Fall 2013

Love, Madness, and Plato

Phaedrus : the worthy other in Plato's dialogues
Raluca Rosu
( rosur00!newschool"edu #
0
$ntroduction
My analysis will focus on two of Platos dialogues, namely the Phaedrus and the
Symposium. I will start from some remarks made by Charles L. Griswold in his book Self-
knowledge in Platos Phaedrus. Griswold seems to be surprised that Plato chose Phaedrus as a
character and named the dialogue after him. e refers to Phaedrus as being inferior to !ocrates.
e also finds their interaction as being mainly comical precisely because of this asymmetry in
their relationship. My interest is not to engage in a detailed criti"ue of Griswolds hypotheses. I
will ne#ertheless present briefly some of the points Griswold makes in his study of the Phaedrus.
$his helps me introduce my own thesis regarding Phaedrus significance for both the dialogue
and !ocrates.
%or Griswold, the main difference between !ocrates and Phaedrus would be that !ocrates
is already aware of his own ignorance, while Phaedrus cannot e#en reali&e the fact that he is
ignorant. Griswolds suggestion is then that Phaedrus is intentionally chosen by Plato as the ideal
character to illustrate the necessity of self'knowledge
(
. Phaedrus would be then useful to both
!ocrates and Plato. Moreo#er, Griswold seems to imply that Phaedrus appears in the dialogue due
to his unworthiness as an interlocutor, referring to him as mediocre
)
. It is true that Griswold is
ready to acknowledge that Phaedrus is turned to philosophy by !ocrates by the end of the
dialogue. owe#er, he can only acknowledge Phaedruss utility. e will not talk about Phaedrus
1
*it is precisely Phaedrus passi#e and formalistic lo#e of speeches that makes him congenial to !ocrates.+, in
Charles L.Griswold ,r., Self-knowledge in Platos Phaedrus -Pennsyl#ania. Penn !tate /ni#ersity Press, (0012, )) 3
the use of the term congenial 4my emphasis5 is only one of the many e6amples of how Griswold inscribes the
relationship between !ocrates and Phaedrus in the language of mere utility. $his is the position I wish to argue
against. 7nother e6ample is the use of the term suitable: *Phaedrus does ser#e as a suitable 4my emphasis5
interlocutor for a con#ersation in which the self'knowledge theme is de#eloped. -Griswold, Self-knowledge in
Platos Phaedrus, )82. Last but not least, Griswold uses the term useful to describe Phaedrus .+Phaedrus is useful
4my emphasis5 to !ocrates as a con#eyer to the city of a partial, politically useful defense of philosophy.+ -Griswold,
Self-knowledge in Platos Phaedrus, )92
2
:mediocre Phaedrus, in Griswold, Self-knowledge in Platos Phaedrus, (;
1
as being intrinsically worthy. It is important to mention that this happens because Griswold fails
to notice the true nature of the relationship between !ocrates and Phaedrus. %or him, despite
!ocratess ob#ious interest in engaging in a con#ersation with Phaedrus
<
, they are not e#en
friends
=
. I firmly consider that !ocrates does not engage in a dialogue with someone who is
unworthy. $his happens not only because !ocrates does not treat Phaedrus as being unworthy,
which Griswold does not deny. My argument is that !ocratess attitude towards Phaedrus is also
Platos attitude. Phaedruss worth, as it can be seen throughout the whole dialogue, is that he
manages to e#entually rise up to !ocratess challenge, his soul turning to philosophy. $his is
intimately related to Phaedruss lo#e for !ocrates. there is already something inside the former
that makes him worthy of !ocratess time and it is Platos intention to e6press that. I shall note
here that I understand worth in the sense of something or someone ha#ing #alue, personal
importance or merit. /sefulness, on the other hand, refers to something or someone that is
ser#ing someone elses purpose, brings an ad#antage to them.
I intend to argue that there is worth to Phaedrus, not mere practicality, which will be by
the end connected to the character of 7lcibiades
8
and the Symposium. Phaedruss lo#e for
!ocrates is crucial for understanding the formers worth. 7lso, !ocratess lo#e for both Phaedrus
and 7lcibiades will help >ustify my position. ?o less important will be e6ploring ideas such as
incompleteness and lack in both the Phaedrus and the Symposium. $o anticipate, an important
distinction must be made. @e ha#e on the one hand !ocratess incompleteness -he knows that he
does not know2 and Phaedruss initial incompleteness -he does not know that he does not know2.
3
Griswold, Self-knowledge in Platos Phaedrus, )8')1.
4
*Aest is the relationship of friendship -philia2 between lo#ers of wisdom. -B2 Phaedrus and !ocrates do not attain
friendship in that sense., Griswold, Self-knowledge in Platos Phaedrus, <(.
5
It is interesting to see that Griswold also connects Phaedrus and 7lcibiades. e misinterprets the relationship
between !ocrates and 7lcibiades as well and ends up stating the following. *$he last section of the Symposium
documents !ocratess inability to get 7lcibiades to understand and control his Cros. %or all his mediocrity, Phaedrus
is in a way closer to philosophy than is 7lcibiades.+, Griswold, Self-knowledge in Platos Phaedrus, ))')<.
2
My conclusion will be that Griswolds reading of the Phaedrus is problematic because it fails to
recogni&e the crucial importance of the role of the other in Platos dialogues. $his is why he talks
about usefulness in his account of the Phaedrus. My reading of the Phaedrus acknowledges
precisely the #alue of the other for the philosophical enterprise, by affirming Phaedruss worth.
%ocrates& attitude towards Phaedrus
$he first manner in which one can understand Phaedruss worth for !ocrates is by looking
at the latters attitude towards Phaedrus. $ake for e6ample the first two lines of the dialogue
1
.
!ocratess "uestion pro#es to be the most meaningful "uestion one can ask. $his has to do with
the idea of education as being a turning of the soul. !ocratess "uestion could be rephrased in the
following manner. can we say that Phaedruss soul is turned into the right directionD
9
%rom the
first lines we understand that the two first "uestions are at stake for the whole dialogue. $his is
only the first clue that !ocrates will be trying to seduce Phaedrus.
!ocrates and Phaedrus embody the relationship between the erastes -adult, acti#e lo#er
and citi&en2 and eromenos -a young boy, the belo#ed who is yet to become an acti#e citi&en2. In
7ncient Greece, an educational relationship like this was a learning opportunity for the young
boy. It was considered that homoerotic relationships strengthened ci#ic bonds
;
. $his is why these
6
*!ECF7$C!. Phaedrus, my friendG @here ha#e you beenD 7nd where are you goingD+ -Plato, *Phaedrus+, in
Plato. Complete Works, ed. ,ohn M. Cooper and H.!. utchinson -Cambridge. ackett Publishing Company, (0092,
))9a.
7
7s Fichard Aernstein had pointed out.
8
Ene must also ha#e in mind Phaedruss speech in the Symposium where he talks about *an army of lo#ers and
belo#eds, a producti#e, happy polity composed entirely of erastai and eromenoi.+, in Iictoria @ohl, *$he Cros of
7lcibiades+, #ol.(; of Classical nti!uity ) -(0002, <81.
3
relationships consisted in standardi&ed practices of homoeroticism
0
. $he proper practice would
imply that the relationship was not reciprocal. $he boy would not se6ually desire the lo#er. e
was supposed to enter the relation out of admiration for the lo#er and for impro#ing himself. $he
boy was supposed to play coy, seriously e#aluate if the erastes deser#ed his fa#ors. 7 positi#e
erotic relationship needed to be transformed into philia when the passion was gone and the boy
became an adult.
$he dialogue starts by !ocrates con#incing Phaedrus to read him one of the speeches of
Lysias, the famous rhetorician. 7lthough Phaedrus is more than eager to do so, he pretends he is
not comfortable doing it. e is playing the co"uette
(J
. Phaedruss age is ne#er mentioned in the
dialogue. e is ne#ertheless known to ha#e been around thirty or forty years old. Hespite that,
there are many instances in which he acts as a boy. $his resistance, an inherent part of any game
of seduction, is an important proof of the erotic nature of the relationship between the two
characters of the dialogue.
Lysiass speech deals with seduction through persuasion, aiming *at seducing a beautiful
boy, but the speaker is not in lo#e with him.+
((
. 7s we will find out later in the dialogue, for Plato,
the soul is immortal because it is a self'mo#ing mo#er
()
. @e might say that Phaedruss
incompleteness consists precisely in his soul not showing self'mo#ement. Ene can clearly
obser#e that Phaedrus lacks autonomy at this point. e is more than ready to succumb to the
9
Iictoria @ohl offers a detailed and comple6 analysis of this relationship and its rele#ance for 7thenian democracy
in +$he Cros of 7lcibiades+. !he talks about a *democratic Cros+ that *defined the 7thenian citi&en as socially
autonomous and se6ually dominant.+, in @ohl, *$he Cros of 7lcibiades+, 8(. I will come back to @ohls te6t in a
following section of this paper.
10
*Ho you think that a mere dilettante like me could recite from memory in a manner worthy of him a speech that
Lysias, the best of our writers, took such time and trouble to composeD, Plato, *Phaedrus+, ));a.
11
Plato, *Phaedrus+, ))9c.
12
*C#ery soul is immortal. $hat is because whate#er is always in motion is immortal. -B2 !o it is only what mo#es
itself that ne#er desists from motion, since it does not lea#e off being itself.+, Plato, *Phaedrus+, )=8c.
4
*cle#er and elegant+
(<
speech of Lysias, enchanted by its form and not concerning himself with
matters of content or truth. $here is an already ob#ious difference between !ocrates and Phaedrus
when it comes to discourse. In the Symposium Phaedrus is named the father of speeches and he is
the one starting the con#ersation about Cros. Ene would be tempted to say that their supposed
shared passion for speeches is not "uite the same. Hespite that, what is of interests here for my
purposes is the e6plicit erotic language defining !ocratess and Phaedruss con#ersation.
$hey refer to each other also as friends
"#
, but they flirt and tease each other #arious times.
!ocrates speaks of him and Phaedrus using the image of two dance partners
(8
. is general attitude
is affectionate and caring, although he is ironic in many instances. e knows #ery well who he is
talking to and takes deep interest in Phaedrus
(1
. e e#en openly says to the latter. *I lo#e you
dearly.+
(9
. Ene can only be surprised how someone, as Griswold does, could still sustain that
!ocrates is not considering Phaedrus to be worthy of his time. I consider the hypothesis of
!ocrates being completely ironical and deceitful e#ery time he is affectionate to Phaedrus hard to
be argued for. Ene can clearly see the game of seduction !ocrates and Phaedrus constantly play.
7lso, the roles are re#ersed at some points, when Phaedrus is chasing !ocrates, and not the other
way around. Ene could then say that !ocrates is not actually himself in this dialogue. 7
discussion of !ocratess strange description of the countryside, where he and Phaedrus actually
ha#e their con#ersation e6ceeds my intentions. owe#er, I want to stress the fact that !ocrates is
13
Plato, *Phaedrus+, ))9c.
14
C#en Griswold notes how the words phileor philotes appear constantly in the dialogue -Griswold, Self-knowledge
in Platos Phaedrus, )12.
15
*7nd running into a man 4!ocrates5 who is sick with the passion for hearing speeches, seeing him, >ust seeing him
3 he was filled with delight . he had found a partner for his fren&ied dance, and he urged him to lead the way.+, Plato,
*Phaedrus+, ));b.
16
!ECF7$C!. *Eh, Phaedrus, if I dont know my Phaedrus I must be forgetting who I am myself.+, Plato,
*Phaedrus+, ));a.
17
Plato, *Phaedrus+, ));d.
5
out of place only in his description of the scenery. is lo#e for Phaedrus is rather a part of
!ocrates being his usual self
(;
.
%or now, the most important aspect of the beginning of the Phaedrus is that !ocrates
knows #ery well that Phaedrus is e6tremely interested in hearing speeches. $he former then
proceeds to talk to the latter about his lo#e for words, engaging in a meaningful and soul'turning
dialogue. !ocrates is trying here to take Phaedrus away from Lysias. !ocratess intention is to
seduce Phaedrus into an understanding of what lo#e truly is. @e can e#en talk about a contest
between Lysias and !ocrates for the soul -psyche2 of Phaedrus. @hy then would !ocrates fight
for a soul that is unworthy and try to pre#ent it from being seduced by anything but philosophyD
'he (inal ste) in seducing Phaedrus into )hiloso)hy
!ocratess affectionate attitude towards Phaedrus, his attempt at seducing him and turning
his soul towards philosophy is an important and necessary step in pro#ing Phaedruss worth.
owe#er, this is not sufficient. It is not enough to pro#e that !ocrates is interested in Phaedrus.
$his is due to the fact that one can still maintain, as Griswold does, that Phaedrus is merely useful
in !ocratess pursuit of knowledge. C#en if we recogni&e an erotic relation between the two, we
could be faced with yet another ob>ection. $he erotic relationship, followed by philia could still
be >ust a gateway and first step towards reaching true beauty, which would be the philosophers
purpose. Phaedrus could still be merely useful to !ocrates and disposable after accessing the form
of Aeauty itself. $his is why it is necessary to further e6plore the way in which !ocrates himself
is incomplete. 7lso, it will pro#e helpful to look into the definition of Cros as not being a god in
18
P7CHF/!. *7nd you, my remarkable friend, appear to be totally out of place.+, Plato, *Phaedrus+, )<Jd.
6
another dialogue, namely the Symposium. Aefore e6ploring all this, a last argument from the
Phaedrus must be detailed.
$here is a part in this dialogue -)91a')99a2 where we can already see why we must talk
about Phaedrus as being worthy and not useful. $owards the end of the dialogue, !ocrates
emphasi&es the importance of the right kind of speech
(0
. !ocrates considers that the proper kind
of discourse and the proper kind of writing is the one that aims at the soul of the listener
)J
. e is
actually describing here what happens between him and Phaedrus. It can also be seen as a
reference to the silence of Lysisass speech, which is read by Phaedrus in Lysiass absence
)(
. It is
another way for !ocrates to tell Phaedrus that it is the right decision to choose philosophy o#er
-bad2 rhetoric. !ocrates is the *sensible farmer+
))
he himself refers to. is use of the imagery of
the seeds that are planted in the soul pro#es his belief in an inner worth of Phaedrus. !ocrates
talks about planting *the seeds he care4s5 for+ and the importance of when and where these seeds
are planted. $he mere decision of engaging in a seduction of Phaedrus through dialogue shows
that Phaedruss soul was worthy enough for !ocrates to choose it among other souls
)<
. Plato is
making !ocrates e6press the idea that there is always an informed choice of the philosopher when
he starts a dialogue with someone. 7gain, this is e6actly the case with Phaedrus. !ocrates,
willingly and carefully selects Phaedruss soul to turn towards philosophy precisely because he
recogni&es it as being the right kind of soul to be turned to philosophy
)=
. I find it highly
19
*the nature of the speech is in fact to direct the soul.+ -Plato, *Phaedrus+, )9(d2.
20
*It is a discourse that is written down, with knowledge in the soul of the listenerK it can defend itself, and it knows
for whom it should speak and for whom it should remain silent.+ -Plato, *Phaedrus+, )91a2.
21
Lysias himself cannot answer !ocratess many "uestions and ob>ections because he is present only through his
written speech 3 which irremediably remains silent and undefended.
22
Plato, *Phaedrus+, )91b.
23
*$he dialectician chooses a proper soul and plants sows within it.+, Plato, *Phaedrus+, )91=e.
24
$his point is also made by L. Fobin, "uoted in adots book, What is ancient philosophy$ . *$he fruitful soul can
fecundate and fructify only by its commerce with another soul, in which the necessary !ualities 4my emphasis5 had
been recogni&ed. $his commerce can be instituted only by li#ing words and the daily interchange re"uired by a life
in common -B2 for an indefinite future.+, in adot, What is ancient philosophy$, trans. Michael Chase -Cambridge.
ar#ard /ni#ersity Press, )JJ)2, 81.
7
uncon#incing if someone would interpret this passage as referring to Phaedruss utility for
!ocrates. I consider the passage an important proof for the worthiness of Phaedrus, whose already
fertile soul allows !ocrates to plant a *discourse -B2 which is not barren, but produces a seed
from which more discourse grows+
)8
. Platos message seems to lead to the crucial importance of
reciprocity
)1
, e#en though the relationship between the two characters of the dialogue remains
asymmetric. It is not as if !ocrates is merely using Phaedrus for his philosophical ascent towards
a world of pure contemplation. $heir dialogue takes place outside the city walls, but in the end
they return to the city. $he city is the place were !ocrates feels to be himself, in contrast to how
he feels in the countryside, where he is out of place -%&P&%%&S
'(
2. $heir friendship sur#i#es
their return to the city
);
. $he whole dialogue shows how !ocrates cares and takes care of
Phaedruss soul. It is impossible to consider !ocrates would lo#e someone whose worth is
uncertain. I consider this to be Platos intention and message. Philosophy turns out to be an
e6istential
)0
practice that aims at gaining knowledge of the truth. In order for this to happen, one
must transform oneself and Phaedrus rises to the challenge. !ocrates already knows that. 7s this
transformation occurs, the soul is changed and this leads to further transformation. knowing the
truth restructures Phaedrus. $he "uestion then arises. how can someones soul be restructured
unless they already had the possibility of this reshaping within themD $his is one of the reasons
why we should be speaking of worth and not instrumentality in the case of Phaedrus.
25
Plato, *Phaedrus+, )99a.
26
7fter !ocrates great speech, the one deli#ered to purify himself from the untruthfulness of his first speech,
Phaedruss attitude has already changed. e says. *I >oin you in your prayer 4for con#erting Phaedrus to philosophy5.
-B2 7s to your speech, I admired it from the moment you began. -B2 Im afraid that Lysiass effort to match it is
bound to fall flat.+, Plato, *Phaedrus+, )89c.
27
7s Cin&ia 7ru&&o pointed out, the Greek word is a superlati#e and can also mean absurdity.
28
In the last lines of the dialogue Phaedrus asks his belo#ed friend !ocrates to pray for him as well. *Make a prayer
for me as well. %riends ha#e e#erything in common.+, Plato, *Phaedrus+, )90c.
29
:$his e6istential option -B2 implies a certain #ision of the world, and the task of philosophical discourse will
therefore be to re#eal and rationally >ustify this e6istential option, as well as this representation of the world.+, adot,
What is ancient philosophy$, <.
8
%ocrates& inco*)leteness
7s I ha#e mentioned earlier, it is necessary to e6plore !ocratess specific incompleteness.
In order to do that, both the Phaedrus and the Symposium will pro#e to be rele#ant. @e can
already see in the Phaedrus how !ocrates directly e6presses his own lack. $his has to do with
him being aware that he cannot yet truly understand and know himself. It constitutes his main
concern
<J
. It is in this light that we should see !ocratess desire to talk to people in general and to
talk to Phaedrus in particular. Moreo#er, this is the reason why !ocrates usually doesnt tra#el
outside 7thens. he has much more to learn from con#ersing with people than from anything
else
<(
. It is true that the Phaedrus takes place outside the city walls, but !ocrates seems to be
charmed mostly by Phaedrus and by the possibility of a meaningful con#ersation with him.
7gain, one could say that !ocrates is being ironic when he stresses the importance of learning
from other people. $hey could then say that for him Phaedrus and e#erybody else is not e#en
useful. I wish to re>ect this interpretation. 7lso, I find it hard to see how someone could still talk
about Phaedrus as being useful from !ocrates. $his is due to the fact that the latter openly
acknowledges the merit and worth of other people. 7dmitting to gain knowledge from others
means already admitting their potential worth.
%or both !ocrates and Plato, the most #aluable interaction with others is the erotic one.
!ocrates talks about )ros as being the most important form of di#ine madness -mania2 in the
Phaedrus
*'
. e is, of course, talking about the lo#erLbelo#ed relationship
<<
. !ocrates tells
30
*Aut I ha#e no time for such thingsK and the reason, my friend, is this. I am still unable, as the Helphic inscription
orders, to know myselfK and it really seems to me ridiculous to look into other things before I ha#e understood that.+ ,
Plato, *Phaedrus+, )<Ja.
31
*I am de#oted to learningK landscapes and trees ha#e nothing to teach 3 only the people in the city can do that.+,
Plato, *Phaedrus+, )<Jd.
32
*$his is the best and noblest of all the forms that possession by god can take for anyone.+, Plato, *Phaedrus+,
)=0e.
33
Hescribed in an earlier section of this paper.
9
Phaedrus. *when someone who lo#es beautiful boys is touched by this madness, he is called a
lo#er.+
<=
. I consider that !ocrates ' and Plato for that matter 3 attributes #alue to the erotic
interaction between an adult man and a young boy. Gi#en that Phaedrus mostly plays the role of
the belo#ed in the dialogue, we can say that his beauty reminds !ocrates of true beauty
<8
.
Phaedrus is the beautiful boy both !ocrates and Lysias talk about in their respecti#e speeches. It
is true that his soul is not yet beautiful as !ocratess soul might be, but Phaedruss #alue could
consist in making !ocrates recollect the #ision of the form of Aeauty. e cannot be >ust a
replaceable element in !ocrates >ourney towards the forms. In order to truly confirm my point,
howe#er, I must go beyond the Phaedrus. 7lthough Plato offers us the image of the soul
regaining the lost wings through lo#e, one could still see mere utility in the lo#e for a young boy.
7gain, !ocratess lo#e for Phaedrus and Phaedruss lo#e for !ocrates are necessary, but not
sufficient proof.
$wo more mentions must be made before e6ploring the Symposium. %irst, true beauty can,
in a certain sense, be grasped through our sight. It is the only form that appears in a sensorial
way. $his means that Cros is an access point to the contemplation of forms
<1
. Aeauty and Cros
then constitute for Plato a bridge between humans and the forms. $he interaction between the
man and the particular beautiful boy is part of the philosophers ascent. %or Plato, though, e#en
after the passion is consumed, there is also a strong emotional attachment to be preser#ed. C#en
here utility seems to be terribly out of place. !econd, the boy also feels erotic desire towards his
34
Plato, *Phaedrus+, )=0e.
35
*he sees the beauty we ha#e down here and 4the lo#erLphilosopher5 is reminded of true beautyK then he takes wing
and flutters in his eagerness to rise up. -...2 beauty was radiant to see at that time when the souls -...2 saw that blessed
and spectacular #ision.+, Plato, *Phaedrus+, )=0e')8Jb.
36
@e cannot deny the physical, se6ual element in erotic relationships precisely because of the specificity of beauty,
as Cin&ia 7ru&&o pointed out.
10
older lo#er, but does not know what he lo#es
<9
. !eeing himself in the lo#ers eyes is like seeing
himself in a mirror. $he boy sees his own beauty, but not as a narcissistic enterprise. is physical
beauty is acknowledged as a transition to the contemplation of the forms. $his is a lo#e that
makes one aware of ones beauty. @hy would !ocrates make Phaedrus aware of something like
his beauty if he considered him unworthyD More than that, how could !ocrates talk about true
beauty in the case of Phaedrus if he en#isioned their relation as being instrumentalD
+risto)hanes&s s)eech
It is true that the androgynous myth offered by 7ristophanes might appear as a strange
way to talk about lo#e in the Symposium. owe#er, there is an important aspect of his speech that
must be considered. $he idea Plato e6presses through him is precisely that human beings are
characteri&ed by a lack that is always seeking fulfillment
<;
. uman beings desire and need each
other
<0
. C#en from 7ristophaness speech we can already see the crucial role of the other in Plato.
It is not as if the other person is a mere means to and end or someone who can offer us only
carnal pleasure. Physicality is definitely not denied its importance, as desire for someones body
has its origin in the soul. 7dded to it, an erotic relationship would also engage the other parts of
the soul
=J
. It has to do also with a desire for unity, according to 7ristophanes. /nfortunately, for
the latter, lo#e is considered to be a god. !ocrates speech will correct that.
37
*!till, his desire is nearly the same as the lo#ers is -B2 though he ne#er speaks nor thinks of it as lo#e, but as
friendship.+, Plato, *Phaedrus+, )88e.
38
7s emphasi&ed se#eral times by Cin&ia 7ru&&o, also in the discussion about the Phaedrus.
39
*Cach one longed for its own other half, and so they would throw their arms about each other, wea#ing themsel#es
together, wanting to grow together.-B2 Lo#e is born into e#ery human being.+, Plato, *!ymposium+, in Plato.
Complete Works, ed. ,ohn M. Cooper and H.!. utchinson -Cambridge. ackett Publishing Company, (0092, (0(bd.
40
*Its ob#ious that the soul of e#ery lo#er longs for something elseK his soul cannot say what it is, but -...2 it has a
sense of what it wants.+, Plato, *!ymposium+, (0)d.
11
,ioti*a&s s)eech: Love is not a god
Aefore e#en starting his speech, !ocrates promises to offer a truthful account of lo#e
=(
through his speech. It is important to note that he then attributes the words he is about to utter to a
woman, Hiotima ' the priestess of Mantinea. 7ll of the people present at the ban"uet and who
ga#e speeches described Cros as a god. !ocrates then starts by saying that Hiotima contradicted
him on this issue when he himself e6pressed a similar #iew. e had already pro#ed 7gathon
=)
that Lo#e needs beauty and the good
=<
. Hiotima is the first to con#ince !ocrates that Cros is
defined by need and desire for beauty and good, without being beautiful or a god
==
. Cros is
presented as an intermediary being. $his follows the same logic as the one in which correct
opinion
=8
-ortodo+a, is situated between wisdom -sophia2 and ignorance. Cros pro#es to be a
daimon, *a great spirit+
=1
who is neither mortal nor immortal. is intermediary state makes him
also a mediator between humans and the gods. $his is one of the reasons why Pierre adot
rightfully sees !ocrates in Hiotimas description of Cros
=9
. Moreo#er, by defining Cros as a *lo#er
of wisdom+
=;
, Hiotima identifies him with the philosopher in general
=0
. Lo#e arises from need
and lack of self'sufficiency and this is also the destiny of !ocrates as a philosopher.
41
*Mou will hear the truth about lo#e, and the words and phrasing will take care of themsel#es.+, Plato,
*!ymposium+, (00b.
42
Ene must not forget that 7gathon was !ocratess beautiful belo#ed and the poet celebrated at the feast described in
the Symposium.
43
*$hen if Lo#e needs beautiful things, and if all good things are beautiful, he will need good things too.+, Plato,
*!ymposium+, )J(c.
44
*@hat about Lo#eD Mou agreed he needs good and beautiful things, and thats why he desires them 3 because he
does he needs them.+ Plato, *!ymposium+, )J)d.
45
*Its >udging things correctly without being able to gi#e a reason. -B2 it is in between understanding and
ignorance.+, Plato, *!ymposium+, )J)a
46
Plato, *!ymposium+, )J)e
47
*e is always poor, and hes far from being delicate and beautiful. -B2 he is tough and shri#eled and shoeless and
homeless.+, Plato, *!ymposium+, )J<d.
48
Plato, *!ymposium+, )J=b.
49
*Cros and !ocrates personify -B2 the figure of the philosopher.+, in adot, What is ancient philosophy$, =(.
12
7lso, Cros is the capacity of some human beings to transform their acknowledged
condition of lack into access to reality, to the forms. @hen I say some human beings I ha#e in
mind Platos idea of people who are *ignorant+ and who do not recogni&e their own ignorance
8J
.
7t first Phaedrus is one of them, but he is "uickly urged by !ocrates to mo#e towards another
type of incompleteness that belongs to the philosopher. $he same happens to the supposedly
untamable and contro#ersial 7lcibiades. 7lcibiadess more complicated case will be analy&ed in
the following section.
Feturning to Hiotimas speech, one can find here a similar image to one found in the
Phaedrus. Lo#e is not only a desire for what is wise and beautiful, but also a desire for fecundity,
adot obser#es. It is a desire *to immortali&e oneself by producing+
8(
. Hiotima carefully makes
the distinction between the fruitfulness of the body -gi#ing birth to children2 and the souls
fruitfulness -gi#ing birth to ideas2
8)
. In the Phaedrus we ha#e this in the image of *impregnating
minds+
8<
and the metaphor of the seeds, already discussed. $his is the reason why !ocrates is also
represented as a midwife, helping his interlocutors gi#e birth to their own truth
8=
. ?ow we can
better understand why !ocratic dialogue is crucial for philosophy. $his means that philosophy
does not presuppose a lonely, detached enterprise. It is en#isioned by Plato as a *community of
life and dialogue between masters and disciples.+
88
. If we agree with this interpretation of Platos
intentions when writing his dialogues, then it is again #ery difficult to maintain a position e#en
remotely similar to that of Griswolds. It seems that seeing the relationship between !ocrates and
50
*%or whats especially difficult about being ignorant is that you are content with yourself, e#en though youre
neither beautiful and good nor intelligent.+, Plato, *!ymposium+, )J=a
51
adot, What is ancient philosophy$, 88.
52
*7ll of us are pregnant, -B2 both in body and in soul, and, as soon as we come to a certain age, we naturally
desire to gi#e birth.+, Plato, *!ymposium+, )J1c.
53
*!uch discourse makes the seed fore#er immortal and renders the man who has it as happy as any human being
can be.+, Plato, *Phaedrus+, )99a.
54
adot, What is ancient philosophy$, )9.
55
adot, What is ancient philosophy$, 81
13
Phaedrus -and any other of his partners in dialogue2 in terms of usefulness is a serious
misunderstanding of what philosophy stands for. It is unconcei#able to talk about utility in the
interaction between master and disciple, although their relation is defined as asymmetrical. $hey
are not using each other in the #ulgar sense Griswold proposes. $he dialogue itself is worth both
their time
81
. $his happens because of the acknowledged worth of both interlocutors. It is true
though that this is more e6plicit in the Symposium than in the Phaedrus.
$he idea of the soul being impregnated with the truth is correlated by Hiotima with
beauty. $his can be seen in her description of lo#ers as *gi#ing birth in beauty, whether in body or
soul.+
89
. Aeauty is a component of reproduction because of the di#ine nature of the latter.
owe#er, there is more #alue in the product of what we might call an intellectual reproduction.
7gain, the lo#erLbelo#ed educational relationship
8;
is described here. It is through the other that
we are reminded of beauty, of something that we ha#e *been carrying inside -B2 for ages+
80
. $his
is how true friendship is reached. I consider this to be an accurate description of what happens
between Phaedrus and !ocrates in the Phaedrus.
$nitiation into the ritual o( love
$he true challenge of Cros consists, according to Hiotima, into mastering a certain path
that must be followed, *through lo#ing boys correctly.+
1J
. $his passage -)(Jb')()c2 is comple6
56
*caring for oursel#es and "uestioning oursel#es occur only when our indi#iduality is transcended and we rise to
the le#el of uni#ersality, which is represented by what the two interlocutors ha#e in common.+, adot, What is
ancient philosophy$, <).
57
Plato, *!ymposium+, )J1b.
58
*such people therefore, ha#e much more to share than do the parents of human children and ha#e a firmer bond of
friendship.+, Plato, *!ymposium+, )J0cdK the children that are gi#en birth to in the homoerotic relationship are ideas,
which are both truly beautiful and immortal, according to Plato.
59
Plato, *!ymposium+, )J0c.
60
Plato, *!ymposium+, )((c
14
and problematic precisely for the "uestion of #alue or worth I ha#e been raising. Hiotima
describes the philosophers ascent from particular, bodily beauty to Aeauty itself
1(
. Aefore talking
about the actual steps of this ascent, I must notice the #erb to use
1)
in the translation of Platos
te6t. !omeone like Griswold would take this as a definiti#e proof of the belo#ed being
instrumental and disposable after true Aeauty is finally reached. I understand why someone
would be tempted to interpret it like this, but I intend to e6plain this statement in relation with the
entire passage about the destination of the philosophers >ourney. 7lso, in the Symposium the
ascent seems to be presented as not being interrupted by any interior conflict. Ene might want to
contrast this with what happens in the Phaedrus in the dramatic myth of the charioteer and the
idea of the tripartition of the soul
1<
.
I will now come back to the steps towards *the sight of -B2 knowledge+
1=
Hiotima speaks
of. Cros leads correctly from a particular beautiful body to e#ery body that is beautiful, then to
the reali&ation that not physical beauty, but the beauty of the soul is truly rele#ant. $he last step is
to reach the Aeauty of true knowledge or the true knowledge of Aeauty
18
. $his is also a place of
true #irtue. Ene crucial point must be made e6plicit here. $he particular boy with whom the
ascent starts is not identical merely to his beautiful body. If it were the case, then we could indeed
consider that he is e#entually discarded and merely used. @hat the ne6t step in the ascent
presupposes is precisely the reali&ation of a more important part of any particular boy, namely his
soul. is physical beauty, although helpful, becomes irrele#ant. $he boy is still not irrele#ant
61
*by itself, with itselfK it is only one in form, and all the other beautiful things share in that+, Plato, *!ymposium+,
)((b.
62
*one goes always upwards for the sake of this Aeauty, starting out from beautiful things and using 4my emphasis5
them like rising stairs.+, Plato, *!ymposium+, )((c.
63
$his important difference between the Phaedrus and the Symposium had been mentioned by Cin&ia 7ru&&o. 7dded
to this, 7lcibiadess entrance in the Symposium, might be seen as a sign of interior conflict. e could be a
representati#e of the infamous black horses passion in the Phaedrus.
64
Plato, *!ymposium+, )(Je.
65
*in the end he comes to know what it is to be beautiful, -B2 beholding this Aeauty.+, Plato, *!ymposium+, )((d.
15
here. More than this, Phaedrus is not irrele#ant to !ocrates at any point. $he #alue of the boy is
truly recogni&ed when the philosopher understands that he should go beyond his passion for a
beautiful body
11
. $he beauty of the body reminds him of the beauty of the soul. $he moment
when the boy is truly #alued is when his soul begins to be cared for and taken care of
19
. !o, when
we are talking about the soul -psyche2, instrumentality seems inappropriate. In order to
understand why Phaedrus is #aluable and needed e#en after contemplating the forms, I shall
return to the idea of dialectics present in the Phaedrus and in Plato in general.
%ocrates& inco*)leteness reconsidered
@e must correlate the image of the ladder used in the Symposium with the importance of a
certain type of dialogue in Platos work. $his is present e6plicitly in the Phaedrus. $he dialogue
between !ocrates and Phaedrus, the constant interaction between the lo#er and the belo#ed can be
en#isioned as a perpetual tra#ersing of all the steps re"uired by true Lo#e. !ocratess
incompleteness can be better understood in this light. e acknowledges both his and Phaedruss
troubles within the soul, although they may be different at first. e is indeed leading Phaedrus
through his transformation, but this itself is part of his own effort towards reaching knowledge.
adot points to the difficulty of holding onto wisdom once it has been reached as part of the
philosophers destiny. $his is why philosophy has to do with the constant desire for wisdom par
e6cellence. adot stresses the fact that !ocrates indeed tests his partners in con#ersation, but also
66
*he will think that the beauty of bodies is a thing of no importance.+, Plato, *!ymposium+, )(Jc.
67
*our lo#er must be content to lo#e and care for him and to seek to gi#e birth to such ideas as will make young men
better.+, Plato, *!ymposium+, )(Jc.
16
himself
1;
. It is true that Phaedrus in this instance is a step towards a destination that should be
final. the realm of the forms.
owe#er, this destination must be perpetually won, or at least this seems to be Platos
message. $his is why !ocratess need for Phaedrus should be defined in terms of worth.
Moreo#er, this is why philosophy in#ol#es a life choice and not an isolated, singular e#ent
10
. Ene
must be reminded here again that in the Phaedrus, !ocrates and Phaedrus e#entually return to the
city, where !ocrates willfully decided to spend all of his life. $he philosopher is indeed an
intermediate between this world and the world of the forms, but his life must be spent in the
company of other people whose #alue he ine#itably recogni&es. It seems now that we ha#e
escaped the possibility in which a particular belo#ed is disposable and lacks true worth. $o
conclude this section, we must admit, along with adot, that !ocrates was always the first to
emphasi&e the necessity of *li#ing contact between human beings+ and that Plato agreed with
him on this topic
9J
.I would add that the basis of this #iew lays in a firm belief in the worth and
possibility of transformation -askesis2 of other peoples souls.
+lci-iades&s unta*ed .ros
/1
68
*such wisdom is ne#er ac"uired once and for all. It is not only others that !ocrates ne#er stops testing, but also
himself. -B2 !elf'transformation is ne#er definiti#e, but demands perpetual recon"uest.+, adot, What is ancient
philosophy$, <1.
69
$his is what adot means when he says that *the philosopher will ne#er attain wisdom, but he can make progress
in its direction. 7ccording to the Symposium, then, philosophy is not wisdom, but a way of life and discourse
determined by the idea of wisdom.+, adot, What is ancient philosophy$, =1.
70
adot, What is ancient philosophy$, 1J.
71
I will only mention the distinction @ohl makes between the democratic )ros, socially accepted in 7ncient Greece
- it defines the relationship between Phaedrus and !ocrates 2 and the tyrannical )ros, unconsciously both desired and
re>ected by the Greeks. $he latter belongs to 7lcibiades, who actually *"ueers -B2 the #ery distinction between good
and bad eros.+, in @ohl, *$he Cros of 7lcibiades+, <18'<11.
17
I will now focus shortly
9)
on 7lcibiades in the Symposium. I do this not only because
Griswold talks about it. $he other reason is that I consider it to reinforce the idea of Phaedruss
#alue, which has been my main concern here. 7s I ha#e mentioned before, 7lcibiades is
considered to be e#en less worthy of !ocratess time than Phaedrus. !ocrates has completely
failed in turning the contro#ersial 7lcibiades to philosophy, according to Griswold. Iictoria @ohl
offers a comple6 discussion of 7lcibiades as a real person. I only want to point to her account of
the Symposium. %or her, Platos dialogue is a place where the strange Cros of 7lcibiades can be
accepted. More than that, this Cros is crucial for both !ocrates and Plato
9<
. Ene already sees here
the stubborn passion of the black horse in the Phaedrus, making lo#e and knowledge possible.
7lcibiadess portrayal of !ocrates in the Symposium shows how deeply !ocrates had mo#ed his
soul
9=
. @ohl offers a key to understanding both 7lcibiadess and Phaedruss worth. 7lcibiadess
worth consists in him being *a manifestation of 7bsolute Aeauty+, says @ohl. $he same could be
said about Phaedrus as well. I consider !ocrates to be able to find true beauty in both of them. is
task is more difficult with 7lcibiades, but he succeeds e#entually
98
. If e#en 7lcibiadess worth is
thus affirmed, how can Phaedruss still not beD Griswolds perspecti#e remains e6tremely
"uestionable.
0onclusion
My analysis started from some comments made by Charles Griswold in connection to the
relationship between Phaedrus and !ocrates in the Phaedrus. e implies that Phaedrus is not
72
My #ery short account of 7lcibiades should not be seen as an incapacity to understand his importance for the
whole dialogue or that I deny that much more could be said about him.
73
@ohl sees *7lcibiadess eros as a central element of !ocratic philosophy.+ is *se6uality -B2 is foundational+ in
the !ymposium, in @ohl, *$he Cros of 7lcibiades+, <91'<9;.
74
7lcibiades is *merely an admirer of the supreme lo#e that is embodied in the most #aluable lo#e'ob>ect, !ocrates
and his philosophy.+, in @ohl, *$he Cros of 7lcibiades+, <9;.
75
*$hus !ocrates, by the magical and demonic effect of his life and his speech, forces 7lcibiades to "uestion himself
and admit that his life is not worth li#ing if he beha#es as he does.+, in adot, What is ancient philosophy$, =9.
18
worthy of !ocratess time because he is mediocre. $heir interaction would then be merely useful
to !ocrates in his pursuit of knowledge.
$he first step in arguing against this position was to point to !ocratess attitude towards
Phaedrus. $he former is affectionate and cares about his partner in con#ersation. !ocrates sees
beauty in Phaedrus and wants to turn the latters soul towards philosophy. $his is a first sign of an
inner worth of Phaedrus. owe#er, I reali&ed it not to be enough, although the two of them ha#e
an erotic relationship. Phaedrus pro#es to be incomplete in the sense of lacking e#en the
awareness of his own ignorance. $his is where !ocrates steps in. $he metaphor of the dialectician
planting seeds in a proper soul, as presented by Plato in the Phaedrus, strengthened my
argumentation. 7 proper soul has worth and not mere utility.
7 second step in#ol#ed discussing !ocratess incompleteness, which pro#ed to be the
philosophers incompleteness. It is recognition of lack. !ocrates needs and desires a knowledge
he is aware he does not yet possess. $his was seen operating both in the Phaedrus and the
Symposium. $his is the reason why I proceeded in analy&ing 7ristophaness and Hiotimas
speeches from the Symposium. 7ccording to Hiotima, Lo#e is not a god. Cros is presented as an
intermediate between humanity and the gods. Hiotimas description of Cros coincides with
!ocratess figure and with the figure of the philosopher in general. It also made clearer the reason
why !ocrates engages in a meaningful con#ersation with Phaedrus after all. $his also hinted to
the actual worth of Phaedrus that defines !ocratess position towards him.
7 third step dealt with the philosophers ascent present in Hiotimas speech. 7lthough this
passage remains problematic, I tried to offer an interpretation that ser#ed my main purpose. $he
main idea was to stress on the fact that the physical beauty of a young boy does not define him
19
completely. @hen the philosopher -!ocrates2 acknowledges the rele#ance of the beauty of the
soul of his partner in dialogue, he actually acknowledges his worth. I sustained that this is the
case with Phaedrus as well.
7 last step was to connect Phaedruss character with 7lcibiadess character in the
Symposium. Iictoria @hols account of the relationship between !ocrates and 7lcibiades pro#ed
to be e6tremely helpful. !ocrates sees true beauty in 7lcibiades, which then confirms e#en
7lcibiadess worth. I applied this to Phaedrus as well. Ay the end of my enterprise I came to
reali&e the reason why Griswolds interpretation was so disturbing for me. Griswold had
misunderstood the crucial importance of the role of the other in Platos dialogues. $his is why he
talks about usefulness in his account of the Phaedrus. My argumentation can be read then not
only as an attempt to pro#e Phaedruss worth and crucial importance for !ocrates. More than this,
it can be taken as an account of the crucial role of the other for the philosophical enterprise. It is
also a way of offering a tentati#e solution for the problems raised by the ascent of the philosopher
towards true knowledge in Hiotimas speech. My conclusion is then that the other is not merely
left behind and treated as a means to an end. e is an engaged partner whose worth consists in
taking part in a constant effort for understanding and reaching the truth.
20
1$1L$23R+P45
(. Griswold, Charles L. ,r. Self-knowledge in Platos Phaedrus. Pennsyl#ania. Penn !tate
/ni#ersity Press, (001.
). adot, Pierre. What is ancient philosophy$. $ranslated by Michael Chase. Cambridge.
ar#ard /ni#ersity Press, )JJ).
<. Plato. -Phaedrus+. In Plato. Complete Works, edited, with Introduction and ?otes, by ,ohn
M. Cooper. 7ssociate Cditor H.!. utchinson, 8J1'881. Cambridge. ackett Publishing
Company, (009
=. Plato. *!ymposium+. In Plato. Complete Works, edited, with Introduction and ?otes, by ,ohn
M. Cooper. 7ssociate Cditor H.!. utchinson, =89'8J8. Cambridge. ackett Publishing
Company, (009
8. @ohl, Iictoria. *$he Cros of 7lcibiades+, #ol.(; of Classical nti!uity ) -(0002. <=0'<;8.
21