Safety Culture and Safety Climate A Review - of - The - Literature

Zohar (1980) was the pioneer of assessing the state of safety via an attitude questionnaire instead ...
Page 1 of 18
Safety culture and safety climate: A review of the literature
Steven Yule
ndustrial Psy!hology "esear!h #entre$ %niversity of &'erdeen$ %(
Please !ite as)
Yule$ S. (*00+). Senior Management Influence on safety performance in the UK and US energy sectors. ,o!toral thesis$ %niversity of
&'erdeen$ S!otland.
#orresponden!e to)
Steven Yule$ ndustrial Psy!hology "esear!h #entre$ %niversity of &'erdeen$ (ing-s #ollege$ .ld &'erdeen &/*0 *%/$ S!otland$ %(
12ail s.3.yule4a'dn.a!.u5
6el) 700 1**0 *8+*10
9a:) 700 1**0 *8+*11
Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.;*<;08=safety !ulture an... *>*<>*008
Zohar (1980) was the pioneer of assessing the state of safety via an attitude questionnaire instead ... Page * of 18
Introduction
1ffe!tive safety 2anage2ent in the twenty;first !entury involves paying attention to hu2an fa!tors as syste2 !o2ponents with as 2u!h
potential to !ause$ or save$ dangerous syste2 states as te!hni!al !o2ponents. /y paying attention to hu2an fa!tors$ highly relia'le
organi?ations !an identify and !apture potential ha?ards 'efore they 2anifest as a!!idents. .ne 2ethod of a!hieving this is 'y 2easuring
the state of safety through so;!alled @leading- indi!ators su!h as safety !ulture or safety !li2ate. 6hese are seen as distin!t fro2 @lagging-
indi!ators of safety su!h as a!!idents as they offer insight into the state of safety without the need for retrospe!tive analyses of negative
safety out!o2es.
12piri!al resear!h on safety !li2ate has developed !onsidera'ly sin!e Zohar-s se2inal (1980) study in sraeli 2anufa!turing. Aowever$
the theoreti!al develop2ent of safety !li2ate and safety !ulture has not 2irrored that progression. ,espite a general agree2ent a2ong
resear!hers$ regulatory 'odies$ and industry that these !on!epts are worthwhile !on!epts for resear!h and appli!ation$ little !onsensus
has 'een rea!hed over other i2portant issues. 9or e:a2ple$ there are 2ultiple definitions of the two !on!eptsB safety !li2ate and safety
!ulture are often !onfused in the literature despite having distin!t ety2ology (#o: C 9lin$ 1998)B no !lear 2odel de2onstrating the
i2pa!t of safety !li2ate and safety !ulture on 'otto2;line safety organi?ational perfor2an!e has 'een developedB nu2erous 2ethods
!overing different sets of fa!tors have 'een used to 2easure the !on!epts$ and 2any of the studies that have 'een reported suffer fro2
2ethodologi!al failings. Dulden2und (*000) su22arises the !urrent state of the art 'y arguing that 2ost efforts have 'een fo!used on
the fa!e validity of safety !li2ate 2easures$ rather than ta!5ling the issues of !onstru!t or predi!tive validity that would advan!e the
resear!h field 'eyond its first stages of develop2ent.
6his literature review treats safety !li2ate as distin!t fro2 safety !ulture$ despite the !onfusion surrounding the two !on!epts in the
literature. 6he ai2s of this literature review are fourfold)
i. ,ifferentially define safety !ulture and safety !li2ate
ii. .utline the origins and !on!eptual develop2ent of safety !ulture and safety !li2ate
iii. 1:a2ine 2ethods of 2easuring safety !ulture and safety !li2ate
iv. ,is!uss the pu'lished results of e2piri!al studies on safety !ulture and safety !li2ate
6he review is split into three 2ain se!tions. Se!tion *.* !onsiders theoreti!al issues regarding safety !ulture and safety !li2ate. Se!tion
*.+ dis!usses the resear!h findings on safety !ulture$ and se!tion *.0 dis!usses the results of e2piri!al studies of safety !li2ate. 6a'le
*.1 outlines these studies and is presented at the end of the !hapter.
Theoretical issues
,efining safety !ulture
6he ter2 safety !ulture gained its first offi!ial use in an initial report into the #herno'yl a!!ident (&1&$ 198E). 6his report introdu!ed
the !on!ept to e:plain the organi?ational errors and operator violations that laid the !onditions for disaster. Pu'li! nquiry reports have
sin!e i2pli!ated poor safety !ulture within operating !o2panies as a deter2inant of several high;profile a!!idents sin!e$ su!h as the
e:plosion on the Piper;&lpha oil platfor2 in the Forth Sea (#ullen$ 1990)B the fire at (ing-s #ross underground station (9ennell$ 1988)B
the sin5ing of the Aerald of 9ree 1nterprise passenger ferry (Sheen$ 1988)$ and the passenger train !rash at #lapha2 Gun!tion (Aidden$
1989). 6he relevan!e of safety !ulture to safe operation is not disputed (#o: C 9lin$ 1998). ndeed$ "eason (1998) argues that it is a
!on!ept @whose ti2e has !o2e- (p. *9+). Aowever$ there is no definitive definition of the !on!ept for two 2ain reasons) (i) different
resear!hers e2phasise different ele2ents of safety !ulture as 2ost salient$ and (ii) !ulture of any 5ind is an e:tre2ely diffi!ult !on!ept to
su!!in!tly define. "eason (1998) 2a5es the !ase that for engineers$ defining organi?ational !ulture has @...the definitional pre!ision of a
!loud- (p. 19*). 6he sa2e argu2ent 2ay also 'e levelled at defining safety !ulture (Pidgeon$ 1991). & nu2'er of definitions of safety
!ulture are offered in the literature. 9or a !o2prehensive analysis of 18 of these definitions (in!luding definitions of safety !li2ate$
!onsidered in the following se!tion)$ see Dulden2und (*000$ p. **8). 6wo of the do2inant definitions are as follows. Hith referen!e to
the #herno'yl disaster$ the nternational &to2i! 1nergy &gen!y (&1&) defined safety !ulture as @Iasse2'ly of !hara!teristi!s and
attitudes in organi?ations and individuals whi!h esta'lished that$ as an overriding priority$ nu!lear plant safety issues re!eive the
attention warranted 'y their signifi!an!e- (&1&$ 1991B p. 1). 6he %( Aealth and Safety #o22ission (AS#) endorse this position and
provide a nu2'er of !hara!teristi!s that are e:pe!ted in positive safety !ultures 'y defining the !on!ept as @I the produ!t of individual
Zohar (1980) was the pioneer of assessing the state of safety via an attitude questionnaire instead ... Page + of 18
and group values$ attitudes$ per!eptions$ !o2peten!ies$ and patterns of 'ehaviour that deter2ine the !o22it2ent to$ and the style and
profi!ien!y of$ an organi?ation-s health and safety 2anage2ent. .rgani?ations with a positive safety !ulture are !hara!terised 'y
!o22uni!ations founded on 2utual trust$ 'y shared per!eptions of the i2portan!e of safety$ and 'y !onfiden!e in the effi!a!y of
preventative 2easure.- (AS#$ 199+B p. *+).
Jost definitions of safety !ulture en!apsulate 'eliefs$ values$ and attitudes that are shared 'y a group. &s hu2an 'ehaviours (and thus at
an individual level$ safe or unsafe 'ehaviours) are partly guided 'y personal 'eliefs$ values$ and attitudes (9a?io$ 198EB (lein5e$ 1980)$
!ontinued wor5pla!e safety 2ay have its 'ase in individually$ and organi?ationally !onstru!ted shared 'eliefs that safety is i2portant. &
related the2e evident in the definitions of safety !ulture offered is that of individual nor2s. .stro2$ Hilhel2sen and (aplan (199+)
argue that a !ulture is !o2prised of so!ial nor2s$ whi!h are unspo5en rules of 'ehaviour that$ if not followed$ result in san!tions. &n
e:a2ple of a positive safety nor2 2ay 'e that the wor5for!e reports all pro!edural irregularities. "eason (1998) argues that this nor2
will only develop under the !onditions he !alls a @reporting !ulture- K a !ulture in whi!h wor5ers feel free to report their errors and near
2isses to 2anage2ent without un3ust punish2ent. &n e:a2ple of a less positive safety nor2 2ay 'e that wor5 is !ondu!ted on live
equip2ent when under ti2e pressure$ i.e. without isolating equip2ent. %nderstanding the safety !ulture of an organi?ation$ wor5 site or
wor5;group as a whole 2ay 'e diffi!ult 'ut identifying and understanding the do2inant safety nor2s 2ay 'e a 2ore 2anagea'le
2ethod of attending to spe!ifi! issues.
,efining safety !li2ate
Zohar (1980) !oined the ter2 safety !li2ate in an e2piri!al investigation of safety attitudes in sraeli 2anufa!turing$ and defined it as
@Ia su22ary of 2olar per!eptions that e2ployees share a'out their wor5 environ2ents- (p. 9E). Jore re!ent definitions e!ho this$ for
e:a2ple$ Fis5anen (1990') defines safety !li2ate as @Ia set of attri'utes that !an 'e per!eived a'out parti!ular wor5 organi?ations and
whi!h 2ay 'e indu!ed 'y the poli!ies and pra!ti!es that organi?ations i2pose upon their wor5ers.- (p. *01). &dditionally$ #a'rera$ sla
and Lilela (1998) !on!eptualise safety !li2ate as organi?ational 2e2'ers- shared per!eptions a'out their wor5 environ2ents and
organi?ational safety poli!ies.
6herefore$ the definitions of safety !li2ate are !learly related to those of safety !ulture. 9or e:a2ple$ Dulden2und (*000) points out that
shared aspe!ts are stressed in 'oth sets of definitions. 6he 2ain differen!es in the definitions are that whereas safety !ulture is
!hara!terised 'y shared underlying 'eliefs$ values$ and attitudes towards wor5 and the organi?ation in general$ safety !li2ate appears to
'e !loser to operations$ and is !hara!terised 'y day;to;day per!eptions towards the wor5ing environ2ent$ wor5ing pra!ti!es$
organi?ational poli!ies$ and 2anage2ent. 6hus$ safety !ulture and safety !li2ate appear to operate on different levels and this refle!ts
the origin of the !on!epts in the organi?ational psy!hology literature of the 1980-s and earlier so!ial and 'ehavioural psy!hology. &s
2any of the definitions of safety !ulture and safety !li2ate have !o22on ele2ents$ safety !li2ate 2ay refle!t the underlying !ulture of
the wor5;group or organi?ation$ although its fo!us is a!tually 2u!h narrower than safety !ulture. Jore spe!ifi!ally$ safety !ulture is seen
as a su';fa!et of organi?ational !ulture (#ooper$ *000) and e:ists at a higher level of a'stra!tion than safety !li2ate ("ei!hers C
S!hneider$ 1990). t see2s plausi'le that safety !ulture and safety !li2ate are not refle!tive of a unitary !on!ept$ rather$ they are
!o2ple2entary independent !on!epts.
.rigins of safety !ulture and safety !li2ate
6he !on!ept of safety !ulture has its origin in the so!ial and 'ehavioural psy!hology of the 19<0-s and 19E0-s that !a2e to the fore in the
organi?ational psy!hology$ organi?ational 'ehaviour$ and 2anage2ent literature of the 1980-s. 6his literature offers a nu2'er of
definitions of organi?ational !ultures and !li2ates that !learly resonate with those presented on safety !ultures and !li2ates a'ove. 9or
e:a2ple$ %ttal (198+) defines organi?ational !ulture as @Shared values (what is i2portant) and 'eliefs (how things wor5) that intera!t
with an organi?ation-s stru!tures and !ontrol syste2s to produ!e 'ehavioral nor2s (the way we do things around here)- (p. E8). 6his
definition appears to 'e so relevant to the !urrent topi! that "eason (1998) wrongly !ites this as a definition of safety !ulture rather than
organi?ational !ulture.
#ulture is learned through the pro!ess of so!ialisation whi!h 2ay 'e one of the reasons why !ulture !hange is a long and diffi!ult
pro!ess. 9or2al training will refle!t a flavour of the underlying !ulture 'ut 2u!h of the infor2ation needed 'y the individual to
understand and 'e!o2e part of the !ulture will 'e inferred through o'servation and infor2al dis!ussions with the wor5for!e. 6herefore$
the 'est 2ethod of understanding a !ulture 2ay 'e to 'e part of that !ulture. "o!hlin$ MaPorte C "o'erts (1988) !onfir2 this assertion
Zohar (1980) was the pioneer of assessing the state of safety via an attitude questionnaire instead ... Page 0 of 18
'y !ondu!ting ethnographi! resear!h on'oard %S air!raft !arriers. t 2ay 'e that the only way to fully understand an organi?ation is to
'e part of it$ however$ 2ost resear!hers have to 'e !ontent with intera!ting with individuals who are part of the !ulture in order to get a
grasp of its nature. 6his highlights a !o2pletely new issue$ as tou!hed on 'y .stro2 et al. (199+). f aspe!ts of !ulture are sy2'oli!$
unspo5en$ and unwritten$ how !an they 'e analysed and understood 'y those who are not part of the !ultureN n addition$ if only those
e2'roiled in a parti!ular !ulture !an understand it$ how are they a'le to !o22uni!ate the features of the !ulture with others who are not
part of itN
6here is also so2e de'ate$ initiated 'y Aofstede (1980)$ and revived 'y "eason (1998)$ a'out the ownership of !ulture. So2e theorists
argue that the organi?ation has !ulture$ whereas others argue that the organi?ation is !ulture. Mi5e organi?ational !ulture$ safety !ulture is
assu2ed to 'e a relatively sta'le !onstru!t$ si2ilar to personality$ and resilient to !hange in the fa!e of i22ediate and transient issues.
6he !on!ept of wor5 !li2ate in the literature a!tually predates !ulture 'y a'out 00 years. Mewin$ Mippitt$ and Hhite (19+9) 2ade the
earliest e:pli!it referen!e to !li2ate in an organi?ational setting in a study of the effe!t of leadership on the @so!ial !li2ate- in groups of
'oys$ although they did not define the !on!ept. ,efinitions of organi?ational !li2ate refle!t those presented of safety !li2ate earlier.
&nother early re!ognition of the i2pa!t on 2anagers on !li2ate was 'y J!Dregor (19E0) who re!ognised the i2portan!e of daily role;
2odelling 'ehaviours of supervisors and 2anagers in setting the !li2ate. #oyle$ Slee2an$ and &da2s (199<) latterly define
organi?ational !li2ate as e2ployee per!eptions of @the so!ial and organi?ational !ir!u2stan!es in whi!h e2ployees wor5- (p. *08)$
e2phasising that !li2ate is a pheno2enon that !an !hange daily and 'e influen!ed 'y !ir!u2stan!e. #li2ate influen!es what wor5 is
done$ how wor5 is done$ and 'y who2 wor5 is done. #li2ate 2ay operate at the level of individuals and s2all !ohesive groups.
S!hneider (198<) argues that ea!h individual-s per!eption of the !li2ate will differ 'e!ause wor5ers have different tas5s$ supervisors$
peers and positions in the organi?ational hierar!hy. #hanges that affe!t the way they wor5 su!h as a new supervisor or what they do su!h
as pro2otion or redundan!y will affe!t their per!eption of !li2ate. Mi5ewise$ events that trans!end a!ross a whole site or organi?ation
su!h as widespread redundan!ies will affe!t 2ore individuals and 'e refle!ted 'y widespread !li2ate !hange. Safety !li2ate des!ri'es
the at2osphere of the state of safety in an organi?ation. t is 'est per!eived as a su'set of organi?ational !li2ate (#oyle et al.$ 199<) and
Hillia2son et al. (1998) argue that safety !li2ate represents the safety ethi! in an organi?ation and is one !ontri'utor to the overall
organi?ational !ulture.
#o: and 9lin (1998) report that the theoreti!al and e2piri!al develop2ent of resear!h on organi?ational !ulture and !li2ate has
progressed differently. .rgani?ational !ulture resear!h has 'een 2ore !on!erned with definition and theoreti!al underpinningsB
2easure2ent has 'een qualitative in nature$ through use of o'servation and interviews$ and the results of these have 'een lin5ed less
with organi?ational out!o2es su!h as produ!tivity$ effi!ien!y$ and satisfa!tion$ in preferen!e for in;depth !ase studies. n !ontrast$
organi?ational !li2ate resear!h has valued e2piri!al resear!h of the !on!ept over theoreti!al develop2ent. #li2ate has predo2inantly
'een 2easured 'y qualitative 2ethods su!h as questionnaires$ and analyses have lin5ed a positive organi?ational !li2ate with several
out!o2e 2easures$ in!luding in!reased produ!tion (e.g. Prit!hard C (arasi!5$ 198+)$ and greater 3o' satisfa!tion (e.g. S!hneider$ 198<).
#on!eptual develop2ent of safety !ulture and safety !li2ate
6he theoreti!al and e2piri!al develop2ent of safety !ulture and !li2ate has followed the pattern set 'y organi?ational !ulture and
!li2ate$ although to a lesser e:tent. &s stated previously$ 2ost efforts have fo!used on the e2piri!al issues surrounding safety !li2ate
although it is possi'le to identify theoreti!al develop2ent of !on!epts within the safety !ulture literature. &lso$ the ter2s safety !ulture
and safety !li2ate have 'een used inter!hangea'ly in the literature (#o: C 9lin$ 1998). ,enison (199E) states that the resear!h 2ethods
used 'y resear!hers !an aid distin!tion 'etween studies that have 2easured safety !ulture fro2 those that have 2easured safety !li2ate.
Ae states that 2easuring !ulture requires qualitative 2ethods whereas !li2ate !an 'e 2easured 'y quantitative 2ethods and goes on to
argue that quantitative 2easures su!h as questionnaire surveys !annot fully represent the underlying safety !ulture. 6hese surveys offer a
snapshot of the prevailing state of safety and are useful in deter2ining e2ployee per!eptions a'out safety in their organi?ation at a
parti!ular 2o2ent in ti2e. n !on!urren!e$ S!hneider (1990) argues that !li2ate !an only give a flavour and indi!ation of the underlying
!ulture$ and !annot !apture the @full ri!hness- of the organi?ational !ulture. #o: and #o: (199E) also de2onstrate this point 'y li5ening
!ulture to personality$ and !li2ate to 2ood. #ondu!ting a survey will assess the !urrent 2ood state of an individual. So2e responses
2ay 'e indi!ative of the individual-s sta'le underlying 'eliefs$ !onstru!ts and personality 'ut overall$ the survey will refle!t how the
individual feels at that point in ti2e. 6he !o2parison 'etween !ulture and personality see2s attra!tive 'e!ause personality is relatively
Zohar (1980) was the pioneer of assessing the state of safety via an attitude questionnaire instead ... Page < of 18
sta'le over ti2e whereas !li2ate and 2ood !an 'e sus!epti'le to short;ter2 flu!tuations (Pervin$ *00+).
n addition to this$ as the !on!epts of safety !li2ate and safety !ulture were developed fro2 their longer;standing organi?ational
!ounterparts$ the theoreti!al develop2ent of these !on!epts indi!ates that they should 'e !on!eptually distin!t. #onsidering the resear!h
field of safety !li2ate and safety !ulture as a whole does not refle!t this. 6he distin!tions 'etween definitions of safety !ulture and safety
!li2ate 2ade earlier leads to the !on!lusion that the vast 2a3ority of resear!h on safety !ulture a!tually refle!ts safety !li2ate instead.
6here are nota'le e:!eptions to this rule$ as the literature offers a handful of well;developed quantitative 2easures that were developed
using qualitative analyses of safety !ulture$ and are designed to 2easure !ultural artefa!ts su!h as 'eliefs$ values$ and nor2s$ alongside
per!eptions of safety !li2ate (e.g. #arroll$ 1998B Mee$ 1998B .stro2 et al.$ 199+).
6heoreti!al develop2ent of safety !ulture
/uilding on the organi?ational !ulture literature$ "eason (1998) identified five i2portant !o2ponents of safety !ulture as follows) (i)
infor2ed !ulture$ (ii) reporting !ulture$ (iii) 3ust !ulture$ (iv) fle:i'le !ulture$ (v) learning !ulture. &n infor2ed !ulture is a safety syste2
that !ollates data fro2 a!!idents and near 2isses and !o2'ines the2 with infor2ation fro2 proa!tive 2easures su!h as safety audits and
!li2ate surveys. n 2any ways$ an infor2ed !ulture is a safety !ulture. n turn$ this safety syste2 requires the a!tive and honest
parti!ipation fro2 the wor5for!e to report near 2isses$ !o2plete attitude surveys and 'e!o2e involved in how safety is 2anaged in their
organi?ation. 6his is !alled a reporting !ulture$ !hara!terised 'y an organi?ational !li2ate in whi!h wor5ers feel free to !ontri'ute to the
infor2ed !ulture. Aowever$ wor5ers will not feel free to !ontri'ute unless a 3ust !ulture$ !hara!terised as an at2osphere of trust$ is in
eviden!e. 6his 2ust 'e distinguished fro2 a no;'la2e !ulture$ as a 3ust !ulture does not turn a 'lind eye to !ri2inal or negligi'le a!ts. n
so2e instan!es$ rewards 2ay 'e offered for reporting near 2isses in 2u!h the sa2e way as they are for safe 'ehaviour although there
are potential pro'le2s with this su!h as over;reporting. #olle!ting this infor2ation is futile unless it is used to enhan!e the safety
perfor2an!e of the organi?ation. & learning !ulture is needed to draw appropriate !on!lusions fro2 the infor2ation !olle!ted along with
the will to i2ple2ent !hanges to pro!edures and equip2ent as dee2ed ne!essary. 6hese !o2ponents are si2ilar to those !ited 'y Hei!5
(1988) whose !riteria for high relia'ility in an organi?ation is a !ulture that en!ourages interpretation$ i2provisation$ unique a!tion$ and
a !li2ate of trust and openness 'etween 2anage2ent and wor5er. 6he results of safety !ulture studies presented in se!tion *.+ also show
the theoreti!al underpinnings of the !on!ept through !ase studies of high relia'ility$ !o2parisons of high and low perfor2ing
organi?ations$ and organi?ations in !risis.
12piri!al develop2ent of safety !li2ate
t is generally a!!epted that safety !li2ate is a @snapshot- of wor5for!e per!eptions of safety (e.g. Jearns$ 9lin$ 9le2ing$ C Dordon$
1998). Ouantitative 2ethods$ espe!ially !ross;se!tional questionnaires$ have !o22only 'een used to 2easure these per!eptions
(,enison$ 199E). 6his 2ethod fa!ilitates as5ing large nu2'ers of people their opinions in a relatively ti2e; and !ost;effe!tive 2anner
(.ppenhei2$ 199*).
&lthough the !on!epts of wor5 and so!ial !li2ate have appeared in 2anage2ent and psy!hology literature for over E0 years$ 2easuring
safety !li2ate is a relatively re!ent te!hnique. &ttitudes towards the organi?ation were 2easured 'efore this and !ontinue as part of
assessing the organi?ational !ulture 'ut were rarely spe!ifi!ally safety;fo!used until Zohar-s (1980) se2inal study. Sin!e then several
resear!h tea2s have developed their own 2ethods of assessing safety !li2ate. 6his has led to a nu2'er of differing 2ethods$ ea!h
offering a way of !olle!ting sensitive infor2ation a'out e2ployee attitudes and per!eptions regarding a wide range of safety;related
issues at their pla!e of wor5. &l2ost without question$ the !onstru!tion of su!h 2ethods has 'een done in !on3un!tion with a parti!ular
organi?ation with a view to 2easuring safety !li2ate at spe!ifi! sites with no great !rossover of use to other sites$ organi?ations$ or
do2ains on!e the 2easures have 'een developed. 6his has led to a proliferation of instru2ents that$ with one or two e:!eptions$ are
spe!ifi! to an organi?ation$ or at 'est$ to the industrial se!tor for whi!h they were developed. 6wo nota'le e:!eptions in!lude the
.ffshore Safety Ouestionnaire (.SO)$ developed 'y 9lin$ Jearns$ Dordon and 9le2ing (199E) on the 'asis of earlier wor5 'y Jare5$
6angenes$ and Aellesoy (198<)$ and "und2o (1990). 6he .SO has 'een used in several offshore environ2ents$ as well as in health!are$
2ining$ and forestry settings around the world. 6he se!ond e:!eption is the %( regulator-s Aealth and Safety #li2ate survey tool (AS1$
1998')$ whi!h was developed to 'e used a!ross all %( industrial se!tors. 6he relative 2erits of this instru2ent will 'e dis!ussed in
detail in the following !hapter. n general$ the only !ontinual develop2ent of safety !li2ate instru2ents has 'een to refine the question
Zohar (1980) was the pioneer of assessing the state of safety via an attitude questionnaire instead ... Page E of 18
sets in order to i2prove fa!e validity$ and in so2e !ases to !ondu!t fa!tor analyses and internal !onsisten!y !he!5s. 6hese have 'een
favoured a'ove e:a2inations of !onstru!t and predi!tive validity (Dulden2und$ *000)$ without whi!h the resear!h field is una'le to
progress 'eyond its first stage of develop2ent. &s a result$ there is a danger of the !on!ept outstripping eviden!e for its utility (#o: C
9lin$ 1998).
& nu2'er of qualitative 2ethods have 'een used to develop quantitative 2easures of safety !ulture and !li2ate. 6hese in!lude
interviews$ fo!us groups and 'rainstor2ing sessions. .stro2 et al. (199+) used interviews with a nu2'er of personnel at a %S nu!lear
power plant$ ranging fro2 la'ourers to 2anage2ent. "espondents were as5ed three questions to as!ertain what people would 'e doing
in three years ti2e if the !o2pany 'e!a2e a world leader (i.e. desired future nor2s)$ how far personnel would have to go to rea!h that
level of perfor2an!e (i.e. !o2parison 'etween present and desired nor2s)$ and what happens !urrently (i.e. !urrent nor2s). Safety
questionnaire ite2s were 'ased on !ontent analysis of those responses and fo!us groups with 2anagers. #arroll (1998) also used open;
ended questions that were designed to eli!it !urrent nor2s and desired goals. Hor5ers were as5ed to identify a re!ent in!ident that
showed the strength or wea5ness of the !urrent safety !li2ate and what !hanges they would instigate were they vi!e president$ in a study
in the %S nu!lear power industry. 6hese questions 2ay 'e 2ore refle!tive of safety !ulture than other safety !li2ate questions.
9o!us groups were also 5ey strategies e2ployed 'y Mee (1998) in the develop2ent of a 18*;ite2 questionnaire used in the %( nu!lear
power industryB #arroll (1998) in the %S nu!lear industryB Jearns et al. (1998) and Jearns$ 9lin$ 9le2ing and Dordon (1998) in the %(
offshore oil and gas industry$ and #o: and #heyne (*000) also in the %( offshore industry. Aowever$ whereas #arroll (1998)
interviewed 2anagers$ supervisors and the wor5for!e separately to avoid hierar!hy issues and pro2ote openness$ Mee (1998) reported no
hierar!hy pro'le2s with 2i:ed groups. 9inally$ a novel !onstru!t generation te!hnique is reported 'y #oyle et al. (199<). 6hey as5ed
industrial personnel to generate the si: 2ost i2portant health and safety issues to the2 and these were arranged in a hierar!hy of
i2portan!e during a 'rainstor2ing session. 6his for2ed the 'asis of a questionnaire.
Safety su';!ultures and su';!li2ates
Safety !ulture has 'een hypothesised to operate on a nu2'er of organi?ational levels. n addition to the glo'al safety !ulture of the
organi?ation$ unique !ultures !an e:ist at individual wor5;sites$ and for individual depart2ents or wor5;groups. Marge organi?ations that
have 2ultiple sites worldwide are li5ely to have several organi?ational !ultures$ 'ased on geographi! lo!ations of their 'usiness. n fa!t$
it 2ay not 'e 'enefi!ial to spea5 of one organi?ational !ulture. #ertainly$ !ore values su!h as a !o22it2ent to safety will 'e evident in
all the !ultures 'ut lo!al influen!es su!h as 2anagerial style and national !ulture will tailor the !ulture of a parti!ular site or group of
e2ployees. S!hein (199*) defines the !ulture of the group as @& pattern of shared 'asi! assu2ptions that the group learned as it solved
its pro'le2s of e:ternal adaption and internal integration$ that has wor5ed well enough to 'e !onsidered valid and$ therefore$ to 'e taught
to new 2e2'ers as the !orre!t way to per!eive$ thin5$ and feel in relation to those pro'le2s- (p. 18*).
6he idea of group !ulture rather than a single organi?ational !ulture allows for the e:isten!e of several group !ultures at different stages
within a single organi?ation. 6he individuals who !o2e together to for2 fun!tional groupings will have different 'eliefs$ values$ and
e:pe!tations$ and will also 'ring different e:perien!es fro2 past e2ployers and previous wor5;groups. &s !ulture is deter2ined 'y
shared 'eliefs and values$ it is li5ely that different wor5groups will have different safety !ultures as a fun!tion of the individual 2e2'ers
of the groups. 6herefore$ despite the fa!t that the sa2e safety;related issues will 'e prevalent a!ross wor5;groups at the sa2e site$ a!ross
sites and a!ross organi?ations$ no two su';!ultures will 'e ali5e. #ooper (*000) argues that that su';!ultures will 'e either in align2ent
or at odds with the do2inant @!ultural the2e- of the organi?ation. 6his !asts dou't over the notion that organi?ational safety !ulture is
!o2posed of shared 'ehaviours$ 'eliefs$ attitudes$ and values (Hillia2s$ ,o'son C Halters$ 1989) as the degree to whi!h ele2ents of
!ulture are shared 2ay 'e di2inished fro2 lowest to highest;level of su'!ulture (i.e. ele2ents of !ulture 2ay 'e highly shared within a
sta'le wor5;tea2 'ut the degree to whi!h they are shared a!ross all the wor5;tea2s at one site 2ay 'e !onsidera'ly less). Jearns et al.
(1998) !onfir2 the presen!e of frag2ented @safety su'!ultures- in a %( offshore sa2ple$ whi!h varied as a fun!tion of seniority and
prior a!!ident involve2ent. 6hey suggested that the intera!tion of different su'!ultures on one wor5;site partly deter2ines the prevailing
safety !li2ate of that site. dentifying the diversity of perspe!tives on safety issues refle!ted 'y the differen!es 'etween su';!ultures !an
also 'e useful for dealing with !olle!tive ignoran!e deter2ined 'y syste2i! un!ertainty (Pidgeon$ 1998)$ and for en!ouraging de'ate
over the solutions to long;ter2 safety issues.
Measuring safety culture
t is i2portant to note that !on!eptual differentiation 'etween safety !ulture and safety !li2ate di!tates that 2easuring safety !ulture and
safety !li2ate require different 2ethods. & nu2'er of qualitative 2ethods have 'een used to 2easure safety !ulture$ in!luding
interviews$ fo!us groups$ audits$ and e:pert ratings. Studies that have 2easured safety !ulture have generally used a !ase study for2at to
report findings. 6hus$ there are !ase studies of high relia'ility organi?ations$ !o2parisons of high and low a!!ident plants$ and narratives
of organi?ational !rises. Studies that have 2easured safety !ulture have generally re3e!ted quantitative 2ethods su!h as questionnaires as
an inappropriate 2eans of data !olle!tion. Aowever$ a nu2'er of studies have used qualitative 2ethods to investigate safety !ulture$ and
then developed quantitative 2ethods on the 'asis of those results (e.g. Mee$ 1998B see se!tion *.*.0.*).
&s 2entioned a'ove$ #arroll (1998) used qualitative 2ethods su!h as interviews and fo!us groups to investigate safety !ulture in the %S
nu!lear industry and argues that the results of questionnaires are open to 2isinterpretation and resear!her;'ias unless so2e for2 of
follow up is !ondu!ted with respondents. Ae found that involve2ent$ a!!ounta'ility$ and the role of supervisors were the 2ost salient
issues in a safety !ulture assess2ent of a %S nu!lear plant. t was also found that 2anagers re!eived a2'iguous !ues fro2 questionnaire
data and were su'sequently te2pted to ta5e qui!5 a!tion in response$ the so;!alled Pqui!5 fi:P$ with little regard for long;ter2 solutions.
Hei!5 (199<) argues that without 'en!h2ar5s$ safety !li2ate 2easures are inherently equivo!al if used to dire!t poli!y in this 2anner.
#lar5e (1999) also used a series of interviews to 2easure safety !ulture in the %( railway industry$ in order to !reate a novel
quantitative 2easure to assess safety !ulture. 6his 2easure allowed e2ployees to respond to questions a'out safety !ulture fro2 the
viewpoint of different organi?ational levels as a 2eans of assessing shared per!eptions of !ulture. nterviews and fo!us groups are often
also used in the develop2ent of safety !li2ate questionnaires. 1:pert ratings are another 2ethod that has 'een used to 2easure safety
!ulture. "o'erts$ "ousseau and Ma Porte (1990) report a study where e:perts rated the 2anifestations of safety !ulture su!h as
!o22uni!ation of sy2'olis2 and 'eliefs$ rites and !ere2onials as a way of gaining insight into the safety !ulture of two %S nu!lear
air!raft !arriers. /ased on the .rgani?ational #ulture nventory (.#B #oo5e C Mafferty$ 1989)$ fo!us groups involving offi!ers and
other senior on;'oard personnel guided the dire!tion of the study and the results were !o2'ined with those of an e2ployee survey to
!reate a !ase study of safety within Aigh "elia'ility .rgani?ations (A".s).
#ase studies of Aigh "elia'ility .rgani?ations (A".s)
6he %S nu!lear air!raft !arriers that "o'erts et al. (1990) investigated are one set of so;!alled @Aigh "elia'ility .rgani?ations- (A".s).
A".s perfor2 'etter than they are e:pe!ted to given the level of te!hnology e2ployed and levels of ris5 2anaged during regular$ high;
te2po operations (Hei!5 C "o'erts$ 199+B Hei!5$ 199<B Hei!5 C Sut!liffe$ *001). 6hey e2phasise shared values that !hara!terise
safety !ulture and differ fro2 other organi?ations 'y fo!using on pro!ess relia'ility a'ove produ!t relia'ility$ and 'y 2aintaining this
high level of pro!ess relia'ility for long periods of ti2e. .ften the nature of their 'usiness 2eans that they !annot slow perfor2an!e
under the threat of danger. n su!h a situation$ the danger 2ust 'e diffused while perfor2an!e is 2aintained. A".s have 'een found to
perfor2 at high levels of safety$ relia'ility$ and syste2 integrity apparently as a result of strong !ultural values that are shared 'y
wor5ers and 2anage2ent. Aowever$ the studies on A".s do not report the !ause and effe!t data that would 'e required to as!ertain this
relationship.
A".s have great i2portan!e with respe!t to safety !ulture and resear!h on A".s 2a5es a strong !ase for safety !ulture as a fa!et of
organi?ational !ulture 'y synthesising the findings of the resear!h on A".s to one glo'al !onstru!t !alled @2indfulness- (Hei!5 C
"o'erts$ 199+B Hei!5 C Sut!liffe$ *001). Jindfulness is a state of !onstant awareness within high;ha?ard environ2ents that is always
loo5ing for failure$ 2anaging safety while 2aintaining high;te2po operations$ and e2powering sharp;end operators with !o22ensurate
e:perien!e to 2a5e !riti!al de!isions. Ju!h of the su!!ess and failure of organi?ations to 2anage highly !o2ple: te!hnology is
attri'uted to the e:tent to whi!h 2anage2ent genuinely advo!ate 2indfulness in operations (Hei!5 C Sut!liffe$ *001).
#o2parative studies
#o2parative studies have fo!used on the !hara!teristi!s of @safe- (i.e. low a!!ident) versus @unsafe- (i.e. high a!!ident) wor5sites and
depart2ents. .ne su!h study was !ondu!ted 'y #heyne and #o: (199<) with 1+ 1uropean 2anufa!turing plants fro2 the sa2e
organi?ation. 6hey !on!luded that plants with low a!!ident frequen!ies had e2ployees with 2ore positive attitudes to safety$ 2ore
positive appraisals of 2anage2ent !o22it2ent to safety$ higher levels of !o2plian!e$ and a 'etter;2anaged ha?ardous environ2ent.
Mee (1998) adds 2ore depth to this finding 'y stating that the 2ain !hara!teristi!s of low a!!ident plants are) high frequen!ies of
infor2al safety !o22uni!ationB eviden!e of good organi?ational learningB strong !o22it2ent to safety 'y senior 2anage2entB
de2o!rati! and parti!ipative leadership stylesB safety aspe!ts e2phasised in s5ills trainingB good house5eepingB high levels of 3o'
satisfa!tion$ and safe wor5 as a !riteria for re!ruit2ent and retention as distin!t fro2 produ!tivity. 6he role of house5eeping (in!luding
!lean and !o2forta'le wor5ing !onditions) in low a!!ident frequen!y !onfir2s the earlier findings fro2 an asse2'ly plant 'y (eenan$
(err and Sher2an (19<1).
.rgani?ations prone to$ in$ or re!overing fro2$ !rises
"etrospe!tive analyses of 2a3or disasters that have warranted a Pu'li! nquiry report (e.g. the (ing-s #ross fireB 9ennell$ 1988)$
Presidential !o22ission (e.g. #hallengerB see Laughan$ 199E)$ or an .SA& nquiry (e.g. 6hree Jile slandB Perrow$ 1980)$ have
!o22only identified poor safety !ulture as a !ontri'utory fa!tor. #o22only !ited !hara!teristi!s of these su'standard safety !ultures
in!lude an a'sen!e of senior 2anage2ent !o22it2ent$ poor house5eeping$ la!5 of organi?ational learning$ and de2and for produ!tivity
or 2eeting s!hedules as a priority over safety of plant and personnel. 6hese fa!tors are in line with the !hara!teristi!s of low a!!ident
plants presented 'y Mee (1998) so it 2ay 'e appropriate to !on!lude that poor safety !ulture is related to higher pro'a'ilities of 'oth
individual a!!idents and organi?ational;level a!!idents (i.e. 2a3or disasters). 6his !on!lusion is intuitively appealing$ however$ it is
2ainly retrospe!tive in nature and relies on the identifi!ation of fa!tors !o22on to those organi?ations$ whi!h 2ay have no predi!tive
power in deter2ining where or when the ne:t organi?ational a!!ident 2ay o!!ur (Hhita5er C Yule$ under review). Aaving said that$
identifying the !hara!teristi!s of organi?ations in !risis is i2portant in the drive to avoid future disasters$ and 2any of these
!hara!teristi!s are refle!ted in safety !li2ate s!ales (e.g. 9lin$ Jearns$ .-#onnor C /ryden$ *000)$ whi!h highlights synergy 'etween
leading and lagging indi!ators of safety.
Measuring safety climate
6he 2ultiple definitions of safety !li2ate in the literature (e.g. 9lin et al.$ *000$ Dulden2und$ *000) has deter2ined to a large e:tent
what varia'les resear!h tea2s have in!orporated when developing 2easures of safety !li2ate. 6he !entral de'ate a2ong theorists
appears to 'e whether safety !li2ate should 'e restri!ted to wor5for!e per!eptions a'out 2anage2ent and the 2anner in whi!h
2anage2ent re!on!ile safety with produ!tivity (/rown C Aol2es$ 198EB ,edo'eleer C /eland$ 1991B Zohar$ 1980$ *000)$ or whether
the role of 2anage2ent is in!orporated with other safety issues su!h as ris5 per!eption$ wor5er involve2ent$ personal a!!ounta'ility$
per!eptions of the physi!al environ2ent$ and 3o' !o22uni!ation (#o: C #o:$ 1991B Hillia2son et al.$1998B #o: et al.$ 1998B #heyne$
#o:$ .liver C 6o2as$ 1998B Mee$ 1998B Jearns et al.$ 1998$ *001). 6his de'ate has not 'een resolved$ and as a result the resear!h field
of safety !li2ate has favoured e2piri!al resear!h over theoreti!al develop2ent.
6he purpose of this se!tion is to review the safety !li2ate literature$ paying parti!ular attention to the results of studies that have
identified influen!es on$ and the influen!es of safety !li2ate. n total$ +1 studies were identified in the literature and are reviewed in this
se!tion. 6hey are su22arised in ta'le *.1 whi!h is presented at the end of the !hapter. 6he 2a3ority of these studies were !ondu!ted in
high ha?ard industrial se!tors$ in!luding transport$ power generation$ offshore oil and gas produ!tion$ 2anufa!turing$ and !onstru!tion.
6he results are presented the2ati!ally$ under the headings 2anagerial fa!tors$ supervisory fa!tors$ wor5for!e fa!tors$ and other syste2
fa!tors.
Janagerial fa!tors
6his !ategory is used to refer to all fa!tors that non;supervisory 2anage2ent !an dire!tly influen!e. 6hese in!lude organi?ational
poli!ies$ syste2s and pro!edures$ 2anage2ent and leadership style$ and 2anage2ent !o22it2ent to safety. & re!ent review of safety
!li2ate studies$ and the2ati! analysis of safety !li2ate fa!tors 'y 9lin et al. (*000) found that 8*Q of the studies assessed the role of
2anage2ent. Janage2ent was also identified as one of only two fa!tors (the other 'eing wor5for!e involve2ent) that were properly
repli!ated a!ross studies (,edo''eleer C /eland$ 1998). & third review of safety !li2ate the2es in!luded a nu2'er of studies not
!overed in the two reviews a'ove$ and found that 2anage2ent was the 2ost frequently 2easured di2ension (Dulden2und$ *000). 6hat
2anage2ent is a well;2easured !o2ponent of safety !li2ate is therefore not disputed. #lose inspe!tion of the studies in ta'le *.1
reveals that 2anagerial fa!tors also display a degree of asso!iation with safety out!o2es.
6he se2inal study 'y Zohar (1980) identified two !li2ate di2ensions as 'eing 2ost influential in deter2ining safety !li2ate level. 6he
se!ond of these (after relevan!e of safety to 3o' 'ehaviour) was wor5for!e per!eptions of 2anage2ent attitudes to safety. Zohar argued
that 2anage2ent !o22it2ent was a prerequisite of su!!essful initiatives ai2ed at i2proving the state of safety in industrial
organi?ations. 6his argu2ent has found !onsidera'le e2piri!al support. 9ro2 a study of wor5ers in %( !he2i!al plants$ ,onald and
#anter (1990) found that a nu2'er of safety !li2ate s!ales !orrelated with self;reported a!!ident involve2ent$ in!luding 2anage2ent
!o22it2ent. 9urther eviden!e for this was provided 'y ,ia? and #a'rera (1998)$ who report that safety !li2ate differentiated
organi?ations with differing levels of safety in a sa2ple of Spanish airport wor5ers. Hor5for!e per!eptions of !o2pany safety poli!y
(in!luding 2anage2ent !o22it2ent) were dee2ed to 'e the 2ost i2portant fa!tor$ with per!eptions of the organi?ational philosophy
regarding the relative priorities of produ!tivity versus safety$ se!ond. Janage2ent !o22it2ent to safety had a!tually 'een studied
'efore the ter2 @safety !li2ate- was !oined. S2ith$ #ohen$ #ohen and #leveland (1988) found that wor5for!e per!eptions of
2anage2ent !o22it2ent to safety were related to low a!!ident rates in a !ross;se!tion of 0* %S industrial plants. &!tive involve2ent
of 2anage2ent was !onsidered an i2portant deter2inant of high !o22it2ent.
.ther studies do not show these effe!ts. 9or e:a2ple$ Jearns et al. (1998) found no differen!e in wor5for!e attitudes to the .J
(.ffshore nstallation Janager$ i.e. the site 2anager) 'etween wor5ers who had and had not suffered an a!!ident. n the sa2e industry$
2anage2ent !o22it2ent was a fa!tor that e:plained the highest varian!e in safety !li2ate s!ores 'ut did not dis!ri2inate 'etween
groups who had and had not suffered an a!!ident (&le:ander et al.$ 199<). n this study no other !li2ate di2ension !ould dis!ri2inate
'etween the two a!!ident groups.
Hhilst it 2ay 'e prefera'le for safety !li2ate di2ensions$ espe!ially those relating to 2anage2ent$ to have so2e dis!ri2inatory power
regarding safety out!o2es$ 2i:ed results regarding self;reported in3uries (a lagging indi!ator of safety) does not ne!essarily 2ean that
2anagerial fa!tors are not i2portant to safety !li2ate. Jore !onsistent results have 'een found using other out!o2es. 9or e:a2ple$
"und2o (1990) found that 2anage2ent !o22it2ent to safety was the 2ost i2portant deter2inant of wor5for!e satisfa!tion with safety$
and with safety;related !ontingen!y 2easures. .rgani?ational support provided 'y 2anage2ent was the se!ond 2ost i2portant
deter2inant. #heyne$ 6o2as$ #o: and .liver (1999) also found that 2anage2ent influen!ed wor5for!e appraisals of !o22it2ent
a!ross three %( industries) 2anufa!turing$ dairy produ!e and transport. Janage2ent also !onsistently influen!ed training a!ross all
three sa2ples 'ut only influen!ed wor5for!e personal a!tions C responsi'ility in the 2anufa!turing and dairy produ!e sa2ples. &s well
as providing insight into the role of 2anage2ent in wor5pla!e safety$ #heyne at al (1999) also argue that the ar!hite!ture of attitudes to
safety are$ in part$ dependent on the industrial !onte:t in whi!h those attitudes are 2easured. 6he applied use of su!h asso!iations is
underlined 'y a study in &ustralian health!are. #oyle et al. (199<) argue that 2odifying the attitudes of 2anage2ent and wor5for!e
toward health and safety should i2prove the organi?ation-s safety !li2ate and ulti2ately their safety re!ord.
Supervisory fa!tors
& 2odel that integrates the safety influen!es of 2anagers is offered 'y 6ho2pson$ Ailton and Hitt (1998)$ who tested a 2odel 'ased
around two !entral pathwaysB (i) fro2 @organi?ational politi!s- to @2anager support for safety- to @safety !onditions-B (ii) fro2
@supervisor fairness- to @supervisor support for safety- to @safety !o2plian!e-. Janage2ent support for safety was also found to
positively influen!e supervisor support for safety. 6ho2pson et al. (1998) !on!luded that 2anage2ent have an influen!e on safety
!onditions 'ut wor5for!e !o2plian!e with safety rules and regulations under those !onditions is influen!ed 'y the per!eived fairness of
the supervisor.
Supervisors have 'een shown to have other i2portant influen!es regarding safety !li2ate. 9ro2 three Spanish sa2ples of @high ris5
organi?ations-$ 6o2as$ Jelia and .liver (1999) found that supervisors played an i2portant role in the a!!ident prevention pro!ess 'y
transferring the ele2ents of safety !li2ate to 2e2'ers of the wor5for!e. 1viden!e for this !a2e fro2 support for a tested 2odel in
whi!h the !ausal !hain ran fro2 @safety !li2ate- to @supervisor response- to @!o;wor5er response- to @wor5er attitude-$ and then to
@safety 'ehaviour-$ @ris5- and finally @a!!idents-. 9inally$ fro2 a study in the %S steel industry$ /rown$ Hillis$ and Prussia (*000) found
that safety !li2ate was negatively related to supervisory pressure$ indi!ating that positive safety !li2ate is !hara!terised 'y a low;
pressure wor5ing environ2ent.
Zohar (1980) was the pioneer of assessing the state of safety via an attitude questionnaire inste... Page 10 of 18
Hor5for!e fa!tors
#heyne$ et al. (1998) found that the individual responsi'ility of wor5for!e 2e2'ers played an i2portant role in the su!!ess of safety
2anage2ent influen!e on safety a!tivities. n this 2ulti;sa2ple analysis of wor5for!e per!eptions within a 2ultinational 2anufa!turing
!o2pany$ 2ediating fa!tors in!luded personal involve2ent$ !o22uni!ation and ha?ards. #heyne et al. (1999) investigated the role of
wor5ers- personal responsi'ility further in a study of 2ultiple organi?ations and !on!luded that personal responsi'ility for safety is
!o2ple2entary to$ and not a repla!e2ent of$ good safety training.
n an atte2pt to shift fo!us 'a!5 to group per!eptions of safety !li2ate rather than analyses !ondu!ted at the individual level$ Zohar
(*000) found support the hypothesis that safety !li2ate is a group;level !onstru!t. Ae found that group per!eptions of supervisor a!tion
and supervisor e:pe!tation were signifi!ant predi!tors of 2inor in3uries within wor5groups for up to five 2onths after the per!eptions
were !olle!ted.
Fon;hu2an syste2 fa!tors
#onfir2ation that the roots of safety !li2ate are in organi?ational !li2ate was found 'y Feal$ Driffin$ and Aart (*000). 6hey found that
organi?ational !li2ate had a higher;order influen!e on safety !li2ate whi!h influen!ed safety !o2plian!e and safety parti!ipation
indire!tly through the deter2inants of safety 5nowledge and safety 2otivation. Joving on to stru!tural influen!es on safety !li2ate$
#heyne et al. (1998) found that 2anage2ent influen!ed safety a!tivities dire!tly$ through their influen!e on the physi!al wor5
environ2ent in a stru!tural 2odel of wor5for!e per!eptions in an international 2anufa!turing !o2pany. 6his was a relatively wea5 'ut
signifi!ant pathway in the 2odel. &nother study that treats safety !li2ate as a refle!tion of syste2 fa!tors is presented 'y Driffin and
Feal (*000) in a study of &ustralian 2ining 2anufa!turing. 6hey treated safety !li2ate as a higher;order fa!tor$ defined 'y wor5for!e
per!eptions of wor5pla!e syste2s. Safety !li2ate was found to refle!t 2anage2ent values$ safety !o22uni!ation$ safety pra!ti!es$
safety training$ and safety equip2ent. Safety !li2ate was found to influen!e wor5for!e !o2plian!e and parti!ipation indire!tly through a
strong relationship with safety 5nowledge$ and through wea5er ('ut signifi!ant) relationships with !o2plian!e 2otivation and
parti!ipant 2otivation.
Discussion
6heoreti!al !onsiderations
Safety !ulture is a set of values and 'eliefs that guide a!tion$ internalised through so!ialisation and learnt through sy2'olis2 whereas
safety !li2ate refle!ts the 2ood and !urrent attitude toward safety$ !o2'ined with the do2inant underlying 'eliefs a'out safety that are
2easura'le. #ulture is sta'le and a'iding whereas !li2ate is su'3e!t to flu!tuation in response to !hange in lo!al varia'les. 6he
reasoning 'ehind this distin!tion lies in the differing develop2ent of organi?ational !ulture and !li2ate. #ulture has 'een su'3e!t to
intense theoreti!al de'ate whereas !li2ate has 'een the su'3e!t of e2piri!al 2easure2ent and analysis. &pplied psy!hologists su!h as
Mitwin and Stringer (19E8)$ started to evaluate the !on!ept of !li2ate in the late 19E0-s without devoting 2u!h ti2e to definition.
#onversely$ the develop2ent of @!ulture- has 'een dogged 'y atte2pts to produ!e a universally a!!epted definition at the e:pense of
e2piri!al definition of the !onstru!t (S!hneider$ 1990).
Safety !li2ate has gained popularity as a result of its applied use and ease of 2easure2ent. Aowever$ this popularity 2as5s a la!5 of
e2piri!al integrity and !on!eptual validity$ whi!h li2its the interpretation of safety !li2ate surveys as do2ain;spe!ifi!$ !ross;se!tional
surveys that 2ay refle!t the underlying safety !ulture to a !ertain degree$ 'ut !annot fully represent it. 6he la!5 of repli!ated studies and
standardi?ed tools for 2easuring safety !li2ate wea5ens the a'ility to generalise resear!h findings fro2 do2ain to do2ain and allows
the influen!e of situational and !onte:tual fa!tors to repla!e sound theoreti!al underpinnings in deter2ining what fa!tors are 2easured
as safety !li2ate.
#ooper (*000) 2a5es a useful !ontri'ution to the de'ate surrounding the relationship 'etween safety !ulture and safety !li2ate 'y
arguing that safety !ulture is thought to affe!t 2e2'ers- attitudes and 'ehaviour in relation to the organi?ation-s ongoing health and
safety perfor2an!e. &s safety !li2ate is a!!epted to 'e a refle!tion of those safety attitudes at a given 2o2ent in ti2e (e.g. Jearns et
al.$ 1998)$ it see2s fair to !on!lude that 2easuring safety !li2ate will pi!5 up ele2ents of the !ulture to a !ertain e:tent. 9ro2 the a'ove
dis!ussion of !li2ate and !ulture$ it is also possi'le to argue that they are independent !on!epts that are lin5ed inso2u!h as they
influen!e ea!h other. t is widely a!!epted that !li2ate is a 2anifestation of !ulture (S!hein$ 198<)$ and is strongly influen!ed 'y it.
1spoused !li2ate is partly influen!ed 'y the sta'le underlying 'eliefs and values held as !ulture and it see2s plausi'le that !ulture
!hange (al'eit slowly and sele!tively) is possi'le through feed'a!5 of strong or persistent per!eptual !hanges in the nature of !li2ate
(Mee$ 199E).
12piri!al !onsiderations
&side fro2 the theoreti!al !onsiderations outlined a'ove$ reviewing the literature on safety !li2ate raises two 2ain e2piri!al issues that
2erit dis!ussion. 6hese issues !on!ern the repli!ation of fa!tor stru!tures of safety !li2ate and the use of out!o2e data to validate the
e2erging fa!tors.
Invariant factor structures. #oyle et al. (199<) report that the fa!tor stru!ture of their safety !li2ate instru2ent re2ained invariant
a!ross two 2at!hed industrial sa2ples fro2 &ustralian health!are. t is li5ely that the two organi?ations$ although si2ilar in 2any
respe!ts differ in how developed their safety !li2ates were. #oyle et al. (199<) argue that this eviden!e refutes Dlennon-s (198*)
suggestion that nine fa!tors (adapted fro2 Zohar-s$ 1980 eight fa!tors) for2 the 'asis of all safety !li2ates$ on the grounds that 2at!hed
organi?ations had so2e !o22on 'ut so2e different fa!tors that signifi!antly influen!ed their safety !li2ates. .ther analyses (e.g. Yule$
.-#onnor C 9lin$ under review) support this$ although /rown and Aol2es (198E) report the opposite$ finding two wor5 sites with
!ongruent fa!tor stru!tures. /rown and Aol2es (198E) argue that as the two fa!tor stru!tures are statisti!ally si2ilar$ the nature of safety
!li2ate !an 'e validly !o2pared 'etween the2.
Lack of objective safety performance criteria. 9our 2ain !ategories of safety out!o2e 2easures have 'een used in studies of safety
!li2ate) (i) !o2pany a!!ident statisti!s$ in!luding analysis of high versus low a!!ident rate plantsB (ii) wor5for!e self;reported a!!ident
and in!ident involve2entB (iii) wor5for!e self;reported safety 'ehaviours$ and (iv) e:pert ratings of safety perfor2an!e 'y regulator$
2anagers$ and supervisors. 6here are 2erits and draw'a!5s of ea!h of these 2easures. #o2pany a!!ident statisti!s !an 'e affe!ted 'y
rando2 events$ in!onsisten!ies in reporting (in!luding under;reporting)$ and even if relia'le$ are often unusa'le due to restri!tion of
varian!e. .n the other hand$ self;report 2easures 2ay also 'e unrelia'le due to reporting 'iases 'ut if !olle!ted anony2ously$ 2ay 'e
2ore refle!tive on the true state of safety than the !o2pany statisti!s.
Summary and conclusions
6he resear!h field offers a proliferation of over *0 different safety !li2ate 2easures that have often 'een designed spe!ifi!ally for a
single organi?ational !onte:t. 6herefore$ the potential for pre!on!eptions a'out whi!h questions and fa!tors 2ay 'e i2portant to
influen!e the resear!h field as a whole is !learly evident. #oyle et al. (199<) argue that the early studies of safety !li2ate 'y Zohar
(1980)$ Dlennon (198*) and /rown and Aol2es (198E) into safety !li2ate were influen!ed 'y the authors- pre!on!eptions of what
questions were i2portant. Aowever$ this is an argu2ent that !an 'e levelled at any of the studies that have 2easured safety !li2ate sin!e
the in!eption of the !on!ept so2e *+ years ago. #oyle et al. (199<) do !on!ede that there is no way of avoiding the 3udge2ents of
professionals in deter2ining what is i2portant to as5 a'out safety and that it is diffi!ult to wholly o'3e!tively !reate a tool that will
2easure safety !li2ate or any other !on!ept.
&fter reviewing the literature$ the overwhel2ing i2pression it leaves is that safety !li2ate resear!h has 'een !ondu!ted for *0 years with
no great !onsensus regarding the i2portant fa!tors or questions to as5$ save that they should 'e 2easured 'y 2eans of a wor5for!e
questionnaire. n !ontrast$ the fa!t that safety !ulture e:ists at a higher level of a'stra!tion than safety !li2ate$ and is less widely
2easured lends it al2ost higher status than !li2ate. 6his 2ay 'e 'e!ause the notion of !ulture is far 2ore salient to individuals as it
refle!ts personal heritage$ what individuals 'elieve in$ and 2ay guide 2any in;role 'ehaviours. #ulture see2s far 2ore i2portant in
deter2ining who we are$ and why we 'ehave in !ertain ways$ whereas !li2ate !an 'e seen as 2ore of a refle!tion of what we are and
what we do. Aaving said that$ the utility of safety !li2ate and its ease of 2easure2ent 2a5e the !on!ept appealing in the a'sen!e of
relia'le 2ethods of 2easuring !ulture that do not involve 2onths or years of ethnography. &dditionally$ the 'ody of resear!h on safety
!li2ate has de2onstrated that in 2any !ases wor5for!e per!eptions of safety !li2ate have 'een related to safety out!o2es. 6he
following !hapter des!ri'es a study that 'uilds on this review 'y testing theoreti!al 2odels of safety !li2ate using data !olle!ted fro2
Zohar (1980) was the pioneer of assessing the state of safety via an attitude questionnaire inste... Page 1* of 18
wor5for!e 2e2'ers in the %( energy se!tor.
Zohar (1980) was the pioneer of assessing the state of safety via an attitude questionnaire inste... Page 1+ of 18
6a'le *.1 Safety culture and safety climate studies
Study Industry and
Data Collection
actors !utcome measures
Synopsis of results" main findings#
sample (n$ response rate and analysis
relia$ility# validation
where availa'le)
S2ith et al. (1988) %S Site visits) interviews$ Janage2ent) !o2ple:ity$ .ut!o2e 2easures) Mow a!!ident plants had) (i) higher 2anage2ent
8 pairs of plants) wood plant wal5;through$ !o22it2ent$ involve2ent$ &!!ident vs. non;a!!ident !o22it2ent to the safety progra2B (ii) 2ore
and lu2'er produ!ts (nR+ o'servations$ effi!ien!y. plants hu2anisti! approa!h in dealing with e2ployeesB
pairs)> 2etals (nR* pairs)> do!u2entary analysis$ Safety) poli!y$ rules$ staff. &nalysis) Per!entage (iii) 'etter !o22uni!ation 'etween first;line and
2anufa!turing (nR* pairs) e:pert ratings 9inan!ial !o22it2ent$ !o2parisons 'etween low 2iddle 2anage2entB (iv) !loser personal
plant solven!y and high a!!ident rate relationships 'etween 2anage2ent and wor5for!eB
plants (v) 'etter ha?ard !ontrol. 6raining$ in!ident
investigation$ and poli!y state2ents showed no
differen!e 'etween low and high a!!ident plants.
Zohar (1980) srael 00 ite2 questionnaire$ Safety training$ .ut!o2e 2easures) Fo 12ergen!e of safety !li2ate as an e2piri!al
*0 fa!tories (nR000) developed fro2 literature 2anage2ent attitudes$ usea'le safety out!o2e dis!ipline$ eight safety !li2ate fa!tors e2erged.
review pro2otion$ ris5$ wor5 data Aigh agree2ent 'etween safety inspe!tor ran5ings
pa!e$ safety offi!er status$ &nalysis) 1:ploratory and safety !li2ate s!ores !orrelated with !li2ate
so!ial status$ safety fa!tor analysis$ 2ultiple; s!ores (although s2all n of inspe!tors)
!o22ittee range test$ e:pert ran5ing$
stepwise dis!ri2inant
analysis
Dlennon (198*) &ustralia E8 ite2 questionnaire Safety and health Fo for2al analysis Fine @!li2ate di2ensions- were found$ slightly
JiningB saw 2illingB legislation$ !orporate e:panding on Zohar-s (1980) eight fa!tors. 6hey
petroleu2B engineering$ attitudes to safety and should 'e a'le to 'e identified in any organi?ation.
2anufa!turing (nR198 health$ status of safety
line 2anagers) offi!er$ i2portan!e of
training$ 2anage2ent
en!ourage2ent$
pro2otion$ ris5 level$
safety vs. produ!tion
targets
/rown and Aol2es %S Ouestionnaire) Zohar-s Safety training$ .ut!o2e 2easures) +;fa!tor safety !li2ate 2odel) ris5$ 2anage2ent
(198E) Produ!tion wor5ers in 10 (1980) 00 ite2 2easure 2anage2ent attitudes$ &!!ident vs. non;a!!ident !on!ern$ 2anage2ent a!tion found to 'e a 'etter
2anufa!turing !o2panies pro2otion$ ris5$ wor5 groups fit than Zohar-s (1980) 8;fa!tor 2odel. Post;
(nR0*<$ of those *00 had pa!e$ safety offi!er status$ &nalysis) #onfir2atory trau2ati! (i.e. a!!ident) group-s per!eptions of
suffered an a!!ident in the so!ial status$ safety 9a!tor &nalysis (#9&) ris5$ 2anage2ent !on!ern$ and 2anage2ent
past year and **< had not) !o22ittee using MS"1M to test a!tion were signifi!antly lower than pre;trau2ati!
Zohar-s (1980) 8;fa!tor (i.e. non;a!!ident) group.
stru!ture$ 1:ploratory
fa!tor analysis to refine
solution
#o: and #o: (1991) 1urope) %($ Der2any$ 18 ite2 questionnaire$ Personal s!epti!is2$ Fo out!o2e 2easures /ased on the fa!tor analysis and fra2ewor5
/elgiu2$ 9ran!e$ Aolland developed fro2 literature individual responsi'ility$ &nalysis) 1:ploratory suggested 'y Purdha2 (1980)$ a theoreti!al 2odel
Das !o2pany depots sear!h and dis!ussions safeness of wor5 fa!tor analysis$ test;retest e2phasising the shared aspe!ts of e2ployee
(nRE+0) with 2anage2ent and environ2ent$ effe!tiveness paradig2 used to !he!5 attitudes to safety is presented.
safety representatives of arrange2ents for safety$ relia'ility of questionnaire
personal i22unity
,edo''eleer and /eland #anada Ouestionnaire designed Jodel 1) Janage2ent Fo out!o2e 2easures &tte2pts to validate previous resear!h (Zohar$
(1991) 9 !onstru!tion !o2panies spe!ifi!ally for the study. !on!erns$ 2anage2ent &nalysis) Ja:i2u2 1980B /rown C Aol2es$ 198E). /rown C Aol2es
(nR+80$ 81Q) te2s refle!ted /rown C safety a!tivities$ e2ployee Mi5elihood and Heighted (198E) + fa!tor 2odel was upheld with the data
Aol2es (198E) + fa!tor ris5 per!eption Meast Squares using 'ut a new *;fa!tor 2odel provided an even 'etter
2odel (whi!h was 'ased Jodel *) Janage2ent MS"1M fit. 6he * fa!tors of 2anage2ent !o22it2ent and
on Zohar-s (1980) !o22it2ent$ wor5er wor5ers involve2ent were !orrelated .E1. 6he
questionnaire) 'ut the involve2ent questionnaire only !o2prised nine questions$
sa2e 2easures were not roughly one question to represent ea!h fa!tor fro2
used Zohar-s (1980) solution.
.stro2 et al. (199+) %S 88;ite2 questionnaire$ Safety awareness$ .ut!o2e 2easures) .ne depart2ent had a higher nu2'er of a!!idents
Fu!lear energy developed fro2 tea2wor5$ pride and &!!ident statisti!s 'y than the others and was found to have 2ore
la'oratory (nR0000 interviews$ analysis of !o22it2ent$ e:!ellen!e$ depart2ent (.SA& negative attitudes towards the availa'ility and
ad2inistered a!ross < 2anager-s safety honesty$ !o22uni!ations$ re!orda'le in3uries in !apa'ility of safety personnel 'ut statisti!al
depart2ents) state2ents$ and literature leadership and 1991) analyses were not !ondu!ted 'eyond des!riptives.
review supervision$ innovation$ &nalysis) ,es!riptive Suggestions were 2ade for further interpretation
training$ !usto2er statisti!s for individual of the results 'ut tests su!h as t;tests$ !hi;square$
relations$ !o2plian!e$ ite2s$ not fa!tors and !orrelations were dee2ed diffi!ult to interpret
safety effe!tiveness$ and would not 'e of additional use to 2anage2ent
fa!ilities so were not !ondu!ted.
Philips et al. (199+) %( <0 ite2 questionnaire$ *8 Janage2ent attitudes$ Fo out!o2e 2easures Study atte2pted to identify Zohar-s (1980) safety
Pa!5age produ!tion plant ite2s fro2 Zohar-s (1980) Safety training$ &nalysis) e:ploratory !li2ate di2ensions in a %( sa2ple 'ut those
(pre) nR+8+$ 81.*QB post) s!ale pro2otion$ ris5$ wor5 fa!tor analysis findings were not repli!ated. Janage2ent and
nR188) pa!e$ safety offi!er status$ supervisory fa!tors were dee2ed to 'e two fa!tors
so!ial status$ safety rather than one and a redu!ed nu2'er of
!o22ittee di2ensions were suggested.
,onald and #anter (1990) %( 1E8 ite2 questionnaire$ People (self$ wor52ates$ .ut!o2e 2easures) Self; Strong relationship 'etween safety !li2ate and
10 !he2i!al sites (nR801$ developed fro2 literature$ supervisor$ 2anager$ reported a!!idents self;reported a!!idents$ !orrelation !oeffi!ients
2ean response rateR and 2apping senten!es safety rep.)B attitude &nalysis) Pearson were in the order of ;.0< to ;.8+$ p S .0<. .nly
<+.8Q) used for question 'ehaviour (5nows a'out$ !orrelations attitudes towards safety reps. did not !orrelate
te2plates is satisfied with$ !arries with self;reported a!!idents.
out)B a!tivity (passive$
a!tive)
Fis5anen (1990a) 9inland 80;ite2 questionnaire. E0 &ttitudes of supervisors$ .ut!o2e 2easures) Aigh #arelessness$ 'eing in a hurry$ la!5 of safety
"oad 2aintenan!e$ varia'les grouped into 10 &ttitudes of !o;wor5ers a!!ident rate (T8 5nowledge$ and in!orre!t safety o'servations were
Hor5ers and supervisors fa!tors for analysis .wn attitudes a!!idents>100 wor5ers) per!eived as i2portant deter2inants of a!!idents.
(nR19+$ 9+Q) .wn a!tions vs. low a!!ident rate (S8 Safety feed'a!5 was predi!ted 'y attitudes of
9eed'a!5 a!!idents>100 wor5ers) supervisors$ attitudes of !o;wor5ers$ and 2anner
(nowledge and &nalysis) ,es!riptive and of instru!ting. .wn a!tions$ feed'a!5$ and safety
instru!tions regression analyses 3udge2ents signifi!antly predi!ted safety
Janner of instru!ting 5nowledge and instru!tions.
Gudge2ents and
attentiveness 1rrors
of others
2portan!e of own
professional s5ills
Fis5anen (1990') 9inland *1>** ite2 questionnaire Hor5ers) attitude towards .ut!o2e 2easures) Aigh 9a!tor stru!tures were slightly different 'etween
"oad !onstru!tion$ 8< (10 ite2s plus 1* safety in the org.$ !hanges a!!ident rate vs. low supervisors and wor5ers sa2ples. Supervisors in
wor5 pla!es (wor5ers) additional for wor5ers and in wor5 de2ands$ a!!ident rate low a!!ident wor5pla!es rate safety inspe!tions
nR1890$ supervisors) nR 11 additional for appre!iation of the wor5$ &nalysis) ,es!riptive 'etter$ rate their own i2portan!e higher$
<E*) supervisors)$ developed safety as part of analyses$ t;tests$ e2phasise safety over !ost$ and 'elieve that
fro2 literature produ!tive wor5. e:ploratory fa!tor a!!idents happen 'y !han!e less. Hor5ers in low;
Supervisors) !hanges in analysis. a!!ident wor5pla!es value their own roles higher$
3o' de2ands$ attitudes to suffer 2ore 2ental stress$ and report in!reased 3o'
safety within the org.$ responsi'ility than their !ounterparts in high
value of the wor5$ safety a!!ident wor5pla!es.
as part of produ!tive wor5.
"und2o (1990) Forway Ouestionnaire$ Safety and !ontingen!y Fo additional out!o2e Janage2ent and e2ployee !o22it2ent and
8 offshore oil platfor2s ,eveloped fro2 literature fa!tors$ !o22it2ent and 2easures involve2ent in safety wor5 was the strongest
fro2 < oil !o2panies sear!h> sour!es of ris5s involve2ent in safety &nalysis) 1:ploratory predi!tor of satisfa!tion with safety 2easures.
(nR91<) fro2 a!!idents statisti!s wor5$ so!ial support$ 9a!tor &nalysis$ S1J Per!eptions of safety vs. produ!tion goals and
attitudes to a!!ident using MS"1M so!ial support were also signifi!ant predi!tors.
prevention Strong positive relationship 'etween 2anage2ent
!o22it2ent and involve2ent.
&le:ander et al. (199<) %($ +E;ite2 questionnaire (*8 #onfli!t and !ontrol$ .ut!o2e 2easures) Self; Aigher per!eptions of !li2ate were felt offshore
.n and offshore oil ite2s load on fa!tors)$ supportive environ2ent$ reported a!!idents than onshore for personal appre!iation of ris5$
produ!tion (nR89<) developed fro2 literature attri'utions of 'la2e$ &nalysis) &F.L& personal need for safety$ and overt 2anage2ent
review Personal appre!iation of !o22it2ent. ndividuals who had 2anagerial or
ris5$ personal need for supervisory responsi'ility felt that there was a
safety$ overt 2anage2ent 2ore supportive environ2ent than those who did
!o22it2ent not. Fo differen!es in safety !li2ate per!eptions
were found 'etween individuals who had and had
not suffered an a!!ident.
#oyle et al. (199<) &ustralia +0;+* ite2 questionnaire Jaintenan!e and Fo out!o2e 2easures Safety !li2ate fa!tors were not sta'le a!ross
#leri!al and servi!e (*E ite2s !onstant 2anage2ent$ !o2pany &nalysis) 1:ploratory organi?ations. 6he fa!tor stru!tures of
organi?ations (total 'etween organi?ations)$ poli!y$ a!!ounta'ility$ 9a!tor &nalysis$ !he!5s organi?ations 1 and * did not 2at!h.$ !alling into
nR880)$ .rgani?ation 1) developed 'y interviews training and 2anage2ent for !on!urrent validity question Dlennon-s (198*) assertion that nine
(nR+00$ <EQ)$ and group;wor5 attitudes$ wor5 fa!tors would 'e universally identified$ and /rown
.rgani?ation *) (nR<00$ environ2ent$ poli!y> and Aol2es- (198E) argu2ent that safety !li2ate
E+Q) pro!edures$ personal !o2prised + sta'le fa!tors.
authority
Aof2ann and Stet?er %S Ouestionnaire !o2prising "ole overload$ per!eptions .ut!o2e 2easures) "ole overload$ group pro!esses$ safety !li2ate$
(199E) #he2i!al pro!essing pu'lished s!ales and of wor5 group pro!esses$ .SA& re!orda'le and intentions to approa!h were related to unsafe
(nR *00 for analysis) s!ales developed approa!h intentions$ a!!idents for previous * 'ehaviours. ntentions to approa!h 2ediated the
spe!ifi!ally for the study. unsafe 'ehaviours years$ self reported unsafe relationship 'etween group pro!esses and unsafe
9 ite2s were 'ased on 'ehaviours$ 'ehaviours. &t the group level$ safety !li2ate$
Zohar-s (1980) safety &nalysis) "egression group pro!esses$ intentions to approa!h$ and
!li2ate s!ale (ordinary least squares)$ unsafe 'ehaviours were related to .SA&
!orrelations re!orda'le a!!idents.
,ia? and #a'rera (1998) Spain 00 ite2 questionnaire$ Safety poli!y$ produ!tivity .ut!o2e 2easures) Self Safety !li2ate dis!ri2inates 'etween
+ &irport ground handling developed fro2 vs. safety$ group attitudes$ reported safety level (in!l. organi?ations with different levels of safety$
!o2panies (nR1EE) 'rainstor2ing sessions prevention strategies$ previous> pro'a'ility of espe!ially for the safety poli!y fa!tor$ whi!h
and literature review per!eived safety level on future in!idents in!ludes 2anage2ent !o22it2ent. 6he se!ond
site$ per!eived safety level &nalysis) nter;!o2pany 2ost i2portant di2ension is wor5for!e
on 3o' differen!es using per!eptions a'out the organi?ational philosophy of
&F.L&$ !orrelations$ produ!tivity vs. safety$ although in so2e
regression organi?ations produ!tivity and safety are seen as
!o2pati'le.
Hillia2son et al. (1998) &ustralia E* ite2 questionnaire$ Safety awareness$ safety .ut!o2e 2easures) self 9a!tor analysis revealed an underlying <;fa!tor
8 2anufa!turing sites developed fro2 literature responsi'ility$ safety reported a!!ident stru!ture$ !o2prising 2otivation$ positive safety
(nREE0$ 0*Q) and the2es of previous priority$ 2anage2ent involve2ent$ per!eptions pra!ti!e$ ris5 3ustifi!ation$ fatalis2$ opti2is2.
questionnaires safety !o22it2ent$ safety of wor5pla!e dangers Hor5ers who had e:perien!ed a!!idents reported
!ontrol$ safety 2otivation$ &nalysis) 1:ploratory poorer safety pra!ti!es and less rationalisation of
safety a!tivity$ safety fa!tor analysis$ one;way the ris5s in their wor5pla!e. "espondents who
evaluation &F.L& per!eived dangers in their wor5pla!e also tended
to 3ustify unsafe wor5ing and 'e 2ore opti2isti!
regarding ris5.
#arroll (1998) %S 0< ite2 questionnaire plus Ouestionnaire fa!tors) Fo out!o2e 2easures 6he results of the safety !ulture survey and group
Fu!lear power plant * open questions$ 2anage2ent support$ &nalysis) Ouestionnaire interviews were fed 'a!5 to 2anage2ent as part of
(nR1+0) developed fro2 literature openness$ 5nowledge$ data were analysed in a !ulture i2prove2ent pro!ess. &lthough the
review$ group interviews wor5 pra!ti!es$ attitudes des!riptive 2anner (i.e. Q !ulture was assessed as 'eing essentially healthy$
'ased on the results of the agree> disagree)B interview it was found that 2anage2ent 'ehaviours were too
questionnaire data were the2ati!ally hierar!hi!al and the role of the supervisor was
grouped under2ined. 12ployees were worried a'out 'eing
'la2ed for 2ista5es and there was a la!5 of
positive reinfor!e2ent for safety 'ehaviours
#o: et al. (1998) %( 19;ite2 questionnaire Janage2ent a!tion$ .ut!o2e 2easures) Per2anent wor5ers had generally higher
1+ 2anufa!turing developed for use in quality of safety training$ 12ployee appraisals of per!eptions than 2anagers$ supervisors$ and
!o2panies (nR++*9$ 8+Q) 2anufa!turing and piloted personal safety a!tions$ organi?ational te2porary wor5ers. Janage2ent a!tions for
using dis!ussion groups e2ployee appraisals of !o22it2ent to safety safety was the strongest predi!tor of e2ployee
with safety professionals organi?ational &nalysis) &F.L&$ appraisals of organi?ational $ followed 'y training
and e2ployees. !o22it2ent to safety. 2ultiple linear regression$ and personal a!tions. n S1J analysis$ personal
stru!tural equation a!tions drops out and 2anage2ent a!tions
2odelling e2erges as a 2u!h stronger predi!tor than
training$ although there is a strong re!ipro!al
relationship 'etween the2. Janage2ent a!tions
was the only predi!tor of personal a!tions.
#heyne et al. (1998) Jultinational Ouestionnaire 'ased on Per!eptions of physi!al .ut!o2e 2easures) 12ployee attitudes to 2anage2ent dire!tly
Janufa!turing (nR91<) #o: and #o: (1991) wor5 environ2ent$ 12ployees- self reported influen!ed safety a!tivities and indire!tly
wor5pla!e ha?ards$ safety a!tivities influen!e individual responsi'ility for safety
attitudes to safety &nalysis) Stru!tural
2anage2ent 1quation Jodelling
(S1J)
Mee (1998) %( 18* ite2 questionnaire$ Ouestionnaire do2ains) .ut!o2e 2easures) +;day 19 fa!tors were identified under the following
Fu!lear repro!essing developed 'y literature safety pro!edures$ ris5$ loss;ti2e a!!idents headings) safety pro!edures (1 fa!tor)$ ris5s (+)$
plant (nR<*9E) review and < 2i:ed;level per2it;to;wor5 (P6H)$ &nalysis) 1:ploratory P6H (+)$ 3o' satisfa!tion (0)$ safety rules(*)$
fo!us groups 3o' satisfa!tion$ safety fa!tor analysts$ t;tests$ training(*)$ parti!ipation(1)$ !ontrol(*)$ design(1).
rules$ training$ dis!ri2inant fun!tion Jost fa!tors dis!ri2inated 'etween a!!ident and
parti!ipation$ !ontrol of analysis non;a!!ident groups.
safety$ plant design
Jearns et al. (1998) %( .ffshore Safety Hor5 environ2ent (* .ut!o2e 2easures) Self; 12ployees who had not had an a!!ident reported
10 offshore oil Ouestionnaire (.SO)$ s!ales fro2 Joos C nsel$ reported a!!idents (in signifi!antly 2ore safety 'ehaviours$ 3o'
installations (nR8**$ ++Q) developed fro2 previous 1980)$ 3o' previous * years on site)B !o22uni!ation$ and stronger attitudes towards
Zohar (1980) was the pioneer of assessing the state of safety via an attitude questionnaire inste... Page 1< of 18
resear!h$ literature !o22uni!ation$ safety &nalysis) ,es!riptive wor5 ha?ards (i.e. the non;a!!ident group felt safer
review$ and fo!us groups 'ehaviour$ ris5 per!eption$ analysis 'y fa!tor (i.e. Q at wor5). 6hey were also happier with a!!ident
safety attitudes$ a!!ident agree> disagree)$ prevention and 2itigation 2easures than the
history 1:ploratory fa!tor a!!ident group. Aowever$ there were no
analysis$ t;tests$ &F.L& signifi!ant differen!es 'etween a!!ident and non;
a!!ident groups for the wor5 !li2ate varia'les of
wor5 pressure or 3o' se!urity. Fo differen!es in
attitudes to the .J (site 2anager) were found.
6he a!!ident group were 2ore positive towards
their own responsi'ility for safety.
6ho2pson et al. (1998) %S Ouestionnaire !o2prising .rgani?ational politi!s$ .ut!o2e 2easures) Janagers and supervisors play i2portant 'ut
* aviation 2anufa!turing pu'lished s!ales (i.e. 2anage2ent support for Per!eived safety different roles in 2aintaining wor5pla!e safety.
sa2ples) 199* (nR +<0$ Janager and supervisor safety$ supervisor support$ !onditions$ self reported Janagers influen!e through politi!s of
E9Q)$ 199< (nR +*9$ support s!ales repli!ated supervisor fairness$ safety !o2plian!e$ !o22uni!ation and have a dire!t i2pa!t on safety
<0Q) fro2 ,edo'eleer C wor5pla!e safety a!!ident frequen!y rate !onditions. Supervisors influen!ed safety
/eland$ 1991) per!eptions$ goal fro2 !o2pany re!ords !o2plian!e through fairness of intera!tion.. ,ata
!ongruen!e (199* only) &nalysis) #onfir2atory !olle!ted in 199* was used to !onstru!t a 2odel
9a!tor &nalysis (#9&)$ whi!h was !onfir2ed with 199< data fro2 sa2e
Stru!tural 1quation organi?ation.
Jodelling (S1J)
#heyne et al. (1999) %( #o: and #o: (1998) Janage2ent a!tions and .ut!o2e 2easures) &ppraisals of !o22it2ent were strongly predi!ted
Janufa!turing$ ,airy safety !li2ate responsi'ility$ Personal e2ployee appraisals of 'y 2anage2ent a!tions and responsi'ility$ and
produ!e$ 6ransport$ questionnaire with 2inor a!tions and responsi'ility$ organi?ational less strongly predi!ted 'y quality of safety training
Hor5for!e$ !onte:tual alterations Safety training$ e2ployee !o22it2ent to safety in all sa2ples. 6here was also a strong re!ipro!al
(nR *0*9 wor5for!e$ E8Q) appraisals of &nalysis) &F.L&$ relationship 'etween these predi!tors. &ttitudes to
organi?ational Stru!tural 1quation 2anage2ent a!tions were related to personal
!o22it2ent to safety. Jodelling (S1J) using a!tions and responsi'ility in 2anufa!turing and
1OS dairy produ!e$ 'ut not in transport. 6here was a
wea5 'ut signifi!ant negative relationship 'etween
training and personal a!tions and responsi'ility
a!ross all + sa2ples. 1viden!e that the ar!hite!ture
of safety !li2ate is not sta'le a!ross industries.
#lar5e (1999) %( 8< ite2 Ouestionnaire$ %nsafe !onditions$ Fo out!o2e 2easures & novel 2ethod was used to assess the degree of
6rain operating developed on the 'asis of 2anagerial de!isions$ &nalysis) 1:ploratory shared per!eptions of !ulture 'etween wor5ers
!o2panies$ wor5for!e a!!ident reports and wor5ing !onditions$ lo!al fa!tor &nalysis$ one;way (train drivers)$ supervisors$ and 2anagers. 1a!h
(train drivers$ nR18E)$ dis!ussions with 2anage2ent$ line J&F.L& level was aware that a shared per!eption of safety
supervisors (nR<<)$ senior 2anagers. (*< unique fun!tions priorities did not e:ist. n;group per!eptions were
2anagers (nR81) ite2s !o2pleted + ti2es) not always a!!urate and were so2eti2es 'iased
6otal response rateR **Q fro2 personal viewpoint (e.g. the wor5for!e thought that supervisors were
then fro2 view of wor5er> 2ore !on!erned a'out safety than senior 2anagers
supervisor> 2anager as when this was not the !ase). 6here was partial
appropriate) support for the hypothesis that wor5ers 'ase their
per!eptions of senior 2anagers on their
per!eptions of lo!al 2anage2ent and supervisors.
6o2as et al. (1999) Spain Ouestionnaire !o2prised Safety !li2ate$ .ut!o2e 2easures) 0 Jodels for * of the + sa2ples showed a!!epta'le
@Aigh;ris5 !o2panies-$ of s!ales that are supervisors- safety self;report 2easures) fit to the data. Safety !li2ate was a dire!t
+ wor5for!e sa2ples) pu'lished (e.g. wor5er-s response$ !o;wor5ers- safety 'ehaviour$ predi!tor of supervisors- response$ and a wea5 to
1) nR 1*+$ 8EQ$ *) nR attitude towards safety safety response$ wor5er per!eption of a!tual ris5$ non;signifi!ant predi!tor of wor5er 'ehaviour and
18*$ E1Q$ +) nR 1*0$ fro2 Meather$ 1988)$ and attitude towards safety o!!urren!e of a!!idents$ !o;wor5er response. Supervisors- response was a
8EQ$ total nR 0*9 those that were developed per!eived level of !entral varia'le in the 2odels$ and lin5ed !li2ate
spe!ifi!ally. intrinsi! ha?ards with wor5er 'ehaviour. n turn$ 'ehaviour$
&nalysis) Stru!tural !o2'ined with assess2ent of ha?ards to influen!e
1quation Jodelling per!eptions of a!tual ris5$ the only varia'le in the
(S1J) using 1OS +.0 2odel to 'e dire!tly predi!tive of a!!idents.
/rown et al. (*000) %S Ouestionnaire designed Safety !li2ate$ pressure$ .ut!o2e 2easures) Self Safety !li2ate was negatively related to
Steel industry (nR <<1 spe!ifi!ally for the study !avalier attitude$ safety report frequen!ies of self supervisory pressure$ indi!ating that positive
wor5for!e$ E9Q) and developed using in; effi!a!y$ safe wor5 and !o;wor5er adheren!e safety !li2ate is !hara!terised 'y a low;pressure
depth tours$ interviews$ 'ehaviour to safety pro!edures$ wor5ing environ2ent. n turn$ pressure positively
fo!us group. Has piloted safety attitudes$ safety influen!ed safe 'ehaviour dire!tly$ was positively
on other sites. effi!ien!y related to !avalier attitude$ and negatively elated
&nalysis) #ovarian!e to safety effi!a!y. Safety ha?ards were found to
stru!ture analysis (#L&) have a negative i2pa!t on per!eptions of safety
!li2ate.
Jearns et al. (*000) %( .ffshore Safety Satisfa!tion with safety .ut!o2e 2easures) +; n 1998$ involve2ent was negatively related with
.ffshore oil and gas Ouestionnaire (.SO)$ a!tivities$ wor5for!e day loss ti2e in!idents$ the +;day M6 rate. n 1999$ involve2ent was
industry (1+ installations) developed fro2 previous involve2ent in health and ",,." data$ near negatively related with ",,." rate$ and
1998) nRE8*B 1999) resear!h$ literature safety planning$ 2isses$ self;reported !o22uni!ation was negatively asso!iated with
nR80E review$ and fo!us groups !o22uni!ation a'out a!!idents dangerous o!!urren!es and ",,." rate.
health and safety$ &nalysis) Stru!tural
supervisor !o2peten!e$ 1quation Jodelling
2anage2ent !o22it2ent (S1J) using 1OS
to safety
Driffin and Feal (*000) &ustralia 81;ite2 questionnaire Janage2ent values$ .ut!o2e 2easures) Self 6his study treats safety as a higher;order fa!tor$
Janufa!turing and survey designed safety inspe!tions$ reported safety defined 'y wor5for!e per!eptions of wor5pla!e
2ining (nR 100+ spe!ifi!ally for the study personnel training$ safety !o2plian!e and safety syste2s. Safety !li2ate was found to refle!t
wor5for!e 2e2'ers. 1*E0 !o22uni!ation$ safety parti!ipation 2anage2ent values$ safety !o22uni!ation$ safety
used in analysis$ response 5nowledge$ safety &nalysis) #onfir2atory pra!ti!es$ safety training$ and safety equip2ent.
rates not availa'le as data !o2plian!e$ safety 9a!tor &nalysis (#9&)$ Safety !li2ate was found to influen!e wor5for!e
were o'tained fro2 parti!ipation Stru!tural 1quation !o2plian!e and parti!ipation indire!tly through a
ar!hival re!ords) Jodelling (S1J) strong relationship with safety 5nowledge$ and
through wea5er ('ut signifi!ant) relationships with
!o2plian!e 2otivation and parti!ipant 2otivation.
6here was also an une:pe!ted negative
relationship 'etween !o2plian!e 2otivation and
safety parti!ipation.
Feal$ et al. (*000) &ustralia <9;ite2 questionnaire .rgani?ational !li2ate$ .ut!o2e 2easures) Self .rgani?ational !li2ate had a higher;order
Aealth!are (nR <*< !o2prising s!ales that are safety !li2ate$ reported safety influen!e on safety !li2ate whi!h influen!ed
wor5for!e$ <EQ) pu'lished (e.g. deter2inants of safety !o2plian!e and safety safety !o2plian!e and safety parti!ipation
organi?ational !li2ate$ perfor2an!e (5nowledge$ parti!ipation indire!tly through the deter2inants of safety
Aart et al.$ 199E)$ and 2otivation)$ !o2ponents &nalysis) 5nowledge and safety 2otivation. 6here was also
those that were developed of safety perfor2an!e Stru!tural 1quation an une:pe!ted dire!t influen!e of safety !li2ate on
spe!ifi!ally. (!o2plian!e$ Jodelling (S1J) safety parti!ipation.
parti!ipation)
Zohar (*000) srael *+; ite2 safety !li2ate Supervisory a!tion$ .ut!o2e 2easures) 6he results support the hypothesis that safety
Jetal pro!essing plant questionnaire 'ased on supervisory e:pe!tation$ Ji!roa!!idents (i.e. first !li2ate is a group;level !onstru!t. 6here was
(nR<+0 produ!tion !riti!al in!ident te!hnique role overload$ e:pert aid in3uries) !olle!ted strong within;group ho2ogeneity 'etween
wor5ers in <+ wor5 plus the 6as5 Moad nde: ratings of su'unit ris5$ during < 2onths after e2ployees regarding supervisor safety pra!ti!es$
Zohar (1980) was the pioneer of assessing the state of safety via an attitude questionnaire inste... Page 1E of 18
groups) (Aart C Staveland$ 1988)$ supervisor ratings of 3o' questionnaire !o2pletion these per!eptions varied 'etween wor5;groups.
Supervisor and e:pert ris5 &nalysis) Droup per!eptions of supervisor a!tion and
ratings of ris5. 1:ploratory fa!tor supervisor e:pe!tation were signifi!ant predi!tors
analysis$ !orrelations$ of 2inor in3uries within the su'unit for the <
within;group 2onths post;questionnaire. Per!eptions of
ho2ogeneity$ one;way supervisor e:pe!tation also negatively !orrelated
&F.L&$ ordinary least with lost;days a!!idents$ although supervisor
squares regression$ a!tion did not.
hierar!hi!al linear
2odelling
References
&le:ander$ J.$ #o:$ S.$ C #heyne$ &. (199<$ *nd 9e'ruary). The concept of safety culture ithin a UK offshore organisation. Paper presented at the %nderstanding
"is5 Per!eption #onferen!e$ &'erdeen.
/rown$ (. &.$ Hillis$ P. D.$ C Prussia$ D. 1. (*000). Predi!ting safe e2ployee 'ehaviour in the steel ndustry) ,evelop2ent and test of a so!io;te!hni!al 2odel.
!ournal of "perations Management# $%$ 00<;0E<.
/rown$ ". M.$ C Aol2es$ A. (198E). 6he use of a fa!tor analyti! pro!edure for assessing the validity of an e2ployee safety !li2ate 2odel. &ccident &nalysis and
'revention.# $%(E)$ 00<;080.
#a'rera$ ,. ,.$ sla$ ".$ C Lilela$ M. ,. (1998$ &ugust). &n evaluation of safety climate in ground handling activities. Paper presented at the &viation Safety$
Pro!eedings of the &S#;98 nternational &viation Safety #onferen!e$ Fetherlands.
#arroll$ G. S. (1998). Safety !ulture as an ongoing pro!ess) #ulture surveys as opportunities for enquiry and !hange. (ork and Stress# $)(+)$ *8*;*80.
#heyne$ &.$ C #o:$ S. (199<$ Fove2'er). Uncovering safety culture. Paper presented at the Hor5 and Hell;'eing) &n &genda for 1urope #onferen!e$
Fottingha2.
#heyne$ &.$ #o:$ S.$ .liver$ &.$ C 6o2as$ G. J. (1998). Jodelling safety !li2ate in the predi!tion of levels of safety a!tivity. (ork and Stress# $)$ *<<;*81.
#heyne$ &.$ 6o2as$ G. J.$ #o:$ S.$ C .liver$ &. (1999). Jodelling 12ployee &ttitudes to Safety) & #o2parison &!ross Se!tors. *uropean 'sychologist# +(1)$ 1;
10.
#lar5e$ S. (1999). Per!eptions of organi?ational safety) 2pli!ations for the develop2ent of safety !ulture. !ournal of "rgani,ational -ehaviour# ).$ 18<;198.
#oo5e$ ". &.$ C Mafferty$ G. #. (1989). "rgani,ational /ulture Inventory0 "/I. Ply2outh$ J) Au2an Synergisti!s.
#ooper$ J. ,. (*000). 6owards a 2odel of safety !ulture. Safety Science# 12$ 111;1+E.
#o:$ S.$ C #o:$ 6. (1991). 6he stru!ture of e2ployee attitudes to safety) & 1uropean e:a2ple. (ork and Stress# 3$ 9+;10E.
#o:$ S.$ C #o:$ 6. (199E). Safety# Systems and 'eople. .:ford) /utterworth;Aeine2ann.
#o:$ S.$ C 9lin$ ". (1998). Safety !ulture) philosopherPs stone or 2an of strawN (ork and Stress# $)(+)$ *0*;*1E.
#o:$ S. G.$ C #heyne$ &. G. 6. (*000). &ssessing safety !ulture in offshore environ2ents. Safety Science# 1+$ 111;1*9.
#oyle$ .$ Slee2an$ S.$ C &da2s$ ,. (199<). Safety !li2ate. !ournal of Safety 4esearch# ))$ *08;*<0.
#ullen$ A. M. (1990). The public in5uiry into the 'iper &lpha disaster ("eport to the Parlia2ent 'y the Se!etary of State for 1nergy 'y #o22and of Aer Ja3esty
Lols. 1 and *). Mondon) AJS..
,edo''eleer$ F.$ C /eland$ 9. (1991). & Safety #li2ate Jeasure for #onstru!tion Sites. !ournal of Safety 4esearch# ))$ 98;10+.
,edo''eleer$ F.$ C /eland$ 9. (1998). s ris5 per!eption one of the di2ensions of safety !li2ateN n &. 9reyer C &. Hillia2son (1ds.)$ "ccupational Injury0 4isk
prevention and Intervention. (pp. 8+;81). Mondon) 6aylor C 9ran!is.
,enison$ ,. ". (199E). Hhat is the differen!e 'etween organi?ational !ulture and organi?ational !li2ate. & nativePs point of view on a de!ade of paradig2 wars.
&cademy of Management 4evie# )$$ E19;E<0.
,ia?$ ".$ C #a'rera$ ,. (1998). Safety !li2ate and attitude as evaluation 2easures of organisational safety. &ccident &nalysis and 'revention# )6(<)$ E0+;E<0.
,onald$ .$ C #anter$ ,. (1990). 12ployee attitudes and safety in the !he2i!al industry. !ournal of Loss 'revention in the 'rocess Industries# 7$ *0+;*08. 9a?io$
". A. (198E). Aow do attitudes guide 'ehaviorN n ". J. Sorrentino C 1. 6. Aiggins (1ds.)$ The 8andbook of motivation and cognition0 9oundations of
social behavior (pp. *00;*0+). Few Yor5) Duilford Press.
9ennell$ ,. (1988). Investigation into the King:s /ross underground fire.) ,epart2ent of 6ransport$ AJS..
9erguson$ 1.$ C #o:$ 6. (199+). 1:ploratory 9a!tor &nalysis) & %sersP Duide. International !ournal of Selection and &ssessment# $;)<$ 80;90.
9erguson$ 1.$ C Patterson$ 9. (1998). 6he 9ive 9a!tor 2odel of personality) .penness a distin!t 'ut related !onstru!t. 'ersonality and Individual =ifferences# )+(E)$
889;89E.
9lin$ ".$ Jearns$ (.$ 9le2ing$ J.$ Dordon$ ". (199E). 4isk 'erception and Safety in the "ffshore "il and >as Industry. (.6A 900<0). AS1 /oo5s$ Suffol5.
9lin$ ".$ Jearns$ (.$ .P#onnor$ P.$ C /ryden$ ". (*000). Jeasuring safety !li2ate) identifying the !o22on features. Safety Science# 1+$ 188;19*.
Dlennon$ ,. 1. (198*). Safety climate in organisations. *rgonomics and occupational health. Paper presented at the 19th &nnual #onferen!e of the 1rgono2i!s
so!iety of &ustralia and Few Zeland.
Driffin$ J. &.$ C Feal$ &. (*000). Per!eptions of safety at wor5) & fra2ewor5 for lin5ing safety !li2ate to safety perfor2an!e$ 5nowledge and 2otivation. !ournal
of "ccupational 8ealth 'sychology# 3(+)$ +08;+<8.
Dulden2und$ 9. H. (*000). 6he nature of safety !ulture) a review of theory and resear!h. Safety Science# 1+(1)$ *1<;*<8.
Aealth and Safety #o22ission. (199+). "rganising for Safety0 Third 4eport of the 8uman 9actors Study >roup of &/S?I ;&dvisory /ommittee on the Safety of
?uclear Installations<. Sud'ury) AS1 /oo5s.
Aealth and Safety 1:e!utive. (1998'). 6he Aealth and Safety #li2ate Survey 6ool) AS1.
Aidden$ &. (1989). Investigation into the /lapham !unction 4ailay &ccident.) ,epart2ent of 6ransport$ AJS..
Aofstede$ D. (1980). /ulture:s conse5uenses0 International differences in ork@related values. Mondon) Sage.
&1&. (198E). Summary 4eport on the 'ost@&ccident 4evie Meeting on the /hernobyl &ccident (Safety Series 8<;FS&D;0). Lienna) nternational Safety
&dvisory Droup.
(eenan$ L.$ (err$ H.$ C Sher2an$ H. (19<1). Psy!hologi!al #li2ate and &!!idents in an &uto2otive Plant. !ournal of &pplied 'sychology# 13$ 108;111.
(lein5e$ #. M. (1980). 6wo Jodels for #on!eptualising the &ttitude;/ehavior "elationship. 8uman 4elations# 17(0)$ +++;+<0.
Mee$ 6. (1998). &ssess2ent of safety !ulture at a nu!lear repro!essing plant. (ork and Stress# $)$ *18;*+8.
Mewin$ (.$ Mippitt$ ".$ C Hhite$ ". (. (19+9). Patterns of aggressive 'ehaviour in e:peri2entally !reated so!ial !li2ates. !ournal of Social 'sychology# $.$ *81;
+01.
Mi5ert$ ". (19E1). ?e patterns of management. Few Yor5) J!Draw;Aill.
Mi5ert$ ". (19E8). The human organi,ation0 Its management and value. Few Yor5) J!Draw Aill.
Mitwin$ D. A.$ C Stringer$ ". &. (19E8). Motivation and organi,ational climate. /oston) Aarvard %niversity$ Draduate S!hool of /usiness &d2inistration.
Jare5$ G.$ 6angenes$ /.$ C Aellesoy$ .. A. (198<). 1:perien!e of ris5 and safety. n .. A. Aellesoy (1d.)$ (ork *nvironment Statfjord. (ork *nvironment# 8ealth
and Safety on a ?orth Sea 'latform. .slo) %niversitetsforlaget.
J!Dregor$ ,. (19E0). The human side of the enterprise. Few Yor5) J!Draw;Aill.
Jearns$ (.$ 9lin$ ".$ 9le2ing$ J.$ C Dordon$ ". (1998). 8uman and "rganisational 9actors in "ffshore Safety ( .6A <0+). Suffol5) .ffshore Safety ,ivision$
AS1 'oo5s.
Jearns$ (.$ 9lin$ ".$ Dordon$ ".$ C 9le2ing$ J. (1998). Jeasuring safety !li2ate on offshore installations. (ork and Stress# $)(+)$ *+8;*<0.
Jearns$ (.$ Hhita5er$ S. J.$ C 9lin$ ". (*001). /en!h2ar5ing safety !li2ate in ha?ardous environ2ents) a longitudinal$ interorgani?ational approa!h. )$# +$ 881;
88E.
Feale$ &.$ Driffin$ J. &.$ C Aart$ P. J. (*000). 6he i2pa!t of organisational !li2ate on safety !li2ate and individual 'ehaviour. Safety Science# 1+$ 99;109.
Fis5anen$ 6. (1990'). Safety !li2ate in the road ad2inistration. Safety Science# $7$ *+8;*<<.
.ppenhei2$ &. F. (199*). Auestionnaire design# intervieing and attitude measurement. Mondon) #assell.
.stro2$ M.$ Hilhel2sen$ #.$ C (aplan$ /. (199+). &ssessing safety !ulture. ?uclear Safety# 1+(*)$ 1E+;18*.
Perrow$ #. (1980). ?ormal accidents. Few Yor5) /asi! /oo5s.
Pervin$ M. &. (*00+). The Science of 'ersonality ( *nd ed.). Few Yor5$ FY) .:ford %niversity Press.
Pidgeon$ F. (1991). Safety !ulture and ris5 2anage2ent in organi?ations. !ournal of /ross@/ultural 'sychology# ))(1).
Pidgeon$ F. (1998). Safety !ulture) (ey theoreti!al issues. (ork and Stress# $)(+)$ *0*;*1E.
Prit!hard$ ". ,.$ C (arasi!5$ /. H. (198+). 6he effe!t of organi?ational !li2ate on 2anagerial 3o' perfor2an!e and 3o' satidfa!tion. "rgani,ational -ehaviour and
8uman 'erformance# 6$ 1*E;10E.
"eason$ G. (1998). Managing the risks of organisational accidents. &ldershot) &shgate.
"eason$ G. (1998). &!hieving a safe !ulture) 6heory and pra!ti!e. (ork and Stress# $)(+)$ *9+;+0E.
"ei!hers$ &. 1.$ C S!hneider$ /. (1990). #li2ate and #ulture) &n 1volution of #onstru!ts. n /. S!hneider (1d.)$ "rganisational /limate and /ulture. San
9ran!is!o) Gossey;/ass.
"o'erts$ (. A.$ "ousseau$ ,. J.$ C Ma Porte$ 6. ". (1990). 6he !ulture of high relia'ility) Ouantitative and qualitative assess2ent a'oard nu!lear;powered air!raft
!arriers. !ournal of 8igh Technology Management 4esearch# 3$ 101;1E1.
"o!hlin$ D.$ MaPorte$ 6.$ C "o'erts$ (. A. (1988). 6he self;designing high relia'ility organi?ation) &ir!raft !arrier flight operation at sea. ?aval (ar /ollege
4evie# +.$ 8E;90.
"und2o$ 6. (1990). &sso!iations 'etween safety and !ontingen!y 2easures and o!!upational a!!idents on offshore petroleu2 platfor2s. Scandinavian !ournal of
(ork and *nvironmental 8ealth# ).$ 1*8;1+1.
S!hein$ 1. A. (198<). "rgani,ational culture and leadership. San 9ran!is!o) Gossey;/ass.
S!hein$ 1. A. (199*). "rgani,ational culture and leadership ( *nd ed.). San 9ran!is!o) Gossey;/ass.
S!hneider$ /. (198<). .rgani?ational !li2ates) an essay. 'ersonnel 'sychology# )%$ 008;089.
S!hneider$ /. (1990). "rgani,ational climate and culture. San 9ran!is!o) Gossey;/ass.
Sheen$ J. G. (1988). M.B. 8erald of 9ree *nterprise. Mondon) AJS.) ,epart2ent of 6ransport.
S2ith$ J.$ #ohen$ A.$ #ohen$ &.$ C #leveland$ ". (1988). #hara!teristi!s of su!!essful safety progra2s. !ournal of Safety 4esearch# $.(1)$ <;1<.
6ho2pson$ ". #.$ Ailton$ 6. 9.$ C Hitt$ M. &. (1998). Hhere the safety ru''er 2eets the shop floor) a !onfir2atory 2odel of 2anage2ent influen!e on wor5pla!e
safety. !ournal of Safety 4esearch# )6(1)$ 1<;*0.
6o2as$ G. J.$ Jelia$ G.M.$ C .liver$ &.J. (1999). & !ross validation of a stru!tural equation 2odel of a!!idents) organisational and psy!hologi!al varia'les as
predi!tors of wor5 safety. (ork and Stress# $1(1)$ 09;<8.
%ttal$ /. (198+). 6he !orporate !ulture vultures. 9ortune Maga,ine# $7 "ctober.
Laughan$ ,. (199E). The /hallenger launch decision. 4isky technology# culture# and deviance at ?&S&. #hi!ago) 6he %niversity of #hi!ago Press.
Hei!5$ (. 1. (1988). .rganisational !ulture as a sour!e of high relia'ility. /alifornia Management 4evie# CCIC$ 11*;1*8.
Hei!5$ (. 1. (199<). Sensemaking in "rgani,ations. 6housand .a5s$ #&) Sage.
Hei!5$ (. 1.$ C "o'erts$ (. A. (199+). #olle!tive Jind in .rgani?ations) Aeedful nterrelating on 9light ,e!5s. &dministrative Science Auarterly# 1%$ +<8;+<8.
Hei!5$ (. 1.$ C Sut!liffe$ (. J. (*001). Managing the UneDpected0 &ssuring 8igh 'erformance in an &ge of /ompleDity. San 9ran!is!o) Gossey /ass.
Hhita5er$ S.$ C Yule$ S.G. (under review). .rgani?ational safety and nonlinear dyna2i!s.
Hillia2s$ &.$ ,o'son$ P.$ C Halters$ J. (1989). /hanging /ulture0 ?e "rgani,ational &pproaches. Mondon) PJ.
Hillia2son$ &.$ 9eyer$ &.$ #airns$ ,.$ C /ian!otti$ ,. (1998). 6he develop2ent of a 2easure of safety !li2ate) the role of safety per!eptions and attitudes. Safety
Science# )3(1<;*8).
Yule$ S. G.$ 9lin$ ".$ C Jurdy$ &. G. (*001). Modelling managerial influence on safety climate. Paper presented at the S.P (So!iety of ndustrial and
.rgani?ational Psy!hologists) !onferen!e$ San ,iego$ #&.
Yule$ S. G.$ .P#onnor$ P.$ C 9lin$ ". (under review). 6esting the stru!ture of a generi! safety !li2ate survey instru2ent) 2pli!ations for applied resear!h and
pra!ti!e.
Zohar$ ,. (1980). Safety #li2ate in ndustrial .rgani?ations) 6heoreti!al and &pplied 2pli!ations. !ournal of &pplied 'sychology# 23(1)$ 9E;10*.
Zohar$ ,. (*000). & Droup;Mevel Jodel of Safety #li2ate) 6esting the 1ffe!t of Droup #li2ate on Ji!roa!!idents in Janufa!turing Go's. !ournal of &pplied
'sychology# %3(0)$ <88;<9E.

Safety Culture and Safety Climate A Review - of - The - Literature

Diunggah oleh

Informasi Dokumen

Judul Asli

Hak Cipta

Format Tersedia

Bagikan dokumen Ini

Bagikan atau Tanam Dokumen

Opsi Berbagi

Apakah menurut Anda dokumen ini bermanfaat?

Apakah konten ini tidak pantas?

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

Safety Culture and Safety Climate A Review - of - The - Literature

Diunggah oleh

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

Zohar (1980) was the pioneer of assessing the state of safety via an attitude questionnaire instead ...

Anda mungkin juga menyukai