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Unconscionability and inequality of bargaining power are common legal dictums. Civil courts in Malaysia apply conventional principles and standards in their determination of cases involving contract law. The factors that would vitiate consent include coercion, undue influence, fraud and misrepresentation or mistake.
Unconscionability and inequality of bargaining power are common legal dictums. Civil courts in Malaysia apply conventional principles and standards in their determination of cases involving contract law. The factors that would vitiate consent include coercion, undue influence, fraud and misrepresentation or mistake.
Unconscionability and inequality of bargaining power are common legal dictums. Civil courts in Malaysia apply conventional principles and standards in their determination of cases involving contract law. The factors that would vitiate consent include coercion, undue influence, fraud and misrepresentation or mistake.
Bachelor of Engineering (Hons) Chemical Engineering
UEEG 2113 Law for Engineers
Individual Assignment
Title:
Discuss.
Name: Thang Ern Sern ID: 1002982 Date: 12 July 2014 Year/Semester: Y4S1 Program: Chemical Engineering Lecturer: Ir Lai Sze Ching
Doctrine of unconscionability contravenes an important cornerstone of the Law of Contract, i.e. freedom of Discussion The issues on unconscionability and inequality of bargaining power are common legal dictums, which are constantly and continuously discussed in consumer contracts. Terms on earnest payment, performance bond, pre-determined damages, standard exemption and limitation terms in commercial contracts are examples of practices which arise from the unconscionability and inequality of bargaining power of the contractual parties. Civil courts in Malaysia apply conventional principles and standards in their determination of cases involving contract law. In ascertaining whether or not a contract or a contractual clause is valid, Malaysian courts tend to emphasize the importance of form and procedure over substance. Subject to a few exceptions, they are inclined to enforce a contract against a party as long as the documents are properly executed and the circumstances in which the contract was entered into satisfy the basic requirements of validity. These requirements according to the Contracts Act 1950 include offer and acceptance, consideration, intention to create legal relations and capacity. Subsumed under these is the overall requirement of consent. The factors that would vitiate consent and thus enable the court to intervene include coercion, undue influence, fraud and misrepresentation or mistake. When a case is verified to vitiate the factors, the contract is said to be voidable at the option of the innocent party, according to Section 19 (1) of Contract Acts 1950. However, once a case is determined to subject under unconscionability, will it have any contravention with the freedom of contract? A contract is an agreement between two or more parties, giving rise to obligations which are enforced or recognized by law. This is defined in Section 2 (h) of Contracts Act 1950. It may be in the form of writing, by word of mouth, by conduct or by any combination of such. Section 10 of the Contracts Act 1950 defines a contract as all agreements made with the free consent of parties competent to contract. One of the most essential features of a contract is the freedom of contract, in which contracting parties must be allowed to enter into a contract freely. The parties must be permitted to enter into agreements of their own choice and on their own terms. The doctrine of freedom of contract also states that nobody shall have contractual obligations imposed upon them without their consent. Therefore, with this doctrine, parties should be as free as possible to make agreements on their own terms without the interference of the courts or Parliament and their agreements should be respected, upheld and enforced by the courts. The principle concerning unconscionability was initially propounded by Lord Denning in the case of Lloyds Bank v. Bundy [1975] QB 326 where it was held that unconscionable transaction between parties may be set aside by the court of equity. This unconscionable category is said to extend to all cases where unfair advantage has been gained by an unconscientious use of power by a stronger party against a weaker. Unconscionability is understood by jurists as a doctrine used by the court of equity to correct mens conscience against conducts and bargains that are unconscionable. This understanding is derived from the judgments in several early English cases including the Earl of Oxfords Case (1615), Earl of Chesterfield v Janssen (1751) and Earl of Aylesford v Morris (1873). Unconscionability is determined by examining the circumstances of the parties when the contract was made; these circumstances include, for example, the bargaining power, age, and mental capacity of the parties. The doctrine is applied only where it would be an affront to the integrity of the judicial system to enforce such contracts. "Inequality of bargaining power" is another term used to express essentially the same idea for the same area of law, which can in turn be further broken down into cases on duress and undue influence. When a court uses the word unconscionable to describe conduct, it means that the conduct does not conform to the dictates of conscience. In addition, when something is judged unconscionable, a court will refuse to allow the perpetrator of the conduct to benefit. From this, the result of the court will definitely interfere the contract or agreement made under consent by both parties there is unconsciounability judged. The following part of the essay will discuss some cases related to unconscionability. In the case Malaysian Refining Company Sdn Bhd v Sumatec Engineering and Construction Sdn Bhd [2011], the appellant (`Sumatec') was appointed by the respondent (`MRC') to be its contractor for a project (`the Structural Steel works contract'). Sumatec was to also provide a bank guarantee for the due performance of the contract. It was Sumatec's assertion that they had duly completed all works required of them by delivery of all agreed steel structure, which was confirmed by the respondent through the issuance of a Provisional Acceptance Certificate. However, a dispute arose between the two parties and subsequently Sumatec was informed that MRC had proceeded to make a demand for payment or encashment of the bank guarantee. Sumatec contended that MRC's call on the bank guarantee amounted to unconscionable conduct and this in itself was sufficient ground to challenge the calling for payments under the said bank guarantee. In the High Court, Sumatec succeeded in obtaining an injunction to restrain the respondent from calling upon the bank guarantee issued by Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB). However, the Court of Appeal found that MRC was not guilty of any unconscionable conduct to restrain it from calling on the bank guarantee and had allowed MRC's appeal, concluding that the balance of convenience tipped in favour of MRC and that damages would, at the end of the day, be a sufficient remedy for Sumatec. As stated in the case, the facts of an individual case must be considered: On the issue of "unconscionability" as raised by the respondent, even assuming the principle is to be applied and adopted in the present case, it must clearly be established and proven by evidence in the circumstances of the case. As in the case of fraud, to establish unconscionability there must be placed before the court manifest or strong evidence of some degree in respect of the alleged unconscionable conduct complained of, not a bare assertion. Hence, the Respondent has to satisfy the threshold of a seriously arguable case that the only realistic inference is the existence of unconscionability which would basically mean establishing a strong prima facie case unconscionability should only be allowed with circumspect where events or conduct are of such degree such as to prick the conscience of a reasonable and sensible man. .. It is not possible to define "unconscionability" other than to give some very broad indications such as lack of bone fides. What kind of situation would constitute "unconscionability" would have to depend on the facts of each case. .. Based on the above considerations, we are of the view that there is no simple formula that would enable the court to ascertain whether a party had acted unconscionably in making a call on an on-demand performance bond or bank guarantee. In the final analysis, whether or not "unconscionability" has been made out is largely dependent on the facts of each 5 case. In every case where "unconscionability" is made out, there would always be an element of unfairness or some form of conduct which appears to be performed in bad faith. This indicates that whether or not unconscionability is found to exist would depend largely on the facts of each case. Sumatec claimed that it is unconscionable that MRC called upon the bank guarantee without its consent. On the facts of this case, it was held that although Sumatec had raised several incidences of the alleged unconscionable conduct on the part of MRC, it had not proven unconscionability. In this case, juries had influences on the contract between Sumatec and MRC to determine if the conduct is unconscionable conduct or not. It can be seen that from this case, when the conduct is determined as unconscionable in the High Court, the contract could not be enforced. However, in the end, the injunction by Sumatec was denied to call the act of MRC as an unconscionable conduct based on the materials provided to the court. This shows that there are no true way to decide whether a conduct is unconciousable or not, and it depends on the methods done by jurists who will make the decisions. Hence, doctrine of unconsciounability can contravene with the freedom of contract in where both parties are free to enter into contract. Besides that, unconscionable conduct which deals with transactions between dominant and weaker parties, also overlaps with duress and undue influence. Unconscionable conduct is prohibited both in equity and, more recently, by statute. Duress or coercion refers to a situation whereby a person performs an act as a result of violence, threat or other pressure against the person. Defined in Section 15 of the Contracts Act 1950, it is the committing, or threatening to commit any act forbidden by the Penal Code, or the unlawful detaining or threatening to detain, any property, to the prejudice of any person whatever, with the intention of causing any person to enter into any agreement. It is separated into two types: Physical Duress and Economical Duress. Some example for physical duress are duress to the person and duress to goods. In Barton v Armstrong [1976] AC 104, a decision of the Privy Council, Armstrong threatened to kill Barton if he did not sign a contract, which was set aside due to duress to the person. Hawker Pacific Pty Ltd v Helicopter Charter Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 298, the contract was set aside after Hawker Pacific's threats to withhold the helicopter from the plaintiff unless further payments were made for repairing a botched paint job, and this is an example for duress of goods. These are examples for when unconscionability is judged, the court can set aside the contract, thus interfere the freedom of contract between two parties or more. However, in these examples, doctrine of unconsciounability stands on a good side to prevent overpowered party to gain stronger benefits from the other. In fact, it strikes for fairness between both parties that have not come into agreement in peace and it also finds to achieve justice for the weaker parties that could not protect themselves and go into contract without other possible way. Economic duress might exist, for example, where the dominant party threatens not to perform a contract - although not all such threats will constitute duress - in particular, if other options were available to the weaker party (purchasing the product elsewhere, seeking legal remedies) duress will not be established. One example for economic duress is in The Siboen and The Sibotre [1976] 1 Lloyds Rep 293. There was a threat by charterers of two ships to break their charter parties by not paying the agreed charter rate unless that rate was lowered. The owners were informed that the charterers had no substantial assets and that the parent company of the charterers would allow it to go into liquidation unless the hire rates were reduced. That information was untrue but nevertheless caused the owners to agree a reduction in the charter rate. The Court found for the owners on the basis of misrepresentation but accepted the principle that economic duress could apply. Another example is the case CTN Cash & Carry v Gallagher [1994] 4 All ER 714 where the defendants sent a consignment of cigarettes to the wrong address. The cigarettes were then stolen. The defendant mistakenly believed that the cigarettes were at the claimant's risk and sent them an invoice. The defendant threatened to withdraw the claimant's credit facility unless the invoice was paid. The claimants needed the credit facilities and so paid the invoice and then sought to reclaim the money on the grounds of economic duress. The threat to withdraw credit facility was lawful since under the terms of the credit agreement credit could be withdrawn anytime. Therefore the threat was legitimate and consequently, economic duress could not be established. Both the example shows economic duress can be arose from unconscionable conducts and for the latter case, economic duress does not apply and it is not unconscionable because of the terms stated in the contract. It shows that the facts are important to determine whether an act is considered unjust and unconscionable, and that decision could place a contract to non-enforceable. Undue influence can also be arose by unconscionable conduct. The doctrine of undue influence refers to a situation where the weaker party is influenced into entering into an agreement. Section 20 provides that such free consent would not exist where the consent was caused by undue influence. Undue influence is classified into actual undue influence and presumed undue influence by the House of Lords in Barclays Bank v OBrien (1993) 4 All ER 417. One example is Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 LLR 113. Mrs. Johnson (the appellant), had for many years looked after the deceased, Buttress. Buttress was illiterate, unsophisticated in business affairs and reliant upon Johnson. Buttress transferred ownership of a piece of land to Johnson without receiving independent legal advice. After Buttress' death, this transfer was challenged by his son. His son argued that the decision to give away the house was done under undue influence. Under Class 2B, if the complainant can prove that he has reposed trust and confidence in the wrongdoer, this existence of relationship will raises the presumption of undue influence. The plaintiff wins. Case law determines that an older persons emotional dependence can be a special disadvantage. (Louth v Diprose (1992) 175 CLR 621; Bridgewater v Leahy (1998) 194 CLR 457.) For example, the older person and an adult family member meet on unequal terms and the adult family member takes advantage of their position to obtain a benefit through an improvident transaction (Bridgewater v Leahy at para 123). In this case, all judges dismissed the appeal, finding undue influence. The majority did so on the basis of 'presumed' undue influence, making no finding of actual undue influence. Although there was no evidence that Johnson had actually pressured Buttress to make the transfer, there was an antecedent relationship between them because Buttress placed trust and confidence in Johnson and relied upon her for advice. Section 16 (2) (b) from Contracts Act 1950 provides the situation where he makes a contract with a person whose mental capacity is temporarily or permanently affected by reason of age, illness, or mental or bodily distress. where the person is in a position to dominate the will of another. When proven unconscionability, the wrongdoer has to prove that the contract was not induced by undue influence, as stated in Section 16 (3) of Contracts Act 1950. However, Johnson could not prove it and there was evidence that Buttress did not realize he was parting with his property permanently. Therefore, although there is an agreement, the transaction is not applied when there is proven undue influence arose from unconscionability. In this case, although doctrine is said to stand for justice for the weaker party (the plaintiff), but it could also possible that the appellant serve the deceased, Buttress very well and she deserved the gift. If it is true that the appellant had served wholeheartedly, then the result of this case is unfair, the doctrine of unconsciounability does not reach for justice for the appellant. However, this is unprovable whether she has done a great job or whether it was the greed of the deceaseds son. Furthermore, she was also unable to prove that there is no undue influence between the deceased and her. In this case, it could be imparted that sometimes doctrine of unconsciounability could not fight for fairness and justice when there is unprovable facts, and when unconscionability is judged, the contract will be set aside and no gift will be permitted although there is already a consent made from both parties. Some other cases related to unconscionability are Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362 and Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447; [1983] HCA 14. In the case of Blomley v Ryan (1956), Blomley entered into a contract to purchase a farm from Ryan. Ryan was 78 and was suffering the effects of prolonged and excessive consumption of alcohol. This is, I think, not so much because intoxication is a self-induced state and a reprehensible thing, but rather because it would be dangerous to lend any countenance to the view that a man could escape the obligation of a contract by simply proving that he was "in liquor" when it was made. Mere drunkenness will not permit a person to get out of a contract. However, where one party was to the knowledge of the other seriously affected by drink, equity will refuse specific performance. In addition, if a court is satisfied a contract disadvantageous to the party affected has been obtained by "drawing him in to drink", or that there has been real unfairness in taking advantage of his condition, the contract may be set aside. Other factors that may induce equity to refuse relief include poverty or need of any kind, sickness, age, sex, infirmity of body or mind, drunkenness, illiteracy or lack of education, lack of assistance or explanation where assistance or explanation is necessary. The common characteristic seems to be that they have the effect of placing one party at a serious disadvantage vis-a-vis the other. Inadequacy of consideration will be relevant but not determinative. In cases like this where intoxication is the main disadvantage relied upon, the adequacy of consideration is particularly important. In this case, the sale price was significantly below market price the only explanation for this was that Ryan was old and impaired by habitual drinking to excess and who contracted during a bout of heavy drinking rendering him utterly incapable of forming a rational judgment about the terms of any business transaction. Although contract were made freely from consent of both parties, the contract is voided due to the condition of Ryan which could not make a rational thinking when he was in a state of hangover, and he was taken an unfair advantage by his agent Blomley to buy his farm in a lower price. Specific performance and damages were, therefore, denied. The result protected Ryan from disadvantages by escaping out from the contract due to unconscionability. One last case that will be discussed here is the case of 1983, Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio. The respondents, Mr and Mrs Amadio, executed a guarantee and mortgage (as security for the guarantee) in favour of the appellant bank. The purpose was to guarantee debts of their son's (Vicenzo Amadio's) company. Mr and Mrs Amadio were Italian migrants in their 70's, with limited English skills, little formal education and limited (in the case of Mr Amadio) or no (in the case of Mrs Amadio) business experience. Mr. and Mrs. Amadio stood as guarantors against their sons loan for his construction business from the Commercial Bank of Australia. The bank manager, Mr. Virgo, who was in close communication with the son, Vincenzo Amadio, had better understanding of the business reality and knew that the son had probably misrepresented facts in a bid to get his parents to stand as guarantors. Subsequently, when Vincenzo Amadios business failed, the bank was required to enforce the guarantee by mortgaging the building owned by Amadios. At trial the judge found that, at the time of signing the document, the Amadio's believed that liability was limited to $50,000 and for a period of six months, which pointed out to be not true by Mr. Virgo. The bank too did not inform the Amadios that there was no limit on their liability as guarantors. This belief was induced by their son's representations and, the trial judge found, they would not have signed the document had they known its true effect. The Respondents allege that the mortgage was procured as a result of unconscionable dealing: the Respondents were in a disadvantageous position because of their lack of English skills and old age, and the Appellant used this in order to procure an unfair contract. On the issue of unconscionable conduct, Justice Mason stated that: ... relief on the ground of "unconscionable conduct" is usually taken to refer to the class of case in which a party makes unconscientious use of his superior position or bargaining power to the detriment of a party who suffers from some special disability or is placed in some special situation of disadvantage ... ... if A having actual knowledge that B occupies a situation of special disadvantage in relation to an intended transaction, so that B cannot make a judgment as to what is in his own interests, takes unfair advantage of his (A's) superior bargaining power or position by entering into that transaction, his conduct in so doing is unconscionable. And if, instead of having actual knowledge of that situation, A is aware of the possibility that that situation may exist or is aware of facts that would raise that possibility in the mind of any reasonable person, the result will be the same. The knowledge of Mr Virgo was the knowledge of the bank. Whether we treat Mr. Virgo as having knowledge of the possibility already discussed or as having knowledge of facts which would raise that possibility in the mind of any reasonable person the inevitable conclusion is that the bank was guilty of unconscionable conduct by entering into the transaction without disclosing such facts as may have enabled the respondents to form a judgment for themselves and without ensuring that they obtained independent advice. From this, the Appellant has acted unconscionably by taking advantage of the Respondents' clear inability to make a proper judgment. Misrepresentation could be a part for the cause of unconscionability. There is a lot of mistakes made by the parties for not giving out real information when signing the contract. Mr. Virgo wanted to mortgage the building may be not wrong because it was stated in the contract that he could do it once terms and conditions applied. Although there is an agreement, but this agreement comes with lacking of true information and independent advice for the Respondents to make a contract. Therefore, the contract is rescinded. Both of the cases from Australia Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362 and Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447; [1983] HCA 14 are some of the development of doctrine of unconsionability being put into practiced, and it has clearly shown that it contravenes with the freedom of contract by not considering the consents made by both the Appellant and the Respondents. It is said that the doctrine of unconscionability granted relief to a much greater extent than common law's non est factum, duress, misrepresentation and mistake as well as the equitable doctrine of undue influence. This evolution of new doctrines and approaches in English law has to a certain degree influenced the development of Malaysian contract law. It should be noted that the development of the doctrine is also influenced by the development of the contractual theory. As JR Peden stated: The history of unconscionable contracts provides a useful focus for tracing the general development of contract theory, and in particular the ongoing conflict between freedom of contract and the desire for fairness. In freedom of contract, the only function of law is to enforce contract that was entered into freely and voluntarily. This led into a detrimental effect over the development or growth of the doctrine of unconscionability. According to JR Peden, the doctrine of unconscionability does not require proof of consent, which is material under the consensual theory of freedom of contract. Even though unconscionability manifested the external indicia of free consent, it was not so easy to reconcile with freedom or sanctity of contract. Unconscionability as an independent doctrine or as a doctrine of wider application is still at its infancy despite the historical evidence that it had been used to correct men's conscience in cases involving equitable frauds. There were several setbacks in its growth, which was hindered particularly by the common law's adherence to the doctrine of freedom of contract. Even though the purpose of the doctrine is different from freedom of contract, it contributes towards ensuring security of the contract. As a conclusion, doctrine of unconscionability contravene with the freedom of contract in term of consents made for an agreement to be enforced by law. Sometimes, the doctrine could not stand for real justice as it also depends on the facts of each cases, which would still lead to unfairness, and if it is due to greed of the stronger party that claimed that it is a weaker party, there would be much distress of unjustness and inequality done to the real weaker parties that could not defend themselves. As quoted by a politician, Barry Goldwater, I would remind you that extremism in the defence of liberty is no vice. And let me remind you also that moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue. This is an interesting thought to be pondered upon whether extremism is always not good, and whether fairness is always a virtue to all mankind, which relates to how far and how just that doctrine of unconscionability can be utilized in solving cases in Malaysia. (4000 words)
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