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PART 2 CIVIL PERSONALITY

ATTY. MARC LESTER TRINIDAD
A. CONCEPT AND CLASSES OF PERSONS
SEE ART 37, 40-47, CIVIL CODE
RULE 131, SEC 3 (ii), RULES OF COURT
SEE CASES
Geluz vs. CA

Facts: Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to know Antonio Geluz, the
petitioner and physician, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in
1950 before she and Oscar were legally married. As advised by her aunt and to conceal it from
her parents, she decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She had her pregnancy aborted again on
October 1953 since she found it inconvenient as she was employed at COMELEC. After two
years, on February 21, 1955, she again became pregnant and was accompanied by her sister
Purificacion and the latters daughter Lucida at Geluz clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez Street.
Oscar at this time was in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial
board. He doesnt have any idea nor given his consent on the abortion.

Issue: Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover
damages from the physician who caused the same.

Held: The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at P3,000 for the death of a
person does not cover cases of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality which trial
court and Court of Appeals predicated. Both trial court and CA wasnt able to find any basis for an
award of moral damages evidently because Oscars indifference to the previous abortions of Nita
clearly indicates he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental affections. Instead of
filing an administrative or criminal case against Geluz, he turned his wifes indiscretion to
personal profit and filed a civil action for damages of which not only he but, including his wife
would be the beneficiaries. It shows that hes after obtaining a large money payment since he
sued Geluz for P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorneys fees that serves as indemnity claim,
which under the circumstances was clearly exaggerated.

People v. Tirol

Facts: Kosain Manibpol and his family were sleeping when he heard the dog bark. When we
went to investigate, 2 persons have already come up to their house, asking if they can borrow his
land. After he gave his consent, Kulas arrived, flashed the light in his face and boxed him. When
he fell, the assailants companions (more than 10 armed men) came in hacked him and his wife
and 7 children. His wife died, 6 kids. Of the 14 suspects, only 2 were apprehended, Ciriaco
Baldesco and Bonifacio Tirol. After they were found guilty of the crime of murder of 7 persons,
they filed an appeal, during which Baldesco died.

Issue: Whether or not Baldesco will be liable for civil damages.

Held: The courts dismissed the case insofar as the criminal liability of Baldesco is concerned.
However following the doctrine in People vs. Senday diego, the appeal will be resolved only for
the purpose of determining his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his
estate is liable. Art 42 states that criminal liability is extinguished in death. The effect of death
upon rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will. Civil
liability is not extngshd.

Joaquin vs. Navarro

Facts: Feb. 6, 1945: battle of liberation of Manila, Joaquin Navarro, Sr., 70, wife Angela Joaquin,
67, daughters Pilar (32-33), Concepcion, and Natividad (23-25), son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., 30 and
his wife Adela Conde sought refuge on the ground floor of German Club Building. Building was
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set on fire and Japanese started shooting hitting the three daughters who fell. Sr. decided to
leave building. His wife didnt want to leave so he left with his son, his sons wife and neighbor
Francisco Lopez . As they came out, Jr. was hit and fell on the ground the rest lay flat on the
ground to avoid bullets. German Club collapsed trapping may people presumably including
Angela Joaquin. Sr., Adela and Francisco sought refuge in an air raid shelter where they hid for
three days. Feb. 10, 1945: on their way to St.Theresa Academy, they met Japanese patrols, Sr.
and Adela were hit and killed. Trial Court ruled that Angela Joaquin outlived her son while Court
of Appeals ruled that son outlived his mother.

Issue: WON Order of death of Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr.

Held: Reversed. Art. 43 civil code: Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die of the
two or more persons who would inherit one from the other, the person who alleges prior death of
either must prove the allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption shall be that they died
at the same time and no transmission of rights from one to the other shall take place.

In light of the conditions painted by FL, a fair inference can be arrived at that JN Jr died before his
mother. The presumption that AJ died before her son was based on speculations, not evidence.
Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by which civil cases are decided, this
inference should prevail. Evidence of survivorship may be (1) direct (2) indirect (3) circumstantial
or (4) inferential.

Art. 43 Speaks about resolving doubt when 2 or more persons are called to succeed each other
as to which of them died first. In the Civil Code, in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they
died at the same time, and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to another. In the
Rules of Court, in cases of calamity, there is a hierarchy of survivorship.

Continental steel manufacturing Corp. vs Montano

Facts: Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation(Continental Steel) filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death
and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA).The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos wife had a
premature delivery while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. The female fetus died during
labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency. Petitioner immediately granted
Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death
benefits. It was maintained by Hortillano, through the Labor Union, that the provisions of the CBA
did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have
acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA
death benefits. Petitioner argued that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the
death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements
for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) deat hand (2) status as legitimate dependent, none
of which existed in Hortillanos case. Continental Steel contended that only one with civil
personality could die, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code which provides: Article
40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes
that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following
article. Article 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mothers womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of
less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete
delivery from the maternal womb.

Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and
obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will. Hence according to the
petitioner, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding
from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the
moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a
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fetus that never acquired juridical personality. Labor arbiter Montao argued that the fetus had
the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus
had to rely on another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself
without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Petitioner appealed with
the CA, who affirmed the Labor Arbiters resolution. Hence this petition.

Issues: 1.Whether or not only one with juridical personality can die2.Whether or not a fetus can
be considered as a dependent3.Whether or not any ambiguity in CBA provisions shall be settled
in favor of the employee

Held: 1. No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the
legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires
personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42
plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death. The issue of civil personality is not
relevant in this case. The above provisions of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of
death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be
extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical
personality could die. Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil
personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less
than the Constitution recognizes the Life of the unborn from conception, that the State must
protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof
even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

2. Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillanos child could not have
reached38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillanos wife, for
sustenance. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child
must have been born or must have acquired civil personality. Without such qualification, then
child shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the
mothers womb.3. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt
in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of
labor. In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. As
decided by this Court, any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor
pursuant to the social justice policy.(Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199
SCRA 265(1991)Bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give
aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss
of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents grief and sense of loss arising from the death of
their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during
delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.

B. CAPACITY TO ACT AND RESTRICTIONS THEREON

1. PRESUMPTION OF CAPACITY
SEE CASE

Standard oil co. vs Arenas

Facts: The SOCNY sued the 5 debtors for payment, including the appellant Vicente Villanueva
who acted as surety to the loan. The CFI of Manila ordered the defendants to pay jointly and
severally to the plaintiffs SOCNY. While the judgment was in the course of execution, Elisa
Villanueva, wife of Vicente appeared and alleged that her husband was declared insane on July
24, 1909, and that on Oct. 11, she was authorized by the court as guardian to institute the proper
legal proceedings for the annulment of several bonds given by her husband while in a state of
insanity.

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Issues: (1)Whether or not suffering from monomania of wealth necessarily warrants the
conclusion that the person does not have capacity to act. (2) Whether or not the appellant, was
Incapable of entering into contract at the time the bond was executed on December 15, 1908.

Held: The court affirmed the trial court decision that Villanueva possessed the capacity to act.
The SC held that there is no evidence to warrant the conclusion, in a judicial decision, that a
person suffering from monomania of wealth is really insane and therefore is deranged and
incapable of binding himself in a contract. From the testimony of his wife, it seemed that Vicente
has the liberty to go wherever he wished, that he had property of his own and was not deprived of
its management, as well as the fact that he had never squandered any large sum of money. As
for the 2nd issue, there was no direct proof that showed that at the date of the giving of the bond,
December 15, 1908, the appellant was incapable of acting because of insanity. The witnesses
who as physicians, testified that they observed insane periods in Villanueva twice prior to 1903,
once on 1908, but none at the time of the execution of the said bond on December 15, 1908. It
was also shown that the wife never before sought to legally deprive her husband management
over his estate knowing full well that he was insane.








2. RESTRICTIONS
ARTS. 6, 38-39, CIVIL CODE
A. MINORITY RA 6809
EFFECTS ON CONTRACT SEE ARTS 1327, 1390 (1), 1403 (3), 1397, 1399, 1426-27, 1489
CIVIL CODE. SEE CASES:

Mercado vs espiritu

Facts: This case is about the signing of a deed of sale in which two of the four parties were
minors with age 18, and 19. On the date of sale, these minors presented themselves that they
were of legal age at the time they signed it, and they made the same manifestation before the
notary public.

Issue:Whether or not the deed of sale is valid when the minors presented themselves that they
were of legal age.

Held: The courts laid down that such sale of real estate was still valid since it was executed by
minors, who have passed the ages of puberty and adolescence, and are near the adult age, and
that the minors pretended that they had already reached their majority.

Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil-
interdiction are mere restrictions on the capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated
person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations,
such as easements. Also, these minors cannot be permitted afterwards to excuse themselves
from compliance with the obligation assumed by them or seek their annulment. This is in
accordance with the provisions of the law on estoppels.This is in accordance with the provisions
of the law on estoppel. Art 1431 of Civil Code. Through estoppel, an admission or representation
is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against
the person relying thereon.

This is also in accordance with the provisions of Rule 123, Sec 68, Par. A Rule 123, sec 68, Par.
A...Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately
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led another to believe a particular thing to be true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any
litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, cannot be permitted to falsify it.

Bambalan vs. maramba

Facts: Bambalans parents Paula Prado and her first husband, Isidro Bambalan Y Calcotura
received a loan from Genoveva Muerong and German Maramba in 1915. Calcotura died leaving
Bambalan as the sole heir of his estate. In 1922, Muerong and Maramba forced Bambalan, who
was at that time, a minor, to sell their land as payment for the loan. Bambalan signed, but said
that he was forced because they were threatening his mother with imprisonment. Muerong and
Maramba bought Bambalans first cedula to acknowledge the document.

Issue: Whether sale of the land to Maramaba and Muerong is valid.


Held: The sale is void as to the plaintiff, because he was a minor at the time of execution. The
Doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado vs. Espiritu is not applicable to this case, because the
plaintiff did not pretend to be of age, and the defendant knew him as a minor.

Important Statutes: Civil Code, Article 38.

Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil-interdiction are
mere restrictions on the capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain
obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements.

Civil code, Art. 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract:

(1) Unemancipated minors;
(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write. (1263a)
Civil code, Art. 1390.
The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no damage
to the contracting parties:
(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract;
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or
fraud.

Braganza vs. Villa Abrille (Minor Signing Contract)

Facts: Rosario Braganza and her sons loaned from De Villa Abrille P70,000 in Japanese war
notes and in consideration thereof, promised in writing to pay him P10,00 + 2% per annum in
legal currency of the Philippines 2 years after the cessation of the war. Because they have no
paid, Abrille is sued them in March 1949. The Manila court of first instance and CA held the
family solidarily liable to pay according to the contract they signed.The family petitioned to review
the decision of the CA whereby they were ordered to solidarily pay De Villa Abrille P10,000 + 2%
interest, praying for consideration of the minority of the Braganza sons when they signed the
contract.

Issue: Whether or not the boys, who were 16 and 18 respectively, are to be bound by the contract
of loan they have signed.

Held: The SC found that Rosario will still be liable to pay her share in the contract because they
minority of her sons does not release her from liability. She is ordered to pay 1/3 of P10,000 +
2% interest. However with her sons, the SC reversed the decision of the CA which found them
similarly liable due to their failure to disclose their minority. The SC sustained previous sources in
Jurisprudence in order to hold the infant liable, the fraud must be actual and not constructive.
It has been held that his mere silence when making a contract as to his age does not constitute a
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fraud which can be made the basis of an action of deceit. The boys, though not bound by the
provisions of the contract, are still liable to pay the actual amount they have profited from the
loan. Art. 1340 states that even if the written contract is unenforceable because of their non-age,
they shall make restitution to the extent that they may have profited by the money received. In
this case, 2/3 of P70,00, which is P46,666.66, which when converted to Philippine money is
equivalent to P1,166.67.

EFFECT ON MARRIAGE
SEE ART 5 AND 35 FAMILT CODE

EFFECT ON CRIMES
SEE RA 9344, SECTIONS 6, 7, 20, 57, 58, 59.

B. INSANITY
EFFECTION ON CONTRACTS
SEE ARTS 1327, 1328, 1399, CIVIL CODE
EFFECT ON CRIMES
SEE ART 12(1), RPC
EFFECT ON MARRIAGE
SEE ART 45(2) AND 47(2) FC
C. STATE OF BEING DEAF-MUTE
SEE ART 1327, 807, 820, CIVIL CODE
D. PRODIGALITY
SEE RULE 92 SEC 2, RULES OF COURT
SEE CASE

Martinez vs. Martinez

Facts: Pedro Martinez Ilustre brought an action against his father Francisco for a declaration of
prodigality against him. Pedro alleges that his father has been dissipating and squandering his
estate by making donations to his 2nd wife, as well as the administration of his estate. The father
denied such allegations, instead he posted that his son was actually mismanaging and
misappropriating the property of the estate.

Issue: What constitutes prodigality?

Held: Since prodigality is not defined in our law, it may be inferred that the acts of prodigality must
show a morbid state of bind and a disposition to spend, waste, and lessen the estate to such an
extent as is likely to expose the family to want of support, or to deprive the forced heirs of their
undisposable part of the estate. The testimony of the plaintiff was insufficient to support his
allegations against his father. There was no evidence to show his father has been transferring by
sale or mortgage any property, which will reflect in the city record of public deeds. The court
found the defendant is far from being prodigal, and is still in the full exercise of his faculties and
still possess the industry, thrift and ability in managing the estate.

E. CIVIL INTERDICTION
ART 34, RPC.
ART 135(1), 142(3) FC.

F. FAMILY RELATIONS
SEE ART 11(2), 13(5), REVISE PENAL CODE.
SEE ART 37, 87, 215, FAMILY CODE.
SEE ART 1109 & 1490, CIVIL CODE.

G. ABSENCE
ARTS 39-391, CIVIL CODE
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ART 41-42, FAMILY CODE

PART 3 PRE-MARITAL CONTROVERSIES
ATTY. MARC LESTER TRINIDAD
A. BREACH OF PROMISESE TO MARRY.
SEE ARTS 19-21, 2176 CIVIL CODE.

Wassmer vs. Velez

Facts: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer are to be wed. 2 days prior the ceremony,
Francisco left, leaving a telegram he will come back but never did. Beatriz filed for damages, and
judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay actual, moral and exemplary damages.
Defendant now asserts that the judgment against him is contrary to law, given that there is no
provision in the Civil Code authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry.

Issue: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is actionable.

Held: No it is not, but this case is not a mere breach of promise to marry. He must be held
answerable for the damages in accordance with Art. 21.

The SC maintained that though breach of promise to marry is not actionable, the defendants act
is still punishable under Article 21 of the Civil Code which states that any person who willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. In this case, plaintiff already arranged
everything for the wedding, like the wedding gowns, invitations, matrimonial bed, etc. The SC
held that this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry A wedding has been formally set
and all the preparations have been made, only for the groom to walk out 2 days before. This is
contrary to good customs, since defendant acted in a reckless and oppressive manner.

Tanjanco vs. CA

Facts: Apolonio Trajanco courted Araceli Santos. Since he promised her marriage, she
consented to his pleas for carnal knowledge. As a result, she conceived a child, and due to her
condition, she had to resign from her work. Because she was unable to support herself and the
baby, and the Apolonio refused to marry her, she instituted an action for damages, compelling the
defendant to recognize the unborn child, pay her monthly support, plus P100,000 in moral and
exemplary damages.

Issue: Whether or not the acts of petitioner constitute seduction as contemplated in Art.21.

Held: No, it is not. Seduction is more than mere sexual intercourse or a breach of promise to
marry. It connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. In this case, for 1 whole
year, the woman maintained intimate sexual relations with the defendant, and such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly here there is voluntariness and mutual passion,
for had the plaintiff been deceived, she would not have again yielded to his embraces for a year.


De Jesus vs. Syquia

Facts: This is an action by Antonia Loanco de Jesus, as mother of two infants, for the purpose of
recovering from the defendant, Cesar Syquia damages arising from (1) breach of promise to
marry, (2) to compel the defendant to recognize Ismael and Pacita as natural children and pay
maintenance for them. Cesar met Antonia at the barbership where she works as a cashier.
Soon, she became pregnant. Cesar was a constant visitor at her home, and wrote a letter to the
priest saying that if the child was a boy, it will be christened in his name. On his trip to China, he
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was writing letters to Antonia cautioning her to keep in good condition so that junior will be
strong. When she gave birth, Syquia took her and the child to live in a house where they lived
together for 1 year as a family, with expenses being shouldered by Syquia. She became
pregnant again, but soon Syquia left her to marry another woman.

Issue: (1) Whether or not breach of promise to marry is actionable. (2) Whether the letters written
by the defendant to the appellant proves paternity.

Held: The SC upheld the decision of the trail court in refusing to give damages to Antonia for
breach of promise to marry. The action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in civil
law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of
such promise. As for the recognition of the child, the acknowledgment of paternity is satisfied by
the production of more than 1 document of indubitable authenticity, containing, all together, the
admission of the father recognizing a particular child as of his paternity, the admission of one
writing being supplemented by those of another.

Piccininni vs. Hajus

Facts: The result of fraudulent representations made by Hajus to Piccininni to the effect that she
would marry him and they would live in her house, Piccininni was induced to spend a
considerable amount of money in the renovation of the would-be conjugal home.

Held: Denial of recovery of property transferred in contemplation of marriage is not necessary to
the accomplishment of the object of heart balm legislation and to hold so will have the
undesirable effect of placing it within the power of the recipient to renounce a promise and yet
retain property bestowed in anticipation of performance. Plaintiff was asserting the defendant
wronged him in fraudulently inducing him to transfer property to her [renovation of the house].
The complaint was based on this and not on her failure to marry him.

Gasheem Shookat Baksh vs CA

Facts: Private respondent, Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27, 1987 for
damages against the petitioner for the alleged breach of their agreement to get married. She met
the petitioner in Dagupan where the latter was an Iranian medical exchange student who later
courted her and proposed marriage. The petitioner even went to Marilous house to secure
approval of her parents. The petitioner then forced the respondent to leave with him in his
apartment. Marilou was a virgin before she lived with him. After a week, she filed a complaint
because the petitioner started maltreating and threatening her. He even tied the respondent in
the apartment while he was in school and drugged her. Marilou at one time became pregnant but
the petitioner administered a drug to abort the baby.

Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told Marilou to not live with him since he is
already married to someone in Bacolod. He claimed that he never proposed marriage or agreed
to be married neither sought consent and approval of Marlious parents. He claimed that he
asked Marilou to stay out of his apartment since the latter deceived him by stealing money and
his passport. The private respondent prayed for damages and reimbursements of actual
expenses.

Issue: Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to cause for damages.

Held: The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. The
court held that when a man uses his promise of marriage to deceive a woman to consent to his
malicious desires, he commits fraud and willfully injures the woman. In that instance, the court
found that petitioners deceptive promise to marry led Marilou to surrender her virtue and
womanhood.

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Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to marry was a deceptive ploy to have carnal
knowledge with the woman and actual damages should be paid for the wedding preparation
expenses. Petitioner even committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws of the country.

Therefore, SC set aside the decision of CA awarding damages to the respondent.