People Vs Abella

People vs Abella
Gr. No. : 127803

Facts: It all started with an altercation during a basketball game. 3 days later, the 5
victims bodies were found in the Pasig River. Victims were Marlon and Joseph
Ronquillo, Erwin and Andres Lojero and Felix Tamayo.

Marlons hands were tied at the back with an electric cord, he hadwounds and died from
a gunshot to the head. Andres hands were also bound at the back with a rope, his
genitals were cut off and hadwounds in his body as well, cause of death was asphyxia
by strangulation. Josephs hands were tied at the back with a basketball t-shirt,
had wounds and died of strangulation as well. Erwins and Felixs body had abrasions
and burns, there were cord impressions on his wrists, a fracture in his skull and died by
drowning.

The accused are Abella, Granada, De Guzman, Valencia (all surnames), for MURDER,
qualified by treachery and evident premeditation. There were other accused but their
names were dropped from the information later on.

March 1992, the victims Ronquillo brothers were played 3 rounds of basketball in Sta.
Mesa Manila against the team of Joey de los Santos. The Ronquillos brothers won the
first 2 rounds but the 3rd one ended in a brawl. Later that afternoon, Joey went back to
the place carrying 2 pillboxes but were apprehended. So, Joey and his brother just
threw stones at the Ronquillos house. The neighbors saw this and ran after them and
mauled them.

That night, the victims were in front of the Ronquillos house. Suddenly, a white Ford
Fiera without a plate number stopped in front of the group. There were 10-13 people on
board, including Joey and his brother. The passengers in the Fiera alighted, faces
covered with handkerchiefs and they were armed. The victims tried to run but a shot
was fired and Felix (victim) was shot. They were boxed, kicked and hit and dragged
into the van. They were brought to a basement in a compound where witness Elena
saw them being mauled, whipped with a gun, beaten with steel tubes and lead pipes.
They also had a blowtorch and the victims hands were tied. The victims begged for
mercy. Afterwards, they were herded back to the car, seeming almost dead. 2 days
later, their bodies were found in the Pasig river.

Accused defense was an alibi, that they are INC members and were attending a panata
that night. According to them, when they read their names in the newspapers as the
perpetrators of the crime, they consulted the INC Central Office and were then
accompanied by a lawyer to go to the police station to clear their names, They were
later on identified in a police line-up. The RTC convicted all of them for MURDER, with a
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Issue: Whether or not the accused are entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender.

Held: No. First of all, the witnesses were able to fully establish and prove and connect
the appellants-accused to the crime. The SC is sufficiently satisfied that their guilt was
proven beyond reasonable doubt.

The killing was characterized by treachery. Though treachery should normally attend at
the inception of the aggression, the facts show that the victims were first seized and
bound and then slain, hence treachery is present. In this case, it is enough to point out
that the victims hands were tied at the back when their bodies were found floating in
Pasig River. This fact clearly shows that the victims were rendered defenseless and
helpless, thereby allowing the appellants to commit the crime without risk at all to
their persons. The circumstance of abuse of superior strength was absorbed in
treachery.

The appellants move to clear their names cannot be accepted as voluntary surrender.
For a surrender to be voluntary, it must be spontaneous and should show the intent of
the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because (1) he
acknowledges his guilt or (2) he wishes to save the government the trouble and
expense necessarily included for his search and capture. When the accused goes to a
police station merely to clear his name and not to give himself up, voluntary surrender
may not be appreciated.

De vera vs De vera
G.R. No. 172832, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 506
Facts: Rosario T. de Vera accused her spouse Geren A. de Vera (Geren) and Josephine F. Juliano
(Josephine) of Bigamy. Geren pleaded "Guilty which was later on withdrawn and the court later on
appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Judgment was rendered holding Geren
guilty of bigamy. Rosario moved for MR for the modification of the courts judgment of conviction
against Geren, because of the allegedly mistaken application of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, which was denied. Geren applied for probation which was granted. Rosario instituted a
special civil action for certiorari before the CA which was dismissed, MR denied.

Issue: Whether the action of Rosario is procedurally tenable since it in effect seeks an increase in the
penalty imposed

Held: Sec. 7, Rule 120, ROC. In judgments of conviction, errors in the decision cannot be corrected unless
the accused consents thereto; or he, himself, moves for reconsideration of, or appeals from, the
decision. Records show that after the promulgation of the judgment convicting Geren of bigamy, it was
petitioner (as private complainant) who moved for the reconsideration14 of the RTC decision. This was
timely opposed by Geren, invoking his right against double jeopardy. The requisite consent of the
accused is intended to protect him from having to defend himself anew from more serious offenses or
penalties which the prosecution or the court may have overlooked

Issue: Whether there was voluntary surrender
Held: Yes. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites should be present: 1) the
offender has not been actually arrested; 2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or
the latters agent; and 3) the surrender was voluntary. In this case, it appears that the Information was
filed with the RTC on February 24, 2005. On March 1, 2005, the court issued an Order finding probable
cause for the accused to stand trial for the crime of bigamy and for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
In the afternoon of the same day, Geren surrendered to the court and filed a motion for reduction of
bail. After the accused posted bail, there was no more need for the court to issue the warrant of arrest.
mere filing of an information and/or the issuance of a warrant of arrest will not automatically make the
surrender "involuntary."

AGGRAVATING
Evident Premeditation

RICARDO BACABAC, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J .:
In the evening of December 23, 1990, Hernani Quidato (the victim) was at a dance hall in Purok 4,
San Joaquin, Iloilo City in the company of Eduardo Selibio (Eduardo) and Melchor Selibio (Melchor).
And so were Jonathan Bacabac (Jonathan) and Edzel Talanquines (Edzel).
1

Jonathan and Edzel left the dance hall. Not long after, the victim and his companions also left and on
their way home, they encountered Jonathan and Edzel. It appears that the two groups then and
there figured in a misunderstanding.
On his way home, Jesus Delfin Rosadio (Jesus), who was also at the dance hall, noticed a
commotion. He soon saw that Melchor was "hugging" Edzel, and later "tying" Jonathan "with his
hands." Still later, he saw the victim hit Edzel with a "stick."
2
He thus told the victim and his
companions that Edzel is the son of Councilor Jose Talanquines, Jr. (Jose), whereupon
Eduardo
3
told him (Jesus) to go away for they might shoot him. Jesus thus left and proceeded to
Edzel's residence to report to his father what he had witnessed. In the meantime, Edzel and
Jonathan managed to flee.
The victim and his companions thereafter headed for home in the course of which they met Pat.
Ricardo Bacabac (herein petitioner), together with Edzel and Jonathan who are his nephews, and
Edzel's father, Jose, his mother, and two sisters at the corner of M.H. Del Pilar and Sto. Domingo
Streets. Petitioner and Jose were carrying M-16 armalites, while Jonathan and Edzel were carrying a
piece of wood and a revolver, respectively.
Jesus thereupon pointed to the victim and his companions as the ones who had manhandled
Jonathan and Edzel. The victim apologized, explaining that he and his companions mistook
Jonathan and Edzel for other persons. Jesus blurted out, however, "You are just bragging that you
are brave. You are only bullying small children."
4
Petitioner, at that instant, fired his armalite into the
air, while Jose fired his armalite ("as if spraying his rifle from right to left") at the victim and Eduardo,
even hitting Jonathan in the thigh as he (Jonathan) "was on the move to strike [the victim] with a
piece of wood." Eduardo fell. And so did the victim who was in a kneeling position, and as he was
raising his hands in surrender, Jose shot him again.
Meanwhile, Melchor escaped.
5

The victim, Eduardo, and Jonathan were brought to the hospital. The victim was pronounced dead
on arrival. Eduardo died two hours later.
Post-mortem examination showed that the victim sustained two bullet wounds in the thoraco-
abdominal regions and one bullet wound in the extremities, and that he died due to "maceration of
the internal organs due to bullet wounds."
6
Eduardo sustained two bullet wounds in the thoraco-
abdominal region, and died of "hemorrhage due to gunshot wounds."
7

Two Informations for Murder were filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City against
Jose, Edzel, Jonathan, Jesus, and the herein petitioner. The accusatory portion of the first
Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 35783, reads:
That on or about the 23
rd
day of December, 1990, in the Municipality of San Joaquin,
Province of Ilo-ilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another to better realize
their purpose, armed with two (2) M16 [a]rmalite [r]ifles and one (1) nickel-plated revolver of
unknown make and caliber, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, with treachery
and evident premeditation and without any justifiable cause or motive, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one HERNANI QUIDATO with
the firearms they were then provided, inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on the
different parts of his body which caused the immediate and instantaneous death of said
Hernani Quidato.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
8

The accusatory portion of the second Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 35784, reads:
That on or about the 23
rd
day of December, 1990, in the Municipality of San Joaquin,
Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another to better realize
their purpose, armed with two (2) M16 [a]rmalite [r]ifles and one (1) nickel-plated revolver of
unknown make and caliber, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, with treachery
and evident premeditation and without any justifiable cause or motive, did then and willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one EDUARDO SELIBIO with the
firearms they were then provided inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on the different
parts of his body which caused the immediate and instantaneous death of said Eduardo
Selibio.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
9

The cases were jointly tried.
By Decision of April 30, 1993, Branch 39 of the Iloilo RTC, finding the presence of conspiracy among
petitioner and his co-accused,
10
convicted them of murder qualified by treachery.
11
The dispositive
portion of the decision of the trial court reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 35783, all the accused, namely; Jose Talanquines, Jr., Edzel
Talanquines, Jonathan Bacabac, Pat. Ricardo Bacabac, and Jesus Delfin Rosadio are
hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and there being no
aggravating circumstances with one mitigating circumstance [immediate vindication for Jose
and Jesus; voluntary surrender for Pat. Ricardo Bacabac
12
], and applying the indeterminate
sentence law, accused Jose Talanquines, Jr., Ricardo Bacabac and Jesus Delfin Rosadio
are hereby sentenced each to suffer imprisonment for a period of 10 years and 1 day, as
minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day as maximum; while accused Edzel Talanquines
and Jonathan Bacabac who are entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
and the ordinary mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense are
hereby sentenced each to suffer imprisonment for a period of four (4) years, 2 months, and 1
day, as minimum, to 10 years and 1 day as maximum. All the accused are ordered to pay
jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased Hernani Quidato, the amount ofP50,000.00 for
his wrongful death; P20,000.00 for moral damages; P10,000.00 for attorneys fees; and the
costs of the suit. (Underscoring supplied)
In Criminal Case No. 35784, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
All the accused, namely; Jose Talanquines, Jr., Edzel Talanquines, Jonathan Bacabac, Pat.
Ricardo Bacabac and Jesus Delfin Rosadio are hereby found guilty of the crime of Murder
and there being no aggravating circumstance with one mitigating circumstance, accused
Jose Talanquines, Jr., Ricardo Bacabac and Jesus Delfin Rosadio are hereby sentenced
each to suffer imprisonment for a period of 10 years and 1 day as minimum, to 17 years, 4
months and 1 day, as maximum; while accused Edzel Talanquines and Jonathan Bacabac
who are entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and the ordinary
mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense, are hereby sentenced to
suffer imprisonment for a period of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day, as minimum to 10 years
and 1 day as maximum. All the accused are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of
the deceased Eduardo Selibio, the amount of P50,000.000 for his wrongful
death; P20,000.00 for moral damages; P10,000.00 for attorney's fees; and the costs of the
suit. (Underscoring supplied)
Accused Jesus Delfin Rosadio, who is detained, is hereby credited with the number of days
he spent under detention, if he is qualified.
SO ORDERED.
13

While petitioner and his co-accused filed a Notice of Appeal
14
which was given due course,
15
only
petitioner filed a Brief, albeit beyond the extensions granted to him, drawing the Court of Appeals to
dismiss his appeal.
16
The conviction of petitioner's co-accused had thus become final and executory.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
17
of the dismissal of his appeal having been denied,
18
he filed
a Petition for Review with this Court which, by Resolution of October 22, 1997, directed the Court of
Appeals to reinstate petitioner's appeal.
19

By Decision
20
of June 28, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Entry of final
judgment was made by the Court of Appeals on July 22, 1999.
21

The trial court thereafter issued a February 7, 2000 Order directing the issuance of warrants for the
arrest of the accused.
22
Except petitioner, all were arrested.
23

On February 24, 2000, petitioner filed before the appellate court a Petition for Relief from Judgment,
Order, and/or Denial of Appeal
24
which was granted,
25
hence, the Entry of Judgment issued by the
appellate court on July 22, 1999 was set aside. He thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration
26
of
the appellate court's June 28, 1999 Decision which was denied by Resolution of August 8,
2001;
27
hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
28

Petitioner assails the Court of Appeals' decision as follows:
First: Contrary to its conclusion on the basis of the facts of the case, Petitioner may not be
deemed to be in conspiracy with the other Accused.
Second: Contrary to its conclusion, there was no treachery.
Third: Contrary to its conclusion, Petitioner, assuming in gratis argumenti the correctness of
the pronouncement of guilt, should have been credited with the mitigating circumstance of
immediate vindication of a grave offense, in the same manner that the other Accused
were so credited.
Fourth: Contrary to its conclusion, the guilt of the Petitioner has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt; hence, by the equipoise rule, should have been acquitted.
Fifth: Contrary to its conclusion, Petitioner is not civilly liable.
29
(Emphasis in the original)
The Court notes that the first, second, and fifth arguments of petitioner were, in the main, raised
before the appellate court.
30

During the pendency of the present petition, petitioner, through counsel, filed before the trial court an
"Urgent Ex Parte Alternative Motions (Re: Pat. Ricardo Bacabac's Motion for Reconsideration and/or
to Vacate the Order dated February 7, 2000 [directing the arrest of the accused] and to Recall the
Warrant of Arrest Dated the Same Date in so far as the Accused Pat. Ricardo Bacabac Only is
Concerned)."
31
The trial court denied
32
the motion as it did deny
33
petitioner's motion for
reconsideration,
34
drawing petitioner to file before this Court on October 5, 2006 a "Motion to Vacate
Order for the Arrest of the Accused and the Warrant of Arrest Issued by the Regional Trial Court
(Branch 39) of Iloilo City."
35

In his "Motion to Vacate Order for the Arrest of the Accused and the Warrant of Arrest Issued by the
Regional Trial Court . . . ," petitioner argues that
[T]he basis of the RTC's Order of February 7, 2000 was the Entry of Judgment by
the Court of Appealsdated 25 November 1999.
36
BUT THE SAID ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
was ALREADY VACATED and SET-ASIDE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS ITSELF ON
ITS RESOLUTION DATED 13 DECEMBER 2000.Therefore, the RTC's Order of 7 February
2000 was ipso facto vacated.
37
and that
[T]he second sentence of Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court cited by the Order of 13
July 2006 does not apply to the case at bench because the main case on the
merits which originated in the RTC as Criminal Cases Nos. 35783-84, went to the Court of
Appeals as CA-G.R. No. 16348 and is now pending in the Supreme Court (Third Division) as
G.R. No. 149372 because of the Petition for Review On Certiorarifiled by Movant herein x x
x. THE MAIN CASE IS NO LONGER PENDING IN THIS HONORABLE COURT [sic].
THEREFORE, THE RTC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO REITERATE AND EXECUTE THE
ORDER OF 7 FEBRUARY 2000.
38
As this Court hereby affirms petitioner's conviction, resolution of his "Motion to Vacate . . ." is
rendered unnecessary.
Petitioner, denying the presence of conspiracy on his part, argues:
[The petitioner] affirms that he was at the scene of the incident and merely fired a warning
shot into the air to respond to a public disturbance, and his firing a warning shot into the
air was intended to avert further acts of violence; both circumstances, therefore, being
merely and solely in pursuance to his avowed duty to keep peace and order in the
community and clearly not to be part of any alleged community of design to kill the victims.
x x x x
Another indication that there was no unity of purpose and of execution in so far as the
Petitioner is concerned is his conduct after Jose Talanquines, Jr. shot the
victims. Eyewitness accounts state that after that lone warning shot, closely followed by
Jose Talanquines, Jr. firing at the victims, the petitioner merely stood there and did nothing
and said nothing. This is obviously because he was himself stunned by the fast happening of
events. The investigating police officer, PO3 NESTOR SANTACERA, on rebuttal, likewise,
admitted to the facts that ten (10) minutes after the incident, they (the police) responded and
upon arrival thereat, learned that the Petitioner already reported the incident to their station
and that it was thePetitioner who first reported the shooting incident officially to their
office. The aforedescribed proven conduct of the Petitioner during and immediately after the
incident in question are, Petitioner respectfully submits, inconsistent with what a co-
conspirators is [sic] wont to do under the circumstances. It is submitted instead that his
conduct on the contrary underscores the lack or want of community of purpose and interest
in the killing incident to make him criminally liable under the conspiracy theory.
Finally, in connection with the conspiracy theory and anent the finding below that the
Petitioner and his Co-Accused waited for the victims' arrival at the corner of St. Domingo
and M.H. del Pilar Streets, it is asserted that the same runs counter to the natural and
ordinary experience of things and event[sic], and raises a cloud of doubt over the
correctness of the lower Courts decision which are based on the Prosecution's version of the
incident. Since, according to the prosecution, the Petitioner and the other Accused were
armed with high-powered firearms (armalite rifles and revolver); they waited at the
statedstreet corner for thirty (30) minutes; the stated street corner was well lighted;
accompanying them were thewife and two (2) young daughters of Jose Talanquines, Jr;
and they stood there conversing with the group of Elston Saquian [a prosecution witness
who testified that he saw the petitioner and his co-accused waiting for the victims
39
and
admitting that they were waiting for certain persons who mauled Edzel Talanquines and
Jonathan Bacabac.
In other words, the lower Courts gave credence to an improbable scenario painting the
Petitioner, known to the place as a police officer, and co-accused to have recklessly and
uncaringly displayed, for all and sundry to see, their alleged criminal intentions. It would
indeed be the height of foolishness for them to be by a well lighted street corner, perhaps
even well traversed, conspicuously fully armed, waiting for persons who were not even sure
would pass by such place, and apparently willing to admit to other passers-by that they were
indeed waiting for the persons who mauled Edzel and Jonathan, and consequently give out
the impression that they were intending to retaliate which is what the lower Courts
regrettably observed.
x x x x
Likewise, the presence of the wife and two (2) young daughters of the accused Jose
Talanquines, Jr. at the scene of the alleged crimes, as testified to by the prosecution
witnesses and believed by the lower Courts, assumes importance in the matter of
determining which version of the incident is correct.
The Prosecution places the wife and the daughters with the alleged fully armed Petitioner
and Co-Accused at Sto. Domingo Streets, also waiting during the same length of time as the
men for the (probable) arrival of the group of the victims. But such a scenario is, likewise,
unnatural. Because, will the male relatives unhesitatingly expose their defenseless
womenfolk to imminent danger?
40
(Citations omitted, emphasis in the original, and
underscoring supplied)
Petitioner's argument that it is improbable for him and his co-accused to have waited for the victims
at a well-lighted street corner does not persuade. Crimes are known to have been brazenly
committed by perpetrators, undeterred by the presence of onlookers or even of peace officers,
completely impervious of the inevitability of criminal prosecution and conviction.
41

From the mode and manner in which the crimes were perpetrated, the conduct of petitioner before,
during, and after their commission,
42
and the conditions attendant thereto,
43
conspiracy, which need
not be proved by direct evidence, is deduced.
44
Petitioner's firing of his armalite could not have
amounted to none other than lending moral assistance to his co-accused, thereby indicating the
presence of conspiracy.
45

As the appellate court observed which is quoted with approval:
In the present recourse, when informed that Jonathan and Edzel were being manhandled
and assaulted by male persons, Appellant armed himself with an M-16 armalite. Jose
Talanquines, Jr., the father of Edzel, followed suit and armed himself with an M-16 armalite
gun. Jesus armed himself with a revolver while Jonathan armed himself with a piece of
wood. Jonathan and Edzel were nephews of the Appellant who resided in the house of Jose
Talanquines, Jr. All the Accused including the Appellant then proceeded posthaste to
the corner of M.H. del Pilar corner Sto. Domingo Streets where the culprits would pass
by and waited for the advent of the culprits. Even as Hernani apologized for his and
his companions' assault of Edzel and Jonathan, Jesus berated Hernani and his
companions. Almost simultaneously, the Appellant fired his gun into the air as
Jonathan lunged at Hernani and his companions to hit them with the piece of
wood. Almost simultaneously, Jose Talaquines, Jr. fired his gun at Hernani and shot
Eduardo hitting them and, in the process, hitting his nephew, Jonathan Bacabac.The
Appellant did not lift a finger when Jose fired at and shot Hernani and Eduardo. He
stood by as Jose shot Hernani anew when the latter on bended knees, raised his two
(2) hands, in surrender. The Appellant and the other Accused then fled from the
scene, with their respective firearms and weapons. The overt act of the Accused and the
Appellant in conjunto, constitute proof of conspiracy.
The Appellant and Jose were armed with high-powered guns. Jesus was armed with a
revolver. The nature of the weapons of the Accused evinced a common desire to do
away with the culprits, not merely to scare them.
What is outrageous is that the Appellant was a policeman. He could very well have
just arrested the culprits as they sauntered by and brought them to the police station
for the requisite investigation and the institution of criminal complaints, if warranted.
He could have dissuaded Jose and Jesus and assured them that the culprits will be
duly investigated and charged if warranted. The Appellant did not. He armed himself
with an M-16 armalite x x x. [T]he three (3) positioned themselves at the corner of M.H. del
Pilar and Sto. Domingo Streets for the culprits to arrive. Hernani and his companions were
doomed. It may be true that the Appellant did not aim his gun at the deceased but the same
is peu de chose. By his overt acts, in unison with the other Accused and his kinship with
Jonathan and Edzel, We are convinced that he conspired with Jose Talanquines, Jr. and the
other Accused to achieve a common purpose to kill Hernani and Eduardo.
46
(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Petitioner's failure to assist the victims after the shooting reinforces this Court's appreciation of
community of design between him and his co-accused to harm the victims. That it was he who first
officially reported the shooting to the police station
47
does not make him any less a conspirator.
Voluntary surrender and non-flight do not conclusively prove innocence.
48
Besides, a conspirator
who wants to extricate himself from criminal liability usually performs an overt act to dissociate or
detach himself from the unlawful plan to commit the felony while the commission of the felony is in
progress.
49
In petitioner's case, he reported the shooting incident after it had already taken place. In
legal contemplation, there was no longer a conspiracy to be repudiated since it had already
materialized.
50

Contrary to petitioner's assertion,
51
the appellate court did not err in appreciating the presence of
conspiracy despite its finding that there was no evident premeditation. This Court's pronouncement
that conspiracy presupposes the existence of evident premeditation
52
does not necessarily imply that
the converse that evident premeditation presupposes the existence of a conspiracy is true. In
any event, a link between conspiracy and evident premeditation is presumed only where the
conspiracy is directly established and not where conspiracy is only implied, as in the present case.
53

Neither did the appellate court err in finding the presence of treachery. Treachery, under Article 14,
paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code, is present "when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make."
What is decisive in treachery is that "the attack was executed in such a manner as to make it
impossible for the victim to retaliate."
54
In the case at bar, petitioner, a policeman, and his co-
accused were armed with two M-16 armalites and a revolver. The victim and his companions were
not armed.
55
The attack was sudden and unexpected,
56
and the victim was already kneeling in
surrender when he was shot the second time. Clearly, the victim and his companion Eduardo had no
chance to defend themselves or retaliate.
Petitioner nevertheless argues that he not being the trigger man, it is not logical nor legal to hold him
guilty of treachery.
57
This argument falls in the face of the settled doctrine that once conspiracy is
established, the act of one is the act of all even if not all actually hit and killed the victim.
58

As for petitioner's invocation of the mitigating circumstance of "immediate vindication of a grave
offense," it fails. For such mitigating circumstance to be credited, the act should be, following Article
13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, "committed in the immediate vindication of a grave
offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, descendants,
legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same
degree."
59
The offense committed on Edzel was "hitting" his ear with a stick
60
(according to Jesus),
a bamboo pole (according to Edzel).
61
By Edzel's own clarification, "[he] was hit at [his] ear, not on
[his] head."
62
That act would certainly not be classified as "grave offense." And Edzel is petitioner's
nephew, hence, not a relative by affinity "within the same degree" contemplated in Article 13,
paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the appellate court's decision is AFFIRMED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUNJUN DUCABO, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:
For review is the Decision
1
dated 31 July 2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01116, which affirmed the Decision
2
dated 31 January 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las
Pias City, Branch 275, in Criminal Case No. 01-0055, finding herein appellant Junjun Ducabo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder committed against Rogelio Gonzales y Factor, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, but modified the amount of damages
awarded.
An Information
3
dated 14 December 2000, charged appellant with the crime of murder, committed as
follows:
That on or about 24
th
day of October 2000, in the City of Las Pias, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named [appellant], without justifiable
motive with intent to kill and by means of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with a gun the head of
one ROGELIO GONZALES Y FACTOR thereby inflicting mortal gunshot wound to the said
victim which directly caused his death.
4

When arraigned, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded NOT GUILTY to the
crime charged.
During the pre-trial conference held on 11 December 2003, the counsel for the appellant admitted
the written statement
5
of Rolando Gonzales, Jr. y Factor (Rolando), but denied the certificate of
death
6
of the victim. The counsel for the appellant reserved the marking of evidence in the course of
trial. In an Order
7
dated 11 December 2003, the trial court considered the pre-trial closed and
terminated. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented the victims brother, Rolando, to prove the material allegations in the
Information and to identify the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime charged. Conversely, the
defense presented the appellant to refute all the allegations in the Information.
In an Order
8
dated 5 October 2004, the trial court, as stipulated upon by the parties, dispensed with
the testimonies of SPO1 George Gabriel, the Police Investigator who conducted the investigation
and prepared the Affidavit of Rolando, and Dr. Ma. Cristina Freyra, who performed the Post-Mortem
Examination on the victim, for they had no personal knowledge of the crime charged.
The evidence for the prosecution consists solely of the testimony of Rolando, the victims brother. He
disclosed that on 24 October 2000, at around 5:45 in the morning, he saw the appellant walking
back and forth, twice, in front of their house at Simeon Street, Fatima Compound, Las Pias City. At
around 6:18 in the morning, while he was sweeping inside their house, his brother Rogelio, the
victim, went out in front of their house also to sweep. When the victim went out of their house, the
appellant was not there. He was five meters away from his brother. While the victim was sweeping in
a stooping position at almost 90 degrees, the appellant suddenly appeared behind the victim.
Appellant was one meter away from the victim. The appellant then poked a gun and shot the victim
once at the back of his head, a little higher on his nape, causing the latter to fall on the ground.
Thereafter, Rolando immediately called for help from their neighbors to bring the victim to the
hospital. Unfortunately, the victim was pronounced dead on arrival at the Perpetual Help Hospital in
Las Pias City. The victim died of hemorrhagic shock as a result of a gunshot wound on his head.
9

Rolando testified that it was the appellant who shot the victim because at the time of the shooting
incident, he was only five meters away from the victim and the appellant as he was inside their
house near the door. He also claimed that he had known the appellant for about 10 years as they
were neighbors at Simeon Street, Fatima Compound, Las Pias City. He added that prior to 24
October 2000, there was an altercation involving their neighbors. The victim tried to pacify those who
were involved in the said fight. Consequently, he was threatened by these persons, one of them a
relative of the appellant. Rolando considered the said incident to be the motive for killing the victim.
On the other hand, the defense presented the appellant, who interposed the defense of denial.
The appellant denied he was the one who shot the victim because they were gangmates in Simeon
Street, Talon Dos, Las Pias City, for more than two years and he had no motive to kill him.
According to appellant, on 24 October 2000, at around 6:00 in the morning, he went to the store of
the victim to buy bread and cigarettes. After those items where handed over to him by the victim, the
latter followed him and sat in front of his store. Surprisingly, when he was about two meters away,
two persons appeared somewhere behind the victim. Appellant recognized them as Joey Cuaderno
(Joey) and Anicer Mingolio (Anicer). Joey immediately poked a gun at him and told him not to run,
otherwise, he will be hurt. Unexpectedly, Joey shot the victim on his head. Anicer, on the other hand,
served only as a lookout. Thereafter, Joey and Anicer ran away. The appellant claimed that when he
saw Joey shoot the victim, he was not able to move (natulala) for 15 minutes. When the people
arrived to help the victim, he went home.
Appellant averred that he did not report the killing incident to any police authority because the police
officers arrived instantaneously. He did not inform the police officers that Joey and Anicer were the
persons who shot the victim because of the death threats he and his family received. The appellant
maintained that Rolando was not at the crime scene.
Appellant also revealed that prior to 24 October 2000, there was an incident that happened in a
cockfight located in front of the house of Joey at Simeon Street, Talon Dos, Las Pias City. In said
incident, the victim did not pay his cockfight bet to his opponents, Joey and Anicer. The victim ran
amuck and punched Joey. Appellant claimed he witnessed the incident as he was only five meters
away from the place where it happened and considered the same as the motive for killing the victim.
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated 31 January 2005, finding the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding [appellant] Jun Jun Ducabo GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as charged and sentenced to undergo the
prison term of Reclusion Perpetuaand suffer the accessory penalty provided for by law and
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Rogelio Gonzales y Factor the sum of P50,000.00 and
pay the costs.
10
(Emphasis supplied.)
Aggrieved, appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals by filing a Notice of Appeal.
11
Appellant
argued that the trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged.
The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dated 31 July 2006, affirming with modification the RTC
Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant
JUNJUN DUCABO is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, ROGELIO GONZALES y
FACTOR, the following sums: (a) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages,
and (b) Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as temperate damages. The civil
indemnity of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court is MAINTAINED.
12

Dissatisfied, the appellant appealed the aforesaid Decision to this Court.
This court required the parties to simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs. Both
the Office of the Solicitor General and the appellant manifested that they were adopting their
respective briefs filed before the Court of Appeals as their supplemental briefs.
After a meticulous review of the records, this court resolves to uphold the judgment of conviction
against the appellant.
The appellant alleges that the trial court merely relied on the bare testimony of Rolando, the
prosecutions alleged eyewitness, in convicting him of the crime charged. The appellant avers that
Rolando testified that he saw him shoot the victim; however, during Rolandos cross examination, he
categorically admitted that at the time of the shooting incident, he was looking at the ground, as he
was then sweeping inside their house. Furthermore, Rolando cannot even describe the firearm
allegedly used in killing the victim, which proved that he was not in the crime scene and he did not
actually witness the shooting.
The aforesaid arguments raised by the appellant hinges on the credibility of a Rolandos testimony.
It is well-entrenched that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of a witness deserve great
weight, given the clear advantage of a trial judge in the appreciation of testimonial evidence. We
have recognized that the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies, because of their unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and to note
their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These are significant factors in
evaluating the sincerity of witnesses, in the process of unearthing the truth.
13
The rule finds an even
more stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.
14
Thus,
except for compelling reasons, we are doctrinally bound by the trial courts assessment of the
credibility of witnesses.
15

In the case at bar, this Court fully agrees in the findings of the trial court and the appellate court that
the testimony of Rolando is credible. As can be clearly gleaned from the records of this case,
Rolando positively identified the appellant as the person who shot the victim as he was just five
meters away from his brother and the appellant at the time of the shooting incident. Such statements
were repeatedly and consistently declared by Rolando even in his cross examination. Likewise,
Rolando clearly described the events that took place before, during, and after the victim was shot by
the appellant on 24 October 2000. Even the Court of Appeals stated that the appellants criminal
participation was proven with clarity and moral certainty because Rolando had a full view of the
appellants overt act while the startling event was taking place. Here we quote the testimony of
Rolando:
Q: Now, on the said date [24 October 2000] at around 6:15 in the morning, while you and
your brother [the victim] were sweeping[,] was there any untoward incident that took place?
A: Nothing, sir, except when my brother was shot by him.
Q: Who shot your brother?
A: [appellant].
Q: When did [appellant] shot (sic) your brother?
A: 24 October 2000.
Q: What time?
A: Around six, sir.
Q: Where was [appellant], when he shot your brother, [the victim]?
A: At Simeon.
Q: Now, from the place where your brother [the victim] was standing, where was [appellant]?
A: When my brother [the victim] was sweeping, he was shot by [appellant], while he is at the
back.
Q: What was the relative position of your brother, when he was shot by [appellant]?
A: Stooping down while sweeping.
Q: Will you please stand up and demonstrate the position of your brother at that time he was
shot by [appellant]?
Court Interpreter:
The Witness demonstrated wherein the Witness stoop-down almost his head parallel
to the waist.
Pros. Castillo:
Almost ninety degrees to his body.
Court Interpreter:
Stipulate, Atty.?
Atty. Gaite:
Yes, almost ninety degrees to his body.
Q: In relation to your brother [the victim], where was [appellant] at the time the latter shot the
former? Will you again stand up and show to the Honorable Court?
A: Directly behind.
Q: How far was [appellant] from your brother [the victim], when your brother was shot by
him?
A: More or less one meter. It is MALAPITAN.
Q: And how far were you from the two at that time?
A: About five meters, because I was inside the house near the door.
Q: Now, what happened to your brother [the victim], after he was shot by [appellant]?
A: He fell down.
x x x x
Q: Now, when you show (sic) [appellant] for the first time on [15 October 2000]
16
at around
6:15 in the morning, what was he doing?
A: He is (sic) walking back and forth in front of the house.
Q: What time was that?
A: 5:45.
Q: And, how many times did you see him, how many times did he walk back and forth in
front of your house?
A: About two times.
Q: And after that what did he do?
A: And then after that, sir, my brother went out to sweep and after that I saw he shot my
brother.
Q: In that particular instance, what was [appellant] doing when you saw him?
A: Sir, because my brother went out of the house, [appellant] was not there. And then, while
my brother was already sweeping, I saw he came near and poke a gun and shot my
brother.
17
Cross Examination:
Q: Now, on the morning of [24 October 2000], when for the first time did you see [appellant]?
A: At 6 in the morning.
Q: What was he doing?
A: He is walking to and fro in front of the house.
Q: When you say walking back and forth, how many meters did he move back and forth?
A: About seven meters.
Q: And, you said this was in front of your house?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: How many times did he walk back and forth in your house?
A: About two times.
Q: And, where were you, Mr. witness, when you saw him walking back and forth?
A: In front of our house but inside our premises.
x x x x
Q: Now, when your bother (sic) was standing in front of your house, you testified that you
saw [appellant] shot your brother, now, where were you in the house when you saw that
incident?
A: Somewhere at the door.
18
From the foregoing, this Court finds Rolandos testimony plausible. His positive identification of the
appellant as the perpetrator of the crime charged was categorical and consistent; hence, we cannot
cast any doubt on his credibility as prosecution witness. Also, there was no indication that he was
improperly motivated when he testified against the appellant. As a rule, absent any evidence
showing any reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no
such improper motive exists, and their testimonies are thus worthy of full faith and credit.
19
It bears
stressing that Rolando was the brother of the victim and it would be unnatural for him, being
a relative and interested in vindicating the crime, to implicate someone other than the real
culprit lest the guilty go unpunished. The earnest desire to seek justice for a dead kin is not
served should the witness abandon his conscience and prudence, and blame one who is innocent of
the crime.
20
In this case, Rolandos act of testifying against the appellant was motivated only by no
other than his strong desire to seek justice for what had happened to his brother.
While it is true that in Rolandos cross examination he stated that he was sweeping during the time
that the alleged incident transpired and his attention was more or less focused on the ground;
however, in his re-direct examination, he clearly disclosed that he noticed the presence of the
appellant in front of their house because when he saw the appellant he was not yet sweeping but
was about to sweep.
21
In this regard, this Court also deems it necessary to quote the discussions
made by the appellate court, which states:
To stress, Rolandos credibility was not tainted by any modicum of doubt. He was certain that
appellant was the lone assailant. Rolando had known appellant as a neighbor in the same
compound spanning seven years since 1993 until that dreadful incident. His favorable
condition of visibility that early morning enabled him to see the commencement and
consummation of appellants nefarious act. Rolando first saw appellant walking back and
forth in front of their house. While he was sweeping, there was no noted obstruction that
could have prevented him from noticing the sudden arrival of appellant. Rolando,
stationed at their door at that time, from five (5) meters distance, saw appellant come within
one meter at the back of the victim, after which appellant shot the victim at close range,
hitting him on the nape. Significantly, Rolando identified appellant in court as the malefactor,
to which the latter did not object.
Once a person gains familiarity with another, identification becomes an easy task
even from a considerable distance. Most often, the face and body movements of the
assailants create a lasting impression on the victims and eyewitness minds which
cannot be easily erased from their memory.
22
The argument of the appellant that Rolandos failure to identify the firearm used in killing the victim
strengthened the fact that he did not witness the shooting incident deserves scant consideration. It is
already well established that the identification and the presentation of the murder weapon are not
indispensable to the prosecutions cause when the accused has positively been identified.
23
Since
Rolando has positively identified the appellant, his failure to identify and present the firearm used in
killing the victim cannot be considered fatal to his testimony.
The appellant likewise denies having committed the crime charged because the victim was his
gangmate for almost two years and he had no motive to kill the victim. Instead, he imputed the
commission of the crime charged to some other persons, who, according to him, had the motive for
killing the victim. The said contentions of the appellant stand on hollow ground.
This Court had previously said that aside from its intrinsic weakness, the defense of denial cannot
prevail over the positive identification made by the prosecution witness who had no improper
motive whatsoever to falsely testify against the accused. Between the self-serving testimony of
the accused and the positive identification by the prosecution witness, the latter deserves greater
credence.
24
Moreover, in the crime of murder, motive is not an element of the offense. Motive
becomes material only when the evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive, and there is some doubt
on whether a crime has been committed or whether the accused has committed it. Indeed, motive is
totally irrelevant when ample direct evidence sustains the culpability of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Where a reliable eyewitness has fully and satisfactorily identified the
accused as the perpetrator of the felony, motive becomes immaterial in the successful
prosecution of a criminal case. Hence, whether or not appellant had any motive in killing the
victim, his conviction may still follow from the positive and categorical identification made by the
witness.
25

In the case under consideration, it must be noted that the appellant immediately left the scene of the
crime after the victim was shot. He also admitted during trial that he did not report to the police
authorities that Joey and Anicer were the persons who shot the victim. He merely kept silent for a
long period of time allegedly because of the death threats made by the alleged culprits. It is
noteworthy that the appellant was apprehended three years after the commission of the crime
charged because he cannot be located by the authorities. Likewise, he simply mentioned the name
of Joey and Anicer as the persons responsible for killing the victim when he was already detained for
almost one year in a detention cell in Las Pias City. The sole reason given by him for his late
confession was because of the threats made upon him by Joey and Anicer. To our mind, these are
lame excuses posited by the appellant only to exonerate himself from his criminal liabilities and
responsibilities. The fact that he immediately went home after the killing incident and was nowhere to
be found thereafter are clear indications of guilt on his part. If the appellant was not the person
responsible for killing the victim, he could have reported it right away to the police authorities who,
according to him, immediately arrived at the scene of the crime.
26
The alleged fear for his life was
also inexistent at such point in time because the police authorities were already there at the scene of
the crime and the alleged culprits had already escaped. In the wordings of the trial court, "the
presence of the police itself was an assurance that they were there to serve justice. The assailants
he pointed to were no longer there and could not made (sic) any threat against him. Any proclaimed
fear by the [appellant] to report the supposed assailants is thus more of a concoction rather than a
fact."
27

Having been positively identified by Rolando as the author of the crime, appellants defense of denial
and lack of motive, being self-serving and unsubstantiated, cannot be given any evidentiary value.
This Court agrees with the trial court in appreciating treachery as a circumstance qualifying the
killing of the victim. As we have consistently ruled, there is treachery when the offender commits any
of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. Two conditions must concur for treachery to exist, namely: (a)
the employment of means of execution that gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of execution was deliberately and consciously
adopted.
28

In the case at bar, the attack on the victim was deliberate, sudden and unexpected. The appellant,
surreptitiously and without warning, shot the victim who was at that time unarmed and completely
unaware of any impending danger to his life. He had no opportunity to offer any defense at all
against the surprise attack by the appellant with a deadly weapon. All these indicate that the
appellant employed means and methods which tended directly and specially to insure the execution
of the offense without risk to himself arising from the defense which the victim might have.
The Information also alleged that evident premeditation attended the killing.
For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following elements must be established: (1) the
time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he
has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between decision and execution to
allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
29
Like any other circumstance that
qualifies a killing as murder, evident premeditation must be established by clear and positive proof;
that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
30
The essence of premeditation is that the execution of
the criminal act was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the
criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.
31
In the case at bar, the
prosecution failed to show the presence of any of these elements.
Appellant is guilty of murder, qualified by treachery, for the wrongful death of the victim. Under
Article 248
32
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty imposed for the crime of murder
is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty
imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2
33
of the Revised
Penal Code. The prison term imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the Court of Appeals is
therefore correct.
We now go to the award of damages. When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages
may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory
damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.
34

Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than
the commission of the crime.
35
We affirm the award of civil indemnity given by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals. Under prevailing jurisprudence,
36
the award of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim
as civil indemnity is proper.
As to actual damages, the heirs of the victim are not entitled thereto because said damages were
not duly proved with reasonable degree of certainty.
37
However, the award of P25,000.00 in
temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and funeral
expenses is presented in the trial court.
38
Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages
may be recovered as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss although
the exact amount was not proved.
39
Thus, the award of temperate damages by the appellate court is
in order.
Anent moral damages, the same is mandatory in cases of murder and homicide, without need of
allegation and proof other than the death of the victim.
40
The award of P50,000.00 as moral damages
is likewise in order.
The heirs of the victim are also entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 since
the qualifying circumstance of treachery was firmly established.
41

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 01116 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant Junjun Ducabo is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by treachery. There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance in the commission of the crime, the appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Rogelio Gonzales
y Factor the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,P25,000.00 as
temperate damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
TREACHERY

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ELBERTO TUBONGBANUA y PAHILANGA, Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua was charged with the crime of murder in an amended
Information
1
that reads:
That on or about the 12th of February, 2001, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with intent
to kill and with evident premeditation, treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab Evelyn Kho y Sua on the different
parts of her body with the use of a deadly weapon, thereby inflicting upon said Evelyn Kho y Sua
stab wounds, which directly caused her death; that the act was committed inside the dwelling of
Evelyn Kho y Sua and with insult or in disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account
of his (sic) rank, age or sex.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued.
The facts are as follows:
Accused was employed as a family driver by Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho since 1998. The latter worked as
the managing partner of the Lawyers Advocate Circle, a law firm operated as a sole proprietorship,
and located at 2302 Atlanta Center, 31 Anapolis St., Greenhills, San Juan, M.M. Accused was
initially paid P6,000.00 a month as wages, aside from boarding, food, overtime and extra pay, which
he received when he did extra driving and other work for Atty. Sua-Khos family.
On February 12, 2001, at around 6:00 oclock in the evening, the accused drove Atty. Sua Kho to
her condominium unit at 1702 Platinum 2000, Anapolis St., Greenhills, San Jun M.M. After handing
his employers bag to Marissa Hiso, the housemaid, accused proceeded to the kitchen where he
drank a glass of water. Also in the condominium unit were Atty. Sua-Khos three year old daughter
Issa and her nanny, Nelie Maglasang. After talking and playing with her daughter for a few minutes,
Atty. Sua-Kho emerged from the bedroom to talk with the accused. Shortly thereafter, Marrisa heard
her employer screaming, and she saw the accused stabbing her with their kitchen knife. She tried to
stop the accused, shouting "Kuya Bert!", but the latter continued to stab Atty. Sua-Kho. Meanwhile,
Nelie also heard her employers screams, and locked herself with Issa in the masters bathroom.
When she peeped-out from her hiding place, she saw Marissa, whom she signaled to go downstairs
for help. The latter did so, and sought help from the security guard. Nellie, meanwhile called Atty.
Sua-Khos father, Marcelino Sua, and husband, Daniel Kho, on the bedroom phone.
When Marcelino Sua arrived, he saw Marissa and a security guard in front of the condominium unit.
When they entered, they saw the bloodied and unmoving body of Atty. Sua-Kho sprawled on the
floor. Marcelino then brought his daughter to the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital, where doctors
tried to revive her, but failed. The accused, meanwhile, fled, using the victims car. He was arrested
soon afterwards in Calapan, Mindoro, while on his way to his home province.
Upon examination of the victims body, Dr. Edgardo Rodriguez Vida found that she suffered eighteen
(18) stab wounds and three (3) incise wounds aside from other minor injuries. The stab wounds on
her chest were considered fatal as they affected both lungs, the main blood vessel of the heart and
the heart itself. There were four stab wounds on the heart, one on the right lung and four on the left
lung. According to the doctor, the wounds could have been caused by a sharp single-bladed object
and that the incise wounds found on the left forearm, right wrist and left leg could have been inflicted
while Atty. Sua-Kho tried to parry the blows.
Marian Aquino, legal secretary of the Lawyers Advocate Circle, where the victim worked, related
that prior to the killing of Atty. Sua-Kho, the accused had confided to her about his grudges against
the victim, such as being given spoiled food, that his meals were being measured, that he worked
long hours of the day and served many bosses. On February 11, 2001, accused spent the day at her
boarding house where he told her he could no longer take the way Atty. Sua-Kho treated him. Later
he said "nadedemonyo na ako" and that he would finish Atty. Sua-Kho. He would hit her at the back,
very deep, and he would make sure that she would die. Then he would go to the province, his
territory, where he could not be followed.
Atty. Joel Baguio, an associate at the Lawyers Advocate Circle, also testified that before the killing,
the accused told him of his grudges against Atty. Sua-Kho, like his being scolded for being late, and
being called a thief, a killer, and ex-convict and other bad names. On February 12, 2001, the
accused also told him not to get too close, as he might get involved in what was going to happen.
The accused, on the other hand, raised the defense of self-defense. Atty. Sua-Kho, he testified,
didnt want her husband to know that she had been taking trips with a company guest, a certain
Phillip Robinson, to Puerto Azul and Daranak Falls in Tanay. She warned the accused that
something bad would happen to him if her husband would learn about it. In the evening of February
12, 2001, Atty. Sua-Kho urged accused to go to her fathers house, because her husband Daniel
Kho would be arriving. As she and the accused argued about Phillip Robinson, the former got a knife
and stabbed him with it, catching him on the wrist. Accused managed to wrest control of the knife,
and with it, stabbed Atty. Sua-Kho three or four times. After he stabbed her he was shocked and left
the place using the victims car. He fled to Mindoro where he allegedly surrendered to the police.
2

On March 26, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163, rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, accused, Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga, is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer
the severe penalty of death by lethal injection with all the accessory penalties provided by law and to
pay the costs.
On the civil liability of the accused, he is ordered to pay the legal heirs of the victim actual, moral,
nominal, exemplary and temperate damages in the respective sums of P298,202.25, P50,000.00,
P200,000.00, P200,000.00 and P50,000.00. He is also ordered to pay the victims heirs P50,000.00
for the loss of the victims life, all with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6 percent per annum from
this date until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
3

The case was elevated to this Court because the penalty imposed was death. However, pursuant to
our ruling in People v. Mateo,
4
the case was transferred and referred to the Court of Appeals.
5

On October 21, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS, in that, the accused-appellant, having been found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Murder, is hereby sentenced to Death. He is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the
following:
(1) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P298,202.25 as actual damages; and
(4) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages
The awards of temperate and nominal damages are hereby DELETED.
Since the imposition of the death penalty in this case was affirmed, this Decision and the complete
records of this case are hereby ordered TRANSMITTED to the Supreme Court on automatic review,
immediately upon the promulgation of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
6

The Court of Appeals disregarded appellants claim of self defense for lack of evidence and for being
incredible considering the number and location of wounds sustained by the victim and his flight from
the crime scene. It also noted that treachery did not attend the commission of the crime as there
were no particulars as to how the killing began or executed.
However, the appellate court found that evident premeditation was adequately established which
qualified the killing to murder. Likewise, it appreciated abuse of superior strength as an aggravating
circumstance.
As regards the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult to the rank, sex and age of the
victim, the Court of Appeals noted that these circumstances were included as amendments to the
information after the presentation by the prosecution of its evidence. As such, the same should not
be allowed because it will prejudice the rights of the appellant.
In a Resolution dated March 7, 2006, we required both parties to file supplemental briefs. The Office
of the Solicitor General manifested that it will no longer be filing a supplemental brief. On the other
hand, appellant insisted on his theory of self defense and prayed for his acquittal.
We agree with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that appellants claim of self-
defense is self-serving hence should not be given credence. In Cabuslay v. People,
7
we ruled that:
One who invokes self defense admits responsibility for the killing. Accordingly, the burden of proof
shifts to the accused who must then prove the justifying circumstance. He must show by clear and
convincing evidence that he indeed acted in self-defense, or in defense of a relative or a stranger.
With clear and convincing evidence, all the following elements of self defense must be established:
(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self
defense.
Appellants version of the stabbing incident does not inspire belief. His testimony that it was Atty.
Sua-Kho who attacked him is uncorroborated and improbable. Appellants alleged use of reasonable
means to repel the aggression is also untenable considering the nature and number of wounds
inflicted on the victim which demonstrate a determined effort to kill the victim and not just defend
oneself.
8
We note that the victim suffered 18 stab wounds which were all directed to her chest, heart
and lungs. She also had incised wounds which were inflicted while she was parrying the blows
coming from the appellant. In fact, appellant testified that Atty. Sua-Kho was running away from him
but he still pursued her and inflicted the fatal wounds:
Q: According to you, Atty. launched at you and you covered and cut on your left hand and that was
the time you got the knife and what happened after that?
A: What I remember is that she went inside.
Q: So, she run (sic) away from you, is that what you are saying?
A: When I was hit and I was able to stab her, she ran towards the room.
Q: So she was trying to avoid [you] after she stabbed you the first time?
A: I do not know, what I know is that when I stabbed her, she went inside the room.
Q: What part of the body did you hit her the first time?
A: At the abdominal area, sir.
Q: After that initial wound, Atty. Kho run (sic) towards the room, is that correct?
A: What I remember, she run (sic), sir.
9

Moreover, appellants act of fleeing from the crime scene instead of reporting the incident to the
police authorities is contrary to his proclaimed innocence but highly indicative of guilt and negate his
claim of self defense.
10

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not present.
Treachery under paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as the deliberate
employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of a crime against persons which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which the intended victim might raise. For treachery to be present, two conditions must concur: (a)
the employment of means of execution which would ensure the safety of the offender from defensive
and retaliatory acts of the victim, giving the victim no opportunity to defend himself; and (b) the
means, method and manner of the execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the
offender.
11
Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or
as conclusively as the killing itself.
12

In the instant case, there is no proof on how the attack was commenced. Where no particulars are
known as to the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the
death of the victim began and developed, it can in no way be established from mere suppositions
that the killing was perpetrated by treachery.
13

We find however that evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength attended the
killing.
Like any other circumstance that qualifies a killing as murder, evident premeditation must be
established by clear and positive evidence;
14
that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
15
The
essence of premeditation is that the execution of the act was preceded by cool thought and
reflections upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to
arrive at a calm judgment. To be considered, the following elements must be proven: (1) the time
when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has
clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the execution, to
allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
16

Prosecution witnesses Marian Aquino and Atty. Joel Baguio testified as to appellants state of mind
and predisposition to avenge the alleged maltreatment by the victim. Both witnesses testified on
appellants ill-plans against his employer the day prior to the crime. Absent evidence showing any
reason or motive for the witnesses to falsely testify against the appellant, the logical conclusion is
that no such improper motive exists and their testimonies should be accorded full faith and credit.
Thus, the lower courts correctly concluded that evident premeditation attended the commission of
the crime.
Appellant likewise took advantage of his superior strength to perpetuate the criminal act. He killed
Atty. Sua-Kho by overpowering her and driving the murder weapon into her body several times,
despite her attempts to parry the blows. He could not have executed the dastardly act without
employing physical superiority over the victim. InPeople v. Espina,
17
we have ruled that an attack by
a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the
circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him,
and from which the woman was unable to defend herself.
We find, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the amendments in the information
regarding the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to
rank, age or sex. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
18
provides that an amendment after the
plea of the accused is permitted only as to matters of form, provided leave of court is obtained and
such amendment is not prejudicial to the rights of the accused. A substantial amendment is not
permitted after the accused had already been arraigned.
19

In Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag,
20
we had the occasion to distinguish between substantial and formal
amendments:
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. Thus, the following
have been held to be merely formal amendments, viz.: (1) new allegations which relate only to the
range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which
does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3)
additional allegations which do not alter the prosecutions theory of the case so as to cause surprise
to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) an amendment which
does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke
prescription.
The test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such
amendment is whether or not a defense under the information as it originally stood would be equally
available after the amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence which the accused might
have would be equally applicable to the information in one form as in the other; if the answer is in the
affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substance.
21

Tested against these guidelines, the insertion of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and
insult or disregard of the respect due to rank, age, or sex of the victim is clearly a formal, not a
substantial, amendment. These amendments do not have the effect of charging another offense
different or distinct from the charge of murder as contained in the original information. They relate
only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction. The
amendment did not adversely affect any substantial right of appellant.
22
Besides, appellant never
objected to the presentation of evidence to prove the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and
insult or in disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of rank, age or
sex.
23
Without any objection by the defense, the defect is deemed waived.
24

There is no dispute that Atty. Sua-Kho was killed in her home. Appellant could have killed her
elsewhere but he decided to commit the crime at her home; thus we appreciate the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling. However, it was not convincingly shown that appellant deliberately
intended to offend or disregard the respect due to rank, age, or sex of Atty. Sua-Kho. The motive for
the murder was his grudge against the victim and not because she was a lawyer and his employer.
Neither did appellant took into consideration the age of Atty. Sua-Kho and the fact that she is a
woman when he killed her.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
25
as amended by R.A. No. 7659,
26
prescribes the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. Considering the qualifying circumstance of
evident premeditation and the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, and taking advantage of
superior strength without any mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty would have
been death.
27

However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
Death Penalty on June 24, 2006
28
, the penalty that should be meted is reclusion perpetua, thus:
SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act
No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act
Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six
Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and all other laws,
executive orders and decrees insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or
amended accordingly.
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of
the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
Pursuant to the same law, appellant shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise
known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Regarding damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral
damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, and (6) interest, in
proper cases.
29

We affirm the monetary awards granted by the Court of Appeals but modify the amount of actual
damages and exemplary damages.
The award for civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim without need of
proof other than the commission of the crime. Hence, based on recent jurisprudence, the award of
civil indemnity ex delicto of P75,000.00 for the heirs Atty. Sua-Kho is in order.
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in order to compensate a party for an injury or
loss he suffered. They arise out of a sense of natural justice and are aimed at repairing the wrong
done.
30
To be recoverable, actual and compensatory damages must be duly proved with reasonable
degree of certainty.
31
In the present case, the award of actual damages of P298,210.25
32
is correct,
considering that the said amount has been duly proven.
The Court of Appeals correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 in view of the
violent death of the victim and the resultant grief of her family.
Article 2230 of the Civil Code specifically states that exemplary damages may be imposed when the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, as in this case. Moreover, as an
example and deterrent to future similar transgressions, the Court finds that an award of P25,000.00
for exemplary damages is proper.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01366,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga
isfound GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt ofMURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by evident premeditation and with the
attendant aggravating circumstances of taking advantage of superior strength and dwelling, with no
mitigating circumstances. The proper imposable penalty would have been death. However, pursuant
to Republic Act No. 9346, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without
possibility of parole. The appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho, the
amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P298,210.25 as actual damages; 50,000.00 as moral
damages; and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; all with interest at the legal rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from this date until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Rivera vs. People
G.R. No. 166326. January 25, 2006
Petitioners: Esmeraldo Rivera, Ismael Rivera, and Edgardo Rivera
Respondent: People of the Philippines
Ponente: J. Callejo, Sr.

Photo courtesy of Google Images
FACTS:
As the victim, Ruben Rodil, went to a nearby store to buy food, accused Edgardo Rivera mocked him for being jobless and dependent on his wife for support.
Ruben resented the rebuke and thereafter, a heated exchange of words ensued. In the evening of the following day, when Ruben and his three-year-old daughter
went to the store to buy food, Edgardo, together with his brother Esmeraldo Rivera and Ismael Rivera, emerged from their house and ganged up on
him. Esmeraldo and Ismael mauled Ruben with fist blows. And as he fell to the ground, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block on the parietal area.
Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo fled to their house only when the policemen arrived. Ruben sustained injuries and was brought to the hospital. The doctor
declared that the wounds were slight and superficial, though the victim could have been killed had the police not promptly intervened. The trial court found the
accused guilty of the crime of frustrated murder. An appeal was made by the accused, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision with modification,
changing the crime to attempted murder and imposed an indeterminate penalty of 2 years of prision correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of prision
mayor as maximum.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not there was intent to kill.
2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in modifying the crime from frustrated to attempted murder.
3) Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of treachery was properly applied.
4) Whether or not the correct penalty was imposed.
HELD:
1) Yes. The Court declared that evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature,
location and number of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim, the
circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. In the present case, Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim with fist
blows, while Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block. Even though the wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not have
produced his death, intent to kill was presumed.
2) Yes. Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and
does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
Although the wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not have produced his death, it does not negate criminal liability of the accused for
attempted murder. The intent to kill was already presumed based on the overt acts of the accused. In fact, victim could have been killed had the police not promptly
intervened.
3) Yes. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, which gives no opportunity for the victim to repel it or defend himself. In the present case,
the accused attacked the victim in a sudden and unexpected manner as he was walking with his three-year-old daughter, impervious of the imminent peril to his
life. He was overwhelmed with the assault of the accused and had no chance to defend himself and retaliate. Thus, there was treachery.
4) No. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the accused
were guilty only of attempted murder, the penalty should be reduced by two degrees, in accordance to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, under Article 61
(2), in relation to Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty should be prision mayor. In the absence of any modifying circumstance in the commission of the
crime other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the medium period of prision mayor
which has a range of from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. To determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, the penalty of prision mayor
should be reduced by one degree, prision correccional, which has a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the accused were sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of from two (2) years of prision correccional in its minimum period, as minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision
mayor in its medium period, as maximum.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO TAAN @ "Bebot" CORONA, and DANNY DOE, CARPIO MORALES, appellants.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J .:
Accused-appellant Eduardo Taan @ Bebot was found guilty of murder aggravated by the use of an
unlicensed firearm and sentenced to death in Criminal Case No. U-10383 in the Decision
1
dated 19
July 2000 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City, Branch 46. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered, CONVICTING EDUARDO TAAN OF the
crime of Murder aggravated with the use of unlicensed firearm and the Court sentences him
to suffer the penalty of DEATH to be implemented in the manner as provided for by law;
Taan is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of P75,000.00 as moral
damages and another sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to prepare the mitimus and to transmit the whole
records of the case to the Honorable Supreme Court of the Philippines for automatic review.
The Jail Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), Urdaneta District Jail,
Urdaneta City, is hereby ordered to deliver the living body of Eduardo Taan alias "BEbot"
[sic] to the National Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, immediately upon receipt of this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.
2

The relevant antecedents are as follows:
The Information
3
in Criminal Case No. U-10383 for murder alleged:
That sometime in July, 1999, at Barangay Canarvacanan, Binalonan, Pangasinan and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused EDUARDO TAAN, alias
"BEBOT", in conspiracy with DANNY DOE, whose true name has not yet been fully
established, armed with a big stone and an unlicensed short firearm, with deliberate intent to
kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully unlawfully, and
feloneously [sic] attack, assault, hold, hit, strike, tie and shoot Ricardo Ladaga, inflicting upon
him the following injuries:
-Depressed Fracture; 3 cm. x 4 cm.; oblong in shape; mid-temporo-parietal area;
Right.
-Fracture, 1 cm. in diameter, circular in shape, mid-posterior aspect of the hard
palate, most probably of a gunshot wound entrance.
-Skull Fracture, 1.3 cm. in diameter, circular in shape, upper third of the occipital
area, most probably of a gunshot wound exit, Right.
-Avulsion, teeth, Left and Right Lower Central Incissors. [sic]
-Avulsion, tooth, Left Lateral Lower Incissor [sic].
which caused the instantaneous death of said Ricardo Ladaga, to the damage and prejudice
of his heirs.
CONTRARY to Art. 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act Nos. 7659 and
8294.
4

During his arraignment, Taan, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial
ensued.
5

The prosecutions evidence consist of the testimonies of (1) Juanito Ochinang, a relative of the
victim, Ricardo Ladaga (Ladaga), and an eyewitness to the shooting incident;
6
(2) Dr. Danilo
Rebugio, Municipal Health Officer of Laoac, Pangasinan, who conducted the autopsy on the body of
Ladaga;
7
(3) Cipriano Culiao, Jr., member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Binalonan,
Pangasinan, who entered into the police blotter the report that Ladaga was missing since 18 July
1999;
8
(4) SPO2 Wilfredo Tagala, member of the PNP Records Section of the Firearms and
Explosives Division, who identified in court the certification that Taan is not a licensed firearm
holder;
9
(5) Dave Fronda, PNP-CIDG, who took down the statement of Ochinang and found
Ladagas body on 15 September 1999 buried at the nearby irrigation canal at Barangay
Canarvacanan, Binalonan, Pangasinan;
10
(6) Silvino Ladaga who testified that the white t-shirt and
slippers he last saw his brother, Ladaga, wearing were found ten (10) meters away from Taans
house after the fateful incident;
11
and documents consisting of (1) the Autopsy Report dated 17
September 1999 on Ladaga;
12
(2) the Sworn Statement dated 14 September 1999 of Ochinang;
13
(3)
the Certification dated 25 April 2000 of the Firearms and Explosives Division of the PNP, showing
that Taan does not possess any authority or license from the government to possess the subject
firearm;
14
(4) the Police Blotter with the entry regarding the disappearance of Ladaga;
15
(5) the Radio
Message for Transmission accomplished by the Police Superintendent in September 1999, reporting
that Ladaga was last seen by witnesses accosted by Taan, Ochinang, and a certain Danny, and that
Ochinang has vowed to pinpoint the location where Ladaga was shot four (4) times in the head and
buried by Taan;
16
and (6) the Memorandum prepared by the Team which investigated the incident
reporting that Taan poked a revolver inside Ladagas mouth and simultaneously a gunshot rang four
(4) times.
17

The prosecution sought to prove that on 18 July 1999, the witness Ochinang, a Barangay Kagawad
and relative of the deceased, was at Mariano Domaoals (Mariano) house in Sitio Obbog, San Maria,
Binalonan, Pangasinan having a "drinking spree" with Mariano, Romeo Domaoal, Mario Rivera,
Eduardo Taan, Danilo Marquez, Marlon Ruar and Romeo Tacadena.
18
At around 4:30 p.m., Taan
invited the group to continue their drinking session at his house in Sitio Obbog, Barangay Dumayat
of the same town.
19
Ochinang, Marquez, Tacadena and Ruar accepted the invitation and on their
way to Taans house, they met Ladaga. Surprised, Taan told his godfather, Tacadena, "this is the
one we are looking for, he was the one who robbed the school." Taan continued to say, "Take him,
Ninong, Danny because I have been looking for that guy."
20
Tacadena and Marquez took hold of
Ladaga and carried him towards a mango tree. To force Ladaga to confess to the crime of stealing,
which he later did, Marquez tied Ladagas hands with a palm leaf while Taan held the latters
legs.
21
Marquez then struck Ladagas forehead with a big stone.
22
Taan removed Ladagas shirt to
wipe the blood off the latters face.
23
At around 8:00 p.m., Ladaga was brought inside Taans
house.
24
Afterwards, Taan asked Tacadena and Ruar to go home.
25
Between midnight to 1:00 a.m.,
Marquez, who had with him a shovel, and Taan, armed with a gun, brought Ladaga to a two (2) foot-
deep irrigation canal at Barangay Canarvacanan. Thereat, Ladaga was made to lie down and Taan
poked a gun in his mouth and fired it four (4) times. Ochinang, then at the dike of the irrigation canal,
about a meter away from the scene, witnessed the incident and how Taan buried Ladaga in the
irrigation canal.
26

Two days later, Taan summoned Ochinang to dig a deeper burial site for Ladaga because of the foul
odor coming from the original gravesite. Nonetheless, it was Taan who dug a deeper site which was
more or less six (6) meters from the original site. Taan removed Ladagas body from the original
gravesite and transferred it to the new excavation.
27

On 14 September 1999, Ochinang reported the matter to the Central Intelligence Division Group
(CIDG), Dagupan City. Thereat, he executed a sworn statement
28
asserting Taans authorship of the
crime and indicating the place where Ladaga had been buried. Subsequently, Ladagas body was
recovered from the place pointed to by Ochinang.
29

Dr. Danilo Rebugio, Municipal Health Officer of Laoac, Pangasinan, conducted an autopsy of the
victim and made the following post-mortem findings, viz.:
SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
- An [almost] decomposed body of a male cadaver.
SIGNIFICANT INTERNAL FINDINGS:
-Depressed Fracture; 3 cm. x 4 cm.; oblong in shape; mid-temporo-parietal area;
Right.
-Fracture, 1 cm. in diameter, circular in shape, mid-posterior aspect of the hard
palate, most probably of a gunshot wound entrance.
area, most probably of a gunshot wound exit, Right.
-Avulsion, teeth, Left and Right Lower Central Incissors [sic].
-Avulsion, tooth, Left Lateral Lower Incissor [sic].
CAUSE OF DEATH: MASSIVE
INTRA-CRANIAL INJURIES MOST
PROBABLY SECONDARY TO GUNSHOT
WOUND.
30

The prosecution likewise presented a certification dated 25 April 2000 from the Firearms and
Explosives Division of the PNP stating that Taan is "not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any
kind and caliber per verification from available records with this office as of this date."
31

Taan, as sole witness for the defense, interposed the defense of denial. He alleged that Ochinang
falsely accused him of the crime because he had previously imputed against the latter the stealing of
three (3) of his uncles goats and he had refused to help Ochinang in his bid for the position
of barangay kagawad.
32

Taan testified that on 18 July 1999, after attending a wedding celebration, he and Marlon Ruar went
to Marianos house and had a drinking session with Mariano, Rogelio Dumali, Romeo Pulido, Luding
and Romeo Domaoal. While thereat, Taan saw Ochinang pulling a person whose identity Taan did
not know and whose hands were tied with "buri." Taan and the rest of the group were shocked to
see the person with a blackeye. Afterwards, Taan left for home with Marlon Ruar, Rogelio Dumali,
Romeo Tacadena and Danny Marquez.
33

At his house, Taan again saw Ochinang with the person who had a blackeye and whose hands were
tied with "buri." Taan asked who the person was. Ochinang replied that he is "[m]y nephew who is a
theft [sic] whom I cannot control." Taan then ordered Ochinang and the man to leave to avoid
involvement in the situation.
34

Several days after, Ochinang dropped by Taans house while the latter was having a drink with
Romeo Tacadena and Danny Marquez. Taan invited Ochinang to join them. Ochinang acceded.
During their conversation, Taan asked Ochinang whether he had heard about the disappearance of
the man he had previously been with. Ochinang, in response, told them not to talk anymore and to
just keep silent. Taan and the group proceeded to tell Ochinang, "You again killed a person."
Ochinang replied, "Just keep your cool and shut up your mouth."
35

Taan was found guilty as charged and the judgment of conviction was elevated to the Court for
automatic review. In a Resolution
36
dated 14 September 2004 of the Court in G.R. No. 145508,
37
the
case was transferred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to the Courts ruling in People v. Efren
Mateo.
38

Before the Court of Appeals, Taan argued that the trial court erred in: (1) convicting him of the crime
of murder despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; (2) giving
full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses while completely ignoring the
defenses evidence; (3) appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery where none existed;
(4) sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs of Ladaga the sum
of P75,000.00 as moral damages and another sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
39

The Court of Appeals in a Decision
40
dated 30 March 2005, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00257, affirmed
with modifications the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, The 19 July 2000 Decision of Branch 46, Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta
City in Criminal Case No. U-10383, finding appellant Eduardo Taan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Murder and imposing upon him the penalty of death, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim, Ricardo
Ladaga, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral
damages; P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
41

The Court of Appeals found no compelling reason to deviate from the trial courts observation that
Ochinang was clear and categorical in identifying Taan as the assailant and that his testimony is
sufficient to support a conviction.
Taan is now before the Court submitting for resolution the same matters argued before the Court of
Appeals. Through his Manifestation and Motion dated 9 January 2006, Taan stated that there is no
more necessity to file a supplemental brief and prayed that the case be resolved on the basis of the
records and the brief earlier filed.
42
Earlier, the Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it was
no longer filing a supplemental brief.
43

The Court finds no reason to depart from the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The
Court affirms the judgment of conviction but reduces the sentence of death to reclusion perpetua.
Settled is the rule that the findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonial evidence
of the parties, its assessment of the probative weight thereof and its conclusions anchored on said
findings are accorded great respect, if not conclusive effect, because of the unique advantage of the
trial court in observing and monitoring at close range the conduct, demeanor and deportment of the
witnesses as they gave their testimonies before the trial court.
44
Unless it is shown that the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated certain facts and circumstances which if considered
would have altered the outcome of the case, appellate courts are bound by the findings of facts of
the trial court.
45

The trial court gave credence and full probative value to the testimony of Ochinang. The trial court
characterized Ochinangs testimony as "positive, categorical and straightforward."
46
The trial court
also found Ochinangs testimony to be adequately supported by documentary evidence. Ochinangs
testimony that Marquez struck Ladagas face with a stone was confirmed by the Autopsy Report, to
wit:
-Depressed Fracture; 3 cm. x 4 cm.; oblong in shape; mid-temporo- parietal area;
Right.
Ochinangs allegation that Taan put the barrel of the gun inside Ladagas mouth and fired it, causing
the latters death, was likewise established by the Autopsy Report, viz:
x x x x
area, most probably of a gunshot wound exit Right.
Thus, leading the trial court to declare that:
Between the positive, clear, unequivocal and specific declarations of Ochinang, who was in
the company of the accused Taan and Marquez on July 18, 1999, and defense contention
that it could have been that the person who could have killed Ricardo Ladaga was Juanito
Ochinang because of his reputation. The declaration of Ochinang prevails over the denial of
Taan. The Court is convinced beyond reasonable doubt that it was Taan, with the assistance
of Marquez, who inflicted injuries to the face of the victim. Likewise, Taan was the one who
shot the victim by putting the barrel of his gun to the mouth of Ladaga.
47

Evidently, Ochinang testified in a clear and convincing manner leaving no room for doubt that indeed
it was Taan who killed Ladaga.
That Ochinangs testimony is at variance with his Sworn Statement
48
does not persuade us to rule
that Ochinang should be discredited as a witness. Taan points out that on the witness stand,
Ochinang testified that after the drinking spree, he was with the rest of the group when they met
Ladaga; while in his Sworn Statement, Ochinang stated that after parting ways with his drinking
mates, he was about to cross a river by means of a foot bridge when he saw Taan and Marquez
holding Ladaga.
49
We believe, however, that the alleged inconsistencies are trivial and insignificant
and refer only to minor details and as such, do not impugn Ochinangs credibility. Discrepancies
and/or inconsistencies between a witnesss affidavit and testimony do not necessarily impair his
credibility as affidavits are taken ex parte and are often incomplete or inaccurate for lack of or
absence of searching inquiries by the investigating officer.
50
Between the ex-parte affidavit and the
testimony of a witness in court, the latter commands greater weight particularly when the defense
had the full opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
51

Next, Taan contends that Ochinangs failure to protect his relative, Ladaga, from harm and to
immediately report the matter to Ladagas family erode Ochinangs credibility.
52

We are not persuaded. Ochinang testified that he had tried to stop Taan and Marquez from tying
Ladagas hands,
53
but could not because Taan was holding a gun and he had taken
shabu.
54
Ochinang also implored Taan and Marquez four (4) times not to kill Ladaga to no
avail.
55
The reason Ochinang failed to immediately report the incident to the authorities was his fear
of Taan, who had warned him not to disclose the incident, and his several bodyguards.
56
Pertinently,
we have ruled in People v. Hernandez,
57
that:
Fear of reprisal and the natural reluctance of a witness to get involved in a criminal case are
sufficient explanations for a witness delay in reporting the crime to the authorities. Such
failure in making a prompt report to the proper authorities does not destroy the truth per se of
the complaint. Likewise, the natural hesitance of the witnesses in this country to volunteer
information about a criminal case, and their unwillingness to be involved or dragged into a
criminal investigation is common, and has been judicially declared not to affect their
credibility.
58

The supposed grudge Ochinang had against Taan which provoked the filing of the criminal case is
flimsy to be believed. Even assuming that the allegation were true, the existence of a grudge does
not automatically render Ochinangs testimony bereft of credibility.
59

All told, pitted against the categorical and positive testimony of Ochinang, Taans defense of denial
miserably fails. Denials, as negative and self-serving evidence, do not deserve as much weight in
law as positive and affirmative testimonies.
60
Remarkably, Taan did not any present corroborating
witness, i.e. his drinking buddies, to strengthen his testimony that Ladaga, the previously unidentified
individual who had a blackeye and whose hands were tied, was last seen with Ochinang.
With respect to the non-presentation of the subject firearm, such is not fatal to the prosecution of an
illegal possession case as long as the existence thereof can be established by testimony.
61
In this
case, Ochinang testified that he saw Taan in possession of a ".38 caliber revolver"
62
which the latter
used to shoot Ladaga.
63
Significantly, this was corroborated by the testimony of Dr. Rebugio, who
conducted the post-mortem examination on Ladaga. He reported that Ladaga sustained a gunshot
wound the entry of which is a hole 1.3 cm. in diameter located in the mid-posterior aspect of the hard
palate while the exit thereof is another hole 1.3 cm in diameter in the upper third of the occipital
area.
64

In qualifying the crime to murder, the trial court correctly appreciated the circumstance of treachery.
For treachery to be considered, two (2) elements must concur: (a) the employment of means of
execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (b) the
means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.
65
Treachery clearly attended the killing
as Ladaga, pinned down by Taan, was tipsy when he was killed, and thus was enfeebled and did not
have full control of his senses.
66
Previously, Ladagas hands had been tied and his forehead had
been struck with a stone.
67
With Marquez carrying a shovel and Taan armed with a gun, the
unarmed, weakened Ladaga was clearly defenseless. The essence of treachery is that the attack
comes without warning and in a swift, deliberate and unexpected manner, affording the hapless,
unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape.
68

Article 248
69
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659,
70
prescribes
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. Considering the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and the aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed
firearm,
71
which was proven through Ochinangs testimony and the Certification that Taan is not a
licensed holder of a firearm, the proper imposable penalty would have been death. However, in view
of the enactment of R.A. No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty, the
penalty that should be imposed is reclusion perpetua.
72

Regarding damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral
damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorneys fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in
proper cases.
73

We affirm the monetary awards granted by the Court of Appeals but modify the awards of civil
indemnity ex delictoto P75,000.00 and moral damages to P50,000.00 for the heirs of Ladaga, based
on recent jurisprudence.
74

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00257 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Eduardo Taan @ "Bebot" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
MURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, aggravated with the use of an unlicensed firearm. The proper imposable penalty is death.
However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without possibility of parole. The appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of the
victim, Ricardo Ladaga, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral
damages; P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P25,000.00 as temperate damages; all with
interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from this date until fully paid. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ARTEMIO CASELA and FELIBERT INSIGNE, Accused,
ARTEMIO CASELA, Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J .:
Appellant Artemio Casela (Casela) assails the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 15
March 2006, affirming with modification the Decision
2
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13
of Carigara, Leyte,
3
dated 10 February 2004, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder.
In an Information
4
dated 31 March 2003 filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Cesar M. Merin,
appellant and his co-accused Felibert Insigne (Insigne) were indicted before the RTC for the crime of
murder against Ronaldo Rain (Rain),
5
committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of January, [sic] 2003, in the Municipality of Carigara, Province of
Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent, with treachery
and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and stab one RONALDO RAIN with the use of a bladed weapon, which the accused have provided
themselves for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the latter the following wounds, to wit:
1. Stabbed (sic) wound 5 cm x 2 cm x 13 cm (R) anterior chest at level of manubrium sterni
with sternal fracture.
2. Stabbed (sic) wound 3.5 cm x 1.4 cm x 15 cm (R) anterior chest at level of 4th ICS along
sternal line.
3. Stabbed (sic) wound 2.2 cm x 1 cm x 13 cm (R) anterior chest along anterior axillary line
at level of 9th ICS.
4. Stabbed (sic) wound 10 cm x 2.5 cm x 6 cm (L) arm middle 3rd, lateral aspect.
which wounds caused the death of said Ronaldo Rain.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
6

On 6 January 2003, appellant was placed under the custody of law. His co-accused Insigne,
however, remains at large. Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.
7
The case forthwith
proceeded to trial with the prosecution presenting the following witnesses: (1) Dr. Bella Vega-
Profetana (Dr. Profetana), Municipal Health Officer of Carigara, Leyte; and (2) Reynaldo Makabenta
(Makabenta), the alleged eyewitness to the attack on the victim.
The prosecution espoused the following version of the incident, as established by the testimony of
Makabenta:
At around 10:00 oclock in the evening of 2 January 2003, Makabenta, the victim Rain and three (3)
other friends started their drinking spree in Barangay Sawang, Carigara, Leyte. Later, at around 3:00
oclock the following morning, Rain excused himself from the ongoing drinking session in order to
buy cigarettes from Naglor Videoke in the next barangay as all the stores in Barangay Sawang were
already closed. When the victim did not return, Makabenta decided to go to Naglor Videoke himself.
As he approached that establishment, located within the premises of the public market of Barangay
Baybay, Makabenta saw Rain being attacked by Insigne and appellant as Rain was about to ride
his bike.
8
Makabenta was about three (3) meters away from Rain when he witnessed the latter
being successively stabbed by both malefactors.
9
Although Rain was able to run away after the
initial assault, he was pursued by Insigne and appellant.
10
In the course of the chase, Makabenta
testified, Insigne was able to grab the back neckline of Rains shirt, turning the latter towards him as
the two accused proceeded to deliver more stabbing blows Rain until Rain fell to the ground.
Afraid to get involved, witness Makabenta left the scene and reported the incident to the nearest
police station. Thereafter, he returned to Barangay Sawang and told their friends about what had
transpired, including the fact that Rain had died.
11

Dr. Profetana, who conducted the post-mortem examination of the victim, testified that she found
four (4) stab wounds on the victim. The first wound, directed backwards, was fatal as it likely hit the
heart. The second one was likewise fatal, hitting vital organs such as the lungs and heart. The third
stab wound was also fatal, hitting the liver. The fourth wound, which only lacerated the victims arm,
was not fatal. She identified the cause of death to be hypovolemic shock secondary to blood loss.
Thus, the victim died due to the decrease in the volume of blood secondary to bleeding caused by
the multiple wounds he sustained on the anterior chest. In light of the extent of the injuries suffered
and the vital organs damaged, Dr. Profetana opined that the victim could not have survived the
attack.
12

In his defense, appellant avers that he had no participation in the attack on Rain which resulted in
the latters death. He testified that at about 1:00 oclock in the morning of 3 January 2003, he was at
Naglor Videoke Bar on a drinking spree with Insigne. Rain allegedly entered the bar, immediately
approached their table and asked who their other companions were.
13
Appellant maintained that he
did not reply to the Rains query because it was public knowledge that there was a feud between
the families of Rain and Insigne, and this being so, he was apprehensive that trouble might erupt
inside the bar.
14
Thereafter, according to appellant, Insigne stepped out of the bar and he followed
suit. As appellant headed home, about three (3) stores away from the videoke bar, he turned back
and saw Insigne stabbing Rain who was holding his bicycle. Appellant purportedly yelled at Insigne
to stop but his advice was not heeded, thus appellant ran home.
15
Appellant alleged that the only
person in the vicinity at the time of the incident was his younger sister, who was on her way to fetch
him.
16
He asserted that Makabenta was not then present.
17

Appellant also presented SPO4 Teofilo Lucelo (SPO4 Lucelo) to refute the assertions of Makabenta
that he had reported the incident to the police and, consequently, to cast doubt on his claim that he
had personally witnessed the events that led to the death of Rain. SPO4 Lucelo testified that from 2
January 2003 until about 8:00 oclock in the morning of the next day, he was officer of the day at the
police station of Carigara, Leyte. At about 3:00 oclock in the morning of 3 January 2003, an
unidentified caller from the market compound reported that there had been a commotion therein.
While SPO4 Lucelo did not notice if anyone had gone to their office that morning to inform them of
the incident, he was certain that he did not see Makabenta in their office. He admitted, however, that
he had an alert team of seven (7) men and an assistant investigator also then on-duty.
18

Finding that the prosecution had proven the guilt of appellant for the crime of murder beyond
reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment against appellant on 10 February 2004. With the
appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of conspiracy, treachery and nighttime, and without
any mitigating circumstance, appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death and to pay: (1)
civil indemnity ex delicto to the heirs of the victim in the amount of P75,500.00; (2) P18,500.00 as
actual damages; (3) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (4) cost.
19

With the death penalty imposed on appellant, the case was elevated to this Court on automatic
review. However, pursuant to this Courts ruling in People v. Mateo,
20
the case was transferred to the
Court of Appeals.
21

On 15 March 2006, the appellate court rendered its decision affirming with modification appellants
conviction. The penultimate paragraph and dispositive portion of the decision states:
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death.
Having discounted the appreciation of conspiracy and nighttime as generic aggravating
circumstances, the crime in the case at bench was not aggravated, and there being no mitigating
circumstance, in accordance with Article 61, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be
imposed. Thus, for the murder of Ronaldo Rain, we reduce the penalty of accused-appellant
Artemio Casela from death to reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING
the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING with MODIFICATION the Decision dated February 10,
2004 of the RTC of Carigara, Leyte in Criminal Case No. 4253 such that the accused-appellant is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua. All other dispositive portions of the
assailed Decision are hereby AFFIRMED by us.
SO ORDERED."
22

On 13 September 2006, the Court issued an order requiring the parties to submit their respective
supplemental briefs within thirty (30) days from notice should they so desire.
23
On 14 November and
22 November 2006, appellant and appellee filed similar manifestations that they are adopting the
briefs they filed before the Court of Appeals.
24
Thus, appellant raises the following errors in this
petition for review:
I
THE COURT A-QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTIONS ALLEGED EYEWITNESS.
II
THE COURT A-QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
III
THE COURT A-QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
MURDER INSTEAD OF HOMICIDE.
25

Simply put, the Court is called upon to determine whether or not the guilt of appellant for the crime
as charged has been established beyond reasonable doubt. The determination of the sufficiency of
the prosecutions evidence to sustain a conviction hinges primarily on the credibility of its sole
eyewitness.
Appellant argues that it was error for the trial court to have relied mainly on Makabentas testimony
that he positively identified appellant as the victims assailant considering that the latters claim that
he personally reported the stabbing incident to the police authorities was categorically disputed by
SPO4 Lucelo. He further avers that a certain Maimai Aguillon (Aguillon) was the actual eyewitness to
the incident but that the prosecution failed to present her during the trial, thus leaving the testimony
of Makabenta doubtful.
26

After carefully sifting the evidence on record, we find no reason to depart from the findings of the
RTC on the credibility of Makabenta. As a general rule, the trial court is in the best position to
determine facts and to assess the credibility of witnesses as it is in a unique position to observe the
witnesses deportment while testifying, an opportunity denied the appellate court.
27
Hence, the trial
courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed
on appeal, unless: (1) it is found to be clearly arbitrary or unfounded; (2) some substantial fact or
circumstance that could materially affect the disposition of the case was overlooked, misunderstood,
or misinterpreted; or (3) the trial judge gravely abused his or her discretion.
28

That Makabenta was the sole eyewitness to the killing of Rain presented against appellant is not,
by itself, determinative. Criminals are convicted not on the number of witnesses against them but on
the quality of the testimony given under oath. Even one witness will suffice provided he or she
succeeds in convincing the court of the
guilt of the accused with moral certainty.
29
The testimony of a single witness is sufficient to sustain a
conviction, even of a charge of murder, if it is positive and credible.
30

Moreover, the prosecution is under no duty to present a definite number of witnesses. The discretion
to decide whom it wants to call to the witness stand lies with the prosecution. It is axiomatic that
witnesses are weighed, not numbered, and the testimony of a single witness may suffice for
conviction if otherwise trustworthy and reliable for there is no law which requires that the testimony
of a single witness needs corroboration except where the law expressly mandates
otherwise.
31
Accordingly, the prosecutions decision to forego the presentation of Aguillon as
corroborating witness is a matter of discretion and does not by itself militate against the credibility of
Makabenta. Curiously, if the defense found Aguillons testimony to be of such consequence, it is a
wonder why it did not so present her to bolster appellants assertions.
Ultimately, the presentation of Makabenta at the trial as the sole eyewitness to the whole event
should not by itself erode his credibility. It is worthy to note that Makabenta testified with candor and
consistency in recounting the material events of the crime. A witness who testifies in a categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remains consistent is a credible witness.
32
What
is more, where conditions of visibility are favorable and the eyewitness assertion as to the identity of
the assailant is not tainted with bias, said assertion as to the identity of the malefactor can very well
be accepted.
33
There is no evidence to show any dubious or improper circumstances or motive why
Makabenta would prevaricate against appellant and his co-accused or falsely implicate them in a
heinous crime as he was friends not only with the victim, but with appellant and Insigne as
well.
34
Hence, appellants bare denial cannot overcome his positive identification by the prosecution
witness.
35

On record, Makabenta declared under oath and in unequivocal terms that he saw, from a distance of
approximately three to six meters, in a well-lit place how appellant and his co-accused had attacked
the victim. He was unambiguous and positive in naming appellant and his co-accused as the
perpetrators of the killing, and in narrating the specifics of the criminal incident, viz:
x x x x
Atty. Canamaque:
Q Do you know the accused Artemio Casela, Jr.?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why?
A Because he is my barkada.
Q How long have you been a barkada with (sic) Artemio Casela, Jr.?
A Long time.
x x x x
Q How about Felibert Insigne, do you know him personally?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why?
A He is also my barkada.
Q How long have you been a barkada of Felibert Insigne?
A Long time, sir.
36

x x x x
Q And did you know where Onie go (sic) to buy cigarette(s)?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where?
A At the Videokes place.
Q Did Onie Rain return back to the place where you were drinking?
A No, sir.
Q So, what did you do?
A So, I went there at (sic) the place where there is a Videoke and I used my bike in going there and I
saw Onie who was about to ride his bike too.
Q Where is this Videoke located?
A Naglor Videoke.
Q Where is that?
A At Brgy. Baybay, Carigara, Leyte.
Q Where particularly in Baybay, Carigara, Leyte?
A Within the premises of the public market.
Q Were you able to reach that place?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you tell this Honorable Court whether that place is well lighted since it is a market?
A Yes, sir there (sic) was.
Q Now, you said Onie Rain was about to ride on his bike, what happened?
A He was successively stabbed by Felibert.
Q Was Onie Rain hit by the stabbing blow of Felibert Insigne?
A Yes, sir.
Q After Felibert Insigne stabbed [sic], what happened next?
A He was again stabbed.
Q By whom?
A That person. [(]Witness pointing to a person in the courtroom who when asked of his name
identified himself as Artemio Casela, Jr.[)]
Q After Artemio Casela, Jr.[,] the accused herein [,] followed the stab (sic) of Felibert Insigne, what
happened?
A Onie ran.
Q Towards what?
A To the place of his mother.
Q Now, when he was running, what happened?
A He was chased by them.
Q Was he overtaken by the two accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the two accuse overtook Onie Rain, what happened?
A He was stabbed again.
Q Was Onie Rain hit?
A Yes, sir.
Q And particularly Felibert Insigne was able to hit?
A Yes, sir.
Q How about Artemio Casela, Jr. was he able to hit also Onie Rain?
A Yes, sir.
Q After hitting by the two stabbing blow (sic) by these two accused, what happened to Onie?
A He fell to the ground.
x x x x
37

Appellant contends that Makabentas testimony is rendered dubious by the testimony of his witness
SPO4 Lucelo. There is nothing contradictory between the eyewitness account of Makabenta and the
testimony of SPO4 Lucelo. Makabenta makes no declaration that he reported the incident to Lucelo
himself. In fact, in SPO4 Lucelos own testimony, he admits that there were other police officers then
on-duty, including his assistant investigator. In the end, SPO4Lucelos claim that he did not see
Makabenta reporting the incident does not detract from the positive assertions made by the
prosecution witness on the matter of the killing of the victim.
After weighing the clashing versions of the prosecution and the defense, we agree with the trial
courts conclusion that the prosecutions version is more credible.
38
However, was the offense
committed murder or only homicide?
The trial court and the appellate court, in convicting appellant of murder, ruled that the killing was
qualified by treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and
specially insure the execution of the crime without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.
39
To establish treachery, two elements must concur: (1) that at the time
of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and (2) that the offender consciously
adopted the particular means of attack employed.
40
The RTC made the following observations on the
matter
With the number, location and nature of the wounds sustained by the victim Ronaldo Rain, there is
apparent treachery in the execution of the dastardly acts by the perpetrators. The victim was
unarmed and totally defenseless, without any opportunity to defend himself or retaliate against the
accused, could be gleaned from the fact that accused Artemio Casela, Jr. and Felibert Insigne did
not suffer even a single scratch on their body after the stabbing incident.
41

In concurring with the RTC that the killing was qualified by treachery, the appellate court made this
pronouncement, thus
x x x Gleaned from the testimony of Makabenta, the deceased was unarmed and about to ride his
bicycle when he was suddenly and successively stabbed by Insigne and then the accused-appellant
also joined in the stabbing of the deceased. The deceased tried to run but he was chased and was
successfully overtaken by the two assailants. Insigne and the accused-appellant successfully
stabbed the deceased until the latter fell to the ground.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the deceased was clearly not in any position to defend himself
from the sudden and unexpected attack of the accused-appellant and Insigne. These circumstances
are manifestly indicative of the presence of the conditions under which treachery may be
appreciated, i.e., the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and that said means of execution was deliberately or
consciously adopted.
42

We find the rulings of the RTC and CA amply supported by the evidence on record. Treachery
attended the stabbing of Rain because he was unarmed and the attack on him was swift and
sudden. He had no means and there was no time for him to defend himself. The prosecution was
able to establish that appellants attack on the victim was without any slightest provocation on the
latters part and that it was sudden and unexpected. This is a clear case of treachery. There being
treachery, appellants conviction for murder is in order.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor without the slightest
provocation on the part of the victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself,
thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor. In this case, treachery was already
present when appellant and Insigne, armed each with a bolo, approached the victim and suddenly
stabbed him. Rain did not have the faintest idea that he was vulnerable to an attack, considering
that he was boarding his bicycle, oblivious of the sinister intent of appellant and Insigne. The fact
that the victim was facing his malefactors at the time of the latters attack did not erase its
treacherous nature. Even if the assault were frontal, there was treachery if it was so sudden and
unexpected that the victim had no time to prepare for his defense.
43
Even more, the fact that
appellant and Insigne chased the victim to inflict more stabbing blows after the latter had already
been gravely wounded clearly exhibits the treacherous nature of the killing of the victim.
The attendance of treachery in the slaughter of Rain can be plainly deduced from the following
excerpts of Makabentas testimony
x x x x
Q Now, you said Onie Rain was about to ride on his bike, what happened?
A He was successively stabbed by Felibert.
Q Was Onie Rain hit by the stabbing blow of Felibert Insigne?
A Yes, sir.
Q After Felibert Insigne stabbed, what happened next?
A He was again stabbed.
Q By whom?
A That person. [(]Witness pointing to a person in the courtroom who when asked of his name
identified himself as Artemio Casela, Jr.[)]
Q After Artemio Casela, Jr. the accused herein followed the stab (sic) of Felibert Insigne, what
happened?
A Onie ran.
Q Towards what?
A To the place of his mother.
Q Now, when he was running, what happened?
A He was chased by them.
Q Was he overtaken by the two accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the two accused overtook Onie Rain, what happened?
A He was stabbed again.
Q Was Onie Rain hit?
A Yes, sir.
Q And particularly Felibert Insigne was able to hit?
A Yes, sir.
Q How about Artemio Casela, Jr.[?] was he able to hit also Onie Rain?
A Yes, sir.
Q After hitting by the two stabbing blow (sic) by these two accused, what happened to Onie?
A He fell to the ground.
x x x x
44

In light of the foregoing, the Court holds that the finding of guilt as pronounced by the RTC and the
Court of Appeals should be sustained. With respect to the civil liability of appellant, the award should
be modified in light of prevailing jurisprudence. Therefore, appellant is ordered to indemnify the heirs
of Ronaldo Rain in the amount ofP50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P18,500.00 as actual damages for
funeral expenses, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
45

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. H.C. No. 00248, finding
appellant ARTEMIO CASELA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. As modified,
appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Ronaldo Rain the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P18,500.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
NICOLAS GUZMAN y BOCBOSILA, Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:
Man is subject to innumerable pains and sorrows by the very condition of humanity, and yet, as if
nature had not sown evils enough in life, we are adding grief to grief and aggravating the common
calamity by our cruel treatment of one another. Joseph Addison.
The passage depicts the tragic fate of the deceased victim in the case at bar. His ultimate dream
was to become a pilot so that he would have enough money to shoulder the schooling and education
expenses of his younger siblings. Sadly, however, this dream will never become a reality as his
young life was brutally snuffed out by certain violent individuals. He was a minor at the time of his
death. Now his family is seeking justice for his untimely and senseless killing.
For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R.-H.C. No. 00095, dated 28
February 2005,
1
affirming with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 69, in Criminal Case No. Q-99-88737, dated 12 November 2001,
2
finding accused-
appellant Nicolas Guzman y Bocbosila guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the heirs of
Michael Balber (Michael) the amount of P35,470.00 as actual damages,P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
On 29 November 1999, appellant was charged in an Information
3
with Murder allegedly committed
as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of November 1999 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating with two other persons, whose true names/identities and
whereabouts are still unknown, and mutually helping one another with intent to kill, with treachery
and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
employ personal violence upon the person of one MICHAEL ANGELO BALBER Y CASTILLON, a
minor, 17 years of age, by then and there stabbing him on the trunk with the use of a bladed
weapon, thereby inflicting upon him serious and grave wound which was the direct and immediate
cause of his untimely death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Michael Angelo Balber y
Castillon.
When arraigned on 21 January 2000,
4
appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charge therein. Trial on
the merits thereafter ensued.
In building its case against appellant, the prosecution relied on the testimonies of its witnesses,
namely: Ronald Santiago (Ronald), Edgardo Bauto (Edgardo), Danilo Balber (Danilo), Police
Inspector Alberto Malaza (Inspector Malaza), SPO3 Samuel Quinto (SPO3 Quinto), and Dr.
Francisco Supe, Jr. (Dr. Supe). Their testimonies are summarized as follows:
Ronald is a jeepney driver and resident of Barangay Commonwealth, Quezon City. He testified that
on 25 November 1999, at about 9:00 in the evening, he stopped by and ate at a carinderia located at
the corner of Sto. Nino Street and Mactan Street, Brgy. Commonwealth, Quezon City. After eating,
he sat on a bench just beside the carinderia and rested. He noticed appellant and two other persons
having a drinking spree in a nearby grocery store. He also saw Michael walking towards the direction
of the same grocery store. When Michael was passing in front of the grocery store, appellant and his
two companions suddenly approached and surrounded Michael. Appellant positioned himself at the
back of Michael while his two companions stood in front of Michael. Suddenly, they grabbed the
shoulders of Michael and overpowered the latter. One of appellants companions, whom he
described as a male with long hair, drew out a knife and repeatedly stabbed Michael at the stomach.
Afterwards, the appellants other companion, whom he described as a male with flat top hair, took
the knife from the companion with long hair, and also stabbed Michael at the stomach. Later,
appellant went in front of Michael, took the knife from the companion with flat top hair, and likewise
stabbed Michael at the stomach. Appellant also kicked Michael when the latter was already lying on
the ground. He witnessed this stabbing incident at a distance of five arms length.
5

Afraid and confused, he immediately went home. The next day, however, he went to the house of
Michaels family and narrated the incident to Michaels father, Danilo. Subsequently, he was
accompanied by Danilo to the Batasan Hills Police Station 6 where he gave a statement about the
incident.
6

Edgardo Bauto (Edgardo) is also a tricycle driver and resident of Brgy. Commonwealth, Quezon
City. He narrated that on 25 November 1999, at around 9:00 in the evening, he was standing at the
corner of Sto. Nino Street and Mactan Street, Brgy. Commonwealth, Quezon City, when he heard a
female voice shouting "Sinasaksak!" When he glanced at the direction of the said shouts, he saw, at
a distance of about five arms length, appellant and the latters two companions taking turns in
stabbing Michael. One of the appellants companions, whom he described as a toothless male with a
long hair, was the first one to stab Michael. Afterwards, the appellants other companion, whom he
described as a male with flat top hair, took the knife from the toothless male with a long hair and
stabbed Michael. Subsequently, appellant also took the knife from his companion with flat top hair
and stabbed Michael too.
7

Thereafter, he immediately ran and proceeded to the house of Michaels family and informed
Michaels parents about the incident. Michaels parents rushed to the crime scene and took Michael
to a hospital. The next day, he was accompanied by Danilo and a certain Ramiro Alfaro to Batasan
Hills Police Station 6 where he gave a statement about the incident.
8

Danilo, Michaels father, testified that on 25 November 1999, at about 9:00 in the evening, he was
walking on his way home along the corner of Sto. Nino Street and Mactan Street, Brgy.
Commonwealth, Quezon City, when he saw Michael lying along Sto. Nino Street. He also saw
appellant and the latters two male companions near Michaels body. When he was about to
approach them, they immediately ran away. He chased and threw stones at them. Appellant and his
two companions proceeded to the formers house and locked the door. He tried to follow them all the
way to the house but appellants relatives blocked his way to the door and told him to leave.
Thereafter, he went back to Michael and took the latter to Fairview Hospital.
9
He was later informed
by the doctors that Michael was already dead.
The next day, he went to Batasan Hills Police Station 6 and gave a statement about the incident. In
an effort to settle the instant case, appellants wife and daughter told Danilo that they would sell a
bus which they owned and would turn over to him the proceeds thereof. He also stated that Michael
wanted to become a pilot so that, as the eldest of the children, he would be the one to shoulder the
education of his siblings.
10

Inspector Malaza is a member of the police force assigned at Police Community Precinct No. 1,
Batasan Hills, Quezon City. He testified that on 25 November 1999, at about 9:00 in the evening, he
was on his way home on board his owner type jeep. Upon reaching the corner of Sto. Nino Street
and Mactan Street, Brgy. Commonwealth, Quezon City, he noticed a commotion nearby. He slowed
down his vehicle and saw, at a distance of five to ten meters, appellant stabbing and kicking
Michael. He also noticed that the appellants two companions were armed with bladed weapons. He
alighted from his vehicle and approached appellant and his two companions. After introducing
himself as a police officer, appellant and his two companions scampered away. He ran after them
but caught only appellant. The two other companions of the appellant successfully escaped.
Thereafter, he handcuffed appellant and brought him to Batasan Hills Police Station 6. He turned
him over to a police investigator therein and executed an affidavit of arrest.
11

SPO3 Quinto is a police investigator at the Batasan Hills Police Station 6. He was the one who
investigated the incident. After the incident was reported to his station on 26 November 1999, he
immediately went to the crime scene upon the advice of the desk officer. Since Michael was already
brought to Fairview Hospital at that time, he proceeded thereto. Upon arriving at the Fairview
Hospital, he was informed that Michael was already dead. He then went back to the station and took
the statements of the prosecution witnesses.
12

Dr. Supe is a medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, Quezon City. He
conducted the post mortem examination on Michaels body. His testimony evolved on the matters
stated in the Medico-Legal Report No. M-3112-99,
13
viz:
"POSTMORTEM FINDINGS:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished male cadaver in rigor mortis with postmortem lividity at the
dependent portions of the body. Conjunctivae are pale. Lips and nail beds are cyanotic. Needle
puncture mark is noted on the dorsum of the right hand. There is fungal infection covering the entire
groin and extending to the buttocks.
"HEAD AND NECK:
1.) Abrasion, left superior orbital region, measuring 0.2 x 0.7 cm, 3.7 cm, from the anterior
midline.
2.) Lacerated wound, left lateral orbital region, measuring 0.5 x 0.8 cm, 5 cm from the
anterior midline.
3.) Abrasion, right inferior orbital region, measuring 0.6 x 2 cm, 1 cm from the anterior
midline.
"CHEST AND ABDOMEN:
1.) Abrasion, left inferior or mammary region, measuring 0.5 x 8.5 cm. along the anterior
midline.
2.) Stab wound, thru and thru, point of entry, left coastal region, measuring 1 x 4 cm, 8 cm
from the anterior midline, directed posteriorwards and medialwards making a point of exit at
the left inferior mammary region, measuring 0.7 x 2.5 cm, 5 cm from the anterior midline,
superficial.
3.) Stab wound, left subcostal region, measuring 0.7 x 2.3 cm, 14.2 cm from the anterior
midline, 9 cm deep, directed posteriorwards, slightly upwards and medialwards, lacerating
the mesentery, small intestine, left hemidiaphragm.
4.) Lacerated wound, thru and thru, point of entry, left inferior clavicular region, measuring 2
x 7 cm, 4.5 cm from the posterior midline, extending to the right inferior clavicular region and
making a point of exit thereat, measuring 1 x 3 cm, superficial.
5.) Two and a half liters of blood and blood clots were evacuated from the abdominal cavity.
6.) The stomach is 250 ml full of billous fluid.
"Extremity:
1.) Lacerated wound, distal third of the right arm, measuring 0.4 x 1 cm, 2.5 cm lateral to its anterior
midline.
"CONCLUSION:
Cause of death is hemorrhage and shock secondary to multiple stab wounds of the trunk."
14

On the other hand, the defense presented the testimonies of appellant and Antonio Sulficiencia
(Antonio) to disprove the foregoing charges.
Appellant testified that on 25 November 1999, at about 9:00 in the evening, he was inside his store
located at No. 886 Mactan St. Brgy. Commonwealth, Quezon City, when he heard shouts outside.
He peeped through the window of his store and saw Danilo and Ronald pulling out a certain Jesus
de Guzman (Jesus) from the latters tricycle. Danilo and Ronald punched Jesus but the latter
retaliated. Thereafter, a rumble ensued. At the height of the brawl, he shouted Hoy! ano ba yan?
Tama na yan! Itigil na ninyo yan! Awatin na ninyo yan." Minutes later, Michael passed by his store
and inquired as to what was happening. He told Michael "Yung tatay mo at si Santiago (Ronald)
pinagtulungan si Rommel." Michael rushed to Danilo and pacified the latter. Edgardo, one of the
participants therein, threw stones at Michael. At this point, a certain Lemuel Grans Querubin
(Lemuel) arrived and tried to join the fracas. Michael, however, blocked Lemuels way. The two
wrestled and both of them fell to the ground. Moments later, Lemuel stood up. Lemuel was holding a
knife and his hands were bloodied. Michael, on the other hand, was still lying on the ground. Lemuel
then chased Danilo and Ronald but the two were able to escape. Afterwards, Danilo, Ronald and
five other persons returned to the scene. Danilo was carrying a big bolo while the others were armed
with stones and lead pipe. Lemuel and Jesus ran towards the direction of Sto. Nino in order to
escape.
15

Appellant went outside his house to observe the situation. Five minutes later, the group of Danilo,
together with two policemen, proceeded to appellants house. The policemen forcibly entered
appellants house and pushed the latter against the wall. They inquired as to the whereabouts of
Lemuel and Jesus, who happened to be appellants bus conductor and driver, respectively. When
they could not find the two, the policemen invited him to the police station. Appellant told them "Bakit
ninyo ako dadalhin? wala naman akong kinalaman diyan." From then on, the policemen held
appellant in custody.
16

Antonio was a former bus driver of appellant and a resident of Paranaque City. He narrated that on
25 November 1999, at about 9:00 in the evening, he parked a bus owned by appellants cousin
named Juanito Palmares (Juanito) just beside the appellants store. He went to appellants store and
conversed with the latter who was inside the same store. Thereafter, he saw a rumble nearby. He
ran and hid inside the parked bus while appellant stayed inside his store. Later, the participants of
the rumble began to stone them. He alighted from the bus and went inside Juanitos house. He
noticed that appellant was still inside the store. Subsequently, he saw Lemuel running and carrying a
knife. He also heard Lemuel saying "Tapos na ang laban, manahimik na kayo." Thereupon, he saw
appellant being apprehended by policemen in civilian clothes.
17

On 12 November 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting appellant of murder.
18
It sustained
the "clear, direct and positive" testimony of the prosecution witnesses who all declared that they saw
appellant stab Michael. It found no ill-motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses in testifying
against appellant. It also ruled that there was treachery in the killing of Michael since the latter was
unarmed, unsuspecting and very young at the time of the attack. In ending, the RTC held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding accused Nicolas Guzman Y Bocbosila guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by treachery. Accordingly, he is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and further ordered to pay the heirs of the late
Michael Angelo Balber the sum of Thirty-Five Thousand Four hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00),
Philippine Currency, as actual damages, excluding the Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) Bagbag
Cemetery as there was no evidence to justify the award of the same; Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00), as moral damages and the additional civil indemnity of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00).
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 26 November 2001.
19
On 28 February 2005, the Court Appeals
promulgated its Decision affirming with modification the RTC Decision.
20
The modification pertains
only to the penalty imposed by the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89, in Criminal Case
No. Q-99-88737 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects except that the sentence be RECLUSION
PERPETUA only.
On automatic review before us, appellant assigned the following errors of the lower court:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE [DOUBT] OF THE CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE THE PALPABLE
DISCREPANCIES AND INCONSISTENCIES IN THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES.
II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING EXCULPATORY WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE DEFENSE.
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO PRODUCE
SUBSTITUTE OR ADDITIONAL WITNESSES FOR HIS DEFENSE.
IV.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT CAN BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE
DEATH OF THE VICTIM, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.
21

Anent the first issue, appellant claims that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses should not
be given any weight as the same are filled with discrepancies and inconsistencies. According to him,
Ronald and Edgardo testified that appellant and his two companions used only one knife in stabbing
Michael. Inspector Malaza, however, declared that appellant and his two companions were armed
with separate knives during the stabbing incident. He also avers that Inspector Malaza gave
contradicting versions of how the latter apprehended him after the incident. Further, Edgardo
testified that after the incident, he immediately went to the house of Michael and informed Danilo of
what he witnessed. Danilo, however, declared that while he was on his way home, he saw Michael
lying at the corner of Sto. Nino St. and Mactan St., and, that the malefactors were running away.
Appellants contention is bereft of merit.
A witness testifying about the same nerve-wracking incident can hardly be expected to be correct in
every detail and consistent with other witnesses in every respect, considering the inevitability of
differences in perception, recollection, viewpoint, or impressions, as well as in their physical, mental,
emotional, and psychological states at the time of the reception and recall of such
impressions.
22
Thus, we have followed the rule in accord with human nature and experience that
honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen, rather than destroy the
credibility of a witness, especially of witnesses to crimes shocking to conscience and numbing to
senses.
23

The inconsistencies cited by appellant refer to minor and unimportant details which do not adversely
affect the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Although the testimony of Ronald and Edgardo as
to the number of knives used in the stabbing incident differs with that of Inspector Malaza, all of them
declared under oath during the trial that appellant stabbed Michael.
Thus, as aptly stated by the Court of Appeals, such inconsistency should not be considered as a
"fatal error," since what is important and decisive is that they had seen appellant stab Michael and
that they testified on the fact during the trial.
Besides, their testimonies on material and relevant points are substantially consistent with each
other. They testified that three persons, among whom was the appellant, had stabbed Michael. Their
descriptions of the faces, physical attributes, and respective positions of appellant and his two
companions during the attack are compatible. They also stated that appellant was the last person
who stabbed Michael.
As regards the alleged inconsistent testimony of Inspector Malaza as to how the latter apprehended
the appellant, it should be borne in mind that the weight of the eyewitness account should be on the
fact that the witness saw the accused commit the crime and was positive of the latters physical
identification.
24
Inspector Malaza had seen appellant stab Michael, and, in fact, apprehended him
right after the incident. Hence, the details on the manner by which Inspector Malaza apprehended
the appellant would be immaterial and irrelevant.
Appellant asserts that the testimony of Danilo runs counter to the testimony of the other prosecution
witnesses. Even if we were to disregard as evidence for the prosecution the testimony of Danilo, the
categorical and credible testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses are sufficient to support the
finding of guilt on the part of appellant. It should be emphasized that the testimony of one eyewitness
would be enough to support a conviction provided it is positive, credible, clear and straightforward.
25

Apropos the second issue, appellant denied any liability and invoked alibi. He argued that he was
inside his store when the stabbing incident occurred, and, that it was Lemuel who stabbed Michael.
He also presented Antonio to corroborate his testimony.
For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was somewhere else when the
crime was committed. He must likewise prove that it is physically impossible for him to be present at
the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
26
If appellant was, as he
claimed, inside his store at the time of the incident, then it was not physically impossible for him to
be at the crime scene or in its immediate vicinity. His store is located just beside Mactan
Street,
27
and that he witnessed the incident at a distance of merely five arms length from his
store.
28
Therefore, his defense of alibi must fail.
Antonio testified that he and appellant, who was inside his store, were having a conversation when
the incident occurred. A perusal of the records, however, shows that appellant did not mention
anything about such conversation. In fact, appellant did not even mention the name of Antonio in his
entire testimony. Given the foregoing, the testimony of Antonio cannot be considered as credible.
In arguing the third issue, appellant avers that his constitutional rights to produce evidence on his
behalf and to due process were violated when the trial court denied the motion of his counsel to
present substitute witnesses.
In the Pre-Trial Order of the RTC dated 29 February 2000, the defense named only four witnesses,
to wit: Antonio, Lizardo Dedase, Eduardo Bidia, and accused himself.
29
In the same order, the RTC
stated the following:
All parties are informed that witnesses and documents which were not mentioned in this pre-trial
order shall not be entertained during the trial on the merits.
30

During the trial, only appellant and Antonio were able to testify. When the two other witnesses in the
pre-trial order, namely, Lizardo Dedase and Eduardo Bidia, failed to appear and testify in court
several times, the defense counsel moved to substitute them explaining that they were hesitant to
testify, and, that one of them went home to his province.
31

The RTC was correct in denying the defense counsels motion for substitution of witnesses since
Section 4, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure mandates that the matters agreed
upon in the pre-trial conference and as stated in the pre-trial order shall bind the parties, to wit:
SEC. 4. Pre-trial order. After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the
actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the
trial to matters not disposed of, and control the course of the action during the trial, unless modified
by the court to prevent manifest injustice (Italics supplied).
The pre-trial order of the RTC dated 29 February 2000 clearly shows that the defense named only
four witnesses. The parties were also informed therein that witnesses who were not mentioned in the
pre-trial order will not be entertained during the trial on the merits. Thus, pursuant to the afore-stated
provision and its purpose of preventing undue delay in the disposition of criminal cases and ensuring
fair trial, the denial of the defense counsels motion for substitution of witnesses is justified.
Moreover, if appellants motion for substitution of witnesses is given due course, it will amount to an
unreasonable disregard of solemn agreements submitted to and approved by the court of justice and
would make a mockery of the judicial process.
This is not to say, however, that such provision is absolute. It can be relaxed in the greater interest
of justice. Nevertheless, the exception does not apply in favor of appellant as the RTC had observed
that his motion for substitution of witnesses appears to be a "fishing expedition" of evidence which is
clearly unfair to the case of the prosecution.
32
Moreover, as aptly stated by the Solicitor General, if
the two other witnesses of appellant were indeed afraid or hesitant to testify, he should have moved
the RTC to subpoena the said witnesses to testify in court
33
pursuant to his constitutional right to
compulsory process to secure the attendance of his witnesses.
34
Unfortunately, appellant did not
avail himself of this remedy.
As to the fourth issue, appellant contends that even if he were held liable for the death of Michael,
there was no treachery which will qualify the killing as murder. According to him, there is no
evidence to show that appellant and his two companions had deliberately and consciously adopted
their mode of attack to ensure its execution without risk to themselves. The stabbing incident
occurred in a place that was properly lighted. There were many people in the area then walking in
different directions. He claims that if he and his two companions wanted to ensure that no risk would
come to them, then they could have chosen another time and place to attack Michael.
Treachery is a sudden and unexpected attack under the circumstances that renders the victim
unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack.
35
It
is an aggravating circumstance that qualifies the killing of a person to murder. Article 14, paragraph
(16) of the Revised Penal Code states the concept and essential elements of treachery as an
aggravating circumstance, thus:
ART. 14. The following are aggravating circumstances:
x x x x
16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing, two essential elements/conditions are required in order that
treachery may be appreciated: (1) The employment of means, methods or manner of execution that
would ensure the offenders safety from any retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, who
has, thus no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; (2) deliberate or conscious choice of means,
methods or manner of execution. Further, it must always be alleged in the information and proved in
trial in order that it may be validly considered.
36

In the instant case, treachery was alleged in the Information against appellant.
37
Moreover, all the
essential elements/conditions of treachery were established and proven during the trial.
After attending a worship service at the Iglesia ni Kristo church in his barangay, Michael proceeded
home. While Michael was casually walking along the corner of Sto. Nino Street and Mactan Street,
appellant and his two companions, who were drinking nearby, suddenly approached and surrounded
Michael. Appellant positioned himself at the back of Michael while his two companions stood in front
of Michael. In an instant, they grabbed the shoulders of Michael and overpowered the latter. One of
the appellants companions, whom the prosecution witnesses described as a male with long hair,
drew out a knife and repeatedly stabbed Michael on the stomach. Unsatisfied, the appellants other
companion, whom the prosecution witnesses described as a male with flat top hair, took the knife
and stabbed Michael on the stomach. As the finale, appellant went in front of Michael, took the knife
and also stabbed Michael on the stomach. When Michael fell on the ground, appellant kicked him at
the body. Upon noticing that the bloodied Michael was no longer moving, appellant and his two
companions fled the scene.
As viewed from the foregoing, the suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack of appellant and
his two companions rendered Michael defenseless, vulnerable and without means of escape. It
appears that Michael was unarmed and alone at the time of the attack. Further, he was merely
seventeen years of age then.
38
In such a helpless situation, it was absolutely impossible for Michael
to escape or to defend himself against the assault of appellant and his two companions. Being
young and weak, Michael is certainly no match against adult persons like appellant and his two
companions. Michael was also outnumbered since he had three assailants, and, was unarmed when
he was stabbed to death. Appellant and his two companions took advantage of their size, number,
and weapon in killing Michael. They also deliberately adopted means and methods in exacting the
cruel death of Michael by first surrounding him, then grabbing his shoulders and overpowering him.
Afterwards, each of them repeatedly stabbed Michael with a knife at the stomach until the latter fell
lifeless to the ground. The stab wounds sustained by Michael proved to be fatal as they severely
damaged the latters large intestine.
39

The fact that the place where the incident occurred was lighted and many people were walking then
in different directions does not negate treachery. It should be made clear that the essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without the slightest
provocation on his part.
40
This is even more true if the assailant is an adult and the victim is a minor.
Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. Thus,
when an adult person illegally attacks a minor, treachery exists.
41
As we earlier found, Michael was
peacefully walking and not provoking anyone to a fight when he was stabbed to death by appellant
and his two companions. Further, Michael was a minor at the time of his death while appellant and
his two companions were adult persons.
With regard to the allegation in the Information that the killing of Michael was attended by an
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, the RTC and the Court of Appeals were correct
in disregarding the same against appellant. The essence of evident premeditation as an aggravating
circumstance is that the execution of the criminal act was preceded by cool thought and reflection
upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
judgment.
42
It implies a deliberate planning of the crime before executing it. It must also be shown
how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out.
43
Further,
there must be proof that the accused meditated and reflected on his intention between the time
when the crime was conceived by him and the time it was actually perpetrated.
44
In the case at bar,
there is no evidence to show that appellant and his two companions had previously planned and
reflected in killing Michael. When appellant and his two companions saw Michael on that fateful
night, they immediately pounced on him. The thought of killing Michael came into the minds of
appellant and his two companions only when they saw Michael walking on the road. Indeed, the
killing of Michael was sudden and unplanned.
On another point, we agree with the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals. Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code states that murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63 of
the same Code provides that if the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, as in the instant
case, and there are no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
Since there is no mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the present case, and, treachery cannot
be considered as an aggravating circumstance as it was already taken as a qualifying circumstance,
the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed. As regards the damages awarded by
the Court of Appeals, we rule that the sum of P35,470.00 as actual damages should be reduced
to P25,670.00 since the receipts on record amounts only to P25,670.00.
45
It is well-settled that only
expenses supported by receipts will be allowed for actual damages.
46
Furthermore, exemplary
damages should also be awarded to the heirs of Michael since the qualifying circumstance of
treachery was firmly established by the prosecution.
47
If a crime is committed with an aggravating
circumstance, either qualifying or generic, an award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is
justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code.
48
This kind of damage is intended to serve as a
deterrent to serious wrongdoings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of
the rights of an injured person or punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.
49
lawphil.net
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R.-H.C. No. 00095 dated 28
February 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, for which, he is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of Michael P25,670.00 as actual
damages; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for Michaels death;
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CELINO NABONG y OSENAR (a.k.a. Salvador Abaquita), ALVIN LAGUIT y BRENDO and
NOLFE LADIAO (a.k.a. Roel Salutario), Accused-Appellants.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:
For review is the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00731 which affirmed the
Decision
2
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 66, finding accused-appellants
Celino Nabong y Ocenar (aka Salvador Abaquita), Alvin Laguit y Brendo and Nolfe Ladiao (aka Roel
Salutario) guilty of the complex crime of attempted rape with homicide and imposing upon them the
death penalty.
On 5 April 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City an Information for the crime of Attempted Rape with Homicide against the appellants and
a certain Arnel Miraflor y Awitan.
On 21 April 1999, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information on the ground that
certain material evidence arose subsequent to the filing of the original information which
necessitated its amendment. Said motion was granted on the same date.
3

An Amended Information was filed on 21 April 1999, indicting appellants and Arnel Miraflor for the
crime of Attempted Rape with Homicide, punishable under Republic Act No. 8357, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of March 1999 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-accused men conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping each other and taking advantage of nighttime, superior strength and by means of
treachery, evident premeditation, force and violence, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attempt to have sexual intercourse with a woman AAA,
4
against her will and consent,
thereby commencing the commission of the crime of rape directly by overt acts but did not perform
all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of rape as a consequence by reason of
causes independent of their own spontaneous desistance, that is, AAA resisted; and by reason or on
the occasion of the attempted rape the accused, with intent to kill, attack, assault and stabbed with a
bladed weapon AAA on the different parts of her body thereby inflicting serious physical injuries
which directly caused her death.
5

Upon arraignment, all of the accused pleaded not guilty
6
of the crime charged. Hence, trial ensued.
The prosecution proved the following facts.
The four accused, Celino Nabong (Nabong), Alvin Laguit (Laguit), Nolfe Ladiao (Ladiao) and Arnel
Miraflor (Miraflor), were all construction workers employed as steelmen by EEI, a construction firm,
and assigned at its OCW-RCBC Plaza Project located at Ayala Avenue, Makati City.
The victim, AAA was a 22-year old accountant employed as junior auditor at the Alba and Romeo
Auditing Firm.
Reynaldo Patenio, a steelman of EEI construction and a co-worker of the accused, testified that on
the fateful night of 23 March 1999, at about 9:00 oclock in the evening, he and the four accused,
together with their co-workers, Rogelio Amit, Lilia and Ariel Cortez, were inside the workers barracks
at the OCW-RCBC Plaza when they decided to go out for a drinking session. They walked from their
barracks and at about 9:15 p.m. reached a nearby videoke bar in Amorsolo Street in Makati City, just
across the Makati Medical Center. There, each of them consumed six bottles of Colt 45 beer.
By 11:30 p.m., they stopped drinking when the videoke bar closed for the night.1a\^/ phi 1. net Rogelio Amit, Lilia
and Ariel Cortez left ahead of the group. The four accused proceeded to Ayala Avenue and stopped
at a vacant lot in front of the Makati Medical Center, where concrete pipes used for construction
were lying around. Reynaldo Patenio, who decided to call it a day, also stepped out of the videoke
bar and was just about five meters away from the four accused, when they invited him to join them.
When Reynaldo Patenio joined the group, they taunted him and made fun of him by pushing him
around like a ball being tossed from one man to another.
Patenio was able to extricate himself from the group and was about to leave when he heard one of
the accused saying loudly "Huwag nayan, lagas nayan," which was directed at a woman who was
then boarding a jeepney. The word "lagas" means old in the Visayan dialect. At about the same time,
AAA was walking towards the center island near the corner of Buendia Avenue and Ayala Avenue
with her officemate Minerva Arguelles Frias. Laguit and Ladiao, who were then standing by the
corner of Ayala Avenue and Buendia Avenue, spotted the two women. Therefrom, Laguit and Ladiao
crossed the street and waited at the island for the two women. Minerva Arguelles Frias then boarded
a bus, leaving AAA alone with Laguit and Ladiao.
Laguit took his shirt off and was laughing while waving his shirt in the air. Ladiao, who was between
Laguit and AAA, had a smirk on his face. Nabong then appeared from the dark portion of the vacant
lot holding a "kabilya," a 7-inch pointed metal bar, sort of an improvised iced pick, and approached
Laguit, Ladiao and AAA. Nabong suddenly stabbed AAA on the right thigh using the pointed metal
bar. Simultaneously, Ladiao jumped at AAA and covered her mouth. The victim slumped on the
pavement while Ladiao, Laguit, Nabong and Miraflor crowded around the woman.
Miraflor, upon seeing what his companions were doing, hurriedly left and went to the barracks.
Patenio also left the scene and went back to the barracks about the same time Miraflor did.
Witness Ofelia A. Camba, a vendor at the RCBC Plaza, testified that on that same night between
11:00 and 11:30, while she was walking towards a creek to urinate, she overheard a group of men
talking. Upon hearing their voices, she changed her mind and instead continued to walk towards her
house at the Botanical Garden, near Urban Avenue. When she passed by the group from where the
voices emanated, she noticed two men who were seated and a man who was standing. She later
identified the man standing as Nabong. She heard Nabong, who was two meters away from her
saying "Huwag yan, lagas na yan." Having understood the remark, she suddenly felt scared.
For her part, Virginia Mabayao, another vendor in the area, testified that at or before midnight of 23
March 1999, while she was walking along Buendia Ave., she saw three men who told her, "Hi, ate
pakape ka naman." She responded by telling them to go to her vending place located at Ayala
Avenue near RCBC. They did not follow her. She noticed that one of them who was standing held a
piece of metal while swaying his head from left to right. The other two were seated. At around 1:00
a.m. the next day, she heard from the barangay captain of the killing incident. Later, at the Makati
police station, she saw the same men again whose identities she subsequently learned as Nabong,
Miraflor, and Laguit. She recalled that Nabong was the man who was standing.
Minerva Arguelles Frias, through her sworn statement, disclosed that she was with the victim that
night. They walked from their office until they reached Ayala Avenue where she boarded a bus,
leaving the victim on site.
PO3 Libretto Buisan testified that on the night of the incident, he, together with PO1 Elmer Garcia,
was on a patrol duty at the Pasong Tamo, Buendia Avenue and Makati Avenue area from 8:00 p.m.
to 8:00 a.m. the following day. At around 11:45 that night, they noticed a commotion along Buendia
Avenue near Tindalo Street. As they went closer, they discovered the body of a woman, later
identified to be that of the victim, lying on the pavement on her back, her undergarment pulled down
almost exposing her private parts. Her brassiere was torn off leaving her left breast exposed. Her
dress was torn and raised showing her belly. PO3 Buisan found the left side of the victims body
heavily bloodied. The center part of the street was splattered with blood. There were also drops of
blood on the vacant lot where the concrete pipes were located as well as on the extension of Tindalo
Street. He asked the barangay tanod to bring the victim to the hospital.
Arnel Marzan, a traffic enforcer and a Bantay Bayan at Barangay San Lorenzo, testified that at past
midnight, on 24 March 1999, he received a call for assistance. He proceeded to the scene and found
the victim still breathing and moaning. He carried the victim to a tricycle that passed by, and together
with a certain Joven Lopez, took her to the Makati Medical Center.
PO2 Rico S. Bulacan, the investigator assigned to the case, narrated that in the early morning of 24
March 1999, he conducted a spot investigation at the scene of the crime. There, he found six
concrete pieces of culvert pipes at the dark side portion of Tindalo Street corner Buendia Avenue.
He also found out that the nearby traffic post which was about 200 meters away from the corner of
Tindalo St. was stained with freshly dried blood. The bloodstains, upon laboratory examination,
tested positive for human blood. Later, he found an earring belonging to the victim near one of the
concrete culvert pipes. It was to him that witness Mabayao first confided that she saw Nabong
holding onto the traffic sign post the previous night.
Pastor Maghamil, the security guard on duty at the workers barracks said that Patenio and Miraflor
entered the barracks at around 1:30 a.m. of 24 March 1999. He also saw a man wearing a bull cap,
in white "cheleko" vest and pants walking normally toward Ayala Avenue Extension. At round 9:00
a.m. of the same day, he learned of the incident from the construction workers. Later in the evening,
policemen arrived at the barracks to inquire as to who among the workers arrived at dawn. He
informed them that Patenio and Miraflor did.
Police inspector Thomas C. Sipin, the team leader of the group who apprehended the accused,
testified that at around 8:00 p.m. of 24 March 1999, he went to the crime scene at Buendia Avenue.
He discovered bloodstains at the back of the parking sign located at the sidewalk along Buendia
Avenue. He took samples of said bloodstains, which, upon NBI laboratory examination, turned out to
be Type O human blood. He proceeded to the RCBC barracks then to the RCBC construction site.
There, he was able to talk to two vendors, Mabayao and Camba, and the security guard. On the
morning of 25 March 1999, he came back to the barracks and invited Nabong, Miraflor and Patenio.
At the police station, PO2 Bulacan conducted an investigation of the three invited persons.
Dr. Ronaldo Mendez, the medico-legal officer of the NBI, testified that the victim was stabbed six
times with the use of sharp, pointed, single-bladed instrument, three on the left chest, one on the
right chest, one on the back right side chest level, and one on the right thigh. He said that the cause
of death of the victim was hemoperigonio or collection of blood at the abdominal cavities caused by
the stab wounds.
BBB, the mother of AAA, testified specifically on the civil liability of the accused.1awphi1. nt
The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of the four accused who denied having
committed the crime and offered the defense of alibi.
The four accused admitted that they went on a drinking spree at the videoke bar at around 9:00 p.m.
of 23 March 1999 with Patenio and the other co-workers. They all claimed that they left the bar at
past midnight, after which they proceeded to the nearby Burger Machine to drink coffee. They also
admitted that they never had any quarrel with Patenio.
According to Nabong, after drinking coffee with the group they parted ways. He went home to
Marikina and arrived there at around 2:00 a.m. He slept and woke up at 6:00 a.m., got his bag then
went to the barracks, arriving there at 8:00 a.m. where he slept again. When he woke up at 12 noon,
he left the barracks to see a movie and returned at 2:00 p.m. He said he chose to start to work at
6:00 p.m. that day since it was very hot to work at daytime.
For his part, Laguit testified that he consumed four bottles of Colt 45 beer at the videoke bar. They
left at past midnight and stayed at the Burger Machine for a few minutes. From there, he proceeded
to the barracks with Miraflor and Patenio. He heard of the killing on 24 March 1999, from the guard.
The whole day he stayed in the barracks. At 9:00 a.m. of 25 March 1999, he was arrested and
brought to the police station where the police asked him to confess to the killing, but he refused.
According to Ladiao, the videoke bar was only less than five minutes walk from the barracks. He
returned to the barracks after dropping by the Burger Machine. On 25 March 1999, the police took
him to the police station.
Miraflor testified that after drinking coffee at the Burger Machine, he returned to the barracks with
Patenio, while Laguit followed them. Upon reaching the barracks, he slept. The following morning,
24 March 1999, he proceeded to work. At around 9:00 p.m. of the same day, the security guard
assigned in the barracks told him and Patenio about the incident and that some policemen were
looking for them. The following day, he and Patenio did not report for work and waited for the
policemen to arrive. When the policemen arrived, they were told that they will be investigated. They
were later brought to the police station where two vendors arrived and identified them as the ones
responsible for the death of AAA.
The trial court subsequently rendered a decision dated 18 June 2002, finding Celino Nabong, in
conspiracy with Alvin Laguit and Nolfe Ladiao, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of Attempted Rape with Homicide under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8353 or the "Anti-Rape Law of 1997." For insufficiency of evidence to
sustain his conviction, Arnel Miraflor was acquitted. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the three accused Celino Nabong y Osenar
(aka Salvador Abaquita), Alvin Laguit y Brendo and Nolfe Ladiao (aka Roel Salutario) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Rape with Homicide who are hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), as exemplary damages, one hundred eleven thousand two hundred thirty-nine pesos
(111,239.00) as actual damages, one million five hundred eight thousand one hundred thirty pesos
(P1,508,130.00) for loss of earning capacity and fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral
damages. Arnel Miraflor Awitan is acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.
7

Due to the imposition of death penalty on appellants, the case was directly elevated to this Court for
review. This Court, however, referred the case to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review,
conformably with the ruling in the case of People v. Mateo.
8

The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision on 9 September 2005 affirming the conviction of
appellants, with modification:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision dated June 18, 2002 of the RTC, Branch
66, Makati City in Criminal Case No. 99-569 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) be awarded to the heirs of AAA as civil indemnity.
9

Appellant Nabong filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated 23 January 2006.
Hence, the instant case.
Appellant Nabong assigns the following errors:
I. The Honorable Court failed to appreciate witness Reynaldo Patenios motive to perjure
himself.
II. There is no evidence on record that accused conspicuously adopted the alleged surprised
attack as a means of executing the crime.
III. There is sufficient basis on record to justify the appreciation of intoxication and low
degree of instruction as mitigating circumstances in favor of accused.
IV. The fundamental right of accused to legal counsel was violated.
For their part, appellant Laguit and Ladiao assign the following error:
BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ALVIN B. LAGUIT AND NOLFE LADIAO OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED
HEREIN.
Appellants contend that the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in finding them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of attempted rape with homicide. They claim that the
circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution is meager to sustain their convictions and that
reasonable doubt exists in their favor.
We say that, contrary to appellants posture, the prosecution has discharged, through circumstantial
evidence, the burden of proving beyond the shadow of doubt that the appellants are guilty of the
charge.
This Court cites with approval circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution on the crime of
attempted rape as found by the trial court:
Ofelia Camba xxx testified that at about 11:30 p.m. of March 23, 1999, shortly before the
commission of the crime, she passed by a place near where she sold cigarettes and some food
items. She was about to proceed to the foot of a bridge at a nearby creek to urinate when she heard
some voices from a group of three persons, two of who were seated while the other was standing.
She distinctly heard one of them- the person standing- say softly to the other two: Huwag na yan,
lagas na yan." She was only two meters away when she heard the words uttered by one of the three
person. "Lagas," according to Camba, meant old. Obviously she was the one being referred to. She
positively identified Nabong as the one who uttered the aforequoted words.
May it be recalled at this juncture that Patenio had also testified that he heard one of the three
accused Ladiao, Laguit and Nabong- utter the same words. He said he was just a few yards away
from the three accused and heard distinctly one of them say: "Huwag na yan. Lagas na yan."
When the body of the victim was found by PO3 Liberato Buisan and PO1 Elmer Garcia, of the
Makati City Police Mobile Unit, her undergarment was "nakababa" (pulled down) and her private
parts were almost exposed. Her brassiere was torn off leaving her entire left breast open to view.
Her dress was torn apart that her belly was likewise exposed.
Such conditions were highly suggestive of force or violence applied upon the victim that is normally
preparatory to sexual attack. Moreover, there was effort on the part of the attackers to keep the
victim from screaming or shouting for help. Patenio saw Ladiao cover the mouth of the victim.
The words of injunction against taking interest in an old woman which can only mean that Camba, at
46, was not worth their while, give an inkling of what the three accused had in mind. Such words
gave away their mischievous intent which, coupled with the conditions that were found in the
sprawled body of the victim when discovered, may well prove the complex crime of attempted rape
with homicide even in the absence of direct evidence.
10

Likewise, the fact of the victims killing by the appellants was sufficiently established with moral
certainty by the prosecution. As aptly discussed by the trial court:
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to the fact of killing have not been successfully
refuted by the defense. Patenio saw Nabong as he struck the first blow- the stab on the victims
thigh. While he did not see the succeeding five strikes upon the woman with the sharpened pointed
(sic) "kabilya", there can be no doubt that it was made by Nabong or any of the two others or both.
That it could not be ascertained if the succeeding stab wounds were inflicted by one or the other of
the accused, it would not make any difference anyway since there was unquestionably conspiracy
among the three accused in the commission of the crime.
Patenio gave testimony with details only an eyewitness could have given. He was candid even to
admit he felt a bit resentful that the accused made fun of him. His testimony clearly showed that
Nabong, Laguit and Ladiao performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as
unmistakably to indicate a common purpose or design which is to rape the victim- and kill her, as
they did. Laguit and Ladiao gave the victim no chance to escape nor to shout for help. They blocked
her way at the slightest indication she would escape. They covered her mouth so she could not call
for help. Then Nabong appeared and stabbed her in the thigh to prevent her even more from running
away.
11

In an attempt to discredit witness Patenios testimony, appellant Nabong insists that the formers
testimony is unreliable based on the following: (a) Patenio has an ax to grind against appellants for
making fun of him; (b) since Patenio was initially taken as a suspect, he was compelled to offer
perjurious testimony against the appellants to save himself from being included as one of the
perpetrators of the crime; (c) even as Patenio allegedly saw Nabong stab the victim in the thigh, he
did not lift a finger to dissuade Nabong from his supposed act, or at least report the incident to the
police.
As a rule, the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses is generally accorded the highest
degree of weight and respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the unique
opportunity to observe the deportment of witnesses while testifying.
12

In the case under consideration, appellant Nabong imputes ill motive to the prosecution witness
Patenio, alleging that the latter has a score to settle with the appellants for making fun of him.
However, such fact does not conclusively establish that the prosecution witness, in testifying against
the appellants, was moved by a desire to retaliate against the latter. In the absence of sufficient
proof of improper motive, the presumption is that the said witness was not so moved and his
testimony is thus entitled to full faith and credit.
13
Besides, it must be recalled that it was witness
Patenio who admitted before the trial court that he felt a bit resentful that the appellants made fun of
him. This candid admission of the prosecution witness in fact bolsters his credibility and fortifies his
testimony against the appellants.
The fact that Patenio was one of the first suspects in the commission of the crime does not make his
testimony less credible. As noted by the Court of Appeals:
Granting that Patenio was initially taken as a suspect in the crime, this fact does not affect his
credibility as a witness. Not all persons invited for questioning by the police turn out to be the real
culprits. It is but normal that the police will have several suspects for initial investigation. This
procedure helps the authorities to determine with clarity the real perpetrators. Some of these
witnesses even turn out to be state witnesses or eye-witness as in the case of Patenio.
14

Witness Patenios failure to report immediately to the proper authority does not impinge on his
credibility. This Court has ruled that, when confronted with startling occurences, behavioral
responses of witnesses are diverse.
15
Indeed, there is no uniform reaction or standard behavioral
response to grisly events.
16
In numerous instances, this Court has declared that the reluctance of
eyewitnesses to testify on a crime and to get involved in a criminal investigation are but normal and
do not by themselves affect the witnesses credibility.
17
The sealed lips of said witnesses are but a
natural and spontaneous reaction.
18
They may opt to remain silent rather than to imperil their own
lives.
19

In the instant case, witness Patenio, fearing for his safety, kept silent about the incident. This is
understandable because the witness has no relatives residing in the metropolis who may be able to
lend him a safe abode in case the appellants would retaliate against him for his testimony. In the
same vein, being an ordinary mortal, the witness, who may not have the virtues of fortitude and
altruism, cannot be expected to risk his life by preventing the appellants from completing their
criminal objective.
Appellants assert that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in appreciating treachery since
the evidence is bereft of proof that appellants plotted to carry out the attack on the victim.
Appellants contention is unmeritorious.
The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape.
20
Thus, this Court has ruled that even frontal
attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the victim is unarmed.
21
Treachery
can still be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his/her
person.
22
What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to
defend himself/herself or to retaliate.
23
In the present case, the victim did not even have sufficient
warning of the danger that was looming, since the attack against her came from behind and was so
sudden and unexpected, thus giving the victim no time to flee or to prepare her defense or enable
her to offer the least resistance to the sudden assault.
Appellant Nabong faults the lower courts in not appreciating intoxication and low degree of
instruction in his favor.
For intoxication to be considered as mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that the intoxication
impaired the will power of the accused and that he did not know what he was doing or could not
comprehend the wrongfulness of his acts.
24
The person pleading intoxication must prove that he took
such quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, as would blur his
reason.
25
This, the appellants failed to do. The records are bereft of any evidence that the quantity of
liquor they had taken was of such quantity as to affect their mental faculties. On the contrary, the fact
that appellants could recall details of what had transpired after their drinking session is the best proof
that they knew what they were doing during that occasion. The deception, the device, the place and
manner of perpetrating the crime all point to the fact that appellants had complete control of their
minds.
Neither can appellant Nabongs alleged lack of instruction be appreciated in his favor. Illiteracy alone
will not constitute such circumstance; it must be accompanied by lack of sufficient intelligence and
knowledge of the full significance of ones act.
26
Besides, one does not have to be educated or
intelligent to be able to know that it is unlawful to take the life of another person.
27

In a desperate effort to exculpate himself from the charge against him, Nabong clutches at straws.
He argues that his fundamental right to legal counsel was violated when his counsel did not bother
to secure the attendance of witnesses in his defense, particularly Nabongs cousin, whose supposed
testimony would support his defense of alibi.
This argument deserves scant consideration. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, this
issue was raised belatedly by appellant Nabong for the first time before the Court of Appeals in a
motion for reconsideration. The rule is that an issue not raised in the trial cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal, much less in a motion for reconsideration.
28

At any rate, the records do not show that Nabongs counsel had been remiss in his duty. Defense
witnesses were presented in the person of the four accused and cross-examination had been
conducted by the defense counsel.
As to the award of actual damages, the trial court ordered the appellants to pay the heirs of the
victim the following amounts: (a) P6,499.00 as medical expenses; (b) P35,000.00 as burial expense;
(c) P25,740.00 cost of the burial lot; and (d) P44,000.00 expenses incurred during the wake.
Appellant Nabong questions the award of P44,000.00 spent for the wake of the victim claiming that
the prosecution did not present official receipts for said expenses. The mother of the victim testified
that she expended the said amount for the wake of her daughter. Said expenses were reduced into
writing and marked as Exh. "V". The defense did not object to this during the direct examination of
the witness for the prosecution nor in the formal offer of evidence. Thus, the rule stating that
"evidence not objected to is deemed admitted" finds application in the case under
consideration.
29
For this reason, the trial court can take into account such evidence in arriving at the
judgment.
30
Hence, the trial courts judgment ordering appellants to pay P44,000.00 for the expenses
incurred during the wake is correct.
Also assailed is the certification of the victims monthly salary from her employer. It is contended that
said evidence is hearsay since nobody from the office of the victims employer testified on the said
document.
Again, this contention is unavailing. Failure on the part of the appellants to object to the presentation
of such evidence during the direct examination of the prosecution witness and the formal offer of the
certificate of employment dated 25 October 1999 issued by the victims employer and marked as
Exh. "W" makes the said evidence admissible and one that can be considered by the trial court in its
verdict.
The computation of the trial court with respect to lost earning capacity is correct. At the time of her
death, the victim was 22 years old. She had been earning P6,500.00 monthly. Loss of earning
capacity is computed by applying the following formula:
31

Net Earning
Capacity
=
life expectancy
[2/3(80-age at death)]
x
Gross Annual
Income (GAI)

living expenses
(50% of GAI)
X = [
2

3
(80-22) ] x GAI [50% of GAI]
X = [
2

3
(58) ] x P78,000 P39,000
X = [
116

3
] x [P39,000]

= [38.67]

[P39,000]
Net Earning
Capacity
of the victim
= P1,508,130.00

Proceeding now to the appropriate penalty, it must be noted that the penalty for the crime of
attempted rape with homicide is "reclusion perpetua to death." Since the penalty is composed of two
indivisible penalties, then for the purpose of determining the imposable penalty, Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code must be considered.
32
It provides in part:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the
greater penalty shall be applied.
With the presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery and there being no mitigating
circumstance, the higher penalty of death should be imposed.
33

In view, however, of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346 entitled, "An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was signed into law on 24 June 2006, the
imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited.
34
Thus, the penalty imposed upon appellants
should be reduced to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility of parole under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
35

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 00731, dated 9 September
2005 as well as its Resolution dated 23 January 2006 are hereby AFFIRMED insofar as the
conviction of appelllants and the amount of damages are concerned. The sentence that shall be
imposed upon appellants, however, is MODIFIED. In view of Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the
imposition of the death penalty, appellants are hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua without
parole. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
vs.
ROLANDO CENTENO, ET AL., defendants. ROLANDO CENTENO, defendant- appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Rodrigo Law Office for defendant-appellant.

CRUZ, J .:
It all started, innocuously enough, with a drinking spree. On that afternoon of December 1, 1968,
Rolando Santos was enjoying himself with some friends and plenty of beer that he eventually could
not carry. Within the hour, he would be dead of a massive brain hemorrhage. The venue would be
the municipal building itself. And the police chief himself, together with one of his policemen, would
be accused of murdering him.
How Santos died is the question we have to settle. The prosecution says he was killed with karate
blows dealt by the accused-appellant. The defense denies this. It says Santos drunkenly staggered
and fell and hit his head and bled to death.
The trial court believed the prosecution and convicted the police chief while absolving his co-
accused. 1 Rolando Centeno is now before us on appeal of his conviction.
The medical evidence is not disputed. It is accepted that Santos died as a result of internal bleeding
in the brain due to trauma. The victim's head showed various contusions and abrasions but not in
the nape of the neck where the karate blows were allegedly delivered. 2
Besides Dr. Plaridel F. Vidal, the NBI medico-legal officer who testified on the autopsy of Santos,
two important witnesses who gave a first-hand version of how Santos was allegedly killed by the
accused-appellant were presented by the prosecution. These were Dionisio Violago and Eulogio
Villanueva, who were both friends of the victim.
According to Violago, he and Santos, together with their other companions, were in the store of one
Aling Goreng when Patrolman Valeriano Reyes approached Santos and told the young man to come
with him. Santos demurred, protesting that he had done nothing wrong, whereupon Reyes boxed
him in the chest and forcibly brought him to the police station. There Santos loudly objected to his
detention, prompting Police Chief Centeno to say, "Matigas ka yatang talaga," although he relented
later and allowed him to go home. But as Santos was leaving, Centeno had a change of mind and
asked Reyes to bring Santos back. Reyes was holding Santos's arm when Centeno administered
the first karate blow on the nape of Santos's neck that made the victim fall forward on the backrest of
a bench. This was followed by two more karate blows that crumpled him to the cement floor where
he lay prostrate and motionless. On Centeno's order, two policemen then picked up Santos and took
him inside the locker room adjacent to the municipal jail. 3
Villanueva corroborated Violago and said he cried out, "Why are you doing this to my friend?" when
he saw Santos being mauled by Centeno. He also declared that Santos was felled with three karate
blows from Centeno. This witness claimed he got a glass of water and gave it to Santos, who could
not drink it any more as he was already dying then. He felt Santos's pulse but there was none. He
opened Santos's shirt and put his ear to his chest but could hear no heartbeat. He said that the other
persons who witnessed the killing, besides the policemen, were Violago, Romy Salao and Serafin
Punzalan. 4
The theory of the defense was that Santos was so intoxicated that he reeled and fell and hit his head
and suffered the internal brain hemorrhage that killed him. To support this claim, it introduced
Mercedes Bautista, chief forensic chemist of the NBI, who testified that at the time of Santos's death
he had 0.21% of alcohol in his blood. She declared on cross-examination that the effect of such
quantity would vary according to the person's physical condition although there would surely be
emotional instability in every case. 5
The defense conjectured that as a result of his inebriation, Santos must have crashed down and hurt
his head, resulting in internal bleeding. Valeriano Reyes, the other accused, testified that after they
had brought Santos to the locker room, they heard a noise ("kalabog") suggesting that Santos had
hit something; and sure enough they found him dying on the floor when they went in to
investigate. 6 It is doubtful though how they could have heard the alleged sound, considering the thick concrete walls of the room and
the fact that they were then some ten meters away. 7
There is also the argument that no external injuries were found on the nape of the neck, where the
karate blows were administered although there were abrasions and contusions elsewhere in the
victim's head. As Dr. Vidal explained, however, even if no marks were left on the neck, karate blows
thereon could cause the generalized and extensive bleedings that caused the victim's death. Thus:
Q Will you please explain, if a karate blow delivered on the nape of a
person without necessarily producing contusions or abrasions will
cause brain hemorrhage?
A Depending on the position of the fist that one will apply on the
person. A karate blow will produce inner injury but without any
outside injury especially this portion of the hand, (witness pointing to
the hypothenar) unlike this portion (witness pointing to the knuckles)
and especially when the karate blows delivered with the hypothenar
on a muscular portion of the body like the nape, there will be no
external injuries but the injury is internal. To further explain, I will cite
to you an example. The boxers who use gloves on their hands and
when they will deliver blows on a person, that person will not sustain
external injuries but there is severe injury inside the brain and that
could justify that karate blows will not produce external injuries but
internal injuries. 8
The defense itself submitted that Santos shouted drunkenly within hearing distance of Centeno and
Reyes, "Putang inang mga pulis iyan! Walang kuwenta sa akin iyan!" 9 They claimed to be tolerant and simply
admonished him to go home, but subsequent events showed they were really annoyed by his remarks. This was the motive that prompted
Reyes to drag Santos to the municipal building and led Centeno later to kill him.
We are satisfied that Violago and Villanueva were telling the truth about the killing of their friend
although there were indeed inconsistencies in their statements. These were minor lapses only and
did not impair the essential truthfulness of their narrations. As for the defense, its explanation of the
death of Santos while he was in the custody of the police is hardly plausible and mainly speculative.
Murder cannot be excused on such improbable conjectures
Murder it was indeed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery. There was alevosia because
Santos was suddenly attacked from behind when in his weakened and intoxicated condition, coupled
with the fact that his arm was then being held by Reyes, he could not defend himself. The accused-
appellant had employed means aimed at achieving his purpose without risk to himself from any
defense the victim could have made.
Even assuming there was abuse of superior strength, on which issue we do not have to rule here,
this aggravating circumstance is deemed absorbed by treachery. As for the mitigating circumstances
claimed by the defense, the Court holds that they cannot be allowed. The derogatory statement
made by Santos which so irritated Centeno did not constitute such a grave provocation as to warrant
the lessening of his penalty for reacting as he did in punishing the victim to death. Neither can
Centeno argue now that he had not intended to commit so grave a wrong as the actual killing of
Santos as he knew, or should have known, that the karate chops on the nape of the neck would
have a lethal effect upon the defenseless and drunken victim.
There being no generic aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the term of imprisonment was
correctly fixed atreclusion perpetua, the medium penalty for murder. The civil indemnity is, however,
increased to P30,000.00 consistent with present policy.
It was not only Rolando Santos who was intoxicated when he died at 22 on December 1, 1968.
There was another kind of drunkenness that afflicted the chief of police, who misused his power and
lawlessly took a life.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED except as to the civil indemnity, which is
increased to P30,000.00. Costs against the accused-appellant. It is so ordered.
vs.
BONIFACIO ABADIES, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
What was supposed to be a merry yuletide season for the Roldan clan turned into a tragic Christmas
Day when, in the early dawn of December 25, 1995, amidst the gaiety, family patriarch Cecilio
Roldan was fatally shot at close range from behind before the horrified gaze of his wife and twelve
year-old son.
Charged with Murder for the fatal shooting of Cecilio Roldan was his uncle, Bonifacio Abadies, a
known neighborhood "toughie". The Information against him reads:
That on or about the 25th day of December 1995, at around 2:00 early dawn, in Brgy. Cadaohan,
Ormoc City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
BONIFACIO ABADIES, with treachery, evident premeditation and intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot (sic) and hit with the use of an unlicensed firearm the person
of the victim herein CECILIO ROLDAN, without giving the latter sufficient time to defend himself,
thereby inflicting upon him a gunshot wound which caused his death. xxx.
1

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 4756-O at the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City,
Branch 35. Upon arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of "Not guilty."
2
After trial, the
court a quo rendered judgment convicting accused-appellant of the crime charged and imposing on
him the supreme penalty of death, to wit:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused Bonifacio Abadies
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as the killing was with treachery and
hereby sentences him, after having found the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation in
the unrebutted testimony of Jose Manuel Roldan and no mitigating circumstances being present to
offset the same, pursuant to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code, with the penalty of DEATH.
The Court further sentences the accused to pay the offended party the sum of P50,000.00 as
indemnity; P25,000.00 as actual expenses; P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO PROMULGATED.
3

On automatic review before the Court, accused-appellant insists that the penalty of death should not
have been imposed on him because
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE MAXIMUM PENALTY ON ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF EVIDENT
PREMEDITATION WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
On December 24, 1995, Cecilio Roldan, his wife Cynthia, their son Ronald and neighbor Salve
Aligway were celebrating Christmas Eve at the balcony of their house at Barangay Cadaohan,
Ormoc City. At 2:00 a.m. of Christmas day, Cynthia saw appellant Bonifacio Abadies, her husbands
uncle, approached Cecilio from behind. Without warning, accused-appellant shot Cecilio with a short
firearm about 8 inches in length.
4

Cecilio was hit on the upper back and slumped to the floor. Salve Aligway rushed to his side. Cynthia
saw accused-appellant rushing towards the back of their house since the balcony was lighted.
5

Jose Manuel Roldan, Cecilios brother who lived next door, heard the gunshot. He immediately went
out of his house and saw accused-appellant, his uncle, carrying a firearm and hurriedly entering his
own house, about ten meters away. Jose Manuel rushed toward his brothers house fearing that he
had been hurt. He recalled that in the morning of the previous day, accused-appellant had
threatened to kill Cecilio Roldan because of a recent misunderstanding between them. Jose Manuel
arrived at Cecilios house and found the latter wounded.
6

Cecilio was rushed to the Ormoc District Hospital, where he eventually died.
7

According to the victims widow, accused-appellant harbored a grudge against her husband because
he was unable to give him the additional amount of P10,000.00 for the lease of a rice land owned by
a certain Langkoy Fran in the month of December 1995, a few weeks before the shooting incident
transpired.
8

Dr. Jesus Castro, who conducted the post-mortem examination on Cecilio, found that he sustained a
fatal gunshot wound at the back which hit the heart. The distance of the gun from the victim was
more than one foot, judging from the absence of gunpowder in the body.
9
His post-mortem report
indicated "Cause of Death: CP arrest, 2 Massive and Profuse bleeding 2 to gunshot wound."
10

Accused-appellant admits having shot Cecilio but claims that the shooting was accidental because
the gun went off when he and Cecilio were grappling for its possession. He alleged that at around
11:00 p.m. of Christmas Eve, 1995, Cecilio invited him and his two sons to celebrate Christmas at
his home. Accused-appellant and his sons arrived at Cecilios house and sat at the terrace, where
they drank tuba and ate chicken with him. At about past midnight, Cecilio went to his bedroom.
When he returned, he was carrying a gun. Eleodoro, accused-appellants son, shouted, "Watch out
Pa, you might be shot!"
11

When he heard Eleodoros warning, accused-appellant got up and grabbed Cecilios hand. While he
and Cecilio grappled for possession of the firearm, they both fell down with Cecilio on top of him.
Accused-appellant tried to twist Cecilios arm toward his back, when the gun suddenly went off.
Immediately after the explosion, accused-appellant and his two sons fled leaving the victim alone.
There were no other people present when the incident happened. At 7:00 a.m. the next morning,
accused-appellant was arrested.
12

We find no reason to reverse the trial courts ruling insofar as the nature of the crime is concerned.
Between the two conflicting versions of the killing, we agree with the trial court that the prosecution
witnesses were more worthy of credence. Their testimonies were found to be spontaneous, positive,
forthright, and were not destroyed or rebutted throughout the trial.
13

Murder is the unlawful killing of any person when qualified by any of the circumstances listed under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
14
Treachery or alevosia, aptly alleged in the information, is
one such qualifying circumstance.
Given the prevailing facts of the case, we agree with the trial court that the killing of Cecilio Roldan
was attended by alevosia. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make.
15
The qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the killing as the two
conditions for the same are present, i.e., (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself, and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means,
method or form of attack employed by him.
16
The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected
attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his part.
17

In the case at bar, Cecilio Roldan was in the comforts of his home.1wphi 1 He was eating, drinking and
thoroughly engrossed in the gaiety of the yuletide season, while engaged in light banter with his wife
and a neighbor. Suddenly and without warning, he was shot from behind by accused-appellant, his
uncle. As in the recent case ofPeople v. Herrera,
18
accused-appellant suddenly positioned himself at
the back of the unsuspecting victim, pointed his gun at him and, without any warning, promptly
delivered the fatal shot. The victim was unaware of the attempt on his life and the danger that lurked
behind him. There was no way the victim could have defended himself, taken flight or avoided the
assault. Thus, the attendance of treachery qualified the killing to Murder.
However, we take exception to the finding of the trial court that the killing of Cecilio Roldan was
premeditated. Like treachery, the elements of evident premeditation must be established with equal
certainty as the criminal act itself, in order for it to be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance.
19
Thus, the following must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he clung to his
determination to commit the crime; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the decision to commit
the crime and the execution thereof to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his
act.
20
The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by
cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent within a space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.
21

Evident premeditation must be based on external facts which are evident, not merely suspected,
which indicate deliberate planning.
22
There must be direct evidence showing a plan or preparation to
kill, or proof that the accused meditated and reflected upon his decision to kill the victim.
23
Criminal
intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evidencing a determination to commit the crime.
In order to be considered an aggravation of the offense, the circumstance must not merely be
"premeditation" but must be "evident premeditation."
24

In the case at bar, none of the requisites of this aggravating circumstance can be inferred from the
facts of this case. For one, the records do not show the time when accused-appellant resolved to
commit the crime. The date and, if possible, the time when the malefactor determined to commit the
crime is essential, because the lapse of time for the purpose of the third requisite is computed from
such date and time.
25

The second requisite is likewise wanting. The fact that accused-appellant made threats to kill the
victim does not necessarily prove evident premeditation without a showing that accused-appellant
performed acts manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination. Accused-appellants threats,
unsupported by evidence which would disclose his true criminal state of mind, will only be construed
as casual remarks naturally emanating from a feeling of rancor and not a resolution of the character
involved in evident premeditation.
26

An expression of hatred does not necessarily imply a resolution to commit a crime.
27
Indeed, Jose
Manuel Roldan, upon whose testimony the finding of evident premeditation is anchored, himself
admitted he did not think accused-appellant would pursue his plan to kill Cecilio.
28
In fact, he even
declared on re-cross examination, "Nobody thought that he would carry out his plan."
29
Suffice it to
state that without such evidence, mere presumptions and inferences, no matter how logical and
probable they might be, would not be enough to sustain a finding of this aggravating
circumstance.
30
In other words, the evidence falls short of proving the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation.
There being no aggravating circumstance to be appreciated, the proper imposable penalty for the
killing of Cecilio Roldan is reclusion perpetua. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659, the penalty for Murder is reclusion perpetua to death. The lesser of
these two indivisible penalties shall be imposed, pursuant to Article 63 (2) of the said Code.
Following prevailing jurisprudence, the Court finds the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the
death of Cecilio Roldan proper without any need of proof other than the death of the victim.
31
Moral
damages, pegged at P50,000.00 by controlling case law,
32
was also correctly awarded by the trial
court taking into consideration the pain and anguish of the victims family brought about by his
death.
33
The award of P25,000.00 as actual expenses incurred by the widow of Cecilio Roldan,
which was duly proved,
34
is likewise affirmed.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City,
Branch 35, in Criminal Case No. 4756-O, finding accused-appellant Bonifacio Abadies guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and ordering him to pay the heirs of the deceased the sums
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for death, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as actual
damages, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua instead of Death.
SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
AMADOR SAPIGAO (At Large); JOSE SAPIGAO (At Large); SAMUEL SAPIGAO (At Large);
ELPIDIO MAMERTO; ARTURO MAMERTO, SR. (At Large); ROBERT OBILLO (At Large);
VERSON MAMERTO (At Large); FRANCIS SAPIGAO (At Large); and REYNALDO SAPIGAO
alias "CALLONG" (At Large), Appellants.
D E C I S I O N
VITUG, J .:
On 24 December 1998, around eleven oclock in the evening, full-swing preparations for the
Christmas Eve festivities among the residents of Barangay Carusocan Sur, Asingan, Pangasinan,
were just about in their final stages. Neighbors and friends had by then gathered together in
anticipation of the much-awaited noche buena to be partaken at the strike of midnight. The
Christmas air, however, gave no warning of an impending bloody incident which would shatter an
otherwise pervading yuletide festivity.
Emmanuel Sapigao and his brother Gem Sapigao were on their way on board a motorcycle, driven
by Gem Sapigao, towards Zone III of the barangay to collect a "compadre's contribution" for the
Christmas party. When the two brothers reached the place fronting the residence
of barangay captain Arturo Mamerto, Sr., his nephew Reynaldo Sapigao and Elpidio Mamerto
blocked their path. Minutes later, Reynaldo Sapigao, then holding a carbine rifle, began firing at
them. Alarmed, the brothers jumped off the motorcycle. Gem Sapigao promptly parked the vehicle
on one side of the street, and the two scampered for safety. Emmanuel hid behind a concrete wall,
approximately ten to twelve meters away, while Gem Sapigao hid in the nearby house of a certain
Shirley Pisalvo. From their hiding places, the brothers saw Reynaldo running and shouting, "Uncle,
uncle, sinugod si Kapitan." Almost immediately, they then saw Elpidio Mamerto, Verson Mamerto,
and Robert Obillo, all armed trooping into the house of the barangay captain obviously in response
to Reynaldos call. Elpidio Mamerto and Robert Mamerto were both holding M-16 armalite rifles.
Verson Mamerto had a carbine. The barangay captain, Arturo Mamerto, Sr., was armed with a
Caliber .45 pistol. Emmanuel Sapigao heard Arturo Mamerto giving instructions to the group to shoot
anyone who would come near the abandoned motorcycle. Momentarily, Emmanuel Sapigao saw
from his hidden perch his cousin Lauro Sapigao passed by in an owner-type jeepney. About half an
hour later, Lauro Sapigao, together with George Cabanilla and Puroy Valdez, returned and stopped
near the abandoned motorcycle. Emmanuel wanted to warn Lauro but he was too afraid of being
seen. Moments after they alighted from the jeepney, the group composed of Elpidio Mamerto, Arturo
Mamerto, Sr., Verson Mamerto, Robert Obillo, Amador Sapigao, Jose Sapigao, Reynaldo Sapigao,
Francis Sapigao and Samuel Sapigao rained fire on Lauro Sapigao. Gem Sapigao saw Jose
Sapigao fire the first shot. Amador Sapigao approached the fallen Lauro Sapigao, got hold of the
latter's Caliber .45 and, with it, again shot the hapless victim. One of those in the group shouted -
"One is gone, many more will follow."
Terrified at what they had seen, the two brothers, Emmanuel and Gem, ran towards the rice field
and proceeded to the north where they flagged down a tricycle, which took them to the Asingan
police station. Fearing for their lives, the two subsequently went into hiding. It was only two months
later when they finally decided to report the incident to the National Bureau of Investigation office in
San Fernando, La Union.
The autopsy conducted by Dr. Leonardo Guerrero, the rural health physician of Asingan, showed
that Lauro Sapigao sustained seven gunshot wounds. The cause of death was severe intracranial
injury and hypovolemic shock secondary to gunshot wounds. The 39-year old Lauro Sapigao, a
member of the Philippine marines with a rank of corporal, was survived by his wife and two minor
children.
On 14 July 1999, following an investigation, an accusatory information for murder was filed against
the several accused -
"That on or about 24 December 1998, in the evening, at Barangay Carusocan Sur, Asingan,
Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in
conspiracy with each other, armed with long and short firearms, with intent to kill, treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, lay in wait, attack,
assault and shoot LAURO SAPIGAO, inflicting upon him fatal gunshot wounds in the vital parts of
his body which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
"Contrary to Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659."
1

On 12 January 2000, the information was amended to state that the killing was committed with the
use of unlicensed firearms. Except for Elpidio Mamerto, the eight other accused remained at large
and yet to be brought to justice.
Against the evidence submitted by the prosecution, heretofore narrated, Elpidio Mamerto raised the
defense ofalibi. He said that he was in his house the entire fateful evening with numerous friends
and relatives preparing for the noche buena. While his house was but twenty meters from the place
of the incident, he, however, was unaware of the shooting that took place because he and his
relatives were busy enjoying themselves. He denied having seen Lauro Sapigao on the date of the
incident. Corroborating Mamertos alibi were his neighbors and relatives who gave testimony to the
effect that Mamerto did not, even for a second, leave his residence around the time when Lauro
Sapigao was shot to death.
On 17 July 2000, the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City, Branch 46, rendered its decision holding
Elpidio Mamerto guilty of murder and imposing on him the extreme penalty of death; it concluded:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, CONVICTING ELPIDIO MAMERTO of the crime of
Murder qualified with aggravated murder, and the Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of
DEATH to be implemented in the manner as provided for by law; ordering Elpidio Mamerto to
indemnify the heirs of Lauro Sapigao the sum of P70,000.00 as actual damages, another sum of
P75,000.00 for moral damages and the further sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
"The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to prepare the mitimus and to transmit the entire records of the
case to the Supreme Court of the Philippines for automatic review.
"The jail warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), Urdaneta District Jail, Urdaneta
City, is hereby ordered to deliver the living body of Elpidio Mamerto to the National Bilibid Prisons,
Muntinlupa City, immediately upon receipt of this decision."
2

In the instant automatic appeal, Elpidio Sapigao has raised, by way of issues, his assignment of
errors thusly:
"WHETHER, NOTWITHSTANDING THE INCONSISTENCIES IN THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
WITNESSES, THE PARTICIPATION OF ACCUSED IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME WAS
ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
"WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN FINDING THAT TREACHERY ATTENDED
THE KILLING OF LAURO SAPIGAO
"WHETHER THERE IS PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT APPELLANT MAMERTO
PARTICIPATED IN THE SHOOTING OF LAURO SAPIGAO WITH THE USE OF AN UNLICENSED
FIREARM."
3

The defense of alibi, like denial, is easily rendered dubious and weak where, such as in this
instance, positive identification has been made by eyewitnesses.
Emmanuel Sapigao, at the witness stand, detailed the participation of Elpidio Mamerto in the killing
of Lauro Sapigao. He testified:
"Q. And after hiding yourself in that cemented wall, what happened next?
"A. I tried to peep and I saw Reynaldo Sapigao running towards the South shouting something, sir.
"Q. What did he shout?
"A. He shouted, Ùncle, uncle, dinarop da ni kapitan, meaning ùncle, uncle, sinugod si kapitan.
"Q. Do you know who this uncle Reynaldo was calling?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Who?
"A. It was Elpidio Mamerto, sir.
"Q. Who is this Kapitan?
"A. Arturo Mamerto, Sr., sir.
"x x x x x x x x x
"Q. After Reynaldo Sapigao called ùncle, uncle, sinugod si Kapitan, what happened next?
"A. I saw Elpidio Mamerto, Verson Mamerto, and Robert Obillo going [towards] the house of
the barangay captain, sir.
"Q. You mean Arturo Mamerto, Sr.?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. What did you notice with Verson Mamerto, Elpidio Mamerto, and Robert Obillo when they were
going towards the house of Arturo Mamerto, Sr.?
"A. They were all armed with a long rifle.
"Q. Will you please describe to the Honorable Court what Elpidio Mamerto was holding at that time?
"A. M-16 armalite, sir.
"x x x x x x x x x
"Q. So what happened next when you saw Verson Mamerto, Robert Obillo and Elpidio
Mamerto going towards the house of Brgy. Captain Arturo Mamerto, Sr.?
"A. They were met by the barangay captain Arturo Mamerto, Sr. in front of their house, sir.
"Q. What did you notice with barangay captain Arturo Mamerto, Sr. when he met them in front of his
house?
"A. He was also armed, sir.
"x x x x x x x x x
"Q. So, what transpired then when barangay captain Arturo Mamerto, Sr., met Verson Mamerto,
Robert Obillo andElpidio Mamerto in front of his house?
"A. I heard him instructing them, he was telling them in Ilocano, ìf anyone gets near the motorcycle,
shoot him.
"Q. So what happened next after the barangay captain instructed the three to shoot anyone who
gets near the motorcycle?
"A. That was the time I saw my cousin riding on his owner type jeep going towards south, towards
Villasis, sir.
"Q. You saw your cousin passing by?
"A. Yes, sir.
"x x x x x x x x x
"Q. What was the name of your cousin?
"A. Lauro Sapigao, sir.
"Q. So, what happened next when you saw your cousin driving his owner type jeep going towards
Villasis?
"A. I was about to get near him but I was afraid because they might shoot me.
"COURT:
"Q. You did not stop him?
"A. No sir, I did not stop him.
"Q. So, he passed by?
"A. Yes, sir.
"PROSECUTOR TOMBOC:
"Q. What transpired next after your cousin Lauro Sapigao passed by driving his owner type jeep?
"A. After a few minutes, Lauro Sapigao came back, sir.
"Q. So, where did he return at that time?
"A. Going to North towards Asingan, sir.
"Q. And while your cousin was going North, what happened?
"A. He suddenly stopped his jeep, sir.
"Q. Where?
"A. At the western side of the street, sir.
"COURT:
"Q. How far was it from the house of Arturo Mamerto, Sr.?
"A. More or less 10 meters, sir.
"Q. So, what else transpired after your cousin Lauro Sapigao stopped his jeep?
"A. When Lauro Sapigao stopped his jeep, he alighted from the jeep, sir.
"COURT:
"Q. Was he alone?
"A. No, sir, with two companions.
"Q. Do you know who were these companions of Lauro Sapigao in that jeep?
"A. Yes, sir, they were George Cabanilla and Puroy Valdez, sir.
"Q. After Lauro Sapigao alighted from the jeep, what else happened?
"A. Lauro Sapigao walked around towards the back of the jeep, sir.
"Q. What happened next?
"A. After having three steps, that was the time he was shot, sir.
"Q. Who shot Lauro Sapigao?
"A. The group of Arturo Mamerto, Sr., sir.
x x x x x x x x x
"Q. Who composed the group?
"A. Elpidio Mamerto, Verson Mamerto, Robert Obillo, Amador Sapigao, Jose Sapigao, Reynaldo
Sapigao, Francis Sapigao and Samuel Sapigao, sir.
"Q. You mean all of them [fired a] shot?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. What was the firearm used by Elpidio Mamerto?
"A. Baby armalite, sir.
"Q. About Reynaldo Sapigao?
"A. Carbine rifle, sir.
"Q. About Verson Mamerto?
"A. Carbine rifle, sir.
"Q. About Robert Obillo
"A. Armalite, sir.
"Q. About Amador Sapigao?
"A. Armalite, sir.
"Q. About Jose Sapigao?
"A. Armalite, sir.
"Q. About the barangay captain Arturo Mamerto, Sr.?
"A. Cal. .45, sir.
"Q. You have mentioned Amador Sapigao, Jose Sapigao, Reynaldo Sapigao, Francis Sapigao and
Samuel Sapigao. When for the first time did you notice them before Lauro Sapigao was shot?
"A. When Elpidio Mamerto went to the house of barangay captain Arturo Mamerto, Sr., they were
already there, sir.
"Q. Mr. Witness, what happened then to Lauro Sapigao when he was shot?
"A. He fell to the ground, sir.
"Q. At that time, Lauro Sapigao fell to the ground, what happened?
"A. I saw Lauro Sapigao fall to the ground and he tried to crawl but Amador Sapigao got near him
and got the Cal. .45 of my cousin and shot him with it, sir.
"COURT:
"Q. You mean Lauro Sapigao had a gun?
"A. Yes, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
"Q. How was his body positioned?
"A. He remained on the ground, facing down, sir.
"Q. How about the group of Verson Mamerto, Robert Obillo, Elpidio Mamerto, Jose Sapigao,
Reynaldo Sapigao, Francis Sapigao, Samuel Sapigao after Amador Sapigao shot Lauro Sapigao?
"A. They remained in front of the house of the barangay captain, sir.
"Q. How about you, what did you do then?
"A. We ran with Gem Sapigao going to the rice field, sir."
4

Gem Sapigao corroborated the testimony of his brother and described with equal clarity the
participation of Elpidio Mamerto in the killing of Lauro Sapigao. He declared:
"Q. What did you do when Reynaldo Sapigao blocked your way holding a carbine firearm?
"A. We were surprised when we were met by Reynaldo Sapigao with carbine being carried by him
and my brother jumped from the motorcycle while I was left because I had my motorcycle stand at
the side of the road.
"Q. After that, what happened next?
"A. After having my motorcycle stand at the side of the road, a jeep passed by and after the jeep
passed by that was the time Reynaldo Sapigao hit me, sir.
"Q. Were you hit?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. About the jeep, do you know who owned that jeep that passed by?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. After that, what happened next when you were not hit?
"A. Of course, I hid myself, ran to a culvert and passed over the culvert going the house of a certain
Shirley Pisalvo.
"Q. x x x. Did you notice your brother Emmanuel?
"A. My brother went ahead of me and sought cover in the same compound, because I was cornered,
I hid myself to a wall.
"Q. After seeking cover in the compound of Shirley Pisalvo, what happened next?
"A. Reynaldo Sapigao came out shouting going to the south.
"Q. What was he shouting at that time?
"A. He was shouting that we attacked the house of Captain Mamerto.
"Q. To whom was Reynaldo Sapigao directing those shouts?
"A. The shouts were directed to the cousins of Reynaldo Sapigao because their names were being
mentioned.
"COURT:
"Q. Who were the cousins he mentioned?
"A. What I heard was, `Cousins, you come.
"x x x x x x x x x
"FISCAL TOMBOC;
"Q. After that Mr. Witness, what happened after Reynaldo Sapigao shouted, `cousins, you come?
"A. I saw coming from the south Elpidio Mamerto, Verson Mamerto, Robert Obillo, Jose Sapigao,
Amado Sapigao, Francis Sapigao, Samuel Sapigao and Michael Orines.
"Q. Who else, Mr. Witness?
"A. Brgy. Captain Arturo Mamerto, Sr.
"x x x x x x x x x
"Q. So after you saw these persons you mentioned coming from the south, what transpired next?
"A. At that time, the jeep of my cousin passed by.
"x x x x x x x x x
"Q. What was the name of your cousin who passed by?
"A. Lauro Sapigao, sir.
"Q. Did you notice how many persons were on board that jeep?
"A. I did not notice because the jeep was closed.
"Q. So, where did that jeep proceed?
"A. It proceeded to Villasis.
"Q. After the jeep passed by, what happened next?
"A. About 30 minutes, more or less, the jeep of my cousin returned because we cannot come out
from where we were because persons were still there.
"Q. When that jeep returned, what happened, Mr. Witness?
"A. The owner jeep stopped near the place where I left my motorcycle.
"COURT:
"Q. Does your cousin Lauro know your motorcycle?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. So, your cousin stopped because he saw your motorcycle?
"A. I do not know, sir.
"FISCAL TOMBOC:
"Q. So when that jeep stopped, what happened next?
"A. Lauro Sapigao alighted from the jeep, sir.
"Q. Where did he go?
"A. He moved three to four steps behind the jeep, sir.
"Q. While your cousin Lauro was proceeding behind the jeep taking about 3 to 4 steps, what
happened next?
"A. There was a series of gunfire, sir.
"Q. Where did the gunfire come from?
"A. The gunfire came from the persons that I noticed coming from the south.
"Q. You mean these persons have firearms when you saw them?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. You said you saw that Elpidio Mamerto [was] one of those persons who came from the south
direction, what was Elpidio Mamerto holding at that time?
"A. Armalite, sir.
"x x x x x x x x x
"Q. You mentioned that the gunfire came from these persons who were holding firearms. Will you
name those persons whom you said the gunfire came from?
"A. The first one who [fired] his gun was Jose Sapigao.
"Q. Whose direction was he firing at?
"A. To my cousin Lauro Sapigao, sir.
"Q. Do you know how many gunshots were fired by Jose Sapigao?
"A. I cannot count how many because the gunshots were numerous.
"x x x x x x x x x
"Q. How about Elpidio Mamerto what was he doing then?
"A. Almost all of them simultaneously fired their guns.
"Q. To whom were they directing their fire?
"A. To my cousin Lauro Sapigao, sir.
"Q. What happened to Lauro Sapigao when you saw these persons fired their firearms at him?
"A. When I saw Lauro Sapigao was hit at both of his legs, he fell facing the ground.
"Q. Were these persons still firing at him when he fell down?
"A. Yes, sir, they continued firing at him when he fell down."
5

Appellant would call attention to the supposed discrepancy in the statements of eyewitness
Emmanuel Sapigao. During direct examination, Emmanuel Sapigao stated that eight persons had
fired shots at Lauro Sapigao.
6
This inadvertence, however, might be explained by the fact that the
name of the ninth malefactor, Arturo Mamerto, Sr., whose name Emmanuel missed to give, was
earlier mentioned by him as being the leader of the group. On cross-examination, Emmanuel
Sapigao made it clear that Arturo Mamerto, Sr., was one of the group of nine
malefactors.
7
Emmanuel remained unwavering in pointing to appellant Elpidio Mamerto as among
those who had fired at Lauro Sapigao. His testimony was similar to the account given by Gem
Sapigao that also undeniably placed appellant at the scene of the crime acting in concert with the
other members of the group.
The conspiracy to kill Lauro Sapigao was implicit from the conduct of the assailants.1wphi1 Upon the call
made by Reynaldo Sapigao, the malefactors, including appellant Elpidio Mamerto, immediately
converged at the latters residence. All were carrying firearms. Appellant Elpidio Mamerto, as well as
the rest of the conspirators, appeared to be acquiescent to the instructions of Arturo Mamerto, Sr.,
the brother of Elpidio, to shoot at anyone who would come near the abandoned motorcycle of Gem
Sapigao. The succeeding events bespoke of a unity of and singularity in the design to kill. While it
might be doubtful that appellant Elpidio Mamerto himself had hit Lauro Sapigao, considering that the
slugs which caused the latter's death were not examined nor matched with the firearms from which
they were fired, the act of one being the act of all in conspiracy, appellant Elpidio Mamerto was
equally liable with the rest of the group. Undeniably, all of the suspects made themselves scarce
from the clutches of the law. Elpidio Mamerto himself was arrested more than a year after the
incident, on 12 January 2000, and only after attempting to evade capture by fleeing to a cornfield.
This conduct would not bespeak well of the character of an innocent man.
In the amended information filed against him, appellant Elpidio Mamerto was charged with the
Murder of Lauro Sapigao, with the aggravating and qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident
premeditation and use of unlicensed firearms.
Apparent from the testimony of the witnesses was the bad blood between the families of the victim
and the perpetrators of the crime. Emmanuel Sapigao ran against, but lost to, appellant Arturo
Mamerto, Sr., for the position of barangay captain of Carusocan. Mariano Sapigao, Jr., brother of
Emmanuel and Gem Sapigao, was incarcerated in Muntinlupa for the murder of the son of Romeo
Torralba, a nephew of appellant Elpidio and Arturo Mamerto. Elpidio Mamerto had accompanied the
police in raiding the house of witnesses Emmanuel and Gem Sapigao in connection with the murder
case which led to the filing of charges of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Assault against the
brothers before the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City. It was appellant, as barangay kagawad,
and his brother, Arturo Mamerto, as barangay chairman, who monitored the movements of the
brothers. The incident that fateful night of 24th of December 1998, from all indications, was not an
isolated occurrence but that it was another scenario in a deep-seated history of violence between
two warring factions in barangay Asingan. Reynaldo Sapigao, upon seeing Emmanuel and Gem
Sapigao, called his cousins and shouted, "Uncle, Uncle, sinugod si kapitan," apparently convinced
that the two brothers had come to do them harm. At Reynaldo's alarm call, the cohorts immediately
converged, each with a firearm, in a defensive posture, as if expecting and readying for an armed
attack from Emmanuel and Gem Sapigao. Lauro Sapigao later stopped near the abandoned
motorcycle to possibly render succor to his cousins. No less than Emmanuel and Gem Sapigao had
admitted that Lauro was also armed at that time. It was more likely than not that he somehow
anticipated an armed encounter. These circumstances render doubtful the attendance of treachery
in the killing of Lauro Sapigao.
Evident premeditation may be appreciated when the execution of the criminal act is preceded by
cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of
time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.
8
As its name suggests, evident premeditation must be
clearly shown. Before it can be considered, its elements, i.e., 1) the time when the accused has
decided to commit the crime, 2) an overt act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his
determination to commit the crime, and 3) sufficient lapse of time between the decision to commit
the crime and the execution thereof to allow for reflection upon the consequences of the act,
9
must be
established with equal certainty and clarity as the criminal act itself.
10
The existence of conspiracy
notwithstanding, evident premeditation cannot be presumed. Only where conspiracy is directly
established, as opposed to its being merely implied, can this aggravating circumstance itself be
possibly assumed to be attendant.
11

It was unlikely that the assailants knew beforehand that Emmanuel and Gem Sapigao would pass
through the residence of Arturo Mamerto, Sr., that fateful night, let alone that the deceased Lauro
Sapigao would come to their aid. Their response to what was perceived to be a dangerous situation
was immediate, virtually allowing them no sufficient time to coolly reflect on the consequences of
their action. Evident premeditation was not adequately shown.
Republic Act No. 8294, which took effect on 06 July 1997, would allow the use of an unlicensed
firearm to be taken as an aggravating circumstance "if homicide or murder was committed with the
use of an unlicensed firearm." The use of unlicensed firearms was proved by the testimony of
prosecution witness SPO4 Elmer Dedicatoria, Sr., from the Firearms and Explosives Division at
Camp Crame, Quezon City. SPO4 Dedicatoria testified and presented before the court a certification
that appellant was only licensed to carry a pistol, Armscor, caliber .45 with Serial No. 7662248
covered by computerized license issued on 08 May 1998 with expiration date on December 2000. It
was clear from the testimony of Emmanuel and Gem Sapigao, however, that appellant Elpidio
Mamerto shot at Lauro Sapigao not with a pistol but with an unlicensed armalite.
The killing of Lauro Sapigao, not having been attended by any circumstance qualifying the act to
murder, appellant Elpidio Mamerto can be held liable for the crime of homicide, defined by Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code, viz:-
"Homicide. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without
the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be
deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal."
There being one aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms, the penalty of reclusion
temporal is to be applied in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum of the penalty to be imposed is anywhere within the penalty one degree lower than the
prescribed penalty, without regard to the modifying circumstances, or prision mayor. Appellant could
thus be held subject to the penalty of anywhere from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to anywhere from seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximum, as maximum.
Consistently with the prevailing jurisprudence, the award made by the trial court of civil indemnity
should be reduced to P50,000.00 and the award of actual damages not having been sufficiently
proved is deleted and, in lieu thereof, an award of P25,000.00 temperate damages would be in
order.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds appellant Elpidio Mamerto GUILTY of the crime of homicide and
imposes upon him an indeterminate sentence of eight (8) years, ten (10) months and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum to eighteen (18) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal
maximum, as maximum. The award by the trial court of civil liability is modified by reducing the civil
indemnity to fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and, in lieu of actual damages which is deleted, an
award of P25,000.00 temperate damages is made in favor of the heirs of Lauro Sapigao. Costs de
oficio.
The Court, in passing, expresses the hope that the law-enforcement agencies have not relented in
their efforts to have all the suspects in the killing of deceased Lauro Sapigao ultimately brought to
justice.
SO ORDERED.
CRUELTY/ALTERNATIVE
Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines
Accused-appellant: Jovencio Lucas
Ponente: J. Cortes
FACTS:
Mauricia Lucas was then thirteen years old and working as a housemaid in Sampaloc, Manila.
Sometime in September 1985, she was fetched by her father, herein accused Jovencio Lucas, from
her place of work. They boarded a jeepney and alighted in a place which Mauricia found
unfamiliar. She was thereafter brought to a dark room where the accused tied both her hands and
feet to a bed, undressed her, burnt her face with a lighted cigarette, kissed her, fondled her private
parts, pointed a knife at her neck, and laughed while consummating the sexual act. The physical and
genital examination supported the fact of defloration and further testified that the findings were
consonant to that of a woman who had several experience with sexual intercourse. Nonetheless, as
the examinations were conducted about six months after the alleged rape took place, evidence of
violence can no longer be established.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of cruelty in the
case.
2) Whether or not the trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of relationship
in the case.
HELD:
1) Yes. The Court held that there is cruelty when the offender enjoys and delights in making his
victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing unnecessary physical pain in the consummation of the
offense. Moreover, the absence of any evidence of force does not negate a finding that forcible sexual
intercourse actually took place. The trial court, having had the opportunity of hearing the witnesses
of both prosecution and defense, gave weight to the sincerity and conviction of the victim. The
appellant tied the victim to a bed, burnt her face with a lighted cigarette, and laughed while
consummating the crime. Undeniably, cruelty is present in this case.
2) Yes. Article 15 of the Revised Penal code provides that, in the case of rape, the alternative
circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration when the victim is the descendant of
the offender. The Court found that in order for the appellant to carry out the crime to his advantage,
the filial trust reposed in him by his daughter was undeniable abused. He personally fetched his
daughter, at her place of work, took her to the scene of the crime, and forced himself sexually. The
aggravating circumstance of relationship in the case was correctly applied in the case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee
vs.
RANIL DUETES (at large), BASILIO QUIJADA @ "KOKOY," (at large), REYMAN FONCARDAS
& RITCHIE DEQUIA (at large), accused,
REYMAN FONCARDAS, appellant.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO-MORALES, J .:
From the Decision
1
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City finding appellant Reyman
Foncardas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Napoleon Erno (the victim) P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages, appellant comes to this Court on appeal.
Appellant, together with Ranil Duetes, Basilio Quijada alias "Kokoy" and Ritchie Dequia, was
indicted for murder under an information dated September 1, 1997 which reads:
The undersigned accuses the above named accused of the crime of Murder, under Art. 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R. A. 7659, committed as follows:
That on or about May 14, 1997, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, conspiring, confederating together and helping one
another, with several unidentified companions, with treachery and evident premeditation, armed with
a piece of wood, and with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and
struck with the piece of wood one Napoleon Erno, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds
which caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
2

As Duetes, Quijada and Dequia remained at large, only appellant, assisted by his counsel, was
arraigned. He entered a plea of not guilty,
3
whereupon trial commenced.
From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is established.
At around 12:00 midnight of May 14, 1997, after having a drinking spree at Romeo's Videoke located
at Trading Boulevard, Duetes, Quijada, Dequia, Marco Mariaca (Mariaca) and appellant (the group)
walked some 50 meters to the corner of Trading Boulevard, fronting Rizal Extension, where it stayed
for five minutes. Realizing that it had run out of cigarettes, the group proceeded to Carol's Store,
4
but
returned to the corner of Trading Boulevard, fronting Rizal Extension, to sit, smoke and while the
time away.
Soon after, the victim who had just purchased a bottle of Coke from Carol's Store, repaired to the
corner of Trading Boulevard, fronting Rizal Extension where he bought balut from a vendor. About 5
meters away from the group, the victim ate balut and drank the coke. Quijada then approached the
victim, and the two started talking while Duetes, Dequia, Mariaca, and appellant just watched and
smoked.
Minutes later, Duetes approached the victim and Quijada and sat down behind the two. Not long
after, Quijada was heard shouting something in the Visayan dialect, allegedly angered by the victim's
not acceding to his demands for money.
Without any warning, Duetes pulled the victim from behind, causing the latter to fall down on his
back. Appellant and Dequia rushed to join their companions Duetes and Quijada. Apparently, the
victim was able to rise. Appellant, Quijada, Duetes and Dequia, however, pummeled him with their
fists while Mariaca looked on in shock and disbelief. The mauling of the victim continued even as
Quijada left the scene momentarily. When Quijada returned bearing a piece of wood about two and
half feet long, appellant and Duetes who were standing behind the victim, held the latter, rendering
him helpless, as Quijada struck the victim's nape with the piece of wood. The victim fell down after
being struck. Duetes then told Mariaca, who was merely looking at his companions, to run. Mariaca
did as he was told and immediately ran away from the scene.
Seeing that a person was struck by a piece of wood, garbage collectors Quirino Cabag (Cabag),
Ronil Viilano, Roman Tajo, and the driver of the garbage truck, who were 50 meters away, shouted
at the assailants and approached them. Quijada thereupon told his companions to move away from
the victim, who was already sprawled helplessly on the ground. Quijada continued to strike at the
victim's head, however. When the garbage collectors were about 7 meters away, appellant, Duetes
and Dequia scampered away even as Quijada continued to assault the victim with the piece of
wood. Before the garbage collectors could apprehend him, however, Quijada speedily left the scene
of the crime.
Gathered from the postmortem examination conducted on the victim by Dr. Gene. L. Gulanes, a
medico-legal officer at the Davao City Health Office, are the following:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Pallor, marked generalized
Body in Rigor Mortis
Lacerated wound located at frontal area midline 2.5 x 1.3 cms; 3.5 x 1.3 cms, located at supraorbital
area, left; 3.2 x 0.8 cms, located at left lateral canthus; 2.5 x 1.0 cms, located at right lateral canthus.
Hematoma, 2.0 x 4.5 cms, periorbital area, right; 6.0 x 5.0 cms, periorbital area, left; 10.0 x 6.0 cms,
zygomatic area, left.
Fracture, comminuted: FACIAL BONE EXCLUDING MANDIBULAR, frontal; parietal; temporal bone;
left, occipital; base of the skull.
Hemorrhage, intracerebral, intracranial, meningeal, generalized.
Stomach 1/4 filled with partially digested food particles.
Other visceral organs pale
CAUSE OF DEATH: Severe Hemorrhage Secondary to skull fracture.
5

Hence, appellant and his co-accused's indictment.
Denying the accusation, appellant claimed that although he was seated at a bench outside Carol's
store, smoking, he did not participate in any manner in the mauling of the victim, as he was merely
an innocent bystander.
6

Discrediting appellant's denial in favor of the positive and categorical testimony of prosecution
witnesses Cabag and Mariaca that they saw him as part of the group that mauled the victim and that
he held the victim as Quijada struck the victim with the piece of wood, the trial court convicted him of
murder by Decision
7
of May 12, 2000 the dispositive portion of which is quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution more than sufficient to prove the guilt of
accused, Reyman Foncardas of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt, without any
aggravating circumstance proved by the prosecution, attendant in the commission of the offense
charged of murder, with inherent attending circumstance of treachery and conspiracy among all his
co-accused, on the resultant offense, accused, REYMAN FONCARDAS, is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, together with all accessory penalty as provided for by law.
Pursuant to Art. 100 in relation to Art. 104 of the Revised Penal Code, governing civil indemnity,
accused Reyman Foncardas, is moreover ordered to pay the mother of the deceased, Fedelina
Erno-Ignacio, the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral
damages, for all the sorrow and worries she suffered, as a result of the death of her son, Napoleon
Erno.
On account of this judgment, issue warrant for the immediate arrest of the other accused, Ranil
Duetes, Basilio Quijada and Ritchie Dequia, for their prosecution and immediate trial of the offense
charged, after their arrest.
SO ORDERED.
8

Hence, the present appeal which ascribes the following errors to the trial court:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "THE ACCUSED REYMAN FONCARDAS WAS
TOGETHER IN THE GROUP OF QUEJADA, DUETES AND DEQUIA."
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING "THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO
PROVE MARCO MARIACA WAS MOTIVATED WITH PERSONAL AND MALICIOUS INCLINATION
IN TESTIFYING AGAINST ACCUSED REYMAN FONCARDAS."
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY AMONG THE
ACCUSED WHICH INCLUDES REYMAN FONCARDAS [AND]
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVINCTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
9

In his brief, appellant argues that the trial court erred in relying on the testimony of Mariaca upon a
finding that there was no evidence on record to prove that Mariaca was motivated by malice in
testifying against appellant just to avoid being himself implicated in the death of the victim.
Additionally, appellant argues that the testimony of Cabag should not be believed due to poor
visibility in the locus criminis and the improbability that, as claimed by Cabag, the assailant stared at
the garbage collectors for such length of time to enable Cabag to remember his face.
In bolstering his case, appellant highlights the inconsistency between the testimonies of Mariaca and
Cabag as to the number of persons during the incident.
Once again, this Court is confronted with the issue of credibility of witnesses. The rule is well settled
that the findings of fact and the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the
trial court.
The rationale for this doctrine as explained in People vs. Cayabyab is that the trial judge is able to
detect that sometimes thin line between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt and
innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal
record by the reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth
or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insistent assertion; or the sudden pallor of a
discovered lie; or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer; or the forthright tone of a ready reply.
The record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion, or looked down in confession, or gazed
steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were
shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying
the case can see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned
verdict.
10
(citations omitted)
Such settled rule aside, a close scrutiny of the testimonies of both prosecution witnesses reveals
that appellant was categorically and positively identified as one of the perpetrators of the crime.
Mariaca testified thus:
Q: And what did this actually (sic) Foncardas and Dequia do when they approached
Napoleon Erno?
A: They helped one another in mauling him.
Q: Now, for how long more or less was the mauling?
A: About 5 minutes because he fell down and he was able to stand-up again.
Q: What happened next to Napoleon Erno?
A: He was held and again Duetes mauled him.
Q: How about Foncardas, what else did he do?
A: He also helped in mauling Napoleon Erno.
Q: After that what did Foncardas do if any?
A: Napoleon Erno became dizzy or he was groggy, it appear to me he held on to a table.
Q: What did Foncardas do?
A: They again approached him at the back of Erno, and they held both hands of Erno.
Q: Who held the hands of Napoleon Erno?
A: Duetes and Foncardas.
Q: And after that what did Foncardas do?
A: At that instance Cocoy arrived.
Q: Who is this Cocoy?
A: Quijada.
Q: You are referring to Cocoy who is one of the accused in this case, but he is at large?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where did Cocoy come from?
A: I don't know because all of a sudden he appeared.
Q: When he appeared did he join the group?
A: He was already carrying a piece of wood.
Q: You are referring to Quijada?
A: Yes, sir.
11

x x x
Q: With that wood, what did Quijada do?
A: He struck Erno with that wood.
12

x x x
Q: While accused Quijada struck Napoleon Erno with this piece of wood, what was
accused Foncardas doing at that time?
A: The two of them, Foncardas and Duetes, held both hands of Napoleon
Erno.[13] (Emphasis supplied)
And Cabag testified thus:
Q: On the part of the assailant you said that you saw them when they attacked the victim,
Napoleon Erno. Would you be able to identify all of them or any one of them if they are in
court?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Please do so, please point at him?
A: That one sir (witness pointing to a person Reyman Foncardas).
Q: If the other persons whom you saw helped with (sic) each other, would be here next time,
could (sic) you be able to identify them?
A: Yes, sir, I can identify if they will be present sir.
Q: You pointed out the accused Reyman Foncardas as one of those who participated
in the commission of the charge (sic) in the incident involving the death of Napoleon
Erno, now tell the court, what was the participation of this accused in that incident?
A: He was one of those who mauled the victim, sir.
Q: Now tell the court, can you still recall who was the accused who used that piece of wood
next time?
A: I can point him when I see him by face, sir.
Q: If I show you a picture of that person who used that piece of wood while that person in
killing (sic) that victim, what was this Reyman Foncardas using (sic)?
A: He was at the back of the victim holding the victim, sir.
14

x x x
Q: At what distance were you were from the group mauling the victim when you shouted at
them?
A: About 50 meters, sir.
Q: And that (sic) at that very incident you shouted at the group, three of them immediately
run (sic) away?
A: Not yet, sir.
Q: So on what incident and at what distance that (sic) these three or four alleged maulers
ran (sic) away when you shouted?
A: Three three (sic) ran away only at that time when we were reaching towards (sic) them,
sir.
Q: At that (sic) distance of (sic) these three scampered (sic) away, about 30 meters?
A: We were already near them because we were already in the middle of the road, sir.
Q: Could it be 20 meters more or less?
A: Very near already, sir.
Q: Or 10 meters?
A: I think 7 meters away, sir.
15

x x x
Q: And then when they scampered away, the only thing that you saw among the three were
only their backs?
A: Actually, before they ran away, they stared at us before they ran
way, sir.
16
(Emphasis supplied)
For personal motives on the part of a witness to testify against the accused to be appreciated as
showing bias, its presence should be supported by satisfactory proof.
17
The records do not yield any
satisfactory proof, however, of any such motives on the part of Mariaca. His alleged ill motives
against appellant have been correctly assessed and brushed aside by the trial court, which had
ample opportunity to observe him. An examination of the transcript of stenographic notes of
Mariaca's testimony shows that even under rigorous cross-examination, he remained steadfast in his
testimony. And such testimony was corroborated on material points by Cabag, who was also an
eyewitness.
Appellant calls attention to the delay in Mariaca's volunteering to testify which, so he contends,
betrays Mariaca's ulterior motives. Appellant's contention is untenable. This Court has repeatedly
noted that witnessing a crime is an unusual experience that elicits different reactions from witnesses
for which no clear-cut standard of behavior can be drawn. Different people react differently to a given
situation, for there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a
strange, startling or frightful experience.
18
The reluctance of eyewitnesses to testify on a crime and to
get involved in a criminal investigation is but normal and does not by itself affect the witnesses'
credibility.
19

That Cabag saw appellant only once before he testified in court
20
should not detract from his ability
to recall appellant's face. Experience dictates that precisely because of the unusual acts of violence
committed right before witnesses' eyes that they remember with a high degree of reliability the
identity of criminals at any given time.
21

Appellant goes on to assail Cabag's testimonial claim of having had a good look at appellant's face
since, so he explained, appellant stared at the garbage collectors. Appellant contends that such is
contrary to human experience since it is not the normal reaction of a person who had just committed
a crime to stare at the witnesses, the normal reaction being to hide or conceal his identity.
Appellant's contention fails to impress. As priorly stated, this Court has long recognized that different
people react differently to a given situation. The reaction of a malefactor who is caught in flagrante
delicto may be aggression, flight or even indifference. In this case, appellant was with three other
young men, one of whom was armed with a piece of wood, while the garbage collectors including
Cabag were unarmed. It is possible that appellant and the other accused were staring at the
garbage collectors as the latter were approaching them in order to assess their chances in engaging
them in a fight.
While the incident took place at around 2:00 a.m., it is not disputed that there was a lighted electric
post nearby.
22
Light from the stars
23
or the moon,
24
it has been held, can give ample illumination to
enable a person to identify or recognize another. A fortiori, this Court is convinced that the
illumination from the electric post sufficed for Cabag, who was near the locus criminis, to enable him
to recognize appellant.
Appellant further draws attention to alleged inconsistencies, conflicting and contradictory testimonies
of prosecution witnesses, he highlighting that of Cabag that he saw four people (appellant, Quijada,
Duetes, and Dequia), and that Mariaca testified that there were five (himself, appellant, Quijada,
Duetes, Dequia) in the vicinity. Such inconsistency does not affect the credibility of either witness.
Minor contradictions among several witnesses of a particular incident which do not relate to the
gravamen of the offense charged are to be expected in view of their differences in impressions,
memory, vantage points and other related factors.
25
In fact, minor inconsistencies in the testimonies
of witnesses bolster rather than weaken their credibility as they erase any suspicion that they have
been rehearsed.
26

In the case at bar, any inconsistency refers to minor and collateral matters which do not affect the
substance, veracity or weight of the witnesses' testimony as it does not refer to an essential element
of the crime
27
and does not have any bearing on the essential fact testified to, that is, the killing of
the victim. What is important is that both Cabag and Mariaca were consistent in positively identifying
appellant as one of the persons who participated in the mauling of the victim.
As for appellant's reliance on defense witness Roman Tajo's testimony that he (appellant) was not
part of the group which mauled the victim, the same is misplaced, for Tajo admitted that he did not
see the faces of the assailants:
Q: You said, you cannot remember really the persons?
A: As far as their faces are concerned, we cannot identify them but as to their height, we can
estimate.
Q: The mother and the wife of accused, tell you that the accused is taller and so he was not
among those whom you saw?
A: The wife of the accused and his mother told me, that I should tell the truth, as I was really
there at the time of the incident.
Q: And the truth that you would like to convey because the accused whom you saw is taller
and not among those whom you saw.
A: I did not really see him during that time of the incident.
Q: You did not see him because you cannot really see the faces of those?
A: I saw the heights and because he is tall, he is not among those three.
Q: You said, that you did not see the faces of those three?
A: Yes, your Honor.
28
(Emphasis supplied)
At all events, appellant submits that there is no evidence of conspiracy between him and his co-
accused.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit an unlawful act.
There is, however, no need to prove a previous agreement to commit the crime if by their overt acts,
it is clear that all the accused acted in concert in the pursuit of their unlawful design. It may even be
inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime.
29

In conspiracy, it is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim.
What is important is that the participants performed specific acts with such closeness and
coordination as unmistakably to indicate a common purpose or design in bringing about the death of
the victim.
From the testimonies of Mariaca and Cabag, it is clear that the trial court did not err in appreciating
the presence of conspiracy. Mariaca's and Cabag's testimonies disclose that appellant was one of
those who restrained the victim while Quijada struck him on the nape with a piece of wood, resulting
in the latter's falling to the ground.
That appellant conspired in the commission of the crime charged was sufficiently and convincingly
shown by his active participation in holding the victim to render him immobile, thus enabling Quijada
to consummate the killing.
30

Regardless of the extent and character of his participation then, conspiracy renders appellant liable
as a co-principal because in contemplation of law, the act of one conspirator is the act of
all.
31
Having joined in the criminal conspiracy, appellant in effect adopted as his own the criminal
design of his co-conspirators. Appellant is, therefore, liable for the killing of the victim.
As for treachery in the killing, the trial court correctly appreciated its presence. The essence of
treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected
manner of execution, affording the hapless and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape.
32
From Mariaca's and Cabag's testimony that appellant and Duetes held the victim while
Quijada struck the nape of the victim, the victim was rendered defenseless. There can be no
mistaking then that the manner by which the victim was restrained and assaulted was deliberately
and consciously adopted by his assailants to ensure his demise.
The attendance of evident premeditation in the commission of the crime, though alleged in the
information, is not supported by evidence, as there is no showing as to when appellant and his co-
accused determined to kill the victim.
Although Mariaca testified that appellant and his co-accused had been drinking before the mauling
of the victim,
33
that does not suffice to aggravate or mitigate appellant's criminal liability.
34
The trial
court could not have appreciated intoxication - appellant's drinking beer - as an aggravating
circumstance, therefore, as the same was not alleged in the information.
Section 9 of Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that qualifying and
aggravating circumstances be alleged in the information.
35
Although the crime was committed before
the effectivity of the said Rule, the same should be applied retroactively as it would be favorable to
appellant.
36
But, even assuming that the aggravating circumstance of intoxication was alleged,
appellant's degree of intoxication was not proven with certainty.
37
Moreover, in the absence of clear
and positive proof that appellant's intoxication was habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the
crime, it is improper to consider the same as an aggravating circumstance.
38

Neither could appellant's alleged intoxication be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance. To be
mitigating, it is necessary that appellant present proof of having taken a quantity of alcoholic
beverage prior to the commission of the crime sufficient to produce the effect of obfuscating reason.
At the same time, he must prove that he is not a habitual drinker and that he did not take the
alcoholic drink purposely to reinforce his resolve to commit the crime.
39
In the absence then of clear
and positive proof as to appellant's state of intoxication, this Court cannot consider appellant's
drinking beer as a mitigating circumstance.
In fine, appellant is indeed guilty of murder, penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7569. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance,
the lesser penalty ofreclusion perpetua was correctly imposed by the trial court, pursuant to Article
63(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
40

As to the civil aspect of the case, in line with prevailing jurisprudence, the award of indemnity to the
heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 is affirmed, it being awarded without need of proof
other than the fact that a crime was committed resulting in the death of the victim and that the
accused was responsible therefor.
41

As for the award by the trial court of moral damages to the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P50,000.00, the same must be deleted, there being no evidence, testimonial or otherwise, presented
to support it.
42

Exemplary damages must, however, be awarded in accordance with Article 2230 of the Civil Code,
at least one aggravating circumstance - treachery - which, in this case, qualifies the offense, being
present.
43

Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, the heirs of the victim are entitled to indemnity for loss of
earning capacity. Ordinarily, documentary evidence is necessary for the purpose. By way of
exception, testimonial evidence may suffice if the victim was either (1) self-employed, earning less
than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in
the victim's line of work, no documentary evidence is available; or (2) employed as a daily-wage
worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.
44
In the case at bar, however,
no witness was called to testify as to the victim's income.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao, finding appellant REYMAN
FONCARDAS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED. The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read as
follows: Appellant is hereby ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim, Napoleon Erno, the amounts of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
vs.
RODRIGO AMADORE Y OBINA, accused-appellant.
VITUG, J .:
What could possibly motivate a grown man to vent his lust on a girl not even old enough to desire?
Her innocence? Her helplessness? Her inability to give voice to her indignation? Mercifully, Ma. Fe
Oquindo would not be silenced. Like the many instances which have found their way to the courts,
the plight of this young girl, who was barely ten years old when initiated into the carnal world, is but
one of the countless illustrations of an evil plaguing our society today. It is high time that this malaise
is addressed not so much by the law as the family and a societal effort to raise the slipping moral
value before it degenerates further and becomes too late to be within retrievable level.
The instant case for automatic review brings to fore anew a decision promulgated by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 275 (Las Pias), of the National Capital Judicial Region, convicting accused-
appellant RODRIGO AMADORE (Amadore) of, and imposing upon him the capital punishment for,
five (5) counts of rape. The same accused-appellant, furthermore, has been found guilty, on one
other count, of attempted rape.1wphi1.nt
Amadore stood charged with five counts of rape perpetrated on MARIA FE OQUINDO, just 15 years
old in 1996, in Criminal Cases No. 96-0468 to No. 96-0472, inclusive, textually reading -
"That on or about the 21st day of March, 1991, in the Municipality of Las Pias, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused being then the stepfather of the private complainant and through moral ascendancy
and influence and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one MARIA FE OQUINDO Y ANDOR,
who is 10 years old, against her will and consent."
1

"That on or about the 11th day of January, 1996, in the Municipality of Las Pias, Metro
against her will and consent."
2

"That on or about the 14th day of March, 1996, in the Municipality of Las Pias, Metro
3

"That on or about the 1st day of March, 1993, in the Municipality of Las Pias, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
being then the step-father of the private complainant and through moral ascendancy and
influence and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
4

"That on or about the 26th day of February, 1996, in the Municipality of Las Pias, Metro
accused being then the step-father of the private complainant and through moral ascendancy
5

Accused-appellant was likewise indicted in three other informations, one, for violation of Section 5,
Republic Act No. 7610, in relation to Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, in an Information, dated
24 October 1996, docketed Criminal Case No. 96-0473 -
"That on or about the 22nd day of March 1991, in the Municipality of Las Pias, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named
accused, with lewd designs and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness upon the person of one
MARIA FE A. OQUINDO, ten (10) years old girl, a minor, by then and there kissing and
touching her private parts, against the latter's will and consent."
6
-
two, for attempted rape in an Information, also dated 24 October 1996, docketed Criminal Case No.
96-0474, -
"That on or about the 27th day of June 1996, in the Municipality of Las Pias, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with lewd designs and by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously try and attempt to have sexual intercourse with a fifteen (15) year
old girl, MARIA FE A. OQUINDO, against her will and consent, thus commencing the
commission of the crime of Rape directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not perform all
the acts of execution that would produce the crime of Rape by reason of causes other than
his own spontaneous desistance."
7

and three, for rape in an Information, dated 18 July 1996, docketed Criminal Case No. 96-0328 -
"That on or about the 11th day of June, 1996, in the Municipality of Las Pias, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being then the stepfather of the private-complainant, and through his moral ascendancy and
influence and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with one MARIA FE OQUINDO, who is 15 years old,
8

Accused-appellant pled "not guilty" to all the charges. The cases were consolidated and jointly tried.
Private complainant Maria Fe Oquindo testified that on 21 March 1991 she awoke to see accused-
appellant, her "stepfather," standing in front of her with only his brief on. He told her to remove her
panty but she refused. Scolding her for her disobedience, accused-appellant got a pillow and placed
it over her face. He laid on top of her, removed her panty, inserted his penis into her vagina, and
then moved himself up and down. She felt severe pain. The incident happened in their house at 004-
A Calabasa Street, Tambakan, Pulanglupa, Las Pias, Metro Manila.
On 22 March 1991, also in the same place, accused-appellant fondled the young girl's breast and
kissed her many times against her will. He did not persist and he threatened her not to tell on him.
On 01 March 1993, while Maria Fe was playing inside the house, accused-appellant called her and
ordered her to lie down. Afraid, she obeyed. Accused-appellant then removed her panty, laid on top
of her, and succeeded in taking her. She was threatened not to mention the incident to anyone or, if
she did, he would kill her mother. At the time, only the victim and accused-appellant were in the
house.
On 11 January 1996, Maria Fe, along with her mother, sister and "stepfather," was in Batangas for a
vacation. While she was playing with her cousins, she was told by accused-appellant to get back
inside the house. She refused. Accused-appellant twisted her arms and pulled her in. He told her to
lie down. She tried to fight back but accused-appellant pushed her down, removed her panty and
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. After a while, she felt a sticky substance coming
from accused-appellant. When told to wash, she saw white sticky substance coming out of her.
On the mid-afternoon of 26 February 1996, back from vacation, Maria Fe was subjected to a like
ordeal. She was in their house playing when accused-appellant asked for a massage. The witness
obliged. While giving the massage, he suddenly embraced her and made her lie on the floor. He
went on top of, and consummated his evil design on, her.
On 14 March 1996, Maria Fe was at her aunt's place located just behind their own house when she
was again called by accused-appellant ostensibly to take a bath. He ordered her to remove her
panty. When she refused, accused-appellant berated her. He twisted her arms and made her lie
down. He removed her panty, laid on top of her and again satisfied his lust.
On 27 June 1996, about two o'clock in the afternoon, while Maria Fe was playing just outside their
house, accused-appellant instructed her to bring him a glass of water. Just as she was about to
hand the glass of water, accused-appellant pulled her down. She tried to push him away but, as
usual, her resistance proved futile. After the sexual congress,
9
she fled out of the house. She was
still fixing her panty when one Nora Caales saw her. Caales asked what had happened. She
pretended to have just urinated. Suspicious, Caales informed Mely Anda, Maria Fe's aunt, of the
incident. When confronted, Maria Fe confessed all that had happened to her in the hands of her
"stepfather."
Maria Fe testified that she was even much younger when she was first abused by accused-
appellant. She kept things to herself because she was afraid that her mother, Julieta Amadore,
would feel more for accused-appellant than she would for her. True to her fears, when she finally
revealed the incident to her mother, she was told - "Siguro, kagustuhan mo ito." With the help of a
neighbor, she finally filed a complaint against her "stepfather."
Julieta Amadore, for her part, denied having been told of any of the incidents by her daughter Maria
Fe.
Accused-appellant denied all the accusations against him, stating that their house is only 12 x 10
feet in area and that Maria Fe had her own room. He claimed that, throughout, he and Maria Fe had
a "smooth relationship," and that the only reason he could think of why the cases were filed against
him was the misunderstanding that once arose when he scolded her after she had refused to be
sent on an errand.
"Q What can you say about her accusation against you Mr. Witness?
"A I did not do anything to her, sir. I am not a bad person.
"x x x x x x x x x
"Q How would you say or describe your relationship with your stepdaughter Maria Fe
Oquindo?
"A We have a smooth relationship, sir.
"Q Would you say it is a good relationship between you and Maria Fe Oquindo?
"A Yes, sir."
10

After having heard both parties, the court a quo gave the case for the prosecution. In not giving
credence to the denial proffered by accused-appellant, the court said that neither the size of the
house nor the misunderstanding between him and the young girl could hardly overwhelm the strong
evidence against him. The trial court concluded:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused Rodrigo Amadore y Obina
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged in the following cases and sentenced
accordingly, to wit:
"1. In Crim. Case No. 96-0468, to die by the method provided by law;
"6. In Crim. Case No. 96-0473, to suffer an Indeterminate Prison term of six (6) months of
arresto mayor medium as minimum to six (6) years of prision correccional maximum as
medium;
"7. In Crim. Case No. 96-0474, to sufer an Indeterminate Prison term of Twelve (12) Years of
prision mayor maximum as minimum to Twenty (20) Years of reclusion temporal maximum
as minimum, and to pay complainant Maria Fe Oquindo the sum of P100,000.00 in each of
dispositions Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, and P50,000.00 in each of dispositions 6 and 7, and pay
the costs in the foregoing dispositions.
"Accused is ACQUITTED in Crim. Case No. 96-0328 for lack of evidence."
11

In his appeal to this Court, accused-appellant raised the following assignment of errors -
"1. The Court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of five (5) counts of rape, attempted rape and violation of Section 5 RA 7610 in relation
to Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code.
"2. The Court a quo gravely erred in finding that the accused-appellant waived the defect of
improper venue in Criminal Case No. 96-0469.
"3. On the assumption that the accused-appellant committed the acts complained of in
Criminal Case Nos. 96-0468 to 0472, the Court a quo gravely erred in imposing the death
penalty for each of the five counts of rape."
12

In support of the first assigned error, accused-appellant would argue that it was not right for the trial
court to heavily rely on the testimony of MARIA FE OQUINDO. He contended that while she could
testify in good detail about each of the incidents covered by seven out of eight criminal informations,
a feat indeed, she was unable to recall, however, the other times when she had similarly been
sexually assaulted by accused-appellant.
In support of the second assigned error, accused-appellant, citing People vs. Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City,
13
asserts that venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional, and that since the
incident in Criminal Case No. 96-0469 is said to have taken place in Nasugbu, Batangas, the
Regional Trial Court of Las Pias did not have jurisdiction to try the case.
In his third assigned error, accused-appellant states that the death penalty cannot be imposed in
Criminal Cases No. 96-0468 to No. 96-0472, inclusive, all the five informations having averred him to
be the "stepfather" when, in fact, Julieta Amadore herself has categorically stated that he is just her
live-in partner and that their union has all along been without the benefit of marriage. Furthermore,
citing the case of People vs. Dimapilis,
14
he claims that all the informations, except for one, have
failed to allege the age of private complainant, another qualifying circumstance, essential to justify
the imposition of the extreme penalty of death.
The first assigned error is an issue that relates to the credibility of a witness, a matter best
addressed during the trial stage. There is no ample reason shown for this Court to discard the long-
standing rule that it should behoove an appellate court, absent clear and convincing justification to
hold otherwise, to accord weight and respect to the findings of the trial court. The inability of private
complainant to remember all the other instances of sexual molestations committed against her by
accused-appellant can hardly downgrade her credibility. Nor would her minor inconsistencies
adversely affect her entire testimony; indeed, such incongruences or inaccuracies in the testimony of
a witness reinforce rather than destroy or weaken credibility.
15
Furthermore, rape victims, particularly
the young, are known not to cherish the memory of an event they would rather forget.
The argument that the filing of the case against accused-appellant by private complainant has
supposedly been motivated by a simple misunderstanding between them is much too flimsy to
belabor. It would be quite absurd to think that this young girl would come up with so serious an
accusation as rape just for a senseless spite. It has more than once been said that "youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity."
16
Neither can it be expected that a woman
would publicly admit being a victim of rape, voluntarily allow herself to be medically probed, and
endure humiliating questions in the course of trial, if her accusations were but malicious
concoctions.
17
Considering the inbred modesty and the consequent revulsion of a woman against
airing in public things that affect her honor, it is hard to conceive that private complainant would
reveal the ignominy she has undergone unless it were true.
18

The denial of accused-appellant cannot prevail over the clear and convincing testimony of Maria Fe.
Neither can his alibi prosper. Accused-appellant himself has testified that he would regularly go
home from work. His work as "kargador" elsewhere, not really that distant away, is not one that could
have prevented him from going back to the house and committing his nefarious deeds. Alibi cannot
prevail over positive identification
19
unless it is found to be so convincing as to preclude any doubt
that the accused could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its vicinity at the
time of its commission.
20
Nor can the fact that the house where the incidents have occurred is but 12
x 10 feet be a deterrent for accused-appellant. Lust, it has been said, "is no respecter of time and
precinct and known to happen in most unlikely places such as in parks, along roadsides, within
school premises or even in occupied rooms."
21

There is merit in the second assigned error relative to Criminal Case No. 96-0469. The concept of
venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike civil cases, is jurisdictional.
22
The filing of a criminal case
with the wrong court can oust the court from trying the case. The evidence introduced by the
prosecution in Criminal Case No. 96-0469 points to Nasugbu, Batangas, as being the scene of the
offense. For lack of jurisdiction, the case should have been dismissed by the court a quo.
The defense has likewise made good point in its third assigned error. The relationship between
accused-appellant and his victim and the latter's minority are qualifying circumstances that must be
correctly alleged and proved in order to warrant the imposition of the death penalty. Apparently, the
victim is not the "stepdaughter" of accused-appellant as has been so stated in the informations but is
the daughter of his common-law spouse by the latter's marital relation with another. A stepdaughter
is a daughter of one's legal spouse by a previous marriage. Except for the information in one of the
criminal cases, the minority of the victim has, too, not been alleged. The Court has successively
ruled that the circumstances under the provisions of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659,
23
the
attendance of any of which mandates the penalty of death, are in the nature of qualifying
circumstances and the absence of the proper averment thereof in the complaint negates the
imposition of that extreme penalty.
In Criminal Case No. 96-0473, where accused-appellant fondled the breast of private complainant
and repeatedly kissed her but he did no further and there was no showing that he at the time
intended to have sex with the victim, the crime for which he should have been held guilty was the
offense of "acts of lasciviousness," not attempted rape, punishable under Article 336 of the Revised
Penal Code by prision correccional.
24

In Criminal Case No. 96-0474, accused-appellant may only be convicted of attempted rape, despite
what appears to be the consummation of the act, as the information has merely charged accused-
appellant with attempted rape. Simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and two degrees
below that is prision mayor.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In
Criminal Cases No. 96-0468, No. 96-0470 to No. 96-0472, accused-appellant Rodrigo Amadore y
Obina is found guilty of simple rape in each of said cases, and he is thus sentenced to suffer a total
of FOUR terms of Reclusion Perpetua. Criminal Case No. 96-0469 is DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the court a quo. In Criminal Case No. 96-0473, accused-appellant is found
guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, and he is meted an indeterminate sentence of from 3 months
and four days of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three years, 2 months and fourteen days ofPrision
Correctional medium, as maximum. In Criminal Case No. 96-0474, the conviction of accused-
appellant for attempted rape, the crime charged in the information, is AFFIRMED but the sentence
imposed by the court a quois modified by hereby imposing, instead, an indeterminate sentence of
from three years, ten months and one day of prision correccional as minimum, to nine years and one
day of prision mayor medium, as maximum. The award of civil liability of P100,000.00 in each of the
Criminal Cases No. 96-0468, No. 96-0470 to No. 96-0472, inclusive, broken down into P50,000.00
civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages, is AFFIRMED. The civil awards in Criminal Cases
No. 96-0473 and No. 96-0474 are REDUCED, respectively, to P10,000.00 and P20,000.00, as and
by way of moral damages. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.1wphi 1. nt
LICYAYO vs PEOPLE
GR No. 169425
March 4, 2008

FACTS: Roberto Licyayo was charged for the crime of homicide, which is the death of Rufino
Guay. That on February 16 1992, the victim together with his friends Jeffrey and Joel, attended
a wedding. The petitioner and his friends Aron, Paul and Oliver were also present at the
wedding. That after the reception, the group of the victim and the accused had a drinking
session in a store, drinking bottles of gin. Later, the petition, Paul and Oliver left the store, and
the victim and his friends likewise adjourned their session and left. Rufino and his friends
dropped by another store where the group of the petitioner was also present. A brawl suddenly
occurred between Rufino and Aron. Rufino fell on the ground and Aron placed himself on top
and punched Rufino several times. Officers Danglay and Buyayo, upon hearing a call for police
assistance, approached the commotion. Upon arriving, they then saw petitioner holding a six-
inch double bladed knife. They tried to pacify the petitioner, but they were also threatened by
the weapon. The petitioner then approached Rufino, who was wrestling Paul, and stabbed
Rufino several times. Roberto Licyayo was disarmed and brought to the station, while Rufino
was taken to the hospital but later on died.
The petitioner claim that there was sufficient provocation on the part of the victim as in
his version of the incident, Rufino was the one who first attacked his brother, Aron as he
grabbed the latters collar and punched his left cheek. The victims friends also punched Aron
while he was lying on the ground. The petitioner fought back but he was overpowered, and can
no longer recall any subsequent event that transpired. The petitioner also said that he was
intoxicated and claims the mitigating circumstance of intoxication as they have consumed
alcohol prior the incident of the crime.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of sufficient
provocation and intoxication.
HELD: No
RATIO: The petitioner cannot invoke the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation
because it was not convincingly shown that there was alleged provocation on the part of Rufino.
The court has no evidence as to how the quarrel arose. The records do not sufficiently establish
who between Rufino and Aron started the brawl which resulted to the stabbing of Rufino by the
petitioner. What is only evident is that Rufino and Aron suddenly and unexpectedly grappled
during the Incident.
The petitioner cannot also be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of intoxication
because although they have consumed alcohol prior to the commission of the crime, it was not
established that the amount of alcohol consumed was enough to impair his reason and affect
his mental faculties. On the contrary, the petitioner can even recall the details that transpired
during and after his drinking session with his friends. That is the best proof that he still knew
what he was doing despite the alcohol he consumed.
IGNOMINY
vs.
MELQUIADES FERNANDEZ alias "Moding", and FEDERICO CONRADO, defendants-appellants.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Eduardo R. Ceniza for defendants-appellants.

PADILLA, J .:
Before the Court is Federico Conrado's appeal from the decision * of the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Pangasinan, Branch I, in Criminal Case No. L-2593 entitled, "The People of
the Philippines vs. Melquiades Fernandez, alias 'Moding' and Federico Conrado" convicting him and
the other accused of the crime of rape and sentencing them each to suffer inter alia two (2) death
penalties.
The criminal complaint dated 2 June 1982 filed before the trial court, reads as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of January, 1982, at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, at
barangay Taloy, municipality of Malasiqui, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned offended party Rebecca M.
Soriano, a virgin and 15 years old, by means of force and intimidation and against
the will of the latter.
1

Assisted by counsel, the accused Fernandez and Conrado, uncle and nephew respectively, pleaded
not guilty on arraignment
2
and underwent trial.
Teofilo Malong employed Rebecca Soriano as a househelper since September 1981. Residing in
Teofilo's house were his wife and daughters Amelita and Ma. Theresa. Rebecca Soriano testified
that on 13 January 1982 at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, and after she had just finished taking
a bath and still naked, the two (2) accused, both in short pants, surreptitiously entered the bathroom.
To prevent her from making an outcry, a piece of cloth was tightly tied around her neck, after which
she was forcibly laid down. Conrado held her hands behind her while Fernandez sexually abused
her. She declared that, immediately after Fernandez had raped her, Conrado in turn went on top of
her and likewise succeeded in having sexual congress with her against her will. She added that,
thereafter, Fernandez got a handful of mud near the bathroom and placed it on her vagina.
Thereupon, she ran to the upper floor of the house to report the tragic incident to Amelita Malong.
3

During the trial, Amelita Malong declared that in that afternoon of 13 January 1982, she was
combing her hair in her room when she saw the approaching Rebecca, naked with smeared mud on
her lower private part and a piece of cloth around her neck. She testified that after she was told by
Rebecca about the incident, they reported the same to her father, Teofilo, who was in his store. She
also declared that she knew both the accused because Fernandez used to spray their mango trees
while Conrado sold to them a dog sometime in November 1981.
4

Teofilo Malong likewise testified for the prosecution. He stated that upon being informed that his
housemaid Rebecca was raped by the accused, he and his family, together with Rebecca,
proceeded to the office of the INP Police Station of Malasiqui to report the crime and had Rebecca
physically examined by Dr. Wilfredo Claudio of the San Carlos General Hospital in that same
afternoon. He further said that the following day, or on 14 January 1982, he, Amelita and Rebecca
gave their written statements to the police.
5

Submitted as evidence for the prosecution was the "Medico-Legal Certificate" issued by Dr. Claudio,
indicating his findings of "hymenal lacerations at 6, 10, 3 o'clock positions and one dead sperm cell
seen on a slide examined."
6

In defense, the two (2) accused denied any involvement in the offense, both claiming they were
nowhere at the scene of the crime when it was committed.
More particularly, Fernandez claimed he was in his house at Taloy, Malasiqui weaving baskets when
the incident happened. He admitted having been formerly employed by Teofilo for about two (2)
years to spray his mango trees and stated that during the period he was hired as such, he lived
alone in a small hut constructed under a mango tree.
7
Conrado, on the other hand, alleged that when
the crime was committed, he was at Malimpuec, Malasiqui as he was hired to spray the mango trees of a
certain Mr. Overo Bo. Malimpuec is his hometown but he admitted that he used to go to Bo. Taloy, prior
to the incident, as his parents-in-law lived there.
8

In the trial court's decision holding that the guilt of both accused had been established beyond
shadow of any doubt, the following observations and conclusions are made:
As already stated, the defense of both accused is alibi, which is not even
corroborated by a single defense witness. It is well-settled rule that alibi is the
weakest defense that can be resorted to by an accused, as it is easy to concoct or
fabricate. . . .
. . . the alibi of both accused can not prevail over their positive identification by the
prosecution witnesses (especially by complainant victim of rape, Rebecca Soriano)
as the perpetrators of the crime charged, they having testified in a clear,
straightforward, positive, truthful, and convincing manner, with no motive to fabricate
this serious charge of rape or falsify the truth. The alibi of both accused can not also
be given credence or weight, considering that at the time of the rape, accused
Melquiades Fernandez was in his house at Bo. Taloy, which is just 150 meters
away from the house of the Malongs, where Rebecca Soriano was raped; and
accused Federico Conrado was at Bo. Malimpuec, which is only 9 kms. away from
Bo. Taloy, where Rebecca was raped that afternoon of January 13, 1982. The
evidence disclose that said distance of 9 kms. can be negotiated in only about 30
minutes by motorized vehicle, on good road connecting the 2 barrios.
xxx xxx xxx
The clear, positive, straightforward, and convincing testimony of rape victim Rebecca
Soriano, as well as her immediate reporting of the incident to the police authorities,
just 30 minutes or so after she was raped that afternoon of January 13, 1982 and her
giving of a sworn statement (Exh. A) on January 14, 1982 just the day after she was
raped) which was corroborated by the statements on the same date (January 14,
1982) by prosecution witnesses Amelita Malong and Teofilo Malong, more than
convinces and satisfies this Court that the came charged was, in truth and fact,
perpetrated by both accused.
9

Hence, the judgment of conviction, now the object of this appeal, the dispositive part of which reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds each of the accused MELQUIADES
FERNANDEZ, alias "Moding" and FEDERICO CONRADO, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two crimes of rape, aggravated by cruelty or ignominy, and, pursuant to law,
hereby sentences each of them to suffer two (2) penalties of death, to indemnify the
aggrieved party, Rebecca M. Soriano, in the amount of P12,000.00 as moral
damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.
10

In an effort to reduce the imposed penalty of death to reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment), without
disproving the charges against them, the two (2) accused assigned the following errors:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FOR
TWO (2) CRIMES OF RAPE.
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE COMMISSION OF THE
RAPE WAS ATTENDED BY THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF CRUELTY
OR IGNOMINY.
3. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING EACH OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS TO SUFFER TWO (2) PENALTIES OF DEATH.
11

In the light, however, of the 1987 Constitution, specifically, Section 19(1), Article III thereof, under
which a death penalty already imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua, Fernandez withdrew his
appeal.
12
The lone appellant therefore is Conrado who insists on his appeal, notwithstanding the advice
of his counsel de officio to discontinue the appeal allegedly on the ground that "it has become moot and
academic."
13

This Court nonetheless proceeded to consider accused-appellant's arguments for the sake of
verifying the correctness of the sentence imposed. We find no merit in the appeal.
First Assignment of Error
The trial court is accused of violating the rule against duplicity of offenses in that, the accused were
convicted for two (2) crimes of rape even when under the criminal complaint against them, there is
only one (1) crime of rape alleged. The rule invoked in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
which states that there should be only one (1) offense charged in a criminal complaint or information,
the purpose of which is to afford the defendant a necessary knowledge of the charge so that he may
not be confused in his defense. But it is likewise the rule that if ever duplicity of offenses is
committed, the same constitutes a ground for a motion to quash the complaint; and failure of the
accused to interpose the objection constitutes waiver.
14
Conrado, after he had been convicted by the
court a quo, can no longer assail its judgment by raising this issue. Neither can he claim, as he now does,
that he was denied the information that he was to be tried for two (2) separate crimes of rape. The acts
complained of, as constituting the offenses, were stated in the 2 June 1982 complaint in ordinary and
concise language that any person of common intelligence would be able to understand and thereby know
what acts he was to defend himself against.
The imposition on each of the accused of the penalty corresponding to two (2) crimes of rape is
proper, because of the existence of conspiracy. As clearly found by the trial court:
Both accused have, obviously, conspired and confederated to commit the crime,
considering that they entered the bathroom where Rebecca was, together and at
the same time. Accused Fernandez then tied her with a piece of cloth tightly
around her neck, while accused Conrado held her hands placing them behind her
body, to prevent her from struggling or resisting. Then after accused Fernandez had
raped Rebecca, accused Conrado raped her. Both accused, thereafter, fled from the
scene of the crime together and at the same time. All these circumstances show
beyond shadow of any doubtconspiracy on the part of both accused, which
renders each of them liable for two (2) crimes of rape, . . .
15

In a long line of decided cases, it has been held by this Court that in multiple rape, each
defendant is responsible not only for the rape personally committed by him, but also for the
rape committed by the others, because each of them (accused) cooperated in the
commission of the rape perpetrated by the others, by acts without which it would not have
been accomplished.
16

Second Assignment of Error
The trial court is correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of ignominy because of the
greater perversity displayed by the offenders. The testimony of the examining physician that he did
not find mud on the victim's private organ, does not necessarily belie the latter's asseveration that
the accused "plastered" (in the words of the lower court) mud on her private part. It is worthwhile
mentioning that the victim was examined and treated by Dr. Claudio at 3:55 p.m. or about almost two
(2) hours after the rape was committed.
17
Given this circumstance, the absence of mud in the victim's
private part when she was examined by the physician, may be attributed to the possibility that the mud
washed or fell off even before the victim left the house for her physical examination. Moreover, Rebecca's
testimony was corroborated by that of Amelita Malong who swore that she saw mud smeared on
Rebecca's private part when she (Amelita) saw Rebecca right after the incident. It is also difficult to
conceive why the offended party, young as she was, and with a chaste reputation, would go to the extent
of fabricating this portion of her testimony notwithstanding the consequent humiliation on her person and
disgrace on her womanhood. We cannot but agree with the trial court's finding that the offense was
aggravated by ignominy. We are of the opinion, however that the word "cruelty" used in the dispositive
portion of the judgment, to describe an alternative aggravating circumstance, is unnecessary. The act of
"plastering" mud on the victim's vagina right after she was raped, is adequately and properly described as
"ignominy" rather than "cruelty or ignominy."
Third Assignment of Error
Lastly, the original death sentence was correctly imposed pursuant to the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code, namely, Article 335 which states that when the crime of rape is committed by two (2) or
more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death, and Article 63, which provides that
when the penalty prescribed is composed of two (2) indivisible penalties (as in this case) and the
offense is attended by an aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.
However, since the original death penalties imposed by the trial court are no longer imposable under
the present Constitution and are reduced to reclusion perpetua, the sentence on appellant Federico
Conrado has to be reduced to two (2) penalties of reclusion perpetua.
18
But the indemnity he has to
pay to the victim must be increased to P20,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment, as above modified, is AFFIRMED. With costs against the
accused-appellant Federico Conrado.
SO ORDERED.
SPECIAL AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Appellee: People of the Philippines
Appellant: Walpan Ladjaalam alias Warpan
Ponente: J. Panganiban
FACTS:
Four Informations were filed against appellant Walpan Ladjaalam in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Zamboanga City (Branch 16), three of which he was found guilty, to wit: 1) maintaining a drug den
in violation of Section 15-A, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972); 2)
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as
amended by Republic Act. No. 8294; and 3) direct assault with multiple attempted homicide. The
following information was provided by the prosecution:
1) In the afternoon of September 24, 1997, more than thirty (30) policemen proceeded to the house
of appellant and his wife to serve the search warrant when they were met by a volley of gunfire
coming from the second floor of the said house. They saw that it was the appellant who fired the M14
rifle towards them.
2) After gaining entrance, two of the police officers proceeded to the second floor where they earlier
saw appellant firing the rifle. As he noticed their presence, the appellant jumped from the window to
the roof of a neighboring house. He was subsequently arrested at the back of his house after a brief
chase.
3) Several firearms and ammunitions were recovered from appellants house. Also found was a pencil
case with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside, each containing methamphetamine hydrochloride.
4) A paraffin test was conducted and the casts taken both hands of the appellant yielded positive for
gunpowder nitrates.
5) Records show that appellant had not filed any application for license to possess firearm and
ammunition, nor has he been given authority to carry firearms.
ISSUE:
Whether or not such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.
HELD:
No. Section 1 of RA 8294 substantially provides that any person who shall unlawfully possess any
firearm or ammunition shall be penalized, unless no other crime was committed. Furthermore, if
homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Since the crime committed was direct
assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating
circumstance.

Petitioner: Vicente Agote
Respondents: Hon. Manuel Lorenzo, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 43, Manila and People of the
Philippines
Ponente: J. Garcia
FACTS:
Petitioner Vicente Agote was charged to have violated Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession
of Firearms) and COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 (Gun Ban) for having in possession one (1) .38 cal.
Rev. with four (4) live bullets in a public place during the election period without having secured the
necessary license and authority from the COMELEC. During the pendency of the case, Republic Act
No. 8294was approved into law. Eventually, the trial court rendered judgment of conviction in both
cases wherein separate penalties were imposed respectively. Petitioner moved for reconsideration,
claiming that the penalty for illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866 had already been
reduced by the subsequent enactment of Republic Act No. 8294, which the trial court subsequently
denied. He then filed a petition before the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
2991-UDK, but was likewise dismissed.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Republic Act No. 8294 should be applied retroactively.
2) Whether or not such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as a special aggravating
circumstance.
HELD:
1) Yes. The rule is that penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person
guilty of a felony. Republic Act No. 8294 lowers the penalty for illegal possession of firearms
depending on the class of firearm possessed. The lighter penalty may be imposed to a person who
shall unlawfully possess any firearm or ammunition, unless no other crime was committed.
Moreover, the Court has already ruled in Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals that said law must be given
retroactive effect in favor of those accused under P.D. No. 1866. But as violation of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2826 or the Gun Ban was also committed by the petitioner at the same time, the
Court cannot but set aside petitioners conviction for illegal possession of firearm.
2) No. Section 1 of RA 8294 substantially provides that any person who shall unlawfully possess any
firearm or ammunition shall be penalized, unless no other crime was committed. It further
provides that such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered only as an aggravating
circumstance in cases of homicide or murder. Since the crime committed was in violation of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 or the Gun Ban, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an
aggravating circumstance.
Criminal Law; Special Penal Laws: CELINO v. CA, G.R. No. 170562 June
29, 2007
Brief Facts:
Two separate Information were filed against the petitioner, Angel Celino: one for
violation of the Comelec gun ban; the other, for Illegal Possession of Firearm under R.A.
8294. After pleading not guilty to the former, he filed a Motion to Quash on the
latter contending that he cannot be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms x x x if
he was also charged of having committed another crime of [sic] violating
the Comelec gun ban under the same set of facts x x x.

Issue:
Whether the mere filing of an information for gun ban violation against him
necessarily bars his prosecution for illegal possession of firearm because of the provision
of the law that "Provided, however,That no other crime was committed by the person
arrested."

Ruling:
Ruling against the petitioner, the High Court explained that he can be convicted
of illegal possession of firearms, provided no other crime wascommitted by the person
arrested. The word committed taken in its ordinary sense, and in light of the
Constitutional presumption of innocence,necessarily implies a prior determination of
guilt by final conviction resulting from successful prosecution or voluntary admission.
Citing the case of People v. Valdez (1999), the Supreme Court ruled that all pending
cases involving illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted and tried
if no other crimes expressly indicated in Republic Act No. 8294 are involved x x x.
In sum, when the other offense involved is one of those enumerated under R.A.
8294, any information for illegal possession of firearm should be quashed because the
illegal possession of firearm would have to be tried together with such other offense,
either considered as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide,or absorbed as
an element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coupdetat. Conversely,
when the other offense involved is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, then
the separate case for illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted.

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