Jurisprudence Specpro

Jurisprudential Developments in Special Proceedings
Settlement of estate
ARBOLARIO vs. CA
G.R. No. !"#$% &April !!% !''$(
)acts*
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals overstepped its bounds when it ruled that since
respondents did not raise the issue of partition on appeal, the RTC had no jurisdiction to divide the disputed lot.
The CA held, however, that the partition of the property had not been contemplated by the parties, because
respondents merely sought recovery of possession of the parcel held by the Salhays, while petitioners sought the
annulment of the eed of Partition respondents had entered into.
Issue* !hether or not the "uestions as to the determination of the heirs of a decedent, the proof of filiation, and
the determination of the estate of a decedent and claims thereto may be brought up before an ordinary court#
Ruling*
Petitioners in this case were unable to establish any right to partition, because they had failed to
establish that they were legitimate half$brothers and half$sisters of the deceased Purificacion. %uestions as to the
determination of the heirs of a decedent, the proof of filiation, and the determination of the estate of a decedent
and claims thereto should be brought up before the proper probate court or in special proceedings instituted for
the purpose. Such issues cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action for the recovery of ownership and
possession.
Note* The same ruling was made in Natcher v. CA, G.R. No. 133000, Oct. 2, 2001 where a regular court was
resolving the "uestion of the alleged advancement of property made by the decedent to one of his heirs. The SC
ruled that the regular court had no jurisdiction over the issue. &t belongs to the probate court.
S+,OND DI-ISION
RIO)+RIO vs. ,O.R/ O) APP+ALS
0G.R. No. !"''1. Januar2 $% !''34
)acts*
Alfonso P. 'rfinada, (r. died without a will leaving several personal and real properties. Private
respondents discovered that petitioner Teodora Rioferio )the paramour* and her children e+ecuted an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, real estate mortgages and transfers
involving the properties of the estate of the decedent. To recover their rights, Alfonso ,Clyde- P. 'rfinada &&&
filed a Petition for Letters of Administration praying that letters of administration encompassing the estate of
Alfonso P. 'rfinada, (r. be issued to him.
Issue* !hether the heirs )respondents* may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the appointment
of an administrator is the issue in this case#
Ruling*
Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal personality to bring
suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article ... of the /ew Civil Code
,that )t*he rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.- The provision in
turn is the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to the e+tent and value of the
Eric-John Soriano Calagui Page 1 of 26
inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law.
0ven if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an
administrator has not yet been appointed. The heirs cannot be e+pected to wait for the appointment of an
administrator1 then wait further to see if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect
the rights and the interests of the deceased1 and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of
the decedent are violated or dissipated.
/5IRD DI-ISION
0G.R. No. 3#$3. )e6ruar2 7% !''4
5eirs of Spouses SAND+JAS vs. LINA% respondent.
)acts*
Petitioners fault the CA ecision by arguing, inter alia, )a* jurisdiction over ordinary civil action
see2ing not merely to enforce a sale but to compel performance of a contract falls upon a civil court, not upon an
intestate court1 and )b* that Section 3 of Rule 34 allows the e+ecutor or administrator, and no one else, to file an
application for approval of a sale of the property under administration.
Issue* !hether or not the probate court has jurisdiction over the contract of sale of realty belonging to the estate
of the decedent#
Ruling*
A contract of sale is not invalidated by the fact that it is subject to probate court5s approval. The
transaction remains binding on the seller$heir, but not on the other heirs who have not given their consent to
it. Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to the settlement of estates )Rules .6 7 38$49* and the probate
of wills )Rules .:$..* of deceased persons, including the appointment and the removal of administrators and
e+ecutors )Rules .3$3:*. &t also e+tends to matters incidental and collateral to the e+ercise of a probate court5s
recogni;ed powers such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate. &ndeed,
the rules on this point are intended to settle the estate in a speedy manner, so that the benefits that may flow
from such settlement may be immediately enjoyed by the heirs and the beneficiaries.

S+,OND DI-ISION
G.R. No. 73$!! August !!% !''#
)IG.RA,ION8G+RILLA v s. -DA. D+ )IG.RA,ION et al.
)acts*
Respondents claim that< )9* the properties constituting =eandro5s estate cannot be partitioned before his
estate is settled and )>* there should be an accounting before anything else, considering that they )respondents*
had to spend for the maintenance of the deceased =eandro ?iguracion and his wife in their final years, which
support was supposed to come from the income of the properties. Among other things, respondents apparently
wanted petitioner to share in the e+penses incurred for the care of their parents during the ten years she stayed in
the @nited States, before she could get her part of the estate while petitioner apparently wanted her gross share,
without first contributing to the e+penses.
Issue* !hether or not there needs to be a prior settlement of =eandro5s intestate estate )that is, an accounting of
the income of the prperties, the payment of e+penses, liabilities and ta+es, plus compliance with other legal
re"uirements, etc.* before the properties can be partitioned or distributed#
Ruling*
!hile Section 3 of Rule 84 provides that there shall be an accounting of the real property5s income )rentals and
profits* in the course of an action for partition, there is no provision for the accounting of e+penses for which
property belonging to the decedent5s estate may be answerable, such as funeral e+penses, inheritance ta+es and
similar e+penses enumerated under Section 9, Rule 4A of the Rules of Court. &n a situation where there remains
an issue as to the e+penses chargeable to the estate, partition is inappropriate. !hile petitioner points out that the
estate is allegedly without any debt and she and respondents are =eandro ?iguracion5s only legal heirs, she does
not dispute the finding of the CA that ,certain e+penses- including those related to her father5s final illness and
burial have not been properly settled. Thus, the heirs )petitioner and respondents* have to submit their father5s
estate to settlement because the determination of these e+penses cannot be done in an action for partition.
S+,OND DI-ISION
0G. R. No. 7#13!. Decem6er '% !''34
SO/+RO A. P.NONGBA9AN vs. DANILO G. P.NONGBA9AN
)acts*
The intestate court denied respondent5s motion that petitioner )who has been co$administrator for only one )9*
day at the time it was filed* should render an accounting of his administration of the estate and to turn over the
certificates of placement of the proceeds from the sales of estate properties. Be maintains that petitioner should
be made to account first for the alleged illegal transfers of estate properties made by him before he )respondent*
could render his own accounting.
Issue* !hether or not the denial of the motion is proper#
Ruling*
Ces. Section 3, Rule 3: of the Rules of Court, provides < 0very e+ecutor or administrator shall
render an account of his administration within one )9* year from the time of receiving letters
testamentary or of administration, unless the court otherwise directs because of e+tensions of time for
presenting claims against, or paying the debts of, the estate, or of disposing of the estate1 and he shall
render such further accounts as the court may re"uire until the estate is wholly settled.
and Sec. ., Rule 3., of the same Rules, provides D
The court, on complaint of an e+ecutor or administrator, may cite a person entrusted by an e+ecutor or
administrator with any part of the estate of the deceased to appear before it, and may re"uire such person to
render a full account, on oath, of the money, goods, chattels, bonds, accounts, or other papers belonging to such
estate as came to his possession in trust for such e+ecutor or administrator, and of his proceedings thereon1 and
if a person so cited refuses to appear to render such account, the court may punish him for contempt as having
disobeyed a lawful order of the court.
Applying Sec. 3, Rule 3:, the intestate court denied the motion on the ground that it was premature considering
that petitioner has been co$administrator for only one )9* day at the time it was filed. !ith the denial,
petitioner5s accountability as co$administrator was in no way settled as it did not preclude or forestall future
accountings by him which, under said Sec. 3, he is obliged to render within one )9* year from receiving letters of
administration, or as re"uired by the court until the estate is settled. /either an accounting or an e+amination of
petitioner under Section ., Rule 3., definitely settle the issue of his alleged illegal transfers and lease since a
proceeding under this section, li2e that under Sec.8 of the same Rule, is merely in the nature of fact$finding
in"uiries. &t is intended to elicit information or evidence relative to estate properties.

)IRS/ DI-ISION
G.R. No. #$:': Septem6er 7% !''#
G.9 vs. ,O.R/ O) APP+ALS
)acts*
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly ac2nowledged illegitimate children of Sima !ei, who
died intestate. They prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly settlement of
decedent5s estate. They li2ewise prayed that, in the meantime, petitioner Eichael C. Fuy, the legitimate son of
the decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator of the estate. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the
petition alleging that private respondents5 claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise e+tinguished by
reason of Remedios5 Release and !aiver of Claim stating that in e+change for the financial and educational
assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima !ei from any
and all liabilities1 and that private respondents do not have the legal personality to institute the petition for letters
of administration as they failed to prove their filiation during the lifetime of Sima !ei.
Issue* !hether the Release and !aiver of Claim precludes private respondents from claiming their successional
rights1 and whether private respondents are barred by prescription from proving their filiation#
Ruling*
Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial
approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property which must pass the court5s scrutiny
in order to protect the interest of the ward. /ot having been judicially authori;ed, the Release and !aiver of
Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the
deceased.
Anent the issue on private respondents5 filiation, in Bernabe v. Alejo that illegitimate children who were
still minors at the time the ?amily Code too2 effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are
given the right to see2 recognition for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested right
was not impaired or ta2en away by the passage of the ?amily Code.

)IRS/ DI-ISION
G.R. No. #:$! Jul2 $% !''#
+PI)ANIO SAN J.AN% JR.% vs. J.DG+ RA;ON A. ,R.<
)acts*
=oreto Samia San (uan e+ecuted a =ast !ill and Testament naming 'scar Casa as one of the devisees
therein. @pon =oreto5s death a certain Atty. Teodorico A. A"uino filed a petition for the probate of the will.
!hile the petition for the probate of the will was pending, the devisee 'scar Casa died, intestate. A"uino filed a
pleading entitled ,Appointment of Administrator- signed by Candelaria, (esus, Arlyn, /estor, 0dna, Genhur,
?ederico, Rafael and Ea. 0den, all surnamed Casa, praying that one of them, ?ederico Casa, (r., be designated
as administrator of the estate of the deceased and that he be substituted for the deceased. Petitioner contested the
same.
Issue* !hether or not a person nominated as ,administrator- by purported heirs of a devisee or legatee in a will
under probate may validly substitute for that devisee or legatee in the probate proceedings despite the fact that
such administrator is not the court$appointed administrator of the estate of the devisee or legatee#
Ruling*
The heirs of the estate of 'scar Casa do not need to first secure the appointment of an administrator of his
estate, because from the very moment of his death, they stepped into his shoes and ac"uired his rights as
deviseeHlegatee of the deceased =oreto San (uan. Thus, a prior appointment of an administrator or e+ecutor of
the estate of 'scar Casa is not necessary for his heirs to ac"uire legal capacity to be substituted as
representatives of the estate. Said heirs may designate one or some of them as their representative before the
trial court.

)IRS/ DI-ISION
G.R. No. 3'3!! August :% !''#
,R.< et. al. vs. ,RIS/OBAL
)acts*
Petitioners )Eercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the deceased Socorro Cristobal, and
0lisa Cristobal$Si2at* claim that they are the legitimate children of Guenaventura Cristobal during his first
marriage to &gnacia Cristobal. 'n the other hand, private respondents )/orberto, ?lorencio, 0ufrosina and (ose,
all surnamed Cristobal* are also the children of Guenaventura Cristobal resulting from his second marriage to
onata 0nri"ue;. Private respondents e+ecuted a deed of partition without notifying petitioners.
Issue* !hether or not the deed of partition is valid#
Ruling*
As to the validity of the eed of Partition of the subject property e+ecuted by the private respondents
among themselves to the e+clusion of petitioners, the applicable rule is Section 9, Rule .6 of the Rules of Court,
which states<
The fact of the e+trajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the manner provided in the ne+t succeeding section1 but no e+trajudicial settlement shall be
binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
@nder the said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the
e+trajudicial settlement is not binding on said persons. &n the case at bar, since the estate of the deceased
Guenaventura Cristobal is composed solely of the subject property, the partition thereof by the private
respondents already amounts to an e+trajudicial settlement of Guenaventura Cristobal5s estate.
Guardians=ip and ,ustod2 of ;inors
/5IRD DI-ISION
0G.R. No. $!!!$. June "% !''4
BONI)A,IA P. -AN,IL% petitioner, vs. 5+L+N G. B+L;+S% respondent.
)acts*
Court of Appeals dis"ualified petitioner Gonifacia P. Iancil )grandmother* to be appointed as
judicial guardian over the persons and estate of subject minors despite the fact that she has all the
"ualifications and none of the dis"ualifications as judicial guardian, merely on the basis of her @.S.
citi;enship which is clearly not a statutory re"uirement to become guardian.
Issue* !hether or not the grandmother of minor should be the latter5s guardian#
Ruling*
Geing the natural mother of minor Iincent, respondent has the corresponding natural and legal right to
his custody. 0ven assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Iincent, still petitioner cannot "ualify
as a substitute guardian. Significantly, this Court has held that courts should not appoint persons as guardians
who are not within the jurisdiction of our courts for they will find it difficult to protect the wards. &n uerrero
vs. !eran, this Court held<
,+++ There is nothing in the law which re"uires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or
guardians. Bowever, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory re"uirements upon this "uestion, the
courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc.,
will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing administrators and guardians who are not
personally subject to their jurisdiction. /otwithstanding that there is no statutory re"uirement, the courts should
not consent to the appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the
jurisdiction of our courts here.-
)IRS/ DI-ISION
0G.R. No. '"77:. Novem6er !"% !'''4
JOS+ .9 and =is Spouse GL+NDA J. .9 and GILDA L. JARD+L+<A% petitioners, vs. ,O.R/ O)
APP+ALS and /+ODORO L. JARD+L+<A% respondents.
)acts*
Petitioner Filda =. (ardele;a averred the physical and mental incapacity of her husband, who was then
confined for intensive medical care and treatment at the &loilo octor5s Bospital. She signified to the court her
desire to assume sole powers of administration of their conjugal properties. She also alleged that her husband5s
medical treatment and hospitali;ation e+penses were piling up, accumulating to several hundred thousands of
pesos already. ?or this, she urgently needed to sell one piece of real property and its improvements. Thus, she
prayed for authori;ation from the court to sell said property.
Issue* !hether or not petitioner Filda =. (ardele;a as the wife of 0rnesto (ardele;a, Sr. who suffered a stro2e, a
cerebrovascular accident, rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, and could not manage
their conjugal partnership property may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property under
Article 9>6 of the ?amily Code and dispose of a parcel of land with its improvements, worth more than twelve
million pesos, with the approval of the court in a summary proceedings, to her co$petitioners, her own daughter
and son$in$law, for the amount of eight million pesos#
Ruling*
The procedural rules on summary proceedings in relation to Article 9>6 of the ?amily Code are not
applicable. &n regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the ?amily Code govern the
proceedings under Article 9>6 of the ?amily Code. The situation contemplated is one where the spouse is
absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. Such rules
do not apply to cases where the non$consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. &n this
case, the trial court found that the subject spouse Jis an incompetentJ who was in comatose or semi$comatose
condition, a victim of stro2e, cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental faculties, and with a diagnosis
of brain stem infarct. &n such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 4K of
the 9486 Revised Rules of Court.
S+,OND DI-ISION
0A.;. No. R/J8'$8:7$. )e6ruar2 7% !''34
,APIS/RANO OB+D+N,IO% JR.% complainant, vs. J.DG+ JOA>.IN ;. ;.RILLO% PR+SIDING
J.DG+% R/,% BRAN,5 !#% ;+DINA% ;ISA;IS ORI+N/AL% respondent.
)acts*
&n a letter$complaint, complainant Capistrano 'bedencio, (r., charged respondent (udge (oa"uin E.
Eurillo of unjustly dismissing Criminal Case for rape, entitled ,Peo"le v. Dexter #. Acenas.- Complainant
sought to secure from the court a copy of the warrant of arrest issued against the accused. To his great surprise,
respondent judge told him that the case had been dismissed three days earlier. According to respondent judge,
=icel 'bedencio had come to court, accompanied by her maternal grandparents and Asst. Provincial Prosecutor
0mmanuel Balla;go. There she was presented to affirm her affidavit of desistance.
Issue* !hether or not the affidavit should have been e+ecuted with the concurrence of her parents#
Ruling*
=icel was only 96 years old, definitely a minor, when she was presented before respondent5s sala to
affirm the e+ecution of her affidavit of desistance. This being the case, said affidavit should have been e+ecuted
with the concurrence of her parents. =icel could not validly give consent to an affidavit of desistance, for a
minor is incompetent to e+ecute such an instrument. Cet, notwithstanding the absence of her parents5
conformity to the affidavit of desistance and lac2 of notice to them or their lawyer of the scheduled hearing,
respondent judge dismissed the criminal case. Truly, he should have e+ercised more prudence and caution
instead of perfunctorily dismissing the case, considering the nature and gravity of the offense charged.At the
very least, herein respondent should have appointed a guardian ad litem for =icel, to protect her welfare and
interest, instead of hastily dismissing the rape case.
)IRS/ DI-ISION
0A.;. No. R/J8""833:. Septem6er !:% !'''4
Spouses L+ONARDO DARA,AN and ;A. /+R+SA DARA,AN vs. J.DG+ +LI G.,. NA/I-IDAD
)acts*
The complainants alleged that upon motion of the court$appointed guardian, =ina ?rancisco$Iele;, the
respondent (udge issued the subject writ of preliminary attachment against their properties even as they are not
parties to the guardianship proceedings. 0+plaining his side in the instant administrative case, the respondent
judge pleaded that he thought all along that under Section 8, Rule 48 of the Revised Rules of Court, he could
issue the "uestioned writ to protect and preserve the rights of the wards in the light of the sworn assertion of the
guardian, =ina ?rancisco$Iele;, that the complainants were indebted to her wards1 that even as the complainants
had priorly been cited by the guardian in a motion to re"uire them to appear for e+amination as debtors of her
wards and against whom she )guardian* had initiated the filing of si+ )8* informations for violation of G.P. Glg.
>>, they )complainants* did not appear to oppose the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment1 that the
department store of the complainants that the sheriff opened, because the former had abandoned the same.
Issue* !hether or not the writ should have been issued#
Ruling*
Section 8, Rule 48 of the 9486 Revised Rules of Court under which the respondent judge issued the
"uestioned writ of preliminary injunction provides<
Sec. 8. Proceedin$ when "ersons sus"ected of embe%%lin$ or concealin$ "ro"ert& of ward. ' @pon complaint of
the guardian or ward, or of any person having actual or prospective interest in the estate of the ward as creditor,
heir or otherwise, that anyone is suspected of having embe;;led, concealed or conveyed away any money, goods
or interest or a written instrument, belonging to the ward or his estate, the court may cite the suspected person to
appear for e+amination, touching such money, goods, interest or instrument and ma2e such orders as will secure
the estate against such embe;;lement, concealment or conveyance.
&n the leading case of (ui vs. Piccio,the foregoing rule was construed as follows<
+ + + its purpose is merely to elicit information or secure evidence from the person suspected of having
embe;;led, concealed or conveyed away any personal property of the ward. &n such proceeding the court has no
authority to determine the right of property or to order delivery thereof. &f after the e+amination the court finds
sufficient evidence showing ownership on the part of the ward, it is the duty of the guardian to bring the proper
action.
+ + + the jurisdiction of the court in guardianship proceedings, ordinarily, is to cite persons suspected of having
embe;;led, concealed or conveyed property belonging to the ward for the purpose of obtaining information
which may be used in an action later to be instituted by the guardian to protect the right of the ward1 and that
only in e+treme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has already been
judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian.
&t is, therefore, beyond cavil that, as found by the Court of Appeals, the respondent judge ,clearly e+ceeded LhisM
jurisdiction- in issuing the writ. &narguably, a guardianship court e+ercises but a limited jurisdiction that cannot
e+tend to the determination of "uestions of ownership. Apart from that, the G.P. Glg. >> cases filed by the wards
against the herein complainants can not be utili;ed by the respondent judge as basis for the issuance of the writ
simply because the cases are not before the guardianship court over which he was then presiding. Similarly, the
fact that herein complainants were deliberately and by stealth removing all their wares and goods from their
store to the prejudice of the wards to whom they )complainants* were indebted to the tune of P: million is
entirely foreign to the guardianship proceedings1 and the guardian5s remedy was to institute a collection suit
against the complainants in the proper court and therein apply for a writ of attachment.
S+,OND DI-ISION
0G.R. No. !!"'#. )e6ruar2 :% !''!4
DINA5 B. /ONOG vs. ,O.R/ O) APP+ALS and +DGAR -. DAG.I;OL
)acts*
A year after the birth of her illegitimate daughter Fardin ?aith, petitioner left for the @nited States of
America where she found wor2 as a registered nurse. Fardin ?aith was left in the care of her father )private
respondent herein* and paternal grandparents. Private respondent filed a petition for guardianship over Fardin
?aith, doc2eted as Sp. Proc. /o. %$4>$99A:K. Petitioner contends that she is entitled to the custody of the minor,
Fardin ?aith, as a matter of law. ?irst, as the mother of Fardin ?aith, the law confers parental authority upon
her as the mother of the illegitimate minor. Second, Fardin ?aith cannot be separated from her since she had
not, as of then, attained the age of seven.
Issue* !hether or not the father can e+ercise temporary custody of the minor, Fardin ?aith, since it appears that
the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been terminated, and no pronouncement has
been made as to who should have final custody of the minor#
Ruling*
Ces. Gearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, we find that the
appellate court did not err in allowing her father )private respondent herein* to retain in the meantime parental
custody over her. Eeanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into
a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment. &t
shall be only understood that, for the present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor
should remain with her father, the private respondent herein pending final judgment of the trial court in Sp. Proc.
/o. %$4>$99A:K.
/5IRD DI-ISION
0G.R. No. 7#!73. June !1% !''74
,RISAN/O RA)A+LI/O G. G.ALB+R/O -% petitioner, vs. ,O.R/ O) APP+ALS? 5on. 5+L+N B.
RI,A)OR/% Presiding Judge% Regional /rial ,ourt Para@aAue ,it2% Branc= !#'? and JO9,+L9N D.
PABLO8G.ALB+R/O% respondents.
)acts*
Crisanto Rafaelito F. Fualberto I filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to (oycelyn
. Pablo Fualberto, with an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 6$year$old son, minor
Rafaello )the child, for brevity*, whom (oycelyn allegedly too2 away with her from the conjugal home and his
school when she decided to abandon Crisanto. 'ne Renato Santos, President of @nited Security =ogistic
testified that he was commissioned by Crisanto to conduct surveillance on (oycelyn and came up with the
conclusion that she is having lesbian relations. The findings of Renato Santos were corroborated by a house
helper of the spouses who stated that the mother does not care for the child as she very often goes out of the
house and on one occasion, she saw (oycelyn slapping the child.
Issue* !hether or not the Respondent Court of Appeals, when it awarded the custody of the child to the father,
violated Art. >9K of the ?amily Code, which mandates that Nno child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.5
Ruling*
&t should be noted that the ?amily Code has reverted to the Civil Code provision mandating that a child
below seven years should not be separated from the mother. &t has indeed been held that under certain
circumstances, the mother5s immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason to deprive her of custody. Gut
se+ual preference or moral la+ity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. /ot even the fact that
a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have custody of her
minor child. To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an
adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from e+ercising proper parental
care.
/5IRD DI-ISION
G.R. No. 7#$3$ Octo6er 1% !''3
JO+9 D. BRION+S vs. ;ARI,+L P. ;IG.+L% )RAN,IS,A P. ;IG.+L and LOR+/A P. ;IG.+L
)acts*
Petitioner (oey . Griones filed a Petition for Babeas Corpus against respondents Earicel Pineda
Eiguel and ?rancisca Pineda Eiguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Eichael Oevin Pineda. The petitioner
alleges that the minor Eichael Oevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent =oreta P. Eiguel. The
respondent =oreta P. Eiguel is now married to a (apanese national and is presently residing in (apan.
Issue* !ho Should Bave Custody of the Child#
Ruling*
Baving been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of petitioner and
Respondent =oreta. Article 9.8 of the ?amily Code of the Philippines e+plicitly provides that Jillegitimate
children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code.J This is the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity.
avid v. Court of Appeals held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be a ground for
ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law e+plicitly confers to the mother sole
parental authority over an illegitimate child1 it follows that only if she defaults can the father assume custody
and authority over the minor. 'f course, the putative father may adopt his own illegitimate child1 in such a case,
the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the adoptive parent.
Adoption
)IRS/ DI-ISION
G.R. No. #:3'7 )e6ruar2 #% !''#
Re2es vs. Sotero
)acts*
Private respondents Chichioco and her alleged co$heirs filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
annulment of the adoption decree. &t was alleged that petitioner5s natural mother supposedly connived with the
court personnel to ma2e it appear that petitioner was adopted by the elos Santos spouses and that the C?&5s
order for initial hearing was published in a wee2ly newspaper which was not authori;ed to publish court orders
in special proceedings.
Issue* !hether or not the CA erred in holding that petitioner had to prove her adoption due to
imputations of irregularities in view of Section 6. of Rule K4#
Ruling*
&t should be borne in mind that an adoption decree is a public document re"uired by law to be entered
into the public records, the official repository of which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements affecting
the status of individuals, is the local civil registrar5s office as well as the court which rendered the judgment.
ocuments consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are
"rima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. As such, the certifications issued by the local civil registrar and
the cler2 of court regarding details of petitioner5s adoption which are entered in the records 2ept under their
official custody, are "rima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. These certifications suffice as proof of
the fact of petitioner5s adoption by the elos Santos spouses until contradicted or overcome by sufficient
evidence. Eere ,imputations of irregularities- will not cast a ,cloud of doubt- on the adoption decree since the
certifications and its contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered.
S+,OND DI-ISION
G.R. No. 37' Jul2 !% !''#
Rivera vs. -illanueva et. al.
)acts*
This petition touches upon "uestions of filiation, presumptions of co$e"ual ac"uisition. A closer
e+amination of the birth certificate reveals that respondent Angelina was listed as ,adopted- both by the
decedents, Iillanueva and Fon;ales.
Issue* &s the adoption of Angelina valid#
Ruling*
The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a
valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child,
and even amounts to simulation of the child5s birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a
public document. ?urthermore, it is well$settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the
facts contained therein. &t is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the
interested parties. ?ollowing the logic of Genite;, respondent Angelina and her co$defendants in S$3:. should
have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the contents of her birth certificate. The records, however, are
bereft of any such evidence.
)IRS/ DI-ISION
G.R. No. #3"31 June !:% !''#
LANDINGIN vs. R+P.BLI, O) /5+ P5ILIPPIN+S
)acts*
iwata Ramos =andingin, a citi;en of the @nited States of America )@SA*, of ?ilipino parentage and a
resident of Fuam, @SA, filed a petition for the adoption of minors 0laine i;on Ramos, 0lma i;on Ramos
and 0ugene i;on Ramos who was born on. The minors are the natural children of Eanuel Ramos, petitioner5s
brother )deceased*, and Amelia Ramos$ who went to &taly, re$married there and now has two children by her
second marriage and no longer communicated with her children .
Issue* !hether or not the petition for adoption is invalid for lac2 of consent of the biological mother#
Ruling*
/o. The general re"uirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to
safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. !hen she filed her petition with
the trial court, Rep. Act /o. 3::> was already in effect. Section 4 thereof provides that if the written consent of
the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. &f,
as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus
have adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.

)irst Division
G.R. No. 7$"1" Jul2 3% !''$
La=om vs. Si6ulo
)acts*
Ers. =ahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption in which she averred, that, despite
the proddings and pleadings of the petitioner and her husband, respondent refused to change his surname from
Sibulo to =ahom, to the frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the latter died, and even before
his death he had made 2nown his desire to revo2e respondent5s adoption, but was prevented by petitioner5s
supplication, however with his further re"uest upon petitioner to give to charity whatever properties or interest
may pertain to respondent in the future.
Issue* Eay the subject adoption, decreed on A: Eay 94.>, still be revo2ed or rescinded by an adopter after the
effectivity of R.A. /o. 3::>#
Ruling*
&t was months after the effectivity of R.A. /o. 3::> that herein petitioner filed an action to revo2e the
decree of adoption granted in 94.:. Gy then, the new law, had already abrogated and repealed the right of an
adopter under the Civil Code and the ?amily Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier
pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been
initiated by petitioner after R.A. /o. 3::> had come into force, no longer could be pursued. &nterestingly, even
before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the fiveDyear bar rule under
Rule 9AA of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revo2e the adoption decree after the
lapse of that period. The e+ercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the
re"uirements of a vested right entitled to protection. &t must also be ac2nowledged that a person has no vested
right in statutory privileges. !hile adoption has often been referred to in the conte+t of a ,right,- the privilege to
adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. &t is a privilege
that is governed by the state5s determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the
child. Eatters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption
decree, are subject to regulation by the State. Concomitantly, a rig=t of action given by statute may be ta2en
away at anytime before it has been e+ercised.
/5IRD DI-ISION
0G.R. No. 31$. ;arc= $% !''74
IN /5+ ;A//+R O) /5+ ADOP/ION O) S/+P5ANI+ NA/59 AS/ORGA GAR,IA
5ONORA/O B. ,A/INDIG% petitioner.
)acts*
Bonorato G. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie
/athy Astorga Farcia. Be alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on (une >8, 9446, that her
mother is Femma Astorga Farcia1 that Stephanie has been using her mother5s middle name and surname1 and
that he is now a widower and "ualified to be her adopting parent. Be prayed that Stephanie5s middle name
Astorga be changed to ,Farcia,- her mother5s surname, and that her surname ,Farcia- be changed to
,Catindig,- his surname.
Issue*Eay an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as
her middle name# This is the issue raised in the instant case.
Ruling*
Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother for the
following reasons<
?irst, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie5s filiation with her natural mother because under
Article 934 of the ?amily Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion
and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should
be maintained.
Second, there is no law e+pressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her
middle name. !hat the law does not prohibit, it allows.
=ast, it is customary for every ?ilipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the
mother. This custom has been recogni;ed by the Civil Code and ?amily Code. &n fact, the ?amily =aw
Committees agreed that )the initial or surname of the mother should immediatel& "recede the surname of the
father so that the second name, if an&, will be before the surname of the mother.*
A6sentee (in relation to presumption o death!
/5IRD DI-ISION
0G.R. No. #$#'3. ;a2 #% !''74
R+P.BLI, O) /5+ P5ILIPPIN+S% petitioner, vs. /5+ 5ON. ,O.R/ O) APP+ALS &/Bentiet=
Division(% 5ON. PR+SIDING J.DG+ )OR/.NI/O L. ;ADRONA% R/,8BR. $7 and
APOLINARIA ;ALINAO JO;O,% respondents.
)acts*
The Republic )petitioner* insists that the declaration of presumptive death under Article 69 of the
?amily Code is not a special proceeding involving multiple or separate appeals where a record on appeal shall
be filed and served in li2e manner. Petitioner cites Rule 9A4 of the Revised Rules of Court which enumerates the
cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed and a record on appeal is re"uired for an appeal to be perfected. The
petition for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse not being included in the enumeration,
petitioner contends that a mere notice of appeal suffices.
Issue* The principal issue in this case is whether a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a person
is in the nature of a special proceeding.
Ruling*
The instant petition is in the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action. The petition
merely see2s for a declaration by the trial court of the presumptive death of absentee spouse Clemente
(omoc. &t does not see2 the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
/either does it involve a demand of right or a cause of action that can be enforced against any person.
/5IRD DI-ISION
0G.R. No. $#3#:. April #% !'''4
AN/ONIA AR;AS 9 ,ALIS/+RIO% petitioner, vs. ;ARI+//A ,ALIS/+RIO% respondent.
)acts*
Petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial
Court a petition entitled, J&n the Eatter of &ntestate 0state of the eceased Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos,
Antonia Armas, Petitioner,J claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the
marriage between the latter and respondent Earietta 0spinosa Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and thereby
null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano C. Armas, (r., be appointed administrator, without bond, of
the estate of the deceased and that the inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate
would have been settled. Respondent Earietta opposed the petition. Earietta stated that her first marriage with
(ames Gounds had been dissolved due to the latterPs absence, his whereabouts being un2nown, for more than
eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouse
of Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration of the estate of the decedent.
Issue* !hether or not the trial court erred in holding that the marriage between oppositor$appellant and the
deceased Teodorico Calisterio is bigamous for failure of the former to secure a decree of the presumptive death
of her first spouse#
Ruling*
@nder the 9433 ?amily Code, in order that a subse"uent bigamous marriage may e+ceptionally be
considered valid, the following conditions must concur1 vi%.< )a* The prior spouse of the contracting party must
have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the
circumstances stated in Article K49 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance1 )b* the spouse present has a
well$founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead1 and )c* there is, unli2e the old rule, a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary
proceeding in court to as2 for that declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the
re"uirement of judicial intervention in subse"uent marriages as so provided in Article 69, in relation to Article
6A, of the ?amily Code. &n the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent EariettaPs first husband, (ames
!illiam Gounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a
second marriage in 94:3 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been contracted
during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of (ames Gounds.
S+,OND DI-ISION
G.R. No. #713! /ovember >4, >AA:
+D.ARDO P. ;AN.+L vs. P+OPL+ O) /5+ P5ILIPPIN+S
)acts*
&n a criminal action for bigamy, petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second
element of the felony, i.e., that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case hisHher spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead under the Civil Code. Be avers that when he married
Fandalera in 9448, FaQa had been ,absent- for >9 years since 94.:1 under Article K4A of the Civil Code, she
was presumed dead as a matter of law. Be points out that, under the first paragraph of Article K4A of the Civil
Code, one who has been absent for seven years, whether or not heHshe is still alive, shall be presumed dead for
all "ur"oses e+cept for succession, while the second paragraph refers to the rule on legal presumption of death
with respect to succession.
Issue* !hether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law when it ruled that petitioner5s
first wife cannot be legally presumed dead as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death#
Ruling*
&t was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant in
9448, he was of the well$grounded belief that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for
more than >A years since 94.:. Be should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring
the presumptive death of his first wife as re"uired by Article K64 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Article 69 of the ?amily Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in
good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a
conse"uence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge
his burden.
/5IRD DI-ISION
G.R. No. #7737 ;arc= !3% !''#
SO,IAL S+,.RI/9 S9S/+; vs. /+R+SI/A JAR>.+ -DA. D+ BAILON
)acts*
Clemente F. Gailon )Gailon* and Alice P. ia; )Alice* contracted marriage in Garcelona, Sorsogon.
Eore than 9: years, Gailon filed before the then Court of ?irst &nstance a petition to declare Alice presumptively
dead which was granted. Close to 9K years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead Gailon
contracted marriage with Teresita (ar"ue )respondent*. Gailon, who was a member of the Social Security System
and a retiree pensioner thereof, died. Respondent filed a claim for funeral benefits. Cecilia Gailon$Cap )Cecilia*,
who claimed to be a daughter of Gailon and one 0lisa (ayona )0lisa* contested before the SSS the release to
respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She claimed that Gailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime,
the first with Alice, the second with her mother 0lisa, and the third with respondent, all of whom are still alive1
she, together with her siblings, paid for Gailon5s medical and funeral e+penses1 and all the documents submitted
by respondent to the SSS in support of her claims are spurious. SSS stopped the release of pension to
respondent.
Issue* !hether or not the subse"uent marriage of Gailon to respondent is bigamous#
Ruling*
&t bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally e+cept in a direct
proceeding. Conse"uently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and
not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage
had been perfectly valid. @pon the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made
good ab initio. &n the case at bar, as no step was ta2en to nullify, in accordance with law, Gailon5s and
respondent5s marriage prior to the former5s death in 9443, respondent is rightfully the dependent
spouse$beneficiary of Gailon. &n fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but
only voidable under Article 3K, paragraph >, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been
contracted with the first wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had
been generally believed dead, still the action for annulment became e+tinguished as soon as one of the
three persons involved had died, as provided in Article 3., paragraph >, of the Code, re"uiring that the
action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And
furthermore, the li"uidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable
marriage must be carried out ,in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse,- as
e+pressly provided in Section > of the Revised Rule .K, and not in the annulment proceeding.
S+,OND DI-ISION
0A.;. No. ;/J8"#8'11. Jul2 "% ""#4
RODOL)O G. NA-ARRO% complainant, vs. J.DG+ 5+RNANDO ,. DO;AG/O9% respondent.
)acts*
The complainant in this administrative case is the Eunicipal Eayor of apa, Surigao del /orte,
Rodolfo F. /avarro. &n relation to the charges against him, respondent judge see2s e+culpation from his act of
having solemni;ed the marriage between Faspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn ?.
Gorga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Eunicipal Trial (udge of Gasey, Samar,
confirming the fact that Er. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. !ith
respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemni;ing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario,
he did not violate Article ., paragraph 9 of the ?amily Code which states that< JEarriage may be solemni;ed
by< )9* Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courtPs jurisdiction-1 and that Article 3 thereof
applies to the case in "uestion.
Issue* !hether or not there was valid subse"uent marriage#
Ruling*
?or the purpose of contracting the subse"uent marriage, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice
to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. 0ven if the spouse present has a well$founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in
order to contract a subse"uent marriage, a mandatory re"uirement which has been precisely incorporated into
the ?amily Code to discourage subse"uent marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been
dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
5a6eas ,orpus
/=ornton v. /=ornton &GR No. 737"1 August #% !''3(
)acts*
Se"uiera (ennifer elle ?rancisco Thornton was born to petitioner and respondent. !ithout notifying
her husband, the respondent left the family home with her daughter. &n view of this incident, the petitioner filed
a petition for habeas corpus in the designated ?amily Court in Ea2ati but was dismissed on the ground that the
child was in Gasilan. Petitioner filed another petition for habeas corpus with CA but it was also denied. Bence,
this petition for review.
Issue* !hether CA has jurisdiction to issue writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors in light of the
provision in R.A. 3K84 giving ?amily Courts e+clusive original jurisdiction over such petitioners#
Ruling*
Ces, the CA should ta2e cogni;ance of the case since there is nothing in RA 3K84 )RTC 0S&F/AT0
AS ?AE&=C C'@RTS* that revo2ed its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving custody of minors.
The provision of RA 3K84 reveals no manifest intent to revo2e the jurisdiction of the CA and SC to issue said
writs. &t cannot be said that the provisions of RA 3K84, RA .4A> )0RPA/&/F TB0 (@R&S&CT&'/ '? TB0
C'@RT '? APP0A=S* and GP 9>4 are absolutely incompatible since RA 3K84 does not prohibit the CA and
SC from issuing said writs. ?amily Courts have concurrent jurisdiction with CA and Sc in petition for habeas
corpus involving custody of minors.
;ON,.PA vs. +NRIL+ &G.R. No. L8#$$37 0"1#4 P5S, !$ &$' Januar2 "1#((
)acts*
Petitioner was arrested on the allegation that he was a /ational emocratic ?ront )/?* staff member, a
Presidential Commitment 'rder )PC'* was issued against him and eight )3* other persons. Be was temporarily
released on the condition that he cannot travel outside Eetro Eanila, change his residence, be interviewed by
media, and have to report to the military.
Isuue* !hether or not habeas corpus can be availed of#
Ruling*
Babeas corpus is available not only for those who are in actual detention but even for those whose
liberty is merely restrained.
-illavicencio v. LuC6an &G.R. No. L83#$" ;arc= !7% ""(
)acts*
Eayor =u2ban, for the best of all reasons, to e+terminate vice, ordered the segregated district for
women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Eanila, closed. The city
authorities "uietly perfected arrangements with the Gureau of =abor for sending the women to avao,
Eindanao, as laborers1 with some government office for the use of the coastguard cutters (orre$idor and
+e$ros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers.
Issue* Should the person be actually confined for writ of Babeas Corpus to issue#
Ruling*
/o, there is no need for actual confinement. Any restraint which precludes freedom of action is
sufficient. The forcible ta2ing of women of ill$repute from Eanila to be brought to avao, deprived them of
their freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they were imprisoned.
Som6ong v. ,A% et. al. &GR NO. 1:#% Januar2 $% ""#(
)acts*
Petitioner filed a petition in the RTC of %ue;on City for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus against
r. Carmen TC and her husband, owners of the Sir (ohn Clinic located at Caloocan City for allegedly detaining
and imprisoning her daughter Arabella whom she left at the clinic for her failure to pay her hospital bill. !hen
thereafter, she paid the spouses but despite her pleas to have her child bac2, the spouses refused to return her
child bac2, the spouses refused to return her daughter. Petition was dismissed on the ground of lac2 of
jurisdiction, the alleged detention having been perpetrated in Caloocan. A criminal complaint ensued and later
on, information for 2idnapping and detention of a minor was filed. ?acing arrest, r. Ty disclosed the possibility
that the child may be found in San ?rancisco del Eonte in %ue;on City. The agents of the /G& went in the said
place and there found a female child who answered to the name of Cristina Frace /eri. %uite significantly the
evidence disclosed that the child Cristina, had been living with respondent Earietta /eri Alviar since 9433.
!hen she was just a baby, Cristina was abandoned by her parents at the Sir (ohn Clinic.
Issue* Should the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus be granted to petitioner#
Ruling*
/o, petitioner does not have the right of custody over the minor child Cristina because by evidence
disclosed before the trial court, Cristina has not been shown to the petitioner5s daughter, Arabella. The evidence
adduced before the trial court does not warrant the conclusion that Arabella is the same person as Cristina. &t will
be remembered that in habeas corpus proceedings, the "uestion of identity is relevant and material, subject to the
usual presumptions including those to the identity of the person. Since petitioner was not able to establish by
evidence to be entitled to the custody of the minor Cristina on account of mista2en identity, it cannot be said that
private respondents are unlawfully withholding from petitioner the rightful custody over Cristina.
GL+NN ,ABALL+S 9 ,5.A -S ,A
G.R. NO. #$'1. )+BR.AR9 !$% !''7
)acts*
'n /ovember 94, >AA9, Petitioner Flenn Chua Caballes was charged with rape of minor in the RTC of
Ealabon City. Gecause the petitioner was charged with a non$bailable offense, he was detained. 'n Eay :,
>AAK, the petitioner filed a motion see2ing an earlier trial date, invo2ing his right to speedy trial Act of 9443. 'n
(uly 6, >AAK, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying his petition for bail. Bowever,
the petitioner prompted the resolution of his motion for reconsideration and filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that his right to speedy and trial has been violated. The trial court reasoned that there was no violation of
the petitioner5s right to speedy trail, considering that the apparent delays could not be attributed to the petitioner
also sought post moments of the trials. The petitioner then filed with Court of Appeals a ,petition for Babeas
Corpus andHor certiorari and prohibition.-
Issue* !hether or not the proper remedy from the appellate court5s denial of a petitioner for a writ of habeas
corpus is a petition for cetionari under rule 8: of the rules of court.
Ruling*
The Supreme Court denied the petition citing Administrative matter no. A9$AKSC amending section K,
rule 69 of the ruled of court. The SC held that the petitioner should have appealed to this court from the CA
decision denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The well$settled rule is that certiorari, is not available
where the aggrieved party5s remedy of appeal is plain, speedy and ade"uate in the ordinary course, the reason
being that certiorari cannot co$e+ist with an appeal or any other ade"uate remedy. A petition for a writ of habeas
corpus is a remedy different from the special civil action of certiorari under rule 8: of the rules of court, as
amended. The writ of habeas corpus is a collateral attac2 on the processes, orders, as judgment of the trial court,
while certiorari is a direct attac2 of said processes, orders or judgment on the ground of lac2 of jurisdiction.
,=ange of name
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 153883. January 13, 2004]
R+P.BLI, O) /5+ P5ILIPPIN+S% petitioner% vs. ,5.L+ 9. LI;% respondent.
)acts*
&n her petition for correction of entries under Rule 9A3, respondent claimed that <
?irst, she claims that her surname ,Cu- was misspelled as ,Co-. She has been using ,Cu- in all her school
records and in her marriage certificate. She presented a clearance from the /ational Gureau of &nvestigation
)/G&* to further show the consistency in her use of the surname ,Cu-.
Second, she claims that her father5s name in her birth record was written as ,Co iu To )Co Tian*- when it
should have been ,Cu io To )Co Tian*.-
Third, her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been ?ilipino considering that her father and
mother never got married. 'nly her deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is ?ilipina. She claims that
her being a registered voter attests to the fact that she is a ?ilipino citi;en.
?inally, it was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was a legitimate child when she
should have been described as illegitimate considering that her parents were never married.
Issue* !hether or not the CA erred in ordering the correction of the citi;enship of respondent and
allowing respondent to continue using her father5s legitimate surname despite her illegitimacy#
Ruling*
Article &I, Section 9)K* of the 94K: Constitution, which provides that the citi;enship of a legitimate
child born of a ?ilipino mother and an alien father followed the citi;enship of the father, unless, upon reaching
the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citi;enship. =i2ewise, the Republic invo2es the provision in
Section 9 of Commonwealth Act /o. 8>:, that legitimate children born of ?ilipino mothers may elect Philippine
citi;enship by e+pressing such intention ,in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before
any officer authori;ed to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall
accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Fovernment of the
Philippines.-
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory re"uirements of electing ?ilipino citi;enship apply only to
legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child,
considering that her Chinese father and ?ilipino mother were never married. As such, she was not re"uired to
comply with said constitutional and statutory re"uirements to become a ?ilipino citi;en. Gy being an
illegitimate child of a ?ilipino mother, respondent automatically became a ?ilipino upon birth. Stated
differently, she is a ?ilipino since birth without having to elect ?ilipino citi;enship when she reached the age of
majority.
&n its second assignment of error, the Republic assails the Court of Appeals5 decision in allowing
respondent to use her father5s surname despite its finding that she is illegitimate.
The Republic5s submission is misleading. The Court of Appeals did not allow respondent to use her
father5s surname. !hat it did allow was the correction of her father5s misspelled surname which she has been
using ever since she can remember. &n this regard, respondent does not need a court pronouncement for her to
use her father5s surname.
RP vs. La6rador
GR No. $!"1' ;arc= """
)acts*
This is a Petition for Review on (ertiorari see2ing to set aside the ecision of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City in Special Proceedings /o. 838 9$C0G granting the petition filed by respondent to have the name
appearing on the birth certificate of Sarah Sita CaQon 0rasmo changed from- Sarah Sita 0rasmo- to ,Sarah Sita
Canon- and that the name of Sarah Sita5s mother, which appeared as ,Rosemarie G. Canon- in the child5s birth
record, be changed to ,Earia Rosario Canon.- Petitioner contended that the summary proceedings under Rule
9A3 of the Rules of Court and Article 69> of the Civil Code may be used only to correct or change clerical or
innocuous errors. &t argued that Rule 9A3 cannot be used to modify, alter or increase substantive rights, such as
those involving the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, which respondent desired to do. The change sought
will result not only in substantial correction in the child5s record of birth but also in the child5s rights which
cannot be effected in a summary action.
Issue* !hether or not summary proceedings for the change of name can be availed of#
Ruling*
Summary proceedings provided under Rule 9A3 of the Rules of Court and Article 69> of the Civil Code
maybe used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the Civil Registry.
Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested
parties are impleaded and due process is observed. !here the effect of a correction of an entry in a civil registry
will change the status of a person from ,legitimate- to ,illegitimate,- as in Sarah Sita5s case, the same cannot be
granted in summary proceedings. The changes sought by respondent were substantial, thus, an adversarial
proceeding is essential in order to fully thresh out the allegations in respondent5s petition. Sarah Sita and her
purported parents should have been parties to the proceeding. After all, it would affect her legitimacy as well as
her successional and other rights. The Supreme Court found the proceeding conducted in the present case does
not suffice. Conse"uently, it annulled and set aside the decision of the trial court.
)IRS/ DI-ISION
0G.R. No. $'!::. ;a2 "% !''!4
;A. LO.RD+S BARRI+N/OS +L+OSIDA% for and in 6e=alf of =er minor c=ild% ,5ARL+S
,5RIS/IAN +L+OSIDA vs. LO,AL ,I-IL R+GIS/RAR O) >.+<ON ,I/9% and ,ARLOS
-ILL+NA BORBON
)acts*
Ea. =ourdes 0leosida filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of %ue;on City see2ing to correct
the following entries in the birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian< first, the surname JGorbonJ should be
changed to J0leosida1J second, the date of the parentsP wedding should be left blan21 and third, the informantPs
name should be JEa. =ourdes G. 0leosida,J instead of JEa. =ourdes 0. Gorbon.J &n support of her petition,
petitioner alleged that she gave birth to her son out of wedloc2 on Eay >6, 944>1 that she and the boyPs father,
Carlos Gorbon, were never married1 and that the child is therefore illegitimate and should follow the motherPs
surname. The petition impleaded the =ocal Registrar of %ue;on City and Carlos Iillena Gorbon as respondents.
Issue* !hether or not corrections of entries in the certificate of live birth pursuant to Article 69> of the Civil
Code, in relation to Rule 9A3 of the Rules of Court may be allowed even if the errors to be corrected are
substantial and not merely clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature#
Ruling*
Rule 9A3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries
in the civil registry. The proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. &f the
correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. &f the
rectification affects the civil status, citi;enship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the
procedure to be adopted is adversary. This is our ruling in Republic vs. Ialencia where we held that even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 9A3 provided the
parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. An appropriate
adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have
been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the
opposite partyPs case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.
S+,OND DI-ISION
0G.R. No. 7""##. ;arc= $'% !''74
IN R+* P+/I/ION )OR ,5ANG+ O) NA;+ ANDDOR ,ORR+,/IOND,AN,+LLA/ION O)
+N/R9 IN ,I-IL R+GIS/R9 O) J.LIAN LIN ,AR.LASAN EANG also CnoBn as J.LIAN
LIN EANG% to 6e amendedDcorrected as J.LIAN LIN EANG% J.LIAN LIN EANG% dul2
represented 62 =is mot=er ANNA LISA EANG vs. ,+B. ,I/9 ,I-IL R+GIS/RAR% dul2
represented 62 t=e Registrar OS,AR B. ;OLO
)acts*
Petitioner (ulian =in Carulasan !ang, a minor, represented by his mother Anna =isa !ang,
filed a petition dated 94 September >AA> for change of name andHor correctionHcancellation of entry in
the Civil Registry of (ulian =in Carulasan !ang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have
his registered name changed from (ulian =in Carulasan !ang to (ulian =in !ang. Petitioner theori;es
that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name as this would help him to adjust more
easily to and integrate himself into Singaporean society.
Issue* oes the law allow one to drop the middle name from his registered name on the cause
mentioned#
Ruling*
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be Nproper and reasonable cause5 for
which the change is sought. To justify a re"uest for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper
or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.
Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are< )a* when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or e+tremely difficult to write or pronounce1 )b* when the change results as a legal conse"uence, as
in legitimation1 )c* when the change will avoid confusion1 )d* when one has continuously used and been 2nown
since childhood by a ?ilipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage1 )e* a sincere desire to adopt a ?ilipino
name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody1 and )f* when the
surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
)IRS/ DI-ISION
G.R. No. 7:'3$ )e6ruar2 !% !'':
R+P.BLI, O) /5+ P5ILIPPIN+S vs. /RINIDAD R.A. ,APO/+
)acts*
Respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote,Fiovanni5s guardian ad litem filed a petition for change of name of
her ward from iovanni +. allamaso to iovanni +adores. Republic contends that the CA erred in affirming
the trial court5s decision which granted the petition for change of name despite the non$joinder of indispensable
parties.
Issue* !hether or not the change petition for change of name should be granted#
Ruling*
The law and facts obtaining here favor Fiovanni5s petition. Fiovanni availed of the proper remedy, a
petition for change of name under Rule 9AK of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural
re"uirements. After hearing, the trial court found )and the appellate court affirmed* that the evidence presented
during the hearing of Fiovanni5s petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 9.8 of the Civil Code,
Fiovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recogni;ed by his father while his mother has always
recogni;ed him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recogni;ed by his
father. &t is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mother5s intended petition to have him join her in the
@nited States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son.
,orrection of entries
/5IRD DI-ISION
0G.R. No. 3#"#$. ;arc= 7% !''34
R+P.BLI, O) /5+ P5ILIPPIN+S and /5+ LO,AL ,I-IL R+GIS/RAR% G.I;BA% N.+-A +,IJA%
vs. P+/RONIO L. B+N+;+RI/O
)acts*
Respondent Petronio =. Genemerito, filed a verified petition before the Regional Trial Court of /ueva
0cija as2ing for the correction of certain entries in the record of birth of his son, (oven =ee Genemerito, on file
with the =ocal Civil Registrar of Fuimba, /ueva 0cija. The entries sought to be corrected included $
)a* a change of the fatherPs name from Peter Laurente Benemerito to Petronio L.
Benemerito1 and
)b* the date of marriage of (oven =ee5s parents, 0dna I. Sicat and Petronio =. Genemerito
appearing therein from ' Septem6er "1" to !7 Januar2 ""1.
Issue* !hether or not the correction of the spelling of petitionerPs name from Peter =aurente Genemerito to
Petronio =aurente Genemerito and the change of the date of marriage from September 9, 9434 to reflect the
actual date of marriage as (anuary >:, 9443, are innocuous#
Ruling*
/o. Rule 9A3 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Article 69> of the Civil Code, states the procedure by
which an entry in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding there contemplated may
generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry.
A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding1 an error made by a cler2 or a
transcriber1 a mista2e in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly
misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. 'n the other hand, substantial or contentious
alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due
process is properly observed.
The ,corrections- sought to be made by respondent in the birth certificate of (oven =ee could hardly
"ualify as just clerical errors, therefore not innocous. &n order to effect the desired changes, it would be essential
to establish that Peter =aurente Genemerito, the person named as being the father of (oven =ee, and Petronio =.
Genemerito, herein respondent, refer to the same person. The intended correction of the date of marriage of the
parents of (oven =ee from A9 September 9434, appearing in his certificate of birth, to >: (anuary 9443, would,
in effect, change the status of the child, (oven =ee, born on A9 (une 944A at a time when he and his wife were
not as yet legally married, from being the legitimate son of Peter =aurente Genemerito to being instead the
legitimated child of Petronio =. Genemerito and a certain Peter =aurente Genemerito.
S+,OND DI-ISION
0G.R. No. !'71:. Januar2 !'% !''34
;ILAGROS ;. BAR,O% as t=e Natural Guardian and Guardian Ad Litem of ;AR9 JO9 ANN
G.S/ILO vs. ,O.R/ O) APP+ALS &SP+,IAL SIF/++N/5 DI-ISION(% R+GIONAL /RIAL
,O.R/ &BR. $$8;AGA/I(% N,JR? /5+ LO,AL ,I-IL R+GIS/RAR O) ;AGA/I? and
NADINA G. ;ARA-ILLA
)acts*
The Court of Appeals held that jurisdiction over the parties was properly ac"uired through the notice by
publication effected in conformity with Section 6 of Rule 9A3. Garco assails this holding and claims that the
failure to implead her as a party to the petition for correction deprived the RTC of jurisdiction.
Issue* !hether or not in the petition for the correction of entry, jurisdiction over the parties was properly
ac"uired#
Ruling*
Ces. Garco is among the parties referred to in Section K of Rule 9A3. Ber interest was affected by the
petition for correction, as any judicial determination that (une was the daughter of Armando would affect her
ward5s share in the estate of her father. &t cannot be established whether /adina 2new of Eary (oy5s e+istence at
the time she filed the petition for correction. &ndeed, doubt may always be cast as to whether a petitioner under
Rule 9A3 would 2now of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition. The fact
that /adina amended her petition to implead ?rancisco and Fustilo indicates earnest effort on her part to comply
with Section K as "uoted above.Cet, even though Garco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of Appeals
correctly pointed out that the defect was cured by compliance with Section 6, Rule 9A3, which re"uires notice
by publication, thus<
Section 6. @pon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by order, fi+ the time and place for the
hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the
petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a wee2 for three )K* consecutive
wee2s in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
The purpose precisely of Section 6, Rule 9A3 is to bind the whole world to the subse"uent judgment on the
petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section K,
Rule 9A3, but were inadvertently left out.
/5IRD DI-ISION
0G.R. No. $!"1'. ;arc= !7% """4
R+P.BLI, O) /5+ P5ILIPPIN+S vs. GLAD9S ,. LABRADOR
)acts*
Petitioner contended that the summary proceedings under Rule 9A3 of the Rules of Court and Article
69> of the Civil Code may be used only to correct or change clerical or innocuous errors. &t argued that Rule
9A3 cannot be used to modify, alter or increase substantive rights, such as those involving the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the child, which respondent desired to do. The change sought will result not only in substantial
correction in the child5s record of birth but also in the child5s rights which cannot be effected in a summary
action.
Issue* !hether or not Rule 9A3 of the Revised Rules of Court is the proper action to impugn the legitimacy of a
child#
Ruling*
/o. Summary proceedings provided under Rule 9A3 of the Rules of Court and Article 69> of the Civil
Code maybe used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the Civil
Registry. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all
interested parties are impleaded and due process is observed. !here the effect of a correction of an entry in a
civil registry will change the status of a person from ,legitimate- to ,illegitimate,- as in Sarah Sita5s case, the
same cannot be granted in summary proceedings. The changes sought by respondent were substantial, thus, an
adversarial proceeding is essential in order to fully thresh out the allegations in respondent5s petition. Sarah Sita
and her purported parents should have been parties to the proceeding. After all, it would affect her legitimacy as
well as her successional and other rights. The Supreme Court found the proceeding conducted in the present
case does not suffice. Conse"uently, it annulled and set aside the decision of the trial court.
)IRS/ DI-ISION
0G.R. No. #3'3. Jul2 !"% !''74
ROS+NDO ALBA% minor% represented 62 =is mot=er and natural guardian% Armi A. Al6a% and
AR;I A. ALBA vs. ,O.R/ O) APP+ALS and ROS+NDO ,. 5+RR+RA
)acts*
Private respondent Rosendo C. Berrera filed a petition for cancellation of the following entries in the
birth certificate of ,Rosendo Alba Berrera, (r.-, to wit< )9* the surname ,Berrera- as appended to the name of
said child1 )>* the reference to private respondent as the father of Rosendo Alba Berrera, (r.1 and )K* the alleged
marriage of private respondent to the child5s mother, Armi A. Alba )Armi* on August 6, 943> in Eandaluyong
City. Be claimed that the challenged entries are false and that it was only sometime in September 9448 that he
learned of the e+istence of said birth certificate.
Issue* !hether or not the trial court ac"uired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and her minor child#
Ruling*
Substantial corrections or cancellations of entries in civil registry records affecting the status or
legitimacy of a person may be effected through the institution of a petition under Rule 9A3 of the Revised Rules
of Court, with the proper Regional Trial Court. Geing a proceeding in rem, ac"uisition of jurisdiction over the
person of petitioner is therefore not re"uired in the present case. &t is enough that the trial court is vested with
jurisdiction over the subject matter.The service of the order at /o. 693 Ar"ui;a St., 0rmita, Eanila and the
publication thereof in a newspaper of general circulation in Eanila, sufficiently complied with the re"uirement
of due process. Eoreover, the publication of the order is a notice to all indispensable parties, including Armi
and petitioner minor, which binds the whole world to the judgment that may be rendered in the petition. An in
rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. The absence of personal service of the order to Armi
was therefore cured by the trial court5s compliance with Section 6, Rule 9A3, which re"uires notice by
publication.
+N BAN,
0G.R. No. $13"#. )e6ruar2 !$% !''34
5.B+R/ /AN ,O and ARL+N+ /AN ,O vs. /5+ ,I-IL R+GIS/+R O) ;ANILA and an2 person
=aving or claiming an interest under t=e entr2 B=ose cancellation or correction is soug=t
)acts*
Petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Eanila a petition under Rule 9A3 of the Rules of Court for
correction of entries in their certificates of birth. They alleged that they were born in the Philippines and the
legitimate children of C' G''/ P0/F who is formerly a citi;en of China, was conferred Philippine
citi;enship by naturali;ation under Presidential ecree /o. 9A:: and had ta2en his oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and at the time of birth of LtheM petitioners, their father C' G''/ P0/F was still a
Chinese citi;en that is why entry in their respective birth certificates as to their father5s citi;enship was Chinese.
?urther they claimed that since they were born in the Philippines and still minors at that time, they became
?ilipino citi;ens through the derivative mode of naturali;ation under our/aturali;ation =aw, specifically Section
9: of Commonwealth Act /o. 6.K, as amended by Commonwealth Act /o. :K:.
Issue* !hether or not the petition is appropriate#
Ruling*
The petitioners5 recourse to Rule 9A3 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is appropriate. @nder Article
69> of the /ew Civil Code, no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
The law does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed. Gut the Court approved Rule 9A3 of
the Rules of Court to provide for a procedure to implement the law. The entries envisaged in Article 69> of the
/ew Civil Code are those provided in Articles 6A. and 6A3 of the /ew Civil Code which reads<
Art. 6A.. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
Art. 6A3. The following shall be entered in the civil register<
)9* Girths1 )>* Earriages1 )K* deaths1 )6* legal separations1 ):* annulments of marriage1 )8*
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning1 ).* legitimations1 )3* adoptions1 )4*
ac2nowledgments of natural children1 )9A* naturali;ation1 )99* loss, or )9>* recovery of citi;enship1
)9K* civil interdiction1 )96* judicial determination of filiation1 )9:* voluntary emancipation of a minor1
and )98* changes of name.
Specific matters covered by the said provision include not only status but also nationality. The acts, events
or factual errors envisaged in Article 6A. of the /ew Civil Code include even those that occur after the birth of
the petitioner. Bowever, in such cases, the entries in the certificates of birth will not be corrected or changed.
The decision of the court granting the petition shall be annotated in the certificates of birth and shall form part of
the civil register in the 'ffice of the =ocal Civil Registrar.
The proceedings in Rule 9A3 of the Rules of Court are summary if the entries in the civil register sought to
be corrected are clerical or innocuous in nature. Bowever, where such entries sought to be corrected or changed
are substantial< i.e., the status and nationality of the petitioners or the citi;enship of their parents, the
proceedings are adversarial in nature as defined by this Court in ,e"ublic v. -alencia, thus<
'ne having opposing parties1 contested, as distinguished from an e+ parte application, one of
which the party see2ing relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an
opportunity to contest it. 0+cludes an adoption proceeding.
&n such a proceeding, the parties to be impleaded as respective defendants are )a* the local civil registrar1
and, )b* all persons who have claims any interest which would be affected thereby.
)IRS/ DI-ISION
0G.R. No. 7$11$. Januar2 $% !''34
R+P.BLI, O) /5+ P5ILIPPIN+S vs. ,5.L+ 9. LI;
)acts*
&n her petition for correction of entries under Rule 9A3, respondent claimed that <
?irst, she claims that her surname ,Cu- was misspelled as ,Co-. She has been using ,Cu- in all her school
records and in her marriage certificate. She presented a clearance from the /ational Gureau of &nvestigation
)/G&* to further show the consistency in her use of the surname ,Cu-.
Second, she claims that her father5s name in her birth record was written as ,Co iu To )Co Tian*- when it
should have been ,Cu io To )Co Tian*.-
Third, her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been ?ilipino considering that her father
and mother never got married. 'nly her deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is ?ilipina. She claims
that her being a registered voter attests to the fact that she is a ?ilipino citi;en.
?inally, it was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was a legitimate child when she should
have been described as illegitimate considering that her parents were never married.
Issue* !hether or not the CA erred in ordering the correction of the citi;enship of respondent and allowing
respondent to continue using her father5s legitimate surname despite her illegitimacy#
Ruling*
Article &I, Section 9)K* of the 94K: Constitution, which provides that the citi;enship of a legitimate
child born of a ?ilipino mother and an alien father followed the citi;enship of the father, unless, upon reaching
the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citi;enship. =i2ewise, the Republic invo2es the provision in
Section 9 of Commonwealth Act /o. 8>:, that legitimate children born of ?ilipino mothers may elect Philippine
citi;enship by e+pressing such intention ,in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before
any officer authori;ed to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall
accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Fovernment of the
Philippines.-
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory re"uirements of electing ?ilipino citi;enship apply only to
legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child,
considering that her Chinese father and ?ilipino mother were never married. As such, she was not re"uired to
comply with said constitutional and statutory re"uirements to become a ?ilipino citi;en. Gy being an
illegitimate child of a ?ilipino mother, respondent automatically became a ?ilipino upon birth. Stated
differently, she is a ?ilipino since birth without having to elect ?ilipino citi;enship when she reached the age of
majority.
&n its second assignment of error, the Republic assails the Court of Appeals5 decision in allowing
respondent to use her father5s surname despite its finding that she is illegitimate.
The Republic5s submission is misleading. The Court of Appeals did not allow respondent to use her
father5s surname. !hat it did allow was the correction of her father5s misspelled surname which she has been
using ever since she can remember. &n this regard, respondent does not need a court pronouncement for her to
use her father5s surname.
/5IRD DI-ISION
0G.R. No. !7":. April !% ""#4
-IRGINIA A. L+ONOR vs. ,O.R/ O) APP+ALS% 5ON. ROLINDO D. B+LDIA% JR and
;A.RI,IO D. L+ONOR% JR
)acts*
The petition assailed the respondent Court5s ecision and 'rder mentioned in the second paragraph of this
ecision for alleged $
9. ,Procedural 0rrors + + + in not finding + + + )a* that the lower court gravely abused its
discretion- in recogni;ing the action as one for declaration of ,nullity of marriage- instead of a
,special proceeding for cancellation of )an* entry- in the civil registry and )b* in not finding that the
,lower court had no jurisdiction )over* the issue of nullity-1 and
>. ,Substantive errors + + + in not finding + + + )a* that the lower court gravely erred in declaring
the marriage null and void + + + and )b* + + + in disregarding the presumptions in favor of the rights of
children and to the administration of the conjugal property + + + and the validity of marriage + + +.-
Issue* &s a judgment voiding a marriage and rendered by the regional trial court under Rule 9A3 of the Rules of
Court valid and proper# Eay its validity be challenged by the wife in a petition for certiorari against the husband
who abandoned her and who is now living abroad with a foreign woman#
Ruling*
The only errors that can be cancelled or corrected under Rule 9A3 of the Rules of Court are
typographical or clerical errors, not material or substantial ones li2e the validity or nullity of a marriage. ,A
clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding1 error made by a cler2 or a
transcriber1 a mista2e in copying or writing .Blac/ vs. ,e"ublic, =$9A384, /ov. >3, 012345 or some harmless and
innocuous change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a mis$statement of the occupation
of the parent. !here the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of petitioner and her
children from legitimate to illegitimate, the same cannot be granted e+cept only in an adversarial proceeding.

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