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Towards a postwestern Europe?

...[T]he idea of Europe has today become dereferentialized, incomplete and postwestern ... In this loss of a
civilizational master discourse, European identity becomes a plural, perspectival discourse consisting of
many languages, civilizational models and political projects.
(Delanty 2003, p.21)

Introduction
The idea of the fall of the west, whether as a consequence of 9/11, or as an imminent reality in the
Asian century, has risen to prominence within international political discourse. A postwestern order
lurks on the horizon, as the wests monopoly on modernity comes to be challenged (Stuenkel 2011a).
Discussion has remained within the confines of geopolitics and international relations theory, with
emphasis on external power relations and political order, but with fleeting references to the social and
cultural implications of such a shift. For this reason Gerard Delantys (2003) concept of a
postwestern Europe has value, which draws upon such discourse, but reframes discussion in context
of internal social and cultural processes. This is a complex concept, which intersects theories of
nationalism, westernisation, Europeanisation and modernity. According to Delanty, Turkeys
accession reflects a decisive turn for the European Union (EU), which could witness a shift in the
balance of power towards the eastern frontier, encountering multiple civilizational forms (p.8). This
essay critically examines Delantys concept, first with reference to Turkeys credentials for accession,
and then to Europes relationship with Russia. It reveals the different ways the west has been put to
use in and across these two countries, and perhaps therefore, why it may be hasty to suggest its
decline. Delantys ideas are drawn from his paper The making of a postwestern Europe: a
civilizational analysis, written in 2003, unless stated otherwise.
Towards a postwestern Europe?
With negotiations for Turkeys accession under way, and Russias global influence ever increasing,
Delanty notes that Europe will expand to assume a postwestern shape. No longer a Fortress Europe
controlled by Brussels, the eastern frontier will become flexible, negotiable and porous (p.9). For the
first time, Delanty argues, the EUs enlargement is a matter of cultural transformation, evidencing a
new dynamic to Europeanisation. Turkey has a nationalist pro-Islamic party, the AKP (Justice and
Development Party), which is likeable to a soft Islamic fundamentalism. Russias diverging political
values, according to Morozov and Rumelili (2012), signify the limits of western power. Both states
will play a large part in the twenty-first century world order, and have potential to enhance the EUs
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foreign policy power (Gerhards and Hans 2011), especially with regard to the rise of China, but
Delantys concern is for the future of Europeanisation, and whether the EU is structured to handle
such a cultural shift.
In tackling such a question we should remember that cultures are not fixed categories, but cognitive
constructions subject to constant reification. Culture is mobilised by powerful groups to determine
who is allowed into, and who is excluded from, a particular community. Our conceptions of Europe
have been shaped by EU ideals, and subsequently our idea of Europe equates with the western
institutional structure through which the EU operates. Due to our assumption that the west is
incompatible with other civilisational identities, possibilities for broader European integration have
been written off. Delanty is very much against this universalist view of Europe; Europe in the broader
sense historically comprises many different civilisations, and as the EU expands eastwards it will
tangle with multiple frameworks of modernity. Discord between particularism and universalism,
OHagan notes, is a current theme in western social thought, and such conflict is manifest in the
debate between the cosmopolitan and communitarian traditions (2002, p.5).
Universalist perspectives are rooted in German idealism, which locates western civilisation at the
forefront of modernity at the expense of competing civilisational structures. In Hegels words,
The History of the World travels from East to West, for Europe is absolutely the end of History, Asia the
beginning.
(2007, p.103)
It has important implications for how Turkey and Russia are subjected to orientalist representation,
and their civilisations rendered obsolete in a more progressive, western world. The EU could be
accused of a similar universalist position, (unrealistically) expecting to construct mirror images of
itself through the accession process. As Ahiska (2003) reminds us, western modernity is a pre-
condition of EU membership; that Turkey and Russia are yet to join the EU implies that they are
latecomers to the party. Such views are manifest in the work of Francis Fukuyama (1989, online),
who argues that western liberalism signifies the end point of mankinds ideological evolution.
Fukuyamas work naturalises Hegels chronology, privileging western democracy as the model to
which societies that are still in evolution should aspire (ibid). It dislocates countries like Turkey and
Russia from the constantly onward-moving chronological sequence of Western progress (Ahiska
2003, p.354).
Informed by civilisational analysis, Delanty admits that the idea of civilization has been much tainted
with notions of cultural superiority, eurocentrism and even racism (p.15). Interpreting civilisation
entails a socio-cognitive process (ibid), where our perceptions, prejudices and stereotypes come into
play. Historically, the term has been exploited by powerful western groups within an aggressive
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dichotomy that differentiates between a civilised self and a barbaric other. Within academic
circles, the term has been used to demonstrate the incommensurability of different civilisations,
mainly in the form of west versus east, or Christianity versus Islam (see Huntington 1996). In defence
of his method, Delanty maintains that civilisational analysis offers a useful means of conceptualising a
nuanced geopolitical configuration, placing emphasis firmly on the role of culture in shaping history.
He insists that clues to the potential of Europeanisation can be found in an examination of Europes
civilisational genealogy.
Delanty observes that Europe historically comprises three civilisational constellations: continually
evolving cultural models which have changed through time and have been shaped through different
histories. Our current conception of Europe, shaped through the EU, is founded on the Occidental
Christian Constellation, hence why the European project is dominated by a western territorial core
and why the EU has an ethnocentric (predominantly white, Christian) foundation (p.18). The
representation of Europe as a fixed western civilisational identity frames our perceptions of the
incommensurability between Turkey and the EU. But there are two other, equally important
constellations, which have been ignored in discussions of modernity, thus which have eluded the
wests gaze. One is the Byzantine-Slavic Eurasian Constellation, a model founded by the Russian
empire, which in the past controlled territory across Europe and Asia. The other is the Ottoman
Islamic Constellation, which forms the basis of the Islamic cultures in Southeast Europe and the Near
East. As the EU moves eastwards, non-western powers will challenge and redefine what it means to
be European, forming a new civilisational constellation.
Delanty moves away from civilisation as an essential construction; rather, civilisations are treated as
unfolding practices, processes, projects and relations (Jackson 1999, p.142). Such an approach
highlights the multiple frameworks of modernity that will contribute to future processes of
Europeanisation. This is where Delantys argument lies: despite the myopic occidental focus of the
EU, European modernity has been shaped by broader processes across Europe and Asia. Through the
rise and fall of empires, different civilisations have contributed to Europes formation, and as
Europeanisation moves eastwards it will confront the historical legacy of its multiple histories
(p.21). Western Europe is therefore a product of its historic cultural interactions with both the
Byzantine-Slavic and Ottoman Islamic empires. The next two sections examine the cases of Turkey
and Russia, respectively. How the arguments of Turkey and Russia are framed, reflect different ways
the relationship between Europe and its Others can be conceptualised. In the case of Turkey, Europe
is marred by cultural exclusivity, which clashes with Turkeys Islamic brand of western modernity.
Conversely, discussion of Russia is grounded in its self-appropriation as Europes political other.


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Europe, Turkey and cultural power
Delanty questions whether, in light of Europes expansion, there is potential for deep social
integration. He criticises the Christian exclusivism that dominates the Europeanisation project and
limits the possibilities of cultural convergence. Keeping in mind that Europe is a socially constructed
entity, the EU has legitimised the selective perception of Europe as a white, Christian project, whilst
simultaneously marginalising the possibility of Islamic integration. Though Stuenkel (2011b)
observes that, as a stable democracy, Turkey is technically compatible with EU structures, enduring
orientalist representations of Islamic states as Outsiders continue to hinder discussions regarding its
membership. If Europeanisation is to succeed, and Turkey to accede, the EU must adopt an ethos of
pluralisation (Delanty 2002, p.356). Ideally Europe can blossom into a genuinely multicultural
community. Indeed Turkeys bid for accession is characterised by appeals to multiculturalism and
diversity, target[ing] the soft underbelly of the west European project (Morozov and Rumelili 2012,
p.43). Turkey thus desires the social integration and end to Christian exclusivism that Delanty so
fervently writes about.
Westernisation has been a signature part of Turkeys national identity since the reign of Atatrk in the
late Ottoman era, but Turkey, consequent to being denied European membership on basis of religious
prejudice, has developed a very self-conscious national identity, ill at ease with both its commitment
to westernisation and its responsibilities as an Islamic state. Ahiska observes that Turkeys bid for
accession increasingly represents a performance geared for the gaze of the West, an important site of
self-reflection concerning how Turkey imagines it is perceived (2003, p.355). Euro-Orientalism has
become entrenched in west European culture, and the increasing prevalence of such orientalist
representations has deteriorated Turkeys chances. This is a more salient issue since 9/11, whereby
migration of Turkish Muslims across EU borders is constructed as a security threat (Gerhards and
Hans 2011). Consequently individual European states, responding to their citizens wishes, have
opposed the motion. In this light, Delantys concept is likeable to a forbidden utopia, unlikely to
become a reality.
Perhaps it is because of Turkeys cultural difference that perceptions of Europe could change. So long
as Turkey desires accession to the EU, it will actively play out a European identity. Regardless of its
accession, simply by being European, Turkey may cause our perceptions of European identity to
shift. Albeit developed to conceptualise the performance of gender, Butlers (1990) theory of
performativity can usefully be applied to the role of the state. As such, Turkeys Europeanisation is an
act that is constantly rehearsed, in preparation for the actual event (its accession). But simply by
performing these actions, this script can become a reality. For Turkey, Delantys concept therefore
does have value, not in terms of analysing the restructuration of the EU, but in conceptualising the
broader role of cultural performativity. As earlier stated, civilisational identities are not fixed, but
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shaped through history and constantly in the making. Turkeys agency is in its ability to decentre
European identity, narrowing the gap between European and Turkish values. Through its projection of
European values onto the EU, Turkey offers a discursive intervention (Morozov and Rumelili 2012,
p.33), coercing the EU into rearticulating their civilisational identity within a more multicultural, and
ultimately cosmopolitan, framework.
In the short term, it thus appears that the prevalence of orientalist attitudes will continue to impede
Turkeys EU accession, and so the EU itself is unlikely to reshape. However, as demonstrated,
through the performance of a European identity Turkey may in the longer term redefine Europe as a
broader social, cultural and political space. As a side note, in the twenty-first century Europe and the
U.S. will increasingly look to Turkey for stability in the Middle East, for Turkeys geopolitical
position makes it a fundamental component for handling the Islamic community (Serfaty 2011).
Denying Turkeys accession risks the possibility of Turkey turning its back on Europe and
concentrating its policies elsewhere. Though discussion of economic policies lies beyond the scope of
this paper, it is useful to note that the Eurozone crisis has challenged the idea that the EU is inevitable
(ibid); consequently Turkey may focus its resources on becoming a powerful actor in the Middle East
(Ouzlu 2011). Ironically therefore, it may be the EUs very articulation of cultural power which
contributes to its own demise in the new world order.
Russia, communism and the idea of the west
In the late seventeenth century, Peter the Great undertook the most ambitious, and ultimately
successful, modernising project in Russian history, taking Russia from medievalism to scientific
rationalism. His construction of western-style Saint Petersburg represented a window on the West
through which continuing western influences could be channeled (Grier 2003, p.32). Saint Petersburg
arguably diminished the cultural clout of Moscow, with Russian culture becoming increasingly
western-oriented. Considering Golden Era writers like Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, and great classical
composers like Tchaikovsky and Mussorgsky, all of which were part of a thriving arts culture
modelled on west European tradition, it is hard to deny that Peter the Great carried Russia into the
common European world. As a result of his efforts, for some,
...the only valid model of civilization was the West European one ... the only legitimate standard for
assessing the achievements of Russia.
(ibid)
Such ideals are clearly at odds with Delantys civilisational particularism. Whilst easy for Delanty to
criticise Enlightenment theorists for placing western civilisation in a master narrative at the forefront
of modernity, the fact remains that the work of these philosophers held real value for Russian
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intellectuals. For Grier (2003, p.44) there is no question that Hegels philosophy influenced the
shaping of modern Russia, providing
...the master narrative into which the history of Russia would have to be fitted if the meaning of Russian
history were to be made clear.
The reign of Peter the Great certainly presents a challenge for Delantys concept, which locates
Russia within a unique civilisational constellation. Why then, has the Russian Eurasian tradition ...
been all but ignored as a model of modernity (Delanty 2003, p.17)? Analysis of Russias
civilisational history reveals that, for over two centuries, Russia was isolated from the west through
Mongol rule. It was through Mongol rule that Moscow came to assert itself as the political hub of
what is now present-day Russia. Bova (2003) observes that it was the entire period since the retreat of
the Mongol empire that shaped Russias relationship with Western Europe, for whilst Moscow
remained the city of the ruling elite it became increasingly geographically isolated from the west
through Russian territorial expansion. It was this geographical isolation, coupled with Moscows
stubborn refusal to comply with the west, which restricted the possibilities of integrating within
Europe.
Such isolation has culminated in the spatio-temporal perception that Russia is one step behind its
western neighbours and, as Bova comments, the misperception that defining cultural and historical
epochs have bypassed this vast state (ibid, p.4). It might further explain why, historically, the
relationship between Russia and the west has been marked by ambivalence and polarity. Since the
Cold War however, discussion of Russias relationship to Europe has not been approached in terms of
cultural or geographical isolation, but grounded in Russias self-appropriation as Europes political
other. Debate concerning Russias relationship to the west, its national identity and position in world
civilisation, and whether it can be defined as a European nation, have come to centre around the
demise of the USSR, Russias supposed disavowal of Soviet ideology and, subsequently, whether it
can integrate into a common European community.
Delanty argues that communism was an experiment, an ephemeral moment in an otherwise
impressive history, but abandoned in 1989. But historically the Russian state has defined itself in
opposition to western modernity, and its persistence with an authoritarian government and departure
from liberal values suggests the likelihood of the ideological polarisation between Russia and Western
Europe enduring throughout the twenty-first century. Delantys remarks on the porosity of the eastern
frontier hold little relevance to Russia, where the boundary is instead closed off. Such polarisation is
evident in that Russias identity is not defined in terms of what Russia is, but what Europe is not
(Morozov and Rumelili 2012). Russias self-appropriation as Europes political other is a product of
its Cold War history, which distinguishes it from European liberal values, whilst simultaneously
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reaffirming Europe as an essentially western identity (ibid). It consolidates the EU as a normative
power that is unlikely to achieve the cosmopolitan ideals that Delanty advocates.
Tsygankov (2009) notes that civilisational discourse has been revived in Russia albeit employed in
an opposing manner to that which Delanty advocates, opting for conflict over convergence. In 1869
philosopher Nikolai Danilevsky, strongly opposed to cosmopolitan ideals, argued that Russia existed
as a distinct biological entity independent of any other civilisational cultures (Niezen 2010). Over 120
years later, as a result of the USSRs disintegration, approximately 20 million ethnic Russians were
displaced from their motherland. Civilisationalists have therefore revived Danilevskys
communitarian theory, pursuing a deep-rooted vision of Slavic integration (Tsygankov 2009). In his
Clash of Civilisations thesis, Huntington (1996) too notes a divergence between western and Slavic
orthodox communities that endures into the present; the result is a cluster of states surrounding and
including Russia with cultural traits unlike any in Western Europe. As the second largest religion in
the world, Orthodox Christianity, rooted in the Byzantine tradition, provides a larger cultural affinity
that transcends and binds the individual Slavic nations (Bova 2003, p.8). Orthodoxy conflicts with
the ideals of the Roman Catholic Church, and so possibilities of incorporating the Byzantine-Slavic
Eurasian Constellation, as with Turkeys Islamic heritage, appear limited. It is more likely that
Byzantine culture will be pursued as a unifying mechanism for the Slavic peoples.
Such an organic vision has important implications for how we position Russias Cold War years in its
broader civilisational context. Tsygankov observes that various Russian commentators see
...Russians as a politically divided nation that is waiting of its unification in the manner of German
unification at the end of the Cold War
(2009, p.354).
Though contentious to conflate Russian politics with the USSR, political developments in the South
Caucasus certainly demand that we scrutinise Russias role as a political power. Its recognition of the
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia in 2008 sparked concern for the revival of
a Russian expansionist project, and for Pavlova, signalled the practical recreation of the Soviet
Union (2008, online). Albeit unlikely that this will happen, such actions undermine the integrative
policies of the EU, signifying the potential of Russia as its own power, but more importantly, the
limits of European power.



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Conclusion
Undeniably, Turkey and Russia will increasingly challenge the meaning of Europe as a geopolitical,
social and cultural space (Delanty 2003, p.8). It is clear from the outset that meanings of European
identity are in contestation, resulting in a complex entity fraught with ambiguities. Understanding
such a multitude of images, their context and coexistence, becomes a complex task. Ongoing debates
between universalism and particularism, communitarianism and cosmopolitanism, will continue to
affect how the future of Europeanisation is perceived. Delantys concept is useful for highlighting the
pitfalls of the EU modernising project and the myopic and westerncentric conception of Europe which
it deploys. His argument is that clues to the potential of Europeanisation can be found in an
examination of Europes civilisational genealogy.
In our endeavours to determine whether Turkey and Russia can integrate with Europe, we must keep
in mind that these relationships have been subject to constant renegotiation. For instance, as a result of
9/11 Turkey is increasingly excluded from the EU on the basis of religious prejudice, and so Turkeys
accession has been far from a straightforward process, and, admittedly, is unlikely to happen in the
immediate future. That is not to say that European identity will not shift; rather that it will be effected
in a manner different to that which Delanty advocates. As I have argued, the re-articulation of
European identity is most likely to happen through Turkeys imposition of a discursive intervention
on European conceptual space.
Russia is further complex. In his book, Perestroika, Mikhail Gorbachev argues that Some in the West
are trying to exclude the Soviet Union from Europe, in spite of geographical and historical
realities (1988, p.190). Certainly when we consider Russias historical connections with the west,
Delantys argument that Russia has developed through a unique civilisational constellation is indeed
problematic. However it is impossible to deny that the enduring legacy of the Soviet Union does
present a challenge for Russias relationship with Europe, with the divergence of such political values
unlikely to be reconciled. Russian violence in Chechnya, and more recently Georgia, provide a
chilling reminder of the tension between empire...and liberal democracy (Bova 2003, p.17).
Both a rapidly westernising yet Islamic Turkey, and a post-Soviet Russia still reeling from decades of
cultural, political and geographical isolation, present daunting challenges for the implementation of
Delantys cosmopolitan ideals. Insofar as both countries engage Europe on a deeper cultural level, the
question of European belonging will remain embroiled in internal debates on multiculturalism,
xenophobia and the role of religion in European identity (Morozov and Rumelili 2012, p.41). But,
considering the enduring complexity of the interrelationship between these countries, Europe and the
west, it is unlikely that Europe can ever become postwestern.

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