Interpretation and Construction in Relation to the Language of

the Statute (Instrinsic Aids)

Ejusdem generis rule (Of the same kinds, class or nature)

meaning "of the same kind", used to interpret loosely in the written statutes. Where a law lists
specific classes of persons or things and then refers to them in general, the general statements
only apply to the same kind of persons or things specifically listed. Example: If a law refers to
automobiles, trucks, tractors, motorcycles and other motor-powered vehicles, "vehicles" would
not include airplanes since the list was of land-based transportation.
Related cases: Mutuc vs. COMELEC, Gaanan vs. IAC

Noscitur a sociis (A word is known by the company it keeps)

In law, it is a rule of language used by the courts to help interpret in legislation under which the
questionable meaning of a doubtful word can be derived from its association with other words.
Under this rule, statutes should be construed in light of their context.
Related cases: People vs. Santiago, Coca- Cola Bottlers Philippines vs. Gomez

Common Meaning Rule (or Plain Meaning Rule)


This rule dictates that statutes are to be interpreted using the ordinary meaning of the language
of the statute, unless a statute explicitly defines some of its terms otherwise. In other words, the
law is to be read word for word and should not divert from its ordinary meaning.
Related cases: Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, BAYAN vs. Zamora

Consequential Analysis or Absurdity Rule


Also known as "Scrivner's Error" in which statutes must be construed to their plain meaning in
order to avoid absurd legal conclusions and to uphold the law and justice.
Related cases: Lina Obana vs. Judge Zamora and Jaime Liron, Santos, Jr. vs. PNOC

Expressio unius est exclusio alterus (The expression of one thing is the exclusion
of another)



Meaning: "The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another" wherein items on the list are
not hereby assumed not to be covered or a contract term. However sometimes a list in the
statute is illustrative, not exclusionary. This is usually indicated by the word such as "incldues"
or "such as".
Related cases: Santos To vs. Cruz Pano, Go-Tan vs. Tan

Casus Omissus (An ommitted case)


When a statute or an instrument of writing undertakes to foresee and provide for certain
contingencies, and through mistake or some other cause, a case remains to be provided for, it is
said to be a casus omissus. For example, when a statute provides for the descent of intestates
estates, and omits a case, the estate descends as it did before the statute, whenever that case
occurs, although it appear to be within the general scope and intent of the statute.
Related cases: People vs. Manantan

Reddendo Singula Singulis


By rendering each of his own, for example, when two descriptions of property are given together
in one mass, both the next of kin and the heir cannot take, unless is cases where a construction
can be made reddendo singula singulis.
Related cases: Amadora vs. Court of Appeals

Doctrine of last antecedent or the last antecedent rule


A doctrine of interpretation of statutes that any qualifying words or phrases refer to the
language immediately preceding the qualifier, unless common sense shows that it was meant to
apply something to more distant or less obvious.
Related cases: Mapa vs. Arroyo

Ubilex non distingut nec nos distinguere debemus (Where the law does not
distinguish, we ought not to distinguish)


When the law does not expressly state to distinguish particular items within a statute, statute
should be construed on its common or plain meaning.


Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank of the
Philippines G.R. No. L-8888 November 29, 1957
Facts of the case:

On January 1953 to October 1953, Song Kiat Chocolate Factory imported sun dried cocoa beans
for which it paid the foreign exchange tax of 17% totalling P74,671.04. Claiming exemption from
the said tax under section 2 of the R.A. No. 601, it sued Central Bank that had enacted payment,
and in its amended complaint it included the Treasurer of the Philippines.

Sec. 2 of the aforesaid Act provides that the tax collected or foreign exchange used for the
payment of costs transportation and/or other charges incident to the importation into the
Philippines of rice, flour, soya beans, butterfat, chocolate, malt syrup... shall be refunded to any
importer making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation...

In support of contention, appellant quotes from dictionaries and encyclopedias interchangeably
using the words chocolate, cacao, and cocoa; however the legal exemption refers to
chocolate... not the bean, nor the nut nor the tree. Cocoa beans however, do not become
chocolate unless and until they have undergone the manufacturing processes above described.

Issue

Whether or not cocoa beans may be considered as chocolate for the purposes of exemption from
foreign exchange tax imposed by Republic Act No. 601 as amended.

Ruling

Strict construction of statutes apply in exemption on taxations.

Principles of strict construction of statutes apply in exemption on taxations. Hence, the
exemption for chocolate in the above section 2 does not include cocoa beans. The one is raw
material, the other manufactured consumer product; the latter is ready for human consumption,
the former is not.

Enrolled bill vs. Journal, Committee Hearings. Enrolled bill prevails.

Despite the committee hearing regarding Republic Act 1197 amending sec. 2 substituting cocoa
beans for chocolate; Courts, however do not give decisive weight to one legislators opinion
expressed in Congressional debates concerning application of existing laws. Moreover, in
approving Republic Act 1197, Congress agreed to exempt cocoa beans instead of chocolate.

Prospectivity of laws.

Despite the proclamation no. 62 on September 1954 specifying that exemption of cocoa beans
from foreign exchange tax shall operate from and after the date only, it is also a general rule
that statutes operate prospectively.

Article 1106: Concepts and Kinds of Prescription

Article 1106 states that--

"By prescription, one acquires ownership and other real rights through the lapse
of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law. (acquisitive
prescription) In the same way, rights and actions are lost by prescription. (extinctive
prescription)

There are two kinds of prescription: (1) The acquisition of a right by the lapse of time, known as
acquisitive prescription, or adverse possession and usucapcion and (2) The loss of a right of
action by the lapse of time known as extinctive prescription or limitation of actions.


Basis of Prescription


By abandonment, negligence, carelessness owners provided with the most perfect titles may be
deprived or dispossessed of their properties by usurpers who, by the lapse of the time specified
by law, acquired the same by prescription.


Acquisitive prescription therefore, is based on the assertion by a usurper of an adverse right
for such a long time, uncontested by the true owner of the right,, as to give rise to the
presumption that the latter has given up such right in favor of the former.


Extinctive prescription is based on probability born of experience, that the alleged right
which accrued in the distant past never existed or has already been extinguished or, if it exists,
the inconvenience caused by the lapse of time should be borne by the party negligent in the
assertion of his right. The purpose of the law on extinctive prescription is to protect the diligent
and vigilant not the person who sleeps on his right, forgetting them and taking no trouble of
exercising them one way or another to show that he truly has such rights.



Sunday, February 16, 2014
Nuisance Per Se and Nuisance Per Accidens
Nuisance are of two kinds--nuisance per se and nuisance per accidens. The first is recognized as
a nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace to the
public. (Nuisance per se). The second is that which depends upon certain conditions and
circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due
hearing in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a
nuisance (Nuisance per accidens)

In this case, appellant's smoked fish factory is not a nuisance per se. It is a legitimate
industry. If it be, in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, then it would be
merely nuisance per accidens. Consequently, the order of the municipal president and those of
health authorities issued with a view to the summary abatement of what they have concluded,
by their own findings, as a nuisance, are null and void there having been no hearing in court
to the effect.

- G. R. No. L- 45519 Salao and Lucas vs. Teofilo Santos


Unless a thing is a nuisance per se, it may not be abated summarily without judicial
intervention.
- G. R. No. 184478 Jaime S. Perez vs. Spouses Mardrona and Pante

Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act or omission, establishment, business,
condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of
others, (2) annoys or offends the senses (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality,
(4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body
of water, or (5) hinders or impairs the use of property.

A nuisance may be per se or per accidens. A nuisance per se is that which affects the
immediate safety of persons or property and may be summarily be abated under the
undefined law of necessity.

x x x In nuisance per accidens, only the courts of law have the power to determine whether a
thing is a nuisance.

- G. R. No. 177807 Retired Justice Emilio Gancayco vs. City Government of
Quezon City and MMDA