Walking a Thin Line: Hizbollah and Operation Cast Lead INSS Insight No.

89,
January 13, 2009
Kulick, Amir

On the morning of January 8, 2009, katyusha rockets were fired at Israel from Lebanon.
Hizbollah hurried to deliver an official announcement that the organization had not carried out
this operation. Muhammad Fneish, Labor Minister and Hizbollah’s senior representative in the
Lebanese government, even added that Hizbollah had no idea who fired the rockets. To a great
extent this response contradicts the spirit of Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, who in a series
of speeches at the beginning of the Israeli operation in Gaza lauded the struggle against Israel
and enthusiastically called for support of the Palestinians fighting the Israeli army. Indeed, as
the operation continues, and the ground war in particular, the question of how Hizbollah will
react emerges in sharper relief, especially in light of the growing number of pictures of
destruction coming out of Gaza and the wave of protests in the Arab and Islamic world.
Nasrallah, who sees himself not merely as a Lebanese figure but as an Arab and Islamic
leader, must provide his supporters with his analysis of the events in Gaza. His statements
during the Israeli operation hint at the logic underlying the organization’s response to the
operation and perhaps the katyusha fire at Israel. Furthermore, the opinions expressed by
Nasrallah likely reflect a view common among many in the Arab and Islamic world, Hamas
among them. Therefore an analysis of Nasrallah’s latest pronouncements affords a glance at
the way in which many in the Middle East understand the fighting in Gaza today and the
strategic context affecting it.
At the strategic level, Nasrallah and his supporters view the Israeli operation as part of
an American-Israeli attempt to impose a humiliating arrangement on the region. According to
Hizbollah’s leader, the Palestinians, Syrians, and Lebanese were left to continue the fight on
their own after Egypt and Jordan signed peace agreements with Israel. Now, Israel and the
United States are trying to solve the conflict with them “not in just any way, but on American or
Israeli terms that will be dictated to the Palestinians.” This is what Israel is trying to achieve
using brute force. In this context, in Nasrallah’s analysis the current conflict is neither a religious
nor an ideological one, but rather a political conflict that centers on political interests, first and
foremost the attitude to Israel and willingness to cooperate with the United States. As such, the
current campaign in Gaza is being waged not only against Hamas but against the resistance in
general, with the obvious objective of eliminating the resistance. Partners to this program – “true
and full partners,” in Nasrallah’s words – are several Arab regimes. Moreover, according to
Nasrallah, as was the case during the 2006 Second Lebanon War, now too the Israeli activity is
waged with the acquiescence of Arabs, “and in some cases even on the basis of Arab demand.”
This approach was well-summarized by Hashem Safi al-Din, chairman of Hizbollah’s Executive
Council (“government”), when he stated that as in the Second Lebanon War, now too “the
decision is American, the implementation is Zionist, and the conspiracy is Arab.” The foot-
dragging at the Arab summit meeting and the belated Arab appeal to the Security Council
strengthen these claims in the view of Hizbollah supporters.
Nonetheless, despite the cooperation between the United States and Israel on the one
hand and the moderate Arab states on the other, Nasrallah is certain that the conflict will be
resolved in the Palestinians’ favor. In his view, the reason lies in two Israeli weaknesses: first,
lack of self-confidence – as evidenced by the absence of clearly stated goals for the operation;
and, second, the sensitivity of the Israeli public to casualties. This vulnerability grew after the
Second Lebanon War and was at the heart of Israel’s hesitancy in launching the ground
campaign. In Nasrallah’s view, this is also the key to victory, and the campaign against Israel
will be decided on the ground. The longer it lasts, the more it plays into the hands of Hamas.
The increased losses along with continued firing at Israel will result in victory by the resistance.
In light of this, what steps does Nasrallah suggest be taken? Even more important, what
options are open to him? Many of Nasrallah’s operative suggestions for resolving the situation
are addressed to others. Of Egypt, Nasrallah demands the opening of the Rafiah crossing in
order to supply Hamas with the means to continue the fighting. Of Lebanon’s president,
Nasrallah demands efforts to convene an Arab summit; of the leaders of the Arab world, he
demands a solution to the crisis; and, finally, of the Arab and Islamic street, Nasrallah demands
new uprisings – intifadas – on behalf of Palestine. The fact that most of his directives for action
are aimed at external elements implies the organization’s desired mode of response.
 However, beyond the rhetoric, Nasrallah has three options open to him: engaging in
some sort of action against Israel, doing nothing, or giving others – Palestinians or global
jihadists – the opportunity to act against Israel.
Each of the three options involves more risk than reward for the organization.
Hizbollah’s firing rockets or carrying out attacks on Israel’s northern border seems to be a move
Nasrallah is trying to avoid. Another round of fighting in the style of the Second Lebanon War is
not in Hizbollah’s best interests. In the last two years, Hizbollah has reaped many victories in
the local arena: it proved that it is the strongest military force inside Lebanon (the May 2008
events); it succeeded, together with its partners in the pro-Syrian coalition, in bringing about the
election of a "friendly" president; it effected the formation of a government in which it enjoys veto
power; and it managed to recover its military might. Hizbollah does not want to jeopardize these
successes. Furthermore, Nasrallah’s failure to foresee Israel’s response to the kidnapping of its
soldiers in the summer of 2006 certainly did not add to his self-confidence or to his desire to
undertake another attempt at anticipating Israel’s reaction to possible events on its northern
border. The gap between doing nothing and declarations can be easily explained as Nasrallah
did, telling his audience that in light of the sensitive situation, Israel should not be given “an
excuse to attack Lebanon, destroy it or confront it.” Doing nothing may be a reasonable option,
though Hizbollah will pay a price in terms of its image and propaganda. Nonetheless, compared
with the first option, this seems like the less dangerous choice.
The other option open to the organization is to let a third party take action, as
apparently occurred on January 8, when unknown elements fired rockets at Israel. True, since
the Second Lebanon War Hizbollah has not maintained a line of outposts and positions along
the border with Israel, and therefore its ability to control what happens there is limited. At the
same time, it is safe to assume that the longer the ground campaign lasts and the greater the
pressure from the Arab street in light of the pictures broadcast from Gaza, the more Hizbollah
will be pressured to take some kind of action – possibly significant action – against Israel. There
is no doubt that in this context, Nasrallah is walking a thin line, and that the risk potential to the
organization outweighs any kind of anticipated reward.