Draft

The Issue of Religious Philosophy:

Hegel through Ranak and Samuel Hirsch

Gershon Greenberg
Association of Jewish Studies
Chicago, 19 December 2012


Two endeavors to reconcile Hegels understanding of the new discipline of religious
philosophy with Judaism found their way to the desk of Leopold Zunz in Berlin in 1840/41:
1

The manuscript of the recently deceased Nahman Krokhmal of Galicia, Moreh nevukhei
hazeman, and that of the twenty-six year old rabbi of Dessau, Samuel Hirsch, entitled Die
Religionsphilosophie der Juden (some 900 pages). Ranak subscribed to Hegel, Hirsch criticized
himand indirectly, Ranak as well.
Hegel
In the Phenomenology Hegel wrote that religious content was absolutely true. Its form,
that of Vorstellungen was incomplete, for subject and object remained independent, as the
subject was not yet conscious of its self-consciousness; and the two were contingent (the subject
God may or may not have created the world (object)). Philosophys Begriff entered in, and
identified subject and object, the object of the idea passing back into itself, consciousness
unifying consciousness and self-consciousness (PM 794). With the Begriff, consciousness
reached to God as self-conscious spirit, as His own object; His self-within self was knowable.
Each particular gathered into the simple unity (God), and expressed total life of spirit
Page 2


(PM 794-797). In the Enzyklopdie Hegel added that philosophy provided knowledge of the
necessary content of the Vorstellungen of religion (para. 573).
*

In his Vorlesungen ber die Philosophie der Religion Hegel identified faith as the
unmediated witness of finite spirit to absolute spirit, whereby spirit directed itself towards
absolute power, went outside itself, emptied itself of itself, elevated and yielded itself to God.

2

The finite spirit immersed itself in the absolute content of God and achieved eternal truth in its
objectiveness, so as to be nothing but God and the explication of God. It conceived of the
objective truth as its own, identified absolute content with itself, and returned to itself (PR I, 19,
50, 142).
Like religion, philosophy was a witness of the finite spirit to the absolute spirit. It elevated
what was in the form of Vorstellung into that of Begriffwith the content remaining the same.
By explaining the elevation of the spirit to God

in terms of thought, Religionsphilosophie

removed contingent, arbitrary ingredients of the Vorstellungen of the inner experience of faith,
and provided the substantive, true, and necessary meaning of the content (PR III, 201-202;
Vorlesungen 2 (1832): 336-337). As it permeated the divine object, philosophy (like religion)
renounced particularly. It immersed itself into the object of eternal truth, and achieved
knowledge of the eternalof what God was and of what flowed from His nature. In Hegels
words, Religionsphilosophie explicated itself, only as it explicated religion; by explicating itself

*
Nun auf dem Grund diesen Erkenntnis der Formen last sich die wahrhafte berzeugung, um es
sich handelte, gewinnen, dass der Inhalt der Philosophie und der Religion derselbe ist, abgesehen
von dem weitern Inhalte der ussern Natur und des endlichen Geistes, was nicht in den Umkreis
der Religion fllt (Enzyklopdie, para. 573).

Der selbe Inhalt aber der zunchst in Form der Vorstellung ist, wird insofern der Mensch denkt,
das Bedrfnis des Denkens ihm wesentlich ist, in die Form des Gedenkens erhoben (Vorlesungen
1 (1832): 80).

Die Erhebung des Geistes zu Gott (Vorlesungen 2 (1832): 336).

Page 3


it explicated religion.
*
As with the activity of religion, philosophy penetrated (eternal) truth in
and for itself;

like religious consciousness, which sought to immerse itself in this content, it

permeated the objectwhich was God (PR I, 19; Vorlesungen 1 (1832): 5, (1928): 37).

For Hegel, the Begriffe form of Religionsphilosophie were higher in stature than the form
of Vorstellungen.

And philosophical reflection intruded into the domain of religion, and was
hostile to the content of religion and its Vorstellungen.
**
Knowing spirit and religious content
fled into Begriff.

Without the Begriff faith was lacking. The Vorstellung did not make true
content necessary; for this, Begriff was required. The Begriff also overcame a tension within
Vorstellung between its tendency towards individuality (finite) and that towards the universal
(infinite), between the phenomenal manifestation of absolute spirit, and absolute spirit (God the

*
Der Gegenstand der Religion, wie der Philosophie, ist die ewige Wahrheit in ihrer Objektivitat
selbst, Gott und nichts als Gott und die Explikation Gottes. Die philosophie explicirt nur sich, in
dem sie die Religion explicirt, und in dem sie sich explicirt, explicirt sie die Religion. PR I 19;
Vorlesungen I:3.

Die Wahrheit durchringt (Vorlesungen 1 (1832): 5).

als philosophirend versenkt sich der Geist mit gleicher Lebendigkeit in diesen Gegenstand
und entsagt er ebenso seiner Besonderheit, indem er sein Object durchdringt, wie es das religise
Bewusstsein thut, das auch nicht Eigenes haben sondern sich nur in diesen Inhalt versenken will.
Vorlesungen 1 (1928): 37.

Sie stellt sich nur ber die Form des Glaubens, der Inhalt ist derselbe (Vorlesungen 2 (1832):
288).
**
Indem die Reflexion in die Religion eingebrochen ist, so hat das Denken, die Reflexion, eine
feindliche Stellung zur Vorstellung in der Religion und zum konkreten Inhalt (Vorlesungen 2
(1832): 286).

Macht das Gemt und den Himmel leer, und der erkennende Geist und der religise Inhalt
flchtet sich dann in den Begriff (Vorlesungen 2 (1832): 286).
Page 4


Idea) itself. It did so by contemplating the idea An sich, as spirit manifest itself infinitely,
reflecting itself in itself (Vorlesungen 1 (1832): 18; PR I, 20, 23).
*

3

Krokhmal
4

Zunz was of the view that with Hegels death in 1832 and the beginning of the publication
of his work, Krokhmal became seriously engaged in his thought.
5
While over the years there has
been disagreement about the breadth and depth of Hegels influence, there has been agreement of
his presence in Chapter 16, Definitions and Proposals for a Theology Derived from Logical
Philosophy, concerning Religionsphilosophie (Hokhmat haemunah).
6
Krokhmal thought of
Religionsphilosophie as lying between the fire of ecstatic religion, and the snow of cold
rationality.

7

The subject of Hokhmat haemunah was faith itself, as available in the Tsiur mahshavi,
which provided Gods attributes, Gods relation to the world and the human soul, and the souls
good and evil functions. When Hokhmat haemunah entered in, the truth-content of faith:
Neetak mitsurat hahagarshah vehatsiur levad el tsurat musagim sikhliim
(Begriffe). kollelim (272).
Hokhmat haemunah released, raised, abstracted and explicated the truth-content, transforming
its truthful parts from the particular to the universal. In the Lehnardt translation (using Landau):
8


*
Die denkende Betrachtung der Religion hat nun die bestimmten Momente derselben selbst zu
Gedanken erhoben und es fragt sich, wie diese denkende Betrachtung der Religion als ein Glied
im System der Philosophie sich zu dieser berhaupt verhalte (Vorlesungen 1 (1928): 41).

The way of approaching Torah may be compared to two paths, one ablaze with fire, the other
covered with snow. If one takes the former [of ecstasy] one will die from the heat. If one takes
the latter path [of rationality] one will be frozen by the snow. What he must do is walk in the
middle [Jer. Hagigah ch. 2, Halakhah 1]. Krokhmal, Shaar 2 in Kitvei (Rawidowicz): 10.
Page 5


jene Denker [Rav Saadya und seit den ersten kabbalisten] haben sie [von dem Inhalte
der Vorstellung] losgelst und in die Form der allgemeinen Vernunftbegriffe
erhoben (659, 660).
In Krokhmals words:
Lehafshitam [abstrahieren] miperatiutam uleasotom kollelim umusagim sikhliim
(272) shehifshitom hahakhamim veasaom lemahshavot kolelot hasekhel
(272) vekaasher higia hahaskalah lehafshit ulehaskil tsiurei haemunah (274)
shehifshitom [aus dem Glauben und den Worten der Kabbalisten] min
haemunah (274) veim hafshitam [erheben] lemahshavot kolelot (274)
[Lehnardt 664].
Further, Hokhmat haemunah held higher status with regard to the truth, than did the
Vorstellungen (Tsiurei tehilat hamahshavah):
Vehinei haemunah bashem ubetorato, hi belo safek reshit hamada vehalimud
vehahinukh leadam, ulazeh hu kodem [viel jnger] bizeman ubateva. Ulam
hokhmat haemunah hiahronah bizeman akh kodemet bemaalah, keyitaron
maalat habinah, haynu hasekhel haelki hakolel hanatua beadam [Die
universelle Gottesidee, die sich in Menschen reflektirt] al maalat tsiurei tehilat
hamahshavah (272) [Landau/Lehnardt 660].
Thus, while belief in God was the beginning of all knowledge and philosophy emerged much
later, considered objectively philosophy was of higher status. Binah (Vernunft), the universal,
divine idea which was rooted in man, was higher than the Tsiurei tehilat hamahshavah which
were present when thought began. Lastly, while the Nose of Hokhmat haemunah and Emunah
itself was the same, Hokhmat haemunah understood the Nose intellectually and permeated
religion with thought:
Page 6


Nose hokhmat haemunah, hu nose haemunah beatsmo, akh kemo shehi niskhelet
basekhel. Veal ken hinei hi [hokhmat haemunah] tserikhah behatsaah lah
[haemunah] lebiur inyan hamahshavah hasichlit bikhelalah ubeferatehah (274).
Das Thema der Religionsphilosophie eigentlich die Religion selbst betrifft,
allerdings nur soweit, wie sie mit dem Verstand erfasst wird, so dass sie einfhrend
sowohl im Ganzen als auch im Einzelnen einer gedanklichen Durchdringung bedarf
(Lehnardt 669).
Accordingly, for Ranak, the exchange of the form of the truth content as it relocated from
Vorstellung of faith to the Begriff of Religionsphilosophie, included the following elements:
1. Movement of the content.
2. Release of the content.
3. Permeating the content of faith with thought.
4. Elevating and abstracting the content.
5. Understanding it intellectually
6. Explicating it.
Krokhmal offered an historical perspective of the process. The Musagei mahshaviot
employed by the ancients (namely those in the mid-Second Temple period, Harav Saadya,
Mekubbalim), including infinite v. finite, necessity v. possibility, eternal v. temporal, being v.
non-being, unity v. difference, material v. spiritual, free-choice v. pre-destination, were all drawn
from logical philosophy. But logical philosophy, in turn, concealed Jewish elements. As Ranak
noted, Greek philosophy began during the era of Cyrus of Persia, which imbibed the Oriental
world in which Israel resided. Philosophical ideas were likely present in Israel not only then, but
over the course of history, only submerged and concealed amid the terrible afflictions. Musagei
mahshaviot, Ranak held, were given to humankind as a whole (such that no single nation could
Page 7


claim them). As such, Rambam could say that the subject of his entire Moreh nevukhim and
what emerged from it was Hokhmat hatorah, and that there were many chapters which were
solely philosophical.
*
It followed, that at the end of days the entire human species would return
to the knowledge of God; it was a principle of haemunah hatoraiit that all mankind was one
habitation in the mind of God (dass der gesammte Menschengeschlecht am Ende der Tage zum
Erkenntnis Gottes zurckkehrtLehnardt, 662). In sum, the content of philosophy switched
back and forth between the faith of Israel and the world of philosophy. To draw from the
discipline of philosophy did not encroach upon the dignity of Torah; the priority of the content in
philosophy did not indicate priority in terms of status.
Chapter 16 offered examples of a priori (logical) philosophical concepts which excluded
Tsiurim. Ranak divided philosophy into three branches. Logical philosophy dealt with
Mahshavot sikhhot, Musagei hasekhel and Mahshavot habinahintellectual thoughts,
Begriffe, ideas, levels of thought which advanced according to diminishing the sensible. Ranak
would deal with them as a priori ideas alone, their order and co-relations. Philosophy of nature
was about a posteriori knowledge; and philosophy of spirit was of the soul and its powers
feeling, fantasy, will, Verstand, and the existence of an encompassing spiritual knowing of God
in spiritual terms.
For example, within logical philosophy the universal idea of existence (Yeshut) and the
particular idea of quality were the beginnings of intellectual thought. Being (Heyot) and non-
being correlated dialectically. They united without negating their differences. Non-being was
discussed by way of being, and being by non-being. The union did not involve the change of one
into the other, rather the idea of becomingwherein they were both static and dynamic. In turn,

*
Rambam, Moreh nevukhim. Behaatakat shemuel ibn tibon (Vilna 1909): 4.
Page 8


this involved quality, which was the separation from the universal idea of being (privation,
particular) and return to it (universal). Being remained in itself, passed into an other, negating
the otheran endless process which included being and non-being together; and endless
negation of the other and negating the negation. Or, with regard to finite and infinite. The
infinite was open on both sides, neither outside the border of the finite as to limit it, nor that to
which the finite opened. Finite and infinite neither impinged upon each other, nor closed off
from the other; the finite was neither conditioned by the infinite, nor did it stand by itself as an
absolute existence. They were related as a union, in terms of quality and its endless negation and
self-negation.
9

Samuel Hirsch
Hirschs Die Religionsphilosophie der Juden, albeit instilled throughout with Hegelian
dialectical method, was bluntly critical of his view of Religionsphilosophie.
10
For Hegel, he
wrote, insofar as religious experience was available in the form of Vorstellung, it was incomplete
and had to start anew as philosophyreligion was but shattered (entzwei gebrochene)
philosophy. The Begriff dealt with religious history, not to enter into the respective religious
spirits and perceive the divine from their perspectives, but to (crudely) carve out the thoughts and
logical schemes. This, because Hegel falsely assumed that the Begriff of religion was to be
explained as the spirits striving to grasp religious essence in thought
*
(RJ 32). Hirsch also
criticized Hegels definition of religion per se, as the striving of the human spirit to become

*
der Begriff der Religion lasse sich mit jener Erklrung die Religion sei das Streben des Geistes,
sein Wesen denkend zu erfassen erschpfen (RJ 32).
Page 9


conscious of its own essence, objectifying itself before itselfsuch that the only God recognized
by Hegel was the essence of the human spirit
*
(RJ 31).
As to Hegels content vis a vis form, citing David Friedrich Strauss Die christliche
Glaubenslehre Hirsch wrote that on the one hand Hegel purported that content was indifferent to
form; on the other, it had to be appropriate to the formfor the content was one thing for
Vorstellungen, another for Gedanke (RJ 828-829).
11
As to the Vorstellungen in particular: First,
they were not a viable category situated as they were between the sensible (no longer present)
and the spiritual (not yet present)both of which were merely vorgestellt. Neither philosophy
per se (which provided die Sache selbst) nor immediate religious knowledge (where God was
spirit, and religion was the immediate testimony of spirit) could be vorgestellt. For Hegel, the
category of Vorstellung was an unregulated mixture, and as such a convenient reservatio
mentalis, should he need to back away and defend himself against one or the other (RJ XVIII).
Second, while Hegel claimed he was not out to change the original religious Vorstellungen
themselves, nor the (philosophical) content which grounded them, he did in fact transform them,
and thereby their grounding as well (RJ 34). Third, the category itself was irrelevant.
Vorstellungen related to the sensible, and thus to naturalistic religions. But they did not relate to
Judaism (or Christianity)although that did not mean that Judaism per se was philosophy.

Hirschs alternative was to treat the content of religious consciousness philosophically
(absent Vorstellungen) as a process of developing consciousness. Religious experience consisted

*
Einen andern Gott als das Wesen des menschlichen Geistes kennt nmlich diese Philosophie
nicht, und daher ist ihr denn auch das Wesen Gottes vllig klar und durchsichtig, gnzlich
offenbar. Sie weiss volkommen, was Gott ist (RJ 31).

Unter Ursache und Wirkung, z. B., denkt sich den Philosoph etwar anderes als der
Nichtphilosoph. Im Grunde hat ereben nur das Wort, und das reicht fr seinen Gebrauch hin.
Er setzt voraus, dass es etwas gbe, das Ursache heisse, und auf dieses Etwas baut er. Was
dieses Etwas sei, das zu wissen, fhlt er kein Bedrfniss (RJ 818).
Page 10


of the spirits bearing witness to its own content. This religious consciousness was a felt
necessity of mans spiritual nature. Religionsphilosophie treated this consciousness
philosophically. It did not provide any new content or form, other than what was available in
immediate religious knowledgenor could it, as its content was identical. All it offered, was to
know, to interpret (begreift) the necessity of the heretofore only felt content (RJ XVII, 31). It
followed that faith and knowledge were not in conflict; they were different and only in terms of
levels: Religion was consciousness and immediate self-consciousness; philosophy was
consciousness (knowing, interpretation) thereof.
*
Religionsphilosophie began with the
contradiction between the felt necessity of the content of the spirit (religious knowledge) and the
spirit-in-itself, which was free; between unspiritual (feeling) and the spiritual (thought). The
spirit placed itself alongside this antithesis, creating a new contradiction. Acknowledgement of
contradiction induced a necessity for philosophical knowledge, and once the content of
immediate religious knowledge would be identified with the content of philosophical knowledge,
the contradiction would be removed. Contradiction acted as an agent for reproducing the entire
content of religious consciousness (through consciousness). Once the content was so
reproduced, the spirit moved from spirit-in-itself (felt necessity; abstract freedom, empty of
content) to spirit-for-itself (concrete freedom). The process towards freedom was enabled by the
being of absolute freedomwhich was God (RJ XXIII-XXV).

*
Zu religisen Erkenntnissen kommt der Mensch zunchst, wie zu anteren Erkenntnissen, z.B.
zur Sprachbildung, durch Anschauung, oder wie man erkennen mag, im nicht unmittelbarem
Wissen zu reden. Die Philosophie begreift jene Anschauungen, verndert sie aber nicht, wenn
sie richtig sind (RJ 34). und das ist der Begriff der Philosophie der Religion. Sie will die
Notwendigkeit begreifen, dass der Geist Solches vom religisen Geiste wissen muss (RJ XVII).
Hirsch sometimes distinguished Philosophie der Religion from Religionsphilosophie, the latter a
subdivision of the former. Here, he did not.
Page 11


Conclusion
Of the two manuscripts before Zunz, one carried Hegels understanding of
Religionsphilosophie forward, the other dismantled it. Ranak, like Hegel, believed that religious
content was transferable; that the Begriff could release the content from Vorstellungen, permeate
them with thought and explicate itthereby elevating it. Hirsch considered it impossible to
separate form from content retroactively, especially by the use of the undefined mixture which
made up the Vorstellunglet alone, employ the Begriff which elevated the human spirit into
God as the means for doing so. Instead, the development of faith into thought was a process of
compounding consciousness and concretizing freedomthe impulse for which came from God.
Hirschs attacks were blunt: He overstated Hegels human-God dialectic as a transformation of
God into the human essence. But he was right about the ambiguous content of the Vorstellung
and the impossibility of clearly exchanging one form for the other. As such, his criticism would
also be valid with regard to Krokhmal.
Page 12


Glossary (Krokhmal)
Binah = Tevunah (Amir) = Vernunft (Landau, Rawidowicz, Lehnardt) = Reason; rational
Emunah toriit = Religion (Lehnardt); geoffenbarte Religion (Rawidowicz). Daat haemet
hamukhlat Hashem barukh hu Vedaat mah Sheyesh lo kium. Veamidah bo
harahani kefi mah shehi netuah bemada ubalev ish kegadol kekatan, behitorer kohot
nafshot leeleh (p. 30, Rawidowicz). Krokhmal makes it brilliantly clear, that not all
popular and traditional thought relates to Emunah toriit. Those which relate to Emunah
toriit mah shehurgelu mineurehem lahashov kakhah were liable to fall into the trap of
the Haredi extremists who defended every dormant ingredient of faith or into the trap of
the intellectual extreme which denied faith entirely (p. 6, Rawidowicz) (Amir 48).
Hokhmat haemunah = Religionsphilosophie (Lehnardt, Hokhmat hatorah:
Religionsphilosophie (Lehnardt); Hokhmat haelohit hatoriit = Religionsphilosophie
(Rawidowicz)
Mada = scientific study
Mahshavah = idea, thought. Bewusstsein, Erkenntnis, Wissenschaft (Rawidowicz).
Mahshavot habinah (or: Musagei habinah) = Idiot, hashelav hagavoha beyoter betahalikh
ibud roshmei hahushim likhelal havanah ruhanit. Haidiot hen zekhot ukedoshot
(p. 12, Rawidowicz). Musageo haemunah movaim beramah zu, ketsiurei habinah (o
tsiurei hatevunah) (Amir 54).
Mahut = Quality = Qualitt (Rawidowicz)
Musar or Musagei mahshaviot = Begriff (Rawidowicz) = concept
Musagei sekhel Amir Gam: Tsiurei hasekhel; tsiurim sikhliim Musarei mahshaviot = Begriffe,
shelav baynayim betahalikh haibud haruhani shel hadaat, bein tsiurei tehilat
Page 13


hamahshavah lavein mahshavot habinah (Amir, 53). Musag sikhli or Musag vetsiur
sikhlit = Verstandesbegriff (Rawidowicz)
Nose = Gegenstand (Landau, Lehnardt) = topic; substrat, subject (Rawidowicz)
Sekhel = Intellect or Verstand (understanding, Rawidowicz)
Sikliot = intellectual
Mahshavot sikhliot = intellectual thoughts
Niskhelet basekhel = understood by the intellect
Tsiur = Vorstellung (Rawidowicz) = representative image
Tsiurei binah = Ideen (Rawidowicz)
Tsiurei haelohit = Dimuyei hael tearav utefisat mahutah shel haelohut. Tsiurei haelohit,
mitpathim beofen shoneh bekhal tarbut leumit umevateim et hamaneh haruhanit
hayehudit leotah umah (Amir, 58).
Tsurei hahushim (Gam: Tsiurim muhashim) Hareshamim hanitbaim behushim, iynei kal ibud
sikhlei shelahim (Amir 58): Sinnliche Vorstellung (Rawidowicz).
Tsiurei hatevunah (Or: Tsiurei habinah; tsiurei omek habinah; tsiurim evuniim) Tokhniot
emuniot o mahshavtiot hamuvaot beramat haahmsagah haitiit, biketer habinah
(Amir 58).
Tsiur kollel = Gesantbild (Rawidowicz)
Tsiur mahshavii = Ideal, Idee, Vorstellung (Rawidowicz)
Tsiurei tehilat hamahshavah (Or: Tsiurim mahshaviim): Vorstellung (Rawidowicz). Dimuim
musagin rishoniim hameafyanim et hashelav hanamukh shel hamsagat hatsiurim
hahushim; hahavanah harishonit haamamit shel hamunahim shehatorah noketet
(Amir 58). Ideen (Lehnardt).
Tsurei tivoniim = Ideen (Rawidowicz)
Page 14


Tsiurim toriim hamunahim hameshamshim et hasafah hadatit; avnei binyan shel
haemunah hayehudit (For example: kodesh vehol, tamei vetahor, hadibur
vehaamirah, nes vegeulah). Tsiurim eleh hem ehad beatsmutam lemaamin veoved
hapashut ulemaskil hamaamik [Rawidowicz, p. 32]. Hem yekholim lehitstayer etsel
hamaamin hapashut beramah shel tsiurei tehilat hamahshavah belo sheyitbarer lo
hayahas benehem. Havanah meleah shelahem museget rak behaalatam leramat haidiot
veamidah al kakh, shebekhal hanogea lahem haemet ehad beatsmo (p. 30). Haynu
hem shezurim bemaarekhet kolelet vekoherentit (Amir 59).
Yeshut = existence
Yehoyada Amir, Moreh nevukhei hazeman. Nahman Krokhmal. Mavo vaarikhah madait
(Jerusalem 2010).
Page 15


Notes

1
The new discipline of philosophy of religion attempted to isolate the essential elements
of the human religious impulse, and to determine the philosophically correct
understanding of God. Mirabile dictum, it was discovered that Christianity (Protestant)
alone was the only historical religion that incorporated a philosophically acceptable
theology, and that successfully accommodated the human religious impulse.
Jay Harris, Nachman KrokhmalGuiding the Perplexed of the Modern Age (New York 1991).
2
Mediated knowledge involved dependence of one thing upon the other, a determinate object.
Immediate knowledge excluded any relation other than simple self-reference, any
differentiation (PR 160-162). The religious content shows itself in the spirit itself, that Spirit
manifests itself in Spirit, and in fact in this my spirit, that this faith has its source, its root in my
deepest personal being, and that it is what is most peculiarly my own, and as such is inseparable
from the consciousness of pure spirit in order that I may believe I must have the witness of
my spirit (PR I 43).
3
Hegel, Fragmente, in Hegels theologische Jugendschriften (Tbingen 1907). Hegel,
Phaenomenologie des Geistes (5
th
ed., Leipzig 1949). Hegel, Phenomology of Mind, transl.
Baillie (6
th
ed., London 1964). Hegel, Enzyklopdie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, im
Grundrisse (5
th
ed., Leipzig 1949). Hegel, Vorlesungen ber die Philosophie der Religion.
Nebst einer Schrift ber die Beweise vom Dasein Gottes (Vorlesungen), ed. P. Marheineke. In
Werke, 2
nd
ed., vols. 11 and 12 (Berlin 1941). Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion
(PR), 3 vols. Transl. Speirs and Sanderson (New York 1962).
4
Nachman Krochmal, Fhrer der Verwirrten der Zeit. 2 vols. bersetzt mit einer Einleitung
und Registeren herausgegeben von Andreas Lehnardt (Hamburg 2011). Nachman Krochmal,

Page 16



More Neboche ha-seman: sive Director errantium nostrae aetatis, Opus ad illustrandes
Judaeorum antiquitates et leges, Philosophiamque, inprimis celeberrimi. Aben Esrae doctrinam
de divino scripsit. Nachman Krochmal. incola Zolkieviensis jubente Auctore: digestum
praefatione instructum et editum a Dr. L. Zunz (Leopoli: Typis Josephi Schnayder 1851).
Nachman Krochmal, Kitvei rabi nahman krokhmal. Arukhim al yedei shimon ravidovitch.
Mahadurah sheniyah. Im tikunim vehosafot (London and Waltham: Ararat 5721).
5
As described by Klausner, Zunz wrote that after Ranaks wife died in 1826, Ranak came across
Hegels writings and worked through them thoroughly. Ranak called Hegels method the
philosophy of philosophies, and thought it closer to Judaism hasiit [?] than to Christianity,
they induced Ranak to find in Judaism the formulations of Hegels ideas and to try to find a new
harmony between Jewish theology and authentic philosophyas happened in Rambams era
(Zunz, Gesammelte Shcriften II, 155-156). Krokhmal was among the Galician Prenumeraten of
the vol. 1 of Hegels Gesammelte Werke (1832). Zunz concluded that Ranak began to seriously
engaged Hegel after he died in 1832. The first chapter of MHZ (Hasamim) appeared in
Kerem hemed 1 (1833). In his letter to his son Joseph in Germany (cited in Zunz, Gesammelte
Schriften, II, 158), Ranak spoke of the controversies over Hegelian Heinrich Leo (Vorlesungen
ber die Geschichte des jdischenStaates, Berlin 1828), and concluded The giant Hegel died,
and their inheritors are not zu Wort kommen lassen. Only a real Hegelian, Klausner observed,
would relate to the controversy between Hegel and his students this way.
6
Shar Ish Horowitz, Yisrael Zinberg and Siman Rawidowicz questioned Hegels impact. Zunz
Letteris, Shir, Pineles, Landau and Klausner affirmed it. See Klausner, shel hegel al rnahman
krokhmal, in Vezot liyehudah. Landau cites, for example: Kovets maamarim behakhmat
yisrael mugash leyovel hasheviim shel harav harashi professor dr. yehudah layb landa

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miyohanisburg (Tel Aviv 1936): 71-8. Diess ist die Vorstellung, welehe die Religion von Gott
im Allgemeinen hat und diesen Inhalt macht die Religionsphilosophie zum Inhalt einer
besondern Betrachtung In der Tat ist diese Behauptung zu machen, dass der Inhalt, dar
Bedrfnis, das Interesse der Philosophie mit der Theologie ein gemeinschaftliches sei,
Einleitung, in Vorlesungen, p. 5 (1832). Philosophie ist des, was in Form der Vorstellung ist,
in die Form des Begriffs zu verwandeln, der Inhalt ist derselbe soll derselbe sein, die Wahrheit
Derselbe Inhalt aber der zunchst in Form der Vorstellung ist, wird insofern der Mensch
denktin die Form der Gedankens erhoben. Vorlesungen, p. 80 (1832).
And Der Philosophie ist der Vorwurf gemacht worden sie stille sich ber die Religion dies ist
aber sehon dem Faktum nach falsch, den sie hat nur diesen und keinen andern Inhalt, aber sie
gibt ihn in der Form des Denkens der Inhalt ist derselbe. Vorlesungen, vol. II, 287.
7
English translations of Gates 1 and 16 of MNZ are included in Gershon Greenberg, Modern
Jewish Thinkers: From Mendelssohn to Rosenzweig (Brighton, Mass. 2011): 81-118.
8
Jacob Layb Landau, Nachman Krochmal: Ein Hegelianer (Berlin 1904).
9
As Amir points out about Krokhmals religion:
Know, that spirit is the grounding of every religion, such that even the lowest form of
religion, situated in the wilderness of the desert, is not in awe, does not venerate the
physical Gegenstand as such, the individual, finite and destructible; but the power
contained in it, the Spirit in it, which knows no change or limit, which is in spite of the
change of all material form endures eternally.
Kitvei, ch. 6, p. 9.
10
Samuel Hirsch, Das System der religisen Anschauung der Juden und sein Verhltniss zum
Heidenthum Christenthum, und zur absoluten Philosophie. Erste Haupt abtheilung. Die

Page 18



Apologetik. Erster Band: Die Religionsphilosophie der Juden. Fr Theologen aller
Konfessionen so wie fr gebildete Nichttheologen dargestellt und mit den erluterten
Beweisstellen, aus dem Talmudim und Midraschim versehen (Leipzig: 1841).
11
David Friedrich Strauss, Die christliche Glaubenslehre: in ihrer geschichtliche Entwicklung
und im Kampfe mit der modernen Wissenschaft, vol. 1 (Tbingen 1840): 11-16.