Imbong vs. Ochoa

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG an !O"E!#$ANN C. IMBONG, %or &'()*(l+(* an in ,('al% o% &'(ir )inor
-'ilr(n, !UCIA CAR!OS IMBONG an BERNA.ETTE CAR!OS IMBONG an MAGNI/ICAT
C0I!. .E"E!OPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
0ON. PA1UITO N. OC0OA, JR., E2(-3&i+( S(-r(&ar4, 0ON. /!ORENCIO B. ABA., S(-r(&ar4,
.(par&)(n& o% B35(& an Mana5()(n&, 0ON. ENRI1UE T. ONA, S(-r(&ar4, .(par&)(n& o%
0(al&', 0ON. ARMIN A. !UISTRO, S(-r(&ar4, .(par&)(n& o% E3-a&ion, C3l&3r( an Spor&*
an 0ON. MANUE!A. RO6AS II, S(-r(&ar4, .(par&)(n& o% In&(rior an !o-al
Go+(rn)(n&, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204974
A!!IANCE /OR T0E /AMI!# /OUN.ATION P0I!IPPINES, INC. 8A!/I9, r(pr(*(n&( ,4 i&*
Pr(*i(n&, Maria Con-(p-ion S. No-'(, Spo3*(* R(4nalo S. !3i*&ro : Ro*i( B . !3i*&ro,
Jo*( S. San(;a* : El(ni&a S.A. San(;a*, Ar&3ro M. Gorr(< : Mari(&&a C. Gorr(<, Sal+aor S.
Man&(, Jr. : 0a<(l((n !. Man&(, Rolano M. Ba3&i*&a : Maria /(li*a S. Ba3&i*&a, .(*i(rio
Ra-'o : Tra=3ilina Ra-'o, / ()an An&onio A. Tan*in5-o : Carol Ann( C. Tan*in5-o %or
&'()*(l+(* an on ,('al% o% &'(ir )inor -'ilr(n, T'(r(*( An&on(&&( C. Tan*in5-o, !or(n<o
Jo*( C. Tan*in5-o, Mi53(l / ()ano C. Tan5*in5-o, Carlo Jo*()aria C. Tan*in5-o : J3an
Paolo C. Tan*in5-o, Spo3*(* Mariano ". Aran(&a : Eil((n >. Aran(&a %or &'()*(l+(* an on
,('al% o% &'(ir )inor -'ilr(n, Ra)on Carlo* >. Aran(&a : Ma4a An5(li-a >. Aran(&a, Spo3*(*
R(na&o C. Ca*&or : Milr( C. Ca*&or %or &'()*(l+(* an on ,('al% o% &'(ir )inor -'ilr(n,
R(n< J(%%r(4 C. Ca*&or, Jo*(p' Ra)il C. Ca*&or, Jo'n Pa3l C. Ca*&or : Rap'a(l C. Ca*&or,
Spo3*(* Al(2an(r R. Ra-'o : >ara >. Ra-'o %or &'()*(l+(* an on ,('al% o% &'(ir )inor
-'ilr(n Mar5ari&a Ra-'o, Mi?a(la Ra-'o, Mar&in Ra-'o, Mari Ra-'o : Manolo Ra-'o,
Spo3*(* Al%r( R. Ra-'o : /ran-in( ". Ra-'o %or &'()*(l+(* an on ,('al% o% &'(ir )inor
-'ilr(n Mi-'a(l Ra-'o, Mariana Ra-'o, Ra%a(l Ra-'o, Ma2i Ra-'o, C'(**i( Ra-'o : !a3ra
Ra-'o, Spo3*(* .a+i R. Ra-'o : Ar)il4n A. Ra-'o %or &'()*(l+(* an on ,('al% o% &'(ir
)inor -'il Ga,ri(l Ra-'o, Min4 M. J3a&a* an on ,('al% o% '(r )inor -'ilr(n Eli;a' G(ral
J3a&a* an Elian Ga,ri(l J3a&a*, Sal+a-ion M. Mon&(iro, E)il4 R. !a@*, Jo*(p' R . !a@* :
Aa&rina R. !a@*, Petitioners,
vs.
0ON. PA1UITO N. OC0OA, JR., E2(-3&i+( S(-r(&ar4, 0ON. ENRI1UE T. ONA, S(-r(&ar4,
.(par&)(n& o% 0(al&', 0ON. ARMIN A. !UISTRO, S(-r(&ar4, .(par&)(n& o% E3-a&ion, C3l&3r(
an Spor&*, 0ON. CORA>ON SO!IMAN, S(-r(&ar4, .(par&)(n& o% So-ial B(l%ar( an
.(+(lop)(n&, 0ON. MANUE!A. RO6AS II, S(-r(&ar4, .(par&)(n& o% In&(rior an !o-al
Go+(rn)(n&, 0ON. /!ORENCIO B. ABA., S(-r(&ar4, .(par&)(n& o% B35(& an Mana5()(n&,
0ON. ARSENIO M. BA!ISACAN, So-io$E-ono)i- Plannin5 S(-r(&ar4 an NE.A .ir(-&or$
G(n(ral, T0E P0I!IPPINE COMMISSION ON BOMEN, r(pr(*(n&( ,4 i&* C'airp(r*on,
R()(io* l5na-io$Ri??(n, T0E P0I!IPPINE 0EA!T0 INSURANCE CORPORATION,
r(pr(*(n&( ,4 i&* Pr(*i(n& E3aro Ban<on, T0E !EAGUE O/ PRO"INCES O/ T0E
P0I!IPPINES, r(pr(*(n&( ,4 i&* Pr(*i(n& Al%on*o U)ali, T0E !EAGUE O/ CITIES O/ T0E
P0I!IPPINES, r(pr(*(n&( ,4 i&* Pr(*i(n& O*-ar Rori53(<, an T0E !EAGUE O/
MUNICIPA!ITIES O/ T0E P0I!IPPINES, r(pr(*(n&( ,4 i&* Pr(*i(n& .ona&o
Mar-o*, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 2049CD
TASA /ORCE /OR /AMI!# AN. !I/E "ISA#AS, INC. an "A!ERIANO S. A"I!A, Petitioners,
vs.
0ON. PA1UITO N. OC0OA, JR., E2(-3&i+( S(-r(&ar4E 0ON. /!ORENCIO B. ABA., S(-r(&ar4,
.(par&)(n& o% B35(& an Mana5()(n&E 0ON. ENRI1UE T. ONA, S(-r(&ar4, .(par&)(n& o%
E3-a&ionE an 0ON. MANUE!A. RO6AS II, S(-r(&ar4, .(par&)(n& o% In&(rior an !o-al
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204988
SER"E !I/E CAGA#AN .E ORO CIT#, INC., r(pr(*(n&( ,4 .r. N(*&or B. !3)i-ao, M..., a*
Pr(*i(n& an in 'i* p(r*onal -apa-i&4, ROSE"A!E /OUN.ATION INC., r(pr(*(n&( ,4 .r.
Rori5o M. Al(n&on, M..., a* )(),(r o% &'( *-'ool ,oar an in 'i* p(r*onal -apa-i&4,
ROSEMARIE R. A!ENTON, IME!.A G. IBARRA, CPA, !O"ENIAP. NACES, P'., ANT0ON# G.
NAGAC, EAR! ANT0ON# C. GAMBE an MAR!ON I. #AP,Petitioners,
vs.
O//ICE O/ T0E PRESI.ENT, SENATE O/ T0E P0I!IPPINES, 0OUSE O/ REPRESENTATI"ES,
.(par&)(n& o% B35(& an Mana5()(n&E 0ON. ENRI1UE T. ONA, S(-r(&ar4, .(par&)(n& o%
0(al&'E 0ON. ARMIN A. !UISTRO, S(-r(&ar4, .(par&)(n& o% E3-a&ion an 0ON. MANUE!A.
RO6AS II, S(-r(&ar4, .(par&)(n& o% In&(rior an !o-al Go+(rn)(n&, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 20C007
E6PE.ITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
O//ICE O/ T0E PRESI.ENT O/ T0E REPUB!IC O/ T0E P0I!IPPINES, 0ON. SENATE
PRESI.ENT, 0ON. SPEAAER O/ T0E 0OUSE O/ REPRESENTATI"ES an 0ON. SO!ICITOR
GENERA!, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 20C047
E.UAR.O B. O!AGUER an T0E CAT0O!IC 6#BRSPACE APOSTO!ATE O/ T0E
P0I!IPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
.O0 SECRETAR# ENRI1UE T. ONA, /.A .IRECTOR SU>ETTE 0. !A>O, .BM SECRETAR#
/!ORENCIO B. ABA., .I!G SECRETAR# MANUE!A. RO6AS II, .ECS SECRETAR# ARMIN A.
!UISTRO, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 20C178
P0I!IPPINE A!!IANCE O/ 6SEMINARIANS, INC. FPA6G, '(r(in r(pr(*(n&( ,4 i&* Na&ional
Pr(*i(n&, A&&4. Ri-aro M . Ri,o, an in 'i* o@n ,('al%, A&&4. !ino E.A. .3)a*, Ro)(o B.
Al)on&(, O*)3no C. Orlan(*, Ar*(nio >. M(nor, Sa)3(l J. #ap, Jai)( /. Ma&(o, Roll4
Si53an, .an&( E. Ma5an5al, Mi-'a(l E35(nio O. Plana, Bi(n+(nio C. Mi53(l, Jr., !anri&o M.
.io?no an Balo)(ro /al-on(, Petitioners,
vs.
0(al&', 0ON. ARMIN A. !UISTRO, S(-r(&ar4, .(par&)(n& o% E3-a&ion, 0ON. MANUE!A.
RO6AS II, S(-r(&ar4, .(par&)(n& o% In&(rior an !o-al Go+(rn)(n&, 0ON. CORA>ON J.
SO!IMAN, S(-r(&ar4, .(par&)(n& o% So-ial B(l%ar( an .(+(lop)(n&, 0ON. ARSENIO
BA!ISACAN, .ir(-&or$G(n(ral, Na&ional E-ono)i- an .(+(lop)(n& A3&'ori&4, 0ON.
SU>ETTE 0. !A>O, .ir(-&or$G(n(ral, /oo an .r35* A)ini*&ra&ion, T0E BOAR. O/
.IRECTORS, P'ilippin( 0(al&' In*3ran-( Corpora&ion, an T0E BOAR. O/
COMMISSIONERS, P'ilippin( Co))i**ion on Bo)(n, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 20C4D8
RE#NA!.O J. EC0A"E>, M..., JAC1UE!INE 0. AING, M..., C#NT0IA T. .OMINGO, M...,
AN. JOSEP0INE MI!!A.O$!UMITAO, M..., -oll(-&i+(l4 ?no@n a* .o-&or* /or !i%(, an
ANT0ON# PERE>, MIC0AE! ANT0ON# G. MAPA, CAR!OS ANTONIO PA!A., BI!/RE.O
JOSE, C!AIRE NA"ARRO, ANNA COSIO, an GABRIE! .# !IACCO -oll(-&i+(l4 ?no@n a*
/ilipino* /or !i%(, Petitioners,
vs.
0ON. PA1UITO N. OC0OA, JR., E2(-3&i+( S(-r(&ar4E 0ON. /!ORENCIO B. ABA., S(-r(&ar4
o% &'( .(par&)(n& o% B35(& an Mana5()(n&E 0ON. ENRI1UE T. ONA, S(-r(&ar4 o% &'(
.(par&)(n& o% 0(al&'E 0ON. ARMIN A. !UISTRO, S(-r(&ar4 o% &'( .(par&)(n& o% E3-a&ionE
an 0ON. MANUE!A. RO6AS II, S(-r(&ar4 o% &'( .(par&)(n& o% In&(rior an !o-al
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 20C491
SPOUSES /RANCISCO S. TATA. AN. MARIA /ENN# C. TATA. : A!A /. PAGUIA, %or
&'()*(l+(*, &'(ir Po*&(ri&4, an &'( r(*& o% /ilipino po*&(ri&4, Petitioners,
vs.
O//ICE O/ T0E PRESI.ENT o% &'( R(p3,li- o% &'( P'ilippin(*, Respondent.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 20CD20
PRO$!I/E P0I!IPPINES /OUN.ATION, In-., r(pr(*(n&( ,4 !o)a M(l(5ri&o, a* E2(-3&i+(
.ir(-&or, an in '(r p(r*onal -apa-i&4, JOSE!#N B. BASI!IO, ROBERT >. CORTES, ARIE! A.
CRISOSTOMO, JEREM# I. GAT.U!A, CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAU! ANTONIO A. NI.O#,
BINSTON CONRA. B. PA.OJINOG, RU/INO !. PO!ICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
O//ICE O/ T0E PRESI.ENT, SENATE O/ T0E P0I!IPPINES, 0OUSE O/ REPRESENTATI"ES,
0(al&', 0ON. ARMIN A. !UISTRO, S(-r(&ar4, .(par&)(n& o% E3-a&ion an 0ON. MANUE! A.
RO6AS II, S(-r(&ar4, .(par&)(n& o% In&(rior an !o-al Go+(rn)(n&, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 20H7CC
MI!!ENNIUM SAINT /OUN.ATION, INC., ATT#. RAMON PE.ROSA, ATT#. CITA BORROMEO$
GARCIA, STE!!AACE.ERA, ATT#. BERTENI CATA!UNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
O//ICE O/ T0E PRESI.ENT, O//ICE O/ T0E E6ECUTI"E SECRETAR#, .EPARTMENT O/
0EA!T0, .EPARTMENT O/ E.UCATION, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 20D111
JO0N BA!TER B. JUAT, MAR# M. IMBONG, ANT0ON# "ICTORIO B. !UMICAO, JOSEP0
MARTIN 1. "ER.EJO, ANTONIA EMMA R. RO6AS an !OTA !AT$GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
0ON. PA1UITO N. OC0OA, JR., E2(-3&i+( S(-r(&ar4, 0ON. /!ORENCIO ABA., S(-r(&ar4,
an 0ON. MANUE! A. RO6AS II, S(-r(&ar4, .(par&)(n& o% In&(rior an !o-al
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 20D1D2
COUP!ES /OR C0RIST /OUN.ATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CAR!OS ARTA.I SARMIENTO
AN. /RANCESCA ISABE!!E BESINGA$SARMIENTO, AN. SPOUSES !UIS /RANCIS A.
RO.RIGO, JR. an .EBORA0 MARIE "ERONICA N. RO.RIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
an 0ON. MANUE!A. RO6AS II, S(-r(&ar4, .(par&)(n& o% In&(rior an !o-al
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 20DCH7
A!MARIM CENTI TI!!A0 an AB.U!0USSEIN M. AAS0IM, Petitioners,
vs.
0ON. PA1UITO N. OC0OA, JR., E2(-3&i+( S(-r(&ar4, 0ON. ENRI1UE T. ONA, S(-r(&ar4 o% &'(
.(par&)(n& o% 0(al&', an 0ON. ARMIN A. !UISTRO,S(-r(&ar4 o% &'( .(par&)(n& o% B35(&
an Mana5()(n&,Respondents.
E C ! " ! # N
MEN.O>A, J.:
$reedo% of religion &as accorded preferred status by the fra%ers of our funda%ental la&. And this
Court has consistently affir%ed this preferred status, &ell a&are that it is 'designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allo& each %an to believe as his conscience directs, to
profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent &ith the liberty of others
and &ith the co%%on good.'
(
)o this day, poverty is still a %a*or stu%bling bloc+ to the nation,s e%ergence as a developed
country, leaving our people beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and une%ploy%ent. -hile
govern%ental policies have been geared to&ards the revitali.ation of the econo%y, the bludgeoning
dearth in social services re%ains to be a proble% that concerns not only the poor, but every %e%ber
of society. )he govern%ent continues to tread on a trying path to the reali.ation of its very purpose,
that is, the general &elfare of the $ilipino people and the develop%ent of the country as a &hole. )he
legislative branch, as the %ain facet of a representative govern%ent, endeavors to enact la&s and
policies that ai% to re%edy loo%ing societal &oes, &hile the executive is closed set to fully
i%ple%ent these %easures and bring concrete and substantial solutions &ithin the reach of /uan
dela Cru.. "ee%ingly distant is the *udicial branch, oftenti%es regarded as an inert govern%ental
body that %erely casts its &atchful eyes on clashing sta+eholders until it is called upon to ad*udicate.
Passive, yet reflexive &hen called into action, the /udiciary then &illingly e%bar+s on its sole%n duty
to interpret legislation vis-a-vis the %ost vital and enduring principle that holds Philippine society
together - the supre%acy of the Philippine Constitution.
Nothing has polari.ed the nation %ore in recent years than the issues of population gro&th control,
abortion and contraception. As in every de%ocratic society, dia%etrically opposed vie&s on the
sub*ects and their perceived conse0uences freely circulate in various %edia. $ro% television
debates
1
to stic+er ca%paigns,
2
fro% rallies by socio-political activists to %ass gatherings organi.ed
by %e%bers of the clergy
3
- the clash bet&een the see%ingly antithetical ideologies of the religious
conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society.
espite calls to &ithhold support thereto, ho&ever, Republic Act 4R.A.5 No. (6273, other&ise +no&n
as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive 8ealth Act of 16(1 4R8 9a&5, &as enacted by
Congress on ece%ber 1(, 16(1.
"hortly after the President placed his i%pri%atur on the said la&, challengers fro% various sectors of
society ca%e +noc+ing on the doors of the Court, bec+oning it to &ield the s&ord that stri+es do&n
constitutional disobedience. A&are of the profound and lasting i%pact that its decision %ay produce,
the Court no& faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen 4(35 petitions and t&o 415
petitions- in-intervention, to &it:
4(5 Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
7
filed by spouses Attys. /a%es ;. !%bong and
9ovely Ann C. !%bong, in their personal capacities as citi.ens, la&yers and taxpayers and on
behalf of their %inor children< and the ;agnificat Child 9ea%ing Center, !nc., a do%estic,
privately-o&ned educational institution 4/%bong5<
415 Petition for Prohibition,
=
filed by the Alliance for the $a%ily $oundation Philippines, !nc.,
through its president, Atty. ;aria Concepcion ". Noche
>
and several others
?
in their personal
capacities as citi.ens and on behalf of the generations unborn 4A9$!5<
425 Petition for Certiorari,
@
filed by the )as+ $orce for $a%ily and 9ife Aisayas, !nc., and
Aaleriano ". Avila, in their capacities as citi.ens and taxpayers 4)as+ $orce $a%ily5<
435 Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
(6
filed by "erve 9ife Cagayan e #ro City,
!nc.,
((
Rosevale $oundation, !nc.,
(1
a do%estic, privately-o&ned educational institution, and
several others,
(2
in their capacities as citi.ens 4"erve 9ife5<
475 Petition,
(3
filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, /r. in his capacity as a citi.en 4Bugarin5<
4=5 Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
(7
filed by Eduardo #laguer and the Catholic
Bybrspace Apostolate of the Philippines,
(=
in their capacities as a citi.ens and taxpayers
4#laguer5<
4>5 Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
(>
filed by the Philippine Alliance of Bse%inarians
!nc.,
(?
and several others
(@
in their capacities as citi.ens and taxpayers 4PAB5<
4?5 Petition,
16
filed by Reynaldo /. Echave., ;.. and several others,
1(
in their capacities as
citi.ens and taxpayers 4Echave.5<
4@5 Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
11
filed by spouses $rancisco and ;aria $enny C.
)atad and Atty. Alan $. Paguia, in their capacities as citi.ens, taxpayers and on behalf of
those yet unborn. Atty. Alan $. Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as a %e%ber of the
Bar 4)atad5<
12
filed by Pro-9ife Philippines $oundation !nc.
13
and
several others,
17
in their capacities as citi.ens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates
&ho are %e%bers of the Bar 4Pro-9ife5<
4((5 Petition for Prohibition,
1=
filed by ;illenniu% "aint $oundation, !nc.,
1>
Attys. Ra%on
Pedrosa, Cita Borro%eo-Carcia, "tella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their
capacities as citi.ens, taxpayers and %e%bers of the Bar 4;"$5<
1?
filed by /ohn -alter B. /uat and several
others,
1@
in their capacities as citi.ens 4/uat5 <
26
filed by Couples for Christ $oundation, !nc. and
several others,
2(
in their capacities as citi.ens 4C$C5<
4(35 Petition for Prohibition
21
filed by Al%ari% Centi )illah and Abdulhussein ;. Dashi% in
their capacities as citi.ens and taxpayers 4)illah5< and
4(75 Petition-!n-!ntervention,
22
filed by Atty. "a%son ". Alcantara in his capacity as a citi.en
and a taxpayer 4Alcantara5< and
4(=5 Petition-!n-!ntervention,
23
filed by Buhay 8ayaang Eu%abong 4B F8AE5 , an accredited
political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions sho&s that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of R8
9a& on the follo&ing CR#FN":
G )he R8 9a& violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners,
not&ithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the i%ple%entation of the R8 9a& &ould
authori.e the purchase of hor%onal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and in*ectables
&hich are abortives, in violation of "ection (1, Article !! of the Constitution &hich guarantees
protection of both the life of the %other and the life of the unborn fro% conception.
27
G )he R8 9a& violates the right to health and the right to protection against ha.ardous
products. )he petitioners posit that the R8 9a& provides universal access to contraceptives
&hich are ha.ardous to one,s health, as it causes cancer and other health proble%s.
2=
G )he R8 9a& violates the right to religious freedo%. )he petitioners contend that the R8
9a& violates the constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authori.es the use of public
funds for the procure%ent of contraceptives. $or the petitioners, the use of public funds for
purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional
%andate ensuring religious freedo%.
2>
!t is also contended that the R8 9a& threatens conscientious ob*ectors of cri%inal prosecution,
i%prison%ent and other for%s of punish%ent, as it co%pels %edical practitioners (H to refer patients
&ho see+ advice on reproductive health progra%s to other doctors< and 1H to provide full and correct
infor%ation on reproductive health progra%s and service, although it is against their religious beliefs
and convictions.
2?
!n this connection, "ection 7 .12 of the !%ple%enting Rules and Regulations of the R8 9a& 4R8-
!RR5,
2@
provides that s+illed health professionals &ho are public officers such as, but not li%ited to,
Provincial, City, or ;unicipal 8ealth #fficers, %edical officers, %edical specialists, rural health
physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health %id&ives, &ho are specifically
charged &ith the duty to i%ple%ent these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious ob*ectors.
36
!t is also argued that the R8 9a& providing for the for%ulation of %andatory sex education in schools
should not be allo&ed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.
3(
-hile the petit(6ners recogni.e that the guarantee of religious freedo% is not absolute, they argue
that the R8 9a& fails to satisfy the 'clear and present danger test' and the 'co%pelling state interest
test' to *ustify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.
31
G )he R8 9a& violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the
petitioners, the R8 9a& sub*ects %edical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to
be accredited under the Phil8ealth progra%, they are co%pelled to provide forty-eight 43?5
hours of pro bona services for indigent &o%en, under threat of cri%inal prosecution,
i%prison%ent and other for%s of punish%ent.
32
)he petitioners explain that since a %a*ority of patients are covered by Phil8ealth, a %edical
practitioner &ould effectively be forced to render reproductive health services since the lac+ of
Phil8ealth accreditation &ould %ean that the %a*ority of the public &ould no longer be able to avail
of the practitioners services.
33
G )he R8 9a& violates the right to e0ual protection of the la&. !t is clai%ed that the R8 9a&
discri%inates against the poor as it %a+es the% the pri%ary target of the govern%ent
progra% that pro%otes contraceptive use. )he petitioners argue that, rather than pro%oting
reproductive health a%ong the poor, the R8 9a& see+s to introduce contraceptives that
&ould effectively reduce the nu%ber of the poor.
37
G )he R8 9a& is 'void-for-vagueness' in violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution. !n i%posing the penalty of i%prison%ent andIor fine for 'any violation,' it is
vague because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated as 'violation' of the R8
9a&.
3=
!n this connection, it is clai%ed that '"ection > of the R8 9a& violates the right to due process by
re%oving fro% the% 4the people5 the right to %anage their o&n affairs and to decide &hat +ind of
health facility they shall be and &hat +ind of services they shall offer.'
3>
!t ignores the %anage%ent
prerogative inherent in corporations for e%ployers to conduct their affairs in accordance &ith their
o&n discretion and *udg%ent.
G )he R8 9a& violates the right to free speech. )o co%pel a person to explain a full range of
fa%ily planning %ethods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his o&n preferred &ay
of fa%ily planning. )he petitioners note that although exe%ption is granted to institutions
o&ned and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer their patients to another
healthcare facility &illing to perfor% the service or procedure.
3?
G )he R8 9a& intrudes into the .one of privacy of one,s fa%ily protected by the Constitution.
!t is contended that the R8 9a& providing for %andatory reproductive health education
intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children in accordance &ith their beliefs.
3@
!t is clai%ed that, by giving absolute authority to the person &ho &ill undergo reproductive health
procedure, the R8 9a& forsa+es any real dialogue bet&een the spouses and i%pedes the right of
spouses to %utually decide on %atters pertaining to the overall &ell-being of their fa%ily. !n the sa%e
breath, it is also clai%ed that the parents of a child &ho has suffered a %iscarriage are deprived of
parental authority to deter%ine &hether their child should use contraceptives.
76
G )he R8 9a& violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority.
)he petitioners 0uestion the delegation by Congress to the $A of the po&er to deter%ine
&hether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the E%ergency rugs 9ist
4E95.
7(
G )he R8 9a& violates the one sub*ectIone bill rule provision under "ection 1=4 ( 5, Article A!
of the Constitution.
71
G )he R8 9a& violates Natural 9a&.
72
G )he R8 9a& violates the principle of Autono%y of 9ocal Covern%ent Fnits 49CFs5 and the
Autono%ous Region of ;usli% ;indanao JAR;;5. !t is contended that the R8 9a&,
providing for reproductive health %easures at the local govern%ent level and the AR;;,
infringes upon the po&ers devolved to 9CFs and the AR;; under the 9ocal Covern%ent
Code and R.A . No. @673.
73
Aarious parties also sought and &ere granted leave to file their respective co%%ents-in-intervention
in defense of the constitutionality of the R8 9a&. Aside fro% the #ffice of the "olicitor Ceneral 4#"C5
&hich co%%ented on the petitions in behalf of the respondents,
77
Congress%an Edcel C.
9ag%an,
7=
for%er officials of the epart%ent of 8ealth r. Esperan.a !. Cabral, /a%ie Calve.-)an,
and r. Alberto C. Ro%ualde.,
7>
the $ilipino Catholic Aoices for Reproductive 8ealth 4C3R85,
7?
Ana
)heresa 'Risa' 8ontiveros,
7@
and Atty. /oan e Aenecia
=6
also filed their respective Co%%ents-in-
!ntervention in con*unction &ith several others. #n /une 3, 16(2, "enator Pia /uliana ". Cayetano
&as also granted leave to intervene.
=(
)he respondents, aside fro% traversing the substantive argu%ents of the petitioners, pray for the
dis%issal of the petitions for the principal reasons that (H there is no actual case or controversy and,
therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for *udicial deter%ination.< 1H so%e petitioners lac+ standing to
0uestion the R8 9a&< and 2H the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over &hich
the Court has no original *urisdiction.
;ean&hile, on ;arch (7, 16(2, the R8-!RR for the enforce%ent of the assailed legislation too+
effect.
#n ;arch (@, 16(2, after considering the issues and argu%ents raised, the Court issued the "tatus
Kuo Ante #rder 4"KA#5, en*oining the effects and i%ple%entation of the assailed legislation for a
period of one hundred and t&enty 4(165 days, or until /uly (>, 16(2.
=1
#n ;ay 26, 16(2, the Court held a preli%inary conference &ith the counsels of the parties to
deter%ine andIor identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the se0uence by &hich these
issues &ere to be discussed in the oral argu%ents. #n /uly @ and 12, 16(2, and on August =, (2,
and 1>, 16(2, the cases &ere heard on oral argu%ent. #n /uly (=, 16(2, the "KA# &as ordered
extended until further orders of the Court.
=2
)hereafter, the Court directed the parties to sub%it their respective %e%oranda &ithin sixty 4=65
days and, at the sa%e ti%e posed several 0uestions for their clarification on so%e contentions of the
parties.
=3
)he "tatus Kuo Ante
4Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive 8ealth 9a&s
Prior to the R8 9a&
9ong before the incipience of the R8 9a&, the country has allo&ed the sale, dispensation and
distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices. As far bac+ as /une (?, (@==, the country enacted
R.A. No. 3>1@ entitled 'An Act to Regu,late the "ale, ispensation, andIor istribution of
Contraceptive rugs and evices.' Although contraceptive drugs and devices &ere allo&ed, they
could not be sold, dispensed or distributed 'unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a
duly licensed drug store or phar%aceutical co%pany and &ith the prescription of a 0ualified %edical
practitioner.'
=7
!n addition, R.A. No. 7@1(,
==
approved on /une 1(, (@=@, contained provisions relative to 'dispensing
of abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances and devices.' Fnder "ection 2> thereof, it &as
provided that 'no drug or che%ical product or device capable of provo+ing abortion or preventing
conception as classified by the $ood and rug Ad%inistration shall be delivered or sold to any
person &ithout a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician.'
#n ece%ber ((, (@=>, the Philippines, adhering to the FN eclaration on Population, &hich
recogni.ed that the population proble% should be considered as the principal ele%ent for long-ter%
econo%ic develop%ent, enacted %easures that pro%oted %ale vasecto%y and tubal ligation to
%itigate population gro&th.
=>
A%ong these %easures included R.A. No. =2=7, approved on August
(=, (@>(, entitled 'An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population, Creating the Co%%ission on
Population and for #ther Purposes. ' )he la& envisioned that 'fa%ily planning &ill be %ade part of a
broad educational progra%< safe and effective %eans &ill be provided to couples desiring to space
or li%it fa%ily si.e< %ortality and %orbidity rates &ill be further reduced.'
)o further strengthen R.A. No. =2=7, then President $erdinand E . ;arcos issued Presidential
ecree. 4P..5 No. >@,
=?
dated ece%ber ?, (@>1, &hich, a%ong others, %ade 'fa%ily planning a part
of a broad educational progra%,' provided 'fa%ily planning services as a part of over-all health
care,' and %ade 'available all acceptable %ethods of contraception, except abortion, to all $ilipino
citi.ens desirous of spacing, li%iting or preventing pregnancies.'
)hrough the years, ho&ever, the use of contraceptives and fa%ily planning %ethods evolved fro%
being a co%ponent of de%ographic %anage%ent, to one centered on the pro%otion of public health,
particularly, reproductive health.
=@
Fnder that policy, the country gave priority to one,s right to freely
choose the %ethod of fa%ily planning to be adopted, in confor%ity &ith its adherence to the
co%%it%ents %ade in the !nternational Conference on Population and evelop%ent.
>6
)hus, on
August (3, 166@, the country enacted R.A. No. @>(6 or ')he ;agna Carta for -o%en, ' &hich,
a%ong others, %andated the "tate to provide for co%prehensive health services and progra%s for
&o%en, including fa%ily planning and sex education.
>(
)he R8 9a&
espite the foregoing legislative %easures, the population of the country +ept on galloping at an
uncontrollable pace. $ro% a paltry nu%ber of *ust over 1> %illion $ilipinos in (@=6, the population of
the country reached over >= %illion in the year 1666 and over @1 %illion in 16(6.
>1
)he executive and
the legislative, thus, felt that the %easures &ere still not ade0uate. )o rein in the proble%, the R8
9a& &as enacted to provide $ilipinos, especially the poor and the %arginali.ed, access and
infor%ation to the full range of %ode% fa%ily planning %ethods, and to ensure that its ob*ective to
provide for the peoples, right to reproductive health be achieved. )o %a+e it %ore effective, the R8
9a& %ade it %andatory for health providers to provide infor%ation on the full range of %ode% fa%ily
planning %ethods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health education.
)o put teeth to it, the R8 9a& cri%inali.es certain acts of refusals to carry out its %andates.
"tated differently, the R8 9a& is an enhance%ent %easure to fortify and %a+e effective the current
la&s on contraception, &o%en,s health and population control.
Prayer of the Petitioners - ;aintain the "tatus Kuo
)he petitioners are one in praying that the entire R8 9a& be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner
A9$!, in particular, argues that the govern%ent sponsored contraception progra%, the very essence
of the R8 9a&, violates the right to health of &o%en and the sanctity of life, &hich the "tate is
%andated to protect and pro%ote. )hus, A9$! prays that 'the status 0uo ante - the situation prior to
the passage of the R8 9a& - %ust be %aintained.'
>2
!t explains:
x x x. )he instant Petition does not 0uestion contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided
under Republic Act No. 7@1( and Republic Act No. 3>1@, the sale and distribution of contraceptives
are prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a physician. -hat the Petitioners
find deplorable and repugnant under the R8 9a& is the role that the "tate and its agencies - the
entire bureaucracy, fro% the cabinet secretaries do&n to the barangay officials in the re%otest areas
of the country - is %ade to play in the i%ple%entation of the contraception progra% to the fullest
extent possible using taxpayers, %oney. )he "tate then &ill be the funder and provider of all for%s of
fa%ily planning %ethods and the i%ple%enter of the progra% by ensuring the &idespread
disse%ination of, and universal access to, a full range of fa%ily planning %ethods, devices and
supplies.
>3
!""FE"
After a scrutiny of the various argu%ents and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesi.ed
and refined the% to the follo&ing principal issues:
!. PR#CEFRA9: -hether the Court %ay exercise its po&er of *udicial revie& over the controversy.
(H Po&er of /udicial Revie&
1H Actual Case or Controversy
2H $acial Challenge
3H 9ocus "tandi
7H eclaratory Relief
=H #ne "ub*ectI#ne )itle Rule
!!. "FB")AN)!AE: -hether the R8 la& is unconstitutional:
(H Right to 9ife
1H Right to 8ealth
2H $reedo% of Religion and the Right to $ree "peech
3H )he $a%ily
7H $reedo% of Expression and Acade%ic $reedo%
=H ue Process
>H E0ual Protection
?H !nvoluntary "ervitude
@H elegation of Authority to the $A
(6H Autono%y of 9ocal Cove%%entsIAR;;
!"CF""!#N
Before delving into the constitutionality of the R8 9a& and its i%ple%enting rules, it behooves the
Court to resolve so%e procedural i%pedi%ents.
!. PR#CEFRA9 !""FE: -hether the Court can exercise its po&er of *udicial revie& over the
controversy.
)he Po&er of /udicial Revie&
!n its atte%pt to persuade the Court to stay its *udicial hand, the #"C asserts that it should sub%it to
the legislative and political &isdo% of Congress and respect the co%pro%ises %ade in the crafting of
the R8 9a&, it being 'a product of a %a*oritarian de%ocratic process'
>7
and 'characteri.ed by an
inordinate a%ount of transparency.'
>=
)he #"C posits that the authority of the Court to revie& social
legislation li+e the R8 9a& by certiorari is '&ea+,' since the Constitution vests the discretion to
i%ple%ent the constitutional policies and positive nor%s &ith the political depart%ents, in particular,
&ith Congress.
>>
!t further asserts that in vie& of the Court,s ruling in "outhern 8e%isphere v. Anti-
)erroris% Council,
>?
the re%edies of certiorari and prohibition utili.ed by the petitioners are i%proper
to assail the validity of the acts of the legislature.
>@
;oreover, the #"C sub%its that as an 'as applied challenge,' it cannot prosper considering that the
assailed la& has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the govern%ent has yet
to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. !t clai%s that the R8 9a& cannot be
challenged 'on its face' as it is not a speech-regulating %easure.
?6
!n %any cases involving the deter%ination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and
the 9egislature, it is often sought that the Court te%per its exercise of *udicial po&er and accord due
respect to the &isdo% of its co-e0ual branch on the basis of the principle of separation of po&ers. )o
be clear, the separation of po&ers is a funda%ental principle in our syste% of govern%ent, &hich
obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each depart%ent of
the govern%ent has exclusive cogni.ance of %atters &ithin its *urisdiction and is supre%e &ithin its
o&n sphere.
?(
)hus, the (@?> Constitution provides that: 4a5 the legislative po&er shall be vested in the Congress
of the Philippines<
?1
4b5 the executive po&er shall be vested in the President of the Philippines<
?2
and
4c5 the *udicial po&er shall be vested in one "upre%e Court and in such lo&er courts as %ay be
established by la&.
?3
)he Constitution has truly bloc+ed out &ith deft stro+es and in bold lines, the
allot%ent of po&ers a%ong the three branches of govern%ent.
?7
!n its relationship &ith its co-e0uals, the /udiciary recogni.es the doctrine of separation of po&ers
&hich i%poses upon the courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their
respect for the other branches of govern%ent, in stri+ing do&n the acts of the Executive or the
9egislature as unconstitutional. Aerily, the policy is a har%onious blend of courtesy and caution.
?=
!t has also long been observed, ho&ever, that in ti%es of social dis0uietude or political instability, the
great land%ar+s of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or %arred, if not entirely obliterated.
?>
!n
order to address this, the Constitution i%presses upon the Court to respect the acts perfor%ed by a
co-e0ual branch done &ithin its sphere of co%petence and authority, but at the sa%e ti%e, allo&s it
to cross the line of separation - but only at a very li%ited and specific point - to deter%ine &hether
the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null because they &ere underta+en &ith
grave abuse of discretion.
??
)hus, &hile the Court %ay not pass upon 0uestions of &isdo%, *ustice or
expediency of the R8 9a&, it %ay do so &here an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion results.
?@
)he Court %ust de%onstrate its unflinching co%%it%ent to protect those
cherished rights and principles e%bodied in the Constitution.
!n this connection, it bears adding that &hile the scope of *udicial po&er of revie& %ay be li%ited, the
Constitution %a+es no distinction as to the +ind of legislation that %ay be sub*ect to *udicial scrutiny,
be it in the for% of social legislation or other&ise. )he reason is si%ple and goes bac+ to the earlier
point. )he Court %ay pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive
branches, since its duty is not to revie& their collective &isdo% but, rather, to %a+e sure that they
have acted in consonance &ith their respective authorities and rights as %andated of the% by the
Constitution. !f after said revie&, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has
no %ore authority of proscribing the actions under revie&.
@6
)his is in line &ith Article A!!!, "ection ( of
the Constitution &hich expressly provides:
"ection (. )he *udicial po&er shall be vested in one "upre%e Court and in such lo&er courts as %ay
be established by la&.
/udicial po&er includes the duty of the courts of *ustice to settle actual controversies involving rights
&hich are legally de%andable and enforceable, and to deter%ine &hether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion a%ounting to lac+ or excess of *urisdiction on the part of any branch or
instru%entality of the Covern%ent. LE%phases suppliedH
As far bac+ as )anada v. Angara,
@(
the Court has une0uivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition
and %anda%us are appropriate re%edies to raise constitutional issues and to revie& andIor
prohibitInullify, &hen proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as there is no other plain,
speedy or ade0uate re%edy in the ordinary course of la&. )his ruling &as later on applied in
;acalintal v. C#;E9EC,
@1
Aldaba v. C#;E9EC,
@2
;agallona v. Er%ita,
@3
and countless others. !n
)anada, the Court &rote:
!n see+ing to nullify an act of the Philippine "enate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a *usticiable controversy. -here an action of the legislative
branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it beco%es not only the right but in fact
the duty of the *udiciary to settle the dispute. ')he 0uestion thus posed is *udicial rather than political.
)he duty 4to ad*udicate5 re%ains to assure that the supre%acy of the Constitution is upheld. ' #nce a
'controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this
Court 4as in the instant case5, it beco%es a legal issue &hich the Court is bound by constitutional
%andate to decide. LE%phasis suppliedH
!n the scholarly esti%ation of for%er "upre%e Court /ustice $lorentino $eliciano, '*udicial revie& is
essential for the %aintenance and enforce%ent of the separation of po&ers and the balancing of
po&ers a%ong the three great depart%ents of govern%ent through the definition and %aintenance of
the boundaries of authority and control bet&een the%. )o hi%, *udicial revie& is the chief, indeed the
only, %ediu% of participation - or instru%ent of intervention - of the *udiciary in that balancing
operation.
@7
9est it be %isunderstood, it bears e%phasi.ing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority
to rule on *ust any and every clai% of constitutional violation. /urisprudence is replete &ith the rule
that the po&er of *udicial revie& is li%ited by four exacting re0uisites, vi. : 4a5 there %ust be an
actual case or controversy< 4b5 the petitioners %ust possess locus standi< 4c5 the 0uestion of
constitutionality %ust be raised at the earliest opportunity< and 4d5 the issue of constitutionality %ust
be the lis %ota of the case.
@=
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the R8 9a& sub%it that the sub* ect petitions do not present any actual case or
controversy because the R8 9a& has yet to be i%ple%ented.
@>
)hey clai% that the 0uestions raised
by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for ad*udication since no one has been charged &ith
violating any of its provisions and that there is no sho&ing that any of the petitioners, rights has been
adversely affected by its operation.
@?
!n short, it is contended that *udicial revie& of the R8 9a& is
pre%ature.
An actual case or controversy %eans an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
deter%ination, not con*ectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court &ould a%ount to an
advisory opinion.
@@
)he rule is that courts do not sit to ad*udicate %ere acade%ic 0uestions to satisfy
scholarly interest, ho&ever intellectually challenging. )he controversy %ust be *usticiable-definite
and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. !n other
&ords, the pleadings %ust sho& an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand,
and a denial thereof, on the other< that is, it %ust concern a real, tangible and not %erely a
theoretical 0uestion or issue. )here ought to be an actual and substantial controversy ad%itting of
specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished fro% an opinion advising &hat
the la& &ould be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
(66
Corollary to the re0uire%ent of an actual case or controversy is the re0uire%ent of ripeness.
(6(
A
0uestion is ripe for ad*udication &hen the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on
the individual challenging it. $or a case to be considered ripe for ad*udication, it is a prere0uisite that
so%ething has then been acco%plished or perfor%ed by either branch before a court %ay co%e into
the picture, and the petitioner %ust allege the existence of an i%%ediate or threatened in*ury to
hi%self as a result of the challenged action. 8e %ust sho& that he has sustained or is i%%ediately in
danger of sustaining so%e direct in*ury as a result of the act co%plained of
(61
!n )he Province of North Cotabato v. )he Covern%ent of the Republic of the Philippines,
(62
&here the
constitutionality of an uni%ple%ented ;e%orandu% of Agree%ent on the Ancestral o%ain 4;#A-
A5 &as put in 0uestion, it &as argued that the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues
raised as there &as yet no concrete act perfor%ed that could possibly violate the petitioners, and the
intervenors, rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the la& or act in 0uestion being
not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a la& are not necessary to render
the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution andIor the la& is enough to a&a+en
*udicial duty.
!n this case, the Court is of the vie& that an actual case or controversy exists and that the sa%e is
ripe for *udicial deter%ination. Considering that the R8 9a& and its i%ple%enting rules have already
ta+en effect and that budgetary %easures to carry out the la& have already been passed, it is
evident that the sub*ect petitions present a *usticiable controversy. As stated earlier, &hen an action
of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only beco%es a
right, but also a duty of the /udiciary to settle the dispute.
(63
;oreover, the petitioners have sho&n that the case is so because %edical practitioners or %edical
providers are in danger of being cri%inally prosecuted under the R8 9a& for vague violations
thereof, particularly public health officers &ho are threatened to be dis%issed fro% the service &ith
forfeiture of retire%ent and other benefits. )hey %ust, at least, be heard on the %atter N#-.
$acial Challenge
)he #"C also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the sub*ect petitions,
contending that the R8 9a& cannot be challenged 'on its face' as it is not a speech regulating
%easure.
(67
)he Court is not persuaded.
!n Fnited "tates 4F"5 constitutional la&, a facial challenge, also +no&n as a $irst A%end%ent
Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected
speech, but also all other rights in the $irst A%end%ent.
(6=
)hese include religious freedo%, freedo%
of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably asse%ble, and to petition the Covern%ent for a
redress of grievances.
(6>
After all, the funda%ental right to religious freedo%, freedo% of the press
and peaceful asse%bly are but co%ponent rights of the right to one,s freedo% of expression, as they
are %odes &hich one,s thoughts are externali.ed.
!n this *urisdiction, the application of doctrines originating fro% the F.". has been generally
%aintained, albeit &ith so%e %odifications. -hile this Court has &ithheld the application of facial
challenges to strictly penal statues,
(6?
it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating
free speech, but also those involving religious freedo%, and other funda%ental rights.
(6@
)he
underlying reason for this %odification is si%ple. $or unli+e its counterpart in the F."., this Court,
under its expanded *urisdiction, is %andated by the $unda%ental 9a& not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights &hich are legally de%andable and enforceable, but also to deter%ine
&hether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion a%ounting to lac+ or excess of *urisdiction
on the part of any branch or instru%entality of the Covern%ent.
((6
Aerily, the fra%ers of #ur
Constitution envisioned a proactive /udiciary, ever vigilant &ith its duty to %aintain the supre%acy of
the Constitution.
Conse0uently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional
hu%an rights to life, speech and religion and other funda%ental rights %entioned above have been
violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to ta+e cogni.ance of these +indred
petitions and to deter%ine if the R8 9a& can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. )o dis%iss these
petitions on the si%ple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, &ould di%inish this
Court as a reactive branch of govern%ent, acting only &hen the $unda%ental 9a& has been
transgressed, to the detri%ent of the $ilipino people.
9ocus "tandi
)he #"C also attac+s the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. !t
contends that the 'as applied challenge' lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed
la& has yet to be enforced and applied against the%,
(((
and the govern%ent has yet to distribute
reproductive health devices that are abortive.
((1
)he petitioners, for their part, invariably invo+e the 'transcendental i%portance' doctrine and their
status as citi.ens and taxpayers in establishing the re0uisite locus standi.
9ocus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that
the party has sustained or &ill sustain direct in*ury as a result of the challenged govern%ental act.
((2
!t
re0uires a personal sta+e in the outco%e of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness
&hich sharpens the presentation of issues upon &hich the court so largely depends for illu%ination
of difficult constitutional 0uestions.
((3
!n relation to locus standi, the 'as applied challenge' e%bodies the rule that one can challenge the
constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his o&n rights. )he rule prohibits one
fro% challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third
persons not before the court. )his rule is also +no&n as the prohibition against third-party standing.
((7
)ranscendental !%portance
Not&ithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that 'the rule on standing is a %atter of procedure,
hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs li+e ordinary citi.ens, taxpayers, and legislators
&hen the public interest so re0uires, such as &hen the %atter is of transcendental i%portance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of para%ount public interest.'
((=
!n Coconut #il Refiners Association, !nc. v. )orres,
((>
the Court held that in cases of para%ount
i%portance &here serious constitutional 0uestions are involved, the standing re0uire%ent %ay be
relaxed and a suit %ay be allo&ed to prosper even &here there is no direct in*ury to the party
clai%ing the right of *udicial revie&. !n the first E%ergency Po&ers Cases,
((?
ordinary citi.ens and
taxpayers &ere allo&ed to 0uestion the constitutionality of several executive orders although they
had only an indirect and general interest shared in co%%on &ith the public.
-ith these said, even if the constitutionality of the R8 9a& %ay not be assailed through an 'as-
applied challenge, still, the Court has ti%e and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi re0uire%ent.
!t has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not other&ise directly in*ured or &ith %aterial
interest affected by a Covern%ent act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental i%portance
is invo+ed. )he rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality &hich the Court has, on
%ore than one occasion, &aived or relaxed, thus allo&ing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as
concerned citi.ens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they %ay not
have been directly in*ured by the operation of a la& or any other govern%ent act. As held in /a&ors+i
v. PACC#R:
((@
Cranting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental i%portance of the issues involved in this case &arrants that &e set aside the
technical defects and ta+e pri%ary *urisdiction over the petition at bar. #ne cannot deny that the
issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and %oral &ell being of this
nation, specially the youth< hence, their proper and *ust deter%ination is an i%perative need. )his is
in accordance &ith the &ell-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools
designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and pro%ote the ad%inistration of *ustice. )heir strict and
rigid application, &hich &ould result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than pro%ote
substantial *ustice, %ust al&ays be esche&ed. 4E%phasis supplied5
!n vie& of the seriousness, novelty and &eight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the
bench and bar, the issues raised %ust be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the R8 9a&
drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedo% of religion
and expression and other constitutional rights. ;indful of all these and the fact that the issues of
contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division a%ong a broad spectru%
of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental i%portance
&arranting i%%ediate court ad*udication. ;ore i%portantly, considering that it is the right to life of the
%other and the unborn &hich is pri%arily at issue, the Court need not &ait for a life to be ta+en a&ay
before ta+ing action.
)he Court cannot, and should not, exercise *udicial restraint at this ti%e &hen rights enshrined in the
Constitution are being i%perilled to be violated. )o do so, &hen the life of either the %other or her
child is at sta+e, &ould lead to irreparable conse0uences.
eclaratory Relief
)he respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief
over &hich the Court has no original *urisdiction.
(16
"uffice it to state that %ost of the petitions are
praying for in*unctive reliefs and so the Court &ould *ust consider the% as petitions for prohibition
under Rule =7, over &hich it has original *urisdiction. -here the case has far-reaching i%plications
and prays for in*unctive reliefs, the Court %ay consider the% as petitions for prohibition under Rule
=7.
(1(
#ne "ub*ect-#ne )itle
)he petitioners also 0uestion the constitutionality of the R8 9a&, clai%ing that it violates "ection
1=4( 5, Article A! of the Constitution,
(11
prescribing the one sub*ect-one title rule. According to the%,
being one for reproductive health &ith responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the
constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent - to act as a population control
%easure.
(12
)o belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the R8 9a& is not a birth or population control
%easure,
(13
and that the concepts of 'responsible parenthood' and 'reproductive health' are both
interrelated as they are inseparable.
(17
espite efforts to push the R8 9a& as a reproductive health la&, the Court sees it as principally a
population control %easure. )he corpus of the R8 9a& is geared to&ards the reduction of the
country,s population. -hile it clai%s to save lives and +eep our &o%en and children healthy, it also
pro%otes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the R8 9a& e%phasi.es the need to
provide $ilipinos, especially the poor and the %arginali.ed, &ith access to infor%ation on the full
range of %ode% fa%ily planning products and %ethods. )hese fa%ily planning %ethods, natural or
%ode%, ho&ever, are clearly geared to&ards the prevention of pregnancy.
$or said reason, the %anifest underlying ob*ective of the R8 9a& is to reduce the nu%ber of births in
the country.
!t cannot be denied that the %easure also see+s to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as &ell. A
large portion of the la&, ho&ever, covers the disse%ination of infor%ation and provisions on access
to %edically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and 0uality reproductive health care
services, %ethods, devices, and supplies, &hich are all intended to prevent pregnancy.
)he Court, thus, agrees &ith the petitioners, contention that the &hole idea of contraception
pervades the entire R8 9a&. !t is, in fact, the central idea of the R8 9a&.
(1=
!ndeed, re%ove the
provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the R8 9a& loses its very
foundation.
(1>
As earlier explained, 'the other positive provisions such as s+illed birth attendance,
%aternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and %anage%ent of reproductive
tract infections including 8!AIA!" are already provided for in the ;agna Carta for -o%en.'
(1?
Be that as it %ay, the R8 9a& does not violate the one sub*ectIone bill rule. !n Ben*a%in E.
Ca&aling, /r. v. )he Co%%ission on Elections and Rep. $rancis /oseph C Escudero, it &as &ritten:
!t is &ell-settled that the 'one title-one sub*ect' rule does not re0uire the Congress to e%ploy in the
title of the enact%ent language of such precision as to %irror, fully index or catalogue all the contents
and the %inute details therein. )he rule is sufficiently co%plied &ith if the title is co%prehensive
enough as to include the general ob*ect &hich the statute see+s to effect, and &here, as here, the
persons interested are infor%ed of the nature, scope and conse0uences of the proposed la& and its
operation. ;oreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of
the rule 'so as not to cripple or i%pede legislation.' LE%phases suppliedH
!n this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the la& sho&s that both 'reproductive
health' and 'responsible parenthood' are interrelated and ger%ane to the overriding ob*ective to
control the population gro&th. As expressed in the first paragraph of "ection 1 of the R8 9a&:
"EC. 1. eclaration of Policy. - )he "tate recogni.es and guarantees the hu%an rights of all persons
including their right to e0uality and nondiscri%ination of these rights, the right to sustainable hu%an
develop%ent, the right to health &hich includes reproductive health, the right to education and
infor%ation, and the right to choose and %a+e decisions for the%selves in accordance &ith their
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the de%ands of responsible parenthood.
)he one sub*ectIone title rule expresses the principle that the title of a la& %ust not be 'so uncertain
that the average person reading it &ould not be infor%ed of the purpose of the enact%ent or put on
in0uiry as to its contents, or &hich is %isleading, either in referring to or indicating one sub*ect &here
another or different one is really e%braced in the act, or in o%itting any expression or indication of
the real sub*ect or scope of the act.'
(1@
Considering the close inti%acy bet&een 'reproductive health' and 'responsible parenthood' &hich
bears to the attain%ent of the goal of achieving 'sustainable hu%an develop%ent' as stated under
its ter%s, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the
public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
!! - "FB")AN)!AE !""FE":
(-)he Right to 9ife
Position of the Petitioners
)he petitioners assail the R8 9a& because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child
under "ection (1, Article !! of the Constitution. )he assailed legislation allo&ing access to
abortifacientsIabortives effectively sanctions abortion.
(26
According to the petitioners, despite its express ter%s prohibiting abortion, "ection 34a5 of the R8
9a& considers contraceptives that prevent the fertili.ed ovu% to reach and be i%planted in the
%other,s &o%b as an abortifacient< thus, sanctioning contraceptives that ta+e effect after fertili.ation
and prior to i%plantation, contrary to the intent of the $ra%ers of the Constitution to afford protection
to the fertili.ed ovu% &hich already has life.
)hey argue that even if "ection @ of the R8 9a& allo&s only 'non-abortifacient' hor%onal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, in*ectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective
fa%ily planning products and supplies, %edical research sho&s that contraceptives use results in
abortion as they operate to +ill the fertili.ed ovu% &hich already has life.
(2(
As it opposes the initiation of life, &hich is a funda%ental hu%an good, the petitioners assert that the
"tate sanction of contraceptive use contravenes natural la& and is an affront to the dignity of %an.
(21
$inally, it is contended that since "ection @ of the R8 9a& re0uires the $ood and rug Ad%inistration
4$A5 to certify that the product or supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the assailed
legislation effectively confir%s that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering that the $A is
not the agency that &ill actually supervise or ad%inister the use of these products and supplies to
prospective patients, there is no &ay it can truthfully %a+e a certification that it shall not be used for
abortifacient purposes.
(22
Position of the Respondents
$or their part, the defenders of the R8 9a& point out that the intent of the $ra%ers of the
Constitution &as si%ply the prohibition of abortion. )hey contend that the R8 9a& does not violate
the Constitution since the said la& e%phasi.es that only 'non-abortifacient' reproductive health care
services, %ethods, devices products and supplies shall be %ade accessible to the public.
(23
According to the #"C, Congress has %ade a legislative deter%ination that contraceptives are not
abortifacients by enacting the R8 9a&. As the R8 9a& &as enacted &ith due consideration to
various studies and consultations &ith the -orld 8ealth #rgani.ation 4-8#5 and other experts in
the %edical field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such a deter%ination
and pass *udg%ent only &hen a particular drug or device is later on deter%ined as an abortive.
(27
$or his part, respondent 9ag%an argues that the constitutional protection of one,s right to life is not
violated considering that various studies of the -8# sho& that life begins fro% the i%plantation of
the fertili.ed ovu%. Conse0uently, he argues that the R8 9a& is constitutional since the la&
specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the i%plantation of the fertili.ed
ovu% are allo&ed.
(2=
)he Court,s Position
!t is a universally accepted principle that every hu%an being en*oys the right to life.
(2>
Even if not for%ally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural la&, is inherent and,
therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular la&, custo%, or belief. !t precedes and
transcends any authority or the la&s of %en.
!n this *urisdiction, the right to life is given %ore than a%ple protection. "ection (, Article !!! of the
Constitution provides:
"ection (. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property &ithout due process of la&, nor
shall any person be denied the e0ual protection of the la&s.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and fa%ily planning %ethods in the Philippines is
not of recent vintage. $ro% the enact%ent of R.A. No. 3>1@, entitled 'An Act )o Regulate )he "ale,
ispensation, andIor istribution of Contraceptive rugs and evices 'on /une (?, (@==, prescribing
rules on contraceptive drugs and devices &hich prevent fertili.ation,
(2?
to the pro%otion of %ale
vasecto%y and tubal ligation,
(2@
and the ratification of nu%erous international agree%ents, the
country has long recogni.ed the need to pro%ote population control through the use of
contraceptives in order to achieve long-ter% econo%ic develop%ent. )hrough the years, ho&ever,
the use of contraceptives and other fa%ily planning %ethods evolved fro% being a co%ponent of
de%ographic %anage%ent, to one centered on the pro%otion of public health, particularly,
reproductive health.
(36
)his has resulted in the enact%ent of various %easures pro%oting &o%en,s rights and health and
the overall pro%otion of the fa%ily,s &ell-being. )hus, aside fro% R.A. No. 3>1@, R.A. No. =2=7 or
')he Population Act of the Philippines' and R.A. No. @>(6, other&ise +no&n as the ')he ;agna
Carta of -o%en' &ere legislated. Not&ithstanding this paradig% shift, the Philippine national
population progra% has al&ays been grounded t&o cornerstone principles: 'principle of no-abortion'
and the 'principle of non-coercion.'
(3(
As &ill be discussed later, these principles are not %erely
grounded on ad%inistrative policy, but rather, originates fro% the constitutional protection expressly
provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedo%.
-hen 9ife BeginsM
;a*ority of the ;e%bers of the Court are of the position that the 0uestion of &hen life begins is a
scientific and %edical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, &ithout proper hearing and
evidence. uring the deliberation, ho&ever, it &as agreed upon that the individual %e%bers of the
Court could express their o&n vie&s on this %atter.
!n this regard, the ponente, is of the strong vie& that life begins at fertili.ation.
!n ans&ering the 0uestion of &hen life begins, focus should be %ade on the particular phrase of
"ection (1 &hich reads:
"ection (1. )he "tate recogni.es the sanctity of fa%ily life and shall protect and strengthen the
fa%ily as a basic autono%ous social institution. !t shall e0ually protect the life of the %other and the
life of the unborn fro% conception. )he natural and pri%ary right and duty of parents in the rearing of
the youth for civic efficiency and the develop%ent of %oral character shall receive the support of the
Covern%ent.
)extually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn fro% conception. )his is undisputable
because before conception, there is no unborn to spea+ of. $or said reason, it is no surprise that the
Constitution is %ute as to any proscription prior to conception or &hen life begins. )he proble% has
arisen because, a%a.ingly, there are 0uarters &ho have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact
that conception is rec+oned fro% fertili.ation. )hey are &aving the vie& that life begins at
i%plantation. 8ence, the issue of &hen life begins.
!n a nutshell, those opposing the R8 9a& contend that conception is synony%ous &ith 'fertili.ation'
of the fe%ale ovu% by the %ale sper%.
(31
#n the other side of the spectru% are those &ho assert that
conception refers to the 'i%plantation' of the fertili.ed ovu% in the uterus.
(32
Plain and 9egal ;eaning
!t is a canon in statutory construction that the &ords of the Constitution should be interpreted in their
plain and ordinary %eaning. As held in the recent case of Chave. v. /udicial Bar Council:
(33
#ne of the pri%ary and basic rules in statutory construction is that &here the &ords of a statute are
clear, plain, and free fro% a%biguity, it %ust be given its literal %eaning and applied &ithout
atte%pted interpretation. !t is a &ell-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language
e%ployed in the Constitution %ust be given their ordinary %eaning except &here technical ter%s are
e%ployed. As %uch as possible, the &ords of the Constitution should be understood in the sense
they have in co%%on use. -hat it says according to the text of the provision to be construed
co%pels acceptance and negates the po&er of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
fra%ers and the people %ean &hat they say. Aerba legis non est recedendu% - fro% the &ords of a
statute there should be no departure.
)he raison d, etre for the rule is essentially t&o-fold: $irst, because it is assu%ed that the &ords in
&hich constitutional provisions are couched express the ob*ective sought to be attained< and second,
because the Constitution is not pri%arily a la&yer,s docu%ent but essentially that of the people, in
&hose consciousness it should ever be present as an i%portant condition for the rule of la& to
prevail.
!n confor%ity &ith the above principle, the traditional %eaning of the &ord 'conception' &hich, as
described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources, %eans that life begins at fertili.ation.
-ebster,s )hird Ne& !nternational ictionary describes it as the act of beco%ing pregnant, for%ation
of a viable .ygote< the fertili.ation that results in a ne& entity capable of developing into a being li+e
its parents.
(37
Blac+,s 9a& ictionary gives legal %eaning to the ter% 'conception' as the fecundation of the fe%ale
ovu% by the %ale sper%ato.oon resulting in hu%an life capable of survival and %aturation under
nor%al conditions.
(3=
Even in *urisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. !n Continental "teel
;anufacturing Corporation v. 8on. Accredited Aoluntary Arbitrator Allan ". ;ontano,
(3>
it &as &ritten:
9ife is not synony%ous &ith civil personality. #ne need not ac0uire civil personality first before
heIshe could die. Even a child inside the &o%b already has life. No less than the Constitution
recogni.es the life of the unborn fro% conception, that the "tate %ust protect e0ually &ith the life of
the %other. !f the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being
delivered, 0ualifies as death. LE%phases in the originalH
!n Con.ales v. Carhart,
(3?
/ustice Anthony Dennedy, &riting for the F" "upre%e Court, said that the
"tate 'has respect for hu%an life at all stages in the pregnancy' and 'a legiti%ate and substantial
interest in preserving and pro%oting fetal life.' !nvariably, in the decision, the fetus &as referred to, or
cited, as a baby or a child.
(3@
!ntent of the $ra%ers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the $ra%ers regarding
the ter% 'conception' used in "ection (1, Article !! of the Constitution. $ro% their deliberations, it
clearly refers to the %o%ent of 'fertili.ation.' )he records reflect the follo&ing:
Rev. Rigos: !n "ection @, page 2, there is a sentence &hich reads:
')he "tate shall e0ually protect the life of the %other and the life of the unborn fro% the %o%ent of
conception.'
-hen is the %o%ent of conceptionN
xxx
;r. Aillegas: As ! explained in the sponsorship speech, it is &hen the ovu% is fertili.ed by the sper%
that there is hu%an life. x x x.
(76
xxx
As to &hy conception is rec+oned fro% fertili.ation and, as such, the beginning of hu%an life, it &as
explained:
;r. Aillegas: ! propose to revie& this issue in a biological %anner. )he first 0uestion that needs to be
ans&ered is: !s the fertili.ed ovu% aliveN Biologically categorically says yes, the fertili.ed ovu% is
alive. $irst of all, li+e all living organis%s, it ta+es in nutrients &hich it processes by itself. !t begins
doing this upon fertili.ation. "econdly, as it ta+es in these nutrients, it gro&s fro% &ithin. )hirdly, it
%ultiplies itself at a geo%etric rate in the continuous process of cell division. All these processes are
vital signs of life. )herefore, there is no 0uestion that biologically the fertili.ed ovu% has life.
)he second 0uestion: !s it hu%anN Cenetics gives an e0ually categorical 'yes.' At the %o%ent of
conception, the nuclei of the ovu% and the sper% rupture. As this happens 12 chro%oso%es fro%
the ovu% co%bine &ith 12 chro%oso%es of the sper% to for% a total of 3= chro%oso%es. A
chro%oso%e count of 3= is found only - and ! repeat, only in hu%an cells. )herefore, the fertili.ed
ovu% is hu%an.
"ince these 0uestions have been ans&ered affir%atively, &e %ust conclude that if the fertili.ed ovu%
is both alive and hu%an, then, as night follo&s day, it %ust be hu%an life. !ts nature is hu%an.
(7(
-hy the Constitution used the phrase 'fro% the %o%ent of conception' and not 'fro% the %o%ent of
fertili.ation' &as not because of doubt &hen hu%an life begins, but rather, because:
;r. )ingson: x x x x the phrase fro% the %o%ent of conception' &as described by us here before
&ith the scientific phrase 'fertili.ed ovu%' %ay be beyond the co%prehension of so%e people< &e
&ant to use the si%pler phrase 'fro% the %o%ent of conception.'
(71
)hus, in order to ensure that the fertili.ed ovu% is given a%ple protection under the Constitution, it
&as discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Ees, &e thin+ that the &ord 'unborn' is sufficient for the purpose of &riting a Constitution,
&ithout specifying 'fro% the %o%ent of conception.'
;r. avide: ! &ould not subscribe to that particular vie& because according to the Co%%issioner,s
o&n ad%ission, he &ould leave it to Congress to define &hen life begins. "o, Congress can define
life to begin fro% six %onths after fertili.ation< and that &ould really be very, very, dangerous. !t is
no& deter%ined by science that life begins fro% the %o%ent of conception. )here can be no doubt
about it. "o &e should not give any doubt to Congress, too.
(72
Fpon further in0uiry, it &as as+ed:
;r. Cascon: ;r. Presiding #fficer, ! &ould li+e to as+ a 0uestion on that point. Actually, that is one of
the 0uestions ! &as going to raise during the period of interpellations but it has been expressed
already. )he provision, as proposed right no& states:
)he "tate shall e0ually protect the life of the %other and the life of the unborn fro% the %o%ent of
conception.
-hen it spea+s of 'fro% the %o%ent of conception,' does this %ean &hen the egg %eets the
sper%N
;r. Aillegas: Ees, the ovu% is fertili.ed by the sper%.
;r. Cascon: )herefore that does not leave to Congress the right to deter%ine &hether certain
contraceptives that &e +no& today are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that so%e of the so-
called contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovu% in the uterus. !f fertili.ation has already occurred,
the next process is for the fertili.ed ovu% to travel to&ards the uterus and to ta+e root. -hat
happens &ith so%e contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertili.ed ovu% to reach
the uterus. )herefore, if &e ta+e the provision as it is proposed, these so called contraceptives
should be banned.
;r. Aillegas: Ees, if that physical fact is established, then that is &hat is called abortifacient and,
therefore, &ould be unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision.
;r. Cascon: Ees. "o %y point is that ! do not thin+ it is up to Congress to state &hether or not these
certain contraceptives are abortifacient. "cientifically and based on the provision as it is no&
proposed, they are already considered abortifacient.
(73
$ro% the deliberations above-0uoted, it is apparent that the $ra%ers of the Constitution e%phasi.ed
that the "tate shall provide e0ual protection to both the %other and the unborn child fro% the earliest
opportunity of life, that is, upon fertili.ation or upon the union of the %ale sper% and the fe%ale
ovu%. !t is also apparent is that the $ra%ers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress
fro% enacting %easures that &ould allo& it deter%ine &hen life begins.
E0ually apparent, ho&ever, is that the $ra%ers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all
contraceptives for being unconstitutional. !n fact, Co%%issioner Bernardo Aillegas, spearheading the
need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life, recogni.ed that the deter%ination of
&hether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a 0uestion of fact &hich should be left to the
courts to decide on based on established evidence.
(77
$ro% the discussions above, contraceptives that +ill or destroy the fertili.ed ovu% should be dee%ed
an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the
%ale sper% and the fe%ale ovu%, and those that si%ilarly ta+e action prior to fertili.ation should be
dee%ed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally per%issible.
As e%phasi.ed by the $ra%ers of the Constitution:
x x x x x x x x x
;r. Cascon: xx xx. As ! %entioned in %y speech on the F" bases, ! a% pro-life, to the point that !
&ould li+e not only to protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the %illions of people in the
&orld by fighting for a nuclear-free &orld. ! &ould *ust li+e to be assured of the legal and prag%atic
i%plications of the ter% 'protection of the life of the unborn fro% the %o%ent of conception.' ! raised
so%e of these i%plications this afternoon &hen ! inter*ected in the interpellation of Co%%issioner
Regalado. ! &ould li+e to as+ that 0uestion again for a categorical ans&er.
! %entioned that if &e institutionali.e the ter% 'the life of the unborn fro% the %o%ent of conception'
&e are also actually saying 'no,' not '%aybe,' to certain contraceptives &hich are already being
encouraged at this point in ti%e. !s that the sense of the co%%ittee or does it disagree &ith %eN
;r. A.cuna: No, ;r. Presiding #fficer, because contraceptives &ould be preventive. )here is no
unborn yet. )hat is yet unshaped.
;r. Cascon: Ees, ;r. Presiding #fficer, but ! &as spea+ing %ore about so%e contraceptives, such as
the intra-uterine device &hich actually stops the egg &hich has already been fertili.ed fro% ta+ing
route to the uterus. "o if &e say 'fro% the %o%ent of conception,' &hat really occurs is that so%e of
these contraceptives &ill have to be unconstitutionali.ed.
;r. A.cuna: Ees, to the extent that it is after the fertili.ation.
;r. Cascon: )han+ you, ;r. Presiding #fficer.
(7=
)he fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the (@?> Constitution is even ad%itted by
petitioners during the oral argu%ents. )here it &as conceded that tubal ligation, vasecto%y, even
condo%s are not classified as abortifacients.
(7>
Atty. Noche:
Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sper%, there is no life yet.
/ustice Bersa%in:
)here is no life.
Atty. Noche:
"o, there is no life to be protected.
/ustice Bersa%in:
)o be protected.
Atty. Noche:
Fnder "ection (1, yes.
/ustice Bersa%in:
"o you have no ob*ection to condo%sN
Atty. Noche:
Not under "ection (1, Article !!.
/ustice Bersa%in:
Even if there is already infor%ation that condo%s so%eti%es have porosityN
Atty. Noche:
-ell, yes, Eour 8onor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Eour 8onor, but ! a% discussing
here "ection (1, Article !!, Eour 8onor, yes.
/ustice Bersa%in:
Alright.
Atty. Noche:
And it,s not, ! have to ad%it it,s not an abortifacient, Eour 8onor.
(7?
;edical ;eaning
)hat conception begins at fertili.ation is not bereft of %edical foundation. ;osby s ;edical, Nursing,
and Allied 8ealth ictionary defines conception as 'the beginning of pregnancy usually ta+en to be
the instant a sper%ato.oon enters an ovu% and for%s a viable .ygote.'
(7@
!t describes fertili.ation as 'the union of %ale and fe%ale ga%etes to for% a .ygote fro% &hich the
e%bryo develops.'
(=6
)he )extboo+ of #bstetrics 4Physiological O Pathological #bstetrics5,
(=(
used by %edical schools in
the Philippines, also concludes that hu%an life 4hu%an person5 begins at the %o%ent of fertili.ation
&ith the union of the egg and the sper% resulting in the for%ation of a ne& individual, &ith a uni0ue
genetic co%position that dictates all develop%ental stages that ensue.
"i%ilarly, recent %edical research on the %atter also reveals that: '8u%an develop%ent begins after
the union of %ale and fe%ale ga%etes or ger% cells during a process +no&n as fertili.ation
4conception5. $ertili.ation is a se0uence of events that begins &ith the contact of a sper%
4sper%ato.oon5 &ith a secondary oocyte 4ovu%5 and ends &ith the fusion of their pronuclei 4the
haploid nuclei of the sper% and ovu%5 and the %ingling of their chro%oso%es to for% a ne& cell.
)his fertili.ed ovu%, +no&n as a .ygote, is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or pri%ordiu%, of
a hu%an being.'
(=1
)he authors of 8u%an E%bryology O )eratology
(=2
%irror the sa%e position. )hey &rote: 'Although
life is a continuous process, fertili.ation is a critical land%ar+ because, under ordinary
circu%stances, a ne&, genetically distinct hu%an organis% is thereby for%ed.... )he co%bination of
12 chro%oso%es present in each pronucleus results in 3= chro%oso%es in the .ygote. )hus the
diploid nu%ber is restored and the e%bryonic geno%e is for%ed. )he e%bryo no& exists as a
genetic unity.'
!n support of the R8 Bill, )he Philippine ;edical Association ca%e out &ith a 'Paper on the
Reproductive 8ealth Bill 4Responsible Parenthood Bill5' and therein concluded that:
C#NC9F"!#N
)he P;A thro&s its full &eight in supporting the R8 Bill at the sa%e ti%e that P;A %aintains its
strong position that fertili.ation is sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus hu%an
life, begins. 8u%an lives are sacred fro% the %o%ent of conception, and that destroying those ne&
lives is never licit, no %atter &hat the purported good outco%e &ould be. !n ter%s of biology and
hu%an e%bryology, a hu%an being begins i%%ediately at fertili.ation and after that, there is no point
along the continuous line of hu%an e%bryogenesis &here only a 'potential' hu%an being can be
posited. Any philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this ob*ective scientific fact.
)he scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a .ygote is a hu%an organis% and that the life
of a ne& hu%an being co%%ences at a scientifically &ell defined '%o%ent of conception.' )his
conclusion is ob*ective, consistent &ith the factual evidence, and independent of any specific ethical,
%oral, political, or religious vie& of hu%an life or of hu%an e%bryos.
(=3
Conclusion: )he ;o%ent of Conception is Rec+oned fro%
$ertili.ation
!n all, &hether it be ta+en fro% a plain %eaning, or understood under %edical parlance, and %ore
i%portantly, follo&ing the intention of the $ra%ers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is
that a .ygote is a hu%an organis% and that the life of a ne& hu%an being co%%ences at a
scientifically &ell-defined %o%ent of conception, that is, upon fertili.ation.
$or the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by 8on. 9ag%an that life
begins at i%plantation.
(=7
According to hi%, 'fertili.ation and conception are t&o distinct and
successive stages in the reproductive process. )hey are not identical and synony%ous.'
(==
Citing a
letter of the -8#, he &rote that '%edical authorities confir% that the i%plantation of the fertili.ed
ovu% is the co%%ence%ent of conception and it is only after i%plantation that pregnancy can be
%edically detected.'
(=>
)his theory of i%plantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific %ooring. !t does
not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. )he fertili.ed ovu%I.ygote is not an
inani%ate ob*ect - it is a living hu%an being co%plete &ith NA and 3= chro%oso%es.
(=?
!%plantation
has been conceptuali.ed only for convenience by those &ho had population control in %ind. )o
adopt it &ould constitute textual infidelity not only to the R8 9a& but also to the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the #"C does not support this position.
!f such theory &ould be accepted, it &ould unnervingly legiti%i.e the utili.ation of any drug or device
that &ould prevent the i%plantation of the fetus at the uterine &all. !t &ould be provocative and
further aggravate religious-based divisiveness.
!t &ould legally per%it &hat the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.
)he R8 9a& and Abortion
)he clear and une0uivocal intent of the $ra%ers of the (@?> Constitution in protecting the life of the
unborn fro% conception &as to prevent the 9egislature fro% enacting a %easure legali.ing abortion.
!t &as so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it other&ise. )his intent of the $ra%ers &as
captured in the record of the proceedings of the (@?= Constitutional Co%%ission. Co%%issioner
Bernardo Aillegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn fro% conception,
explained:
)he intention .. .is to %a+e sure that there &ould be no pro-abortion la&s ever passed by Congress
or any pro-abortion decision passed by the "upre%e Court.
(=@
A reading of the R8 9a& &ould sho& that it is in line &ith this intent and actually proscribes abortion.
-hile the Court has opted not to %a+e any deter%ination, at this stage, &hen life begins, it finds that
the R8 9a& itself clearly %andates that protection be afforded fro% the %o%ent of fertili.ation. As
pointed out by /ustice Carpio, the R8 9a& is replete &ith provisions that e%body the policy of the
la& to protect to the fertili.ed ovu% and that it should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for
i%plantation.
(>6
;oreover, the R8 9a& recogni.es that abortion is a cri%e under Article 17= of the Revised Penal
Code, &hich penali.es the destruction or expulsion of the fertili.ed ovu%. )hus:
(H xx x.
"ection 3. efinition of )er%s. - $or the purpose of this Act, the follo&ing ter%s shall be defined as
follo&s:
xxx.
405 Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of %ethods, facilities, services and
supplies that contribute to reproductive health and &ell-being by addressing reproductive health-
related proble%s. !t also includes sexual health, the purpose of &hich is the enhance%ent of life and
personal relations. )he ele%ents of reproductive health care include the follo&ing:
xxx.
425 Proscription of abortion and %anage%ent of abortion co%plications<
xxx.
1H xx x.
"ection 3. x x x.
4s5 Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and
responsibly &hether or not to have children< the nu%ber, spacing and ti%ing of their children< to
%a+e other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discri%ination, coercion and violence< to have
the infor%ation and %eans to do so< and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and
reproductive health: Provided, ho&ever, )hat reproductive health rights do not include abortion, and
access to abortifacients.
2H xx x.
"EC. 1@. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing la&s against abortion, any la&, presidential
decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, ad%inistrative order, rule or regulation
contrary to or is inconsistent &ith the provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. >2@1,
other&ise +no&n as the ;id&ifery Act, is hereby repealed, %odified or a%ended accordingly.
)he R8 9a& and Abortifacients
!n carrying out its declared policy, the R8 9a& is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. )o be clear,
"ection 34a5 of the R8 9a& defines an abortifacient as:
"ection 3. efinition of )er%s - x x x x
4a5 Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside
the %other,s &o%b or the prevention of the fertili.ed ovu% to reach and be i%planted in the %other,s
&o%b upon deter%ination of the $A.
As stated above, the R8 9a& %andates that protection %ust be afforded fro% the %o%ent of
fertili.ation. By using the &ord ' or,' the R8 9a& prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent
i%plantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that induce the destruction of a fetus
inside the %other,s &o%b. )hus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that either:
4a5 !nduces abortion< or
4b5 !nduces the destruction of a fetus inside the %other,s &o%b< or
4c5 Prevents the fertili.ed ovu% to reach and be i%planted in the %other,s &o%b, upon
deter%ination of the $A.
Contrary to the assertions %ade by the petitioners, the Court finds that the R8 9a&, consistent &ith
the Constitution, recogni.es that the fertili.ed ovu% already has life and that the "tate has a
bounden duty to protect it. )he conclusion beco%es clear because the R8 9a&, first, prohibits any
drug or device that induces abortion 4first +ind5, &hich, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to
that &hich induces the +illing or the destruction of the fertili.ed ovu%, and, second, prohibits any
drug or device the fertili.ed ovu% to reach and be i%planted in the %other,s &o%b 4third +ind5.
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertili.ed ovu% to reach and be
i%planted in the %other,s &o%b is an abortifacient 4third +ind5, the R8 9a& does not intend to %ean
at all that life only begins only at i%plantation, as 8on. 9ag%an suggests. !t also does not declare
either that protection &ill only be given upon i%plantation, as the petitioners li+e&ise suggest.
Rather, it recogni.es that: one, there is a need to protect the fertili.ed ovu% &hich already has life,
and t&o, the fertili.ed ovu% %ust be protected the %o%ent it beco%es existent - all the &ay until it
reaches and i%plants in the %other,s &o%b. After all, if life is only recogni.ed and afforded
protection fro% the %o%ent the fertili.ed ovu% i%plants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or
device fro% +illing or destroying the fertili.ed ovu% prior to i%plantation.
$ro% the foregoing, the Court finds that inas%uch as it affords protection to the fertili.ed ovu%, the
R8 9a& does not sanction abortion. )o repeat, it is the Court,s position that life begins at fertili.ation,
not at i%plantation. -hen a fertili.ed ovu% is i%planted in the uterine &all , its viability is sustained
but that instance of i%plantation is not the point of beginning of life. !t started earlier. And as defined
by the R8 9a&, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, &hich +ills or destroys the fertili.ed
ovu% or prevents the fertili.ed ovu% to reach and be i%planted in the %other,s &o%b, is an
abortifacient.
Proviso Fnder "ection @ of the R8 9a&
)his not&ithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under "ection @ of the la& that 'any product or
supply included or to be included in the E9 %ust have a certification fro% the $A that said product
and supply is %ade available on the condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient' as e%pty
as it is absurd. )he $A, &ith all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device &ill not all be
used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance &hen the
contraceptive product or supply &ill be used.
(>(
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient
contraceptives, ho&ever, the Court finds that the proviso of "ection @, as &orded, should bend to the
legislative intent and %ean that 'any product or supply included or to be included in the E9 %ust
have a certification fro% the $A that said product and supply is %ade available on the condition
that it cannot be used as abortifacient.' "uch a construction is consistent &ith the proviso under the
second paragraph of the sa%e section that provides:
Provided, further, )hat the foregoing offices shall not purchase or ac0uire by any %eans e%ergency
contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that &ill be used for such purpose and their other
for%s or e0uivalent.
Abortifacients under the R8-!RR
At this *uncture, the Court agrees &ith A9$! that the authors of the R8-!RR gravely abused their
office &hen they redefined the %eaning of abortifacient. )he R8 9a& defines 'abortifacient' as
follo&s:
"EC. 3. efinition of )er%s. - $or the purpose of this Act, the follo&ing ter%s shall be defined as
follo&s:
4a5 Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside
the %other,s &o%b or the prevention of the fertili.ed ovu% to reach and be i%planted in the %other,s
&o%b upon deter%ination of the $A.
"ection 2.6l 4a5 of the !RR, ho&ever, redefines 'abortifacient' as:
"ection 2.6( $or purposes of these Rules, the ter%s shall be defined as follo&s:
a5 Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that pri%arily induces abortion or the destruction of a
fetus inside the %other,s &o%b or the prevention of the fertili.ed ovu% to reach and be i%planted in
the %other,s &o%b upon deter%ination of the $ood and rug Ad%inistration 4$A5. LE%phasis
suppliedH
Again in "ection 2.6lC5 of the R8-!RR, 'contraceptive,' is redefined, vi.:
*5 Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven %odern fa%ily planning
%ethod, device, or health product, &hether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not
pri%arily destroy a fertili.ed ovu% or prevent a fertili.ed ovu% fro% being i%planted in the %other,s
&o%b in doses of its approved indication as deter%ined by the $ood and rug Ad%inistration 4$A5.
)he above-%entioned section of the R8-!RR allo&s 'contraceptives' and recogni.es as
'abortifacient' only those that pri%arily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
%other,s &o%b or the prevention of the fertili.ed ovu% to reach and be i%planted in the %other,s
&o%b.
(>1
)his cannot be done.
!n this regard, the observations of /ustice Brion and /ustice el Castillo are &ell ta+en. As they
pointed out, &ith the insertion of the &ord 'pri%arily,' "ection 2.6l4a5 and C5 of the R8-!RR
(>2
%ust be
struc+ do&n for being ultra vires.
Evidently, &ith the addition of the &ord 'pri%arily,' in "ection 2.6l4a5 and C5 of the R8-!RR is indeed
ultra vires. !t contravenes "ection 34a5 of the R8 9a& and should, therefore, be declared invalid.
)here is danger that the insertion of the 0ualifier 'pri%arily' &ill pave the &ay for the approval of
contraceptives &hich %ay har% or destroy the life of the unborn fro% conceptionIfertili.ation in
violation of Article !!, "ection (1 of the Constitution. -ith such 0ualification in the R8-!RR, it appears
to insinuate that a contraceptive &ill only be considered as an 'abortifacient' if its sole +no&n effect
is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the i%plantation of the fertili.ed ovu%.
$or the sa%e reason, this definition of 'contraceptive' &ould per%it the approval of contraceptives
&hich are actually abortifacients because of their fail-safe %echanis%.
(>3
Also, as discussed earlier, "ection @ calls for the certification by the $A that these contraceptives
cannot act as abortive. -ith this, together &ith the definition of an abortifacient under "ection 3 4a5 of
the R8 9a& and its declared policy against abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that
contraceptives to be included in the PN$" and the E9 &ill not only be those contraceptives that
do not have the pri%ary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the %other,s
&o%b or the prevention of the fertili.ed ovu% to reach and be i%planted in the %other,s &o%b, but
also those that do not have the secondary action of acting the sa%e &ay.
!ndeed, consistent &ith the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line &ith the principle that
la&s should be construed in a %anner that its constitutionality is sustained, the R8 9a& and its
i%ple%enting rules %ust be consistent &ith each other in prohibiting abortion. )hus, the &ord '
pri%arily' in "ection 2.6l4a5 and C5 of the R8-!RR should be declared void. )o uphold the validity of
"ection 2.6l4a5 and C5 of the R8-!RR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the pri%ary
effect of being an abortive &ould effectively 'open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives
&hich %ay har% or destroy the life of the unborn fro% conceptionIfertili.ation in violation of Article !!,
"ection (1 of the Constitution.'
(>7
)o repeat and e%phasi.e, in all cases, the 'principle of no abortion' e%bodied in the constitutional
protection of life %ust be upheld.
1-)he Right to 8ealth
)he petitioners clai% that the R8 9a& violates the right to health because it re0uires the inclusion of
hor%onal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, in*ectables and fa%ily products and supplies in the
National rug $or%ulary and the inclusion of the sa%e in the regular purchase of essential
%edicines and supplies of all national hospitals.
(>=
Citing various studies on the %atter, the petitioners
posit that the ris+ of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in &o%en &ho use
oral contraceptives as co%pared to &o%en &ho never use the%. )hey point out that the ris+ is
decreased &hen the use of contraceptives is discontinued. $urther, it is contended that the use of
co%bined oral contraceptive pills is associated &ith a threefold increased ris+ of venous
thro%boe%bolis%, a t&ofold increased ris+ of ische%atic stro+e, and an indeter%inate effect on ris+
of %yocardial infarction.
(>>
Civen the definition of 'reproductive health' and 'sexual health' under
"ections 34p5
(>?
and 4&5
(>@
of the R8 9a&, the petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only see+s
to ensure that &o%en have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives.
(?6
)he #"C, ho&ever, points out that "ection (7, Article !! of the Constitution is not self-executory, it
being a %ere state%ent of the ad%inistration,s principle and policy. Even if it &ere self-executory, the
#"C posits that %edical authorities refute the clai% that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of
&o%en.
(?(
A co%ponent to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. !n this regard, the Constitution is
replete &ith provisions protecting and pro%oting the right to health. "ection (7, Article !! of the
Constitution provides:
"ection (7. )he "tate shall protect and pro%ote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness a%ong the%.
A portion of Article B!!! also specifically provides for the "tates, duty to provide for the health of the
people, vi.:
8EA9)8
"ection ((. )he "tate shall adopt an integrated and co%prehensive approach to health develop%ent
&hich shall endeavor to %a+e essential goods, health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost. )here shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sic+, elderly,
disabled, &o%en, and children. )he "tate shall endeavor to provide free %edical care to paupers.
"ection (1. )he "tate shall establish and %aintain an effective food and drug regulatory syste% and
underta+e appropriate health, %anpo&er develop%ent, and research, responsive to the country,s
health needs and proble%s.
"ection (2. )he "tate shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation,
self-develop%ent, and self-reliance, and their integration into the %ainstrea% of society.
$inally, "ection @, Article BA! provides:
"ection @. )he "tate shall protect consu%ers fro% trade %alpractices and fro% substandard or
ha.ardous products.
Contrary to the respondent,s notion, ho&ever, these provisions are self-executing. Fnless the
provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-
executory. )here is no need for legislation to i%ple%ent these self-executing provisions.
(?1
!n ;anila
Prince 8otel v. C"!",
(?2
it &as stated:
x x x 8ence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional %andate, the presu%ption no& is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. !f the constitutional provisions are treated as re0uiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature &ould have the po&er to ignore and practically nullify the %andate of the
funda%ental la&. )his can be cataclys%ic. )hat is &hy the prevailing vie& is, as it has al&ays been,
that P
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing. . . . Fnless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule &ould give the legislature discretion to deter%ine &hen,
or &hether, they shall be effective. )hese provisions &ould be subordinated to the &ill of the
la&%a+ing body, &hich could %a+e the% entirely %eaningless by si%ply refusing to pass the
needed i%ple%enting statute. 4E%phases supplied5
)his not&ithstanding, it bears %entioning that the petitioners, particularly A9$!, do not 0uestion
contraception and contraceptives per se.
(?3
!n fact, A9$! prays that the status 0uo - under R.A. No.
7@1( and R.A. No. 3>1@, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited &hen they are
dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be %aintained.
(?7
)he legislative intent in the enact%ent of the R8 9a& in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of
R.A. No. 3>1@. )here is no intention at all to do a&ay &ith it. !t is still a good la& and its re0uire%ents
are still in to be co%plied &ith. )hus, the Court agrees &ith the observation of respondent 9ag%an
that the effectivity of the R8 9a& &ill not lead to the un%itigated proliferation of contraceptives since
the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices &ill still re0uire the
prescription of a licensed physician. -ith R.A. No. 3>1@ in place, there exists ade0uate safeguards
to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are %ade available to the public. As aptly
explained by respondent 9ag%an:
. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used &ithout
prescription
(6?. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the sa%e cannot be dispensed
and used &ithout prescription.
(6@. Republic Act No. 3>1@ or 'An Act to Regulate the "ale, ispensation, andI or istribution of
Contraceptive rugs and evices' and Republic Act No. 7@1( or 'An Act Regulating the Practice of
Phar%acy and "etting "tandards of Phar%aceutical Education in the Philippines and for #ther
Purposes' are not repealed by the R8 9a& and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent &ith
the R8 9a&.
((6. Conse0uently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are
particularly governed by RA No. 3>1@ &hich provides in full:
'"ection (. !t shall be unla&ful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or
other&ise distribute &hether for or &ithout consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless
such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or phar%aceutical co%pany
and &ith the prescription of a 0ualified %edical practitioner.
'"ec. 1 . $or the purpose of this Act:
'4a5 'Contraceptive drug' is any %edicine, drug, che%ical, or portion &hich is used
exclusively for the purpose of preventing fertili.ation of the fe%ale ovu%: and
'4b5 'Contraceptive device' is any instru%ent, device, %aterial, or agent introduced into the
fe%ale reproductive syste% for the pri%ary purpose of preventing conception.
'"ec. 2 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished
&ith a fine of not %ore than five hundred pesos or an i%prison%ent of not less than six %onths or
%ore than one year or both in the discretion of the Court.
')his Act shall ta+e effect upon its approval.
'Approved: /une (?, (@=='
(((. #f the sa%e i%port, but in a general %anner, "ection 17 of RA No. 7@1( provides:
'"ection 17. "ale of %edicine, phar%aceuticals, drugs and devices. No %edicine, phar%aceutical, or
drug of &hatever nature and +ind or device shall be co%pounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or
other&ise be %ade available to the consu%ing public except through a prescription drugstore or
hospital phar%acy, duly established in accordance &ith the provisions of this Act.
((1. -ith all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the R8 9a& and other relevant statutes,
the pretension of the petitioners that the R8 9a& &ill lead to the un%itigated proliferation of
contraceptives, &hether har%ful or not, is co%pletely un&arranted and baseless.
(?=
LE%phases in the
#riginal. Fnderlining supplied.H
!n Re: "ection (6 of the R8 9a&:
)he foregoing safeguards should be read in connection &ith "ection (6 of the R8 9a& &hich
provides:
"EC. (6. Procure%ent and istribution of $a%ily Planning "upplies. - )he #8 shall procure,
distribute to 9CFs and %onitor the usage of fa%ily planning supplies for the &hole country. )he #8
shall coordinate &ith all appropriate local govern%ent bodies to plan and i%ple%ent this
procure%ent and distribution progra%. )he supply and budget allot%ents shall be based on, a%ong
others, the current levels and pro*ections of the follo&ing:
4a5 Nu%ber of &o%en of reproductive age and couples &ho &ant to space or li%it their
children<
4b5 Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of %ethod used< and
4c5 Cost of fa%ily planning supplies.
Provided, )hat 9CFs %ay i%ple%ent its o&n procure%ent, distribution and %onitoring progra%
consistent &ith the overall provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the #8.
)hus, in the distribution by the #8 of contraceptive drugs and devices, it %ust consider the
provisions of R.A. No. 3>1@, &hich is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it &ill
procure shall be fro% a duly licensed drug store or phar%aceutical co%pany and that the actual
dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices &ill done follo&ing a prescription of a
0ualified %edical practitioner. )he distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices %ust not be
indiscri%inately done. )he public health %ust be protected by all possible %eans. As pointed out by
/ustice e Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assu%ed by the govern%ent in supplying
contraceptive drugs and devices, for it %ay be held accountable for any in*ury, illness or loss of life
resulting fro% or incidental to their use.
(?>
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been sub%itted to the $A
pursuant to the R8 9a&. !t behooves the Court to a&ait its deter%ination &hich drugs or devices are
declared by the $A as safe, it being the agency tas+ed to ensure that food and %edicines available
to the public are safe for public consu%ption. Conse0uently, the Court finds that, at this point, the
attac+ on the R8 9a& on this ground is pre%ature. !ndeed, the various +inds of contraceptives %ust
first be %easured up to the constitutional yardstic+ as expounded herein, to be deter%ined as the
case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong vie& that Congress cannot legislate that hor%onal
contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. )he first sentence of "ection
@ that ordains their inclusion by the National rug $or%ulary in the E9 by using the %andatory
'shall' is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by
the $A. )he $A, not Congress, has the expertise to deter%ine &hether a particular hor%onal
contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. )he provision of the third sentence
concerning the re0uire%ents for the inclusion or re%oval of a particular fa%ily planning supply fro%
the E9 supports this construction.
"tated differently, the provision in "ection @ covering the inclusion of hor%onal contraceptives, intra-
uterine devices, in*ectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective fa%ily planning
products and supplies by the National rug $or%ulary in the E9 is not %andatory. )here %ust first
be a deter%ination by the $A that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective fa%ily
planning products and supplies. )here can be no predeter%ination by Congress that the ga%ut of
contraceptives are 'safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective' &ithout the proper scientific
exa%ination.
2 -$reedo% of Religion
and the Right to $ree "peech
Position of the Petitioners:
(. #n Contraception
-hile contraceptives and procedures li+e vasecto%y and tubal ligation are not covered by the
constitutional proscription, there are those &ho, because of their religious education and
bac+ground, sincerely believe that contraceptives, &hether abortifacient or not, are evil. "o%e of
these are %edical practitioners &ho essentially clai% that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of
contraceptives but also the &illing participation and cooperation in all things dealing &ith
contraceptive use. Petitioner PAB explained that 'contraception is gravely opposed to %arital
chastity, it is contrary to the good of the trans%ission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the
spouses< it har%s true love and denies the sovereign rule of Cod in the trans%ission of 8u%an
life.'
(??
)he petitioners 0uestion the "tate-sponsored procure%ent of contraceptives, arguing that the
expenditure of their taxes on contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedo% since
contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs.
(?@
1. #n Religious Acco%%odation and
)he uty to Refer
Petitioners !%bong and 9uat note that &hile the R8 9a& atte%pts to address religious senti%ents by
%a+ing provisions for a conscientious ob*ector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated
because the la& also i%poses upon the conscientious ob*ector the duty to refer the patient see+ing
reproductive health services to another %edical practitioner &ho &ould be able to provide for the
patient,s needs. $or the petitioners, this a%ounts to re0uiring the conscientious ob*ector to cooperate
&ith the very thing he refuses to do &ithout violating hisIher religious beliefs.
(@6
)hey further argue that even if the conscientious ob*ector,s duty to refer is recogni.ed, the
recognition is unduly li%ited, because although it allo&s a conscientious ob*ector in "ection 12 4a5425
the option to refer a patient see+ing reproductive health services and infor%ation - no escape is
afforded the conscientious ob*ector in "ection 12 4a54l5 and 415, i.e. against a patient see+ing
reproductive health procedures. )hey clai% that the right of other individuals to conscientiously
ob*ect, such as: a5 those &or+ing in public health facilities referred to in "ection >< b5 public officers
involved in the i%ple%entation of the la& referred to in "ection 124b 5< and c5 teachers in public
schools referred to in "ection (3 of the R8 9a&, are also not recogni.e.
(@(
Petitioner Echave. and the other %edical practitioners %ean&hile, contend that the re0uire%ent to
refer the %atter to another health care service provider is still considered a co%pulsion on those
ob*ecting healthcare service providers. )hey add that co%pelling the% to do the act against their &ill
violates the octrine of Benevolent Neutrality. "ections @, (3 and ( > of the la& are too secular that
they tend to disregard the religion of $ilipinos. Authori.ing the use of contraceptives &ith abortive
effects, %andatory sex education, %andatory pro-bono reproductive health services to indigents
encroach upon the religious freedo% of those upon &ho% they are re0uired.
(@1
Petitioner C$C also argues that the re0uire%ent for a conscientious ob*ector to refer the person
see+ing reproductive health care services to another provider infringes on one,s freedo% of religion
as it forces the ob*ector to beco%e an un&illing participant in the co%%ission of a serious sin under
Catholic teachings. -hile the right to act on one,s belief %ay be regulated by the "tate, the acts
prohibited by the R8 9a& are passive acts &hich produce neither har% nor in*ury to the public.
(@2
Petitioner C$C adds that the R8 9a& does not sho& co%pelling state interest to *ustify regulation of
religious freedo% because it %entions no e%ergency, ris+ or threat that endangers state interests. !t
does not explain ho& the rights of the people 4to e0uality, non-discri%ination of rights, sustainable
hu%an develop%ent, health, education, infor%ation, choice and to %a+e decisions according to
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the de%ands of responsible parenthood5 are being
threatened or are not being %et as to *ustify the i%pair%ent of religious freedo%.
(@3
$inally, the petitioners also 0uestion "ection (7 of the R8 9a& re0uiring &ould-be couples to attend
fa%ily planning and responsible parenthood se%inars and to obtain a certificate of co%pliance. )hey
clai% that the provision forces individuals to participate in the i%ple%entation of the R8 9a& even if
it contravenes their religious beliefs.
(@7
As the assailed la& dangles the threat of penalty of fine andIor
i%prison%ent in case of non-co%pliance &ith its provisions, the petitioners clai% that the R8 9a&
forcing the% to provide, support and facilitate access and infor%ation to contraception against their
beliefs %ust be struc+ do&n as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious freedo%.
)he Respondents, Positions
)he respondents, on the other hand, contend that the R8 9a& does not provide that a specific %ode
or type of contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. !t neither i%poses nor sanctions any
religion or belief.
(@=
)hey point out that the R8 9a& only see+s to serve the public interest by
providing accessible, effective and 0uality reproductive health services to ensure %aternal and child
health, in line &ith the "tate,s duty to bring to reality the social *ustice health guarantees of the
Constitution,
(@>
and that &hat the la& only prohibits are those acts or practices, &hich deprive others
of their right to reproductive health.
(@?
)hey assert that the assailed la& only see+s to guarantee
infor%ed choice, &hich is an assurance that no one &ill be co%pelled to violate his religion against
his free &ill.
(@@
)he respondents add that by asserting that only natural fa%ily planning should be allo&ed, the
petitioners are effectively going against the constitutional right to religious freedo%, the sa%e right
they invo+ed to assail the constitutionality of the R8 9a&.
166
!n other &ords, by see+ing the
declaration that the R8 9a& is unconstitutional, the petitioners are as+ing that the Court recogni.e
only the Catholic Church,s sanctioned natural fa%ily planning %ethods and i%pose this on the entire
citi.enry.
16(
-ith respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the sa%e does not violate the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedo%, it being a carefully balanced co%pro%ise bet&een the
interests of the religious ob*ector, on one hand, &ho is allo&ed to +eep silent but is re0uired to refer
-and that of the citi.en &ho needs access to infor%ation and &ho has the right to expect that the
health care professional in front of her &ill act professionally. $or the respondents, the concession
given by the "tate under "ection > and 124a5425 is sufficient acco%%odation to the right to freely
exercise one,s religion &ithout unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others.
161
-hatever burden is placed on the petitioner,s religious freedo% is %ini%al as the duty to refer is
li%ited in duration, location and i%pact.
162
Regarding %andatory fa%ily planning se%inars under "ection (7 , the respondents clai% that it is a
reasonable regulation providing an opportunity for &ould-be couples to have access to infor%ation
regarding parenthood, fa%ily planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. !t is argued that those &ho
ob*ect to any infor%ation received on account of their attendance in the re0uired se%inars are not
co%pelled to accept infor%ation given to the%. )hey are co%pletely free to re*ect any infor%ation
they do not agree &ith and retain the freedo% to decide on %atters of fa%ily life &ithout intervention
of the "tate.
163
$or their part, respondents e Aenecia et al., dispute the notion that natural fa%ily planning is the
only %ethod acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys
on the %atter, they highlight the changing stand of the Catholic Church on contraception throughout
the years and note the general acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its follo&ers in
planning their fa%ilies.
)he Church and )he "tate
At the outset, it cannot be denied that &e all live in a heterogeneous society. !t is %ade up of people
of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and bac+grounds. 8istory has sho&n us that our
govern%ent, in la& and in practice, has allo&ed these various religious, cultural, social and racial
groups to thrive in a single society together. !t has e%braced %inority groups and is tolerant to&ards
all - the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. )he undisputed fact is that our
people generally believe in a deity, &hatever they conceived 8i% to be, and to &ho% they call for
guidance and enlighten%ent in crafting our funda%ental la&. )hus, the prea%ble of the present
Constitution reads:
-e, the sovereign $ilipino people, i%ploring the aid of Al%ighty Cod, in order to build a *ust and
hu%ane society, and establish a Covern%ent that shall e%body our ideals and aspirations, pro%ote
the co%%on good, conserve and develop our patri%ony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity,
the blessings of independence and de%ocracy under the rule of la& and a regi%e of truth, *ustice,
freedo%, love, e0uality, and peace, do ordain and pro%ulgate this Constitution.
)he $ilipino people in 'i%ploring the aid of Al%ighty Cod ' %anifested their spirituality innate in our
nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is
e%bodied in the prea%ble, it %eans that the "tate recogni.es &ith respect the influence of religion in
so far as it instills into the %ind the purest principles of %orality.
167
;oreover, in recognition of the
contributions of religion to society, the (@27, (@>2 and (@?> constitutions contain benevolent and
acco%%odating provisions to&ards religions such as tax exe%ption of church property, salary of
religious officers in govern%ent institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.
)he $ra%ers, ho&ever, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the "tate &ould not encroach
into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa. )he principle of separation of Church and "tate &as,
thus, enshrined in Article !!, "ection = of the (@?> Constitution, vi.:
"ection =. )he separation of Church and "tate shall be inviolable.
Aerily, the principle of separation of Church and "tate is based on %utual respect.1wphi1 Cenerally, the
"tate cannot %eddle in the internal affairs of the church, %uch less 0uestion its faith and dog%as or
dictate upon it. !t cannot favor one religion and discri%inate against another. #n the other hand, the
church cannot i%pose its beliefs and convictions on the "tate and the rest of the citi.enry. !t cannot
de%and that the nation follo& its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the
country.
Consistent &ith the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the
Constitution in the above-cited provision utili.es the ter% 'church' in its generic sense, &hich refers
to a te%ple, a %os0ue, an iglesia, or any other house of Cod &hich %etaphorically sy%boli.es a
religious organi.ation. )hus, the 'Church' %eans the religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an a%ple barrier to protect the
"tate fro% the pursuit of its secular ob*ectives, the Constitution lays do&n the follo&ing %andate in
Article !!!, "ection 7 and Article A!, "ection 1@ 415, of the (@?> Constitution:
"ection. 7. No la& shall be %ade respecting an establish%ent of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. )he free exercise and en*oy%ent of religious profession and &orship, &ithout
discri%ination or preference, shall forever be allo&ed. No religious test shall be re0uired for the
exercise of civil or political rights.
"ection 1@.
xxx.
No public %oney or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or e%ployed, directly or indirectly,
for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, deno%ination, sectarian institution, or syste% of
religion, or of any priest, preacher, %inister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except
&hen such priest, preacher, %inister, or dignitary is assigned to the ar%ed forces, or to any penal
institution, or govern%ent orphanage or leprosariu%.
!n short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedo% provides t&o guarantees: the
Establish%ent Clause and the $ree Exercise Clause.
)he establish%ent clause 'principally prohibits the "tate fro% sponsoring any religion or favoring any
religion as against other religions. !t %andates a strict neutrality in affairs a%ong religious
groups.'
16=
Essentially, it prohibits the establish%ent of a state religion and the use of public
resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.
#n the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the
hu%an conscience.
16>
Fnder this part of religious freedo% guarantee, the "tate is prohibited fro%
unduly interfering &ith the outside %anifestations of one,s belief and faith.
16?
Explaining the concept of
religious freedo%, the Court, in Aictoriano v. Eli.alde Rope -or+ers Fnion
16@
&rote:
)he constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or
the %odes of &orship of any sect, thus forestalling co%pulsion by la& of the acceptance of any
creed or the practice of any for% of &orship 4F.". Ballard, 211 F.". >?, ?? 9. ed. ((3?, ((725, but
also assures the free exercise of one,s chosen for% of religion &ithin li%its of ut%ost a%plitude. !t
has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allo& each %an to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his
beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent &ith the liberty of others and &ith the
co%%on good. Any legislation &hose effect or purpose is to i%pede the observance of one or all
religions, or to discri%inate invidiously bet&een the religions, is invalid, even though the burden %ay
be characteri.ed as being only indirect. 4"herbert v. Aerner, 2>3 F.". 2@?, (6 9.ed.1d @=7, ?2 ". Ct.
(@>65 But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, &ithin its po&er, a general la& &hich has for its
purpose and effect to advance the state,s secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect
burden on religious observance, unless the state can acco%plish its purpose &ithout i%posing such
burden. 4Braunfeld v. Bro&n, 2== F.". 7@@, = 9ed. 1d. 7=2, ?( ". Ct. (33< ;cCo&an v. ;aryland,
2== F.". 316, 333-7 and 33@5.
As expounded in Escritor,
)he establish%ent and free exercise clauses &ere not designed to serve contradictory purposes.
)hey have a single goal-to pro%ote freedo% of individual religious beliefs and practices. !n si%plest
ter%s, the free exercise clause prohibits govern%ent fro% inhibiting religious beliefs &ith penalties
for religious beliefs and practice, &hile the establish%ent clause prohibits govern%ent fro% inhibiting
religious belief &ith re&ards for religious beliefs and practices. !n other &ords, the t&o religion
clauses &ere intended to deny govern%ent the po&er to use either the carrot or the stic+ to influence
individual religious beliefs and practices.
1(6
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one,s religion is the principle that the guarantee of
religious freedo% is co%prised of t&o parts: the freedo% to believe, and the freedo% to act on one,s
belief. )he first part is absolute. As explained in Cerona v. "ecretary of Education:
1((
)he real% of belief and creed is infinite and li%itless bounded only by one,s i%agination and thought.
"o is the freedo% of belief, including religious belief, li%itless and &ithout bounds. #ne %ay believe
in %ost anything, ho&ever strange, bi.arre and unreasonable the sa%e %ay appear to others, even
heretical &hen &eighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But bet&een the freedo%
of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is 0uite a stretch of road to travel.
1(1
)he second part ho&ever, is li%ited and sub*ect to the a&eso%e po&er of the "tate and can be
en*oyed only &ith proper regard to the rights of others. !t is 'sub*ect to regulation &here the belief is
translated into external acts that affect the public &elfare.'
1(2
9egislative Acts and the
$ree Exercise Clause
)hus, in case of conflict bet&een the free exercise clause and the "tate, the Court adheres to the
doctrine of benevolent neutrality. )his has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor,
4Escritor5
1(3
&here it &as stated 'that benevolent neutrality-acco%%odation, &hether %andatory or
per%issive, is the spirit, intent and fra%e&or+ underlying the Philippine Constitution.'
1(7
!n the sa%e
case, it &as further explained that'
)he benevolent neutrality theory believes that &ith respect to these govern%ental actions,
acco%%odation of religion %ay be allo&ed, not to pro%ote the govern%ent,s favored for% of
religion, but to allo& individuals and groups to exercise their religion &ithout hindrance. ')he purpose
of acco%%odation is to re%ove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person,s or institution,s
religion.'
1(=
'-hat is sought under the theory of acco%%odation is not a declaration of
unconstitutionality of a facially neutral la&, but an exe%ption fro% its application or its ,burdenso%e
effect,, &hether by the legislature or the courts.'
1(>
!n ascertaining the li%its of the exercise of religious freedo%, the co%pelling state interest test is
proper.
1(?
Fnderlying the co%pelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a funda%ental
right and that la&s burdening it should be sub*ect to strict scrutiny.
1(@
!n Escritor, it &as &ritten:
Philippine *urisprudence articulates several tests to deter%ine these li%its. Beginning &ith the first
case on the $ree Exercise Clause, A%erican Bible "ociety, the Court %entioned the 'clear and
present danger' test but did not e%ploy it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in
subse0uent cases on religious liberty. )he Cerona case then pronounced that the test of
per%issibility of religious freedo% is &hether it violates the established institutions of society and la&.
)he Aictoriano case %entioned the 'i%%ediate and grave danger' test as &ell as the doctrine that a
la& of general applicability %ay burden religious exercise provided the la& is the least restrictive
%eans to acco%plish the goal of the la&. )he case also used, albeit inappropriately, the 'co%pelling
state interest' test. After Aictoriano , Cer%an &ent bac+ to the Cerona rule. Ebralinag then e%ployed
the 'grave and i%%ediate danger' test and overruled the Cerona test. )he fairly recent case of
!glesia ni Cristo &ent bac+ to the ' clear and present danger' test in the %aiden case of A %erican
Bible "ociety. Not surprisingly, all the cases &hich e%ployed the 'clear and present danger' or
'grave and i%%ediate danger' test involved, in one for% or another, religious speech as this test is
often used in cases on freedo% of expression. #n the other hand, the Cerona and Cer%an cases
set the rule that religious freedo% &ill not prevail over established institutions of society and la&.
Cerona, ho&ever, &hich &as the authority cited by Cer%an has been overruled by Ebralinag &hich
e%ployed the 'grave and i%%ediate danger' test . Aictoriano &as the only case that e%ployed the
'co%pelling state interest' test, but as explained previously, the use of the test &as inappropriate to
the facts of the case.
)he case at bar does not involve speech as in A %erican Bible "ociety, Ebralinag and !glesia ni
Cristo &here the 'clear and present danger' and 'grave and i%%ediate danger' tests &ere
appropriate as speech has easily discernible or i%%ediate effects. )he Cerona and Cer%an
doctrine, aside fro% having been overruled, is not congruent &ith the benevolent neutrality
approach, thus not appropriate in this *urisdiction. "i%ilar to Aictoriano, the present case involves
purely conduct arising fro% religious belief. )he 'co%pelling state interest' test is proper &here
conduct is involved for the &hole ga%ut of hu%an conduct has different effects on the state,s
interests: so%e effects %ay be i%%ediate and short-ter% &hile others delayed and far-reaching. A
test that &ould protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, &hether i%%ediate
or delayed, is therefore necessary. 8o&ever, not any interest of the state &ould suffice to prevail
over the right to religious freedo% as this is a funda%ental right that en*oys a preferred position in
the hierarchy of rights - 'the %ost inalienable and sacred of all hu%an rights', in the &ords of
/efferson. )his right is sacred for an invocation of the $ree Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher
sovereignty. )he entire constitutional order of li%ited govern%ent is pre%ised upon an
ac+no&ledg%ent of such higher sovereignty, thus the $ilipinos i%plore the 'aid of Al%ighty Cod in
order to build a *ust and hu%ane society and establish a govern%ent.' As held in "herbert, only the
gravest abuses, endangering para%ount interests can li%it this funda%ental right. A %ere balancing
of interests &hich balances a right &ith *ust a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate.
!nstead, only a co%pelling interest of the state can prevail over the funda%ental right to religious
liberty. )he test re0uires the state to carry a heavy burden, a co%pelling one, for to do other&ise
&ould allo& the state to batter religion, especially the less po&erful ones until they are destroyed. !n
deter%ining &hich shall prevail bet&een the state,s interest and religious liberty, reasonableness
shall be the guide. )he 'co%pelling state interest' serves the purpose of revering religious liberty
&hile at the sa%e ti%e affording protection to the para%ount interests of the state. )his &as the test
used in "herbert &hich involved conduct, i.e. refusal to &or+ on "aturdays. !n the end, the
'co%pelling state interest' test, by upholding the para%ount interests of the state, see+s to protect
the very state, &ithout &hich, religious liberty &ill not be preserved. LE%phases in the original.
Fnderlining supplied.H
!n the case at bench, it is not &ithin the province of the Court to deter%ine &hether the use of
contraceptives or one,s participation in the support of %ode% reproductive health %easures is %oral
fro% a religious standpoint or &hether the sa%e is right or &rong according to one,s dog%a or belief.
$or the Court has declared that %atters dealing &ith 'faith, practice, doctrine, for% of &orship,
ecclesiastical la&, custo% and rule of a church ... are un0uestionably ecclesiastical %atters &hich
are outside the province of the civil courts.'
116
)he *urisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular %orality. -hatever pronounce%ent the Court %a+es in the case at bench should be
understood only in this real% &here it has authority. "tated other&ise, &hile the Court stands &ithout
authority to rule on ecclesiastical %atters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to
deter%ine &hether the R8 9a& contravenes the guarantee of religious freedo%.
At first blush, it appears that the R8 9a& recogni.es and respects religion and religious beliefs and
convictions. !t is replete &ith assurances the no one can be co%pelled to violate the tenets of his
religion or defy his religious convictions against his free &ill. Provisions in the R8 9a& respecting
religious freedo% are the follo&ing:
(. )he "tate recogni.es and guarantees the hu%an rights of all persons including their right to
e0uality and nondiscri%ination of these rights, the right to sustainable hu%an develop%ent, the right
to health &hich includes reproductive health, the right to education and infor%ation, and the right to
choose and %a+e decisions for the%selves in accordance &ith their religious convictions, ethics,
cultural beliefs, and the de%ands of responsible parenthood. L"ection 1, eclaration of PolicyH
1 . )he "tate recogni.es %arriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the fa%ily
&hich in turn is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the "tate shall defend:
4a5 )he right of spouses to found a fa%ily in accordance &ith their religious convictions and the
de%ands of responsible parenthood.' L"ection 1, eclaration of PolicyH
2. )he "tate shall pro%ote and provide infor%ation and access, &ithout bias, to all %ethods of fa%ily
planning, including effective natural and %odern %ethods &hich have been proven %edically safe,
legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance &ith scientific and evidence-based %edical
research standards such as those registered and approved by the $A for the poor and
%arginali.ed as identified through the N8)"-PR and other govern%ent %easures of identifying
%arginali.ation: Provided, )hat the "tate shall also provide funding support to pro%ote %odern
natural %ethods of fa%ily planning, especially the Billings #vulation ;ethod, consistent &ith the
needs of acceptors and their religious convictions. L"ection 24e5, eclaration of PolicyH
3. )he "tate shall pro%ote progra%s that: 4(5 enable individuals and couples to have the nu%ber of
children they desire &ith due consideration to the health, particularly of &o%en, and the resources
available and affordable to the% and in accordance &ith existing la&s, public %orals and their
religious convictions. L"ection 2C/
7. )he "tate shall respect individuals, preferences and choice of fa%ily planning %ethods that are in
accordance &ith their religious convictions and cultural beliefs, ta+ing into consideration the "tate,s
obligations under various hu%an rights instru%ents. L"ection 24h5H
=. Active participation by nongovern%ent organi.ations 4NC#s5 , &o%en,s and people,s
organi.ations, civil society, faith-based organi.ations, the religious sector and co%%unities is crucial
to ensure that reproductive health and population and develop%ent policies, plans, and progra%s
&ill address the priority needs of &o%en, the poor, and the %arginali.ed. L"ection 24i5H
>. Responsible parenthood refers to the &ill and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and
aspirations of the fa%ily and children. !t is li+e&ise a shared responsibility bet&een parents to
deter%ine and achieve the desired nu%ber of children, spacing and ti%ing of their children according
to their o&n fa%ily life aspirations, ta+ing into account psychological preparedness, health status,
sociocultural and econo%ic concerns consistent &ith their religious convictions. L"ection 34v5H
4E%phases supplied5
-hile the Constitution prohibits abortion, la&s &ere enacted allo&ing the use of contraceptives. )o
so%e %edical practitioners, ho&ever, the &hole idea of using contraceptives is an anathe%a.
Consistent &ith the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.
)he Establish%ent Clause
and Contraceptives
!n the sa%e breath that the establish%ent clause restricts &hat the govern%ent can do &ith religion,
it also li%its &hat religious sects can or cannot do &ith the govern%ent. )hey can neither cause the
govern%ent to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the
govern%ent to restrict other groups. )o do so, in si%ple ter%s, &ould cause the "tate to adhere to a
particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Conse0uently, the petitioners are %isguided in their supposition that the "tate cannot enhance its
population control progra% through the R8 9a& si%ply because the pro%otion of contraceptive use
is contrary to their religious beliefs. !ndeed, the "tate is not precluded to pursue its legiti%ate secular
ob*ectives &ithout being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. #ne cannot refuse to pay
his taxes si%ply because it &ill cloud his conscience. )he de%arcation line bet&een Church and
"tate de%ands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar,s and unto Cod the things
that are Cod,s.
11(
)he $ree Exercise Clause and the uty to Refer
-hile the R8 9a&, in espousing state policy to pro%ote reproductive health %anifestly respects
diverse religious beliefs in line &ith the Non-Establish%ent Clause, the sa%e conclusion cannot be
reached &ith respect to "ections >, 12 and 13 thereof. )he said provisions co%%only %andate that
a hospital or a %edical practitioner to i%%ediately refer a person see+ing health care and services
under the la& to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious ob*ections based
on religious or ethical beliefs.
!n a situation &here the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by govern%ent legislation or
practice, the co%pelling state interest test in line &ith the Court,s espousal of the octrine of
Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. !n this case, the conscientious ob*ector,s clai% to
religious freedo% &ould &arrant an exe%ption fro% obligations under the R8 9a&, unless the
govern%ent succeeds in de%onstrating a %ore co%pelling state interest in the acco%plish%ent of
an i%portant secular ob*ective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious ob*ectors for exe%ption
fro% the R8 9a& deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
!n applying the test, the first in0uiry is &hether a conscientious ob*ector,s right to religious freedo%
has been burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-&ar plagues a
conscientious ob*ector. #ne side coaxes hi% into obedience to the la& and the abandon%ent of his
religious beliefs, &hile the other entices hi% to a clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. )he
scenario is an illustration of the predica%ent of %edical practitioners &hose religious beliefs are
incongruent &ith &hat the R8 9a& pro%otes.
)he Court is of the vie& that the obligation to refer i%posed by the R8 9a& violates the religious
belief and conviction of a conscientious ob*ector. #nce the %edical practitioner, against his &ill,
refers a patient see+ing infor%ation on %ode% reproductive health products, services, procedures
and %ethods, his conscience is i%%ediately burdened as he has been co%pelled to perfor% an act
against his beliefs. As Co%%issioner /oa0uin A. Bernas 4Co%%issioner Bernas5 has &ritten, 'at the
basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the hu%an conscience.
111
)hough it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, ho&ever, a false
co%pro%ise because it %a+es pro-life health providers co%plicit in the perfor%ance of an act that
they find %orally repugnant or offensive. )hey cannot, in conscience, do indirectly &hat they cannot
do directly. #ne %ay not be the principal, but he is e0ually guilty if he abets the offensive act by
indirect participation.
;oreover, the guarantee of religious freedo% is necessarily intert&ined &ith the right to free speech,
it being an externali.ation of one,s thought and conscience. )his in turn includes the right to be
silent. -ith the constitutional guarantee of religious freedo% follo&s the protection that should be
afforded to individuals in co%%unicating their beliefs to others as &ell as the protection for si%ply
being silent. )he Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter &hat is in his %ind and
the liberty not to utter &hat is not in his %ind.
112
-hile the R8 9a& see+s to provide freedo% of choice
through infor%ed consent, freedo% of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and
prohibits any degree of co%pulsion or burden, &hether direct or indirect, in the practice of one,s
religion.
113
!n case of conflict bet&een the religious beliefs and %oral convictions of individuals, on one hand,
and the interest of the "tate, on the other, to provide access and infor%ation on reproductive health
products, services, procedures and %ethods to enable the people to deter%ine the ti%ing, nu%ber
and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong vie& that the religious freedo% of
health providers, &hether public or private, should be accorded pri%acy. Accordingly, a
conscientious ob*ector should be exe%pt fro% co%pliance &ith the %andates of the R8 9a&. !f he
&ould be co%pelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it &ould be violative of 'the
principle of non-coercion' enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
!nterestingly, on April 13, 16(2, "cotland,s !nner 8ouse of the Court of "ession, found in the case of
oogan and -ood v. N8" Creater Clasgo& and Clyde 8ealth Board,
117
that the %id&ives clai%ing to
be conscientious ob*ectors under the provisions of "cotland,s Abortion Act of (@=>, could not be
re0uired to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor &ard &ho &ere involved in
abortions.
11=
)he !nner 8ouse stated 'that if ,participation, &ere defined according to &hether the
person &as ta+ing part ,directly, or , indirectly, this &ould actually %ean %ore co%plexity and
uncertainty.'
11>
-hile the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle &as the sa%e - they
could not be forced to assist abortions if it &ould be against their conscience or &ill.
!nstitutional 8ealth Providers
)he sa%e holds true &ith respect to non-%aternity specialty hospitals and hospitals o&ned and
operated by a religious group and health care service providers. Considering that "ection 13 of the
R8 9a& penali.es such institutions should they fail or refuse to co%ply &ith their duty to refer under
"ection > and "ection 124a5425, the Court dee%s that it %ust be struc+ do&n for being violative of the
freedo% of religion. )he sa%e applies to "ection 124a54l5 and 4a5415 in relation to "ection 13,
considering that in the disse%ination of infor%ation regarding progra%s and services and in the
perfor%ance of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedo% of health care service
providers should be respected.
!n the case of !sla%ic a,&ah Council of the Philippines, !nc. v. #ffice of the Executive "ecretary
11?
it
&as stressed:
$reedo% of religion &as accorded preferred status by the fra%ers of our funda%ental la&. And this
Court has consistently affir%ed this preferred status, &ell a&are that it is 'designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allo& each %an to believe as his conscience directs, to
profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent &ith the liberty of others
and &ith the co%%on good.'
(6
)he Court is not oblivious to the vie& that penalties provided by la& endeavour to ensure
co%pliance. -ithout set conse0uences for either an active violation or %ere inaction, a la& tends to
be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, &hen &hat is bartered for an effective i%ple%entation of a
la& is a constitutionally-protected right the Court fir%ly chooses to sta%p its disapproval. )he
punish%ent of a healthcare service provider, &ho fails andIor refuses to refer a patient to another, or
&ho declines to perfor% reproductive health procedure on a patient because inco%patible religious
beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee &hich the Court cannot allo&.
)he !%ple%enting Rules and Regulation 4R8-!RR5
)he last paragraph of "ection 7.13 of the R8-!RR reads:
Provided, )hat s+illed health professional such as provincial, city or %unicipal health officers, chiefs
of hospital, head nurses, supervising %id&ives, a%ong others, &ho by virtue of their office are
specifically charged &ith the duty to i%ple%ent the provisions of the RPR8 Act and these Rules,
cannot be considered as conscientious ob*ectors.
)his is discri%inatory and violative of the e0ual protection clause. )he conscientious ob*ection
clause should be e0ually protective of the religious belief of public health officers. )here is no
perceptible distinction &hy they should not be considered exe%pt fro% the %andates of the la&. )he
protection accorded to other conscientious ob*ectors should e0ually apply to all %edical practitioners
&ithout distinction &hether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the freedo% to
believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not
ta+en off even if one ac0uires e%ploy%ent in the govern%ent.
!t should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of
hu%an values. )he %ind %ust be free to thin+ &hat it &ills, &hether in the secular or religious
sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through the %edia and, thus, see+ other
candid vie&s in occasions or gatherings or in %ore per%anent aggrupation. E%braced in such
concept then are freedo% of religion, freedo% of speech, of the press, asse%bly and petition, and
freedo% of association.
11@
)he discri%inatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the R8 9a&
itself but also because it is violative of the e0ual protection clause in the Constitution. Kuoting
respondent 9ag%an, if there is any conflict bet&een the R8-!RR and the R8 9a&, the la& %ust
prevail.
/ustice ;endo.a:
!,ll go to another point. )he R8 la& .. .in your Co%%ent- in-!ntervention on page 71, you %entioned
R8 9a& is replete &ith provisions in upholding the freedo% of religion and respecting religious
convictions. Earlier, you affir%ed this &ith 0ualifications. No&, you have read, ! presu%ed you have
read the !RR-!%ple%enting Rules and Regulations of the R8 BillN
Congress%an 9ag%an:
Ees, Eour 8onor, ! have read but ! have to ad%it, it,s a long !RR and ! have not thoroughly dissected
the nuances of the provisions.
/ustice ;endo.a:
! &ill read to you one provision. !t,s "ection 7.13. )his ! cannot find in the R8 9a&. But in the !RR it
says: ' .... s+illed health professionals such as provincial, city or %unicipal health officers, chief of
hospitals, head nurses, supervising %id&ives, a%ong others, &ho by virtue of their office are
specifically charged &ith the duty to i%ple%ent the provisions of the RPR8 Act and these Rules,
cannot be considered as conscientious ob*ectors.' o you agree &ith thisN
Congress%an 9ag%an:
! &ill have to go over again the provisions, Eour 8onor.
/ustice ;endo.a:
!n other &ords, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners &ho can be conscientious
ob*ectors, s+illed health professionals cannot be considered conscientious ob*ectors. o you agree
&ith thisN !s this not against the constitutional right to the religious beliefN
Congress%an 9ag%an:
Eour 8onor, if there is any conflict bet&een the !RR and the la&, the la& %ust prevail.
126
Co%pelling "tate !nterest
)he foregoing discussion then begets the 0uestion on &hether the respondents, in defense of the
sub*ect provisions, &ere able to: (H de%onstrate a %ore co%pelling state interest to restrain
conscientious ob*ectors in their choice of services to render< and 1H discharge the burden of proof
that the obligatory character of the la& is the least intrusive %eans to achieve the ob*ectives of the
la&.
Fnfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents, sub%issions proved to be in vain. )he #"C &as
curiously silent in the establish%ent of a %ore co%pelling state interest that &ould rationali.e the
curbing of a conscientious ob*ector,s right not to adhere to an action contrary to his religious
convictions. uring the oral argu%ents, the #"C %aintained the sa%e silence and evasion. )he
)ranscripts of the "tenographic Notes disclose the follo&ing:
/ustice e Castro:
9et,s go bac+ to the duty of the conscientious ob*ector to refer. ..
"enior "tate "olicitor 8ilbay:
Ees, /ustice.
/ustice e Castro:
... &hich you are discussing a&hile ago &ith /ustice Abad. -hat is the co%pelling "tate interest in
i%posing this duty to refer to a conscientious ob*ector &hich refuses to do so because of his religious
beliefN
Ahh, Eour 8onor, ..
/ustice e Castro:
-hat is the co%pelling "tate interest to i%pose this burdenN
!n the first place, Eour 8onor, ! don,t believe that the standard is a co%pelling "tate interest, this is
an ordinary health legislation involving professionals. )his is not a free speech %atter or a pure free
exercise %atter. )his is a regulation by the "tate of the relationship bet&een %edical doctors and
their patients.
12(
Resultantly, the Court finds no co%pelling state interest &hich &ould li%it the free exercise clause of
the conscientious ob*ectors, ho&ever fe& in nu%ber. #nly the prevention of an i%%ediate and grave
danger to the security and &elfare of the co%%unity can *ustify the infringe%ent of religious freedo%.
!f the govern%ent fails to sho& the seriousness and i%%ediacy of the threat, "tate intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable.
121
$reedo% of religion %eans %ore than *ust the freedo% to believe. !t also %eans the freedo% to act
or not to act according to &hat one believes. And this freedo% is violated &hen one is co%pelled to
act against one,s belief or is prevented fro% acting according to one,s belief.
122
Apparently, in these cases, there is no i%%ediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the
perceived scenario of the sub*ect provisions. After all, a couple &ho plans the ti%ing, nu%ber and
spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is contingent on &hether or not the
%other decides to adopt or use the infor%ation, product, %ethod or supply given to her or &hether
she even decides to beco%e pregnant at all. #n the other hand, the burden placed upon those &ho
ob*ect to contraceptive use is i%%ediate and occurs the %o%ent a patient see+s consultation on
reproductive health %atters.
;oreover, granting that a co%pelling interest exists to *ustify the infringe%ent of the conscientious
ob*ector,s religious freedo%, the respondents have failed to de%onstrate 'the gravest abuses,
endangering para%ount interests' &hich could li%it or override a person,s funda%ental right to
religious freedo%. Also, the respondents have not presented any govern%ent effort exerted to sho&
that the %eans it ta+es to achieve its legiti%ate state ob*ective is the least intrusive %eans.
123
#ther
than the assertion that the act of referring &ould only be %o%entary, considering that the act of
referral by a conscientious ob*ector is the very action being contested as violative of religious
freedo%, it behooves the respondents to de%onstrate that no other %eans can be underta+en by the
"tate to achieve its ob*ective &ithout violating the rights of the conscientious ob*ector. )he health
concerns of &o%en %ay still be addressed by other practitioners &ho %ay perfor% reproductive
health-related procedures &ith open &illingness and %otivation. "uffice it to say, a person &ho is
forced to perfor% an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard
of constitutional freedo%s.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already ta+en by the 9egislature to ensure that the right to
health is protected. Considering other legislations as they stand no&, R.A . No. 3 >1@ or the
Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. =2=7 or ')he Population Act of the Philippines' and R.A. No. @>(6,
other&ise +no&n as ')he ;agna Carta of -o%en,' a%ply cater to the needs of &o%en in relation to
health services and progra%s. )he pertinent provision of ;agna Carta on co%prehensive health
services and progra%s for &o%en, in fact, reads:
"ection (>. -o%en,s Right to 8ealth. - 4a5 Co%prehensive 8ealth "ervices. - )he "tate shall, at all
ti%es, provide for a co%prehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and
progra%s covering all stages of a &o%an,s life cycle and &hich addresses the %a*or causes of
&o%en,s %ortality and %orbidity: Provided, )hat in the provision for co%prehensive health services,
due respect shall be accorded to &o%en,s religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to found a
fa%ily in accordance &ith their religious convictions, and the de%ands of responsible parenthood,
and the right of &o%en to protection fro% ha.ardous drugs, devices, interventions, and substances.
Access to the follo&ing services shall be ensured:
4(5 ;aternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and
infant health and nutrition<
415 Pro%otion of breastfeeding<
425 Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective %ethods of fa%ily planning<
435 $a%ily and "tate collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services
&ithout pre*udice to the pri%ary right and duty of parents to educate their children<
475 Prevention and %anage%ent of reproductive tract infections, including sexually
trans%itted diseases, 8!A, and A!"<
4=5 Prevention and %anage%ent of reproductive tract cancers li+e breast and cervical
cancers, and other gynecological conditions and disorders<
4>5 Prevention of abortion and %anage%ent of pregnancy-related co%plications<
4?5 !n cases of violence against &o%en and children, &o%en and children victi%s
and survivors shall be provided &ith co%prehensive health services that include
psychosocial, therapeutic, %edical, and legal interventions and assistance to&ards
healing, recovery, and e%po&er%ent<
4@5 Prevention and %anage%ent of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to
ethical nor%s and %edical standards<
4(65 Care of the elderly &o%en beyond their child-bearing years< and
4((5 ;anage%ent, treat%ent, and intervention of %ental health proble%s of &o%en
and girls. !n addition, healthy lifestyle activities are encouraged and pro%oted
through progra%s and pro*ects as strategies in the prevention of diseases.
4b5 Co%prehensive 8ealth !nfor%ation and Education. - )he "tate shall provide &o%en in all sectors
&ith appropriate, ti%ely, co%plete, and accurate infor%ation and education on all the above-stated
aspects of &o%en,s health in govern%ent education and training progra%s, &ith due regard to the
follo&ing:
4(5 )he natural and pri%ary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and
the develop%ent of %oral character and the right of children to be brought up in an
at%osphere of %orality and rectitude for the enrich%ent and strengthening of
character<
415 )he for%ation of a person,s sexuality that affir%s hu%an dignity< and
425 Ethical, legal, safe, and effective fa%ily planning %ethods including fertility
a&areness.
As an afterthought, Asst. "olicitor Ceneral 8ilbay eventually replied that the co%pelling state interest
&as '$ifteen %aternal deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives
changed, x x x.'
127
8e, ho&ever, failed to substantiate this point by concrete facts and figures fro%
reputable sources.
)he undisputed fact, ho&ever, is that the -orld 8ealth #rgani.ation reported that the $ilipino
%aternal %ortality rate dropped to 3? percent fro% (@@6 to 166?,
12=
although there &as still no R8
9a& at that ti%e. espite such revelation, the proponents still insist that such nu%ber of %aternal
deaths constitute a co%pelling state interest.
Cranting that there are still deficiencies and fla&s in the delivery of social healthcare progra%s for
$ilipino &o%en, they could not be solved by a %easure that puts an un&arrantable stranglehold on
religious beliefs in exchange for blind confor%ity.
Exception: 9ife )hreatening Cases
All this not&ithstanding, the Court properly recogni.es a valid exception set forth in the la&. -hile
generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care
procedures if doing it &ould contravene their religious beliefs, an exception %ust be %ade in life-
threatening cases that re0uire the perfor%ance of e%ergency procedures. !n these situations, the
right to life of the %other should be given preference, considering that a referral by a %edical
practitioner &ould a%ount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a
%other in grave danger. )hus, during the oral argu%ents, Atty. 9iban, representing C$C, %anifested:
'the forced referral clause that &e are ob*ecting on grounds of violation of freedo% of religion does
not conte%plate an e%ergency.'
12>
!n a conflict situation bet&een the life of the %other and the life of a child, the doctor is %orally
obliged al&ays to try to save both lives. !f, ho&ever, it is i%possible, the resulting death to one
should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:
Principle of ouble-Effect. - ;ay &e please re%ind the principal author of the R8 Bill in the 8ouse of
Representatives of the principle of double-effect &herein intentional har% on the life of either the
%other of the child is never *ustified to bring about a 'good' effect. !n a conflict situation bet&een the
life of the child and the life of the %other, the doctor is %orally obliged al&ays to try to save both
lives. 8o&ever, he can act in favor of one 4not necessarily the %other5 &hen it is %edically
i%possible to save both, provided that no direct har% is intended to the other. !f the above principles
are observed, the loss of the child,s life or the %other,s life is not intentional and, therefore,
unavoidable. 8ence, the doctor &ould not be guilty of abortion or %urder. )he %other is never pitted
against the child because both their lives are e0ually valuable.
12?
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a %other, procedures endangering the life of the child
%ay be resorted to even if is against the religious senti%ents of the %edical practitioner. As 0uoted
above, &hatever burden i%posed upon a %edical practitioner in this case &ould have been %ore
than *ustified considering the life he &ould be able to save.
$a%ily Planning "e%inars
Anent the re0uire%ent i%posed under "ection (7
12@
as a condition for the issuance of a %arriage
license, the Court finds the sa%e to be a reasonable exercise of police po&er by the govern%ent. A
cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedo% of the petitioners is not at
all violated. All the la& re0uires is for &ould-be spouses to attend a se%inar on parenthood, fa%ily
planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. !t does not even %andate the type of fa%ily planning
%ethods to be included in the se%inar, &hether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the
#"C, those &ho receive any infor%ation during their attendance in the re0uired se%inars are not
co%pelled to accept the infor%ation given to the%, are co%pletely free to re*ect the infor%ation they
find unacceptable, and retain the freedo% to decide on %atters of fa%ily life &ithout the intervention
of the "tate.
3-)he $a%ily and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner C$C assails the R8 9a& because "ection 124a5 415 4i5 thereof violates the provisions of
the Constitution by intruding into %arital privacy and autono%y. !t argues that it cultivates disunity
and fosters ani%osity in the fa%ily rather than pro%ote its solidarity and total develop%ent.
136
)he Court cannot but agree.
)he (@?> Constitution is replete &ith provisions strengthening the fa%ily as it is the basic social
institution. !n fact, one article, Article BA, is devoted entirely to the fa%ily.
AR)!C9E BA
)8E $A;!9E
"ection (. )he "tate recogni.es the $ilipino fa%ily as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively pro%ote its total develop%ent.
"ection 1. ;arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the fa%ily and shall be
protected by the "tate.
"ection 2. )he "tate shall defend:
)he right of spouses to found a fa%ily in accordance &ith their religious convictions and the
de%ands of responsible parenthood<
)he right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection fro% all
for%s of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions pre*udicial to their develop%ent<
)he right of the fa%ily to a fa%ily living &age and inco%e< and
)he right of fa%ilies or fa%ily assoc(at(ons to participate in the planning and i%ple%entation of
policies and progra%s that affect the%.
!n this case, the R8 9a&, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population gro&th, contains provisions
&hich tend to &rec+ the fa%ily as a solid social institution. !t bars the husband andIor the father fro%
participating in the decision %a+ing process regarding their co%%on future progeny. !t li+e&ise
deprives the parents of their authority over their %inor daughter si%ply because she is already a
parent or had suffered a %iscarriage.
)he $a%ily and "pousal Consent
"ection 124a5 415 4i5 of the R8 9a& states:
)he follo&ing acts are prohibited:
4a5 Any health care service provider, &hether public or private, &ho shall: ...
415 refuse to perfor% legal and %edically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal
age on the ground of lac+ of consent or authori.ation of the follo&ing persons in the follo&ing
instances:
4i5 "pousal consent in case of %arried persons: provided, )hat in case of disagree%ent, the decision
of the one undergoing the procedures shall prevail. LE%phasis suppliedH
)he above provision refers to reproductive health procedures li+e tubal litigation and vasecto%y
&hich, by their very nature, should re0uire %utual consent and decision bet&een the husband and
the &ife as they affect issues inti%ately related to the founding of a fa%ily. "ection 2, Art. BA of the
Constitution espouses that the "tate shall defend the 'right of the spouses to found a fa%ily.' #ne
person cannot found a fa%ily. )he right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. !n the sa%e "ection 2,
their right 'to participate in the planning and i%ple%entation of policies and progra%s that affect
the% ' is e0ually recogni.ed.
)he R8 9a& cannot be allo&ed to infringe upon this %utual decision-%a+ing. By giving absolute
authority to the spouse &ho &ould undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse fro%
participating in the decision &ould drive a &edge bet&een the husband and &ife, possibly result in
bitter ani%osity, and endanger the %arriage and the fa%ily, all for the sa+e of reducing the
population. )his &ould be a %ar+ed departure fro% the policy of the "tate to protect %arriage as an
inviolable social institution.
13(
ecision-%a+ing involving a reproductive health procedure is a private %atter &hich belongs to the
couple, not *ust one of the%. Any decision they &ould reach &ould affect their future as a fa%ily
because the si.e of the fa%ily or the nu%ber of their children significantly %atters. )he decision
&hether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one
cohesive unit as they chart their o&n destiny. !t is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. Fnless
it pre*udices the "tate, &hich has not sho&n any co%pelling interest, the "tate should see to it that
they chart their destiny together as one fa%ily.
As highlighted by /ustice 9eonardo-e Castro, "ection (@4 c5 of R.A. No. @>(6, other&ise +no&n as
the ';agna Carta for -o%en,' provides that &o%en shall have e0ual rights in all %atters relating to
%arriage and fa%ily relations, including the *oint decision on the nu%ber and spacing of their
children. !ndeed, responsible parenthood, as "ection 24v5 of the R8 9a& states, is a shared
responsibility bet&een parents. "ection 124a54154i5 of the R8 9a& should not be allo&ed to betray the
constitutional %andate to protect and strengthen the fa%ily by giving to only one spouse the
absolute authority to decide &hether to undergo reproductive health procedure.
131
)he right to chart their o&n destiny together falls &ithin the protected .one of %arital privacy and
such state intervention &ould encroach into the .ones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the
Constitution. !n our *urisdiction, the right to privacy &as first recogni.ed in ;ar*e v. ;utuc,
132
&here
the Court, spea+ing through Chief /ustice $ernando, held that 'the right to privacy as such is
accorded recognition independently of its identification &ith liberty< in itself, it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection.'
133
;ar*e adopted the ruling of the F" "upre%e Court in Cris&old v.
Connecticut,
137
&here /ustice -illia% #. ouglas &rote:
-e deal &ith a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than
our school syste%. ;arriage is a co%ing together for better or for &orse, hopefully enduring, and
inti%ate to the degree of being sacred. !t is an association that pro%otes a &ay of life, not causes< a
har%ony in living, not political faiths< a bilateral loyalty, not co%%ercial or social pro*ects. Eet it is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
!ronically, Cris&old invalidated a Connecticut statute &hich %ade the use of contraceptives a
cri%inal offense on the ground of its a%ounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy
of %arried persons. Nevertheless, it recogni.ed the .one of privacy rightfully en*oyed by couples.
/ustice ouglas in Cris&orld &rote that 'specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penu%bras,
for%ed by e%anations fro% those guarantees that help give the% life and substance. Aarious
guarantees create .ones of privacy.'
13=
At any rate, in case of conflict bet&een the couple, the courts &ill decide.
)he $a%ily and Parental Consent
E0ually deplorable is the debar%ent of parental consent in cases &here the %inor, &ho &ill be
undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a %iscarriage. "ection > of the R8 la&
provides:
"EC. >. Access to $a%ily Planning. P x x x.
No person shall be denied infor%ation and access to fa%ily planning services, &hether natural or
artificial: Provided, )hat %inors &ill not be allo&ed access to %odern %ethods of fa%ily planning
&ithout &ritten consent fro% their parents or guardianIs except &hen the %inor is already a parent or
has had a %iscarriage.
)here can be no other interpretation of this provision except that &hen a %inor is already a parent or
has had a %iscarriage, the parents are excluded fro% the decision %a+ing process of the %inor &ith
regard to fa%ily planning. Even if she is not yet e%ancipated, the parental authority is already cut off
*ust because there is a need to ta%e population gro&th.
!t is precisely in such situations &hen a %inor parent needs the co%fort, care, advice, and guidance
of her o&n parents. )he "tate cannot replace her natural %other and father &hen it co%es to
providing her needs and co%fort. )o say that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-fa%ily.
!t does not pro%ote unity in the fa%ily. !t is an affront to the constitutional %andate to protect and
strengthen the fa%ily as an inviolable social institution.
;ore alar%ingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional %andate that 'the natural and pri%ary
right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the develop%ent of %oral
character shall receive the support of the Covern%ent.'
13>
!n this regard, Co%%issioner Bernas
&rote:
)he (@?> provision has added the ad*ective 'pri%ary' to %odify the right of parents. !t i%ports the
assertion that the right of parents is superior to that of the "tate.
13?
LE%phases suppliedH
)o insist on a rule that interferes &ith the right of parents to exercise parental control over their
%inor-child or the right of the spouses to %utually decide on %atters &hich very &ell affect the very
purpose of %arriage, that is, the establish%ent of con*ugal and fa%ily life, &ould result in the
violation of one,s privacy &ith respect to his fa%ily. !t &ould be dis%issive of the uni0ue and strongly-
held $ilipino tradition of %aintaining close fa%ily ties and violative of the recognition that the "tate
affords couples entering into the special contract of %arriage to as one unit in for%ing the foundation
of the fa%ily and society.
)he "tate cannot, &ithout a co%pelling state interest, ta+e over the role of parents in the care and
custody of a %inor child, &hether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a %iscarriage. #nly
a co%pelling state interest can *ustify a state substitution of their parental authority.
$irst Exception: Access to !nfor%ation
-hether &ith respect to the %inor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph
of "ection > or &ith respect to the consenting spouse under "ection 124a54154i5, a distinction %ust be
%ade. )here %ust be a differentiation bet&een access to infor%ation about fa%ily planning services,
on one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and %odern fa%ily planning
%ethods the%selves, on the other. !nsofar as access to infor%ation is concerned, the Court finds no
constitutional ob*ection to the ac0uisition of infor%ation by the %inor referred to under the exception
in the second paragraph of "ection > that &ould enable her to ta+e proper care of her o&n body and
that of her unborn child. After all, "ection (1, Article !! of the Constitution %andates the "tate to
protect both the life of the %other as that of the unborn child. Considering that infor%ation to enable
a person to %a+e infor%ed decisions is essential in the protection and %aintenance of ones, health,
access to such infor%ation &ith respect to reproductive health %ust be allo&ed. !n this situation, the
fear that parents %ight be deprived of their parental control is unfounded because they are not
prohibited to exercise parental guidance and control over their %inor child and assist her in deciding
&hether to accept or re*ect the infor%ation received.
"econd Exception: 9ife )hreatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious ob*ector, an exception %ust be %ade in life-threatening cases
that re0uire the perfor%ance of e%ergency procedures. !n such cases, the life of the %inor &ho has
already suffered a %iscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at grave ris+ si%ply for lac+
of consent. !t should be e%phasi.ed that no person should be denied the appropriate %edical care
urgently needed to preserve the pri%ordial right, that is, the right to life.
!n this connection, the second sentence of "ection 124a54154ii5
13@
should be struc+ do&n. By effectively
li%iting the re0uire%ent of parental consent to 'only in elective surgical procedures,' it denies the
parents their right of parental authority in cases &here &hat is involved are 'non-surgical
procedures.' "ave for the t&o exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as
provided in the first sentence of "ection 124a54154ii5, the parents should not be deprived of their
constitutional right of parental authority. )o deny the% of this right &ould be an affront to the
constitutional %andate to protect and strengthen the fa%ily.
7 - Acade%ic $reedo%
!t is asserted that "ection (3 of the R8 9a&, in relation to "ection 13 thereof, %andating the teaching
of Age-and evelop%ent-Appropriate Reproductive 8ealth Education under threat of fine andIor
i%prison%ent violates the principle of acade%ic freedo% . According to the petitioners, these
provisions effectively force educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even if
they believe that the sa%e is not suitable to be taught to their students.
176
Citing various studies
conducted in the Fnited "tates and statistical data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that
the prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-&edloc+ births< divorce and
brea+do&n of fa%ilies< the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia< the 'fe%ini.ation of poverty'< the
aging of society< and pro%otion of pro%iscuity a%ong the youth.
17(
At this point, suffice it to state that any attac+ on the validity of "ection (3 of the R8 9a& is
pre%ature because the epart%ent of Education, Culture and "ports has yet to for%ulate a
curriculu% on age-appropriate reproductive health education. #ne can only speculate on the
content, %anner and %ediu% of instruction that &ill be used to educate the adolescents and &hether
they &ill contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. )hus,
considering the pre%ature nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its
constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, "ection (1, Article !! of the (@?> Constitution provides that the natural and pri%ary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and develop%ent of %oral
character shall receive the support of the Covern%ent. 9i+e the (@>2 Constitution and the (@27
Constitution, the (@?> Constitution affir%s the "tate recognition of the invaluable role of parents in
preparing the youth to beco%e productive %e%bers of society. Notably, it places %ore i%portance
on the role of parents in the develop%ent of their children by recogni.ing that said role shall be
'pri%ary,' that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the "tate.
171
!t is also the inherent right of the "tate to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the %oral
develop%ent of the youth. !ndeed, the Constitution %a+es %ention of the i%portance of developing
the youth and their i%portant role in nation building.
172
Considering that "ection (3 provides not only
for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but also for values for%ation< the
develop%ent of +no&ledge and s+ills in self-protection against discri%ination< sexual abuse and
violence against &o%en and children and other for%s of gender based violence and teen pregnancy<
physical, social and e%otional changes in adolescents< &o%en,s rights and children,s rights<
responsible teenage behavior< gender and develop%ent< and responsible parenthood, and that Rule
(6, "ection ((.6( of the R8-!RR and "ection 34t5 of the R8 9a& itself provides for the teaching of
responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and e%otional changes a%ong
adolescents - the Court finds that the legal %andate provided under the assailed provision
supple%ents, rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the %oral develop%ent of
their children.
$urther%ore, as "ection (3 also %andates that the %andatory reproductive health education
progra% shall be developed in con*unction &ith parent-teacher-co%%unity associations, school
officials and other interest groups, it could very &ell be said that it &ill be in line &ith the religious
beliefs of the petitioners. By i%posing such a condition, it beco%es apparent that the petitioners,
contention that "ection (3 violates Article BA, "ection 24(5 of the Constitution is &ithout %erit.
173
-hile the Court notes the possibility that educators %ight raise their ob*ection to their participation in
the reproductive health education progra% provided under "ection (3 of the R8 9a& on the ground
that the sa%e violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its *udg%ent should an actual case
be filed before it.
= - ue Process
)he petitioners contend that the R8 9a& suffers fro% vagueness and, thus violates the due process
clause of the Constitution. According to the%, "ection 12 4a54l5 %entions a 'private health service
provider' a%ong those &ho %ay be held punishable but does not define &ho is a 'private health
care service provider.' )hey argue that confusion further results since "ection > only %a+es
reference to a 'private health care institution.'
)he petitioners also point out that "ection > of the assailed legislation exe%pts hospitals operated by
religious groups fro% rendering reproductive health service and %odern fa%ily planning %ethods. !t
is unclear, ho&ever, if these institutions are also exe%pt fro% giving reproductive health infor%ation
under "ection 124a54l5, or fro% rendering reproductive health procedures under "ection 124a5415.
$inally, it is averred that the R8 9a& punishes the &ithholding, restricting and providing of incorrect
infor%ation, but at the sa%e ti%e fails to define 'incorrect infor%ation.'
)he argu%ents fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers fro% the defect of vagueness &hen it lac+s co%prehensible standards that
%en of co%%on intelligence %ust necessarily guess its %eaning and differ as to its application. !t is
repugnant to the Constitution in t&o respects: 4(5 it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid< and 415 it leaves la&
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and beco%es an arbitrary flexing of the
Covern%ent %uscle.
177
;oreover, in deter%ining &hether the &ords used in a statute are vague,
&ords %ust not only be ta+en in accordance &ith their plain %eaning alone, but also in relation to
other parts of the statute. !t is a rule that every part of the statute %ust be interpreted &ith reference
to the context, that is, every part of it %ust be construed together &ith the other parts and +ept
subservient to the general intent of the &hole enact%ent.
17=
As correctly noted by the #"C, in deter%ining the definition of 'private health care service provider,'
reference %ust be %ade to "ection 34n5 of the R8 9a& &hich defines a 'public health service
provider,' vi.:
4n5 Public health care service provider refers to: 4(5 public health care institution, &hich is duly
licensed and accredited and devoted pri%arily to the %aintenance and operation of facilities for
health pro%otion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treat%ent and care of individuals suffering fro%
illness, disease, in*ury, disability or defor%ity, or in need of obstetrical or other %edical and nursing
care< 415 public health care professional, &ho is a doctor of %edicine, a nurse or a %idvvife< 425
public health &or+er engaged in the delivery of health care services< or 435 barangay health &or+er
&ho has undergone training progra%s under any accredited govern%ent and NC# and &ho
voluntarily renders pri%arily health care services in the co%%unity after having been accredited to
function as such by the local health board in accordance &ith the guidelines pro%ulgated by the
epart%ent of 8ealth 4#85 .
$urther, the use of the ter% 'private health care institution' in "ection > of the la&, instead of 'private
health care service provider,' should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they
are used synony%ously.
)he Court need not belabor the issue of &hether the right to be exe%pt fro% being obligated to
render reproductive health service and %ode% fa%ily planning %ethods, includes exe%ption fro%
being obligated to give reproductive health infor%ation and to render reproductive health
procedures. Clearly, sub*ect to the 0ualifications and exe%ptions earlier discussed, the right to be
exe%pt fro% being obligated to render reproductive health service and %ode% fa%ily planning
%ethods, necessarily includes exe%ption fro% being obligated to give reproductive health
infor%ation and to render reproductive health procedures. )he ter%s 'service' and '%ethods' are
broad enough to include the providing of infor%ation and the rendering of %edical procedures.
)he sa%e can be said &ith respect to the contention that the R8 9a& punishes health care service
providers &ho intentionally &ithhold, restrict and provide incorrect infor%ation regarding reproductive
health progra%s and services. $or ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby 0uoted as
follo&s:
"EC. 12. Prohibited Acts. - )he follo&ing acts are prohibited:
4a5 Any health care service provider, &hether public or private, &ho shall:
4(5 Dno&ingly &ithhold infor%ation or restrict the disse%ination thereof, andI or intentionally provide
incorrect infor%ation regarding progra%s and services on reproductive health including the right to
infor%ed choice and access to a full range of legal, %edically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective
fa%ily planning %ethods<
$ro% its plain %eaning, the &ord 'incorrect' here denotes failing to agree &ith a copy or %odel or
&ith established rules< inaccurate, faulty< failing to agree &ith the re0uire%ents of duty, %orality or
propriety< and failing to coincide &ith the truth.
17>
#n the other hand, the &ord '+no&ingly' %eans
&ith a&areness or deliberateness that is intentional.
17?
Fsed together in relation to "ection 124a54l5,
they connote a sense of %alice and ill %otive to %islead or %isrepresent the public as to the nature
and effect of progra%s and services on reproductive health. Public health and safety de%and that
health care service providers give their honest and correct %edical infor%ation in accordance &ith
&hat is acceptable in %edical practice. -hile health care service providers are not barred fro%
expressing their o&n personal opinions regarding the progra%s and services on reproductive health,
their right %ust be te%pered &ith the need to provide public health and safety. )he public deserves
no less.
>-Egual Protection
)he petitioners also clai% that the R8 9a& violates the e0ual protection clause under the
Constitution as it discri%inates against the poor because it %a+es the% the pri%ary target of the
govern%ent progra% that pro%otes contraceptive use . )hey argue that, rather than pro%oting
reproductive health a%ong the poor, the R8 9a& introduces contraceptives that &ould effectively
reduce the nu%ber of the poor. )heir bases are the various provisions in the R8 9a& dealing &ith
the poor, especially those %entioned in the guiding principles
17@
and definition of ter%s
1=6
of the la&.
)hey add that the exclusion of private educational institutions fro% the %andatory reproductive
health education progra% i%posed by the R8 9a& renders it unconstitutional.
!n Biraogo v. Philippine )ruth Co%%ission,
1=(
the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept
of e0ual protection. )hus:
#ne of the basic principles on &hich this govern%ent &as founded is that of the e0uality of right
&hich is e%bodied in "ection (, Article !!! of the (@?> Constitution. )he e0ual protection of the la&s
is e%braced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discri%ination offends the re0uire%ents
of *ustice and fair play. !t has been e%bodied in a separate clause, ho&ever, to provide for a %ore
specific guaranty against any for% of undue favoritis% or hostility fro% the govern%ent. Arbitrariness
in general %ay be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act
assailed parta+es of an un&arranted partiality or pre*udice, the sharper &eapon to cut it do&n is the
e0ual protection clause.
'According to a long line of decisions, e0ual protection si%ply re0uires that all persons or things
si%ilarly situated should be treated ali+e, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities i%posed.' !t
're0uires public bodies and inst itutions to treat si%ilarly situated individuals in a si%ilar %anner.'
')he purpose of the e0ual protection clause is to secure every person &ithin a state,s *urisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discri%ination, &hether occasioned by the express ter%s of a statue
or by its i%proper execution through the state,s duly constituted authorities.' '!n other &ords, the
concept of e0ual *ustice under the la& re0uires the state to govern i%partially, and it %ay not dra&
distinctions bet&een individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legiti%ate govern%ental
ob*ective.'
)he e0ual protection clause is ai%ed at all official state actions, not *ust those of the legislature. !ts
inhibitions cover all the depart%ents of the govern%ent including the political and executive
depart%ents, and extend to all actions of a state denying e0ual protection of the la&s, through
&hatever agency or &hatever guise is ta+en.
!t, ho&ever, does not re0uire the universal application of the la&s to all persons or things &ithout
distinction. -hat it si%ply re0uires is e0uality a%ong e0uals as deter%ined according to a valid
classification. !ndeed, the e0ual protection clause per%its classification. "uch classification,
ho&ever, to be valid %ust pass the test of reasonableness. )he test has four re0uisites: 4(5 )he
classification rests on substantial distinctions< 415 !t is ger%ane to the purpose of the la&< 425 !t is not
li%ited to existing conditions only< and 435 !t applies e0ually to all %e%bers of the sa%e class.
'"uperficial differences do not %a+e for a valid classification.'
$or a classification to %eet the re0uire%ents of constitutionality, it %ust include or e%brace all
persons &ho naturally belong to the class. ')he classification &ill be regarded as invalid if all the
%e%bers of the class are not si%ilarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations i%posed. !t
is not necessary that the classification be %ade &ith absolute sy%%etry, in the sense that the
%e%bers of the class should possess the sa%e characteristics in e0ual degree. "ubstantial
si%ilarity &ill suffice< and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be
treated e0ually. )he %ere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs fro% the other %e%bers,
as long as that class is substantially distinguishable fro% all others, does not *ustify the non-
application of the la& to hi%.'
)he classification %ust not be based on existing circu%stances only, or so constituted as to preclude
addition to the nu%ber included in the class. !t %ust be of such a nature as to e%brace all those &ho
%ay thereafter be in si%ilar circu%stances and conditions. !t %ust not leave out or 'underinclude'
those that should other&ise fall into a certain classification. LE%phases supplied< citations excludedH
)o provide that the poor are to be given priority in the govern%ent,s reproductive health care
progra% is not a violation of the e0ual protection clause. !n fact, it is pursuant to "ection ((, Article
B!!! of the Constitution &hich recogni.es the distinct necessity to address the needs of the
underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health develop%ent of the
people. )hus:
"ection ((. )he "tate shall adopt an integrated and co%prehensive approach to health develop%ent
&hich shall endeavor to %a+e essential goods, health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost. )here shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sic+, elderly,
disabled, &o%en, and children. )he "tate shall endeavor to provide free %edical care to paupers.
!t should be noted that "ection > of the R8 9a& prioriti.es poor and %arginali.ed couples &ho are
suffering fro% fertility issues and desire to have children. )here is, therefore, no %erit to the
contention that the R8 9a& only see+s to target the poor to reduce their nu%ber. -hile the R8 9a&
ad%its the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As "ection 24(5
explains, the 'pro%otion andIor stabili.ation of the population gro&th rate is incidental to the
advance%ent of reproductive health.'
;oreover, the R8 9a& does not prescribe the nu%ber of children a couple %ay have and does not
i%pose conditions upon couples &ho intend to have children. -hile the petitioners sur%ise that the
assailed la& see+s to charge couples &ith the duty to have children only if they &ould raise the% in a
truly hu%ane &ay, a deeper loo+ into its provisions sho&s that &hat the la& see+s to do is to si%ply
provide priority to the poor in the i%ple%entation of govern%ent progra%s to pro%ote basic
reproductive health care.
-ith respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions fro% the %andatory reproductive
health education progra% under "ection (3, suffice it to state that the %ere fact that the children of
those &ho are less fortunate attend public educational institutions does not a%ount to substantial
distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision. #n the other hand, substantial distinction rests
bet&een public educational institutions and private educational institutions, particularly because
there is a need to recogni.e the acade%ic freedo% of private educational institutions especially &ith
respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity to&ards the teaching of reproductive
health education.
?-!nvoluntary "ervitude
)he petitioners also aver that the R8 9a& is constitutionally infir% as it violates the constitutional
prohibition against involuntary servitude. )hey posit that "ection (> of the assailed legislation
re0uiring private and non-govern%ent health care service providers to render forty-eight 43?5 hours
of pro bono reproductive health services, actually a%ounts to involuntary servitude because it
re0uires %edical practitioners to perfor% acts against their &ill.
1=1
)he #"C counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in "ection (> can hardly be
considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have
the discretion as to the %anner and ti%e of giving pro bono services. ;oreover, the #"C points out
that the i%position is &ithin the po&ers of the govern%ent, the accreditation of %edical practitioners
&ith Phil8ealth being a privilege and not a right.
)he point of the #"C is &ell-ta+en.
!t should first be %entioned that the practice of %edicine is undeniably i%bued &ith public interest
that it is both a po&er and a duty of the "tate to control and regulate it in order to protect and
pro%ote the public &elfare. 9i+e the legal profession, the practice of %edicine is not a right but a
privileged burdened &ith conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this
po&er includes the po&er of Congress
1=2
to prescribe the 0ualifications for the practice of professions
or trades &hich affect the public &elfare, the public health, the public %orals, and the public safety<
and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revo+ing such right
altogether.
1=3
;oreover, as so%e petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of
force, threats, inti%idation or other si%ilar %eans of coercion and co%pulsion.
1=7
A reading of the
assailed provision, ho&ever, reveals that it only encourages private and nongovern%ent
reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. #ther than non-accreditation
&ith Phil8ealth, no penalty is i%posed should they choose to do other&ise. Private and non-
govern%ent reproductive healthcare service providers also en*oy the liberty to choose &hich +ind of
health service they &ish to provide, &hen, &here and ho& to provide it or &hether to provide it all.
Clearly, therefore, no co%pulsion, force or threat is %ade upon the% to render pro bono service
against their &ill. -hile the rendering of such service &as %ade a prere0uisite to accreditation &ith
Phil8ealth, the Court does not consider the sa%e to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a
necessary incentive i%posed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legiti%ate state interest.
Consistent &ith &hat the Court had earlier discussed, ho&ever, it should be e%phasi.ed that
conscientious ob*ectors are exe%pt fro% this provision as long as their religious beliefs and
convictions do not allo& the% to render reproductive health service, pro bona or other&ise.
@-elegation of Authority to the $A
)he petitioners li+e&ise 0uestion the delegation by Congress to the $A of the po&er to deter%ine
&hether or not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential rugs 9ist 4E95.
1==
)he Court finds nothing &rong &ith the delegation. )he $A does not only have the po&er but also
the co%petency to evaluate, register and cover health services and %ethods. !t is the only
govern%ent entity e%po&ered to render such services and highly proficient to do so. !t should be
understood that health services and %ethods fall under the ga%ut of ter%s that are associated &ith
&hat is ordinarily understood as 'health products.'
!n this connection, "ection 3 of R.A. No. 2 >16, as a%ended by R.A. No. @>(( reads:
"EC. 3. )o carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the $ood
and rug Ad%inistration 4$A5 in the epart%ent of 8ealth 4#85. "aid Ad%inistration shall be
under the #ffice of the "ecretary and shall have the follo&ing functions, po&ers and duties:
'4a5 )o ad%inister the effective i%ple%entation of this Act and of the rules and regulations
issued pursuant to the sa%e<
'4b5 )o assu%e pri%ary *urisdiction in the collection of sa%ples of health products<
'4c5 )o analy.e and inspect health products in connection &ith the i%ple%entation of this Act<
'4d5 )o establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products
standards, and to reco%%end standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, 0uality and fill of
container<
'4e5 )o issue certificates of co%pliance &ith technical re0uire%ents to serve as basis for the
issuance of appropriate authori.ation and spot-chec+ for co%pliance &ith regulations
regarding operation of %anufacturers, i%porters, exporters, distributors, &holesalers, drug
outlets, and other establish%ents and facilities of health products, as deter%ined by the
$A<
'x x x
'4h5 )o conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of
appropriate authori.ations to ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and 0uality<
'4i5 )o re0uire all %anufacturers, traders, distributors, i%porters, exporters, &holesalers,
retailers, consu%ers, and non-consu%er users of health products to report to the $A any
incident that reasonably indicates that said product has caused or contributed to the death,
serious illness or serious in*ury to a consu%er, a patient, or any person<
'4*5 )o issue cease and desist orders %otu propio or upon verified co%plaint for health
products, &hether or not registered &ith the $A Provided, )hat for registered health
products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty 4265 days and %ay be extended for
sixty 4 =65 days only after due process has been observed<
'4+5 After due process, to order the ban, recall, andIor &ithdra&al of any health product found
to have caused death, serious illness or serious in*ury to a consu%er or patient, or is found
to be i%%inently in*urious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to re0uire all
concerned to i%ple%ent the ris+ %anage%ent plan &hich is a re0uire%ent for the issuance
of the appropriate authori.ation<
x x x.
As can be gleaned fro% the above, the functions, po&ers and duties of the $A are specific to
enable the agency to carry out the %andates of the la&. Being the country,s pre%iere and sole
agency that ensures the safety of food and %edicines available to the public, the $A &as e0uipped
&ith the necessary po&ers and functions to %a+e it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary
i%plication, the %andate by Congress to the $A to ensure public health and safety by per%itting
only food and %edicines that are safe includes 'service' and '%ethods.' $ro% the declared policy of
the R8 9a&, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those %edicines that are
proven %edically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance &ith scientific and
evidence-based %edical research standards. )he philosophy behind the per%itted delegation &as
explained in Echagaray v. "ecretary of /ustice,
1=>
as follo&s:
)he reason is the increasing co%plexity of the tas+ of the govern%ent and the gro&ing inability of
the legislature to cope directly &ith the %any proble%s de%anding its attention. )he gro&th of
society has ra%ified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated proble%s that the legislature
cannot be expected reasonably to co%prehend. "peciali.ation even in legislation has beco%e
necessary. )o %any of the proble%s attendant upon present day underta+ings, the legislature %ay
not have the co%petence, let alone the interest and the ti%e, to provide the re0uired direct and
efficacious, not to say specific solutions.
(6- Autono%y of 9ocal Covern%ents and the Autono%ous Region
of ;usli% ;indanao 4AR;;5
As for the autono%y of local govern%ents, the petitioners clai% that the R8 9a& infringes upon the
po&ers devolved to local govern%ent units 49CFs5 under "ection (> of the 9ocal Covern%ent Code.
"aid "ection (> vested upon the 9CFs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic
services and facilities, as follo&s:
"EC)!#N (>. Basic "ervices and $acilities. P
4a5 9ocal govern%ent units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the
po&ers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon the%. )hey shall also
discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to
the% pursuant to this Code. 9ocal govern%ent units shall li+e&ise exercise such other
po&ers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary,
appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and
facilities enu%erated herein.
4b5 "uch basic services and facilities include, but are not li%ited to, x x x.
-hile the afore%entioned provision charges the 9CFs to ta+e on the functions and
responsibilities that have already been devolved upon the% fro% the national agencies on
the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective *urisdictions,
paragraph 4c5 of the sa%e provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving
nationally-funded pro*ects, facilities, progra%s and services.
1=?
)hus:
4c5 Not&ithstanding the provisions of subsection 4b5 hereof, public &or+s and infrastructure
pro*ects and other facilities, progra%s and services funded by the National Covern%ent
under the annual Ceneral Appropriations Act, other special la&s, pertinent executive orders,
and those &holly or partially funded fro% foreign sources, are not covered under this
"ection, except in those cases &here the local govern%ent unit concerned is duly
designated as the i%ple%enting agency for such pro*ects, facilities, progra%s and services.
LE%phases suppliedH
)he essence of this express reservation of po&er by the national govern%ent is that, unless an 9CF
is particularly designated as the i%ple%enting agency, it has no po&er over a progra% for &hich
funding has been provided by the national govern%ent under the annual general appropriations act,
even if the progra% involves the delivery of basic services &ithin the *urisdiction of the 9CF.
1=@
A
co%plete relin0uish%ent of central govern%ent po&ers on the %atter of providing basic facilities and
services cannot be i%plied as the 9ocal Covern%ent Code itself &eighs against it.
1>6
!n this case, a reading of the R8 9a& clearly sho&s that &hether it pertains to the establish%ent of
health care facilities,
1>(
the hiring of s+illed health professionals,
1>1
or the training of barangay health
&or+ers,
1>2
it &ill be the national govern%ent that &ill provide for the funding of its i%ple%entation.
9ocal autono%y is not absolute. )he national govern%ent still has the say &hen it co%es to national
priority progra%s &hich the local govern%ent is called upon to i%ple%ent li+e the R8 9a&.
;oreover, fro% the use of the &ord 'endeavor,' the 9C Fs are %erely encouraged to provide these
services. )here is nothing in the &ording of the la& &hich can be construed as %a+ing the
availability of these services %andatory for the 9CFs. $or said reason, it cannot be said that the R8
9a& a%ounts to an undue encroach%ent by the national govern%ent upon the autono%y en*oyed by
the local govern%ents.
)he AR;;
)he fact that the R8 9a& does not intrude in the autono%y of local govern%ents can be e0ually
applied to the AR;;. )he R8 9a& does not infringe upon its autono%y. ;oreover, Article !!!,
"ections =, (6 and (( of R.A. No. @673, or the organic act of the AR;;, alluded to by petitioner
)illah to *ustify the exe%ption of the operation of the R8 9a& in the autono%ous region, refer to the
policy state%ents for the guidance of the regional govern%ent. )hese provisions relied upon by the
petitioners si%ply delineate the po&ers that %ay be exercised by the regional govern%ent, &hich
can, in no %anner, be characteri.ed as an abdication by the "tate of its po&er to enact legislation
that &ould benefit the general &elfare. After all, despite the veritable autono%y granted the AR;;,
the Constitution and the supporting *urisprudence, as they no& stand, re*ect the notion of i%periu%
et i%perio in the relationship bet&een the national and the regional govern%ents.
1>3
Except for the
express and i%plied li%itations i%posed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to
exercise its inherent and plenary po&er to legislate on all sub*ects &hich extends to all %atters of
general concern or co%%on interest.
1>7
(( - Natural 9a&
-ith respect to the argu%ent that the R8 9a& violates natural la&,
1>=
suffice it to say that the Court
does not duly recogni.e it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a la&. #ur only guidepost is
the Constitution. -hile every la& enacted by %an e%anated fro% &hat is perceived as natural la&,
the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in confor%ity to it. )o
begin &ith, it is not enacted by an acceptable legiti%ate body. ;oreover, natural la&s are %ere
thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. )he
*urists of the philosophical school are interested in the la& as an abstraction, rather than in the actual
la& of the past or present.
1>>
Fnless, a natural right has been transfor%ed into a &ritten la&, it cannot
serve as a basis to stri+e do&n a la&. !n Republic v. "andiganbayan,
1>?
the very case cited by the
petitioners, it &as explained that the Court is not duty-bound to exa%ine every la& or action and
&hether it confor%s &ith both the Constitution and natural la&. Rather, natural la& is to be used
sparingly only in the %ost peculiar of circu%stances involving rights inherent to %an &here no la& is
applicable.
1>@
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the R8 9a& does not sanction the ta+ing a&ay of life. !t does not
allo& abortion in any shape or for%. !t only see+s to enhance the population control progra% of the
govern%ent by providing infor%ation and %a+ing non-abortifacient contraceptives %ore readily
available to the public, especially to the poor.
$acts and $allacies
and the -isdo% of the 9a&
!n general, the Court does not find the R8 9a& as unconstitutional insofar as it see+s to provide
access to %edically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and 0uality reproductive
healthcare services, %ethods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, ho&ever, the religious
freedo% of so%e sectors of society cannot be tra%pled upon in pursuit of &hat the la& hopes to
achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedo% is a recognition that %an stands
accountable to an authority higher than the "tate.
!n confor%ity &ith the principle of separation of Church and "tate, one religious group cannot be
allo&ed to i%pose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine %ode% society leaves enough
roo% for diversity and pluralis%. As such, everyone should be tolerant and open-%inded so that
peace and har%ony %ay continue to reign as &e exist alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the R8 9a& %ay be, the idea does not escape the Court that &hat it
see+s to address is the proble% of rising poverty and une%ploy%ent in the country. 9et it be said
that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large population but the une0ual distribution of
&ealth. Even if population gro&th is controlled, poverty &ill re%ain as long as the country,s &ealth
re%ains in the hands of the very fe&.
At any rate, population control %ay not be beneficial for the country in the long run. )he European
and Asian countries, &hich e%bar+ed on such a progra% generations ago , are no& burdened &ith
ageing populations. )he nu%ber of their young &or+ers is d&indling &ith adverse effects on their
econo%y. )hese young &or+ers represent a significant hu%an capital &hich could have helped the%
invigorate, innovate and fuel their econo%y. )hese countries are no& trying to reverse their
progra%s, but they are still struggling. $or one, "ingapore, even &ith incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the econo%y is being propped up by re%ittances fro% our #verseas $ilipino
-or+ers. )his is because &e have an a%ple supply of young able-bodied &or+ers. -hat &ould
happen if the country &ould be &eighed do&n by an ageing population and the fe&er younger
generation &ould not be able to support the%N )his &ould be the situation &hen our total fertility rate
&ould go do&n belo& the replace%ent level of t&o 415 children per &o%an.
1?6
!ndeed, at the present, the country has a population proble%, but the "tate should not use coercive
%easures 4li+e the penal provisions of the R8 9a& against conscientious ob*ectors5 to solve it.
Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the &isdo% of a la&.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond &hat the legislature has laid do&n. !ts duty is to say &hat the
la& is as enacted by the la&%a+ing body. )hat is not the sa%e as saying &hat the la& should be or
&hat is the correct rule in a given set of circu%stances. !t is not the province of the *udiciary to loo+
into the &isdo% of the la& nor to 0uestion the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the
business of this )ribunal to re%edy every un*ust situation that %ay arise fro% the application of a
particular la&. !t is for the legislature to enact re%edial legislation if that &ould be necessary in the
pre%ises. But as al&ays, &ith apt *udicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court %ust carry out the
delicate function of interpreting the la&, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and
%indful of settled *urisprudence. )he Court,s function is therefore li%ited, and accordingly, %ust
confine itself to the *udicial tas+ of saying &hat the la& is, as enacted by the la&%a+ing body.
1?(
Be that as it %ay, it bears reiterating that the R8 9a& is a %ere co%pilation and enhance%ent of the
prior existing contraceptive and reproductive health la&s, but &ith coercive %easures. Even if the
Court decrees the R8 9a& as entirely unconstitutional, there &ill still be the Population Act 4R.A. No.
=2=75, the Contraceptive Act 4R.A. No. 3>1@5 and the reproductive health for &o%en or )he ;agna
Carta of -o%en 4R.A. No. @>(65, sans the coercive provisions of the assailed legislation. All the
sa%e, the principle of 'no-abortion' and 'non-coercion' in the adoption of any fa%ily planning
%ethod should be %aintained.
-8ERE$#RE, the petitions are PAR)!A99E CRAN)E. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No.
(6273 as N#) FNC#N")!)F)!#NA9 except &ith respect to the follo&ing provisions &hich are
declared FNC#N")!)F)!#NA9:
(5 "ection > and the corresponding provision in the R8-!RR insofar as they: a5 re0uire
private health facilities and non-%aternity specialty hospitals and hospitals o&ned and
operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an e%ergency or life-threatening case,
as defined under Republic Act No. ?233, to another health facility &hich is conveniently
accessible< and b5 allo& %inor-parents or %inors &ho have suffered a %iscarriage access to
%ode% %ethods of fa%ily planning &ithout &ritten consent fro% their parents or guardianIs<
15 "ection 124a54l5 and the corresponding provision in the R8-!RR, particularly "ection 7 .13
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider &ho fails and or refuses to
disse%inate infor%ation regarding progra%s and services on reproductive health regardless
of his or her religious beliefs.
25 "ection 124a54154i5 and the corresponding provision in the R8-!RR insofar as they allo& a
%arried individual, not in an e%ergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic
Act No. ?233, to undergo reproductive health procedures &ithout the consent of the spouse<
35 "ection 124a54154ii5 and the corresponding provision in the R8-!RR insofar as they li%it the
re0uire%ent of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
75 "ection 124a5425 and the corresponding provision in the R8-!RR, particularly "ection 7.13
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider &ho fails andIor refuses to
refer a patient not in an e%ergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act
No. ?233, to another health care service provider &ithin the sa%e facility or one &hich is
conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs<
=5 "ection 124b5 and the corresponding provision in the R8-!RR, particularly "ection 7 .13
thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer &ho refuses to support reproductive health
progra%s or shall do any act that hinders the full i%ple%entation of a reproductive health
progra%, regardless of his or her religious beliefs<
>5 "ection (> and the corresponding prov(s(6n in the R8-!RR regarding the rendering of pro
bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious ob*ector in
securing Phil8ealth accreditation< and
?5 "ection 2.6l4a5 and "ection 2.6( C5 of the R8-!RR, &hich added the 0ualifier 'pri%arily' in
defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and
void for contravening "ection 34a5 of the R8 9a& and violating "ection (1, Article !! of the
Constitution.
)he "tatus Kuo Ante #rder issued by the Court on ;arch (@, 16(2 as extended by its #rder, dated
/uly (=, 16(2 , is hereby 9!$)E, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. (6273 &hich have been
herein declared as constitutional.
"# #RERE.

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