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FACTS: Tecson signed a contract of employment with GLAXO saying agreeing to study and abide by the
existing company rules which includes disclosure to management any existing or future relationship by
consanguinity and affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies and should
management find that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company.
Tecson got married to Betsy, an employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals, a competitor of Glaxo. Glaxo then
transferred Tecson to Butuan City, Tecson asked the company to reconsider but it was denied. Because
they were unable to resolve the issue, Glaxo offered Tecson a separation pay but he declined offer.
HELD: Glaxos policy on marriage is a valid exercise of management prerogative. This is reasonable
under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the
company. Stipulation is valid because it does not pose an absolute prohibition to marry. The
Constitution also recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right
to reasonable returns on investments and expansion and growth. Company has right to protects its
economic interests.

Navarro vs. Judge Domagtoy A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996
Facts: Mayor Rodolfo Navarro filed an administrative case against Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge
Hernando Domagtoy. Complainant contended that Domagtoy displayed gross misconduct as well as
inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law when he solemnized the weddings of Gaspar Tagadan and
Arlyn Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife, and Floriano
Dador Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario, which was solemnized at the respondents residence which
does not fall within his jurisdictional area. Respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having
solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn
Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey,
Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven
years. With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between
Sumaylo and Del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code and that article 8
thereof applies to the case in question.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge may be held liable for solemnizing marriages which did not
comply with the requisites in the FC.
Ruling: The Court held that even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the present spouse
was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order
to contract a subsequent marriage. In this case, Tagadan was not able to present a summary proceeding
for the declaration of the first wifes presumptive death thus, he is still considered married to his first wife.
A marriage can only be considered beyond the boundaries of the jurisdiction of the judge in the following
instances: (1) at the point of death; (2) in remote places; or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a
sworn statement to this effect. None of these were complied with therefore there is an irregularity.

Eugenio Sr. vs. Velez 185 SCRA 425
Facts: Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of Vitaliana Vargas, her full blood brothers and sisters,
herein private respondents filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging
that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in
his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly
deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition was filed, it was alleged that
Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio. Petitioner refused to
surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff. As her
common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her body. Private respondents (Vargases)
alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenio, who is not in any way related to Vitaliana was wrongfully
interfering with their
(Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, the Vargases contended that,
as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the dead body of their sister
Vitaliana. An exchange of pleadings followed. Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art.
294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse used therein not being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the
absence of such qualification, he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers and
sisters contend otherwise.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner can be considered as a spouse of Vitaliana Vargas.
Ruling: There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces
common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no
distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another
who are husband and wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We
hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144,
when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis--vis Vitaliana was not
a lawfully wedded spouse; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters (the

Cosca vs. Palaypayon 237 SCRA 249
Ramon C. Sambo and other complainants filed an administrative complaint to the Office of the Court
Administrator against Judge Lucio Palaypayon and Nelia Baroy, respondents, for the following offenses:
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
2. Falsification of the monthly reports of cases
3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in court
4. Non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received
5. Infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners, and
6. Requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite of marriage
license. Thus, several couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of paying the marriage
fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of marriage license. As a consequence, their marriage
contracts did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, the respondent judge did not sign their
marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had
to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the
ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge is liable of illegal solemnization of marriage.
Ruling: On the charge regarding illegal marriages, the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal
requisite of marriage, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein.
Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally
render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the
validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable. Thus, respondent judge is liable for illegal solemnization of marriage.

Manzano vs. Sanchez A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him in
San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that
marriage. However, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the
same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
"separated." Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims that when he officiated the marriage between
Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two
had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as
manifested in their joint affidavit. According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he
would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy.
He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass
him. After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that
respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
1) Whether or not convalidation of the second union of the respondent falls under the purview of Article
34 of the Family Code.
2) Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before
the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years and are
without legal impediment to marry each other; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of
the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate
affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano
and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage
contract, it was indicated that both were "separated." Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a
subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null
and void.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and
voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting
previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he
solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

FACTS: Tenebro contracted marriage with private respondent in 1990. In 1991, Tenebro told his wife that
he had been previously married in 1986. He then left the private respondent and lived with his first wife. In
1993, he then contracted another marriage. It was here when private respondent confirmed with the first
wife that petitioner was indeed previously married. Private respondent then filed a case against petitioner
for bigamy. Tenebro claims that he is not guilt of bigamy because:- That there was no valid second
marriage because no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union - That the declaration of the
nullity of the second marriage on the ground of Psychological Incapacity, which is an alleged indicator
that his marriage to private respondent lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on
which the second marriage was celebrated.
HELD: There is no requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil
registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of marriage. The law penalizes the mere act of
contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. The moment
petitioner entered into marriage with private respondent, he already committed bigamy. There is criminal
bigamy even if the second marriage is void because of psychological incapacity.

Balogbog vs. CA G.R. No. 83598 March 7, 1997
Facts: Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva
Arzibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died
in 1935, predeceasing their parents. In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog
brought an action for partition and accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate
children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino
in the estate of their grandparents. In their answer, petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They
alleged that their brother Gavino died single and without issue in their parents' residence at Tagamakan,
Asturias, Cebu. The Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment for private respondents,
ordering petitioners to render an accounting from 1960 until the finality of its judgment, to partition the
estate and deliver to private respondents one-third of the estate of Basilio and Genoveva, and to pay
attorney's fees and costs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage between Gavino and Catalina is valid even in the absence of
marriage certificate.
Ruling: Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as
husband and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the
contrary. In this case, petitioners' claim that the certification presented by private respondents, to the
effect that the record of the marriage had been lost or destroyed during the war, was belied by the
production of the Book of Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer of Asturias. Petitioners argue
that this book does not contain any entry pertaining to the alleged marriage of private respondents'
parents. This contention has no merit. Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of
marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be
presented to prove marriage.
Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and Catalina were married
in 1929; that they had three children, one of whom died in infancy; that their marriage subsisted until 1935
when Gavino died; and that their children, private respondents herein, were recognized by Gavino's
family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino. Hence, the marriage between Gavino and
Catalina is valid.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr. 139 SCRA 139
Facts: Alice Reyes, a Filipina, married Richard Upton, an American, in Hongkong in 1972. They
established residence in the Philippines and had two children. In 1982, the wife sued for divorce in
Nevada, U.S.A., on the ground of incompatibility. She later married Theodore Van Dorn in Nevada in
1983. Upton sued her before RTC, Branch LXV in Pasay City asking that she be ordered to render an
accounting of her business, which Upton alleged to be conjugal property. He also prayed that he be
declared with a right to manage the conjugal property. The defendant wife moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the cause of action was barred by a previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings wherein he had acknowledged that the couple had no community property.
Issue: Whether or not absolute divorce decree granted by U.S. court, between Filipina wife and American
husband held binding upon the latter.
Ruling: The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada Divorce of the parties. There can be no question as to
the validity of that Nevada divorce in any states of the U.S. The decree is binding on Upton as an
American citizen. Hence, he cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any state of the United States. It is
true that owing to the nationality principle under article 15 of the civil code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released Upton
from the marriage from the standards of American law. Thus, pursuant to his national law, he is no longer
the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as petitioner husband entitled
to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is also estopped by his own representation before the
Nevada court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. He should not continue to be
one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.

Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera 174 SCRA 653
Facts: Article 26; On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in the Federal Republic of Germany. The
marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila.
Thereafter, marital discord set in, followed by a separation de facto between them. After about three and
a half years of marriage, private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany.
He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982.
On January 15, 1986, Schoneberg Local Court promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure
of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. Petitioner, on the other
hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila on January 23, 1983.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints
for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner
"had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named James Chua
sometime in 1983". On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the
lower court denying her motion to quash.
Issue: Whether or not the criminal cases filed by the German ex-spouse may prosper.
Ruling: Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except
upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power
to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the
status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. Hence,
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at
the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. In the present case, the fact that private
respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. Private
respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery
case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

Republic vs. Orbecido 472 SCRA 114
Facts: Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros M. Villanueva were married with two children. Lady Myros
then left for the United States with one son and became a naturalized American citizen, obtained a valid
divorce decree in 2000 capacitating her to remarry, and contracted a marriage with Innocent Stanley, an
American. Cipriano then filed a petition for authority to remarry under Article 26(2) of the Family Code The
Office of the Solicitor General contends that the invoked article was not applicable and raises this pure
question of law, they further posit that Orbecido should file for Legal Separation or Annulment instead.
Issue: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26(2).
Ruling: YES. Article 26(2) should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a
spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. To rule otherwise would be
to sanction absurdity and injustice.
For the application of Article 26(2), there must have been (1) a valid marriage celebrated between a
Filipino and a foreigner, and that (2) a valid divorce decree is obtained by the alien spouse capacitating
her to remarry.Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the following must
be proven: (1) divorce as a fact, (2) foreign law, (3) divorce decree capacitated one to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but
their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained by the alien spouse. Annulment or Legal
Separation need not be the proper remedies for such would be in the case of the former, long, tedious,
and infeasible, and in the case of the latter, is futile to sever marital ties.

Nial vs. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122
Facts: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were
born herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa. One year and 8
months thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Bayadog got married without
any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986
stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and were thus exempt from
securing a marriage license. After Pepitos death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack
of a marriage license.
Issue: What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code (now Article 34 of
the Family Code) to warrant the counting of the 5-year period in order to exempt the future spouses from
securing a marriage license.
Ruling: The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration
of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year
period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5
years and continuity is unbroken. Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first
spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior
marriage was dissolved or annulled.In this case, at the time Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot
be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to their wedding
day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only
about 20 months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting
with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated
in fact from
his lawful spouse.
The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as
husband and wife. Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by
the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such

Republic vs. CA and Molina February 13, 1997
Facts: On April 14, 1985, plaintiff Roridel O. Molina married Reynaldo Molina which union bore a son.
After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a
father as he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends, depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels
between them. The RTC granted Roridel petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage which was
affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities constitute psychological
Ruling: The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are
hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
(a) Medically or clinically identified,
(b) Alleged in the complaint,
(c) Sufficiently proven by experts and
(d) Clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state.

Antonio vs. Reyes G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
Facts: Leonilo Antonio, petitioner, filed a petition to have his marriage to Marie Reyes, respondent,
declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage.
He asserted that respondents incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still
subsists up to the present. As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner
claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things.
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Lopez, a clinical
psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal,
introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondents
persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic
relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect. They further asserted that respondents
extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis
for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the
foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and held that respondents propensity to
lying about almost anything-her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among
others-had been duly established. According to the trial court, respondents fantastic ability to invent and
fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her
psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her
marriage. The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.
Issue: Whether or not there is sufficient basis/showing of psychological incapacity as to render the
marriage null and void.
Ruling: It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in
order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of
respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioners witnesses and the
trial court were emphatic on respondents inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of
her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondents inability to understand and
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and
reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic
meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to
adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.
Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondents
psychological incapacity was curable or incurable. From the totality of the evidence, however, the court is
sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondents psychological incapacity has been established
by the petitioner.

Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
Facts: Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao were married on May 22, 1988. Until their separation on March 15,
1989, there was no sexual contact between them. Hence, Gina (wife) filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage. Medical examinations showed that the wife was healthy, normal and still a virgin,
while the husband was found to be capable of having sexual intercourse since he was not impotent.
The wife claimed that her husband was impotent, and was a closet homosexual as he did not show his
penis and since he was using his mothers eyebrow pencil and cleansing cream. She also claimed that
her husband married her, a Filipino citizen, in order to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the
country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man. On the other hand, the husband
claimed that it was his wife who was psychologically incapacitated to perform basic marital obligations. He
asserts that his wife avoided him whenever he wants to have sexual intercourse with her. He further
claimed that his wife filed the case because she was afraid that she would be forced to return the pieces
of jewelry of his mother, and that he might consummate their marriage. He also insisted that their
marriage would remain valid because they are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome
their differences.
The trial court declared their marriage void on account of psychological incapacity of the husband. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the prolonged refusal of the husband to have sexual cooperation for the
procreation of children with his wife is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Ruling: Yes. The prolonged refusal of the husband to have sexual cooperation for the procreation of
children with his wife is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, the Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. The husbands senseless and protracted
refusal to fulfill his marital obligations is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.
Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage.
Decision affirmed and petition denied for lack of merit.

FACTS: Juanita and Manuel were married civilly and in the Catholic Church. Discovering that they could
not have a baby they adopted a baby boy. After 24 years of marriage, Manuel filed a declaration of nullity
on ground of Psychological Incapacity. He alleged that Juanita exhibited an over domineering and selfish
attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose nature, that she
incessantly complained about almost everything and anyone connected with him like his elderly parents,
staff, she showed no respect for his prestige and high position as judge in the Municipal Trial Court.
Juanita said that Manuel is still living with her at their conjugal home in Bulacan, that he invented
malicious stories against her so that he could marry his paramour, that she supported Manuel in all his
endeavors despite his philandering, that she was raised in a real happy family and had a happy childhood
contrary to what was said by Manuel.
HELD: Psychological Incapacity must be judged on a case to case basis. It should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity. It must be characterized by a. gravity b. juridical antecedence c.
incurability --- this was not met. Sexual infidelity does not constitute psycho incapacity within
contemplation of family code. It must be shown that Manuels unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a
disordered personality which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential marital state and
not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. The negative traits must
paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
Unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities DOES NOT constitute psychological incapacity.

REPUBLIC v. QUINTERO-HAMANO 428 SCRA 735 G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004
Facts: Respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in
the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On
November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child. On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by
Judge Isauro
M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest
only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return
by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two months,
Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded.
Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not
bother to see her and their child.
Issue: Whether or not abandonment by one spouse tantamount to psychological incapacity.
Ruling: The court find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was
doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological
illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented
showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder.
Abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was no showing that the case at bar was not
just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. It cannot presume psychological
defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the
marriage. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married
person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not
physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and
complying with the obligations essential to marriage. In proving psychological incapacity, the court finds
no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. It cannot be lenient in the application of the
rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign
national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the
basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological
incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.