could solve
them do not have the moral responsibility to do so. This paper will assess two potential solutions to
that problem: (a) the ascription of collective obligations to individuals in random groups and (b) the
appeal to moral character or virtue.
Nicholas Serafin, The University of Michigan
COPG031, Tuesday 9-9.55AM (Ethics of Force Stream)

Just War Theory and the Status of Peacekeepers
With regard to the law of war, nearly every state is a signatory to the Geneva Conventions and to
their Additional Protocols, which layout the essentials of international humanitarian law. Yet
despite the fact that it is meant to be a comprehensive guide to what can and cannot be done in
armed conflict, IHL suffers from a serious blind spot: it is unclear whether and how IHL applies to
United Nations peacekeeping missions. Currently, UN forces are protected from attack when under
IHL they would be granted civilian immunity. When engaged in combat, however, UN forces
would be subject to the rules of IHL. It is my contention that this model is seriously flawed. I
suspect that the source of the problem lies in the fact that contemporary peacekeeping is poorly
served by the combatant / non-combatant distinction within traditional J ust War Theory. I will then
investigate alternative statuses that could accommodate the practice of peacekeeping.
Idit Shafra Gittleman, Bar Ilan University
COPG031, Monday 9-9.55AM (Ethics of Force Stream)

Partiality in War
Can national partiality justify harming innocent civilians during war? In my paper I am offering an
account according to which - at least sometimes - the reason one has to protect ones fellow citizens
outweighs ones reason to avoid collaterally harming innocent enemy civilians. Consequentially,
sometimes harming civilians may be permissible only to the parties to the conflict, but not to a
third, unrelated party. I am suggesting that since considering this issue requires a complex
comparison of two duties: the duty to protect ones fellow citizens and the duty not to harm
63
innocent civilians, it would be useful to compare them with a third factor - the protection of the life
of the soldier himself. Considering this question, both from the soldiers point of view and the
decision-makers point of view, I argue, should lead to the conclusion that sometimes harming
civilians may be permissible during war. I am arguing that this permission can be defended on the
grounds of three assumptions: (1) a person may give priority to his own life and even harm (as a
side effect) another person if that is unavoidable for saving his own life; (2) a soldier is expected to
give priority to the lives of his fellow civilians over his own life; (3) a soldier may give some
priority to his own life over the lives of enemy citizens. None of these assumptions is trivial, and
each raises objections and doubts. I explore these questions and discuss them in my paper.
Ming Shao, Yibin University

Mind, Meaning, and Normativity
Normativity appeared when the people in the empirical world started to reflect their behaviors and
realized a possibility that they would be able to better their life if they followed right rules.
However, the questions of the origin and essence of normativity have still been under dispute. The
paper argues: the meaning world as the result of the experience becomes constantly in the ordinary
life in which an agent has ability to endow something with meanings; the infiniteness and openness
of meanings toward the unknown and future areas implied two essential tendencies: rich or stagnant
of meanings; the principal norm of value would thereby arose and would not become some
necessary constraint on a person or a society, but only prompt people more likely to enrich and
broaden their meaning kingdoms; it needs persons own efforts to act by the norms and positively
engaged on cultural activities. The perspective indicated that both of human beings and the natural
world would not be two absolute opposites but understood first in a whole meaning world in which
all of the self, the others, natural things would be the internal constitutive contents but absolutely
heterogeneous others.
Paul Silva, Monash University

Justification and Composite Normative Concepts
According to many, to have epistemic justification to believe P is just for it to be epistemically
permissible to believe P. Others think it's for believing P to be epistemically good. Yet others think
it has to do with being epistemically blameless in believing P. All such views of justification
encounter problems for they fail to capture some intuitively compelling aspect of justification and
other very plausible epistemic theses. After drawing attention to these problems a new view of
justification is proposed according to which justification is a kind of composite normative status
that involves distinct forms of appraisal. The result is a view of justification that offers hope of
solving some longstanding epistemological problems.
Robert Sinnerbrink, Macquarie University
COPG030, Wednesday 10-10.55AM (Continental Stream)

Gangster Film: Cinematic Ethics in The Act of Killing
My presentation is part of a project on cinematic ethics: the idea of film as a medium of ethical
experience, one with the power to evoke varieties of ethical experience leading to critical reflection
through emotional engagement and aesthetic involvement. Although film can be used for moral
pedagogy (or for political propaganda), it also has the power to challenge our moral assumptions,
dogmatic beliefs, or ideological convictions. It can problematise social, cultural, and political
situations in ways that force viewers to see their worldor multiple worldsin more
psychologically nuanced, socially complex, and ethically confronting ways. It can reveal obscured,
forgotten, or ignored elements of a world or the ethical complexities of a social, political, or
64
historical situation. This ethical capacity of cinema is particularly evident in the documentary or
non-fiction film, one of the most innovative areas of contemporary global cinema. Recent
documentary film theory has highlighted the importance of ethics, subjectivity, reflexivity, fictional
narrative, and aesthetic technique in contemporary non-fictional film. All of these elements are
featured, but also questioned, in one of the most confronting and original non-fiction films in recent
years, J oshua Oppenheimers The Act of Killing (2012). An extraordinary fusion of reflexive
perpetrator documentary, historico-political reckoning, stylised fictional re-enactment, and surreal
essay film, The Act of Killing confronts the ongoing social and historical legacy of Indonesias
state-sanctioned death squads, who killed over a million dissident Communists and ethnic Chinese
following the military coup of 1965. Focusing on some of the perpetrators themselves, who are
filmed making their own bizarre movie version of their crimes, The Act of Killings provocative
exploration of the traumatic intersection of politics, history, cinema, and violence makes it a
uniquely challenging and thought-provoking case study in cinematic ethics.
Maksymillian Sipowicz, Monash University
COPG030, Wednesday 2-2.55PM (Continental Stream)

The Kantian Antinomy of Politics
In this essay I argue that there is a tension in Kant's notion of the 'sovereign', which I will refer to as
the Kantian Antinomy of Politics. In essays such as an answer to the question: What is the
Enlightenment? Kant argues that a 'sovereign' is necessary in order to guide humanity to
Enlightenment. At the same time, in Kant's philosophical writings there can be found several
arguments for why a 'sovereign' would be unnecessary. Firstly, in Perpetual Peace Kant argues that
as humanity progresses, the role of the 'sovereign' diminishes, ultimately making him unnecessary.
Secondly, in his moral writings, such as The Critique of Practical Reason, Kant argues that thanks
to 'the fact of reason' human beings are guided in their actions by the Categorical Imperative,
therefore leaving human laws set by a sovereign as superfluous. In addition there is the possibility
that given the absence of forms of accountability proper to the sovereign' it may be the case that
instead of enabling progress towards Enlightenment, the sovereign will actually impede it. The
paper will examine the presence of this antinomy in Kants writing and offer a solution.
Hartley Slater, The University of Western Australia

Propositional Identities and Implications
Many would still use Prior's non-nominal quantification and write 'Peter believes something' as
'(Ep)(Peter believes that p)' rather than '(Ex)(Peter believes x)'. One difficulty with this lies in the
associated formulation of propositional identity. For 'The proposition that p is identical with the
proposition that q' comes out as 'p =q', with the '=' being pretty much limited to strict equivalence,
and there are well known difficulties with this. But there are also difficulties with the associated
formulation of propositional implication, since 'The proposition that p implies the proposition that q'
comes out as 'If p then q'. Prior even said that the implication was just a 'fluffed up' way of writing
the conditional. In this paper I demonstrate the error in Prior's 'fluffing up', and explore the large re-
write of twentieth century logic that is required to accommodate this fact.
Peter Slezak, University of New South Wales
MCCT2, Thursday 3-3:55pm (Devitt-J ackson Stream)

Proper Names: The Omniscient Observer
Despite the seeming simplicity of the phenomenon, the debate on proper names keeps spreading
and the epidemic of theories goes unabated (Bach 1987). However, Pietroski (2003) laments that
the vast literature provides no grounds for thinking that names bear any interesting and
theoretically tractable relation to their bearers. Bianchi (2001), too, complains that forty years after
65
Kripkes refutation of Frege/Russell descriptivism we do not possess a fully blown theory built on
this picture. Devitt protests that he has proposed just such a theory but I argue that his causal-
chain account is empty if taken to explain our naming competence or ability to designate as
advertised. I argue that the Devitt/Kripke account arises from a kind of error about causation noted
by Dummett (1973), Mackie (1980) and van Fraassen (1980) regarding the pragmatic choice of
events in a background causal field. I explore Fodors (2004) heretical thought that something has
gone awfully wrong in the mainstream philosophical consensus, perhaps confirming Chomskys
(2012) view that the whole field of philosophical semantics is utterly wrongheaded by virtue
assuming that there is a mind-world or reference relation. I offer a diagnosis in terms of
Donnellans (1974) omniscient observer which is not an innocuous metaphor.
Michael Smith, Princeton University

Philosophy from the Armchair
My aim is to explain why it is still legitimate to do philosophy from the armchair. If I am right,
then though many arguments given by experimental philosophers against conclusions reached from
the armchair will be seen to miss their mark, it will not follow that such arguments can never hit
their mark. Nor does it follow that, even when they do miss their mark, there is nothing of value in
their conclusions.
Severin Staalesen, The University of Melbourne

Naturalising Phenomenology: Phenomenology Meets Philosophy of Biology
The project of naturalising phenomenology faces a seemingly insurmountable hurdle. At least
insofar as they are conventionally conceived, naturalism and phenomenology represent two
alternative, indeed competing, paradigms. In his 2012 review of the research program, Shaun
Gallagher tentatively suggested that the way out of this conceptual impasse will entail redefining
both naturalism and phenomenology. In pursuit of this point I want to outline a non-reductive
naturalism that promises to be broadly consistent with a moderate yet nevertheless
phenomenologically motivated account of the mind. More specifically, I hold that a position
broadly construed as ontological pluralism can serve as a naturalistic framework within which
phenomenological psychology counts as a perfectly legitimate scientific activity. To this end my
paper will proceed as follows. After recapitulating the main themes of this research program, I will
define what I mean by phenomenological psychology, then outline and briefly motivate a coherent
account of ontological pluralism, and then finish by clarifying how phenomenological psychology
could count as a legitimate scientific activity within such a framework. Whilst what I aim to achieve
falls well short of naturalising phenomenology, I would like to think that, if successful, it might
gesture toward future avenues to this goal.
Daniel Star, Boston University

The Reasons of Virtue: A Reductive Epistemic Account
Is it possible to provide informative, non-circular analyses of individual practical virtues in terms of
something prima facie (conceptually) distinct from such virtues? It has been claimed that virtues are
stable psychological states the possession of which brings about the realization of good outcomes in
the world. It has also been claimed, by different authors, that they are stable psychological states
that promote the flourishing of the individuals that possess them (but such claims are not always
intended to involve any commitment to being able to provide reductive analyses of individual
virtues). The aim here is to provide a new, quite different kind of analysis that takes off from Daniel
Elstein and Thomas Hurkas attempt to analyze virtues in terms of a non-ethical element and a
66
thin ethical element, viz. goodness. Partly through the examination of individual virtues, the
present paper contends: (1) although Elstein & Hurka are on the right track, a better recipe for
analyzing virtue is provided by focusing on normative reasons, instead of goodness; and (2) on the
correct account of normative reasons (reasons as evidence), the practical virtues are nearly entirely
epistemic in nature.
Marilyn Stendera, The University of Melbourne
COPG030, Monday 3-3.55PM (Continental Stream)

Heideggerian Temporality and Recent Cognitive Science
The account of practical engagement that Heidegger offers in Being and Time continues to feature
prominently in the contemporary dialogue between the phenomenological tradition and recent
cognitive science. One vital aspect of his account which has, however, continued to slip below the
radar of this interdisciplinary interest is Heideggers theory of time. For the Heidegger of Being and
Time, temporality is integral to practice, yet the discourse that draws upon a Heideggerian view of
the latter has generally neglected to take into account the former. Meanwhile, many of those
participants in the interaction between phenomenology and cognitive science such as Evan
Thompson and Shaun Gallagher who do emphasise the importance of temporality to that
endeavour focus upon other phenomenological accounts of time, such as that of Husserl and
Merleau-Ponty. This paper will suggest that attempts to integrate phenomenology with cognitive
science need to incorporate an understanding of Heideggerian temporality. Such an understanding
will uncover a radical view of temporality as always-already fundamentally integrated with
practice, purposiveness and the world-enacting concern of the experiencer. This can, I will contend,
offer distinctive insights valuable to any interaction of phenomenology with cognitive science,
especially to those taking up an enactive approach to cognition and practice.
Kim Sterelny, Australian National University
MCCT2, Thursday 10-10:55AM (Devitt-J ackson Stream)

Evolving Reference
I have spent much of the last decade developing a framework for understanding the evolution of the
distinctive features of human social and cognitive life. Such a project must address language, surely
one of the most distinctive features of human social life; in particular, it is important to develop an
incremental model of the evolution of language and locate it within a more general account of the
evolution of human social behaviour. But in an earlier life, though, I worked on philosophy of
language, and especially the theory of reference; much of this with Michael Devitt, and largely
synthesised in our Language and Reality. The aim of this paper is to return to those issues in the
context of a general model of the evolution of human social life, and with the tools that model
provides; in particular, to issues to do with the cognitive and informational load on language use; to
what agents who use language need to know, in order to be able to use it.
Macintosh Stewart, The University of Sydney

Contractualism and Self-Interest
Kantian and Hobbesian forms of contractualism have striking differences, but the leading forms of
each also share a significant similarity. In each case, the contractors are conceived as being
motivated by narrowly-construed self-interest. They are not permitted, for example, to be
motivated by a concern for others. I call this motivational assumption the received view. I will
discuss a number of possible justifications for the received view. I will then argue that none of these
justifications succeed, and that the received view leads to significant complications for
contractualism. Finally, I conclude that we should reject the received view in favour of a realistic
67
view of the motivations of the contractors. This amendment resolves many difficulties for both
Kantian and Hobbesian contractualism.
Natalie Stoljar, McGill University

Silencing Autonomy
There is a philosophical literature on silencing and a larger one on autonomy but almost nothing
on the question of how the harm of silencing might be connected to the undermining of agent
autonomy. This paper aims to remedy this gap. I identify several different conceptions of silencing
and argue that silencing impairs the competencies required for autonomy, in particular the
competency to form effective intentions. Since a necessary condition of silencing is that others have
certain attitudes to either the agent herself or the agent qua member of a subordinated group, it
follows from my argument that the competencies required for autonomy can also be nullified by
others attitudes. I attempt to show from here that autonomy is (partially) a social and constitutively
relational concept.
Saranga Sudarshan, The University of Sydney
MORG009, Thursday 4.30-5.30PM

The Focus of Luck-Egalitarianism
One strong argument against a Luck-Egalitarian conception of justice has been the Wrong Focus
Objection. The objection is that luck-egalitarianism as argued for by Ronald Dworkin and Gerald
Cohen, has the wrong focus for an egalitarian theory of justice. In particular it is argued that luck-
egalitarianism is not an egalitarian theory at all, because it lacks an account of political and social
equality. I argue that current solutions to the objections fail because they ether dismiss the force of
the objection or misunderstand the subject of the objection. I suggest a successful solution that
understands luck-egalitarianism as a theory that disseminates the responsibility for the operation
and reformation of social intuitions to all the citizens in society of mutual cooperation.
Christine Swanton, University of Auckland

Why we Need Virtue Ethics: Three Paradoxes of Practical Reason
Why virtue ethics? The usual answer is that virtue ethics reveals the richness and complexity of the
normative terrain in a way that other theories with their more impoverished normative language do
not. But this answer does not explain why virtue notions should be central to our practical
orientation to the world as opposed to being at the periphery, while notions of consequence, duty or
rights, or the good and the right, are at the core. I begin by offering a general answer to this
question. Since any satisfactory answer is so large, I cannot do more than offer a general sketch. My
main focus is to add to the justification of virtue ethics as a theoretical framework by considering
three paradoxes of practical reason and showing how a virtue ethical framework resolves them. The
paradoxes are: The Paradox of Supererogation; The No Difference Problem; and the Problem of
Underdetermination.
Xavier Symons, The University of Sydney

Why Ockham cuts himself with his own razor (twice)
William of Ockham is famed for his repudiation of the metaphysics of mind put forward by
Aquinas and Scotus. Ockham argued that the heavy metaphysical machinery employed by these two
was unnecessary. He offered an alternative theory of cognition that dispensed with the notion of an
'intelligible species'. He argued that the mere act of cognition was sufficient to explain the intellect's
68
grasping of a particular. It was not necessary to posit a mental representation that presented objects
to the mind. I will argue that Ockhams account of cognition gets cut - twice - by his own razor: 1.
Ockham claims that the act of cognition itself acts as sign. However, it is simply unclear at least
in this context - how an act can function as a sign. Ockham fails to provide an explanation for this.
2. Ockham severs the causal connection between the mind and the external world (which happens
when he rejects formal causality). The alternative explanation that he offered was that the very
nature of the representation bears within it an indication of its causal origin. However, it is far from
clear how this 'aptitude' of a mental act to be caused by one particular creature and not by another is
to be understood.
Weng Hong Tang, National University of Singapore

Transparency and Partial Belief
It's sometimes claimed that beliefs are transparentthat we can find out whether we believe p
simply by asking ourselves whether p. For example, if the claim is right, then to find out whether I
believe that it has stopped raining, I may simply ask myself whether it has stopped rainingmy
answering yes will tell me that I have such a belief; my answering otherwise will tell me that I
dont. An early proponent of such a claim is Gareth Evans, and related theses have recently been
defended by Richard Moran, Alex Byrne, and Nicholas Silins, among others. Invariably, discussion
of such theses has focused on a binary notion of belief. But what if belief comes in degrees? On the
face of it, the claim that beliefs are transparent does not seem to hold for degrees of belief. For
example, to find out whether we are 80% confident that p, its not enough to ask Is p true?.
Answering yes may tell us that we are very confident that p, but answering no or maybe wont
tell us exactly how confident we are that p. One may suggest that we should allow answers such as
Theres an 80% chance that p and that such answers will tell us exactly how confident we are that
p. But Ill argue that such a suggestion does not work. I'll then explore some implications that this
has for the thesis that beliefs are transparent.
George Tsai, Australian National University/University of Hawaii

On Being Supportive
In recent years, philosophers have offered illuminating accounts of important dimensions of our
interpersonal lives, such as love, care, trust, loyalty, and friendship. However, they have been
surprisingly silent on the related though distinct phenomenon of being supportive. Concentrating on
thick interpersonal relationships between adult, able-minded persons (e.g., close friendship,
marriage, the relationship between parent and adult child), I offer a normative account of the stance
and practice of being supportive. After distinguishing between two central cases of being
supportive, being supportive of someone in a circumstance of misfortune and being supportive of
someone in their self-expressive pursuit observe that in both of these cases, the value of being
supportive involves the provision of goods such as care, comfort, guidance, and assistance to hold
up the other. Focusing on the latter case, I argue there are further goods that being supportive can
make available: in particular, being supportive (1) facilitates the supported persons autonomy
within the normative constraints of the relationship, and (2) engenders a sense of solidarity between
the supporting and supported person. I end by reflecting more broadly on the distinctive role of
support in promoting both autonomy and solidarity, enabling us to flourish in our social lives as
rational beings.

Lachlan Umbers, Australian National University
69

Equality, Autonomy, and the All-Affected Interests Principle
The all-affected interests principle (AAI) requires that all persons affected by a decision have the
right to exercise some degree of power over that decision. AAI is both popular and intuitively
appealing. Nevertheless, it is vulnerable to counterexamples. For instance, if Sherlock bets Mycroft
500 that J ohn will marry Mary, Sherlock will certainly be affected by their decision but surely
does not thereby acquire any right to exercise power over that decision. In this paper I argue for a
revised version of AAI that escapes these counterexamples by appealing to the values of moral
equality, personal autonomy and self-control.
Martin Vacek, Slovak Academy of Sciences

Modal Structuralism and Impossible Worlds
The aim of the paper is to outline a realistic approach to impossible worlds. In particular I argue for
a claim that metaphysical impossibility equals to dissimilarity between worlds instantiating distinct
metaphysical structures. Next, I propose a metaphysical account of "structure". It is assumed that a)
there are structural properties of possible and impossible worlds and b) the properties are objective.
Finally, I discuss some characterizations about their logical and metaphysical behaviour.
Markos Valaris, University of New South Wales

Reasoning as Skill
Intuitively, you cannot be justified in believing p by inference from r unless you are also justified in
believing that r supports p. Nevertheless, epistemologists have come to doubt this principle, because
of a regress of justification. In this paper I argue that an independently motivated conception of
reasoning as a skill can help address the regress worry.
Laura Valentini, London School of Economics
COPG031, Monday 10-10.55AM (Ethics of Force Stream)
Just Causes for War: Orthodox, Radically Revisionist, and Reformist Views
The debate on what justifies resort to war is polarised between two camps. Proponents of the
orthodox view insist that only national defence and humanitarian intervention qualify as just causes
for war; advocates of the radically revisionist view push for extending the just cause to include
violations of subsistence rights. I argue that both views are implausible, and propose what I call a
reformist approach to the just cause for war. Central to this approach is the recognition that
independently of their realm of application (whether domestic or international)principles of
justice come in two forms: constitutional and legislative. Constitutional principles set out non-
negotiable demands of justice that ought to be included in the constitution of the political order at
hand (e.g., society, the international arena). Legislative principles set out reasonably contested
requirements of justice whose legitimate enforceability rests on their being the output of fair
decision-making procedures. On the view I propose, only serious violations of constitutional
principles of international justice count as just causes for war. I conclude by showing that this
approach leads to a picture of the just cause steering a middle course between orthodox and radical
stances.
Simon Varey, Sydney University

Directly Referential Definite Descriptions
Kaplan (1980) argues that indexical expressions are (in his terminology) directly referential. In
70
other words, he argues that the propositional content (but not the reference-fixing character) of uses
of such expressions are identical to their referents. In this talk, I will present a semantic analysis of
definite descriptions as directly referential expressions. I will argue that this analysis provides the
best explanation of the linguistic behaviour of definite descriptions. I will first suggest some of the
advantages of such an approach and then examine some of the problem cases for this analysis, in
particular cases of misdescription and de dicto uses of definite descriptions, and suggest how these
cases could be handled given a directly referential analysis.
Alexandra Varlakov, The University of Queensland

Tuning in to Self-Organisation
In line with Gershenson and Heylighen (2003) I will take self-organisation to be perspectival. I will
propose a set of informational features that will identify self-organised systems across all possible
perspectives; informational features are general and any system can we evaluated with regard to
them. This leaves the problem of selecting measurement parameters to evaluate for self-
organisation, as there is no apparent non-anthropocentric bias for such selection. I will outline a
'bootstrap' solution - arbitrary selection of sets of measurement parameters to to delimit systems and
subsequently determine if they meet the informational criteria for self-organisation. This is akin to
tuning a radio in to a station without prior knowledge of its frequency. Any additional
discrimination between resulting 'self-organised systems' will be on pragmatic grounds. Finally,
given that self-organisation is a necessary condition for considering a system to be living, I will
sketch out a definition of life on the basis of informational criteria.
Michael Vincent, The University of Queensland
MCCT6, Monday 9-9.55AM (Brennan Stream)

Public Reason: Is there a right answer?
In what I hope will be a broadly relevant paper, I want to examine the various values pursued by
moral and political philosophers who work within the theoretical framework of public reason.
Among other considerations, public reason accounts of ethics cannot be self-undermining in
practice (the Hobbesian consideration), should be internally consistent (the Kantian consideration),
and have a broad notion of the public (the liberal consideration). While these and other values are
generally shared, they are prioritised in different ways, and so each theorist ends up with a different
set of conclusions. Some of these priority decisions may be justified by appeal to the social sciences
or pure reason, but some substantial disagreements cannot be resolved in this way. Is there a right
answer in the debates within the public reason literature? If we accept its foundational assumptions,
then public reason can sometimes tell us when a normative claim is wrong. But if it allows too
many potentially correct claims, then it cannot take centre stage in philosophy of ethics in the way
that its proponents intend. So my short answer is no, but that is not at all to say that public reason
can be safely abandoned.
Steven Vitale, Bond University

An Argument for Satisfied Ambivalence via Self-Knowledge and the Freedom That
Accompanies it Through The Posse
The picture of freedom I want to defend is based on the original position Frankfurt takes in
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person (FTW). Christian Rostboll and others critique
Frankfurt for his conflicting and incommensurate definitions of freedom made throughout several of
his articles. In FTW, Frankfurt defends the position that free agency is dependent upon having the
will one wants. However, in The Faintest Passion (FP), Frankfurt developed a narrower sense of
freedom where one is free if and only if one possesses a wholehearted volitional complex (i.e. a
71
fully unified will). Forms of unfree agency involve ambivalent or wanton wills. Moreover,
Frankfurt claims it is impossible to be satisfied with ones ambivalence. I argue that this claim is
mistaken; one can be satisfied with ones ambivalence as well as possess a free will. To show how
agents might be free in their divided will, I examine three separate forms of ambivalence. The first
two forms are common. One involves cases where it is impossible to uphold ones ideals based on
the amount of time one has (e.g. one encounters simultaneously occurring events which require
attention according to ones ideals). The other involves a clash between conflicting ideals (e.g.
incommensurate values and ideals). My last case is a stronger version of the clash of ideal or values
case, one based off inner-hostility. Lastly, I examine the idea that although ambivalence forces one
to choose between equally desired outcomes this choice is free because one still has a will that one
wants. I also examine cases in which ambivalence is a product of ignorance or confusion. I argue
that certain kinds of ignorance and confusion, but not others, are compatible with freedom of the
will.
Adrian Walsh, University of New England

Applied Philosophy, The Empirical and the Defeasible A Priori.
In recent years there has been a remarkable increase in scepticism about the existence of a distinct
method that philosophers have at their disposal. Some philosophical naturalists such as David
Papineau, go so far as to claim that philosophical and scientific methods are of a single kind. If
there is no distinctive method in philosophy in general then surely a fortiori matters must be worse
for what is often called applied philosophy. If philosophy is ultimately an empirical pursuit, then
how could applied philosophy be anything other than empirical? In this paper I explore how
applied philosophy is possible as a distinctively philosophical form of analysis and make some
general claims about what good applied philosophy involves. Answering these questions about the
nature of applied philosophy involves thinking carefully about how philosophical analysis differs
from the sciences, since applied philosophy necessarily engages with the empirical realities of the
practical problems it confronts. In explaining how applied philosophy is possible and what makes
for good applied philosophy, I begin with the claim that the defeasible a priori is at the heart of
philosophical method and then provide a taxonomy of ways in which applied philosophy engages
with the empirical. I also suggest that this line of inquiry might well shed light on philosophical
method more generally.
Brian Weatherson, The University of Michigan

Should We Act on Higher-Order Evidence?
Recently, many philosophers have argued that agents can lose grounds for confidence in a
proposition not because their evidence changes, but solely because they get evidence that questions
their ability to reliably process the evidence. The proffered explanations of this phenomenon
suggest that agents should also be able to gain grounds for confidence in a proposition by similar
means. In particular, agents should be able to come to know propositions by losing confidence in
their ability to reasonably doubt it. This has implausible consequences, especially when the agents
are deciding whether to act on the proposition. I propose an alternative explanation of what's going
on in the cases that have motivated orthodox views on higher-order evidence. Epistemologists have
traditionally made too sharp a distinction between acquiring and processing evidence. Thinking
through publicly available data is a way of acquiring new evidence. Grounds for questioning our
own reliability are grounds for rejecting the evidence thus acquired. That's why we should hesitate
to act when we are suspicious of our grounds for belief, but not act precipitously when we are
suspicious of our grounds for doubt.
72
David Wiens, The University of California, San Diego
MCCT6, Monday 3-3.55PM (Brennan Stream)

'Actual' Does Not Imply 'Feasible'
It is common, among academics and non-academics alike, to support calls for apparently infeasible
social and political reforms by noting that apparently infeasible reforms have been realised in the
past. The abolition of slavery and suffrage for women seemed infeasible prior to their realisation;
yet they were realised, so they must have been feasible. Hence, eradicating severe global poverty or
overthrowing entrenched dictators, although apparently infeasible, cannot be ruled out as such.
This "Appeal to History" has considerable prima facie appeal; the premises may even seem
indisputable. Moreover, if successful, the Appeal to History is potentially normatively significant.
We shall argue that the Appeal to History is not successful. In particular, against (H2), we advance
an objection that we shall call the Flukiness Objection. The argument, in outline, is just this: First, if
realising a state of affairs is feasible, then its realisation must not be fluky; as we shall put it,
feasible implies not fluky. But, second, the realisation of some actual states of affairs are fluky;
actual does not imply not fluky. So, its false that actual implies feasible. We conclude with a
discussion of the normative significance of our conclusion.
Daniel Wilson, The University of Auckland

The Psychology of Sentiment and Humes Standard of Taste
I argue for an interpretation of David Humes essay Of the Standard of Taste that grounds his
theory of aesthetic evaluation in the general empirical principles for the operation of sentiments
expounded by him in Of the Passions. Both essays were originally published by Hume in his Four
Dissertations (1757). Here I take up J ohn Immerwahrs suggestion that Of the Passions provides
theoretical support for Hume's aesthetic theory. When read in conjunction with Of the Passions, I
argue, we can make sense of central concepts and relations in Hume's aesthetic theory that have
previously proven too vague to afford convergence regarding their correct interpretation.
Emma Wood, Victoria University of Wellington

Prohibited discourses
Attempts to develop a content-based account of slurs words used to denigrate a group of people
on the basis of race, nationality, religion, gender, or sexual orientation have faced various
problems. Given such problems, it has recently been doubted that a slurs potential to offend has
anything to do with its content at all. In this paper I shall attempt to give my own content-based
account of slurs, which intends to explain their potential to offend, in what sense they are
prohibited words, why they are often reclaimed by the group of people they intend to target, and
their status as thick normative terms. I will argue that slurs constitute a short-hand way of making
a negative judgment of some kind about a person belonging to a particular group, in which their
belonging to that group is taken to be the justification for the negative judgment made. This account
of the content of slurs, I will argue, is able to explain all of their familiar features, listed above.
Helen Yetter-Chappell, Bowling Green State University

Leaving it Open: From Sparse Experiences to Sparse Reality
I argue that both experiences and reality can be a great deal more sparse than you might initially
believe. There can be experiences that are determinately phenomenally warm-colored, but not any
particular warm shade; there can be experiences of objects standing in spatial relations to one
another, but not any particular spatial relations; there can be experiences of triangles, that are
73
neither equilateral, isosceles, nor scalene, for the relationships between the lengths of sides and
angles are left open. Further, for each such sparse experience, there is a corresponding possible
world. There are possible worlds in which objects stand in spatial relations to one another, but not
any particular spatial relations e.g. in which one object is determinately above another, but where
their horizontal positions are left open. There are possible worlds in which there are triangles that
are neither equilateral, isosceles, nor scalene.
74
Streams

(For abstracts, please look under Abstracts A-Z.)

Advances in Philosophy of the Cognitive Sciences and Psychology (Co-ordinator: Glenn
Carruthers)

Ashley Atkins, Princeton University
Justin Bruner, Australian National University
MCCT4, Tuesday 4:30-5:50pm
Nicolas Bullot, Macquarie University
Glenn Carruthers, Macquarie University
Anya Daly, University of Melbourne
Kate Devitt, QUT
Sidney Diamante, University of Auckland
Mirko Farina, Macquarie University
Anya Farenikova, Australian National University
Ian Gold, McGill University
Christian Griffiths, Monash University
Liz Irvine, Australian National University/University of Cardiff
Cameron Keys, Center for Nanotechnology in Society at Arizona State University
Chris Letheby, University of Adelaide
Will Newsome, Macquarie University
Suzanne Noel-Bentley, University of Otago Bioethics Centre
Ross Pain, La Trobe University
Mary Salvaggio, Rutgers University
Ryoji Sato, Monash University
MCCT4, Friday 11.30-12.25PM

75

Continental Philosophy (Co-ordinator: Joanne Faulkner)

Dylan Clements, Australian National University
COPGO30, Tuesday 3-3:55pm
Andrew Donnelly, University of Sydney
COPGO30, Wednesday 9-9:55am
Joanne Faulkner, University of NSW
COPGO30, Thursday 9-9:55am
Rebeca Furtado de Melo, Universidade do Estado de Rio de Janeiro/ University of Tasmania
COPGO30, Wednesday 3-3:55pm
Ali Mamouri, Australian Catholic University
COPG030, Monday 2-2.55PM
Dennis McEnnerney, The Colorado College
COPG030, Monday 10-10.55AM
Andre Okawara, Monash University
COPG030, Tuesday 4.30-5.30PM
Knox Peden, Australian National University
COPG030, Tuesday 10-10.55AM
Alison Ross, Monash University
Thomas Ryan, Monash University
Robert Sinnerbrink, Macquarie University
COPG030, Wednesday 10-10.55AM
Maksymillian Sipowicz, Monash University
COPG030, Wednesday 2-2.55PM
Marilyn Stendera, The University of Melbourne

The Ethics of Force: War, Self-defence, and other cases (Co-ordinator: Seth Lazar)

Saba Bazargan, University of California at San Diego
Matthew Beard, University of Notre Dame Australia
COPGO31, Thursday 9-9:55am
Ned Dobos, UNSW Canberra
Helen Frowe, Stockholm University
COPGO30, Monday 2-2:55pm
Adam C. Gastineau, Australian National University
Adam Henschke, National Security College, Australian National University
Sibel Kibar, Kastamonu University
Christie Lars, University of Oslo
76
Seth Lazar, Australian National University
Nadia Mazouz, ETH Zurich
Margaux Portron, University of Paris 8 / Auckland University
Massimo Renzo, The University of Warwick
Nafise Sate, Qom University
COPG031, Thursday 10-10.55AM
Sebastian Schneider, University of Lucerne
Nicholas Serafin, The University of Michigan
Idit Shafra Gittleman, Bar Ilan University
Laura Valentini, London School of Economics

Philosophy, Politics and Economics: In Celebration of Geoffrey Brennan (Co-ordinator: Nic
Southwood)

Lina Eriksson, Flinders University
David Kinkead, The University of Queensland
Michael Vincent, The University of Queensland
David Wiens, The University of California, San Diego

The Philosophy of Frank Jackson and Michael Devitt (Co-ordinator: Kim Sterelny)

Michael Devitt, Graduate Center, City University of New York
Peter Godfrey-Smith, CUNY Graduate Centre
Richard Hanley, University of Delaware
Frank Jackson, Australian National University
Peter Slezak, University of New South Wales
Kim Sterelny, Australian National University
MCCT2, Thursday 10-10:55AM

AAP2014 Abstracts Booklet

Diunggah oleh

Informasi Dokumen

Deskripsi Asli:

Hak Cipta

Format Tersedia

Bagikan dokumen Ini

Bagikan atau Tanam Dokumen

Opsi Berbagi

Apakah menurut Anda dokumen ini bermanfaat?

Apakah konten ini tidak pantas?

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

AAP2014 Abstracts Booklet

Diunggah oleh

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

Conference 2014

Anda mungkin juga menyukai