G.R. No.

78517 February 27, 1989

GABINO ALITA, JESUS JULIAN, JR., JESUS JULIAN, SR., PEDRO RICALDE,
VICENTE RICALDE and ROLANDO SALAMAR, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ENRIQUE M. REYES, PAZ M. REYES
and FE M. REYES, respondents.
Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance for petitioners.
Leonardo N. Zulueta for Enrique Reyes, et al. Adolfo S. Azcuna for private respondents.

PARAS, J .:
Before us is a petition seeking the reversal of the decision rendered by the respondent
Court of Appeals**on March 3, 1987 affirming the judgment of the court a quo dated
April 29, 1986, the dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reading as follows;
WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by this Court on November 5, 1982
is hereby reconsidered and a new judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring that Presidential Decree No. 27 is inapplicable to lands
obtained thru the homestead law,
2. Declaring that the four registered co-owners will cultivate and operate
the farmholding themselves as owners thereof; and
3. Ejecting from the land the so-called tenants, namely; Gabino Alita,
Jesus Julian, Sr., Jesus Julian, Jr., Pedro Ricalde, Vicente Ricalde and
Rolando Salamar, as the owners would want to cultivate the farmholding
themselves.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (p. 31, Rollo)
The facts are undisputed. The subject matter of the case consists of two (2) parcels of
land, acquired by private respondents' predecessors-in-interest through homestead
patent under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Said lands are situated at
Guilinan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur.
Private respondents herein are desirous of personally cultivating these lands, but
petitioners refuse to vacate, relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and
appurtenant regulations issued by the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (DAR for short),
now Department of Agrarian Reform (MAR for short).
On June 18, 1981, private respondents (then plaintiffs), instituted a complaint against
Hon. Conrado Estrella as then Minister of Agrarian Reform, P.D. Macarambon as
Regional Director of MAR Region IX, and herein petitioners (then defendants) for the
declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Letters of Instructions and General Orders
issued in connection therewith as inapplicable to homestead lands.
Defendants filed their answer with special and affirmative defenses of July 8, 1981.
Subsequently, on July 19, 1982, plaintiffs filed an urgent motion to enjoin the
defendants from declaring the lands in litigation under Operation Land Transfer and
from being issued land transfer certificates to which the defendants filed their opposition
dated August 4, 1982.
On November 5, 1982, the then Court of Agrarian Relations 16th Regional District,
Branch IV, Pagadian City (now Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial Region, Branch XVIII)
rendered its decision dismissing the said complaint and the motion to enjoin the
defendants was denied.
On January 4, 1983, plaintiffs moved to reconsider the Order of dismissal, to which
defendants filed their opposition on January 10, 1983.
Thus, on April 29, 1986, the Regional Trial Court issued the aforequoted decision
prompting defendants to move for a reconsideration but the same was denied in its
Order dated June 6, 1986.
On appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals, the same was sustained in its judgment
rendered on March 3, 1987, thus:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error thereof, the decision appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. (p. 34, Rollo)
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
The pivotal issue is whether or not lands obtained through homestead patent are
covered by the Agrarian Reform under P.D. 27.
The question certainly calls for a negative answer.
We agree with the petitioners in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of
tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land they
till is a sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the
social justice precepts of the Constitution. However, such contention cannot be invoked
to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth
Act No. 141. Thus,
The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of
the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a piece of land where he may
build a modest house for himself and family and plant what is necessary
for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's other needs. The right of
the citizens to their homes and to the things necessary for their
subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a right to live
with a certain degree of comfort as become human beings, and the State
which looks after the welfare of the people's happiness is under a duty to
safeguard the satisfaction of this vital right. (Patricio v. Bayog, 112 SCRA
45)
In this regard, the Philippine Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the
homesteaders' rights over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform
statute. In point is Section 6 of Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which
provides:
Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or
stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the
disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of
public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to
prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of
indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
Additionally, it is worthy of note that the newly promulgated Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657 likewise contains a proviso supporting
the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by homestead patents like those of the
property in question, reading,
Section 6. Retention Limits. ...
... Provided further, That original homestead grantees or their direct
compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the
approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to
cultivate said homestead.'
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
sustaining the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 103302 August 12, 1993
NATALIA REALTY, INC., AND ESTATE DEVELOPERS AND INVESTORS CORP., petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, SEC. BENJAMIN T. LEONG and DIR. WILFREDO LEANO, DAR REGION IV, respondents.
Lino M. Patajo for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J .:
Are lands already classified for residential, commercial or industrial use, as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and its
precursor agencies
1
prior to 15 June 1988,
2
covered by R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988? This is the pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari assailing the Notice of
Coverage
3
of the Department of Agrarian Reform over parcels of land already reserved as townsite areas
before the enactment of the law.
Petitioner Natalia Realty, Inc. (NATALIA, for brevity) is the owner of three (3) contiguous parcels of land
located in Banaba, Antipolo, Rizal, with areas of 120.9793 hectares, 1.3205 hectares and 2.7080
hectares, or a total of 125.0078 hectares, and embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31527 of the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal.
On 18 April 1979, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land located in the
Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban as townsite areas to absorb the population overspill
in the metropolis which were designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite. The NATALIA properties are
situated within the areas proclaimed as townsite reservation.
Since private landowners were allowed to develop their properties into low-cost housing subdivisions
within the reservation, petitioner Estate Developers and Investors Corporation (EDIC, for brevity), as
developer of NATALIA properties, applied for and was granted preliminary approval and locational
clearances by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. The necessary permit for Phase I of the
subdivision project, which consisted of 13.2371 hectares, was issued sometime in 1982;
4
for Phase II,
with an area of 80,000 hectares, on 13 October 1983;
5
and for Phase III, which consisted of the
remaining 31.7707 hectares, on 25 April 1986.
6
Petitioner were likewise issued development permits
7

after complying with the requirements. Thus the NATALIA properties later became the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision.
On 15 June 1988, R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988"
(CARL, for brevity), went into effect. Conformably therewith, respondent Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR, for brevity), through its Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, issued on 22 November 1990 a Notice
of Coverage on the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision which consisted of roughly
90.3307 hectares. NATALIA immediately registered its objection to the notice of Coverage.
EDIC also protested to respondent Director Wilfredo Leano of the DAR Region IV Office and twice wrote
him requesting the cancellation of the Notice of Coverage.
On 17 January 1991, members of the Samahan ng Magsasaka sa Bundok Antipolo, Inc. (SAMBA, for the
brevity), filed a complaint against NATALIA and EDIC before the DAR Regional Adjudicator to restrain
petitioners from developing areas under cultivation by SAMBA members.
8
The Regional Adjudicator
temporarily restrained petitioners from proceeding with the development of the subdivision. Petitioners
then moved to dismiss the complaint; it was denied. Instead, the Regional Adjudicator issued on 5 March
1991 a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Petitioners NATALIA and EDIC elevated their cause to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB); however,
on 16 December 1991 the DARAB merely remanded the case to the Regional Adjudicator for further
proceedings.
9

In the interim, NATALIA wrote respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform reiterating its request to set aside
the Notice of Coverage. Neither respondent Secretary nor respondent Director took action on the protest-
letters, thus compelling petitioners to institute this proceeding more than a year thereafter.
NATALIA and EDIC both impute grave abuse of discretion to respondent DAR for including
undedeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision within the coverage of the CARL. They argue
that NATALIA properties already ceased to be agricultural lands when they were included in the areas
reserved by presidential fiat for the townsite reservation.
Public respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General dispute this contention. They maintain that
the permits granted petitioners were not valid and binding because they did not comply with the
implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957, otherwise known as "The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers Protective Decree," in that no application for conversion of the NATALIA lands from
agricultural residential was ever filed with the DAR. In other words, there was no valid conversion.
Moreover, public respondents allege that the instant petition was prematurely filed because the case
instituted by SAMBA against petitioners before the DAR Regional Adjudicator has not yet terminated.
Respondents conclude, as a consequence, that petitioners failed to fully exhaust administrative remedies
available to them before coming to court.
The petition is impressed with merit. A cursory reading of the Preliminary Approval and Locational
Clearances as well as the Development Permits granted petitioners for Phases I, II and III of the Antipolo
Hills Subdivision reveals that contrary to the claim of public respondents, petitioners NATALIA and EDIC
did in fact comply with all the requirements of law.
Petitioners first secured favorable recommendations from the Lungsod Silangan Development
Corporation, the agency tasked to oversee the implementation of the development of the townsite
reservation, before applying for the necessary permits from the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission.
10
And, in all permits granted to petitioners, the Commission
stated invariably therein that the applications were in "conformance"
11
or "conformity"
12
or "conforming"
13
with the implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957. Hence, the argument of public
respondents that not all of the requirements were complied with cannot be sustained.
As a matter of fact, there was even no need for petitioners to secure a clearance or prior approval from
DAR. The NATALIA properties were within the areas set aside for the Lungsod Silangan Reservation.
Since Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 created the townsite reservation for the purpose of providing
additional housing to the burgeoning population of Metro Manila, it in effect converted for residential use
what were erstwhile agricultural lands provided all requisites were met. And, in the case at bar, there was
compliance with all relevant rules and requirements. Even in their applications for the development of the
Antipolo Hills Subdivision, the predecessor agency of HLURB noted that petitioners NATALIA and EDIC
complied with all the requirements prescribed by P.D. 957.
The implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957 applied to all subdivisions and
condominiums in general. On the other hand, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 referred only to the
Lungsod Silangan Reservation, which makes it a special law. It is a basic tenet in statutory construction
that between a general law and a special law, the latter prevails.
14

Interestingly, the Office of the Solicitor General does not contest the conversion of portions of the Antipolo
Hills Subdivision which have already been developed.
15
Of course, this is contrary to its earlier position
that there was no valid conversion. The applications for the developed and undeveloped portions of
subject subdivision were similarly situated. Consequently, both did not need prior DAR approval.
We now determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that
the CARL shall "cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands." As to what constitutes "agricultural land," it is referred to as "land devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land."
16
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural
lands" are only those lands which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include
commercial, industrial and residential lands."
17

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot
in any language be considered as "agricultural lands." These lots were intended for residential use. They
ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation.
Even today, the areas in question continued to be developed as a low-cost housing subdivision, albeit at
a snail's pace. This can readily be gleaned from the fact that SAMBA members even instituted an action
to restrain petitioners from continuing with such development. The enormity of the resources needed for
developing a subdivision may have delayed its completion but this does not detract from the fact that
these lands are still residential lands and outside the ambit of the CARL.
Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands
previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies
other than respondent DAR. In its Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private
Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses,
18
DAR itself defined "agricultural land" thus
. . . Agricultural lands refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in R.A.
6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in town
plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for
residential, commercial or industrial use.
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, respondent DAR is bound by such
conversion. It was therefore error to include the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision
within the coverage of CARL.
Be that as it may, the Secretary of Justice, responding to a query by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
noted in an Opinion
19
that lands covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 1637, inter alia, of which the
NATALIA lands are part, having been reserved for townsite purposes "to be developed as human
settlements by the proper land and housing agency," are "not deemed 'agricultural lands' within the
meaning and intent of Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657. " Not being deemed "agricultural lands," they are
outside the coverage of CARL.
Anent the argument that there was failure to exhaust administrative remedies in the instant petition,
suffice it to say that the issues raised in the case filed by SAMBA members differ from those of
petitioners. The former involve possession; the latter, the propriety of including under the operation of
CARL lands already converted for residential use prior to its effectivity.
Besides, petitioners were not supposed to wait until public respondents acted on their letter-protests, this
after sitting it out for almost a year. Given the official indifference, which under the circumstances could
have continued forever, petitioners had to act to assert and protect their interests.
20

In fine, we rule for petitioners and hold that public respondents gravely abused their discretion in issuing
the assailed Notice of Coverage of 22 November 1990 by of lands over which they no longer have
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The Notice of Coverage of 22 November 1990 by
virtue of which undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision were placed under CARL coverage
is hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 162070 October 19, 2005
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by SECRETARY JOSE MARI
B. PONCE (OIC), Petitioner
vs.
DELIA T. SUTTON, ELLA T. SUTTON-SOLIMAN and HARRY T. SUTTON,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J .:
This is a petition for review filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004,
respectively, which declared DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1993, null and
void for being violative of the Constitution.
The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been
devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing
agrarian reform program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS)
1

their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage
farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.
On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR,
2

this Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the
definition of agricultural land. Hence, we declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of the
CARL insofar as they included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform.
In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to
withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus
exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
3

On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, inspected
respondents land and found that it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding. He
recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of their VOS and
requested the return of the supporting papers they submitted in connection therewith.
4
Petitioner
ignored their request.
On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993,
5
which provided that only
portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of
June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land
to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the following retention limits, viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio (i.e., 1
hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall be retained by the landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815
hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from
the operations of the CARL.
On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and advised him to consider as final
and irrevocable the withdrawal of their VOS as, under the Luz Farms doctrine, their entire
landholding is exempted from the CARL.
6

On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order
7
partially
granting the application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Applying the
retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9, petitioner exempted 1,209 hectares of
respondents land for grazing purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure.
Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents landholding to be segregated and placed under
Compulsory Acquisition.
Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire landholding should be
exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising. Their motion was denied.
8
They filed a
notice of appeal
9
with the Office of the President assailing: (1) the reasonableness and validity of
DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, which provided for a ratio between land and livestock in determining
the land area qualified for exclusion from the CARL, and (2) the constitutionality of DAR A.O.
No. 9, s. 1993, in view of the Luz Farms case which declared cattle-raising lands excluded from
the coverage of agrarian reform.
On October 9, 2001, the Office of the President affirmed the impugned Order of petitioner
DAR.
10
It ruled that DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, does not run counter to the Luz Farms case as
the A.O. provided the guidelines to determine whether a certain parcel of land is being used for
cattle-raising. However, the issue on the constitutionality of the assailed A.O. was left for the
determination of the courts as the sole arbiters of such issue.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9,
s. 1993, void for being contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude
livestock farms from the land reform program of the government. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, DAR Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993 is
hereby DECLARED null and void. The assailed order of the Office of the President dated 09
October 2001 in so far as it affirmed the Department of Agrarian Reforms ruling that
petitioners landholding is covered by the agrarian reform program of the government is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
11

Hence, this petition.
The main issue in the case at bar is the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993,
which prescribes a maximum retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising.
Invoking its rule-making power under Section 49 of the CARL, petitioner submits that it issued
DAR A.O. No. 9 to limit the area of livestock farm that may be retained by a landowner pursuant
to its mandate to place all public and private agricultural lands under the coverage of agrarian
reform. Petitioner also contends that the A.O. seeks to remedy reports that some unscrupulous
landowners have converted their agricultural farms to livestock farms in order to evade their
coverage in the agrarian reform program.
Petitioners arguments fail to impress.
Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature, i.e., the power to make
rules and regulations. They have been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to
regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated rule-making has become a
practical necessity in modern governance due to the increasing complexity and variety of public
functions. However, while administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law,
they are not immune from judicial review.
12
They may be properly challenged before the courts
to ensure that they do not violate the Constitution and no grave abuse of administrative discretion
is committed by the administrative body concerned.
The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative rules and
regulations must be issued by authority of a law and must not contravene the provisions of
the Constitution.
13
The rule-making power of an administrative agency may not be used to
abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the Constitution. Nor can it be used to
enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond the scope intended. Constitutional
and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be
promulgated by administrative agencies and the scope of their regulations.
14

In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution.
The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian
reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the
deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter
alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The Court clarified
in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do
not fall within the definition of "agriculture" or "agricultural activity." The raising of livestock,
swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural,
activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed
assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill
with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for
feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by
lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other
technological appurtenances.
15

Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted
by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in
issuing the assailed A.O.
The subsequent case of Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR
16
reiterated our ruling in the Luz Farms
case. In Natalia Realty, the Court held that industrial, commercial and residential lands are not
covered by the CARL.
17
We stressed anew that while Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that
the CARL shall cover all public and private agricultural lands, the term "agricultural
land" does not include lands classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial. Thus, in Natalia Realty, even portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision, which are
arable yet still undeveloped, could not be considered as agricultural lands subject to agrarian
reform as these lots were already classified as residential lands.
A similar logical deduction should be followed in the case at bar. Lands devoted to raising of
livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as industrial, not agricultural, lands and thus
exempt from agrarian reform. Petitioner DAR argues that, in issuing the impugned A.O., it was
seeking to address the reports it has received that some unscrupulous landowners have been
converting their agricultural lands to livestock farms to avoid their coverage by the agrarian
reform. Again, we find neither merit nor logic in this contention. The undesirable scenario
which petitioner seeks to prevent with the issuance of the A.O. clearly does not apply in this
case. Respondents family acquired their landholdings as early as 1948. They have long been in
the business of breeding cattle in Masbate which is popularly known as the cattle-breeding
capital of the Philippines.
18
Petitioner DAR does not dispute this fact. Indeed, there is no
evidence on record that respondents have just recently engaged in or converted to the business of
breeding cattle after the enactment of the CARL that may lead one to suspect that respondents
intended to evade its coverage. It must be stressed that what the CARL prohibits is the
conversion of agricultural lands for non-agricultural purposes after the effectivity of the
CARL. There has been no change of business interest in the case of respondents.
Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of a statute by
Congress without substantial change is an implied legislative approval and adoption of the
previous law. On the other hand, by making a new law, Congress seeks to supersede an earlier
one.
19
In the case at bar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7881
20

which amended certain provisions of the CARL. Specifically, the new law changed the
definition of the terms "agricultural activity" and "commercial farming" by dropping
from its coverage lands that are devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-
raising.
21
With this significant modification, Congress clearly sought to align the provisions
of our agrarian laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude
livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform.
In sum, it is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must be in harmony with the provisions
of the Constitution. They cannot amend or extend the Constitution. To be valid, they must
conform to and be consistent with the Constitution. In case of conflict between an administrative
order and the provisions of the Constitution, the latter prevails.
22
The assailed A.O. of petitioner
DAR was properly stricken down as unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian
reform beyond the scope intended by the 1987 Constitution.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004, respectively, are
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182332 February 23, 2011
MILESTONE FARMS, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J .:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
1
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Amended Decision
2
dated October
4, 2006 and its Resolution
3
dated March 27, 2008.
The Facts
Petitioner Milestone Farms, Inc. (petitioner) was incorporated with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on January 8, 1960.
4
Among its pertinent secondary purposes are: (1) to engage in
the raising of cattle, pigs, and other livestock; to acquire lands by purchase or lease, which may
be needed for this purpose; and to sell and otherwise dispose of said cattle, pigs, and other
livestock and their produce when advisable and beneficial to the corporation; (2) to breed, raise,
and sell poultry; to purchase or acquire and sell, or otherwise dispose of the supplies, stocks,
equipment, accessories, appurtenances, products, and by-products of said business; and (3) to
import cattle, pigs, and other livestock, and animal food necessary for the raising of said cattle,
pigs, and other livestock as may be authorized by law.
5

On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian reform law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), took effect, which included the raising of
livestock, poultry, and swine in its coverage. However, on December 4, 1990, this Court, sitting
en banc, ruled in Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform
6
that agricultural
lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and/or swine raising are excluded from the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Thus, in May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of its 316.0422-hectare
property, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. (T-410434) M-15750, (T-486101) M-
7307, (T-486102) M-7308, (T-274129) M-15751, (T-486103) M-7309, (T-486104) M-7310, (T-
332694) M-15755, (T-486105) M-7311, (T-486106) M-7312, M-8791, (T-486107) M-7313, (T-
486108) M-7314, M-8796, (T-486109) M-7315, (T-486110) M-9508, and M-6013, and located
in Pinugay, Baras, Rizal, from the coverage of the CARL, pursuant to the aforementioned ruling
of this Court in Luz Farms.
Meanwhile, on December 27, 1993, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1993 (DAR A.O. No. 9), setting forth rules and regulations
to govern the exclusion of agricultural lands used for livestock, poultry, and swine raising from
CARP coverage. Thus, on January 10, 1994, petitioner re-documented its application pursuant to
DAR A.O. No. 9.
7

Acting on the said application, the DARs Land Use Conversion and Exemption Committee
(LUCEC) of Region IV conducted an ocular inspection on petitioners property and arrived at
the following findings:
[T]he actual land utilization for livestock, swine and poultry is 258.8422 hectares; the area which
served as infrastructure is 42.0000 hectares; ten (10) hectares are planted to corn and the
remaining five (5) hectares are devoted to fish culture; that the livestock population are 371
heads of cow, 20 heads of horses, 5,678 heads of swine and 788 heads of cocks; that the area
being applied for exclusion is far below the required or ideal area which is 563 hectares for the
total livestock population; that the approximate area not directly used for livestock purposes with
an area of 15 hectares, more or less, is likewise far below the allowable 10% variance; and,
though not directly used for livestock purposes, the ten (10) hectares planted to sweet corn and
the five (5) hectares devoted to fishpond could be considered supportive to livestock production.
The LUCEC, thus, recommended the exemption of petitioners 316.0422-hectare property from
the coverage of CARP. Adopting the LUCECs findings and recommendation, DAR Regional
Director Percival Dalugdug (Director Dalugdug) issued an Order dated June 27, 1994, exempting
petitioners 316.0422-hectare property from CARP.
8

The Southern Pinugay Farmers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (Pinugay Farmers), represented
by Timiano Balajadia, Sr. (Balajadia), moved for the reconsideration of the said Order, but the
same was denied by Director Dalugdug in his Order dated November 24, 1994.
9
Subsequently,
the Pinugay Farmers filed a letter-appeal with the DAR Secretary.
Correlatively, on June 4, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint for Forcible Entry against Balajadia
and company before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Teresa-Baras, Rizal, docketed
as Civil Case No. 781-T.
10
The MCTC ruled in favor of petitioner, but the decision was later
reversed by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 80, of Tanay, Rizal. Ultimately, the case reached
the CA, which, in its Decision
11
dated October 8, 1999, reinstated the MCTCs ruling, ordering
Balajadia and all defendants therein to vacate portions of the property covered by TCT Nos. M-
6013, M-8796, and M-8791. In its Resolution
12
dated July 31, 2000, the CA held that the
defendants therein failed to timely file a motion for reconsideration, given the fact that their
counsel of record received its October 8, 1999 Decision; hence, the same became final and
executory.
In the meantime, R.A. No. 6657 was amended by R.A. No. 7881,
13
which was approved on
February 20, 1995. Private agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine raising
were excluded from the coverage of the CARL. On October 22, 1996, the fact-finding team
formed by the DAR Undersecretary for Field Operations and Support Services conducted an
actual headcount of the livestock population on the property. The headcount showed that there
were 448 heads of cattle and more than 5,000 heads of swine.
The DAR Secretarys Ruling
On January 21, 1997, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao (Secretary Garilao) issued an
Order exempting from CARP only 240.9776 hectares of the 316.0422 hectares previously
exempted by Director Dalugdug, and declaring 75.0646 hectares of the property to be covered by
CARP.
14

Secretary Garilao opined that, for private agricultural lands to be excluded from CARP, they
must already be devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine raising as of June 15, 1988, when the
CARL took effect. He found that the Certificates of Ownership of Large Cattle submitted by
petitioner showed that only 86 heads of cattle were registered in the name of petitioners
president, Misael Vera, Jr., prior to June 15, 1988; 133 were subsequently bought in 1990, while
204 were registered from 1992 to 1995. Secretary Garilao gave more weight to the certificates
rather than to the headcount because "the same explicitly provide for the number of cattle owned
by petitioner as of June 15, 1988."
Applying the animal-land ratio (1 hectare for grazing for every head of cattle/carabao/horse) and
the infrastructure-animal ratio (1.7815 hectares for 21 heads of cattle/carabao/horse, and 0.5126
hectare for 21 heads of hogs) under DAR A.O. No. 9, Secretary Garilao exempted 240.9776
hectares of the property, as follows:
1. 86 hectares for the 86 heads of cattle existing as of 15 June 1988;
2. 8 hectares for infrastructure following the ratio of 1.7815 hectares for every 21 heads
of cattle;
3. 8 hectares for the 8 horses;
4. 0.3809 square meters of infrastructure for the 8 horses; [and]
5. 138.5967 hectares for the 5,678 heads of swine.
15

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
16
submitting therewith copies of Certificates of
Transfer of Large Cattle and additional Certificates of Ownership of Large Cattle issued to
petitioner prior to June 15, 1988, as additional proof that it had met the required animal-land
ratio. Petitioner also submitted a copy of a Disbursement Voucher dated December 17, 1986,
showing the purchase of 100 heads of cattle by the Bureau of Animal Industry from petitioner, as
further proof that it had been actively operating a livestock farm even before June 15, 1988.
However, in his Order dated April 15, 1997, Secretary Garilao denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
17

Aggrieved, petitioner filed its Memorandum on Appeal
18
before the Office of the President (OP).
The OPs Ruling
On February 4, 2000, the OP rendered a decision
19
reinstating Director Dalugdugs Order dated
June 27, 1994 and declared the entire 316.0422-hectare property exempt from the coverage of
CARP.
However, on separate motions for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision filed by farmer-
groups Samahang Anak-Pawis ng Lagundi (SAPLAG) and Pinugay Farmers, and the Bureau of
Agrarian Legal Assistance of DAR, the OP issued a resolution
20
dated September 16, 2002,
setting aside its previous decision. The dispositive portion of the OP resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision subject of the instant separate motions for reconsideration is hereby
SET ASIDE and a new one entered REINSTATING the Order dated 21 January 1997 of then
DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao, as reiterated in another Order of 15 April 1997, without
prejudice to the outcome of the continuing review and verification proceedings that DAR, thru
the appropriate Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, may undertake pursuant to Rule III (D) of
DAR Administrative Order No. 09, series of 1993.
SO ORDERED.
21

The OP held that, when it comes to proof of ownership, the reference is the Certificate of
Ownership of Large Cattle. Certificates of cattle ownership, which are readily available being
issued by the appropriate government office ought to match the number of heads of cattle
counted as existing during the actual headcount. The presence of large cattle on the land, without
sufficient proof of ownership thereof, only proves such presence.
Taking note of Secretary Garilaos observations, the OP also held that, before an ocular
investigation is conducted on the property, the landowners are notified in advance; hence, mere
reliance on the physical headcount is dangerous because there is a possibility that the landowners
would increase the number of their cattle for headcount purposes only. The OP observed that
there was a big variance between the actual headcount of 448 heads of cattle and only 86
certificates of ownership of large cattle.
Consequently, petitioner sought recourse from the CA.
22

The Proceedings Before the CA and Its Rulings
On April 29, 2005, the CA found that, based on the documentary evidence presented, the
property subject of the application for exclusion had more than satisfied the animal-land and
infrastructure-animal ratios under DAR A.O. No. 9. The CA also found that petitioner applied
for exclusion long before the effectivity of DAR A.O. No. 9, thus, negating the claim that
petitioner merely converted the property for livestock, poultry, and swine raising in order to
exclude it from CARP coverage. Petitioner was held to have actually engaged in the said
business on the property even before June 15, 1988. The CA disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the Office
of the President dated September 16, 2002 is hereby SET ASIDE, and its Decision dated
February 4, 2000 declaring the entire 316.0422 hectares exempt from the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is hereby REINSTATED without prejudice to the
outcome of the continuing review and verification proceedings which the Department of
Agrarian Reform, through the proper Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, may undertake
pursuant to Policy Statement (D) of DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1993.
SO ORDERED.
23

Meanwhile, six months earlier, or on November 4, 2004, without the knowledge of the CA as
the parties did not inform the appellate court then DAR Secretary Rene C. Villa (Secretary
Villa) issued DAR Conversion Order No. CON-0410-0016
24
(Conversion Order), granting
petitioners application to convert portions of the 316.0422-hectare property from agricultural to
residential and golf courses use. The portions converted with a total area of 153.3049 hectares
were covered by TCT Nos. M-15755 (T-332694), M-15751 (T-274129), and M-15750 (T-
410434). With this Conversion Order, the area of the property subject of the controversy was
effectively reduced to 162.7373 hectares.
On the CAs decision of April 29, 2005, Motions for Reconsideration were filed by farmer-
groups, namely: the farmers represented by Miguel Espinas
25
(Espinas group), the Pinugay
Farmers,
26
and the SAPLAG.
27
The farmer-groups all claimed that the CA should have accorded
respect to the factual findings of the OP. Moreover, the farmer-groups unanimously intimated
that petitioner already converted and developed a portion of the property into a leisure-
residential-commercial estate known as the Palo Alto Leisure and Sports Complex (Palo Alto).
Subsequently, in a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration on Newly Secured Evidence
pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1993
28
(Supplement) dated June 15,
2005, the Espinas group submitted the following as evidence:
1) Conversion Order
29
dated November 4, 2004, issued by Secretary Villa, converting
portions of the property from agricultural to residential and golf courses use, with a total
area of 153.3049 hectares; thus, the Espinas group prayed that the remaining 162.7373
hectares (subject property) be covered by the CARP;
2) Letter
30
dated June 7, 2005 of both incoming Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
(MARO) Bismark M. Elma (MARO Elma) and outgoing MARO Cesar C. Celi (MARO
Celi) of Baras, Rizal, addressed to Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) II of
Rizal, Felixberto Q. Kagahastian, (MARO Report), informing the latter, among others,
that Palo Alto was already under development and the lots therein were being offered for
sale; that there were actual tillers on the subject property; that there were agricultural
improvements thereon, including an irrigation system and road projects funded by the
Government; that there was no existing livestock farm on the subject property; and that
the same was not in the possession and/or control of petitioner; and
3) Certification
31
dated June 8, 2005, issued by both MARO Elma and MARO Celi,
manifesting that the subject property was in the possession and cultivation of actual
occupants and tillers, and that, upon inspection, petitioner maintained no livestock farm
thereon.
Four months later, the Espinas group and the DAR filed their respective Manifestations.
32
In its
Manifestation dated November 29, 2005, the DAR confirmed that the subject property was no
longer devoted to cattle raising. Hence, in its Resolution
33
dated December 21, 2005, the CA
directed petitioner to file its comment on the Supplement and the aforementioned Manifestations.
Employing the services of a new counsel, petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Rejoinder,
34
and
prayed that the MARO Report be disregarded and expunged from the records for lack of factual
and legal basis.
With the CA now made aware of these developments, particularly Secretary Villas Conversion
Order of November 4, 2004, the appellate court had to acknowledge that the property subject of
the controversy would now be limited to the remaining 162.7373 hectares. In the same token, the
Espinas group prayed that this remaining area be covered by the CARP.
35

On October 4, 2006, the CA amended its earlier Decision. It held that its April 29, 2005 Decision
was theoretically not final because DAR A.O. No. 9 required the MARO to make a continuing
review and verification of the subject property. While the CA was cognizant of our ruling in
Department of Agrarian Reform v. Sutton,
36
wherein we declared DAR A.O. No. 9 as
unconstitutional, it still resolved to lift the exemption of the subject property from the CARP, not
on the basis of DAR A.O. No. 9, but on the strength of evidence such as the MARO Report and
Certification, and the Katunayan
37
issued by the Punong Barangay, Alfredo Ruba (Chairman
Ruba), of Pinugay, Baras, Rizal, showing that the subject property was no longer operated as a
livestock farm. Moreover, the CA held that the lease agreements,
38
which petitioner submitted to
prove that it was compelled to lease a ranch as temporary shelter for its cattle, only reinforced the
DARs finding that there was indeed no existing livestock farm on the subject property. While
petitioner claimed that it was merely forced to do so to prevent further slaughtering of its cattle
allegedly committed by the occupants, the CA found the claim unsubstantiated. Furthermore, the
CA opined that petitioner should have asserted its rights when the irrigation and road projects
were introduced by the Government within its property. Finally, the CA accorded the findings of
MARO Elma and MARO Celi the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions in the absence of evidence proving misconduct and/or dishonesty when they inspected
the subject property and rendered their report. Thus, the CA disposed:
WHEREFORE, this Courts Decision dated April 29, 2005 is hereby amended in that the
exemption of the subject landholding from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program is hereby lifted, and the 162.7373 hectare-agricultural portion thereof is hereby declared
covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
SO ORDERED.
39

Unperturbed, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
40
On January 8, 2007, MARO Elma,
in compliance with the Memorandum of DAR Regional Director Dominador B. Andres, tendered
another Report
41
reiterating that, upon inspection of the subject property, together with
petitioners counsel-turned witness, Atty. Grace Eloisa J. Que (Atty. Que), PARO Danilo M.
Obarse, Chairman Ruba, and several occupants thereof, he, among others, found no livestock
farm within the subject property. About 43 heads of cattle were shown, but MARO Elma
observed that the same were inside an area adjacent to Palo Alto. Subsequently, upon Atty.
Ques request for reinvestigation, designated personnel of the DAR Provincial and Regional
Offices (Investigating Team) conducted another ocular inspection on the subject property on
February 20, 2007. The Investigating Team, in its Report
42
dated February 21, 2007, found that,
per testimony of petitioners caretaker, Rogelio Ludivices (Roger),
43
petitioner has 43 heads of
cattle taken care of by the following individuals: i) Josefino Custodio (Josefino) 18 heads; ii)
Andy Amahit 15 heads; and iii) Bert Pangan 2 heads; that these individuals pastured the herd
of cattle outside the subject property, while Roger took care of 8 heads of cattle inside the Palo
Alto area; that 21 heads of cattle owned by petitioner were seen in the area adjacent to Palo Alto;
that Josefino confirmed to the Investigating Team that he takes care of 18 heads of cattle owned
by petitioner; that the said Investigating Team saw 9 heads of cattle in the Palo Alto area, 2 of
which bore "MFI" marks; and that the 9 heads of cattle appear to have matched the Certificates
of Ownership of Large Cattle submitted by petitioner.
Because of the contentious factual issues and the conflicting averments of the parties, the CA set
the case for hearing and reception of evidence on April 24, 2007.
44
Thereafter, as narrated by the
CA, the following events transpired:
On May 17, 2007, [petitioner] presented the Judicial Affidavits of its witnesses, namely,
[petitioners] counsel, [Atty. Que], and the alleged caretaker of [petitioners] farm, [Roger], who
were both cross-examined by counsel for farmers-movants and SAPLAG. [Petitioner] and
SAPLAG then marked their documentary exhibits.
On May 24, 2007, [petitioners] security guard and third witness, Rodolfo G. Febrada, submitted
his Judicial Affidavit and was cross-examined by counsel for fa[r]mers-movants and SAPLAG.
Farmers-movants also marked their documentary exhibits.
Thereafter, the parties submitted their respective Formal Offers of Evidence. Farmers-movants
and SAPLAG filed their objections to [petitioners] Formal Offer of Evidence. Later, [petitioner]
and farmers-movants filed their respective Memoranda.
In December 2007, this Court issued a Resolution on the parties offer of evidence and
considered [petitioners] Motion for Reconsideration submitted for resolution.
45

Finally, petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution
46
dated
March 27, 2008. The CA discarded petitioners reliance on Sutton. It ratiocinated that the
MARO Reports and the DARs Manifestation could not be disregarded simply because DAR
A.O. No. 9 was declared unconstitutional. The Sutton ruling was premised on the fact that the
Sutton property continued to operate as a livestock farm. The CA also reasoned that, in Sutton,
this Court did not remove from the DAR the power to implement the CARP, pursuant to the
latters authority to oversee the implementation of agrarian reform laws under Section 50
47
of the
CARL. Moreover, the CA found:
Petitioner-appellant claimed that they had 43 heads of cattle which are being cared for and
pastured by 4 individuals. To prove its ownership of the said cattle, petitioner-appellant offered
in evidence 43 Certificates of Ownership of Large Cattle. Significantly, however, the said
Certificates were all dated and issued on November 24, 2006, nearly 2 months after this Court
rendered its Amended Decision lifting the exemption of the 162-hectare portion of the subject
landholding. The acquisition of such cattle after the lifting of the exemption clearly reveals that
petitioner-appellant was no longer operating a livestock farm, and suggests an effort to create a
semblance of livestock-raising for the purpose of its Motion for Reconsideration.
48

On petitioners assertion that between MARO Elmas Report dated January 8, 2007 and the
Investigating Teams Report, the latter should be given credence, the CA held that there were no
material inconsistencies between the two reports because both showed that the 43 heads of cattle
were found outside the subject property.
Hence, this Petition assigning the following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD
THAT LANDS DEVOTED TO LIVESTOCK FARMING WITHIN THE MEANING
OF LUZ FARMS AND SUTTON, AND WHICH ARE THEREBY EXEMPT FROM
CARL COVERAGE, ARE NEVERTHELESS SUBJECT TO DARS CONTINUING
VERIFICATION AS TO USE, AND, ON THE BASIS OF SUCH VERIFICATION,
MAY BE ORDERED REVERTED TO AGRICULTURAL CLASSIFICATION AND
COMPULSORY ACQUISITION[;]
II.
GRANTING THAT THE EXEMPT LANDS AFORESAID MAY BE SO REVERTED
TO AGRICULTURAL CLASSIFICATION, STILL THE PROCEEDINGS FOR SUCH
PURPOSE BELONGS TO THE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE
DAR, BEFORE WHICH THE CONTENDING PARTIES MAY VENTILATE
FACTUAL ISSUES, AND AVAIL THEMSELVES OF USUAL REVIEW
PROCESSES, AND NOT TO THE COURT OF APPEALS EXERCISING
APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER ISSUES COMPLETELY UNRELATED TO
REVERSION [; AND]
III.
IN ANY CASE, THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT THE PROPERTY IN
DISPUTE IS NO LONGER BEING USED FOR LIVESTOCK FARMING.
49

Petitioner asseverates that lands devoted to livestock farming as of June 15, 1988 are classified
as industrial lands, hence, outside the ambit of the CARP; that Luz Farms, Sutton, and R.A. No.
7881 clearly excluded such lands on constitutional grounds; that petitioners lands were actually
devoted to livestock even before the enactment of the CARL; that livestock farms are exempt
from the CARL, not by reason of any act of the DAR, but because of their nature as industrial
lands; that petitioners property was admittedly devoted to livestock farming as of June 1988 and
the only issue before was whether or not petitioners pieces of evidence comply with the ratios
provided under DAR A.O. No. 9; and that DAR A.O. No. 9 having been declared as
unconstitutional, DAR had no more legal basis to conduct a continuing review and verification
proceedings over livestock farms. Petitioner argues that, in cases where reversion of properties to
agricultural use is proper, only the DAR has the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide
the same; hence, the CA, in this case, committed serious errors when it ordered the reversion of
the property and when it considered pieces of evidence not existing as of June 15, 1988, despite
its lack of jurisdiction; that the CA should have remanded the case to the DAR due to conflicting
factual claims; that the CA cannot ventilate allegations of fact that were introduced for the first
time on appeal as a supplement to a motion for reconsideration of its first decision, use the same
to deviate from the issues pending review, and, on the basis thereof, declare exempt lands
reverted to agricultural use and compulsorily covered by the CARP; that the "newly discovered
[pieces of] evidence" were not introduced in the proceedings before the DAR, hence, it was
erroneous for the CA to consider them; and that piecemeal presentation of evidence is not in
accord with orderly justice. Finally, petitioner submits that, in any case, the CA gravely erred
and committed grave abuse of discretion when it held that the subject property was no longer
used for livestock farming as shown by the Report of the Investigating Team. Petitioner relies on
the 1997 LUCEC and DAR findings that the subject property was devoted to livestock farming,
and on the 1999 CA Decision which held that the occupants of the property were squatters,
bereft of any authority to stay and possess the property.
50

On one hand, the farmer-groups, represented by the Espinas group, contend that they have been
planting rice and fruit-bearing trees on the subject property, and helped the National Irrigation
Administration in setting up an irrigation system therein in 1997, with a produce of 1,500 to
1,600 sacks of palay each year; that petitioner came to court with unclean hands because, while it
sought the exemption and exclusion of the entire property, unknown to the CA, petitioner
surreptitiously filed for conversion of the property now known as Palo Alto, which was actually
granted by the DAR Secretary; that petitioners bad faith is more apparent since, despite the
conversion of the 153.3049-hectare portion of the property, it still seeks to exempt the entire
property in this case; and that the fact that petitioner applied for conversion is an admission that
indeed the property is agricultural. The farmer-groups also contend that petitioners reliance on
Luz Farms and Sutton is unavailing because in these cases there was actually no cessation of the
business of raising cattle; that what is being exempted is the activity of raising cattle and not the
property itself; that exemptions due to cattle raising are not permanent; that the declaration of
DAR A.O. No. 9 as unconstitutional does not at all diminish the mandated duty of the DAR, as
the lead agency of the Government, to implement the CARL; that the DAR, vested with the
power to identify lands subject to CARP, logically also has the power to identify lands which are
excluded and/or exempted therefrom; that to disregard DARs authority on the matter would
open the floodgates to abuse and fraud by unscrupulous landowners; that the factual finding of
the CA that the subject property is no longer a livestock farm may not be disturbed on appeal, as
enunciated by this Court; that DAR conducted a review and monitoring of the subject property
by virtue of its powers under the CARL; and that the CA has sufficient discretion to admit
evidence in order that it could arrive at a fair, just, and equitable ruling in this case.
51

On the other hand, respondent OP, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), claims that
the CA correctly held that the subject property is not exempt from the coverage of the CARP, as
substantial pieces of evidence show that the said property is not exclusively devoted to livestock,
swine, and/or poultry raising; that the issues presented by petitioner are factual in nature and not
proper in this case; that under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, questions of fact
may be raised by the parties and resolved by the CA; that due to the divergence in the factual
findings of the DAR and the OP, the CA was duty bound to review and ascertain which of the
said findings are duly supported by substantial evidence; that the subject property was subject to
continuing review and verification proceedings due to the then prevailing DAR A.O. No. 9; that
there is no question that the power to determine if a property is subject to CARP coverage lies
with the DAR Secretary; that pursuant to such power, the MARO rendered the assailed reports
and certification, and the DAR itself manifested before the CA that the subject property is no
longer devoted to livestock farming; and that, while it is true that this Courts ruling in Luz
Farms declared that agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and/or swine raising are
excluded from the CARP, the said ruling is not without any qualification.
52

In its Reply
53
to the farmer-groups and to the OSGs comment, petitioner counters that the
farmer-groups have no legal basis to their claims as they admitted that they entered the subject
property without the consent of petitioner; that the rice plots actually found in the subject
property, which were subsequently taken over by squatters, were, in fact, planted by petitioner in
compliance with the directive of then President Ferdinand Marcos for the employer to provide
rice to its employees; that when a land is declared exempt from the CARP on the ground that it is
not agricultural as of the time the CARL took effect, the use and disposition of that land is
entirely and forever beyond DARs jurisdiction; and that, inasmuch as the subject property was
not agricultural from the very beginning, DAR has no power to regulate the same. Petitioner also
asserts that the CA cannot uncharacteristically assume the role of trier of facts and resolve
factual questions not previously adjudicated by the lower tribunals; that MARO Elma rendered
the assailed MARO reports with bias against petitioner, and the same were contradicted by the
Investigating Teams Report, which confirmed that the subject property is still devoted to
livestock farming; and that there has been no change in petitioners business interest as an entity
engaged in livestock farming since its inception in 1960, though there was admittedly a decline
in the scale of its operations due to the illegal acts of the squatter-occupants.
Our Ruling
The Petition is bereft of merit.
Let it be stressed that when the CA provided in its first Decision that continuing review and
verification may be conducted by the DAR pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 9, the latter was not yet
declared unconstitutional by this Court. The first CA Decision was promulgated on April 29,
2005, while this Court struck down as unconstitutional DAR A.O. No. 9, by way of Sutton, on
October 19, 2005. Likewise, let it be emphasized that the Espinas group filed the Supplement
and submitted the assailed MARO reports and certification on June 15, 2005, which proved to be
adverse to petitioners case. Thus, it could not be said that the CA erred or gravely abused its
discretion in respecting the mandate of DAR A.O. No. 9, which was then subsisting and in full
force and effect.
While it is true that an issue which was neither alleged in the complaint nor raised during the trial
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as it would be offensive to the basic rules of fair
play, justice, and due process,
54
the same is not without exception,
55
such as this case. The CA,
under Section 3,
56
Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, can, in the interest of justice,
entertain and resolve factual issues. After all, technical and procedural rules are intended to help
secure, and not suppress, substantial justice. A deviation from a rigid enforcement of the rules
may thus be allowed to attain the prime objective of dispensing justice, for dispensation of
justice is the core reason for the existence of courts.
57
Moreover, petitioner cannot validly claim
that it was deprived of due process because the CA afforded it all the opportunity to be heard.
58

The CA even directed petitioner to file its comment on the Supplement, and to prove and
establish its claim that the subject property was excluded from the coverage of the CARP.
Petitioner actively participated in the proceedings before the CA by submitting pleadings and
pieces of documentary evidence, such as the Investigating Teams Report and judicial affidavits.
The CA also went further by setting the case for hearing. In all these proceedings, all the parties
rights to due process were amply protected and recognized.
With the procedural issue disposed of, we find that petitioners arguments fail to persuade. Its
invocation of Sutton is unavailing. In Sutton, we held:
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution.
The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian
reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the
deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all
lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry-raising. The Court clarified in the
Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall
within the definition of "agriculture" or "agricultural activity." The raising of livestock, swine
and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity.
A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such
as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with
grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds
and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by
lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other
technological appurtenances.
Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by
the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the
assailed A.O.
59

Indeed, as pointed out by the CA, the instant case does not rest on facts parallel to those of
Sutton because, in Sutton, the subject property remained a livestock farm. We even highlighted
therein the fact that "there has been no change of business interest in the case of respondents."
60

Similarly, in Department of Agrarian Reform v. Uy,
61
we excluded a parcel of land from CARP
coverage due to the factual findings of the MARO, which were confirmed by the DAR, that the
property was entirely devoted to livestock farming. However, in A.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc.,
represented by Carmen Z. Arnaiz v. Office of the President; Department of Agrarian Reform;
Regional Director, DAR Region V, Legaspi City; Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, DAR
Provincial Office, Masbate, Masbate; and Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, DAR Municipal
Office, Masbate, Masbate,
62
we denied a similar petition for exemption and/or exclusion, by
according respect to the CAs factual findings and its reliance on the findings of the DAR and
the OP that
the subject parcels of land were not directly, actually, and exclusively used for pasture.
63

Petitioners admission that, since 2001, it leased another ranch for its own livestock is fatal to its
cause.
64
While petitioner advances a defense that it leased this ranch because the occupants of the
subject property harmed its cattle, like the CA, we find it surprising that not even a single police
and/or barangay report was filed by petitioner to amplify its indignation over these alleged illegal
acts. Moreover, we accord respect to the CAs keen observation that the assailed MARO reports
and the Investigating Teams Report do not actually contradict one another, finding that the 43
cows, while owned by petitioner, were actually pastured outside the subject property.
Finally, it is established that issues of Exclusion and/or Exemption are characterized as Agrarian
Law Implementation (ALI) cases which are well within the DAR Secretarys competence and
jurisdiction.
65
Section 3, Rule II of the 2003 Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
Rules of Procedure provides:
Section 3. Agrarian Law Implementation Cases.
The Adjudicator or the Board shall have no jurisdiction over matters involving the administrative
implementation of RA No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) of 1988 and other agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent rules and administrative
orders, which shall be under the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Office of the
Secretary of the DAR in accordance with his issuances, to wit:
x x x x
3.8 Exclusion from CARP coverage of agricultural land used for livestock, swine, and poultry
raising.
Thus, we cannot, without going against the law, arbitrarily strip the DAR Secretary of his legal
mandate to exercise jurisdiction and authority over all ALI cases. To succumb to petitioners
contention that "when a land is declared exempt from the CARP on the ground that it is not
agricultural as of the time the CARL took effect, the use and disposition of that land is entirely
and forever beyond DARs jurisdiction" is dangerous, suggestive of self-regulation. Precisely, it
is the DAR Secretary who is vested with such jurisdiction and authority to exempt and/or
exclude a property from CARP coverage based on the factual circumstances of each case and in
accordance with law and applicable jurisprudence. In addition, albeit parenthetically, Secretary
Villa had already granted the conversion into residential and golf courses use of nearly one-half
of the entire area originally claimed as exempt from CARP coverage because it was allegedly
devoted to livestock production.lawphil1
In sum, we find no reversible error in the assailed Amended Decision and Resolution of the CA
which would warrant the modification, much less the reversal, thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the Court of Appeals Amended Decision dated
October 4, 2006 and Resolution dated March 27, 2008 are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 100091 October 22, 1992
CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED ITS PRESIDENT DR. LEONARDO A. CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, THE COURT OF APPEALS and ALVIN OBRIQUE,
REPRESENTING BUKIDNON FREE FARMERS AGRICULTURAL LABORERS ORGANIZATION (BUFFALO), respondents.

CAMPOS, JR., J .:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to nullify the proceedings and decision of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB for brevity) dated September 4, 1989 and to set aside the decision the decision * of the Court
of Appeals dated August 20, 1990, affirming the decision of the DARAB which ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of suitable, compact
and contiguous portions of the Central Mindanao University (CMU for brevity) land and their inclusion in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP for brevity) for distribution to qualified beneficiaries, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
This case originated in a complaint filed by complainants calling themselves as the Bukidnon Free Farmers and Agricultural Laborers
Organization (BUFFALO for brevity) under the leadership of Alvin Obrique and Luis Hermoso against the CMU, before the Department of
Agrarian Reform for Declaration of Status as Tenants, under the CARP.
From the records, the following facts are evident. The petitioner, the CMU, is an agricultural educational institution owned and run by the
state located in the town of Musuan, Bukidnon province. It started as a farm school at Marilang, Bukidnon in early 1910, in response to the
public demand for an agricultural school in Mindanao. It expanded into the Bukidnon National Agricultural High School and was transferred to
its new site in Managok near Malaybalay, the provincial capital of Bukidnon.
In the early 1960's, it was converted into a college with campus at Musuan, until it became what is now known as the CMU, but still primarily
an agricultural university. From its beginning, the school was the answer to the crying need for training people in order to develop the
agricultural potential of the island of Mindanao. Those who planned and established the school had a vision as to the future development of
that part of the Philippines. On January 16, 1958 the President of the Republic of the Philippines, the late Carlos P. Garcia, "upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and pursuant to the provisions of Section 53, of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, as amended", issued Proclamation No. 476, withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural
College, a site which would be the future campus of what is now the CMU. A total land area comprising 3,080 hectares was surveyed and
registered and titled in the name of the petitioner under OCT Nos. 160, 161 and 162.
1

In the course of the cadastral hearing of the school's petition for registration of the aforementioned grant
of agricultural land, several tribes belonging to cultural communities, opposed the petition claiming
ownership of certain ancestral lands forming part of the tribal reservations. Some of the claims were
granted so that what was titled to the present petitioner school was reduced from 3,401 hectares to 3,080
hectares.
In the early 1960's, the student population of the school was less than 3,000. By 1988, the student
population had expanded to some 13,000 students, so that the school community has an academic
population (student, faculty and non-academic staff) of almost 15,000. To cope with the increase in its
enrollment, it has expanded and improved its educational facilities partly from government appropriation
and partly by self-help measures.
True to the concept of a land grant college, the school embarked on self-help measures to carry out its
educational objectives, train its students, and maintain various activities which the government
appropriation could not adequately support or sustain. In 1984, the CMU approved Resolution No. 160,
adopting a livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program" under which the land resources of
the University were leased to its faculty and employees. This arrangement was covered by a written
contract. Under this program the faculty and staff combine themselves to groups of five members each,
and the CMU provided technical know-how, practical training and all kinds of assistance, to enable each
group to cultivate 4 to 5 hectares of land for the lowland rice project. Each group pays the CMU a service
fee and also a land use participant's fee. The contract prohibits participants and their hired workers to
establish houses or live in the project area and to use the cultivated land as a collateral for any kind of
loan. It was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU and the
faculty and/or employees. This particular program was conceived as a multi-disciplinary applied research
extension and productivity program to utilize available land, train people in modern agricultural technology
and at the same time give the faculty and staff opportunities within the confines of the CMU reservation to
earn additional income to augment their salaries. The location of the CMU at Musuan, Bukidnon, which is
quite a distance from the nearest town, was the proper setting for the adoption of such a program. Among
the participants in this program were Alvin Obrique, Felix Guinanao, Joven Caballero, Nestor Pulao,
Danilo Vasquez, Aronio Pelayo and other complainants. Obrique was a Physics Instructor at the CMU
while the others were employees in the lowland rice project. The other complainants who were not
members of the faculty or non-academic staff CMU, were hired workers or laborers of the participants in
this program. When petitioner Dr. Leonardo Chua became President of the CMU in July 1986, he
discontinued the agri-business project for the production of rice, corn and sugar cane known as Agri-
Business Management and Training Project, due to losses incurred while carrying on the said project.
Some CMU personnel, among whom were the complainants, were laid-off when this project was
discontinued. As Assistant Director of this agri-business project, Obrique was found guilty of mishandling
the CMU funds and was separated from service by virtue of Executive Order No. 17, the re-organization
law of the CMU.
Sometime in 1986, under Dr. Chua as President, the CMU launched a self-help project called CMU-
Income Enhancement Program (CMU-IEP) to develop unutilized land resources, mobilize and promote
the spirit of self-reliance, provide socio-economic and technical training in actual field project
implementation and augment the income of the faculty and the staff.
Under the terms of a 3-party Memorandum of Agreement
2
among the CMU, the CMU-Integrated
Development Foundation (CMU-IDF) and groups or "seldas" of 5 CMU employees, the CMU would
provide the use of 4 to 5 hectares of land to a selda for one (1) calendar year. The CMU-IDF would
provide researchers and specialists to assist in the preparation of project proposals and to monitor and
analyze project implementation. The selda in turn would pay to the CMU P100 as service fee and P1,000
per hectare as participant's land rental fee. In addition, 400 kilograms of the produce per year would be
turned over or donated to the CMU-IDF. The participants agreed not to allow their hired laborers or
member of their family to establish any house or live within vicinity of the project area and not to use the
allocated lot as collateral for a loan. It was expressly provided that no tenant-landlord relationship would
exist as a result of the Agreement.
Initially, participation in the CMU-IEP was extended only to workers and staff members who were still
employed with the CMU and was not made available to former workers or employees. In the middle of
1987, to cushion the impact of the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar cane project on the lives of
its former workers, the CMU allowed them to participate in the CMU-IEP as special participants.
Under the terms of a contract called Addendum To Existing Memorandum of Agreement Concerning
Participation To the CMU-Income Enhancement Program,
3
a former employee would be grouped with an
existing selda of his choice and provided one (1) hectare for a lowland rice project for one (1) calendar
year. He would pay the land rental participant's fee of P1,000.00 per hectare but on a charge-to-crop
basis. He would also be subject to the same prohibitions as those imposed on the CMU employees. It
was also expressly provided that no tenant-landlord relationship would exist as a result of the Agreement.
The one-year contracts expired on June 30, 1988. Some contracts were renewed. Those whose contracts
were not renewed were served with notices to vacate.
The non-renewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar cane project, the loss of
jobs due to termination or separation from the service and the alleged harassment by school authorities,
all contributed to, and precipitated the filing of the complaint.
On the basis of the above facts, the DARAB found that the private respondents were not tenants and
cannot therefore be beneficiaries under the CARP. At the same time, the DARAB ordered the segregation
of 400 hectares of suitable, compact and contiguous portions of the CMU land and their inclusion in the
CARP for distribution to qualified beneficiaries.
The petitioner CMU, in seeking a review of the decisions of the respondents DARAB and the Court of
Appeals, raised the following issues:
1.) Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction to hear and decide Case No. 005 for Declaration of Status
of Tenants and coverage of land under the CARP.
2.) Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the Petition for Review on Certiorari and affirming the
decision of DARAB.
In their complaint, docketed as DAR Case No. 5, filed with the DARAB, complainants Obrique, et al.
claimed that they are tenants of the CMU and/or landless peasants claiming/occupying a part or portion of
the CMU situated at Sinalayan, Valencia, Bukidnon and Musuan, Bukidnon, consisting of about 1,200
hectares. We agree with the DARAB's finding that Obrique, et. al. are not tenants. Under the terms of the
written agreement signed by Obrique, et. al., pursuant to the livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling
Sikap Program", it was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU
and the faculty and staff (participants in the project). The CMU did not receive any share from the
harvest/fruits of the land tilled by the participants. What the CMU collected was a nominal service fee and
land use participant's fee in consideration of all the kinds of assistance given to the participants by the
CMU. Again, the agreement signed by the participants under the CMU-IEP clearly stipulated that no
landlord-tenant relationship existed, and that the participants are not share croppers nor lessees, and the
CMU did not share in the produce of the participants' labor.
In the same paragraph of their complaint, complainants claim that they are landless peasants. This
allegation requires proof and should not be accepted as factually true. Obrique is not a landless peasant.
The facts showed he was Physics Instructor at CMU holding a very responsible position was separated
from the service on account of certain irregularities he committed while Assistant Director of the Agri-
Business Project of cultivating lowland rice. Others may, at the moment, own no land in Bukidnon but
they may not necessarily be so destitute in their places of origin. No proof whatsoever appears in the
record to show that they are landless peasants.
The evidence on record establish without doubt that the complainants were originally authorized or given
permission to occupy certain areas of the CMU property for a definite purpose to carry out certain
university projects as part of the CMU's program of activities pursuant to its avowed purpose of giving
training and instruction in agricultural and other related technologies, using the land and other resources
of the institution as a laboratory for these projects. Their entry into the land of the CMU was with the
permission and written consent of the owner, the CMU, for a limited period and for a specific purpose.
After the expiration of their privilege to occupy and cultivate the land of the CMU, their continued stay was
unauthorized and their settlement on the CMU's land was without legal authority. A person entering upon
lands of another, not claiming in good faith the right to do so by virtue of any title of his own, or by virtue
of some agreement with the owner or with one whom he believes holds title to the land, is a squatter.
4

Squatters cannot enter the land of another surreptitiously or by stealth, and under the umbrella of the
CARP, claim rights to said property as landless peasants. Under Section 73 of R.A. 6657, persons guilty
of committing prohibited acts of forcible entry or illegal detainer do not qualify as beneficiaries and may
not avail themselves of the rights and benefits of agrarian reform. Any such person who knowingly and
wilfully violates the above provision of the Act shall be punished with imprisonment or fine at the
discretion of the Court.
In view of the above, the private respondents, not being tenants nor proven to be landless peasants,
cannot qualify as beneficiaries under the CARP.
The questioned decision of the Adjudication Board, affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, segregating
400 hectares from the CMU land is primarily based on the alleged fact that the land subject hereof is "not
directly, actually and exclusively used for school sites, because the same was leased to Philippine
Packing Corporation (now Del Monte Philippines)".
In support of this view, the Board held that the "respondent University failed to show that it is using
actually, really, truly and in fact, the questioned area to the exclusion of others, nor did it show that the
same is directly used without any intervening agency or person",
5
and "there is no definite and concrete
showing that the use of said lands are essentially indispensable for educational purposes".
6
The reliance
by the respondents Board and Appellate Tribunal on the technical or literal definition from Moreno's
Philippine Law Dictionary and Black's Law Dictionary, may give the ordinary reader a classroom meaning
of the phrase "is actually directly and exclusively", but in so doing they missed the true meaning of
Section 10, R.A. 6657, as to what lands are exempted or excluded from the coverage of the CARP.
The pertinent provisions of R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988, are as follows:
Sec. 4. SCOPE. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229
including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for
agriculture. No reclassification of forest of mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be
undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological,
developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific
limits of the public domain;
(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits ad determined by
Congress in the preceding paragraph;
(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and
(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural
products raised or that can be raised thereon.
Sec. 10 EXEMPTIONS AND EXCLUSIONS. Lands actually, directly and exclusively
used and found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestration, fish
sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves, national defense, school
sites and campuses including experimental farm stations operated by public or private
schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production
centers, church sites and convents appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic
centers appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies
and penal farms actually worked by the inmates, government and private research and
quarantine centers and all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except
those already developed shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act. (Emphasis
supplied).
The construction given by the DARAB to Section 10 restricts the land area of the CMU to its present
needs or to a land area presently, actively exploited and utilized by the university in carrying out its
present educational program with its present student population and academic facility overlooking the
very significant factor of growth of the university in the years to come. By the nature of the CMU, which is
a school established to promote agriculture and industry, the need for a vast tract of agricultural land and
for future programs of expansion is obvious. At the outset, the CMU was conceived in the same manner
as land grant colleges in America, a type of educational institution which blazed the trail for the
development of vast tracts of unexplored and undeveloped agricultural lands in the Mid-West. What we
now know as Michigan State University, Penn State University and Illinois State University, started as
small land grant colleges, with meager funding to support their ever increasing educational programs.
They were given extensive tracts of agricultural and forest lands to be developed to support their
numerous expanding activities in the fields of agricultural technology and scientific research. Funds for
the support of the educational programs of land grant colleges came from government appropriation,
tuition and other student fees, private endowments and gifts, and earnings from miscellaneous sources.
7

It was in this same spirit that President Garcia issued Proclamation No. 476, withdrawing from sale or
settlement and reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College (forerunner of the CMU) a land
reservation of 3,080 hectares as its future campus. It was set up in Bukidnon, in the hinterlands of
Mindanao, in order that it can have enough resources and wide open spaces to grow as an agricultural
educational institution, to develop and train future farmers of Mindanao and help attract settlers to that
part of the country.
In line with its avowed purpose as an agricultural and technical school, the University adopted a land
utilization program to develop and exploit its 3080-hectare land reservation as follows: 8
No. of Hectares Percentage
a. Livestock and Pasture 1,016.40 33
b. Upland Crops 616 20
c. Campus and Residential sites 462 15
d. Irrigated rice 400.40 13
e. Watershed and forest reservation 308 10
f. Fruit and Trees Crops 154 5
g. Agricultural
Experimental stations 123.20 4
3,080.00 100%
The first land use plan of the CARP was prepared in 1975 and since then it has undergone several revisions in line with changing economic
conditions, national economic policies and financial limitations and availability of resources. The CMU, through Resolution No. 160 S. 1984,
pursuant to its development plan, adopted a multi-disciplinary applied research extension and productivity program called the "Kilusang
Sariling Sikap Project" (CMU-KSSP). The objectives
9
of this program were:
1. Provide researches who shall assist in (a) preparation of proposal; (b) monitor project
implementation; and (c) collect and analyze all data and information relevant to the
processes and results of project implementation;
2. Provide the use of land within the University reservation for the purpose of establishing
a lowland rice project for the party of the Second Part for a period of one calendar year
subject to discretionary renewal by the Party of the First Part;
3. Provide practical training to the Party of the Second Part on the management and
operation of their lowland project upon request of Party of the Second Part; and
4. Provide technical assistance in the form of relevant livelihood project specialists who
shall extend expertise on scientific methods of crop production upon request by Party of
the Second Part.
In return for the technical assistance extended by the CMU, the participants in a project pay a nominal
amount as service fee. The self-reliance program was adjunct to the CMU's lowland rice project.
The portion of the CMU land leased to the Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte Phils., Inc.)
was leased long before the CARP was passed. The agreement with the Philippine Packing Corporation
was not a lease but a Management and Development Agreement, a joint undertaking where use by the
Philippine Packing Corporation of the land was part of the CMU research program, with the direct
participation of faculty and students. Said contracts with the Philippine Packing Corporation and others of
a similar nature (like MM-Agraplex) were made prior to the enactment of R.A. 6657 and were directly
connected to the purpose and objectives of the CMU as an educational institution. As soon as the
objectives of the agreement for the joint use of the CMU land were achieved as of June 1988, the CMU
adopted a blue print for the exclusive use and utilization of said areas to carry out its own research and
agricultural experiments.
As to the determination of when and what lands are found to be necessary for use by the CMU, the
school is in the best position to resolve and answer the question and pass upon the problem of its needs
in relation to its avowed objectives for which the land was given to it by the State. Neither the DARAB nor
the Court of Appeals has the right to substitute its judgment or discretion on this matter, unless the
evidentiary facts are so manifest as to show that the CMU has no real for the land.
It is our opinion that the 400 hectares ordered segregated by the DARAB and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals in its Decision dated August 20, 1990, is not covered by the CARP because:
(1) It is not alienable and disposable land of the public domain;
(2) The CMU land reservation is not in excess of specific limits as determined by
Congress;
(3) It is private land registered and titled in the name of its lawful owner, the CMU;
(4) It is exempt from coverage under Section 10 of R.A. 6657 because the lands are
actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for school site and
campus, including experimental farm stations for educational purposes, and for
establishing seed and seedling research and pilot production centers. (Emphasis
supplied).
Under Section 4 and Section 10 of R.A. 6657, it is crystal clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is
limited only to matters involving the implementation of the CARP. More specifically, it is restricted to
agrarian cases and controversies involving lands falling within the coverage of the aforementioned
program. It does not include those which are actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be
necessary for, among such purposes, school sites and campuses for setting up experimental farm
stations, research and pilot production centers, etc.
Consequently, the DARAB has no power to try, hear and adjudicate the case pending before it involving a
portion of the CMU's titled school site, as the portion of the CMU land reservation ordered segregated is
actually, directly and exclusively used and found by the school to be necessary for its purposes. The
CMU has constantly raised the issue of the DARAB's lack of jurisdiction and has questioned the
respondent's authority to hear, try and adjudicate the case at bar. Despite the law and the evidence on
record tending to establish that the fact that the DARAB had no jurisdiction, it made the adjudication now
subject of review.
Whether the DARAB has the authority to order the segregation of a portion of a private property titled in
the name of its lawful owner, even if the claimant is not entitled as a beneficiary, is an issue we feel we
must resolve. The quasi-judicial powers of DARAB are provided in Executive Order No. 129-A, quoted
hereunder in so far as pertinent to the issue at bar:
Sec. 13. AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD There is hereby created
an Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board under the office of the Secretary. . . . The Board
shall assume the powers and functions with respect to adjudication of agrarian reform
cases under Executive Order 229 and this Executive Order . . .
Sec. 17. QUASI JUDICIAL POWERS OF THE DAR. The DAR is hereby vested
with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters including implementation of Agrarian
Reform.
Section 50 of R.A. 6658 confers on the DAR quasi-judicial powers as follows:
The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and shall have original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform. . . .
Section 17 of Executive Order No. 129-A is merely a repetition of Section 50, R.A. 6657. There is
no doubt that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute in the
implementation of the CARP. An agrarian dispute is defined by the same law as any controversy
relating to tenurial rights whether leasehold, tenancy stewardship or otherwise over lands devoted
to
agriculture.
10

In the case at bar, the DARAB found that the complainants are not share tenants or lease holders of the
CMU, yet it ordered the "segregation of a suitable compact and contiguous area of Four Hundred
hectares, more or less", from the CMU land reservation, and directed the DAR Regional Director to
implement its order of segregation. Having found that the complainants in this agrarian dispute for
Declaration of Tenancy Status are not entitled to claim as beneficiaries of the CARP because they are not
share tenants or leaseholders, its order for the segregation of 400 hectares of the CMU land was without
legal authority. w do not believe that the quasi-judicial function of the DARAB carries with it greater
authority than ordinary courts to make an award beyond what was demanded by the
complainants/petitioners, even in an agrarian dispute. Where the quasi-judicial body finds that the
complainants/petitioners are not entitled to the rights they are demanding, it is an erroneous interpretation
of authority for that quasi-judicial body to order private property to be awarded to future beneficiaries. The
order segregation 400 hectares of the CMU land was issued on a finding that the complainants are not
entitled as beneficiaries, and on an erroneous assumption that the CMU land which is excluded or
exempted under the law is subject to the coverage of the CARP. Going beyond what was asked by the
complainants who were not entitled to the relief prayed the complainants who were not entitled to the
relief prayed for, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion because it implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
The education of the youth and agrarian reform are admittedly among the highest priorities in the
government socio-economic programs. In this case, neither need give way to the other. Certainly, there
must still be vast tracts of agricultural land in Mindanao outside the CMU land reservation which can be
made available to landless peasants, assuming the claimants here, or some of them, can qualify as
CARP beneficiaries. To our mind, the taking of the CMU land which had been segregated for educational
purposes for distribution to yet uncertain beneficiaries is a gross misinterpretation of the authority and
jurisdiction granted by law to the DARAB.
The decision in this case is of far-reaching significance as far as it concerns state colleges and
universities whose resources and research facilities may be gradually eroded by misconstruing the
exemptions from the CARP. These state colleges and universities are the main vehicles for our scientific
and technological advancement in the field of agriculture, so vital to the existence, growth and
development of this country.
It is the opinion of this Court, in the light of the foregoing analysis and for the reasons indicated, that the
evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of grave abuse of discretion by respondents Court of Appeals
and DAR Adjudication Board. We hereby declare the decision of the DARAB dated September 4, 1989
and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 20, 1990, affirming the decision of the quasi-
judicial body, as null and void and hereby order that they be set aside, with costs against the private
respondents.
SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 158228 March 23, 2004
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, as represented by its Secretary, ROBERTO
M. PAGDANGANAN, petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS), respondent.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the decision
1
of the Court of Appeals
dated October 29, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 64378, which reversed the August 30, 2000 decision
of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, as well as the Resolution dated May 7, 2003, which denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
In controversy are Lot No. 2509 and Lot No. 817-D consisting of an aggregate area of 189.2462
hectares located at Hacienda Fe, Escalante, Negros Occidental and Brgy. Gen. Luna, Sagay,
Negros Occidental, respectively. On October 21, 1921, these lands were donated by the late
Esteban Jalandoni to respondent DECS (formerly Bureau of Education).
2
Consequently, titles
thereto were transferred in the name of respondent DECS under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
167175.
3

On July 15, 1985, respondent DECS leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for 10
agricultural crop years, commencing from crop year 1984-1985 to crop year 1993-1994. The
contract of lease was subsequently renewed for another 10 agricultural crop years, commencing
from crop year 1995-1996 to crop year 2004-2005.
4

On June 10, 1993, Eugenio Alpar and several others, claiming to be permanent and regular farm
workers of the subject lands, filed a petition for Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
coverage with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Escalante.
5

After investigation, MARO Jacinto R. Piosa, sent a "Notice of Coverage" to respondent DECS,
stating that the subject lands are now covered by CARP and inviting its representatives for a
conference with the farmer beneficiaries.
6
Then, MARO Piosa submitted his report to OIC-
PARO Stephen M. Leonidas, who recommended to the DAR Regional Director the approval of
the coverage of the landholdings.
On August 7, 1998, DAR Regional Director Dominador B. Andres approved the
recommendation, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the petition is granted. Order is hereby
issued:
1. Placing under CARP coverage Lot 2509 with an area of 111.4791 hectares situated at
Had. Fe, Escalante, Negros Occidental and Lot 817-D with an area of 77.7671 hectares
situated at Brgy. Gen. Luna, Sagay, Negros Occidental;
2. Affirming the notice of coverage sent by the DAR Provincial Office, Negros
Occidental dated November 23, 1994;
3. Directing the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office of Negros Occidental and the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officers of Sagay and Escalante to facilitate the acquisition
of the subject landholdings and the distribution of the same qualified beneficiaries.
SO ORDERED.
7

Respondent DECS appealed the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform which affirmed the
Order of the Regional Director.
8

Aggrieved, respondent DECS filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which set
aside the decision of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
9

Hence, the instant petition for review.
The pivotal issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the subject properties are exempt
from the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1998 (CARL).
The general policy under CARL is to cover as much lands suitable for agriculture as possible.
10

Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 sets out the coverage of CARP. It states that the program shall:
" cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including
other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture."
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for
agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be
undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account, ecological,
developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific
limits of the public domain;
(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as determined by
Congress in the preceding paragraph;
(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and
(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural
products raised or that can be raised thereon.
Section 3(c) thereof defines "agricultural land," as "land devoted to agricultural activity as
defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial
land." The term "agriculture" or "agricultural activity" is also defined by the same law as
follows:
Agriculture, Agricultural Enterprises or Agricultural Activity means the cultivation of the soil,
planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the
harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities, and practices performed by a farmer
in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.
11

The records of the case show that the subject properties were formerly private agricultural lands
owned by the late Esteban Jalandoni, and were donated to respondent DECS. From that time
until they were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, the lands continued to be agricultural
primarily planted to sugarcane, albeit part of the public domain being owned by an agency of the
government.
12
Moreover, there is no legislative or presidential act, before and after the enactment
of R.A. No. 6657, classifying the said lands as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land. Indubitably, the subject lands fall under the classification of lands of the public
domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture.
Respondent DECS sought exemption from CARP coverage on the ground that all the income
derived from its contract of lease with Anglo Agricultural Corporation were actually, directly
and exclusively used for educational purposes, such as for the repairs and renovations of schools
in the nearby locality.
Petitioner DAR, on the other hand, argued that the lands subject hereof are not exempt from the
CARP coverage because the same are not actually, directly and exclusively used as school sites
or campuses, as they are in fact leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation. Further, to be exempt
from the coverage, it is the land per se, not the income derived therefrom, that must be actually,
directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.
We agree with the petitioner.
Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which are exempted from the
coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their exemption, viz:
x x x x x x x x x
c) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense,
school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private
schools for educational purposes, , shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.
13

x x x x x x x x x
Clearly, a reading of the paragraph shows that, in order to be exempt from the coverage: 1) the
land must be "actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary;" and 2) the
purpose is "for school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by
public or private schools for educational purposes."
The importance of the phrase "actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary"
cannot be understated, as what respondent DECS would want us to do by not taking the words in
their literal and technical definitions. The words of the law are clear and unambiguous. Thus, the
"plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is applicable in this case. Where the
words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without attempted interpretation.
14

We are not unaware of our ruling in the case of Central Mindanao University v. Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board,
15
wherein we declared the land subject thereof exempt
from CARP coverage. However, respondent DECS reliance thereon is misplaced because the
factual circumstances are different in the case at bar.
Firstly, in the CMU case, the land involved was not alienable and disposable land of the public
domain because it was reserved by the late President Carlos P. Garcia under Proclamation No.
476 for the use of Mindanao Agricultural College (now CMU).
16
In this case, however, the lands
fall under the category of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture.
Secondly, in the CMU case, the land was actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be
necessary for school sites and campuses. Although a portion of it was being used by the
Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte Phils., Inc.) under a "Management and
Development Agreement", the undertaking was that the land shall be used by the Philippine
Packing Corporation as part of the CMU research program, with direct participation of faculty
and students. Moreover, the land was part of the land utilization program developed by the CMU
for its "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Project" (CMU-KSSP), a multi-disciplinary applied research
extension and productivity program.
17
Hence, the retention of the land was found to be necessary
for the present and future educational needs of the CMU. On the other hand, the lands in this
case were not actually and exclusively utilized as school sites and campuses, as they were leased
to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, not for educational purposes but for the furtherance of its
business. Also, as conceded by respondent DECS, it was the income from the contract of lease
and not the subject lands that was directly used for the repairs and renovations of the schools in
the locality.
Anent the issue of whether the farmers are qualified beneficiaries of CARP, we disagree with the
Court of Appeals finding that they were not.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that the identification of actual and potential beneficiaries
under CARP is vested in the Secretary of Agrarian Reform pursuant to Section 15, R.A. No.
6657, which states:
SECTION 15. Registration of Beneficiaries. The DAR in coordination with the Barangay
Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) as organized in this Act, shall register all agricultural
lessees, tenants and farmworkers who are qualified to be beneficiaries of the CARP. These
potential beneficiaries with the assistance of the BARC and the DAR shall provide the following
data:
(a) names and members of their immediate farm household;
(b) owners or administrators of the lands they work on and the length of tenurial
relationship;
(c) location and area of the land they work;
(d) crops planted; and
(e) their share in the harvest or amount of rental paid or wages received.
A copy of the registry or list of all potential CARP beneficiaries in the barangay shall be posted
in the barangay hall, school or other public buildings in the barangay where it shall be open to
inspection by the public at all reasonable hours.
In the case at bar, the BARC certified that herein farmers were potential CARP beneficiaries of
the subject properties.
18
Further, on November 23, 1994, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage placing the
subject properties under CARP. Since the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are
matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP,
19
it behooves the
courts to exercise great caution in substituting its own determination of the issue, unless there is
grave abuse of discretion committed by the administrative agency. In this case, there was none.
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) is the bastion of social justice of poor
landless farmers, the mechanism designed to redistribute to the underprivileged the natural right
to toil the earth, and to liberate them from oppressive tenancy. To those who seek its benefit, it is
the means towards a viable livelihood and, ultimately, a decent life. The objective of the State is
no less certain: "landless farmers and farmworkers will receive the highest consideration to
promote social justice and to move the nation toward sound rural development and
industrialization."
20

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court
of Appeals dated October 29, 2002, in CA-G.R. SP No. 64378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The decision dated August 30, 2000 of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform placing the subject
lands under CARP coverage, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 103125 May 17, 1993
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV. LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE and HON. BENJAMIN V. PANGA as Presiding Judge
of RTC Branch 33 at Pili, Camarines Sur, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION), ERNESTO SAN JOAQUIN and EFREN SAN JOAQUIN, respondents.
The Provincial Attorney for petitioners.
Reynaldo L. Herrera for Ernesto San Joaquin.

QUIASON, J .:
In this appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 20551 entitled "Ernesto N. San Joaquin, et al., v.
Hon. Benjamin V. Panga, et al.," this Court is asked to decide whether the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units is
subject, to the prior approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform, as the implementator of the agrarian reform program.
On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988,
authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot
farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees.
The "WHEREAS" clause o:f the Resolution states:
WHEREAS, the province of Camarines Sur has adopted a five-year Comprehensive Development plan, some of the
vital components of which includes the establishment of model and pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional
agricultural crops, soil testing and tissue culture laboratory centers, 15 small scale technology soap making, small scale
products of plaster of paris, marine biological and sea farming research center,and other progressive feasibility
concepts objective of which is to provide the necessary scientific and technology know-how to farmers and fishermen in
Camarines Sur and to establish a housing project for provincial government employees;
WHEREAS, the province would need additional land to be acquired either by purchase or expropriation to implement
the above program component;
WHEREAS, there are contiguous/adjacent properties to be (sic) present Provincial Capitol Site ideally suitable to
establish the same pilot development center;
WHEREFORE . . . .
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, Hon. Luis R.Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for
expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin, docketed as Special Civil Action Nos. P-17-89 and P-19-89 of the
Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur, presided by the Hon. Benjamin V. Panga.
Forthwith, the Province of Camarines Sur filed a motion for the issuance of writ of possession. The San Joaquins failed to appear at the
hearing of the motion.
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. In an order dated
December 6, 1989, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the
property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00, the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for
damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court issued a writ of
possession in an order dated January18, 1990.
The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of their property and
a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied in the order dated February 1990.
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order dated December 6,
1989 (i) denying the motion to dismiss and (ii) allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject of the
expropriation and the order dated February 26, 1990, denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They also
asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction.
In its answer to the petition, the Province of Camarines Sur claimed that it has the authority to initiate the expropriation proceedings under
Sections 4 and 7 of Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and that the expropriations are for a public purpose.
Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government
Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents'
lands and the order denying the admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation
proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to
convert the classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.
Hence this petition.
It must be noted that in the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked for: (i) the dismissal of the complaints for expropriation on the ground
of the inadequacy of the compensation offered for the property and (ii) the nullification of Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur.
The Court of Appeals did not rule on the validity of the questioned resolution; neither did it dismiss the complaints. However, when the Court
of Appeals ordered the suspension of the proceedings until the Province of Camarines Sur shall have obtained the authority of the
Department of Agrarian Reform to change the classification of the lands sought to be expropriated from agricultural to non-agricultural use, it
assumed that the resolution is valid and that the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of "public purpose" or "public use" for which the power of eminent
domain may be exercised. The old concept was that the condemned property must actually be used by the general public (e.g. roads,
bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could satisfy the constitutional requirement of "public use". Under the new concept,
"public use" means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the
whole community, like a resort complex for tourists or housing project (Heirs of Juancho Ardano v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]; Sumulong
v. Guerrero, 154 SC.RA 461 [1987]).
The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development
center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would
make available to the community invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the
livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of
the Constitution. As held in Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461, "Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state
concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum the general welfare."
It is the submission of the Province of Camarines Sur that its exercise of the power of eminent domain cannot be restricted by the provisions
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657), particularly Section 65 thereof, which requires the approval of the Department
of Agrarian Reform before a parcel of land can be reclassified from an agricultural to a non-agricultural land.
The Court of Appeals, following the recommendation of the Solicitor General, held that the Province of Camarines Sur must comply with the
provision of Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform
of the plan to expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.
In Heirs of Juancho Ardana v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, petitioners raised the issue of whether the Philippine Tourism Authority can
expropriate lands covered by the "Operation Land Transfer" for use of a tourist resort complex. There was a finding that of the 282 hectares
sought to be expropriated, only an area of 8,970 square meters or less than one hectare was affected by the land reform program and
covered by emancipation patents issued by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. While the Court said that there was "no need under the facts of
this petition to rule on whether the public purpose is superior or inferior to another purpose or engage in a balancing of competing public
interest," it upheld the expropriation after noting that petitioners had failed to overcome the showing that the taking of 8,970 square meters
formed part of the resort complex. A fair and reasonable reading of the decision is that this Court viewed the power of expropriation as
superior to the power to distribute lands under the land reform program.
The Solicitor General denigrated the power to expropriate by the Province of Camarines Sur by stressing the fact that local government units
exercise such power only by delegation. (Comment, pp. 14-15; Rollo, pp. 128-129)
It is true that local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the
legislature (City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 28l US 439, 74 L.ed. 950, 50 SCt. 360). It is also true that in delegating the power to expropriate, the
legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments (Joslin Mfg. Co. v.
Providence, 262 US 668 67 L. ed. 1167, 43 S Ct. 684). While such delegated power may be a limited authority, it is complete within its limits.
Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the power or in other
legislations.
Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, which provides:
A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian exercise the right
of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government, units must first secure the approval of the Department of Land
Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation
proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of
agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The closest provision of law that the Court
of Appeals could cite to justify the intervention of the Department of Agrarian Reform in expropriation matters is Section 65 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which reads:
Sec. 65. Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be
economically feasible and sound for, agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have
a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the
beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the
reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his
obligation.
The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision sends signals that it applies to lands previously placed under the agrarian reform program as
it speaks of "the lapse of five (5) years from its award."
The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the
source of the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to
which it would be devoted by the expropriating authority. While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive
authority to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial uses, such authority is limited to
the applications for reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries.
Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by implication (Schulman v.
People, 10 N.Y. 2d. 249, 176 N.E. 2d. 817, 219 NYS 2d. 241).
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the
construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of
Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of
Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be
expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative determination and will
intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or substantial relation to the public use (United States Ex Rel Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Welch, 327 US 546, 90 L. ed. 843, 66 S Ct 715; State ex rel Twin City Bldg. and Invest. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 174 NW
885, 8 ALR 585).
There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no matter how broad their terms are, do not embrace the sovereign unless the
sovereign is specially mentioned as subject thereto (Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1
[1983]). The Republic of the Philippines, as sovereign, or its political subdivisions, as holders of delegated sovereign powers, cannot be
bound by provisions of law couched in general term.
The fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of the valuation declared in the tax declarations of their property, are
unfounded. This Court has declared as unconstitutional the Presidential Decrees fixing the just compensation in expropriation cases to be
the value given to the condemned property either by the owners or the assessor, whichever was lower ([Export Processing Zone Authority v.
Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 [1987]). As held in Municipality of Talisay v. Ramirez, 183 SCRA 528 [1990], the rules for determining just
compensation are those laid down in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which allow private respondents to submit evidence on what they
consider shall be the just compensation for their property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial
court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend
the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform
to convert or reclassify private respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial court, denying the amended motion to dismiss
of the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 149548 December 4, 2009
ROXAS & COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
DAMBA-NFSW and the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
*
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 167505 December 4, 2009
DAMAYAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG BUKID SA ASYENDA ROXAS-NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS (DAMBA-NFSW) Petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPT. OF AGRARIAN REFORM, ROXAS & Co., INC.
AND/OR ATTY. MARIANO AMPIL, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 167540 December 4, 2009
KATIPUNAN NG MGA MAGBUBUKID SA HACIENDA ROXAS, INC. (KAMAHARI),
rep. by its President CARLITO CAISIP, and DAMAYAN NG MANGGAGAWANG
BUKID SA ASYENDA ROXAS-NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS
(DAMBA-NFSW), represnted by LAURO MARTIN, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPT. OF AGRARIAN REFORM, ROXAS & Co., INC.,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 167543 December 4, 2009
DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORM, FORMERLY DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM (DAR), Petitioner,
vs.
ROXAS & CO, INC., Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 167845 December 4, 2009
ROXAS & CO., INC., Petitioner,
vs.
DAMBA-NFSW, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 169163 December 4, 2009
DAMBA-NFSW REPRESENTED BY LAURO V. MARTIN, Petitioner,
vs.
ROXAS & CO., INC., Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179650 December 4, 2009
DAMBA-NFSW, Petitioner,
vs.
ROXAS & CO., INC., Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J .
The main subject of the seven consolidated petitions is the application of petitioner Roxas & Co.,
Inc. (Roxas & Co.) for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural use of its three haciendas
located in Nasugbu, Batangas containing a total area of almost 3,000 hectares. The facts are not
new, the Court having earlier resolved intimately-related issues dealing with these haciendas.
Thus, in the 1999 case of Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
1
the Court presented the facts as
follows:
. . . Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas,
namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of Nasugbu,
Batangas. Hacienda Palico is 1,024 hectares in area and is registered under Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 985. This land is covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 0465, 0466, 0468, 0470,
0234 and 0354. Hacienda Banilad is 1,050 hectares in area, registered under TCT No. 924 and
covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 0236, 0237 and 0390. Hacienda Caylaway is 867.4571 hectares
in area and is registered under TCT Nos. T-44662, T-44663, T-44664 and T-44665.
x x x x
On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over legislative
power from the President. This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The Act was signed by the President on June 10, 1988
and took effect on June 15, 1988.
Before the laws effectivity, on May 6, 1988, [Roxas & Co.] filed with respondent DAR a
voluntary offer to sell [VOS] Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229.
Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by DAR in
accordance with the CARL.
x x x x
Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, [Roxas & Co.], through its President, Eduardo J. Roxas, sent a
letter to the Secretary of DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. The
Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of
Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural. As a result, petitioner informed
respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to
other uses.
x x x x
2
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The petitions in G.R. Nos. 167540 and 167543 nub on the interpretation of Presidential
Proclamation (PP) 1520 which was issued on November 28, 1975 by then President Ferdinand
Marcos. The PP reads:
DECLARING THE MUNICIPALITIES OF MARAGONDON AND TERNATE IN CAVITE
PROVINCE AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU IN BATANGAS AS A TOURIST
ZONE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
WHEREAS, certain areas in the sector comprising the Municipalities of Maragondon and
Ternate in Cavite Province and Nasugbu in Batangas have potential tourism value after
being developed into resort complexes for the foreign and domestic market; and
WHEREAS, it is necessary to conduct the necessary studies and to segregate specific geographic
areas for concentrated efforts of both the government and private sectors in developing their
tourism potential;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby declare the area comprising the
Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate in Cavite Province and Nasugbu in Batangas
Province as a tourist zone under the administration and control of the Philippine Tourism
Authority (PTA) pursuant to Section 5 (D) of P.D. 564.
The PTA shall identify well-defined geographic areas within the zone with potential
tourism value, wherein optimum use of natural assets and attractions, as well as existing
facilities and concentration of efforts and limited resources of both government and private
sector may be affected and realized in order to generate foreign exchange as well as other tourist
receipts.
Any duly established military reservation existing within the zone shall be excluded from this
proclamation.
All proclamation, decrees or executive orders inconsistent herewith are hereby revoked or
modified accordingly. (emphasis and underscoring supplied).
The incidents which spawned the filing of the petitions in G.R. Nos. 149548, 167505, 167845,
169163 and 179650 are stated in the dissenting opinion of Justice Minita Chico-Nazario, the
original draft of which was made the basis of the Courts deliberations.
Essentially, Roxas & Co. filed its application for conversion of its three haciendas from
argricultural to non-agricultural on the assumption that the issuance of PP 1520 which declared
Nasugbu, Batangas as a tourism zone, reclassified them to non-agricultural uses. Its pending
application notwithstanding, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Certificates of
Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to the farmer-beneficiaries in the three haciendas including
CLOA No. 6654 which was issued on October 15, 1993 covering 513.983 hectares, the subject
of G.R. No. 167505.
The application for conversion of Roxas & Co. was the subject of the above-stated Roxas & Co.,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals which the Court remanded to the DAR for the observance of proper
acquisition proceedings. As reflected in the above-quoted statement of facts in said case, during
the pendency before the DAR of its application for conversion following its remand to the DAR
or on May 16, 2000, Roxas & Co. filed with the DAR an application for exemption from the
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of 1988 on the basis of PP
1520 and of DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 1994
3
which states that all lands
already classified as commercial, industrial, or residential before the effectivity of CARP no
longer need conversion clearance from the DAR.
It bears mentioning at this juncture that on April 18, 1982, the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu
enacted Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4 (Nasugbu MZO No. 4) which was approved on May
4, 1983 by the Human Settlements Regulation Commission, now the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB).
The records show that Sangguniang Bayan and Association of Barangay Captains of Nasugbu
filed before this Court petitions for intervention which were, however, denied by Resolution of
June 5, 2006 for lack of standing.
4

After the seven present petitions were consolidated and referred to the Court en banc,
5
oral
arguments were conducted on July 7, 2009.
The core issues are:
1. Whether PP 1520 reclassified in 1975 all lands in the Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu
tourism zone to non-agricultural use to exempt Roxas & Co.s three haciendas in
Nasugbu from CARP coverage;
2. Whether Nasugbu MSO No. 4, Series of 1982 exempted certain lots in Hacienda
Palico from CARP coverage; and
3. Whether the partial and complete cancellations by the DAR of CLOA No. 6654 subject
of G.R. No. 167505 is valid.
The Court shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
I. PP 1520 DID NOT AUTOMATICALLY CONVERT THE AGRICULTURAL LANDS
IN THE THREE MUNICIPALITIES INCLUDING NASUGBU TO NON-
AGRICULTURAL LANDS.
Roxas & Co. contends that PP 1520 declared the three municipalities as each constituting a
tourism zone, reclassified all lands therein to tourism and, therefore, converted their use to non-
agricultural purposes.
To determine the chief intent of PP 1520, reference to the "whereas clauses" is in order. By and
large, a reference to the congressional deliberation records would provide guidance in dissecting
the intent of legislation. But since PP 1520 emanated from the legislative powers of then
President Marcos during martial rule, reference to the whereas clauses cannot be dispensed
with.
6

The perambulatory clauses of PP 1520 identified only "certain areas in the sector comprising the
[three Municipalities that] have potential tourism value" and mandated the conduct of "necessary
studies" and the segregation of "specific geographic areas" to achieve its purpose. Which is why
the PP directed the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) to identify what those potential tourism
areas are. If all the lands in those tourism zones were to be wholly converted to non-agricultural
use, there would have been no need for the PP to direct the PTA to identify what those "specific
geographic areas" are.
The Court had in fact passed upon a similar matter before. Thus in DAR v. Franco,
7
it
pronounced:
Thus, the DAR Regional Office VII, in coordination with the Philippine Tourism Authority,
has to determine precisely which areas are for tourism development and excluded from the
Operation Land Transfer and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. And suffice it to
state here that the Court has repeatedly ruled that lands already classified as non-agricultural
before the enactment of RA 6657 on 15 June 1988 do not need any conversion clearance.
8

(emphasis and underscoring supplied).
While the above pronouncement in Franco is an obiter, it should not be ignored in the resolution
of the present petitions since it reflects a more rational and just interpretation of PP 1520. There
is no prohibition in embracing the rationale of an obiter dictum in settling controversies, or in
considering related proclamations establishing tourism zones.
In the above-cited case of Roxas & Co. v. CA,
9
the Court made it clear that the "power to
determine whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exempt
from the coverage of the [Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law] lies with the [Department of
Agrarian Reform], not with this Court."
10
The DAR, an administrative body of special
competence, denied, by Order of October 22, 2001, the application for CARP exemption of
Roxas & Co., it finding that PP 1520 did not automatically reclassify all the lands in the affected
municipalities from their original uses. It appears that the PTA had not yet, at that time,
identified the "specific geographic areas" for tourism development and had no pending tourism
development projects in the areas. Further, report from the Center for Land Use Policy Planning
and Implementation (CLUPPI) indicated that the areas were planted with sugar cane and other
crops.
11

Relatedly, the DAR, by Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of 2004,
12
came up with
clarificatory guidelines and therein decreed that
A. x x x x.
B. Proclamations declaring general areas such as whole provinces, municipalities, barangays,
islands or peninsulas as tourist zones that merely:
(1) recognize certain still unidentified areas within the covered provinces, municipalities,
barangays, islands, or peninsulas to be with potential tourism value and charge the
Philippine Tourism Authority with the task to identify/delineate specific geographic areas
within the zone with potential tourism value and to coordinate said areas development;
or
(2) recognize the potential value of identified spots located within the general area
declared as tourist zone (i.e. x x x x) and direct the Philippine Tourism Authority to
coordinate said areas development;
could not be regarded as effecting an automatic reclassification of the entirety of the land area
declared as tourist zone. This is so because "reclassification of lands" denotes their allocation
into some specific use and "providing for the manner of their utilization and disposition (Sec. 20,
Local Government Code) or the "act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for
non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, or commercial, as embodied in the land use
plan." (Joint HLURB, DAR, DA, DILG Memo. Circular Prescribing Guidelines for MC 54, S.
1995, Sec.2)
A proclamation that merely recognizes the potential tourism value of certain areas within the
general area declared as tourist zone clearly does not allocate, reserve, or intend the entirety of
the land area of the zone for non-agricultural purposes. Neither does said proclamation direct that
otherwise CARPable lands within the zone shall already be used for purposes other than
agricultural.
Moreover, to view these kinds of proclamation as a reclassification for non-agricultural purposes
of entire provinces, municipalities, barangays, islands, or peninsulas would be unreasonable as it
amounts to an automatic and sweeping exemption from CARP in the name of tourism
development. The same would also undermine the land use reclassification powers vested in
local government units in conjunction with pertinent agencies of government.
C. There being no reclassification, it is clear that said proclamations/issuances, assuming [these]
took effect before June 15, 1988, could not supply a basis for exemption of the entirety of the
lands embraced therein from CARP coverage x x x x.
D. x x x x. (underscoring in the original; emphasis and italics supplied)
The DARs reading into these general proclamations of tourism zones deserves utmost
consideration, more especially in the present petitions which involve vast tracts of agricultural
land. To reiterate, PP 1520 merely recognized the "potential tourism value" of certain areas
within the general area declared as tourism zones. It did not reclassify the areas to non-
agricultural use.
Apart from PP 1520, there are similarly worded proclamations declaring the whole of Ilocos
Norte and Bataan Provinces, Camiguin, Puerto Prinsesa, Siquijor, Panglao Island, parts of Cebu
City and Municipalities of Argao and Dalaguete in Cebu Province as tourism zones.
13

Indubitably, these proclamations, particularly those pertaining to the Provinces of Ilocos Norte
and Bataan, did not intend to reclassify all agricultural lands into non-agricultural lands in one
fell swoop. The Court takes notice of how the agrarian reform program wasand still is
implemented in these provinces since there are lands that do not have any tourism potential and
are more appropriate for agricultural utilization.
Relatedly, a reference to the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995
14
provides a parallel orientation
on the issue. Under said Act, several towns and cities encompassing the whole Philippines were
readily identified as economic zones.
15
To uphold Roxas & Co.s reading of PP 1520 would see a
total reclassification of practically all the agricultural lands in the country to non-agricultural use.
Propitiously, the legislature had the foresight to include a bailout provision in Section 31 of said
Act for land conversion.
16
The same cannot be said of PP 1520, despite the existence of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27 or the Tenant Emancipation Decree,
17
which is the precursor of
the CARP.
Interestingly, then President Marcos also issued on September 26, 1972 PD No. 2 which declared
the entire Philippines as land reform area.
18
Such declaration did not intend to reclassify all lands
in the entire country to agricultural lands. President Marcos, about a month later or on October
21, 1972, issued PD 27 which decreed that all private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice
and corn were deemed awarded to their tenant-farmers.
Given these martial law-era decrees and considering the socio-political backdrop at the time PP
1520 was issued in 1975, it is inconceivable that PP 1520, as well as other similarly worded
proclamations which are completely silent on the aspect of reclassification of the lands in those
tourism zones, would nullify the gains already then achieved by PD 27.
Even so, Roxas & Co. turns to Natalia Realty v. DAR and NHA v. Allarde to support its
position. These cases are not even closely similar to the petitions in G.R. Nos. 167540 and
167543. The only time that these cases may find application to said petitions is when the PTA
actually identifies "well-defined geographic areas within the zone with potential tourism value."
In remotely tying these two immediately-cited cases that involve specific and defined townsite
reservations for the housing program of the National Housing Authority to the present petitions,
Roxas & Co. cites Letter of Instructions No. 352 issued on December 22, 1975 which states that
the survey and technical description of the tourism zones shall be considered an integral part of
PP 1520. There were, however, at the time no surveys and technical delineations yet of the
intended tourism areas.
On hindsight, Natalia and Allarde find application in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 179650 &
167505, which petitions are anchored on the extenuating effects of Nasugbu MZO No. 4, but not
in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 167540 & 167543 bearing on PP 1520, as will later be discussed.
Of significance also in the present petitions is the issuance on August 3, 2007 of Executive Order
No. 647
19
by President Arroyo which proclaimed the areas in the Nasugbu Tourism
Development Plan as Special Tourism Zone. Pursuant to said Executive Order, the PTA
completed its validation of 21 out of 42 barangays as tourism priority areas, hence, it is only after
such completion that these identified lands may be subjected to reclassification proceedings.
It bears emphasis that a mere reclassification of an agricultural land does not automatically allow
a landowner to change its use since there is still that process of conversion before one is
permitted to use it for other purposes.
20

The recent passage of the Tourism Act of 2009
21
also impacts on the present petitions since
Section 32 thereof states that:
Sec. 32. x x x x. - Any other area specifically defined as a tourism area, zone or spot under any
special or general law, decree or presidential issuance shall, as far as practicable, be
organized into a TEZ under the provisions of this Act. x x x x. (italics and emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, it is only under this same Act that it is explicitly declared that lands identified as
part of a tourism zone shall qualify for exemption from CARP coverage.
22

The dissenting opinion ignores the supervening issuances mentioned above during the pendency
of the present petitions because they came after the effectivity of the CARP on June 15, 1988. It
labors on the supposition that PP 1520 had already reclassified the lands encompassing the
tourism zones; and that those subsequent issuances, even if applied in the present cases, cannot
be applied retroactively.
Relevantly, while it may be argued that a remand to the DAR would be proper in light of the
recent formulation of a tourism development plan, which was validated by the PTA, that would
put the cases within the ambit of PP 1520, the Court sees otherwise. Roxas & Co. can only look
to the provisions of the Tourism Act, and not to PP 1520, for possible exemption.
II. ROXAS & CO.S APPLICATION IN DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97
FOR CARP EXEMPTION IN HACIENDA PALICO SUBJECT OF G.R. NO. 179650
CANNOT BE GRANTED IN VIEW OF DISCREPANCIES IN THE LOCATION AND
IDENTITY OF THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND.
Since PP 1520 did not automatically convert Haciendas Caylaway, Banilad and Palico into non-
agricultural estates, can Roxas & Co. invoke in the alternative Nasugbu MZO No. 4, which
reclassified in 1982 the haciendas to non-agricultural use to exclude six parcels of land in
Hacienda Palico from CARP coverage?
By Roxas & Co.s contention, the affected six parcels of land which are the subject of DAR
Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97 and nine parcels of land which are the subject of DAR
Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 involved in G.R. No. 167505, all in Hacienda Palico,
have been reclassified to non-agricultural uses via Nasugbu MZO No. 4 which was approved by
the forerunner of HLURB.
Roxas & Co.s contention fails.
To be sure, the Court had on several occasions decreed that a local government unit has the
power to classify and convert land from agricultural to non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of
the CARL.
23
In Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association v. Nicolas,
24
it reiterated that
. . . the facts obtaining in this case are similar to those in Natalia Realty. Both subject lands form
part of an area designated for non-agricultural purposes. Both were classified as non-agricultural
lands prior to June 15, 1988, the date of effectivity of CARL.
x x x x
In the case under review, the subject parcels of lands were reclassified within an urban zone as
per approved Official Comprehensive Zoning Map of the City of Davao. The reclassification
was embodied in City Ordinance No. 363, Series of 1982. As such, the subject parcels of
land are considered "non-agricultural" and may be utilized for residential, commercial,
and industrial purposes. The reclassification was later approved by the HLURB.
25

(emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The DAR Secretary
26
denied the application for exemption of Roxas & Co., however, in this
wise:
Initially, CLUPPI-2 based [its] evaluation on the lot nos. as appearing in CLOA No. 6654.
However, for purposes of clarity and to ensure that the area applied for exemption is indeed part
of TCT No. T-60034, CLUPPI-2 sought to clarify with [Roxas & Co.] the origin of TCT No. T-
60034. In a letter dated May 28, 1998, [Roxas & Co.] explains that portions of TCT No. T-985,
the mother title, was subdivided into 125 lots pursuant to PD 27. A total of 947.8417 was
retained by the landowners and was subsequently registered under TCT No. 49946. [[Roxas &
Co.] further explains that TCT No. 49946 was further subdivided into several lots (Lot 125-A to
Lot 125-P) with Lot No. 125-N registered under TCT No. 60034. [A] review of the titles,
however, shows that the origin of T-49946 is T-783 and not T-985. On the other hand, the
origin of T-60034 is listed as 59946, and not T-49946. The discrepancies were attributed by
[Roxas & Co.] to typographical errors which were "acknowledged and initialled" [sic] by
the ROD. Per verification, the discrepancies . . . cannot be ascertained.
27
(emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In denying Roxas & Co.s motion for reconsideration, the DAR Secretary held:
The landholdings covered by the aforesaid titles do not correspond to the Certification
dated February 11, 1998 of the [HLURB] , the Certification dated September 12, 1996
issued by the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, and the Certifications
dated July 31, 1997 and May 27, 1997 issued by the National Irrigation Authority. The
certifications were issued for Lot Nos. 21, 24, 28, 31, 32 and 34. Thus, it was not even possible
to issue exemption clearance over the lots covered by TCT Nos. 60019 to 60023.
Furthermore, we also note the discrepancies between the certifications issued by the HLURB and
the Municipal Planning Development Coordinator as to the area of the specific lots.
28
(emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
In affirming the DAR Secretarys denial of Roxas & Co.s application for exemption, the Court
of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 63146 subject of G.R. No. 179650, observed:
In the instant case, a perusal of the documents before us shows that there is no indication that the
said TCTs refer to the same properties applied for exemption by [Roxas & Co.] It is true that the
certifications refer, among others, to DAR Lot Nos. 21, 24, 28, 31, 32 and 34But these
certifications contain nothing to show that these lots are the same as Lots 125-A, 125-B, 125-C,
125-D and 125-E covered by TCT Nos. 60019, 60020, 60021, 60022 and 60023, respetively.
While [Roxas & Co.] claims that DAR Lot Nos. 21, 24 and 31 correspond to the aforementioned
TCTs submitted to the DAR no evidence was presented to substantiate such allegation.
Moreover, [Roxas & Co.] failed to submit TCT 634 which it claims covers DAR Lot Nos. 28, 32
and 24.(TSN, April 24, 2001, pp. 43-44)
x x x x
[Roxas & Co.] also claims that subject properties are located at Barangay Cogunan and
Lumbangan and that these properties are part of the zone classified as Industrial under Municipal
Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982 of the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. .a scrutiny of the
said Ordinance shows that only Barangays Talangan and Lumbangan of the said
municipality were classified as Industrial ZonesBarangay Cogunan was not included. x x
x x. In fact, the TCTs submitted by [Roxas & Co.] show that the properties covered by said titles
are all located at Barrio Lumbangan.
29
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Its foregoing findings notwithstanding, the appellate court still allowed Roxas & Co. to adduce
additional evidence to support its application for exemption under Nasugbu MZO No. 4.
Meanwhile, Roxas & Co. appealed the appellate courts decision in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 63146
affirming the DAR Secretarys denial of its application for CARP exemption in Hacienda Palico
(now the subject of G.R. No. 149548).
When Roxas & Co. sought the re-opening of the proceedings in DAR Administrative Case No.
A-9999-142-97 (subject of G.R. No. 179650), and offered additional evidence in support of its
application for CARP exemption, the DAR Secretary, this time, granted its application for the six
lots including Lot No. 36 since the additional documents offered by Roxas & Co. mentioned the
said lot.
In granting the application, the DAR Secretary
30
examined anew the evidence submitted by
Roxas & Co. which consisted mainly of certifications from various local and national
government agencies.
31
Petitioner in G.R. Nos. 167505, 167540, 169163 and 179650, Damayan
Ng Mga Manggagawang Bukid Sa Asyenda Roxas-National Federation of Sugar Workers
(DAMBA-NFSW), the organization of the farmer-beneficiaries, moved to have the grant of the
application reconsidered but the same was denied by the DAR by Order of December 12, 2003,
hence, it filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
82225, on grounds of forum-shopping and grave abuse of discretion. The appellate court, by
Decision of October 31, 2006, ruled that DAMBA-NFSW availed of the wrong mode of appeal.
At all events, it dismissed its petition as it upheld the DAR Secretarys ruling that Roxas & Co.
did not commit forum-shopping, hence, the petition of DAMBA-NGSW in G.R. No. 179650.
While ordinarily findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies are generally accorded great weight
and even finality by the Court if supported by substantial evidence in recognition of their
expertise on the specific matters under their consideration,
32
this legal precept cannot be made to
apply in G.R. No. 179650.
Even as the existence and validity of Nasugbu MZO No. 4 had already been established, there
remains in dispute the issue of whether the parcels of land involved in DAR Administrative Case
No. A-9999-142-97 subject of G.R. No. 179650 are actually within the said zoning ordinance.
The Court finds that the DAR Secretary indeed committed grave abuse of discretion when he
ignored the glaring inconsistencies in the certifications submitted early on by Roxas & Co. in
support of its application vis--vis the certifications it later submitted when the DAR Secretary
reopened DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97.
Notably, then DAR Secretary Horacio Morales, on one hand, observed that the "landholdings
covered by the aforesaid titles do not correspond to the Certification dated February 11, 1998 of
the [HLURB], the Certification dated September 12, 1996 issued by the Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator, and the Certifications dated July 31, 1997 and May 27, 1997 issued
by the National Irrigation Authority." On the other hand, then Secretary Hernani Braganza relied
on a different set of certifications which were issued later or on September 19, 1996.
In this regard, the Court finds in order the observation of DAMBA-NFSW that Roxas & Co.
should have submitted the comprehensive land use plan and pointed therein the exact locations
of the properties to prove that indeed they are within the area of coverage of Nasugbu MZO No.
4.
The petitions in G.R. Nos. 179650 & 149548 must be distinguished from Junio v. Garilao
33

wherein the certifications submitted in support of the application for exemption of the therein
subject lot were mainly considered on the presumption of regularity in their issuance, there being
no doubt on the location and identity of the subject lot.
34
In G.R. No. 179650, there exist
uncertainties on the location and identities of the properties being applied for exemption.
G.R. No. 179650 & G.R. No. 149548 must accordingly be denied for lack of merit.
III. ROXAS & CO.S APPLICATION FOR CARP EXEMPTION IN DAR Administrative
Case No. A-9999-008-98 FOR THE NINE PARCELS OF LAND IN HACIENDA PALICO
SUBJECT OF G.R. NO. 167505 SHOULD BE GRANTED.
The Court, however, takes a different stance with respect to Roxas & Co.s application for CARP
exemption in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 over nine parcels of land identified
as Lot Nos. 20, 13, 37, 19-B, 45, 47, 49, 48-1 and 48-2 which are portions of TCT No. 985
covering 45.9771 hectares in Hacienda Palico, subject of G.R. No. 167505.
In its application, Roxas & Co. submitted the following documents:
1. Letter-application dated 29 September 1997 signed by Elino SJ. Napigkit, for and on
behalf of Roxas & Company, Inc., seeking exemption from CARP coverage of subject
landholdings;
2. Secretarys Certificate dated September 2002 executed by Mariano M. Ampil III,
Corporate Secretary of Roxas & Company, Inc., indicating a Board Resolution
authorizing him to represent the corporation in its application for exemption with the
DAR. The same Board Resolution revoked the authorization previously granted to the
Sierra Management & Resources Corporation;
3. Photocopy of TCT No. 985 and its corresponding Tax Declaration No. 0401;
4. Location and vicinity maps of subject landholdings;
5. Certification dated 10 July 1997 issued by Reynaldo Garcia, Municipal Planning
and Development Coordinator (MPDC) and Zoning Administrator of Nasugbu,
Batangas, stating that the subject parcels of land are within the Urban Core Zone as
specified in Zone A. VII of Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982,
approved by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), now the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), under Resolution No. 123, Series of 1983,
dated 4 May 1983;
6. Two (2) Certifications both dated 31 August 1998, issued by Alfredo Tan II,
Director, HLURB, Region IV, stating that the subject parcels of land appear to be
within the Residential cluster Area as specified in Zone VII of Municipal Zoning
Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982, approved under HSRC Resolution No. 123, Series of
1983, dated 4 May 1983;
35

x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By Order of November 6, 2002, the DAR Secretary granted the application for exemption but
issued the following conditions:
1. The farmer-occupants within subject parcels of land shall be maintained in their
peaceful possession and cultivation of their respective areas of tillage until a final
determination has been made on the amount of disturbance compensation due and
entitlement of such farmer-occupants thereto by the PARAD of Batangas;
2. No development shall be undertaken within the subject parcels of land until the
appropriate disturbance compensation has been paid to the farmer-occupants who are
determined by the PARAD to be entitled thereto. Proof of payment of disturbance
compensation shall be submitted to this Office within ten (10) days from such payment;
and
3. The cancellation of the CLOA issued to the farmer-beneficiaries shall be subject of a
separate proceeding before the PARAD of Batangas.
36

DAMBA-NSFW moved for reconsideration but the DAR Secretary denied the same and
explained further why CLOA holders need not be informed of the pending application for
exemption in this wise:
As regards the first ground raised by [DAMBA-NSFW], it should be remembered that an
application for CARP-exemption pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, as
implemented by DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994, is non-adversarial or non-
litigious in nature. Hence, applicant is correct in saying that nowhere in the rules is it required
that occupants of a landholding should be notified of an initiated or pending exemption
application.
x x x x
With regard [to] the allegation that oppositors-movants are already CLOA holders of subject
propert[ies] and deserve to be notified, as owners, of the initiated questioned exemption
application, is of no moment. The Supreme Court in the case of Roxas [&] Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 321 SCRA 106, held:
"We stress that the failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in the
acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the CLOAs already issued
to the farmer beneficiaries. x x x x. Anyhow, the farmer[-]beneficiaries hold the property in trust
for the rightful owner of the land."
Since subject landholding has been validly determined to be CARP-exempt, therefore, the
previous issuance of the CLOA of oppositors-movants is erroneous. Hence, similar to the
situation of the above-quoted Supreme Court Decision, oppositors-movants only hold the
property in trust for the rightful owners of the land and are not the owners of subject landholding
who should be notified of the exemption application of applicant Roxas & Company,
Incorporated.
Finally, this Office finds no substantial basis to reverse the assailed Orders since there is
substantial compliance by the applicant with the requirements for the issuance of exemption
clearance under DAR AO 6 (1994).
37

On DAMBA-NSFWs petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals, noting that the petition was
belatedly filed, sustained, by Decision of December 20, 1994 and Resolution of May 7, 2007,
38

the DAR Secretarys finding that Roxas & Co. had substantially complied with the prerequisites
of DAR AO 6, Series of 1994. Hence, DAMBA-NFSWs petition in G.R. No. 167505.
The Court finds no reversible error in the Court of Appeals assailed issuances, the orders of the
DAR Secretary which it sustained being amply supported by evidence.
IV. THE CLOAs ISSUED BY THE DAR in ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. A-9999-008-
98 SUBJECT OF G.R. No. 179650 TO THE FARMER-BENEFICIARIES INVOLVING THE
NINE PARCELS OF LAND IN HACIENDA PALICO MUST BE CANCELLED.
Turning now to the validity of the issuance of CLOAs in Hacienda Palico vis--vis the present
dispositions: It bears recalling that in DAR Administrative Case Nos. A-9999-008-98 and A-
9999-142-97 (G.R. No. 179650), the Court ruled for Roxas & Co.s grant of exemption in DAR
Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 but denied the grant of exemption in DAR
Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97 for reasons already discussed. It follows that the
CLOAs issued to the farmer-beneficiaries in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 must
be cancelled.
But first, the Court digresses. The assertion of DAMBA-NSFW that the petitions for partial and
complete cancellations of the CLOAs subject of DARAB Case Nos. R-401-003-2001 to R-401-
005-2001 and No. 401-239-2001 violated the earlier order in Roxas v. Court of Appeals does not
lie. Nowhere did the Court therein pronounce that the CLOAs issued "cannot and should not be
cancelled," what was involved therein being the legality of the acquisition proceedings. The
Court merely reiterated that it is the DAR which has primary jurisdiction to rule on the validity
of CLOAs. Thus it held:
. . . [t]he failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in the
acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the [CLOAs] already issued
to the farmer-beneficiaries. To assume the power is to short-circuit the administrative process,
which has yet to run its regular course. Respondent DAR must be given the chance to correct its
procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings. x x x x. Anyhow, the farmer beneficiaries hold
the property in trust for the rightful owner of the land.
39

On the procedural question raised by Roxas & Co. on the appellate courts relaxation of the rules
by giving due course to DAMBA-NFSWs appeal in CA G.R. SP No. 72198, the subject of G.R.
No. 167845:
Indeed, the perfection of an appeal within the statutory period is jurisdictional and failure to do
so renders the assailed decision final and executory.
40
A relaxation of the rules may, however, for
meritorious reasons, be allowed in the interest of justice.
41
The Court finds that in giving due
course to DAMBA-NSFWs appeal, the appellate court committed no reversible error. Consider
its ratiocination:
x x x x. To deny [DAMBA-NSFW]s appeal with the PARAD will not only affect their right
over the parcel of land subject of this petition with an area of 103.1436 hectares, but also that of
the whole area covered by CLOA No. 6654 since the PARAD rendered a Joint Resolution of the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the [DAMBA-NSFW] with regard to [Roxas & Co.]s
application for partial and total cancellation of the CLOA in DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001
to R-401-005-2001 and No. 401-239-2001. There is a pressing need for an extensive discussion
of the issues as raised by both parties as the matter of canceling CLOA No. 6654 is of utmost
importance, involving as it does the probable displacement of hundreds of farmer-beneficiaries
and their families. x x x x (underscoring supplied)
Unlike courts of justice, the DARAB, as a quasi-judicial body, is not bound to strictly observe
rules of procedure and evidence. To strictly enforce rules on appeals in this case would render to
naught the Courts dispositions on the other issues in these consolidated petitions.
In the main, there is no logical recourse except to cancel the CLOAs issued for the nine parcels
of land identified as Lot Nos. 20, 13, 37, 19-B, 45, 47, 49, 48-1 and 48-2 which are portions of
TCT No. 985 covering 45.9771 hectares in Hacienda Palico (or those covered by DAR
Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98). As for the rest of the CLOAs, they should be
respected since Roxas & Co., as shown in the discussion in G.R. Nos. 167540, 167543 and
167505, failed to prove that the other lots in Hacienda Palico and the other two haciendas, aside
from the above-mentioned nine lots, are CARP-exempt.
Conformably, Republic Act No. 3844 (R.A. No. 3844), as amended,
42
mandates that disturbance
compensation be given to tenants of parcels of land upon finding that "(t)he landholding is
declared by the department head upon recommendation of the National Planning Commission to
be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes."
43
In addition,
DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1994 directs the payment of disturbance compensation before the
application for exemption may be completely granted.
Roxas & Co. is thus mandated to first satisfy the disturbance compensation of affected farmer-
beneficiaries in the areas covered by the nine parcels of lands in DAR AO No. A-9999-008-98
before the CLOAs covering them can be cancelled. And it is enjoined to strictly follow the
instructions of R.A. No. 3844.
Finally then, and in view of the Courts dispositions in G.R. Nos. 179650 and 167505, the May
27, 2001 Decision of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)
44
in DARAB Case
No. 401-239-2001 ordering the total cancellation of CLOA No. 6654, subject of G.R. No.
169163, is SET ASIDE except with respect to the CLOAs issued for Lot Nos. 20, 13, 37, 19-B,
45, 47, 49, 48-1 and 48-2 which are portions of TCT No. 985 covering 45.9771 hectares in
Hacienda Palico (or those covered by DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98). It goes
without saying that the motion for reconsideration of DAMBA-NFSW is granted to thus vacate
the Courts October 19, 2005 Resolution dismissing DAMBA-NFSWs petition for review of the
appellate courts Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 75952;
45

WHEREFORE,
1) In G.R. No. 167540, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the November 24,
2003 Decision
46
and March 18, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 72131 which declared that Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 reclassified the lands
in the municipalities of Nasugbu in Batangas and Maragondon and Ternate in Cavite to
non-agricultural use;
2) The Court accordingly GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration of the Department of
Agrarian Reform in G.R. No. 167543 and REVERSES and SETS ASIDE its Resolution
of June 20, 2005;
3) In G.R. No. 149548, the Court DENIES the petition for review of Roxas & Co. for
lack of merit;
4) In G.R. No. 179650, the Court GRANTS the petition for review of DAMBA-NSFW
and REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the October 31, 2006 Decision and August 16, 2007
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82225;
5) In G.R. No. 167505, the Court DENIES the petition for review of DAMBA-NSFW
and AFFIRMS the December 20, 2004 Decision and March 7, 2005 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82226;
6) In G.R. No. 167845, the Court DENIES Roxas & Co.s petition for review for lack of
merit and AFFIRMS the September 10, 2004 Decision and April 14, 2005 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals;
7) In G.R. No. 169163, the Court SETS ASIDE the Decisions of the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator in DARAB Case No. 401-239-2001 ordering the cancellation of
CLOA No. 6654 and DARAB Cases Nos. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001
granting the partial cancellation of CLOA No. 6654. The CLOAs issued for Lots No. 21
No. 24, No. 26, No. 31, No. 32 and No. 34 or those covered by DAR Administrative Case
No. A-9999-142-97) remain; and
8) Roxas & Co. is ORDERED to pay the disturbance compensation of affected farmer-
beneficiaries in the areas covered by the nine parcels of lands in DAR Administrative
Case No. A-9999-008-98 before the CLOAs therein can be cancelled, and is ENJOINED
to strictly follow the mandate of R.A. No. 3844.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.