20130250

The "Republic'"s Third Wave and the Paradox of Political Philosophy
Author(s): Jacob Howland

Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Mar., 1998), pp. 633-657
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THE REPUBLICS THIRD WAVE AND THE PARADOX OF
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
JACOB HOWLAND
"Unless,"
I
said,
"the
philosophers
rule as
kings
or those now
called
kings
and chiefs
genuinely
and
adequately philosophize,
and
political
power
and
philosophy
coincide in the same
place,
while the
many
na
tures now
making
their
way
to either
apart
from the other are
by
neces
sity excluded,
there is no rest from ills for the
cities, my
dear
Glaucon,
nor I think for human
kind,
nor will the
regime
we have now
described
in
speech
ever come forth from
nature,
insofar as
possible,
and see the
light
of the sun. This is what for so
long
was
causing
my
hesitation to
speak, seeing
how
very paradoxical
it would be to
say."1
!5o
GOES what Socrates DESCRIBES as the
"biggest
and most difficult"
of the three waves of
paradox
set forth in book 5 of the
Republic
(472a4).
While he does not
pause
to
justify
the latter
description
when
he introduces the third
wave,
there can be little doubt that this wave is
indeed both
very big
or
important
and
very
difficult. As for its diffi
culty,
Socrates mentions no less than four times his
hesitancy
to state
that
philosophers
must rule or rulers
philosophize (472a, 473e, 499a-b,
503b). Moreover,
a more
subtle, yet perhaps
no less
telling
indication
of the
importance
of the third wave is
provided by
the fact that it
breaks at the exact center of the text as measured
by Stephanus
pages?a
fact that commentators on the
Republic
seem
hardly
even to
have noticed.2
Correspondence
to:
Department
of
Philosophy
and
Religion,
The Uni
versity
of
Tulsa,
600 South
College Avenue, Tulsa,
OK
74104;
e-mail:
jahow
land@aol.com
1
Plato, Republic
473cll-e4. Most
quotations
from the
Republic
in this
essay
are drawn from Allan Bloom's The
Republic of
Plato
(New
York: Basic
Books, 1968);
otherwise I offer
my
own translation of the Greek text of John
Burnet,
Platonis
Opera,
vol. 4
(1902; reprint,
Oxford: Oxford
University
Press, 1982).
2
Some calculation is involved in
determining
the
length
of the
Republic,
because the
numbering
of the
Stephanus pages
is not continuous.
Thus,
book 1 runs from
327a-354c;
book
2, 357a-383c;
book
3, 386a-417b;
book
4,
419a-445e;
book
5, 449a-480a;
book
6, 484a-511e;
book
7, 514a-541b;
book
8,
543a-569c;
book
9, 571a-592b;
book
10,
595a-621d. If we
assign
to each of
The Review
of Metaphysics
51
(March 1998):
633-657.
Copyright
? 1998
by
The Review
of
Metaphysics
634 JACOB HOWLAND
There are several reasons to believe that the
centrality
of the
third
wave
may prove
to be a
philosophically important
detail.
First,
the
general
structure of the
Republic
seems to
place special emphasis
on its central books. One
scholar,
Eva
Brann, begins
her
interpreta
tion of the
Republic
with the observation that this
dialogue
"is com
posed
on the
plan
of concentric
rings."3
There are furthermore other
dialogues
in which Plato has
evidently
calculated the center of the
text
quite precisely,
and has done so with the intention of
indirectly
underscoring
the fundamental
importance
of a
philosophical concep
tion, argument,
or issue. The most
striking example
of Plato's use of
this
literary
device is to be found in the
Statesman,
in which the
Eleatic
Stranger
introduces the notion of measurement in accordance
with the nonarithmetical mean?a notion that is crucial to his account
of
statesmanship?at
the
arithmetically-determined midpoint
of the
dialogue.4
So
too,
Plato seems to call
special
attention to the
signifi
cance of the Eleatic
Stranger's philosophical "parricide"
of his teacher
Parmenides
by placing
that dramatic event at the
midpoint
of the
Sophist.5
While each of the
passages
cited above
requires
careful con
the five subdivisions of the
Stephanus page
that are
designated by
the letters
a, b, c, d,
and e the value of 0.2
pages,
book 1 is calculated to be 27.6
Stephanus pages
in
length;
book
2, 26.6;
book
3, 31.4;
book
4, 27;
book
5, 31.2;
book
6, 28;
book
7, 27.4;
book
8, 26.6;
book
9, 21.4;
book
10, 26.6;
and the total
length
of the
Republic
is 273.8
Stephanus pages. By
this method of
reckoning,
the
midpoint
of the
dialogue
occurs 136.9
pages
from the
beginning,
or at
473b. The third wave
breaks,
so to
speak,
at 473c-e. The
centrality
of the
third wave is almost
universally
overlooked in the
secondary
literature on the
Republic.
It is noted in
passing
in Leon
Craig,
The War Lover: A
Study of
Plato's
Republic (Toronto: University
of Toronto
Press, 1994),
11.
3
According
to
Brann,
the center of the
Republic?books
5
through 7,
in
which Plato sets forth "the actual
founding
of a
city
in
'deed,' ergon"?coin
cides with the
dialogue's
core
accomplishment:
the education of Glaucon
through
Socrates'
philosophical
"music." Eva T. H.
Brann,
"The Music of the
Republic"
St. John's Review 39.1 and 2
(1989-90),
1-103: 7-8.
My
claim that
thematic elements in the
Republic
are
arranged
in
opposition
around the
third wave
(see below) supports
Brann's
insight
that the
Republic
reflects the
"ring"
or
"geometric" composition
that functions as a structural
principle
in
Homer. Cf. Cedric H.
Whitman,
Homer and the Heroic Tradition
(1958;
re
print,
New York: W. W. Norton and
Co., 1965).
4
The
midpoint
of the Statesman is 284b. The
Stranger's
distinction be
tween arithmetical and nonarithmetical measurement is set forth at 283c
285c. At
284b,
the
Stranger explains
that the
arts, including
the
political art,
could not exist in the absence of nonarithmetical measurement.
5
The
midpoint
of the
Sophist
is
242b,
and the
Stranger
introduces the is
sue of
parricide
at 24Id.
THE REPUBLIC'S THIRD WAVE 635
sideration in its own
right,6
these
examples perhaps
suffice to show
that the
placement
of the third wave at the exact center of the
Repub
lic is
unlikely
to be incidental to our
understanding
of its
significance
within the
dialogue
as a whole.
The center of a text is an
appropriate place
to hide that which is
especially questionable
as well as to
emphasize
that which is
espe
cially important;
in certain cases where the author does not wish to be
understood
by every reader,
these intentions
may overlap.
In
writing
on
Plato,
Leo Strauss took
pains
to
identify
the central item in a list as
well as the
subjects
treated at the center of a section or
book.7 Some
times,
he
suggested,
the center is to be understood as a
place
of honor
suited to that which is most
important;
on other
occasions,
what is at
the center is
questionable
in a
way
that casts doubt
upon
that which
stands at the
periphery.8
Both of these
uses,
we
may note,
are con
firmed
by
ancient authors.9
Both, moreover,
coincide in certain
texts,
especially
where the author has reason to write
esoterically.
A nota
ble
example
of this coincidence is to be found in Alfarabi's
Summary
of
Plato's
Laws, where,
Strauss
observes,
at the
"very
center" of the
Summary
and at the
beginning
of the fifth
chapter (which
is
"literally
the central
chapter")
Alfarabi "does
exactly
the same
thing
he did at
the end of the fourth
chapter:
he
drops
Plato's
repeated
and
unambig
uous reference to the
gods."10
For those with
eyes
to
see,
Strauss
sug
gests,
the center of the
Summary
contains Alfarabi's
implicit critique
6
For a
discussion of the connection between the central
passages
of the
trilogy Sophist, Statesman,
and
Theaetetus,
see Jacob
Howland,
The Para
dox
of
Political
Philosophy:
Socrates'
Philosophic
Trial
(Lanham,
Md.: Row
man and Littlefield
Publishers, 1998).
7
See for instance Strauss's The
Argument
and the Action
of
Plato's
Laws
(1975; reprint, Chicago:
The
University
of
Chicago Press, 1983), 66, 69,
148,164-5, 175,
182.
8
For an
example
of the latter see
Strauss, Argument
and
Action,
175.
Examples
of the former are
provided by
the other
passages
cited in the
previ
ous
note;
see also Strauss's remark about Adeimantus in "On Plato's
Repub
lic,"
in The
City
and Man
(1964; reprint, Chicago: University
of
Chicago
Press, 1978),
64.
9
In his
Life of
Cicero
2.2-3,
Plutarch notes that Cicero's
being
in the
middle
among
his friends was a mark of honor. In De Oratore
2.77.313-14,
Cicero observes that a
good speech begins
and ends with its
strongest points
and hides its weakest
points
in the middle.
10
While Alfarabi maintains that "what has to be cared for in the first
place
is the
soul,"
Strauss notes that "Farabi does not
reproduce
Plato's state
ment that one
ought
to honor one's soul 'next after the
gods' (726a6-727a2)."
"How Farabi Read Plato's
Laws,"
in What is Political
Philosophy?
And Other
Studies
(1959; reprint, Chicago: University
of
Chicago Press, 1988),
148.
636 JACOB HOWLAND
of the central
religious
doctrine of God?a
critique
that this
early
Is
lamic
philosopher certainly
had reason to
present
with the utmost
caution.11
The
present essay
regards
the textual
centrality
of the third wave
of
paradox
as an essential clue to the
meaning
and structure of the Re
public.
The
centrality
of the third wave
suggests
that the
relationship
between
philosophy
and
politics
constitutes the foremost theme of
the
Republic
as a whole. The
placement
of the third wave is further
more a
key
to the
organization
of the
dialogue.
As we shall
see,
the
paradoxical
character of the
relationship
between
philosophy
and
politics
can be
grasped
most
directly through
an
examination of cer
tain fundamental
oppositions
that are
systematically arranged
around
the third wave as the
primary
thematic and dramatic focal
point
of the
Republic. Finally,
I shall
argue
that the
Republic
is also in some re
spects
an esoteric document that
appropriately attempts
to conceal
certain dimensions of Plato's
political teaching
from
nonphilosophical
readers.
Plato scholars have followed two main lines of
interpretation
in
approaching
the third wave. The
majority
of commentators take the
text more or less at face value.
They
understand the coincidence of
philosophy
and
politics
as the
indispensable requirement
for
bringing
into
being
the
regime
that Socrates has been
describing
since the mid
dle of book
2,
and
they
believe that Plato viewed this
regime
as a
model of the
genuinely
virtuous
city. Opinions
differ within this ma
jority viewpoint
as to whether Plato saw this model as a
blueprint
for
political
action or as an ideal that actual cities could at best
only
roughly approximate.12
A
second, very
different line of
interpretation
was
championed thirty years ago by
Strauss and his student Allan
Bloom.13 Strauss and Bloom assert that the discussion of the
just city
in
general,
and of the third wave in
particular,
must be understood
within the context of Socrates'
relationship
to his
interlocutors, espe
cially
Glaucon.
They argue
that Socrates was concerned to cure Glau
con of his
political
ambition and to turn him toward a life of
philoso
phy.14
Read in this
way, they claim,
the
city
in
speech
illuminates in
complex
and subtle
ways
both the ineliminable tension between
phi
losophy
and
politics
and the
necessary
limits of the
political
commu
11
Strauss's
interpretation
of Alfarabi's
Summary
should be read in con
nection with the
general
remarks on the
extraordinary significance
that a
"central
passage"
may
assume in esoteric
writing
offered in "Persecution and
the Art of
Writing,"
in Persecution and the Art
of Writing (1952; reprint,
Chi
cago: University
of
Chicago Press, 1988), 22-37;
see
especially pp.
24-5.
nity
with
respect
to the cultivation of virtue in human
beings.
Far
from
advancing
a
Utopian vision,
the
Republic
in fact sets forth a
pro
found
critique
of
political
idealism.15
In
important respects,
the
interpretation developed
below lends
more
support
to the
readings
of Strauss and Bloom than to the
major
ity
view. I maintain that the third
wave fails to
present
even an
"ideal,"
impractical political solution,
for Socrates raises serious doubts about
the virtue of the
great majority
of the citizens of the
city
in
speech.
In
particular,
reflection
upon
the
oppositions arranged
around the third
wave
brings
to
light
the
implication
that even in the
"just" city,
the
Auxiliaries, precisely
because
they
are not
genuinely philosophical,
may
be bound to the
regime by
vice more than
by
virtue.
Rightly
12
In A
History of
Greek
Philosophy,
vol. 4
(Cambridge: Cambridge
Uni
versity Press, 1975),
W. K. C. Guthrie canvasses the
range
of views on the
question
of "whether this
[Plato's]
state,
granted
its virtues
if
it
existed,
could
ever become a
reality" (483).
Karl
Popper famously
asserted that the
Repub
lic "was meant
by
its author not so much as a theoretical
treatise,
but as a
topical political manifesto";
The
Open Society
and its
Enemies,
2 vols.
(1943,
Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1966),
1:153.
According
to
Nickolas
Pappas,
the
Republic,
a
"systematic utopia," presents "uncompro
mising
recommendations for
political change";
Plato and the
Republic (New
York:
Routledge, 1995), 14,
15. In
Philosopher-Kings:
The
Argument of
Plato's
Republic (Princeton:
Princeton
C. D. C. Reeve
asserts that Plato
attempted
to show that the
Kallipolis,
"the
good
or maxi
mally happy political community"
that is ruled
by philosopher-kings,
is "a real
possibility,"
from which it follows that the
just city
Socrates
lays
out
prior
to
the third wave is "a real
possibility
as well"
(170-1).
Julia Annas
argues
that
Plato wished
only
to make the case that his
"political
ideal"?the
just city,
the
society
of
good people?is
at least "not
impossible
in
principle";
An Intro
duction to Plato's
Republic (Oxford:
Oxford
University Press, 1981), 185;
em
phasis
in
original.
13
Strauss,
"On Plato's
Republic";
Allan
Bloom, "Interpretive Essay,"
in
Bloom, Republic of Plato,
307-436. Dale Hall defends the
majority
view
against
the
readings
of Strauss and Bloom in "The
Republic
and the Limits of
Politics,"
Political
Theory
5.3
(1977):
293-313. The main lines of Bloom's
reading
of the
Republic
axe
summarized,
and in certain
respects extended,
in
"Aristophanes
and Socrates: A
Response
to
Hall,"
now
reprinted
in
Bloom,
Giants and
Dwarfs: Essays
1960-1990
(New
York: Simon and
Schuster,
1990),
162-76.
14
Strauss,
"On Plato's
Republic" 65; Bloom, "Response
to
Hall,"
167-8.
Bloom asserts that
by
the end of the
Republic
"Glaucon has moved from the
desire to be a ruler to the desire to be a
ruler-philosopher
to the desire to be a
philosopher.
The conceit of
philosopher-kings
was the crucial
stage
in his
conversion"; "Response
to
Hall,"
168.
15
"Socrates constructs his
utopia
to
point up
the
dangers
of what we
would call
utopianism;
as such it is the
greatest critique
of
political
idealism
ever
written"; Bloom, "Interpretive Essay,"
410.
638 JACOB HOWLAND
understood,
the core of the
Republic suggests
that a
virtuous commu
nity
of
nonphilosophical
individuals is an
impossibility.
This is a
sug
gestion
that a
politically responsible
author would have
good
reason
to conceal from
many
readers. The third wave thus calls attention to
the
relationship
between
philosophy
and
politics
as the fundamental
and
enduring problem
for all who care
Socratically
for the souls of hu
man
beings.
Strauss and Bloom are also
right
to insist that the third wave
must be understood within the context of Socrates'
relationship
to his
young interlocutors;
the
Republic is, among
other
things,
a
pedagogi
cal drama. Yet there is an
important
sense in which
my
reading
tries
to find the
neglected
middle
ground
between the two main lines of in
terpretation
set forth above. For the
arrangements pertaining
to non
philosophical
souls in the
city
in
speech
must be
distinguished
from
those
pertaining
to
potential philosophers. Moreover,
I shall
argue
that the
city
in
speech,
at least in the final form that it achieves
by
the
end of book
7,
would be
superior
to
any
actual
regime
with
respect
to
the care and
development
of the souls of
potential philosophers.
To
this
extent,
Socrates'
proposals
are a
serious?albeit
admittedly
unre
alistic?reflection of his wishes. The
proposed
education of the
phi
losophers
in the
city
in
speech
is one of the more
poignant
facets of
the
problem
of the
relationship
between
philosophy
and
politics.
I
Just
prior
to
introducing
the third
wave,
Socrates states that
deeds fall short
of,
and can at best
only approximate,
the truth con
tained in
speeches (473a-b).
The
paradox
of the third
wave, however,
does not first arise in the course of
attempting
to actualize the
city
in
speech;
it is rather one that subsists on the level of
speech
or
concep
tualization itself. Socrates thus stresses that it is
very paradoxical
simply
to
say
that
philosophy
and
political power
must coincide
(473e4).
What could this mean? A
preliminary
answer to this
ques
tion is furnished
by
the observation that Socrates
misleadingly pre
sents the rule of
philosophers
as
simply
an
indispensable
condition
for the
genesis
of the
regime
that he and his
companions
have
already
described. This is
misleading
because the rule of
philosophy
will ulti
mately
not be
something
external to the nature of the
regime:
the
city
itself will
inevitably
be transformed
by
the
requirement
that its rulers
be
philosophers.
Most
obviously,
the
regime
must now
be structured
so as to
guarantee,
insofar as this is
possible,
a reliable
supply
of
philosophic
rulers
(see 520a). Perhaps
the first
paradox
associated
with the third wave is that the essential condition for the
possibility
of
the
city
in
speech
entails a
transformation of the
very
nature of the
city
itself.
This
thought may
be
fruitfully extended,
for it seems inevitable
that
philosophy
will also be transformed when it comes to be
yoked
with
political power.
If this is
correct,
our
path
into the
paradox
at the
heart of the
Republic
is well-marked: we must ask both what
politics
and
philosophy
are in themselves and what
they
come to be when
brought
into connection with each other in the
way
that Socrates de
scribes. I
speak
of
politics
rather than the
city
in
speech
because So
crates
presents
the third wave as the condition for the cure of
political
ills in
general
as well as the condition for the realization of the
city
in
speech
in
particular.
This
formulation, however, presents
an
obvious
problem:
the
Republic
addresses neither
politics
as such nor
philoso
phy
as
such,
for the treatment of each is from the first conditioned
by
the
requirements
of the other. Just as the
philosopher
is introduced in
the
guise
of a ruler and in
response
to the needs of the
city,
the
just
city
is introduced in
response
to the
philosophical question
of the
power
of
justice
in the soul
(368b-369a).
The conversation that un
folds in the
Republic precisely
reverses the order of nature: the
city
comes into
being
for the sake of
speech,
while the
philosopher
comes
into
being
for the sake of the deed of
ruling.
A few words must be said about the
interpretative challenge pre
sented
by
this situation. Note first that
interpretation
is unavoidable.
In the
city
in
speech
the
political things
assume an
exaggerated purity
or
perfection (see 473a-b),
and in Socrates'
depiction
of the lover of
wisdom in books 6 and 7 we see the
philosopher through
the filter of
the
city's deepest longing. Fortunately
there are two sorts of clues
that will assist us in
correcting
or
compensating
for the
resulting
dis
tortions of
philosophy
and
politics.
Some clues are
internal to the ar
gument.
These include Socrates'
frequent
references to
compulsion,
politically necessary lies,
and the like. Others are
provided by
the con
trast between the level of drama and the level of
argument.
These two
sorts of clues will
help
us to see
politics
and
philosophy
as
they
are. In
particular, they
will
help
to show that Socrates' claims about the
jus
tice of the
city
are no less
exaggerated
than his claims about the excel
640 JACOB HOWLAND
lence of the
philosophers
as rulers?a
political
excellence that is
pre
sented as a function of theoretical wisdom.
The
Republic
in fact
puts
before
us three distinct versions of the
just regime.
In
introducing
the third
wave,
Socrates mentions the re
gime
"that
we have now described in
speech" (473e2).
Socrates is
clearly referring
neither to the first
just city (or City
of
Pigs)
nor to the
Feverish
City (372e-374a),
but rather to the
regime
that results from
the
purification
of the latter. This
regime?let
us call it the Second
Just
City?includes
the first two waves of book
5,
which do not intro
duce new measures but
merely amplify
ones that were
accepted
much
earlier in the discussion
(423e-424a).
Because the Second Just
City
is
the
city prior
to the rule of
philosopher-kings,
it is in the
description
of this
city
that we will find the abstract or
purified
reflection of
poli
tics in itself or
apart
from
philosophy.
The third
wave, moreover,
sig
nals the introduction of
philosophy
as an
explicit subject
of discus
sion,
so that it is in the stretch of text between the third wave and the
end of book 7 that we will find the
politicized
reflection of
philosophy
in itself.
Further,
it is in this same central stretch of text that Socrates
confronts the
problem
of
making philosophers
into
kings,
or of con
vincing
the
city
to
accept
the rule of the
philosopher
and
convincing
the
philosopher
to rule the
city.
The third
just city
that results from
the
paradoxical marriage
of
philosophy
and
politics
is the
Kallipolis,
the "Noble and Beautiful
City"
that Socrates
explicitly
associates with
Glaucon.16
The third wave is the
logical
and rhetorical fulcrum of the
Repub
lic as a whole. As
we shall
see,
Socrates'
proposition
that
philoso
phers
must rule or rulers
philosophize
entails the reconciliation of a
range
of
humanly
fundamental
oppositions, including
those between
spiritedness
and erotic
love, public
welfare and
private affection,
technical
knowledge
and nontechnical
inspiration,
the
political pro
duction of civic order and the
philosophical discovery
of truth. These
opposed
elements are
arranged
as
counterweights
around the third
wave, upon
which balances the whole burden of the
argument.
The
common thread
running through
all of these
oppositions
is the matter
of
er?s,
which is treated in
radically
different
ways
before and after
the third
wave. The difficulties involved in
attempting
a reconcilia
tion of these
oppositions
are furthermore of interest not
only
with re
16
At
527cl-2,
Socrates
speaks
of "the
men in
your [Glaucon's] kallipo
lis."
spect
to the
city
in
speech, but,
more
importantly,
with
respect
to Ufe
in actual human communities. For the fact is
that, strange
bedfellows
as
they are, philosophy
and the
city
nonetheless stand in need of one
another. The fundamental
challenges
and tasks of
political philoso
phy
are thus writ
large
in the
Republic.
II
Socrates'
hesitancy
in
introducing
the third wave
may initially
surprise
the reader. For his insistence that the
city's
rulers be
philoso
phers
looks at first
merely
like the restatement of a
point
that he has
already
introduced and will
develop
further in the
sequel, namely,
that
the
city
must be
governed by knowledgeable
individuals whose under
standing
of the
regime
will be no
less
adequate
than that of its
founders
(428e-429a, 497c-d).
Viewed in this
light,
what is new in this
restatement is
simply
the use of the word
"philosopher"
to
designate
the
possessor
of the
requisite political knowledge.
Socrates'
hesitancy
would then seem to be rooted
solely
in an
apprehension
that his com
panions
will misunderstand him: his
response
to Glaucon's immediate
prediction
that
"very many men,
and not
ordinary
ones" will attack
him is that
they
will have to make
plain
"whom we mean when we
dare to assert that the
philosophers
must rule"
(473e7-474al,
474b5
6). Subsequent developments
confirm the
prudence
of this course of
action,
for Socrates must later
argue against
Adeimantus's association
of
philosophy
with individuals who are either vicious
or,
at
best,
use
less
(see
487b-d and
498c-499b).
The
problem presented by
Adeimantus's accusation is not
insig
nificant. Nor is the fact that this accusation comes from the mouth of
Adeimantus,
as this tells us
something
about the difference between
him and his more erotic and
potentially philosophical
brother. The
preceding interpretation
nevertheless does not do
justice
to the radi
cal
novelty
of Socrates'
suggestion.
For Socrates introduces the third
wave without
having
clarified either the
goal
of
philosophic striving
or
the internal motivation of the
philosopher.
Not
knowing yet
what
phi
losophy is,
we are nonetheless told that
philosophers
should rule.
Two
questions
will
help
to
bring
home the absence of
philosophy
from Socrates'
prior
account of the
just regime. First,
do the Guard
ians in the Second Just
City possess
a
genuinely philosophical
charac
ter?
Second,
how does the
political knowledge possessed by
these
642 JACOB HOWLAND
Guardians
compare
with the wisdom at which
philosophy
aims? With
regard
to the first
question,
Socrates insists
early
on
that those who
are
going
to combine
gentleness
with
spiritedness
after the model of
good guard dogs
must be
philosophical by
nature
(376a-c).
In this
context
philosophy
is associated with
gentleness
and
distinguished
from
spiritedness
or thumos. The same distinction is at work when
Socrates later
speaks
of two coordinated elements within the souls of
potential Guardians,
one
spirited
and one
philosophical,
which must
be "harmonized"
by
music and
gymnastics (410c-412b).
In
describing
the distinctive
qualifications
of those fit to be
rulers, however,
So
crates
says nothing
about
philosophy.
He states instead that the
Guardians will be
distinguished
from the Auxiliaries
by being
older
and more skillful in
guarding,
and
by
their unusual steadfastness in
preserving
the conviction
(dogma)
that one must do what is best for
the
city (412c-e;
see also
413c, 414b).
This
dogged
steadfastness in
retaining
the
impress
of civic
orthodoxy
is
nothing
other than the vir
tue of
political courage,
which Socrates identifies in book 4 as the
power always
to hold fast to orth?
doxa,
or
"right opinion,"
much as
good,
white wool that has been well
dyed keeps
its color under even
the most adverse conditions
(429d-430c). Courage, however,
is the
virtue
proper
to
thumos,
not to intellect
(see 375a-b). Moreover,
while one is
courageous
in the defense of that which one
loves,
So
crates makes it clear that the Guardians' care for the
regime
is to be
rooted not in
philosophia
or the love of wisdom but in their love
of,
or
philia for,
the
city (412c-d).
In book
4,
Socrates discovers wisdom in the
"good
counsel" and
"craft of
guarding [h?phulakik?]"
of the
Guardians,
which involves
knowledge
of how the
city
as a whole is to be cared for
(428b-d).
In
what does this
knowledge
consist? We
may approach
this
question by
way
of the tasks that the Guardians are to undertake in the Second
Just
City.
These include the conduct of
war,
regulating
the
population
and the
economy,
sorting
children into the
appropriate classes,
and
overseeing
the
breeding
and education of citizens
(415b, 421e-422a,
423b-d, 459c-461e).
The latter tasks in
particular
will
require
the em
ployment
of medicinal
lies,
which in the best case will deceive even
the rulers themselves
(414b-c, 459c-d).17
These dimensions of the art
of
ruling, however,
amount neither
individually
nor
collectively
to
wisdom or
sophia.
To be
willing
to lie in the belief that it is best to do
so is of course not the same
thing
as to know the truth about what is
best. We
may
note in this connection that when Socrates tracks down
the virtue of
sophia
in book
4,
he rather
pointedly
confesses his
igno
rance about how it is that he was able to do so
(429a).
Nor is much
light
shed on the nature of wisdom when Socrates turns from the vir
tues of the
city
to the
parallel
virtues of the soul. The virtue of the rul
ing part
of the soul is said to be
logismos
or
calculation
(439d),
but
there is in this context
only
the faintest
anticipation
of that in the
light
of which correct calculation is
possible, namely,
one's
perception
of
goodness (438a).
The
Good,
we learn in book
6,
is the ultimate
object
of the soul's
deepest
desire as well as of
philosophical aspiration
(505d-511e). Apart
from an
inquiry
into the Good such as that under
taken later in the
dialogue,
Socrates' identification of calculation with
wisdom is
woefully incomplete.
To
summarize,
the Second Just
City
is
distinguished by
the rule of
courage
and
moderation,
or of
well-tempered thumos,
rather than wis
dom. In this it resembles both the character of its founders and that of
the most well-ordered actual
regimes.
We recall that Socrates is
moved to establish a
city
in
speech by
the
provisional praise
of
tyr
anny
set forth
by Glaucon,
who is
"always
most
courageous
in
every
thing" (357a2-3),
and
especially by
the moral
indignation
of Adeiman
tus at the
ubiquitous spectacle
of human
injustice (358b-367e).
The
vehemence of Adeimantus's attack on
those who
"vulgarly"
turn the
powers
of
justice
and
injustice "upside
down"
(367a7-8)
and the indul
gence
with which he excuses Glaucon's
praise
of
injustice suggests
that he thinks of himself as one of those
exceptional
individuals "who
from a divine nature cannot stand
doing injustice" (366c7),
and so as
someone who would be "so adamant
[adamantinos]
as to stick
by jus
tice" even if he
possessed Gyges' ring (360b5).
The same
pun appears
at the end of the
Republic,
when Socrates states that one must
"cling
adamantly"
to the
opinion
that the choice between
justice
and
injus
tice is the most
important
one "in life and death"
(618e3-619al).
That
the
city
in
speech
has its roots in offended thumos is underscored also
by
Socrates' reference in this context to the
courage
that Glaucon and
Adeimantus
displayed
at the battle in
Megara (368a).
Socrates' intro
duction of the
city
in
speech
is furthermore itself an act of
courage:
al
though
he believes that he is
incapable
of
presenting
an
adequate
17
Note that the models of the
gods according
to which the rulers are to
be educated cannot themselves be
distinguished
from noble
lies, because,
as
Socrates
admits,
"we do not know where the truth about ancient
things
lies"
(382dl-2;
see also
378a).
644 JACOB HOWLAND
defense of
justice,
he nonetheless maintains that "when
justice
is be
ing spoken badly
of" it would be
impious
to
"give
up
and not
bring
help
while I am still
breathing
and able to utter a
sound"
(368b8-c2).18
There is another feature of the Second Just
City
that must be ob
served,
and that is its technical
approach
to civic education. This is
something
that the
city
in
speech
has in common with all actual cities.
Like
every existing political community,
the Second Just
City
wants
its citizens cut to measure: it seeks to fashion human
beings
who will
understand themselves not in terms of their
particular individuality
but in terms of the
homogeneity
of
citizenship.
The
city
therefore en
visions civic education
or
paideia
on the model of the
productive
arts.19
According
to
Socrates,
citizens are to be formed
by
a
process
that involves
taming
human
beings
like
animals, stamping
and mold
ing
them like
putty, tuning
them like musical
instruments,
and
dying
them like wool with
salutary
beliefs
(375b-e, 377a-b, 410d-e,
429c
430b). Although
the Second Just
City
carries its control over the edu
cation and
comportment
of citizens to an extreme that has never been
seen in actual
political communities,
it is
perhaps
not coincidental
that the actual
regime
most like it in these
respects
was that of
Sparta,
which was also
distinguished by
the rule of thumos moderated
by
shame.20
The artful
molding
of citizens in the Second Just
City
and the
measures
pertaining
to women and children that are introduced in
book 5 have a common
aim, namely,
the achievement of civic order.
18
Strauss observes that
"anger
is no mean
part
of the
city [in speech]";
"as far as
possible, patriotism,
dedication to the common
good, justice,
must
take the
place
of
er?s,
and
patriotism
has a closer
kinship
to
spiritedness,
ea
gerness
to
fight, 'waspishness,' indignation,
and
anger
than to
er?s";
"On
Plato's
Republic," 78,
111. As Strauss notes in the same
essay,
the
City
of
Pigs "complies
to some extent with Adeimantas' character.
. . .
[b]ut
it is
wholly unacceptable
to his
brother";
95. Cf.
Stanley
Rosen's careful distinc
tion between Glaucon's
spirited
and erotic nature and Adeimantus's more
austere nature in "The Role of Eros in Plato's
Republic,"
Review
of
Meta
physics
18
(1965): 452-75;
see
esp.
463-6.
19
Cf. the Eleatic
Stranger's employment
of the art of
weaving
as a model
for the
political
techn?
(Statesman 279a-283a, 305e-311c).
One should also
consider in this connection the
Euthyphro,
in which Socrates
compares
the
Athenian model of
paideia
to the cultivation of
plants.
I
explore
this
impor
tant
analogy
in ch. 4 of The Paradox
of
Political
Philosophy.
20
An excellent overview of the
Spartan regime
is
provided by
Paul A.
Rahe, Republics
Ancient and Modern: Classical
Republicanism
and the
American Revolution
(Chapel
Hill: The
University
of North Carolina
Press,
1992),
136-62.
We recall that in the first
city
in
speech,
civic order was a
consequence
of the innate moderation of the citizens?individuals who seem inhu
man in that
they
lack thumos and are moved
by
er?s
only
on the most
rudimentary
level of sexual
appetite.
Thus
they
neither eat meat nor
hunt animals
(see
372a-c with
373c), they
have no
political
offices and
no
army,
there are no
competitions among them,
and
they
are free in
every respect
from
pleonexia,
the desire
always
"to have more"
(ple
onektein)
of which
Thrasymachus speaks (344al).
It is Glaucon's re
jection
of this
"City
of
Pigs"
that introduces the
recognizably
human
community
of the Feverish
City
and so
ultimately
necessitates the al
teration of human nature for the sake of civic order. The Second Just
City represents
an extreme
attempt
on the
part
of a Feverish
City
to
return to the
humanly impossible
order of the
City
of
Pigs by
means of
the moderation of
spiritedness
and the
suppression
of
potentially
un
just
desires in the souls of its citizens.
Moreover,
because
every
actual
city engages
to some lesser
degree
in
precisely
this
attempt,
the failure
of the Second Just
City
to fashion
truly
virtuous citizens
exposes
the
necessary
limits of
nonphilosophical politics.
While Socrates never
explicitly
admits that the Second Just
City
fails in this
respect,
he
provides
us with
enough
evidence to rule out
any
other inference.
According
to
Socrates,
the rulers must
guard
above all one
"great"
or at least "sufficient"
thing (423el-2)?namely,
the education and
rearing
of the Auxiliaries and
potential
Guardians.
Yet in a
slightly
earlier
passage
he admits that one cannot
confidently
affirm
(diischurizesthai)
the
adequacy
of this civic education with re
spect
to the
prevention
of
iryustice (416b8-9).
It is not hard to see
why
he does so. In the first
place,
Socrates finds it
necessary
to
sup
plement
the education with a
great
lie that will
help
to make the citi
zens "care more for the
city
and for one another"
(415d3-4).
Even
with the addition of the Noble
Lie, however,
Socrates worries that the
Auxiliaries
may
come to treat their fellow citizens like
savage masters,
much as
sheep-dogs
may
turn
upon
the flock "due to
licentiousness,
hunger,
or some other bad habit"
(416a4-5).
He therefore finds it nec
essary
to remove the
temptations
that
might
"rouse them
up
to do
harm to the other citizens"
(416dl).
In
particular,
the Auxiliaries will
not be allowed to
possess private
houses and storerooms or
private
property beyond
what is
strictly necessary,
and
they
will be told that it
is not lawful or
holy
for them to
pollute
the
gold
and silver in their
souls
by coming
into contact with material
gold
or silver
(416d-417a).
646 JACOB HOWLAND
The latter measures leave no
place
to hide
private gains.
In
guar
anteeing
that the Auxiliaries are
always
in the
public eye,
these mea
sures
combine shame before one's
peers
with fear and reverence be
fore the
gods
in order to insure that the desire for riches does not take
root in the soul. Notice that this assumes that the threat of
unjust ag
gression
can be neutralized
by preventing
the
growth
of the
longing
for wealth and
luxury,
or at least
by providing
for its immediate dis
covery
and
punishment.
But what about the other desires that
may
lead to
injustice, especially
those more
closely
connected with the
spiritedness
and erotic
longing
of
youthful warriors?qualities
that
are
concretely exemplified by
Glaucon
(see 402e, 474d-475a)?
It is
striking
that Socrates is silent about these matters. For it is the ambi
tion to rule and the love of honor and
victory
that are most
closely
as
sociated with
injustice
in Glaucon's
Myth
of
Gyges' Ring (see
360a-c
with
362b),
while er?s is connected with
psychic
disease and
tyranny
from the moment
Cephaius
endorses
Sophocles' description
of erotic
desire as a "frenzied and
savage
master"
(329c3-4).
In book
3,
So
crates
equates
erotic
passion
with such "misfortunes" as disease and
drunkenness;
the "mad"
pleasures
of sex must therefore be restricted
on account of their connection with
hybris
and licentiousness
(395e,
396d, 402d-403c).
And in book
9,
er?s is revealed as
nothing
less than
the inner
tyrant
that
explains
the
phenomenon
of the
tyrannical
man
(573b6-7, 574e2-575a7, 575c4-dl).
By failing
to mention the
potential
for
injustice
that arises from
er?s and from the
longing
for
power, victory,
and
honor,
Socrates
seems to
suggest
that the civic education
as
supplemented by
the No
ble Lie has succeeded in
moderating
these desires. That
any
such
sug
gestion
would be
misleading
is clear from the
beginning
of book
8,
in
which Socrates
explains
that the decline of the
city
in
speech
results
from the ultimate failure of the
regime
to control sexual
er?s,
or in
Glaucon's words to subordinate erotic
necessity
to
geometrical
neces
sity (458d).
This is not all. For the
shocking
truth is that the Second
Just
City attempts
to control the desires in
question
not so much
by
moderating
them as
by pandering
to them.
It is crucial to realize in this connection that in book 5?a book in
which Socrates
speaks
almost
exclusively
with Glaucon?Socrates
deliberately provides
for the vicarious satisfaction of his
companions'
desires for
bodily pleasure, power,
and honor. At the outset of book
5,
Socrates is detained
by
men
eager
to hear about matters
pertaining
to sex
(449a-450a).
This is not the first time in the
dialogue
that he
has been "arrested"
(see 327c-328b),
and since he
capitulated
on the
previous
occasion his
companions
are no
doubt confident that
they
will now also
prevail.
Under the
circumstances,
Socrates' resistance
to discuss matters
pertaining
to women and children seems
coy?as
though
he wished to tease his
young companions
rather than to dis
suade them. He then
proceeds
to inflame the
imagination
of his audi
tors
by
means of the
increasing
titillations of the first and second
waves of
paradox?measures stating
that the male and female
guard
ians must share all
pursuits
in common and
establishing
the common
possession
of women and children
(457b-d).
Thus the
pleasurable
prospect
of
joining
women in naked exercise
(452a-b) gives way
even
tually
to the
fantasy
of intercourse "as often as
possible"
with
multiple
partners
that is
given
as a reward to the best men
of the
city,
and
espe
cially
to those
among
the Auxiliaries who are
good
in war
(459d
460b).
So enthusiastic is Glaucon about these measures that he
lays
down the additional law that no
one,
whether male or
female,
should
be allowed to refuse the kiss of the valorous soldier
(468b-c). Keep
ing
in mind Socrates' earlier reference to the fact that both Glaucon
and Adeimantus were
eulogized by
Glaucon's lover for their
bravery
in
the battle of
Megara (368a),
we
may
conclude that these
young men,
and
probably
the others who are
present
as
well,
must
imagine
that
they
themselves would receive all of the rewards of valor in this
city?
including
not
only sex,
but also choice cuts of
meat, distinguished
fu
nerals,
and even
worship
as a daim?n or lesser
divinity
after death
(468c-469b).21
This list of rewards
is, moreover,
disturbingly
familiar:
in their
enjoyment
of food fit for heroes and honors and erotic liber
ties suited more to the traditional Greek
gods
than to human
beings,
the best men of the Second Just
City possess many
of the main advan
tages
that Glaucon had earlier associated with the
tyrannical
license
conferred
by Gyges' ring (360a-c).
The connection with erotic license
is further
strengthened by
the observation that even the
tyrannical
dream of incestuous intercourse finds fulfillment in this
city (461e;
see
also
571c-d). Finally,
we
may
note that the
suspension
of laws
against
assault in the Second Just
City goes
a
long way
toward the fulfillment
of still another
tyrannical desire,
in that it removes the
greatest
con
ventional
impediment
to the immediate satisfaction of violent
aggres
sion
(464e).
21
The reward of various honors in life and death was
previously
re
served for the Guardians alone
(414a).
648 JACOB HOWLAND
The
preceding
observations are sufficient to raise
grave
doubts
about the internal order of the souls of the Auxiliaries in the Second
Just
City.
Put
bluntly,
it is unclear whether the attachment of these in
dividuals to the
city
would be rooted in their
courage
and moderation
or in the selfishness of untutored desires. This
problem
cannot be dis
solved
by
the observation that the
Auxiliaries,
unlike the
tyrant
of
book
9,
act for the common
good,
for what is in
question
here is the
intrinsic condition of their souls.
Moreover,
Socrates
ultimately sug
gests
that civic education without
philosophy
is
capable
of
producing
only
the
superficial image
of virtue in the
soul,
not the
genuine
arti
cle.22
Shortly
after he calls into
question
the
quality
of the education
adumbrated in books 2 and
3,
Socrates makes a distinction between
the
political courage
that such an education
produces
and the sort of
courage
that would come to
light by way
of a
"still finer" treatment
(430c4).
The latter treatment would
presumably
involve the
longer
road that involves
inquiry
into the Good
(435d, 504b).
In book
6,
at
any rate,
Socrates
explains
that the
philosophic
ruler is a craftsman
not of virtue
per
se but of "the whole of demotic virtue"
(500d7-8)?
the common virtue characteristic of the
people
or demos. He
goes
on
to describe the
process
of
crafting
demotic virtue as one of
drawing
or
painting
certain virtuous
practices upon
the
dispositions
of human be
ings,
an
image
that
suggests
the results of this educational
process
are,
so to
speak,
no more than
skin-deep (501a-c).
This
implication
is
confirmed much later in the
Republic by
Er's
cautionary
tale about
the first
participant
in the
lottery
of
lives,
a
soul that
jumps
at the
chance to
possess
the
greatest tyranny.
At the critical moment the
soul in
question
is
swayed by
unchecked
folly
and
gluttony,
even
though
it had
previously
lived in an
"orderly regime"
and had
partici
pated
in virtue
"by habit, [and]
without
philosophy" (619c6-dl).
Yet it
is true of
every
citizen in the Second Just
City,
and of all but the rulers
of the
Kallipolis,
that if
they participate
in virtue
they
do so
by habit,
and without
philosophy.
Virtue
apart
from
philosophy, however,
would seem to be a weak and
paltry thing.
Before we leave behind the Second Just
City,
let us
briefly
con
sider the matter of Socrates'
pedagogical
rhetoric.
Especially given
22
Put in the terms introduced
by
David Sachs in "A
Fallacy
in Plato's Re
public" (in Gregory Vlastos, ed.,
Plato: A Collection
of
Critical
Essays,
vol.
2,
1971
[Notre
Dame:
University
of Notre Dame
Press, 1978], 35-56),
the Auxil
iaries are
vulgarly just
but
Platonically ur\just.
Cf.
Strauss,
"On Plato's Re
public":
"while in one
respect
the warrior's life is the
just
life
par excellence,
in another
respect only
the
philosopher's
life is
just" (115).
the limitations of the Second Just
City, why
does Socrates describe
the life of the Auxiliaries in book 5 in such
conventionally
seductive
terms?terms intended to arouse the erotic
imagination
of Glaucon
and his
young companions?
In
addressing
this
question
it is
important
to bear in mind that book 5 unfolds in a concrete context that makes
its own
peculiar pedagogical
demands
upon
Socrates. This
point
comes
sharply
into focus when we consider Socrates'
suggestion
at
the end of book 7 that the
Kallipolis
could be established
by beginning
with children under the
age
of ten
(540e-541a).
Needless to
say,
one
would not
speak
to these children as Socrates has
just spoken
to Glau
con;
one would not
attempt
to win their
allegiance
to the
regime by
emphasizing
sexual rewards for
bravery
and the like.
Conversely,
So
crates
speaks
as he does in book 5 because he wants to win Glaucon's
allegiance,
not to the Second Just
City
as
such,
but to the
logos
as a
whole. In
particular,
he wishes to
guarantee
that Glaucon will listen
with the keenest
possible
interest to what comes next. For what
comes next is a radical reorientation toward the
subject
of er?s?a re
orientation that creates
space
for the
expansion
of Glaucon's awaken
ing
desire into a
genuinely philosophical passion.
Ill
When Socrates introduces the third
wave,
he states that the coin
cidence of
philosophy
and
political
rule is
necessary
to
bring
into be
ing
the
just city
that he and his
companions
have
already
described.
He thus
implies
that the
city
in
speech
has been
perfected
and now
lacks
only
actual existence
(see 472d-e).
As we have
seen,
the Second
Just
City
is less than
perfect
to the extent that the souls of most of its
citizens
(with
the
exception
of the
Guardians)
are
likely
to remain in
ternally disordered,
in
spite
of the civic education and the other mea
sures to which
they
have been
subjected.
In other
words,
the Second
Just
City
is not
genuinely just;
the
genuinely just city
does not
yet
exist
even on the level of
speech.
The rule of
philosophy,
as we shall
see,
is
necessary
not
simply
or even
primarily
for the existence of the virtu
ous
regime
in
deed,
but more
importantly
for the
regime's (limited)
achievement of virtue in
speech.
The connection between
philosophy
and the
perfection
of the
city
in
speech
is not obvious from Socrates' defense of the third
wave,
be
cause that defense takes for
granted
the
goodness
of the
regime
and
focuses instead on the
problem
of its
possibility (see 471c-e).
650 JACOB HOWLAND
Socrates
points
out that the
regime
will need rulers who
possess
the
same
understanding
as that of its founders?the
primary founder,
of
course, being
Socrates himself?which is to
say
that the rulers will
have to
possess philosophical insight
into the
superiority
of this
city
over all others
(497c-d).
His main
argument, however,
is that
only
philosophers possess knowledge
of what virtue is in
itself; they
alone
will therefore be
competent
craftsmen of laws and
practices pertain
ing
to what is
noble, just, moderate,
and
good (484b-d, 500b-501c).
Such
knowledge, however, implies
an intellectual
apprehension
of the
nature of the Good itself
(504a-e, 540a-b),
and so is
equivalent
to wis
dom.
Perhaps
it is his
eagerness
to
provide
the
city
with the best
pos
sible rulers that causes Socrates thus to blur the distinction between
philosophia
and
sophia:
no one who is
wise,
as he
points
out in the
Symposium,
either
"longs
for wisdom
[philosophei]
or desires to be
come
wise,
for he is wise"
(204al-2).
No less
noteworthy
is Socrates'
apparent assumption
that the
regime
has indeed been
wisely
founded
up
to this
point.
For
although
he takes
pains
in book 7 to describe the
education of the
philosopher-kings,
he does not
modify
or
extend the
rearing
and education of the
nonphilosophical majority.
The mode of
education established
prior
to the third wave must
evidently
suffice
for the latter.
Especially
when viewed in the
light
of Socrates'
description
of
the
painting
of souls undertaken
by
the
philosophic
craftsman of de
motic
virtue,
the
preceding
considerations leads us to conclude that
the
great majority
of citizens in the
Kallipolis
will be no better or
worse than the citizens of the Second Just
City.
Socrates also makes
it
clear, however,
that the
philosophic
rulers of the
Kallipolis
will be
superior
to
everyone
in the Second Just
City
because
they
alone will
be
fully
virtuous.
Only
the
philosopher,
he
says,
"knows and lives
truly,"
for he alone has a "clear
pattern"
of the virtues "in his soul" and
thus "becomes
orderly
and
divine,
to the extent that is
possible
for a
human
being" (484c7-8, 490b6, 500c9-dl).
The
Kallipolis perfects
the
Second Just
City
because
only
the
Kallipolis
aims
explicitly
at
making
possible
the achievement of the fullest excellence of which the
very
best human
beings
are
capable. Paradoxically,
it is
only
in
thinking
about how the best conceivable
city
can be realized in deed that So
crates and his
companions
succeed in
bringing
this
city
to
perfection
in
speech.23
Socrates' introduction of the
topic
of
philosophy
in fact involves
a number of
paradoxes,
all of which
turn,
in one
way
or
another,
on
the matter of er?s. For the third wave
signals
a tidal
shift,
so to
speak,
in his treatment of this
subject.
Let us
begin
with the observa
tion that the
phenomenon
of erotic love has no
place
whatsoever in
Socrates' discussion of the lives of the
nonphilosophical many.
In
fact,
the laws established in book 5
attempt
to sever the
distinctively
human connection between sexual desire and to kalon or the beauti
ful,
which is to
say
that
they effectively
reduce er?s to an animal
appe
tite that exhausts itself in the achievement of its immediate
object.
This reduction is
necessary
because sex in the
city
in
speech
is subor
dinated to a
program
of
politically
useful
eugenics?a program
that
represents
a
logical,
albeit
extreme,
extension of the
city's attempt
to
fashion citizens after the model of the
productive
technai. Erotic at
traction to the beautiful is after all irrelevant to the
biological
event of
insemination,
and tends in
any
event to lead to the disease of
"irregu
lar intercourse"
(see
458d9 with the reference to
drugs
at
459c).
One
could
say
that the ladder of er?s that Diotima describes in the
Sympo
sium
(210a-212b)
is cut off at the first
rung
in the
Republic.
The love
of other bodies is
deprived
of the usual human
opportunities
to
grow
into the love of another
soul,
for in the
city
in
speech
the fulfillment of
physical
desire leads neither to
marriage
nor to the
intimacy
of the
family. Instead,
the citizens are to be bred like farm animals and
reared in
"pens"
into which mothers will be
brought
for
milking (459a
b, 460c-d). Further, just
as one
might
drown the runt of
a
litter,
mal
formed or
illegitimate babies, including
those born of
parents beyond
the
prime age
of
mating,
will be
destroyed (460c, 461b-c).24
So much for love
apart
from
philosophy. Immediately
after the
third wave is
introduced, however,
the theme of er?s
explodes
unex
pectedly
into the
dialogue:
Socrates
begins
to
clarify
the nature of the
philosopher by appealing
to the
way
in which
boys
who
glow
with the
23
This
may
be a
consequence
of the fact that Socrates'
companions
in
the
Republic
axe not
yet philosophers;
in such a
conversation,
Socrates
per
haps
could not
perfect
his
city
in
speech by any
other method.
24
Socrates, incidentally,
is
obviously
well aware that such measures bru
talize
er?s,
since he introduces to kalon as the
object
of erotic love
just
after
the third wave breaks
(476b).
We must conclude that he knows
just
how out
rageous
are his constant references to the
highly
sacred character of the
ephemeral "marriages"
in the
city
in
speech (458e, 459e-460a, 461a)?mar
riages
that will
inevitably
violate even the divine
prohibition against
incest
(461e).
This is
presumably why
he takes the
precaution
at the
beginning
of
book 5 of
prostrating
himself before
Adrasteia,
a
goddess
who
punishes
acts
of
hybris against
the
gods
and sacred
laws,
and
why
he later
explains
that he
"shrank from
touching
the law
concerning
the
possession
and
rearing
of chil
dren"
(451a, 453dl-3).
For further discussion see Jacob
Howland,
The Re
public:
The
Odyssey of Philosophy (New
York:
Twayne Publishers, 1993),
110-18.
652 JACOB HOWLAND
bloom of
youth
are able to arouse and
"put
their
sting
in" erotic lovers
like Glaucon
(474d5).
What is
more,
the borrowed
language
of
bodily
attraction
pervades
Socrates' entire discussion of the
philosophic
na
ture. Thus the main distinction between
philosophers
and
nonphilos
ophers
is at the outset
presented
as an erotic one: while others love
wine, food, honors,
beautiful
sights,
and arts and
practices
of all
sorts,
the
philosopher
alone is a lover of the whole of wisdom and
truth,
for
which he
cares,
Socrates
says,
as a lover
might
care for
everything
re
lated to his
boy (475a-476b, 485a-b).
So
strong
is his er?s for wisdom
that moral virtue
accompanies
it as a kind of
by-product:
a soul en
gaged
in "the
contemplation
of all time and all
being" (486a8-9)
would
not be
immoderate, illiberal, cowardly,
or
unjust.
While these vices
are connected with
bodily er?s,
Socrates
explains
that the
genuine
philosopher?the
soul that
possess
"a true erotic
passion
for true
phi
losophy" (499c 1-2)?longs
for intercourse with the
Ideas,
and for the
psychic
labor and birth of wisdom that follows from this union
(490a
b).
He even
goes
so far as to
represent philosophy
as a woman who
will bear bastard
children,
or
sophisms,
when she
joins
with
any
but
the most
worthy
natures
(495b-c, 496a;
see also
535c, 536a).
This
warning,
we
may note,
is the
philosophical
or
spiritual counterpart
to
the
prohibition against irregular bodily
intercourse in the
city.
What
exactly
is
going
on
here? To
begin with,
it would
appear
that the
topic
of erotic love can be
safely explored only
in the context
of the soul's
relationship
to the true and the beautiful. But if it is safe
to discuss er?s in connection with
philosophy,
it is also
necessary
that one do so. For
philosophy
cannot be
pressed upon
the soul. "No
forced
study,"
as Socrates
says
in book
7,
"abides in a soul"
(536e3-4),
and the alternative to extrinsic
pedagogical compulsion?the
alterna
tive,
in other
words,
to the
process
of
stamping, molding,
and
dyeing
that constitutes the bulk of the civic education laid out in books 2
through
5?is the internal motivation of er?s. Socrates touches
upon
the nature of this motivation in connection with the discussion of mu
sic in book
3,
which is also the
only place prior
to the third wave
where er?s is treated
as
something
other than
merely
a discrete
phys
ical
appetite.
In that
context,
Socrates makes it clear that the
proper
object
of love is
beauty:
thus that which is
kalliston,
most beautiful or
fine,
is also the most lovable
(erasmi?taton: 402d6). Music,
in
turn,
is
presented
as a
guide
for er?s:
by surrounding young
souls with im
ages
of
beauty,
music trains them "to love in a moderate and musical
way
what is
orderly
and kalon"
(403a7-8).25
Once it is
awakened,
however,
this love itself
guides
the soul. Socrates thus mentions the
fact that Glaucon once loved a
boy
with a
good
character but a defec
tive
body
in order
gently
to
suggest
to him that a musical soul will nat
urally
move
beyond
the mad love of bodies to the
orderly
love of noble
and beautiful souls
(402e-403c).
So
important
is er?s for the
develop
ment of
genuine
virtue that it is
literally
the last word on the
subject
of
music: for it is
fitting,
Socrates
says,
that musical matters end in
"erotic matters
pertaining
to the beautiful
[ta
tou kalon
er?tika]"
(403c6-7).
Someone
reading only
the discussion of music in book 3
might
in
correctly
conclude that well-directed er?s is the foundation of virtue
in the Second Just
City.
Socrates
suggests, however,
that the educa
tion in music will be
fully
successful in
only
a
very
few
cases,
because
anyone
whose soul is
truly
musical will become
a
Guardian. Con
versely, anyone
who fails the tests
by
which the Guardians are se
lected?anyone
who
forgets
to do what is best for the
city,
or can be
persuaded
to do
otherwise,
or can be forced
by grief
or
pain
or
charmed
by pleasure
or terrified
by
fear to do
otherwise?proves
thereby
not to be "a
good guardian
of himself and the music he was
learning" (413e3).
The
great majority,
in other
words,
need to be
guarded by others,
who will control them with
precisely
these instru
ments of external
compulsion?pleasure, pain, fear,
and
persuasive
deceptions.
If Socrates cuts off Diotima's ladder of er?s in the first
parts
of book 5 after
letting
us
glimpse
it in book
3,
it is
only
because
he understands that it cannot
support
the
weight
of the
many.
For the
many nonphilosophical
citizens who are the focus of
books 2
through 5,
education is a
highly public,
technical
process
founded not in er?s but in thumos.
However,
the situation after the
third wave is
quite
different. For the few
philosophical
rulers who are
the focus of books 6 and
7,
education is a much more
profound,
inte
rior,
and therefore
private process
that is
essentially
erotic
and,
with
respect
to its ultimate
goal, prophetic.
In book
7,
Socrates establishes
tests of character and intellect that
recapitulate
on a
higher
level the
tests of
courage
and moderation set forth in book 3.
Teachers,
he ex
plains,
should use
play
and not force in
training
and
observing
25
Socrates states that the musical man will feel
just
this sort of moder
ate and musical love for those who are beautiful in soul as well as
body,
and
it is
noteworthy
that Glaucon identifies himself as one who is
capable
of lov
ing
a
boy
who is
physically
defective but beautiful in soul
(402d-e).
654 JACOB HOWLAND
children in
"labors, studies,
and fears"
(537a9-10).
At each
stage,
So
crates
says,
"the
boy
who shows himself
always
readiest must be
chosen to
join
a select number"
(537al0-ll).
In this
way,
those suited
by
nature to rule will in effect select themselves when
they
are
placed
in situations that allow them to manifest the
requisite qualities,
in
cluding especially philosophical
er?s and an
aptitude
for studies
(see
535b-d). Philosophical er?s,
in
turn,
is connected with a
kind of
prophecy
or
foreknowledge
about the Good. Thus Socrates uses the
verb
manteuesthai,
"to
divine,"
to describe the soul's access to the
Good:
just
as the soul "divines that it
[the good
that it
pursues]
is
something,
but is unable to
get
a sufficient
grasp
of
just
what it
is,"
So
crates
"divine[s]
that no one will
adequately
know" the
just
and noble
things
before it is known in what
way they
are
good (505el-2,
506a6
7).
"You divine
beautifully,"
is Glaucon's
response
(506a8).
One is re
minded of
Aristophanes'
remark in the
Symposium
that the soul of
one in love "is not able to
say,
but divines and
speaks
oracles about
what it wants"
(192dl-2). Aristophanes' speech,
one should
recall,
is
followed
by
Socrates' account of his initiation at the hands of a
priest
ess into the
Mysteries
of
er?s,
a daim?n or
demigod
that
interprets
for human
beings
that which is divine
(202d-203a),
and there is a
par
allel here to Socrates' initiation of Glaucon into the
Mysteries
of the
Good.26
Would it be fair to
say
that in the
Kallipolis
the natures of
poten
tial
philosophers grow naturally
toward the Good? Not
quite.
For
books 6 and 7 are also
peppered
with references to
compulsion,
not
all of which have to do with
forcing philosophers
to assume the task
of
ruling.
Most
important,
Socrates makes it clear that
compulsion
is
needed to harmonize the elements of a
philosophical
nature. "For the
parts
of nature that we have described as a
necessary
condition for
them,"
he
explains,
"are
rarely willing
to
grow together
in the same
place" (503b7-9).
In
fact,
Socrates
explains by way
of
answering
Ade
imantus's
worry
about the link between
philosophy
and viciousness
that the best souls are
peculiarly corruptible,
for each of the
praise
worthy
elements of the best natures "has a
part
in
destroying
the soul
26
Cf.
509a9,
where Socrates reminds Glaucon to avoid
blasphemy
and
use words of
good
omen
(euph?mein)
as he
explicates
the
image
of the sun.
Since Socrates observes that the sun?Helios in Greek
mythology?is
a
god
(508a),
it is evident that the
Good,
as a
philosophical reinterpretation
of our
divine
origins,
is itself to be understood as divine. Socrates
engages
in
philo
sophical
divination or
prophecy
in book 7 as well
(see 523a8, 538a4, a7, a9),
and it is worth
noting
that at one
point
he calls Glaucon daimonic
(522b3).
that has them and
tearing
it
away
from
philosophy" (491b8-9).
What
is
more,
in actual cities the
very
excellence of such souls makes them
a
target
for
every
kind of
flattery (494b-495a). Carefully
exercised
compulsion
therefore
plays
a role at each
stage
of a
philosophical
edu
cation. Just as in the
Image
of the Cave the
prisoner
who is released
from bonds is
compelled
to look at the fire and must be
dragged
into
the
sunlight (515e),
the
potential philosopher
is forced to undertake
the
study
of calculation because calculation
"compels
the soul to use
the intellect on the truth itself"
(526b 1-3).
The same is true of kindred
studies such as
geometry
and
astronomy,
which
potential philoso
phers
will be commanded to
pursue
because
they compel
the soul to
turn toward what is
(526e, 529a). Compulsion
is
present
even at the fi
nal
stage
of
education,
for when
philosophical
souls reach the
age
of
fifty they
must be forced to
gaze upon
the Good
(540a).
Given that no forced
learning
abides in a
soul,
how are we to un
derstand the role of
compulsion
in a
philosophical
education? There
seems to be
only
one
answer, namely,
that it is needed to remove im
pediments
to the natural
growth
of
learning?impediments
that would
otherwise block the
path
of the soul's erotic attraction to the true and
the beautiful. Provided with the
opportunity, philosophically-inclined
souls?but
only
such souls?will climb the ladder of er?s to the
top.
Everything depends, however,
on the creation of such
opportunities
through
the
intelligent
use of extrinsic
pressure.
To the
many,
of
course,
such
pressure
must
always
seem burdensome. For the exter
nal harshness of a
rigorous
education fades
away only
when one be
gins
to
glimpse
the inner
beauty
of
genuine understanding.
IV
It is in
thinking through
Socrates' references to
compulsion
that
we
may
best come to
appreciate
the
complexity
of the need that at
taches
philosophy
to the
city,
and therewith the
enduring paradox
that
stands at the heart of the
Republic.
The
political community
needs
philosophy
because
only philosophical insight
into the soul makes
clear the limits of
politics
with
respect
to
virtue,
and it is
only
with
these limits in mind that the
city
can
hope
to establish and maintain
beneficial
laws, customs,
and institutions.
Philosophy
needs a well
ordered
city
because
only
such a
city
takes deliberate
steps
to remove
the
many impediments
to the
perfection
of
philosophical
natures. The
pursuit
of
philosophy, however,
is at odds with the
public
life of the
656 JACOB HOWLAND
city
in
ways
that are
exemplified by
the
oppositions
between thumos
and
er?s, orthodoxy
and
insight,
and
public
order and
private
virtue
that we have been
exploring
in this
essay.
These thematic
opposi
tions, arranged
as
they
are around the third
wave,
come to a head
when one
ponders
how it is that
philosophy
and
political power
could
ever be
brought
to coincide.
Actual communities do not
recognize
the
political importance
of
philosophy,
because most human
beings, lacking philosophical
er?s
therefore also lack
self-knowledge
and
knowledge
of the nature of
genuine
virtue. In actual
communities, moreover,
most
philosophi
cally-inclined
natures are
corrupted,
while those few that are able to
"keep company
with
philosophy
in a
way
that's
worthy" (496b 1) grow
up spontaneously,
like weeds
(520b;
see also
497b). Furthermore,
these few
philosophers
are
unwilling
to rule. This
general
situation
makes for the
problem
of the third
wave,
a
problem
that Socrates is
ultimately
unable to solve.
According
to
Socrates,
the
philosopher
must
attempt
to
persuade
the
nonphilosophical many
that
philosophers
should rule
(499d-500a;
see also
493e-494a).
This
presupposes
that the
philosopher
is
willing
to rule or can be
compelled
to
rule,
for otherwise he would never at
tempt
to
persuade
others to allow him to do so. But the
philosopher
is not
initially willing
to
rule,
and can be
compelled
to do so
only by
an
argument
that adverts to his debt to the
city
that has
given
him a
philosophical
education?a debt that is not incurred
by any philoso
pher
in
any
actual
regime (520a-b).
Hence the
only argument
that can
persuade
the
philosopher
to
try
to convince the citizens that
philoso
phers
should rule
presupposes
that a
city
ruled
by philosophers
al
ready
exists. The same
circularity
is evident when we consider the
question
of whether the
many
would be
persuaded by
the
argument
that
philosophers
should rule. Socrates makes it clear that the
many
could be
persuaded
of this
only
if
they
are
gentle, ungrudging,
moder
ate,
and
willing
to let reason
guide
their actions
(500a, 501c-d).
Yet a
nonphilosophical
multitude of such
good
character
surely
exists no
where outside of the
city
in
speech.27
The textual
centrality
of the third wave
suggests
that the
para
doxical character of the
city
in
speech,
and more
generally
of the rela
tionship
between
philosophy
and the
political community,
is the
27
Cf.
Strauss,
who maintains that "the
Republic repeats,
in order to
overcome
it,
the error of the
sophists regarding
the
power
of
speech";
"On
Plato's
Republic," 127;
see also 124-5.
philosophically
central
point
of the
Republic.
Reflection on the third
wave reveals the need that links
philosophy
to the
political
commu
nity, together
with the
necessary
limits of
philosophy's efficacy
with
regard
to the life of the
city
and of the
city's ability
to become
philo
sophical.
For the
philosophically-inclined
reader who is sensitive to
the structure of the
text,
these are the core lessons of the
Republic.
That
they
have not
generally
been
recognized
as such is a measure of
Plato's
subtlety
in
communicating them,
which is in turn an
indication
of his
political responsibility.28
Finally,
let it be noted that the
Republic
not
only presents
us with
a fundamental
problem,
but also
provides
a
solution in dramatic form.
For it is with the
paradox
of
political philosophy clearly
in mind that
we can best
begin
to
appreciate
the extent of Socrates'
accomplish
ment in
fashioning
even a
single night's community
of
philosophical
discourse out of a
group
of
young
men on their
way
to a
big
town
party.29
University of
Tulsa
28
Yet these lessons are taken to heart
by perhaps
the most dedicated
students of the
political philosophy
of the
Republic,
the medieval Muslim and
Jewish
philosophers.
Alfarabi's influential
description
of the
philosophical
ruler and his
appraisal
of the usefulness of noble lies
(and specifically
reli
gious myth)
in
ruling
the
nonphilosophical many
are
clearly
laid out in the
passages
from The Political
Regime,
The Attainment
of Happiness,
and
Plato's Laws
excerpted
in Medieval Political
Philosophy (hereafter, UMPP"),
ed.
Ralph
Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi
(Ithaca:
Cornell
31-94. With
regard
to the
question
of the
political responsibility
of the
philos
opher,
Averroes remarks in his
commentary
on the
Republic
that "Just as it is
only
the
physician
who
prescribes
a
drug,
so it is the
king
who lies to the mul
titude
concerning
affairs of the realm. That is because untrue stories are nec
essary
for the
teaching
of the citizens. No
bringer
of a nomos is to be found
who does not make use of invented
stories,
for this is
something necessary
for the multitude to reach their
happiness";
Averroes on Plato's
Republic,
trans.
Ralph
Lerner
(Ithaca:
Cornell
24. See also Al
farabi's
explicit
defense of Plato's esotericism in Plato's
Laws, MPP, 84-5,
as
well as the distinction between the
demonstrative, dialectical,
and rhetorical
classes drawn
by
Averroes in The Decisive
Treatise, MPP,
163-86
(see esp.
181)
and the remarks
pertaining
to Plato set forth
by
Isaac Israeli in his Book
on the
Elements, excerpted
in Isaac Israeli: A
Neoplatonic Philosopher of
the
Early
Tenth
Century,
ed. A. Altmann and S. Stern
(New
York: Oxford
134-41.
291 wish to thank the
Philosophy Department
at
Baylor University
and
the
Philosophy Faculty
at the
University
of Bucharest for the
opportunity
to
present
earlier versions of this
essay.
A
Liberty
Fund conference
organized
by Joseph Cropsey provided
the seeds for
my
ideas about the third wave. I
am
especially
indebted to
Jeffrey Macy
of the Hebrew
University,
whose
many
helpful suggestions
have
greatly improved
the
present
article.

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The "Republic'"s Third Wave and the Paradox of Political Philosophy

Author(s): Jacob Howland

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