1

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and
female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming
from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said.
She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open.
Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named
the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of
Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the
changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a persons sex? May
a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to
reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of
his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The
petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio
Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel
Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as
"male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and
acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.
1
Feeling
trapped in a mans body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to
transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex
reassignment surgery
2
in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-
Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate
attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to
have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from
"male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the Peoples Journal Tonight, a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.
3
Copies of the order
were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the
petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American
fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision
4
in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions
read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction
thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records
compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in
consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment],
petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the
physique of a female. Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his own
doing and should not be in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody
or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would
bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fianc] and the
realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present
petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has
not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil
Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of
*p+etitioner, specifically for petitioners first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and
petitioners gender from "Male" to FEMALE.
5

On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals.
6
It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in
the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals
7
rendered a decision
8
in favor of the Republic. It ruled
that the trial courts decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name
or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court
2

of Appeals granted the Republics petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
9
Hence,
this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed
under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.
10

The petition lacks merit.
A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex.
As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction
thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records
compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled
to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.
11
A change of name is a privilege, not a right.
12
Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes.
13
In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA
9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name
or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname
which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules
and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.
14
It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned.
Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily
lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to
exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an
administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.
15
It likewise lays
down the corresponding venue,
16
form
17
and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change of
first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor
or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended
to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through
surgery. However, a change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status.
18
RA 9048
does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding
confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose may only create grave
complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or
any compelling reason justifying such change.
19
In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced
by the use of his true and official name.
20
In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any
prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioners first name
was not within that courts primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local
civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the
proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the
wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth
certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does
not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners
petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court
must look to the statutes.
21
In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
3

ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far
as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now
be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA
9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.
22
Rule
108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.
23

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the
performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry
in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or
misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other
existing record or records:Provided, however, That no correction must involve
the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis
supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
24

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions;
(9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth.
25
However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the
conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change
means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves
as a substitute."
26
The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including
those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births,
marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of
marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of
citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts,
events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status
and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized
nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities
and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.
27

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status
include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights
in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption,
emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession.
28
(emphasis supplied)
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a persons legal
capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed
by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is
fatal to petitioners cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the physician or
midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent
of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register.
Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the
4

local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a)
date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion
of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of
parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required
in the regulations to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at
the time of birth.
29
Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there
is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time
of his or her birth, if not attended by error,
30
is immutable.
31

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning
in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the
Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore
be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the
contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that
distinguish a male from a female"
32
or "the distinction between male and female."
33
Female is "the
sex that produces ova or bears young"
34
and male is "the sex that has organs to produce
spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."
35
Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding
do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are
employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been
used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary."
36
Since the statutory language of the
Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that
the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-
operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the
civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change
of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of
Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice
and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to
anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioners first step
towards his eventual marriage to his male fianc. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent unionbetween a man and a woman.
37
One of its
essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a
female.
38
To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter
the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who
has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are
various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women,
39
certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code
40
and the presumption of
survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,
41
among others. These laws
underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if
petitioners petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license
for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not
to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what
guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative
guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction
or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked,
what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to
confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex
to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn
governing the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be
recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a
law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can
only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and
[the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are
people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized
parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the
remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
5

SO ORDERED.
FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO SY, respondents.
For review is the decision
[1]
dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44144,
which affirmed the decision
[2]
of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, denying the
petition
[3]
for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy.
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15,
1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.
[4]
Both were then 22 years old. Their
union was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who were born on July 8, 1975
and February 14, 1978,respectively.
[5]

The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga, and
later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. They operated a lumber and hardware business in Sto.
Tomas, Pampanga.
[6]

On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived
separately, and their two children were in the custody of their mother. However, their son Frederick
transferred to his father's residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15,1988, and from then
on, lived with his father.
[7]

On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation, docketed as Civil Case No. 7900
before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion of petitioner, the
action was later amended to a petition for separation of property on the grounds that her husband
abandoned her without just cause; that they have been living separately for more than one year;
and that they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated September 29, 1983,
containing the rules that would govern the dissolution of their conjugal partnership.
[8]
Judgment was
rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of
properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses.
[9]
The trial court also
granted custody of the children to Filipina.
[10]

In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 88-68006, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina testified that in
the afternoon of May 15, 1988, she went to the dental clinic at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila, owned
by her husband but operated by his mistress, to fetch her son and bring him to San Fernando,
Pampanga. While she was talking to her son, the boy ignored her and continued playing with the
family computer. Filipina got mad, took the computer away from her son, and started spanking him.
At that instance, Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son, and punched her in the different
parts of her body. Filipina also claimed that her husband started choking her when she fell on the
floor, and released her only when he thought she was dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma and
contusions on different parts of her body as a result of the blows inflicted by her husband,
evidenced by a Medical Certificate issued by a certain Dr. James Ferraren. She said it was not the
first time Fernando maltreated her.
[11]

The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision
[12]
dated April 26, 1990, convicted
Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, and sentenced him to 20 days
imprisonment. Edpmis
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent, docketed as Civil
Case No. 8273,on the following grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3)
attempt by respondent against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her husband without
justifiable cause for more than one year. The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its
decision
[13]
dated December 4,1991, granted the petition on the grounds of repeated physical
violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal separation. It awarded custody of their
daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son Frederick to respondent.
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition
[14]
for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage
to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. She points out that the final judgment
rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for separation of property and
legal separation, and Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which led to the conviction of
her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity. She also cites as
manifestations of her husband's psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2)
refusal to live with her without fault on her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and (3)
refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act only to satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina
alleges that such psychological incapacity of her husband existed from the time of the celebration of
their marriage and became manifest thereafter.
[15]

The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision
[16]
dated December 9, 1993,
denied the petition of Filipina Sy for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando.
It stated that the alleged acts of the respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not constitute
psychological incapacity which may warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage.Lexjuris
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court. In the
decision
[17]
of the Court of Appeals dated May 21, 1996, it ruled that the testimony of petitioner
concerning respondent's purported psychological incapacity falls short of the quantum of evidence
required to nullify a marriage celebrated with all the formal and essential requisites of law.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to show that the alleged psychological
incapacity of respondent had existed at the time of the celebration of their marriage in 1973. It
reiterated the finding of the trial court that the couple's marital problems surfaced only in 1983, or
almost ten years from the date of the celebration of their marriage. And prior to their separation in
1983, they were living together harmoniously. Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of
the lower court which it found to be in accordance with law and the evidence on record.
[18]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
[19]
which the Court of Appeals denied in its resolution
dated November 21, 1996.
[20]

Hence, this appeal by certiorari
[21]
wherein petitioner now raises the following issues: Jurismis
6

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY
OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ON THE DATE OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE
PARTIES' MARRIAGE ON NOVEMBER 15, 1973, NOT DISPUTED BY RESPONDENT
FERNANDO, THERE WAS NO MARRIAGE LICENSE THERETO;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY
APPELLANT [herein petitioner] DO NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY AS WOULD JUSTIFY NULLIFICATION OF HER MARRIAGE TO
APPELLEE [herein respondent];
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW
THAT THE ALLEGED UNDESIRABLE ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE HAD EXISTED OR
WERE PRESENT AT THE TIME THEIR MARRIAGE WAS CELEBRATED IN 1973; Jjjuris
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS RULING OF THE LOWER
COURT THAT THERE IS A REDEEMING ATTITUDE SHOWN TO THE COURT BY
RESPONDENT FERNANDO WITH RESPECT TO HIS CHILDREN AND ALSO BELIEVES
THAT RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS NOT A REMOTE POSSIBILITY
WHICH IS ERRONEOUS; AND
5.WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V.COURT OF APPEALS (240 SCRA
20) IS APPLICABLE HERETO.
[22]

In sum, two issues are to be resolved: justice
1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage
celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage
license at the time of its celebration. It appears that, according to her, the date of the actual
celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage
license are different and incongruous. Jksm
Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal,
as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice,
[23]
in a number of instances, we
have relaxed observance of procedural rules, noting that technicalities are not ends in themselves
but exist to protect and promote substantive rights of litigants. We said that certain rules ought not
to be applied with severity and rigidity if by so doing, the very reason for their existence would be
defeated.
[24]
Hence, when substantial justice plainly requires, exempting a particular case from the
operation of technicalities should not be subject to cavil.
[25]
In our view, the case at bar requires
that we address the issue of the validity of the marriage between Fillipina and Fernando which
petitioner claims is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license, in order to arrive at a just
resolution of a deeply seated and violent conflict between the parties. Note, however, that here the
pertinent facts are not disputed; and what is required now is a declaration of their effects according
to existing law.
Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for annulment of
marriage before the trial court that the incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and the
celebration of the marriage itself would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to Fernando was
void from the beginning, she points out that these critical dates were contained in the documents
she submitted before the court. The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate,
September 17, 1974, is contained in their marriage contract which was attached as Annex "A" in her
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked
as Exhibit "A" in the course of the trial.
[26]
The date of celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of
Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private
respondent, as stated in paragraph three of petitioner's petition for the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage before the trial court, and private respondent's answer admitting it.
[27]
This fact
was also affirmed by petitioner, in open court, on January 22, 1993, during her direct
examination,
[28]
as follows: Es m
ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that you were married on November
15,1973?
FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.
November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in both their son's and
daughter's birth certificates, which are also attached as Annexes " B" and "C" in the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibits
"B" and "C" in the course of the trial.
[29]
These pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably
show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license
is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage
contract shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet,
neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona.
[30]

Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that indeed petitioner did
not expressly state in her petition before the trial court that there was incongruity between the
date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of the issuance of their marriage
license. From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued on September
17,1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable
conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license. Nowhere do we
find private respondent denying these dates on record. Article 80 of the Civil Code
[31]
is clearly
applicable in this case. There being no claim of an exceptional character, the purported marriage
between petitioner and private respondent could not be classified among those enumerated in
Articles 72-79
[32]
of the Civil Code. We thus conclude that under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the
marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning. Es msc
7

We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only photocopies. So are the birth
certificates of their son Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents were
marked as Exhibits during the course of the trial below, which shows that these have been
examined and admitted by the trial court, with no objections having been made as to their
authenticity and due execution. Likewise, no objection was interposed to petitioner's testimony in
open court when she affirmed that the date of the actual celebration of their marriage was on
November 15, 1973. We are of the view, therefore, that having been admitted in evidence, with the
adverse party failing to timely object thereto, these documents are deemed sufficient proof of the
facts contained therein.
[33]

The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no longer detain us.
It is mooted by our conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack
of a marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized. Esmm is
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, dated December 9,1993 as well as the Decision promulgated on May 21, 1996 by the
Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated November 21, 1996, in CA-G.R. No. 44144 are set aside.
The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Yap and private
respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time of
celebration. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M. Castro in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin
F. Cardenas.
1
As ground therefor, Castro claims that no marriage license was ever issued to them
prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer. Consequently, he was
declared in default. Trial proceeded in his absence.
The controlling facts are undisputed:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony
performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated
without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the
processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the
procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage
license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig,
Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown
to Castro's parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that
the couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months.
Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted
by Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order
her marital status before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E.
Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they
discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their
marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro
Manila. It reads:
February 20, 1987
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO
who were allegedly married in the Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970 under an
alleged (s)upportive marriage license
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be
located as said license no. 3196182 does not appear from our records.
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS
Senior Civil Registry Officer
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in order
to apply for a license. Neither did she sign any application therefor. She affixed her signature only
on the marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition.
2
It held that the above certification was inadequate to establish
the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the
parties. It ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not
conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued."
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She insisted that the
certification from the local civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage license.
As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court.
3
It declared
the marriage between the contracting parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig
to cancel the subject marriage contract.
8

Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate court erred when it ruled that
the certification issued by the civil registrar that marriage license no. 3196182 was not in their
record adequately proved that no such license was ever issued. Petitioner also faults the
respondent court for relying on the self-serving and uncorroborated testimony of private
respondent Castro that she had no part in the procurement of the subject marriage license.
Petitioner thus insists that the certification and the uncorroborated testimony of private
respondent are insufficient to overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity of a marriage.
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the parties as null and void,
respondent appellate court disregarded the presumption that the solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo
M. Malvar, regularly performed his duties when he attested in the marriage contract that marriage
license no. 3196182 was duly presented to him before the solemnization of the subject marriage.
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the documentary and testimonial
evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent
to Edwin F. Cardenas.
We affirm the impugned Decision.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital
relations was the New Civil Code. The law
4
provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a
marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid
marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio.
5

Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and inability to find a
record or entry to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not
adequate to prove its non-issuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer
having custody of an official record or by his deputy, that after diligent search,
no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his
office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence
that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was
not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers
charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage
license was issued and such other relevant data.
6

The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to
the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant
to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to find"
sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting
parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in
itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her
testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the
subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage is
one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily
used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of
either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and
Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held against
her. Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of
the petition. Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was
properly declared in default. Private respondent cannot be faulted for her husband's lack of interest
to participate in the proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on record to show that there
was collusion between private respondent and her husband Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the
contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that
indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have
been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial
evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject
marriage license.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error
committed by respondent appellate court.
SO ORDERED.
SEVILLA, petitioner, vs. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
9

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004 which set aside the Decision
2
of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.
In a Complaint
3
dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on 19
May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N.
Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the
Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain
Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the father of
Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of the
Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to
Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no
marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were
married civilly on 19 May 1969,
4
and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 1969
5
at the Most
Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with the local civil registry of
Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license
after having been married to her for 25 years.
The trial court made the following findings:
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May 19, 1969, he and
defendant [Carmelita] appeared before a certain Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the
Gospel, at the city hall in Manila where they executed a Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in
civil rites. A certain Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff alleged, was an aide of defendant's
father accompanied them, and who, together with another person, stood as witness to
the civil wedding. That although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San
Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was indicated in the marriage contract, the same was
fictitious for he never applied for any marriage license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon verifications
made by him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola, with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a
Certification dated March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by said
office." On May 31, 1969, he and defendant were again wed, this time in church rites,
before Monsignor Juan Velasco at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish Church in Brixton Hills,
Quezon City, where they executed another marriage contract (Exh. "F") with the same
marriage license no. 2770792 used and indicated. Preparations and expenses for the
church wedding and reception were jointly shared by his and defendant's parents. After
the church wedding, he and defendant resided in his house at Brixton Hills until their first
son, Jose Gabriel, was born in March 1970. As his parents continued to support him
financially, he and defendant lived in Spain for some time, for his medical studies.
Eventually, their marital relationship turned bad because it became difficult for him to be
married he being a medical student at that time. They started living apart in 1976, but
they underwent family counseling before they eventually separated in 1978. It was during
this time when defendant's second son was born whose paternity plaintiff questioned.
Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree against defendant in the United States in 1981 and
later secured a judicial separation of their conjugal partnership in 1983.
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself manifested that when his
service was engaged by plaintiff, and after the latter narrated to him the circumstances of
his marriage, he made inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry of San Juan where the
supposed marriage license was obtained and with the Church of the Most Holy Redeemer
Parish where the religious wedding ceremony was celebrated. His request letters dated
March 3, 1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994 (Exh. "M") and March
11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all sent to and received by the Civil Registrar of San Juan, who in
reply thereto, issued Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"), and March 11, 1994
(Exh. "E") and September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"), that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was
ever issued by that office." Upon his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish Church issued him
a certified copy of the marriage contract of plaintiff and defendant (Exh. "F") and a
Certificate of Marriage dated April 11, 1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it noted that it was a
"purely religious ceremony, having been civilly married on May 19, 1969 at the City Hall,
Manila, under Marriage License No. 2770792 issued at San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969."
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan, identified the
Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March 11, 1994 and September 20, 1994 issued by
Rafael Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their office failed to locate
the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p.
5).
Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had a steady romantic
relationship after they met and were introduced to each other in October 1968. A model,
she was compelled by her family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty pageant when
plaintiff who was afraid to lose her, asked her to run away with him to Baguio. Because
she loved plaintiff, she turned back on her family and decided to follow plaintiff in Baguio.
When they came back to Manila, she and plaintiff proceeded to the latter's home in
Brixton Hills where plaintiff's mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told her not to worry. Her parents were
hostile when they learned of the elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla convinced them that she will
take care of everything, and promised to support plaintiff and defendant. As plaintiff was
still fearful he may lose her, he asked her to marry him in civil rites, without the
knowledge of her family, more so her father (TSN, 5-28-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969, before
a minister and where she was made to sign documents. After the civil wedding, they had
lunch and later each went home separately. On May 31, 1969, they had the church
wedding, which the Sevilla family alone prepared and arranged, since defendant's mother
just came from hospital. Her family did not participate in the wedding preparations.
Defendant further stated that there was no sexual consummation during their
honeymoon and that it was after two months when they finally had sex. She learned from
Dr. Escudero, plaintiff's physician and one of their wedding sponsors that plaintiff was
undergoing psychiatric therapy since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some traumatic
problem compounded by his drug habit. She found out plaintiff has unusual sexual
behavior by his obsession over her knees of which he would take endless pictures of.
Moreover, plaintiff preferred to have sex with her in between the knees which she called
10

"intrafemural sex," while real sex between them was far and between like 8 months,
hence, abnormal. During their marriage, plaintiff exhibited weird sexual behavior which
defendant attributed to plaintiff's drug addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive
liar, plaintiff has a bad temper who breaks things when he had tantrums. Plaintiff took
drugs like amphetamines, benzedrine and the like, "speed" drugs that kept him from sleep
and then would take barbiturates or downers, like "mogadon." Defendant tried very hard
to keep plaintiff away from drugs but failed as it has become a habit to him. They had no
fixed home since they often moved and partly lived in Spain for about four and a half
years, and during all those times, her mother-in-law would send some financial support on
and off, while defendant worked as an English teacher. Plaintiff, who was supposed to be
studying, did nothing. Their marriage became unbearable, as plaintiff physically and
verbally abused her, and this led to a break up in their marriage. Later, she learned that
plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United States.
Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not aware of the civil wedding of
his daughter with the plaintiff; that his daughter and grandson came to stay with him after
they returned home from Spain and have lived with him and his wife ever since. His
grandsons practically grew up under his care and guidance, and he has supported his
daughter's expenses for medicines and hospital confinements (Exhs. "9" and "10").
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and corroborated that it was
plaintiff's family that attended to all the preparations and arrangements for the church
wedding of her sister with plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the couple wed in civil
rites some time prior to the church wedding. She also stated that she and her parents
were still civil with the plaintiff inspite of the marital differences between plaintiff and
defendant.
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that because of irreconcilable
differences with defendant and in order for them to live their own lives, they agreed to
divorce each other; that when he applied for and obtained a divorce decree in the United
States on June 14, 1983 (Exh. "13"), it was with the knowledge and consent of defendant
who in fact authorized a certain Atty. Quisumbing to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p.
21). During his adverse testimony, plaintiff identified a recent certification dated July 25,
2000 (Exh. "EE") issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that the marriage license
no. 2770792, the same marriage license appearing in the marriage contract (Exh. "A"), is
inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious.
6

In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of the parties, the trial
court made the following justifications:
Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the marriage, the lack or
absence of a license renders the marriage void ab initio. It was shown under the various
certifications (Exhs. "I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by the office of the Local Civil Registrar
of the Municipality of San Juan, and the more recent one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh.
"EE") that no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office, hence, the
marriage license no. 2770792 appearing on the marriage contracts executed on May 19,
1969 (Exh. "A") and on May 31, 1969 (Exh. "F") was fictitious. Such a certification enjoys
probative value under the rules on evidence, particularly Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court, x x x.
x x x x
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla and
Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on
May 19, 1969 as well as their contract of marriage solemnized under religious rites by Rev.
Juan B. Velasco at the Holy Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of
the requisite marriage license. Let the marriage contract of the parties under Registry No.
601 (e-69) of the registry book of the Local Civil Registry of Manila be cancelled.
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in
accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code. Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded
the Office of the Solicitor General for its record and information.
7

Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20 December 2004, the
Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and held:
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court explained
that: "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails
until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus,
unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive."
In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan
testified that they"failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is
registered," for the reason that "the employee handling is already retired." With said
testimony We cannot therefore just presume that the marriage license specified in the
parties' marriage contract was not issued for in the end the failure of the office of the
local civil registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of the marriage license was attributable
not to the fact that no such marriage license was issued but rather, because it "failed to
locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered." Simply put, if the
pertinent book were available for scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that it would have
contained an entry on marriage license no. 2720792.
x x x x
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage on the basis of a mere
perception of plaintiff that his union with defendant is defective with respect to an
essential requisite of a marriage contract, a perception that ultimately was not
substantiated with facts on record.
8

11

Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in
a Resolution dated 6 April 2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
He raises the following issues for Resolution.
1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the
parties herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in question;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on the presumption of
regularity of officials acts, particularly the issuance of a marriage license, arising solely
from the contents of the marriage contracts in question which show on their face that a
marriage license was purportedly issued by the Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro
Manila, and
3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the presumption of validity
of a marriage arising from the admitted "fact of marriage."
9

At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not the certifications from the
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the
marriage contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null and
void ab initio.
We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.
Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at the time of the marriage of the
parties are Articles 53,
10
58
11
and 80.
12

Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential requisite for the validity of
marriage. The marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception.
At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one involving a marriage that is null and
void on the ground of absence of a marriage license based on the certifications issued by the Local
Civil Registar of San Juan. As ruled by this Court in the case of Cario v. Cario
13
:
[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no
record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a
certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any
circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil
registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a
record of all date relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased
has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that
their marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she
was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue
and explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of
Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain
from pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed
validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being
one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly
void ab initio.
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar
should be read in line with the decision in the earlier case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,
14
where it
was held that:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent
search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a
specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil
registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register
book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the
names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant
data. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the
document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register
despite diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as
stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. a written statement signed by an officer having the
custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry
of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office
contain no such record or entry.
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan
in connection with Marriage License No. 2770792 complied with the foregoing requirements and
deserved to be accorded probative value.
The first Certification
15
issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, was dated 11
March 1994. It reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
12

No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this Office. With regards
(sic) to Marriage License Number 2880792,
16
we exert all effort but we cannot find the
said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above
problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
March 11, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
The second certification
17
was dated 20 September 1994 and provides:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were ever issued by this Office
with regards to Marriage License Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find
the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above
problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
September 20, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
The third Certification,
18
issued on 25 July 2000, states:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no Marriage License
Application was filed and no Marriage License No. 2770792 allegedly dated May 19, 1969
was issued by this Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA CARDENAS-
SEVILLA.
This is to further certify that the said application and license do not exist in our Local Civil
Registry Index and, therefore, appear to be fictitious.
This certification is being issued upon the request of the interested party for whatever
legal intent it may serve.
San Juan, Metro Manila
July 25, 2000
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and understand our loaded
work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem." It could be easily implied from the
said statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate
and determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work." Likewise,
both certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or not such license was issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to
the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of
the said person was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that the former
custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not be secured. This
belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the material contents therein, had
been exerted.
As testified to by Perlita Mercader:
Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring to this Court among other
things the register of application of/or (sic) for marriage licenses received by the Office of
the :Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Province of Rizal, from January 19, 1969 to May
1969. Did you bring with you those records?
A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.
Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for subpoena?
A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .
Q Did you bring that with you?
13

A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.
Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage applications that your
office maintains as required by the manual of the office of the Local Civil Registrar?
COURT
May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.
x x x x
COURT
Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage license 2880792 is the
number issued by their office while with respect to license no. 2770792 the
office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan is very definite about it it was never
issued. Then ask him how about no. 2880792 if the same was ever issued by
their office. Did you ask this 2887092, but you could not find the record? But for
the moment you cannot locate the books? Which is which now, was this issued
or not?
A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.
19

Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted
to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the
presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing
the certifications, is effectively rebutted.
According to Section 3(m),
20
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed is among the disputable presumptions.
In one case, it was held:
A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence that may be accepted
and acted on where there is no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it
stands, or one which may be overcome by other evidence. One such
disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an official act or duty has been regularly
performed. x x x.
21

The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity
or failure to perform a duty.
22

The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome by
other evidence as in the case at bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the
tenor of the first and second certifications.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License
No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot
be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot
easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds.
23
The courts look upon this presumption with
great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
24

The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as
the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
25

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several years
producing two offsprings,
26
now adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the
petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in
1991.
27
We are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him
his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.
28

Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution.
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in
which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and
happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their
preservation is not the concern of the family members alone.
29

"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason
is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage."
30

14

This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.
31

By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling with his emotion or deepest
sentiments. As we have said in Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,
32
regrettably, there are situations like
this one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual
problem.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 20 December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and APOLLO A.
VILLAMORA, complainants,
vs.
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of
Court II, both of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, respondents.Complainants
Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo Villamora, are Stenographer I,
Interpreter I, Clerk II, and Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are
respectively the Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same court.
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October 5, 1992,
herein respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of
marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of an
appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the
custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities.
1

Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court respondents filed their respective Comments.
2
A Reply
to Answers of Respondents was filed by complainants.
3
The case was thereafter referred to
Executive Judge David C. Naval of the Regional Trial Court, Naga City, for investigation report and
recommendation. The case was however transferred to First Assistant Executive Judge Antonio N.
Gerona when Judge Naval inhibited himself for the reason that his wife is a cousin of respondent
Judge Palaypayon, Jr.
4

The contending versions of the parties regarding the factual antecedents of this administrative
matter, as culled from the records thereof, are set out under each particular charge against
respondents.
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite
marriage license. Thus, the following couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of
paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license, viz.: Alano
P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin, Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Gacer,
Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario, and Sammy Bocaya and
Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, their marriage contracts (Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and A,
respectively) did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, respondent judge did not sign
their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he
allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually
several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local
civil registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo, who prepares the marriage contracts, called the
attention of respondents to the lack of marriage licenses and its effect on the marriages involved,
but the latter opted to proceed with the celebration of said marriages.
Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed Clerk of Court II, the employees of the
court were already hostile to her, especially complainant Ramon Sambo who told her that he was
filing a protest against her appointment. She avers that it was only lately when she discovered that
the court had a marriage Register which is in the custody of Sambo; that it was Sambo who failed to
furnish the parties copies of the marriage contract and to register these with the local civil registrar;
and that apparently Sambo kept these marriage contracts in preparation for this administrative
case. Complainant Sambo, however, claims that all file copies of the marriage contracts were kept
by respondent Baroy, but the latter insists that she had instructed Sambo to follow up the
submission by the contracting parties of their marriage licenses as part of his duties but he failed to
do so.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between Alano P. Abellano and Nelly
Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt from the marriage license
requirement; that he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple a copy of
the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar, but the latter failed to do so; that
in order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized their marriage by securing a
marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was filed with the civil
registrar; that the other five marriages alluded to in the administrative complaint were not illegally
solemnized because the marriage contracts were not signed by him and they did not contain the
date and place of marriage; that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of
complainant Sambo; that the alleged marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie
Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, and of Arsenio Sabater and
Margarita Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of
a marriage license; that the marriage of Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was celebrated even
without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties in order to avoid embarrassment to
their guests but that, at any rate, he did not sign their marriage contract which remains unsigned up
to the present.
2. Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991 regarding the number of
marriages solemnized and the number of documents notarized.
15

It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages in the
month of July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and void;
that respondents likewise made it appear that they have notarized only six (6) documents for July,
1992, but the Notarial Register will show that there were one hundred thirteen (113) documents
which were notarized during that month; and that respondents reported a notarial fee of only
P18.50 for each document, although in fact they collected P20.00 therefor and failed to account for
the difference.
Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage registry where all marriages celebrated by
respondent judge are entered is under the exclusive control and custody of complainant Ramon
Sambo, hence he is the only one who should be held responsible for the entries made therein; that
the reported marriages are merely based on the payments made as solemnization fees which are in
the custody of respondent Baroy. She further avers that it is Sambo who is likewise the custodian of
the Notarial Register; that she cannot be held accountable for whatever alleged difference there is
in the notarial fees because she is liable only for those payments tendered to her by Sambo himself;
that the notarial fees she collects are duly covered by receipts; that of the P20.00 charged, P18.50 is
remitted directly to the Supreme Court as part of the Judiciary Development Fund and P150 goes to
the general fund of the Supreme Court which is paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur. Respondent theorizes that the discrepancies in the monthly report were
manipulated by complainant Sambo considering that he is the one in charge of the preparation of
the monthly report.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous number of marriages celebrated was
intentionally placed by complainant Sambo; that the number of marriages solemnized should not be
based on solemnization fees paid for that month since not all the marriages paid for are solemnized
in the same month. He claims that there were actually only six (6) documents notarized in the
month of July, 1992 which tallied with the official receipts issued by the clerk of court; that it is
Sambo who should be held accountable for any unreceipted payment for notarial fees because he is
the one in charge of the Notarial Register; and that this case filed by complainant Sambo is merely
in retaliation for his failure to be appointed as the clerk of court. Furthermore, respondent judge
contends that he is not the one supervising or preparing the monthly report, and that he merely has
the ministerial duty to sign the same.
3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court
Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of court, respondent judge
forwarded to the Supreme Court the applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell
Abiog. However, they were surprised when respondent Baroy reported for duty as clerk of court on
October 21, 1991. They later found out that respondent Baroy was the one appointed because she
gave a brand-new air-conditioning unit to respondent judge.
Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga City she purchased an air-conditioning unit
but when she was appointed clerk of court she had to transfer to Tinambac and, since she no longer
needed the air conditioner, she decided to sell the same to respondent judge. The installation and
use thereof by the latter in his office was with the consent of the Mayor of Tinambac.
Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the applications for the position of clerk of court to
the Supreme Court which has the sole authority over such appointments and that he had no hand in
the appointment of respondent Baroy. He contends that the air-conditioning unit was bought from
his
co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992, eight (8) months after Baroy had been
appointed clerk of court. He claims that he would not be that naive to exhibit to the public as item
which could not be defended as a matter of honor and prestige.
4. Cash bond issued without a receipt
It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled "People vs. Mendeza, et al., "bondswoman
Januaria Dacara was allowed by respondent judge to change her property bond to cash bond; that
she paid the amount of P1,000.00 but was never issued a receipt therefor nor was it made to
appear in the records that the bond has been paid; that despite the lapse of two years, the money
was never returned to the bondswoman; and that it has not been shown that the money was
turned over to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was deposited with the former clerk of court, then
turned over to the acting clerk of court and, later, given to her under a corresponding receipt; that
the cash bond is deposited with the bank; and that should the bondswoman desire to withdraw the
same, she should follow the proper procedure therefor.
Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438 was archieved for failure of the bondsman
to deliver the body of the accused in court despite notice; and that he has nothing to do with the
payment of the cash bond as this is the duty of the clerk of court.
5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners
Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got detention prisoners to work in his house,
one of whom was Alex Alano, who is accused in Criminal Case No. 5647 for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act; that while Alano was in the custody of respondent judge, the former escaped
and was never recaptured; that in order to conceal this fact, the case was archived pursuant to an
order issued by respondent judge dated April 6, 1992.
Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that he never employed detention prisoners
and that he has adequate household help; and that he had to order the case archived because it
had been pending for more than six (6) months and the accused therein remained at large.
6. Unlawful collection of docket fees
Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the Rural Bank of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, Inc. although such entity is exempt by law from the payment of said fees, and that
while the corresponding receipt was issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit the amount to the
Supreme Court and, instead, she deposited the same in her personal account.
16

Respondents Baroy contends that it was Judge-Designate Felimon Montenegro (because
respondent judge was on sick leave) who instructed her to demand payment of docket fees from
said rural bank; that the bank issued a check for P800.00; that she was not allowed by the Philippine
National Bank to encash the check and, instead, was instructed to deposit the same in any bank
account for clearing; that respondent deposited the same in her account; and that after the check
was cleared, she remitted P400.00 to the Supreme Court and the other P400.00 was paid to the
Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona prepared
and submitted to us his Report and Recommendations dated May 20, 1994, together with the
administrative matter. We have perspicaciously reviewed the same and we are favorably impressed
by the thorough and exhaustive presentation and analysis of the facts and evidence in said report.
We commend the investigating judge for his industry and perspicacity reflected by his findings in
said report which, being amply substantiated by the evidence and supported by logical illations, we
hereby approve and hereunder reproduce at length the material portions thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The first charge against the respondents is illegal solemnization of marriage.
Judge Palaypayon is charged with having solemnized without a marriage license
the marriage of Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte (Exh. A). Alano Abellano and
Nelly Edralin (Exh. B), Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), Eddie
Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor (Exh. D), Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga
(Exh. F) and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G).
In all these aforementioned marriages, the blank space in the marriage
contracts to show the number of the marriage was solemnized as required by
Article 22 of the Family Code were not filled up. While the contracting parties
and their witnesses signed their marriage contracts, Judge Palaypayon did not
affix his signature in the marriage contracts, except that of Abellano and Edralin
when Judge Palaypayon signed their marriage certificate as he claims that he
solemnized this marriage under Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
In said marriages the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their
marriage contract and the Local Civil Registrar was not sent either a copy of the
marriage certificate as required by Article 23 of the Family Code.
The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have been solemnized by
Judge Palaypayon without a marriage license. The testimonies of Bocay himself
and Pompeo Ariola, one of the witnesses of the marriage of Bocaya and
Besmonte, and the photographs taken when Judge Palaypayon solemnized their
marriage (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) sufficiently show that Judge Palaypayon really
solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by Judge
Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days after their marriage was solemnized
and bring with them their marriage license. In the meantime, they already
started living together as husband and wife believing that the formal requisites
of marriage were complied with.
Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and
Besmonte because the parties allegedly did not have a marriage license. He
declared that in fact he did not sign the marriage certificate, there was no date
stated on it and both the parties and the Local Civil Registrar did not have a copy
of the marriage certificate.
With respect to the photographs which show that he solemnized the marriage
of Bocaya and Besmonte, Judge Palaypayon explains that they merely show as if
he was solemnizing the marriage. It was actually a simulated solemnization of
marriage and not a real one. This happened because of the pleading of the
mother of one of the contracting parties that he consent to be photographed to
show that as if he was solemnizing the marriage as he was told that the food for
the wedding reception was already prepared, visitors were already invited and
the place of the parties where the reception would be held was more than
twenty (20) kilometers away from the poblacion of Tinambac.
The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to believe. The fact alone that
he did not sign the marriage certificate or contract, the same did not bear a date
and the parties and the Local Civil Registrar were not furnished a copy of the
marriage certificate, do not by themselves show that he did not solemnize the
marriage. His uncorroborated testimony cannot prevail over the testimony of
Bocaya and Ariola who also declared, among others, that Bocaya and his bride
were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days with their
marriage license and whose credibility had not been impeached.
The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the
signing of the marriage certificate in front of Judge Palaypayon and on his table
(Exhs. K-3, K-3-a, K-3-b, K-3-c, K-4, K-4-a, K-4-b, K-4-c,
K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-8-a and K-9), cannot possibly be just to
show a simulated solemnization of marriage. One or two pictures may convince
a person of the explanation of Judge Palaypayon, but not all those pictures.
Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge Palaypayon would
allows himself to be photographed as if he was solemnizing a marriage on a
mere pleading of a person whom he did not even know for the alleged reasons
given. It would be highly improper and unbecoming of him to allow himself to
be used as an instrument of deceit by making it appear that Bocaya and
Besmonte were married by him when in truth and in fact he did not solemnize
their marriage.
With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B), Judge Palaypayon
admitted that he solemnized their marriage, but he claims that it was under
Article 34 of the Family Code, so a marriage license was not required. The
contracting parties here executed a joint affidavit that they have been living
together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years already (Exh. 12; Exh. AA).
17

In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was
solemnized, it was stated that Abellano was only eighteen (18) years, two (2)
months and seven (7) days old. If he and Edralin had been living together as
husband and wife for almost six (6) years already before they got married as
they stated in their joint affidavit, Abellano must ha(ve) been less than thirteen
(13) years old when he started living with Edralin as his wife and this is hard to
believe. Judge Palaypayon should ha(ve) been aware of this when he solemnized
their marriage as it was his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting
parties who might ha(ve) executed a false joint affidavit in order to have an
instant marriage by avoiding the marriage license requirement.
On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed, Judge Palaypayon
married again Abellano and Edralin, this time with a marriage license (Exh. BB).
The explanation given by Judge Palaypayon why he solemnized the marriage of
the same couple for the second time is that he did not consider the first
marriage he solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code as (a) marriage at
all because complainant Ramon Sambo did not follow his instruction that the
date should be placed in the marriage certificate to show when he solemnized
the marriage and that the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their
marriage certificate.
This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano and
Edralin for the second time with a marriage license already only gave rise to the
suspicion that the first time he solemnized the marriage it was only made to
appear that it was solemnized under exceptional character as there was not
marriage license and Judge Palaypayon had already signed the marriage
certificate. If it was true that he solemnized the first marriage under exceptional
character where a marriage license was not required, why did he already
require the parties to have a marriage license when he solemnized their
marriage for the second time?
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage of Abellano and
Edralin was not a marriage at all as the marriage certificate did not state the
date when the marriage was solemnized and that the contracting parties were
not furnished a copy of their marriage certificate, is not well taken as they are
not any of those grounds under Article(s) 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code
which declare a marriage void from the beginning. Even if no one, however,
received a copy of the marriage certificate, the marriage is still valid (Jones vs.
H(o)rtiguela, 64 Phil. 179). Judge Palaypayon cannot just absolve himself from
responsibility by blaming his personnel. They are not the guardian(s) of his
official function and under Article 23 of the Family Code it is his duty to furnish
the contracting parties (a) copy of their marriage contract.
With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), and
Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G), Selpo and Carrido and Sabater
and Nacarcio executed joint affidavits that Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize
their marriage (Exh. 13-A and Exh. 1). Both Carrido and Nacario testified for the
respondents that actually Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage as
they did not have a marriage license. On cross-examination, however, both
admitted that they did not know who prepared their affidavits. They were just
told, Carrido by a certain Charito Palaypayon, and Nacario by a certain Kagawad
Encinas, to just go to the Municipal building and sign their joint affidavits there
which were already prepared before the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur.
With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. f), their
marriage contract was signed by them and by their two (2) witnesses, Atty.
Elmer Brioso and respondent Baroy (Exhs. F-1 and F-2). Like the other
aforementioned marriages, the solemnization fee was also paid as shown by a
receipt dated June 7, 1992 and signed by respondent Baroy (Exh. F-4).
Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the marriage of Gamay and
Belga allegedly because there was no marriage license. On her part, respondent
Baroy at first denied that the marriage was solemnized. When she was asked,
however, why did she sign the marriage contract as a witness she answered that
she thought the marriage was already solemnized (TSN, p. 14; 10-28-93).
Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of Judge Palaypayon. She
signed the marriage contract of Gamay and Belga as one of the two principal
sponsors. Yet, she wanted to give the impression that she did not even know
that the marriage was solemnized by Judge Palaypayon. This is found very
difficult to believe.
Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of having solemnized also the marriage
of Terrobias and Gaor (Exh. D). The contracting parties and their witnesses also
signed the marriage contract and paid the solemnization fee, but Judge
Palaypayon allegedly did not solemnize their marriage due to lack of marriage
license. Judge Palaypayon submitted the affidavit of William Medina, Vice-
Mayor of Tinambac, to corroborate his testimony (Exh. 14). Medina, however,
did not testify in this case and so his affidavit has no probative value.
Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice have been that
before the contracting parties and their witnesses enter his chamber in order to
get married, he already required complainant Ramon Sambo to whom he
assigned the task of preparing the marriage contract, to already let the parties
and their witnesses sign their marriage contracts, as what happened to Gamay
and Belga, and Terrobias and Gaor, among others. His purpose was to save his
precious time as he has been solemnizing marriages at the rate of three (3) to
four (4) times everyday (TSN, p. 12;
2-1-94).
18

This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper and irregular, if
not illegal, because the contracting parties are supposed to be first asked by the
solemnizing officer and declare that they take each other as husband and wife
before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two (2) witnesses
before they are supposed to sign their marriage contracts (Art. 6, Family Code).
The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge Palaypayon as to his alleged
practice and procedure before solemnizing a marriage, is not true as shown by
the picture taken during the wedding of Bocaya and Besmonte (Exhs. K-3 to K-9)
and by the testimony of respondent Baroy herself who declared that the
practice of Judge Palaypayon ha(s) been to let the contracting parties and their
witnesses sign the marriage contract only after Judge Palaypayon has
solemnized their marriage (TSN, p. 53;
10-28-93).
Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show also that he was really
solemnizing three (3) to four (4) marriages everyday. On the contrary his
monthly report of cases for July, 1992 shows that his court had only twenty-
seven (27) pending cases and he solemnized only seven (7) marriages for the
whole month (Exh. E). His monthly report of cases for September, 1992 shows
also that he solemnized only four (4) marriages during the whole month (Exh. 7).
In this first charge of having illegally solemnized marriages, respondent Judge
Palaypayon has presented and marked in evidence several marriage contracts of
other persons, affidavits of persons and certification issued by the Local Civil
Registrar (Exhs. 12-B to 12-H). These persons who executed affidavits, however,
did not testify in this case. Besides, the marriage contracts and certification
mentioned are immaterial as Judge Palaypayon is not charged of having
solemnized these marriages illegally also. He is not charged that the marriages
he solemnized were all illegal.
The second charge against herein respondents, that of having falsified the
monthly report of cases submitted to the Supreme Court and not stating in the
monthly report the actual number of documents notarized and issuing the
corresponding receipts of the notarial fees, have been sufficiently proven by the
complainants insofar as the monthly report of cases for July and September,
1992 are concerned.
The monthly report of cases of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur for July,
1992 both signed by the respondents, show that for said month there were six
(6) documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon in his capacity as Ex-Officio
Notary Public (Exhs. H to H-1-b). The notarial register of the MTC of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, however, shows that there were actually one hundred thirteen
(113) documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon for the said month (Exhs. Q to
Q-45).
Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no falsification of the monthly report of
cases for July, 1992 because there were only six (6) notarized documents that
were paid (for) as shown by official receipts. He did not, however, present
evidence of the alleged official receipts showing that the notarial fee for the six
(6) documetns were paid. Besides, the monthly report of cases with respect to
the number of documents notarized should not be based on how many
notarized documents were paid of the notarial fees, but the number of
documents placed or recorded in the notarial register.
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not personally verifying and checking
anymore the correctness of the monthly reports because he relies on his co-
respondent who is the Clerk of Court and whom he has assumed to have
checked and verified the records. He merely signs the monthly report when it is
already signed by respondent Baroy.
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well taken because he is required to
have close supervision in the preparation of the monthly report of cases of
which he certifies as to their correctness. As a judge he is personally responsible
for the proper discharge of his functions (The Phil. Trial Lawyer's Asso. Inc. vs.
Agana, Sr., 102 SCRA 517). In Nidera vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 581, it was held that
"A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement of his
court personnel."
On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the blame of the falsification of the
monthly report of cases on complainant Sambo whom she allegedly assigned to
prepare not only the monthly report of cases, but the preparation and custody
of marriage contracts, notarized documents and the notarial register. By her
own admission she has assigned to complainant Sambo duties she was
supposed to perform, yet according to her she never bother(ed) to check the
notarial register of the court to find out the number of documents notarized in a
month (TSN, p. 30; 11-23-93).
Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the preparation of the monthly report
of cases to Sambo, which was denied by the latter as he claims that he only
typed the monthly report based on the data given to him by her, still it is her
duty to verify and check whether the report is correct.
The explanation of respondent Baroy that Sambo was the one in custody of
marriage contracts, notarized documents and notarial register, among other
things, is not acceptable not only because as clerk of court she was supposed to
be in custody, control and supervision of all court records including documents
and other properties of the court (p. 32, Manual for Clerks of Court), but she
herself admitted that from January, 1992 she was already in full control of all
the records of the court including receipts (TSN, p. 11; 11-23-93).
19

The evidence adduced in this cases in connection with the charge of falsification,
however, also shows that respondent Baroy did not account for what happened
to the notarial fees received for those documents notarized during the month of
July and September, 1992. The evidence adduced in this case also sufficiently
show that she received cash bond deposits and she did not deposit them to a
bank or to the Municipal Treasurer; and that she only issued temporary receipts
for said cash bond deposits.
For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents reported to have been
notarized by Judge Palaypayon although the documents notarized for said
month were actually one hundred thirteen (113) as recorded in the notarial
register. For September, 1992, there were only five (5) documents reported as
notarized for that month, though the notarial register show(s) that there were
fifty-six (56) documents actually notarized. The fee for each document notarized
as appearing in the notarial register was P18.50. Respondent Baroy and Sambo
declared that what was actually being charged was P20.00. Respondent Baroy
declared that P18.50 went to the Supreme Court and P1.50 was being turned
over to the Municipal Treasurer.
Baroy, however, did not present any evidence to show that she really sent to
the Supreme Court the notarial fees of P18.50 for each document notarized and
to the Municipal Treasurer the additional notarial fee of P1.50. This should be
fully accounted for considering that Baroy herself declared that some notarial
fees were allowed by her at her own discretion to be paid later. Similarly, the
solemnization fees have not been accounted for by Baroy considering that she
admitted that even (i)n those instances where the marriages were not
solemnized due to lack of marriage license the solemnization fees were not
returned anymore, unless the contracting parties made a demand for their
return. Judge Palaypayon declared that he did not know of any instance when
solemnization fee was returned when the marriage was not solemnized due to
lack of marriage license.
Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon Sambo did not turn over to her some
of the notarial fees. This is difficult to believe. It was not only because Sambo
vehemently denied it, but the minutes of the conference of the personnel of the
MTC of Tinambac dated January 20, 1992 shows that on that date Baroy
informed the personnel of the court that she was taking over the functions she
assigned to Sambo, particularly the collection of legal fees (Exh. 7). The notarial
fees she claims that Sambo did not turn over to her were for those documents
notarized (i)n July and September, 1992 already. Besides there never was any
demand she made for Sambo to turn over some notarial fees supposedly in his
possession. Neither was there any memorandum she issued on this matter, in
spite of the fact that she has been holding meetings and issuing memoranda to
the personnel of the court (Exhs. V, W, FF, FF-1, FF-2, FF-3; Exhs. 4-A
(supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and 8-S).
It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on October 29, 1991 a cash bond
deposit of a certain Dacara in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos
was turned over to her after she assumed office and for this cash bond she
issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y). She did not deposit this cash bond in
any bank or to the Municipal Treasurer. She just kept it in her own cash box on
the alleged ground that the parties in that case where the cash bond was
deposited informed her that they would settle the case amicably.
Respondent Baroy declared that she finally deposited the aforementioned cash
bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos with the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) in February, 1993, after this administrative case was already filed (TSN, pp.
27-28; 12-22-93). The Pass Book, however, shows that actually Baroy opened an
account with the LBP, Naga Branch, only on March 26, 1993 when she deposited
an amount of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos (Exhs. 8 to 8-1-a). She claims
that One Thousand (P1,000.000) Pesos of the initial deposit was the cash bond
of Dacara. If it were true, it was only after keeping to herself the cash bond of
One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for around one year and five months when she
finally deposited it because of the filing of this case.
On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two days after she finally deposited
the One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos cash bond of Dacara, she withdrew it from
the bank without any authority or order from the court. It was only on July 23,
1993, or after almost three (3) months after she withdrew it, when she
redeposited said cash bond (TSN, p. 6; 1-4-94).
The evidence presented in this case also show that on February 28, 1993
respondent Baroy received also a cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00)
Pesos from a certain Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180. For this cash
bond deposit, respondent Baroy issued only an annumbered temporary receipt
(Exh. X and X-1). Again Baroy just kept this Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos
cash bond to herself. She did not deposit it either (in) a bank or (with) the
Municipal Treasurer. Her explanation was that the parties in Crim. Case No.
5180 informed her that they would settle the case amicably. It was on April 26,
1993, or almost two months later when Judge Palaypayon issued an order for
the release of said cash bond (Exh. 7).
Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she assumed office on October 21,
1991 she used to issue temporary receipt only for cash bond deposits and other
payments and collections she received. She further admitted that some of these
temporary receipts she issued she failed to place the number of the receipts
such as that receipt marked Exhibit X (TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93). Baroy claims that
she did not know that she had to use the official receipts of the Supreme Court.
It was only from February, 1993, after this case was already filed, when she only
started issuing official receipts.
20

The next charge against the respondents is that in order to be appointed Clerk
of Court, Baroy gave Judge Palaypayon an air conditioner as a gift. The evidence
adduced with respect to this charge, show that on August 24, 1991 Baroy
bought an air conditioner for the sum of Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred
(P17,600.00) Pesos (Exhs. I and I-1). The same was paid partly in cash and in
check (Exhs. I-2 and I-3). When the air conditioner was brought to court in order
to be installed in the chamber of Judge Palaypayon, it was still placed in the
same box when it was bought and was not used yet.
The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to Judge Palaypayon for Twenty
Thousand (P20,00.00) Pesos on installment basis with a down payment of Five
Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos and as proof thereof the respondents presented a
typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1993 (Exh. 22). The receipt was signed by
both respondents and by the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur and
another person as witness.
The alleged sale between respondents is not beyond suspicion. It was bought by
Baroy at a time when she was applying for the vacant position of Clerk of Court
(to) which she was eventually appointed in October, 1991. From the time she
bought the air conditioner on August 24, 1991 until it was installed in the office
of Judge Palaypayon it was not used yet. The sale to Judge Palaypayon was only
evidenced by a mere typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1992 when this case
was already filed. The receipt could have been easily prepared. The Municipal
Mayor of Tinambac who signed in the receipt as a witness did not testify in this
case. The sale is between the Clerk of Court and the Judge of the same court. All
these circumstances give rise to suspicion of at least impropriety. Judges should
avoid such action as would subject (them) to suspicion and (their) conduct
should be free from the appearance of impropriety (Jaagueta vs. Boncasos, 60
SCRA 27).
With respect to the charge that Judge Palaypayon received a cash bond deposit
of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos from Januaria Dacara without issuing a
receipt, Dacara executed an affidavit regarding this charge that Judge
Palaypayon did not give her a receipt for the P1,000.00 cash bond she deposited
(Exh. N). Her affidavit, however, has no probative value as she did not show that
this cash bond of P1,000.00 found its way into the hands of respondent Baroy
who issued only a temporary receipt for it and this has been discussed earlier.
Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the getting of detention prisoners
to work in his house and one of them escaped while in his custody and was
never found again. To hide this fact, the case against said accused was ordered
archived by Judge Palaypayon. The evidence adduced with respect to this
particular charge, show that in Crim. Case No. 5647 entitled People vs. Stephen
Kalaw, Alex Alano and Allan Adupe, accused Alex Alano and Allan Adupe were
arrested on April 12, 1991 and placed in the municipal jail of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur (Exhs. 0, 0-1, 0-2 and 0-3; Exh. 25). The evidence presented that
Alex Alano was taken by Judge Palaypayon from the municipal jail where said
accused was confined and that he escaped while in custody of Judge Palaypayon
is solely testimonial, particularly that of David Ortiz, a former utility worker of
the MTC of Tinambac.
Herein investigator finds said evidence not sufficient. The complainants should
have presented records from the police of Tinambac to show that Judge
Palaypayon took out from the municipal jail Alex Alano where he was under
detention and said accused escaped while in the custody of Judge Palaypayon.
The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated April 6, 1992 in Crim. Case No.
5047 archiving said case appears to be without basis. The order states: "this
case was filed on April 12, 1991 and the records show that the warrant of arrest
(was) issued against the accused, but up to this moment there is no return of
service for the warrant of arrest issued against said accused" (Exh. 0-4). The
records of said case, however, show that in fact there was a return of the service
of the warrant of arrest dated April 12, 1991 showing that Alano and Adupe
were arrested (Exh. 0-3).
Judge Palaypayon explained that his order dated April 6, 1992 archiving Crim.
Case No. 5047 referred only to one of the accused who remained at large. The
explanation cannot be accepted because the two other accused, Alano and
Adupe, were arrested. Judge Palaypayon should have issued an order for the
arrest of Adupe who allegedly jumped bail, but Alano was supposed to be
confined in the municipal jail if his claim is true that he did not take custody of
Alano.
The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why he ordered the case archived was
because he heard from the police that Alano escaped. This explanation is not
acceptable either. He should ha(ve) set the case and if the police failed to bring
to court Alano, the former should have been required to explain in writing why
Alano was not brought to court. If the explanation was that Alano escaped from
jail, he should have issued an order for his arrest. It is only later on when he
could not be arrested when the case should have been ordered archived. The
order archiving this case for the reason that he only heard that Alano escaped is
another circumstance which gave rise to a suspicion that Alano might have
really escaped while in his custody only that the complainants could not present
records or other documentary evidence to prove the same.
The last charge against the respondents is that they collected filing fees on
collection cases filed by the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur which was
supposed to be exempted in paying filing fees under existing laws and that the
filing fees received was deposited by respondent Baroy in her personal account
in the bank. The evidence presented show that on February 4, 1992 the Rural
Bank of Tinambac filed ten (10) civil cases for collection against farmers and it
paid the total amount of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos representing filing fees.
21

The complainants cited Section 14 of Republic Act 720, as amended, which
exempts Rural Banks (from) the payment of filing fees on collection of sums of
money cases filed against farmers on loans they obtained.
Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do with the payment of the filing
fees of the Rural Bank of Tinambac as it was respondent Baroy who received
them and besides, on February 4, 1992, he was on sick leave. On her part Baroy
claims that the bank paid voluntarily the filing fees. The records, however,
shows that respondent Baroy sent a letter to the manager of the bank dated
January 28, 1992 to the effect that if the bank would not pay she would submit
all Rural Bank cases for dismissal (Annex 6, comment by respondent Baroy).
Respondent Baroy should have checked whether the Rural Bank of Tinambac
was really exempt from the payment of filing fees pursuant to Republic Act 720,
as amended, instead of threatening the bank to have its cases be submitted to
the court in order to have them dismissed. Here the payment of the filing fees
was made on February 4, 1992, but the Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos was only
turned over to the Municipal Treasurer on March 12, 1992. Here, there is an
undue delay again in complying with her obligation as accountable officer.
In view of the foregoing findings that the evidence presented by the
complainants sufficiently show that respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr.
had solemnized marriages, particularly that of Sammy Bocaya and Gina
Besmonte, without a marriage license, and that it having been shown that he
did not comply with his duty in closely supervising his clerk of court in the
preparation of the monthly report of cases being submitted to the Supreme
Court, particularly for the months of July and September, 1992 where it has
been proven that the reports for said two (2) months were falsified with respect
to the number of documents notarized, it is respectfully recommended that he
be imposed a fine of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that
the same or similar offenses will be more severely dealt with.
The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts or
certificates of those marriages he solemnized without a marriage license, there
were no dates placed in the marriage contracts to show when they were
solemnized, the contracting parties were not furnished their marriage contracts
and the Local Civil Registrar was not being sent any copy of the marriage
contract, will not absolve him from liability. By solemnizing alone a marriage
without a marriage license he as the solemnizing officer is the one responsible
for the irregularity in not complying (with) the formal requ(i)sites of marriage
and under Article 4(3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, he shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable.
Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his negligence or failure to comply with
his duty of closely supervising his clerk of court in the performance of the
latter's duties and functions, particularly the preparation of the monthly report
of cases (Bendesula vs. Laya, 58 SCRA 16). His explanation that he only signed
the monthly report of cases only when his clerk of court already signed the
same, cannot be accepted. It is his duty to closely supervise her, to check and
verify the records if the monthly reports prepared by his clerk of court do not
contain false statements. It was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind
the inefficiency or incompetence of court personnel (Nidua vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA
158).
In view also of the foregoing finding that respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy, the
clerk of court of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, has been
found to have falsified the monthly report of cases for the months of July and
September, 1992 with respect to the number of documents notarized, for
having failed to account (for) the notarial fees she received for said two (2)
months period; for having failed to account (for) the solemnization fees of those
marriages allegedly not solemnized, but the solemnization fees were not
returned; for unauthorized issuance of temporary receipts, some of which were
issued unnumbered; for receiving the cash bond of Dacara on October 29, 1991
in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for which she issued only a
temporary receipt (Exh. Y) and for depositing it with the Land Bank of the
Philippines only on March 26, 1993, or after one year and five months in her
possession and after this case was already filed; for withdrawing said cash bond
of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos on April 29, 1993 without any court order or
authority and redepositing it only on July 23, 1993; for receiving a cash bond of
Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No.
5180, MTC, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, for which she issued only an unnumbered
temporary receipt (Exhs. X and X-1) and for not depositing it with a bank or with
the Municipal Treasurer until it was ordered released; and for requiring the
Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur to pay filing fees on February 4, 1992 for
collection cases filed against farmers in the amount of Four Hundred (P400.00)
Pesos, but turning over said amount to the Municipal Treasurer only on March
12, 1992, it is respectfully recommended that said respondent clerk of court
Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy be dismissed from the service.
It is provided that "Withdrawal of court deposits shall be by the clerk of court
who shall issue official receipt to the provincial, city or municipal treasurer for
the amount withdrawn. Court deposits cannot be withdrawn except by order of
the court, . . . ." (Revised Manual of Instructions for Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184
and 626; p. 127, Manual for Clerks of Court). A circular also provides that the
Clerks of Court shall immediately issue an official receipt upon receipt of
deposits from party litigants and thereafter deposit intact the collection with
the municipal, city or provincial treasurer and their deposits, can only be
withdrawn upon proper receipt and order of the Court (DOJ Circular No. 52, 26
April 1968; p. 136, Manual for Clerks of Court). Supreme Court Memorandum
Circular No. 5, 25 November 1982, also provides that "all collections of funds of
fiduciary character including rental deposits, shall be deposited immediately by
the clerk of court concerned upon receipt thereof with City, Municipal or
Provincial Treasurer where his court is located" and that "no withdrawal of any
22

of such deposits shall be made except upon lawful order of the court exercising
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply with the foregoing circulars, or
deliberately disregarded, or even intentionally violated them. By her conduct,
she demonstrated her callous unconcern for the obligations and responsibility of
her duties and functions as a clerk of court and accountable officer. The gross
neglect of her duties shown by her constitute(s) a serious misconduct which
warrant(s) her removal from office. In the case of Belen P. Ferriola vs. Norma
Hiam, Clerk of Court, MTCC, Branch I, Batangas City; A.M. No. P-90-414; August
9, 1993, it was held that "The clerk of court is not authorized to keep funds in
his/her custody; monies received by him/her shall be deposited immediately
upon receipt thereof with the City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer. Supreme
Court Circular Nos. 5 dated November 25, 1982 and 5-A dated December 3,
1982. Respondent Hiam's failure to remit the cash bail bonds and fine she
collected constitutes serious misconduct and her misappropriation of said funds
constitutes dishonesty. "Respondent Norma Hiam was found guilty of
dishonesty and serious misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and (the Court) ordered her immediate dismissal (from) the service.
xxx xxx xxx
We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct and behavior of everyone
connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the
lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all
times, must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be
beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an example of integrity, uprightness and
honesty.
5
Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity.
6
It applies, without
qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to the least of its personnel, they being standard-
bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and morality imposed upon a Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal
requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for
therein.
7
Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal
requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
8

The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriages,
and what we are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all
without prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that "(p)riests or
ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize
any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage
Law."
9
This is of course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to be imposed on respondent
judge should, therefore, be modified. For one, with respect to the charge of illegal solemnization of
marriages, it does appear that he had not taken to heart, but actually trifled with, the law's concern
for the institution of marriage and the legal effects flowing from civil status. This, and his undeniable
participation in the other offenses charged as hereinbefore narrated in detail, approximate such
serious degree of misconduct and of gross negligence in the performance of judicial duties as to
ineludibly require a higher penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P.
Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the
future will definitely be severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to
employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.
Let copies of this decision be spread on their records and furnished to the Office of the Ombudsman
for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the
Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000,
respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the
requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband
passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioners right to inherit the vast
properties left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions
of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and
unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and
sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court
Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court
Administrator required respondent judge to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a
certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February
2000. Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to
solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However,
on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand
the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua.
23

Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which
request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined
the documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess
the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to
another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the
delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human
compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of
Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the
marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage
void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the
afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with
Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be
delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is
valid despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment
suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with
the Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to
solemnize her marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and that it was because of
her prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same. She confessed that she
filed this administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the Comment filed by respondent
judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application
for Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license
shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no
record of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it
cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no record of their
marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could
communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of
her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a
letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed respondent judge that
their office cannot issue the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death
Certificate of his previous spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November
2000, found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage
license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to
be imposed on respondent judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial
court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial
jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,
[1]
respondent judge held
office and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del
Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos. We held that:
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is authorized
to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or
a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless
of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are
appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not
beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity
of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
[2]
(Emphasis
supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of
solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further
held that:
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law
they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in
understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles like the ones involved in the instant case. x x x While magistrates may at times make
mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance
of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married
persons.
[3]

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality
of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may
not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license. In People vs. Lara,
[4]
we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the
marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or
even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage
license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge
did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect,
respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
24

Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner.
This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not
necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the
prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be
undermined.
[5]
Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely private or personal matters.
They can not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or
another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a
matter which involves the Courts constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power
may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of a public office and impair the integrity and
dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.
[6]

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision
[1]
dated October 21, 1999 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment
[2]
dated August 5, 1996
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found
herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced
him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution
[3]
of the
appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigos motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at
Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The
former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada,
they maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in
Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de
Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce
against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on
February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago
[4]
at the Virgen sa
Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in
the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among
others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage
ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information
[5]
filed by the City
Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
[6]

The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for
judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His
motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution.
When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein
petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years
and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
[7]

In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioners claim that his first
marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,
[8]
the trial
court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The
parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the
fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be
allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,
[9]
which
held that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or
both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to
determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not
entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucios defense of good faith in contracting the second
marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v. Bitdu,
[10]
everyone is presumed to know
25

the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not
exempt him from the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the
appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage
between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal
was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
[11]

In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the
subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit
Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 349
[12]
of the Revised Penal Code
is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the
CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a
bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the
Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15
[13]
of the
Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article
17
[14]
of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment
promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, contending that the
doctrine in Mendiola v. People,
[15]
allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect
of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit.
[16]
However,
the denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate courts original decision in CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P.
Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then
there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first
marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be
convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES
PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE.
COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE]
PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS.
BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH AND
EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT.
[17]

To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and
if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce
decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly
and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further argues
that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime
of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence,
good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a
difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it
does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an
intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the
instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling
inMarbella-Bobis v. Bobis,
[18]
which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all the
elements concur, stressing that under Article 40
[19]
of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of
nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said
Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that
petitioners contention that he was in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the
Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must
first determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v.
Bobis,
[20]
we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
26

(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the
first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R.
CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No.
6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the
marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar,
Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the
marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.
[21]

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio
and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage
contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the
marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3
[22]
and 4
[23]
of the Family Code. As the
dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, This simply means that there was no
marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first
marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of
the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused
was, under the eyes of the law, never married.
[24]
The records show that no appeal was taken from
the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and
executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus,
there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being
declared void ab initio, the two were never married from the beginning. The contract of marriage
is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes,
petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The
existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it
is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage
to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.
[25]
In the
latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the
second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be
legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statutes as void.
[26]

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just
once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six
months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to
have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own.
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and
thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to
constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless
he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in
favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to
ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner
has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity
of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court
dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioners motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the
ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.
NOLLORA vs PEOPLE
The Case
G.R. No. 191425 is a petition for review
1
assailing the Decision
2
promulgated on 30 September 2009
as well as the Resolution
3
promulgated on 23 February 2010 by the Court of Appeals (appellate
court) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538. The appellate court affirmed the 19 November 2007 Decision
4
of
Branch 215 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (trial court) in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031.
The trial court found accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) guilty of bigamy under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment. Co-accused Rowena Geraldino
(Geraldino) was acquitted for the prosecutions failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Facts
The appellate court recited the facts as follows:
27

On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond Jonathan B. Lledo filed an Information
against Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. ("Nollora") and Rowena P. Geraldino ("Geraldino") for the crime of
Bigamy. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
"That on or about the 8th day of December 2001 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., being then legally married to one JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA, and
as said marriage has not been legally dissolved and still subsisting, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a subsequent or second marriage with her [sic] co-accused
ROWENA P. GERALDINO, who knowingly consented and agreed to be married to her co-accused
ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. knowing him to be a married man, to the damage and prejudice of the
said offended party JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA."
Upon his arraignment on April 18, 2005, accused Nollora assisted by counsel, refused to enter his
plea. Hence, a plea of not guilty was entered by the Court for him. Accused Geraldino, on the other
hand, entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on June 14, 2005. On even date, pre-trial
conference was held and both the prosecution and defense entered the following stipulation of
facts:
"1. the validity of the first marriage between Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and Jesusa
Pinat Nollora solemnized on April 6, 1999 at Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte;
2. that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted the second marriage with Rowena P.
Geraldino on December 8, 2001 in Quezon City;
3. that in the Counter-Affidavit of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., he admitted that he
contracted the second marriage to Rowena P. Geraldino;
4. that Rowena P. Geraldino attached to her Counter-Affidavit the Certificate of
Marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. dated December 8, 2001;
5. the fact of marriage of Rowena P. Geraldino with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. as
admitted in her Counter-Affidavit."
The only issue thus proffered by the prosecution for the RTCs resolution is whether or not the
second marriage is bigamous. Afterwards, pre-trial conference was terminated and the case was set
for initial hearing. Thereafter, trial ensued.
Evidence for the Prosecution
As culled from the herein assailed Decision, the respective testimonies of prosecution witnesses
were as follows:
"xxx (W)itness Jesusa Pinat Nollora xxx testified that she and accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. met in
Saudi Arabia while she was working there as a Staff Midwife in King Abdulah Naval Base Hospital.
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. courted her and on April 6, 1999, they got married at the [IE]MELIF Chruch
*sic+ in Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan (Exhibit A). While working in said hospital, she
heard rumors that her husband has another wife and because of anxiety and emotional stress, she
left Saudi Arabia and returned to the Philippines (TSN, October 4, 2005, page 10). Upon arrival in
the Philippines, the private complainant learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a
second marriage with co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 (Exhibit B) when she
secured a certification as to the civil status of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Exhibit C) from the National
Statistics Office (NSO) sometime in November 2003.
Upon learning this information, the private complainant confronted Rowena P. Geraldino at the
latters workplace in CBW, FTI, Taguig and asked her if she knew of the first marriage between
complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to which Rowena P. Geraldino allegedly affirmed and despite
this knowledge, she allegedly still married Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him so much and
because they were neighbors and childhood friends. Private complainant also knew that Rowena P.
Geraldino knew of her marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because when she (private
complainant) was brought by Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. at the latters residence in Taguig, Metro Manila
and introduced her to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.s parents, Rowena P. Geraldino was there in the house
together with a friend and she heard everything that they were talking about.
Because of this case, private complainant was not able to return to Saudi Arabia to work as a Staff
Midwife thereby losing income opportunity in the amount of P34,000.00 a month, more or less.
When asked about the moral damages she suffered, she declared that what happened to her was a
tragedy and she had entertained [thoughts] of committing suicide. She added that because of what
happened to her, her mother died and she almost got raped when Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. left her
alone in their residence in Saudi Arabia. However, she declared that money is not enough to
assuage her sufferings. Instead, she just asked for the return of her money in the amount
of P50,000.00 (TSN, July 26, 2005, pages 4-14).
Prosecution witness Ruth Santos testified that she knew of the marriage between the private
complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because she was one of the sponsors in said wedding.
Sometime in November 2003, she was asked by the private complainant to accompany the latter to
the workplace of Rowena P. Geraldino in FTI, Taguig, Metro Manila. She declared that the private
complainant and Rowena P. Geraldino had a confrontation and she heard that Rowena P. Geraldino
admitted that she (Rowena) knew of the first marriage of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and the private
complainant but she still went on to marry Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him very much
(TSN, October 24, 2005, pages 3-5).
Evidence for the Defense
The defenses version of facts, as summarized in the herein assailed Decision, is as follows:
"Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted two (2) marriages, the first with private
complainant Jesusa Pinat and the second with Rowena P. Geraldino. He, however, claimed that he
was a Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992, even before he contracted the first marriage
28

with the private complainant. As a [M]uslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry four (4) wives
as allowed under the Muslim or Islam belief.
To prove that he is a Muslim convert even prior to his marriage to the private complainant, Atilano
O. Nollora, Jr. presented a Certificate of Conversion dated August 2, 2004 issued by one Hadji Abdul
Kajar Madueo and approved by one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin wherein it is stated that Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. allegedly converted as a Muslim since January 19, 1992 (Exhibit 2, 3 and 4). Aside
from said certificate, he also presented a Pledge of Conversion dated January 10, 1992 issued by the
same Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueo and approved by one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin (Exhibit 7).
He claimed that the private complaint knew that he was a Muslim convert prior to their marriage
because she [sic] told this fact when he was courting her in Saudi Arabia and the reason why said
private complainant filed the instant case was due to hatred having learned of his second marriage
with Rowena P. Geraldino. She [sic] further testified that Rowena P. Geraldino was not aware of his
first marriage with the private complainant and he did not tell her this fact because Rowena P.
Geraldino is a Catholic and he does not want to lose her if she learns of his first marriage.
He explained that in his Marriage Contract with Jesusa Pinat, it is indicated that he was a Catholic
Pentecostal but that he was not aware why it was placed as such on said contract. In his Marriage
Contract with Rowena P. Geraldino, the religion Catholic was also indicated because he was
keeping as a secret his being a Muslim since the society does not approve of marrying a Muslim. He
also indicated that he was single despite his first marriage to keep said first marriage a secret (TSN,
January 30, 2006, pages 2-13).
Defense witness Hadji Abdul Qasar Madueo testified that he is the founder and president of Balik
Islam Tableegh Foundation of the Philippines and as such president, he has the power and authority
to convert any applicant to the Muslim religion. He alleged that sometime in 1992, he met accused
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. in Mabini (Manila) who was then going abroad. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. applied
to become a Muslim (Exhibit 14) and after receiving the application, said accused was
indoctrinated regarding his obligations as a Muslim. On January 10, 1992, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
embraced the Muslim faith. He was then directed to report every Sunday to monitor his
development.
In the year 2004, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. visited him and asked for a certification because of the filing
of the instant case. On October 2, 2004, he issued a Certificate of Conversion wherein it is stated
that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is a Muslim convert since January 10, 1992. Apart from the above-
mentioned document, their Imam also issued a Pledge of Conversion (Exhibit 7). He declared that
a Muslim convert could marry more than one according to the Holy Koran. However, before
marrying his second, third and fourth wives, it is required that the consent of the first Muslim wife
be secured. Thus, if the first wife is not a Muslim, there is no necessity to secure her consent (TSN,
October 9, 2006, pages 2-12).
During his cross-examinations, he declared that if a Muslim convert gets married not in accordance
with the Muslim faith, the same is contrary to the teachings of the Muslim faith. A Muslim also can
marry up to four times but he should be able to treat them equally. He claimed that he was not
aware of the first marriage but was aware of the second. Since his second marriage with Rowena P.
Geraldino was not in accordance with the Muslim faith, he advised Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to re-
marry Rowena P. Geraldino in accordance with Muslim marriage celebration, otherwise, he will not
be considered as a true Muslim (TSN, June 25, 2007, pages 3-7).
Accused Rowena P. Geraldino alleged that she was only a victim in this incident of bigamous
marriage. She claimed that she does not know the private complainant Jesusa Pinat Nollora and
only came to know her when this case was filed. She insists that she is the one lawfully married to
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., having been married to the latter since December 8, 2001. Upon learning that
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a first marriage with the private complainant, she confronted the
former who admitted the said marriage. Prior to their marriage, she asked Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. if
he was single and the latter responded that he was single. She also knew that her husband was a
Catholic prior to their marriage but after she learned of the first marriage of her husband, she
learned that he is a Muslim convert. She also claimed that after learning that her husband was a
Muslim convert, she and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., also got married in accordance with the Muslim
rites. She also belied the allegations of the private complainant that she was sought by the private
complainant and that they had a confrontation where she admitted that she knew that Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. was married to the private complainant and despite this knowledge, she went on to
marry him because she loved him very much. She insisted that she only came to know the private
complainant when she (private complainant) filed this case (TSN, August 14, 2007, pages 2-8)."
5

The Trial Courts Ruling
In its Decision
6
dated 19 November 2007, the trial court convicted Nollora and acquitted Geraldino.
The trial court stated that there are only two exceptions to prosecution for bigamy: Article 41
7
of
the Family Code, or Executive Order No. 209, and Article 180
8
of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws
of the Philippines, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The trial court also cited Article 27 of the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, which provides the qualifications for allowing Muslim
men to have more than one wife: "[N]o Muslim male can have more than one wife unless he can
deal with them in equal companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law and only in
exceptional cases."
In convicting Nollora, the trial courts Decision further stated thus:
The principle in Islam is that monogamy is the general rule and polygamy is allowed only to meet
urgent needs. Only with the permission of the court can a Muslim be permitted to have a second
wife subject to certain requirements. This is because having plurality of wives is merely tolerated,
not encouraged, under certain circumstances (Muslim Law on Personal Status in the Philippines by
Amer M. Bara-acal and Abdulmajid J. Astir, 1998 First Edition, Pages 64-65). Arbitration is necessary.
Any Muslim husband desiring to contract subsequent marriages, before so doing, shall notify the
Sharia Circuit Court of the place where his family resides. The clerk of court shall serve a copy
thereof to the wife or wives. Should any of them objects [sic]; an Agama Arbitration Council shall be
constituted. If said council fails to secure the wifes consent to the proposed marriage, the Court
29

shall, subject to Article 27, decide whether on [sic] not to sustain her objection (Art. 162, Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines).
Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino, did not
comply with the above-mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did not even declare that he was
a Muslim convert in both marriages, indicating his criminal intent. In his converting to the Muslim
faith, said accused entertained the mistaken belief that he can just marry anybody again after
marrying the private complainant. What is clear, therefore, is [that] a Muslim is not given an
unbridled right to just marry anybody the second, third or fourth time. There are requirements that
the Sharia law imposes, that is, he should have notified the Sharia Court where his family resides
so that copy of said notice should be furnished to the first wife. The argument that notice to the
first wife is not required since she is not a Muslim is of no moment. This obligation to notify the said
court rests upon accused Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is not for him to interpret the Sharia law. It is the
Sharia Court that has this authority.
In an apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, the accused recelebrated their marriage in
accordance with the Muslim rites. However, this can no longer cure the criminal liability that has
already been violated.
The Court, however, finds criminal liability on the person of accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., only. There
is no sufficient evidence that would pin accused Rowena P. Geraldino down. The evidence
presented by the prosecution against her is the allegation that she knew of the first marriage
between private complainant and Atilano Nollora, Jr., is insufficient[,] being open to several
interpretations. Private complainant alleged that when she was brought by Atilano Nollora, Jr., to
the latters house in Taguig, Metro Manila, Rowena P. Geraldino was there standing near the door
and heard their conversation. From this incident, private complainant concluded that said Rowena
P. Geraldino was aware that she and Atilano Nollora, Jr., were married. This conclusion is obviously
misplaced since it could not be reasonably presumed that Rowena P. Geraldino understands what
was going on between her and Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is axiomatic that "(E)very circumstance favoring
accuseds innocence must be taken into account, proof against him must survive the test of reason
and the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment" (People vs. Austria, 195 SCRA
700). This Court, therefore, has to acquit Rowena P. Geraldino for failure of the prosecution to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
a) Finding accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
This court hereby renders judgment imposing upon him a prison term of two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum of his
indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by law.
b) Acquitting accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO of the crime of Bigamy for failure
of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Costs against accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
9

Nollora filed a notice of appeal and moved for the allowance of his temporary liberty under the
same bail bond pending appeal. The trial court granted Nolloras motion.
Nollora filed a brief with the appellate court and assigned only one error of the trial court:
The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged despite the
prosecutions failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
10

The Appellate Courts Ruling
On 30 September 2009, the appellate court dismissed Nolloras appeal and affirmed the trial courts
decision.
11

The appellate court rejected Nolloras defense that his second marriage to Geraldino was in lawful
exercise of his Islamic religion and was allowed by the Quran. The appellate court denied Nolloras
invocation of his religious beliefs and practices to the prejudice of the non-Muslim women who
married him pursuant to Philippine civil laws.1avvphi1Nolloras two marriages were not conducted
in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, hence the Family Code of the Philippines
should apply. Nolloras claim of religious freedom will not immobilize the State and render it
impotent in protecting the general welfare.
In a Resolution
12
dated 23 February 2010, the appellate court denied Nolloras motion for
reconsideration. The allegations in the motion for reconsideration were a mere rehash of Nolloras
earlier arguments, and there was no reason for the appellate court to modify its 30 September 2009
Decision.
Nollora filed the present petition for review before this Court on 6 April 2010.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Nollora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.
The Courts Ruling
Nolloras petition has no merit. We affirm the rulings of the appellate court and of the trial court.
Elements of Bigamy
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
30

Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse
is absent, theabsent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the
Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.
13

The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally
married to Pinat;
14
(2) Nollora and Pinats marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date
of the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence of his second marriage to
Geraldino;
15
and (4) Nollora and Geraldinos marriage has all the essential requisites for validity
except for the lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage.
16

The marriage certificate
17
of Nollora and Pinats marriage states that Nollora and Pinat were
married at Sapang Palay IEMELIF Church, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan on 6 April
1999. Rev. Jonathan De Mesa, Minister of the IEMELIF Church officiated the ceremony. The
marriage certificate
18
of Nollora and Geraldinos marriage states that Nollora and Geraldino were
married at Maxs Restaurant, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, Metro Manila on 8 December 2001.
Rev. Honorato D. Santos officiated the ceremony.
A certification dated 4 November 2003 from the Office of the Civil Registrar General reads:
We certify that ATILANO JR O. NOLLORA who is alleged to have been born on February 22, 1968
from ATILANO M. NOLLORA SR and FLAVIANA OCLARIT, appears in our National Indices of Marriage
for Groom for the years 1973 to 2002 with the following information:
Date of Marriage Place of Marriage

a) April 06, 1999 b) SAN JOSE DEL MONTE, BULACAN
a) December 08, 2001 b) QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA (2nd District)
19

Before the trial and appellate courts, Nollora put up his Muslim religion as his sole defense. He
alleged that his religion allows him to marry more than once. Granting arguendo that Nollora is
indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both marriages,
20
Nollora cannot deny that both
marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, or
Presidential Decree No. 1083. The applicable Articles in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws read:
Art. 14. Nature. - Marriage is not only a civil contract but a civil institution. Its nature, consequences
and incidents are governed by this Code and the Sharia and not subject to stipulation, except that
the marriage settlements to a certain extent fix the property relations of the spouses.
Art. 15. Essential Requisites. - No marriage contract shall be perfected unless the following essential
requisites are complied with:
(a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given;
(c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least two competent persons
after the proper guardian in marriage (wali) has given his consent; and
(d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two competent persons.
Art. 16. Capacity to contract marriage. - (1) Any Muslim male at least fifteen years of age and any
Muslim female of the age of puberty or upwards and not suffering from any impediment under the
provisions of this Code may contract marriage. A female is presumed to have attained puberty upon
reaching the age of fifteen.
x x x.
Art. 17. Marriage Ceremony. - No particular form of marriage ceremony is required but the ijab and
the qabul in marriage shall be declared publicly in the presence of the person solemnizing the
marriage and the two competent witnesses. The declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in
triplicate, signed or marked by the contracting parties and said witnesses, and attested by the
person solemnizing the marriage. One copy shall be given to the contracting parties and another
sent to the Circuit Registrar by the solemnizing officer who shall keep the third.
Art. 18. Authority to solemnize marriage. - Marriage maybe solemnized:
(a) By the proper wali by the woman to be wedded;
(b) Upon the authority of the proper wali, by any person who is competent under Muslim
law to solemnize marriage; or
(c) By the judge of the Sharia District Court or Sharia Circuit Court or any person
designated by the judge, should the proper wali refuse without justifiable reason, to
authorize the solemnization.
31

Art. 19. Place of solemnization. - Marriage shall be solemnized publicly in any mosque, office of
the Sharia judge, office of the Circuit Registrar, residence of the bride or her wali, or at any other
suitable place agreed upon by the parties.
Art. 20. Specification of dower. - The amount or value of dower may be fixed by the contracting
parties (mahr-musamma) before, during or after the celebration of marriage. If the amount or the
value thereof has not been so fixed, a proper dower (mahr-mithl) shall, upon petition of the wife, be
determined by the court according to the social standing of the parties.
Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that "[i]n case of a marriage
between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this
Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of
the Philippines] shall apply." Nolloras religious affiliation is not an issue here. Neither is the claim
that Nolloras marriages were solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his
professed religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.
21

Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Geraldino that his civil status is "single." Moreover,
both of Nolloras marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or
falsehood of the declaration of ones religion in the marriage certificate is not an essential
requirement for marriage, such omissions are sufficient proofs of Nolloras liability for bigamy.
Nolloras false declaration about his civil status is thus further compounded by these omissions.
[ATTY. CALDINO:]
Q: In your marriage contract, Mr. Witness, with Jesusa Pinat, you indicated here as your religion,
Catholic Pentecostal, and you were saying that since January 10, 1992, you are already a [M]uslim
convert. . . you said, Mr. Witness, that you are already a [M]uslim convert since January 10, 1992.
However, in your marriage contract with Jesusa Pinat, there is no indication here that you have
indicated your religion. Will you please go over your marriage contract?
[NOLLORA:]
A: When we got married, they just placed there Catholic but I didnt know why they did not place
any Catholic there.
x x x
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, I would like to call your attention with respect to your marriage contract
with your co-accused in this case, Rowena Geraldino, x x x will you please tell us, Mr. Witness,
considering that you said that you are already a [M]uslim convert on January 10, 1992, why in the
marriage contract with Rowena Geraldino, you indicated there your religion as Catholic, Mr.
Witness?
A: Since I was a former Catholic and since I was then keeping, I was keeping it as a secret my being
my Balik-Islam, thats why I placed there Catholic since I know that the society doesnt approve a
Catholic to marry another, thats why I placed there Catholic as my religion, sir.
Q: How about under the column, "civil status," why did you indicate there that youre single, Mr.
Witness?
A: I also kept it as a secret that I was married, earlier married.
22
(Emphasis supplied)
x x x
[PROSECUTOR TAYLOR:]
Q: Would you die for your new religion, Mr. Nollora?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: If you would die for your new religion, why did you allow that your faith be indicated as Catholic
when in fact you were already as you alleged [M]uslim to be put in your marriage contract?
x x x
*A:+ I dont think there is anything wrong with it, I just signed it so we can get married under the
Catholic rights [sic] because after that we even got married under the [M]uslim rights [sic], your
Honor.
x x x
Q: Under your Muslim faith, if you marry a second wife, are you required under your faith to secure
the permission of your first wife to get married?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Did you secure that permission from your first wife, Jesusa Nollora?
A: I was not able to ask any permission from her because she was very mad at me, at the start, she
was always very mad, maam.
23

In his petition before this Court, Nollora casts doubt on the validity of his marriage to
Geraldino.1avvphi1 Nollora may not impugn his marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate himself
from criminal liability; otherwise, we would be opening the doors to allowing the solemnization of
multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As we stated in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:
24

32

There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab
initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal
liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely
nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some
manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling
throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538
promulgated on 30 September 2009 and the Resolution promulgated on 23 February 2010
are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Bigamy in
Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment with a term
of two years, four months and one day of prision correccional as minimum to eight years and one
day of prision mayor as maximum of his indeterminate sentence, as well as the accessory penalties
provided by law.
Costs against petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the
September 29, 2011 Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed
the April 25, 2008Decision
2
of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of
Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I.
Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a
Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.
3

On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage
with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as
husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or
complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made
in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed
a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On
October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a
determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits
ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,
5
the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty
Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this
pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as she never acquired any
right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.
x x x x
SO ORDERED.
6

The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence
to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable
her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of
$2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to
the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him
the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that
when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and
family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed
a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the
motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties
failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it
and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
33

In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that
the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not
understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a
marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage
contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their
purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for
Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE
CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE,
LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.
8

The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for
Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they
knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of
being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter
being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest. The
parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise,
the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment
9
to the petition, reiterating her stand that her
marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply
10
reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on
certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole
purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the
ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for
the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of
marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages
where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been
referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.
11
A common limited purpose marriage is one entered
into solely for the legitimization of a child.
12
Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for
immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the
time of their marriage,
13
and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve
immigration status.
14

In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
15
established the
principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a
"marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time
they were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the
marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United
States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to
determining the intention of evading immigration laws.
16
It must be noted, however, that this
standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the
legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited
purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose
marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein
17
was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the
country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six
months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into
permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to
every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the
contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x
Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true
that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a
marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the
understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they
have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is
ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive
others.
18

(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,
19
which declared as
valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a
valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited
34

purpose."
20
The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,
21
further recognized that a fraudulent
or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as
problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is
first necessary.
22
At present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving"
limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have
upheld such marriages as valid.
23

The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondents marriage not void
In declaring the respondents marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into
for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and
should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSGs motion for
reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the
parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally
bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that
the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the
Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the
parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of
$2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as
husband and wife or build a family.
The CAs assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties supposed lack of consent. Under
Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code
provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence
of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such
as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.
24
Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in
that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the
beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.
25
Their understanding should not be affected
by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.
26

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent
was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their
consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately
contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to
fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal
tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a
marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as
a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct
indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.
27
It is a pretended marriage not intended to be
real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine
consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but
for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely
no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondents marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1wphi1 Albios and Fringer
had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the
respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow
them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an
application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage
status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly
present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a
conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to
establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in
accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of
marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared
void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if
it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the
acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites
prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it
shall be declared valid.
28

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate
on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go
into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions.
29
The right
to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit,
to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so
on.
30
Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites,
31
are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the
only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a
marriage.
35

Although the Court views with disdain the respondents attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest
purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondents marriage may be
considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and
continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the
Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud,
namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by
the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4)
concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit
shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the
sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances.
Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or
innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both
conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with
Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot
declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after
they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals
cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already
misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to
again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
32
It must, therefore, be safeguarded
from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that
marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily
nullified when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
questioning the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No.
86760, which reversed the Decision
2
in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008,
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of
a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269,
otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his
marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract
3
of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued
at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this
information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in
1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.
4
He arrived in the
Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was
at his mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F. Muoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-
law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some
ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of
said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not
know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did
not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that
area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on
their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the
marriage license number could be found.
5
The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion,
issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in
the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another
marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.
6
Said certification reads
as follows:
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage License No.
9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January
19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA
F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it
may serve.
7

36

On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and
2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification
on whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of his counsel.
8

Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was
issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.
9

Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers
are issued chronologically.
10
He testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and
signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that
Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19,
1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of the same serial number, namely
9969967, to any other person.
11

For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo
Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay
captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines.
12
He testified that
he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on
January 9, 1993.
13
He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and
Mary Ann Ceriola.
14
He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is
familiar with the requirements.
15
Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the
marriage license the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared
by his secretary.
16
After the solemnization of the marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage
license with that office.
17

Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria
Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo.
18
He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to
secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured the license and gave the
same to him on January 8, 1993.
19
He further testified that he did not know where the marriage
license was obtained.
20
He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage
contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the
solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.
21

Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and
that she was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house.
22
She testified
that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license,
and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male person went to their house with the
application for marriage license.
23
Three days later, the same person went back to their house,
showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz,
the solemnizing officer.
24
She further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the
marriage license, and that she was told that the marriage license was obtained from Carmona.
25
She
also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
26

As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of
the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in
the wedding photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her
testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract
bearing their signatures as proof.
27
She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing
a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house
and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after several days returned with an
application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned
with the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their
residence.
28

Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.
29

Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria
Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.
30

Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she
did not know if said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who
celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were Chinese.
31

The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No.
9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and
Syed.
32
It also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the
place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family
Code.
33
As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the
lack of a valid marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed
on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the respondent
declaring as follows:
37

1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent
Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the
respondent even if no property was acquired during their cohabitation by reason of the
nullity of the marriage of the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics
Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their respective civil registries the marriage
contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January
9, 1993 in Manila.
SO ORDERED.
34

Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same,
prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE
EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE,
THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE
WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING
OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS
HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL
AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE
PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.
35

The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of
the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage
license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be
accorded probative value.
36
The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary
evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the
requisites laid down by law.
37

It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA
also considered that the parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only
instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for bigamy.
38

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005
and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case
No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas
contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
39

Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008
40
but the same was denied by the
CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.
41

Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING
REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND
CONTRARY TO THE COURTS OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE,
WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
42

The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
38

As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or
the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply
to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article
45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
x x x x
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal
requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony.
Nor is the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage license under
Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a
valid marriage license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license
had been issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the
marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license.
To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested
certification that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals
43
such
certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an
official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is
found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-
issuance of a marriage license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was
not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers
charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage
license was issued and such other relevant data.
44

The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative
value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was
allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed
was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was
presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not
appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not
comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the certification,
and since the certification used stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no
diligent search had been conducted and thus the certification could not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals.
45
It is worth noting
that in that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage
license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely
stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did not appear in their
records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted
a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty
has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held,
"The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty."
46
No such affirmative evidence was shown that the
Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus
39

the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as
Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the
names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the
presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She
failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where,
admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best
witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she
presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in
Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license,
having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria
and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where
the license came from. The task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who
could have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present
this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the
marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage
license could have simply been secured from that office and submitted to the court. However,
Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage
license issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cario v. Cario,
47
following the case of Republic,
48
it was held that the certification of
the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove
the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cario further held that the presumed validity of the
marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a
valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had
been secured.
49
Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be
reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple
irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license
was presented by the respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria
and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Glorias
failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were
validly married. To quote the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant and
appellee have been validly married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by
law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity was even issued by
the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee
admitted that the signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were
presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other
members of appellants family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant
where the lunch was held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which
shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.
x x x x
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea
Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before
he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the
Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to have been instituted by him only
after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for
contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We
are not ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom
and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.
50

All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage
contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of
the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code
also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those
exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same
Code.
51
Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having
been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.1wphi1
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives
are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make
up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the
weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be
attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As
the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab
initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay
City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with
respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.
40

D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review
1
assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision
2
and the 14 March
2012 Resolution
3
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
The Antecedent Facts
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a non-
existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged
that on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three
children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a
customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by Benjamins family. In December 1981,
Azucena left for the United States of America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together
as husband and wife. Sallys father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to
appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a
purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamins marital status, assured him that the
marriage contract would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sallys cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period of
their cohabitation, they acquired the following real properties:
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names of
Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin,
married to Sally;
(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783 registered
in the name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally as a
single individual.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice
and Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public
documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in
turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of
marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it
lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition
of the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his
appointment as administrator of the properties during the pendency of the case, and for the
declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties
became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties
enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court
denied. Sally filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court also denied. Sally filed a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals and asked for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or injunction which the Court of Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to
present any evidence before the trial court citing the pendency of her petition before the Court of
Appeals. The trial court gave Sally several opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February
2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008, and
28 November 2008. Despite repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally still refused to present her
evidence, prompting the trial court to consider the case submitted for decision.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In a Decision
4
dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The trial court gave
weight to the certification dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was
confirmed during trial, that only Marriage License Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for
the month of February 1982 and the purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued to
Benjamin and Sally.
5
The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil
registrar and the National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamins
subsisting marriage with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial
court ruled that the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but
because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not
committed in this case. The trial court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice
and Bentley because they were not parties to the case. The trial court denied Sallys claim for
spousal support because she was not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support
for Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age and did not ask for support.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she named
in her answer as part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was
not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties that Sally was claiming were owned by
Benjamins parents who gave the properties to their children, including Benjamin, as advance
inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase "married
to Sally Go" was merely descriptive of Benjamins civil status in the title. As regards the two lots
under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were bought by Benjamin using
his own money and that Sally failed to prove any actual contribution of money, property or industry
in their purchase. The trial court found that Sally was a registered co-owner of the lots covered by
TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well as the two condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782
41

and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that the lot under TCT No. 61722 and the two
condominium units were purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that
the properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of
the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamins right to dispute
his conjugal state with Azucena in a separate proceeding.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was
married to Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sallys share in
the properties covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while
Benjamins share reverted to his conjugal ownership with Azucena.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982 at
Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared
NONEXISTENT.
Respondents claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT
Nos. 17722, 17723, 17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949,
188950, 188951, 193035, 194620, 194621, 194622, 194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627,
194628, 194629, 194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635, 194636, 194637, 194638,
194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
registered owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo B. Bangayan
and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go" Consequently, the Registry of
Deeds for Quezon City and Manila are directed to delete the words "married to Sally Go" from these
thirty-seven (37) titles.
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties
acquired from petitioners money without contribution from respondent, hence, these are
properties of the petitioner and his lawful wife. Consequently, petitioner is appointed the
administrator of these five (5) properties. Respondent is ordered to submit an accounting of her
collections of income from these five (5) properties within thirty (30) days from notice hereof.
Except for lot under TCT No. 61722, respondent is further directed within thirty (30) days from
notice hereof to turn over and surrender control and possession of these properties including the
documents of title to the petitioner.
On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are under co-
ownership of the parties shared by them equally. However, the share of respondent is declared
FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go Bangayan. The share of the petitioner
shall belong to his conjugal ownership with Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition and
distribution of these two (2) properties shall be further processed pursuant to Section 21 of A.M.
No. 02-11-10 of March 15, 2003.
Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-
11-10.
Respondents claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack
of merit. Further, no declaration of the status of the parties children.
No other relief granted.
Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor General
and the Registry of Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.
SO ORDERED.
6

Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration. In its
Order dated 27 August 2009,
7
the trial court denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial courts
decision before the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the trial court did not err in submitting the case for decision. The Court of Appeals noted
that there were six resettings of the case, all made at the instance of Sally, for the initial reception
of evidence, and Sally was duly warned to present her evidence on the next hearing or the case
would be deemed submitted for decision. However, despite the warning, Sally still failed to present
her evidence. She insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and was not subpoenaed
despite the presence of her other witnesses.
The Court of Appeals rejected Sallys allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his action for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamins action was based on
his prior marriage to Azucena and there was no evidence that the marriage was annulled or
dissolved before Benjamin contracted the second marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled
that the trial court committed no error in declaring Benjamins marriage to Sally null and void.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by
Article 148 of the Family Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties acquired by the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
37 properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.
As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that only the
properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him
exclusively because he was able to establish that they were acquired by him solely. The Court of
Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782
and 8783 were exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamins actual
contribution in their purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that the property under TCT No. 61722
registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be shared
42

equally. However, the share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his existing
marriage with Azucena while Sallys share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and
convincing proof of bad faith.
Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing evidence that
would show bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge that would justify his inhibition from
the case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision
and Order dated March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification declaring
TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-appellee while the properties
under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be solely owned by
the respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by them and common
and to be shared equally but the share of the petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the conjugal
partnership under his first marriage while the share of respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The
rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
8

Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision. In its 14 March 2012
Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied her motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial
courts ruling that Sally had waived her right to present evidence;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial
courts decision declaring the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio
and non-existent; and
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with
modification the trial courts decision regarding the property relations of Benjamin and
Sally.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts ruling that she waived her
right to present her evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present evidence that she and
Benjamin were married, the trial court abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an inviolable
institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right
but is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.
9
In this case, Sallys presentation of evidence
was scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter, there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July
2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all
made at Sallys instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned
Sally that in case she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be submitted for decision.
On the date of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other available witnesses, Sally
insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed on that day. Sallys counsel insisted
that the trial court could not dictate on the priority of witnesses to be presented, disregarding the
trial courts prior warning due to the numerous resettings of the case. Sally could not complain that
she had been deprived of her right to present her evidence because all the postponements were at
her instance and she was warned by the trial court that it would submit the case for decision should
she still fail to present her evidence on 28 November 2008.
We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was
deemed to have waived her right to present them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sallys
continued failure to present her evidence despite the opportunities given by the trial court showed
her lack of interest to proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that Sally was delaying the case
because she was waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the
trial courts denial of her demurrer to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not
issue any temporary restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the trial court of
failing to protect marriage as an inviolable institution because the trial court also has the duty to
ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by one of the
parties.
10

Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to Benjamin
because a marriage could not be nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void ab initio. Sally
further alleges that if she were allowed to present her evidence, she would have proven her
marriage to Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to consider that in
acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was "married to" her; that
Benjamin was the informant in their childrens birth certificates where he stated that he was their
father; and that Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally
claims that there was no real property registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally
43

further alleges that Benjamin was not the informant in the birth certificates of his children with
Azucena.
First, Benjamins marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the trial
court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally
entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena
was valid and subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II
of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to
Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were
issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the series
issued for the month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue
Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance,
the certification enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a
record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
11
Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and
Sally entered into a marriage contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a
marriage license.
12

It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The lack of
record was certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of the Municipality of Pasig;
13
Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the
Records Management and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and the Arts;
14
and
Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department of the National Statistics Office.
15
The
documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was no marriage between Benjamin and
Sally. As pointed out by the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in
jest"
16
and "a simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected
social humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society especially from her parents seen as
Chinese conservatives."
17
In short, it was a fictitious marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a
proof of the marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the
informant in Bernices birth certificate which stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8
March 1982
18
while Sally was the informant in Bentleys birth certificate which also stated that
Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 1982.
19
Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married
on 7 March 1982 which did not match the dates reflected on the birth certificates.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio
and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized
without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void
from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without
a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage
License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar
of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article
35
20
which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also
non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the
Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the
beginning."
21
Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial courts ruling that the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all
aspects the trial courts decision and ruled that "the rest of the decision stands."
22
While the Court
of Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the
decision declaring that "the rest of the decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial
courts discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous.1wphi1 The trial
court stated:
On whether or not the parties marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not
be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid,
there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face
of their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of the existence
of the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not
committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that what was committed was
contracting marriage against the provisions of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the
Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore not bigamous because
there was no marriage license. The daring and repeated stand of respondent that she is legally
married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to
petitioner has the marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would
be invalidated by a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena.
23

For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for
validity except for the existence of a prior marriage.
24
In this case, there was really no subsequent
marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license.
The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics
Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and
represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed
by Article 148 of the Family Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be
equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of
credit.
44

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue
to the absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who
acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired
by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by
Benjamins father to his children as advance inheritance. Sallys Answer to the petition before the
trial court even admitted that "Benjamins late father himself conveyed a number of properties to
his children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x x."
25

As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is more
in accord with the evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered
in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses.
26
The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860
were in the name of Benjamin
27
with the descriptive title "married to Sally." The property covered
by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally
28
with the descriptive title "married
to Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the
name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the name
of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner.
29
Such words do not
prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be
no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.
30

Inhibition of the Trial Judge
Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from hearing
the case. She cited the failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her evidence.
She further alleged that Judge Gironella practically labeled her as an opportunist in his decision,
showing his partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.
We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound
discretion on the part of the judge.
31
To justify the call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic
evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which
may be inferred from the decision or order itself.
32
In this case, we have sufficiently explained that
Judge Gironella did not err in submitting the case for decision because of Sallys continued refusal to
present her evidence.
We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used
uncomplimentary words in writing the decision, they are not enough to prove his prejudice against
Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the case that would justify the call for his
voluntary inhibition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
SO ORDERED.