CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW

Digested Cases

June 27, 2013











Submitted to:
Atty. Edilwasif Baddiri
(Prof)




Submitted by:
LLB-4 C














ARTICLE I
NATIONAL TERRITORY




















1. REAGAN VS. CIR
30 SCRA 968
Facts:
Petitioner William C. Reagan, at one time a civilian employee of an American corporation
providing technical assistance to the United States Air Force in the Philippines.
He dispute the tax assessed on him by respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue on an
amount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the United States Marine Corps,
the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base at Pampanga.
Reagan contended, that in legal contemplation the sale, was made outside Philippine territory
and therefore beyond our jurisdiction to tax.

Issue:
Whether or not the Philippines has jurisdiction over the US bases here in the country.

Held:
The Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its
entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are
supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must
submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily,
likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty.















2. PEOPLE VS. GOZO
L 36409, OCTOBER 26, 1973

Facts:
Defendant-appellant Loreta Gozo brought a house located inside the United State Naval Base
in Olongapo City. She demolished and built another house in it, without building permit from the
City Mayor of Olongapo City.
A building and lot inspector from the Engineers Office, Olongapo City apprehended the
carpenters of the house. After due investigation, Loreta Gozo was charge with violation of Municipal
Ordinance No. 14 Series of 1964. The City court of Olongapo City found her guilty of violating the
said ordinance. This was affirmed by the Court of First Instance of Zambales.
She contended that the ordinance does not apply to her because the location of her dwelling is
within the naval base.

Issue:
Whether or not the Philippines has sovereignty over the American bases here in the country.

Held:
By the [Military Bases] Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government merely
consents that the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purely
as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or
divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein." Under the terms of the
treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such
offense. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdiction rights not granted, but also such
ceded rights as the US Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of.











3. MAGALLONA VS. ERMITA
GR No. 187167, August 16, 2011

Facts:
Petitioner, in their respective capacities as citizens, taxpayers or legislators assails the
constitutionality of RA 9522. According to them it reduces the Philippine Maritime territory.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 9522 reduces Philippine Maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the
Philippine states sovereign power.

Held:
Baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out
specific base points along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured,
to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental
shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous
zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic
baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to
delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives
notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine
areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty
over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and
sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living
resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).
Even under petitioners theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the
waters within the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines
would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the
baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or
other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the "outermost
islands and drying reefs of the archipelago."
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as
petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire
(or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by
executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply
with the treatys terms.
















Article II

Declaration of Principles and State Policies






















Legal Value of Article I

4. TONDO MEDICAL VS. CA
GR NO. 167324 JULY 17, 2007

Facts:
In 199, the DOH launched the Health Sector Reform Agenda, a reform agenda
developed by the HSRA Technical Working Group, it provided for five general areas of reform: (1) to
provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals; (2) secure funding for priority public health
programs; (3) promote the development of local health systems and ensure its effective performance;
(4) strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies; and (5) expand the coverage of the
National Health Insurance Program.
Petitioners questioned the first reform agenda involving the fiscal autonomy of
government hospitals, particularly the collection of socialized user fees and the corporate
restructuring of government hospitals. In lieu thereof, according to petitioner, certain employees
allegedly suffered diminution of compensation, while others were supposedly assigned to positions for
which they were neither qualified nor suited.

Issue:
Whether or not the provisions of the constitution are considered self-executing, and do
not require future legislation for their enforcement.

Held:
As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not
require future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the
mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. [18] However,
some provisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as non self-executing.

In Tanada v. Angara, [19] the Court specifically set apart the sections found under Article II of
the 1987 Constitution as non self-executing and ruled that such broad principles need legislative
enactments before they can be implemented:
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of principles and state policies.
x x x. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise
of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.
In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, [20] this Court declared that
Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, [21] the Court
referred to Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of the Constitution as moral incentives
to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights. These provisions, which merely lay down a general
principle, are distinguished from other constitutional provisions as non self-executing and, therefore,
cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts; they do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights.



6. In Re letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno
210 SCRA 588

Facts:
Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, member of the Court of Appeals, wrote a letter dated Nov.
14, 1990 addressed to this court, seeking the correction of his seniority ranking in the Court of
Appeals. He contends that the error was an Inadvertence.
The aftermath of the EDSA Revolution in February 1986 brought about a reorganization of the
entire government, including the judiciary. To effect the reorganization of the Intermediate Appellate
Court and other lower courts, a screening committee was created. President Corazon C. Aquino,
exercising legislative powers by virtue of the revolution, issued EO No. 33 to govern the said
reorganization of the judiciary.
The screening committee recommended and assigned petitioner in rank eleven (11), but where
the appointments were signed by President Aquino, petitioners seniority ranking changed, however,
from number eleven (11) to number twenty six (26).
The Supreme Court granted the plea of petitioner and ordered the correction, but a motion
for reconsideration was filed by Associate Justices Jose G. Campos, Jr. and Luis A. Javellana who
were affected by the order. They contended that the present court of appeals is a New Court and
that petitioner could not claim a reappointment to a prior court; neither can he claim that he was
returning from his former court.

Issue:
W/N the present Court of Appeals is a New Court such that it would negate any claim to
precedence in the Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to EO No. 33.

Held:
The present Court of Appeals is a New Court, different and distinct from the Court of
Appeals or Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to EO No. 33 for it was created in the wake of
the revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino in the aftermath of the People Power Revolution
(EDSA) in 1986.
The Gist of the case:
The revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of the established government in
any country or state by those who were previously subject to it or as a sudden, radical and
fundamental change in the government or political system, usually effected with violence. In Kelsens
book, The General Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that which occurs whenever the legal
order of a community is nullified and replaced by a new order.a way not prescribed by the first
order itself.
It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more popularly
known as the People Power Revolution that the Filipino tore themselves away from an existing
regime. This revolution also saw the unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino Government.
From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as an inherent
right of the people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system
of government or institution by force or a general uprising when the legal and constitutional method
of making such change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable. It has
been said that the locus of the positive law- making power lies with the people of the state and from
there is derived the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of
government without regard to the existing constitution.
7. Republic v. Sandiganbayan
407 SCRA 11
Facts:
On 3 March 1986, the constabulary raiding team served at Christine Dimaanos residence a
search warrant. Dimaano was not present during the raid, but her cousin witnessed it. The raiding
team seized several rifles and pistols, and items not included in the search warrant. The search and
seizure was conducted on March 3, 1986, or five (5) days after the successful EDSA revolution.
Dimaano questioned the propriety of the search and seizure invoking exclusionary right guaranteed
by the 1973 Constitution. Petitioner asserts that revolutionary government effectively withheld the
operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed respondents exclusionary right.

Issue:
1. Whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution during the Interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective takeover by
the revolutionary government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to
24 March 1986 (Immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution)
2. Whether the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights Covenant and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(Declaration) remained in effect during the Interregnum.

Held:
The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the Interregnum.
During the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under the Bill of Rights.
But the revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the
interregnum. Article 17 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that,
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. Hence, according to the Supreme Court, the
seizure of the items was void.











8. Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh
75 PHIL 113 (1945)

Facts:
This petition for mandamus in which petitioner prays that the respondent judge of the lower
court be ordered to continue the proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court, which were initiated
under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military
occupation of these Islands.
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings in said case
on the ground that the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had
the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of the
Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines
established during the Japanese military occupation, and that, furthermore, the lower courts have no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the
defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority. And
the same respondent, in his answer and memorandum filed in this Court, contends that the
government established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation were no de facto
government.

Issue:
Whether or not the courts of the Commonwealth, which are the same as those existing prior
to, and continued during, the Japanese military occupation by the Philippine Executive Commission
and by the so-called Republic of the Philippines, have jurisdiction to continue now the proceedings in
actions pending in said courts at the time the Philippine Islands were reoccupied or liberated by the
American and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth Government was restored.

Held:
That the present courts as the same courts which had been functioning during the Japanese
regime and, therefore, can continue the proceedings in cases pending therein prior to the restoration
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, is confirmed by Executive Order No. 37 which we have
already quoted in support of our conclusion in connection with the second question. Said Executive
Order provides"(1) that the Court of Appeals created and established under Commonwealth Act No. 3
as amended, be abolished, as it is hereby abolished," and "(2) that all cases which have heretofore
been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final
decision. . . ." In so providing, the said Order considers that the Court of Appeals abolished was the
same that existed prior to, and continued after, the restoration of the Commonwealth Government;
for, as we have stated in discussing the previous question, almost all, if not all, of the cases pending
therein, or which had theretofore (that is, up to March 10, 1945) been duly appealed to said court,
must have been cases coming from the Courts of First Instance during the so-called Republic of the
Philippines. If the Court of Appeals abolished by the said Executive Order was not the same one
which had been functioning during the Republic, but that which had existed up to the time of the
Japanese occupation, it would have provided that all the cases which had, prior to and up to that
occupation on January 2, 1942, been dully appealed to the said Court of Appeals shall be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision.


9. ACCFA V. CUGCO
30 SCRA 649

Facts:
Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA), a government agency
created under RA 821, as amended was reorganized and its name changed to Agricultural Credit
Administration (ACA) under RA 3844 or Land Reform Code. A collective Bargaining Agreement was
agreed upon between ACCFA and the labor unions ASA (ACCFA Supervisors Association) & AWA
(ACCFA Workers Association which was supposed to be effective for one year beginning July 1, 1961.
Due to non-implementation of the CBA, the unions held a strike. Five days later, the unions with its
mother union, the Confederation of Unions in Government Corporation and Offices (CUGCO) filed a
complaint against ACCFA before the CIR on the ground of alleged acts of unfair labor practices,
violation of the CBA in order to discourage the members of unions in the exercise of their right to self
organization, discrimination against said members in the matter of promotion and refusal to bargain.
ACCFA moved for reconsideration. But while the appeal was pending, RA 3844 was passed
into law and effectively changed ACCFA into ACA. ASA and AWA then petitioned that they obtained
sole bargaining rights with ACA. While the petition was not yet decided upon, EO 75 was also passed
which placed ACA under Land Reform Project Administration. Notwithstanding the latest legislation
passed, Trial Court & Appellate Court ruled in favor of ASA and AWA. ACA challenged the jurisdiction
of CIR to entertain the petition of the unions for certification elections on the ground that it is
performing a governmental function. The unions join the issue on this single point contending that
ACA is performing a proprietary function.

Issue:
Whether or not ACA is a government entity.

Held:
There can be no dispute as to the fact that Land Reform Program contemplated in the said
code is beyond the capabilities of any private enterprise to translate to reality. It is purely a
governmental function no less than the establishment of public schools and hospitals. The growing
complexities of modern society have rendered the classification of the governmental functions
unrealistic, if not obsolete. Ministrant and governmental function continue to lose their well defined
boundaries and are absorbed within the activities that government must undertake in its sovereign
capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times and move towards a greater
socialization of economic force.





10. PHHC VS CIR
150 SCRA 296

Facts:
In 1967, through the agreement entered into between the Philippine Government & World
Food Program, Peoples Homesite & Housing Corporation proposed a self help project to be
undertaken for the families of squatters in Sapang Palay engaging them to work in the construction
of two earth dams. World Food Program has been asked to supply the food for basic ration of 500
settlers participating in this scheme and their 2000 dependents for a period of 560 days. The food
ration will supplement a cash incentive of 0.50 peso per participant per day. Although, participants
were assigned to work on canals & roads, the projects were never fully implemented. Complaining
about their work and compensation, the participant brought the matter to Dept. of Labor. Thereafter,
PHHC suspended work. Participants then instituted an action with the CIR against PHHC praying for
the payment of difference between minimum wage and 0.50 paid to them, overtime and
reinstatement. In its answer, PHHC claimed that it was exercising a governmental functions; that it
did not employ private respondents; CIR had no jurisdiction over PHHC and over the subject matter
of action.

Issue:
WON CIR has jurisdiction over PHHC, a government owned and controlled corporation performing
governmental function.

Held:
PHHC, as it was established as an instrumentality of the government to accomplished
governmental policies and objectives and extend essential services to the people, performs a
governmental and not proprietary function. It is thus comes under the jurisdiction of civil service
commission and not DOLE. CIR has jurisdiction over labor disputes involving GOCC performing
basically proprietary function but not those performing governmental function.











11. Sps. Jose Fontanilla and Virginia Fontanilla vs Hon. Maliaman
GR No. L-55963 February 27, 1991

Facts:
On December 1, 1989, the court rendered a decision declaring NIA, a government agency
performing proprietary functions like an ordinary employer, NIA was held liable for the injuries
resulting in death of Francisco Fontanilla, son of the petitioners Sps. Fontanilla, caused by the fault
and/or negligence of NIAs driver employee Hugo Garcia. NIA, however maintains that it does not
perform solely and primarily proprietary functions, but is an agency the government tasked with
government functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortuous act of its driver who was not its
special agent.

Issue:
Whether or not NIA is a government agency with juridical personality separate and distinct from the
Government.

Held:
Yes. NIA was not created for purposes of local government. While it may be true that NIA was
essentially a service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare,
such fact does not make NIA essentially and purely a government function corporation. NIA was
created for the purpose of constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all irrigation
system in the Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation projects. Certainly, the state
and the community as a whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but the
functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency which is the irrigation of lands.
NIA is a government agency, invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the
government, thus is governed by the corporation law. It is not mere agency of the government but a
corporate body performing proprietary function. Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages
caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent.










12. PEOPLE VS. GOZO
53 SCRA 476

Facts:
Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval Reservation which is
within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon advice of an Assistant in Mayors Office and
some neighbors, she demolished the house without acquiring the necessary permits and then later
on erected another house. She was charged by the City Engineers Office for violating Mun.
Ordinance 14 series of 1964 which require her to secure permits for any demolition and/or
construction within the city. She was convicted in violation thereof by the lower court. She appealed
and countered that the City of Olongapo has no administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because
it is within the naval base of foreign country.

Issue:
Is the municipal ordinance enforceable within the US Naval Base?

Held:
Yes. The Philippine government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of
Philippine Territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed within
therein. Under the terms of the Treaty, the US Government has prior or preferential but not only
jurisdictional rights but also all such ceded rights as to the US Military Authority for reason of their
own desire to make use of. Hence, in the exercise of its sovereignty, the state through the City of
Olongapo does have administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within the US Naval base.













SECTION 2. GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
13. AGUSTIN VS. EDU

88 SCRA 195

Facts:

This case is a petition assailing the validity or the constitutionality of Letter of
Instruction No. 229 issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all vehicle owners,
users or drivers to procure early warning devices to be installed a distance away from a
vehicle when it is stalled or is disabled. In compliance with such letter of instruction, the
Commissioner of the Land Transportation Office issued Administrative Order No. 1
directing compliance with such Instruction. This petition alleges that such letter of
instruction and subsequent administrative order are unlawful and unconstitutional as it
violates the provisions on due process, equal protection of the law and undue delegation of
police power.

Issue:

Whether or not Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent Administrative Order
issued are unconstitutional.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition. The statutes in question
are deemed not unconstitutional. These were definitely in the exercise of police power as
such were established to promote public welfare and public safety. In fact, the letter of
instruction is based on the constitutional provision of adopting the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The letter of instruction
mentions, as its premise and basis, the resolutions of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road
Signs and Signals and the discussions on traffic safety by the United Nations, and that
such Letter was issued in consideration of a growing number of road accidents due to
stalled or parked vehicles on the streets and highways.










14. J.B.L. Reyes vs Bagatsing

G.R. No. 65366 October 25, 1983

Facts:
Retired Justice Jose B. L. Reyes, in behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought for a
permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983,
starting from the Luneta Park to the gates of the United States embassy. The objective of
the rally was to peacefully petition for the removal of all foreign military bases in the
country and to present such a petition to a representative of the US Embassy so that it
may be delivered to the United States Ambassador. The coalition initially sought to compel
the mayor of the City of Manila to make a decision on the application for a permit but it
was discovered later that a denial of the application has already been sent through mail.
The same letter also provided that should the rally be held somewhere else, permit may be
issued. The respondent mayor alleged that holding the rally in front of the US Embassy is a
violation of the resolutions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations adopted in
1961 and of which the Philippines is a signatory. In the doctrine of incorporation, the
Philippines has to comply with such generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land. The petitioner, on the other hand, contends that the denial of
the permit is a violation of the constitutional right of the freedom of speech and expression.

Issue:

Whether or not the Anti-Bases Coalition should be allowed to hold a peaceful protest rally
in front of the US Embassy.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled to allow the rally in front of the US Embassy to protect
the exercise of the rights to free speech and of peaceful assembly and on the ground that
there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
that could justify the denial of the permit. These rights are not only assured by our
constitution but also provided for in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Between
the two generally accepted principles of diplomatic relations and human rights, the latter
takes higher ground. The exercise of the right of freedom of expression and of peaceful
assembly is highly ranked in the scheme of constitutional values.







15. Tanada v. Angara
272 SCRA 18 (1997)
Facts:

On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by its Secretary of the Department of
Trade and Industry signed the Final Act binding the Philippine Government to submit to its
respective competent authorities the WTO (World Trade Organization) Agreements to seek approval
for such. On December 14, 1994, Resolution No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine Senate to ratify
the WTO Agreement.
This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of the WTO agreement as it violates Sec 19, Article II,
providing for the development of a self reliant and independent national economy, and Sections 10
and 12, Article XII, providing for the Filipino first policy.

Issue:

Whether or not the Resolution No. 97 ratifying the WTO Agreement is unconstitutional

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled the Resolution No. 97 is not unconstitutional. While the constitution
mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it
recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino interests only against foreign competition and trade
practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationalist
policy. Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy
does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates
neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community.

The Senate, after deliberation and voting, gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby
making it a part of the law of the land. The Supreme Court gave due respect to an equal department
in government. It presumes its actions as regular and done in good faith unless there is convincing
proof and persuasive agreements to the contrary. As a result, the ratification of the WTO Agreement
limits or restricts the absoluteness of sovereignty. A treaty engagement is not a mere obligation but
creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. A state which has contracted valid international
obligations is bound to make its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the
fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.











16. Bayan vs Zamora
GR 138570, October 10, 2000
Facts:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others,
the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of
conferences and negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter,
President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary
Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the
senate approved it by (2/3) votes.
Cause of Action:
Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is
applicable and not Section 21, Article VII.
Following the argument of the petitioner, under the provision cited, the foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are
sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so
that, what is requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at
least two-thirds of all the members of the senate.
Issue:
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution?
Held:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign
military bases, troops or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and
in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability
with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes
required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate.
The Constitution makes no distinction between transient and permanent. We
find nothing in section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be
stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.
It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a
treaty.




17. ARTHUR D. LIM vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GR No. 151445, April 11, 2002

FACTS:
This case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition as well as a petition-in intervention,
praying that respondents be restrained from proceeding with the so-called "Balikatan 02-1" and that
after due notice and hearing, that judgment be rendered issuing a permanent writ of injunction
and/or prohibition against the deployment of U.S. troops in Basilan and Mindanao for being illegal
and in violation of the Constitution.

Beginning January of this year 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of
America started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in
"Balikatan 02-1." These so-called "Balikatan" exercises are the largest combined training operations
involving Filipino and American troops. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers
pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines
and the United States in 1951.

The entry of American troops into Philippine soil is proximately rooted in the international
anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the tragic events that
occurred on September 11, 2001.
On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for
certiorari and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. They were joined
subsequently by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-Iist organizations, who
filed a petition-in-intervention on February 11, 2002.
Petitioners contend that the RP and the US signed the Mutual Defense Treaty to provide mutual
military assistance in accordance with the constitutional processes of each country only in the case
of an armed attack by an external aggressor, meaning a third country, against one of them. They
further argued that it cannot be said that the Abu Sayyaf in Basilan constitutes an external aggressor
to warrant US military assistance in accordance with MDT of 1951. Another contention was that the
VFA of 1999 does not authorize American soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine
territory.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Balikatan 02-1 activities are covered by the VFA.
HELD:
Petition is dismissed. The VFA itself permits US personnel to engage on an impermanent
basis, in activities, the exact meaning of which is left undefined. The sole encumbrance placed on
its definition is couched in the negative, in that the US personnel must abstain from any activity
inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity.
Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only
logical to assume that Balikatan 02-1 a mutual anti terrorism advising assisting and training
exercise falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement.
Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that
combat-related activities as opposed to combat itself such as the one subject of the instant
petition, are indeed authorized.
The Court held that no doubt that the US forces are prohibited / from engaging in an
offensive war on Philippine territory. Yet a nagging question remains: are American troops actively
engaged in combat alongside Filipino soldiers under the guise of an alleged training and assistance
exercise? The Court cannot take judicial notice of the events transpiring down south, as reported
from the saturation coverage of the media. As a rule, it does not take cognizance of newspaper or
electronic reports per se, not because of any issue as to their truth, accuracy, or impartiality, but for
the simple reason that facts must be established in accordance with the rules of evidence. It cannot
accept, in the absence of concrete proof, petitioners' allegation that the Arroyo government is engaged
in "doublespeak" in trying to pass off as a mere training exercise an offensive effort by foreign troops
on native soil. The petitions invite the Court to speculate on what is really happening in Mindanao.
Wherefore, the petition and the petition-in-intervention were dismissed.

18. PRISCILLA C. MIJARES vs. HON. SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA
GR 139325, April 12, 2005
Facts:
Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al., all of whom suffered human rights
violations during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their favor against the Estate of the
late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly $1.9B in compensatory and exemplary damages for
tortuous violations of international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final Judgment was
affirmed by the US Court of Appeals.
As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC Makati for the enforcement of
the Final Judgment, paying P410 as docket and filing fees based on Rule 141, 7(b) where the value
of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Estate of Marcos however, filed a
Motion to dismiss alleging the non-payment of the correct filing fees. RTC Makati dismissed the
Complaint stating that the subject matter was capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved a
judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of a definite sum of money allowing for
the easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment. As such, the proper filing fee was P472M,
which Petitioners had not paid.
Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary estimation as the subject matter
of the suit is the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and not an action for the collection of a sum of
money or recovery of damages.
For the CHR, the Makati RTC erred in interpreting the action for the execution of a foreign
judgment as a new case, in violation of the principle that once a case has been decided between the
same parties in one country on the same issue with finality, it can no longer be litigated again in
another country. The CHR likewise invokes the principle of comity and of vested rights.
Petitioners complaint may have been lodged against an estate, but it is clearly based on a
judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court. The provision does not make any distinction
between a local judgment and a foreign judgment, and where the law does not distinguish, we shall
not distinguish.
Thus, respondent judge was in clear and serious error.
To resolve this question, a proper understanding is required on the nature and effects of a
foreign judgment in this jurisdiction.

Issue:
Is the preclusion of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment a generally accepted principle of
International Law.

Held:
The conditions required by the Philippines for recognition and enforcement of a foreign
judgment were originally contained in Section 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing,
while in an action in personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. However, in both cases,
the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of want of
jurisdiction or notice to the party, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law or fact.
The complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary
estimation. But at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus
placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. We find that it is covered by Section 7(b)(3),
involving as it does, other actions not involving property.
The viability of the public policy defense against the enforcement of a foreign judgment has
been recognized in this jurisdiction. This defense allows for the application of local standards in
reviewing the foreign judgment, especially when such judgment creates only a presumptive right, as
it does in cases wherein the judgment is against a person. The public policy defense can safeguard
against possible abuses to the easy resort to offshore litigation if it can be demonstrated that the
original claim is noxious to our constitutional values.
There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines to
recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof. However, generally
accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution,
form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.
While the definite conceptual parameters of the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments have not been authoritatively established, the Court can assert with certainty that such
an undertaking is among those generally accepted principles of international law. There is a
widespread practice among states accepting in principle the need for such recognition and
enforcement, albeit subject to limitations of varying degrees. The fact that there is no binding
universal treaty governing the practice is not indicative of a widespread rejection of the principle, but
only a disagreement as to the imposable specific rules governing the procedure for recognition and
enforcement.
Thus, relative to the enforcement of foreign judgments in the Philippines, it emerges that there
is a general right recognized within our body of laws, and affirmed by the Constitution, to seek
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, as well as a right to defend against such
enforcement on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.
The preclusion of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment in this country merely due
to an exorbitant assessment of docket fees is alien to generally accepted practices and principles in
international law.
In this particular circumstance, given that the complaint is lodged against an estate and is
based on the US District Courts Final Judgment, this foreign judgment may, for purposes of
classification under the governing procedural rule, be deemed as subsumed under Section 7(b)(3) of
Rule 141, i.e., within the class of all other actions not involving property. Thus, only the blanket
filing fee of minimal amount is required..
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE,
and a new order REINSTATING Civil Case No. 97-1052 is hereby issued. No costs.











19. Shangri-La International Hotel Management Ltd. v Developers Group of Companies, Inc.
GR No. 159928, March 31, 2006
Facts:
DGCI claimed ownership of the trade marks based on prior use on its restaurant business
within the Philippines since 1982, and on that basis was granted a certificate of trade mark
registration on May 31, 1983. SLIHM started using the mark in the Philippines only in 1987 when it
put up two hotels, the EDSA Shangri-La Hotel and the Makati Shangri-La. However, use of the
trademarks went back as far as 1962 when the Kuok family, owners of SLIHM, adopted the name
Shangri-La in all of their hotels and hotel related establishments around the world.
On June 21, 1988, the Shangri-La International Hotel Management, Ltd. and Kuok Philippine
Properties, Inc., filed with the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT) a
petition praying for the cancellation of the registration of the Shangri-La mark and S logo issued to
the Developers Group of Companies Inc., on the ground that the same was illegally and fraudulently
obtained and appropriated for the latters restaurant business. In this regard, they point to the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property as affording security and protection to SLIHMs
exclusive right to said mark and logo.
The Shangri-La Group alleged that it has been using the said mark and logo for its corporate
affairs and business since March 1962 and caused the same to be specially designed for their
international hotels in 1975, much earlier than the alleged first use by the Developers Group in 1982.
DGCIs lone witness even admitted in court that he travelled around Asia prior to 1962 and knew the
Shangri-La Hotel in Hong Kong and even stayed in that hotel.
The Developers Group instituted a complaint for infringement and damages with prayer for
injunction. When the Shangri-La Group moved for the suspension of the proceedings, the trial court
denied such.
The Shangri-La Group filed a petition for certiorari before the CA but it was dismissed ruling
that Kuok Group does not have proof of actual use in commerce in the Philippines in accordance with
Section 2 of R.A. No. 166, it cannot claim ownership of the mark and logo. While the Paris
Convention protects internationally known marks, R.A. No. 166 still requires use in commerce in the
Philippines. Accordingly, and on the premise that international agreements, such as Paris
Convention, must yield to a municipal law, the question on the exclusive right over the mark and logo
would still depend on actual use in commerce in the Philippines. Respondent has a right to the mark
and logo by virtue of its prior use in the Philippines and the issuance of Certificate of Registration.
Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:
Whether or not international agreements, such as Paris Convention, must yield to a municipal law
(RA No. 166).

Held:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the CA and the Trial Court which found SLIHM
guilty of trademark infringement. SC is in favor of SLIHM.
The new Intellectual Property Code (IPC), Republic Act No. 8293, undoubtedly shows the firm
resolve of the Philippines to observe and follow the Paris Convention by incorporating the relevant
portions of the Convention such that persons who may question a mark (that is, oppose registration,
petition for the cancellation thereof, sue for unfair competition) include persons whose internationally
well-known mark, whether or not registered, is identical with or confusingly similar to or
constitutes a translation of a mark that is sought to be registered or is actually registered. However,
while the Philippines was already a signatory to the Paris Convention, the IPC only took effect on
January 1, 1988, and in the absence of a retroactivity clause, R.A. No. 166 still applies.
The Paris Convention mandates that protection should be afforded to internationally known
marks as signatory to the Paris Convention, without regard as to whether the foreign corporation is
registered, licensed or doing business in the Philippines. It goes without saying that the same runs
afoul to Republic Act No. 166, which requires the actual use in commerce in the Philippines of the
subject mark or devise.
Our municipal law on trademarks regarding the requirement of actual use in the Philippines
must subordinate an international agreement. Withal, the fact that international law has been made
part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over
national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most
countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislative
enactments
Consequently, the petitioners cannot claim protection under the Paris Convention.
Nevertheless, with the double infirmity of lack of two-month prior use, as well as bad faith in the
respondent's registration of the mark, it is evident that the petitioners cannot be guilty of
infringement. It would be a great injustice to adjudge the petitioners guilty of infringing a mark when
they are actually the originator and creator thereof.
Under the former trademark law, R.A. No. 166, as amended, which was in effect up to
December 31, 1997, hence, the law in force at the time of respondent's application for registration of
trademark, the root of ownership of a trademark is actual use in commerce. Section 2 of said law
requires that before a trademark can be registered, it must have been actually used in commerce and
service for not less than two months in the Philippines prior to the filing of an application for its
registration.
Registration, without more, does not confer upon the registrant an absolute right to the
registered mark. Evidence of prior and continuous use of the mark or trade name by another can
overcome the presumptive ownership of the registrant and may very well entitle the former to be
declared owner in an appropriate case.
As between actual use of a mark without registration, and registration of the mark without
actual use thereof, the former prevails over the latter.
While the present law on trademarks has dispensed with the requirement of prior actual use
at the time of registration, the law in force at the time of registration must be applied, and thereunder
it was held that as a condition precedent to registration of trademark, trade name or service mark,
the same must have been in actual use in the Philippines before the filing of the application for
registration.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are hereby SET ASIDE.
The complaint for infringement in Civil Case No. Q-91-8476 is ordered DISMISSED.







20. Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque
GR No. 173034, October 09,2007

Facts:
Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries
of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as
a co-respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said
executive agency. Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on
October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom
Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect
to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breast milk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code
adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several
Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it
should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breast milk substitutes. In
1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of
said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and
child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed
of the advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which
was to take effect on July 7, 2006. Part of the prohibitions contained in the IRR is the total ban on
advertising and promotion of breast milk substitutes. Petitioner challenged said order and contends
that the provisions of the IRR are unconstitutional and go beyond the law it is supposed to
implement. It also contends that respondent acted in grave abuse of discretion in issuing the said
IRR. Respondents aver that the IIRR seeks not only to implement the Milk Code but also various
international instruments which are deemed part of the law of the land.

Issue:
Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by
the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional.

Held:
Yes. Under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members, in
the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come
into force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads:
Article 23.
The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with respect
to any matter within the competence of the Organization
for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is
being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules.
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of the domestic
law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as
social legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration,
international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into
domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the
land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the
legislature.























21. IBP vs. Zamora
338 SCRA 81 (2000)

FACTS:
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines to join the Philippine
National Police in visibility patrols around the metropolis. This is in view of the alarming increase in
violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in a
verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of
crime prevention and suppression.
On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines filed the instant petition to annul
LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and
unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Wether or not the deployment of Phil. Marines with PNP in Metro Manila constitutes a breach
of civilian supremacy.

HELD:
No.
The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy
clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for
civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of
the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines authority.











22. ARTHUR D. LIM vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GR No. 151445, April 11, 2002

FACTS:
This case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition as well as a petition-in intervention,
praying that respondents be restrained from proceeding with the so-called "Balikatan 02-1" and that
after due notice and hearing, that judgment be rendered issuing a permanent writ of injunction
and/or prohibition against the deployment of U.S. troops in Basilan and Mindanao for being illegal
and in violation of the Constitution.

Beginning January of this year 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of
America started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in
"Balikatan 02-1." These so-called "Balikatan" exercises are the largest combined training operations
involving Filipino and American troops. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers
pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines
and the United States in 1951.

The entry of American troops into Philippine soil is proximately rooted in the international
anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the tragic events that
occurred on September 11, 2001.
On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for
certiorari and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. They were joined
subsequently by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-Iist organizations, who
filed a petition-in-intervention on February 11, 2002.
Petitioners contend that the RP and the US signed the Mutual Defense Treaty to provide mutual
military assistance in accordance with the constitutional processes of each country only in the case
of an armed attack by an external aggressor, meaning a third country, against one of them. They
further argued that it cannot be said that the Abu Sayyaf in Basilan constitutes an external aggressor
to warrant US military assistance in accordance with MDT of 1951. Another contention was that the
VFA of 1999 does not authorize American soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine
territory.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Balikatan 02-1 activities are covered by the VFA.
HELD:
Petition is dismissed. The VFA itself permits US personnel to engage on an impermanent
basis, in activities, the exact meaning of which is left undefined. The sole encumbrance placed on
its definition is couched in the negative, in that the US personnel must abstain from any activity
inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity.
Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only
logical to assume that Balikatan 02-1 a mutual anti terrorism advising assisting and training
exercise falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement.
Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that
combat-related activities as opposed to combat itself such as the one subject of the instant
petition, are indeed authorized.
The Court held that no doubt that the US forces are prohibited / from engaging in an
offensive war on Philippine territory. Yet a nagging question remains: are American troops actively
engaged in combat alongside Filipino soldiers under the guise of an alleged training and assistance
exercise? The Court cannot take judicial notice of the events transpiring down south, as reported
from the saturation coverage of the media. As a rule, it does not take cognizance of newspaper or
electronic reports per se, not because of any issue as to their truth, accuracy, or impartiality, but for
the simple reason that facts must be established in accordance with the rules of evidence. It cannot
accept, in the absence of concrete proof, petitioners' allegation that the Arroyo government is engaged
in "doublespeak" in trying to pass off as a mere training exercise an offensive effort by foreign troops
on native soil. The petitions invite the Court to speculate on what is really happening in Mindanao.
Wherefore, the petition and the petition-in-intervention were dismissed.

23. BAYAN VS. ZAMORA
GR 138570 October 10, 2000

Facts:
The Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases Agreement, among
others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United States military personnel. To
further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the Philippines and the United States
entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to
respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft.
In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the
Philippines and the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases agreement.
On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in
the Philippines.

Issue:
Wether or not the VFA violates the prohibition against nuclear weapons under Article II
Section 8 of the constitution.

Held:
Military bases established within the territory of another state is no longer viable because of
the alternatives offered by new means and weapons of warfare such as nuclear weapons, guided
missiles as well as huge sea vessels that can stay afloat in the sea even for months and years without
returning to their home country. These military warships are actually used as substitutes for a land-
home base not only of military aircraft but also of military personnel and facilities. Besides, vessels
are mobile as compared to a land-based military headquarters.











24. ROE VS. WADE
410 US 113 (1973)

Facts.
Texas statutes made it a crime to procure or attempt an abortion except when medically
advised for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. Appellant Jane Roe sought a declaratory
judgment that the statutes were unconstitutional on their face and an injunction to prevent
defendant Dallas County District Attorney from enforcing the statutes. Appellant alleged that she was
unmarried and pregnant, and that she was unable to receive a legal abortion by a licensed physician
because her life was not threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy and that she was unable to
afford to travel to another jurisdiction to obtain a legal abortion. Appellant sued on behalf of herself
and all other women similarly situated, claiming that the statutes were unconstitutionally vague and
abridged her right of personal privacy.

Issue.
Does the Texas abortion law violated womens constitutional right to have an abortion?

Held:
The right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but the right is not unqualified
and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.
A woman, with her doctor, could choose abortion during the first six months without restrictions and
with restrictions during the last three months, based on the rights to privacy.
The court deemed abortion a fundamental right under the United States Constitution, thereby
subjecting all laws attempting to restrict it to the standard of strict scrutiny.













25. MEYER VS. NEBRASKA
262 US 30 (1932)

Facts:
Plaintiff in error was tried and convicted in the district court for Hamilton county, Nebraska,
under an information which charged that on May 25, 1920, while an instructor in Zion Parochial
School he unlawfully taught the subject of reading in the German language to Raymond Parpart, a
child of 10 years, who had not attained and successfully passed the eighth grade. The information is
based upon 'An act relating to the teaching of foreign languages in the state of Nebraska, that no
person, individually or as a teacher, shall, in any private, denominational, parochial or public school,
teach any subject to any person in any language than the English language. That languages, other
than the English language, may be taught as languages only after a pupil shall have attained and
successfully passed the eighth grade.

Issue:
Whether or not a statute prohibiting the teaching of German language to students up to a
certain age is valid.

Held:
No. A statute prohibiting the teaching of a German language to students up to a certain age is
invalid. It is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in
life; and nearly all the states, including Nebraska, enforce this obligation by compulsory laws. That
the state may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to imporve the quality of its citizens, physically,
mentally and morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be
respected. T
he protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as to
those born with English on the tongue. Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all had ready
understanding of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be coerced by methods which conflict with the
Constitution-a desirable and cannot be promoted by prohibited means.










26. PIERCE VS SOCIETY OF SISTERS OF THE HOLY NAMES OF JESUS AND MARY

268 U.S. 510 JUNE 1, 1925


Facts:

The appellate lawyers argued that the state had an overriding intent to oversee and control
the providers of education to the children of Oregon. In 1922, the Oregon school system took part in
a decision to Americanize their schools which requires all students between ages 8-16 to attend
public schools, excluding those who were physically unable, those who lived more than 3 miles from
the nearest road and those who were already completed the 8
th
grades. To enforce this law, parents
who did not send their children to public schools were subjected to 100 dollar fine and up to 30 days
in jail. This system seem highly unreasonable to the Society of Sisters and go against the 14
th

Amendment, which provides equal protection and equal opportunity.

The Sisters sued Pierce along with Isaac Van Winkle and Stanley Myers alleging that the
enactment conflicts with the right of parents to choose schools where their children will receive
appropriate mental and religious training and the right of the schools and teachers therein to engage
in a useful business of profession.

Issue:

Whether or not there is a grave abuse of discretion on the states power by
implementing the Oregon law.

Held:

The court unanimously upheld the lower courts decision, the injunction against the amended
act, thus in favour of parents in this case.

The court ruled that Oregon could not constitutionally compel all school students to attend
public schools because in doing so would cause irreparable harm to the primary schools operated by
religious organizations. A state law that require all children in the first eight grades to attend public
school rather than private or parochial schools violate the 14
th
Amendment due process guarantee
of personal liberty. Implicit to this liberty
is the right of the parents to choose the kind of education they want for their children.






















27. GINSBERG VS NEW YORK

390 US 629 (1968)


Facts:

Under New York law it is illegal to wilfully sell to minors under 17 of age any picture which
depicts nudity and any magazine which taken as a whole is harmful to minors. Ginsberg and his wife
sold a girlie magazine to two 16 year old boys which they were prosecuted and found guilty.

Issue:

Whether or not the state of New York deprived minors of their liberty

Held:

The court found that it was well within the states power to protect minors and that just
because the material is not classified as obscene to adults it may still be regulated with minors.







































28. JUAN ANTONINO, ANNA ROSARIO, AND JOSE ALFONSO ALL SURNAMED OPOSA,
petitioners
VS
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S- FACTURAN, respondent.

GR NO 101083 JULY 30, 1993

Facts:

Minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents and the Philippine Ecological
Network Inc filed a class suit petition against the Secretary of Department of Environment and
Natural Resources in the person of Hon. Fulgencio Facturan Jr. The petitioners prayed to cancel all
existing Timber license agreements in the country and cease from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving the new TLA, and further reinstated the adverse effect of continued
deforestation in the country.

Facturan filed a motion to dismiss the complaints on the grounds that the issue raised is a
political question which properly pertains to the legislative and executive branches of the
government. The motion to dismiss was granted. The court ruled that the prayer of plaintiff will
result to the impairment of contracts which has prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file a case.

Held:

Yes. Base on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology is concerned, such right is considered rhythm and harmony of nature. Such
political question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power
or the impenetrable shield that protects the executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry.
The petitioner may therefore amend their complaint.




























29. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner
VS
COURT OF APPEALS

GR NO 110120 MARCH 16, 1994

Facts:

The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition filed with the Court of Laguna Lake
Development Authority against the City of Government of Caloocan, et al. in a decision promulgated
by Court of Appeals on January 29, 1993 ruled that the LLDA has no power and authority to issue,
cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in Brgy. Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan
City. The LLDA now seeks, in this petition, review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

Whether or not LLDA have the power and authority to issue, cease, and desist order under RA No
4850 and its amending laws.

Held:

Yes. The cease and desist order issued by LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to
stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in
violation of RA No.4850, as amended, and other relevant environment laws, cannot be stamped as an
authorized execise by the LLDA of injunctive power.


















ARTICLE II, SEC. 16
30. Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals
G.R.No. 120865-71
December 7, 1995
Facts:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in order to
execute the policy towards environmental protection and sustainable development so as to accelerate
the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces and
towns.
PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since water quality studies have shown that the
lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same.
EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the LLDA and enumerated the
towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term Laguna de Bay Region.

Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities
assumed exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters
since Sec.149 thereof provides: Municipal corporations shall have the authority to grant fishery
privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore
Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish cages to the
consternation of the LLDA.
The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen operation and the
indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have saturated the lake with
fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna
Lake.
The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture
structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are declared illegal; (2) those declared
illegal shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal
Fishing; and (3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A
of RA 4850 as amended by PD 813.

A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures
otherwise demolition shall be effected.
Issues:

1.Which agency of the government the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region
should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of
permits for fishery privileges is concerned?

2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?
Held:

1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813,and Sec.2 of EO
No.927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the
use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region. On the other hand,
RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges on
municipal waters. The provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDA
and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, latter should prevail
since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be
taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary
conclusion. Implied repeals are not favored and, as much as possible, effect must be given to all
enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent
general law by mere implication.
The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was granted for revenue purposes. On the other
hand, the power of the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens, fish cages, and other aqua-culture
structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating & monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay
region and for lake control and management. It partakes of the nature of police power which is the
most pervasive, least limitable and most demanding of all state powers including the power of
taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of police power should
prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
2. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases
with authority to issue a cease and desist order and on matters affecting the construction of illegal
fishpens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay.
Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, as
amended. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for enjoyment of fishery
privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to
exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.
















31. MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

G.R. Nos. 171947-48 December 18, 2008



Facts:

On January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, for the cleanup,
rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay.

The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable
standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment
Code.

In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in
abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:
(1) Respondents constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;
(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);
(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);
(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);
(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);
(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
(8) Executive Order No. 192;
(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);
(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and
(12) International Law

Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay
and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.

Issues:

a) Whether or not pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning
of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general.

b) Whether or not the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by
mandamus.


Held:

Regional Trial Courts Order to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay

On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. Finding merit in the
complaint, the Court ordered defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and
rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-
diving and other forms of contact recreation.

To attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within six
(6) months from receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by devising a consolidated,
coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.

In particular:

Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment facilities
in strategic places under its jurisdiction and increase their capacities.

Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct and operate
sewage facilities for the proper disposal of waste.

Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate and
maintain waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous substances.

Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes but also
of other solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution of the bay.

Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill
and/or adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal system
such as re-use or recycling of wastes.

Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the marine life in
Manila Bay and restock its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals.

Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of cleaning up
and rehabilitation of Manila Bay.

Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the free flow
of waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually end up in
Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to actively
participate in removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other non-biodegradable
garbage in the bay.

Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge companies and
require them to have proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage
coming from septic tanks.

Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education the
importance of preserving and protecting the environment.

Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the Manila
Bay from all forms of illegal fishing.
The Court of Appeals Sustained the RTCs Decision

The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of Appeals
(CA) individual Notices of Appeal. On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard
(PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five other executive departments and
agencies filed directly with this Court a petition for review under Rule 45.

In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the extreme
necessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge
their respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need to
set timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks, some of them as defined for them by
law and the nature of their respective offices and mandates.

The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark
cannot be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former
splendor and bring back the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks
ahead, daunting as they may be, could only be accomplished if those mandated, with the help and
cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their minds to these tasks and take
responsibility. This means that the State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in the preservation
and protection of the Manila Bay.

So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political
rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Even assuming the absence of a
categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and
women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the
waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal
of the trust reposed in them.

By a Decision of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the Decision of
the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial courts decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside
of their usual basic functions under existing laws.


32. Garcia vs. Board of Investments (BOI)
191 SCRA 288
November 1990

FACTS:

Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation, formed by a
group of Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI its have its plant site for the products naphta
cracker and naphta to based in Bataan. In February 1989, one year after the BPC began its
production in Bataan, the corporation applied to the BOI to have its plant site transferred from
Bataan to Batangas. Despite vigorous opposition from petitioner Cong. Enrique Garcia and others,
the BOI granted private respondent BPCs application, stating that the investors have the final choice
as to where to have their plant site because they are the ones who risk capital for the project.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the application of the
investors without considering the national interest

HELD:

The Supreme Court found the BOI to have committed grave abuse of discretion in this case, and
ordered the original application of the BPC to have its plant site in Bataan and the product naphta as
feedstock maintained.
The ponente, Justice Gutierrez, Jr., first stated the Courts judicial power to settle actual
controversies as provided for by Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987 Constitution before he wrote the
reasons as to how the Court arrived to its conclusion. He mentioned that nothing is shown to justify
the BOIs action in letting the investors decide on an issue which, if handled by our own government,
could have been very beneficial to the State, as he remembered the word of a great Filipino leader, to
wit: .. he would not mind having a government run like hell by Filipinos than one subservient to
foreign dictation.

Justice Grio Aquino, in her dissenting opinion, argued that the petition was not well-taken because
the 1987 Investment Code does not prohibit the registration of a certain project, as well as any
decision of the BOI regarding the amended application. She stated that the fact that petitioner
disagrees with BOI does not make the BOI wrong in its decision, and that petitioner should have
appealed to the President of the country and not to the Court, as provided for by Section 36 of the
1987 Investment Code.

Justice Melencio-Herrera, in another dissenting opinion, stated that the Constitution does not vest in
the Court the power to enter the realm of policy considerations, such as in this case.





33. TAADA VS ANGARA
G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

Facts:
Petitioners Senators Taada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by the
Philippine Senate of the Presidents ratification of the international Agreement establishing the World
Trade Organization (WTO). They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987
Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino
labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods. Further, they contended that the national
treatment and parity provisions of the WTO Agreement place nationals and products of member
countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products, in contravention of the Filipino First
policy of our Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Issue:
Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is
liberalized, deregulated and privatized?
Held:
[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine Senate of
the Presidents ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO.]
NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in worldwide
trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is
liberalized, deregulated and privatized.
There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the
Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.
[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world
on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against
foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not
intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in
the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited
entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In
fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign
competition that is unfair.
[T]he constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither
economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community. As explained by
Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of
overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or
economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international community.
Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy, especially in
such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources and public utilities.
The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national treatment, and trade without
discrimination cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and
reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on equality
and reciprocity, the fundamental law encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic
and foreign markets, thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade
environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with
the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown
capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino
entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to
prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.
It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to
develop an independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or
prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally true
that such principles while serving as judicial and legislative guides are not in themselves
sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental constitutional principles
relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general
welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity
and the promotion of industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,
thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the
exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to
the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its
consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land is a legitimate
exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no patent and gross arbitrariness or despotism by
reason of passion or personal hostility in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this
Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous
to the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to
attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute
grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludibly, what the Senate did was a
valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the
realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the
people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and
economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine in electing their policy makers.
After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of
a member.







Article II: Declaration of Principles and State Policies
Section 26. Equal Access to Political Opportunities and Political Dynasties
34. Pamatong v. COMELEC
427 SCRA 96 (2004)

Facts:
Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on
December 17, 2003.
Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course to petitioners
Certificate of Candidacy in its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004.
The decision of COMELEC was not unanimous since Commissioners Luzviminda G.
Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted to include petitioner as they believed he had parties or
movements to back up his candidacy.
On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. 6558.
The COMELEC, acting on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and on similar motions filed
by other aspirants for national elective positions, denied the same under the aegis of Omnibus
Resolution No. 6604 dated February 11, 2004.
The petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari seeking to reverse the resolutions which
were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to equal access to opportunities for public service
under Section 26, Article II of the 1987.
Petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the
electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign people to choose their leaders.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner can invoke the Constitutional Provision Article II, Section 26.
Held:
The equal access provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled
Declaration of Principles and State Policies. The provisions under the Article are generally
considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to
the equal access provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does
not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for
legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action
before the courts.
Clearly, therefore, petitioners reliance on the equal access clause in Section 26, Article II of
the Constitution is misplaced.
The Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 are cognizant of the
compelling State interest to ensure orderly and credible elections by excising impediments thereto,
such as nuisance candidacies that distract and detract from the larger purpose. The COMELEC is
mandated by the Constitution with the administration of elections and endowed with considerable
latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the promotion of free, orderly and honest
elections.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual.
The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the
reception of further evidence is in order.
A word of caution is in order. What is at stake is petitioners aspiration and offer to serve in
the government. It deserves not a cursory treatment but a hearing which conforms to the
requirements of due process.
As to petitioners attacks on the validity of the form for the certificate of candidacy, suffice it to
say that the form strictly complies with Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. This provision
specifically enumerates what a certificate of candidacy should contain, with the required information
tending to show that the candidate possesses the minimum qualifications for the position aspired for
as established by the Constitution and other election laws.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, COMELEC Case No. SPP (MP) No. 04-001 is hereby remanded
to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether
petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
The COMELEC is directed to hold and complete the reception of evidence and report its
findings to this Court with deliberate dispatch.











Article VI: The Legislative Department

Section 1. Legislative Power; Non-Delegation

35. Araneta v. Gatmaitan
101 PHIL 328 (1957)

Facts:
The President issued E.O 22 - prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, and the E.O 66
and 80 as amendments to EO 22, as a response for the general clamor among the majority of people
living in the coastal towns of San Miguel Bay that the said resources of the area are in danger of
major depletion because of the effects of trawl fishing. A group of Otter trawl operators filed a
complaint for injunction to restrain the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from
enforcing the said E.O. and to declare E.O 22 as null and void.

Issue:
W/N E.O 22, 60 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof was not in the exercise of legislative
powers unduly delegated to the Pres.

Held:
VALID. Congress provided under the Fisheries Act that a.) it is unlawful to take or catch fry or
fish eggs in the waters of the Phil and b.) it authorizes Sec. of Agriculture and Nat. Resources to
provide regulations/ restrictions as may be deemed necessary. The Act was complete in itself and
leaves it to the Sec. to carry into effect its legislative intent. The Pres. did nothing but show an
anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants and dispose of issues of gen. concern w/c were in
consonance and strict conformity with law.











36. Rubi v. Provincial Board
39 PHIL 660 (1918-1919)

Facts:
The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein non-
Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800
hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent
settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this
reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial
governor.

In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the
townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the
districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the
site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall
upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the
revised Administrative Code.
Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the
protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they
roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.
It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within
the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.
It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials
of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at
Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the
provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the reservation.
Issue:
Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty of abode.
Thus, WON Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Held:
The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty
of abode and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in
reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude.
The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate
exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people
of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige
them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) the protection of
the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of
introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.

One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general
good of the Philippines.
Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and
for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do
exactly as he pleases.
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law.

Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can,
therefore, not issue.







37. People v. Maceren

79 SCRA 450 (1977)



Facts:

The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 which
penalizes electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law
and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. The municipal court quashed the complaint and held
that the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, hence the executive and judicial departments
cannot consider the same. On appeal, the CFI affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this appeal to the SC.

Issue:

Whether the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid?

Held:

NO. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries
exceeded their authority in issuing the administrative order. The old Fisheries Law does not expressly
prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it.
Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could
have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an
executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the
issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. Where the
legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate
rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards,
which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not
represent a valid precise to the rule law - making power












38. Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA

166 SCRA 533 (1988)


Facts:
Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan on
March 15, 1985. The widow filed a complaint for damages against the Eastern Shipping Lines with
the POEA based on Memorandum Circular No. 2 issued by the latter which stipulated death benefits
and burial expenses for the family of an overseas worker. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and
after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant.

The petition is DISMISSED


Issue:
Whether or not the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers.

Held:
Supreme Court held there was a valid delegation of powers.

In questioning the validity of the Memorandum Circular No. 2, Eastern Shipping Lines contended that POEA
was given no authority to promulgate the regulations, and even with such authorization , the regulations represents
an exercise of legislative discretion which under the principle, is not subject the delegation.
























39. Tablarin v. Gutierrez

152 SCRA 730 (1987)


Facts:
Petitioners Teresita Tablarin et al sought admission into Colleges or School of Medicine for the SY 1987-
1988,without, however taking a successly the NMAT required by public respondent Board of Medical Education and
administered by private respondent Center for Educational Measurements. Consequently, petitioners, filed with the
RTC of the NCR, petition for declaratory relief and prohibition with the prayer for TRO & preliminary Injunction
seeking to enjoin the secretary of education, the board of medical education, and Center for Educational
Measurement from enforcing RA 2382 and MEC Order No. 52, series of 1985. After hearing, the trial court denied the
petition for the issuance of preliminary Injunction.


Issue:
Whether or not RA 2832 and MEC Order No. 52 is constitutional?


Held:
The Medical Act of 1959, as amended and MEC Order No. 52, Series of 1985 constitute a valid exercise of the
police power of the state. The police power is non- waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and
promote all the important interest and needs in a word, the public order of the general community. An important
component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of
which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation.






















40. Cebu Oxygen Acetylene Co. v, Drilon
176 SCRA 24 (1989)


Facts:
The Collective Bargaining Agreement stipulates that in case any wage adjustment decreed
by laws higher than the increase given in the agreement, the company shall pay the difference, RA
6640 decreed a wage increase higher than the CBA increase. Dole, however, issued a regulation
saying that salary increase granted pursuant to a CBA will not be considered in determining
compliance with the new laws.


Issue:
Is it proper?

Held:
No. Administrative Regulation adopted under Legislative Authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the provision of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect in general regulations. An administrative agency cannot amend and act of
Congress.


































41. Osmena v. Orbos
220 SCRA 703


Facts:
On October 10, 1984, President Marcos issued PD 1956 creating a Special Account in the
General Fund, designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF was designated to
reimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products.
Subsequently, the OPSF was reclassified into a trust liability account, in virtue of EO
1024, and ordered released from the National Treasury to the Ministry of Energy.
President Corazon Aquino, amended PD 1956 and promulgated EO no. 137 on February
27, 1987 expanding the grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost under recovery
incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products, the amount of under
recovery being left for determination by the Ministry of Finance.
Petitioner avers that the creation of the trust fund violates section 29, Article VI of the
Constitution and contends that the delegation of authority is undue or invalid.


Issue:
Whether or not the delegation of authority is considered invalid and unconstitutional.

Held:
The court finds that the provision confessing the authority upon the Energy Regulatory
Board to impose additional amount s on petroleum products provides sufficient standard by which
the authority must be exercised.
























42. CHIONGBIAN, et.al. v. ORBOS et.al.
G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995

FACTS:
Pursuant to the Constitution, Congress passed R.A 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in MuslimMindanao calling for a plebiscite to create an autonomous region. The provinces of
Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao,Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, which voted for the creation of such region were
later on known as the Autonomous Region inMuslim Mindanao. Consistent with the authority
granted by Article XIX, Section 13 of RA 6734 which authorizesthe President to merge the
existing regions, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O No. 429 providing for
theReorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao.Petitioners contend that Art. XIX,
Section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because it unduly delegateslegislative
power to the President by authorizing him to merge by administrative determination the existing
regionsor at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated and
that the power granted is notexpressed in the title of the law.aw libraryThey also challenge the
validity of E.O. No. 429 on the ground that the power granted by RA 6734 to the Presidentis only to
merge regions IX and XII but not to reorganize the entire administrative regions in Mindanao and
certainlynot to transfer the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the R.A 6734 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the Presidents
discretion.

HELD:
No, in conferring on the President the power to merge by
administrative determination the existing regions following the establishment of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous
legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. The choice of the
President as delegate is logical because the division of the country into regions is intended to
facilitate not only the administration of local governments but also the direction of executive
departments which the law requires should have regional offices. While
the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the
Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the
exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments. (Abbas v. COMELEC)
The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative
purposes. The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust municipal boundary
which has been described as "administrative in nature. (Pelaez v. Auditor General)Thus, the
regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are definition or redrawing of the lines
separating administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of
local government units by the President and insuring the efficient delivery of essential services.





43. Rodrigo v. Sandiganbayan
309 SCRA 661

Facts:
Conrado B. Rodrigo and Reynaldo G. Mejica are the Mayor and Municipal
Planning andDevelopment Coordinator, respectively, of San Nicolas, Pangasinan, while Alejandro A.
Facundois the former Municipal Treasurer of the
same municipality.In June 1992, the Municipality of San Nicolas, thru Mayor Rodrigo, entered into a
nagreement with Philwood Construction, represented by Larry Lu, for the electrification of Barangay
Caboloan, San Nicolas, for the sum of P486,386.18, requiring the installation of the 2units diesel
power generator, battery starter and other related installations.In September 1992, Mejica,
the Planning and Development Coordinator of San Nicolas,prepare
an Accomplishment Report stating that the Caboloan Power Generation project was97.5%
accomplished. Said report was supposedly approved by Mayor Rodrigo and confirmed
byLarry Lu. On the basis of said report, the municipal treasurer effected payment to PhilwoodConstru
ction.In August 1993, Rodrigo et. al. received a Notice of Disallowance from the ProvincialAuditor of P
angasinan, Atty. Agustin Chan, Jr., who found that as per COA evaluation of theelectrification
project, only 60.0171% of the project was actually accomplished. The ProvincialAuditor thus
disallowed the amount of P160,910.46.Rodrigo et. al. requested the Provincial Auditor to lift the
notice of disallowance and to re-inspect the project. They reiterated their plea in a letter to
the Provincial Auditor attachingtherewith a "Certificate of Acceptance and Completion" signed by Cle
mente Arquero, Jr.,Barangay Captain of Caboloan, Eusebio Doton, President of the Cabaloan Electric
Cooperative. The Provincial Auditor, however, allegedly did not act on their requests.On 10 January
1994, the Provincial Auditor filed a criminal complaint for estafa before theOmbudsman against
Rodrigo et. al., Larry Lu and Ramil Ang of Philwood Construction.In 1995, the Ombudsman approved
the filing of an information against Rodrigo et. al. forviolation of Anti-
Graft Law before the Sandiganbayan. Rodrigo et. al. filed a motion forreinvestigation before the Sandi
ganbayan. The Sandiganbayan granted it. The Office of theSpecial Prosecutor issued a memorandum
recommending that the charges against Rodrigo et. al.be maintained. The Ombudsman approved said
memorandum. Rodrigo et. al. then filed beforethe Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the information
alleging, as grounds therefor that (1) thefacts alleged in the information did not constitute an offense,
and (2) the same informationcharged more than one offense. Motion to quash denied.
The prosecution moved to suspendRodrigo et. al.pendente
lite. Rodrigo et. al. opposed the motion on the ground tht theSandiganbayan lacked jurisdiction over
them. The Sandiganbayan ruled that it had jurisdiction over them and ordered their suspension
pendente lite. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether there was violation of due process by the filing of the complaint by the Provincial Auditor.

Held:
No. Rodrigo et. al. argues that it is the duty of the auditor, by virtue of its issuance of disallowance, to
decide on their written explanation. And the auditors hasty filing of criminal complaint against them
denied them due process. However, Sec. 82 of State Audit Code states that the suspension shall
become a disallowance if the charge of suspension is "not satisfactorily explained within ninety-day
period within which the accountable officer may answer the charge of suspension may nevertheless
be extended by the Commission or the auditor for good cause shown. It must be noted that
disallowance and suspension are two distinct concepts. A disallowance is the disapproval
of a credit or credits to an account/accountable officer'saccountability due to non-compliance with
law or regulations. Thus, the auditor may disallow an expenditure/transaction which is unlawful or
improper. A suspension, on the other hand, is the deferment of action to debit/credit the
account/accountable ability pending compliance with certain requirements. A notice of
suspension is issued on transactions or accounts which could otherwise have been settled except for
some requirements, like lack of supporting documents or certain signatures. It is also issued on
transactions or accounts the legality/propriety of which the auditor doubts but which he may later
allow after satisfactory or valid justification is submitted by the parties concerned. Rodrigo et. al.
misinterpreted Section44.6.4 of the Code. The auditor actually issued a disallowance and not a mere
suspension and that the "written explanation" was "for the purpose of lifting the suspension or
extending the time to answer beyond the ninety (90) day period prior to its conversion into a
disallowance," not for contesting a disallowance. In fact, under COA Circular No. 85-156-B, the
Provincial Auditor is duty-bound to file a complaint before the Ombudsman when, from the evidence
obtained during the audit, he is convinced that "criminal prosecution is warranted." The Provincial
Auditor need not resolve the opposition to the notice of disallowance and the motion for re-inspection
pending in his office before he institutes such complaint so long as there are sufficient grounds to
support the same. The right to due process of Rodrigo et. al. to the complaint, insofar as the criminal
aspect of the case is concerned, is not impaired by such institution. They will still have the
opportunity to confront the accusations contained in the complaint during the preliminary
investigation. They may still raise the same defenses contained in their motion to lift the
disallowance, as well as other defenses, in the preliminary investigation. Should the Provincial
Auditor later reverse himself and grant respondent's motions, or should the COA, or this Court,
subsequently absolve them from liability during the pendency of the preliminary investigation,
the respondents may ask the prosecuting officer to take cognizance of such decision. The
prosecuting officer may then accord such decision its proper weight.
Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Rodrigo et. al.
Held:
Yes. Although RA 7975 limits the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to those government officials
having Salary Grade 27 or higher, municipal mayors were re-classified from Salary Grade24 to Salary
Grade 27 by virtue of RA 6758 which took effect on July 1, 1989. Rodrigo however, claim that at the
time of the commission of the alleged crime on or about 2 September 1992,Mayor Rodrigo, the
highest public ranking public official impleaded in this case, was receiving a monthly salary
of P10,441.00. Such amount 6758 is supposedly equivalent to a fourth step increment in Grade 24
under the Salary Schedule prescribed in Section 7 of R.A. No. 6758. This argument is too simplistic.
Section 5, Article IX-C of the Constitution provides that the Congress shall provide for the
standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporation with original charters, taking into account the nature
of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions. Congress
enacted R.A. No. 6758. Section 2 thereof declares it the policy of the State "to provide equal pay
for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in
duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions." To give life to this policy,
as well as the constitutional prescription to take into account the nature of the responsibilities
pertaining to, and the qualifications required for the positions of government officials and employees,
Congress adopted the scheme employed in P.D. No. 985 for classifying positions with
comparable responsibilities and qualifications for the purpose of according such positions similar
salaries. This scheme is known as the "Grade," defined in P.D. No. 985 as including all classes of
positions which, although different with respect to kind or subject matter of work, are sufficiently
equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the
work to warrant the inclusion of such classes of positions within one range of basic compensation.
The Grade is therefore a means of grouping positions "sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty
and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work" so that that may be lumped
together in "one range of basic compensation." Thus, Congress, under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6758,
fixed the Salary Grades34 ["Salary Grade" is "the numerical place on the Salary Schedule
representing multiple steps or rates which is assigned to a class. That Rodrigo received a salary less
than that prescribed for such Grade is explained by Sections 10 and 19 (b) of R.A. No. 6758 which
provides that a local government official's actual salary may be less than what the Salary Schedule
under Section 7 prescribes, depending on the class and financial capability of his or her respective
local government unit. This circumstance, however, has no bearing on such official's Grade. An
official's salary is determined by the Grade accorded his position, and ultimately by the nature of his
position - the level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the
work. To give credence to petitioners' argument that Mayor Rodrigo's salary determines his Grade
would be to misconstrue the provisions of R.A. No. 6758, and ignore the constitutional and statutory
policies behind said law. Rodrigos position having been classified as Grade 27 in accordance with
R.A. No. 6758, and having been charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, petitioner is
subject to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, as defined by Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606,
as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975.

44. People vs. Vera
65 PHIL 56 (1937-1938)

Facts:

Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was
elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting
new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of.
Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied
the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be
set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng
under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of
Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted
person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only
indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is
unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said
law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of
power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to
provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is undue delegation of power.

HELD:

The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an
imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided
by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial
boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non
delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The
challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in
those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation
officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be
appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation
Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may
have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces
where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation.













45. Solicitor General vs. Metropolitan Manila Authority
204 SCRA 837 (1991)
Facts:
On July 13, 1990 the Court held in the case of Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic
District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for
traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila
Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid down by LOI 43 in the
case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. Even the confiscation of drivers licenses for
traffic violations was not directly prescribed or allowed by the decree. After no motion for
reconsideration of the decision was filed the judgment became final and executor. Withstanding
the Gonong decision still violations of the said decision transpired, wherein there were several
persons who sent complaint letters to the Court regarding the confiscation of drivers licenses
and removal of license plate numbers. On May 24, 1990 the MMA issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of
1991, authorizing itself to detach license plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned
motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila.On July 2, 1991, the
Court issued a resolution regarding the matter which stated that the Ordinance No. 11, Section 2
appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court, and that the Court has received several
complaints against the enforcement of such ordinance.
Issue:
W/N Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1991 and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998 arevalid in the exercise
of such delegated power to local government acting only as agents of the national legislature?
Held:
No, the Court rendered judgment: 1) declaring Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the MMA
and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Null and Void; and 2)
enjoining all law-enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license plates of
motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI43) and confiscating drivers licenses for traffic
violations within the said area.
















46. ABAKADA Guro Party List v Purisima
G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008

Facts:
1. This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing
Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005).RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of
Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed
their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of
Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers
all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of
employment status

2. Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of
RA 9335, tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and
incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into
mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of
suchrewards. Petitioners also assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on
the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers, for it permits legislative
participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.

Issue:
Whether or not the joint congressional committee is valid and constitutional.

Held:

No. It is unconstitutional.In the case of Macalintal, in the discussion of J. Puno,
The power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhanceits
understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly,
oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor
bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agenciesare
properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent
executive usurpation of legislative authority,and (d) to assess executive conformity with the
congressional perception of public interest.

The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and
integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government With this
backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither
necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines
the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral tothe checks and balances inherent in a
democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as itprevents
the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.

However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative
sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may not
vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either executive or judicial power.

And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under the Constitution including the procedure for
enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as
this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be
confined to the following:(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress
power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection withit, its power to ask
heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining
to their departments and its power of confirmation and (2)investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by
the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to
present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or
through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such
regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight
committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash
(other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially
delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution's diagram of
power asit entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.


















47. US v Ang Tang Ho
GR L-17122 February 27, 1922

Facts:
The Philippine Legislature enacted Act 2868 with one of its salient provisions, Section 1,
authorizing the governor-General from any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of
palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying
out the purposes of the Act. Thus, on August 1, 1919, the Governor-General signed EO 53, fixing the
price of rice. On August 6, 1919, Ang TangHo was caught selling a ganta of rice at the price of eighty
centavos, a price higher than that fixed by EO 53. Defendant was found guilty and now assails the
constitutionality of the Act 2868 for invalid delegation of legislative powers.
Issue:
Whether or not Act 2868 is unconstitutional?

Held:
Yes. Said Act constituted an invalid delegation of power since the said Act authorized the
Governor-General to promulgate laws and not merely rules and regulations to effect the law. The said
Act was not complete when it left the legislature as it failed to specify what conditions the Governor-
General shall issue the proclamation as the said Act states for any cause. It also failed to define
extraordinary rise that such proclamation by the Governor-General aims to prevent. Lastly, the said
Act authorized the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures by the Governor-
General.















48. EMPLOYERS CONFEDERATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NATIONAL WAGES AND
PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION
G.R. No. 96169 September 24, 1991


Facts:

On October 15, 1990, the Regional Board of the National Capital Region issued Wage Order No. NCR-
01, increasing the minimum wage by P17.00 daily in the National Capital Region. The Trade Union
Congress of the Philippines (TUCP) moved for reconsideration; so did the Personnel Management
Association of the Philippines (PMAP). ECOP opposed.

On October 23, 1990, the Board issued Wage Order No. NCR01-A, amending Wage Order No. NCR-
01. It provides that all workers and employees in the private sector in the National Capital Region
already receiving wages above the statutory minimum wage rates up to one hundred and twenty-five
pesos (P125.00) per day shall also receive an increase of seventeen pesos (P17.00) per day.

ECOP appealed to the National Wages and Productivity Commission contending that the board's
grant of an "across-the-board" wage increase to workers already being paid more than existing
minimum wage rates (up to P125.00 a day) as an alleged excess of authority. ECOP further alleges
that under the Republic Act No. 6727, the boards may only prescribe "minimum wages," not
determine "salary ceilings." ECOP likewise claims that Republic Act No. 6727 is meant to promote
collective bargaining as the primary mode of settling wages, and in its opinion, the boards can not
preempt collective bargaining agreements by establishing ceilings.

On November 6, 1990, the Commission promulgated an Order, dismissing the appeal for lack of
merit. On November 14, 1990, the Commission denied reconsideration. ECOP then, elevated the case
via petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

The main issue in this case is whether Wage Order No. NCR-01-A providing for new wage rates, as
well as authorizing various Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Boards to prescribe minimum
wage rates for all workers in the various regions, and for a National Wages and Productivity
Commission to review, among other functions, wage levels determined by the boards is valid.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the National Wages and Productivity Commission and Regional
Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board-NCR, Trade Union Congress of the Philippines and denied
the petition of ECOP.

The Supreme Court held that Republic Act No. 6727 was intended to rationalize wages, first, by
providing for full-time boards to police wages round-the-clock, and second, by giving the boards
enough powers to achieve this objective. The Court is of the opinion that Congress meant the boards
to be creative in resolving the annual question of wages without labor and management knocking on
the legislature's door at every turn.
.
The Court's opinion is that if Republic No. 6727 intended the boards alone to set floor wages, the Act
would have no need for a board but an accountant to keep track of the latest consumer price index,
or better, would have Congress done it as the need arises, as the legislature, prior to the Act, has
done so for years. The fact of the matter is that the Act sought a "thinking" group of men and women
bound by statutory standards. The Court is not convinced that the Regional Board of the National
Capital Region, in decreeing an across-the-board hike, performed an unlawful act of legislation. It is
true that wage-firing, like rate-fixing, constitutes an act Congress; it is also true, however, that
Congress may delegate the power to fix rates provided that, as in all delegations cases, Congress
leaves sufficient standards. As this Court has indicated, it is impressed that the above-quoted
standards are sufficient, and in the light of the floor-wage method's failure, the Court believes that
the Commission correctly upheld the Regional Board of the National Capital Region.

49. People vs. Rosenthal
68 PHIL 328
Facts:
Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmea were founders and shareholders of the ORO Oil
Company. The main endeavor of the company is to mine, refine, market, buy and sell petroleum,
natural gas and other oil products. Rosenthal and Osmea were found guilty of selling their shares to
individuals without actual tangible assets. Their shares were merely based on speculations and
future gains. This is in violation of Sections 2 and 5 of Act No. 2581. Section of said law provides that
every person, partnership, association, or corporation attempting to offer to sell in the Philippines
speculative securities of any kind or character whatsoever, is under obligation to file previously with
the Insular Treasurer the various documents and papers enumerated therein and to pay the required
tax of twenty-pesos. Sec 5, on the other hand, provides that whenever the said Treasurer of the
Philippine Islands is satisfied, either with or without the examination herein provided, that any
person, partnership, association or corporation is entitled to the right to offer its securities as above
defined and provided for sale in the Philippine Islands, he shall issue to such person, partnership,
association or corporation a certificate or permit reciting that such person, partnership, association
or corporation has complied with the provisions of this act, and that such person, partnership,
association or corporation, its brokers or agents are entitled to order the securities named in said
certificate or permit for sale; that said Treasurer shall furthermore have authority, when ever in his
judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel said certificate or permit, and that an appeal from the
decision of the Insular Treasurer may be had within the period of thirty days to the Secretary of
Finance. Rosenthal argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional because no standard or rule is fixed in
the Act which can guide said official in determining the cases in which a certificate or permit ought to
be issued, thereby making his opinion the sole criterion in the matter of its issuance, with the result
that, legislative powers being unduly delegated to the Insular Treasurer, Act No. 2581 is
unconstitutional.

Issue:

Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the Internal Treasurer.

Held:

The SC is of the opinion that the Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Insular Treasurer
to follow in reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit. The
certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the person, partnership, association
or corporation applying therefor has complied with the provisions of this Act, and this requirement,
construed in relation to the other provisions of the law, means that a certificate or permit shall be
issued by the Insular Treasurer when the provisions of Act No. 2581 have been complied with. Upon
the other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly
conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation is in the public interest. In view of the intention
and purpose of Act No. 2581 to protect the public against speculative schemes which have no
more basis than so many feet of blue sky and against the sale of stock in fly-by-night concerns,
visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations, we incline to hold
that public interest in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a
decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits. And the term
public interest is not without a settled meaning. Rosenthal insists that the delegation of authority to
the Commission is invalid because the stated criterion is uncertain. That criterion is the public
interest. It is a mistaken assumption that this is a mere general reference to public welfare without
any standard to guide determinations. The purpose of the Act, the requirement it imposes, and the
context of the provision in question show the contrary. . .







50. Agustin Vs. Edu
88 SCRA 195
Facts:
President Marcos issued the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which states that all owners, users
or drivers shall have at all times one pair of early warning devise (EWD) in their cars acquire from any
source depending on the owners choice. The Letter of Instruction was assailed by petitioner Leovillo
Agustin to have violated the constitution guarantee of due process against Hon Edu, Land
Transportation Commissioner, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of national Defense, Hon. Juinio,
Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communication and Hon. Aquino, Minister of Public
Highways. Because of such contentions, the Implementing Rules and Regulation was ordered to be
suspended for a period of 6 months. Petitioner alleges that EWD are not necessary because vehicles
already have hazard lights (blinking lights) that can be use as a warning device. Also petitioner
contest that the letter of instruction violates the delegation of police power because it is deemed
harsh, oppressive and unreasonable for the motorists and those dealers of EWD will become instant
millionaires because of such law.

Issue:
Whether or not Petitioners contentions possess merit.

Held:
Petitioners contentions are without merit because the exercise of police power may interfere
with personal liberty or property to ensure and promote the safety, health and prosperity of the State.
Also, such letter of instruction is intended to promote public safety and it is indeed a rare occurrence
that such contention was alleged in a instruction with such noble purpose. Petitioner also failed to
present the factual foundation that is necessary to invalidate the said letter of instruction. In cases
where there is absence in the factual foundation, it should be presumed that constitutionality shall
prevail. Pres. Marcos on the other hand possesses vital statistics that will justify the need for the
implementation of this instruction. As signatory to the 1968 Vienna Conventions on Road Signs and
Signals, our country must abide with the standards given as stated in our Constitution that the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of International Law as part of the law of the
land. In the case at bar, the Vienna Convention also requires the use of EWD. Vehicle owners are not
obliged to buy an EDW. They can personally create a EWD provided that it is in accordance to the
specifications provided by law. Petitioners allegation against the manufacturers of EDW being
millionaires is deemed to be an unfounded speculation. Wherefore, the petition is dismissed. The
restraining order regarding the implementation of the Reflector Law is lifted making the said law
immediately executory.






51. Ynot v. IAC
148 SCRA 659

Facts:
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To
strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from
interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught
transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot
averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process.
He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being
heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of
police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of
carabaos.
Issue:
Whether or not the law is valid.

Held:
The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A created a
presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the
other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to
defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated.
The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the
method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law
and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of
separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties
arbitrarily taken.










52. US VS. PANLILIO
28 PHIL 608
Facts:
The accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760 relating to the quarantining of animals
suffering from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and sentencing him to pay a fine of
P40 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of trial. It is alleged that
the accused illegally and without being authorized to do so, and while quarantine against the said
carabaos exposed to rinder pest was still in effect, permitted and ordered said carabaos to be taken
from the corral in which they were quarantined and drove them from one place to another. The
accused contends that the facts alleged in the information and proved on the trial do not constitute a
violation of Act No. 1760
Issue:
Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the Bureau of Agriculture?
Held:
NO. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made
unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders. Section 8 of Act
No. 1760 provides that any person violating any of the provisions of the Act shall, upon conviction, be
punished. However, the only sections of the Act which prohibit acts and pronounce them as unlawful
are Sections 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall within any of them. A violation of the orders of the
Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph, is not a violation of the provision of the Act. The
orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to have the force of law, are
statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense
unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. No wherein
Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is
such violation punished in any way therein. However, the accused did violate Art. 581, 2 of
the Penal Code which punishes any person who violates regulations or ordinances with reference to
epidemic disease among animals













53. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation
567 SCRA 354

Facts:

1) 6 Aug 1994 Board of Directors of IRC approved a Memorandum of Agreement (MoA)
with Ganda Holdings Berhad (GHB).
a. Under the MoA, IRC acquired 100% or the entire capital stock of Ganda Energy
Holdings, Inc. (GEHI), which would own and operate a 102 megawatt gas turbine
power-generating barge.
b. Also stipulated is that GEHI would assume a five-year power purchase contract with
National Power Corp. At that time, GEHIs power-generating barge was 97% complete
and would go on-line by mid-Sept 1994.
c. In exchange, IRC will issue to GHB 55% of the expanded capital stock of IRC
(amounting to 40.88 billion shares total par value of P488.44 million)
d. On the side, IRC would acquire 67% of the entire capital stock of Philippine Racing
Club, Inc. (PRCI). PRCI owns 25.724 hectares of real estate property in Makati.
e. Under the Agreement, GHB, a member of the Westmont Group of Companies in
Malaysia, shall extend or arrange a loan required to pay for the proposed acquisition
by IRC of PRCI.
2) 8 Aug 1994 IRC alleged that a press release announcing the approval of the agreement was
sent through fax to Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) and the SEC, but that the fax machine of
SEC could not receive it. Upon the advice of SEC, IRC sent the press release on the morning
of 9 Aug 1994.
3) SEC averred that it received reports that IRC failed to make timely public disclosures of
its negotiations with GHB and that some of its directors heavily traded IRC shares
utilizing this material insider information.
4) 16 Aug 1994 SEC Chairman issued a directive requiring IRC to submit to SEC a copy of its
aforesaid MoA with GHB and further directed all principal officers of IRC to appear at a
hearing before the Brokers and Exchanges Dept (BED) of SEC to explain IRCs failure to
immediately disclose the information as required by the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts
by Corporations Whose Securities are Listed in Any Stock Exchange or Registered/Licensed
Under the Securities Act
5) IRC sent a letter to SEC, attaching copies of MoA and its directors appeared to explain IRCs
alleged failure to immediately disclose material information as required under the Rules on
Disclosure of Material Facts.
6) 19 Sept 1994 SEC Chairman issued an Order finding that IRC violated the Rules on
Disclosure when it failed to make timely disclosure, and that some of the officers and
directors of IRC entered into transactions involving IRC shares in violation of Sec 30, in
relation to Sec 36 of the Revised Securities Act.
7) IRC filed an Omnibus Motion (later an Amended Omnibus Motion) alleging that SEC had no
authority to investigate the subject matter, since under Sec 8 of PD 902-A, as amended by PD
1758, jurisdiction was conferred upon the Prosecution and Enforcement Dept (PED) of SEC
8) IRC also claimed that SEC violated their right to due process when it ordered that the
respondents appear before SEC and show cause why no administrative, civil or criminal
sanctions should be imposed on them, and thus, shifted the burden of proof to the
respondents. They filed a Motion for Continuance of Proceedings.
9) No formal hearings were conducted in connection with the Motions.
10) 25 Jan 1995 SEC issued an Omnibus Order: creating a special investigating panel to hear
and decide the case in accordance with Rules of Practice and Procedure before the PED, SEC;
to recall the show cause orders; and to deny the Motion for Continuance for lack of merit.
11) Respondents filed a petition before the CA questioning the Omnibus Orders and filed a
Supplemental Motion wherein they prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
12) 5 May 1995 CA granted their motion and issued a writ of preliminary injunction, which
effectively enjoined SEC from filing any criminal, civil or administrative case against the
respondents.
13) 20 Aug 1998 CA promulgated a Decision
a. Determined that there were no implementing rules and regulations regarding
disclosure, insider trading, or any of the provisions of the Revised Securities
Acts which respondents allegedly violated.
b. It found no statutory authority for SEC to initiate and file any suit for civil liability
under Sec 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, thus, it ruled that no civil,
criminal or administrative proceedings may possibly be held against the respondents
without violating their rights to due process and equal protection.
c. It further resolved that absent any implementing rules, the SEC cannot be allowed to
quash the assailed Omnibus Orders
d. Further decided that the Rules of Practice and Procedure before the PED did not
comply with the statutory requirements contained in the Administrative Code of
1997. Section 9, Rule V of the Rules of Practice and Procedure before the PED affords
a party the right to be present but without the right to cross-examine witnesses
presented against him, in violation of Sec 12(3), Chap 3, Book VII of the Administrative
Code.

Issues:
Do sections 8, 30, and 36 of the Revised Securities Act require the enactment of implementing
rules to make them binding and effective? No.


Held:

1) Sections 8, 30, and 36 of the Revised Securities Act (RSA) do not require the enactment of
implementing rules to make them binding and effective.
The mere absence of implementing rules cannot effectively invalidate provisions of law, where
a reasonable construction that will support the law may be given.
Absence of any constitutional or statutory infirmity, which may concern Secs 30 and 36 of
RSA, the provisions are legal and binding.
Every law has in its favour the presumption of validity. Unless and until a specific provision of
the law is declared invalid and unconstitutional, the same is valid and binding for all intents
and purposes.
The Court does not discern any vagueness or ambiguity in Sec 30 and 36 of RSA
o Sec 30 Insiders duty to disclose when trading
Insiders are obligated to disclose material information to the other party or
abstain from trading the shares of his corporation. This duty to disclose or
abstain is based on two factors:
1. the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit
of anyone
2. the inherent unfairness involved when a party takes advantage of such information
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.
The intent of the law is the protection of investors against fraud, committed
when an insider, using secret information, takes advantage of an uninformed
investor.
In some cases, however, there may be valid corporate reasons for nondisclosure
of material information. Where such reasons exist, an issuers decision not to
make any public disclosures is not ordinarily considered as a violation of
insider trading. At the same time, the undisclosed information should not be
improperly used for non-corporate purposes, particularly to disadvantage other
persons with whom an insider might transact, and therefore the insider must
abstain from entering into transactions involving such securities.
o Sec 36 Directors, officers and principal stockholders
A straightforward provision that imposes upon:
1. a beneficial owner of more than 10 percent of any class of any equity security
or
2. a director or any officer of the issuer of such security
the obligation to submit a statement indicating his or her ownership of the issuers securities and
such changes in his or her ownership.
Sections 30 and 36 of the RSA were enacted to promote full disclosure
in the securities market and prevent unscrupulous individuals, who by
their positions obtain non-public information, from taking advantage of
an uninformed public.
Sec 30 prevented the unfair use of non-public information in securities
transactions, while Sec 36 allowed the Sec to monitor the transactions
entered into by corporate officers and directors as regards the securities
of their companies.
The lack of implementing rules cannot suspend the effectivity of these
provisions.





















54. Romeo P. Gerochi et.al., petitioners
vs.
Department of Energy (DOE) et.al, respondent
G.R. No. 159796 July 17, 2007

Facts:
Petitioner come before the Court praying that Section 34 of R.A. 9136, otherwise known as the
Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), imposing the universall charge, and Rule 16 of
the Rules and Regulations (IRR) which seeks to implement the said imposition, be declared
unconstitutional. Petitioners asserted that said universal charge has the characteristics of a tax and
are collected to fund the operations of NPC. They also pray that the universal charge imposed upon
the consumers be refunded and that a preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
(TRO) be issued directing the respondent to refrain from implementing, charging and collecting the
said charge.
Respondents contend that the assailed universal charge is levied for a specific regulatory
purpose which is to ensure the viability of the country;s electric power industry. They also contend
that the universal charge does not possess the essential characteristics of a tax, that its imposition
would redound to the benefit of the electric power industry and not to the public, and that its rate is
uniformly levied electricity end-users, unlike a tax which is imposed on the individual taxpayers
ability to pay.
Issue:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of Energy
Regulatory Commission.
Held:
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification,
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution and not one that is doubtful,
speculative or argumentative. Petitioners failed to overcome this presumption
1. It can be gleaned that the assailed universal charge is not a tax but an exaction in the
exercise of the states police power to be able to promote public welfare.
2. On the premise, the PSALM submits that there is no undue delegation of legislative power to
the ERC since the latter merely exercise a limit of authority as to the execution of
implementation of the provisions of EPIRA.








55. Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. (PSL) vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority
608 SCRA 442 December 18, 2009
Facts:
PSL is a company engage in the business of laundry services. On 6 June 2001 the
Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR endowed to respondent Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA), the inspection report on the complaint of black smoke emission from petitioners
plant. On 22 June 2001, LLDA conducted an investigation and found that untreated wastewater
generated by the petitioners laundry washing activities was discharged directly to the San Francisco
Del Monte River. The report further showed that petitioners plant was operating without clearance
and discharge permit from LLDA. The latter conducted wastewater sampling of petitioners effluent.
The result showed non-compliance with effluent standards particularly Total suspended Solids,
Biochemical Oxygen Demand, Oil/Grease Concentration and Color Units. Consequently, LLDA issued
to petitioner a Notice of Violation and ordered the latter to pay a penalty of P1,000.00 per day of
discharging pollutive water and a fine of P5,000.00 per year for operating without the necessary
clearance/permits from LLDA.
Issue:
Whether or not the grant of implied power to LLDA to impose penalties violate the rule on
non-delagation of legislative powers.
Held:
Petitioner contends that if LLDA is deemed to have implied power to impose penalties, then
LLDA will have unfettered discretion to determine for itself the penalties it may impose, which will
amount to undue delegation of legislative power.
We do not agree. Contrary to petitioners contention, LLDAs power to impose fines is not
unrestricted. In this case, LLDA investigated the pollution complaint against petitioner and
conducted wastewater sampling of petitioners effluent. It was only after the investigation result
showing petitioners failure to meet the established water and effluent quality standards that LLDA
imposed a fine against petitioner. LLDA then impose upon petitioner a penalty of P1,000 per day of
discharging pollutive wastewater. The penalty is in accordance with the amount of penalty prescribed
under PD 984.
Clearly, there are adequate statutory limitations on LLDAs power to impose fines which
obviates unbridled discretion in the exercise of such power.









56. People of the Philippines vs. Que Po Lay
94 SCRA 640 March 29, 1954
Facts:
Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating
Central Bank Circular No.20 in connection with Section 34 of RA 265 sentencing him to suffer 6
months imprisonment, pay the fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs.
The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US
dollars, US checks and US money orders amounting to $7,000 failed to sell the same to the Central
Bank as required by Circular No. 20. The appeal is based on the claim that said circular was not
published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that
consequently, said circular had no force effect.
Issue:
Whether or not publication of Circular No. 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to become
effective and subject violators to corresponding penalties.
Held:
It is true that Circular No. 20 is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation
of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to jurisprudence.
Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 in question which
prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the
general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and
specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.















57. People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Judge Auxencio Dacuycuy
173 SCRA 90
Facts:
Private respondents were charged with violation of RA4670, otherwise known as Magna Carta
for Public School Teachers. They contended that the facts charged do not constitute an offense since
the penal provision, which is Section 32 of said law, is unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1)
it imposes a cruel and unusual punishment (2) it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if
the latter were the legislative department of the Government.
Issue:
Whether or not the penal provision in question constitutes undue delegation of legislative
power.
Held:
Section 32 of RA 4670 provides for an indeterminable period of imprisonment, with neither a
minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by the legislative authority. The courts are thus
given a wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment, without even the benefit of any
sufficient standard, such that the duration thereof may range, in the words of respondent judge, from
one minute to the lifespan of the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be allowed. It vests in the courts a
power and a duty essentially legislative in nature and which, as applied to this case, does violence to
the rules on separation of powers as well as the non-delegability of legislative powers.
















58. Carbonilla v. Board of Airlines Representatives

657 SCRA 775

Facts:
The Bureau of Customs issued Customs Administrative Order No. 1-2005 (CAO 1-2005)
amending CAO 7-92. The Department of Finance approved CAO 1-2005 on 9 February 2006. CAO 7-
92 and CAO 1-2005 were promulgated pursuant to Section 3506 in relation to Section 608 of the
Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP)Petitioners Office of the President, et al. alleged
that prior to the amendment of CAO 7-92, the BOC created on 23 April 2002 a committee to review
the overtime pay of Customs personnel in Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and to propose
its adjustment from the exchange rate of P25 to US$1 to the then exchange rate of P55 to US$1. The
Office of the President, et al. alleged that for a period of more than two years from the creation of the
committee, several meetings were conducted with the agencies concerned, including respondent
Board of Airlines Representatives (BAR), to discuss the proposed rate adjustment that would be
embodied in an Amendatory Customs Administrative Order. On the other hand, BAR alleged that it
learned of the proposed increase in the overtime rates only sometime in 2004 and only through
unofficial reports.

On 23 August 2004, BAR wrote a letter addressed to Edgardo L. De Leon, Chief, Bonded
Warehouse Division, BOC-NAIA, informing the latter of its objection to the proposed increase in the
overtime rates. BAR further requested for a meeting to discuss the matter.
BAR wrote the Secretary of Finance on 31 January 2005 and 21 February 2005 reiterating its
concerns against the issuance of CAO 1-2005. In a letter dated 3 March 2005, the Acting District
Collector of BOC informed BAR that the Secretary of Finance already approved CAO 1-2005 on 9
February 2005. As such, the increase in the overtime rates became effective on 16 March 2005. BAR
still requested for an audience with the Secretary of Finance which was granted on 12 October
2005. The BOC then sent a letter to BARs member airlines demanding payment of overtime services
to BOC personnel in compliance with CAO 1-2005. The BARs member airlines refused and
manifested their intention to file a petition with the Commissioner of Customs and/or the Secretary
of Finance to suspend the implementation of CAO 1-2005. In a letter dated 31 August 2006
Undersecretary Gaudencio A. Mendoza, Jr. (Usec. Mendoza), Legal and Revenue Operations Group,
Department of Finance informed BAR, through its Chairman Felix J. Cruz (Cruz), that they find no
valid ground to disturb the validity of CAO 1-2005, much less to suspend its implementation or
effectivity and that its implementation effective 16 March 2005 is legally proper. In separate letters
both dated 4 December 2006, Cruz requested the Office of the President and the Office of the
Executive Secretary to review the decision of Usec. Mendoza. Cruz manifested the objection of the
International Airlines operating in the Philippines to CAO 1-2005. On 13 December 2006, Deputy
Executive Secretary Manuel B. Gaite (Deputy Exec. Sec. Gaite) issued an Order

requiring BAR to pay
its appeal fee and submit an appeal memorandum within 15 days from notice. BAR paid the appeal
fee and submitted its appeal memorandum on 19 January 2007. The Court of Appeals ruled that
Section 8, Article IX(B) of the Constitution prohibits an appointive public officer or employee from
receiving additional, double or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law. The
Court of Appeals ruled that Section 3506 of the TCCP only authorized payment of additional
compensation for overtime work, and thus, the payment of traveling and meal allowances under CAO
7-92 and CAO 1-2005 are unconstitutional and could not be enforced against BAR members.

Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in declaring Section 3506 of the TCCP,
CAO 7-92, and CAO 1-2005 unenforceable against BAR.
Held:
BARs argument has no merit.
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals in excluding airline companies, aircraft owners, and
operators from the coverage of Section 3506 of the TCCP. The term other persons served refers to all
other persons served by the BOC employees. Airline companies, aircraft owners, and operators are
among other persons served by the BOC employees. As pointed out by the OSG, the processing of
embarking and disembarking from aircrafts of passengers, as well as their baggages and cargoes,
forms part of the BOC functions. BOC employees who serve beyond the regular office hours are
entitled to overtime pay for the services they render. The Court of Appeals ruled that, applying the
principle of ejusdem generis, airline companies, aircraft owners, and operators are not in the same
category as importers and shippers because an importer brings goods to the country from a foreign
country and pays custom duties while a shipper is one who ships goods to another; one who
engages the services of a carrier of goods; one who tenders goods to a carrier for transportation.
However, airline passengers pass through the BOC to declare whether they are bringing goods that
need to be taxed. The passengers cannot leave the airport of entry without going through the BOC.
Clearly, airline companies, aircraft owners, and operators are among the persons served by the BOC
under Section 3506 of the TCCP. The overtime pay of BOC employees may be paid by any of the
following: (1) all the taxpayers in the country; (2) the airline passengers; and (3) the airline companies
which are expected to pass on the overtime pay to passengers. If the overtime pay is taken from all
taxpayers, even those who do not travel abroad will shoulder the payment of the overtime pay. If the
overtime pay is taken directly from the passengers or from the airline companies, only those who
benefit from the overtime services will pay for the services rendered. Here, Congress deemed it proper
that the payment of overtime services shall be shouldered by the other persons served by the BOC,
that is, the airline companies. This is a policy decision on the part of Congress that is within its
discretion to determine. Such determination by Congress is not subject to judicial review. We do not
agree with the Court of Appeals that Section 3506 of the TCCP failed the completeness and sufficient
standard tests. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. The second test requires adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the
boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Contrary to the
ruling of the Court of Appeals, Section 3506 of the TCCP complied with these requirements. The law
is complete in itself that it leaves nothing more for the BOC to do: it gives authority to the Collector to
assign customs employees to do overtime work; the Commissioner of Customs fixes the rates; and it
provides that the payments shall be made by the importers, shippers or other persons served. Section
3506 also fixed the standard to be followed by the Commissioner of Customs when it provides that
the rates shall not be less than that prescribed by law to be paid to employees of private
enterprise.Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, BOC employees rendering overtime services
are not receiving double compensation for the overtime pay, travel and meal allowances provided for
under CAO 7-92 and CAO 1-2005. Section 3506 provides that the rates shall not be less than that
prescribed by law to be paid to employees of private enterprise. The overtime pay, travel and meal
allowances are payment for additional work rendered after regular office hours and do not constitute
double compensation prohibited under Section 8, Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution as they are in
fact authorized by law or Section 3506 of the TCCP. BAR raises the alleged failure of BOC to publish
the required notice of public hearing and to conduct public hearings to give all parties the
opportunity to be heard prior to the issuance of CAO 1-2005 as required under Section 9(2), Chapter
I, Book VII of the Administrative Code of the Philippines. Section 9(2) provides:
Sec. 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as
practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the
opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule. (2) In the fixing of rates, no
rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a
newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.(3) In
cases of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.The BOC created a
committee to re-evaluate the proposed increase in the rate of overtime pay and for two years,
several meetings were conducted with the agencies concerned to discuss the proposal. BAR
and the Airline Operators Council participated in these meetings and discussions.
Hence, BAR cannot claim that it was denied due process in the imposition of the increase of
the overtime rate. CAO 1-2005 was published in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines on 18 February 2005 and while it was supposed to take effect on
5 March 2005, or 15 days after its publication, the BOC-NAIA still deferred BARs compliance
until 16 March 2005. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition in G.R. No. 193247. We GRANT
the petition in G.R. No. 194276 and SET ASIDE the 9 July 2009 Decision and 26 October
2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103250. Petitioner Bureau of
Customs is DIRECTED to implement CAO 1-2005 immediately.










59. ROBERT V. TOBIAS, ET AL. vs. BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, ET AL.


Facts:

Mandaluyong and San Juan were one legislative district until the passage of the RA 7675 with title
An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the
City of Mandaluyong." Same bill is now in question at to its constitutionality by the petitioners by
invoking their right as tax payers and residents of Mandaluyong.

With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994, people of Mandaluyong voted to for the the conversion of
Mandaluyong to a highly urbanized city ratifying RA 7675 and making it in effect.

Issues:

WON RA 7675 is in:

1. Violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution regarding 'one subject one bill rule".

2. Violation of Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) as to the number of members of the Congress to 250
and reappropriating the legislative districts.


Held:

Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed the contention of constitutionality
pertaining to Art VI 26(1) saying "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It
should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and
all the provisions are germane to that general subject."

As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" was enforced justifying the act
of the legislature to increase the number of the members of the congress.

Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the Congress itself which drafted the bill
reapportioning the legislative district.

In view of the foregoing facts, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.









60. MARIANO, JR. VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 118627; 242 SCRA 213, March 7, 1995 (Constitutional Law Requirements in challenging
the constitutionality of the law)
Facts:
Petitioners suing as tax payers, assail a provision (Sec 51) of RA No. 7859 (An Act Converting
the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati) on the
ground that the same attempts to alter or restart the 3-consecutive term limit for local elective
officials disregarding the terms previously served by them, which collides with the Constitution (Sec
8, Art X & Sec 7, Art VI).
Issue:
Whether or not challenge to the constitutionality of questioned law is with merit.
Held:
No. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well-
delineated. They are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be
necessary to the determination of the case itself.



















61.Sema vs COMELEC
Facts:
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of
Maguindanao but it is not part or ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a
plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1
st
legislative district
comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic Act and vesting it with power to
create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional
Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the
municipalities of the 1
st
district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1
st
district is now
only made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo
should be retained however just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be called
Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from
Congress as to Cotabatos status as a legislative district (or part of any).
Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato
(1
st
district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district
and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen was
from there and D was winning in fact he won). She contended that under the Constitution, upon
creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative representation
and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a
representative in the HOR.
COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S.
Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs.
Held:
RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by Section
10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in
the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or
barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must
follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with
any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution
for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government
units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies
the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict
arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards,
and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to
compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite
requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff
Kabunsuan province.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and
that a province, once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that
in order to have a legislative district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district.
Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so Semas contention is untenable. On the
other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a
legislative district. But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is
vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.
62. BAGABUYO v. COMELEC
GR No. 176970, December 8, 2008
Facts:
In 2006, Rep. Jaraula of Cagayan de Oro sponsored a bill increasing the citys legislative
district from one to two. It eventually became a law causing COMELEC to promulgate a resolution
that for the election of May 2007, Cagayan de Oro's voters would be classified as belonging to either
the first or the second district, depending on their place of residence. Bagabuyo filed a petition and
argued that COMELEC cannot implement the act without providing for the rules, regulations and
guidelines for the conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or conversion of a
local government unit.
Issue:
Whether or not a plebiscite is required in the case at bar.
Held:
No. The Court upheld COMELECs arguments that the law merely increased the
representation of CDO in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to
Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and that the criteria established under Section 10,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay. In this case, no
such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took
place. Further, the law did not bring about any change in CDOs territory, population and income
classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.








63. SENATOR BENIGNO C. AQUINO III V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010
Facts:
Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of Camarines
Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province. The said law
originated from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
on 12 October 2009.
To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to
create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of
Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second
district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716 violates the
constitutional standards that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (
250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the proposed first district will end up with a
population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Issue:
Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a
new legislative district in a province.
Held:
NO. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: Each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one
hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a province is entitled to at least
a representative, there is nothing mentioned about the population. Meanwhile, a city must first meet
a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000 minimum
population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.


64. ALDABA VS. COMELEC

Facts:
This is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9591 (RA
9591), creating a legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan, for violating the minimum
population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.

On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City Charter,2 by creating a
separate legislative district for the city. The population of Malolos City was 223,069. The population
of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that House Bill No. 3693
relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO)
that the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using
the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of
250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
We grant the petition and declare RA 9591 unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution
YES. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must
have a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.
House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated Certification of Regional Director Alberto N. Miranda of
Region III of the National Statistics Office (NSO) as authority that the population of the City of
Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010. The Certification states that the population of Malolos,
Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291. The Certification further states that it was issued upon the
request of Mayor Danilo A. Domingo of the City of Malolos in connection with the proposed creation of
Malolos City as a lone congressional district of the Province of Bulacan.

First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are declared
official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Second, certifications based on
demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying
officer. Third, intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every year.

Moreover, the Certification states that the total population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is
175,291. The Certification also states that the population growth rate of Malolos is 3.78% per year
between 1995 and 2000. Based on a growth rate of 3.78% per year, the population of Malolos of
175,291 in 2000 will grow to only 241,550 in 2010.

Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be based on
an official and credible source. That is why the OSG cited Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the
population projection would be unreliable or speculative.






65. OCAMPO VS. HRET
GR No. 158466, June 15, 2004
Facts:
In the case at bar, private respondent, a duly elected congressman, was declared disqualified
22 months after the May 14, 2001 elections. Petitioner avers that, having garnered the second
highest number of votes, the same should be declared the winner in the said elections.
Issue:
Whether or not a second placer in congressional elections can be proclaimed the duly elected
Congressman.
Held:
No, it is settled jurisprudence that the subsequent disqualification of a candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner. The latter could not be proclaimed winner as he could not
be considered the first among the qualified candidates.
Note: Voters are not afforded the opportunity of electing a substitute congressman in the
eventuality that their first choice dies, resigns, is disqualified, or in any other way leaves the post
vacant. There can only be one representative for that particular legislative district. There are no
runners-up or second placers. Thus, when the person vested with the mandate of the majority is
disqualified from holding the post he was elected to, the only recourse to ascertain the new choice of
the electorate is to hold another election.











66. ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY VS. COMELEC
359 SCRA 698 (2001)

Facts:
Petitioner challenged a resolution issued by the COMELEC. It seeks the disqualification of
certain major political parties in the 2001 party-list elections arguing that the party-list system was
intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented and not the mainstream
political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections
(2) Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented sectors
and organizations
Held:
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, major political parties cannot be disqualified
from the party-list elections merely on the ground that they are political parties. But while even major
political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list
system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be elected to the House of Representatives. In other
words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must
show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented.






67. VS CADANGEN, ET AL V. COMELEC
GR NO. 177179, JUNE 05, 2009

Facts:
On September 13, 2006, petitioner Alliance of Civil Servants Inc., represented by its then
president, Atty. Sherwin R. Lopez, filed a petition for registration as a sectoral organization under the
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act. It claimed among others that it had been in
existence since December 2004 and it sought to represent past and present government employees in
the party-list system.
The COMELEC Second Division, on December 11, 2006 issued an order requiring Civil
Servants to file a memorandum that would prove its presence or existence nationwide, track record,
financial capability to wage a nationwide campaign, platform of government officers and membership,
and compliance with the provision of the party-list system act and the light-point guideline laid down
by the court in Ang Bagong Bayani- OFW Party v. Commission on Elections.

Issue:
Whether or not a party can participate in the party-list election.

Held:
The court cannot grant the prayer of petitioner for registration as a sectoral party, because to
do so will entail an evaluation of the evidence to determine whether indeed petitioner qualifies as a
party-list organization and whether it has made untruthful statements in its application for
registration.
The Councils function as mandated by Section I, ARTICLE VIII of the Constitution is merely
to check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits
of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, this court will have no occasion to exercise its
corrective power. It has no authority to inquire into what it thinks is apparent error.
The dismissal of this petition however, shall not be taken to mean preclusion on the part of
the petitioner from re-filing an application for the registration, compliant with the requirements of the
law.
Wherefore, promises considered, the petition for certiorari and mandamus s dismissed.


























68. VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY VS. COMELEC
342 SCRA 247, October 6, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner assailed public respondent COMELEC resolutions ordering the proclamation of 38
additional party-list representatives to complete the 52 seats in the House of Representatives as
provided by Sec 5, Art VI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941.
On the other hand, Public Respondent, together with the respondent parties, avers that the
filling up of the twenty percent(20%) membership of party-list representatives in the House of
Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory, wherein the twenty
percent(20%) congressional seats for party-list representatives is filled up at all times.
Issue:
Whether or not the twenty percent (20%) allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory.

Held:
No, it is merely a ceiling for the party-list seats in Congress. The same declared therein a
policy to promote proportional representation in the election of party-list representatives in order to
enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation
that would benefit them.
It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in
the system to obtain at least two percent (20%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system in
order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes.
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in
the House of Representatives (sec 11(b) RA 7941).




69. Partidong Manggagawa vs. COMELEC
GR 164702, March 15, 2006

Facts:
The petition involves the formula for computing the additional seats due, if any, for winners in
party-list elections. Several party-list participants sent queries to the respondent COMELEC
regarding the formula to be adopted in computing the additional seats for the party-list winners in
the May 10, 2004 elections. In response, the respondent Commission issued Resolution No. 6835,
adopting the simplified formula of "one additional seat per additional two percent (2%) of the total
party-list votes.

Issue:
How are the party-list seats computed among the parties?

Held:
First, the twenty two percent (22%) allocation- the combined number of all party-list
congressman shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the party list;
Second, the two percent (2%) threshold-only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have seat in the House of
Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit- each qualified party regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained is entitled to a maximum of three seats, that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to
shall be computed in proportion to their number of votes.




70. Lokin, Jr. vs. COMELEC

GR Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010


Facts:

Lokin assail the resolution of the COMELEC approving the withdrawal of the nomination of
Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales as the second nominee and Atty.
Armi Jane R. Borje as the third nominee; and to challenge the validty of Section 13 of Resloution No.
7804 the COMELECs basis for allowing CIBACs withdrawal of Lokins Nomination.

Issue:

Whether the COMELEC can issue IRR.

Held:

The COMELEC may not issue Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) that provide a
ground for the substitution of a party-list nominee not written in RA No. 7941, otherwise known as
the Party-List System.



































71. Aquino vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995

Facts:
Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative
for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political
party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy.Cembo, Makati City, filed a
petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residencequalification as a
candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period
not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections.


Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for
congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution


Held:

In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of
Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice.

Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a
resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years
immediately preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate indicated that he was also a
registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace
of his parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record
up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was
Concepcion, Tarlac.

The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a
condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract may be indicative of petitioners
intention to reside in Makati City, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove
abandonment of ones original domicile.

Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion
which is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must
prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue.


72. Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

248 SCRA 300

Facts:

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative
of Leyte First District. On March 23, 1995, private respondent CirilioMontejo, also a candidate for the
same position, filed a petition for disqualification of the petitioner with COMELEC on the ground that
petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. On March 29, 1995, petitioner
filed an amended certificate of candidacy, changing the entry of seven months to since childhood in
item no. 8 in said certificate. However, the amended certificate was not received since it was already
past deadline. She claimed that she always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile and residence.
The Second Division of the COMELEC with a vote of 2 to 1 came up with a resolution finding private
respondents petition for disqualification meritorious.


Issue:

Whether or not petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her
marriage to the late President Marcos.

Held:

For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the
qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had
resided in the district for only 7 months, because of the following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of
her parents; Tacloban became petitioners domicile of origin by operation of law when her father
brought the family to Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change
of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and
acts which correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence
of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically
gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing
in Political Law; when petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin
and merely gained a new home, not a domiciliumnecessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a
new domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband
died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her
domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.










73. Domino vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999

Facts:

Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the
lone legislative district of the Province of Sarangani indicating that he has resided in the constituency
where he seeks to be elected for 1 year and 2 months. Private respondents filed a petition seeking to
cancel the certificate of candidacy of Domino, alleging that Domino, contrary to his declaration in the
certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani
where he seeks election. Thereafter, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution declaring Domino
disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani in the May
11, 1998 polls for lack of the one-year residency requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of
his certificate of candidacy based on his own Voters Registration Record and his address indicated as
24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Hts., Old Balara, Quezon City.


Issue:

Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediately
preceding the May 11, 1998 elections


Held:

The term residence, as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective
office, means the same thing as domicile, which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or
some other reasons, one intends to return.

Records show that petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in
1991,he acquired a new domicile of choice in Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy
for the position of representative of the Third District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election.
Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his residence in Quezon City and has
established a new domicile of choice in the Province of Sarangani.

A persons domicile, once established, is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a
new one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.

The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not adequately
support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of Dominos intention to reside in
Sarangani, but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones
original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long,
without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus, the date of the
contract of lease of a house and lot in Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of other
circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement. Further, Dominos
lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is strengthened by his act of registering as
voter in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong
presumption of residence especially in this case where Domino registered in his former barangay.






























74. Maquera v. Boraa

15 SCRA 7

Facts:
Petitioners were incumbent commissioners of the National Police Commission when Republic
Act. No. 8851, otherwise known as the PNP Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998, took effect.
Section 8 of Republic Act. No. 8851 provided that the terms of office of the incumbent commissioners
were deemed expired. Petitioners claimed that this violated their security of tenure.
Held:
Petitioners are members of the civil service. Republic Act No. 8551 did not expressly abolish
the positions of petitioners. Under RA No. 6975, the National Police Commission was under the
Department of Interior and Local Government, while under Republic Act. No. 8551 it is made an
agency attached to the Department of Interior and Local Government. The organizational structure
and the composition of the National Police Commission remain essentially the same except for the
addition of the Chief of PNP as ex-officio member. The powers and duties of the National Police
Commission remain basically unchanged. No bona fide reorganization of the NPC having been
mandated by Congress and insofar as RA 8851declares the office of the petitioner as expired resulting
in their separation from office, it instant amount to removing civil service employees from office
without legal cause therefore, it must be struck down for being constitutionally infirm.









75. Social Justice Society vs. Dangerous Drugs Board and PDEA
GR.NO. 157870 November 3, 2008

Facts:

The constitutionality of Section36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of
public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses,
among other personalities, is put in issue. Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the
Republic and a candidate for re - election in the May 10, 2004elections filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition under Rule 65. He seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165and COMELEC Resolution
No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose qualification for
candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to
enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 36 of RA 9165 and COMELEC RESOLUTION are valid?

Held:

No, the requirement is unconstitutional because it adds to the exclusive qualifications for
such offices prescribed by the Constitution. COMELEC cannot enforce or imposed qualifications in
addition to what the constitution prescribes.











76. Dimaporo v Mitra
202 SCRA 779

Facts:

Petitioner Dimaporo was elected as a representative for the second legislative district of Lanao
del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. Dimaporo filed a certificate of candidacy for the
position of governor of ARMM. Secretary and Speaker of the House excluded the name of Dimaporo
from the Roll of Members of HR under Art IX of Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code. Dimaporo lost
the election wrote a letter intending to resume performing his duties and functions as an elected
member of the Congress. Unfortunately, he was not able to regain his seat in the Congress.
Dimaporo contended that he did not lose his seat as a Congressman because Art. IX Sec. 67
of BP 881 is not operative in the present constitution, and therefore not applicable to the members of
Congress.
Issue:
Whether or not Dimaporo considered as a member of Congress even after he has filed for another
government position?
Held:
No. There is a new chapter in the constitution there is a new chapter on the accountability of
public officers. In the 1935 Constitution, it was provided that public office is a public trust. Public
officers should serve with the highest degree of responsibility and integrity. The filling of a certificate
shall be considered as an overt act or abandoning or relinquishing his mandate to the people and he
should therefore resign if he want to seek another position which he feels he could be of better
service.












77. Farias v. Executive Secretary
GR. No. 147387 December 10, 2003

Facts:
Before the court is a petition under rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to declare as
unconstitutional Section 14 of the Republic Act 9006 otherwise known as The Fair Election Act
insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 14 f RA 9006 is valid?

Held:
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject
of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction.
It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a
statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for
the accomplishing of that object. The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: An Act to Enhance the Holding
of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.
















78. Quinto v. COMELEC

GR No. 189698, December 1, 2009

Facts:

Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate
of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it
only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.
Issue:

Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.
Held:

NO. In the Farias case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with
appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court upheld the substantial distinctions between the two and
pronounced that there was no violation of the equal protection clause.
However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on the equal protection clause was
an obiter dictum since the issue raised therein was against the repealing clause. It didnt squarely
challenge Sec. 66.
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites
of a valid classification, the proviso does not comply with the second requirement that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to
promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate. The
measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by
eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political
considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition
that the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or
inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather
than to their office work.
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to
whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the
government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his certificate of candidacy for
the election. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the
government to wield influence in the political world.
The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or non
partisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or brgy. level. Congress has not
shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping
scale.




SECTION 8. REGULAR ELECTIONS

79. EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR.
VS.
HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official capacities as
speaker and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, respectively, and MA.
VICTORIA L. LOCSIN
G.R. No. 150605, December 10, 2002

Facts:
Petitioner garnered the highest votes in the election for representative in the 4
th
district of
Leyte as against respondent Locsin. Petitioner won while a disqualification suit was pending.
Respondent moved for the suspension of petitioners proclamation. By virtue of the Comelec ex parte
order, petitioners proclamation was suspended. Comelec later on resolved that petitioner was guilty
of soliciting votes and consequently disqualified him. Respondent Locsin was proclaimed winner.
Upon motion by petitioner, the resolution was however reversed and a new resolution declared
respondents proclamation as null and void. Respondent made his defiance and disobedience to
subsequent resolution publicly known while petitioner asserted his right to the office he won.

Issues:
1. Whether or not respondents proclamation was valid.
2. Whether or not the Comelec had jurisdiction in the instant case.
3. Whether or not proclamation of the winner is a ministerial duty.

HELD:
1. The respondents proclamation was premature given that the case against petitioner had not yet
been disposed of with finality. In fact, it was subsequently found that the disqualification of the
petitioner was null and void for being violative of due process and for want of substantial factual
basis. Furthermore, respondent, as second placer, could not take the seat in office since he did not
represent the electorates choice.
2. Since the validity of respondents proclamation had been assailed by petitioner before the
Comelec and that the Comelec was yet to resolve it, it cannot be said that the order disqualifying
petitioner had become final. Thus Comelec continued to exercise jurisdiction over the case pending
finality. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review
resolutions or decisions of the Comelec. A petition for quo warranto must also fail since respondents
eligibility was not the issue.
3. The facts had been settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction
on the matter, that petitioner won. The rule of law demands that its (Comelecs) Decision be
obeyed by all officials of the land. Such duty is ministerial. Petitioner had the right to the office
which merits recognition regardless of personal judgment or opinion.






























SECTION 9. SPECIAL ELECTIONS

80. ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
SENATOR RALPH G. RECTO and SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASAN
G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004

Facts:
Petitioners assailed the manner by which the simultaneous regular and special elections of
2001 were conducted by the COMELEC. Petitioners contend that, if held simultaneously, a special
and a regular election must be distinguished in the documentation as well as in the canvassing of
their results. Thirteen senators were proclaimed from the said election with the 13th placer to serve
that of the remaining term of Sen. Guingona, who vacated a seat in the senate. Petitioners sought for
the nullification of the special election and, consequently, the declaration of the 13
th
elected senator.

Issue:
1Whether or not Court had jurisdiction.
2Whether or not the petition was moot.
3Whether or not petitioners had locus standi.
4Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term
Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001
Held:
On the issue of jurisdiction, Court had jurisdiction because what petitioners were questioning
was the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 in which Honasan was elected and not to
determine Honasans right in the exercise of his office as Senator proper under a quo warranto.
On the issue of mootness, it was held that courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is
capable of repetition yet evading review.
On the issue of locus standi, the court had relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised
our discretion to give due course to voters suits involving the right of suffrage, considering that the
issue raised in this petition is likely to arise again
On the Validity of the Election, the Court held that the May 14, 2001 Election was valid.
The Court held that COMELECs Failure to Give Notice of the Time of the Special Election as
required under RA 6645, as amended, did Not Negate the Calling of such Election. Section 2 of R.A.
No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy
shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. The law charges the voters
with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELECs failure to give the additional notice did not
negate the calling of such special election, much less invalidate it. Further, there was No Proof that
COMELECs Failure to Give Notice of the Office to be Filled and the Manner of Determining the
Winner in the Special Election Misled Voters. IT could not be said that the voters were not informed
since there had been other accessible information resources. Finally, the Court held that unless there
had been a patent showing of grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not interfere with the affairs
and conduct of the Comelec.




























SECTION 10. Salaries of the House of Representatives

81. Philippine Constitution vs. Mathay
G.R. No. L-25554, October 4, 1966

Facts:

On June 10, 1964, the Philippine Congress promulgated R.A. 4134 authorizing the increase of
the compensation for the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives, the Philippine
Constitution Association filed a petition before the Supreme Court enjoining permanent prohibition
against the implementation of R.A. 6242 (the appropriation act of 1965) allowing the audit for
disbursement of increased salary for the speaker and members of the house of representatives even
without the expiration of their term in office. Petitioner strongly contends that the implementation is
unconstitutional and violative of Sec. 14 Article VI of the Constitution, of which the increase of the
Salary will only take effect after the expiration of the term.

Issues:
Whether or Not, the implementation of such audit for disbursement is unconstitutional.

Held:
Yes, pursuant to R.A. 4134, the period of the implementation to take effect as stated therein
conformed to the period as mandated by Sec. 14, Article VI of the Constitution, In establishing what
might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for legislators becomes fully
effective, the Constitutional provision refers to all members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between
them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the expiration of
the full term of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular
form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the
purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word term in the
singular, when combined with the following phrase all the members of the Senate and the House,
underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration is
that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure must have expired
before the increase in compensation can become operative. The Court agreed with petitioner that the
increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full
term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it will have expired.




82. People v. Jalosjos
324 SCRA 689
Facts:
The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined
at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is
pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the
duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of
popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented.


Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of
Representatives


Held:
Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the
privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of theHouse of
Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in
a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended
beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or
equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of
Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to
attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of
a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him
a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only
elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the
purposes of the correction system.







83. Jimenez vs Cabangbang
17 SCRA 876 (1966)
Facts:
Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee
on National Defense. On 14 Nov 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter
addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three operational plans
under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists.
That such strategists have had collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus
Vargas, was planning a coup dtat to place him as the president. The planners allegedly have
Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware
that they are being used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have been published in
newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of
damages against Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbangs statement is libelous. Cabangbang
petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of the HOR he is immune
from suit and that he is covered by the privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not
even libelous.
Issue:
Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to members of
Congress. Whether or not the said letter is libelous.
Held:
Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from
arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the
same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place. The
publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements
made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced
in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either
in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as
members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as
such at the time of the performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the
letter was published and at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is
obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his
official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary
to the finding made by the lower court the said communication is not absolutely privileged.
The SC is satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support Jimenez action for
damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the persons unnamed
therein alluded to as planners, and that, having been handpicked by Vargas, it should be noted
that defendant, likewise, added that it is of course possible that plaintiffs are unwitting tools of the
plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge. In other words, the very document upon
which plaintiffs action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the
alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. The SC does
not think that this statement is derogatory to Jimenez to the point of entitling them to recover
damages, considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under
the control of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question
seems to suggest that the group therein described as planners include these two (2) high ranking
officers. Petition is dismissed.




























85. ANTONINO V. VALENCIA

MAY 27, 1974
Facts:

Lorenzo Sarmiento of the Liberal Party lost to Vicente Duterte of the Nacionalista Party in the election
for governor in Davao.
Subsequently, Senator Antonino issued a statement that the loss was caused by the support given by
Valencia, the Secretary of Public Works, to the independent LP candidate Maglana which caused a
division in LP votes. Antonino was quoted in various newspapers that had Valencia not Sabotaged
and double-crossed them, the LP would have won.
Antonino then proceeded to file requests to have Valencia investigated by the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee on alleged anomalous acquisitions of public works supplies and equipment.
Valencia retaliated by issuing a press release that he will also file charges with the Blue Ribbon
Committee regarding anomalous acts of the Senator. This release was published in newspapers
Antonino filed this case of damages. Valencia filed a counter-claim. Lower court ruled in favor of
Antonino. Valencia appealed. Antonino died and was substituted by Senator Antonino (Wife)

Issues:

1. Whether or not the Press Release was issued by Valencia
2. Whether or not the Press Release is libelous

Held:

YES. The fact that Valencia caused the release and publication of the press release is seen in the
following facts:
1.The newspapers reproduced the specific charges her filed by Antonino.
2. On the press release there was marked For release under the date.
3. It was indicated on the press release the answers made by Valencia to the charges of Antonino in
the same numerical order.
4. The press release indicated that it came from Valencia
5. The press release quoted Valencia and he admitted making the statement in his office in the
presence of the press

6. The first page of the press release consisted of quoted statements by Valencia and reports and
information he received about Antonino
7. The press release mentioned specific figures which only Valencia could know given the time
constraint
8. Valencia did not make any correction or denial of the published statement.
YES. The statements issued were defamatory and libelous in nature as they imputed upon
him certain corrupt practices. Also, because the statement was not issued privately or officially,
malice is presumed and such presumption was not overcome as
Valencia did not prove the truth of his statements or that they were published with good intentions
and with a justifiable motive or that they were made in the exercise of the right of fair comment on
the character, good faith, ability and sincerity of public officials.
The court said that had Valencia not been motivated with malice he would have filed charges
against Antonino with the Senate seeing as Antonino was not a candidate for election and that his
term as senator was no yet to expire.
Also, Valencia cannot claim that his actions were justified in that Antonino was first in
making libelous statements. The anomalous transactions charge was duly filed with the Blue Ribbon.
Also, the statement on sabotage and double crossing cannot be considered libelous
ascontemporary politics shows that no stigma of disgrace or disrepute befalls one who changes
political parties.