Aswath Damodaran 1

Corporate Finance: Instructors Manual

Applied Corporate Finance - Second Edition
Aswath Damodaran
Stern School of Business
This is my attempt at an instructors manual. It is built around the slides I use
for my corporate nance class at Stern (which last 14 weeks and 26 sessions).
The notes for the slides are included. Please use what you want, abandon what
does not work and add or modify as you go along. You can download the
powerpoint slides on my website!
Aswath Damodaran 2
The Objective in Corporate Finance
If you dont know where you are going, it does not matter how you get
there
This is the big picture of corporate nance.
Tie in the course outline to the big picture. (I put session numbers on this page
to show when we will be doing what)
Emphasize the common sense basis of corporate nance. Note that people have
been running businesses, and some of them very well, for hundreds of years
prior to the creation of corporate nance as a discipline.
Talk about the three major components of corporate nance - the investment,
nancing and dividend decisions, and how corporate nance views these
decisions through the prism of rm value maximization.
Aswath Damodaran 3
First Principles
! Invest in projects that yield a return greater than the minimum acceptable
hurdle rate.
The hurdle rate should be higher for riskier projects and reect the nancing mix
used - owners funds (equity) or borrowed money (debt)
Returns on projects should be measured based on cash ows generated and the
timing of these cash ows; they should also consider both positive and negative
side effects of these projects.
! Choose a nancing mix that minimizes the hurdle rate and matches the assets
being nanced.
! If there are not enough investments that earn the hurdle rate, return the cash to
the owners of the rm (if public, these would be stockholders).
The form of returns - dividends and stock buybacks - will depend upon the
stockholders characteristics.
Objective: Maximize the Value of the Firm
Aswath Damodaran 4
The Classical Viewpoint
! Van Horne: "In this book, we assume that the objective of the rm is to
maximize its value to its stockholders"
! Brealey & Myers: "Success is usually judged by value: Shareholders are
made better off by any decision which increases the value of their stake in the
rm... The secret of success in nancial management is to increase value."
! Copeland & Weston: The most important theme is that the objective of the
rm is to maximize the wealth of its stockholders."
! Brigham and Gapenski: Throughout this book we operate on the assumption
that the management's primary goal is stockholder wealth maximization
which translates into maximizing the price of the common stock.
I picked four widely used books and quoted the value maximization objective
statement from each of the books to illustrate two points:
Value maximization as an objective function is pervasive in corporate
nancial theory
Not enough attention is paid to defending this objective function in
most corporate nance books. The assumption is that all readers will
accept this objective function, which is not necessarily true.
It is also interesting that these four books also state the objective functions
differently - Van Horne as stockholders value maximization , Brealey and
Myers and Copeland and Weston as stockholder wealth maximization and
Brigham and Gapenski as the maximization as the stock price.
Question to ask :
Are these objective functions equivalent?
If not, which assumption is the least restrictive and which is the most
restrictive?
What are the additional assumptions needed to get from the least to the most
restrictive objective functions?
This is the answer to the question posed in the previous overhead.
There are alternative objective functions (Maximize market share, maximize
earnings, maximize growth )
These are intermediate objective functions - maximizing market share by itself is
valuable insofar as it increases pricing power and thus, potentially the market
value.
Aswath Damodaran 5
The Objective in Decision Making
! In traditional corporate nance, the objective in decision making is to
maximize the value of the rm.
! A narrower objective is to maximize stockholder wealth. When the stock is
traded and markets are viewed to be efcient, the objective is to maximize the
stock price.
! All other goals of the rm are intermediate ones leading to rm value
maximization, or operate as constraints on rm value maximization.
Aswath Damodaran 6
The Criticism of Firm Value Maximization
! Maximizing stock price is not incompatible with meeting employee
needs/objectives. In particular:
- Employees are often stockholders in many rms
- Firms that maximize stock price generally are rms that have treated employees
well.
! Maximizing stock price does not mean that customers are not critical to
success. In most businesses, keeping customers happy is the route to stock
price maximization.
! Maximizing stock price does not imply that a company has to be a social
outlaw.
Open up the discussion to what arguments student might have or might have
heard about stock price maximization. The three that I have heard most often are
listed above.
Stock price maximization implies not caring for your employees. Use a
recent story of layoffs to illustrate this criticism (Eastman Kodak
announced it was laying of 15,000 employees and stock price jumped
$3.50). Then note that this is the exception rather than the rule. A
Conference Board study from 1994 found that companies whose stock
prices have gone up are more likely to hire people than one whose stock
prices have gone down. Also note that employees, especially in high tech
companies, have a large stake in how well their company does because
they have stock options or stock in the company.
Note that customer satisfaction is important but only in the context that
satised customers buy more from you. What would happen to a rm
that dened its objective as maximizing customer satisfaction?
A healthy company whose stock price has done well is much more likely
to do social good than a company which is nancially healthy. Again,
note that there are social outlaws who might create social costs in the
pursuit of stock price maximization (Those nasty corporate raiders..) but
they are the exception rather than the rule.
Aswath Damodaran 7
Why traditional corporate nancial theory focuses on
maximizing stockholder wealth.
! Stock price is easily observable and constantly updated (unlike other
measures of performance, which may not be as easily observable, and
certainly not updated as frequently).
! If investors are rational (are they?), stock prices reect the wisdom of
decisions, short term and long term, instantaneously.
! The objective of stock price performance provides some very elegant theory
on:
how to pick projects
how to nance them
how much to pay in dividends
Emphasize how important it is to have an objective function that is observable
and measurable. Note that stock prices provide almost instantaneous feedback
(some of which is unwelcome) on every decision you make as a rm.
Consider the example of an acquisition announcement and the market reaction
to it. Stock prices of the acquiring rm tend to drop in a signicant proportion
of acquisitions. Why might markets be more pessimistic than managers about
the expected success of an acquisition? Because the track record of rms on
acquisitions is not very good.
Aswath Damodaran 8
The Classical Objective Function
STOCKHOLDERS
Maximize
stockholder
wealth
Hire & re
managers
- Board
- Annual Meeting
BONDHOLDERS
Lend Money
Protect
bondholder
Interests
FINANCIAL MARKETS
SOCIETY Managers
Reveal
information
honestly and
on time
Markets are
efcient and
assess effect on
value
No Social Costs
Costs can be
traced to rm
This is the utopian world. None of the assumptions are really defensible as
written, and skepticism is clearly justied:
Why do we need these assumptions?
Since, in many large rms, there is a separation of ownership from
management, managers have to be fearful of losing their jobs and go out
and maximize stockholder wealth. If they do not have this fear, they will
focus on their own interests.
If bondholders are not protected, stockholders can steal from them and
make themselves better off, even as they make the rm less valuable.
If markets are not efcient, maximizing stock prices may not have
anything to do with maximizing stockholder wealth or rm value.
If substantial social costs are created, maximizing stock prices may
create large side costs for society (of which stockholders are members).
Note that corporate nance, done right, is not about stealing from other groups
(bondholders, other stockholders or society) but about making the rm more
productive and valuable.
Aswath Damodaran 9
What can go wrong?
STOCKHOLDERS
Managers put
their interests
above stockholders
Have little control
over managers
BONDHOLDERS
Lend Money
Bondholders can
get ripped off
FINANCIAL MARKETS
SOCIETY Managers
Delay bad
news or
provide
misleading
information
Markets make
mistakes and
can over react
Signicant Social Costs
Some costs cannot be
traced to rm
This is my worst case scenario:
Stockholders have little or no control over managers. Managers,
consequently, put their interests above stockholder interests.
Bondholders who do not protect themselves nd stockholders
expropriating their wealth.
Information conveyed to markets is noisy, biases and sometimes
misleading. Markets do not do a very good job of assimilating this
information and market price changes have little to do with true value.
Firms in the process of maximizing stockholder wealth create large
social costs.
In this environment, stockholder wealth maximization is not a good objective
function.
Aswath Damodaran 10
I. Stockholder Interests vs. Management Interests
! In theory: The stockholders have signicant control over management. The
mechanisms for disciplining management are the annual meeting and the
board of directors.
! In Practice: Neither mechanism is as effective in disciplining management
as theory posits.
In theory, stockholders are supposed to come to the annual meeting, and make
informed judgments about whether they want to keep incumbent management in
place. The board of directors is supposed to protect the stockholders.
Aswath Damodaran 11
The Annual Meeting as a disciplinary venue
! The power of stockholders to act at annual meetings is diluted by three factors
Most small stockholders do not go to meetings because the cost of going to the
meeting exceeds the value of their holdings.
Incumbent management starts off with a clear advantage when it comes to the
exercise of proxies. Proxies that are not voted becomes votes for incumbent
management.
For large stockholders, the path of least resistance, when confronted by managers
that they do not like, is to vote with their feet.
It is not irrational for small stockholders to not actively involve themselves in the
management of rms, because it is not economical for them to do so.
A signicant percentage of proxies do not get turned in. In many rms, the
managers of the rm get the votes commanded by these proxies. That would be
the equivalent of having an election and allowing the incumbent to get the votes
of anyone who does not vote.
For a large stockholder like Fidelity Magellan, with its hundreds of holdings, it
just might not be feasible to be an active investor. Even CALPERS, which has a
history of activism, has pulled back in recent years.
The annual meeting is tightly scripted and run, making it difcult for dissident
stockholders to be heard. (In Japan, in the 1980s, trouble makers were hired to
heckle stockholders who tried to ask managers tough questions.
Aswath Damodaran 12
Board of Directors as a disciplinary mechanism
This sounds judgmental and it is meant to be. Directors do not spend a great
deal of time overseeing managers, and they are well paid.
The pay shown here understates the true compensation that directors make from
other perks and benets that they get (pensions, for instance).
(These numbers are from the surveys done by Korn/Ferry, an executive search
rm, and come from a BusinessWeek article looking at the board.)
Aswath Damodaran 13
The CEO often hand-picks directors..
! The 1992 survey by Korn/Ferry revealed that 74% of companies relied on
recommendations from the CEO to come up with new directors; Only 16%
used an outside search rm. While that number has changed in recent years,
CEOs still determine who sits on their boards.
! Directors often hold only token stakes in their companies. The Korn/Ferry
survey found that 5% of all directors in 1992 owned less than ve shares in
their rms. Most directors in companies today still receive more
compensation as directors than they gain from their stockholdings.
! Many directors are themselves CEOs of other rms.
This adds to why directors spend so little time on oversight. CEOs, left to
themselves, will seldom pick adversarial directors. Directors also make far more
money from directorships than they do from owning stock in the rm. Not
surprisingly, they do not take the side of stockholders.
A Wall Street Journal article, a few years ago, looked at the phenomenon of
CEOs sitting on each others boards. It is very difcult to see how they can be
objective in those cases.
Aswath Damodaran 14
Directors lack the expertise (and the willingness) to ask the
necessary tough questions..
! In most boards, the CEO continues to be the chair. Not surprisingly, the CEO
sets the agenda, chairs the meeting and controls the information provided to
directors.
! The search for consensus overwhelms any attempts at confrontation.
Harold Geneen who ruled ITT with an iron st during the sixties when Ibuilt
itself up through acquisitions, mentions in his memoirs that almost all decisions,
during his tenure, that were made by the board were unanimous.
CEOs almost always chair the board, and establish the agenda for what the
board discusses.
Aswath Damodaran 15
Whos on Board? The Disney Experience - 1997
This may be going back in time but it may help understanding Disneys present
predicament. This way Disney s board at the height of Michael Eisners
powers.
Note the number of insiders on the board. (Seven out of 16)
Also note the presence of Mr. Eisners private attorney (Irwin Russell) and the
principal of his childs elementary school (Reveta Bowers) on the board.
How independent was this board likely to be of Mr. Eisner?
Aswath Damodaran 16
The Calpers Tests for Independent Boards
! Calpers, the California Employees Pension fund, suggested three tests in 1997
of an independent board
Are a majority of the directors outside directors?
Is the chairman of the board independent of the company (and not the CEO of the
company)?
Are the compensation and audit committees composed entirely of outsiders?
! Disney was the only S&P 500 company to fail all three tests.
Calpers was one of the rst institutional investors to pay attention to corporate
governance. Every year, Calpers lists the 10 companies that were the worst
culprits when it came to putting managerial interests over stockholder interests.
Aswath Damodaran 17
Business Week piles on The Worst Boards in 1997..
A poor board does not necessarily translate into a poorly managed rm. For
instance, Disney and Coca Cola do not have highly rated boards but delivered
superior returns to stockholders over the period.
As a stockholder, however, the fact that returns are good might not compensate
for the fact that you do not believe that managers are responsive to your
interests. (At the Disney stockholder meetings in both 1996 and 1997, there was
substantial stockholder dissension in spite of the fact that the stock had
performed very well in both periods.)
Aswath Damodaran 18
!Application Test: Whos on board?
! Look at the board of directors for your rm. Analyze
How many of the directors are inside directors (Employees of the rm, ex-
managers)?
Is there any information on how independent the directors in the rm are from the
managers?
You can usually nd this information for your rm in the 14-DEF ling that all
rms in the US have to make with the SEC. If you have a non-US rm, this
becomes more difcult to do. While you can usually nd the names of the
directors from the annual report, you may have a difcult time nding out the
linkages (and potential conicts) these directors may have with the managers of
the rm.
Aswath Damodaran 19
So, what next? When the cat is idle, the mice will play ....
! When managers do not fear stockholders, they will often put their interests
over stockholder interests
Greenmail: The (managers of ) target of a hostile takeover buy out the potential
acquirer's existing stake, at a price much greater than the price paid by the raider,
in return for the signing of a 'standstill' agreement.
Golden Parachutes: Provisions in employment contracts, that allows for the
payment of a lump-sum or cash ows over a period, if managers covered by these
contracts lose their jobs in a takeover.
Poison Pills: A security, the rights or cashows on which are triggered by an
outside event, generally a hostile takeover, is called a poison pill.
Shark Repellents: Anti-takeover amendments are also aimed at dissuading hostile
takeovers, but differ on one very important count. They require the assent of
stockholders to be instituted.
Overpaying on takeovers
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These actions could all suggest that managerial interests are being put over
stockholder interests. (Some of these actions, though, may also increase
stockholder wealth. Managers will, of course, always claim that these actions are
in stockholders best interests)
Aswath Damodaran 20
Overpaying on takeovers
! The quickest and perhaps the most decisive way to impoverish stockholders is
to overpay on a takeover.
! The stockholders in acquiring rms do not seem to share the enthusiasm of
the managers in these rms. Stock prices of bidding rms decline on the
takeover announcements a signicant proportion of the time.
! Many mergers do not work, as evidenced by a number of measures.
The protability of merged rms relative to their peer groups, does not increase
signicantly after mergers.
An even more damning indictment is that a large number of mergers are reversed
within a few years, which is a clear admission that the acquisitions did not work.
Managers of acquiring rms almost always make every acquisition sound like a
good idea. Stockholders are more skeptical (as is evidenced by the behavior of
acquiring rm stock prices on the announcement of acquisitions).
Stockholders must be right, on average, since many takeovers do not seem to
work in terms on increasing stockholder wealth or making the rms more
efcient.
(Good references
The Synergy Trap, Mark Sirower)
Aswath Damodaran 21
A Case Study: Kodak - Sterling Drugs
! Eastman Kodaks Great Victory
Note the difference in stock price behavior of the target and bidding rms.
Note also the symmetry between premium paid over the market price at Sterling
Drugs ($ 2.1 billion) and value lost at Kodak ($2.2 billion). Kodak argued that
this merger would create synergy and that was why they were paying the
premium. The market did not seem to see any synergy.
Aswath Damodaran 22
Earnings and Revenues at Sterling Drugs
Sterling Drug under Eastman Kodak: Where is the synergy?
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
5,000
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Revenue Operating Earnings
Where is the synergy?
Prots essentially stagnated at Sterling after the Kodak acquisition. The rest of
the drug industry reported an annual growth in earnings of 15% a year during
this period.
Why is synergy so hard to capture?
Firms do not plan for it at the time of the acquisitions
Culture shock
Unrealistic assumptions (AT&T and NCR)
Aswath Damodaran 23
Kodak Says Drug Unit Is Not for Sale (NY Times, 8/93)
! An article in the NYTimes in August of 1993 suggested that Kodak was eager to shed its drug unit.
In response, Eastman Kodak ofcials say they have no plans to sell Kodaks Sterling Winthrop drug unit.
Louis Mattis, Chairman of Sterling Winthrop, dismissed the rumors as massive speculation, which ies in the face of the stated
intent of Kodak that it is committed to be in the health business.
! A few months laterTaking a stride out of the drug business, Eastman Kodak said that the Sano Group, a French
pharmaceutical company, agreed to buy the prescription drug business of Sterling Winthrop for $1.68 billion.
Shares of Eastman Kodak rose 75 cents yesterday, closing at $47.50 on the New York Stock Exchange.
Samuel D. Isaly an analyst , said the announcement was very good for Sano and very good for Kodak.
When the divestitures are complete, Kodak will be entirely focused on imaging, said George M. C. Fisher, the company's chief
executive.
The rest of the Sterling Winthrop was sold to Smithkline for $2.9 billion.
As in the old Soviet Union, nothing is true until it is ofcially denied.
Aswath Damodaran 24
!Application Test: Who owns/runs your rm?
Look at: Bloomberg printout HDS for your rm
! Looking at the top 15 stockholders in your rm, are top managers in your rm
also large stockholders in the rm?
! Is there any evidence that the top stockholders in the rm play an active role
in managing the rm?
You can also get this information from Yahoo! Finance by going into company
proles and clicking on institutional investors
Aswath Damodaran 25
Disneys top stockholders in 2003
Not a single individual investor in the list other than Roy Disney who was the
15th largest stockholder Managers are not signicant stockholders in
Disney (and the same can be said for most large publicly traded rms).
The response is not to give them options since owning options does not create
the same incentives as owning shares
Consider the following scenarios:
1. Managers are not signicant stockholders in the rm: Signicant potential
for conicts of interest between managers and stockholders.
2. Individuals are signicant stockholders in the rm as well as part of top
management. Usually, these are founder-owners of the rm and the rms
tend to be younger rms or family run businesses that have recently made
the transition to publicly traded rms. Smaller potential for conict between
managers and stockholders, but potential for conict between inside
stockholders and outside stockholders.
3. Trusts or descendants of owners are signicant stockholders in the rm but
are not an active part of incumbent management. Power that these
stockholders retain to replace managers reduces potential for conict of
interest but power is reduced as holdings get diluted among lots of family
members.
4. Another company is largest stockholder in rm. In this case, trace out who
owns stock in the other company.
Aswath Damodaran 26
A confounding factor: Voting versus Non-voting Shares -
Aracruz
! Aracruz Cellulose, like most Brazilian companies, had multiple classes of
shares at the end of 2002.
The common shares had all of the voting rights and were held by incumbent
management, lenders to the company and the Brazilian government.
Outside investors held the non-voting shares, which were called preferred shares,
and had no say in the election of the board of directors. At the end of 2002,
! Aracruz was managed by a board of seven directors, composed primarily of
representatives of those who own the common (voting) shares, and an
executive board, composed of three managers of the company.
When voting rights vary across shares, incumbent managers can consolidate
their hold on a company with relatively small holdings. This reduces the power
that stockholders have in these companies.
Differences in voting rights are common outside the U.S. In Asia and Latin
America, incumbent managers or family members can control companies with
relatively small holdings with complete impunity.
Aswath Damodaran 27
Another confounding factor Cross Holdings
! In a cross holding structure, the largest stockholder in a company can be
another company. In some cases, companies can hold stock in each other.
! Cross holding structures make it more difcult for stockholders in any of the
companies involved to
decipher what is going on in each of the individual companies
decide which management to blame or reward
change managers even if they can gure out who to blame.
Deutsche is the largest stockholder in Daimler Chrysler, the German automobile
company, and Allianz, the German insurance company, is the largest stockholder
in Deutsche.
Aswath Damodaran 28
II. Stockholders' objectives vs. Bondholders' objectives
! In theory: there is no conict of interests between stockholders and
bondholders.
! In practice: Stockholder and bondholders have different objectives.
Bondholders are concerned most about safety and ensuring that they get paid
their claims. Stockholders are more likely to think about upside potential
Bondholders include all lenders (including banks). The actions listed above
transfer wealth from them to stockholders.
Aswath Damodaran 29
Examples of the conict..
! Increasing dividends signicantly: When rms pay cash out as dividends,
lenders to the rm are hurt and stockholders may be helped. This is because
the rm becomes riskier without the cash.
! Taking riskier projects than those agreed to at the outset: Lenders base
interest rates on their perceptions of how risky a rms investments are. If
stockholders then take on riskier investments, lenders will be hurt.
! Borrowing more on the same assets: If lenders do not protect themselves, a
rm can borrow more money and make all existing lenders worse off.
In each of these cases, you are likely to see stock prices go up on the action and
bond prices go down.
Aswath Damodaran 30
An Extreme Example: Unprotected Lenders?
Nabiscos bond price plummeted on the day of the LBO, while the stock price
soared.
Is this just a paper loss? (You still get the same coupon. Only the price has
changed)
Not really. There is now a greater chance of default in Nabisco, for
which you as a lender are not compensated.
How could Nabiscos bondholders have protected themselves?
Put in a covenant that allowed them to turn the bonds into the rm in the
event of something like an LBO and receive the face value of the bond.
(Puttable bonds)
Make the coupon payments on the bond a function of the companys
rating (Rating sensitive bonds)
Aswath Damodaran 31
III. Firms and Financial Markets
! In theory: Financial markets are efcient. Managers convey information
honestly and and in a timely manner to nancial markets, and nancial
markets make reasoned judgments of the effects of this information on 'true
value'. As a consequence-
A company that invests in good long term projects will be rewarded.
Short term accounting gimmicks will not lead to increases in market value.
Stock price performance is a good measure of company performance.
! In practice: There are some holes in the 'Efcient Markets' assumption.
An efcient market is one where the market price reects the true value of the
equity in the rm (and any changes in it). It does not imply perfection on the
part of markets, but it does imply a link between what happens to the stock price
and what happens to true value.
Aswath Damodaran 32
Managers control the release of information to the general
public
! Information (especially negative) is sometimes suppressed or delayed by
managers seeking a better time to release it.
! In some cases, rms release intentionally misleading information about their
current conditions and future prospects to nancial markets.
Consider an example of Bre-X, which told markets that it had found one of the
largest gold reserves in the world in Indonesia in the early 1990s. In 1997, it
was revealed that there was no gold, and that the rm had salted the mine with
gold to fool investors. When the news eventually came out, the stock price
dropped to zero.
Bre-X was followed by 9 analysts, all of whom professed to be shocked by the
revelation.
Aswath Damodaran 33
Evidence that managers delay bad news..
DO MANAGERS DELAY BAD NEWS?: EPS and DPS Changes- by
Weekday
-6. 00%
-4. 00%
-2. 00%
0.00%
2.00%
4.00%
6.00%
8.00%
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thur sday F r i da y
% Chg(EPS) % Chg(DPS)
This study looked at thousands of earnings and dividend announcements,
categorized by day of the week in the 1980s. Either bad things tend to happen
on Fridays, or managers are trying to hold on to bad news until Friday. In fact,
most of the bad news on Friday comes out after 4 pm, and markets have closed.
Managers do not trust markets to not panic on bad news.
This may explain a portion of the weekend effect - stock prices tend to go down
on Mondays.
Aswath Damodaran 34
Some critiques of market efciency..
! Prices are much more volatile than justied by the underlying fundamentals.
Earnings and dividends are much less volatile than stock prices.
! Financial markets overreact to news, both good and bad.
! Financial markets are manipulated by insiders; Prices do not have any
relationship to value.
! Financial markets are short-sighted, and do not consider the long-term
implications of actions taken by the rm.
The Shiller effect - stock prices are much volatile than justied by looking at the
underlying dividends and other fundamentals - is debatable. While people often
present anecdotal evidence on the phenomenon, they under estimate the volatility
of the underlying fundamentals.
For every researcher who claims to nd evidence that markets overreact, there
seems to be another researcher who nds evidence that it under reacts. And no
one seems to be able to systematically make real money (as opposed to
hypothetical money) on these supposed over or under reactions.
Corporate strategists, like Michael Porter, argue that market prices are based
upon short term forecasts of earnings and do not factor in the long term.
In markets outside the US, the argument is that prices are moved by insiders and
that they have no relationship to value.
Aswath Damodaran 35
Are Markets Short term?
! Focusing on market prices will lead companies towards short term decisions
at the expense of long term value.
a. I agree with the statement
b. I do not agree with this statement
! Allowing managers to make decisions without having to worry about the
effect on market prices will lead to better long term decisions.
a. I agree with this statement
b. I do not agree with this statement
This again has no right answers. Most participants, given the barrage of
criticism that they hear about markets on the outside, come in with the
perception that prices are short term.
Aswath Damodaran 36
Are Markets short term? Some evidence that they are
not..
! There are hundreds of start-up and small rms, with no earnings
expected in the near future, that raise money on nancial markets. Why
would a myopic market that cares only about short term earnings attach
high prices to these rms?
! If the evidence suggests anything, it is that markets do not value current
earnings and cashows enough and value future earnings and cashows
too much. After all, studies suggest that low PE stocks are under priced
relative to high PE stocks
! The market response to research and development and investment
expenditure is generally positive.
None of these pieces of evidence is conclusive proof that markets are long term,
but the evidence does add up to markets being much more long term than
they are given credit for. There is little evidence, outside of anecdotal
evidence, that markets are short term.
The best support for markets comes from looking at how well they do relative to
expert prognosticators:
1. Forward currency rates are better predictors of expected currency rates in
the future than economic forecasters.
2. Orange juice futures markets seem to predict the weather in Florida better
than weather forecasters.
3. The Iowa Election Market has predicted election results better than political
pundits.
It is true that there are many short term investors and analysts in the market, but
the real question is whether the market price is able to get past their short
term considerations and focus on the long term. Sometimes, it does not but
surprisingly often, it does.
Aswath Damodaran 37
Market Reaction to Investment Announcements
Note that the price increases tend to be small, since these announcements tend to
affect value by only small amounts. The effect seems to correlate with the
weightiness of each announcement, being lower for product strategy
announcements (which might signify little or no real investment) and being
higher for the other three.
Markets also tend to be discriminating and look at both the type of business
where the R&D is being spent (Intel versus Kellogg) and the track record of the
managers spending the money.
Aswath Damodaran 38
IV. Firms and Society
! In theory: There are no costs associated with the rm that cannot be traced
to the rm and charged to it.
! In practice: Financial decisions can create social costs and benets.
A social cost or benet is a cost or benet that accrues to society as a whole and
not to the rm making the decision.
Environmental costs (pollution, health costs, etc..)
Quality of Life' costs (trafc, housing, safety, etc.)
Examples of social benets include:
creating employment in areas with high unemployment
supporting development in inner cities
creating access to goods in areas where such access does not exist
Social costs and benets exist in almost every nancial decision.
Aswath Damodaran 39
Social Costs and Benets are difcult to quantify because ..
! They might not be known at the time of the decision (Example: Manville and
asbestos)
! They are 'person-specic' (different decision makers weight them differently)
! They can be paralyzing if carried to extremes
Economists measure social benets in utils . Few, if any, businesses have
gured out a way of actually putting this into practice.
Aswath Damodaran 40
A Hypothetical Example
Assume that you work for Disney and that you have an opportunity to open a
store in an inner-city neighborhood. The store is expected to lose about
$100,000 a year, but it will create much-needed employment in the area, and
may help revitalize it.
! Would you open the store?
a) Yes
b) No
! If yes, would you tell your stockholders and let them vote on the issue?
a) Yes
b) No
! If no, how would you respond to a stockholder query on why you were not
living up to your social responsibilities?
I do this survey in three parts.
First, I allow people to make the choice of whether they would open the store. I
then pick someone who would open the store and press them on whether they
would reveal this to their stockholders. If the answer is No, I point out that it is
after all the stockholders wealth. If the answer is Yes, I then ask them whether
they would let stockholders vote (if not on individual store openings, on the
money that the rm will spend collectively on being socially responsible)
I also ask people why they would open the store. If the answer is that they
would do it for the publicity, I counter that it is advertising and not social
responsibility that is driving the decision. There is nothing wrong with being
socially responsible and getting economically rewarded for it. In fact, if societies
want to make rms socially responsible they have to make it in their economic
best interests to do so.
Aswath Damodaran 41
So this is what can go wrong...
STOCKHOLDERS
Managers put
their interests
above stockholders
Have little control
over managers
BONDHOLDERS
Lend Money
Bondholders can
get ripped off
FINANCIAL MARKETS
SOCIETY Managers
Delay bad
news or
provide
misleading
information
Markets make
mistakes and
can over react
Signicant Social Costs
Some costs cannot be
traced to rm
This is my worst case scenario:
Stockholders have little or no control over managers. Managers,
consequently, put their interests above stockholder interests.
Bondholders who do not protect themselves nd stockholders
expropriating their wealth.
Information conveyed to markets is noisy, biases and sometimes
misleading. Markets do not do a very good job of assimilating this
information and market price changes have little to do with true value.
Firms in the process of maximizing stockholder wealth create large
social costs.
In this environment, stockholder wealth maximization is not a good objective
function.
Aswath Damodaran 42
Traditional corporate nancial theory breaks down when ...
! The interests/objectives of the decision makers in the rm conict with the
interests of stockholders.
! Bondholders (Lenders) are not protected against expropriation by
stockholders.
! Financial markets do not operate efciently, and stock prices do not reect the
underlying value of the rm.
! Signicant social costs can be created as a by-product of stock price
maximization.
This summarizes the break down in each of the linkages noted on the previous
page.
Aswath Damodaran 43
When traditional corporate nancial theory breaks down, the
solution is:
! To choose a different mechanism for corporate governance
! To choose a different objective for the rm.
! To maximize stock price, but reduce the potential for conict and breakdown:
Making managers (decision makers) and employees into stockholders
By providing information honestly and promptly to nancial markets
At this point, things look pretty bleak for stock price maximization. These are
the three choices that we have, if we abandon pure stock price maximization as
an objective function.
Aswath Damodaran 44
An Alternative Corporate Governance System
! Germany and Japan developed a different mechanism for corporate
governance, based upon corporate cross holdings.
In Germany, the banks form the core of this system.
In Japan, it is the keiretsus
Other Asian countries have modeled their system after Japan, with family
companies forming the core of the new corporate families
! At their best, the most efcient rms in the group work at bringing the less
efcient rms up to par. They provide a corporate welfare system that makes
for a more stable corporate structure
! At their worst, the least efcient and poorly run rms in the group pull down
the most efcient and best run rms down. The nature of the cross holdings
makes its very difcult for outsiders (including investors in these rms) to
gure out how well or badly the group is doing.
In the 1980s, Michael Porter argued that US companies should move towards
the Japanese system. The Japanese and German systems tend to do well in
stable environments, where failure tends to be unsystematic ( a rm here and a
rm there). They can take care of their failures and nurse them back to health,
rather than exposing themselves to the costs associated with failure.
These systems break down when problems are wide spread and systematic.
Contrast the way US banks dealt with problem loans on their balance sheets
(markets forced them to deal with these problems quickly ) and the way
Japanese banks have dealt with them (by hiding them and hoping they go away)
Aswath Damodaran 45
Choose a Different Objective Function
! Firms can always focus on a different objective function. Examples would
include
maximizing earnings
maximizing revenues
maximizing rm size
maximizing market share
maximizing EVA
! The key thing to remember is that these are intermediate objective functions.
To the degree that they are correlated with the long term health and value of the
company, they work well.
To the degree that they do not, the rm can end up with a disaster
Consider each of these objectives. If you put them through the same tests that
we did stock price maximization, you come up with far more problems with each.
Note that rms might pick an intermediate objective (like market share) when it
is correlated with rm value but continue to use it, even after it loses this link.
Do you want a 100% market share of a losing business?
Aswath Damodaran 46
Maximize Stock Price, subject to ..
! The strength of the stock price maximization objective function is its internal
self correction mechanism. Excesses on any of the linkages lead, if
unregulated, to counter actions which reduce or eliminate these excesses
! In the context of our discussion,
managers taking advantage of stockholders has lead to a much more active market
for corporate control.
stockholders taking advantage of bondholders has lead to bondholders protecting
themselves at the time of the issue.
rms revealing incorrect or delayed information to markets has lead to markets
becoming more skeptical and punitive
rms creating social costs has lead to more regulations, as well as investor and
customer backlashes.
The strength of market based systems is that they are both ruthless and quick in
correcting errors, once they are spotted.
These constraints ow from the earlier framework, where we introduced what
can go wrong with each linkage.
Aswath Damodaran 47
The Stockholder Backlash
! Institutional investors such as Calpers and the Lens Funds have become much
more active in monitoring companies that they invest in and demanding
changes in the way in which business is done
! Individuals like Michael Price specialize in taking large positions in
companies which they feel need to change their ways (Chase, Dow Jones,
Readers Digest) and push for change
! At annual meetings, stockholders have taken to expressing their displeasure
with incumbent management by voting against their compensation contracts
or their board of directors
All of these developments represent the backlash to managers putting their
interests over stockholder interests.
Aswath Damodaran 48
In response, boards are becoming more independent
! Boards have become smaller over time. The median size of a board of
directors has decreased from 16 to 20 in the 1970s to between 9 and 11 in
1998. The smaller boards are less unwieldy and more effective than the larger
boards.
! There are fewer insiders on the board. In contrast to the 6 or more insiders
that many boards had in the 1970s, only two directors in most boards in 1998
were insiders.
! Directors are increasingly compensated with stock and options in the
company, instead of cash. In 1973, only 4% of directors received
compensation in the form of stock or options, whereas 78% did so in 1998.
! More directors are identied and selected by a nominating committee rather
than being chosen by the CEO of the rm. In 1998, 75% of boards had
nominating committees; the comparable statistic in 1973 was 2%.
While these trends are positive, note that many of these better boards (at least as
seen from the vantage point of 1998) were responsible for the scandals of the
bull market (Enron, Worldcom, Tyco) In bull markets and strong economies,
boards tend to get lazy.
Aswath Damodaran 49
Disneys Board in 2003
Board Members Occupation
Reveta Bowers Head of school for the Center for Early Education,
John Bryson CEO and Chairman of Con Edison
Roy Disney Head of Disney Animation
Michael Eisner CEO of Disney
Judith Estrin CEO of Packet Design (an internet company)
Stanley Gold CEO of Shamrock Holdings
Robert Iger Chief Operating Officer, Disney
Monica Lozano Chief Operation Officer, La Opinion (Spanish newspaper)
George Mitchell Chairman of law firm (Verner, Liipfert, et al.)
Thomas S. Murphy Ex-CEO, Capital Cities ABC
Leo ODonovan Professor of Theology, Georgetown University
Sidney Poitier Actor, Writer and Director
Robert A.M. Stern Senior Partner of Robert A.M. Stern Architects of New York
Andrea L. Van de Kamp Chairman of Sotheby's West Coast
Raymond L. Watson Chairman of Irvine Company (a real estate corporation)
Gary L. Wilson Chairman of the board, Northwest Airlines.
Some improvement over 1997 but most of the directors are still there
The most obvious conict (Irwin Russell) has been removed. Still, there are far
too many directors on this board (16), too many of them are still insiders (4)
and there are too many CEOs of other rms. Nevertheless, this board is a
much better one than the 1997 board. What precipitated the changes?
1. Poor nancial and stock price performance
2. Pressure from major stockholders (like Stanley Gold)
3. Stockholder distrust of management
4. Big deals (like the Cap Cities acquisition) that have gone bad
5. Enronitis
Aswath Damodaran 50
Changes in corporate governance at Disney
! Required at least two executive sessions of the board, without the CEO or other members of
management present, each year.
! Created the position of non-management presiding director, and appointed Senator George Mitchell
to lead those executive sessions and assist in setting the work agenda of the board.
! Adopted a new and more rigorous denition of director independence.
! Required that a substantial majority of the board be comprised of directors meeting the new
independence standards.
! Provided for a reduction in committee size and the rotation of committee and chairmanship
assignments among independent directors.
! Added new provisions for management succession planning and evaluations of both management
and board performance
! Provided for enhanced continuing education and training for board members.
These changes were all welcome but they were being made in response to
widespread stockholder anger. They would have been more effective and
believable if they had been adopted at the height of Eisners powers (say, in
1996).
Aswath Damodaran 51
The Hostile Acquisition Threat
! The typical target rm in a hostile takeover has
a return on equity almost 5% lower than its peer group
had a stock that has signicantly under performed the peer group over the previous
2 years
has managers who hold little or no stock in the rm
! In other words, the best defense against a hostile takeover is to run your rm
well and earn good returns for your stockholders
! Conversely, when you do not allow hostile takeovers, this is the rm that you
are most likely protecting (and not a well run or well managed rm)
This is the ultimate threat. Managers often have deathbed conversions to become
advocates for stockholder wealth maximization, when faced with the threat of a
hostile takeover.
For Disney, this wake-up call came in 2004, when Comcast announced a hostile
acquisitiion bid for Disney. Though the bid failed, it shook up the company and
led to Eisners decision to step down in 2006.
Aswath Damodaran 52
Is there a payoff to better corporate governance?
! In the most comprehensive study of the effect of corporate governance on
value, a governance index was created for each of 1500 rms based upon 24
distinct corporate governance provisions.
Buying stocks that had the strongest investor protections while simultaneously
selling shares with the weakest protections generated an annual excess return of
8.5%.
Every one point increase in the index towards fewer investor protections decreased
market value by 8.9% in 1999
Firms that scored high in investor protections also had higher prots, higher sales
growth and made fewer acquisitions.
! The link between the composition of the board of directors and rm value is
weak. Smaller boards do tend to be more effective.
! On a purely anecdotal basis, a common theme at problem companies is an
ineffective board that fails to ask tough questions of an imperial CEO,
The bottom line is this. Changing the way boards of directors are chosen cannot
change the way companies are governed. You need informed and active
stockholders and a responsive management ot make corporate governance work.
When it does, stockholders are better off.
Aswath Damodaran 53
The Bondholders Defense Against Stockholder Excesses
! More restrictive covenants on investment, nancing and dividend policy have
been incorporated into both private lending agreements and into bond issues,
to prevent future Nabiscos.
! New types of bonds have been created to explicitly protect bondholders
against sudden increases in leverage or other actions that increase lender risk
substantially. Two examples of such bonds
Puttable Bonds, where the bondholder can put the bond back to the rm and get
face value, if the rm takes actions that hurt bondholders
Ratings Sensitive Notes, where the interest rate on the notes adjusts to that
appropriate for the rating of the rm
! More hybrid bonds (with an equity component, usually in the form of a
conversion option or warrant) have been used. This allows bondholders to
become equity investors, if they feel it is in their best interests to do so.
Bondholders, responding to the Nabisco asco and other cases where
stockholders expropriated their wealth, have become much more savvy about
protecting themselves (using covenants or special features added to bonds) or
getting an equity stake in the business (as is the case with convertibles)
Aswath Damodaran 54
The Financial Market Response
! While analysts are more likely still to issue buy rather than sell
recommendations, the payoff to uncovering negative news about a rm is
large enough that such news is eagerly sought and quickly revealed (at least to
a limited group of investors).
! As investor access to information improves, it is becoming much more
difcult for rms to control when and how information gets out to markets.
! As option trading has become more common, it has become much easier to
trade on bad news. In the process, it is revealed to the rest of the market.
! When rms mislead markets, the punishment is not only quick but it is
savage.
The distinction between the US and most foreign markets is the existence of a
private market for information. In many countries, rms are the only source of
information about themselves, leading to very biased information.
The more avenues there are for investors to trade on information (including
option markets), the more likely it is that prices will contain that information.
Aswath Damodaran 55
The Societal Response
! If rms consistently out societal norms and create large social costs, the
governmental response (especially in a democracy) is for laws and regulations
to be passed against such behavior.
! For rms catering to a more socially conscious clientele, the failure to meet
societal norms (even if it is legal) can lead to loss of business and value
! Finally, investors may choose not to invest in stocks of rms that they view as
social outcasts.
None of these measures is perfect or complete, but they reect the tug-of-war
between private and public interests.
Here are some good examples for each:
1. After the Exxon-Valdez oil spill in the alter 1980s, many states and the
federal government tightened regulations on oil tankers The same is true
for tobacco rms, where laws were tightened both on smoking in general
and tobacco company advertising in particular.
2. After public interest groups claimed that speciality retailers were using
under-age labor to run their factories, many retailers saw sales decline.
3. Many pension funds (and university endowment funds) are restricted from
iinvesting in sin stocks.
Aswath Damodaran 56
The Counter Reaction
STOCKHOLDERS
Managers of poorly
run rms are put
on notice.
1. More activist
investors
2. Hostile takeovers
BONDHOLDERS
Protect themselves
1. Covenants
2. New Types
FINANCIAL MARKETS
SOCIETY Managers
Firms are
punished
for misleading
markets
Investors and
analysts become
more skeptical
Corporate Good Citizen Constraints
1. More laws
2. Investor/Customer Backlash
This summarizes the objective function of maximizing stockholder wealth, with
the xes noted on the last few pages.
Aswath Damodaran 57
So what do you think?
! At this point in time, the following statement best describes where I stand in
terms of the right objective function for decision making in a business
a) Maximize stock price or stockholder wealth, with no constraints
b) Maximize stock price or stockholder wealth, with constraints on being a good
social citizen.
c) Maximize prots or protability
d) Maximize market share
e) Maximize Revenues
f) Maximize social good
g) None of the above
If the sales pitch has worked, most choose to maximize stock price, subject to
constraint. If it has not, you have a long semester ahead of you.
In reasonably efcient markets, where bondholders and lenders are protected,
stock prices are maximized where rm value is maximized. Thus, these objective
functions become equivalent.
Aswath Damodaran 58
The Modied Objective Function
! For publicly traded rms in reasonably efcient markets, where bondholders
(lenders) are protected:
Maximize Stock Price: This will also maximize rm value
! For publicly traded rms in inefcient markets, where bondholders are
protected:
Maximize stockholder wealth: This will also maximize rm value, but might not
maximize the stock price
! For publicly traded rms in inefcient markets, where bondholders are not
fully protected
Maximize rm value, though stockholder wealth and stock prices may not be
maximized at the same point.
! For private rms, maximize stockholder wealth (if lenders are protected) or
rm value (if they are not)
These are the guiding objectives that we will use. For the publicly traded rms in
our analysis, we will view maximizing stock prices as our objective function (but
in the context of efcient markets and protected lenders). For the private rm, we
will focus on maximizing stockholder wealth.
Aswath Damodaran 59
Risk and Return Models: Equity and Debt
The rst and perhaps biggest part of corporate nance.
The focus of the rst part of this investment analysis section is on coming up
with a minimum acceptable hurdle rate. In the process, we have to grapple with
the question of what risk is and how to bring risk into the hurdle rate.
Aswath Damodaran 60
First Principles
! Invest in projects that yield a return greater than the minimum acceptable
hurdle rate.
The hurdle rate should be higher for riskier projects and reect the nancing
mix used - owners funds (equity) or borrowed money (debt)
Returns on projects should be measured based on cash ows generated and the
timing of these cash ows; they should also consider both positive and negative
side effects of these projects.
! Choose a nancing mix that minimizes the hurdle rate and matches the assets
being nanced.
! If there are not enough investments that earn the hurdle rate, return the cash to
stockholders.
The form of returns - dividends and stock buybacks - will depend upon the
stockholders characteristics.
Aswath Damodaran 61
The notion of a benchmark
! Since nancial resources are nite, there is a hurdle that projects have to cross
before being deemed acceptable.
! This hurdle will be higher for riskier projects than for safer projects.
! A simple representation of the hurdle rate is as follows:
Hurdle rate = Riskless Rate + Risk Premium
! The two basic questions that every risk and return model in nance tries to
answer are:
How do you measure risk?
How do you translate this risk measure into a risk premium?
Underlying the idea of a hurdle rate is the notion that projects have to earn a
benchmark rate of return to be accepted, and that this benchmark should be
higher for riskier projects than for safer ones.
Aswath Damodaran 62
What is Risk?
! Risk, in traditional terms, is viewed as a negative. Websters dictionary, for
instance, denes risk as exposing to danger or hazard. The Chinese symbols
for risk, reproduced below, give a much better description of risk
! The rst symbol is the symbol for danger, while the second is the symbol
for opportunity, making risk a mix of danger and opportunity.
Note that risk is neither good nor bad. It is a combination of danger and
opportunity - you cannot have one without the other.
When businesses want opportunity (higher returns), they have to live with the
higher risk.
Any sales pitch that offers returns without risk is a pipe dream.
Aswath Damodaran 63
A good risk and return model should
1. It should come up with a measure of risk that applies to all assets and not be
asset-specic.
2. It should clearly delineate what types of risk are rewarded and what are not,
and provide a rationale for the delineation.
3. It should come up with standardized risk measures, i.e., an investor presented
with a risk measure for an individual asset should be able to draw conclusions
about whether the asset is above-average or below-average risk.
4. It should translate the measure of risk into a rate of return that the investor
should demand as compensation for bearing the risk.
5. It should work well not only at explaining past returns, but also in predicting
future expected returns.
Before we embark on looking at risk and return models, it pays to specify what
a good model will look like
Aswath Damodaran 64
The Capital Asset Pricing Model
! Uses variance of actual returns around an expected return as a measure of risk.
! Species that a portion of variance can be diversied away, and that is only
the non-diversiable portion that is rewarded.
! Measures the non-diversiable risk with beta, which is standardized around
one.
! Translates beta into expected return -
Expected Return = Riskfree rate + Beta * Risk Premium
! Works as well as the next best alternative in most cases.
This is a summary of the CAPM, before we get into the details.
Aswath Damodaran 65
The Mean-Variance Framework
! The variance on any investment measures the disparity between actual and
expected returns.
Expected Return
Low Variance Investment
High Variance Investment
Note that the variance that the CAPM is built around is the variance of actual
returns around an expected return.
If you were an investor with a 1-year time horizon, and you bought a 1-
year T.Bill, your actual returns (at least in nominal terms) will be equal
to your expected returns.
If you were the same investor, and you bought a stock (say Intel), your
actual returns will almost certainly not be equal to your expected returns.
In practice, we often look at historical (past) returns to estimate variances.
Implicitly, we are assuming that this variance is a good proxy for expected
future variance.
Aswath Damodaran 66
How risky is Disney? A look at the past
Figure 3.4: Returns on Disney: 1999- 2003
-30.00%
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)

Disneys stock price has been volatile, yielding a standard deviation of 32.31%
(on an annualized basis) between 19999 and 2003. If you were an investor
looking at Disney in 2004, what concerns (if any) would you have in using this
as your measure of the forward looking risk in Disney stock?
Aswath Damodaran 67
Do you live in a mean-variance world?
! Assume that you had to pick between two investments. They have the same
expected return of 15% and the same standard deviation of 25%; however,
investment A offers a very small possibility that you could quadruple your
money, while investment Bs highest possible payoff is a 60% return. Would
you
a. be indifferent between the two investments, since they have the same expected
return and standard deviation?
b. prefer investment A, because of the possibility of a high payoff?
c. prefer investment B, because it is safer?
While some people may be indifferent, most pick investment A. The possibility
of a high payoff, even though it is captured in the expected value, seems to tilt
investors. In statistical terms, this can be viewed as evidence that investors prefer
positive skewness (high positive payoffs) and value it. It is a direct contradiction
to the mean-variance framework that underlies so much of conventional risk
theory.
Aswath Damodaran 68
The Importance of Diversication: Risk Types
Actions/Risk that
affect only one
firm
Actions/Risk that
affect all investments
Firm-specific Market
Projects may
do better or
worse than
expected
Competition
may be stronger
or weaker than
anticipated
Entire Sector
may be affected
by action
Exchange rate
and Political
risk
Interest rate,
Inflation &
news about
economy
Figure 3.5: A Break Down of Risk
Affects few
firms
Affects many
firms
Firm can
reduce by
Investing in lots
of projects
Acquiring
competitors
Diversifying
across sectors
Diversifying
across countries
Cannot affect
Investors
can
mitigate by
Diversifying across domestic stocks Diversifying across
asset classes
Diversifying globally
This is the critical second step that all risk and return models in nance take.
As examples,
Project-specic Risk: Disneys new Animal Kingdom theme park: To
the degree that actual revenues at this park may be greater or less than
expected.
Competitive Risk: The competition (Universal Studios, for instance) may
take actions (like opening or closing a park) that affect Disneys
revenues at Animal Kingdom.
Industry-specic risk: Congress may pass laws affecting cable and
network television, and affect expected revenues at Disney and ABC, as
well as all other rms in the sector, perhaps to varying degrees.
International Risk: As the Asian crisis deepened in the late 1990s, there
wasy be a loss of revenues at Disneyland (as tourists from Asia choose
to stay home) and at Tokyo Disney
Market risk: If interest rates in the US go up, Disneys value as a rm
will be affected.
From the perspective of an investor who holds only Disney, all risk is relevant.
From the perspective of a diversied investor, the rst three risks can be
diversied away, the fourth might be diversiable (with a globally diversied
portfolio) but the last risk I not.
Aswath Damodaran 69
The Effects of Diversication
! Firm-specic risk can be reduced, if not eliminated, by increasing the number
of investments in your portfolio (i.e., by being diversied). Market-wide risk
cannot. This can be justied on either economic or statistical grounds.
! On economic grounds, diversifying and holding a larger portfolio eliminates
rm-specic risk for two reasons-
(a) Each investment is a much smaller percentage of the portfolio, muting the effect
(positive or negative) on the overall portfolio.
(b) Firm-specic actions can be either positive or negative. In a large portfolio, it is
argued, these effects will average out to zero. (For every rm, where something
bad happens, there will be some other rm, where something good happens.)
The rst argument (that each investment is a small percent of your portfolio) is a
pretty weak one. The second one (that things average out over investments and
time) is a much stronger one.
Consider the news stories in the WSJ on any given day. About 85 to 90% of the
stories are on individual rms (rather than affecting the entire market or about
macro economic occurrences) and they cut both ways - some stories are good
news (with the stock price rising) and some are bad news (with stock prices
falling)
Aswath Damodaran 70
A Statistical Proof that Diversication works An example
with two stocks..
Disney Aracruz
ADR
Average Monthly Return - 0.07% 2.57%
Standard Deviation in Monthly Returns 9.33% 12.62%
Correlation between Disney and Aracruz 0.2665

These are the statistics for Disney and Aracruz from 1999 to 2003. They are
annualized values computed from monthly returns.
Aswath Damodaran 71
The variance of a portfolio
Figure 3.6: Standard Deviation of Portfolio
0.00%
2.00%
4.00%
6.00%
8.00%
10.00%
12.00%
14.00%
100% 90.0% 80.0% 70.0% 60.0% 50.0% 40.0% 30.0% 20.0% 10.0% 0.0%
Proportion invested in Disney
S
ta
n
d
a
r
d
d
e
v
ia
tio
n
o
f
p
o
r
tf
o
lio

As you combine Disney and Aracruz in a portfolio, the variance declines
(because the correlation between the stocks is low) and is actually minimized at
about 70% Disney, 30% Aracruz
The gains would have been even stronger if the correlation had been zero or
negative. Even when two stocks move together though (the correlation is
positive but not one), there will be gains from diversication.
Aswath Damodaran 72
The Role of the Marginal Investor
! The marginal investor in a rm is the investor who is most likely to be the
buyer or seller on the next trade and to inuence the stock price.
! Generally speaking, the marginal investor in a stock has to own a lot of stock
and also trade a lot.
! Since trading is required, the largest investor may not be the marginal
investor, especially if he or she is a founder/manager of the rm (Michael
Dell at Dell Computers or Bill Gates at Microsoft)
! In all risk and return models in nance, we assume that the marginal investor
is well diversied.
We assume that the marginal investor, who sets prices, is well diversied. (Note
that we do not need to assume that all investors are diversied)
An argument for the marginally diversied investor: Assume that a
diversied investor and a non-diversied investor are both looking at Disney.
The latter looks at the stock and sees all risk. The former looks at it and sees
only the non-diversiable risk. If they agree on the expected earnings and cash
ows, the former will be willing to pay a higher price. Thus, the latter will get
driven out of the market (perhaps into mutual funds).
Aswath Damodaran 73
Identifying the Marginal Investor in your rm
Percent of Stock held by
Institutions
Percent of Stock held by
Insiders
Marginal Investor
High Low Institutional Investor
a
High High Institutional Investor, with
insider influence
Low High (held by
founder/manager of firm)
Insider (often undiversified)
Low High (held by wealthy
individual investor)
Wealthy individual
investor, fairly diversified
Low Low Small individual investor
with restricted
diversification
This is meant to be a rough guide to identifying the marginal investor. The key
is to recognize that you are not identifying a particular investor but a type of
investor.
Aswath Damodaran 74
Looking at Disneys top stockholders (again)
Of Disneys top 17 investors, only 1 is an individual.
Aswath Damodaran 75
And the top investors in Deutsche and Aracruz
Deutsche Bank Aracruz - Preferred
Allianz (4.81%) Safra (10.74%)
La Caixa (3.85%) BNDES (6.34%)
Capital Research (1.35%) Scudder Kemper (1.03%)
Fidelity (0.50%) BNP Paribas (0.56%)
Frankfurt Trust (0.43%) Barclays Global (0.29%)
Aviva (0.37%) Vanguard Group (0.18%)
Daxex (0.31%) Banco Itau (0.12%)
Unifonds (0.29%) Van Eck Associates (0.12%)
Fidelity (0.28%) Pactual (0.11%)
UBS Funds (0.21%) Banco Bradesco (0.07%)

The top investors are also institutional investors.
Aswath Damodaran 76
Analyzing the investor bases
Disney Deutsche Bank Aracruz (non-voting)
Mutual Funds 31% 16% 29%
Other
Institutional
Investors
42% 58% 26%
Individuals 27% 26% 45%

These companies are predominantly held by institutions who also do much of
the trading on the stock. Insiders hold almost no stock in the company. The
marginal investor is an institutional investor. Aracruz has the highest
percentage of individual investors and it also has voting shares held by insiders.
We would be most cautious in extending the marginal investor is diversied
argument to Aracruz.
Aswath Damodaran 77
The Market Portfolio
! Assuming diversication costs nothing (in terms of transactions costs), and
that all assets can be traded, the limit of diversication is to hold a portfolio of
every single asset in the economy (in proportion to market value). This
portfolio is called the market portfolio.
! Individual investors will adjust for risk, by adjusting their allocations to this
market portfolio and a riskless asset (such as a T-Bill)
Preferred risk level Allocation decision
No risk 100% in T-Bills
Some risk 50% in T-Bills; 50% in Market Portfolio;
A little more risk 25% in T-Bills; 75% in Market Portfolio
Even more risk 100% in Market Portfolio
A risk hog.. Borrow money; Invest in market portfolio
! Every investor holds some combination of the risk free asset and the market
portfolio.
There are two reasons investors choose to stay undiversied:
They think that they can pick undervalued investments (private
information)
There are transactions costs. Since the marginal benets of
diversication decrease as the number of investments increases, you will
stop diversifying.
If we assume no costs to diversifying and no private information, we take away
these reasons fro not diversifying. Consequently, you will keep adding traded
assets to your portfolio until you have every single one. This portfolio is called
the market portfolio. This portfolio should include all traded assets, held in
proportion to their market value.
The only differences between investors then will be in not what is in the market
portfolio but how much they allocate to the riskless asset and how much to the
market portfolio.
Aswath Damodaran 78
The Risk of an Individual Asset
! The risk of any asset is the risk that it adds to the market portfolio
Statistically, this risk can be measured by how much an asset moves with the
market (called the covariance)
! Beta is a standardized measure of this covariance, obtained by dividing the
covariance of any asset with the market by the variance of the market. It is a
measure of the non-diversiable risk for any asset can be measured by the
covariance of its returns with returns on a market index, which is dened to
be the asset's beta.
! The required return on an investment will be a linear function of its beta:
Expected Return = Riskfree Rate+ Beta * (Expected Return on the Market Portfolio -
Riskfree Rate)
If an investor holds the market portfolio, the risk of any asset is the risk that it
adds to the portfolio. That is what beta measures.
The cost of equity is a linear function of the beta of the portfolio.
Aswath Damodaran 79
Limitations of the CAPM
1. The model makes unrealistic assumptions
2. The parameters of the model cannot be estimated precisely
- Denition of a market index
- Firm may have changed during the 'estimation' period'
3. The model does not work well
- If the model is right, there should be
a linear relationship between returns and betas
the only variable that should explain returns is betas
- The reality is that
the relationship between betas and returns is weak
Other variables (size, price/book value) seem to explain differences in returns better.
The rst two critiques can be lowered against any model in nance.
The last critique is the most damaging. Fama and French (1991) noted that
Betas explained little of the difference in returns across stocks between
1962 and 1991. (Over long time periods, it should, if the CAPM is right
and betas are correctly estimated), explain almost all of the difference)
Market Capitalization and price to book value ratios explained a
signicant portion of the differences in returns.
This test, however, is a test of which model explains past returns best,
and might not necessarily be a good indication of which one is the best
model for predicting expected returns in the future.
Aswath Damodaran 80
Alternatives to the CAPM
The risk in an investment can be measured by the variance in actual returns around an
expected return
E(R)
Riskless Investment Low Risk Investment High Risk Investment
E(R) E(R)
Risk that is specific to investment (Firm Specific) Risk that affects all investments (Market Risk)
Can be diversified away in a diversified portfolio Cannot be diversified away since most assets
1. each investment is a small proportion of portfolio are affected by it.
2. risk averages out across investments in portfolio
The marginal investor is assumed to hold a diversified portfolio. Thus, only market risk will
be rewarded and priced.
The CAPM The APM Multi-Factor Models Proxy Models
If there is
1. no private information
2. no transactions cost
the optimal diversified
portfolio includes every
traded asset. Everyone
will hold this market portfolio
Market Risk = Risk
added by any investment
to the market portfolio:
If there are no
arbitrage opportunities
then the market risk of
any asset must be
captured by betas
relative to factors that
affect all investments.
Market Risk = Risk
exposures of any
asset to market
factors
Beta of asset relative to
Market portfolio (from
a regression)
Betas of asset relative
to unspecified market
factors (from a factor
analysis)
Since market risk affects
most or all investments,
it must come from
macro economic factors.
Market Risk = Risk
exposures of any
asset to macro
economic factors.
Betas of assets relative
to specified macro
economic factors (from
a regression)
In an efficient market,
differences in returns
across long periods must
be due to market risk
differences. Looking for
variables correlated with
returns should then give
us proxies for this risk.
Market Risk =
Captured by the
Proxy Variable(s)
Equation relating
returns to proxy
variables (from a
regression)
Step 1: Defining Risk
Step 2: Differentiating between Rewarded and Unrewarded Risk
Step 3: Measuring Market Risk
Note that all of the models of risk and return in nance agree on the rst two
steps. They deviate at the last step in the way they measure market risk, with
The CAPM, capturing all of it in one beta, relative to the market portfolio
The APM, capturing the market risk in multiple betas against unspecied
economic factors
The Multi-Factor model, capturing the market risk in multiple betas
against specied macro economic factors
The Regression model, capturing the market risk in proxies such as
market capitalization and price/book ratios
Aswath Damodaran 81
Why the CAPM persists
! The CAPM, notwithstanding its many critics and limitations, has survived as
the default model for risk in equity valuation and corporate nance. The
alternative models that have been presented as better models (APM,
Multifactor model..) have made inroads in performance evaluation but not in
prospective analysis because:
The alternative models (which are richer) do a much better job than the CAPM in
explaining past return, but their effectiveness drops off when it comes to
estimating expected future returns (because the models tend to shift and change).
The alternative models are more complicated and require more information than
the CAPM.
For most companies, the expected returns you get with the the alternative models
is not different enough to be worth the extra trouble of estimating four additional
betas.
It takes a model to beat a model The CAPM may not be a very good model at
predicting expected returns but the alternative models dont do much better
either. In fact, the tests of the CAPM are joint tests of both the effectiveness of
the model and the quality of the parameters used in the testing (betas, for
instance). We will argue that better beta estimates and a more careful use of the
CAPM can yield far better estimates of expected return than switching to a
different model.
Aswath Damodaran 82
!Application Test: Who is the marginal investor in your
rm?
You can get information on insider and institutional holdings in your rm from:
http://nance.yahoo.com/
Enter your companys symbol and choose prole.
! Looking at the breakdown of stockholders in your rm, consider whether the
marginal investor is
a) An institutional investor
b) An individual investor
c) An insider
For most large US rms, most, if not all, of the 15 largest investors are
institutional investors. Thus, the assumption that the marginal investor is well
diversied is quite justiable.
For very small rms, the marginal investor may be an individual investor or even
a day trader, who is not diversied. What implications does this have for the use
of risk and return models?
Aswath Damodaran 83
Estimating Hurdle Rates: Risk Parameters
Aswath Damodaran 84
Inputs required to use the CAPM -
" The capital asset pricing model yields the following expected return:
Expected Return = Riskfree Rate+ Beta * (Expected Return on the Market Portfolio -
Riskfree Rate)
To use the model we need three inputs:
(a) The current risk-free rate
(b) The expected market risk premium (the premium expected for investing in risky
assets (market portfolio) over the riskless asset)
(c) The beta of the asset being analyzed.
Summarizes the inputs. Note that we are replacing the last component (E(Rm)-
Rf) with the expected risk premium..
Aswath Damodaran 85
The Riskfree Rate and Time Horizon
! On a riskfree asset, the actual return is equal to the expected return. Therefore,
there is no variance around the expected return.
! For an investment to be riskfree, i.e., to have an actual return be equal to the
expected return, two conditions have to be met
There has to be no default risk, which generally implies that the security has to be
issued by the government. Note, however, that not all governments can be viewed
as default free.
There can be no uncertainty about reinvestment rates, which implies that it is a
zero coupon security with the same maturity as the cash ow being analyzed.
Reemphasize that you need to know the expected returns with certainty for
something to be riskless.
No default risk and no reinvestment risk. Most people understand the rst point,
but dont get the second.
If you need an investment where you will know the expected returns with
certainty over a 5-year time horizon, what would that investment be?
A T.Bill would not work - there is reinvestment risk.
Even a 5-year T.Bond would not work, because the coupons will cause
the actual return to deviate from the expected return.
Thus, you need a 5-year zero coupon T.Bond
Aswath Damodaran 86
Riskfree Rate in Practice
! The riskfree rate is the rate on a zero coupon government bond matching the
time horizon of the cash ow being analyzed.
! Theoretically, this translates into using different riskfree rates for each cash
ow - the 1 year zero coupon rate for the cash ow in year 1, the 2-year zero
coupon rate for the cash ow in year 2 ...
! Practically speaking, if there is substantial uncertainty about expected cash
ows, the present value effect of using time varying riskfree rates is small
enough that it may not be worth it.
From a present value standpoint, using different riskfree rates for each cash
ow may be overkill, except in those cases where your interest rates are very
different for different time horizons (a very upward sloping or downward
sloping yield curve)
Aswath Damodaran 87
The Bottom Line on Riskfree Rates
! Using a long term government rate (even on a coupon bond) as the riskfree
rate on all of the cash ows in a long term analysis will yield a close
approximation of the true value.
! For short term analysis, it is entirely appropriate to use a short term
government security rate as the riskfree rate.
! The riskfree rate that you use in an analysis should be in the same currency
that your cashows are estimated in. In other words, if your cashows are in
U.S. dollars, your riskfree rate has to be in U.S. dollars as well.
Data Source: You can get riskfree rates for the US in a number of sites. Try
http://www.bloomberg.com/markets.
Since corporate nance generally looks at long term decisions, we will for the
most part use the long term government bond rate.
Aswath Damodaran 88
What if there is no default-free entity?
! You could adjust the local currency government borrowing rate by the
estimated default spread on the bond to arrive at a riskless local currency rate.
The default spread on the government bond can be estimated using the local
currency ratings that are available for many countries.
! For instance, assume that the Brazilian government bond rate (in nominal
Brazilian Reals (BR)) is 14% and that the local currency rating assigned to the
Brazilian government is BB+. If the default spread for BB+ rated bonds is
5%, the riskless Brazilian real rate would be 9%.
! Alternatively, you can analyze Brazilian companies in U.S. dollars and use a
treasury bond rate as your riskfree rate or in real terms and do all analysis
without an ination component.
For a real riskfree rate, an expected real growth rate for the economy should
provide a reasonable approximation.
To do your analysis in real terms, you need a real riskfree rate. In the
U.S., you can obtain such a rate by looking at the ination indexed
treasury bond rate. Outside the U.S., you can assume as a rough
approximation that the real riskfree rate is equal to your real growth rate.
IIf the real growth rate is much lower than the real interest rate, you will
have signicant decits - trade or budget - to make up the shortfall. If the
real growth rate is much higher than the real interest rate, you will the
exact opposite - surpluses. A long term equilibrium can be reached only
when the two are equal.
Aswath Damodaran 89
Measurement of the risk premium
! The risk premium is the premium that investors demand for investing in an
average risk investment, relative to the riskfree rate.
! As a general proposition, this premium should be
greater than zero
increase with the risk aversion of the investors in that market
increase with the riskiness of the average risk investment
Implicit here are two questions - Which investors risk premium? What is the
average risk investment?
Aswath Damodaran 90
What is your risk premium?
! Assume that stocks are the only risky assets and that you are offered two investment options:
a riskless investment (say a Government Security), on which you can make 5%
a mutual fund of all stocks, on which the returns are uncertain
How much of an expected return would you demand to shift your money from the riskless asset to the
mutual fund?
a) Less than 5%
b) Between 5 - 7%
c) Between 7 - 9%
d) Between 9 - 11%
e) Between 11- 13%
f) More than 13%
Check your premium against the survey premium on my web site.
I usually nd that the median number that I get in the US is 10.7-12.7%, though
the distribution is pretty spread out. This translates into a risk premium of 4-6%.
Aswath Damodaran 91
Risk Aversion and Risk Premiums
! If this were the capital market line, the risk premium would be a weighted
average of the risk premiums demanded by each and every investor.
! The weights will be determined by the magnitude of wealth that each investor
has. Thus, Warren Buffets risk aversion counts more towards determining
the equilibrium premium than yours and mine.
! As investors become more risk averse, you would expect the equilibrium
premium to increase.
The wealthier you are, the more your estimate of the risk premium will weight
into the nal market premium.
Aswath Damodaran 92
Risk Premiums do change..
Go back to the previous example. Assume now that you are making the same
choice but that you are making it in the aftermath of a stock market crash (it
has dropped 25% in the last month). Would you change your answer?
a) I would demand a larger premium
b) I would demand a smaller premium
c) I would demand the same premium
Quite a few will demand a larger premium, suggesting that this is a dynamic
estimate, changing from period to period.
You can ask the same question about how a recession or losing your job will
affect your risk premium.
Aswath Damodaran 93
Estimating Risk Premiums in Practice
! Survey investors on their desired risk premiums and use the average premium
from these surveys.
! Assume that the actual premium delivered over long time periods is equal to
the expected premium - i.e., use historical data
! Estimate the implied premium in todays asset prices.
Lists the basic approaches
Aswath Damodaran 94
The Survey Approach
! Surveying all investors in a market place is impractical.
! However, you can survey a few investors (especially the larger investors) and
use these results. In practice, this translates into surveys of money managers
expectations of expected returns on stocks over the next year.
! The limitations of this approach are:
there are no constraints on reasonability (the survey could produce negative risk
premiums or risk premiums of 50%)
they are extremely volatile
they tend to be short term; even the longest surveys do not go beyond one year
Merrill Lynch does surveys of portfolio managers (who presumably have more
wealth to invest and hence should be weighted more) asking investors what they
think the market will do over the next year. They report the number but do not
use it internally as a risk premium.
Aswath Damodaran 95
The Historical Premium Approach
! This is the default approach used by most to arrive at the premium to use in
the model
! In most cases, this approach does the following
it denes a time period for the estimation (1926-Present, 1962-Present....)
it calculates average returns on a stock index during the period
it calculates average returns on a riskless security over the period
it calculates the difference between the two
and uses it as a premium looking forward
! The limitations of this approach are:
it assumes that the risk aversion of investors has not changed in a systematic way
across time. (The risk aversion may change from year to year, but it reverts back to
historical averages)
it assumes that the riskiness of the risky portfolio (stock index) has not changed
in a systematic way across time.
This is the basic approach used by almost every large investment bank and
consulting rm.
Aswath Damodaran 96
Historical Average Premiums for the United States
Arithmetic average Geometric Average
Stocks - Stocks - Stocks - Stocks -
Historical Period T.Bills T.Bonds T.Bills T.Bonds
1928-2004 7.92% 6.53% 6.02% 4.84%
1964-2004 5.82% 4.34% 4.59% 3.47%
1994-2004 8.60% 5.82% 6.85% 4.51%
What is the right premium?
! Go back as far as you can. Otherwise, the standard error in the estimate will be large. (
! Be consistent in your use of a riskfree rate.
! Use arithmetic premiums for one-year estimates of costs of equity and geometric premiums for estimates of long term
costs of equity.
Data Source: Check out the returns by year and estimate your own historical premiums by going to updated data on my web
site.
!
Std Error in estimate =
Annualized Std deviation in Stock prices
Number of years of historical data
)
This is based upon historical data available on the Federal Reserve site in St.
Louis. There are three reasons for why the premium estimated may differ:
1. How far back you go (My personal bias is to go back as far as
possible. Stock prices are so noisy that you need very long time periods
to get reasonable estimates)
2. Whether you use T.Bill or T.Bond rates ( You have to be consistent.
Since I will be using the T.Bond rate as my riskfree rate, I will use the
premium over that rate)
3. Whether you use arithmetic or geometric means (If returns were
uncorrelated over time, and you were asked to estimate a 1-year
premium, the arithmetic mean would be used. Since returns are
negatively correlated over time, and we are estimating premiums over
longer holding periods, it makes more sense to use the compounded
return, which gives us the geometric average)
Thus, I should be using the updated geometric average for stocks over bonds.
The rest of these lecture notes were set in 2004, and the risk premiums used will
reect risk premiums then:
Aswath Damodaran 97
What about historical premiums for other markets?
! Historical data for markets outside the United States is available for much
shorter time periods. The problem is even greater in emerging markets.
! The historical premiums that emerge from this data reects this and there is
much greater error associated with the estimates of the premiums.
Increasingly, the challenges we face are in estimating risk premiums outside the
United States, not only because so many companies that we value are in
younger, emerging markets but because so many US companies are looking at
expanding into these markets.
Aswath Damodaran 98
One solution: Look at a countrys bond rating and default
spreads as a start
! Ratings agencies such as S&P and Moodys assign ratings to countries that
reect their assessment of the default risk of these countries. These ratings
reect the political and economic stability of these countries and thus provide
a useful measure of country risk. In September 2004, for instance, Brazil had
a country rating of B2.
! If a country issues bonds denominated in a different currency (say dollars or
euros), you can also see how the bond market views the risk in that country.
In September 2004, Brazil had dollar denominated C-Bonds, trading at an
interest rate of 10.01%. The US treasury bond rate that day was 4%, yielding
a default spread of 6.01% for Brazil.
! Many analysts add this default spread to the US risk premium to come up
with a risk premium for a country. Using this approach would yield a risk
premium of 10.85% for Brazil, if we use 4.84% as the premium for the US.
This appraoch is simple but it assumes that country default spreads are also
good measures of additional country equity risk. The question thought is
whether equities (which are riskier than bonds) should command a larger risk
premium.
Aswath Damodaran 99
Beyond the default spread
! Country ratings measure default risk. While default risk premiums and equity
risk premiums are highly correlated, one would expect equity spreads to be
higher than debt spreads. If we can compute how much more risky the equity
market is, relative to the bond market, we could use this information. For
example,
Standard Deviation in Bovespa (Equity) = 36%
Standard Deviation in Brazil C-Bond = 28.2%
Default spread on C-Bond = 6.01%
Country Risk Premium for Brazil = 6.01% (36%/28.2%) = 7.67%
! Note that this is on top of the premium you estimate for a mature market.
Thus, if you assume that the risk premium in the US is 4.84%, the risk
premium for Brazil would be 12.51%.
In In this approach, we scale up the default spread to reect the additional risk in
stocks This will result in larger equity risk premiums. There is a third
approach which is closely related where you look at the standard deviation of the
emerging equity market, relative to the standard deviation of the U.S. equity
market, and multiply by the U.S. equity risk premium. Thus, the equity risk
premium for an emerging market which is twice as volatiles as the the US
market should have an equity risk premium of 9.68% (twice 4.84%).
Aswath Damodaran 100
Implied Equity Premiums
! We can use the information in stock prices to back out how risk averse the market is and how much of a risk premium it
is demanding.
! If you pay the current level of the index, you can expect to make a return of 7.87% on stocks (which is obtained by
solving for r in the following equation)
! Implied Equity risk premium = Expected return on stocks - Treasury bond rate = 7.87% - 4.22% = 3.65%
!
1211.92 =
38.13
(1+ r)
+
41.37
(1+ r)
2
+
44.89
(1+ r)
3
+
48.71
(1+ r)
4
+
52.85
(1+ r)
5
+
52.85(1.0422)
(r ".0422)(1+ r)
5
January 1, 2005
S&P 500 is at 1211.92
In 2004, dividends & stock
buybacks were 2.90% of
the index, generating 35.15
in cashflows
Analysts expect earnings to grow 8.5% a year for the next 5 years .
After year 5, we will assume that
earnings on the index will grow at
4.22%, the same rate as the entire
economy
38.13 41.37 44.89 48.71 52.85
Aswath Damodaran 101
Implied Premiums in the US
Aswath Damodaran 102
! Application Test: A Market Risk Premium
! Based upon our discussion of historical risk premiums so far, the risk
premium looking forward should be:
a) About 7.92%, which is what the arithmetic average premium has been since 1928,
for stocks over T.Bills
b) About 4.84%, which is the geometric average premium since 1928, for stocks
over T.Bonds
c) About 3.7%, which is the implied premium in the stock market today
There is no right answer, but it will lead to very different costs of equity and
capital, and corporate nancial decisions down the road.
Aswath Damodaran 103
Estimating Beta
! The standard procedure for estimating betas is to regress stock returns (R
j
)
against market returns (R
m
) -
R
j
= a + b R
m
where a is the intercept and b is the slope of the regression.
! The slope of the regression corresponds to the beta of the stock, and measures
the riskiness of the stock.
Betas reect not just the volatility of the underlying investment but also how it
moves with the market:
Beta (Slope) = Correlation
jm
(!
j /
!
m
)
Note that !
j
can be high but beta can be low (because the asset is not very
highly correlated with the market)
Aswath Damodaran 104
Estimating Performance
! The intercept of the regression provides a simple measure of performance
during the period of the regression, relative to the capital asset pricing model.
R
j
= R
f
+ b (R
m
- R
f
)
= R
f
(1-b) + b R
m
........... Capital Asset Pricing Model
R
j
= a + b R
m
........... Regression Equation
! If
a > R
f
(1-b) .... Stock did better than expected during regression period
a = R
f
(1-b) .... Stock did as well as expected during regression period
a < R
f
(1-b) .... Stock did worse than expected during regression period
! The difference between the intercept and R
f
(1-b) is Jensen's alpha. If it is
positive, your stock did perform better than expected during the period of the
regression.
Jensens alpha can also be computed by estimating the expected return during
the period of the regression, using the actual return on the market during the
period, the riskfree rate during the period and the estimated beta, and then
comparing it to the actual return over the period.
Algebraically, you should get the same answer.
Aswath Damodaran 105
Firm Specic and Market Risk
! The R squared (R
2
) of the regression provides an estimate of the proportion
of the risk (variance) of a rm that can be attributed to market risk;
! The balance (1 - R
2
) can be attributed to rm specic risk.
This ties back to the second step of the derivation of the model, where we
divided risk into diversiable and non-diversiable risk. R squared measures the
proportion of the risk that is not diversiable (also called market or systematic
risk)
Aswath Damodaran 106
Setting up for the Estimation
! Decide on an estimation period
Services use periods ranging from 2 to 5 years for the regression
Longer estimation period provides more data, but rms change.
Shorter periods can be affected more easily by signicant rm-specic event that
occurred during the period (Example: ITT for 1995-1997)
! Decide on a return interval - daily, weekly, monthly
Shorter intervals yield more observations, but suffer from more noise.
Noise is created by stocks not trading and biases all betas towards one.
! Estimate returns (including dividends) on stock
Return = (Price
End
- Price
Beginning
+ Dividends
Period
)/ Price
Beginning
Included dividends only in ex-dividend month
! Choose a market index, and estimate returns (inclusive of dividends) on the
index for each interval for the period.
Note the number of subjective judgments that have to be made. The estimated
beta is going to be affected by all these judgments.
My personal biases are to
Use ve years of data (because I use monthly data)
Use monthly returns (to avoid non-trading problems)
Use returns with dividends
Use an index that is broad, market weighted and with a long history (I
use the S&P 500. The NYSE composite is not market weighted, and the
Wilshire 5000 has both non-trading and measurement issues that have
not been resolved.)
Reports parameters used.
Aswath Damodaran 107
Choosing the Parameters: Disney
! Period used: 5 years
! Return Interval = Monthly
! Market Index: S&P 500 Index.
! For instance, to calculate returns on Disney in December 1999,
Price for Disney at end of November 1999 = $ 27.88
Price for Disney at end of December 1999 = $ 29.25
Dividends during month = $0.21 (It was an ex-dividend month)
Return =($29.25 - $27.88 + $ 0.21)/$27.88= 5.69%
! To estimate returns on the index in the same month
Index level (including dividends) at end of November 1999 = 1388.91
Index level (including dividends) at end of December 1999 = 1469.25
Return =(1469.25 - 1388.91)/ 1388.91 = 5.78%
This has both the scatter plot and the regression line. Note the noise in the plots
around the line.
That can be viewed either as a sign of a poor regression or as a measure of the
rm-specic risk that Disney is exposed to.
Aswath Damodaran 108
Disneys Historical Beta
Aswath Damodaran 109
The Regression Output
! Using monthly returns from 1999 to 2003, we ran a regression of returns on
Disney stock against the S*P 500. The output is below:
Returns
Disney
= 0.0467% + 1.01 Returns
S & P 500
(R squared= 29%)
(0.20)
The standard error of the beta is reported in brackets under the beta.
Aswath Damodaran 110
Analyzing Disneys Performance
! Intercept = 0.0467%
This is an intercept based on monthly returns. Thus, it has to be compared to a
monthly riskfree rate.
Between 1999 and 2003,
Monthly Riskfree Rate = 0.313% (based upon average T.Bill rate: 99-03)
Riskfree Rate (1-Beta) = 0.313% (1-1.01) = -..0032%
! The Comparison is then between
Intercept versus Riskfree Rate (1 - Beta)
0.0467% versus 0.313%(1-1.01)=-0.0032%
Jensens Alpha = 0.0467% -(-0.0032%) = 0.05%
! Disney did 0.05% better than expected, per month, between 1999 and 2003.
Annualized, Disneys annual excess return = (1.0005)
12
-1= 0.60%
Disney did 0.60% better than expected on an annual basis between 1999 and
2003.
Aswath Damodaran 111
More on Jensens Alpha
If you did this analysis on every stock listed on an exchange, what would the
average Jensens alpha be across all stocks?
a) Depend upon whether the market went up or down during the period
b) Should be zero
c) Should be greater than zero, because stocks tend to go up more often than down
Should be zero, if it is weighted by market value. The market cannot beat or lag
itself.
Aswath Damodaran 112
A positive Jensens alpha Who is responsible?
! Disney has a positive Jensens alpha of 0.60% a year between 1999 and 2003.
This can be viewed as a sign that management in the rm did a good job,
managing the rm during the period.
a) True
b) False
This is not necessarily true. In fact, the average Jensens alpha across
entertainment companies during this period was 1.33% (annualized). This
would suggest that Disney underperformed the sector by 0.70%. In fact, a
companys positive Jensens alpha can be entirely attributable to sector
performance. Conversely, a company can have a negative Jensens alpha and
impeccable management at the same time.
Aswath Damodaran 113
Estimating Disneys Beta
! Slope of the Regression of 1.01 is the beta
! Regression parameters are always estimated with error. The error is captured
in the standard error of the beta estimate, which in the case of Disney is 0.20.
! Assume that I asked you what Disneys true beta is, after this regression.
What is your best point estimate?
What range would you give me, with 67% condence?
What range would you give me, with 95% condence?
Best point estimate: 1.01
Range with 67% condence: 0.81-1.21
Range with 95% condence: 0.61 - 1.41
Aswath Damodaran 114
The Dirty Secret of Standard Error
Di str i buti on of Standar d Er r or s: Beta Esti mates for U.S. stocks
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
<.10 .10 - .20 .20 - .30 .30 - .40 .40 - .50 .50 - .75 >.75
Standar d Er r or i n Beta Esti mate
N
u
m
b
e
r

o
f

F
i
r
m
s
The standard errors of betas estimated in the US tend to be fairly high, with
many beta estimates having standard errors of 0.40 or greater. These betas
should come with warnings.
Aswath Damodaran 115
Breaking down Disneys Risk
! R Squared = 29%
! This implies that
29% of the risk at Disney comes from market sources
71%, therefore, comes from rm-specic sources
! The rm-specic risk is diversiable and will not be rewarded
This again is well in line with typical rms in the US. The typical rm has an R
squared of between 20-25%. Hence, the allure of diversication.
Aswath Damodaran 116
The Relevance of R Squared
You are a diversied investor trying to decide whether you should invest in
Disney or Amgen. They both have betas of 1.01, but Disney has an R
Squared of 29% while Amgens R squared of only 14.5%. Which one would
you invest in?
a) Amgen, because it has the lower R squared
b) Disney, because it has the higher R squared
c) You would be indifferent
Would your answer be different if you were an undiversied investor?
If you were a diversied investor, you would not care, since you would diversify
away all of the undiversiable risk anyway. If you were undiversied, you
would prefer Disney, which has less rm-specic risk.
Aswath Damodaran 117
Beta Estimation: Using a Service (Bloomberg)

This is the page for Disneys beta, using the same period as the regression run
earlier, from Bloomberg.
Bloomberg, however, uses only price returns (it ignores dividends both in the
stock and the index). Hence the intercept is different.
The adjusted beta is just the regression beta moves towards one, reecting the
empirical realities that for most rms, betas tend to drift towards one as they get
larger and more diversied.
Aswath Damodaran 118
Estimating Expected Returns for Disney in September 2004
! Inputs to the expected return calculation
Disneys Beta = 1.01
Riskfree Rate = 4.00% (U.S. ten-year T.Bond rate)
Risk Premium = 4.82% (Approximate historical premium: 1928-2003)
! Expected Return = Riskfree Rate + Beta (Risk Premium)
= 4.00% + 1.01(4.82%) = 8.87%
Note that this expected return would have been different if we had decided to
use a different historical premium or the implied premium.
Aswath Damodaran 119
Use to a Potential Investor in Disney
As a potential investor in Disney, what does this expected return of 8.87% tell
you?
a) This is the return that I can expect to make in the long term on Disney, if the stock
is correctly priced and the CAPM is the right model for risk,
b) This is the return that I need to make on Disney in the long term to break even on
my investment in the stock
c) Both
Assume now that you are an active investor and that your research suggests that
an investment in Disney will yield 12.5% a year for the next 5 years. Based
upon the expected return of 8.87%, you would
a) Buy the stock
b) Sell the stock
Both. If the stock is correctly priced, the beta is correctly estimated and the
CAPM is the right model, this is what you would expect to make on Disney in
the long term. As an investor, this is what you would need to make to break even
on the investment.
Buy the stock, since you think you can make more than the hurdle rate.
Aswath Damodaran 120
How managers use this expected return
! Managers at Disney
need to make at least 8.87% as a return for their equity investors to break even.
this is the hurdle rate for projects, when the investment is analyzed from an equity
standpoint
! In other words, Disneys cost of equity is 8.87%.
! What is the cost of not delivering this cost of equity?
The cost of equity is what equity investors in your company view as their
required return.
The cost of not delivering this return is more unhappy stockholders, a lower
stock price, and if you are a manager, maybe your job.
Going back to the corporate governance section, if stockholders have little or no
control over managers, managers are less likely to view this as the cost of equity.
Aswath Damodaran 121
! Application Test: Analyzing the Risk Regression
! Using your Bloomberg risk and return print out, answer the following
questions:
How well or badly did your stock do, relative to the market, during the period of
the regression? (You can assume an annualized riskfree rate of 4.8% during the
regression period)
Intercept - (4.8%/n) (1- Beta) = Jensens Alpha
Where n is the number of return periods in a year (12 if monthly; 52 if monthly)
What proportion of the risk in your stock is attributable to the market? What
proportion is rm-specic?
What is the historical estimate of beta for your stock? What is the range on this
estimate with 67% probability? With 95% probability?
Based upon this beta, what is your estimate of the required return on this stock?
Riskless Rate + Beta * Risk Premium
Try this on your company.
Aswath Damodaran 122
A Quick Test
You are advising a very risky software rm on the right cost of equity to use in
project analysis. You estimate a beta of 3.0 for the rm and come up with a
cost of equity of 18.46%. The CFO of the rm is concerned about the high
cost of equity and wants to know whether there is anything he can do to
lower his beta.
How do you bring your beta down?
Should you focus your attention on bringing your beta down?
a) Yes
b) No
There are three ways to bring your beta down:
Pay off debt, if you have any
Move into safer businesses
Sell off assets, and keep cash on your balance sheet
No. What matters is the difference between what you make on your projects
(return on equity) and your cost of equity. If you lower your cost of equity, but
lower your return on equity even more, you are not serving your stockholders.
Aswath Damodaran 123
Disneys Beta Calculation: A look back at 1997-2002
Jensens alpha = -0.39% -
0.30 (1 - 0.94) = -0.41%
Annualized = (1-
.0041)^12-1 = -4.79%
If you go back 12 months, the conclusions on Disneys performance would
have been much more negative.
Jensens alpha = -0.39% - 0.30 (1 - 0.94) = -0.41% ! Monthly riskfree rate
during the period is 0.30%)
Annualized Jensens alpha = (1-.0041)^12-1 = -4.79%
Aswath Damodaran 124
Beta Estimation and Index Choice: Deutsche Bank
Note that Deutsche Bank is about 8% of the DAX.
Aswath Damodaran 125
A Few Questions
! The R squared for Deutsche Bank is very high (62%), at least relative to U.S.
rms. Why is that?
! The beta for Deutsche Bank is 1.04.
Is this an appropriate measure of risk?
If not, why not?
! If you were an investor in primarily U.S. stocks, would this be an appropriate
measure of risk?
The R-squared is high, because Deutsche Bank is such a large percentage of the
index.
This beta is a reasonable measure of risk only to those whose entire portfolio is
composed of large German companies.
If you were primarily a US investor, you would look at the risk that DBK would
add on to a US index.
Aswath Damodaran 126
Deutsche Bank: Alternate views of Risk
DAX FTSE Euro
300
MSCI
Intercept
1.24% 1.54% 1.37%
Beta 1.05 1.52 1.23
Std Error of
Beta
0.11 0.19 0.25
R Squared 62% 52% 30%

As the index used expands and becomes broader, the R-squared drops off and
the standard error increases. The least precise beta estimate (with the highest
standard error) may be the most meaningful.
Aswath Damodaran 127
Aracruzs Beta?
Aracruz ADR vs S&P 500
S&P
20 10 0 -10 -20
A
r
a
c
r
u
z

A
D
R
80
60
40
20
0
-20
-40

Aracruz vs Bovespa
BOVESPA
30 20 10 0 -10 -20 -30 -40 -50
A
r
a
c
r
u
z
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
-20
-40

A r a c r u z ADR = 2.80% + 1.00 S&P Ar acr uz = 2.62% + 0.22 Bovespa
Two very different views of Aracruzs risk. Which one is the right one?
The Bovespa is a narrow index and Aracruzs beta estimated against it may tell
us nothing about its risk.
The regression against the S&P 500 is more informative, but the standard error
is large
Aswath Damodaran 128
Beta: Exploring Fundamentals
Beta = 1
Beta > 1
Beta = 0
Beta < 1
Real Networks: 3.24
Qwest Communications: 2.60
General Electric: 1.10
Microsoft: 1..25
Philip Morris: 0.65
Exxon Mobil: 0.40
Harmony Gold Mining: - 0.10
Enron: 0.95
Aswath Damodaran 129
Determinant 1: Product Type
! Industry Effects: The beta value for a rm depends upon the sensitivity of
the demand for its products and services and of its costs to macroeconomic
factors that affect the overall market.
Cyclical companies have higher betas than non-cyclical rms
Firms which sell more discretionary products will have higher betas than rms that
sell less discretionary products
Betas measure risk relative to the market.
Firms which are cyclical or sell discretionary products tend to do much better
when the economy is doing well (and the market is doing well) and much worse
when the economy is doing badly than other rms in the market.
Aswath Damodaran 130
A Simple Test
Consider an investment in Tiffanys. What kind of beta do you think this
investment will have?
a) Much higher than one
b) Close to one
c) Much lower than one
Much Higher than one. Most of the products sold by Tiffanys are
discretionary.
Aswath Damodaran 131
Determinant 2: Operating Leverage Effects
! Operating leverage refers to the proportion of the total costs of the rm that
are xed.
! Other things remaining equal, higher operating leverage results in greater
earnings variability which in turn results in higher betas.
Firms with high xed costs tend to see much bigger swings in operating income
(and stock prices) for a given change in revenues than rms with more exible
cost structures.
Consider the case of the airline sector, which tends to have cost structures which
are almost entirely xed (plane lease expenses, fuel costs )
Aswath Damodaran 132
Measures of Operating Leverage
Fixed Costs Measure = Fixed Costs / Variable Costs
! This measures the relationship between xed and variable costs. The higher
the proportion, the higher the operating leverage.
EBIT Variability Measure = % Change in EBIT / % Change in Revenues
! This measures how quickly the earnings before interest and taxes changes as
revenue changes. The higher this number, the greater the operating leverage.
The direct measures of xed costs and variable costs are difcult to obtain.
Hence we use the second.
Aswath Damodaran 133
Disneys Operating Leverage: 1987- 2003
Year Net Sales % Change
in Sales
EBIT % Change
in EBIT
1987 2877 756
1988 3438 19.50% 848 12.17%
1989 4594 33.62% 1177 38.80%
1990 5844 27.21% 1368 16.23%
1991 6182 5.78% 1124 -17.84%
1992 7504 21.38% 1287 14.50%
1993 8529 13.66% 1560 21.21%
1994 10055 17.89% 1804 15.64%
1995 12112 20.46% 2262 25.39%
1996 18739 54.71% 3024 33.69%
1997 22473 19.93% 3945 30.46%
1998 22976 2.24% 3843 -2.59%
1999 23435 2.00% 3580 -6.84%
2000 25418 8.46% 2525 -29.47%
2001 25172 -0.97% 2832 12.16%
2002 25329 0.62% 2384 -15.82%
2003 27061 6.84% 2713 13.80%
1987-2003 15.83% 10.09%
1996-2003 11.73% 4.42%

This measures Disneys operating leverage historically. You need a number of
years of data before you can get reasonable estimates.
Aswath Damodaran 134
Reading Disneys Operating Leverage
! Operating Leverage = % Change in EBIT/ % Change in Sales
= 10.09% / 15.83% = 0.64
! This is lower than the operating leverage for other entertainment rms, which
we computed to be 1.12. This would suggest that Disney has lower xed costs
than its competitors.
! The acquisition of Capital Cities by Disney in 1996 may be skewing the
operating leverage. Looking at the changes since then:
Operating Leverage
1996-03
= 4.42%/11.73% = 0.38
Looks like Disneys operating leverage has decreased since 1996.
The operating leverage number makes sense only when compared to industry
averages or historical averages. It is the relative operating leverage that affects
betas.
Aswath Damodaran 135
A Test
Assume that you are comparing a European automobile manufacturing rm with
a U.S. automobile rm. European rms are generally much more constrained
in terms of laying off employees, if they get into nancial trouble. What
implications does this have for betas, if they are estimated relative to a
common index?
a) European rms will have much higher betas than U.S. rms
b) European rms will have similar betas to U.S. rms
c) European rms will have much lower betas than U.S. rms
European rms will have more xed costs, leading to higher betas. This might
put these rms at a competitive disadvantage relative to US rms.
Are there ways in which you can bring your operating leverage down as a rm?
Make more of your xed costs into variable costs (Build in escape
clauses into lease agreements, for instance). Negotiate exibility in wage
contracts or use part time employees to deal with surplus business.
Spin off assets that are capital intensive (Coca Cola spun off its bottlers
in the early 1980s)
Aswath Damodaran 136
Determinant 3: Financial Leverage
! As rms borrow, they create xed costs (interest payments) that make their
earnings to equity investors more volatile.
! This increased earnings volatility which increases the equity beta
Same rationale as operating leverage.
Aswath Damodaran 137
Equity Betas and Leverage
! The beta of equity alone can be written as a function of the unlevered beta and
the debt-equity ratio
"
L
= "
u
(1+ ((1-t)D/E))
where
"
L
= Levered or Equity Beta
"
u
= Unlevered Beta
t = Corporate marginal tax rate
D = Market Value of Debt
E = Market Value of Equity
This is based upon two assumptions
Debt bears no market risk (which is consistent with studies that have
found that default risk is non-systematic)
Debt creates a tax benet
Assets Liabilities
Assets A ("
u
) Debt D ("
D
=0)
Tax Benets tD ("
D
=0) Equity E ("
L
)
Betas are weighted averages,
#
u
(E + D - tD)/(D+E) = "
L
(E/(D+E))
Solve for "
L
,
"
L
= #
u
(E + D - tD)/E= #
u
(1 + (1-t)D/E)
If debt has a beta ("
D
)
#
u
(E + D - tD)/(D+E) + "
D
tD/(D+E) = "
L
(E/(D+E)) + "
D
D/(D+E)
"
L
= #
u
(1 + (1-t)D/E) - "
D
(1-t) [D/(D+E)]
Aswath Damodaran 138
Effects of leverage on betas: Disney
! The regression beta for Disney is 1.01. This beta is a levered beta (because it
is based on stock prices, which reect leverage) and the leverage implicit in
the beta estimate is the average market debt equity ratio during the period of
the regression (1999 to 2003)
! The average debt equity ratio during this period was 27.5%.
! The unlevered beta for Disney can then be estimated (using a marginal tax
rate of 37.3%)
= Current Beta / (1 + (1 - tax rate) (Average Debt/Equity))
= 1.01 / (1 + (1 - 0.373)) (0.275) = 0.8615
Note that betas reect the average leverage over the period and not the current
leverage of the rms. Firms whose leverage has changed over the period will
have regression betas that are different from their true betas.
Aswath Damodaran 139
Disney : Beta and Leverage
Debt to Capital Debt/Equity Ratio Beta Effect of Leverage
0.00% 0.00% 0.86 0.00
10.00% 11.11% 0.92 0.06
20.00% 25.00% 1.00 0.14
30.00% 42.86% 1.09 0.23
40.00% 66.67% 1.22 0.36
50.00% 100.00% 1.40 0.54
60.00% 150.00% 1.67 0.81
70.00% 233.33% 2.12 1.26
80.00% 400.00% 3.02 2.16
90.00% 900.00% 5.72 4.86
Since equity investors bear all of the non-diversiable risk, the beta of Disneys
equity will increase as the leverage increases.
Aswath Damodaran 140
Betas are weighted Averages
! The beta of a portfolio is always the market-value weighted average of the
betas of the individual investments in that portfolio.
! Thus,
the beta of a mutual fund is the weighted average of the betas of the stocks and
other investment in that portfolio
the beta of a rm after a merger is the market-value weighted average of the betas
of the companies involved in the merger.
Betas are always weighted averages - where the weights are based upon market
value. This is because betas measure risk relative to a market index.
Aswath Damodaran 141
The Disney/Cap Cities Merger: Pre-Merger
Disney:
! Beta = 1.15
! Debt = $ 3,186 million Equity = $ 31,100 million Firm = $34,286
! D/E = 0.10
ABC:
! Beta = 0.95
! Debt = $ 615 million Equity = $ 18,500 million Firm= $ 19,115
! D/E = 0.03
These are the betas of the rms at the time of Disneys acquisition. The tax rate
used for both betas is 36%.
Aswath Damodaran 142
Disney Cap Cities Beta Estimation: Step 1
! Calculate the unlevered betas for both rms
Disneys unlevered beta = 1.15/(1+0.64*0.10) = 1.08
Cap Cities unlevered beta = 0.95/(1+0.64*0.03) = 0.93
! Calculate the unlevered beta for the combined rm
Unlevered Beta for combined rm
= 1.08 (34286/53401) + 0.93 (19115/53401)
= 1.026
[Remember to calculate the weights using the rm values of the two rms]
The unlevered beta of the combined rm will always be the weighted average of
the two rms unlevered betas. The rm values (rather than the equity values) are
used for the weights because we are looking at the unlevered betas of the rms .
Aswath Damodaran 143
Disney Cap Cities Beta Estimation: Step 2
! If Disney had used all equity to buy Cap Cities
Debt = $ 615 + $ 3,186 = $ 3,801 million
Equity = $ 18,500 + $ 31,100 = $ 49,600
D/E Ratio = 3,801/49600 = 7.66%
New Beta = 1.026 (1 + 0.64 (.0766)) = 1.08
! Since Disney borrowed $ 10 billion to buy Cap Cities/ABC
Debt = $ 615 + $ 3,186 + $ 10,000 = $ 13,801 million
Equity = $ 39,600
D/E Ratio = 13,801/39600 = 34.82%
New Beta = 1.026 (1 + 0.64 (.3482)) = 1.25
This reects the effects of the nancing of the acquisition. In the second
scenario, note that $ 10 billion of the $ 18.5 billion is borrowed. The remaining
$ 8.5 billion has to come from new equity issues.
Exercise: What would Disneys beta be if it had borrowed the entire $ 18.5
billion?
Debt = $ 615 + $ 3,186 + $ 18,500 = $ 22,301 million
Equity = $ 31,100 million
D/E Ratio = 71.70%
New Beta = 1.026 ( 1 + 0.64 (.717)) = 1.50
Aswath Damodaran 144
Firm Betas versus divisional Betas
! Firm Betas as weighted averages: The beta of a rm is the weighted average
of the betas of its individual projects.
! At a broader level of aggregation, the beta of a rm is the weighted average of
the betas of its individual division.
The same principle applies to a rm. To the degree that the rm is in multiple
businesses, its beta reects all of these businesses.
Aswath Damodaran 145
Bottom-up versus Top-down Beta
! The top-down beta for a rm comes from a regression
! The bottom up beta can be estimated by doing the following:
Find out the businesses that a rm operates in
Find the unlevered betas of other rms in these businesses
Take a weighted (by sales or operating income) average of these unlevered betas
Lever up using the rms debt/equity ratio
! The bottom up beta will give you a better estimate of the true beta when
the standard error of the beta from the regression is high (and) the beta for a rm is
very different from the average for the business
the rm has reorganized or restructured itself substantially during the period of the
regression
when a rm is not traded
Bottom-up betas build up to the beta from the fundamentals, rather than trusting
the regression.
The standard error of an average beta for a sector, is smaller by a factor of ! n,
where n is the number of rms in the sector. Thus, if there are 25 rms in a
sector, the standard error of the average is 1/5 the average standard error.
Aswath Damodaran 146
Disneys business breakdown
Business
Comparable
fi rms
Number
of firms
Average
levered
bet a
Median
D/ E
Unlevered
bet a
Cash/Firm
Val ue
Unlevered
beta
corrected
for cash
Media
Networks
Radia and TV
broadcasting
companies 2 4 1. 22 20.45% 1.0768 0. 75% 1.0850
Parks and
Resorts
Theme park &
Entertainment
fi rms 9 1. 58 120.76 % 0.8853 2. 77% 0.9105
Studio
Entertainment
Movie
companies 1 1 1. 16 27.96% 0.9824 14.08% 1.1435
Consumer
Products
Toy and
apparel
retailers;
Entertainment
software 7 7 1. 06 9. 18% 0.9981 12.08% 1.1353

Diosney has other businesses (like cruise lines) which are not broken out
separately because they are too small There is also a trade off to breaking
businesses down too much into subsectors, since it becomes more difcult
to nd comparable rms.
Estimating details:
1. Comparable rms: get 75% or more of their revenues from the stated
business
2. Average levered beta: Simple average of two-year weekly return betas for
comparable rms.
3. Cash / Firm value: Cash holdings as a percent of rm value at comparable
rms
4. Unlevered beta corrected for cash: Unlevered beta/ (1 - Cash/ Firm Value).
We are assuming that cash has a beta of zero.
Aswath Damodaran 147
Disneys bottom up beta
Business
Revenues
in 2002 EV/Sales
Estimated
Value
Firm
Value
Proportion
Unlevered
beta
Media
Networks $10,941 3.41 $37,278.62 49.25% 1.0850
Parks and
Resorts $6,412 2.37 $15,208.37 20.09% 0.9105
Studio
Entertainment $7,364 2.63 $19,390.14 25.62% 1.1435
Consumer
Products $2,344 1.63 $3,814.38 5.04% 1.1353
Disney $27,061 $75,691.51 100.00% 1.0674

EV/Sales = (Market Value of Equity + Market value of debt - Cash)/Sales. The
number reported here is the average across the comparable rms.
Aswath Damodaran 148
Disneys Cost of Equity
Business Unlevered Beta
D/E
Ratio
Levered
Beta
Cost of
Equity
Media Networks 1.0850 26.62% 1.2661 10.10%
Parks and
Resorts 0.9105 26.62% 1.0625 9.12%
Studio
Entertainment 1.1435 26.62% 1.3344 10.43%
Consumer
Products 1.1353 26.62% 1.3248 10.39%
Disney 1.0674 26.62% 1.2456 10.00%

We are using Disneys debt to equity ratio as the debt to equity ratio for each of
its divisions since the divisision dont carry their own debt. Optimally, you
would like to break the debt down by division, estimate a value of equity for
each division and come up with a debt to equity ratio for each division.
Aswath Damodaran 149
Discussion Issue
! If you were the chief nancial ofcer of Disney, what cost of equity would
you use in capital budgeting in the different divisions?
a) The cost of equity for Disney as a company
b) The cost of equity for each of Disneys divisions?
The cost of equity for each division should be used. Otherwise, the riskier
divisions will over invest and the safest divisions will under invest.
Over time, the rm will become a riskier rm. Think of Bankers Trust from
1980, when it was a commercial bank, to 1992, when it had become primarily an
investment bank.
Aswath Damodaran 150
Estimating Aracruzs Bottom Up Beta
Comparables No Avg " D/E "
Unlev
Cash/Val "
Correct
Emerging Markets 111 0.6895 38.33% 0.5469 6.58% 0.5855
US 34 0.7927 83.57% 0.5137 2.09% 0.5246
Global 288 0.6333 38.88% 0.5024 6.54% 0.5375
! Aracruz has a cash balance which was 7.07% of the market value :
Unlevered Beta for Aracruz = (0.9293) (0.585) + (0.0707) (0) = 0.5440
! Using Aracruzs gross D/E ratio of 44.59% & a tax rate of 34%:
Levered Beta for Aracruz = 0.5440 (1+ (1-.34) (.4459)) = 0.7040
! The levered beta for just the paper business can also be computed:
Levered Beta for paper business = 0.585 (1+ (1-.34) (.4459))) = 0.7576
The tax rates used were 32% for emerging market companies, 35% for U.S.
companies and 33% for Global companies, based upon averaging the marginal
tax rates in each group.
This is a solution to the problems associated with estimating betas for emerging
markets. Use bottom-up betas and lever up.
Note that
Firms which carry disproportionate amounts of cash (greater than is
typical for the sector) should have lower betas.
If they hold marketable securities (or stocks) the beta of these securities
can be used in computing the weighted average.
Aswath Damodaran 151
Aracruz: Cost of Equity Calculation
! We will use a risk premium of 12.49% in computing the cost of equity,
composed of the U.S. historical risk premium (4.82% from 28-03) and the
Brazil country risk premium of 7.67% (estimated earlier in the package)
! U.S. $ Cost of Equity
Cost of Equity = 10-yr T.Bond rate + Beta * Risk Premium
= 4% + 0.7040 (12.49%) = 12.79%
! Real Cost of Equity
Cost of Equity = 10-yr Ination-indexed T.Bond rate + Beta * Risk Premium
= 2% + 0.7040 (12.49%) = 10.79%
! Nominal BR Cost of Equity
Cost of Equity =
= 1.1279 (1.08/1.02) -1 = .1943 or 19.43%
!
(1+$ Cost of Equity)
(1+ Inflation Rate
Brazil
)
(1+ Inflation Rate
US
)
"1
The cost of equity can be stated in different currencies. When computing the
nominal BR cost of equity, we scale up the risk premium to reect the fact the
the ination rates (and risk free rates in BR) are much higher.
Aswath Damodaran 152
Estimating Bottom-up Beta: Deutsche Bank
! Deutsche Bank is in two different segments of business - commercial banking
and investment banking.
To estimate its commercial banking beta, we will use the average beta of
commercial banks in Germany.
To estimate the investment banking beta, we will use the average bet of investment
banks in the U.S and U.K.
! To estimate the cost of equity in Euros, we will use the German 10-year bond
rate of 4.05% as the riskfree rate and the US historical risk premium (4.82%)
as our proxy for a mature market premium.
Business Beta Cost of Equity Weights
Commercial Banking 0.7345 7.59% 69.03%
Investment Banking 1.5167 11.36% 30.97%
Deutsche Bank 8.76%
Same process for Deutsche Bank. The only difference is that leverage is ignored
because it is a nancial service rm. It is implicitly assumed that banks tend to
have similar leverage.
We use the German 10-year bond rate, not because Deutsche is a German
company, but because the German 10-year Euro bond had the lowest interest
rate of all European 10-year bonds (and thus most likely to be default free).
Aswath Damodaran 153
Estimating Betas for Non-Traded Assets
! The conventional approaches of estimating betas from regressions do not
work for assets that are not traded.
! There are two ways in which betas can be estimated for non-traded assets
using comparable rms
using accounting earnings
Private rms are not traded. There are no historical price records to compute
betas from.
Aswath Damodaran 154
Using comparable rms to estimate beta for Bookscape
Assume that you are trying to estimate the beta for a independent bookstore in
New York City.
Firm Beta Debt Equity Cash
Books-A-Million 0.532 $45 $45 $5
Borders Group 0.844 $182 $1,430 $269
Barnes & Noble 0.885 $300 $1,606 $268
Courier Corp 0.815 $1 $285 $6
Info Holdings 0.883 $2 $371 $54
John Wiley &Son 0.636 $235 $1,662 $33
Scholastic Corp 0.744 $549 $1,063 $11
Sector 0.7627 $1,314 $6,462 $645
Unlevered Beta = 0.7627/(1+(1-.35)(1314/6462)) = 0.6737
Corrected for Cash = 0.6737 / (1 645/(1314+6462)) = 0.7346
This is the bottom-up beta for a private book store. The beta can be estimated
assuming that the business has the same or different leverage as comparable
rms. (All you have for private rms is book value debt and equity)
Aswath Damodaran 155
Estimating Bookscape Levered Beta and Cost of Equity
! Since the debt/equity ratios used are market debt equity ratios, and the only
debt equity ratio we can compute for Bookscape is a book value debt equity
ratio, we have assumed that Bookscape is close to the industry average debt
to equity ratio of 20.33%.
! Using a marginal tax rate of 40% (based upon personal income tax rates) for
Bookscape, we get a levered beta of 0.82.
Levered beta for Bookscape = 0.7346 (1 +(1-.40) (.2033)) = 0.82
! Using a riskfree rate of 4% (US treasury bond rate) and a historical risk
premium of 4.82%:
Cost of Equity = 4% + 0.82 (4.82%) = 7.95%
Aswath Damodaran 156
Using Accounting Earnings to Estimate Beta
Year S&P 500 Bookscape Year S&P 500 Bookscape
1980 3.01% 3.55% 1991 -12.08% -32.00%
1981 1.31% 4.05% 1992 -5.12% 55.00%
1982 -8.95% -14.33% 1993 9.37% 31.00%
1983 -3.84% 47.55% 1994 36.45% 21.06%
1984 26.69% 65.00% 1995 30.70% 11.55%
1985 -6.91% 5.05% 1996 1.20% 19.88%
1986 -7.93% 8.50% 1997 10.57% 16.55%
1987 11.10% 37.00% 1998 -3.35% 7.10%
1988 42.02% 45.17% 1999 18.13% 14.40%
1989 5.52% 3.50% 2000 15.13% 10.50%
1990 -9.58% -10.50% 2001 -14.94% -8.15%
2002 6.81% 4.05%
Accounting betas are computed by regressing accounting earnings changes
against changes in earnings at the S&P 500.
Aswath Damodaran 157
The Accounting Beta for Bookscape
! Regressing the changes in prots at Bookscape against changes in prots for
the S&P 500 yields the following:
Bookscape Earnings Change Change = 0.1003 + 0.7329 (S & P 500 Earnings Change)
Based upon this regression, the beta for Bookscapes equity is 0.73.
! Using operating earnings for both the rm and the S&P 500 should yield the
equivalent of an unlevered beta.
The biggest problems with accounting betas are:
Earnings tend to be smoothed out
You will not have very many observations in your regression
Aswath Damodaran 158
Is Beta an Adequate Measure of Risk for a Private Firm?
! The owners of most private rms are not diversied. Beta measures the risk
added on to a diversied portfolio. Therefore, using beta to arrive at a cost of
equity for a private rm will
a) Under estimate the cost of equity for the private rm
b) Over estimate the cost of equity for the private rm
c) Could under or over estimate the cost of equity for the private rm
Using beta (that looks at only market risk) will tend to under estimate the cost of
equity since private owners feel exposed to all risk.
Aswath Damodaran 159
Total Risk versus Market Risk
! Adjust the beta to reect total risk rather than market risk. This adjustment is
a relatively simple one, since the R squared of the regression measures the
proportion of the risk that is market risk.
Total Beta = Market Beta / Correlation of the sector with the market
! In the Bookscape example, where the market beta is 0.82 and the average R-
squared of the comparable publicly traded rms is 16%,
Total Cost of Equity = 4% + 2.06 (4.82%) = 13.93%
!
Market Beta
R squared
=
0.82
.16
= 2.06
This assumes that
The owner of the private business has all of his or her wealth invested in
the business
The reality is that most individuals will fall somewhere between the two
extremes.
If you were a private business looking at potential acquirers - one is a publicly
traded rm and the other is an individual . Which one is likely to pay the higher
price and why?
If both acquirers have the same cash ow expectations, the publicly
traded rm will win out (Blockbuster Video, Browning-Ferris are good
examples of publicly traded rms which bought small private businesses
to grow to their current stature.)
Aswath Damodaran 160
! Application Test: Estimating a Bottom-up Beta
! Based upon the business or businesses that your rm is in right now, and its
current nancial leverage, estimate the bottom-up unlevered beta for your
rm.
! Data Source: You can get a listing of unlevered betas by industry on my web
site by going to updated data.
The breakdown of a rm into businesses is available in the 10-K. The unlevered
betas are available on my web site.
Aswath Damodaran 161
From Cost of Equity to Cost of Capital
! The cost of capital is a composite cost to the rm of raising nancing to fund
its projects.
! In addition to equity, rms can raise capital from debt
Capital is more than just equity. It also includes other nancing sources,
including debt.
Aswath Damodaran 162
What is debt?
! General Rule: Debt generally has the following characteristics:
Commitment to make xed payments in the future
The xed payments are tax deductible
Failure to make the payments can lead to either default or loss of control of the
rm to the party to whom payments are due.
! As a consequence, debt should include
Any interest-bearing liability, whether short term or long term.
Any lease obligation, whether operating or capital.
Debt is not restricted to what gets called debt in the balance sheet. It includes
any nancing with these characteristics.
Aswath Damodaran 163
Estimating the Cost of Debt
! If the rm has bonds outstanding, and the bonds are traded, the yield to
maturity on a long-term, straight (no special features) bond can be used as the
interest rate.
! If the rm is rated, use the rating and a typical default spread on bonds with
that rating to estimate the cost of debt.
! If the rm is not rated,
and it has recently borrowed long term from a bank, use the interest rate on the
borrowing or
estimate a synthetic rating for the company, and use the synthetic rating to arrive at
a default spread and a cost of debt
! The cost of debt has to be estimated in the same currency as the cost of equity
and the cash ows in the valuation.
While the cost of debt can be estimated easily for some rms, by looking up
traded bonds, it can be more difcult for non-rated rms. The default spreads
can be obtained from
http://www.bondsonline.com
Aswath Damodaran 164
Estimating Synthetic Ratings
! The rating for a rm can be estimated using the nancial characteristics of the
rm. In its simplest form, the rating can be estimated from the interest
coverage ratio
Interest Coverage Ratio = EBIT / Interest Expenses
! For a rm, which has earnings before interest and taxes of $ 3,500 million and
interest expenses of $ 700 million
Interest Coverage Ratio = 3,500/700= 5.00
! In 2003, Bookscape had operating income of $ 2 million after interest
expenses of 5000,000. The resulting interest coverage ratio is 4.00.
Interest coverage ratio = 2,000,000/500,000 = 4.00
This is simplistic. A more realistic approach would use more than the interest
coverage ratio. In fact, we could construct a score based upon multiple ratios
(such as a Z-score) and use that score to estimate ratings.
Aswath Damodaran 165
Interest Coverage Ratios, Ratings and Default Spreads:
Small Companies
Interest Coverage Ratio Rating Typical default spread
> 12.5 AAA 0.35%
9.50 - 12.50 AA 0.50%
7.50 9.50 A+ 0.70%
6.00 7.50 A 0.85%
4.50 6.00 A- 1.00%
4.00 4.50 BBB 1.50%
3.50 - 4.00 BB+ 2.00%
3.00 3.50 BB 2.50%
2.50 3.00 B+ 3.25%
2.00 - 2.50 B 4.00%
1.50 2.00 B- 6.00%
1.25 1.50 CCC 8.00%
0.80 1.25 CC 10.00%
0.50 0.80 C 12.00%
< 0.65 D 20.00%
This table is constructed, using smaller non-nancial service companies (<$5
billion market cap) that are rated, and their interest coverage ratios. The rms
were sorted based upon their ratings, and the interest coverage range was
estimated.
These ranges will change over time, especially as the economy strengthens or
weakens. You can get the updated ranges on my web site.
Aswath Damodaran 166
Synthetic Rating and Cost of Debt for Bookscape
! Rating based on interest coverage ratio = BBB
! Default Spread based upon rating = 1.50%
! Pre-tax cost of debt = Riskfree Rate + Default Spread = 4% + 1.50% = 5.50%
! After-tax cost of debt = Pre-tax cost of debt (1- tax rate) = 5.50% (1-.40) =
3.30%
The tax rate used is the marginal tax rate. Interest savings you taxes on your
marginal income, not rst or average dollar of income.
Aswath Damodaran 167
Estimating Cost of Debt with rated companies
! For the three publicly traded rms in our sample, we will use the actual bond
ratings to estimate the costs of debt:
S&P Rating Riskfree Rate Default Cost of Tax After-tax
Spread Debt Rate Cost of Debt
Disney BBB+ 4% ($) 1.25% 5.25% 37.3% 3.29%
Deutsche Bank AA- 4.05% (Eu) 1.00% 5.05% 38% 3.13%
Aracruz B+ 4% ($) 3.25% 7.25% 34% 4.79%
! We computed the synthetic ratings for Disney and Aracruz using the interest
coverage ratios:
Disney: Coverage ratio = 2,805/758 =3.70 Synthetic rating = A-
Aracruz: Coverage ratio = 888/339= 2.62 Synthetic rating = BBB
Disneys synthetic rating is close to its actual rating. Aracruz has two ratings one
for its local currency borrowings of BBB- and one for its dollar borrowings of B+.
Can we trust rating agencies? In general, ratings agencies do a reasonable job of
assessing default risk and offer us these measures for free (at least to investors).
They have two faults: (1) They adjust for changes in default risk too slowly. All
too often ratings downgrades follow bond price declines and not the other way
around (2) They sometimes get caught up in the mood of the moment and either
overestimate default risk or underestimate default risk for an entire sector.
It is a good idea to estimate synthetic ratings even for rms that have actual
ratings. If there is disagreement between ratings agencies or a rm has multiple
bond ratings, the synthetic rating can operate as a tie-breaker. If there is a
signicant difference between actual and synthetic ratings and there is no
fundamental reason that can be pinpointed for the difference, the synthetic rating
may be providing an early signal of a ratings agency mistake.
Aswath Damodaran 168
! Application Test: Estimating a Cost of Debt
! Based upon your rms current earnings before interest and taxes, its interest
expenses, estimate
An interest coverage ratio for your rm
A synthetic rating for your rm (use the table from previous page)
A pre-tax cost of debt for your rm
An after-tax cost of debt for your rm
To estimate the after-tax cost of debt, you need a marginal tax rate. Since the
federal tax rate for corporations is 35%, I would expect the marginal tax rate to
be 35% of higher. Thus, even if the effective tax rate reported in the nancial
statements are lower, I would use at least 35%. If the effective tax rate is higher
than 35%, I would use the effective tax rate, with the assumption that it is
capturing other taxes that the rm has to pay.
Aswath Damodaran 169
Costs of Hybrids
! Preferred stock shares some of the characteristics of debt - the preferred
dividend is pre-specied at the time of the issue and is paid out before
common dividend -- and some of the characteristics of equity - the payments
of preferred dividend are not tax deductible. If preferred stock is viewed as
perpetual, the cost of preferred stock can be written as follows:
k
ps
= Preferred Dividend per share/ Market Price per preferred share
! Convertible debt is part debt (the bond part) and part equity (the conversion
option). It is best to break it up into its component parts and eliminate it from
the mix altogether.
The easiest way to break down a convertible bond is to value it as a straight
bond and to then assign the remaining market value to the conversion option. In
March 2004, Disney had convertible bonds outstanding with 19 years left to
maturity and a coupon rate of 2.125%, trading at $1,064 a bond. Holders of
this bond have the right to convert the bond into 33.9444 shares of stock
anytime over the bonds remaining life. To break the convertible bond into
straight bond and conversion option components, we will value the bond using
Disneys pre-tax cost of debt of 5.25%:
At this conversion ratio, the price that investors would be paying for
Disney shares would be $29.46, much higher than the stock price of
$20.46 prevailing at the time of the analysis.
This rate was based upon a 10-year treasury bond rate. If the 5-year
treasury bond rate had been substantially different, we would have
recomputed a pre-tax cost of debt by adding the default spread to the
5-year rate.
Straight Bond component
= Value of a 2.125% coupon bond due in 19 years with a market interest rate of
5.25%
= PV of $21.25 in coupons each year for 19 years + PV of $1000 at end of
year 19
The coupons are assumed to be annual. With semi-annual coupons,
you would divide the coupon by 2 and apply a semi-annual rate to
calculate the present value.
=
Conversion Option = Market value of convertible Value of straight
bond
= 1064 - $629.91 = $434.09
The straight bond component of $630 is treated as debt, while the conversion
option of $434 is treated as equity.
Aswath Damodaran 170
Weights for Cost of Capital Calculation
! The weights used in the cost of capital computation should be market values.
! There are three specious arguments used against market value
Book value is more reliable than market value because it is not as volatile: While
it is true that book value does not change as much as market value, this is more a
reection of weakness than strength
Using book value rather than market value is a more conservative approach to
estimating debt ratios: For most companies, using book values will yield a lower
cost of capital than using market value weights.
Since accounting returns are computed based upon book value, consistency
requires the use of book value in computing cost of capital: While it may seem
consistent to use book values for both accounting return and cost of capital
calculations, it does not make economic sense.
Assume that the market value debt ratio is 10%, while the book value debt
ratio is 30%, for a firm with a cost of equity of 15% and an after-tax cost of
debt of 5%. The cost of capital can be calculated as follows
With market value debt ratios: 15% (.9) + 5%
(.1) = 14%
With book value debt ratios: 15% (.7) + 5% (.3) = 12%
Which is the more conservative estimate?
Aswath Damodaran 171
Estimating Market Value Weights
! Market Value of Equity should include the following
Market Value of Shares outstanding
Market Value of Warrants outstanding
Market Value of Conversion Option in Convertible Bonds
! Market Value of Debt is more difcult to estimate because few rms have
only publicly traded debt. There are two solutions:
Assume book value of debt is equal to market value
Estimate the market value of debt from the book value
For Disney, with book value of 13,100 million, interest expenses of $666 million,
a current cost of borrowing of 5.25% and an weighted average maturity of 11.53
years.
Estimated MV of Disney Debt =
!
666
(1 "
1
(1.0525)
11.53
.0525
#
$
%
%
%
%
&
'
(
(
(
(
+
13,100
(1.0525)
11.53
= $12, 915 million
The market value of debt is estimated by considering all debt as if it were one
large coupon bond.
The average maturity of debt can be obtained from the 10-K. For Disney in
September 2004, the face-value weighted maturity in 2004 was 11.53 years
Aswath Damodaran 172
Converting Operating Leases to Debt
! The debt value of operating leases is the present value of the lease
payments, at a rate that reects their risk.
! In general, this rate will be close to or equal to the rate at which the company
can borrow.
This allows us to get a more realistic view of the leverage of rms that use
operating leases a lot. Examples would be the retailers like the Gap or Walmart.
Aswath Damodaran 173
Operating Leases at Disney
! The pre-tax cost of debt at Disney is 5.25%
Year Commitment Present Value
1 $ 271.00 $ 257.48
2 $ 242.00 $ 218.46
3 $ 221.00 $ 189.55
4 $ 208.00 $ 169.50
5 $ 275.00 $ 212.92
6 9 $ 258.25 $ 704.93
Debt Value of leases = $ 1,752.85
! Debt outstanding at Disney = $12,915 + $ 1,753= $14,668 million
The pre-tax cost of debt was based upon Disneys current rating.
Disney reports a lump sum of $ 1.033 billion as the amount due in year 6.
We break it up into four annual payments of $258.25 millijn a year based upon
the average lease payments over the rst 5 years
Aswath Damodaran 174
! Application Test: Estimating Market Value
! Estimate the
Market value of equity at your rm and Book Value of equity
Market value of debt and book value of debt (If you cannot nd the average
maturity of your debt, use 3 years): Remember to capitalize the value of operating
leases and add them on to both the book value and the market value of debt.
! Estimate the
Weights for equity and debt based upon market value
Weights for equity and debt based upon book value
Aswath Damodaran 175
Current Cost of Capital: Disney
! Equity
Cost of Equity = Riskfree rate + Beta * Risk Premium
= 4% + 1.25 (4.82%) = 10.00%
Market Value of Equity = $55.101 Billion
Equity/(Debt+Equity ) = 79%
! Debt
After-tax Cost of debt =(Riskfree rate + Default Spread) (1-t)
= (4%+1.25%) (1-.373) = 3.29%
Market Value of Debt = $ 14.668 Billion
Debt/(Debt +Equity) = 21%
! Cost of Capital = 10.00%(.79)+3.29%(.21) = 8.59%
55.101(55.101+14.
668)
This reproduces the current cost of capital computation for Disney, using
market value weights for both debt and equity, the cost of equity (based upon
the bottom-up beta) and the cost of debt (based upon the bond rating)
The market value of debt is estimated by estimating the present value of total
interest payments and face value at the current cost of debt.
One way to frame the capital structure question: Is there a mix of debt and
equity at which Disneys cost of capital will be lower than 12.22%?
Aswath Damodaran 176
Disneys Divisional Costs of Capital
Business Cost of After-tax E/(D+E) D/(D+E) Cost of capital
Equity cost of debt
Media Networks 10.10% 3.29% 78.98% 21.02% 8.67%
Parks and Resorts 9.12% 3.29% 78.98% 21.02% 7.90%
Studio Entertainment 10.43% 3.29% 78.98% 21.02% 8.93%
Consumer Products 10.39% 3.29% 78.98% 21.02% 8.89%
Disney 10.00% 3.29% 78.98% 21.02% 8.59%
All of the divisions are assumed to share the same debt ratio and the cost of
debt. If they had borrowed on their own, we would have used division specic
debt ratios and costs of debt.
These would be the hurdle rates that we would use to analyze projects at each of
these divisions.
Aswath Damodaran 177
Aracruzs Cost of Capital
Levered Beta
Cost of
Equity
After-tax
Cost of Debt D/(D+E)
Cost of
Capital
In Real Terms
Paper &
Pulp 0.7576 11.46% 3.47% 30.82% 9.00%
Cash 0 2.00% 2.00%
Aracruz 0.7040 10.79% 3.47% 30.82% 8.53%
In US Dollar Terms
Paper &
Pulp 0.7576 13.46% 4.79% 30.82% 10.79%
Cash 0 4.00% 4.00%
Aracruz 0.7040 12.79% 4.79% 30.82% 10.33%

When computing cost of capital, we compute the cost both with cash as part of
the equation (in which case it is lower) and without cash.
Aswath Damodaran 178
Bookscape Cost of Capital
Beta Cost of After-tax D/(D+E) Cost of
Equity cost of debt Capital
Market Beta 0.82 7.97% 3.30% 16.90% 7.18%
Total Beta 2.06 13.93% 3.30% 16.90% 12.14%
If we assume that the owners of a private business are not diversied, we arrive
at much higher estimates of costs of equity and capital.
Aswath Damodaran 179
! Application Test: Estimating Cost of Capital
! Using the bottom-up unlevered beta that you computed for your rm, and the
values of debt and equity you have estimated for your rm, estimate a bottom-
up levered beta and cost of equity for your rm.
! Based upon the costs of equity and debt that you have estimated, and the
weights for each, estimate the cost of capital for your rm.
! How different would your cost of capital have been, if you used book value
weights?
Aswath Damodaran 180
Choosing a Hurdle Rate
! Either the cost of equity or the cost of capital can be used as a hurdle rate,
depending upon whether the returns measured are to equity investors or to all
claimholders on the rm (capital)
! If returns are measured to equity investors, the appropriate hurdle rate is the
cost of equity.
! If returns are measured to capital (or the rm), the appropriate hurdle rate is
the cost of capital.
While the cost of equity and capital can be very different numbers, they can both
be used as hurdle rates, as long as the returns and cash ows are dened
consistently.
Aswath Damodaran 181
Back to First Principles
! Invest in projects that yield a return greater than the minimum acceptable
hurdle rate.
The hurdle rate should be higher for riskier projects and reect the nancing
mix used - owners funds (equity) or borrowed money (debt)
Returns on projects should be measured based on cash ows generated and the
timing of these cash ows; they should also consider both positive and negative
side effects of these projects.
! Choose a nancing mix that minimizes the hurdle rate and matches the assets
being nanced.
! If there are not enough investments that earn the hurdle rate, return the cash to
stockholders.
The form of returns - dividends and stock buybacks - will depend upon the
stockholders characteristics.
Aswath Damodaran 182
Measuring Investment Returns
Show me the money
Jerry Maguire
Aswath Damodaran 183
First Principles
! Invest in projects that yield a return greater than the minimum acceptable
hurdle rate.
The hurdle rate should be higher for riskier projects and reect the nancing mix
used - owners funds (equity) or borrowed money (debt)
Returns on projects should be measured based on cash ows generated and
the timing of these cash ows; they should also consider both positive and
negative side effects of these projects.
! Choose a nancing mix that minimizes the hurdle rate and matches the assets
being nanced.
! If there are not enough investments that earn the hurdle rate, return the cash to
stockholders.
The form of returns - dividends and stock buybacks - will depend upon the
stockholders characteristics.
Aswath Damodaran 184
Measures of return: earnings versus cash ows
! Principles Governing Accounting Earnings Measurement
Accrual Accounting: Show revenues when products and services are sold or
provided, not when they are paid for. Show expenses associated with these
revenues rather than cash expenses.
Operating versus Capital Expenditures: Only expenses associated with creating
revenues in the current period should be treated as operating expenses. Expenses
that create benets over several periods are written off over multiple periods (as
depreciation or amortization)
! To get from accounting earnings to cash ows:
you have to add back non-cash expenses (like depreciation)
you have to subtract out cash outows which are not expensed (such as capital
expenditures)
you have to make accrual revenues and expenses into cash revenues and expenses
(by considering changes in working capital).
Accrual accounting income is designed to measure the income made by an
entity during a period, on sales made during the period. Thus, accrual
accounting draws lines between operating expenses (that create income in the
current period) and capital expenditures (which create income over multiple
periods).
It is not always consistent. R&D, for instance, is treated as an operating
expense.
Accrual accounting also tries to allocate the cost of materials to current period
revenues, leading to inventory, and give the company credit for sales made
during the period, even if cash has not been received, giving rise to accounts
receivable.
Aswath Damodaran 185
Measuring Returns Right: The Basic Principles
! Use cash ows rather than earnings. You cannot spend earnings.
! Use incremental cash ows relating to the investment decision, i.e.,
cashows that occur as a consequence of the decision, rather than total cash
ows.
! Use time weighted returns, i.e., value cash ows that occur earlier more
than cash ows that occur later.
The Return Mantra: Time-weighted, Incremental Cash Flow Return
These are the basic nancial principles underlying the measurement of
investment returns.
We focus on cash ows, because we cannot spend earnings.
We focus on incremental effects on the overall business, since we
care about the overall health and value of the business, not individual
projects.
We use time-weighted returns, since returns made earlier are worth more
than the same returns made later.
Aswath Damodaran 186
Earnings versus Cash Flows: A Disney Theme Park
! The theme parks to be built near Bangkok, modeled on Euro Disney in Paris,
will include a Magic Kingdom to be constructed, beginning immediately,
and becoming operational at the beginning of the second year, and a second
theme park modeled on Epcot Center at Orlando to be constructed in the
second and third year and becoming operational at the beginning of the fourth
year.
! The earnings and cash ows are estimated in nominal U.S. Dollars.
The earnings and cash ows will really be in Thai Baht. We will consider later
the effects of looking at all the cash ows in a different currency.
Note that this investment is not going to be fully operational until the fth year.
Aswath Damodaran 187
Key Assumptions on Start Up and Construction
! The cost of constructing Magic Kingdom will be $3 billion, with $ 2 billion to
be spent right now, and $1 Billion to be spent one year from now.
! Disney has already spent $0.5 Billion researching the proposal and getting the
necessary licenses for the park; none of this investment can be recovered if
the park is not built.
! The cost of constructing Epcot II will be $ 1.5 billion, with $ 1 billion to be
spent at the end of the second year and $0.5 billion at the end of the third year.
The emphasis in the rst item should be on already spent .
While we often classify all these investments as initial investments , they
occur over time.
Aswath Damodaran 188
Key Revenue Assumptions
Revenue estimates for the parks and resort properties (in millions)
Year Magic Kingdom Epcot II Resort Properties Total
1 $0 $0 $0 $0
2 $1,000 $0 $250 $1,250
3 $1,400 $0 $350 $3,000
4 $1,700 $300 $500 $4,250
5 $2,000 $500 $625 $5,625
6 $2,200 $550 $688 $6,563
7 $2,420 $605 $756 $7,219
8 $2,662 $666 $832 $7,941
9 $2,928 $732 $915 $8,735
10 $2,987 $747 $933 $9,242
Beyond Revenues grow 2% a year forever
These are assumptions. Most real investments involve uncertainty about the
future, but we have to make a judgment on what we expect to make. These
expectations may be based upon past experience or market testing.
Note that these are not conservative or low-ball estimates. Using lower numbers
than expected (because a project is risky or because you are risk-averse) can
lead to risk being double counted.
There is an alternative approach to capital budgeting where we can estimate what
are called certainty equivalent cash ows, but the discount rate in that case would
be the riskfree rate.
Finally, note that the project continues after year 10.
Aswath Damodaran 189
Key Expense Assumptions
! The operating expenses are assumed to be 60% of the revenues at the parks,
and 75% of revenues at the resort properties.
! Disney will also allocate corporate general and administrative costs to this
project, based upon revenues; the G&A allocation will be 15% of the
revenues each year. It is worth noting that a recent analysis of these expenses
found that only one-third of these expenses are variable (and a function of
total revenue) and that two-thirds are xed. After year 10, these expenses are
also assumed to grow at the ination rate of 2%.
Again, these numbers are easier to estimate in an investment like this one, where
Disney can look at similar investments that it has made in the past.
Most large rms have signicant expenses that cannot be traced to individual
projects. These expenses are sometimes lumped under General and
Administrative expenses (G&A) and get allocated to projects.
Aswath Damodaran 190
Depreciation and Capital Maintenance
Year Depreciation as % Capital Maintenance as %
of book value of Depreciation
1 0.00% 0.00%
2 12.70% 50.00%
3 11.21% 60.00%
4 9.77% 70.00%
5 8.29% 80.00%
6 8.31% 90.00%
7 8.34% 100.00%
8 8.38% 105.00%
9 8.42% 110.00%
10 8.42% 110.00%
!The capital maintenance expenditures are low in the early years, when the parks are still new but
increase as the parks age. After year 10, both depreciation and capital expenditures are assumed to grow
at the ination rate (2%).
This is accrual accounting at work. Some expenses such as regular maintenance
expenses will be treated as operating, but some expenses (such as replacing a
signicant portion of an existing ride) will be treated as capital expenditures.
The capital expenditures on this page are maintenance capital expenditures,
designed to keep the parks in operational condition, generating revenues in the
long term, and are on top of the initial capital expenditures.
The depreciation is the total depreciation on all cap ex. Note that capital
expenditures moves towards depreciation over time, reecting the fact that on an
innite-life project, depreciation is usually no longer a cash inow, since it has to
be reinvested back to sustain future growth.
Aswath Damodaran 191
Other Assumptions
! Disney will have to maintain non-cash working capital (primarily consisting
of inventory at the theme parks and the resort properties, netted against
accounts payable) of 5% of revenues, with the investments being made at the
end of each year.
! The income from the investment will be taxed at Disneys marginal tax rate of
37.3%
This will be a drain on the cash ows, since revenues are growing. This, in turn,
will create larger inventory and working capital needs each year, which will tie
up more cash in the project.
The tax rate used is the marginal tax rate (as opposed to the effective tax rate
reported in income statements and annual reports) because projects create
income at the margin and will be taxed at the margin.
Aswath Damodaran 192
Earnings on Project
Now (0) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Magic Kingdom $0 $1,000 $1,400 $1,700 $2,000 $2,200 $2,420 $2,662 $2,928 $2,987
Second Theme Park $0 $0 $0 $300 $500 $550 $605 $666 $732 $747
Resort & Properties $0 $250 $350 $500 $625 $688 $756 $832 $915 $933
Total Revenues $1,250 $1,750 $2,500 $3,125 $3,438 $3,781 $4,159 $4,575 $4,667
Magic Kingdom: Operating
Expenses $0 $600 $840 $1,020 $1,200 $1,320 $1,452 $1,597 $1,757 $1,792
Epcot II: Operating
Expenses $0 $0 $0 $180 $300 $330 $363 $399 $439 $448
Resort & Property:
Operating Expenses $0 $188 $263 $375 $469 $516 $567 $624 $686 $700
Depreciation & Amortization $0 $537 $508 $430 $359 $357 $358 $361 $366 $369
Allocated G&A Costs $0 $188 $263 $375 $469 $516 $567 $624 $686 $700
Operating Income $0 -$262 -$123 $120 $329 $399 $473 $554 $641 $657
Taxes $0 -$98 -$46 $45 $123 $149 $177 $206 $239 $245
Operating Income after
Taxes -$164 -$77 $75 $206 $250 $297 $347 $402 $412

This shows the accounting earnings calculations for the next 10 years. Note the
increasing after-tax operating income over time.
Aswath Damodaran 193
And the Accounting View of Return
Year
After-tax
Operating
Income
BV of
Capital:
Beginning
BV of
Capital:
Ending
Average BV
of Capital ROC
1 $0 $2,500 $3,500 $3,000 NA
2 -$165 $3,500 $4,294 $3,897 -4.22%
3 -$77 $4,294 $4,616 $4,455 -1.73%
4 $75 $4,616 $4,524 $4,570 1.65%
5 $206 $4,524 $4,484 $4,504 4.58%
6 $251 $4,484 $4,464 $4,474 5.60%
7 $297 $4,464 $4,481 $4,472 6.64%
8 $347 $4,481 $4,518 $4,499 7.72%
9 $402 $4,518 $4,575 $4,547 8.83%
10 $412 $4,575 $4,617 $4,596 8.97%
$175 $4,301 4.23%

This converts the accounting income into a percentage return (to enable us to do
the comparison to the hurdle rate, which is a percentage rate)
The average book value is computed each year using the beginning and ending
book values. The book values themselves are computed as follows:
Ending BV = Beginning BV - Depreciation + Capital Expenditures
Aswath Damodaran 194
Estimating a hurdle rate for the theme park
! We did estimate a cost of equity of 9.12% for the Disney theme park business
in the last chapter, using a bottom-up levered beta of 1.0625 for the business.
! This cost of equity may not adequately reect the additional risk associated
with the theme park being in an emerging market.
! To counter this risk, we compute the cost of equity for the theme park using a
risk premium that includes a country risk premium for Thailand:
The rating for Thailand is Baa1 and the default spread for the country bond is
1.50%. Multiplying this by the relative volatility of 2.2 of the equity market in
Thailand (strandard deviation of equity/standard devaiation of country bond) yields
a country risk premium of 3.3%.
Cost of Equity in US $= 4% + 1.0625 (4.82% + 3.30%) = 12.63%
Cost of Capital in US $ = 12.63% (.7898) + 3.29% (.2102) = 10.66%
Adds a risk premium to the cost of equity to reect the additional risk of
investing in an emerging market
Aswath Damodaran 195
Would lead us to conclude that...
! Do not invest in this park. The return on capital of 4.23% is lower than the
cost of capital for theme parks of 10.66%; This would suggest that the
project should not be taken.
! Given that we have computed the average over an arbitrary period of 10
years, while the theme park itself would have a life greater than 10 years,
would you feel comfortable with this conclusion?
a) Yes
b) No
I would not. I think the accounting return, which cuts of the analysis arbitrarily
after 10 years, understates the true return on projects like this one, which have
longer expected lives.
Aswath Damodaran 196
From Project to Firm Return on Capital: Disney in 2003
! Just as a comparison of project return on capital to the cost of capital yields a
measure of whether the project is acceptable, a comparison can be made at the
rm level, to judge whether the existing projects of the rm are adding or
destroying value.
! Disney, in 2003, had earnings before interest and taxes of $2,713 million, had
a book value of equity of $23,879 million and a book value of debt of 14,130
million. With a tax rate of 37.3%, we get
Return on Capital = 2713(1-.373)/ (23879+14130) = 4.48%
Cost of Capital for Disney= 8.59%
Excess Return = 4.49%-8.59% = -4.11%
! This can be converted into a dollar gure by multiplying by the capital
invested, in which case it is called economic value added
EVA = (..0448-.0859) (23879+14130) = -$1,562 million
A rm can be viewed as having a portfolio of existing projects. This approach
allows you to assess whether that portfolio is earning more than the hurdle rate,
but it is based upon the following assumptions:
Accounting earnings are a good measure of the earnings from current
projects (They might not be, if items like R&D, which are really
investments for the future, extraordinary prots or losses, or accounting
changes affect the reported income.)
The book value of capital is a good measure of what is invested in
current projects.
Aswath Damodaran 197
! Application Test: Assessing Investment Quality
! For the most recent period for which you have data, compute the after-tax
return on capital earned by your rm, where after-tax return on capital is
computed to be
After-tax ROC = EBIT (1-tax rate)/ (BV of debt + BV of Equity)
previous year
! For the most recent period for which you have data, compute the return
spread earned by your rm:
Return Spread = After-tax ROC - Cost of Capital
! For the most recent period, compute the EVA earned by your rm
EVA = Return Spread * ((BV of debt + BV of Equity)
previous year
This measure of investment quality is only as good as the measures of operating
income and book value that go into it.
We use the book value of capital from the end of the previous year, because it is
more consistent with how we dene returns in nance. You could also do this on
the basis of the average operating income and capital.
Aswath Damodaran 198
The cash ow view of this project..

To get from income to cash ow, we

"added back all non-cash charges such as depreciation
"subtracted out the capital expenditures
"subtracted out the change in non-cash working capital
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Operating Income after Taxes -$165 -$77 $75 $206 $251
+ Depreciation & Amortization $537 $508 $430 $359 $357
- Capital Expenditures $2,500 $1,000 $1,269 $805 $301 $287 $321
- Change in Working Capital $0 $0 $63 $25 $38 $31 $16
Cashflow to Firm -$2,500 -$1,000 -$960 -$399 $166 $247 $271
This converts earnings to cash ows.
Derpreciation and amortization are just two of the most common non-cash
charges.
Any capital expenditures (whether initial or maintenance) need to be subtracted
out.
It is only the change in non-cash working capital that needs to be subtracted out.
Aswath Damodaran 199
The Depreciation Tax Benet
! While depreciation reduces taxable income and taxes, it does not reduce the
cash ows.
! The benet of depreciation is therefore the tax benet. In general, the tax
benet from depreciation can be written as:
Tax Benet = Depreciation * Tax Rate
! For example, in year 2, the tax benet from depreciation to Disney from this
project can be written as:
Tax Benet in year 2 = $ 537 million (.373) = $ 200 million
Proposition 1: The tax benet from depreciation and other non-cash charges is
greater, the higher your tax rate.
Proposition 2: Non-cash charges that are not tax deductible (such as amortization
of goodwill) and thus provide no tax benets have no effect on cash ows.
If a rm pays no taxes (it is a tax-exempt entity, for instance), there is no benet
to depreciation.
In the 1970s, when tax rates for wealthy individuals were much higher than tax
rates for corporations, the former (who get much higher tax benets from
depreciation) would buy expensive assets (such as airplanes) and lease them
back to the latter.
Non-cash charges that are not tax deductible do not create a benet from a cash
ow standpoint. They are subtracted out from after-tax income and then added
back. Thus, the debate in acquisitions about whether to use purchase accounting
(which leads to goodwill, the amortization of which reduces after-tax earnings in
future periods) or pooling (which does not affect earnings) has no implications
for cash ows.
Aswath Damodaran 200
Depreciation Methods
! Broadly categorizing, depreciation methods can be classied as straight line
or accelerated methods. In straight line depreciation, the capital expense is
spread evenly over time, In accelerated depreciation, the capital expense is
depreciated more in earlier years and less in later years. Assume that you
made a large investment this year, and that you are choosing between straight
line and accelerated depreciation methods. Which will result in higher net
income this year?
a) Straight Line Depreciation
b) Accelerated Depreciation
Which will result in higher cash ows this year?
a) Straight Line Depreciation
b) Accelerated Depreciation
Straight line depreciation will lead to higher income and accelerated depreciation
to higher cash ows.
Most US rms use straight line depreciation for nancial reporting (as in annual
reports) and accelerated depreciation (for tax purposes). This is often the reason
why effective tax rates in annual reports look low. (Effective Tax Rate = Taxes
Paid / Reported Pre-tax Income)
Aswath Damodaran 201
The Capital Expenditures Effect
! Capital expenditures are not treated as accounting expenses but they do cause
cash outows.
! Capital expenditures can generally be categorized into two groups
New (or Growth) capital expenditures are capital expenditures designed to create
new assets and future growth
Maintenance capital expenditures refer to capital expenditures designed to keep
existing assets.
! Both initial and maintenance capital expenditures reduce cash ows
! The need for maintenance capital expenditures will increase with the life of
the project. In other words, a 25-year project will require more maintenance
capital expenditures than a 2-year asset.
While most analysts who look at projects remember to consider the initial
capital investment, many of them fail to consider the need for capital
maintenance expenditure.
Depreciation and capital expenditures are highly interrelated assumptions. You
cannot depreciate what you do not cap ex.
Aswath Damodaran 202
To cap ex or not to cap ex
! Assume that you run your own software business, and that you have an
expense this year of $ 100 million from producing and distribution
promotional CDs in software magazines. Your accountant tells you that you
can expense this item or capitalize and depreciate. Which will have a more
positive effect on income?
a) Expense it
b) Capitalize and Depreciate it
Which will have a more positive effect on cash ows?
a) Expense it
b) Capitalize and Depreciate it
Capitalizing and amortizing the expense will have a more positive effect on
income. Assuming you have the income to expense it, expensing it will have a
more positive effect on cash ows.
America Online, which incurs a huge expenditure each year on the promotional
CDs and diskette that it inserts in computer magazines, capitalizes the expense
(at least for reporting purposes) and amortizes it.
Aswath Damodaran 203
The Working Capital Effect
! Intuitively, money invested in inventory or in accounts receivable cannot be
used elsewhere. It, thus, represents a drain on cash ows
! To the degree that some of these investments can be nanced using suppliers
credit (accounts payable) the cash ow drain is reduced.
! Investments in working capital are thus cash outows
Any increase in working capital reduces cash ows in that year
Any decrease in working capital increases cash ows in that year
! To provide closure, working capital investments need to be salvaged at the
end of the project life.
! Proposition 1: The failure to consider working capital in a capital budgeting
project will overstate cash ows on that project and make it look more
attractive than it really is.
! Proposition 2: Other things held equal, a reduction in working capital
requirements will increase the cash ows on all projects for a rm.
By working capital, we consider only non-cash working capital. Dened even
more tightly,
Non-cash WC = Inventory + Accounts Receivable - Accounts Payable
Why do we not include cash? Because the investment in working capital is
considered to be an investment on which you cannot make a return. To the
extent that most US rms that have cash today earn interest on the cash, treating
the cash as part of non-cash working capital may be requiring it to earn a return
twice.
Some businesses do need to maintain traditional cash balances. If that is the
case, that cash can be counted into working capital.
Aswath Damodaran 204
The incremental cash ows on the project
To get from cash ow to incremental cash ows, we
"Taken out of the sunk costs from the initial investment
"Added back the non-incremental allocated costs (in after-tax terms)
Now (0) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Operating Income after Taxes
-$165 -$77 $75 $206 $251 $297 $347 $402 $412
+ Depreciation & Amortization
$537 $508 $430 $359 $357 $358 $361 $366 $369
- Capital Expenditures
$2,500 $1,000 $1,269 $805 $301 $287 $321 $358 $379 $403 $406
- Change in Working Capital
$ 0 $ 0 $63 $25 $38 $31 $16 $17 $19 $21 $ 5
+ Non-incremental Allocated Expense (1-t)
$ 0 $78 $110 $157 $196 $216 $237 $261 $287 $293
+ Sunk Costs
500
Cashflow to Firm
-$2,000 -$1,000 -$880 -$289 $324 $443 $486 $517 $571 $631 $663

$ 500 million has already been spent
2/3rd of allocated G&A is xed.
Add back this amount (1-t)
A sunk cost is any cost that has already been incurred and will not be recovered
even if the project under consideration is rejected.
Only the after-tax amount of the non-incremental allocated costs are added back
because the cash ows are after-tax cash ows.
Alternatively, the cash ows can be estimated from scratch using only the
incremental cash ows.
Aswath Damodaran 205
Sunk Costs
! Any expenditure that has already been incurred, and cannot be recovered
(even if a project is rejected) is called a sunk cost
! When analyzing a project, sunk costs should not be considered since they are
incremental
! By this denition, market testing expenses and R&D expenses are both likely
to be sunk costs before the projects that are based upon them are analyzed. If
sunk costs are not considered in project analysis, how can a rm ensure that
these costs are covered?
Sunk costs should not be considered an investment analysis, but a healthy rm
has to gure out a way to recover sunk costs from on-going projects. The only
way to ensure that this happens is to have a process where costs are examined
before they become sunk. For instance, pharmaceutical rms need to be able to
ask whether a specied expenditure in R&D is worth it (given expectations for
products that might emerge from the R&D, and the size of the market) before
the expenditure is made.
This is likely to be far more difcult if the research is basic research without a
specic product in mind.
Aswath Damodaran 206
Allocated Costs
! Firms allocate costs to individual projects from a centralized pool (such as
general and administrative expenses) based upon some characteristic of the
project (sales is a common choice)
! For large rms, these allocated costs can result in the rejection of projects
! To the degree that these costs are not incremental (and would exist anyway),
this makes the rm worse off.
Thus, it is only the incremental component of allocated costs that should show up
in project analysis.
! How, looking at these pooled expenses, do we know how much of the costs
are xed and how much are variable?
Allocation is the accountants mechanism for fairness.
If the allocation is of an expense that would be incurred anyway, whether the
project is taken or not, it is not incremental.
It is difcult to gure out what allocated expenses are xed and what are
incremental. One approach that works reasonably well for rms with a history is
to look at the expense (say, G&A) over time and compare it with some base
variable (revenues or number of units). If the expense is xed, it should not vary
with the base variable. If it is variable, it will, and the nature of the variation will
help dene how much is xed and how much is variable.
G & A Expense = a + b (Revenues) across time
The coefcient on revenues will be the amount G& A will increase by for a
dollar change in revenues. This can then be used in conjunction with the
revenues on the new project, to specify the G&A that the new project should
carry.
Aswath Damodaran 207
To Time-Weighted Cash Flows
! Incremental cash ows in the earlier years are worth more than incremental
cash ows in later years.
! In fact, cash ows across time cannot be added up. They have to be brought to
the same point in time before aggregation.
! This process of moving cash ows through time is
discounting, when future cash ows are brought to the present
compounding, when present cash ows are taken to the future
! The discounting and compounding is done at a discount rate that will reect
Expected ination: Higher Ination -> Higher Discount Rates
Expected real rate: Higher real rate -> Higher Discount rate
Expected uncertainty: Higher uncertainty -> Higher Discount Rate
Cash ows across time cannot be compared. Discounting brings cash ows
back to the same point in time.
Aswath Damodaran 208
Present Value Mechanics
Cash Flow Type Discounting Formula Compounding Formula
1. Simple CF CF
n
/ (1+r)
n
CF
0
(1+r)
n
2. Annuity
3. Growing Annuity
4. Perpetuity A/r
5. Growing Perpetuity Expected Cashow next year/(r-g)
A
1 -
1
(1+ r)
n
r
!
"
#
#
$
%
&
&
A
(1 + r)
n
- 1
r
!
"
#
$
%
&
A(1+ g)
1 -
(1 + g)
n
(1 + r)
n
r - g
!
"
#
#
#
$
%
&
&
&
These are the basic present value formulae. All except the growing annuity, can
be done using the PV key on any nancial calculator.
These formulae are based upon the assumptions that cash ows occur at the end
of each period.
Aswath Damodaran 209
Discounted cash ow measures of return
! Net Present Value (NPV): The net present value is the sum of the present
values of all cash ows from the project (including initial investment).
NPV = Sum of the present values of all cash ows on the project, including the initial
investment, with the cash ows being discounted at the appropriate hurdle rate
(cost of capital, if cash ow is cash ow to the rm, and cost of equity, if cash ow
is to equity investors)
Decision Rule: Accept if NPV > 0
! Internal Rate of Return (IRR): The internal rate of return is the discount
rate that sets the net present value equal to zero. It is the percentage rate of
return, based upon incremental time-weighted cash ows.
Decision Rule: Accept if IRR > hurdle rate
The key difference between these approaches is that Net Present Value is a
dollar measure, and it measures surplus value created. Thus, even a small net
present value is over and above your hurdle rate.
Internal rate of return is a percentage measure of total return (not excess return).
It is only when it is compared to the hurdle rate that is provides a measure of
excess return (in percentage terms)
Aswath Damodaran 210
Closure on Cash Flows
! In a project with a nite and short life, you would need to compute a salvage
value, which is the expected proceeds from selling all of the investment in the
project at the end of the project life. It is usually set equal to book value of
xed assets and working capital
! In a project with an innite or very long life, we compute cash ows for a
reasonable period, and then compute a terminal value for this project, which
is the present value of all cash ows that occur after the estimation period
ends..
! Assuming the project lasts forever, and that cash ows after year 9 grow 2%
(the ination rate) forever, the present value at the end of year 10 of cash
ows after that can be written as:
Terminal Value in year 10= CF in year 11/(Cost of Capital - Growth Rate)
=663 (1.02) /(.1066-.02) = $ 7,810 million
When you stop estimating cash ows on a project, you have to either estimate
salvage value or terminal value. For projects with nite lives (such as buying a
plant or equipment), estimating salvage value is appropriate. For projects with
very long lives, estimating a terminal value is more reasonable.
If you assume that the project is liquidated, any investments in working capital
have to be salvaged. This does not necessarily mean that you will get 100% back.
A terminal value can also be thought off as the value that you would get by
selling this project (as an on-going project) to someone else at the end of the
analysis. In this case, we are estimating that the theme park in Bangkok will be
worth $ 8,821 million at the end of year 9. (The perpetual growth model gives
the value of the asset at the beginning of the year of the cash ow)
Aswath Damodaran 211
Which yields a NPV of..
Year
Annual
Cashflow
Terminal
Value
Present
Value
0 -$2,000 -$2,000
1 -$1,000 -$904
2 -$880 -$719
3 -$289 -$213
4 $324 $216
5 $443 $267
6 $486 $265
7 $517 $254
8 $571 $254
9 $631 $254
10 $663 $7,810 $3,076
$749

This is the net present value calculation using the cost of capital of 10.66%, the
theme park cost of capital adjusted for emerging market risk.
Aswath Damodaran 212
Which makes the argument that..
! The project should be accepted. The positive net present value suggests that
the project will add value to the rm, and earn a return in excess of the cost of
capital.
! By taking the project, Disney will increase its value as a rm by $749 million.
The net present value calculation suggests that this project is a good one.
The increase in rm value will not necessarily translate into an increase in
market value, since market values reect expectations. If expectations were such
that the market expected Disney to take large positive NPV projects, the $ 818
million will have to be measured against these expectations.
Aswath Damodaran 213
The IRR of this project
This is a net present value prole, where NPV is plotted against discount rates.
The IRR is that discount rate at which NPV is zero.
Aswath Damodaran 214
The IRR suggests..
! The project is a good one. Using time-weighted, incremental cash ows, this
project provides a return of 11.97%. This is greater than the cost of capital of
10.66%.
! The IRR and the NPV will yield similar results most of the time, though
there are differences between the two approaches that may cause project
rankings to vary depending upon the approach used.
The information needed to use IRR in investment analysis is the same as the
information need to use NPV.
If the hurdle rate is changing over time, IRR becomes more complicated to use.
It has to be compared to the geometric average of the hurdle rates over time.
Aswath Damodaran 215
Case 1: IRR versus NPV
! Consider a project with the following cash ows:
Year Cash Flow
0 -1000
1 800
2 1000
3 1300
4 -2200
Two Sign Changes ...
Aswath Damodaran 216
Projects NPV Prole
Leads to Two Internal Rates of Return (IRR)
Aswath Damodaran 217
What do we do now?
! This project has two internal rates of return. The rst is 6.60%, whereas the
second is 36.55%.
! Why are there two internal rates of return on this project?
! If your cost of capital is 12%, would you accept or reject this project?
a) I would reject the project
b) I would accept this project
Explain.
Because there are two sign changes.
I would accept the project because the NPV (see previous page) at the 12% is
greater than zero.
Thus, when there is more than one IRR, use NPV.
Aswath Damodaran 218
Case 2: NPV versus IRR
Cash Flow
Investment
$ 350,000
$ 1,000,000
Project A
Cash Flow
Investment
Project B
NPV = $467,937
IRR= 33.66%
$ 450,000 $ 600,000 $ 750,000
NPV = $1,358,664
IRR=20.88%
$ 10,000,000
$ 3,000,000 $ 3,500,000 $ 4,500,000 $ 5,500,000
Note the difference in scale.
Aswath Damodaran 219
Which one would you pick?
! Assume that you can pick only one of these two projects. Your choice will
clearly vary depending upon whether you look at NPV or IRR. You have
enough money currently on hand to take either. Which one would you pick?
a) Project A. It gives me the bigger bang for the buck and more margin for error.
b) Project B. It creates more dollar value in my business.
If you pick A, what would your biggest concern be?
If you pick B, what would your biggest concern be?
Depends upon whether you have capital rationing. If you do not have capital
rationing, you should use NPV (and pick project B). The more serious the
capital rationing constraint, the more likely that IRR will be used (to pick project
A)
If you pick project A, the biggest risk is that no other projects come along
during the course of the period, and the funds stay uninvested (earning a NPV
of zero)
If you pick project B, the biggest risk is that lots of very good projects earning
higher returns than B come along and you do not have the funds to accept them.
Aswath Damodaran 220
Capital Rationing, Uncertainty and Choosing a Rule
! If a business has limited access to capital, has a stream of surplus value
projects and faces more uncertainty in its project cash ows, it is much more
likely to use IRR as its decision rule.
Small, high-growth companies and private businesses are much more likely to
use IRR.
! If a business has substantial funds on hand, access to capital, limited surplus
value projects, and more certainty on its project cash ows, it is much more
likely to use NPV as its decision rule.
As rms go public and grow, they are much more likely to gain from using NPV.
Small rms which are successful become large rms, but some continue to act
as if they have a capital rationing constraint and maintain unrealistically high
hurdle rates. These rms will often accumulate cash while turning away projects
that earn more than their cost of capital.
Aswath Damodaran 221
The sources of capital rationing
Cause Number of firms Percent of total
Debt limit imposed by outside agreement 10 10.7
Debt limit placed by management external
to firm
3 3.2
Limit placed on borrowing by internal
management
65 69.1
Restrictive policy imposed on retained
earnings
2 2.1
Maintenance of target EPS or PE ratio 14 14.9

In a world where rms had free and complete access to capital markets and
information could be conveyed credibly to nancial markets, there would be no
capital rationing constraints. Any rm with a good project (positive NPV) would
be able to raise the funds to take the investment. In the real world, there are
market frictions that can cause capital rationing. This table is the result of an old
survey (1976) which tried to identify the reasons for capital rationing.
More often than not, the source of capital rationing s not external (lack of access
to markets, inability to convey information, transactions costs) but by internal
factors (management is conservative, restrictions on human capital)
Aswath Damodaran 222
An Alternative to IRR with Capital Rationing
! The problem with the NPV rule, when there is capital rationing, is that it is a
dollar value. It measures success in absolute terms.
! The NPV can be converted into a relative measure by dividing by the initial
investment. This is called the protability index.
Protability Index (PI) = NPV/Initial Investment
! In the example described, the PI of the two projects would have been:
PI of Project A = $467,937/1,000,000 = 46.79%
PI of Project B = $1,358,664/10,000,000 = 13.59%
Project A would have scored higher.
It is possible to convert NPV, which is dollar measure of value, into a percentage
measure by dividing by the initial investment.
The rankings will be similar to IRR but the two approaches make different
assumptions about what rate the intermediate cash ows get reinvested at. (This
will be illustrated on the next two overheads)
Aswath Damodaran 223
Case 3: NPV versus IRR
Cash Flow
Investment
$ 5,000,000
$ 10,000,000
Project A
Cash Flow
Investment
Project B
NPV = $1,191,712
IRR=21.41%
$ 4,000,000 $ 3,200,000 $ 3,000,000
NPV = $1,358,664
IRR=20.88%
$ 10,000,000
$ 3,000,000 $ 3,500,000 $ 4,500,000 $ 5,500,000
The projects have the same scale. Why are the two approaches yielding different
rankings? (They are both discounted cash ow approaches, but they must be
time-weighting the cash ows slightly differently to yield different rankings)
Aswath Damodaran 224
Why the difference?
These projects are of the same scale. Both the NPV and IRR use time-weighted
cash ows. Yet, the rankings are different. Why?
Which one would you pick?
a) Project A. It gives me the bigger bang for the buck and more margin for error.
b) Project B. It creates more dollar value in my business.
NPV assumes that intermediate cash ows get reinvested at the cost of capital,
while IRR assumes that they get reinvested at the IRR.
I would pick project B. It is much more reasonable to assume that you can earn
the cost of capital on the intermediate cash ows (since the cost of capital is
based upon what investments of similar risk are making in the market place)
Aswath Damodaran 225
NPV, IRR and the Reinvestment Rate Assumption
! The NPV rule assumes that intermediate cash ows on the project get
reinvested at the hurdle rate (which is based upon what projects of
comparable risk should earn).
! The IRR rule assumes that intermediate cash ows on the project get
reinvested at the IRR. Implicit is the assumption that the rm has an innite
stream of projects yielding similar IRRs.
! Conclusion: When the IRR is high (the project is creating signicant surplus
value) and the project life is long, the IRR will overstate the true return on the
project.
The higher the IRR, the more dangerous this problem. Note that this
reinvestment assumption will never make a bad project into a good project. It
just makes a good project look better than it really is.
Aswath Damodaran 226
Solution to Reinvestment Rate Problem
Cash Flow
Investment
$ 300 $ 400 $ 500 $ 600
<$ 1000>
$300(1.15)
3
$400(1.15)
2
$500(1.15)
$600
$575
$529
$456
Terminal Value = $2160
Internal Rate of Return = 24.89%
Modied Internal Rate of Return = 21.23%
This is the modied IRR. Its rankings are going to be very similar to those
yielded by the PI approach.
Aswath Damodaran 227
Why NPV and IRR may differ..
! A project can have only one NPV, whereas it can have more than one IRR.
! The NPV is a dollar surplus value, whereas the IRR is a percentage measure
of return. The NPV is therefore likely to be larger for large scale projects,
while the IRR is higher for small-scale projects.
! The NPV assumes that intermediate cash ows get reinvested at the hurdle
rate, which is based upon what you can make on investments of comparable
risk, while the IRR assumes that intermediate cash ows get reinvested at the
IRR.
This summarizes the conclusions of the last 3 illustrations. Generally, the NPV
approach is based upon sounder fundamental assumptions, but does assume
that the rm has the capital to take positive NPV projects.
Aswath Damodaran 228
Case 4: NPV and Project Life
Project A
-$1500
$350 $350 $350 $350 $350
-$1000
$400 $400 $400 $400 $400
$350 $350 $350 $350 $350
Project B
NPV of Project A = $ 442
NPV of Project B = $ 478
Hurdle Rate for Both Projects = 12%
The NPV of the shorter life project will generally be lower than the NPV of the
longer-life project. This is an issue only if they are mutually exclusive, i.e. you
can pick only one.
Aswath Damodaran 229
Choosing Between Mutually Exclusive Projects
! The net present values of mutually exclusive projects with different lives
cannot be compared, since there is a bias towards longer-life projects.
! To do the comparison, we have to
replicate the projects till they have the same life (or)
convert the net present values into annuities
To be fair in your comparison, you have to do one or the other.
Aswath Damodaran 230
Solution 1: Project Replication
Project A: Replicated
-$1500
$350 $350 $350 $350 $350 $350 $350 $350 $350 $350
Project B
-$1000
$400 $400 $400 $400 $400 $400 $400 $400 $400 $400
-$1000 (Replication)
NPV of Project A replicated = $ 693
NPV of Project B= $ 478
Here, we have done the replication assuming that the cash ows are identical for
the second replication. (This does not have to be the case)
This process will become more complicated if you are comparing projects with
7 and 9 year lives, for instance.
Aswath Damodaran 231
Solution 2: Equivalent Annuities
! Equivalent Annuity for 5-year project
= $442 * PV(A,12%,5 years)
= $ 122.62
! Equivalent Annuity for 10-year project
= $478 * PV(A,12%,10 years)
= $ 84.60
This is simpler than replication but it is actually based upon the principle of
innite replication. The conclusions will be the same as with replication with the
same cash ows.
Aswath Damodaran 232
What would you choose as your investment tool?
! Given the advantages/disadvantages outlined for each of the different
decision rules, which one would you choose to adopt?
a) Return on Investment (ROE, ROC)
b) Payback or Discounted Payback
c) Net Present Value
d) Internal Rate of Return
e) Protability Index
Generally, most students pick the NPV rule and a few pick IRR.
Aswath Damodaran 233
What rms actually use ..
Decision Rule % of Firms using as primary decision rule in
1976 1986
IRR 53.6% 49.0%
Accounting Return 25.0% 8.0%
NPV 9.8% 21.0%
Payback Period 8.9% 19.0%
Protability Index 2.7% 3.0%
Why do so many rms pick IRR, if NPV is the superior approach?
Because many rms, whether it is true or not, perceive themselves to be
operating with a capital rationing constraint.
Most decision-makers, for whatever reason, are more comfortable
looking at percentage rates of return rather than dollar values.
Aswath Damodaran 234
The Disney Theme Park: The Risks of International
Expansion
! The cash ows on the Bangkok Disney park will be in Thai Baht. This will
expose Disney to exchange rate risk. In addition, there are political and
economic risks to consider in an investment in Thailand. The discount rate of
10.66% that we used reected this additional risk. Should we adjust costs of
capital any time we invest in a foreign country?
# Yes
# No
Depends on whether this risk is viewed, from the perspective of Disney
stockholders, to be diversiable (in which case, it should be ignored) or non-
diversiable (in which case, it should lead to a higher discount rate)
For Disney, which is primarily institutionally held, I would assume that the risk
is diversiable to my stockholders, and assess no extra premium.
If I wanted to assess an extra premium, I would go back and use the risk
premium for Thailand in the CAPM, and come up with a higher cost of equity
and capital for this project.
If you were a large stockholder in the rm and you were not well diversied, you
would probably want an even larger premium.
Aswath Damodaran 235
Should there be a risk premium for foreign projects?
! The exchange rate risk should be diversiable risk (and hence should not
command a premium) if
the company has projects is a large number of countries (or)
the investors in the company are globally diversied.
For Disney, this risk should not affect the cost of capital used. Consequently, we
would not adjust the cost of capital for Disneys investments in other mature
markets (Germany, UK, France)
! The same diversication argument can also be applied against political risk,
which would mean that it too should not affect the discount rate. It may,
however, affect the cash ows, by reducing the expected life or cash ows on
the project.
For Disney, this is the risk that we are incorporating into the cost of capital when
it invests in Thailand (or any other emerging market)
This will depend upon the company. Smaller companies, with higher insider
holdings, should be more likely to assess higher discount rates for expanding
overseas. Larger companies, with more diverse stockholdings, should be more
inclined to use the same discount rates they use in the domestic market.
Aswath Damodaran 236
Domestic versus international expansion
! The analysis was done in dollars. Would the conclusions have been any
different if we had done the analysis in Thai Baht?
a) Yes
b) No
No. It should not. A good project should be good in any currency.
Aswath Damodaran 237
The Consistency Rule for Cash Flows
! The cash ows on a project and the discount rate used should be dened in
the same terms.
If cash ows are in dollars (baht), the discount rate has to be a dollar (baht)
discount rate
If the cash ows are nominal (real), the discount rate has to be nominal (real).
! If consistency is maintained, the project conclusions should be identical, no
matter what cash ows are used.
When working with higher ination currencies, the discount rates will be higher
but so will the expected growth (because of the ination)
We are implicitly assuming that current exchange rates are correct and that
expected changes in exchange rates over time will reect differences in ination.
To the degree that this is not true, the project analysis might be affected by the
currency in which the analysis is done.
Aswath Damodaran 238
Dealing with Ination
! In our analysis, we used nominal dollars and Bt. Would the NPV have been
different if we had used real cash ows instead of nominal cash ows?
a) It would be much lower, since real cash ows are lower than nominal cash ows
b) It would be much higher
c) It should be unaffected
Again, the answer is no. The discount rate will be lower, but so will the expected
growth rate and cash ows.
Aswath Damodaran 239
Disney Theme Park: Project Analysis in Baht
! The ination rates were assumed to be 10% in Thailand and 2% in the United
States. The Baht/dollar rate at the time of the analysis was 42.09 BT/dollar.
! The expected exchange rate was derived assuming purchasing power parity.
Expected Exchange Rate
t
= Exchange Rate today * (1.10/1.02)
t
! The expected growth rate after year 10 is still expected to be the ination rate,
but it is the 10% Thai ination rate.
! The cost of capital in Baht was derived from the cost of capital in dollars and
the differences in ination rates:
Baht Cost of Capital =
= (1.1066) (1.1/1.02) - 1 =.1934 or 19.34%
!
(1+ US $ Cost of Capital)
(1+ Exp Inflation
Thailand
)
(1+ Exp Inflation
US
)
"1
Note that the expected exchange rate reects purchasing power parity.
Many companies in Asia, during the early 1990s used the current exchange rate
to forecast future cash ows, because governments in these markets had pegged
their currencies to the dollar (essentially promising a xed exchange rate).
While this held up for a while, the differences in ination eventually caused the
local currency to collapse, taking many real projects down with it.
Aswath Damodaran 240
Disney Theme Park: Thai Baht NPV
NPV = 31,542 Bt/42.09 Bt = $ 749 Million
NPV is equal to NPV in dollar terms
Year Cashflow ($) Bt/$ Cashflow (Bt) Present Value
0 -2000 42.09 -84180 -84180
1 -1000 45.39 -45391 -38034
2 -880 48.95 -43075 -30243
3 -289 52.79 -15262 -8979
4 324 56.93 18420 9080
5 443 61.40 27172 11223
6 486 66.21 32187 11140
7 517 71.40 36920 10707
8 571 77.01 43979 10687
9 631 83.04 52412 10671
10 8474 89.56 758886 129470
31542
The NPV is identical because what we lose by using a higher discount rate is
exactly offset by what we gain in growth in the cash ows.
Aswath Damodaran 241
Equity Analysis: The Parallels
! The investment analysis can be done entirely in equity terms, as well. The
returns, cashows and hurdle rates will all be dened from the perspective of
equity investors.
! If using accounting returns,
Return will be Return on Equity (ROE) = Net Income/BV of Equity
ROE has to be greater than cost of equity
! If using discounted cashow models,
Cashows will be cashows after debt payments to equity investors
Hurdle rate will be cost of equity
The Disney analysis was a rm analysis, looking at cost of capital and returns
on capital.
The analysis could have been done entirely in terms of cash ows and returns to
equity investors in the business.
Aswath Damodaran 242
A Brief Example: A Paper Plant for Aracruz - Investment
Assumptions
The plant is expected to have a capacity of 750,000 tons and will have the
following characteristics:
! It will require an initial investment of 250 Million BR. At the end of the fth
year, an additional investment of 50 Million BR will be needed to update the
plant.
! Aracruz plans to borrow 100 Million BR, at a real interest rate of 5.25%,
using a 10-year term loan (where the loan will be paid off in equal annual
increments).
! The plant will have a life of 10 years. During that period, the plant (and the
additional investment in year 5) will be depreciated using double declining
balance depreciation, with a life of 10 years. At the end of the tenth year, the
plant is expected to be sold for its remaining book value.
This project differs from the Disney analysis on three dimensions:
The cash ows are in real terms.
The investment is a nite life investment
The analysis will be done in equity terms.
Aswath Damodaran 243
Operating Assumptions
! The plant will be partly in commission in a couple of months, but will have a capacity of only 650,000 tons in the rst
year, 700,000 tons in the second year before getting to its full capacity of 750,000 tons in the third year.
! The capacity utilization rate will be 90% for the rst 3 years, and rise to 95% after that.
! The price per ton of linerboard is currently $400, and is expected to keep pace with ination for the life of the plant.
! The variable cost of production, primarily labor and material, is expected to be 55% of total revenues; there is a xed cost
of 50 Million BR, which will grow at the ination rate.
! The working capital requirements are estimated to be 15% of total revenues, and the investments have to be made at the
beginning of each year. At the end of the tenth year, it is anticipated that the entire working capital will be salvaged.
Many of these inputs were estimated by looking at similar plants run by Aracruz
and other paper and pulp manufacturers.
Aswath Damodaran 244
The Hurdle Rate
! The analysis is done in real, equity terms. Thus, the hurdle rate has to be a
real cost of equity
! The real cost of equity for Aracruz, based upon
the levered beta estimate of 0.7576 (for just the paper business)
the real riskless rate of 2% (US Ination Indexed treasury bond)
and the risk premium for Brazil of 12.49% (US mature market premium (4.82%) +
Brazil country risk premium (7.67%))
Real Cost of Equity = 2% + 0.7576 (12.49%) = 11.46%
Everything is done in real, equity terms.
Note that we are using the levered beta for just the paper business (and not the
levered beta for Aracruz as a whole).
Aswath Damodaran 245
Breaking down debt payments by year
Year
Beginning
Debt
Interest
expense
Principal
Repaid
Total
Payment
Ending
Debt
1 R$ 100,000 R$ 5,250 R$ 7,858 R$ 13,108 R$ 92,142
2 R$ 92,142 R$ 4,837 R$ 8,271 R$ 13,108 R$ 83,871
3 R$ 83,871 R$ 4,403 R$ 8,705 R$ 13,108 R$ 75,166
4 R$ 75,166 R$ 3,946 R$ 9,162 R$ 13,108 R$ 66,004
5 R$ 66,004 R$ 3,465 R$ 9,643 R$ 13,108 R$ 56,361
6 R$ 56,361 R$ 2,959 R$ 10,149 R$ 13,108 R$ 46,212
7 R$ 46,212 R$ 2,426 R$ 10,682 R$ 13,108 R$ 35,530
8 R$ 35,530 R$ 1,865 R$ 11,243 R$ 13,108 R$ 24,287
9 R$ 24,287 R$ 1,275 R$ 11,833 R$ 13,108 R$ 12,454
10 R$ 12,454 R$ 654 R$ 12,454 R$ 13,108 R$ 0

Start by estimating the annual payment, using the loan amount of 100 million
and the interest rate of 5.25%, with a ten-year maturity. Then, break the payment
down by year into interest and principal. If you do it right, there should be no
principal left at the end of the 10th year.
Aswath Damodaran 246
Project Income: Paper Plant
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Capacity (in
'000s) 650 700 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750
Utilization
Rate 90% 90% 90% 95% 95% 95% 95% 95% 95% 95%
Production 585 630 675 713 713 713 713 713 713 713
Price per ton 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400
Revenues
234,000 252,000 270,000 285,000 285,000 285,000 285,000 285,000 285,000 285,000
Operating
Expenses 178,700 188,600 198,500 206,750 206,750 206,750 206,750 206,750 206,750 206,750
Depreciation 35,000 28,000 22,400 17,920 14,336 21,469 21,469 21,469 21,469 21,469
Operating
Income 20,300 35,400 49,100 60,330 63,914 56,781 56,781 56,781 56,781 56,781
- Interest 5,250 4,837 4,403 3,946 3,465 2,959 2,426 1,865 1,275 654
Taxable
Income 15,050 30,563 44,697 56,384 60,449 53,822 54,355 54,916 55,506 56,127
- Taxes 5,117 10,391 15,197 19,170 20,553 18,300 18,481 18,671 18,872 19,083
Net Income 9,933 20,171 29,500 37,213 39,896 35,523 35,874 36,244 36,634 37,044

Since the price of paper is held constant (in todays dollars), these net income
projections are in real terms. The costs are also being held constant in real
dollars.
Aswath Damodaran 247
A ROE Analysis
Real ROE of 23.24% is greater than
Real Cost of Equity of 11.46%
Year
Net
Income
Beg. BV:
Assets Depreciation
Capital
Exp.
Ending
BV:
Assets
BV of
Working
Capital Debt
BV:
Equity
Average
BV:
Equity ROE
0 0 0 250,000 250,000 35,100 100,000 185,100
1 9,933 250,000 35,000 0 215,000 37,800 92,142 160,658 172,879 5.75%
2 20,171 215,000 28,000 0 187,000 40,500 83,871 143,629 152,144 13.26%
3 29,500 187,000 22,400 0 164,600 42,750 75,166 132,184 137,906 21.39%
4 37,213 164,600 17,920 0 146,680 42,750 66,004 123,426 127,805 29.12%
5 39,896 146,680 14,336 50,000 182,344 42,750 56,361 168,733 146,079 27.31%
6 35,523 182,344 21,469 0 160,875 42,750 46,212 157,413 163,073 21.78%
7 35,874 160,875 21,469 0 139,406 42,750 35,530 146,626 152,020 23.60%
8 36,244 139,406 21,469 0 117,938 42,750 24,287 136,400 141,513 25.61%
9 36,634 117,938 21,469 0 96,469 42,750 12,454 126,764 131,582 27.84%
10 37,044 96,469 21,469 0 75,000 0 0 75,000 100,882 36.72%
23.24%

The return on equity is computed by dividing the net income by the average
book value of equity. Note the increase in return on equity as you move through
to the later years (income rises as depreciation falls, and the book value of the
equity investment becomes smaller because of the depreciation)
The fact that this is a nite life project allows us to get away with only a small
capital maintenance expenditure in year 5.
Aswath Damodaran 248
From Project ROE to Firm ROE
! As with the earlier analysis, where we used return on capital and cost of
capital to measure the overall quality of projects at Disney, we can compute
return on equity and cost of equity at Aracruz to pass judgment on whether
Aracruz is creating value to its equity investors
! In 2003 Aracruz had net income of 428 million BR on book value of equity of
6,385 million BR, yielding a return on equity of:
ROE = 428/6,385 = 6.70% (Real because book value is ination adjusted)
Cost of Equity = 10.79%
Excess Return = 6.70% - 10.79% = -4.09%
! This can be converted into a dollar value by multiplying by the book value of
equity, to yield a equity economic value added
Equity EVA = (6.70% - 10.79%) (6,385 Million) = -261 Million BR
Here, we generalize to looking at the performance of the portfolio of projects
that a rm has. We use
The total net income of the rm as a measure of the equity earnings
generated by existing projects
The book value of equity as a measure of the equity invested in projects
in place
We cannot use market value of equity since it has embedded in it a premium for
expected future growth. Dividing current net income by market value of equity
will yield very low returns on equity for high growth rms, not because they
have necessarily taken bad projects.
We are assuming that the ination accounting completely adjusts the book value
of equity for ination, giving us real returns on equity. To the extent that this is
not true, the return can be biased. We are also using the cost of equity for the
entire rm (including cash) since the net income includes the interest income
from cash.
Aswath Damodaran 249
An Incremental CF Analysis
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Net Income 9,933 20,171 29,500 37,213 39,896 35,523 35,874 36,244 BR 36,634 BR 37,044 BR
+ Depreciation &
Amortization 35,000 28,000 22,400 17,920 14,336 21,469 21,469 21,469 21,469 21,469
- Capital Expenditures 250,000 0 0 0 0 50,000 0 0 0 0 0
+ Net Debt 100,000
- Change i n Working
Capital 35,100 2,700 2,700 2,250 0 0 0 0 0 0
- Principal Repayments 7,858 8,271 8,705 9,162 9,643 10,149 10,682 11,243 11,833 12,454
+ Salvage Value of Assets
b
117,750
Cashflow to Equity (185,100 ) 34,375 37,201 40,945 45,971 (5,411 ) 46,842 46,661 46,470 46,270 163,809

This converts the equity earnings on the previous page into cash ows to equity.
Note that we reduce the initial investment by the new debt (since it reduces the
equity investment needed).
The real cash ows to equity are discounted at the real cost of equity to arrive at
a NPV (which should be the same in real and nominal terms)
FCFE : Free Cash Flow to Equity. This measures the cash ow left over for
equity investors after all needs on this project are met, including debt payments
and capital expenditures.
Aswath Damodaran 250
An Equity NPV
Year FCFE PV of FCFE
0 (185,100 BR) (185,100 BR)
1 34,375 BR 30,840 BR
2 37,201 BR 29,943 BR
3 40,945 BR 29,568 BR
4 45,971 BR 29,784 BR
5 (5,411 BR) (3,145 BR)
6 46,842 BR 24,427 BR
7 46,661 BR 21,830 BR
8 46,470 BR 19,505 BR
9 46,270 BR 17,424 BR
10 163,809 BR 55,342 BR
NPV 70,418 BR

The caswhows to equity are real cashows and are discounted back at the real
cost of equity of 11.46%. This project is a good project and has a net present
value of 70.418 million BR.
Aswath Damodaran 251
An Equity IRR
Figure 5.6: NPV Profile on Equity Investment in Paper Plant: Aracruz
($50,000.00)
$0.00
$50,000.00
$100,000.00
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Discount Rate
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The IRR for this project, using real equity cashows, is 18.39%, higher than the
cost of equity of 11.46%.
Aswath Damodaran 252
The Role of Sensitivity Analysis
! Our conclusions on a project are clearly conditioned on a large number of
assumptions about revenues, costs and other variables over very long time
periods.
! To the degree that these assumptions are wrong, our conclusions can also be
wrong.
! One way to gain condence in the conclusions is to check to see how
sensitive the decision measure (NPV, IRR..) is to changes in key assumptions.
It is natural to ask what-if questions about a project once an analysis is complete.
Given how easy it is today to do sensitivity analysis, it is important that we focus
only on the most important variables. Doing sensitivity analysis on too many
minor variables may draw attention away from the key factors underlying the
conclusion.
Aswath Damodaran 253
Viability of Paper Plant: Sensitivity to Price per Ton
Clearly NPV goes down as the price per ton goes down. As a decision maker,
then this analysis is useful on two levels:
At the point of decision making, it provides a break even point for when
the project stops being viable. The question then might be: How likely is
it that prices will drop below $ 335 per ton?
It can be used as a tool in risk management. It is conceivable, for
instance, that Aracruz might be able to hedge against the possibility of
paper prices dropping below $ 335 (using options or forward contracts)
Aswath Damodaran 254
What does sensitivity analysis tell us?
Assume that the manager at Aracruz who has to decide on whether to take this
plant is very conservative. She looks at the sensitivity analysis and decides
not to take the project because the NPV would turn negative if the price drops
below $335 per ton. (Though the expected price per ton is $400, there is a
signicant probability of the price dropping below $335.)Is this the right
thing to do?
a) Yes
b) No
Explain.
Sensitivity analysis will reect the risk aversion of the decision maker. There is a
danger here that we are double counting some risk (by using a higher discount
rate and doing the what-if) and counting in some rm-specic risk (which
should be diversiable to our investors).
Aswath Damodaran 255
Side Costs and Benets
! Most projects considered by any business create side costs and benets for
that business.
! The side costs include the costs created by the use of resources that the
business already owns (opportunity costs) and lost revenues for other projects
that the rm may have.
! The benets that may not be captured in the traditional capital budgeting
analysis include project synergies (where cash ow benets may accrue to
other projects) and options embedded in projects (including the options to
delay, expand or abandon a project).
! The returns on a project should incorporate these costs and benets.
These costs and benets should be incorporated, but that is easier said than done.
Some projects deliver most of their benets indirectly. Thus, this is not a minor
issue. (How much would you pay to re-sign Michael Jordan to a one-year
contract, if you were the Chicago Bulls?)
Aswath Damodaran 256
Opportunity Cost
! An opportunity cost arises when a project uses a resource that may already
have been paid for by the rm.
! When a resource that is already owned by a rm is being considered for use in
a project, this resource has to be priced on its next best alternative use, which
may be
a sale of the asset, in which case the opportunity cost is the expected proceeds
from the sale, net of any capital gains taxes
renting or leasing the asset out, in which case the opportunity cost is the expected
present value of the after-tax rental or lease revenues.
use elsewhere in the business, in which case the opportunity cost is the cost of
replacing it.
In most established businesses, this occurs frequently.
This can involve
Real assets, like land, buildings or equipment
Individuals, who work for the rm already on other project or divisions
Aswath Damodaran 257
Case 1: Opportunity Costs
! Assume that Disney owns land in Bangkok already. This land is undeveloped
and was acquired several years ago for $ 5 million for a hotel that was never
built. It is anticipated, if this theme park is built, that this land will be used to
build the ofces for Disney Bangkok. The land currently can be sold for $ 40
million, though that would create a capital gain (which will be taxed at 20%).
In assessing the theme park, which of the following would you do:
a) Ignore the cost of the land, since Disney owns its already
b) Use the book value of the land, which is $ 5 million
c) Use the market value of the land, which is $ 40 million
d) Other:
Use the market value of the land, net of capital gains taxes.
$ 40 million - 0.2 (40 - 5) = $ 33 million
Aswath Damodaran 258
Case 2: Excess Capacity
! In the Aracruz example, assume that the rm will use its existing distribution
system to service the production out of the new paper plant. The new plant
manager argues that there is no cost associated with using this system, since
it has been paid for already and cannot be sold or leased to a competitor (and
thus has no competing current use). Do you agree?
a) Yes
b) No
No. Using that excess capacity will create a cost down the road for the rm.
Aswath Damodaran 259
Estimating the Cost of Excess Capacity
! The existing Capacity is 100,000 units; the book value of this unit is $ 1
million. The cost of buying a unit with the same capacity is $1.5 million. The
companys cost of capital is 12%.
! Current Usage = 50,000 (50% of Capacity); 50% Excess Capacity;
New Product will use 30% of Capacity; Sales growth at 5% a year; CM per unit =
$5/unit
Current product sales growing at 10% a year. CM per unit = $4/unit
! Basic Framework
If I do not take this product, when will I run out of capacity?
If I take this project, when will I run out of capacity
When I run out of capacity, what will I do?
cut back on production: cost is PV of after-tax cash ows from lost sales
buy new capacity: cost is difference in PV between earlier & later investment
The use of excess capacity in the rst year does not create a cost, since there is
an excess capacity of 50%, and only 30% will be used by the new product. It is
the fact that the existing product revenues are growing that will create the cost.
Aswath Damodaran 260
Opportunity Cost of Excess Capacity
Year Old New Old + New Lost ATCF PV(ATCF)
1 50.00% 30.00% 80.00% $0
2 55.00% 31.50% 86.50% $0
3 60.50% 33.08% 93.58% $0
4 66.55% 34.73% 101.28% $5,115 $ 3,251
5 73.21% 36.47% 109.67% $38,681 $ 21,949
6 80.53% 38.29% 118.81% $75,256 $ 38,127
7 88.58% 40.20% 128.78% $115,124 $ 52,076
8 97.44% 42.21% 139.65% $158,595 $ 64,054
9 100% 44.32% 144.32% $177,280 $ 63,929
10 100% 46.54% 146.54% $186,160 $ 59,939
PV(Lost Sales)= $ 303,324
! PV (Building Capacity In Year 3 Instead Of Year 8) = 1,500,000/1.12
3
-1,500,000/1.12
8
= $ 461,846
! Opportunity Cost of Excess Capacity = $ 303,324
The costs begin in year 4.
The calculation of the cost in year 4 is as follows:
Number of Units that rm will have to cut back = (101.28% - 100%)
(100,000) = 1,280 units (rounded)
We will cut back on the less protable product (the old one), losing
1280 * 4 = $ 5,120 (rounded. The table is based upon non-rounded
numbers)
Since this is already in after-tax terms, we discount it back to the present
at the cost of capital to yield $ 3,251.
We continue until year 10, which is the life of the new product. If it had
a longer life, we would continue with the process.
Alternatively, we could acquire new capacity in year 3 (if we take the new
product) instead of year 8 (if we do not). The difference in present
values is $ 461,846 (This fails to consider depreciation benets)
Given the two costs, I would pick the lost sales option since it has the
lower cost and show it as part of the initial investment.
Aswath Damodaran 261
Product and Project Cannibalization: A Real Cost?
Assume that in the Disney theme park example, 20% of the revenues at the
Bangkok Disney park are expected to come from people who would have
gone to Disneyland in Anaheim, California. In doing the analysis of the park,
you would
a) Look at only incremental revenues (i.e. 80% of the total revenue)
b) Look at total revenues at the park
c) Choose an intermediate number
Would your answer be different if you were analyzing whether to introduce a
new show on the Disney cable channel on Saturday mornings that is expected
to attract 20% of its viewers from ABC (which is also owned by Disney)?
a) Yes
b) No
The answer will depend upon whether the cannibalization would occur anyway
(to a competitor, if Disney does not take the project). The greater the barriers to
entry or the competitive advantage that Disney has over its competitors, the less
likely it is that cannibalization would occur anyway. In that case, it should be
treated as an incremental cost. If not, it should be treated as non-incremental and
ignored.
I would argue that Disney has far greater competitive advantages at its theme
parks, than it does in TV broadcasting. Therefore, I would look at only the
incremental revenue for the theme park, and the total revenues for the TV show.
Aswath Damodaran 262
Project Synergies
! A project may provide benets for other projects within the rm. If this is the
case, these benets have to be valued and shown in the initial project analysis.
! Consider, for instance, a typical Disney animated movie. Assume that it costs
$ 50 million to produce and promote. This movie, in addition to theatrical
revenues, also produces revenues from
the sale of merchandise (stuffed toys, plastic gures, clothes ..)
increased attendance at the theme parks
stage shows (see Beauty and the Beast and the Lion King)
television series based upon the movie
Disney is a master at creating project synergies.
Aswath Damodaran 263
Adding a Caf: Bookscape
! The initial cost of remodeling a portion of the store to make it a cafe, and of buying equipment is expected to be
$150,000. This investment is expected to have a life of 5 years, during which period it will be depreciated using straight
line depreciation. None of the cost is expected to be recoverable at the end of the ve years.
! The revenues in the rst year are expected to be $ 60,000, growing at 10% a year for the next four years.
! There will be one employee, and the total cost for this employee in year 1 is expected to be $30,000 growing at 5% a
year for the next 4 years.
! The cost of the material (food, drinks ..) needed to run the cafe is expected to be 40% of revenues in each of the 5 years.
! An inventory amounting to 5% of the revenues has to be maintained; investments in the inventory are made at the
beginning of each year.
! The tax rate for Bookscape as a business is 40%.
This is a caf being added on to an existing bookstore. The revenues shown
here are the revenues at the caf.
Aswath Damodaran 264
NPV of Caf: Stand alone analysis
0 1 2 3 4 5
Investment - $ 150,000
Revenues
$60,000 $66,000 $72,600 $79,860 $87,846
Labor
$30,000 $31,500 $33,075 $34,729 $36,465
Materials
$24,000 $26,400 $29,040 $31,944 $35,138
Depreciation
$30,000 $30,000 $30,000 $30,000 $30,000
Operating Income
-$24,000 -$21,900 -$19,515 -$16,813 -$13,758
Taxes
-$9,600 -$8,760 -$7,806 -$6,725 -$5,503
AT Operating Income
-$14,400 -$13,140 -$11,709 -$10,088 -$8,255
+ Depreciation
$30,000 $30,000 $30,000 $30,000 $30,000
- Working Capital
$3,000 $300 $330 $363 $399 -$4,392
Cash Flow to Firm
-$153,000 $15,300 $16,530 $17,928 $19,513 $26,138
PV at 12.14%
-$153,000 $13,644 $13,146 $12,714 $12,341 $14,742
Net Present Value
-$86,413

We used the cost of capital for Bookscape of 12.14%, estimated earlier in the
package as the discount rate.
Aswath Damodaran 265
The side benets
! Assume that the cafe will increase revenues at the store by $500,000 in year 1, growing at 10% a
year for the following 4 years. In addition, assume that the pre-tax operating margin on these sales is
10%.
! The net present value of the added benets is $124,474. Added to the NPV of the standalone Caf of
-86,413 yields a net present value of $38,061/
1 2 3 4 5
Increased Revenues $500,000 $550,000 $605,000 $665,500 $732,050
Operating Margin 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00%
Operating Income $50,000 $55,000 $60,500 $66,550 $73,205
Operating Income after
Taxes $29,000 $31,900 $35,090 $38,599 $42,459
PV of C ash Flows @
12.14% $25,861 $25,369 $24,886 $24,412 $23,947
Net Present Value $124,474

With the side benets, the caf looks like a good investment.
Interesting side questions;
1. Should we be using different discount rates for the caf revenues and the
bookstore revenues? (I dont think so since the caf is an extension of the
bookstore)
2. If we had used different discount rates, whose discount rate should be used
to discount the synergies?
Aswath Damodaran 266
Project Options
! One of the limitations of traditional investment analysis is that it is static and
does not do a good job of capturing the options embedded in investment.
The rst of these options is the option to delay taking a project, when a rm has
exclusive rights to it, until a later date.
The second of these options is taking one project may allow us to take advantage
of other opportunities (projects) in the future
The last option that is embedded in projects is the option to abandon a project, if
the cash ows do not measure up.
! These options all add value to projects and may make a bad project (from
traditional analysis) into a good one.
Most projects have one or more than one option embedded in them.
Aswath Damodaran 267
The Option to Delay
! When a rm has exclusive rights to a project or product for a specic period,
it can delay taking this project or product until a later date.
! A traditional investment analysis just answers the question of whether the
project is a good one if taken today.
! Thus, the fact that a project does not pass muster today (because its NPV is
negative, or its IRR is less than its hurdle rate) does not mean that the rights to
this project are not valuable.
Traditional investment analysis just looks at the question of whether a project is
a good one, if taken today. It does not say the rights to this project are worthless.
Aswath Damodaran 268
Valuing the Option to Delay a Project
Present Value of Expected
Cash Flows on Product
PV of Cash Flows
from Project
Initial Investment in
Project
Project has negative
NPV in this section
Project's NPV turns
positive in this section
This looks at the option to delay a project, to which you have exclusive rights.
The initial investment in the project is what you would need to invest to convert
this project from a right to a real project.
The present value of the cash ows will change over time.
If the perceived present value of the cash ows stays below the investment
needed, the project should never be taken.
Aswath Damodaran 269
An example: A Pharmaceutical patent
! Assume that a pharmaceutical company has been approached by an
entrepreneur who has patented a new drug to treat ulcers. The entrepreneur
has obtained FDA approval and has the patent rights for the next 17 years.
! While the drug shows promise, it is still very expensive to manufacture and
has a relatively small market. Assume that the initial investment to produce
the drug is $ 500 million and the present value of the cash ows from
introducing the drug now is only $ 350 million.
! The technology and the market is volatile, and the annualized standard
deviation in the present value, estimated from a simulation is 25%.
This patent is not viable today, viewed as a conventional project. The net present
value of this project is - $150 million.
Aswath Damodaran 270
Valuing the Patent
! Inputs to the option pricing model
Value of the Underlying Asset (S) = PV of Cash Flows from Project if introduced
now = $ 350 million
Strike Price (K) = Initial Investment needed to introduce the product = $ 500
million
Variance in Underlying Assets Value = (0.25)
2
= 0.0625
Time to expiration = Life of the patent = 17 years
Dividend Yield = 1/Life of the patent = 1/17 = 5.88%
Assume that the 17-year riskless rate is 4%. The value of the option can be
estimated as follows:
! Call Value= 350 exp
(-0.0588)(17)
(0.5285) -500 (exp
(-0.04)(17)
(0.1219)= $ 37.12
million
We are assuming that if the option goes in the money, there is a cost of not
exercising (which is the dividend yield) equivalent to losing 1 of the remaining
years of patent protection. (1/17 this year, 1/16 next year.)
Aswath Damodaran 271
Insights for Investment Analyses
! Having the exclusive rights to a product or project is valuable, even if the
product or project is not viable today.
! The value of these rights increases with the volatility of the underlying
business.
! The cost of acquiring these rights (by buying them or spending money on
development - R&D, for instance) has to be weighed off against these benets.
The value of an option will increase with the uncertainty associated with the cash
ows and value of the project.
Thus, rms should be willing to pay large amounts for the rights to technology
in areas where there is tremendous uncertainty about what the future will bring,
and much less in sectors where there is more stability.
The expenses incurred on R&D can be viewed as the cost of acquiring these
rights.
Aswath Damodaran 272
The Option to Expand/Take Other Projects
! Taking a project today may allow a rm to consider and take other valuable
projects in the future.
! Thus, even though a project may have a negative NPV, it may be a project
worth taking if the option it provides the rm (to take other projects in the
future) provides a more-than-compensating value.
! These are the options that rms often call strategic options and use as a
rationale for taking on negative NPV or even negative return projects.
A project may be the rst in a sequence.
Aswath Damodaran 273
The Option to Expand
Present Value of Expected
Cash Flows on Expansion
PV of Cash Flows
from Expansion
Additional Investment
to Expand
Firm will not expand in
this section
Expansion becomes
attractive in this section
Here, the initial project gives you the option to invest an additional amount in the
future which you will do only if the present value of the additional cash ows
you will get by expanding are greater than the investment needed.
For this to work, you have to do the rst project to be eligible for the option to
expand.
Aswath Damodaran 274
An Example of an Expansion Option
! Disney is considering investing $ 100 million to create a Spanish version of
the Disney channel to serve the growing Mexican market.
! A nancial analysis of the cash ows from this investment suggests that the
present value of the cash ows from this investment to Disney will be only $
80 million. Thus, by itself, the new channel has a negative NPV of $ 20
million.
! If the market in Mexico turns out to be more lucrative than currently
anticipated, Disney could expand its reach to all of Latin America with an
additional investment of $ 150 million any time over the next 10 years.
While the current expectation is that the cash ows from having a Disney
channel in Latin America is only $ 100 million, there is considerable
uncertainty about both the potential for such an channel and the shape of the
market itself, leading to signicant variance in this estimate.
This is a negative net present value project, but it gives Disney the option to
expand later. Implicitly, we are also saying that if Disney does not make the
initial project investment (with a NPV of - $ 20 million), it cannot expand later
into the rest of Latin America.
Aswath Damodaran 275
Valuing the Expansion Option
! Value of the Underlying Asset (S) = PV of Cash Flows from Expansion to
Latin America, if done now =$ 100 Million
! Strike Price (K) = Cost of Expansion into Latin American = $ 150 Million
! We estimate the variance in the estimate of the project value by using the
annualized standard deviation in rm value of publicly traded entertainment
rms in the Latin American markets, which is approximately 30%.
Variance in Underlying Assets Value = 0.30
2
= 0.09
! Time to expiration = Period of expansion option = 10 years
! Riskless Rate = 4%
Call Value= $ 36.3 Million
This values the option, using the Black Scholes model.
The value from the model itself is affected not only by the assumptions made
about volatility and value, but also by the asssumptions underlying the model.
The value itself is not the key output from the model. It is the fact that strategic
options, such as this one, can be valued, and that they can make a signicant
difference to your decision.
Aswath Damodaran 276
Considering the Project with Expansion Option
! NPV of Disney Channel in Mexico = $ 80 Million - $ 100 Million = - $ 20
Million
! Value of Option to Expand = $ 36.3 Million
! NPV of Project with option to expand
= - $ 20 million + $ 36.3 million
= $ 16.3 million
! Take the rst investment, with the option to expand.
A bad project, with options considered, becomes a good one.
Aswath Damodaran 277
The Option to Abandon
! A rm may sometimes have the option to abandon a project, if the cash ows
do not measure up to expectations.
! If abandoning the project allows the rm to save itself from further losses,
this option can make a project more valuable.
Present Value of Expected
Cash Flows on Project
PV of Cash Flows
from Project
Cost of Abandonment
You would like to abandon a project, once you know that it will create only
negative cash ows for you. This is not always possible, because of contracts
you might have entered into with employees or customers.
Aswath Damodaran 278
Valuing the Option to Abandon
! Disney is considering taking a 25-year project which
requires an initial investment of $ 250 million in an real estate partnership to
develop time share properties with a South Florida real estate developer,
has a present value of expected cash ows is $ 254 million.
! While the net present value of $ 4 million is small, assume that Disney has the
option to abandon this project anytime by selling its share back to the
developer in the next 5 years for $ 150 million.
! A simulation of the cash ows on this time share investment yields a
variance in the present value of the cash ows from being in the partnership is
0.09.
We are assuming that the developer will be in a position to honor his or her
commitment to buy back Disneys share for $ 150 million.
Aswath Damodaran 279
Project with Option to Abandon
! Value of the Underlying Asset (S) = PV of Cash Flows from Project
= $ 254 million
! Strike Price (K) = Salvage Value from Abandonment = $ 150 million
! Variance in Underlying Assets Value = 0.09
! Time to expiration = Life of the Project =5 years
! Dividend Yield = 1/Life of the Project = 1/25 = 0.04 (We are assuming that
the projects present value will drop by roughly 1/n each year into the project)
! Assume that the ve-year riskless rate is 4%.
These are the inputs to the model. The likelihood of abandonment will increase
over time, as the value of the project decreases.
Aswath Damodaran 280
Should Disney take this project?
! Call Value = 254 exp
(0.04)(5)
(0.9194) -150 (exp
(-0.04)(5)
(0.8300)
= $ 89.27 million
! Put Value= $ 89.27 - 254 exp
(0.04)(5)
+150 (exp
(-0.04)(5)
= $ 4.13 million
! The value of this abandonment option has to be added on to the net present
value of the project of $ 4 million, yielding a total net present value with the
abandonment option of $ 8.13 million.
If you can negotiate this option into your investment projects, you increase their
value. To the degree that you have to pay for this option, you would be willing to
pay up to $ 4.13 million.
Aswath Damodaran 281
Corporate Finance: Lecture Note Packet 2
Capital Structure, Dividend Policy and Valuation
Aswath Damodaran
B40.2302.20
Stern School of Business
Aswath Damodaran 282
Finding the Right Financing Mix: The
Capital Structure Decision
We shift from the investment principle to the nancing principle.
Aswath Damodaran 283
First Principles
! Invest in projects that yield a return greater than the minimum acceptable
hurdle rate.
The hurdle rate should be higher for riskier projects and reect the nancing mix
used - owners funds (equity) or borrowed money (debt)
Returns on projects should be measured based on cash ows generated and the
timing of these cash ows; they should also consider both positive and negative
side effects of these projects.
! Choose a nancing mix that minimizes the hurdle rate and matches the assets
being nanced.
! If there are not enough investments that earn the hurdle rate, return the cash to
stockholders.
The form of returns - dividends and stock buybacks - will depend upon the
stockholders characteristics.
Objective: Maximize the Value of the Firm
Aswath Damodaran 284
The Choices in Financing
! There are only two ways in which a business can make money.
The rst is debt. The essence of debt is that you promise to make xed payments in
the future (interest payments and repaying principal). If you fail to make those
payments, you lose control of your business.
The other is equity. With equity, you do get whatever cash ows are left over after
you have made debt payments.
! The equity can take different forms:
For very small businesses: it can be owners investing their savings
For slightly larger businesses: it can be venture capital
For publicly traded rms: it is common stock
! The debt can also take different forms
For private businesses: it is usually bank loans
For publicly traded rms: it can take the form of bonds
While there are several different nancing instruments available to a rm, they
can all be categorized either as debt or equity. Furthermore, this is a choice that
both private and public rms have to make.
Aswath Damodaran 285
Stage 2
Rapid Expansion
Stage 1
Start-up
Stage 4
Mature Growth
Stage 5
Decline
Financing Choices across the life cycle
External
Financing
Revenues
Earnings
Owners Equity
Bank Debt
Venture Capital
Common Stock
Debt Retire debt
Repurchase stock
External funding
needs
High, but
constrained by
infrastructure
High, relative
to firm value.
Moderate, relative
to firm value.
Declining, as a
percent of firm
value
Internal financing
Low, as projects dry
up.
Common stock
Warrants
Convertibles
Stage 3
High Growth
Negative or
low
Negative or
low
Low, relative to
funding needs
High, relative to
funding needs
More than funding needs
Accessing private equity Inital Public offering Seasoned equity issue Bond issues
Financing
Transitions
Growth stage
$ Revenues/
Earnings
Time
The nancing choices for a rm in terms of both debt and equity evolve as the
rm goes through the life cycle.
Aswath Damodaran 286
The Financing Mix Question
! In deciding to raise nancing for a business, is there an optimal mix of debt
and equity?
If yes, what is the trade off that lets us determine this optimal mix?
If not, why not?
This is the basic question that we will cover in the rst part of the analysis.
Aswath Damodaran 287
Measuring a rms nancing mix
! The simplest measure of how much debt and equity a rm is using currently
is to look at the proportion of debt in the total nancing. This ratio is called
the debt to capital ratio:
Debt to Capital Ratio = Debt / (Debt + Equity)
! Debt includes all interest bearing liabilities, short term as well as long term.
! Equity can be dened either in accounting terms (as book value of equity) or
in market value terms (based upon the current price). The resulting debt ratios
can be very different.
The difference between book value and market value debt ratios can give rise to
problems. For instance, most published debt ratios are book value debt ratios
and many analysts talk about book debt ratios when talking about nancial
leverage.
The higher the expected growth rate in a rm, the greater will be the difference
between book and market value.
Aswath Damodaran 288
Costs and Benets of Debt
! Benets of Debt
Tax Benets
Adds discipline to management
! Costs of Debt
Bankruptcy Costs
Agency Costs
Loss of Future Flexibility
This summarizes the trade off that we make when we choose between using debt
and equity.
Aswath Damodaran 289
Tax Benets of Debt
! When you borrow money, you are allowed to deduct interest expenses from
your income to arrive at taxable income. This reduces your taxes. When you
use equity, you are not allowed to deduct payments to equity (such as
dividends) to arrive at taxable income.
! The dollar tax benet from the interest payment in any year is a function of
your tax rate and the interest payment:
Tax benet each year = Tax Rate * Interest Payment
! Proposition 1: Other things being equal, the higher the marginal tax rate of a
business, the more debt it will have in its capital structure.
The tax benet of debt will be lower if the tax code allows some or all of the
cash ows to equity to be tax deductible, as well. For instance, in Germany,
dividends paid to stockholders are taxed at a lower rate than retained earnings.
In these cases, the tax advantage of debt will be lower.
If you do not pay taxes, debt becomes a lot less attractive. Carnival Cruise Lines,
which gets most of its business from US tourists pays no taxes because it is
domiciled in Liberia. We would expect it to have less debt in its capital structure
than a competitor in the US which pays taxes.
Aswath Damodaran 290
The Effects of Taxes
You are comparing the debt ratios of real estate corporations, which pay the
corporate tax rate, and real estate investment trusts, which are not taxed, but
are required to pay 95% of their earnings as dividends to their stockholders.
Which of these two groups would you expect to have the higher debt ratios?
# The real estate corporations
# The real estate investment trusts
# Cannot tell, without more information
I would expect real estate corporations to have more debt. The forced payout of
95% of earnings as dividends by REITs to their stockholders may expose their
investors to substantial personal taxes, but the absence of taxes at the entity level
will make debt a less attractive option.
In practice, REITs do use debt. On reason might be that they can borrow at a
lower rate at the REIT level than at the property level.
Aswath Damodaran 291
Debt adds discipline to management
! If you are managers of a rm with no debt, and you generate high income and
cash ows each year, you tend to become complacent. The complacency can
lead to inefciency and investing in poor projects. There is little or no cost
borne by the managers
! Forcing such a rm to borrow money can be an antidote to the complacency.
The managers now have to ensure that the investments they make will earn at
least enough return to cover the interest expenses. The cost of not doing so is
bankruptcy and the loss of such a job.
Managers of rms with substantial cash ows and little debt are much more
protected from the consequences of their mistakes (especially when
stockholders are powerless and boards toothless).
Left to themselves, managers (especially lazy ones) would rather run all-equity
nanced rms with substantial cash reserves.
Aswath Damodaran 292
Debt and Discipline
Assume that you buy into this argument that debt adds discipline to management.
Which of the following types of companies will most benet from debt
adding this discipline?
# Conservatively nanced (very little debt), privately owned businesses
# Conservatively nanced, publicly traded companies, with stocks held by
millions of investors, none of whom hold a large percent of the stock.
# Conservatively nanced, publicly traded companies, with an activist and
primarily institutional holding.
Conservatively nanced (Equity nanced), publicly traded rms with a wide and
diverse stockholding.
Private rms should have the incentive to be efcient without debt, because the
owner/manager has his or her wealth at stake.
Publicly traded rms with activist stockholders (like Michael Price) might not
need debt to be disciplined. Investors looking over managers shoulders will
keep them honest.
Aswath Damodaran 293
Bankruptcy Cost
! The expected bankruptcy cost is a function of two variables--
the cost of going bankrupt
direct costs: Legal and other Deadweight Costs
indirect costs: Costs arising because people perceive you to be in nancial trouble
the probability of bankruptcy, which will depend upon how uncertain you are
about future cash ows
! As you borrow more, you increase the probability of bankruptcy and hence
the expected bankruptcy cost.
Studies (see Warner) seem to indicate that the direct costs of bankruptcy are
fairly smal.
The indirect cost of going bankrupt comes from the perception that you are in
nancial trouble, which in turn affects sales and the capacity to raise credit.
As an example, when Apple Computer was perceived to be in nancial trouble in
early 1997, rst-time buyers and businesses stopped buying Apples and
software rms stopped coming up with upgrades for products.
Similarly, Kmart found that suppliers started demanding payments in 30 days
instead of 60 days, when it got into nancial trouble.
The probability of bankruptcy should be a function of the predictability (or
variability) of earnings.
Aswath Damodaran 294
The Bankruptcy Cost Proposition
! Proposition 2: Other things being equal, the greater the indirect bankruptcy
cost and/or probability of bankruptcy in the operating cashows of the rm,
the less debt the rm can afford to use.
Both the cost of bankruptcy and the probability of bankruptcy go into the
expected cost. A rm can have a high expected bankruptcy cost when either or
both is high.
If governments step in and provide protection to rms that get into nancial
trouble, they are reducing the expected cost of bankruptcy. Under that scenario,
you would expect rms to borrow more money. (See South Korea)
Aswath Damodaran 295
Debt & Bankruptcy Cost
Rank the following companies on the magnitude of bankruptcy costs from most
to least, taking into account both explicit and implicit costs:
# A Grocery Store
# An Airplane Manufacturer
# High Technology company
I would expect a grocery store to have the lowest bankruptcy costs. Customers
generally do not consider the rating or default risk of grocery stores when they
shop, but they denitely do consider both when placing an order for an airplane.
Technology companies can have high bankruptcy costs, but the costs will vary
depending upon what type of product they produce. A PC manufacturer might
be affected more than someone who manufacturers software; a company which
serves businesses might be affected more than one which creates games for
children.
Aswath Damodaran 296
Agency Cost
! An agency cost arises whenever you hire someone else to do something for you. It arises because
your interests(as the principal) may deviate from those of the person you hired (as the agent).
! When you lend money to a business, you are allowing the stockholders to use that money in the
course of running that business. Stockholders interests are different from your interests, because
You (as lender) are interested in getting your money back
Stockholders are interested in maximizing your wealth
! In some cases, the clash of interests can lead to stockholders
Investing in riskier projects than you would want them to
Paying themselves large dividends when you would rather have them keep the cash in the business.
! Proposition 3: Other things being equal, the greater the agency problems associated with lending to a
rm, the less debt the rm can afford to use.
What is good for equity investors might not be good for bondholders and
lenders.
A risky project, with substantial upside, may make equity investors happy, but
they might cause bondholders, who do not share in the upside, much worse off.
Similarly, paying a large dividend may make stockholders happier but they
make lenders less well off.
Aswath Damodaran 297
Debt and Agency Costs
Assume that you are a bank. Which of the following businesses would you
perceive the greatest agency costs?
# A Large Pharmaceutical company
# A Large Regulated Electric Utility
Why?
I would expect a grocery store to have the lowest bankruptcy costs. Customers
generally do not consider the rating or default risk of grocery stores when they
shop, but they denitely do consider both when placing an order for an airplane.
Technology companies can have high bankruptcy costs, but the costs will vary
depending upon what type of product they produce. A PC manufacturer might
be affected more than someone who manufacturers software; a company which
serves businesses might be affected more than one which creates games for
children.
Aswath Damodaran 298
Loss of future nancing exibility
! When a rm borrows up to its capacity, it loses the exibility of nancing
future projects with debt.
! Proposition 4: Other things remaining equal, the more uncertain a rm is
about its future nancing requirements and projects, the less debt the rm will
use for nancing current projects.
Firms like to preserve exibility. The value of exibility should be a function of
how uncertain future investment requirements are, and the rms capacity to
raise fresh capital quickly.
Firms with uncertain future needs and the inability to access markets quickly
will tend to value exibility the most, and borrow the least.
Aswath Damodaran 299
What managers consider important in deciding on how
much debt to carry...
! A survey of Chief Financial Ofcers of large U.S. companies provided the
following ranking (from most important to least important) for the factors that
they considered important in the nancing decisions
Factor Ranking (0-5)
1. Maintain nancial exibility 4.55
2. Ensure long-term survival 4.55
3. Maintain Predictable Source of Funds 4.05
4. Maximize Stock Price 3.99
5. Maintain nancial independence 3.88
6. Maintain high debt rating 3.56
7. Maintain comparability with peer group 2.47
This survey suggests that nancial exibility (which is not explicitly allowed for
in the trade off) is valued very highly. What implications does this have for
whether rms will borrow as much as the trade off suggests they should?
What is nancial exibility? Flexibility to do what? What do we need to assume
about access to capital markets for nancial exibility to have high value? What
kinds of rms will value exibility the most?
Aswath Damodaran 300
Debt: Summarizing the Trade Off
Advantages of Borrowing Disadvantages of Borrowing
1. Tax Benet:
Higher tax rates --> Higher tax benet
1. Bankruptcy Cost:
Higher business risk --> Higher Cost
2. Added Discipline:
Greater the separation between managers
and stockholders --> Greater the benet
2. Agency Cost:
Greater the separation between stock-
holders & lenders --> Higher Cost
3. Loss of Future Financing Flexibility:
Greater the uncertainty about future
nancing needs --> Higher Cost
This summarizes our previous discussion in a balance sheet format.
In this format, if the advantages of the marginal borrowing exceed the
disadvantages, you would borrow. Otherwise, you would use equity.
Aswath Damodaran 301
!Application Test: Would you expect your rm to gain or
lose from using a lot of debt?
! Considering, for your rm,
The potential tax benets of borrowing
The benets of using debt as a disciplinary mechanism
The potential for expected bankruptcy costs
The potential for agency costs
The need for nancial exibility
! Would you expect your rm to have a high debt ratio or a low debt ratio?
! Does the rms current debt ratio meet your expectations?
This is just a qualitative analysis. It will not give you a specic optimal debt ratio
but provides insight into why the rm may be using the nancing mix that it is
today.
Aswath Damodaran 302
A Hypothetical Scenario
! Assume you operate in an environment, where
(a) there are no taxes
(b) there is no separation between stockholders and managers.
(c) there is no default risk
(d) there is no separation between stockholders and bondholders
(e) rms know their future nancing needs
Assume that you super impose these assumptions on the balance sheet on the
previous page. The advantages of debt go to zero, as do the disadvantages.
Under such a scenario, rms should be indifferent to issuing debt.
Aswath Damodaran 303
The Miller-Modigliani Theorem
! In an environment, where there are no taxes, default risk or agency costs,
capital structure is irrelevant.
! The value of a rm is independent of its debt ratio.
With the assumptions on the previous page:
The cost of capital will remain unchanged as the debt ratio changes
The value of the rm will not be a function of leverage
Investment decisions can be made independently of nancing decisions
Note that if we allow for tax benets, and keep the other assumptions, the
optimal debt ratio will go to 100%.
Aswath Damodaran 304
Implications of MM Theorem
! Leverage is irrelevant. A rm's value will be determined by its project cash
ows.
! The cost of capital of the rm will not change with leverage. As a rm
increases its leverage, the cost of equity will increase just enough to offset
any gains to the leverage
The cost of capital remains unchanged, because what you gain by substituting
expensive equity with cheaper debt will be offset by the increase in the cost of
equity.
Aswath Damodaran 305
What do rms look at in nancing?
! Is there a nancing hierarchy?
! Argument:
There are some who argue that rms follow a nancing hierarchy, with retained
earnings being the most preferred choice for nancing, followed by debt and that
new equity is the least preferred choice.
Firms have fairly strong preferences in terms of where they would like to raise
capital. They seem to prefer internal over external sources of capital and new
debt over new equity.
Aswath Damodaran 306
Rationale for Financing Hierarchy
! Managers value exibility. External nancing reduces exibility more than
internal nancing.
! Managers value control. Issuing new equity weakens control and new debt
creates bond covenants.
Managers make nancing decisions, not stockholders.
Aswath Damodaran 307
Preference rankings long-term nance: Results of a survey
Ranking Source Score
1 Retained Earnings 5.61
2 Straight Debt 4.88
3 Convertible Debt 3.02
4 External Common Equity 2.42
5 Straight Preferred Stock 2.22
6 Convertible Preferred 1.72
Notice that
internal equity is vastly preferred to external equity. (Is it the fear of
dilution?),
straight debt over convertible debt, and
debt over preferred stock (Is that due to debt having a tax advantage?)
Aswath Damodaran 308
Financing Choices
You are reading the Wall Street Journal and notice a tombstone ad for a company,
offering to sell convertible preferred stock. What would you hypothesize
about the health of the company issuing these securities?
# Nothing
# Healthier than the average rm
# In much more nancial trouble than the average rm
I would expect the rm to be in much more nancial trouble than the average
rm. Why else would it use convertible preferred stock when it could have used
an alternate source of nancing?
The stock price response to the issue of securities seems to mirror this nancing
hierarchy, with new bond issues eliciting more positive stock price responses
than new stock issues.
Aswath Damodaran 309
Determining Optimal Financing Mix:
Approaches and Alternatives
Aswath Damodaran 310
Pathways to the Optimal
! The Cost of Capital Approach: The optimal debt ratio is the one that
minimizes the cost of capital for a rm.
! The Adjusted Present Value Approach: The optimal debt ratio is the one that
maximizes the overall value of the rm.
! The Sector Approach: The optimal debt ratio is the one that brings the rm
closes to its peer group in terms of nancing mix.
! The Life Cycle Approach: The optimal debt ratio is the one that best suits
where the rm is in its life cycle.
Aswath Damodaran 311
I. The Cost of Capital Approach
! Value of a Firm = Present Value of Cash Flows to the Firm, discounted back
at the cost of capital.
! If the cash ows to the rm are held constant, and the cost of capital is
minimized, the value of the rm will be maximized.
This is the conventional valuation model for a rm.
If the cash ows are the same, and the discount rate is lowered, the present value
has to go up. (The key is that cash ows have to remain the same. If this is not
true, then minimizing cost of capital may not maximize rm value)
Aswath Damodaran 312
Measuring Cost of Capital
! It will depend upon:
(a) the components of nancing: Debt, Equity or Preferred stock
(b) the cost of each component
! In summary, the cost of capital is the cost of each component weighted by its
relative market value.
WACC = k
e
(E/(D+E)) + k
d
(D/(D+E))
The cost of capital is the weighted average of the cost of all the different sources
of nancing.
Preferred stock, which is not debt (because preferred dividends are not tax
deductible) and not equity (because preferred dividends are xed) is best treated
as a third item on the cost of capital computation, with its own cost. The simplest
measure of this cost is the preferred dividend yield. (Preferred
dividend/Preferred stock price)
Aswath Damodaran 313
Recapping the Measurement of cost of capital
! The cost of debt is the market interest rate that the rm has to pay on its
borrowing. It will depend upon three components
(a) The general level of interest rates
(b) The default premium
(c) The rm's tax rate
! The cost of equity is
1. the required rate of return given the risk
2. inclusive of both dividend yield and price appreciation
! The weights attached to debt and equity have to be market value weights, not
book value weights.
The cost of debt is the rate at which a business can borrow today.
Aswath Damodaran 314
Costs of Debt & Equity
A recent article in an Asian business magazine argued that equity was cheaper
than debt, because dividend yields are much lower than interest rates on debt.
Do you agree with this statement
# Yes
# No
Can equity ever be cheaper than debt?
# Yes
# No
No. Dividend yields are only a portion of what you have to deliver to equity
investors to keep them satised (To which, the Asian manager might well
respond: What if they are not satised? What can the do to me? The more
power stockholders have over managers, the more likely it is that they will
subscribe to viewing cost of equity as including dividend yield and price
appreciation)
Equity can never be cheaper than debt for any rm at any stage in its life cycle,
since equity investors always stand behind debt holders in line when it comes to
claims on cash ows (each year) and on assets (on liquidation). I know.. I
know.. There is one exception. If you have a company with a negative or very
low beta, its cost of equity may be so low that it is lower than the default-risk
adjusted cost of debt. Such a company should never borrow money in the rst
place, making the exception moot.
Aswath Damodaran 315
Fallacies about Book Value
1. People will not lend on the basis of market value.
2. Book Value is more reliable than Market Value because it does not change as
much.
1. To those who would make this argument, I would ask: When you take a
second mortgage on your house, do you justify it to the bank using market or
book value? The proportion of market value that you are willing to lend might be
higher for some assets (with less volatile market value and higher current cash
ows) than for others.
2. The very fact that book value does not move very much, when we know the
true value does, is an indicator of the unreliability of book value.
3. From a cost of capital perspective, this is denitely not true (see next
overhead)
Aswath Damodaran 316
Issue: Use of Book Value
Many CFOs argue that using book value is more conservative than using market
value, because the market value of equity is usually much higher than book
value. Is this statement true, from a cost of capital perspective? (Will you get
a more conservative estimate of cost of capital using book value rather than
market value?)
# Yes
# No
No. In most countries, including the US, the market value of equity is far higher
than the book value of equity, while the market value of debt tends to be closer
to the book value of debt.
Using book value weights results in a lower weight for equity and a higher
weight for debt. Since the cost of equity is much higher than the cost of debt, the
cost of capital, based on book value weights, will be much lower than that
computed using market value weights. Since this is the hurdle rate used to
decide whether to take projects or not, it is less conservative to use book value
weights.
Aswath Damodaran 317
Applying Cost of Capital Approach: The Textbook Example
D/(D+E) ke kd After-tax Cost of Debt WACC
0 10.50% 8% 4.80% 10.50%
10% 11% 8.50% 5.10% 10.41%
20% 11.60% 9.00% 5.40% 10.36%
30% 12.30% 9.00% 5.40% 10.23%
40% 13.10% 9.50% 5.70% 10.14%
50% 14% 10.50% 6.30% 10.15%
60% 15% 12% 7.20% 10.32%
70% 16.10% 13.50% 8.10% 10.50%
80% 17.20% 15% 9.00% 10.64%
90% 18.40% 17% 10.20% 11.02%
100% 19.70% 19% 11.40% 11.40%
This is a simple example, where both the costs of debt and equity are given.
Note that both increase as the debt ratio goes up, but the cost of capital becomes
lower at least initially as you take on more debt ( because you are substituting in
cheaper debt for more expensive equity)
At 40%, the cost of capital is minimized. It is the optimal debt ratio.
Aswath Damodaran 318
WACC and Debt Ratios
Weighted Average Cost of Capital and Debt Ratios
Debt Ratio
W
A
C
C
9.40%
9.60%
9.80%
10.00%
10.20%
10.40%
10.60%
10.80%
11.00%
11.20%
11.40%
0
1
0
%
2
0
%
3
0
%
4
0
%
5
0
%
6
0
%
7
0
%
8
0
%
9
0
%
1
0
0
%
The same results are presented here in a graphical format.
In the Miller-Modigliani world, this would be a at line.
Aswath Damodaran 319
Current Cost of Capital: Disney
! Equity
Cost of Equity = Riskfree rate + Beta * Risk Premium
= 4% + 1.25 (4.82%) = 10.00%
Market Value of Equity = $55.101 Billion
Equity/(Debt+Equity ) = 79%
! Debt
After-tax Cost of debt =(Riskfree rate + Default Spread) (1-t)
= (4%+1.25%) (1-.373) = 3.29%
Market Value of Debt = $ 14.668 Billion
Debt/(Debt +Equity) = 21%
! Cost of Capital = 10.00%(.79)+3.29%(.21) = 8.59%
55.101(55.101+14.
668)
This reproduces the current cost of capital computation for Disney, using
market value weights for both debt and equity, the cost of equity (based upon
the bottom-up beta) and the cost of debt (based upon the bond rating)
The market value of debt is estimated by estimating the present value of total
interest payments and face value at the current cost of debt.
One way to frame the capital structure question: Is there a mix of debt and
equity at which Disneys cost of capital will be lower than 8.59%?
Aswath Damodaran 320
Mechanics of Cost of Capital Estimation
1. Estimate the Cost of Equity at different levels of debt:
Equity will become riskier -> Beta will increase -> Cost of Equity will increase.
Estimation will use levered beta calculation
2. Estimate the Cost of Debt at different levels of debt:
Default risk will go up and bond ratings will go down as debt goes up -> Cost of Debt
will increase.
To estimating bond ratings, we will use the interest coverage ratio (EBIT/Interest
expense)
3. Estimate the Cost of Capital at different levels of debt
4. Calculate the effect on Firm Value and Stock Price.
The basic inputs for computing cost of capital are cost of equity and cost of
debt. This summarizes the basic approach we will use to estimate each.
Aswath Damodaran 321
Process of Ratings and Rate Estimation
! We use the median interest coverage ratios for large manufacturing rms to
develop interest coverage ratio ranges for each rating class.
! We then estimate a spread over the long term bond rate for each ratings class,
based upon yields at which these bonds trade in the market place.
The interest coverage ratios in the previous table are medians. We use the ratios
for large manufacturing rms to develop the table on the next page.
We also estimate a spread over the long term government bond rate at each
rating, using the average yield to maturity on long-term straight bonds within
each ratings class and comparing to the treasury bond rate. (Try
bondsonline.com for the latest default spreads)
Aswath Damodaran 322
Medians of Key Ratios : 1998-2000
AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC
EBIT interest cov. (x) 17.5 10.8 6.8 3.9 2.3 1.0 0.2
EBITDA interest cov. 21.8 14.6 9.6 6.1 3.8 2.0 1.4
Funds flow/total debt 105.8 55.8 46.1 30.5 19.2 9.4 5.8
Free oper. cash
flow/total debt (%)
55.4 24.6 15.6 6.6 1.9 4.5 -14.0
Return on capital (%) 28.2 22.9 19.9 14.0 11.7 7.2 0.5
Oper.income/sales
(%)
29.2 21.3 18.3 15.3 15.4 11.2 13.6
Long-term
debt/capital (%)
15.2 26.4 32.5 41.0 55.8 70.7 80.3
Total Debt/ Capital
(%)
26.9 35.6 40.1 47.4 61.3 74.6 89.4
Number of firms 10 34 150 234 276 240 23

To estimate the cost of debt, we will estimate a bond rating for the rm, using
nancial ratios. This page provides the averages for key ratios used by S&P to
rate manufacturing rms between 1993 and 1995.
We will actually build the entire analysis around the rst ratio (pre-tax interest
coverage ratio = EBIT/Interest expenses) to
Keep the analysis simple (It is relatively straightforward to expand it to
include multiple ratios)
Focus on a ratio that will change as the leverage changes
Focus on a ratio that has been shown to be highly correlated with ratings.
Aswath Damodaran 323
Interest Coverage Ratios and Bond Ratings: Large market
cap, manufacturing rms
Interest Coverage Ratio Rating
> 8.5 AAA
6.50 - 6.50 AA
5.50 6.50 A+
4.25 5.50 A
3.00 4.25 A-
2.50 3.00 BBB
2.05 - 2.50 BB+
1.90 2.00 BB
1.75 1.90 B+
1.50 - 1.75 B
1.25 1.50 B-
0.80 1.25 CCC
0.65 0.80 CC
0.20 0.65 C
< 0.20 D
For more detailed interest coverage ratios and bond ratings, try the ratings.xls spreadsheet on my web site.
These are interest coverage ratio/ratings classes for large manufacturing rms
(Market cap > $ 5 billion)
The ratios need to be much higher for smaller rms to get similar ratings. (See
ratings.xls spreadsheet)
Special cases:
1. If you have no interest expenses, your interest coverage ratio will be innite:
AAA rating (does not matter anyway, since you probably have no debt)
2. 2. If you have negative operating income, interest coverage ratio is negative:
D rating. You may want to modify by using average operating income over
last few years.
Aswath Damodaran 324
Spreads over long bond rate for ratings classes: 2003
Rating Typical default spread Market interest rate on debt
AAA0.35% 4.35%
AA 0.50% 4.50%
A+ 0.70% 4.70%
A 0.85% 4.85%
A- 1.00% 5.00%
BBB 1.50% 5.50%
BB+ 2.00% 6.00%
BB 2.50% 6.50%
B+ 3.25% 7.25%
B 4.00% 8.00%
B- 6.00% 10.00%
CCC 8.00% 12.00%
CC 10.00% 14.00%
C 12.00% 16.00%
D 20.00% 24.00%
Riskless Rate = 4%
This is the default spread over and above the long term (10 year) treasury bond
rate at the time of this analysis. See http://www.bondsonline.com
for latest spreads. T
Aswath Damodaran 325
Current Income Statement for Disney: 1996
2003 2002
Revenues 27061 25329
- Operating expenses (other than
depreciation) 23289 21924
EBITDA 3772 3405
- Depreciation and Amortization 1059 1021
EBIT 2713 2384
- Interest Expenses 666 708
+ Interest Income 127 255
Taxable Income 2174 1931
- Taxes 907 695
Net Income 1267 1236

Disney recovered somewhat from a disastrous 2001 (when operating income
was only $1.25 billion) to better years in 2003 and 2004.
Aswath Damodaran 326
Estimating Cost of Equity
Unlevered Beta = 1.0674 (Bottom up beta based upon Disneys businesses)
Market premium = 4.82% T.Bond Rate = 4.00% Tax rate=37.3%
Debt Ratio D/E Ratio Levered Beta Cost of Equity
0.00% 0.00% 1.0674 9.15%
10.00% 11.11% 1.1418 9.50%
20.00% 25.00% 1.2348 9.95%
30.00% 42.86% 1.3543 10.53%
40.00% 66.67% 1.5136 11.30%
50.00% 100.00% 1.7367 12.37%
60.00% 150.00% 2.0714 13.98%
70.00% 233.33% 2.6291 16.67%
80.00% 400.00% 3.7446 22.05%
90.00% 900.00% 7.0911 38.18%
This reproduces the levered beta, using the formula developed during the risk
and return section. The unlevered beta of 1.0674 is the bottom-up unlevered beta.
Beta
Levered
= Unlevered Beta (1 + (1-t) (Debt/Equity Ratio)) In calculating the
levered beta in this table, we assumed that all market risk is borne by the equity
investors; this may be unrealistic especially at higher levels of debt. We will also
consider an alternative estimate of levered betas that apportions some of the
market risk to the debt:
"
levered
= "
u
[1+(1-t)D/E] - "
debt
(1-t) D/E
The beta of debt is based upon the rating of the bond and is estimated by
regressing past returns on bonds in each rating class against returns on a market
index. The levered betas estimated using this approach will generally be lower
than those estimated with the conventional model
Aswath Damodaran 327
Estimating Cost of Debt
Start with the current market value of the rm = 55,101 + 14668 = $69, 769 mil
D/(D+E) 0.00% 10.00% Debt to capital
D/E 0.00% 11.11% D/E = 10/90 = .1111
$ Debt $0 $6,977 10% of $69,769

EBITDA $3,882 $3,882 Same as 0% debt
Depreciation $1,077 $1,077 Same as 0% debt
EBIT$2,805 $2,805 Same as 0% debt
Interest $0 $303 Pre-tax cost of debt * $ Debt

Pre-tax Int. cov " 9.24 EBIT/ Interest Expenses
Likely Rating AAA AAA From Ratings table
Pre-tax cost of debt 4.35% 4.35% Riskless Rate + Spread
This is a manual computation of the cost of debt. Note the circularity in the
argument, since the interest expense is needed to compute the rating, and the
rating is needed to compute the cost of debt.
To get around the circularity, I start the 10% debt ratio calculation assuming that
my cost of debt is the same as it was at 0% (which is 4.35%). I could have even
started with the long term treasury bond rate, but I would have had to do one
additional iteration to get the costs of debt consistent.
We assume that whatever is borrowed is used to buy back equity, and that the
operating assets of the rm remain unchanged (EBITDA and EBIT dont
change). This allows us to isolate the effect of the recapitalization.
Aswath Damodaran 328
The Ratings Table
Interest Coverage
Ratio
Ratin
g
Typical default
spread
Market interest rate
on debt
> 8.5 AAA 0.35% 4.35%
6.50 - 6.50 AA 0.50% 4.50%
5.50 6.50 A+ 0.70% 4.70%
4.25 5.50 A 0.85% 4.85%
3.00 4.25 A- 1.00% 5.00%
2.50 3.00 BBB 1.50% 5.50%
2.05 - 2.50 BB+ 2.00% 6.00%
1.90 2.00 BB 2.50% 6.50%
1.75 1.90 B+ 3.25% 7.25%
1.50 - 1.75 B 4.00% 8.00%
1.25 1.50 B- 6.00% 10.00%
0.80 1.25 CCC 8.00% 12.00%
0.65 0.80 CC 10.00% 14.00%
0.20 0.65 C 12.00% 16.00%
< 0.20 D 20.00% 24.00%

This is the look-up table that I used to determine what my rating and cost of
debt would be at a 12.44 interest coverage ratio.
Aswath Damodaran 329
A Test: Can you do the 20% level?
D/(D+E) 0.00% 10.00% 20.00% 2nd Iteration 3rd?
D/E 0.00% 11.11%
$ Debt $0 $6,977

EBITDA $3,882 $3,882
Depreciation $1,077 $1,077
EBIT $2,805 $2,805
Interest $0 $303

Pre-tax Int. cov " 9.24
Likely Rating AAA AAA
Cost of debt 4.35% 4.35%
D/(D+E) 0.00% 10.00% 20.00% Second Iteration
D/E 0.00% 11.11% 25.00%
$ Debt $0 6,977 $13,954
EBITDA. $3,882 $3,882 $3,882
Depreciation $1,077 $1,077 $1,077
EBIT $5,559 2,805$ 2,805 $2,805
Interest $0 $303 $ 606 $
677 $698
Int. cov " 9.24 4.62
4.14 4.02
Likely Rating AAA AAA A A- A-
Interest Rate 4.35% 4.35% 4.85% 5.00%
Aswath Damodaran 330
Bond Ratings, Cost of Debt and Debt Ratios
Debt
Ratio Debt
Interest
expense
Interest
Coverage
Ratio
Bond
Rating
Interest
rate on
debt
Tax
Rate
Cost of
Debt
(after-tax)
0% $0 $0 ! AAA 4.35% 37.30% 2.73%
10% $6,977 $303 9.24 AAA 4.35% 37.30% 2.73%
20% $13,954 $698 4.02 A- 5.00% 37.30% 3.14%
30% $20,931 $1,256 2.23 BB+ 6.00% 37.30% 3.76%
40% $27,908 $3,349 0.84 CCC 12.00% 31.24% 8.25%
50% $34,885 $5,582 0.50 C 16.00% 18.75% 13.00%
60% $41,861 $6,698 0.42 C 16.00% 15.62% 13.50%
70% $48,838 $7,814 0.36 C 16.00% 13.39% 13.86%
80% $55,815 $8,930 0.31 C 16.00% 11.72% 14.13%
90% $62,792 $10,047 0.28 C 16.00% 10.41% 14.33%

This is the completed schedule of interest coverage ratios, ratings and costs of
debt at different debt ratios ranging up to 90%.
It is signicant that EBITDA not change as the debt ratio goes up. The reason
is that the new debt is not used to make the rm larger by taking new projects,
but to buy back equity. (This isolates the effect of the nancing decision on the
value of the rm)
We are being simplistic in assuming that the interest coverage ratio solely
determines the ratings. We could use more than one ratio, create a consolidated
score (like the Altman Z score) and make the rating a function of this score.
Note that the effective tax rate increases after the 40% debt ratio. That is because
we have insufcient income to cover the entire interest expense beyond that
point. (EBIT < Interest Expenses) We therefore lose some of the tax advantage
of borrowing.
Aswath Damodaran 331
Stated versus Effective Tax Rates
! You need taxable income for interest to provide a tax savings
! In the Disney case, consider the interest expense at 30% and 40%
30% Debt Ratio 40% Debt Ratio
EBIT $ 2,805 m $ 2,805 m
Interest Expense$ 1,256 m $ 3,349 m
Tax Savings $ 1,256*.373=468 2,805*.373 = $ 1,046
Tax Rate 37.30% 1,046/3,349= 31.2%
Pre-tax interest rate 6.00% 12.00%
After-tax Interest Rate 3.76% 8.25%
! You can deduct only $2,805 million of the $3,349 million of the interest
expense at 40%. Therefore, only 37.3% of $ 2,805 million is considered as the
tax savings.
We are being conservative. The interest that is not tax deductible can be carried
forward and will probably earn some tax benet in future periods.
Given that this is a permanent change in capital structure, however, it seems to be
more conservative to just look at the interest expenses that provide a tax benet
in the current period.
Aswath Damodaran 332
Disneys Cost of Capital Schedule
Debt Ratio Cost of Equity Cost of Debt (after-tax) Cost of Capital
0% 9.15% 2.73% 9.15%
10% 9.50% 2.73% 8.83%
20% 9.95% 3.14% 8.59%
30% 10.53% 3.76% 8.50%
40% 11.50% 8.25% 10.20%
50% 13.33% 13.00% 13.16%
60% 15.66% 13.50% 14.36%
70% 19.54% 13.86% 15.56%
80% 27.31% 14.13% 16.76%
90% 50.63% 14.33% 17.96%
Summarizes the cost of equity and debt from prior pages, as well as the cost of
capital at different debt ratios.
If the objective is to minimize cost of capital, it occurs at 30% debt.
This will maximize rm value, if operating earnings (EBITDA) is unaffected by
changes in leverage and the consequent changes in ratings.
Aswath Damodaran 333
Disney: Cost of Capital Chart
The cost of capital is minimized at 30% but notes that the cost of capital does
not rise smoothly. In fact, there are times when you will see a kink in the cost of
capital graph, largely because the cost of debt changes discontinuously,
changing only when the rating changes.
We can make the cost of debt a continuous function of default risk or interest
coverage ratios.
Aswath Damodaran 334
Effect on Firm Value
! Firm Value before the change = 55,101+14,668= $ 69,769
WACC
b
= 8.59% Annual Cost = $69,769 *8.59%= $5,993 million
WACC
a
= 8.50% Annual Cost = $69,769 *8.50% = $5,930 million
$ WACC = 0.09% Change in Annual Cost = $ 63 million
! If there is no growth in the rm value, (Conservative Estimate)
Increase in rm value = $63 / .0850= $ 741 million
Change in Stock Price = $741/2047.6= $0.36 per share
! If we assume a perpetual growth of 4% in rm value over time,
Increase in rm value = $63 /(.0850-.04) = $ 1,400 million
Change in Stock Price = $1,400/2,047.6 = $ 0.68 per share
Implied Growth Rate obtained by
Firm value Today =FCFF(1+g)/(WACC-g): Perpetual growth formula
$69,769 = $1,722(1+g)/(.0859-g): Solve for g -> Implied growth = 5.98%
The reduction in the cost of capital translates into annual savings. Most of these
savings are implicit, being savings in the cost of equity. Thus, the rms
accounting earnings will not reect these savings directly.
These savings can be converted into a present value by discounting back at the
new cost of capital.
It is more realistic to assume growth in rm value. A simple way to estimate
what the current growth attributed to the rm by the market is to estimate it
using the rm value today, the free cash ow to the rm and the current cost of
capital.
Note that the simple valuation formula used above assumes stable growth
forever. For high growth rms, this formula will yield an implied growth rate
that is too high (It will be very close to the cost of capital). In those cases, it is
better to put a cap on the growth rate of around 4% (the nominal growth rate of
the US economy).
In this case, maximizing rm value also maximizes stock price, because we
assume that
Debt is renanced at current market rates, thus protecting bondholders
Markets are rational and efcient.
Aswath Damodaran 335
A Test: The Repurchase Price
! Let us suppose that the CFO of Disney approached you about buying back
stock. He wants to know the maximum price that he should be willing to pay
on the stock buyback. (The current price is $ 26.91) Assuming that rm value
will grow by 4% a year, estimate the maximum price.
! What would happen to the stock price after the buyback if you were able to
buy stock back at $ 26.91?
When we divide the increase in rm value by the total number of shares, we are
implicitly assuming that all stockholders (including those who sell back their
shares) will get an equal share of the rm value increase(since the announcement
is public). Thus, we are assuming that the stock will be bought back at 26.91 +
$0.68= $ $ 27.59
If the rm can buy the stock back at the current price of $ 26.91, the remaining
stockholders will get a much greater increase in the stock price. To compute this
change in value per share, we rst compute how many shares we would buy
back with the additional debt taken on of $ 6,263 billion (Debt at 30% optimal
Current Debt) and the stock price of $ 26.91. We then divide the increase in
rm value of $ 1,400 million by the remaining shares outstanding:
Change in stock price = $ 1400 million / (2047.6 (6263/26.91)) = $ 0.77 per
share
Aswath Damodaran 336
Buybacks and Stock Prices
! Assume that Disney does make a tender offer for its shares but pays $28 per
share. What will happen to the value per share for the shareholders who do
not sell back?
a. The share price will drop below the pre-announcement price of $26.91
b. The share price will be between $26.91 and the estimated value (above) or $27.59
c. The share price will be higher than $27.59
If Disney buys shares back at $28, there will be a transfer of wealth from the
stockholders who dont sell back to those that do. To compute the stock price
after the buyback:
Number of shares bought back = Additional dollar debt/ $ 28 = 6263/28 =
223.68 million shares
Dollar Premium paid to stockholders = 223.68 * (28-26.91) = $243 million
Premium for remaining stockholders = 1400 - 243 = 1167 million
Increase in stock price for remaining stockholders = 1167/(2047.6 - 223.68) =
$0.64
Stock price after buyback = $26.91 + 0.64 = $27.55
Aswath Damodaran 337
The Downside Risk
! Doing What-if analysis on Operating Income
A. Standard Deviation Approach
Standard Deviation In Past Operating Income
Standard Deviation In Earnings (If Operating Income Is Unavailable)
Reduce Base Case By One Standard Deviation (Or More)
B. Past Recession Approach
Look At What Happened To Operating Income During The Last Recession. (How Much
Did It Drop In % Terms?)
Reduce Current Operating Income By Same Magnitude
! Constraint on Bond Ratings
This analysis is based upon the rm continuing as a going concern. To the
extent that more debt can put this survival at risk, it is important to do what-if
analyses or build in survival constraints into the analysis.
Aswath Damodaran 338
Disneys Operating Income: History
Year EBIT % Change
in EBIT
1987 756
1988 848 12.17%
1989 1177 38.80%
1990 1368 16.23%
1991 1124 -17.84%
1992 1287 14.50%
1993 1560 21.21%
1994 1804 15.64%
1995 2262 25.39%
1996 3024 33.69%
1997 3945 30.46%
1998 3843 -2.59%
1999 3580 -6.84%
2000 2525 -29.47%
2001 2832 12.16%
2002 2384 -15.82%
2003 2713 13.80%

These are percentage changes in operating income at Disney.
Aswath Damodaran 339
Disney: Effects of Past Downturns
Recession Decline in Operating Income
2002 Drop of 15.82%
1991 Drop of 22.00%
1981-82 Increased
Worst Year Drop of 29.47%
! The standard deviation in past operating income is about 20%.
Both are designed to measure how much Disneys operating income will drop
in a downside scenario. The rst approach gives a more intuitive estimate
than the latter.
Note that the downside does not have to be framed in terms of a recession. It
could be in terms of something that the rm fears (the loss of a large contract,
for instance)
Alternatively, this entire analysis could have been based upon normalized
operating income , which would be the operating income that the rm will earn
in a normal year , rather than on current operating income.
Aswath Damodaran 340
Disney: The Downside Scenario
% Drop in EBITDA EBIT Optimal Debt Ratio
0% $ 2,805 30%
5% $ 2,665 20%
10% $ 2,524 20%
15% $ 2385 20%
20% $ 2,245 20%

The optimal debt ratio is lower, as you would expect it to be, but it drops to 20%
and stays at 20% for large drops in operating income. You can try what if
analyses on the other variables, but this approach to setting leverage is based
primarily upon cash ows (which are measured by the EBITDA). The effect of
changing the other variables will be fairly small.
Aswath Damodaran 341
Constraints on Ratings
! Management often species a 'desired Rating' below which they do not want
to fall.
! The rating constraint is driven by three factors
it is one way of protecting against downside risk in operating income (so do not do
both)
a drop in ratings might affect operating income
there is an ego factor associated with high ratings
! Caveat: Every Rating Constraint Has A Cost.
Provide Management With A Clear Estimate Of How Much The Rating Constraint
Costs By Calculating The Value Of The Firm Without The Rating Constraint And
Comparing To The Value Of The Firm With The Rating Constraint.
Rating constraints are one way of buffering your analysis against the
assumption that operating income will not change as leverage changes. If the
operating income will suffer when ratings fall below a certain point (say BBB or
investment grade), it makes sense to build in that constraint into the analysis.
When managers brag about their high ratings, the questions that should come
up are whether the high rating is paying off in terms of higher operating income,
and if not, how much stockholders are paying for managers bragging rights.
Aswath Damodaran 342
Ratings Constraints for Disney
! At its optimal debt ratio of 30%, Disney has an estimated rating of BB+.
! Assume that Disney imposes a rating constraint of A or greater.
! The optimal debt ratio for Disney is then 20% (see next page)
! The cost of imposing this rating constraint can then be calculated as follows:
Value at 30% Debt = $ 71,239 million
- Value at 20% Debt = $ 69,837 million
Cost of Rating Constraint = $ 1,376 million
This is a little unfair, since it is based upon the assumption that operating
income is unaffected by the change in ratings. To the degree that Disneys
operating income will drop if its rating drops below BBB, this will overstate the
cost of the constraint.
Aswath Damodaran 343
Effect of Ratings Constraints: Disney
Debt Ratio Rating Firm Value
0% AAA $62,279
10% AAA $66,397
20% A- $69,837
30% BB+ $71,239
40% CCC $51,661
50% C $34,969
60% C $30,920
70% C $27,711
80% C $25,105
90% C $22,948
This shows how the constrained optimal is computed. With a BBB constraint,
the constrained optimal is about 25%. With a more rigid constraint, it would be
even lower.
This process can be modied to allow for other constraints. For instance, some
rms do not want their book value debt ratios to rise above a certain level (say,
industry averages). In other cases, existing bond covenants may restrict a
nancial ratio from exceeding a specied number.
Aswath Damodaran 344
What if you do not buy back stock..
! The optimal debt ratio is ultimately a function of the underlying riskiness of
the business in which you operate and your tax rate.
! Will the optimal be different if you invested in projects instead of buying
back stock?
No. As long as the projects nanced are in the same business mix that the
company has always been in and your tax rate does not change signicantly.
Yes, if the projects are in entirely different types of businesses or if the tax rate is
signicantly different.
The analysis is built on the assumption that debt is used to buy back stock.
Many rms would rather use the debt to take projects, or might be barred from
buying back stock (as is the case in markets like Germany)
If we assume that projects in the same line of business have the same cash ow
generating capacity as the current rm (EBITDA/Firm Value), the optimal debt
ratio will remain unchanged, but the optimal dollar debt will be a much higher
number. (This analysis is impervious to changes in scale. If you double all the
numbers, the optimal debt ratio will remain unchanged)
If the business you are expanding into has more risk and more negative
cashows, your optimal will decrease.
Aswath Damodaran 345
Analyzing Financial Service Firms
! The interest coverage ratios/ratings relationship is likely to be different for
nancial service rms.
! The denition of debt is messy for nancial service rms. In general, using all
debt for a nancial service rm will lead to high debt ratios. Use only interest-
bearing long term debt in calculating debt ratios.
! The effect of ratings drops will be much more negative for nancial service
rms.
! There are likely to regulatory constraints on capital
Financial service rms often do not consider debt to be a source of capital, as
much as they consider it to be raw material that they use to produce their
products.
Thus, most banks borrow, using the regulatory capital ratios as constraints,
rather than to minimize cost of capital.
Aswath Damodaran 346
Interest Coverage ratios, ratings and Operating income
Long Term Interest Coverage Ratio Rating is Spread is Operating Income Decline
< 0.05 D 16.00% -50.00%
0.05 0.10 C 14.00% -40.00%
0.10 0.20 CC 12.50% -40.00%
0.20 - 0.30 CCC 10.50% -40.00%
0.30 0.40 B- 6.25% -25.00%
0.40 0.50 B 6.00% -20.00%
0.50 0.60 B+ 5.75% -20.00%
0.60 0.75 BB 4.75% -20.00%
0.75 0.90 BB+ 4.25% -20.00%
0.90 1.20 BBB 2.00% -20.00%
1.20 1.50 A- 1.50% -17.50%
1.50 2.00 A 1.40% -15.00%
2.00 2.50 A+ 1.25% -10.00%
2.50 3.00 AA 0.90% -5.00%
> 3.00 AAA 0.70% 0.00%

These numbers were obtained by looking at banks in the United States. The
percentage drop in operating income as the rating changes is obtained by
looking at the operating income of banks whose ratings have dropped in the
year after the change. Below BBB, this data was not available (since banks tend
to be taken over by the FDIC when they get that risky). We set the operating
income drop to be large enough to prevent any bank from having an optimal
below BBB.
Aswath Damodaran 347
Deutsche Bank: Optimal Capital Structure
Debt
Ratio Beta
Cost of
Equity
Bond
Rating
Interest
rate on debt
Tax
Rate
Cost of Debt
(after-tax) WACC
Firm
Value (G)
0% 0.44 6.15% AAA 4.75% 38.00% 2.95% 6.15% $111,034
10% 0.47 6.29% AAA 4.75% 38.00% 2.95% 5.96% $115,498
20% 0.50 6.48% AAA 4.75% 38.00% 2.95% 5.77% $120,336
30% 0.55 6.71% AAA 4.75% 38.00% 2.95% 5.58% $125,597
40% 0.62 7.02% AAA 4.75% 38.00% 2.95% 5.39% $131,339
50% 0.71 7.45% A+ 5.30% 38.00% 3.29% 5.37% $118,770
60% 0.84 8.10% A 5.45% 38.00% 3.38% 5.27% $114,958
70% 1.07 9.19% A 5.45% 38.00% 3.38% 5.12% $119,293
80% 1.61 11.83% BB+ 8.30% 32.43% 5.61% 6.85% $77,750
90% 3.29 19.91% BB 8.80% 27.19% 6.41% 7.76% $66,966

The optimal debt ratio is 40%, even though the cost of capital is minimized at
70%. The drop in cost of capital is overwhelmed by the drop in operating
income below 40%.
Aswath Damodaran 348
Analyzing Companies after Abnormal Years
! The operating income that should be used to arrive at an optimal debt ratio is
a normalized operating income
! A normalized operating income is the income that this rm would make in a
normal year.
For a cyclical rm, this may mean using the average operating income over an
economic cycle rather than the latest years income
For a rm which has had an exceptionally bad or good year (due to some rm-
specic event), this may mean using industry average returns on capital to arrive at
an optimal or looking at past years
For any rm, this will mean not counting one time charges or prots
Since the optimal debt ratio for a rm is a ratio that you expect the rm to
sustain in the long term, you need to have a measure of what the sustainable
operating income in the long term is.
Aswath Damodaran 349
Analyzing Aracruz Celluloses Optimal Debt Ratio
! Aracruz Cellulose, the Brazilian pulp and paper manufacturing rm, reported
operating income of 887 million BR on revenues of 3176 million BR in 2003.
This was signicantly higher than its operating income of 346 million BR in
2002 and 196 million Br in 2001.
! In 2003, Aracruz had depreciation of 553 million BR and capital expenditures
amounted to 661 million BR.
! Aracruz had debt outstanding of 4,094 million BR with a dollar cost of debt
of 7.25%. Aracruz had 859.59 million shares outstanding, trading 10.69 BR
per share.
! The beta of the stock is estimated, using comparable rms, to be 0.7040.
! The corporate tax rate in Brazil is estimated to be 34%.
Aracruz was affected by both operating problems at its plant and the plunge in
the price of paper and pulp during the year.
Aswath Damodaran 350
Aracruzs Current Cost of Capital
! Current $ Cost of Equity = 4% + 0.7040 (12.49%) = 12.79%
! Market Value of Equity = 10.69 BR/share * 859.59= 9,189 million BR
Current $ Cost of Capital
= 12.79% (9,189/(9,189+4,094)) + 7.25% (1-.34) (4,094/(9189+4,094) = 10.33%
Aswath Damodaran 351
Modifying the Cost of Capital Approach for Aracruz
! The operating income at Aracruz is a function of the price of paper and pulp in global markets. While 2003 was a very
good year for the company, its income history over the last decade reects the volatility created by pulp prices. We
computed Aracruzs average pre-tax operating margin over the last 10 years to be 25.99%. Applying this lower average
margin to 2003 revenues generates a normalized operating income of 796.71 million BR.
! Aracruzs synthetic rating of BBB, based upon the interest coverage ratio, is much higher than its actual rating of B- and
attributed the difference to Aracruz being a Brazilian company, exposed to country risk. Since we compute the cost of
debt at each level of debt using synthetic ratings, we run to risk of understating the cost of debt. The difference in interest
rates between the synthetic and actual ratings is 1.75% and we add this to the cost of debt estimated at each debt ratio
from 0% to 90%.
! We used the interest coverage ratio/ rating relationship for smaller companies to estimate synthetic ratings at each level
of debt.
Commodity companies tend to have volatile operating income. If you use the
current years income and it happens to reect a really good or bad year for
commodity prices, you will overstate or understate the optimal debt ratio.
We are assuming that 1995 earnings were normal. There are alternative ways of
estimating normalized operating income:
Look at the average operating income over time. (If you have a cyclical
rm, you might want to look at the average over the entire economic
cycle). This is especially true if the entire sector is earning abrnormally
high or low earnings.
Look at the typical margins or returns on capital earned by rms in the
sector. Then estimate the normalized operating income for your rm (by
multiplying the industry margin by the rms revenues, or return on
capital by the rms capital). This is the approach to use if your rm has
abnormally low or high earnings in a sector that is not affected by the
same factors.
Aswath Damodaran 352
Aracruzs Optimal Debt Ratio
Debt
Ratio Beta
Cost of
Equity
Bond
Rating
Interest
rate on
debt
Tax
Rate
Cost of
Debt
(after-
tax) WACC
Firm
Value
in BR
0% 0.54 10.80% AAA 6.10% 34.00% 4.03% 10.80% 12,364
10% 0.58 11.29% AAA 6.10% 34.00% 4.03% 10.57% 12,794
20% 0.63 11.92% A 6.60% 34.00% 4.36% 10.40% 13,118
30% 0.70 12.72% BBB 7.25% 34.00% 4.79% 10.34% 13,256
40% 0.78 13.78% CCC 13.75% 34.00% 9.08% 11.90% 10,633
50% 0.93 15.57% CCC 13.75% 29.66% 9.67% 12.62% 9,743
60% 1.20 19.04% C 17.75% 19.15% 14.35% 16.23% 6,872
70% 1.61 24.05% C 17.75% 16.41% 14.84% 17.60% 6,177
80% 2.41 34.07% C 17.75% 14.36% 15.20% 18.98% 5,610
90% 4.82 64.14% C 17.75% 12.77% 15.48% 20.35% 5,138

This is the optimal debt ratio with normalized operating income. The costs of
equity and capital are computed in US dollar terms. The optimal debt ratio is
30%, which is about where they are right now.
Aswath Damodaran 353
Analyzing a Private Firm
! The approach remains the same with important caveats
It is far more difcult estimating rm value, since the equity and the debt of
private rms do not trade
Most private rms are not rated.
If the cost of equity is based upon the market beta, it is possible that we might be
overstating the optimal debt ratio, since private rm owners often consider all risk.
Private rms will tend to be more cautious about moving to a higher debt ratio
than otherwise similar publicly traded rms, because the owners of a private
business will not view default risk as diversiable.
Aswath Damodaran 354
Bookscapes current cost of capital
! We assumed that Bookscape would have a debt to capital ratio of 16.90%,
similar to that of publicly traded book retailers, and that the tax rate for the
rm is 40%. We computed a cost of capital based on that assumption.
! We also used a total betaof 2.0606 to measure the additional risk that the
owner of Bookscape is exposed to because of his lack of diversication.
! Cost of Capital
Cost of equity = Risfree Rate + Total Beta * Risk Premium
= 4% + 2.0606 * 4.82% = 13.93%
Pre-tax Cost of debt = 5.5% (based upon synthetic rating of BBB)
Cost of capital = 13.93% (.8310) + 5.5% (1-.40) (.1690) = 12.14%
Note that we use the total beta rather than market beta to estimate the cost of
equity. This will increase the cost of equity at every debt ratio.
Aswath Damodaran 355
The Inputs: Bookscape
! While Bookscapes has no conventional debt outstanding, it does have one large operating lease commitment. Given that
the operating lease has 25 years to run and that the lease commitment is $500,000 for each year, the present value of the
operating lease commitments is computed using Bookscapes pre-tax cost of debt of 5.5%:
Present value of Operating Lease commitments (in 000s) = $500 (PV of annuity, 5.50%, 25 years) = 6,708
! Bookscape had operating income before taxes of $ 2 million in the most recent nancial year. Since we consider the
present value of operating lease expenses to be debt, we add back the imputed interest expense on the present value of
lease expenses to the earnings before interest and taxes.
Adjusted EBIT (in 000s) = EBIT + Pre-tax cost of debt * PV of operating lease expenses = $ 2,000+ .055 * $6,7078 = $2,369
! Estimated Market Value of Equity (in 000s) = Net Income for Bookscape * Average PE for publicly traded book
retailers = 1,320 * 16.31 = $21,525
We are treating operating leases as the equivalent of debt. Therefore, we have to
be consistent and treat the imputed interest expenses (computed by multiplying
the pre-tax cost of debt of 5.5% by the PV of operating leases computed to be
$3.36 million) as nancing expenses. They are added back to EBIT to arrive at
the adjusted EBIT.
The imputed interest expense is an approximation. The full adjustment would be
to add the entire operating lease expense back to the operating income and to
subtract out the estimated depreciation on the leased asset.
Aswath Damodaran 356
Interest Coverage Ratios, Spreads and Ratings: Small Firms
Interest Coverage Ratio Rating Spread over T Bond Rate
> 12.5 AAA 0.35%
9.50-12.50 AA 0.50%
7.5 - 9.5 A+ 0.70%
6.0 - 7.5 A 0.85%
4.5 - 6.0 A- 1.00%
4.0 - 4.5 BBB 1.50%
3.5 4.0 BB+ 2.00%
3.0 - 3.5 BB 2.50%
2.5 - 3.0 B+ 3.25%
2.0 - 2.5 B 4.00%
1.5 - 2.0 B- 6.00%
1.25 - 1.5 CCC 8.00%
0.8 - 1.25 CC 10.00%
0.5 - 0.8 C 12.00%
< 0.5 D 20.00%
Note that smaller rms need much higher interest coverage ratios to get the same
ratings as large rms.
Aswath Damodaran 357
Optimal Debt Ratio for Bookscape
Debt
Ratio
Total
Beta
Cost of
Equity
Bond
Rating
Interest
rate on
debt
Tax
Rate
Cost of Debt
(after-tax) WACC
Firm
Value (G)
0 % 1. 84 12. 87% AAA 4. 35% 40. 00% 2. 61% 12. 87% $25, 020
1 0 % 1. 96 13. 46% AAA 4. 35% 40. 00% 2. 61% 12. 38% $26, 495
2 0 % 2. 12 14. 20% A + 4. 70% 40. 00% 2. 82% 11. 92% $28, 005
3 0 % 2. 31 15. 15% A - 5. 00% 40. 00% 3. 00% 11. 51% $29, 568
4 0 % 2. 58 16. 42% B B 6. 50% 40. 00% 3. 90% 11. 41% $29, 946
5 0 % 2. 94 18. 19% B 8. 00% 40. 00% 4. 80% 11. 50% $29, 606
6 0 % 3. 50 20. 86% C C 14. 00% 39. 96% 8. 41% 13. 39% $23, 641
7 0 % 4. 66 26. 48% C C 14. 00% 34. 25% 9. 21% 14. 39% $21, 365
8 0 % 7. 27 39. 05% C 16. 00% 26. 22% 11. 80% 17. 25% $16, 745
9 0 % 14. 54 74. 09% C 16. 00% 23. 31% 12. 27% 18. 45% $15, 355

The optimal debt ratio for the private rm is 40% but the cost of capital is at
between 30 and 50%. The rm value is maximized at that point.
To the extent that private business owners view default risk more seriously than
stockholders in a publicly traded rm, they will probably be more cautious about
moving to the optimal.
We can extend the argument to closely held publicly traded rms. We would
expect these rms to have lower debt ratios than publicly traded rms with
diverse stockholdings.
Aswath Damodaran 358
Determinants of Optimal Debt Ratios
! Firm Specic Factors
1. Tax Rate
Higher tax rates - - > Higher Optimal Debt Ratio
Lower tax rates - - > Lower Optimal Debt Ratio
2. Pre-Tax CF on Firm = EBITDA / MV of Firm
Higher Pre-tax CF - - > Higher Optimal Debt Ratio
Lower Pre-tax CF - - > Lower Optimal Debt Ratio
3. Variance in Earnings [ Shows up when you do 'what if' analysis]
Higher Variance - - > Lower Optimal Debt Ratio
Lower Variance - - > Higher Optimal Debt Ratio
! Macro-Economic Factors
1. Default Spreads
Higher - - > Lower Optimal Debt Ratio
Lower - - > Higher Optimal Debt Ratio
The key determinant is the pre-tax return on market value of the rm. This
measures the cash ow generating capacity of the rm, relative to its market
value. The greater this number, the higher the optimal debt ratio should be.
Many high growth rms have low optimal debt ratios (in market value terms)
because their current operating income as a percentage of market value is a low
number
As rms mature, this ratio will rise, and the optimal debt ratios will go up. Many
rms, however, continue to behave as they did in earlier stages of growth and
use no debt. This is the period when the gap between actual and optimal debt
ratios will expand.
Aswath Damodaran 359
! Application Test: Your rms optimal nancing mix
! Using the optimal capital structure spreadsheet provided:
Estimate the optimal debt ratio for your rm
Estimate the new cost of capital at the optimal
Estimate the effect of the change in the cost of capital on rm value
Estimate the effect on the stock price
! In terms of the mechanics, what would you need to do to get to the optimal
immediately?
Aswath Damodaran 360
II. The APV Approach to Optimal Capital Structure
! In the adjusted present value approach, the value of the rm is written as the
sum of the value of the rm without debt (the unlevered rm) and the effect
of debt on rm value
! Firm Value = Unlevered Firm Value + (Tax Benets of Debt - Expected
Bankruptcy Cost from the Debt)
! The optimal dollar debt level is the one that maximizes rm value
This is an alternative approach with the same objective of maximizing rm value.
It assesses the costs and benets of debt in dollar value terms rather than
through the cost of capital.
Aswath Damodaran 361
Implementing the APV Approach
! Step 1: Estimate the unlevered rm value. This can be done in one of two
ways:
1. Estimating the unlevered beta, a cost of equity based upon the unlevered beta and
valuing the rm using this cost of equity (which will also be the cost of capital,
with an unlevered rm)
2. Alternatively, Unlevered Firm Value = Current Market Value of Firm - Tax
Benets of Debt (Current) + Expected Bankruptcy cost from Debt
! Step 2: Estimate the tax benets at different levels of debt. The simplest
assumption to make is that the savings are perpetual, in which case
Tax benets = Dollar Debt * Tax Rate
! Step 3: Estimate a probability of bankruptcy at each debt level, and multiply
by the cost of bankruptcy (including both direct and indirect costs) to
estimate the expected bankruptcy cost.
In practice, analysts often do the rst two steps but skip the third because the
inputs are so difcult to get. The result is that the value of the rm always go up
as you borrow money, since you count in the tax benets but you dont consider
the bankrutpcy costs.
Aswath Damodaran 362
Estimating Expected Bankruptcy Cost
! Probability of Bankruptcy
Estimate the synthetic rating that the rm will have at each level of debt
Estimate the probability that the rm will go bankrupt over time, at that level of
debt (Use studies that have estimated the empirical probabilities of this occurring
over time - Altman does an update every year)
! Cost of Bankruptcy
The direct bankruptcy cost is the easier component. It is generally between 5-10%
of rm value, based upon empirical studies
The indirect bankruptcy cost is much tougher. It should be higher for sectors where
operating income is affected signicantly by default risk (like airlines) and lower
for sectors where it is not (like groceries)
The two key inputs you need to estimate the expected bankruptcy cost. The rst
one is easier to get than the second.
Aswath Damodaran 363
Ratings and Default Probabilities: Results from Altman
study of bonds
Bond Rating Default Rate
D 100.00%
C 80.00%
CC 65.00%
CCC 46.61%
B- 32.50%
B 26.36%
B+ 19.28%
BB 12.20%
BBB 2.30%
A- 1.41%
A 0.53%
A+ 0.40%
AA 0.28%
AAA 0.01%
This table is updated every year by Ed Altman at the Stern School of Business.
It is the probability that a bond is each of these ratings classes will default and is
based upon actual default rates over 10 years of bonds in each ratings class.
Aswath Damodaran 364
Disney: Estimating Unlevered Firm Value
Current Market Value of the Firm = $55,101+$14,668 = $ 69,789
- Tax Benet on Current Debt = $14,668* 0.373 = $ 5,479 million
+ Expected Bankruptcy Cost = 1.41% * (0.25* 69,789)= $ 984 million
Unlevered Value of Firm = $65,294 million
Cost of Bankruptcy for Disney = 25% of rm value
Probability of Bankruptcy = 1.41%, based on rms current rating of A-
Tax Rate = 37.3%
To implement APV, you have to rst estimate the unlevered rm value.
Aswath Damodaran 365
Disney: APV at Debt Ratios
Debt Ratio $ Debt Tax Rate Unlevered Firm Value Tax Benefits Bond Rating Probability of Default Expected Bankruptcy Cost Value of Levered Firm
0% $0 37.30% $64,556 $0 AAA 0.01% $2 $64,555
10% $6,979 37.30% $64,556 $2,603 AAA 0.01% $2 $67,158
20% $13,958 37.30% $64,556 $5,206 A- 1.41% $246 $69,517
30% $20,937 37.30% $64,556 $7,809 BB+ 7.00% $1,266 $71,099
40% $27,916 31.20% $64,556 $8,708 CCC 50.00% $9,158 $64,107
50% $34,894 18.72% $64,556 $6,531 C 80.00% $14,218 $56,870
60% $41,873 15.60% $64,556 $6,531 C 80.00% $14,218 $56,870
70% $48,852 13.37% $64,556 $6,531 C 80.00% $14,218 $56,870
80% $55,831 11.70% $64,556 $6,531 C 80.00% $14,218 $56,870
90% $62,810 10.40% $64,556 $6,531 C 80.00% $14,218 $56,870
Disneys optimal debt ratio is 30%, which matches the optimal using the cost of
capital approach.
Aswath Damodaran 366
III. Relative Analysis
I. Industry Average with Subjective Adjustments
! The safest place for any rm to be is close to the industry average
! Subjective adjustments can be made to these averages to arrive at the right
debt ratio.
Higher tax rates -> Higher debt ratios (Tax benets)
Lower insider ownership -> Higher debt ratios (Greater discipline)
More stable income -> Higher debt ratios (Lower bankruptcy costs)
More intangible assets -> Lower debt ratios (More agency problems)
Most rms pick their debt ratios by looking at industry averages. By staying
close to the average, managers get cover in case they make mistakes - everyone
else has made the same mistake.
Managers also try to stay close to the industry average, because ratings agencies
and equity research analysts look at these averages.
Aswath Damodaran 367
Comparing to industry averages
Disney Entertainment Aracruz
Paper and Pulp (Emerging
Market)
Market Debt Ratio 21.02% 19.56% 30.82% 27.71%
Book Debt Ratio 35.10% 28.86% 43.12% 49.00%

Disney is close to the industry-average debt ratio, with market and book value
debt ratios slightly higher than the industry average . It could make the argument
that it is therefore correctly levered. It is, however larger and safer than the
typical comparable rm.
Aracruz has a market debt ratio slightly higher than the industry average though
its book value debt ratio is lower.
Aswath Damodaran 368
Getting past simple averages: Using Statistics
! Step 1: Run a regression of debt ratios on the variables that you believe
determine debt ratios in the sector. For example,
Debt Ratio = a + b (Tax rate) + c (Earnings Variability) + d (EBITDA/Firm
Value)
! Step 2: Estimate the proxies for the rm under consideration. Plugging into
the cross sectional regression, we can obtain an estimate of predicted debt
ratio.
! Step 3: Compare the actual debt ratio to the predicted debt ratio.
This is one way to control for differences across rms. The variables in the
regression should be proxies for the factors that drive the debt trade-off
Tax Benet -> Tax Rate
Bankruptcy Risk -> Earnings Variability
Agency Costs -> EBITDA/Firm Value
Aswath Damodaran 369
Applying the Regression Methodology: Entertainment Firms
! Using a sample of entertainment rms, we arrived at the following regression:
Debt/Capital = 0.2156 - 0.1826 (Sales Growth) + 0.6797 (EBITDA/ Value)
(4.91) (1.91) (2.05)
! The R squared of the regression is 14%. This regression can be used to arrive
at a predicted value for Disney of:
Predicted Debt Ratio = 0.2156 - 0.1826 (.0668) + 0.6797 (.0767) = 0.2555 or
25.55%
Based upon the capital structure of other rms in the entertainment industry,
Disney should have a market value debt ratio of 25.55%.
This assumes a linear relationship between the independent variables and the
debt ratio. The variables can be transformed if the relationship is non-linear.
The t statistics are reported in brackets. The last variable is the EBITDa as a
percent of the market value of the rm.
I plugged in the values for Disney into the regression. This suggest that Disney
is underlevered, relative to comparable rms, after controlling for differences
across these rms. Note that the low R-squared will also result in large
prediction errors.
Aswath Damodaran 370
Extending to the entire market: 2003 Data
! Using 2003 data for rms listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ data
bases. The regression provides the following results
DFR = 0.0488 + 0.810 Tax Rate 0.304 CLSH + 0.841 E/V 2.987 CPXFR
(1.41
a
) (8.70
a
) (3.65
b
) (7.92
b
) (13.03
a
)
where,
DFR = Debt / ( Debt + Market Value of Equity)
Tax Rate = Effective Tax Rate
CLSH = Closely held shares as a percent of outstanding shares
CPXFR = Capital Expenditures / Book Value of Capital
E/V = EBITDA/ Market Value of Firm
! The regression has an R-squared of only 53.3%.
This looks at the entire market and uses the following variables (from Value
Line CD-ROM)
Variance in rm value as proxy for bankruptcy risk
Closely held shares disciplinary power of debt
Free Cash ow Agency costs
Capital Expenditure/BV Need for exibility
No tax rate variable was used, because it was assumed that most rms have the
same marginal tax rate.
Low R-squared is typical of these large cross sectional regressions.
Aswath Damodaran 371
Applying the Regression
Lets check whether we can use this regression. Disney had the following values
for these inputs in 1996. Estimate the optimal debt ratio using the debt
regression.
Effective Tax Rate = 34.76%
Closely held shares as percent of shares outstanding = 2.2%
Capital Expenditures as fraction of rm value = 2.09%
EBITDA/Value = 7.67%
Optimal Debt Ratio
= 0.0488 + 0.810 ( ) 0.304 ( ) + 0.841( ) 2.987 ( )
What does this optimal debt ratio tell you?
Why might it be different from the optimal calculated using the weighted
average cost of capital?
Plugging in the values for Disney yields the following optimal debt ratio:
DFR
Disney
= 0.0488 + 0.810 (0.3476) 0.304 (0.022) + 0.841
(.0767) 2.987 (.0209)
= 0.3257 or 32.57%
Based upon the debt ratios of other rms in the market and Disneys nancial
characteristics, we would expect Disney to have a debt ratio of 32.57%. Since its
actual debt ratio is 21.02%, Disney is under levered.
It may be different from the optimal because it is based upon the assumption
that rms, on average, get their debt ratios right. If most rms are under levered,
for instance, you will get a lower predicted value from the regression than for a
cost of capital approach.
Aswath Damodaran 372
Stage 2
Rapid Expansion
Stage 1
Start-up
Stage 4
Mature Growth
Stage 5
Decline
IV. The Debt-Equity Trade off and Life Cycle
Time
Agency Costs
Revenues
Earnings
Very high, as firm
has almost no
assets
Low. Firm takes few
new investments
Added Disceipline
of Debt
Low, as owners
run the firm
Low. Even if
public, firm is
closely held.
Increasing, as
managers own less
of firm
High. Managers are
separated from
owners
Bamkruptcy Cost
Declining, as firm
does not take many
new investments
Stage 3
High Growth
Net Trade Off
Need for Flexibility
$ Revenues/
Earnings
Tax Benefits
Zero, if
losing money
Low, as earnings
are limited
Increase, with
earnings
High High, but
declining
Very high. Firm has
no or negative
earnings.
Very high.
Earnings are low
and volatile
High. Earnings are
increasing but still
volatile
Declining, as earnings
from existing assets
increase.
Low, but increases as
existing projects end.
High. New
investments are
difficult to monitor
High. Lots of new
investments and
unstable risk.
Declining, as assets
in place become a
larger portion of firm.
Very high, as firm
looks for ways to
establish itself
High. Expansion
needs are large and
unpredicatble
High. Expansion
needs remain
unpredictable
Low. Firm has low
and more predictable
investment needs.
Non-existent. Firm has no
new investment needs.
Costs exceed benefits
Minimal debt
Costs still likely
to exceed benefits.
Mostly equity
Debt starts yielding
net benefits to the
firm
Debt becomes a more
attractive option.
Debt will provide
benefits.
Looks at how the determinants of capital structure change (and with it the
optimal) as a rm goes through the life cycle. A short cut to the optimal debt
ratio is to look at where a rm is in the life cycle and assign it an appropriate
debt ratio. The problem is that categorizing a rm in terms of the life cycle may
not be easy to do and rms in the same stage can be very different in terms of
cashow and risk characteristics.
Aswath Damodaran 373
Summarizing for Disney
Approach Used Optimal
1a. Cost of Capital unconstrained 30%
1b. Cost of Capital w/ lower EBIT 20%
1c. Cost of Capital w/ Rating constraint 20%
II. APV Approach 30%
IIIa. Entertainment Sector Regression 25.55%
IIIb. Market Regression 32.57%
IV. Life Cycle Approach Mature Growth
Actual Debt Ratio 21%
Disney is slightly under levered. What would you do if you go a split verdict -
under levered using cost of capital but over levered using the sector comparison?
Aswath Damodaran 374
A Framework for Getting to the Optimal
Is the actual debt ratio greater than or lesser than the optimal debt ratio?
Actual > Optimal
Overlevered
Actual < Optimal
Underlevered
Is the rm under bankruptcy threat? Is the rm a takeover target?
Yes No
Reduce Debt quickly
1. Equity for Debt swap
2. Sell Assets; use cash
to pay off debt
3. Renegotiate with lenders
Does the rm have good
projects?
ROE > Cost of Equity
ROC > Cost of Capital
Yes
Take good projects with
new equity or with retained
earnings.
No
1. Pay off debt with retained
earnings.
2. Reduce or eliminate dividends.
3. Issue new equity and pay off
debt.
Yes
No
Does the rm have good
projects?
ROE > Cost of Equity
ROC > Cost of Capital
Yes
Take good projects with
debt.
No
Do your stockholders like
dividends?
Yes
Pay Dividends
No
Buy back stock
Increase leverage
quickly
1. Debt/Equity swaps
2. Borrow money&
buy shares.
Studies that have looked at the likelihood of a rm being taken over (in a hostile
takeover) have concluded that
Small rms are more likely to be taken over than larger rms
Closely held rms are less likely to be taken over than widely held rms
Firms with anti-takeover restrictions in the corporate charter (or from the
state) are less likely to be taken over than rms without these restrictions
Firms which have done well for their stockholders (positive Jensens
alpha, Positive EVA) are less likely to be taken over than rms which
have done badly.
Whether a rm is under bankruptcy threat can be assessed by looking at its
rating. If its rating is B or less, you can argue that the bankruptcy threat is real.
Looking at historical ROE or ROC, relative to the cost of equity and capital,
does assume that the future will look like the past.
Aswath Damodaran 375
Disney: Applying the Framework
Is the actual debt ratio greater than or lesser than the optimal debt ratio?
Actual > Optimal
Overlevered
Actual < Optimal
Underlevered
Is the rm under bankruptcy threat? Is the rm a takeover target?
Yes No
Reduce Debt quickly
1. Equity for Debt swap
2. Sell Assets; use cash
to pay off debt
3. Renegotiate with lenders
Does the rm have good
projects?
ROE > Cost of Equity
ROC > Cost of Capital
Yes
Take good projects with
new equity or with retained
earnings.
No
1. Pay off debt with retained
earnings.
2. Reduce or eliminate dividends.
3. Issue new equity and pay off
debt.
Yes
No
Does the rm have good
projects?
ROE > Cost of Equity
ROC > Cost of Capital
Yes
Take good projects with
debt.
No
Do your stockholders like
dividends?
Yes
Pay Dividends
No
Buy back stock
Increase leverage
quickly
1. Debt/Equity swaps
2. Borrow money&
buy shares.
This is the analysis for Disney.
I am assuming that future projects will be as successful as current projects. This
might not always be the appropriate assumption, especially when the returns on
projects are trending downwards.
Aswath Damodaran 376
! Application Test: Getting to the Optimal
! Based upon your analysis of both the rms capital structure and investment
record, what path would you map out for the rm?
# Immediate change in leverage
# Gradual change in leverage
# No change in leverage
! Would you recommend that the rm change its nancing mix by
# Paying off debt/Buying back equity
# Take projects with equity/debt
Map out your rms path to the optimal debt ratio depending upon
1. Urgency: If your is a likely target for an acquisition or bankruptcy, go for an
immediate change. If not, go for a gradual change.
2. If your stock price performance has been poor (Jensens alpha < 0) and
your project choice has yielded negative excess returns (EVA <0) , go for
recapitalization (paying off debt or buying back equity). If you have good
projects, go for good investments.
Aswath Damodaran 377
Designing the Perfect Debt
Aswath Damodaran 378
Designing Debt: The Fundamental Principle
! The objective in designing debt is to make the cash ows on debt match up as
closely as possible with the cash ows that the rm makes on its assets.
! By doing so, we reduce our risk of default, increase debt capacity and
increase rm value.
It is not the reduction in risk but the increase in debt capacity that generates the
value. A rm that does not use this debt capacity will not gain from matching
debt to assets in the rst place.
Aswath Damodaran 379
Firm with mismatched debt
Note that the rm goes bankrupt in the two periods, when the rm value falls
below the value of the debt.
Aswath Damodaran 380
Firm with matched Debt
The same rm never goes bankrupt, even though it has borrowed a lot more.
Aswath Damodaran 381
Design the perfect nancing instrument
! The perfect nancing instrument will
Have all of the tax advantages of debt
While preserving the exibility offered by equity
Duration Currency Effect of Inflation
Uncertainty about Future
Growth Patterns
Cyclicality &
Other Effects
Define Debt
Characteristics
Duration/
Maturity
Currency
Mix
Fixed vs. Floating Rate
* More floating rate
- if CF move with
inflation
- with greater uncertainty
on future
Straight versus
Convertible
- Convertible if
cash flows low
now but high
exp. growth
Special Features
on Debt
- Options to make
cash flows on debt
match cash flows
on assets
Start with the
Cash Flows
on Assets/
Projects
Commodity Bonds
Catastrophe Notes
Design debt to have cash flows that match up to cash flows on the assets financed
There is ample scope for creativity in trying to design the perfect bond. The idea
is to design debt that looks and acts like equity, in terms of the cash ows.
Aswath Damodaran 382
Ensuring that you have not crossed the line drawn by the tax
code
! All of this design work is lost, however, if the security that you have designed
does not deliver the tax benets.
! In addition, there may be a trade off between mismatching debt and getting
greater tax benets.
Overlay tax
preferences
Deductibility of cash flows
for tax purposes
Differences in tax rates
across different locales
If tax advantages are large enough, you might override results of previous step
Zero Coupons
Note though that all is lost if the tax authorities do not allow you to subtract
interest expenses for tax purposes.
It is also possible that you could increase your tax benets by deviating from
your perfect bond.
Aswath Damodaran 383
While keeping equity research analysts, ratings agencies and
regulators applauding
! Ratings agencies want companies to issue equity, since it makes them safer.
Equity research analysts want them not to issue equity because it dilutes
earnings per share. Regulatory authorities want to ensure that you meet their
requirements in terms of capital ratios (usually book value). Financing that
leaves all three groups happy is nirvana.
Consider
ratings agency
& analyst concerns
Analyst Concerns
- Effect on EPS
- Value relative to comparables
Ratings Agency
- Effect on Ratios
- Ratios relative to comparables
Regulatory Concerns
- Measures used
Can securities be designed that can make these different entities happy?
Operating Leases
MIPs
Surplus Notes
This is a tough one. You have to issue a security that looks like equity to the
ratings agency, debt to the equity research analysts and equity again to your
regulatory authorities (if you are a nancial service rm).
While it may seem impossible, trust preferred and several other very protable
innovations (at least to investment bankers) have succeeded in doing this.
Aswath Damodaran 384
Debt or Equity: The Strange Case of Trust Preferred
! Trust preferred stock has
A xed dividend payment, specied at the time of the issue
That is tax deductible
And failing to make the payment can cause ? (Can it cause default?)
! When trust preferred was rst created, ratings agencies treated it as equity. As
they have become more savvy, ratings agencies have started giving rms only
partial equity credit for trust preferred.
Ratings agencies have learnt over time, but slowly. As they have learnt,
investment banks have come up with new securities that have the same objective.
Aswath Damodaran 385
Debt, Equity and Quasi Equity
! Assuming that trust preferred stock gets treated as equity by ratings agencies,
which of the following rms is the most appropriate rm to be issuing it?
# A rm that is under levered, but has a rating constraint that would be violated
if it moved to its optimal
# A rm that is over levered that is unable to issue debt because of the rating
agency concerns.
I would expect under levered rms to gain, and over levered rms to lose by
doing this. The latter might fool the ratings agencies but they lose because of the
expected default cost that they create for themselves.
Aswath Damodaran 386
Soothe bondholder fears
! There are some rms that face skepticism from bondholders when they go out
to raise debt, because
Of their past history of defaults or other actions
They are small rms without any borrowing history
! Bondholders tend to demand much higher interest rates from these rms to
reect these concerns.
Factor in agency
conflicts between stock
and bond holders
Observability of Cash Flows
by Lenders
- Less observable cash flows
lead to more conflicts
Type of Assets financed
- Tangible and liquid assets
create less agency problems
Existing Debt covenants
- Restrictions on Financing
If agency problems are substantial, consider issuing convertible bonds
Convertibiles
Puttable Bonds
Rating Sensitive
Notes
LYONs
While adding these conditions to debt may make it less attractive to the rm, it
may be only way they can borrow.
Aswath Damodaran 387
And do not lock in market mistakes that work against you
! Ratings agencies can sometimes under rate a rm, and markets can under
price a rms stock or bonds. If this occurs, rms should not lock in these
mistakes by issuing securities for the long term. In particular,
Issuing equity or equity based products (including convertibles), when equity is
under priced transfers wealth from existing stockholders to the new stockholders
Issuing long term debt when a rm is under rated locks in rates at levels that are far
too high, given the rms default risk.
! What is the solution
If you need to use equity?
If you need to use debt?
When you feel that your equity or debt is under valued, you do not want to lock
in the under valuation. You should use short-term solutions (bridge nancing)
until they feel more comfortable with the valuations. Bridge nancing includes
short term debt and short term warrants.
Aswath Damodaran 388
Designing Debt: Bringing it all together
Duration Currency Effect of Ination
Uncertainty about Future
Growth Patterns
Cyclicality &
Other Effects
Dene Debt
Characteristics
Duration/
Maturity
Currency
Mix
Fixed vs. Floating Rate
* More oating rate
- if CF move with
ination
- with greater uncertainty
on future
Straight versus
Convertible
- Convertible if
cash ows low
now but high
exp. growth
Special Features
on Debt
- Options to make
cash ows on debt
match cash ows
on assets
Start with the
Cash Flows
on Assets/
Projects
Overlay tax
preferences
Deductibility of cash ows
for tax purposes
Differences in tax rates
across different locales
Consider
ratings agency
& analyst concerns
Analyst Concerns
- Effect on EPS
- Value relative to comparables
Ratings Agency
- Effect on Ratios
- Ratios relative to comparables
Regulatory Concerns
- Measures used
Factor in agency
conicts between stock
and bond holders
Observability of Cash Flows
by Lenders
- Less observable cash ows
lead to more conicts
Type of Assets nanced
- Tangible and liquid assets
create less agency problems
Existing Debt covenants
- Restrictions on Financing
Consider Information
Asymmetries
Uncertainty about Future Cashows
- When there is more uncertainty, it
may be better to use short term debt
Credibility & Quality of the Firm
- Firms with credibility problems
will issue more short term debt
If agency problems are substantial, consider issuing convertible bonds
Can securities be designed that can make these different entities happy?
If tax advantages are large enough, you might override results of previous step
Zero Coupons
Operating Leases
MIPs
Surplus Notes
Convertibiles
Puttable Bonds
Rating Sensitive
Notes
LYONs
Commodity Bonds
Catastrophe Notes
Design debt to have cash ows that match up to cash ows on the assets nanced
This provides the basic framework for designing the right kind of debt.
You begin by trying to match up nancing type to asset type (in terms of
duration, currency, growth patterns and special features). By doing so, you
reduce your risk of bankruptcy, increase your capacity to borrow and
consequently the tax benets of debt.
Then, you modify the perfect debt
For tax factors, to ensure that you get the maximum tax benet
To meet the needs and objectives of equity research analysts and ratings
agencies
To x any agency conicts that might prevent lenders from lending
To prevent an undeservedly low rating from pushing up the cost of debt
above what it should be. (If you are under rated, you should probably
use short term debt until you feel your rating is justied)
Aswath Damodaran 389
Approaches for evaluating Asset Cash Flows
! I. Intuitive Approach
Are the projects typically long term or short term? What is the cash ow pattern on
projects?
How much growth potential does the rm have relative to current projects?
How cyclical are the cash ows? What specic factors determine the cash ows on
projects?
! II. Project Cash Flow Approach
Project cash ows on a typical project for the rm
Do scenario analyses on these cash ows, based upon different macro economic
scenarios
! III. Historical Data
Operating Cash Flows
Firm Value
These are the three basic approaches to assessing the cash ow characteristics of
your asset base. The last two approaches provide more quantitative answers but
may not work for companies which have a short history or have changed their
asset mixes over time.
Aswath Damodaran 390
I. Intuitive Approach - Disney
Business Project Cash Flow Characteristics Type of Financing
Movies Projects are likely to
1. Be short term
2. Have cash outflows primarily in dollars (since Disney makes most of
its movies in the U.S.) but cash inflows could have a substantial
foreign currency component (because of overseas sales)
3. Have net cash flows that are heavily driven by whether the movie is a
hit, which is often difficult to predict.
Debt should be
1. Short term
2. Primarily dollar debt.
3. If possible, tied to the success
of movies. (Lion King or
Nemo Bonds)
Broadcasting Projects are likely to be
1. Short term
2. Primarily in dollars, though foreign component is growing
3. Driven by advertising revenues and show success
Debt should be
1. Short term
2. Primarily dollar debt
3. If possible, linked to network
ratings.
Theme Parks Projects are likely to be
1. Very long term
2. Primarily in dollars, but a significant proportion of revenues come
from foreign tourists, who are likely to stay away if the dollar
strengthens
3. Affected by success of movie and broadcasting divisions.
Debt should be
1. Long term
2. Mix of currencies, based upon
tourist make up.

Consumer Products Projects are likely to be short to medium term and linked to the success of
the movie division. Most of Disneys product offerings are derived from
their movie productions.
Debt should be
a. Medium term
b. Dollar debt.

There is plenty of room to be creative in this approach.
Look at rms which operate in each of these businesses and see what nancing
they use. That might be useful in designing the right kind of debt.
Aswath Damodaran 391
! Application Test: Choosing your Financing Type
! Based upon the business that your rm is in, and the typical investments that
it makes, what kind of nancing would you expect your rm to use in terms of
Duration (long term or short term)
Currency
Fixed or Floating rate
Straight or Convertible
Based upon what a typical investment looks like, assess the right type of debt
for your rm.
Aswath Damodaran 392
II. Project Specic Financing
! With project specic nancing, you match the nancing choices to the project
being funded. The benet is that the the debt is truly customized to the project.
! Project specic nancing makes the most sense when you have a few large,
independent projects to be nanced. It becomes both impractical and costly
when rms have portfolios of projects with interdependent cashows.
If you have large, stand alone projects, you can try to match the debt specically
to the projects characteristics. If you take lots of smaller projects, you will often
nd it less costly to nance a portfolio of projects rather than each project
individually.
Aswath Damodaran 393
Duration of Disney Theme Park
Year Annual Cashflow Terminal Value Present Value Present value *t
0 -$2,000 -$2,000 $0
1 -$1,000 -$904 -$904
2 -$833 -$680 -$1,361
3 -$224 -$165 -$496
4 $417 $278 $1,112
5 $559 $337 $1,684
6 $614 $334 $2,006
7 $658 $324 $2,265
8 $726 $323 $2,582
9 $802 $322 $2,899
10 $837 $9,857 $3,882 $38,821
$2,050 $48,609
Duration = 48609/2050 = 23.71 years

We have used the projected cash ows on the Disney theme park to estimate the
duration of the theme park.
This understates the duration,
Since cash ows are likely to drop if interest rates go up
Since we have arbitrarily estimated a terminal value at the end of year
9.
Aswath Damodaran 394
The perfect theme park debt
! The perfect debt for this theme park would have a duration of roughly 23.71
years and be in a mix of Asian currencies, reecting where the visitors to the
park are coming from.
! If possible, you would tie the interest payments on the debt to the number of
visitors at the park.
Aswath Damodaran 395
III. Firm-wide nancing
Rather than look at individual projects, you could consider the rm to be a
portfolio of projects. The rms past history should then provide clues as to
what type of debt makes the most sense. In particular, you can look at
1. Operating Cash Flows
l The question of how sensitive a rms asset cash ows are to a variety of factors, such
as interest rates, ination, currency rates and the economy, can be directly tested by
regressing changes in the operating income against changes in these variables.
l This analysis is useful in determining the coupon/interest payment structure of the debt.
2. Firm Value
l The rm value is clearly a function of the level of operating income, but it also
incorporates other factors such as expected growth & cost of capital.
l The rm value analysis is useful in determining the overall structure of the debt,
particularly maturity.
Each measures a different aspect of the rm.
The operating cash ows measure the year-to-year capacity of the rm to
generate cash ows.
Firm value reects current operating income, as well as the expected
growth and the cost of capital.
Aswath Damodaran 396
Disney: Historical Data
Period Operating Income Firm value
2003 $2,713 $68,239
2002 $2,384 $53,708
2001 $2,832 $45,030
2000 $2,525 $47,717
1999 $3,580 $88,558
1998 $3,843 $65,487
1997 $3,945 $64,236
1996 $3,024 $65,489
1995 $2,262 $54,972
1994 $1,804 $33,071
1993 $1,560 $22,694
1992 $1,287 $25,048
1991 $1,004 $17,122
1990 $1,287 $14,963
1989 $1,109 $16,015
1988 $789 $9,195
1987 $707 $8,371
1986 $281 $5,631
1985 $206 $3,655
1984 $143 $2,024
1983 $134 $1,817
1982 $141 $2,108

Disney has changed changed considerably over time in terms of its business
mix. For instance, in 1996, Disney acquired ABC.
The rm value is the market value of equity plus the book value of debt
outstanding in each year. ( I would have preferred to use market value of debt,
but book value seems like a reasonable proxy)
In doing this table, we reverted back to reported EBIT, rather than using the
adjusted EBIT that we have been working with so far.
Aswath Damodaran 397
The Macroeconomic Data
Period T.Bond Rate Change in rate GDP (Deflated) % Chg in GDP CPI Change in CPI Weighted Dollar % Change in $
2003 4.29% 0.40% 10493 3.60% 2.04% 0.01% 88.82 -14.51%
2002 3.87% -0.82% 10128 2.98% 2.03% -0.10% 103.9 -3.47%
2001 4.73% -1.20% 9835 -0.02% 2.13% -1.27% 107.64 1.85%
2000 6.00% 0.30% 9837 3.53% 3.44% 0.86% 105.68 11.51%
1999 5.68% -0.21% 9502 4.43% 2.56% 1.05% 94.77 -0.59%
1998 5.90% -0.19% 9099 3.70% 1.49% -0.65% 95.33 0.95%
1997 6.10% -0.56% 8774 4.79% 2.15% -0.82% 94.43 7.54%
1996 6.70% 0.49% 8373 3.97% 2.99% 0.18% 87.81 4.36%
1995 6.18% -1.32% 8053 2.46% 2.81% 0.19% 84.14 -1.07%
1994 7.60% 2.11% 7860 4.30% 2.61% -0.14% 85.05 -5.38%
1993 5.38% -0.91% 7536 2.25% 2.75% -0.44% 89.89 4.26%
1992 6.35% -1.01% 7370 3.50% 3.20% 0.27% 86.22 -2.31%
1991 7.44% -1.24% 7121 -0.14% 2.92% -3.17% 88.26 4.55%
1990 8.79% 0.47% 7131 1.68% 6.29% 1.72% 84.42 -11.23%
1989 8.28% -0.60% 7013 3.76% 4.49% 0.23% 95.10 4.17%
1988 8.93% -0.60% 6759 4.10% 4.25% -0.36% 91.29 -5.34%
1987 9.59% 2.02% 6493 3.19% 4.63% 3.11% 96.44 -8.59%
1986 7.42% -2.58% 6292 3.11% 1.47% -1.70% 105.50 -15.30%
1985 10.27% -1.11% 6102 3.39% 3.23% -0.64% 124.56 -10.36%
1984 11.51% -0.26% 5902 4.18% 3.90% -0.05% 138.96 8.01%
1983 11.80% 1.20% 5665 6.72% 3.95% -0.05% 128.65 4.47%
1982 10.47% -3.08% 5308 -1.61% 4% -4.50% 123.14 6.48%

This would apply to any rm that we would analyze over this time period.
Aswath Damodaran 398
I. Sensitivity to Interest Rate Changes
! How sensitive is the rms value and operating income to changes in the level
of interest rates?
! The answer to this question is important because it
it provides a measure of the duration of the rms projects
it provides insight into whether the rm should be using xed or oating rate debt.
How much has rm value changed for a given change in interest rates?
Aswath Damodaran 399
Firm Value versus Interest Rate Changes
! Regressing changes in rm value against changes in interest rates over this
period yields the following regression
Change in Firm Value = 0.2081 - 4.16 (Change in Interest Rates)
(2.91) (0.75)
T statistics are in brackets.
! The coefcient on the regression (-4.16) measures how much the value of
Disney as a rm changes for a unit change in interest rates.
These regressions tend to be noisy, even for rms with substantial historical data.
Industry-average coefcients might provide more reliable estimates (just as
sector betas are often better than rm-specic betas)
Aswath Damodaran 400
Why the coefcient on the regression is duration..
! The duration of a straight bond or loan issued by a company can be written in
terms of the coupons (interest payments) on the bond (loan) and the face
value of the bond to be
! The duration of a bond measures how much the price of the bond changes for
a unit change in interest rates.
! Holding other factors constant, the duration of a bond will increase with the
maturity of the bond, and decrease with the coupon rate on the bond.
Duration of Bond =
dP/P
dr/r
=
t * Coupon
t
(1 +r)
t
t =1
t =N
!
+
N* Face Value
(1 + r)
N
"
#
$
$
%
&
'
'
Coupon
t
(1+ r)
t
t =1
t =N
!
+
Face Value
(1+ r)
N
"
#
$
$
%
&
'
'
This is a traditional Macaulay duration. It is a measure of the percentage change
in the bond price for a 1% change in interest rates.
Equivalently, it can be viewed as the maturity of a zero-coupon bond with the
same sensitivity to interest rate changes.
Note, in the regression on the previous page, the coefcient on the change in
interest rates, measures the percentage change in rm value for a 1% change in
interest rates. Thus, the regression coefcient also measures duration.
Aswath Damodaran 401
Duration: Comparing Approaches
!P/!r=
Percentage Change
in Value for a
percentage change in
Interest Rates
Traditional Duration
Measures
Regression:
!P = a + b (!r)
Uses:
1. Projected Cash Flows
Assumes:
1. Cash Flows are unaffected by
changes in interest rates
2. Changes in interest rates are
small.
Uses:
1. Historical data on changes in
firm value (market) and interest
rates
Assumes:
1. Past project cash flows are
similar to future project cash
flows.
2. Relationship between cash
flows and interest rates is
stable.
3. Changes in market value
reflect changes in the value of
the firm.
It is very difcult to estimate Macaulay Duration on a project-by-project basis
for all the projects that a rm has.
It is much easier to run the regression, but the results are likely to be noisy and
affected by whether the rms business mix has changed over time.
This leaves us with
The intuitive analysis that preceded this section
Industry average duration numbers, which can be used for any rm in
that industy
Aswath Damodaran 402
Operating Income versus Interest Rates
! Regressing changes in operating cash ow against changes in interest rates
over this period yields the following regression
Change in Operating Income = 0.2189 + 6.59 (Change in Interest Rates)
(2.74) (1.06)
Conclusion: Disneys operating income,un like its rm value, has moved with
interest rates.
! Generally speaking, the operating cash ows are smoothed out more than the
value and hence will exhibit lower duration that the rm value.
This measures the effect of interest rates on operating income. Firm value will
be affected more because discount rates tend to also go up when interest rates
increase.
Aswath Damodaran 403
II. Sensitivity to Changes in GDP/ GNP
! How sensitive is the rms value and operating income to changes in the
GNP/GDP?
! The answer to this question is important because
it provides insight into whether the rms cash ows are cyclical and
whether the cash ows on the rms debt should be designed to protect against
cyclical factors.
! If the cash ows and rm value are sensitive to movements in the economy,
the rm will either have to issue less debt overall, or add special features to
the debt to tie cash ows on the debt to the rms cash ows.
Is the rm a cyclical rm?
Aswath Damodaran 404
Regression Results
! Regressing changes in rm value against changes in the GDP over this period
yields the following regression
Change in Firm Value = 0.2165 + 0.26 (GDP Growth)
(1.56) (0.07)
Conclusion: Disney is not very sensitive to economic growth
! Regressing changes in operating cash ow against changes in GDP over this
period yields the following regression
Change in Operating Income = 0.1725 + 0.66 (GDP Growth)
(1.10) (0.15)
Conclusion: Disneys operating income is not sensitive to economic growth either.
Note that neither of the t statistics on the GNP variable is statistically signicant.
Disney is not a cyclical rm.
Aswath Damodaran 405
III. Sensitivity to Currency Changes
! How sensitive is the rms value and operating income to changes in
exchange rates?
! The answer to this question is important, because
it provides a measure of how sensitive cash ows and rm value are to changes in
the currency
it provides guidance on whether the rm should issue debt in another currency that
it may be exposed to.
! If cash ows and rm value are sensitive to changes in the dollar, the rm
should
gure out which currency its cash ows are in;
and issued some debt in that currency
Again, we are assuming that the historical exposure of earnings and rm value to
currencies is a good measure of future exposure.
Aswath Damodaran 406
Regression Results
! Regressing changes in rm value against changes in the dollar over this
period yields the following regression
Change in Firm Value = 0.2060 -2.04 (Change in Dollar)
(3.40) (2.52)
Conclusion: Disneys value is sensitive to exchange rate changes, decreasing as the
dollar strengthens.
! Regressing changes in operating cash ow against changes in the dollar over
this period yields the following regression
Change in Operating Income = 0.1768 -1.76( Change in Dollar)
(2.42) (1.81)
Conclusion: Disneys operating income is also impacted by the dollar. A stronger
dollar seems to hurt operating income.
The negative effect of the stronger dollar on operating income might reect the
revenues that Disney gets from tourists at its theme parks. These tourists are
less likely to visit the theme parks when the dollar is stronger.
The effect is muted on rm value. It is possible that a stronger dollar has an
offsetting effect on discount rates (A stronger dollar might translate into lower
interest rates)
Aswath Damodaran 407
IV. Sensitivity to Ination
! How sensitive is the rms value and operating income to changes in the
ination rate?
! The answer to this question is important, because
it provides a measure of whether cash ows are positively or negatively impacted
by ination.
it then helps in the design of debt; whether the debt should be xed or oating rate
debt.
! If cash ows move with ination, increasing (decreasing) as ination
increases (decreases), the debt should have a larger oating rate component.
On oating rate debt, interest expenses tend to increase as market interest rates
increase. We are assuming that year-to-year changes in interest rates are driven
primarily by changes in ination.
Aswath Damodaran 408
Regression Results
! Regressing changes in rm value against changes in ination over this period
yields the following regression
Change in Firm Value = 0.2262 + 0.57 (Change in Ination Rate)
(3.22) (0.13)
Conclusion: Disneys rm value does not seem to be affected too much by changes in
the ination rate.
! Regressing changes in operating cash ow against changes in ination over
this period yields the following regression
Change in Operating Income = 0.2192 +9.27 ( Change in Ination Rate)
(3.01) (1.95)
Conclusion: Disneys operating income seems to increase in periods when ination
increases. However, this increase in operating income seems to be offset by the
increase in discount rates leading to a much more muted effect on value.
Operating income tends to move with ination, but rm value does not. (This is
not surprising, if cashow effects and discount rate effects cancel out)
I would weigh the operating income regression more in determining whether to
use oating rate or xed rate debt, since the cash ows each year go towards
paying the coupons.
Aswath Damodaran 409
Summarizing
! Looking at the four macroeconomic regressions, we would conclude that
Disneys assets have a duration of 4.17 years
Disney is not a cyclical rm
Disney is hurt by a stronger dollar
Disneys operating income tends to move with ination
! All of the regression coefcients have substantial standard errors associated
with them. One way to reduce the error (a la bottom up betas) is to use sector-
wide averages for each of the coefcients.
Aswath Damodaran 410
Bottom-up Estimates
Coefficients on firm value regression
Interest Rate s GDP Growth Inflation Currency Disney
Weights
Movie s -3. 70 0. 56 1. 41 -1. 23 25.62%
Theme Parks -6. 47 0. 22 -1. 45 -3. 21 20.09%
Broadcasting -4. 50 0. 70 -3. 05 -1. 58 49.25%
Consumer
Products -4. 88 0. 13 -5. 51 -3. 01 5. 04%
Disney -4. 71 0. 54 -1. 71 -1. 89 100%

Since the standard errors on the regression estimates are so high, this alternative
may yield more precise estimates of the each of the coefcients.
Aswath Damodaran 411
Recommendations for Disney
! The debt issued should be long term and should have duration of between 4
and 5 years.
! A signicant portion of the debt should be oating rate debt, reecting
Disneys capacity to pass ination through to its customers and the fact that
operating income tends to increase as interest rates go up.
! Given Disneys sensitivity to a stronger dollar, a portion of the debt should be
in foreign currencies. The specic currency used and the magnitude of the
foreign currency debt should reect where Disney makes its revenues. Based
upon 2003 numbers at least, this would indicate that about 20% of the debt
should be in Euros and about 10% of the debt in Japanese Yen reecting
Disneys larger exposures in Europe and Asia. As its broadcasting businesses
expand into Latin America, it may want to consider using either Mexican
Peso or Brazilian Real debt as well.
Aswath Damodaran 412
Analyzing Disneys Current Debt
! Disney has $13.1 billion in debt with an average maturity of 11.53 years.
Even allowing for the fact that the maturity of debt is higher than the duration,
this would indicate that Disneys debt is far too long term for its existing
business mix.
! Of the debt, about 12% is Euro debt and no yen denominated debt. Based
upon our analysis, a larger portion of Disneys debt should be in foreign
currencies.
! Disney has about $1.3 billion in convertible debt and some oating rate debt,
though no information is provided on its magnitude. If oating rate debt is a
relatively small portion of existing debt, our analysis would indicate that
Disney should be using more of it.
There may be good reasons for the mismatch but for most rms, the existing
debt structure is more a result of history and inertia. Disneys business mix has
changed signicantly over the last decade - more broadcasting, less theme park -
and it is not surprising that the debt structure has not kept pace.
In some cases, market frictions and limitations may contribute to the mismatch.
In fact, many emerging market companies were unable to borrow long term until
recently because banks would not lend long term in those markets.
Aswath Damodaran 413
Adjusting Debt at Disney
! It can swap some of its existing long term, xed rate, dollar debt with shorter
term, oating rate, foreign currency debt. Given Disneys standing in nancial
markets and its large market capitalization, this should not be difcult to do.
! If Disney is planning new debt issues, either to get to a higher debt ratio or to
fund new investments, it can use primarily short term, oating rate, foreign
currency debt to fund these new investments. While it may be mismatching
the funding on these investments, its debt matching will become better at the
company level.
Disneys large size and access to capital markets give it lots of options. Smaller
rms and emerging market rms will have fewer options. In the extreme
scenario, it may take more time to adjust the debt.
Aswath Damodaran 414
Returning Cash to the Owners: Dividend
Policy
Third and nal principle of corporate nance.
Aswath Damodaran 415
First Principles
! Invest in projects that yield a return greater than the minimum acceptable
hurdle rate.
The hurdle rate should be higher for riskier projects and reect the nancing mix
used - owners funds (equity) or borrowed money (debt)
Returns on projects should be measured based on cash ows generated and the
timing of these cash ows; they should also consider both positive and negative
side effects of these projects.
! Choose a nancing mix that minimizes the hurdle rate and matches the assets
being nanced.
! If there are not enough investments that earn the hurdle rate, return the cash to
stockholders.
The form of returns - dividends and stock buybacks - will depend upon the
stockholders characteristics.
Objective: Maximize the Value of the Firm
Aswath Damodaran 416
Steps to the Dividend Decision
Cashflow
from
Operations
Cashflows to Debt
(Principal repaid,
Interest
Expenses)
Cashflows from
Operations to
Equity Investors
Reinvestment back
into the business
Cash available
for return to
stockholders
Cash held back
by the company
Cash Paid out
Stock Buybacks
Dividends
How much did you borrow?
How good are your investment choices?
What is a reasonable cash balance?
What do your
stockholders prefer?
Dividend policy is affected by investment and nancing decisions.
Aswath Damodaran 417
I. Dividends are sticky
Most companies in most years pay out what they did last year as dividends.
Among rms that change dividends, increases are more common than decreases.
Aswath Damodaran 418
II. Dividends tend to follow earnings
Dividends tend to follow earnings. They dont lead them and they are not
contemporaneous. In other words, dont expect a company to pay out more in
dividends if their earnings go up If earnings go up two years in a row,
maybe.. Three years in a row and the odds increase.
Aswath Damodaran 419
III. More and more rms are buying back stock, rather than
pay dividends...
This trend accelerated through the 1990s. It can be partially explained by
1. An increase in the volatility of earnings at all companies, making dividends
much more difcult to maintain
2. An increasing proportion of investors who invested primarily for capital
gains
3. Managers being compensated with options like stock buybacks more than
dividends since the latter leads to lower stock prices.
Aswath Damodaran 420
IV. But the change in dividend tax law in 2003 may cause a
shift back to dividends
A seismic shift in the tax law in 2003. For the rst time, dividends are taxed at
the same rate as capital gains. Firms are responding with higher dividends.
Aswath Damodaran 421
Measures of Dividend Policy
! Dividend Payout:
measures the percentage of earnings that the company pays in dividends
= Dividends / Earnings
! Dividend Yield :
measures the return that an investor can make from dividends alone
= Dividends / Stock Price
These are the two most common measures of dividend. They both focus on
traditional dividends, and could be modied to include stock buybacks.
Aswath Damodaran 422
Dividend Payout Ratios: January 2005
The median payout ratio is between 30 and 40% for rms that pay dividends.
More rms, however, do not pay dividends than do pay dividends. The trend in
the number of non-dividend paying rms has been upwards.
Aswath Damodaran 423
Dividend Yields in the United States: January 2005
Here again, there is a trend. Over the last two decades, the dividend yield for
U.S. rms has decreased across the board.
Aswath Damodaran 424
Three Schools Of Thought On Dividends
! 1. If
(a) there are no tax disadvantages associated with dividends
(b) companies can issue stock, at no cost, to raise equity, whenever needed
Dividends do not matter, and dividend policy does not affect value.
! 2. If dividends have a tax disadvantage,
Dividends are bad, and increasing dividends will reduce value
! 3. If stockholders like dividends, or dividends operate as a signal of future prospects,
Dividends are good, and increasing dividends will increase value
Note that the schools span the spectrum. Firms which increase, decrease or do
nothing on dividends can all nd something in one of these schools to justify
their actions.
Aswath Damodaran 425
The balanced viewpoint
! If a company has excess cash, and few good investment opportunities
(NPV>0), returning money to stockholders (dividends or stock repurchases) is
good.
! If a company does not have excess cash, and/or has several good investment
opportunities (NPV>0), returning money to stockholders (dividends or stock
repurchases) is bad.
These propositions are really not about dividends, but about returning cash to
the owners of the business. Firms which want to return money to stockholders
can buy back stock or pay dividends.
Aswath Damodaran 426
Why do rms pay dividends?
! The Miller-Modigliani Hypothesis: Dividends do not affect value
! Basis:
If a rm's investment policy (and hence cash ows) don't change, the value of the
rm cannot change with dividend policy. If we ignore personal taxes, investors
have to be indifferent to receiving either dividends or capital gains.
! Underlying Assumptions:
(a) There are no tax differences between dividends and capital gains.
(b) If companies pay too much in cash, they can issue new stock, with no otation
costs or signaling consequences, to replace this cash.
(c) If companies pay too little in dividends, they do not use the excess cash for bad
projects or acquisitions.
This summarizes the MM argument for why dividend policy is irrelevant.
Generally, rms that pay too much in dividends lose value because they
cannot take value-creating projects that they should. In the MM world,
this cost is eliminated by assuming that these rms can raise the capital
(with no transactions costs and no frictions) to take these projects.
Investors who receive dividends often face a much larger tax bill than
investors who get capital gains. This is eliminated by assuming that there
are no tax disadvantages associated with dividends.
Aswath Damodaran 427
The Classic Tax Response: Until 2003, dividends were
taxed much more heavily than capital gains
This has generally been true in the United States, but is not always the case in
other markets. For instance, in the UK, where investors are allowed to offset the
corporate tax paid on dividends against their taxes, dividends may have a tax
advantage for some investors over capital gains.
There are several markets where capital gains are not taxed at all.
Aswath Damodaran 428
Gauging the tax effect by looking at Price Behavior on Ex-
Dividend Date
Let P
b
= Price before the stock goes ex-dividend
P
a
=Price after the stock goes ex-dividend
D = Dividends declared on stock
t
o
, t
cg
= Taxes paid on ordinary income and capital gains respectively
$ Pb $Pa
______________|_______ Ex-Dividend Day _______________|
Assume that we are looking at a market, where every investor in this stock
bought this stock 3 years ago (to allow it to qualify for capital gains) at a price
P .
Each investor is now assumed to face a decision of whether to sell before the ex-
dividend day and get P
b (
(and give up the dividend) or sell after and get P
a
and
receive the dividend.
Aswath Damodaran 429
Cashows from Selling around Ex-Dividend Day
! The cash ows from selling before then are-
P
b
- (P
b
- P) t
cg
! The cash ows from selling after the ex-dividend day are-
P
a
- (P
a
- P) t
cg
+ D(1-t
o
)
Since the average investor should be indifferent between selling before the ex-
dividend day and selling after the ex-dividend day -
P
b
- (P
b
- P) t
cg
= P
a
- (P
a
- P) t
cg
+ D(1-t
o
)
Moving the variables around, we arrive at the following:
For this market to be stable, the cash ow from selling before has to be equal to
the cash ow from selling after for most of the investors in this rm (or for the
median investor).
If, for instance, the cash ow from selling before was greater than the cash ow
from selling after for the median investor, the market would collapse, with every
one selling before the ex-dividend day.
If the cash ow from selling after was greater for the median investor, every one
would hold through the ex-dividend day and sell after.
Differences in tax status will mean, however, that there are prot opportunities
for investors whose tax status is very different from that of the median investor.
Aswath Damodaran 430
Price Change, Dividends and Tax Rates
If P
b
- P
a
= D then t
o
= t
cg
P
b
- P
a
< D then t
o
> t
cg
P
b
- P
a
> D then t
o
< t
cg
P
b
% P
a
D
=
(1- t
o
)
(1% t
cg
)
This equality has to hold, in equilibrium, for the median investor in the rm to
be indifferent between selling before and selling after.
By looking at price behavior on ex-dividend days, we should be able to get a
snap shot of what differential tax rate investors in this stock, on average, face on
dividends as opposed to capital gains.
If the price drop is much smaller than the dividend, the median investor,
it can be argued, faces a tax rate on dividends that is higher than the tax
rate on capital gains.
If it is equal, the median investor faces the same tax rate on both (or does
not pay taxes at all)
If the price drop is greater than the dividend, the median investor pays
more taxes on capital gains than he or she does on dividends.
Aswath Damodaran 431
The Evidence on Ex-Dividend Day Behavior
Ordi nary I nco me Capit al Gai ns ( P
b
- P
a
)/ D
Bef ore 1981 70 % 28 % 0. 78( 1966- 69)
1981- 85 50 % 20 % 0. 85
1986- 1990 28 % 28 % 0. 90
1991- 1993 33 % 28 % 0. 92
1994. . 39. 6 % 28 % 0.90
As the difference in marginal tax rates has narrowed from what it used be prior
to 1981, the trend in the ex-dividend day measure has been towards one. This
may also reect the greater role played by pension funds (which are tax
exempt) in the process.
Note, thought, that even in the 1986-90 time period, when dividends and capital
gains were taxed at the same rate, the ratio did not converge on one. This
indicates that the timing option (you choose when to take capital gains and you
have none on dividends) will make dividends less attractive than capital gains
even when the tax rates are the same
Source:
1966-69: Elton and Gruber
Later periods: From CRSP and COMPUSTAT, looking at only dividend paying
stocks.
Aswath Damodaran 432
Dividend Arbitrage
! Assume that you are a tax exempt investor, and that you know that the price
drop on the ex-dividend day is only 90% of the dividend. How would you
exploit this differential?
# Invest in the stock for the long term
# Sell short the day before the ex-dividend day, buy on the ex-dividend day
# Buy just before the ex-dividend day, and sell after.
# ______________________________________________
I would buy just before the ex-dividend day and sell after.
Aswath Damodaran 433
Example of dividend capture strategy with tax factors
! XYZ company is selling for $50 at close of trading May 3. On May 4, XYZ
goes ex-dividend; the dividend amount is $1. The price drop (from past
examination of the data) is only 90% of the dividend amount.
! The transactions needed by a tax-exempt U.S. pension fund for the arbitrage
are as follows:
1. Buy 1 million shares of XYZ stock cum-dividend at $50/share.
2. Wait till stock goes ex-dividend; Sell stock for $49.10/share (50 - 1* 0.90)
3. Collect dividend on stock.
! Net prot = - 50 million + 49.10 million + 1 million = $0.10 million
Note that this is before transactions costs and is exposed to the risk that the
market might be down sharply on the day of the transaction.
To reduce these effects, successful dividend capture requires that it be done in
large quantities (to reduce the transactions costs) and across a large number of
stocks and ex-dividend days (to reduce the market risk)
Aswath Damodaran 434
The wrong reasons for paying dividends
1. The bird in the hand fallacy
! Argument: Dividends now are more certain than capital gains later. Hence
dividends are more valuable than capital gains.
! Counter: The appropriate comparison should be between dividends today
and price appreciation today. (The stock price drops on the ex-dividend day.)
When dividends are compared to the stock price drop that occurs on the ex-
dividend day, this fallacy is exposed. At that point in time, the investor has a
choice between receiving the dividends or cashing out on the stock (and getting
the higher price).
Aswath Damodaran 435
2. We have excess cash this year
! Argument: The rm has excess cash on its hands this year, no investment
projects this year and wants to give the money back to stockholders.
! Counter: So why not just repurchase stock? If this is a one-time
phenomenon, the rm has to consider future nancing needs. Consider the
cost of issuing new stock:
Excess cash might be a temporary phenomenon. To initiate dividends with the
cash will create the expectation that the rm will continue to pay those dividends,
which might be unsustainable.
Stock buybacks provide more exibility in terms of future actions.
Aswath Damodaran 436
The Cost of Raising Capital
If a small rm has excess cash and is uncertain about its future investment
needs, it is prudent to hold the cash rather than return it to its stockholders.
Larger rms with more access to capital markets should be more inclined to use
the cash to buy back stock.
Aswath Damodaran 437
Are rms perverse to pay dividends?

In the case of Citizens Utility (studied by John Long), investors had a clear
choice. They could buy
Class A shares, which paid a cash dividend in each period
Class B shares, which paid an equivalent stock dividend, but could be
converted into class A shares (thus providing an equivalent capital gain)
Class A shares, given the tax argument, should sell for less than class B shares.
In reality, they sold at a premium. No obvious reasons were founds, including
transactions cost or liquidity differences. At least for this stock, investors
seemed to like the cash dividends and were willing to pay a premium for them.
Aswath Damodaran 438
Evidence from Canadian Firms
Company Premium for Cash dividend over
Stock Dividend Shares
Consolidated Bathurst 19.30%
Donfasco 13.30%
Dome Petroleum 0.30%
Imperial Oil 12.10%
Newfoundland Light &Power 1.80%
Royal Trustco 17.30%
Stelco 2.70%
TransAlta 1.10%
Average 7.54%
The same phenomenon seems to apply to these Canadian utilities, with cash
dividend and capital gain shares, that were studied by Bailey a few years ago.
Aswath Damodaran 439
A clientele based explanation
! Basis: Investors may form clienteles based upon their tax brackets. Investors
in high tax brackets may invest in stocks which do not pay dividends and
those in low tax brackets may invest in dividend paying stocks.
! Evidence: A study of 914 investors' portfolios was carried out to see if their
portfolio positions were affected by their tax brackets. The study found that
(a) Older investors were more likely to hold high dividend stocks and
(b) Poorer investors tended to hold high dividend stocks
Investors buy stock in companies which have dividend policies that they like.
This self-selection process creates dividend clienteles that each rm caters to. As
long as there are sufcient investors in each clientele, having a high dividend or
no dividend, by itself, should not affect value.
If an imbalance occurs between supply and demand in any clientele, there can be
an effect on stock prices.
Aswath Damodaran 440
Results from Regression: Clientele Effect
Dividend Yield
t
= a + b "
t
+ c Age
t
+ d Income
t
+ e Differential Tax Rate
t
+ &
t
Variable Coefficient Implies
Constant 4.22%
Beta Coefficient -2.145 Higher beta stocks pay lower dividends.
Age/100 3.131 Firms with older investors pay higher
dividends.
Income/1000 -3.726 Firms with wealthier investors pay lower
dividends.
Differential Tax Rate -2.849 If ordinary income is taxed at a higher rate
than capital gains, the firm pays less
dividends.
This is evidence of investors picking stocks based upon their tax status. Low
income, older investors tend to buy safer stocks with higher dividends, and this
behavior is accentuated when the difference in tax rates between dividends and
capital gains increases.
Aswath Damodaran 441
Dividend Policy and Clientele
! Assume that you run a phone company, and that you have historically paid
large dividends. You are now planning to enter the telecommunications and
media markets. Which of the following paths are you most likely to follow?
# Courageously announce to your stockholders that you plan to cut dividends
and invest in the new markets.
# Continue to pay the dividends that you used to, and defer investment in the
new markets.
# Continue to pay the dividends that you used to, make the investments in the
new markets, and issue new stock to cover the shortfall
# Other
Given that the dividend clientele that I have attracted is unlikely to be swayed by
my arguments about my investment needs, I would try to spin off my media
division and allow it to set a dividend policy very different from mine. In the
spin off, investors who would prefer the capital gains will hold on to the media
division shares and those who want the dividends will continue to hold the
phone company shares.
AT&T did something similar when it nally split itself into Lucent (that pays
little in dividends), NCR (that pays a small dividend) and AT&T (which pays a
high dividend).
Aswath Damodaran 442
Increases in dividends are signals of good news..

A rm which announces an increase in dividends is sending a signal that it
expects future cash ows to be strong enough to sustain this dividend. This
allows it to set itself apart from other rms, which might say they have great
prospects but do not have the condence in them to raise dividends.
Given how reluctant rms are to cut dividends, the act of cutting dividends is
viewed by the market as a signal that the rm is in far worse trouble than they
thought. (Note how much larger the stock price drop on a dividend decrease is
than the stock price increase on a dividend increase.)
Aswath Damodaran 443
An Alternative Story..Dividends as Negative Signals
The ip side. A rm that increases or initiates dividends might be signaling that
it is running out of investment opportunities. Note that earnings growth peaks
around the period when dividends are initiated.
Aswath Damodaran 444
The Wealth Transfer Hypothesis
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
t:-
15
-12 -9 -6 -3 0 3 6 9 12 15
CAR (Div Up)
CAR (Div down)
EXCESS RETURNS ON STRAIGHT BONDS AROUND DIVIDEND CHANGES
Day (0: Announcement date)
CAR
Bondholders view dividend increases as bad news. It makes the bonds much
riskier. To the extent that the dividend increase was unanticipated and was not
built into interest rate, this transfers wealth from bondholders to stockholders.
Aswath Damodaran 445
Tools for Assessing Dividend
Policy
Aswath Damodaran
Aswath Damodaran 446
Assessing Dividend Policy
! Approach 1: The Cash/Trust Nexus
Assess how much cash a rm has available to pay in dividends, relative what it
returns to stockholders. Evaluate whether you can trust the managers of the
company as custodians of your cash.
! Approach 2: Peer Group Analysis
Pick a dividend policy for your company that makes it comparable to other rms in
its peer group.
Two very different approaches to assessing dividend policy. The rst is more
comprehensive but the second is simpler.
Aswath Damodaran 447
I. The Cash/Trust Assessment
! Step 1: How much could the company have paid out during the period under
question?
! Step 2: How much did the the company actually pay out during the period in
question?
! Step 3: How much do I trust the management of this company with excess
cash?
How well did they make investments during the period in question?
How well has my stock performed during the period in question?
By paid out to stockholders in this phase of the analysis, we mean both
dividends and stock buybacks.
Aswath Damodaran 448
A Measure of How Much a Company Could have Afforded
to Pay out: FCFE
! The Free Cashow to Equity (FCFE) is a measure of how much cash is left in
the business after non-equity claimholders (debt and preferred stock) have
been paid, and after any reinvestment needed to sustain the rms assets and
future growth.
Net Income
+ Depreciation & Amortization
= Cash ows from Operations to Equity Investors
- Preferred Dividends
- Capital Expenditures
- Working Capital Needs
- Principal Repayments
+ Proceeds from New Debt Issues
= Free Cash ow to Equity
This cashow is
Free: because it cashow left over after debt payments and investment
needs have been met
To Equity Investors: because it is after payments to all non-equity
claimholders
In coming up with the numbers, we dene
Capital expenditures as including all capital investments. We do not
distinguish between discretionary and non-discretionary cap ex. Once
we assume growth in earnings, all cap ex is non-discretionary.
Working capital needs refers to the increase in non-cash working capital.
Aswath Damodaran 449
Estimating FCFE when Leverage is Stable
Net Income
- (1- ') (Capital Expenditures - Depreciation)
- (1- ') Working Capital Needs
= Free Cash ow to Equity
' = Debt/Capital Ratio
For this rm,
Proceeds from new debt issues = Principal Repayments + ' (Capital Expenditures -
Depreciation + Working Capital Needs)
When leverage is stable,
All principal repayments will come from new debt issues (since repaying
them with equity will lower the debt ratio)
New external nancing needs [Cap Ex - Depreciation + Change in non-
cash working capital] have to be nanced using the desired debt ratio
Adding the two together:
New Debt Issues = Principal Repayments + ' ( Cap Ex - Depreciation
+ Change in Non-cash Working Capital)
Substituting back into the FCFE equation on the previous page in the case
where there is no preferred dividend, we arrive at this formula. If there are
preferred dividends, they will be subtracted out to get to the FCFE.
Aswath Damodaran 450
An Example: FCFE Calculation
! Consider the following inputs for Microsoft in 1996. In 1996, Microsofts
FCFE was:
Net Income = $2,176 Million
Capital Expenditures = $494 Million
Depreciation = $ 480 Million
Change in Non-Cash Working Capital = $ 35 Million
Debt Ratio = 0%
! FCFE = Net Income - (Cap ex - Depr) (1-DR) - Chg WC (!-DR)
= $ 2,176 - (494 - 480) (1-0) - $ 35 (1-0)
= $ 2,127 Million
Note that Microsoft has almost no net cap ex. That is because their biggest
reinvestment expenditure is R&D, which is expensed to arrive at net income.
Aswath Damodaran 451
Microsoft: Dividends?
! By this estimation, Microsoft could have paid $ 2,127 Million in
dividends/stock buybacks in 1996. They paid no dividends and bought back
no stock. Where will the $2,127 million show up in Microsofts balance sheet?
It will show up in the cash balance. (The more common answer, which is
retained earnings, focuses on the wrong side of the balance sheet.) This excess
cash cannot be going into projects (since it is after cap ex) or R&D (since net
income is after R&D). Microsofts cash balance at the end of 1996 was $ 8
billion.
Microsoft kept doing this (paying out little or no dividends while generating
billions in FCFE) through 2003, accumulating a cash balance of $ 43 billion by
the end of that year. Finally, in 2004, Microsoft paid a huge dividend (of $ 5
billion).
Aswath Damodaran 452
Dividends versus FCFE: U.S.
Most rms pay less in dividends than they have available in FCFE. In recent
years, however, many of them have supplemented dividends with stock
buybacks, which return the cash, at irregular intervals, back to stockholders.
Aswath Damodaran 453
The Consequences of Failing to pay FCFE
Chrysler: FCFE, Dividends and Cash Balance
($500)
$0
$500
$1,000
$1,500
$2,000
$2,500
$3,000
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Year
C
a
s
h

F
lo
w
$0
$1,000
$2,000
$3,000
$4,000
$5,000
$6,000
$7,000
$8,000
$9,000
C
a
s
h

B
a
l
a
n
c
e
= Free CF to Equity = Cash to Stockholders Cumulated Cash
This shows the accumulation of a large cash balance at Chrysler. Starting with a
zero cash balance in 1985, I added back the difference between FCFE and
dividends each year to the cash balance. In the last few years, that difference has
led to an accumulation in cash.
This large cash balance, of course, was what triggered the attempt by Kirk
Kirkorian to take over Chrysler. While he failed, he did put sufcient pressure
on Chrysler to force them to increase dividends and buy back stock.
Note that while Chrysler has argued that it needs a large cash balance as a buffer
against the next recession, it used up only $ 0.5 billion during the 1990-91
recession.
Aswath Damodaran 454
! Application Test: Estimating your rms FCFE
In General, If cash ow statement used
Net Income Net Income
+ Depreciation & Amortization + Depreciation & Amortization
- Capital Expenditures + Capital Expenditures
- Change in Non-Cash Working Capital + Changes in Non-cash WC
- Preferred Dividend + Preferred Dividend
- Principal Repaid + Increase in LT Borrowing
+ New Debt Issued + Decrease in LT Borrowing
+ Change in ST Borrowing
= FCFE = FCFE
Compare to
Dividends (Common) -Common Dividend
+ Stock Buybacks - Decrease in Capital Stock
+ Increase in Capital Stock
Estimate the rms FCFE and compare to how much it returned to stockholders.
Aswath Damodaran 455
A Practical Framework for Analyzing Dividend Policy
How much did the rm pay out? How much could it have afforded to pay out?
What it could have paid out What it actually paid out
Net Income Dividends
- (Cap Ex - Depr!n) (1-DR) + Equity Repurchase
- Chg Working Capital (1-DR)
= FCFE
Firm pays out too little
FCFE > Dividends
Firm pays out too much
FCFE < Dividends
Do you trust managers in the company with
your cash?
Look at past project choice:
Compare ROE to Cost of Equity
ROC to WACC
What investment opportunities does the
rm have?
Look at past project choice:
Compare ROE to Cost of Equity
ROC to WACC
Firm has history of
good project choice
and good projects in
the future
Firm has history
of poor project
choice
Firm has good
projects
Firm has poor
projects
Give managers the
exibility to keep
cash and set
dividends
Force managers to
justify holding cash
or return cash to
stockholders
Firm should
cut dividends
and reinvest
more
Firm should deal
with its investment
problem rst and
then cut dividends
Most rms return less in cash than they have available to return. Whether they
will nd themselves under pressure (like Chrysler) or relatively untouched (like
Microsoft) will depend upon how much stockholders trust the managers of the
rm to use the cash wisely.
Stockholders will tend to be less aggressive about demanding that the cash be
returned to them for rms
With a good investment track record
In a sector with high returns
Where managers have substantial equity stakes in the rm
They will tend to be most aggressive when these conditions do not hold.
Aswath Damodaran 456
A Dividend Matrix
Quality of projects taken: ROE versus Cost of Equity
Poor projects Good projects
Cash Surplus + Good
Projects
Maximum flexibility in
setting dividend policy
Cash Surplus + Poor
Projects
Significant pressure to
pay out more to
stockholders as
dividends or stock
buybacks
Cash Deficit + Good
Projects
Reduce cash payout, if
any, to stockholders
Cash Deficit + Poor
Projects
Cut out dividends but
real problem is in
investment policy.
The freedom that a company will have with dividend policy is directly
proportional to its history in delivering high returns both on projects and to its
stockholders.
Aswath Damodaran 457
More on Microsoft
! As we noted earlier, Microsoft had accumulated a cash balance of $ 43 billion
by 2003 by paying out no dividends while generating huge FCFE. At the end
of 2003, there was no evidence that
Microsoft was being penalized for holding such a large cash balance
Stockholders were becoming restive about the cash balance. There was no hue and
cry demanding more dividends or stock buybacks.
! Why?
During that period, Microsoft also generated extraordinary returns on the
projects its took (ROE > cost of equity by more than 10%) and good returns for
its stockholders (Jensens alpha > 10%). Stockholders felt comfortable
leaving their cash in the company. (The fact that Bill Gates and Steve Ballmer
had substantial investments in the company was probably a contributing factor)
Aswath Damodaran 458
Microsofts big dividend in 2004
! In 2004, Microsoft announced a huge special dividend of $ 33 billion and
made clear that it would try to return more cash to stockholders in the future.
What do you think changed?
While the most obvious answer that comes to mind is the change in the dividend
tax rate, there was a strong contributing factor. Microsofts return on equity has
been dropping in recent years and many of Microsofts recent investments (in
entertainment and software) have not paid off The stock has not done much
over the last two years. Microsoft may be anticipating stockholder pressure and
being proactive.
Aswath Damodaran 459
Disney: An analysis of FCFE from 1994-2003
Year
Net
Income Depreciat i on
Capital
Expenditure s
Change in
non-cash
WC
FCFE
(before
debt CF)
Net CF
from Debt
FCFE
(after
Debt CF)
1994 $1,110.40 $1,608.30 $1,026.11 $654.10 $1,038.49 $551.10 $1,589.59
1995 $1,380.10 $1,853.00 $896.50 ($270.70) $2,607.30 $14.20 $2,621.50
1996 $1,214.00 $3,944.00 $13,464.00 $617.00 ($8,923.00) $8,688.00 ($235.00)
1997 $1,966.00 $4,958.00 $1,922.00 ($174.00) $5,176.00 ($1,641.00) $3,535.00
1998 $1,850.00 $3,323.00 $2,314.00 $939.00 $1,920.00 $618.00 $2,538.00
1999 $1,300.00 $3,779.00 $2,134.00 ($363.00) $3,308.00 ($176.00) $3,132.00
2000 $920.00 $2,195.00 $2,013.00 ($1,184.00) $2,286.00 ($2,118.00) $168.00
2001 ($158.00) $1,754.00 $1,795.00 $244.00 ($443.00) $77.00 ($366.00)
2002 $1,236.00 $1,042.00 $1,086.00 $27.00 $1,165.00 $1,892.00 $3,057.00
2003 $1,267.00 $1,077.00 $1,049.00 ($264.00) $1,559.00 ($1,145.00) $414.00
Average $1,208.55 $2,553.33 $2,769.96 $22.54 $969.38 $676.03 $1,645.41

Disney could have returned $ 969 million to its stockholders on an annual basis
between 1994 and 2003.
You could also get the approximate estimate of FCFE, using the average debt
ratio used by Disney during the period. The average would have been the same
using the longer approach to estimating FCFE, though the year to year numbers
would have been different.
Aswath Damodaran 460
Disneys Dividends and Buybacks from 1994 to 2003
Disney
Year Dividends (in $) Equity Repurchases (in
$)
Cash to Equity
1994 $153 $571 $724
1995 $180 $349 $529
1996 $271 $462 $733
1997 $342 $633 $975
1998 $412 $30 $442
1999 $0 $19 $19
2000 $434 $166 $600
2001 $438 $1,073 $1,511
2002 $428 $0 $428
2003 $429 $0 $429
Average $ 308.70 $ 330.30 $ 639

On average, Disney returned about $ 639 million each year to investors.
Aswath Damodaran 461
Disney: Dividends versus FCFE
! Disney paid out $ 330 million less in dividends (and stock buybacks) than it
could afford to pay out (Dividends and stock buybacks were $639 million;
FCFE before net debt issues was $969 million). How much cash do you think
Disney accumulated during the period?
Roughly speaking, the cash accumulated over the 10years amounts to 3,300
million, without interest (10 times $ 330 million). With interest income, the
accumulation would have been larger.
Aswath Damodaran 462
Disneys track record on projects and stockholder wealth
Over the entire period, Disneys stock has under performed the market (earning
only 8.27% ayear) and the return on equity earned by Disney of 7.50% has
lagged the cost of equity of 14.62%.
Aswath Damodaran 463
Can you trust Disneys management?
! Given Disneys track record over the last 10 years, if you were a Disney
stockholder, would you be comfortable with Disneys dividend policy?
# Yes
# No
The fact that Disney has underperformed the market both in terms of stock price
performance and return on equity suggests that stockholders are unlikely to
have much patience with Disney accumulating cash (afraid of what they will do
with the cash).
Aswath Damodaran 464
The Bottom Line on Disney Dividends
! Disney could have afforded to pay more in dividends during the period of the
analysis.
! It chose not to, and used the cash for acquisitions (Capital Cities/ABC) and ill
fated expansion plans (Go.com).
! While the company may have exibility to set its dividend policy a decade
ago, its actions over that decade have frittered away this exibility.
! Bottom line: Large cash balances will not be tolerated in this company.
Expect to face relentless pressure to pay out more dividends.
Disneys acquisition of ABC is a huge gamble. By taking cash that has
accumulated over time, and using this cash (in conjunction with new debt and
equity issues) to nance a large acquisition, Disney has essentially puts its chips
on the acquisition working out.
If it does not, stockholders will probably remember the acquisition and be much
less likely to let Disneys managers accumulate cash again. (This is what
happened in the aftermath of large failures like AT&Ts acquisition of NCR and
Kodaks acquisition of Sterling Drugs)
Aswath Damodaran 465
Aracruz: Dividends and FCFE: 1998-2003
Year
Net
Income Depreciation
Capital
Expenditures
Change in
non-cash
WC
FCFE
(before net
Debt CF)
Net Debt
Cashflow
FCFE
(after net
Debt CF)
1998 $3.45 $152.80 $88.31 $76.06 ($8.11) $174.27 $166.16
1999 $90.77 $158.83 $56.47 $2.18 $190.95 ($604.48) ($413.53)
2000 $201.71 $167.96 $219.37 $12.30 $138.00 ($292.07) ($154.07)
2001 $18.11 $162.57 $421.49 ($56.76) ($184.06) $318.24 $134.19
2002 $111.91 $171.50 $260.70 ($5.63) $28.34 $36.35 $64.69
2003 $148.09 $162.57 $421.49 ($7.47) ($103.37) $531.20 $427.83
Average $95.67 $162.70 $244.64 $3.45 $10.29 $27.25 $37.54

Aracruz could have paid out $37.54 million a year in dividends between 1998
and 2003.
Aswath Damodaran 466
Aracruz: Cash Returned to Stockholders
Year Net Income Dividends Payout Rati o FCFE Cash returned to
Stockholders
Cash Returned/FCFE
1998 $3. 45 $24.39 707.51% $166.16 $50.79 30.57%
1999 $90.77 $18.20 20.05% ($413.53) $18.20 NA
2000 $201.71 $57.96 28.74% ($154.07) $80.68 NA
2001 $18.11 $63.17 348.87% $134.19 $63.17 47.08%
2002 $111.91 $73.80 65.94% $64.69 $75.98 117.45%
2003 $148.09 $109.31 73.81% $427.83 $112.31 26.25%
1998-
2003
$574.04 $346.83 60.42% $225.27 $401.12 178.07%

Aracruz returned more cash to stockholders than it had available in FCFE. It
used its existing cash balance to make up the decit.
Aswath Damodaran 467
Aracruz: Stock and Project Returns
During this period, Aracruz earned an average return on equity of 5.68%, barely
in excess of its average cost of equity of 5.27% but an investor in its stock
would have seen an average annual return of 22.84% over the same period.
Aswath Damodaran 468
Aracruz: Its your call..
! Assume that you are a large stockholder in Aracruz. They have been paying
more in dividends than they have available in FCFE. Their project choice has
been acceptable and your stock has performed well over the period. Would
you accept a cut in dividends?
# Yes
# No
Aracruz can make a reasonable case that they should be cutting dividends and
reinvesting more back into the business Whether their investors will accept
this reasoning is a different issue.
Aswath Damodaran 469
Mandated Dividend Payouts
! There are many countries where companies are mandated to pay out a certain
portion of their earnings as dividends. Given our discussion of FCFE, what
types of companies will be hurt the most by these laws?
# Large companies making huge prots
# Small companies losing money
# High growth companies that are losing money
# High growth companies that are making money
It will most hurt high growth companies that are making money, and thus will be
mandated to pay out dividends, even though their FCFE is negative. Note that
while earnings are positive, the net cap ex needed to sustain growth might make
the F CFE a negative number.
Aswath Damodaran 470
BP: Dividends- 1983-92
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Net Income $1,256.00 $1,626.00 $2,309.00 $1,098.00 $2,076.00 $2,140.00 $2,542.00 $2,946.00 $712.00 $947.00
- (Cap. Exp - Depr)*(1-DR) $1,499.00 $1,281.00 $1,737.50 $1,600.00 $580.00 $1,184.00 $1,090.50 $1,975.50 $1,545.50 $1,100.00
$ Working Capital*(1-DR) $369.50 ($286.50) $678.50 $82.00 ($2,268.00) ($984.50) $429.50 $1,047.50 ($305.00) ($415.00)
= Free CF to Equity ($612.50) $631.50 ($107.00) ($584.00) $3,764.00 $1,940.50 $1,022.00 ($77.00) ($528.50) $262.00
Dividends $831.00 $949.00 $1,079.00 $1,314.00 $1,391.00 $1,961.00 $1,746.00 $1,895.00 $2,112.00 $1,685.00
+ Equity Repurchases
= Cash to Stockholders $831.00 $949.00 $1,079.00 $1,314.00 $1,391.00 $1,961.00 $1,746.00 $1,895.00 $2,112.00 $1,685.00
Dividend Ratios
Payout Ratio 66.16% 58.36% 46.73% 119.67% 67.00% 91.64% 68.69% 64.32% 296.63% 177.93%
Cash Paid as % of FCFE -135.67% 150.28% -1008.41% -225.00% 36.96% 101.06% 170.84% -2461.04% -399.62% 643.13%
Performance Ratios
1. Accounting Measure
ROE 9.58% 12.14% 19.82% 9.25% 12.43% 15.60% 21.47% 19.93% 4.27% 7.66%
Required rate of return 19.77% 6.99% 27.27% 16.01% 5.28% 14.72% 26.87% -0.97% 25.86% 7.12%
Difference -10.18% 5.16% -7.45% -6.76% 7.15% 0.88% -5.39% 20.90% -21.59% 0.54%
Note the year to year swings in FCFE.
Note also that the required returns are computed each year using the actual
returns on the market each year.
Aswath Damodaran 471
BP: Summary of Dividend Policy
Summary of calculations
Average Standard Deviation Maximum Minimum
Free CF to Equity $571.10 $1,382.29 $3,764.00 ($612.50)
Dividends $1,496.30 $448.77 $2,112.00 $831.00
Dividends+Repurchases $1,496.30 $448.77 $2,112.00 $831.00
Dividend Payout Ratio 84.77%
Cash Paid as % of FCFE 262.00%
ROE - Required return -1.67% 11.49% 20.90% -21.59%
BP clearly paid out more than it could have afforded to during this period. It
nanced the shortfall (in each year except 1987, when it issued stock) by
borrowing money.
Aswath Damodaran 472
BP: Just Desserts!
While it is pretty clear the BP should cut dividends, the stock price response
was not positive when it did. This reects the fact that investor clienteles cannot
be changed overnight. In BPs case, its history of high dividends had attracted
investors who liked the high dividends. When they cut the dividends, these
investors sold and a new clientele moved in, but not immediately. (It took a few
months)
In hindsight, BP became a much healthier rm, with higher returns and lower
leverage, after the dividend cut.
Aswath Damodaran 473
The Limited: Summary of Dividend Policy: 1983-1992
Summary of calculations
Average Standard Deviation Maximum Minimum
Free CF to Equity ($34.20) $109.74 $96.89 ($242.17)
Dividends $40.87 $32.79 $101.36 $5.97
Dividends+Repurchases $40.87 $32.79 $101.36 $5.97
Dividend Payout Ratio 18.59%
Cash Paid as % of FCFE -119.52%
ROE - Required return 1.69% 19.07% 29.26% -19.84%
A rm with negative FCFE should not pay dividends, especially when its
projects earn excess returns.
Aswath Damodaran 474
Growth Firms and Dividends
! High growth rms are sometimes advised to initiate dividends because its
increases the potential stockholder base for the company (since there are some
investors - like pension funds - that cannot buy stocks that do not pay
dividends) and, by extension, the stock price. Do you agree with this
argument?
# Yes
# No
Why?
No. For every investor that these rms gain because they pay dividends, they
lose more than one investor who will not buy the stock any more because the
rm pays dividends.
Besides, rms which cannot afford to pay dividends should not be attracting a
clientele that wants and likes dividends.
Aswath Damodaran 475
Summing up
ROE - Cost of Equity
Cash Returned < FCFE
Cash Returned > FCFE
Good Projects Poor Projects
Flexibility to
accumulate
cash
Cut payout
Invest in Projects
Increase payout
Reduce Investment
Cut payout
Reduce Investment
Figure 11.5: Analyzing Dividend Policy
Aracruz
Microsoft
Disney

Summarizes the discussion from the last few pages
Aswath Damodaran 476
! Application Test: Assessing your rms dividend policy
! Compare your rms dividends to its FCFE, looking at the last 5 years of
information.
! Based upon your earlier analysis of your rms project choices, would you
encourage the rm to return more cash or less cash to its owners?
! If you would encourage it to return more cash, what form should it take
(dividends versus stock buybacks)?
Aswath Damodaran 477
II. The Peer Group Approach - Disney
Company Name Dividend Yield Dividend Payout
Astral Media Inc. 'A' 0.00% 0.00%
Belo Corp. 'A' 1.34% 34.13%
CanWest Global Comm. Corp. 0.00% 0.00%
Cinram Intl Inc 0.00% 0.00%
Clear Channel 0.85% 35.29%
Cox Radio 'A' Inc 0.00% 0.00%
Cumulus Media Inc 0.00% 0.00%
Disney (Walt) 0.90% 32.31%
Emmis Communications 0.00% 0.00%
Entercom Comm. Corp 0.00% 0.00%
Fox Entmt Group Inc 0.00% 0.00%
Hearst-Argyle Television Inc 0.00% 0.00%
InterActiveCorp 0.00% 0.00%
Liberty Media 'A' 0.00% 0.00%
Lin TV Corp. 0.00% 0.00%
Metro Goldwyn Mayer 0.00% 0.00%
Pixar 0.00% 0.00%
Radio One INC. 0.00% 0.00%
Regal Entertainment Group 2.70% 66.57%
Sinclair Broadcast 0.00% 0.00%
Sirius Satellite 0.00% 0.00%
Time Warner 0.00% 0.00%
Univision Communic. 0.00% 0.00%
Viacom Inc. 'B' 0.56% 19.00%
Westwood One 0.00% 0.00%
XM Satellite `A' 0.00% 0.00%
Average 0.24% 7.20%

We dened comparable rms as entertainment companies with market cap > $ 1
billion. The average dividend yield of these companies is 0.24% and the average
payout ratio is 7.20%. A simple comparison with Disneys dividend yield of
0.90% and payout ratio of 32.315 would indicate that Disney is paying too
much in dividends. (But is this fair? Disney is larger, more mature and more
stable than most of the companies in this group)
Aswath Damodaran 478
Peer Group Approach: Deutsche Bank
Name Dividend Yield Dividend Payout
Banca Intesa Spa 1.57% 167.50%
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argenta 0.00% 0.00%
Banco Santander Central Hisp 0.00% 0.00%
Barclays Plc 3.38% 35.61%
Bnp Paribas 0.00% 0.00%
Deutsche Bank Ag -Reg 1.98% 481.48%
Erste Bank Der Oester Spark 0.99% 24.31%
Hbos Plc 2.85% 27.28%
Hsbc Holdings Plc 2.51% 39.94%
Lloyds Tsb Group Plc 7.18% 72.69%
Royal Bank Of Scotland Group 3.74% 38.73%
Sanpaolo Imi Spa 0.00% 0.00%
Societe Generale 0.00% 0.00%
Standard Chartered Plc 3.61% 46.35%
Unicredito Italiano Spa 0.00% 0.00%
Average 1.85% 62.26%

Deutsche has a dividend yield very similar to the average but its dividend payout
ratio is off the charts
Aswath Damodaran 479
Peer Group Approach: Aracruz
Group
Dividend
Yi el d
Dividend
Payout
Latin Americ a 2. 86% 41. 34%
Emerging
Market 2. 03% 22. 16%
U S 1. 14% 28. 82%
All paper and
pulp 1. 75% 34. 55%
Aracruz 3. 00% 37. 41%

Aracruz pays dividends that are similar to other Latin American paper and pulp
companies but much higher dividends than paper companies elsewhere in the
world. This may be the price paid by voting shareholders in the company to
maintain their voting privileges. (At most Brazilian companies, the failure to pay
a mandated ratio (35% generally) can lead to non-voting shares being granted
voting rights).
Aswath Damodaran 480
A High Growth Bank?
! Assume that you are advising a small high-growth bank, which is concerned
about the fact that its dividend payout and yield are much lower than other
banks. The CEO of the bank is concerned that investors will punish the bank
for its dividend policy. What do you think?
a. I think that the bank will be punished for its errant dividend policy
b. I think that investors are sophisticated enough for the bank to be treated fairly
c. I think that the bank will not be punished for its low dividends as long as it tries to
convey information to its investors about the quality of its projects and growth
prospects.
While I would love to believe that markets are efcient and that the bank will not
be punished, this will happen only if the bank works at explaining why it has
low dividends.
Aswath Damodaran 481
Going beyond averages Looking at the market
! Regressing dividend yield and payout against expected growth yields:
PYT = 0.3889 - 0.738 CPXFR - 0.214 INS + 0.193 DFR - 0.747 EGR
(20.41) (3.42) (3.41) (4.80) (8.12) R
2
= 18.30%
YLD = 0.0205 - 0.058 CPXFR - 0.012 INS + 0.0200 DFR - 0.047 EGR
(22.78) (5.87) (3.66) (9.45) (11.53) R
2
= 28.5%
PYT = Dividend Payout Ratio = Dividends/Net Income
YLD = Dividend Yield = Dividends/Current Price
CPXFR = Capital Expenditures / Book Value of Total Assets
EGR = Expected growth rate in earnings over next 5 years (analyst estimates)
DFR = Debt / (Debt + Market Value of Equity)
INS = Insider holdings as a percent of outstanding stock
Higher growth companies tend to pay lower dividends. These simple
regressions allow us to adjust payout ratios and yields for differences across
entertainment companies. Based upon this analysis, it looks like Disney is
paying out too much in dividends.
Aswath Damodaran 482
Disney and Aracruz ADR vs US Market
! For Disney
Payout Ratio = 0.3889 - 0.738 (0.021)- 0.214 (0.026) + 0.193 (0.2102) - 0.747
(0.08) = 34.87%
Dividend Yield = 0.0205 - 0.058 (0.021)- 0.012 (0.026) + 0.0200 (0.2102)- 0.047
(0.08)= 1.94%
Disney is paying out too little in dividends, with its payout ratio of 32.31% and its
dividend yield of 0.91%
! For Aracruz ADR
Payout Ratio = 0.3889 - 0.738 (0.02)- 0.214 (0.20) + 0.193 (0.31) - 0.747 (0.23) =
21.71%
Dividend Yield = 0.0205 - 0.058 (0.02)- 0.012 (0.20)+ 0.0200 (0.31)- 0.047 (0.23)
= 1.22%
Aracruz is paying out too much in dividends, with its payout ratio of 37.41% and its
dividend yield of 3%
Two things to note:
1. The low R-squared on the regressions will create large prediction ranges.
Disney may very well be paying out the right amount in dividends (at least
for the payout ratio) when we consider this.
2. This is a comparison of the Aracruz ADR against the US market. It would
be interesting to see how Aracruz measures up against the Brazilian market.
Aswath Damodaran 483
Other Actions that affect Stock Prices
! In the case of dividends and stock buybacks, rms change the value of the
assets (by paying out cash) and the number of shares (in the case of buybacks).
! There are other actions that rms can take to change the value of their
stockholders equity.
Divestitures: They can sell assets to another rm that can utilize them more
efciently, and claim a portion of the value.
Spin offs: In a spin off, a division of a rm is made an independent entity. The
parent company has to give up control of the rm.
Equity carve outs: In an ECO, the division is made a semi-independent entity. The
parent company retains a controlling interest in the rm.
Tracking Stock: When tracking stock are issued against a division, the parent
company retains complete control of the division. It does not have its own board of
directors.
Aswath Damodaran 484
Differences in these actions
Aswath Damodaran 485
Valuation
Aswath Damodaran
Aswath Damodaran 486
First Principles
! Invest in projects that yield a return greater than the minimum acceptable
hurdle rate.
The hurdle rate should be higher for riskier projects and reect the nancing mix
used - owners funds (equity) or borrowed money (debt)
Returns on projects should be measured based on cash ows generated and the
timing of these cash ows; they should also consider both positive and negative
side effects of these projects.
! Choose a nancing mix that minimizes the hurdle rate and matches the assets
being nanced.
! If there are not enough investments that earn the hurdle rate, return the cash to
stockholders.
The form of returns - dividends and stock buybacks - will depend upon the
stockholders characteristics.
Objective: Maximize the Value of the Firm
Aswath Damodaran 487
Discounted Cashow Valuation: Basis for Approach
where,
n = Life of the asset
CF
t
= Cashow in period t
r = Discount rate reecting the riskiness of the estimated cashows
Value =
CF
t
(1+ r)
t
t =1
t = n
!
The value of any asset is the present value of the expected cash ows on the
assets.
Aswath Damodaran 488
Equity Valuation
! The value of equity is obtained by discounting expected cashows to equity,
i.e., the residual cashows after meeting all expenses, tax obligations and
interest and principal payments, at the cost of equity, i.e., the rate of return
required by equity investors in the rm.
where,
CF to Equityt = Expected Cashow to Equity in period t
ke = Cost of Equity
! The dividend discount model is a specialized case of equity valuation, and
the value of a stock is the present value of expected future dividends.
Value of Equity =
CF to Equity
t
(1+ k
e
)
t
t=1
t=n
!
The value of equity is the present value of cash ows to the equity investors
discounted back at the rate of return that those equity investors need to make to
break even (the cost of equity).
In the strictest sense of the word, the only cash ow stockholders in a publicly
traded rm get from their investment is dividends, and the dividend discount
model is the simplest and most direct version of an equity valuation model.
Aswath Damodaran 489
Firm Valuation
! The value of the rm is obtained by discounting expected cashows to the
rm, i.e., the residual cashows after meeting all operating expenses and
taxes, but prior to debt payments, at the weighted average cost of capital,
which is the cost of the different components of nancing used by the rm,
weighted by their market value proportions.
where,
CF to Firmt = Expected Cashow to Firm in period t
WACC = Weighted Average Cost of Capital
Value of Firm =
CF to Firm
t
(1+ WACC)
t
t=1
t=n
!
A rm includes not just the equity, but all claim holders. The cash ow to the
rm is the collective cash ow that all claim holders make from the rm, and it is
discounted at the weighted average of their different costs.
Aswath Damodaran 490
Generic DCF Valuation Model
Cash flows
Firm: Pre-debt cash
flow
Equity: After debt
cash flows
Expected Growth
Firm: Growth in
Operating Earnings
Equity: Growth in
Net Income/EPS
CF1 CF2 CF3 CF4 CF5
Forever
Firm is in stable growth:
Grows at constant rate
forever
Terminal Value
CFn
.........
Discount Rate
Firm:Cost of Capital
Equity: Cost of Equity
Value
Firm: Value of Firm
Equity: Value of Equity
DISCOUNTED CASHFLOW VALUATION
Length of Period of High Growth
Sets up the basic inputs:
1. Discount rates
2. Cash ows
3. Expected Growth
4. Length of the period that they can sustain a growth rate higher than the
growth rate of the economy.
Aswath Damodaran 491
Estimating Inputs:
I. Discount Rates
! Critical ingredient in discounted cashow valuation. Errors in estimating the
discount rate or mismatching cashows and discount rates can lead to serious
errors in valuation.
! At an intuitive level, the discount rate used should be consistent with both the
riskiness and the type of cashow being discounted.
! The cost of equity is the rate at which we discount cash ows to equity
(dividends or free cash ows to equity). The cost of capital is the rate at
which we discount free cash ows to the rm.
Recaps what we stated when we talked about investment analysis.
Aswath Damodaran 492
Estimating Aracruzs Cost of Equity
! We will do the Aracruz valuation in U.S. dollars. We will therefore use a U.S.
dollar cost of equity.
! We estimated a beta for equity of 0.7576 for the paper business that Aracruz.
With a nominal U.S. dollar riskfree rate of 4% and an equity risk premium of
12.49% for Brazil, we arrive at a dollar cost of equity of 13.46%
Cost of equity = 4% + 0.7576 (12.49%) = 13.46%
We used the equity beta of just the operating assets in this valuation.
If we had chosen to include the cash from financial holdings as part of
net income, we would have used Aracruzs consolidated equity beta of
0.7040.
Aswath Damodaran 493
Estimating Cost of Equity: Deutsche Bank
! Deutsche Bank is in two different segments of business - commercial banking
and investment banking.
To estimate its commercial banking beta, we will use the average beta of
commercial banks in Germany.
To estimate the investment banking beta, we will use the average bet of investment
banks in the U.S and U.K.
! To estimate the cost of equity in Euros, we will use the German 10-year bond
rate of 4.05% as the riskfree rate and the US historical risk premium (4.82%)
as our proxy for a mature market premium.
Business Beta Cost of Equity Weights
Commercial Banking 0.7345 7.59% 69.03%
Investment Banking 1.5167 11.36% 30.97%
Deutsche Bank 8.76%
This reproduces the botttom-up beta for Deutsche Bank, looking at other
commercial banks in Germany, and investment banks in the US and UK.
The cost of equity is estimated in nominal DM.
Aswath Damodaran 494
Reviewing Disneys Costs of Equity & Debt
! Disneys Cost of Debt (based upon rating) = 5.25%
! Disneys tax rate = 37.3%
Business Unlevered Beta
D/E
Ratio
Levered
Beta
Cost of
Equity
Media Networks 1.0850 26.62% 1.2661 10.10%
Parks and
Resorts 0.9105 26.62% 1.0625 9.12%
Studio
Entertainment 1.1435 26.62% 1.3344 10.43%
Consumer
Products 1.1353 26.62% 1.3248 10.39%
Disney 1.0674 26.62% 1.2456 10.00%

This is a reproduction of a page that we used to estimate costs of capital for
Disney divisions as part of the investment analysis section.
Aswath Damodaran 495
Current Cost of Capital: Disney
! Equity
Cost of Equity = Riskfree rate + Beta * Risk Premium
= 4% + 1.25 (4.82%) = 10.00%
Market Value of Equity = $55.101 Billion
Equity/(Debt+Equity ) = 79%
! Debt
After-tax Cost of debt =(Riskfree rate + Default Spread) (1-t)
= (4%+1.25%) (1-.373) = 3.29%
Market Value of Debt = $ 14.668 Billion
Debt/(Debt +Equity) = 21%
! Cost of Capital = 10.00%(.79)+3.29%(.21) = 8.59%
55.101(55.101+14.
668)
This reproduces the current cost of capital computation for Disney, using
market value weights for both debt and equity, the cost of equity (based upon
the bottom-up beta) and the cost of debt (based upon the bond rating)
The market value of debt is estimated by estimating the present value of total
interest payments and face value at the current cost of debt.
One way to frame the capital structure question: Is there a mix of debt and
equity at which Disneys cost of capital will be lower than 12.22%?
Aswath Damodaran 496
II. Estimating Cash Flows
Cash Flows
To Equity To Firm
The Strict View
Dividends +
Stock Buybacks
The Broader View
Net Income
- Net Cap Ex (1-Debt Ratio)
- Chg WC (1 - Debt Ratio)
= Free Cashflow to Equity
EBIT (1-t)
- ( Cap Ex - Depreciation)
- Change in Working Capital
= Free Cashflow to Firm
Shows the three different cash ows that can be used in valuation.
Cap Ex includes acquisitions and the effect of R&D. (R&D is capitalized)
Aswath Damodaran 497
Estimating FCFE last year: Aracruz
2003 numbers Normalized
Net Income from operating assets $119.68 million $ 119.68 million
- Net Capital Expenditures (1-DR) $ 37.31 million $ 71.45 million
-Chg. Working Capital*(1-DR) $ 3.05 million $ 7.50 million
Free Cashow to Equity $ 79.32 million $ 40.73 million
DR = Debt Ratio = Industry average book debt to capital ratio = 55.98%
Equity Reinvestment = 71.45 million + 7.50 million = $ 78.95 million
Equity Reinvestment Rate = 78.95/ 119.68 = 65.97%
Aracruz has had a volatile history of reinvesting a great deal in some years and
not at all in others. The normalized net cap ex and non-cash working capital
numbers were estimated as follows:
1. We looked at aggregate net cap and changes in non-cash working capital as
a percent of aggregate net income between 1998 and 2003. We used these
percentages to compute the net cap ex and change in non-cash working
capital in 2003, but multiplying this percent by the net income for 2003.
Net Cap Ex Normalized = Net Cap Ex as percent of Net Income
98-03
* Net
Income
2003
= 135.61% * 119.68 = 162.30 million
Non-cash WC change normalized = Non-cash WC as percent of Net
Income
98-03
* Net Income
2003
= 6.27%* 119.68 = 17.04 million
1. We used an industry average book debt ratio of 55.98% to compute the
equity investment each year in net cap ex and change in working capital.
Net Cap Ex Normalized (1 - Debt Ratio) = 162.30 (1-.5598) = 71.45
million
Non-cash WC Normalized (1 - Debt Ratio) = 17.04 (1-.5598) = 7.50
millionn
Aswath Damodaran 498
Estimating FCFF in 2003: Disney
! EBIT = $ 2,805 Million Tax rate = 37.30%
! Capital spending = $ 1,735 Million
! Depreciation = $ 1,254 Million
! Increase in Non-cash Working capital = $ 454 Million
! Estimating FCFF
EBIT * (1 - tax rate) $1,759 : 2805 (1-.373)
- Net Capital Expenditures $481 : (1735 - 1254)
-Change in Working Capital $454
Free Cashow to Firm $824
! Total Reinvestment = Net Cap Ex + Change in WC = 481 + 454 = 935
! Reinvestment Rate =935/1759 = 53.18%
The working capital change is rather large. We might need to normalize before
we start forecasting the cash ows.
Aswath Damodaran 499
! Application Test: Estimating your rms FCFF
! Estimate the FCFF for your rm in its most recent nancial year:
In general, If using statement of cash ows
EBIT (1-t) EBIT (1-t)
+ Depreciation + Depreciation
- Capital Expenditures + Capital Expenditures
- Change in Non-cash WC + Change in Non-cash WC
= FCFF = FCFF
Estimate the dollar reinvestment at your rm:
Reinvestment = EBIT (1-t) - FCFF
Again, include acquisitions as part of cap ex.
Aswath Damodaran 500
Choosing a Cash Flow to Discount
! When you cannot estimate the free cash lows to equity or the rm, the only
cash ow that you can discount is dividends. For nancial service rms, it is
difcult to estimate free cash ows. For Deutsche Bank, we will be
discounting dividends.
! If a rms debt ratio is not expected to change over time, the free cash ows
to equity can be discounted to yield the value of equity. For Aracruz, we will
discount free cash ows to equity.
! If a rms debt ratio might change over time, free cash ows to equity
become cumbersome to estimate. Here, we would discount free cash ows to
the rm. For Disney, we will discount the free cash ow to the rm.
As a general rule, we should use a free cash ow (rather than a dividend) to
discount, if we can estimate the free cash ow. It is difcult to estimate cap ex
and working capital for a nancial service rm.
When leverage is changing, we need to forecast debt repayments and new debt
issues to estimate the free cash ow to equity. The free cash ow to the rm can
be estimated much more directly.
Aswath Damodaran 501
III. Expected Growth
Expected Growth
Net Income Operating Income
Retention Ratio=
1 - Dividends/Net
Income
Return on Equity
Net Income/Book Value of
Equity
X
Reinvestment
Rate = (Net Cap
Ex + Chg in
WC/EBIT(1-t)
Return on Capital =
EBIT(1-t)/Book Value of
Capital
X
Note that the approaches are similar, with the only difference being in how we
dene how much the rm reinvests and how well it reinvests.
Aswath Damodaran 502
Expected Growth in EPS
g
EPS
= Retained Earnings
t-1
/ NI
t-1
* ROE
= Retention Ratio * ROE
= b * ROE
Proposition 1: The expected growth rate in earnings for a company
cannot exceed its return on equity in the long term.
In the short term, improvements in return on equity will translate into more than
proportional increases in expected growth in earnings. In fact, the expected
growth in earnings per share in any year can be written as:
g
EPS
= b *ROE
t+1
+{(ROE
t+1
ROE
t
)BV of Equity
t
)/ROE
t
(BV of Equity
t
)}
Note that the larger the rm, the greater the effect (in either direction) of changes
in ROE.
Aswath Damodaran 503
Estimating Expected Growth in EPS: Deutsche Bank
! In 2003, Deutsche Bank reported net income of $1,365 million on a book value of equity of $29,991
million at the end of 2002.
Return on Equity = Net Income
2003
/ Book Value of Equity
2002
= 1365/29,991 = 4.55%
! This is lower than the cost of equity for the rm, which is 8.76%, and the average return on equity
for European banks, which is 11.26%. In the four quarters ended in March 2004, Deutsche Bank
paid out dividends per share of 1.50 Euros on earnings per share of 4.33 Euros.
Retention Ratio = 1 Dividends per share/ Earnings per share = 1 1.50/4.33 = 65.36%
! If Deutsche maintains its existing return on equity and retention ratio for the long term, its expected
growth rate will be anemic.
Expected Growth Rate= Retention Ratio * ROE = .6536*.0455 = 2.97%
! For the next ve years, we will assume that the return on equity will improve to the industry average
of 11.26% while the retention ratio will stay unchanged at 65.36%. The expected growth in earnings
per share is 7.36%.
Expected Growth Rate
Modied Fundamentals
= .6536 * .1126 = .0736
Note that what we need are estimates for the future. While we might start with
the base year estimates, nothing in valuation requires us to stay with these inputs.
Aswath Damodaran 504
Estimating Expected Growth in Net Income: Aracruz
! Rather than base the equity reinvestment rate on the most recent years numbers, we
will use the average values for each of the variables over the last 6 years to compute a
normalized equity reinvestment rate:
Normalized Equity Reinvestment Rate = Average Equity Reinvestment
99-03
/ Average Net
Income
99-03
= 213.17/323.12 = 65.97%
! To estimate the return on equity, we look at only the portion of the net income that
comes from operations (ignoring the income from cash and marketable securities) and
divide by the book value of equity net of cash and marketable securities.
Non-cash ROE = (Net Income After-tax Interest income on cash)
2003
/ (BV of Equity
Cash)
2002
Non-cash ROE
Aracruz
= (148.09 43.04(1-.34))/ (1760.58-273.93) = .0805 or 8.05%
! Expected Growth in Net Income = Equity Reinvestment Rate * Non-cash ROE
= 65.97% * 8.05% = 5.31%
Aracruz had net income of $148.09 million in 2003, interest income
before taxes of $43.04 million and faced a tax rate of 34%. The book
value of equity at the end of 2002 was $1760.58 million, of which cash
represented $273.93 million.
Aswath Damodaran 505
ROE and Leverage
! ROE = ROC + D/E (ROC - i (1-t))
where,
ROC = (EBIT (1 - tax rate)) / Book Value of Capital
= EBIT (1- t) / Book Value of Capital
D/E = BV of Debt/ BV of Equity
i = Interest Expense on Debt / Book Value of Debt
t = Tax rate on ordinary income
! Note that BV of Capital = BV of Debt + BV of Equity.
Leverage will have a positive effect on expected growth as long as the projects
taken with the leverage earn more than the after-tax cost of debt.
Again, while we need to use book values if our objective is to explain past
growth, looking forward, we need to make the best estimates we can for each of
these inputs.
Aswath Damodaran 506
Decomposing ROE
! Assume that you are analyzing a company with a 15% return on capital, an
after-tax cost of debt of 5% and a book debt to capital ratio of 100%. Estimate
the ROE for this company.
! Now assume that another company in the same sector has the same ROE as
the company that you have just analyzed but no debt. Will these two rms
have the same growth rates in earnings per share if they have the same
dividend payout ratio?
! Will they have the same equity value?
The return on equity for the rst rm = 15% + 1 (15% -5%)= 25%
The two rms, if they have the same ROE and retention ratio, will have the same
earnings per share growth rate.
However, the rst rm will have a higher cost of equity, since it has the higher
debt ratio, and thus a lower equity value.
Aswath Damodaran 507
Expected Growth in EBIT And Fundamentals
! Reinvestment Rate and Return on Capital
g
EBIT
= (Net Capital Expenditures + Change in WC)/EBIT(1-t) * ROC
= Reinvestment Rate * ROC
! Proposition 2: No rm can expect its operating income to grow over time
without reinvesting some of the operating income in net capital expenditures
and/or working capital.
! Proposition 3: The net capital expenditure needs of a rm, for a given growth
rate, should be inversely proportional to the quality of its investments.
The reinvestment rate and the return on capital should be forward-looking
numbers, rather than what they were last year.
Aswath Damodaran 508
Estimating Growth in EBIT: Disney
! We begin by estimating the reinvestment rate and return on capital for Disney
in 2003, using the numbers from the latest nancial statements. We did
convert operating leases into debt and adjusted the operating income and
capital expenditure accordingly.
Reinvestment Rate
2003
= (Cap Ex Depreciation + Chg in non-cash WC)/ EBIT (1-
t) = (1735 1253 + 454)/(2805(1-.373)) = 53.18%
Return on capital
2003
= EBIT (1-t)
2003
/ (BV of Debt
2002
+ BV of Equity
2002
) =
2805 (1-.373)/ (15,883+23,879) = 4.42%
Expected Growth Rate from existing fundamentals = 53.18% * 4.42% = 2.35%
! We will assume that Disney will be able to earn a return on capital of 12% on
its new investments and that the reinvestment rate will be 53.18% for the
immediate future.
Expected Growth Rate in operating income = Return on capital * Reinvestment
Rate = 12% * .5318 = 6.38%
The book value of debt is augmented by the $1,753 million in present
value of operating lease commitments. The unadjusted operating
income for Disney was $2,713 million. The operating lease adjustment
adds the inputted interest expense on the PV of operating leases to the
operating income (5.25% of $1753 million= $92 million), the current
years operating lease expense to capital expenditures ($556 million)
and the depreciation on the leased asset to depreciation ($195 million).
Disney earned a return on capital of 19% prior to its acquisition of
Cap Cities. Since then, the return on capital has been in a downward
spiral and 9/11 made the spiral worse. The reinvestment rate has also
jumped around, with acquisitions driving reinvestment up in some
years above 100%.
Aswath Damodaran 509
! Application Test: Estimating Expected Growth
! Estimate the following:
The reinvestment rate for your rm
The after-tax return on capital
The expected growth in operating income, based upon these inputs
Aswath Damodaran 510
IV. Getting Closure in Valuation
! A publicly traded rm potentially has an innite life. The value is therefore
the present value of cash ows forever.
! Since we cannot estimate cash ows forever, we estimate cash ows for a
growth period and then estimate a terminal value, to capture the value at the
end of the period:
Value =
CF
t
(1+ r)
t
t = 1
t = !
"
Value =
CF
t
(1 + r)
t
+
Terminal Value
(1 + r)
N
t = 1
t = N
!
Firms have innite lives. Since we cannot estimate cash ows forever, we
assume a constant growth rate forever as a way of closing off the valuation.
A very commonly used variant is to use a multiple of the terminal years
earnings. This brings an element of relative valuation into the analysis. In a pure
DCF model, the terminal value has to be estimated with a stable growth rate.
Aswath Damodaran 511
Stable Growth and Terminal Value
! When a rms cash ows grow at a constant rate forever, the present value
of those cash ows can be written as:
Value = Expected Cash Flow Next Period / (r - g)
where,
r = Discount rate (Cost of Equity or Cost of Capital)
g = Expected growth rate
! This constant growth rate is called a stable growth rate and cannot be higher
than the growth rate of the economy in which the rm operates.
! While companies can maintain high growth rates for extended periods, they
will all approach stable growth at some point in time.
! When they do approach stable growth, the valuation formula above can be
used to estimate the terminal value of all cash ows beyond.
If the stable growth rate is set below the growth rate of the economy (as it
should be), you should never nd g to be greater than r, which leads to absurd
values.
Aswath Damodaran 512
Growth Patterns
! A key assumption in all discounted cash ow models is the period of high
growth, and the pattern of growth during that period. In general, we can make
one of three assumptions:
there is no high growth, in which case the rm is already in stable growth
there will be high growth for a period, at the end of which the growth rate will
drop to the stable growth rate (2-stage)
there will be high growth for a period, at the end of which the growth rate will
decline gradually to a stable growth rate(3-stage)
! The assumption of how long high growth will continue will depend upon
several factors including:
the size of the rm (larger rm -> shorter high growth periods)
current growth rate (if high -> longer high growth period)
barriers to entry and differential advantages (if high -> longer growth period)
This is the shakiest area of valuation. The high growth period should be a
function of a rms capacity to earn excess returns and erect and maintain
barriers to entry. This is where corporate strategy meets corporate valuation.
Aswath Damodaran 513
Length of High Growth Period
! Assume that you are analyzing two rms, both of which are enjoying high
growth. The rst rm is Earthlink Network, an internet service provider,
which operates in an environment with few barriers to entry and extraordinary
competition. The second rm is Biogen, a bio-technology rm which is
enjoying growth from two drugs to which it owns patents for the next decade.
Assuming that both rms are well managed, which of the two rms would
you expect to have a longer high growth period?
# Earthlink Network
# Biogen
# Both are well managed and should have the same high growth period
I would expect Biogen to grow longer, because its barrier to entry (patent) is
much stronger and easier to maintain.
Aswath Damodaran 514
Choosing a Growth Period: Examples
Disney Aracruz Deutsche Bank
Firm Size/Market Size Firm is one of the largest players in the
entertainment and theme park
businesses but the businesses are
redefining themselves and expanding.
Firm has a small market share of the
paper/pulp business, but the business is
mature.
Firm has a significant market share of a
mature business.
Current Excess Returns Firm is earning less than its cost of
capital, and has done so for last fe w
years
Returns on capital are largely a function
of paper/pulp pric es but, on averag e,
have been less than the cost of capital.
Firm has a return on equity that has
lagged its cost of equity in recent years.
Competitive Advantages Has some of the most recognized brand
names in the world. Knows more about
operating theme parks than any other
firm in the world. Has skilled animation
studio staff.
Cost advantages because of access to
Brazilian rainforests. Has invested in
newer, updated plants and has skilled
workforce.
Has an edge in the commercial banking
business in Germany but this advantage
is dissipating in the EU.
Length of High Growth period 10 years, entirely because of its strong
competitive advantages (which have
been wasted over the last few years) but
the excess returns are likely to be small.
5 years, largely due to access to cheap
raw material.
5 years, mostly to allow firms to recover
to pre-downturn levels.

I would not be inclined to use growth periods longer than 10 years. While there
are rms like IBM, Microsoft and Coca Cola which have been able to sustain
growth for much longer periods, they are more the exception than the rule. Most
rms are able to maintain high growth for shorter periods.
I am going to use rm valuation for Disney, because I expect leverage to
change, and rm valuation is simpler when that occurs
For Aracruz, I will use FCFE, since I do not expect leverage to change,
and do the analysis in real terms, to avoid having to deal with expected
ination in BR
For Deutsche Bank, where it is difcult to estimate free cash ows, I will
use dividends and make the assumptions that dividends over time will be
equal to FCFE.
Aswath Damodaran 515
Firm Characteristics as Growth Changes
Variable High Growth Firms tend to Stable Growth Firms tend to
Risk be above-average risk be average risk
Dividend Payout pay little or no dividends pay high dividends
Net Cap Ex have high net cap ex have low net cap ex
Return on Capital earn high ROC (excess return) earn ROC closer to WACC
Leverage have little or no debt higher leverage
When you adjust the growth rate to make it stable, make the other inputs about
the rm consistent with the stable growth assumption.
Aswath Damodaran 516
Estimating Stable Growth Inputs
! Start with the fundamentals:
Protability measures such as return on equity and capital, in stable growth, can be
estimated by looking at
industry averages for these measure, in which case we assume that this rm in stable
growth will look like the average rm in the industry
cost of equity and capital, in which case we assume that the rm will stop earning excess
returns on its projects as a result of competition.
Leverage is a tougher call. While industry averages can be used here as well, it
depends upon how entrenched current management is and whether they are
stubborn about their policy on leverage (If they are, use current leverage; if they
are not; use industry averages)
! Use the relationship between growth and fundamentals to estimate payout and
net capital expenditures.
There is a signicant subjective judgment involved with each of these estimates.
That is unavoidable.
Aswath Damodaran 517
Estimating Stable Period Inputs: Disney
! The beta for the stock will drop to one, reecting Disneys status as a mature company. This will
lower the cost of equity for the rm to 8.82%.
Cost of Equity = Riskfree Rate + Beta * Risk Premium = 4% + 4.82% = 8.82%
! The debt ratio for Disney will rise to 30%. This is the optimal we computed for Disney in chapter 8
and we are assuming that investor pressure will be the impetus for this change. Since we assume that
the cost of debt remains unchanged at 5.25%, this will result in a cost of capital of 7.16%
Cost of capital = 8.82% (.70) + 5.25% (1-.373) (.30) = 7.16%
! The return on capital for Disney will drop from its high growth period level of 12% to a stable
growth return of 10%. This is still higher than the cost of capital of 7.16% but the competitive
advantages that Disney has are unlikely to dissipate completely by the end of the 10
th
year. The
expected growth rate in stable growth will be 4%. In conjunction with the return on capital of 10%,
this yields a stable period reinvestment rate of 40%:
Reinvestment Rate = Growth Rate / Return on Capital = 4% /10% = 40%
As Disney moves into stable growth, it should exhibit the characteristics of
stable growth rms. If you want to be conservative in your estimates, you could
set the return on capital = cost of capital in stable growth.
Aswath Damodaran 518
A Dividend Discount Model Valuation: Deutsche Bank
! We estimated the annual growth rate for the next 5 years at Deutsche Bank to
be 7.36%, based upon an estimated ROE of 11.26% and a retention ratio of
65.36%.
! In 2003, the earnings per share at Deutsche Bank were 4.33 Euros, and the
dividend per share was 1.50 Euros.
! Our earlier analysis of the risk at Deutsche Bank provided us with an estimate
of beta of 0.98, which used in conjunction with the Euro riskfree rate of
4.05% and a risk premium of 4.82%, yielded a cost of equity of 8.76%
We are using the dividend discount model because it is difcult to estimate the
FCFE for a bank. (What are the capital expenditure and working capital
requirements of a bank?)
We assume that Deutsche Bank, given its size and the competitive sector it
operates in, is in stable growth.
We have used a normalized return on equity of 14% (which is the industry
average ROE) to estimate expected growth rate forever.
Aswath Damodaran 519
Expected Dividends and Terminal Value
Year EPS Payout Ratio DPS PV at 8.76%
1 !4.65 34.64% !1.61 !1.48
2 !4.99 34.64% !1.73 !1.46
3 !5.36 34.64% !1.86 !1.44
4 !5.75 34.64% !1.99 !1.42
5 !6.18 34.64% !2.14 !1.41
Present value of expected dividends = !7.22

Aswath Damodaran 520
Terminal Value and Present Value
! At the end of year 5, we will assume that Deutsche Banks earnings growth will drop to
4% and stay at that level in perpetuity. In keeping with the assumption of stable growth,
we will also assume that
The beta will rise marginally to 1, resulting in a slightly higher cost of equity of 8.87%.
Cost of Equity = Riskfree Rate + Beta * Risk Premium = 4.05%+ 4.82% = 8.87%
The return on equity will drop to the cost of equity of 8.87%, thus preventing excess returns
from being earned in perpetuity.
Stable Period Payout Ratio = 1 g/ ROE = 1- .04/.0887 = .5490 or 54.9%
Expected Dividends in year 6 = Expected EPS
6
* Stable period payout ratio
=!6.18 (1.04) * .549 = !3.5263
Terminal Value per share = Expected Dividends in year 6/ (Cost of equity g)
= !3.5263/(.0887 - .04) = !72.41
Present value of terminal value = 72.41/1.0876
5
= 47.59
! Value per share = PV of expected dividends in high growth + PV of terminal value =
%7.22 + %47.59 = %54.80
! Deutsche Bank was trading at %66 at the time of this analysis.
To get to the terminal value, you cannot take the fth years dividends and grow
them at 4% for a year. The dividend payout ratio has to be recomputed based
upon the expected growth rate and the expected return on equity. This new
payout ratio has to be used to compute the dividends in year 6, which are then
used to get the terminal value at the end of year 5.
The terminal value is discounted back to the present at the high growth period
cost of equity.
Aswath Damodaran 521
What does the valuation tell us?
! Stock is overvalued: This valuation would suggest that Deutsche Bank is
signicantly overvalued, given our estimates of expected growth and risk.
! Dividends may not reect the cash ows generated by Deutsche Bank. The
FCFE could have been signicantly higher than the dividends paid.
! Estimates of growth and risk are wrong: It is also possible that we have
underestimated growth or overestimated risk in the model, thus reducing our
estimate of value.
Any or all three of these explanations could hold.
While it is natural to assume that you have estimated something wrong, the
entire point of valuation is to take a stand when you feel that you have made
reasonable assumptions. In other words, you could back out what would need to
be true (in terms of growth and return on equity) for the market to be right, and
then ask the question of whether this is feasible.
Aswath Damodaran 522
A FCFE Valuation: Aracruz Celulose
! The net income for the rm in 2003 was $148.09 million but $28.41 million of this income represented income from
nancial assets. The net income from non-operating assets is $119.68 million.
! Inputs estimated for high growth period
Expected Growth in Net Income = Equity Reinvestment Rate * Non-cash ROE
= 65. 97%* 8. 05%= 5. 31%
Cost of equity = 4% + 0.7576 (12.49%) = 13.46%
! After year 5, we will assume that the beta will remain at 0.7576 and that the equity risk premium will decline to 8.66%.
Cost of equity in stable growth = 4% + 0.7576 (8.66%) = 10.56%
We will also assume that the growth in net income will drop to the ination rate (in U.S. dollar terms) of 2% and that the return on
equity will rise to 10.56% (which is also the cost of equity).
Equity Reinvestment Rate
Stable Growth
= Expected Growth Rate/ Return on Equity
= 2%/10.56% = 18.94%
We use the FCFE model because dividends are less than FCFE and we assume
that leverage is stable. (If you can estimate FCFE, it is better to do the valuation
using FCFE rather than dividends)
Aswath Damodaran 523
Aracruz: Estimating FCFE for next 5 years
1 2 3 4 5
Net Income (non-cash) $126.04 $132.74 $139.79 $147.21 $155.03
Equity Reinvestment Rate 65.97% 65.97% 65.97% 65.97% 65.97%
FCFE$42.89 $45.17 $47.57 $50.09 $52.75
Present Value at 10.33% $37.80 $35.09 $32.56 $30.23 $28.05
FCFE in year 6 = Net Income in year 6 (1- Equity Reinvestment Rate
Stable Growth
) = 155.03 (1.02) (1- .1894) =
$128.18 million
Terminal value of equity = 128.18/(.1056-.02) = $1497.98 million
Present Value of FCFEs in high growth phase = $163.73
+ Present Value of Terminal Equity Value = 1497.98/1.1346
5
= $796.55
Value of equity in operating assets = $960.28
+ Value of Cash and Marketable Securities = $352.28
Value of equity in rm = $1,312.56
Value of equity/share = $1,312.56/859.59 = $1.53/share
Value of equity/share in BR = $1.53 * 3.15 BR/$ = 4.81 BR/share
Stock price 7.50 BR/share
These are the projected FCFE the next 5 years. These FCFE are discounted
back to the present at the current cost of equity. Note that we add back cash and
marketable securities because we estimated FCFE using net income only from
operating assets. If we had used the total net income, we would have discounted
back at a cost of equity computing using a lower beta (reecting the cash
balance) and not added back cash at the end.
Aswath Damodaran 524
Disney Valuation
! Model Used:
Cash Flow: FCFF (since I think leverage will change over time)
Growth Pattern: 3-stage Model (even though growth in operating income is only
10%, there are substantial barriers to entry)
While Disney is a large rm, its brand name (especially in childrens
entertainment and theme parks) will allow it to earn excess returns and maintain
high growth for a longer period.
Aswath Damodaran 525
Disney: Inputs to Valuation
High Growth Phase Transition Phase Stable Growth Phase
Length of Period 5 years 5 years Forever after 10 years
Tax Rate 37.3% 37.3% 37.3%
Return on Capital 12% (last years return o n
capital was 4.42%)
Declines linearly to 10% Stable ROC of 10%
Reinvestment Rate
(Net Cap Ex + Working Capital
Investments/EBIT)
53. 18% (La s t years
reinvestment rate)
Declines to 40% as ROC an d
growth rates drop:
Reinvestment Rate = g/ROC
40% of afte r-tax operating
income, estimated from stabl e
growth rate of 4% and return
on capital of 10%.
Reinvestment rate = 4/10 =40%
Expected Growth Rate in EBIT ROC * Reinvestment Rate =
12%*0.5318 = 6.38%
Linear decline t o Stable
Growth Rate of 4%
4%: Set to riskfree rate
Debt/Capital Ratio 21% (Existing debt ratio) Increases linearly to 30% Stable debt ratio of 30%
Risk Parameters Beta = 1.25, k
e
= 10%
Cost of Debt = 5.25%
Cost of capital = 8.59%
Beta decreases linearly to 1.00;
Cost of debt stays at 5.25%
Cost of capital drops to 7.16%
Beta = 1.00; k
e
= 8.82%
Cost of debt stays at 5.25%
Cost of capital = 7.16%

The transition period is used as a phase where the inputs from the high growth
period can be adjusted towards stable growth levels (which reect industry or
market averages).
Note that we estimate reinvestment needs using the expected growth rate and the
return on capital.
We are making the assumption that Disney will continue to earn excess returns
even in stable growth. (The return on capital is moved towards the cost of
capital, but it is still higher than the cost of capital). If that assumption seems
over optimistic, the return on capital in stable growth can be set equal to the cost
of capital.
The leverage is pushed up to 30%, which was the constrained optimal we arrived
at in the capital structure section.
Aswath Damodaran 526
Disney: FCFF Estimates
Year
Expected
Growth EBIT
EBIT (1-
t)
Reinvestment
Rate Reinvestment FCFF
Current $2,805
1 6.38% $2,984 $1,871 53.18% $994.92 $876.06
2 6.38% $3,174 $1,990 53.18% $1,058.41 $931.96
3 6.38% $3,377 $2,117 53.18% $1,125.94 $991.43
4 6.38% $3,592 $2,252 53.18% $1,197.79 $1,054.70
5 6.38% $3,822 $2,396 53.18% $1,274.23 $1,122.00
6 5.90% $4,047 $2,538 50.54% $1,282.59 $1,255.13
7 5.43% $4,267 $2,675 47.91% $1,281.71 $1,393.77
8 4.95% $4,478 $2,808 45.27% $1,271.19 $1,536.80
9 4.48% $4,679 $2,934 42.64% $1,250.78 $1,682.90
10 4.00% $4,866 $3,051 40.00% $1,220.41 $1,830.62

These projected cash ows reect the assumptions made on the previous page.
The reinvestment rate changes linearly over the transition period to reach the
stable growth input of 40%.
Aswath Damodaran 527
Disney: Costs of Capital and Present Value
Year Cost of capital FCFF PV of FCFF
1 8.59% $876.06 $806.74
2 8.59% $931.96 $790.31
3 8.59% $991.43 $774.21
4 8.59% $1,054.70 $758.45
5 8.59% $1,122.00 $743.00
6 8.31% $1,255.13 $767.42
7 8.02% $1,393.77 $788.91
8 7.73% $1,536.80 $807.42
9 7.45% $1,682.90 $822.90
10 7.16% $1,830.62 $835.31
PV of cashflows during high growth = $7,894.66

The cost of capital changes over time, since both beta and leverage change over
time. As a result, the present value computation each year has to use the
compounded cost of capital. To compute the present value of the cashows in
years 6 through 10, we have to use the compounded cost of capital over the
previous years. To illustrate, the present value of $1536.80 million in cashows
in year 8 is:
Present value of cashow in year 8 = 1536.80/
(1.0859
5
*1.0831*1.0802*1.0773)
Aswath Damodaran 528
Disney: Terminal Value and Firm Value
! Terminal Value
FCFF
11
= EBIT
11
(1-t) (1- Reinvestment Rate
Stable Growth
)/
= 4866 (1.04) (1-.40) = $1,903.84 million
Terminal Value = FCFF
11
/ (Cost of capital
Stable Growth
g)
= 1903.84/ (.0716 - .04) = $60,219.11 million
! Value of rm
PV of cashows during the high growth phase =$ 7,894.66
PV of terminal value =$ 27,477.81
+ Cash and Marketable Securities =$ 1,583.00
+ Non-operating Assets (Holdings in other companies) =$ 1,849.00
Value of the rm =$ 38,804.48
To estimate the terminal value, we rst estimate how much needs to be
reinvested. With a growth rate of 4%, and a return on capital of 10%, the total
reinvestment (net cap ex + change in working capital) is 40%.
The free cash ow to the rm is used to arrive at the terminal value, with the cost
of capital in year 11 being used as the discount rate.
Disney reported a book value of $1.849 million for minority investments in
other companies(Disney owns 39% of Euro Disney and 43% of the proposed
Hong Kong Disney park. It also owns 37.5% of the A&E network and 39.6%
of E! Television). primarily in non-US Disney theme parks. In the absence of
detailed nancial statements for these investments, we will assume that the book
value is roughly equal to the market value. Note that we consider the rest of the
assets on Disneys balance sheet including the $6.2 billion it shows in
capitalized television and lm costs and $19.7 billion it shows in goodwill and
intangibles to be operating assets that we have already captured in the cashows.
Aswath Damodaran 529
From Firm to Equity Value: What do you subtract out?
! The rst thing you have to subtract out is the debt that you computed (and used in estimating the
cost of capital). If you have capitalized operating leases, you should continue to treat operating
leases as debt in this stage in the process.
! This is also your last chance to consider other potential liabilities that may be faced by the rm
including
Expected liabilities on lawsuits: You could be analyzing a firm that is the defendant in a lawsuit, where it
potentially could have to pay tens of millions of dollars in damages. You should estimate the probability that
this will occur and use this probability to estimate the expected liability.
Unfunded Pension and Health Care Obligations: If a firm has significantly under funded a pension or a health
plan, it will need to set aside cash in future years to meet these obligations. While it would not be considered
debt for cost of capital purposes, it should be subtracted from firm value to arrive at equity value.
Deferred Tax Liability: The deferred tax liability that shows up on the financial statements of many firms
reflects the fact that firms often use strategies that reduce their taxes in the current year while increasing their
taxes in the future years.
With tobacco companies, for instance,t he expected liabilities from lawsuits can
be a very large number and cannot be ignored. It is not easy to estimate and you
may have to consult with lawyers (rather than nancial analysts).
What about overfunded pension plans? There are some analysts who add the
excess funding back to rm value, arguing that it belongs to stockholders. The
legal and tax costs of trying to withdraw these funds are usually so high that it is
prudent not to do this.
Aswath Damodaran 530
From Equity Value to Equity Value per share: The Effect of
Options
! When there are warrants and employee options outstanding, the estimated
value of these options has to be subtracted from the value of the equity, before
we divide by the number of shares outstanding.
! There are two alternative approaches that are used in practice:
One is to divide the value of equity by the fully diluted number of shares
outstanding rather than by the actual number. This approach will underestimate the
value of the equity, because it fails to consider the cash proceeds from option
exercise.
The other shortcut, which is called the treasury stock approach, adds the expected
proceeds from the exercise of the options (exercise price multiplied by the number
of options outstanding) to the numerator before dividing by the number of shares
outstanding. While this approach will yield a more reasonable estimate than the
rst one, it does not include the time value of the options outstanding.
Aswath Damodaran 531
Valuing Disneys options
! At the end of 2003, Disney had 219 million options outstanding, with a
weighted average exercise price of $26.44 and weighted average life of 6
years.
! Using the current stock price of $26.91, an estimated standard deviation of 40,
a dividend yield of 1.21%. a riskfree rate of 4% and the Black-Scholes option
pricing model we arrived at a value of $2,129 million.
! Since options expenses are tax-deductible, we used the tax rate of 37.30% to
estimate the value of the employee options:
! Value of employee options = 2129 (1- .373) = $1334.67 million
In valuing the options, we modied the Black-Scholes model to allow for the
fact that exercising these options will affect the stock price (reducing it by
increasing the number of shares outstanding). We also used a historical
standard deviation in Disneys stock price.
Aswath Damodaran 532
Disney: Value of Equity per Share
! Subtracting out the market value of debt (including operating leases) of
$14,668.22 million and the value of the equity options (estimated to be worth
$1,334.67 million in illustration 12.10) yields the value of the common stock:
! Value of equity in common stock = Value of rm Debt Equity Options =
$38,804.48 - $14,668.22 - $1334.67 = $ 22,801.59
! Dividing by the number of shares outstanding (2047.60 million), we arrive at
a value per share o $11.14, well below the market price of $ 26.91 at the time
of this valuation.
Note that we use the actual number of shares outstanding since we have
considered the value of equity options explicitly.
Aswath Damodaran 533
Current Cashflow to Firm
EBIT(1-t) : 1,759
- Nt CpX 481
- Chg WC 454
= FCFF $ 824
Reinvestment Rate=(481+454)/1759
= 53.18%
Expected Growth
in EBIT (1-t)
.5318*.12=.0638
6.38%
Stable Growth
g = 4%; Beta = 1.00;
Cost of capital = 7.16%
ROC= 10%
Reinvestment Rate=g/ROC
=4/ 10= 40%
Terminal Value10= 1,904/(.0716-.04) = 60,219
Cost of Equity
10%
Cost of Debt
(4.00%+1.25%)(1-.373)
= 3.29%
Weights
E = 79% D = 21%
Discount at Cost of Capital (WACC) = 10.00% (.79) + 3.29% (0.21) = 8.59
Op. Assets 35,373
+ Cash: 3,432
+Other Inv
- Debt 14,668
=Equity 24,136
- Options 1,335
=Equity CS 22,802
Value/Sh $11.14
Riskfree Rate:
Riskfree Rate= 4%
+
Beta
1.2456
X
Mature market
premium
4%
Unlevered Beta for
Sectors: 1.0674
Firm!s D/E
Ratio: 24.77%
Disney: Valuation
Reinvestment Rate
53.18%%
Return on Capital
12%
Term Yr
3089
- 864
= 2225
Disney was trading at about
$ 26 at the time of this
valuation.
Cashflows
EBIT (1-t) $1,871 $1,990 $2,117 $2,252 $2,396 $2,538 $2,675 $2,808 $2,934 $3,051
- Reinvestment $995 $1,058 $1,126 $1,198 $1,274 $1,283 $1,282 $1,271 $1,251 $1,220
FCFF $876 $932 $991 $1,055 $1,122 $1,255 $1,394 $1,537 $1,683 $1,831
In transition phase,
debt ratio increases to 30% and cost
of capital decreases to 7.16%
Growth drops to 4%
Brings it all together. The stock was trading at $26 at the time that I did this
Aswath Damodaran 534
Current EBIT (1-t)
$ 1,759
The Investment Decision
Invest in projects that earn a
return greater than a minimum
acceptable hurdle rate
The Dividend Decision
If you cannot find investments that earn
more than the hurdle rate, return the
cash to the owners of the businesss.
The Financing Decision
Choose a financing mix that
minimizes the hurdle rate and match
your financing to your assets.
Investment decision affects risk of assets being finance and financing decision affects hurdle rate
Return on Capital
12%
Reinvestment Rate
53.18%
Expected Growth Rate = 12% * 53.18%
= 6.38%
Existing
Investments
ROC = 4.22%
New Investments
Financing Mix
D=21%; E= 79%
Financing Choices
Fxed rate US $
debt with duration
of 11.5 years
Cost of capital = 10% (.79) + 3.29% (.21) = 8.59%

Year Expected Growth EBIT EBIT (1-t) Reinvestment Rate Reinvestment FCFF Cost of capital PV of FCFF
Current $2,805
1 6.38% $2,984 $1,871 53.18% $994.92 $876.06 8.59% $806.74
2 6.38% $3,174 $1,990 53.18% $1,058.41 $931.96 8.59% $790.31
3 6.38% $3,377 $2,117 53.18% $1,125.94 $991.43 8.59% $774.22
4 6.38% $3,592 $2,252 53.18% $1,197.79 $1,054.70 8.59% $758.45
5 6.38% $3,822 $2,396 53.18% $1,274.23 $1,122.00 8.59% $743.00
6 5.90% $4,047 $2,538 50.54% $1,282.59 $1,255.13 8.31% $767.42
7 5.43% $4,267 $2,675 47.91% $1,281.71 $1,393.77 8.02% $788.92
8 4.95% $4,478 $2,808 45.27% $1,271.19 $1,536.80 7.73% $807.43
9 4.48% $4,679 $2,934 42.64% $1,250.78 $1,682.90 7.45% $822.90
10 4.00% $4,866 $3,051 40.00% $1,220.41 $1,830.62 7.16% $835.31
Terminal Value $60,219.11 $27,477.93
$35,372.62
$3,432.00
$38,804.62
$14,668.22
$1,334.67
$22,801.73
$11.14
- Options
Value of equity in stock =
Value per share
Value of Operating Assets =
+ Cash & Non-op Assets =
Value of firm
- Debt
Disney: Corporate Financing Decisiions and Firm Value
Shows the link between our valuation and the earlier corporate nancial analysis.
Aswath Damodaran 535
Current EBIT (1-t)
$ 3,417
The Investment Decision
Invest in projects that earn a
return greater than a minimum
acceptable hurdle rate
The Dividend Decision
If you cannot find investments that earn
more than the hurdle rate, return the
cash to the owners of the businesss.
The Financing Decision
Choose a financing mix that
minimizes the hurdle rate and match
your financing to your assets.
Investment decision affects risk of assets being finance and financing decision affects hurdle rate
Return on Capital
15%
Reinvestment Rate
53.18%
Expected Growth Rate = 15% * 53.18%
= 7.98%
Existing
Investments
ROC = 8.59%
New Investments
Financing Mix
D=30%; E= 70%
Financing Choices
Debt in different
currencies with
duration of 4 years
Cost of capital = 10.53% (.70) + 3.45%(.30) = 8.40%
Disney: The Value of Control

Year Expected Growth EBIT EBIT (1-t) Reinvestment Rate Reinvestment FCFF Cost of capital PV of FCFF
Current $5,327
1 7.98% $5,752 $3,606 53.18% $1,918 $1,688 8.40% $1,558
2 7.98% $6,211 $3,894 53.18% $2,071 $1,823 8.40% $1,551
3 7.98% $6,706 $4,205 53.18% $2,236 $1,969 8.40% $1,545
4 7.98% $7,241 $4,540 53.18% $2,414 $2,126 8.40% $1,539
5 7.98% $7,819 $4,902 53.18% $2,607 $2,295 8.40% $1,533
6 7.18% $8,380 $5,254 50.54% $2,656 $2,599 8.16% $1,605
7 6.39% $8,915 $5,590 47.91% $2,678 $2,912 7.91% $1,667
8 5.59% $9,414 $5,902 45.27% $2,672 $3,230 7.66% $1,717
9 4.80% $9,865 $6,185 42.64% $2,637 $3,548 7.41% $1,756
10 4.00% $10,260 $6,433 40.00% $2,573 $3,860 7.16% $1,783
Terminal Value $126,967 $58,645
$74,900
$3,432
$78,332
$14,649
$1,335
$62,349
$30.45
Value of Operating Assets =
+ Cash & Non-op Assets =
Value of firm
- Debt
- Options
Value of equity in stock =
Value per share
We changed three inputs:
1. We assumed that the return on capital on existing assets to the cost of
capital of 8.59%, which increases the after-tax operating income to $3,417
million
2. We assumed that new investments would earn a higher return on capital
(15% instead of 12%)
3. The rm would move to its optimal debt ratio of 30% immediately and keep
its existing debt on its books (at favorable interest rates). This reduces the
cost of capital to 8.40%.
The net effect is that the value per share increases to $30.45. The difference
between this value and the value per share with the status quo (on last page)
is the value of control; value of control = 30.45 - 11.14 = 19.31 per share.
Aswath Damodaran 536
Relative Valuation
! In relative valuation, the value of an asset is derived from the pricing of
'comparable' assets, standardized using a common variable such as earnings,
cashows, book value or revenues. Examples include --
Price/Earnings (P/E) ratios
and variants (EBIT multiples, EBITDA multiples, Cash Flow multiples)
Price/Book (P/BV) ratios
and variants (Tobin's Q)
Price/Sales ratios
This is the preferred mode of valuation on Wall Street. Philosophically, it is a
different way of thinking about valuation.
In relative valuation, we assume that markets make mistakes on individual
investments, but that they are right, on average, in how they price a sector or the
market. (In discounted cash ow valuation, we assume that markets make
mistakes over time.)
Aswath Damodaran 537
Multiples and Fundamenals
! Gordon Growth Model:
! Dividing both sides by the earnings,
! Dividing both sides by the book value of equity,
! If the return on equity is written in terms of the retention ratio and the
expected growth rate
! Dividing by the Sales per share,
P
0
=
DPS
1
r ! g
n
P
0
EPS
0
= PE=
Payout Ratio * (1 + g
n
)
r-g
n
P
0
BV
0
= PBV =
ROE - g
n
r-g
n
P
0
BV
0
= PBV =
ROE* Payout Ratio * (1 + g
n
)
r-g
n
P
0
Sales
0
= PS=
Profit Margin * Payout Ratio * (1 + g
n
)
r-g
n
All multiples have their roots in fundamentals. A little algebra can take a
discounted cash ow model and state it in terms of a multiple. This, in turn,
allows us to nd the fundamentals that drive each multiple:
PE : Growth, Risk, Payout
PBV: Growth, Risk, Payout, ROE
PS: Growth, Risk, Payout, Net Margin.
Every multiple has a companion variable, which more than any other variable
drives that multiple. The companion variable for the multiples listed above are
underlined. When comparing rms, this is the variable that you have to take the
most care to control for.
When people use multiples because they do not want to make the assumptions
that DCF valuation entails, they are making the same assumptions implicitly.
Aswath Damodaran 538
Disney: Relative Valuation
Company Name
Ticker
Symbol PE
Expected
Growth Rate PEG
Point 360 PTSX 10.62 5.00% 2.12
Fox Entmt Group Inc FOX 22.03 14.46% 1.52
Belo Corp. 'A' BLC 25.65 16.00% 1.60
Hearst-Argyle Television Inc HTV 26.72 12.90% 2.07
Journal Communications Inc. JRN 27.94 10.00% 2.79
Saga Communic. 'A' SGA 28.42 19.00% 1.50
Viacom Inc. 'B' VIA/B 29.38 13.50% 2.18
Pixar PIXR 29.80 16.50% 1.81
Disney (Walt) DIS 29.87 12.00% 2.49
Westwood One WON 32.59 19.50% 1.67
World Wrestling Ent. WWE 33.52 20.00% 1.68
Cox Radio 'A' Inc CXR 33.76 18.70% 1.81
Beasley Broadcast Group Inc BBGI 34.06 15.23% 2.24
Entercom Comm. Corp ETM 36.11 15.43% 2.34
Liberty Corp. LC 37.54 19.50% 1.92
Ballantyne of Omaha Inc BTNE 55.17 17.10% 3.23
Regent Communications Inc RGCI 57.84 22.67% 2.55
Emmis Communications EMMS 74.89 16.50% 4.54
Cumulus Media Inc CMLS 94.35 23.30% 4.05
Univision Communic. UVN 122.76 24.50% 5.01
Salem Communications Corp SALM 145.67 28.75% 5.07
Average for sector 47.08 17.17% 2.74

Note that when people compare rms across sectors, they implicitly assume that
rms in a sector have similar risk and cash ow characteristics. This is clearly a
dangerous assumption to make.
The PEG ratio is a simplistic way of controlling for expected growth differences
across rms. A low PEG ratio is viewed as a sign of an undervalued rm.
The PEG ratio is based upon the implicit assumption that PE and expected
growth are linearly related.
Aswath Damodaran 539
Is Disney fairly valued?
! Based upon the PE ratio, is Disney under, over or correctly valued?
# Under Valued
# Over Valued
# Correctly Valued
! Based upon the PEG ratio, is Disney under valued?
# Under Valued
# Over Valued
# Correctly Valued
! Will this valuation give you a higher or lower valuation than the discounted
cashow valuation?
# Higher
# Lower
If we assume that all of the rms in this sector have similar growth, risk and
payout characteristics, Disney is under valued, because its PE is lower than the
industry average.
On a PEG ratio basis, if we assume that all rms in this sector have similar risk
and payout characteristics, Disney is also under valued.
It is tough to say. It depends upon whether the DCF valuation is making
reasonable assumptions and whether the market, on average, is pricing these
rms correctly.
Aswath Damodaran 540
Relative Valuation Assumptions
! Assume that you are reading an equity research report where a buy
recommendation for a company is being based upon the fact that its PE ratio
is lower than the average for the industry. Implicitly, what is the underlying
assumption or assumptions being made by this analyst?
# The sector itself is, on average, fairly priced
# The earnings of the rms in the group are being measured consistently
# The rms in the group are all of equivalent risk
# The rms in the group are all at the same stage in the growth cycle
# The rms in the group are of equivalent risk and have similar cash ow
patterns
# All of the above
All of the above.
Aswath Damodaran 541
First Principles
! Invest in projects that yield a return greater than the minimum acceptable
hurdle rate.
The hurdle rate should be higher for riskier projects and reect the nancing mix
used - owners funds (equity) or borrowed money (debt)
Returns on projects should be measured based on cash ows generated and the
timing of these cash ows; they should also consider both positive and negative
side effects of these projects.
! Choose a nancing mix that minimizes the hurdle rate and matches the assets
being nanced.
! If there are not enough investments that earn the hurdle rate, return the cash to
stockholders.
The form of returns - dividends and stock buybacks - will depend upon the
stockholders characteristics.
Objective: Maximize the Value of the Firm