UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

,
Petitioner vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ANICETO FONTANILLA,
et al.Facts:Private respondent Aniceto Fontanilla purchased from petitioner United Airlines in Manila three (3) "Visit the U.S.A." tickets for
himself,his wife and his son.The Fontanillas proceeded to the United States as planned, where they used the first
coupon from San Francisco to Washington. On April24, 1989, Aniceto Fontanilla bought two (2) additional coupons each for
himself, his wife and his son from petitioner at its office inWashington Dulles Airport. After paying the penalty for rewriting their
tickets, the Fontanillas were issued tickets with corresponding boardingpasses with the words "CHECK-IN REQUIRED," for
United Airlines Flight No. 1108.The cause of the non-boarding of the Fontanillas on United Airlines Flight No. 1108 makes
up the bone of contention of this controversy.
The Fontanillas claim that they were denied boarding, that the employees of United Airlines were discourteous, arbitrary and
discriminatoryOn the other hand, according to United Airlines, the Fontanillas did not initially go to the check-in
counter to get their seat assignments for UAFlight 1108. They instead proceeded to join the queue boarding the
aircraft without first securing their seat assignments as required in their ticket and boarding passes. Having no seat
assignments, the stewardess at the door of the plane instructed them to go to the check-incounter. When the
Fontanillas proceeded to the check-in counter, Linda Allen, the United Airlines Customer Representative at the
counter informed them that the flight was overbooked. She booked them on the next available flight and offered
them denied boarding compensation. Allen vehemently denies uttering the derogatory and racist words attributed to
her by the Fontanillas.The incident prompted the Fontanillas to file Civil Case No. 89-4268 for damages before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati. The TC ruled infavour of the Petitioner. CA reversed, finding that there was an admission on the part of United Airlines that the
Fontanillas did in factobserve the check-in requirement and ruled further that even assuming there was a failure to
observe the check-in requirement, United Airlines failed to comply with the procedure laid down in cases where a
passenger is denied boarding.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent court of appeals gravely erred in ruling that private respondents failure
to check
-in will not defeat hisclaims because the denied boarding rules were not complied with.
Held:
The Court does not agree with the conclusion reached by the appellate court that private respondents failure to
comply with t
His check-in requirement will not defeat his claim as the denied boarding rules were not complied with. Notably, the
appellate court relied on the Code of Federal Regulation Part on Oversales.The appellate court, however, erred in
applying the laws of the United States as, and in the case at bar, Philippine law is the applicable law. Although, the
contract of carriage was to be performed
In the United States, the tickets were purchased through petitioners agent in Manila.
It is true that the tickets were "rewritten" in Washington, D.C. however, such fact did not change the nature of the
original contract of carriage entered into by the parties in Manila. The doctrine of lex loci contractus. According to
the doctrine, as a general rule, the law of the place where a contract is made or entered into governs with respect to
its nature and validity, obligation and interpretation. This has been said to be the rule even though the place where
the contract was made is different from the place where it is to be performed, and particularly so, if the place of the
making and the place of performance are the same. Hence, the court should apply the law of the place where the
airline ticket was issued, when the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in
such State by the defendant airline. The law of the forum on the subject matter is Economic Regulations No. 7 as amended by
Boarding Priority and Denied Board Compensation of the Civil Aeronautics Board which provides that the check-in
requirement be complied with before a passenger may claim against a carrier for being denied boarding: Sec. 5.
Amount of Denied Boarding Compensation Subject to the exceptions provided hereinafter under Section 6, carriers shall pay to
passengers holding confirmed reserved space and who have presented themselves at the proper
Place and time and fully complied with the carriers check
-in and reconfirmation procedures and who are acceptable for
Carriage under the Carriers tariff but who have been denied boarding for lack of space,
compensation at the rate of:
xxxPlaintiffs fail to realize that their failure to check in, as expressly required in their boarding passes, is they very
reason why they were not given their respective seat numbers, which resulted in their being denied boarding. The
private respondents were not able to prove that they were subjected to coarse and harsh treatment by the ground crew of united
Airlines. Neither were they able to show that there was bad faith on part of the carrier airline. CA decision reversed


REPUBLIC V SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. NO. 90478)FACTS:
Private respondents are defendants in Civil Case No. 0008 of the Sandiganbayan. The complaint whichinitiated the action was
denominated one "for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages,"and was avowedly filed pursuant to
Executive Order No. 14. Tantoco Jr and Santiago filed a

MOTION TOSTRIKE OUT SOME PORTIONS OF THE COMPLAINT AND FOR
BILL OF PARTICULARS
OF OTHERPORTIONS

. PCGG filed an opposition thereto and an order by Sandiganbayan in order to expediteproceedings and accommodate the
defendants, gave the PCGG forty-five (45) days to expand its complaint tomake more specific certain allegations.Tantoco and
Santiago then presented a "
motion for leave to file interrogatories
under Rule 25 of the Rules ofCourt. PCGG filed a
motion to strike out said motion and interrogatories
but filed an expanded complaint.Still Tantoco and Santiago reiterated their motion for bill of particulars through a
manifestation. SB
denied
the
motion to strike out for bill of particulars
(PCGG) and for
leave to file interrogatories
(Tantoco) holdingthem to be without legal and factual basis. It declared inter alia the complaint to be

sufficiently definite andclear enough,

there are adequate allegations which portray the supposed involvement and/or allegedparticipation of defendant-movants in the
transactions described in detail in said complaint.PCGG submitted to pre trial and was subsequently required to file a pre trial
briefs. Tantoco & Santiago filedwith SB a pleading for

Interrogatories to Plaintiff

and

Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff

as well as
Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents.
SB admitted the
Amended Interrogatories
and granted
Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents
.Motion for Reconsideration by the PCGG, denied. Petition for Certiorari, claiming that SB acted with graveabuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction in granting the two pleadings of Tantoco.
ISSUE:
Is the granting of amended interrogatories and motion for production and inspection of documents allowed.
HELD:Yes.
Involved in the present proceedings are two of the modes of discovery provided in the Rules of Court:interrogatories to parties,
and production and inspection of documents and things. The ascertainment of all thematerial and relevant facts from the
pleadings and from the evidence adduced by the parties, and second, afterthat determination of the facts has been completed, by
the application of the law thereto to the end that thecontroversy may be settled authoritatively, definitely and finally.
Contending party fully and fairly lays beforethe court the facts in issue and then brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive
all imperfections of formand technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done on the merits. It is the duty of each
contending partyto lay before the court the facts in issue-fully and fairly; i.e., to present to the court all the material and relevant
facts known to him, suppressing or concealing nothing, nor preventing another party, by clever and adroitmanipulation of the
technical rules of pleading and evidence, from also presenting all the facts within hisknowledge.Only "ultimate facts" are set
forth in the pleadings; hence, only the barest outline of the facfual basis of aparty's claims or defenses is limned in his
pleadings. The law says that every pleading "shall contain in amethodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement
of the ultimate facts on which the partypleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of
mere evidentiary facts."The truth is that "evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and learned by the parties before the trial.
Civiltrials should not be carried on in the dark; and the Rules of Court make this ideal possible through thedeposition-discovery
mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29. It not only eliminates unessential issue from trialsthereby shortening them considerably,
but also requires parties to play the game with the cards on the table sothat the possibility of fair settlement before trial is
measurably increased.The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-
trialhearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device forascertaining the
facts relative to those issues, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and factsbefore trials and thus prevent that
said trials are carried on in the dark.The inquiry extends to all facts which are relevant, whether they be ultimate or evidentiary,
excepting onlythose matters which are privileged. discovery of every bit of information which may be useful in thepreparation
for trial, such as the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts; thoserelevant facts themselves; and the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books,documents, or other tangible things. Either party
may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has inhis possession.Liberty of a party to make discovery is well nigh
unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwiserelevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and
within the bounds of the law.
Petitioner's first contention

that the
interrogatories in question are defective
because they (a) do not namethe particular individuals to whom they are propounded, being addressed only to the PCGG, and
(b) are"fundamentally the same matters . . (private respondents) sought to be clarified through their aborted Motionfor
Bill of Particulars
"

are
untenable
and quickly disposed of.Petitioner's objections to the interrogatories served on it in accordance with Rule 25 of the Rules of
Courtcannot be sustained. If the party served with interrogatories is a juridical entity such as "a public or privatecorporation or a
partnership or association," the same shall be "answered . . by any officer thereof competent totestify in its behalf.
Interrogatories are addressed only to the PCGG, without naming any specificcommissioner or officer thereof, is utterly of no
consequence, and may not be invoked as a reason to refuse toanswer. As the rule states, the interrogatories shall be answered
"by any officer thereof competent to testify inits behalf. Bill of particulars may elicit only ultimate facts, not so-called
evidentiary facts.Interrogatories deal with factual matters which will be part of the PCGG's proof upon trial, is not ground
forsuppressing them either. A party may . . . call an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of apublic or private
corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party, and interrogate himby leading questions and contradict
and impeach him in all respects

Eugenio Cuaresma vs Marcelo Daquis et al
ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2012
63 SCRA 257 Legal Ethics A lawyer owes candor to the court
An order to demolish the property where Cuaresma was staying was issued by a trial judge pursuant to a civil case filed by
Daquis. Cuaresmas lawyer, Atty. Macario Directo, filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court where he alleged that
they had no knowledge of the said civil case hence the order of demolition is unjust. The Supreme Court however later found
out that Cuaresma and his lawyer in fact knew of the existence of said civil case. The Supreme Court then directed Directo to
show cause why he should not be disciplined.
In his explanation, Directo stated that what he meant was that he and his client belatedly learned of the civil case; that had
there been a mistake committed, it had been an honest one, and would say in all sincerity that there was no deliberate attempt
and intent on his part of misleading this Honorable Court, honestly and totally unaware of any false allegation in the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Directo should be subject to disciplinary actions.
HELD: No. But he was reprimanded by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court gave Directo the benefit of the doubt although it
did say that Directos reasoning could very well be just an afterthought. The Supreme Court also stated that Directo is presumed
to be in good faith especially so that the misstatements in his petition could be attributed either to his carelessness or his lack of
English proficiency. The Supreme Court admonished Directo to prepare pleadings carefully in the future so that the least doubt
as to his intellectual honesty cannot be entertained. Every member of the bar should realize that candor in the dealings with the
Court is of the very essence of honorable membership in the profession.
RODOLFO DE LEON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES
ESTELITA and AVELINO BATUNGBACAL, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J .:
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It
seeks to annul and set aside the resolution
i[1]
dated January 13, 1999 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R.
CV No. 57989, denying petitioners motion (a) to dismiss the appeals of private respondents, and (b) to
suspend the period to file appellees brief. Also assailed is the CA resolution
ii[2]
dated April 19, 1999,
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On March 11, 1996, petitioner Rodolfo de Leon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bataan, Branch
3, a complaint
iii[3]
for a sum of money plus damages, with a prayer for preliminary attachment, against
herein private respondents Avelino and Estelita Batungbacal. The complaint averred that private
respondent Estelita Batungbacal executed a promissory note
iv[4]
in favor of herein petitioner for her
P500,000 loan with stipulated interest at 5 percent monthly. The loan and interest remained unpaid
allegedly because the check issued by Estelita was dishonored. Private respondents filed an answer with
counterclaim. Estelita admitted the loan obligation, but Avelino denied liability on the ground that his wife
was not the designated administrator and therefore had no authority to bind the conjugal partnership.
Avelino further averred that his wife contracted the debt without his knowledge and consent.
Based on Estelitas admission, petitioner filed a motion for partial judgment against Estelita, which
the trial court granted in an order
v[5]
dated May 14, 1996:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings is hereby granted in accordance
with Sec. 4 of Rule 36, Rules of Court. As prayed for, judgment is hereby rendered against Estelita Q.
Batungbacal, ordering her to pay plaintiff Rodolfo de Leon the principal amount of the loan obligation of
P500,000.00 plus the stipulated interest which has accrued thereon at 5% per month since May 1995 until
now, plus interest at the legal rate on said accrued interest from date of judicial demand until the
obligation is fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Counsel for private respondent spouses received a copy of the partial judgment on May 21, 1996, but
no appeal was taken therefrom. Thus, petitioner filed a motion for execution of said judgment on June 6,
1996. Counsel for private respondents was furnished a copy of the motion on the same date. As private
respondents interposed no objection, a writ of execution was correspondingly issued. The sheriff then
proceeded to execute the writ and partially satisfied the judgment award against the paraphernal property
of Estelita and the conjugal properties of the private respondents with due notice to the latter and their
counsel. Again, private respondents interposed no objection.
Pre-trial was held and trial proceeded on two main issues: (1) whether the loan was secured with the
knowledge and consent of the husband and whether the same redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership; and (2) whether the capital of the husband would be liable if the conjugal assets or the
paraphernal property of the wife were insufficient to satisfy the loan obligation. On June 2, 1997, the trial
court rendered judgment
vi[6]
ordering private respondent Avelino Batungbacal to pay the amount of the
loan plus interest and other amounts in accordance with Article 121 of the Family Code.
Counsel for private respondent spouses received a copy of the decision on June 6, 1997. Avelino
through counsel, filed a notice of appeal
vii[7]
on June 19, 1997. In a notice of appearance
viii[8]
dated June 25,
1997 bearing the conformity solely of Estelita, a new counsel appeared in collaboration with the counsel
of record for the private respondents. On the same date, Estelita through said new counsel, served a notice
that she is appealing both decisions promulgated on May 14, 1996, and June 2, 1997, to the Court of
Appeals. However, the trial court, in an order
ix[9]
dated July 7, 1997 denied the notice of appeal
x[10]
filed by
Estelita on the ground that said notice was filed beyond the reglementary period to appeal.
Private respondents appeal was docketed with the respondent Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. CV No.
57989. Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal with Motion to
Suspend period to file Appellees Brief
xi[11]
on October 21, 1998. Petitioner based his motion to dismiss on
the following grounds: (1) that the statement of the case as well as the statement of the facts in the
appellants brief do not have page references to the record, and that the authorities relied upon in the
arguments are not cited by the page of the report at which the case begins and the page of the report on
which the citation is found; (2) that no copy of the appealed decision of the lower court was attached to
the appellants brief, in violation of the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals; (3) that private respondents
furnished only one copy of the appellants brief to the petitioner, also in violation of the Rules of Court;
(4) that the decision promulgated against Estelita on May 14, 1996 is no longer appealable; and (5) that
the notice of appeal filed on June 25, 1996 by Estelita concerning the decision of the trial court against
Avelino was filed beyond the reglementary period to appeal.
xii[12]
The motion also prayed that the period
for filing the appellees brief be suspended in view of the pendency of the motion to dismiss.
xiii[13]

Private respondents, in their opposition,
xiv[14]
insisted that the statements of the case as well as the
statement of facts in their brief contained page references to the record, and that Estelita had seasonably
filed her appeal. Private respondent spouses also stated that they had filed an Amended Appellants
Brief
xv[15]
on November 27, 1998 and that two copies thereof had been served on petitioner together with
copies of the trial courts decisions.
On January 13, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution
xvi[16]
denying petitioners
motion to dismiss and virtually admitting the Amended Appellants Brief as follows:
As submitted by appellants, they adopted pertinent portions of the appealed Decision in the Statement
of the Case, indicated specific pages in the appealed decision where the quoted portions are found. In the
bottom of page 2 of the brief, is the quoted portions of the decision, referring to pages 1 and 2 thereof. On
page 3 of the brief is the dispositive portion, taken on page 11 of the decision. The rest of the narration in
the Statement of the Case are the specific dates of the pleadings, orders, and portions of the decision citing
the page references where they are found.
Two (2) copies of the Amended Brief were served upon appellee with the appealed Decision attached
as Annex A, and B.
Appellant Estellita Batungbacal explained that her appeal was filed on time. She cited Guevarra, et.
al. vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., L-49017 and 49024, that a partial judgment may be appealed only together
with the judgment in the main case. She personally received a copy of the main Decision, dated June 2,
1997 on June 10, 1997, and filed her notice of appeal dated June 25, 1995 (sic) sent by registered mail on
even date, per Registry Receipt No. 2618, attached as Annex C hereof, thereby showing that the notice
of appeal was filed within 15 days from receipt of the Decision appealed from. At any rate, the merit of
appellees contention that appellant Estellita Batungbacal can no longer appeal from the decision may be
resolved after the case is considered ready for study and report.
WHEREFORE, the motion to dismiss is hereby DENIED, and appellee is required to file his
appellees brief within forty-five (45) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
On January 22, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
xvii[17]
of the aforesaid resolution but
said motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in a resolution
xviii[18]
dated April 19, 1999, the pertinent
portion of which reads as follows:
The resolution promulgated on January 13, 1999 required appellee to file his appellees brief within
forty-five (45) days from receipt of that resolution, or up to March 4, 1999. Up to this date no appellees
brief has been submitted.
WHEREFORE, the appeal by appellants is deemed submitted for decision without the benefit of
appellees brief, and the records of this case is hereby transmitted to the Raffle Committee, for re-raffle,
for study and report.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
xix[19]
wherein petitioner contends that respondent
Court of Appeals acted:
(1) WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT
ESTELITA BATUNGBACAL;
(2) WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN DISREGARD OF THE EXPRESS
MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS OF THE RULES AS WELL AS AGAINST SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT DENIED THE PETITIONERS MOTION TO DISMISS THE
APPEAL OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT SPOUSES;
(3) WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN GRAVE VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS OF
LAW IN ADMITTING THE AMENDED APPELLANTS BRIEF FILED BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS AND IN REQUIRING THE PETITIONER AS APPELLEE TO FILE HIS
APPELLEES BRIEF;
(4) WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN IT RESOLVED TO HAVE THE APPEAL OF THE
APPELLANT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DEEMED SUBMITTED FOR DECISION WITHOUT
BENEFIT OF APPELLEES BRIEF.
xx[20]

Simply put, the following are the issues presented before this Court for resolution: (1) whether or not
the appellate court erred in taking cognizance of the appeal; and (2) whether or not the appellate court
erred or committed grave abuse of discretion when it considered the appeal as submitted for decision
without petitioners brief.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the decisions of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6480
promulgated on May 14, 1996 and June 2, 1997 had become final and executory as to private respondent
Estelita Batungbacal. This is because Estelita never appealed the partial judgment promulgated on May
14, 1996. In fact, there has been a partial execution of said judgment with notice to and without objection
from private respondent spouses. As regards the decision dated June 2, 1997, petitioner contends that the
same had become final for failure to file the notice of appeal within 15 days, counted from the time
counsel of record for private respondent spouses received a copy on June 6, 1997 and not from the time
Estelita received a copy on June 10, 1997. Petitioner points to Section 2 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court
and argues that since the trial court never ordered that service of the judgment be made upon Estelita, she
was not entitled to service of the judgment. The fact that she received a copy of the judgment separately
from her counsel cannot prejudice the legal consequences arising out of prior receipt of copy of the
decision by her counsel. It was thus clear error for the Court of Appeals to accept Estelitas argument that
the reglementary period commenced not from receipt of a copy of the decision by counsel of record but
from the time she received a copy of the decision. The appeal having been filed out of time, the Court of
Appeals did not have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal of Estelita.
Petitioner also assails the appellants brief for certain formal defects. As pointed out in his motion to
dismiss filed before the public respondent, there are no page references to the record in the statements of
the case and of the facts in the appellants brief submitted by private respondents. Petitioner asserts that
while there are many pleadings and orders mentioned in said statements, only the decision dated June 2,
1997 is cited, and the citation is limited only to the particular page or pages in said decision where the
citation or quotation is taken, without any reference to the pages in the record where the decision can be
found. Neither is there reference to the pages in the record where the particular cited or quoted portions of
the decision can be found.
Petitioner likewise alleges that the authorities relied upon in the appellants brief of private
respondents are also not cited by the page on which the citation is found, as required in Sec. 13 (f) of Rule
44 of the Rules of Court. Page references to the record are also required in Section 13, paragraphs (c), (d)
and (f) of Rule 44 and absence thereof is a ground for dismissal of the appeal, pursuant to Sec. 1 (f) of
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner also harps on the failure of private respondents to furnish
petitioner with two copies of the original appellants brief, to submit proof of service of two copies of the
brief on the appellee, and to furnish the petitioner with two copies of the amended appellants brief as
required by the Rules of Court. Additionally, petitioner asserts that the failure of private respondents to
append copies of the appealed decisions to their appellants brief constitutes a violation of the Internal
Rules of the Court of Appeals and is likewise a ground for dismissal under Section 1 of Rule 50 of the
Rules of Court.
Lastly, petitioner contends that the virtual admission into the record by the respondent court of the
amended appellants brief of the private respondents under the resolution dated January 13, 1999 and its
corresponding action to require the petitioner to respond thereto, constitute grave abuse of discretion and
blatant disregard of due process of law because the amended brief was filed without leave of court.
Private respondents, for their part, argue that the resolutions being assailed by petitioner are
interlocutory in character because the Court of Appeals still has to decide the appeal on the merits; hence,
certiorari does not lie in his favor. Private respondents allege that petitioner has another adequate and
speedy remedy, i.e., to file his brief raising all issues before the Court of Appeals. Once the appeal is
resolved on the merits, all proper issues may be elevated to the Supreme Court. An order denying a
motion to dismiss being merely interlocutory, it cannot be the basis of a petition for certiorari. The proper
remedy is to appeal in due course after the case is decided on the merits.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
On the first issue, we find that the Court of Appeals did not act without jurisdiction in entertaining the
appeal filed by private respondent Estelita Batungbacal. Contrary to petitioners apparent position, the
judgments rendered by the trial court in this case are not several judgments under the Rules of Court so
that there would be multiple periods of finality.
A several judgment is proper only when the liability of each party is clearly separable and distinct
from that of his co-parties, such that the claims against each of them could have been the subject of
separate suits, and judgment for or against one of them will not necessarily affect the other.
xxi[21]
Where a
common cause of action exists against the defendants, as in actions against solidary debtors, a several
judgment is not proper. In this case, private respondents are sued together under a common cause of action
and are sought to be held liable as solidary debtors for a loan contracted by Estelita. This is the clear
import of the allegation in the complaint that the proceeds of the loan benefited the conjugal partnership.
Thus, between the two judgments rendered by the trial court, there could only be one judgment that
finally disposes of the case on the merits. Receipt of notice of this final judgment marks the point when
the reglementary period is to begin running. In this case, that judgment is the decision
xxii[22]
rendered by the
trial court on June 2, 1997 and it is only from the date of notice of this decision that the reglementary
period began to run. The partial judgment dated May 14, 1996 was rendered only with respect to one issue
in the case and is not the final and appealable order or judgment that finally disposes of the case on the
merits.
xxiii[23]
It must, therefore, only be appealed together with the decision dated June 2, 1997.
A final order is that which gives an end to the litigation.
xxiv[24]
When the order or judgment does not
dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be done upon the merits, it is merely
interlocutory.
xxv[25]
Quite obviously, the partial judgment ordering Estelita to pay petitioner is an
interlocutory order because it leaves other things for the trial court to do and does not decide with finality
the rights and obligations of the parties. Specifically, at the time the partial judgment was rendered, there
remained other issues including whether the husband Avelino had any liability under Article 121 of the
Family Code. However, as the partial judgment disposed of one of the issues involved in the case, it is to
be taken in conjunction with the decision dated June 2, 1997. Together, these two issuances form one
integrated decision.
The question now is when the period to appeal should actually commence, from June 6, 1997, as
petitioner contends; or from June 10, 1997, as private respondent Estelita Batungbacal claims? We hold
that the period began to run on June 6, 1997 when counsel for private respondents received a copy of the
decision dated June 2, 1997. When a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and
notices must be made upon said attorney and notice to the client and to any other lawyer, not the counsel
of record, is not notice in law.
xxvi[26]
The exception to this rule is when service upon the party himself has
been ordered by the court.
xxvii[27]
In this case, it does not appear that there was any substitution of counsel or
that service upon private respondent Estelita Batungbacal had been specifically ordered by the trial court;
hence, the counsel of record for the private respondents is presumed to be their counsel on appeal and the
only one authorized to receive court processes. Notice of the judgment upon such counsel, therefore, was
notice to the clients for all legal intents and purposes.
Private respondents appeal had been taken within the reglementary period since Avelino Batungbacal
had filed a notice of appeal on June 19, 1997 or 13 days from their counsels receipt of the decision on
June 6, 1997. Respondent spouses having been jointly sued under a common cause of action, an appeal
made by the husband inures to the benefit of the wife. The notice of appeal filed by Estelita was a
superfluity, the appeal having been perfected earlier by her husband.
We come now to petitioners contention that the appellants brief suffers from fatal defects.
Worth stressing, the grounds for dismissal of an appeal under Section 1 of Rule 50
xxviii[28]
of the Rules
of Court are discretionary upon the Court of Appeals. This can be seen from the very wording of the Rules
which uses the word may instead of shall. This Court has held in Philippine National Bank vs.
Philippine Milling Co., Inc.
xxix[29]
that Rule 50, Section 1 which provides specific grounds for dismissal of
appeal manifestly confers a power and does not impose a duty. What is more, it is directory, not
mandatory.
xxx[30]
With the exception of Sec. 1(b), the grounds for the dismissal of an appeal are directory
and not mandatory, and it is not the ministerial duty of the court to dismiss the appeal.
xxxi[31]
The discretion,
however, must be a sound one to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play having
in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.
xxxii[32]

The Court of Appeals rightly exercised its discretion when, in denying petitioners motion to dismiss,
it ruled that the citations contained in the appellants brief were in substantial compliance with the rules.
Where the citations found in the appellants brief could sufficiently enable the appellate court to locate
expeditiously the portions of the record referred to, there is substantial compliance with the requirements
of Section 13(c) and (d), Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. Such determination was properly within the
appellate courts discretion. Nothing in the records indicate that it was exercised capriciously,
whimsically, or with a view of permitting injury upon a party litigant. For the same reasons, we hold that
the respondent Court of Appeals also did not err when it did not dismiss the appeal based on the allegation
that appellants brief failed to comply with the internal rules of said court.
However, the Court of Appeals erred in requiring petitioner to file the appellees brief in response to
the amended appellants brief. Note that the amended brief was filed without the proper motion for leave
to do so and corresponding order from the respondent court. Even more significant, it was filed beyond the
extensions of time granted to appellants. The discretion in accepting late briefs conferred upon respondent
court which this Court applied in the cases of Maqui vs. CA
xxxiii[33]
and Vda. de Haberer vs. CA,
xxxiv[34]
finds
no application under the present circumstances because, unlike in these two cases, here no valid reason
was advanced for the late filing of the amended brief. While the amended brief
xxxv[35]
might contain no
substantial and prejudicial changes, it was error for the respondent court to accept the amended brief as
filed and then require petitioner to file appellees brief because admittedly the amended brief was filed
beyond August 31, 1998, the last period of extension granted to private respondents.
On the second issue, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
considering the appeal submitted for decision. The proper remedy in case of denial of the motion to
dismiss is to file the appellees brief and proceed with the appeal. Instead, petitioner opted to file a motion
for reconsideration which, unfortunately, was pro forma. All the grounds raised therein have been
discussed in the first resolution of the respondent Court of Appeals. There is no new ground raised that
might warrant reversal of the resolution. A cursory perusal of the motion would readily show that it was a
near verbatim repetition of the grounds stated in the motion to dismiss; hence, the filing of the motion for
reconsideration did not suspend the period for filing the appellees brief. Petitioner was therefore properly
deemed to have waived his right to file appellees brief.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The resolutions dated January 13, 1999 and April 19, 1999
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57989 are AFFIRMED, and the Court of Appeals is ordered
to proceed with the appeal and decide the case with dispatch. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, De Leon, Jr., and Corona, JJ., concur.




De Liano vs ca

LEGAL NOTE 0034: FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS ON APPELLANTS BRIEF WOULD
LEAD TO DISMISSAL OF APPEAL.
SOURCE: ADELIA C. MENDOZA AND AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT OF ALICE MALLETA VS. UNITED
COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, INC. (G.R. NO. 165575, 2 FEBRUARY 2011, PERALTA, J .) (SUBJECT: FAILURE
TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS ON APPELLANTS BRIEF).
xx
CASE STORY:

IN A FORECLOSURE CASE PETITIONER FILED AN APPELLANTS BRIEF BEFORE THE C.A. THE
APPELLANTS BRIEF CONTAINED ONLY THE FOLLOWING TOPICS: (1) PREFARATORY STATEMENT; (2)
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS; (3) PARTIES; (4) STATEMENT OF THE CASE;
(5) ISSUES; (6) ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSION; AND (7) PRAYER.
THE APPELLANTS BRIEF DID NOT HAVE THE FOLLOWING ITEMS: (1) A SUBJECT INDEX OF THE
MATTER IN THE BRIEF WITH A DIGEST OF THE ARGUMENTS AND PAGE REFERENCES, AND A TABLE
OF CASES ALPHABETICALLY ARRANGED, TEXTBOOKS AND STATUTES CITED WITH REFERENCES TO
THE PAGES WHERE THEY ARE CITED; (2) AN ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS; (3) ON THE AUTHORITIES
CITED, REFERENCES TO THE PAGE OF THE REPORT AT WHICH THE CASE BEGINS AND PAGE OF THE
REPORT ON WHICH THE CITATION IS FOUND; (4) PAGE REFERENCES TO THE RECORD IN THE
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE. RESPONDENT PRAYED FOR DISMISSAL OF
APPEAL.
PETITIONER CONTENDED THAT THAT THE ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS WERE ONLY DESIGNATED AS
ISSUES IN THEIR APPELLANTS BRIEF; AND ALTHOUGH THE DESIGNATION OF THE ASSIGNMENT
OF ERROR MAY VARY, THE SUBSTANCE THEREOF REMAINS. MOREOVER, PETITIONERS STATED
THAT THE TEXTBOOKS AND STATUTES WERE CITED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE PORTION WHERE
THEY ARE QUOTED, WHICH IS MORE CONVENIENT AND FACILITATES READY REFERENCE OF THE
LEGAL AND JURISPRUDENTIAL BASIS OF THE ARGUMENTS. THEY CLAIMED THAT THE ABSENCE OF A
SUBJECT INDEX DOES NOT SUBSTANTIALLY DEVIATE FROM THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE RULES OF
COURT, BECAUSE ONE CAN EASILY GO OVER THE APPELLANTS BRIEF AND CAN DESIGNATE THE
PARTS WITH NOMINAL PRUDENCE. THEY POINTED OUT THAT SECTION 6 OF THE RULES OF COURT
PROVIDES FOR A LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE RULES IN ORDER TO PROMOTE THEIR OBJECTIVE
OF SECURING A JUST, SPEEDY AND INEXPENSIVE DISPOSITION OF EVERY ACTION AND PROCEEDING.
C.A. DISMISSED THE CASE. SC AFFIRMED.
WHAT IS THE ISSUE IN THE CASE ABOVE?
The main issue is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioners appeal on the ground that their
Appellants Brief failed to comply with Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as the said brief did not have
a subject index, an assignment of errors, and page references to the record in the Statement of Facts.
Petitioners argue that the absence of a subject index in their Appellants Brief is not a material deviation from the requirements
of Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, and that each portion of the 12-page brief was boldly
designated to separate each portion.
Moreover, petitioners contend that while the assignment of errors was not designated as such in their Appellants Brief, the
assignment of errors were clearly embodied in the Issues thereof, which substantially complies with the rules.
IS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS ON APPELLANTS BRIEF A VALID CAUSE FOR
DISMISSING AN APPEAL?
YES. BECAUSE RIGHT TO APPEAL IS MERELY A STATUTORY PRIVILEGE. THUS, AN APPEALING PARTY
MUST STRICTLY COMPLY WITH THE REQUISITES LAID DOWN IN THE RULES.
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
[28]
An appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party
must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.
[29]

WHAT ARE THE CONTENTS OF AN APPELLANTS BRIEF?
In regard to ordinary appealed cases to the Court of Appeals, such as this case, Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides for the contents of an Appellants Brief, thus:

Sec. 13. Contents of appellants brief.The appellants brief shall contain, in the order herein indicated, the following:
(a) A subject index of the matter in the brief with a digest of the arguments and page references, and a table of cases
alphabetically arranged, textbooks and statutes cited with references to the pages where they are cited;
(b) An assignment of errors intended to be urged, which errors shall be separately, distinctly and concisely stated without
repetition and numbered consecutively;
(c) Under the heading Statement of the Case, a clear and concise statement of the nature of the action, a summary of the
proceedings, the appealed rulings and orders of the court, the nature of the judgment and any other matters necessary to an
understanding of the nature of the controversy, with page references to the record;
(d) Under the heading Statement of Facts, a clear and concise statement in a narrative form of the facts admitted by both
parties and of those in controversy, together with the substance of the proof relating thereto in sufficient detail to make it clearly
intelligible, with page references to the record;
(e) A clear and concise statement of the issues of fact or law to be submitted to the court for its judgment;
(f) Under the heading Argument, the appellants arguments on each assignment of error with page references to the record.
The authorities relied upon shall be cited by the page of the report at which the case begins and the page of the report on which
the citation is found;
(g) Under the heading Relief, a specification of the order or judgment which the appellant seeks; and
(h) In cases not brought up by record on appeal, the appellants brief shall contain, as an appendix, a copy of the judgment or
final order appealed from.
WHAT IS THE IMPORTANCE OF A SUBJECT INDEX?
In this case, the Appellants Brief of petitioners did not have a subject index. The importance of a subject index should not be
underestimated. De Liano v. Court of Appeals
[30]
declared that the subject index functions like a table of contents, facilitating
the review of appeals by providing ready reference. It held that:
[t]he first requirement of an appellants brief is a subject index. The index is intended to facilitate the review of appeals by
providing ready reference, functioning much like a table of contents. Unlike in other jurisdictions, there is no limit on the length
of appeal briefs or appeal memoranda filed before appellate courts. The danger of this is the very real possibility that the
reviewing tribunal will be swamped with voluminous documents. This occurs even though the rules consistently urge the
parties to be brief or concise in the drafting of pleadings, briefs, and other papers to be filed in court. The subject index
makes readily available at ones fingertips the subject of the contents of the brief so that the need to thumb through the brief
page after page to locate a partys arguments, or a particular citation, or whatever else needs to be found and considered, is
obviated.
[31]

IS ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS SAME AS STATEMENT OF ISSUES?
NO. AN ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS IS AN ENUMERATION BY THE APPELLANT OF THE ERRORS ALLEGED
TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT FOR WHICH HE/SHE SEEKS TO OBTAIN A
REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT, WHILE THE STATEMENT OF ISSUES PUTS FORTH THE QUESTIONS OF
FACT OR LAW TO BE RESOLVED BY THE APPELLATE COURT.
[33]

Moreover, the Appellants Brief had no assignment of errors, but petitioners insist that it is embodied in the Issues of the
brief. The requirement under Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for an assignment of errors in
paragraph (b) thereof is different from a statement of the issues of fact or law in paragraph (e) thereof. The statement of
issues is not to be confused with the assignment of errors, since they are not one and the same; otherwise, the rules would not
require a separate statement for each.
[32]
An assignment of errors is an enumeration by the appellant of the errors alleged to have
been committed by the trial court for which he/she seeks to obtain a reversal of the judgment, while the statement of issues puts
forth the questions of fact or law to be resolved by the appellate court.
[33]


WHY SHOULD THE STATEMENT OF FACTS BE SUPPORTED BY PAGE REFERENCES?
IF A STATEMENT OF FACT IS UNACCOMPANIED BY A PAGE REFERENCE TO THE RECORD, IT MAY BE
PRESUMED TO BE WITHOUT SUPPORT IN THE RECORD AND MAY BE STRICKEN OR DISREGARDED
ALTOGETHER.
[34]

Further, the Court of Appeals found that the Statement of Facts was not supported by page references to the record. De Liano v.
Court of Appeals held:
x x x The facts constitute the backbone of a legal argument; they are determinative of the law and jurisprudence applicable to
the case, and consequently, will govern the appropriate relief. Appellants should remember that the Court of Appeals is
empowered to review both questions of law and of facts. Otherwise, where only a pure question of law is involved, appeal
would pertain to this Court. An appellant, therefore, should take care to state the facts accurately though it is permissible to
present them in a manner favorable to one party. x x x Facts which are admitted require no further proof, whereas facts in
dispute must be backed by evidence. Relative thereto, the rule specifically requires that ones statement of facts should be
supported by page references to the record. Indeed, disobedience therewith has been punished by dismissal of the appeal. Page
references to the record are not an empty requirement. If a statement of fact is unaccompanied by a page reference to the
record, it may be presumed to be without support in the record and may be stricken or disregarded altogether.
[34]

WHAT IS THE LEGAL BASIS FOR DISMISSING THE APPEAL IF THE RULE ON APPELLANTS BRIEF IS
NOT FOLLOWED STRICTLY?
The assignment of errors and page references to the record in the statement of facts are important in an Appellants Brief as the
absence thereof is a basis for the dismissal of an appeal under Section 1 (f), Rule 50, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, thus:
SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on
that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
x x x x
(f ) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellants brief, or of page references to the record as required in section
13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d) and (f) of Rule 44.
PETITIONER PLEAD FOR LIBERALITY IN CONSTRUING THE RULES. IS HE CORRECT.
NO. TO DISREGARD THE RULES IN THE GUISE OF LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION WOULD BE TO DEFEAT
THE PURPOSE OF THE RULES WHICH IS THE PROPER AND PROMPT DISPOSITION OF CASES.
Rules 44 and 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are designed for the proper and prompt disposition of cases before the
Court of Appeals.
[35]
Rules of procedure exist for a noble purpose, and to disregard such rules in the guise of liberal
construction would be to defeat such purpose.
[36]
The Court of Appeals noted in its Resolution denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration that despite ample opportunity, petitioners never attempted to file an amended appellants brief correcting the
deficiencies of their brief, but obstinately clung to their argument that their Appellants Brief substantially complied with the
rules. Such obstinacy is incongruous with their plea for liberality in construing the rules on appeal.
[37]

De Liano v. Court of Appeals held:
Some may argue that adherence to these formal requirements serves but a meaningless purpose, that these may be ignored with
little risk in the smug certainty that liberality in the application of procedural rules can always be relied upon to remedy the
infirmities. This misses the point. We are not martinets; in appropriate instances, we are prepared to listen to reason, and to give
relief as the circumstances may warrant. However, when the error relates to something so elementary as to be inexcusable, our
discretion becomes nothing more than an exercise in frustration. It comes as an unpleasant shock to us that the contents of an
appellants brief should still be raised as an issue now. There is nothing arcane or novel about the provisions of Section 13,
Rule 44. The rule governing the contents of appellants briefs has existed since the old Rules of Court, which took effect onJuly
1, 1940, as well as the Revised Rules of Court, which took effect on January 1, 1964, until they were superseded by the present
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The provisions were substantially preserved, with few revisions.
[38]


MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION and AURMELA GANZON vs.
RAUL DE LEON
G.R. No. 165622 [ October 17, 2008]
Facts:
Respondent Raul T. De Leon, a judge, noticed that his left eye was reddish. He also had difficulty reading. On the same
evening, he met a friend who happened to be a doctor, Dr. Charles Milla. The latter prescribed the drugs
CortisporinOpthalmic and Ceftin to relieve his eye problems. Before heading to work the following morning, De Leon
went to the Betterliving, Paraaque, branch of Mercury Drug Store Corporation to buy the prescribed medicines. He showed his
prescription to petitioner AurmelaGanzon, a pharmacist assistant. At his chambers, De Leon requested his sheriff to assist him
in using the eye drops. As instructed, the sheriff applied 2-3 drops on respondents left eye. Instead of relieving his irritation,
respondent felt searing pain. He immediately rinsed the affected eye with water, but the pain did not subside. Only then did he
discover that he was given the wrong medicine, CortisporinOtic Solution. De Leon returned to the same Mercury Drug
branch, with his left eye still red and teary. When he confronted Ganzon why he was given ear drops, instead of the prescribed
eye drops, she did not apologize and instead brazenly replied that she was unable to fully read the prescription and it was her
supervisor who apologized and informed De Leon that they do not have stock of the needed CortisporinOpthalmic. De Leon
wrote Mercury Drug, through its president, Ms. Vivian K. Askuna, about the days incident. Instead, two sales persons went to
his office and informed him that their supervisor was busy with other matters. Having been denied his simple desire for a
written apology and explanation, De Leon filed a complaint for damages against Mercury Drug.
Issue:
Whether or not the Mercury Drug and Ganzon are liable.
Ruling:
Yes. Mercury Drug and Ganzoncannot exculpate themselves from any liability. As active players in the field of dispensing
medicines to the public, the highest degree of care and diligence is expected of them. Likewise, numerous decisions, both here
and abroad, have laid salutary rules for the protection of human life and human health. In the United States case of Tombari v.
Conners, it was ruled that the profession of pharmacy demands care and skill, and druggists must exercise care of a specially
high degree, the highest degree of care known to practical men. In other words, druggists must exercise the highest practicable
degree of prudence and vigilance, and the most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable conduct of the
business, so that human life may not constantly be exposed to the danger flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons for
harmless medicines.
In cases where an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there has
been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection or supervision of ones employees. This presumption may
be rebutted by a clear showing that the employer has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family. Mercury
Drug failed to overcome such presumption.
Petitioners Mercury Drug and Ganzon have similarly failed to live up to high standard of diligence expected of them as
pharmacy professionals. They were grossly negligent in dispensing ear drops instead of the prescribed eye drops to De Leon.
As a buyer, De Leon relied on the expertise and experience of Mercury Drug and its employees in dispensing to him the right
medicine. This Court has ruled that in the purchase and sale of drugs, the buyer and seller do not stand at arms length. There
exists an imperative duty on the seller or the druggist to take precaution to prevent death or injury to any person who relies on
ones absolute honesty and peculiar learning.