Del Banco v IAC [G.R. No.

72694 December 1, 1987]

AURORA DEL BANCO, EVELYN DEL BANCO, FEDERICO TAINO, SOLEDAD TAINO, JOVENCIO TAINO, SAMSON TAINO,
NOE TAINO, SOCORRO TAINO and CLEOFAS TAINO, petitioners,
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Second Civil Cases Division), ALEJANDRA PANSACOLA, LEONILA ENCALLADO,
VEDASTO ENCALLADO, JOSE YEPES, et al., respondents.

Facts:
In 1859, brothers Benedicto, Manuel and Jose Pansacola decided to purchase from the Spanish
Government the 1,600-hectare land in Quezon (Cagbalite Island). They entered into anagreement for the
land to be considered as their common property along with Manuels children Domingo Arce and
Baldomera Angulo. They agreed that whatever benefits they may derive shall be shared equally.
In 1868, after two years of actual enjoyment and possession of property, they agreed to modify the
conditions of the agreement. The new sharing and distribution of lands is: to Don Benedicto; to Jose;
to the children of their deceased brother Eustaquio, Maria and Hipolito; and to Domingo Acre,
Baldomera Angulo, Marcelina Flores, Francisca Flores, Candelaria dela Cruz and Gervasio Pansacola.
A century later, private respondents Alejandra Pansacola et.al brought an action of partition at the Court
of First Instance in Quezon.
CFI Ruling: in favour of successors-in-interest of the original co-owners; against Alejandra
Upon motion for reconsideration of Alejandra, the same was denied.
CA Ruling: reversed CFI decision
Three separate petitions were then filed to the Supreme Court; two for review and one to deny one of the
petitions for review

Issue:

Was the Cagbalite Island still undivided property owned in common by the heirs and successors-in-interest of the
brothers, Benedicto, Jose and Manuel Pansacola?

Ruling:

YES. The Supreme Court held that the Cagbalite Island was still a co-ownership property. After review of the four
agreement made a century ago, there is nothing in the agreements that suggests that actual or physical partition
of the Island had really been made by either the original owners or their heirs or successors-in-interest. In 1859,
they only agreed to the sharing of whatever benefits of the property. In 1868, the co-owners agreed not only on
the sharing proportion of the benefits derived from the Island but also on the distribution of the Island. In 1907,
the heirs that were represented agreed on how the Island was to be partitioned. More importantly, the 1908
agreement reveals that no actual partition of the Island had as yet been done.

The Supreme Court noted that despite the claims of res judicata of the successors-in-interest because of the
Courts use of the word partition in the previous cases filed by their predecessors, employment or use of the
word "partition" therein was made not in its technical and legal meaning or sense but in an ideal, abstract and
spiritual sense. Such is evident from the bare statement in said decision to the effect that the property was divided
into four parts, without any reference to the specific parts of the property that may have been adjudicated to each
owner. It is also worth knowing that the issue in the previous cases which were tried together is not whether there
has already been a partition of the Cagbalite Island but, to recover possession of three distinct parcels of land,
together with damages.
Also, the fact that some of the petitioners have been in actual possession and enjoyment of several portions of the
property in question, does not prove that the land was actually partitioned and co-ownership terminated. A co-
owner cannot, without the conformity of the other co-owners or a judicial decree of partition issued pursuant to
the provision of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, adjudicate to himself in fee simple a determinate portion of the lot
owned in common, as his share therein, to the exclusion of other co-owners
1
. It is a basic principle in the law of co-
ownership both under the present Civil Code as in the Code of 1889 that no individual co- owner can claim any
definite portion thereof.
2
Reitirating the ruling in Caro v Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that It is not
enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide the property. They must have a subdivision plan drawn in
accordance with which they take actual and exclusive possession of their respective portions in the plan and titles
issued to each of them accordingly.

In addition to, the Supreme Court stated that no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners
or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
3
Co-owners cannot acquire by
prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership clearly
communicated to the other co-owners.
4
Furthermore, Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that each co-owner
may demand at any time the partition of the common property, a provision which implies that the action to
demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches.

PETITION DENIED.

1 Santos, Jr. vs. Buenconsejo, 14 SCRA 407 [1965]; Carvajal vs. Court of Appeals, 112 SCRA 237 [1982]
2 Diversified Credit Corporation vs. Rosada 26 SCRA 470 [1968]
3 Valdez vs. Olonga, 51 SCRA 71 [1973], Tero vs. Tero, 131 SCRA 100 [1984]
4 Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]

































Pardel v Bartolome [G.R. No. L-4656 November 18, 1912]

RICARDO PARDELL Y CRUZ and VICENTA ORTIZ Y FELIN DE PARDELL, plaintiffs-appellees, GASPAR DE BARTOLOME Y
ESCRIBANO and MATILDE ORTIZ Y FELIN DE BARTOLOME, defendants-appellants

Facts:
Vicenta Ortiz and Matilde Ortiz were daughters of spouses Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin of Vigan, Ilocos
Norte.
Before, Calixta died, she executed on August 17, 1876, a nuncupative will in Vigan whereby she made her
four children, named Manuel, Francisca, Vicenta, and Matilde, her sole and universal heirs of all her
property. However, Manuel died before Calixta and Francisca died a few years after. This made Vicenta
and Matilde the only heirs of the personal and real properties of their mother.
In 1888, according to Vicentas allegations, Matilde and her husband Bartolome took upon themselves the
administration and enjoyment of the said properties and collected the rents, fruits, and products of the
same. Vicenta was in Spain while such scenario went on.
Despite the different and repeated demands extrajudicially made to Matilde for the delivery of of the
properties to Vicenta, the former was not able to do so.
However, as per Matildes answer, she claimed that she has never refused to divide the property and that
she has delivered large amounts from their properties profits to Vicenta.
In 1905, the lower court ordered that Vicenta was entitled to acquire the building known as La Quinta,
the lot on which it stands and the warehouses and other improvements comprised within the inclosed
land, and the seeds lands situated in the pueblos of Vigan and Santa Lucia; and that Matilde was likewise
entitled to acquire the house on Calle Escolta, the lot on Calle Magallanes, and the three parcels of land
situated in the pueblo of Candon.
The properties retained by Matilde were valued at P9,310, and those retained by Vicenta, at P2,885, one-
half of which amounts each party had to deliver to the other, as they were pro indivisoproperties; that,
therefore, the Matilde had to pay Vicentathe sum of P3,212.50.
In 1907, the lower court ordered that the revenues and the expenses were compensated by the residence
at Calle Escolta house enjoyed by Matilde, that no losses or damages were either caused or suffered, nor
likewise any other expense besides those aforementioned.
Matildes counsel filed for a new trial but was denied. Subsequently, the counsel filed for a bill of
particulars which then reached the Supreme Court.

Issues:

1. Was Matilde Ortiz, as coowner of the house on Calle Escolta, entitled, with her husband, to reside therein
without paying to her coowner, Vicenta Ortiz one-half of the rents which the upper story would have
produced, had it been rented to a stranger?
2. Was the payment of the sum in counterclaim proper?
3. Was Matildes husband entitled to compensation for his administration of the property of common
ownership?
4. Does the co-owner have the right, during division or sale, to petition for propertys valuation by
competent expert appraisers?

Ruling:

1. YES. The Supreme Court held that Matilde has the right to reside at the Calle Escota house despite non-
payment of rentals to Vicenta. Article 394* of the Civil Code provides thata co-owner may use the
common property so long as it does not injure the interests of the community. Matilde Ortiz and her
husband occupied the upper story of the house. The record shows no proof that, by so doing, the said
Matilde occasioned any detriment to the interest of the community property, nor that she prevented her
sister Vicenta from utilizing the said upper story according to her rights. Also, thr stores of the lower floor
were rented and accounting of the rents was duly made to Vicenta. Until a division be made, the
respective part of each holder cannot be determined and every one of the coowners exercises, together
with his other coparticipants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and
enjoyment of the same. Matilde was exercising a legitimate right as a co-owner of the property.

However, such is not the same for Matildes husband Bartolome. He was using the lower floor of the
house as an office as he was the justice of the peace of Vigan. He needs to pay rent to Vicenta.
Bartolome's liability results from the fact that, even as the husband of the defendant coowner of the
property, he had no right to occupy and use gratuitously the said part of the lower floor of the house in
question, where he lived with his wife, to the detriment of the plaintiff Vicenta who did not receive one-
half of the rent which those quarters could and should have produced, had they been occupied by a
strange. He is to pay Vicenta P384, that is, one-half of P768, the total amount of the rents.

2. YES. As a result of a serious earthquake on August 15, 1897, the house in Calle Escolta was left in ruins
and uninhabitable, and that, for its reconstruction or repair, Matilde had to expend the sum of P6,252.32.
Evidence was also introduced which proved that the rents produced by all the rural and urban properties
of common ownership amounted, up to August 1, 1905, to the sum of P3,654.15 which, being applied
toward the cost of the repair work on the said house, leaves a balance of P2,598.17. t is therefore lawful
and just that Vicenta pays one-half of the amount expanded in the said repair work.

3. NO. Bartolome is not entitled to the payment of any remuneration whatsoever. he administered the said
pro indivisoproperty, one-half of which belonged to his wife who held it in joint tenancy, with his sister-in-
law, and the law does not allow him any compensation as such voluntary administrator. He is merely
entitled to a reimbursement for such actual and necessary expenditures as he may have made on the
undivided properties and an indemnity for the damages he may have suffered while acting in that
capacity. In exchange for the trouble occasioned him by the administration of his sister-in-law's half of the
said property, he with his wife resided in the upper story of the house.

4. YES. It is shown by the record that the ruling of the trial judge admitting the amendment to the original
complaint, is in accord with the law and principles of justice, for the reason that any of the coowners of a
pro indiviso property, subject to division or sale, is entitled to petition for its valuation by competent
expert appraisers. Such valuation is not prejudicial to any of the joint owners, but is beneficial to their
interests, considering that, as a general rule, the assessed value of a building or a parcel of realty is less
than the actual real value of the property.

PARTIAL REVERSAL of Trial Courts decision

*Art 394 - Each coowner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses them in accordance with their
object and in such manner as not to injure the interests of the community nor prevent the coowners from utilizing
them according to their rights.











Caro v CA [G.R. No. L-46001 March 25, 1982]

LUZ CARO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and BASILIA LAHORRA VDA. DE BENITO, AS
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF MARIO BENITO, respondents.

Facts:

Aflredo, Mario and Benjamin were original co-owners of two parcels of land in Sorsogon. Mario died
sometime in January, 1957. His surviving wife, Basilia Lahorra and his father, Saturnino Benito were made
as joint administrators of his estate.
In 1959, Benjamin Benito executed a deed of absolute sale of his one-third undivided portion in favor of
Luz Caro, for the sum of P10,000.00.
Soon, with the consent of Saturnino Benito and Alfredo Benito, a subdivision title was issued to Caro.
In 1966, Lahorra, learned from an allegation in a pleading that Caro acquired by purchase from Benjamin
Benito the aforesaid one-third undivided share in each of the two parcels of land.
Lahorra filed for an annulment of sale and mortgage and cancellation of the annotation of the sale and
mortgage involving the same parcels of land. But such was dismissed.
Undeterred, she filed for an action (legal redemption) to prove that as a joint administrator of the estate
of Mario Benito, she had not been notified of the sale as required by Article 1620 in connection with
Article 1623 of the New Civil Code.
Trial Court ruling: dismissed Lahorras complaint on the ground: on the grounds that: (a) private respondent,
as administratrix of the intestate estate of Mario Benito, does not have the power to exercise the right of legal
redemption, and (b) Benjamin Benito substantially complied with his obligation of furnishing written notice
CA ruling: reversed and executed a deed of redemption over the one-third share of BENJAMIN BENITO in favor
of Lahorra
CA denied Caros motion for reconsideration

Issue:

Does Lahorra have the right of legal redemption with respect to the lots in question?

Ruling:

NO. Lahorra does not have the right of legal redemption. The Supreme Court held that Lahorras basis on Article
1620* of the Civil is premised on the contention that the land is under co-ownership. Unfortunately for her, the
land is not in co-ownership. As early as 1960, co-ownership of the parcels of land covered was terminated when
Alfredo Benito, Luz Caro and the Intestate Estate of Mario Benito, represented by administrators Saturnino Benito,
as trustee and representative of the heirs of Mario Benito, agreed to subdivide the property. A subdivision plan
was made and by common agreement Lot I-C thereof, with an area of 163 hectares, more or less, was ceded to
Caro. Once the property is subdivided and distributed among the co-owners, the community has terminated and
there is no reason to sustain any right of legal redemption.
1
Also, the right of redemption may be exercised only
before partition.
2
In this case, the right was asserted not only after partition but after the property inherited had
actually been subdivided. Also, upon the expiration of the term of one year from the date of the entry of the
subdivision title, the Certificate of Title shall be incontrovertible (Section 38, Act 496). Since the title of Caro is now
indefeasible, Lahorra cannot, by means of the present action, directly attack the validity thereof.

Even on the assumption that there still is co-ownership, the right of legal redemption exists, Lahorra has no
personality to exercise said right for and in behalf of the intestate estate of Mario Benito. She is on the same
footing as co-administrator Saturnino Benito. Thus, if Saturnino's consent to the sale of the one-third portion to
Caro cannot bind the intestate estate of Mario Benito on the ground that the right of redemption was not within
the powers of administration, in the same manner, private respondent as co-administrator has no power exercise
the right of redemption.

Furthermore, there was no compliance with the conditions precedent for the valid exercise of the right to
redemption. One of the conditions is that the redemptioner should tender payment of the redemption money
within thirty (30) days from written notice of the sale by the co-owner. In the present case, three months have
passed since she learned of the sale. She even already knew of the said transaction even before receipt of the said
pleading.

CA decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. COMPLAINT DISMISSED.

*Article1620 - A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other co-
owners or any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of alienation is grossly excessive, the petitioner shall
pay only a reasonable price. Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may
only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in common.
1 Caram, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 101 Phil. 315
2 Saturnino vs. Paulino, 97 Phil. 50

















G.R. No. 78178 April 15, 1988
DELIA BAILON-CASILAO, LUZ PAULINO-ANG, EMMA PAULINO-YBANEZ, NILDA PAULINO-TOLENTINO, and SABINA
BAILON, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CELESTINO AFABLE, respondents.
FACTS:

The petitioners herein filed a case for recovery of property and damages with notice of lis pendens on
March 13, 1981 against the defendant and herein private respondent, Celestino Afable
The parcel of land involved in this case, with an area of 48,849 square meters, is covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 1771 issued on June 12, 1931, in the names of Rosalia, Gaudencio, Sabina Bernabe,
Nenita and Delia, all surnamed Bailon, as co-owners, each with a 1/6 share. Gaudencio and Nenita are
now dead, the latter being represented in this case by her children. Luz, Emma and Nilda. Bernabe went
to China in 1931 and had not been heard from since then
It appears that on August 23, 1948, Rosalia Bailon and Gaudencio Bailon sold a portion of the said land
consisting of 16,283 square meters to Donato Delgado. On May 13, 1949, Rosalia Bailon alone sold the
remainder of the land consisting of 32,566 square meters to Ponciana V. Aresgado de Lanuza. On the
same date, Lanuza acquired from Delgado the 16,283 square meters of land which the latter had earlier
acquired from Rosalia and Gaudencio.
On December 3, 1975, John Lanuza, acting under a special power of attorney given by his wife, Ponciana
V. Aresgado de Lanuza, sold the two parcels of land to Celestino Afable, Sr.
It appears that said land had been successively declared for taxation first, in the name of Ciriaca Dellamas,
mother of the registered co-owners, then in the name of Rosalia Bailon in 1924, then in that of Donato
Delgado in 1936, then in Ponciana de Lanuza's name in 1962 and finally in the name of Celestino Afable,
Sr. in 1983.
In his answer to the complaint filed by the herein petitioners, Afable claimed that he had acquired the
land in question through prescription and contended that the petitioners were guilty of laches.
He later filed a third-party complaint against Rosalia Bailon for damages allegedly suffered as a result of
the sale to him of the land with which the RTC which ruled:
o Finding and declaring Celestino Afable, a co-owner of the land described in paragraph III of the
complaint having validly bought the two-sixth (2/6) respective undivided shares of Rosalia Bailon
and Gaudencio Bailon;
o Ordering the defendant to restore the possession of the plaintiffs respective shares as well as all
attributes of absolute dominion
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the decision of the lower court insofar as it held
that prescription does not go against plaintiffs-appellees because they are co-owners of the original
vendors. However, the appellate court declared that, although registered property cannot be lost by
prescription, nevertheless, an action to recover it may be barred by laches, citing the ruling in Mejia de
Lucaz v.]. Accordingly, it held the petitioners guilty of laches and dismissed their complaint
Hence, petitioners herein filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC

ISSUE: The principal issue to be resolved in this case concerns the applicability of the equitable doctrine of laches.
Initially though, a determination of the effect of a sale by one or more co-owners of the entire property held in
common without the consent of all the co-owners and of the appropriate remedy of the aggrieved co-owners is
required.
HOLDING: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED, the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals is SET ASIDE, and the decision of the trial court is REINSTATED.
In its decision, the SC averred the following:

The rights of a co-owner of a certain property are clearly specified in Article 493 of the Civil Code.Thus:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the acts and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate assign or mortgage it and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may
be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. [Emphasis supplied.]
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the
entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only
the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his hereditary
successors, because they merely step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law and are
merely the continuation of the personality of their predecessor-in-interest. [Barcelona v.
Barcelona, 100 Phil. 251, 257].
Laches is likewise unavailing as a shield against the action of herein petitioners.
Well-stated in this jurisdiction are the four basic elements of laches, namely: (1) conduct on the part of the
defendant or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which
the complainant seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the corporations complainant's rights, the complainant
having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute
suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on
which he bases his suit; and, (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred [Go China Gun, et al. v. Co Cho et al., 96 Phil. 622 (1955)].
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which by exercising
due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined
to assert it. Tijam, et al., v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 25, 1968, 23 SCRA 29,35; Tendo v. Zamacoma, G.R.
No. L-63048, August 7, 1985, 138 SCRA 78, 90].





G.R. No. 75886 August 30, 1988
CONCEPCION ROQUE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ERNESTO ROQUE, FILOMENA OSMUNDO, CECILIA ROQUE, MARCELA
ROQUE, JOSE ROQUE and RUBEN ROQUE, respondents.
FACTS:
The controversy here involves a 312 square meter parcel of land situated in San Juan, Malolos, Bulacan
and designated as Lot No. 1549 of the Cadastral Survey of Malolos. The property was registered originally
in the name of Januario Avendao, a bachelor who died intestate and without issue on 22 October 1945.
On 21 September 1959, the intestate heirs of Januario Avendafio executed a document entitled
"Paghahati at Pagtagabuyan ng Mana sa Labas ng Hukuman."
1
Through this instrument, extrajudicial
partition of Lot No. 1549 was effected among the intestate heirs as follows:
a. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to Illuminada Avendao.
b. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to Gregorio Avendafio and Miguel Avendao.
c. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to Bernardino, Bienvenido, Numeriano and Rufina,
all surnamed Avendao.
d. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to respondent Emesto Roque and Victor Roque.
2

On 28 September 1959, co-owners Illuminada, Gregorio, Miguel, Bernardino, Bienvenido, Numeriano and
Rufina, all surnamed Avendao, in consideration of the aggregate amount of P500.00, transferred their
collective and undivided threefourths (3/4) share in Lot No. 1549 to respondent Ernesto Roque and Victor
Roque, thereby vesting in the latter full and complete ownership of the property
Subsequently, in an unnotarized "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan"
4
dated 27 November 1961, Emesto and
Victor Roque purportedly sold a three-fourths (3/4) undivided portion of Lot No. 1549 to their half-sister,
petitioner Concepcion Roque, for the same amount. The property, however, remained registered in the
name of the decedent, Januario Avendao.
Upon the instance of petitioner Concepcion Roque and allegedly of respondent Ernesto Roque, Lot No.
1549 was surveyed on 20 September 1975. Consequent thereto, a Subdivision Plan
5
was drawn up by the
Geodetic Engineer Identifying and delineating a one-fourth (1/4) portion (78 square meters) of the
property as belonging to respondent Ernesto Roque and Victor Roque (who had died on 14 April 1962),
upon the one hand, and a three-fourths (3/4) portion (234 square meters) of the same property as
belonging to petitioner Concepion Roque, upon the other hand
Respondents Ernesto Roque and the legal heirs of Victor Roque, however, refused to acknowledge
petitioner's claim of ownership of any portion of Lot No. 1549 and rejected the plan to divide the land.
Attempts at amicable settlement having fallen through, petitioner Concepcion Roque, on 6 December
1977, filed a Complaint for "Partition with Specific Performance"
6
(docketed as Civil Case No. 5236-M)
with Branch 2 of the then Court of First Instance of Malolos against respondents Emesto Roque and the
heirs of Victor Roque. In her complaint, petitioner (plaintiff below) claimed legal ownership of an
undivided threefourths (3/4) portion of Lot No. 1549, by virtue of the 27 November 1961 "Bilihan Lubos at
Patuluyan" executed in her favor by Emesto Roque and Victor Roque. In support of this claim, petitioner
also presented an undated and unnotarized "Kasulatang Pagkilala sa Bilihan Patuluyan ng Bahagui at
Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman at Paghahati-hati at Abuyan ng Bahagui"
7
said to have been signed by
the respondents in acknowledgment of the existence and validity of the Bilihan in favor of petitioner.
Finally, petitioner alleged that, as a coowner of Lot No. 1549, she had a right to seek partition of the
property, that she could not be compelled to remain in the coownership of the same.


On 27 June 1983, the trial court (now Branch 9, Regional Trial Court of Malolos) rendered a Decision,
9
the
dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants;
1. Ordering the heirs of the late Victor Roque namely Filomena Osmunda his spouse, his children,
Cecilia Roque, Marcela Roque, Jose Roque and Ruben Roque and their uncle and co-defendant Emesto
Roque, to execute a deed of confirmation of the sale made by Emesto and Victor Roque in favor of
plaintiff Concepcion Roque, entitled "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan," executed on November 27, 1961, Exh.
E, over the 3/4 portion of the subject property;
2. Ordering the partition of the parcel of land described in par. 3 of tie complaint covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 1442 Bulacan issued in the name of Januario Avendafio, in the proportion
of 3/4 to pertain to Concepcion Roque, and 1/4 to pertain to Emesto Roque and his co- defendants, his
sister-in-law, nephews and nieces, in accordance with the approved subdivision plan (LRC Psd-230726).
The respondents appealed from this decision with the IAC.
Acting on the appeal (docketed as A.C.-G.R. CV No. 02248), the Intermediate Appellate Court, in a
Decision
11
dated 31 July 1986, REVERSED the judgment of the trial court and dismissed both the
petitioner's complaint and the respondents' appeal. A Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner
Concepcion Roque was denied
Petitioner filed a motion for review with the SC
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioner can file for petition for the partition of the title held in co-ownership
HOLDING: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated 31 July 1986 in A.C.-G.R. CV No.
02248 is SET ASIDE with respect to that portion which orders the dismissal of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 5236-
M, but is AFFIRMED with respect to that portion which orders the dismissal of the respondents'appeal in A.C.-G.R.
CV No. 02248. The Decision of Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos dated 27 June 1983 in Civil Case No.
5236-M is hereby REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
In its the decision, the SC noted that:
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co- ownership" and that
"each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is
concerned." It also provides that 'no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners
or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
While the action for the partition of the thing owned in common (actio communi dividendo or actio familiae
erciscundae) does not prescribe, the co-ownership does not last forever since it may be repudiated by a co-owner
[i.e., Sixto]. In such a case, the action for partition does not lie. What may be brought by the aggrieved co-owner
[i.e., the heirs of Catalino and Galo] is an accion reivindicatoria or action for recovery of title and possession. That
action may be barred by prescription.
If the co-heir or co-owner having possession of the hereditary or community property, holds the same in his own
name, that is, under claim of exclusive ownership, he may acquire the property by prescription if his possession
meets all the other requirements of the law, and after the expiration of the prescriptive period, his co-heir or co-
owner may lose their right to demand partition, and their action may then be held to have prescribed (De los
Santos vs. Santa Teresa, 44 Phil. 811).
Epitacio, Paclano, Fidel, Virgilio, Galileo, surnamed Delima, Bibiano, Olimpio, Purificacion, all surnamed Bacus
(petitioners) vs. CA, Galileo Delima (+), substituted by his legal heirs: Flaviana vda. De Delima, Lily Delima-Arias,
Helen Niadas, Antonio, Dionisio, Irenea, Ester, Fely, all surnamed Delima (respondents) G.R. No. L-46296, Sept.
24, 1991
Facts:
- Lino Delima acquired a lot in Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Estate Lands in Cebu by sale on installments from
the government. He later died in 1921, leaving his only heirs three brothers and a sister, namely Eulalio,
Juanita, Galileo, and Vicente. After Linos death, the TCT of the property in question was issued in the
name of Legal Heirs of Lino De Lima, deceased, represented by Galileo Delima.
- Galileo, now substituted by his legal heirs, executed an affidavit of Extra-Judicial Declaration of Heirs.
Because of this, the previous TCT was cancelled and a new TCT was issued in the name of Galileo alone,
excluding his brothers and sister. Galileo declared the lot in his name for taxation purposes and paid the
taxes from 1954-1965.
- The petitioners, who are surviving heirs of Eulalio and Juanita, filed with CFI-Cebu an action for
reconveyance and/or partition of the property and an annulment of the TCT, with damages against their
uncles Galileo and Vicente. Vicente was named as a respondent because he refused to join with the
petitioners in their action.
- The TC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners, rendering of the land to Vicente Delima, to the
heirs of Juanita (the Bacuses), to the heirs of Eulalio, to the heirs of Galileo; the cancellation of the
TCT under Galileos name; turnover of the respective shares of the fruits of the lot, P170/year from 1958
to the present time with legal interest; partition of the lot within 60 days from the day the decision was
rendered; defendants are condemned to pay the costs of suit.
- The respondents were unsatisfied with the decision and appealed to the CA, who reversed the RTCs
decision and upheld Galileos claim over the other siblings, with the reason that they have already
relinquished and waived their rights to the property in his favor, considering that Galileo paid the
remaining balance of the purchase price and realty taxes.
ISSUE: WON petitioners action for partition is already barred by the statutory period provided by law
HELD: YES, their action is already barred. Art. 494 of the NCC provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain
in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand, at any time, the partition of the thing owned in common,
insofar as his share is concerned. Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of
time, not exceeding 10 years, shall be valid. This term may be extended for a new agreement. A donor/testator
may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed 20 years, neither shall there be any partition when it is
prohibited by law. No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner/co-heir against his co-owner or co-heirs as long
as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
However, from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the
properties and denies the others any shares therein, the question involved is no longer of partition but of
ownership. In such a case, the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked or applied
when one of the co-owners has adversely possessed the property as exclusive owner for a period sufficient to vest
ownership by prescription. The act of Galileo in executing a TCT under his name, making him appear as the new
owner of the property, effectively denies or repudiates the ownership of the other co-owners over their shares,
thus the statute of limitations started to run for the purposes of the action insitituted by the latter in seeking a
declaration of existence of the co-ownership and of their rights thereunder. The action for reconveyance
prescribes after 10 years, and it runs from the date of issuance of such title that the effective assertion of adverse
titles for purposes of the statute of limitations is counted. The lapse of 10 years of adverse possession by Galileo
was sufficient to vest title in him by prescription.

Virgilio B. Aguilar (petitioner) vs. Court of Appeals and Senen B. Aguilar
G.R. No. 76351, Oct. 29, 1993
Facts:
- Virgilio and Senen are brothers; Virgilio is the youngest of 7 children of the late Maximiano Aguilar, while
Senen is the 5
th
.
- The brothers purchased a house and lot in Paranaque in 1969, where their father could spend and enjoy
his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood. They initially agreed that Virgilios share in the co-
ownership was 2/3
rd
, while Senens was 1/3
rd
. However, by virtue of a written memorandum, the brothers
agreed that their interests in the house and lot were equal, with Senen assuming the remaining mortgage
obligation of the original owners with the SSS in exchange for his possession and enjoyment of the house
together with their father.
- Virgilio was, at the time, disqualified from obtaining a loan from SSS. Thus, the brothers agreed that the
deed of sale would be executed and the title registered in the meantime in Senens name. They also
stipulated that Senen would take care of their father, since Virgilio was based in Cebu.
- Their father died in 1974, and Virgilio demanded that Senen vacate the house and that the property be
sold, and the proceeds thereof divided among them. Senen refused, so Virgilio filed an action to compel
the sale of the house and lot so that they could divide the proceeds between them. Virgilios complaint
prayed that the proceeds should be divided, 2/3
rd
in his favor and 1/3
rd
to Senen. The former also prayed
for monthly rentals for the use of, the house by respondent after the death of their father.
- Senen alleged in his counterclaim that he had no objection to the sale, as long as the best selling price
could be obtained; and if such sale would be effected, the proceeds thereof should be divided equally;
and that rentals should not be paid, for being a co-owner, he was entitled to the use and enjoyment of
the property. Upon the pre-trial, Senen executed an SPA for his lawyer to appear and enter into any
amicable settlement. Senens lawyer, Atty. Tonogbanua, filed a motion to cancel pre-trial since he was
going to Dumaguete for a wedding (what), but this was denied by the RTC for lack of merit.
- During the pre-trial, neither Senen nor his lawyer appeared. The TC declared Senen in default and ordered
reception of plaintiffs evidence, ex parte.
TC Ruling: On July 1979, the TC ruled against the defendant, but found him and Virgilio to be co-owners of the
house and lot, in equal shares based on the memorandum. It also held that the property should be sold to a
3
rd
person and proceeds divided equally between parties, since the plaintiff could not agree to the amount
offered by the defendant for the formers share. The TC also ordered Senen to vacate the property and pay his
brother P1,300 as rentals from January 1975 up to the date of the decision, plus interest.
CA Ruling: Set aside the order of the trial court, finding the explanation of counsel for defendant in his motion
to cancel pre-trial as satisfactory and devoid of manifest intention to delay the disposition of the case.
ISSUE: (1) WON the trial court correctly declared respondent as in default for his failure to appear at the pre-
trial;
The law is clear that the appearance of the parties at the pre-trial is mandatory. A party who fails to appear at
a pre-trial conference may be non-suited or considered as in default. In the case at bar, where private
respondent and counsel failed to appear, the trial court has authority to declare respondent in default. The
grant or denial of a motion to postpone a pre-trial hearing is within the sound discretion of the trial court,
depending on two factors: (a) the reason for postponement; (b) the merits of the case of movant.
In the case at bar, the trial court found the reason to cancel the pre-trial without merit. The counsels
explanation that he had to accompany his wife to Dumaguete for a wedding cannot be accepted. It is
insufficient to justify postponement based on such grounds, and the CA did not act wisely in overruling the
denial. The SC sustain the TCs decision and rule that it did not abuse its discretion in denying the
postponement for lack of merit. The SC emphasizes that there should be much more than mere perfunctory
treatment of the pre-trial procedure, and its observance must be taken seriously if it is to attain its objective,
which is the speedy and inexpensive disposition of the case. The counsel was notified 3 days before the
scheduled pretrial, and if indeed counsel could not have made it, respondent at least should have personally
appeared as not to be declared in default.
ISSUE: (2) WON the trial court correctly rendered the default judgment against respondent.

The SC holds that on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and the ex-parte evidence presented, the petitioner
and respondents are co-owners of the subject house and lot in equal shares; either one of them may demand the
sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot object to such demand; thereafter, the proceeds of the
sale shall be divided equally according to their own respective interests.
The trial court ordered respondent to vacate the property so that it could be sold to third persons and the
proceeds divided between them equally, and for respondent to pay petitioner of P2,400 as monthly rentals, to
conform with their stipulated sharing reflected in their written agreement. The SC upheld the order of the trial
court, except that the effectivity of payment of monthly rentals, which should commence only after the trial court
ordered respondent to vacate in accordance with its July 1979 order.
Art 494 of NCC provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that each co-owner
may demand at any time patition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share in concerned. However, Art.
498 of the NCC states that whenever the same thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that
it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly
distributed. It should also be noted that being a co-owner, respondent has the right to use the house and lot
without paying any compensation to petitioner, as he may use the property owned in common as long as it is in
accordance with the purpose for which it is intended. Each co-owner of the property held pro indiviso exercises his
rights over the entire property and may use the same with no other limitation that he shall not injure the interests
of his co-owners.
Since petitioner has decided to enforce his right in court to end the co-ownership of the house and lot and
respondent has not refuted the allegation that he has been preventing the sale of the property by his continued
occupancy of the premises, justice and equity demand that the latter and his family vacate the property so that the
sale can be effected immediately. In fairness to the petitioner, respondent should pay a rental of P1,200 per
month, with legal interest, from the time the TC ordered him to vacate, for the use and enjoyment of the other
half other property belonging to petitioner. When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale which was granted
by the TC (which also ordered the ejectment of respondent), the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the
right to enjoy the possession jointly has also ceased.




Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. (petitioner) vs. CA, Hon. Alejandro Marquez, Crisanta, Elpidia, Efrina,
Ireneo and Artemio (all surnamed de Castro) (respondents). G. R. No. 124262, Oct. 12, 1999
Facts:
- Private respondents (the de Castros) filed an action for partition before RTC-Rizal. They alleged that their
predecessor-in-interest, Juan de Castro, died intestate in 1993 and that they are his only surviving and
legitimate heirs. They also alleged that Juan owned a parcel of land in San Juan, Morong, Rizal with an
area of more or less 2,269 sq/m. They further claim that in 1979, without their knowledge or consent,
that said lot was sold by their brother Mariano to Tomas Claudio Memorial College. The sale was made
possible by Marianos contention that he was the sole heir of the property. The private respondents
contend that the sale Mariano made affected only his undivided share to the lot in question, but not the
shares of his siblings, which was 4/5
th
of the property.
- Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, stating its special defense, lack of jurisdiction, and prescription and/or
laches. The TC dismissed petitioners complaint, but after a motion for reconsideration, reconsidered the
dismissal of the complaint and set aside its previous order.
ISSUE: WON the shares of Marianos siblings were included in the sale.
HELD: NO, the 4/5
th
of the property was not included in the sale. The SC held that even if a co-owner sells the
whole property as his, the sale will only affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not
consent to the sale. Under Art. 493 of NCC, the sale or other disposition only affects the sellers share pro indiviso,
and the transferee gets only what corresponds to his grantors share in the partition of the property owned in
common. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner
without the consent of the others is not null and void; however, only the rights of the co-owner/seller are
transferred, making the buyer (the petitioner) a co-owner of the property. The proper action in a case like this
division or partition of the entire property if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who
possessed and administer it. Such partition should result in segregating the portion belonging to the seller, and its
delivery to the buyer.
The defense of prescription is also untenable. Pursuant to Art 494 of NCC, no co-owner shall be obliged to
remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand, at any time, the partition of the thing in common,
insofar as his share is concerned. It cannot be barred by prescription.
Virgilio B. Aguilar (petitioner) vs. Court of Appeals and Senen B. Aguilar
G.R. No. 76351, Oct. 29, 1993
Facts:
- Virgilio and Senen are brothers; Virgilio is the youngest of 7 children of the late Maximiano Aguilar, while
Senen is the 5
th
.
- The brothers purchased a house and lot in Paranaque in 1969, where their father could spend and enjoy
his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood. They initially agreed that Virgilios share in the co-
ownership was 2/3
rd
, while Senens was 1/3
rd
. However, by virtue of a written memorandum, the brothers
agreed that their interests in the house and lot were equal, with Senen assuming the remaining mortgage
obligation of the original owners with the SSS in exchange for his possession and enjoyment of the house
together with their father.
- Virgilio was, at the time, disqualified from obtaining a loan from SSS. Thus, the brothers agreed that the
deed of sale would be executed and the title registered in the meantime in Senens name. They also
stipulated that Senen would take care of their father, since Virgilio was based in Cebu.
- Their father died in 1974, and Virgilio demanded that Senen vacate the house and that the property be
sold, and the proceeds thereof divided among them. Senen refused, so Virgilio filed an action to compel
the sale of the house and lot so that they could divide the proceeds between them. Virgilios complaint
prayed that the proceeds should be divided, 2/3
rd
in his favor and 1/3
rd
to Senen. The former also prayed
for monthly rentals for the use of, the house by respondent after the death of their father.
- Senen alleged in his counterclaim that he had no objection to the sale, as long as the best selling price
could be obtained; and if such sale would be effected, the proceeds thereof should be divided equally;
and that rentals should not be paid, for being a co-owner, he was entitled to the use and enjoyment of
the property. Upon the pre-trial, Senen executed an SPA for his lawyer to appear and enter into any
amicable settlement. Senens lawyer, Atty. Tonogbanua, filed a motion to cancel pre-trial since he was
going to Dumaguete for a wedding (what), but this was denied by the RTC for lack of merit.
- During the pre-trial, neither Senen nor his lawyer appeared. The TC declared Senen in default and ordered
reception of plaintiffs evidence, ex parte.
TC Ruling: On July 1979, the TC ruled against the defendant, but found him and Virgilio to be co-owners of the
house and lot, in equal shares based on the memorandum. It also held that the property should be sold to a
3
rd
person and proceeds divided equally between parties, since the plaintiff could not agree to the amount
offered by the defendant for the formers share. The TC also ordered Senen to vacate the property and pay his
brother P1,300 as rentals from January 1975 up to the date of the decision, plus interest.
CA Ruling: Set aside the order of the trial court, finding the explanation of counsel for defendant in his motion
to cancel pre-trial as satisfactory and devoid of manifest intention to delay the disposition of the case.
ISSUE: (1) WON the trial court correctly declared respondent as in default for his failure to appear at the pre-
trial;
The law is clear that the appearance of the parties at the pre-trial is mandatory. A party who fails to appear at
a pre-trial conference may be non-suited or considered as in default. In the case at bar, where private
respondent and counsel failed to appear, the trial court has authority to declare respondent in default. The
grant or denial of a motion to postpone a pre-trial hearing is within the sound discretion of the trial court,
depending on two factors: (a) the reason for postponement; (b) the merits of the case of movant.
In the case at bar, the trial court found the reason to cancel the pre-trial without merit. The counsels
explanation that he had to accompany his wife to Dumaguete for a wedding cannot be accepted. It is
insufficient to justify postponement based on such grounds, and the CA did not act wisely in overruling the
denial. The SC sustain the TCs decision and rule that it did not abuse its discretion in denying the
postponement for lack of merit. The SC emphasizes that there should be much more than mere perfunctory
treatment of the pre-trial procedure, and its observance must be taken seriously if it is to attain its objective,
which is the speedy and inexpensive disposition of the case. The counsel was notified 3 days before the
scheduled pretrial, and if indeed counsel could not have made it, respondent at least should have personally
appeared as not to be declared in default.
ISSUE: (2) WON the trial court correctly rendered the default judgment against respondent.

The SC holds that on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and the ex-parte evidence presented, the petitioner
and respondents are co-owners of the subject house and lot in equal shares; either one of them may demand the
sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot object to such demand; thereafter, the proceeds of the
sale shall be divided equally according to their own respective interests.
The trial court ordered respondent to vacate the property so that it could be sold to third persons and the
proceeds divided between them equally, and for respondent to pay petitioner of P2,400 as monthly rentals, to
conform with their stipulated sharing reflected in their written agreement. The SC upheld the order of the trial
court, except that the effectivity of payment of monthly rentals, which should commence only after the trial court
ordered respondent to vacate in accordance with its July 1979 order.
Art 494 of NCC provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that each co-owner
may demand at any time patition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share in concerned. However, Art.
498 of the NCC states that whenever the same thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that
it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly
distributed. It should also be noted that being a co-owner, respondent has the right to use the house and lot
without paying any compensation to petitioner, as he may use the property owned in common as long as it is in
accordance with the purpose for which it is intended. Each co-owner of the property held pro indiviso exercises his
rights over the entire property and may use the same with no other limitation that he shall not injure the interests
of his co-owners.
Since petitioner has decided to enforce his right in court to end the co-ownership of the house and lot and
respondent has not refuted the allegation that he has been preventing the sale of the property by his continued
occupancy of the premises, justice and equity demand that the latter and his family vacate the property so that the
sale can be effected immediately. In fairness to the petitioner, respondent should pay a rental of P1,200 per
month, with legal interest, from the time the TC ordered him to vacate, for the use and enjoyment of the other
half other property belonging to petitioner. When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale which was granted
by the TC (which also ordered the ejectment of respondent), the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the
right to enjoy the possession jointly has also ceased.












Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. (petitioner) vs. CA, Hon. Alejandro Marquez, Crisanta, Elpidia, Efrina,
Ireneo and Artemio (all surnamed de Castro) (respondents). G. R. No. 124262, Oct. 12, 1999
Facts:
- Private respondents (the de Castros) filed an action for partition before RTC-Rizal. They alleged that their
predecessor-in-interest, Juan de Castro, died intestate in 1993 and that they are his only surviving and
legitimate heirs. They also alleged that Juan owned a parcel of land in San Juan, Morong, Rizal with an
area of more or less 2,269 sq/m. They further claim that in 1979, without their knowledge or consent,
that said lot was sold by their brother Mariano to Tomas Claudio Memorial College. The sale was made
possible by Marianos contention that he was the sole heir of the property. The private respondents
contend that the sale Mariano made affected only his undivided share to the lot in question, but not the
shares of his siblings, which was 4/5
th
of the property.
- Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, stating its special defense, lack of jurisdiction, and prescription and/or
laches. The TC dismissed petitioners complaint, but after a motion for reconsideration, reconsidered the
dismissal of the complaint and set aside its previous order.
ISSUE: WON the shares of Marianos siblings were included in the sale.
HELD: NO, the 4/5
th
of the property was not included in the sale. The SC held that even if a co-owner sells the
whole property as his, the sale will only affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not
consent to the sale. Under Art. 493 of NCC, the sale or other disposition only affects the sellers share pro indiviso,
and the transferee gets only what corresponds to his grantors share in the partition of the property owned in
common. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner
without the consent of the others is not null and void; however, only the rights of the co-owner/seller are
transferred, making the buyer (the petitioner) a co-owner of the property. The proper action in a case like this
division or partition of the entire property if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who
possessed and administer it. Such partition should result in segregating the portion belonging to the seller, and its
delivery to the buyer.
The defense of prescription is also untenable. Pursuant to Art 494 of NCC, no co-owner shall be obliged to
remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand, at any time, the partition of the thing in common,
insofar as his share is concerned. It cannot be barred by prescription.










Sering v Plazo
Facts:
Sering filed a forcible entry suit against the Plazos.
MTC ruled in favor of Sering, however the plazo appealed to the RTC contending that Sering has co-
owners and therefore, they should be impleaded in the complaint
RTC ordered Sering to amend his complaint and to include the other co-owners.
Sering demurred claiming that under the law, any one of the co-owners could bring a suit for ejectment.
Plazos contend that the provision invoked by Sering is only for unlawful detainer cases and not applicable
to forcible entry cases.
RTC dismissed after Sering failed to amend the complaint.
Issue:
Whether there is a need to include the other co-owner in an action for forcible entry and detainer?
Holding:
NO, any of the co-owners may file:
2. Anent the question of whether an action of forcible entry and detainer should be brought in the name of all co-
owners, We hold that under Article 487 of the new Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring the action ... .
In forcible entry and detainer action(s) the matter to be determined is simply the question of prior physical
possession. It having been alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff was in actual possession of the properties,
certainly the plaintiff alone, who was in actual possession, could file the complaint.
RTCs judgment is reversed.














Adlawan v Adlawan
Facts:
Narcisso Adlwan filed an unlawful detainer suit against Emeterio and Narcissa Adlawan. (Uncle kag Aunty
ya)
The dispute started over a house and lot where the respondents tigulangs are residing, however the lot is
registered in the name of Narcissos father, Dominador Adlwan.
That sometime ago, the lot is owned by the parents of Emeterio and Narcissa, siblings of Doming, and that
the title was transferred in the name of Doming because the parents once needed to renovate the house,
because Doming is the only one who has college degree, hes the only one who can obtain the loan,
therefore, the parents executed a simulated deed of sale.
That on the transfer Doming was still single, later on he married Graciana Ramas but they did not have
children. Doming died ahead of his wife.
Narcisso claims to be an acknowledge illegitimate son of Doming and therefore is the sole heir of the
subject propert.
The respondents contend the signature at the back of Narcissos BC was forged and that even if he really
is an acknowledge illegitimate son, his ownership in the property is doubtful because Doming was
succeeded by his wife.
MTC dismissed- stating that Nars filiations should first be established.
RTC reversed holding that the title of Doming cannot be attacked collaterally, court then granted Nars
the motion for execution which was opposed by the alleged nephew and nieces of Graciana Ramas. They
contented that as heirs of Graciana, they have a share in the subject property and that intervention is
necessary to protect their rights. They then declared that as co-owners of the property, they allow the Res
to stay in the property until formal partition.
CA set aside RTCs decision because Pet cannot eject Res from the property via unlawful detainer filed in
his own name and as sole owner.
Issue:
Whether Nars can validly maintain an instant case of ejectment under his name and as the sole owner.
Holding:
NO, he cannot.
Art. 487 only applies when:
A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as
co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for
the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-
ownership, the action will not prosper. (Emphasis added)

Coronel vs Constantino
Facts:
Emilia Meking Vda. De Coronel together with her sons Benjamin, Catalino and Ceferino are heirs of of
the property owned by Honoria Aguinaldo. Another of the said property is inherited by Florentino
Constantino and Aurea Buensuceso.
That sometime ago when Emilia was financially hard up, she sold the property to Jess Santos and Prescilla
Bernardo, who then sold the property to Constantino and Buensuceso.
Constantino and Buensuceso then filed a complaint for declaration of ownership, quieting of title and
damages.
RTC adjudged in favor of the Respondents
CA affirmed
However, upon perusal DOS, the deeds signatories as vendors are Emilia and Benjamin therefore
excluding Catalino and Ceferino, and there was no signature of Benjamin in the Deed.
Issue:
*Whether the deed of sale executed by Emilia includes that of the shares of her sons
*Whether there was ratification by the sons on the act of their mother
Holding:
*NO.
Article 493 of the Civil Code states:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he
may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall
be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Consequently, the sale of the subject property made by Emilia in favor of Santos and Bernardo is limited to
the portion which may be allotted to her upon the termination of her co-ownership over the subject property with
her children.
The sale is valid insofar as the share of petitioner Emilia Meking Vda. de Coronel is concerned.

*NO.
No evidence was presented to show that the three brothers were aware of the sale made by their mother.
Unaware of such sale, Catalino, Ceferino and Benjamin could not be considered as having voluntarily remained
silent and knowingly chose not to file an action for the annulment of the sale. Their alleged silence and inaction
may not be interpreted as an act of ratification on their part.



MANINGDING VS CA (G.R. No. 121157, July 31, 1997)

Parties:
Heirs of Segunda Maningding: petitioners
CA: respondent
Facts:
Petitioners claim that they own the disputed lots in common and pro-indiviso.
Luis and Eriberta (two of the respondents), aver that their father Roque Bauzon was the owner of the
subject lots by virtue of a deed of donation propter nuptias.
Roque, together with Juan Maningding, Maria Maningding and Segunda Maningding were the surviving
children of Ramon Bauzon y Untalan who died intestate.
As claimed by the petitioners, Roque Bauzon repudiated the co-ownership over the sugarland, and Juan
& Maria Maningding quitclaimed their shares on the riceland in favor of Roque Bauzon.
Roque Bauzon then transferred the riceland to Luis Bauzon & the sugarland to Eriberta Bauzon.
CA held that the properties validly pertained to Roque Bauzon by virtue of the donation propter nuptias
and the transfers made by Roque Bauzon must be given effect. Nevertheless, the same court
maintained that the properties belonged to Roque Bauzon by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
Issue:
1) Whether the Roque Bauzon obtained the properties in dispute by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
Ruling:
FIRST ISSUE: YES, Roque Bauzon acquired ownership over the subject properties by acquisitive prescription.
Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring (or losing) ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time
in the manner and under conditions laid down by law. Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten (10) years. In
extraordinary prescription ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty (30) years, without need of title or of good faith.
The disputed lots are unregistered lands and ownership over such was evidenced by tax declarations. While tax
declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership, yet, when coupled with proof of actual
possession, as in the instant case, tax declarations and receipts are strong evidence of ownership.
Even assuming that the donation proper nuptias is void for failure to comply with formal requisites, it could still
constitute a legal basis for adverse possession. With clear and convincing evidence of possession, a private
document of donation may serve as basis for a claim of ownership.
There is no question that the donation in question is invalid, but it does not follow that said donation may not
serve as basis of acquisitive prescription when on the strength thereof the done has taken possession of the
property adversely and in the concept of owner.
Roque Bauzon possessed the subject parcels of land virtue of the donation propter nuptias. The possession was
public as it was Roque Bauzon who personally tilled and cultivated the lots; his possession therefore is one of good
faith as he does not have knowledge of the previous infirmity of the donation.
The donation propter nuptias was effected as early as 21 April 1926. It was only 1986 heirs of Segunda Maningding
demanded partition of the properties and conveyance of the produce.
Prescription, as a rule, does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes
the co-ownership. Co-owners cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear
repudiation of the co-owner
Here fore while prescription among co-owners cannot take place when the acts of ownership exercised are vague
and uncertain, such prescription arises and produces all its effects when the acts of ownership do not evince any
doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the other co-ownersship.

TAPIONAS RESOLUTION DENIED.





















MARIATIGUE VS CA (GR No. L-57062, January 24, 1992)
Parties:
Maria Del Rosario Mariatigue: petitioners
CA, Jacinto Mariateguie, Juan Mariategui: respondents

Facts:
Lupo Mariategui had contracted 3 marriages when he was alive.
1
st
wife: Eusebia Montellano
Children: 4 (Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo)

2
nd
wife: Flaviana Montellano
Daughter: Cresenciana

3
rd
wife: Felipa Velasco
Children: 3 (Jacinto, Julian and Paulina)
At the time of his death without a will, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired when he
was still unmarried.
Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition where
they adjudicated to themselves Lot 163. Registration was awarded to the heirs who thereafter subdivided
the lots.
Lupos children on his 3
rd
marriage then filed a complaint in the lower court claiming that the extrajudicial
partition and subdivisions of the lot deprived them of their share to their common fathers estate.
Thereafter, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and
prescription. They specifically contended that the complaint was one for recognition of natural children.
Trial court dismissed the motion, together with their complaint and counterclaim.
Upon appeal, CA held all children of Lupo Mariategui as entitled to equal shares in the estate of the
deceased. They directed the adjudicates to execute a deed of reconveyance to the children of 3
rd

marriage.
Issue:
1) Whether prescription barred private respondents' right to demand the partition of the estate of Lupo
Mariategui.
Ruling:
FIRST ISSUE: NO, private respondents commenced the instant action barely two months after learning that
petitioners had registered in their names the lots involved.
The allegations in the complaint alleged that the nature of the complaint is one of partition. Since the Court of
Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are legitimate children of the deceased, then the time
limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to this case.
Prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition so
long as the heirs, for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-
ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is
properly repudiated by the co-owner. Furthermore, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible and
cannot be barred by laches.
In the case, valid repudiation was made by petitioners to the prejudice of private respondents. Even assuming
that registration of the subject lot in 1971 was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had not
yet set in when private respondents filed in 1973 the present action for partition.
PETITION DENIED, DECISION OF CA AFFIRMED.