The writing on the wall is that the experiment has failed; and this must be acknowledged

and corrected.
The administration of elections by the judiciary also forms a clear case of conflict of
interest because as an institution, it administers these and then itself adjudicates upon
conflicts arising out of their administration. Acknowledging this, the National Judicial
olicy !aking "ommittee had in #$$% decided not to lend its personnel to the &" but
retracted its decision before the #$'( elections in the )larger national interest*.
The in+ol+ement of the judiciary in elections has confused two separate constitutional
spaces reser+ed for two different constitutional bodies. ,t has made the elections appear
like an auxiliary function of the judiciary while the job of the &" has been reduced to
issuing notifications, directi+es and statements.
,n this confusion, the &lection "ommission has lost its freedom to make decisions and
act. The two functions not only need to be separated from each other, the &" also needs
some kind of immunity from judicial inter+ention. &lections are a time-bound exercise
and their administrators need ability, agility and creati+ity in order to be able to respond
to any unpredictable situation at any hour. ,f solutions are to be subjected to long
procedural delays, they are bound to pro+e useless.
The second most important area where the &" needs to be empowered is its control o+er
the ci+il administration. ,t needs the ser+ices of an army of go+ernment employees to
perform duties at the polling station le+el. ,t needs to wean these seconded personnel off
any political affiliations, guard them against threats of +iolence from +ested interest
groups, check any negligence on their part and make them work efficiently.
.e+eloping other stakes in ci+il administration is important as peace and order in society
are a prere/uisite for elections. The &" also needs the support of all go+ernment
departments, including the law-enforcement agencies to ensure that the "ode of "onduct
for pre-election campaigns is strictly followed, that +oters are not bribed or coerced, and
that there is a le+el playing field for all contestants.
The &" has not been able to ensure all of this to the satisfaction of the parties. 0ne
likely reason is that this area too is contested by two constitutional bodies, the &" and
the caretaker go+ernment. They are both entrusted with the same responsibility of
ensuring neutrality in go+ernment. This duplication not only creates confusion but also
works as a disincenti+e for the &" to take the initiati+e, besides allowing the two to
blame failures on each other.
,nterim set-ups ha+e traditionally ser+ed as a constitutional window for the establishment
to inter+ene in the electoral process. The system of appointment was changed
substantially through the '1th Amendment but caretaker set-ups too ha+e failed to meet
expectations.
The &" thus needs a new legal framework for its engagement with the ci+il
administration. There is no harm in taking a leaf from the ,ndian experience where no
caretakers are appointed and the election commission +irtually takes o+er the entire state
machinery, as soon as the election process begins and until the results are announced.
The &lectoral 2eforms "ommittee will ha+e to a+oid indulging in rephrasing old laws
and show some creati+ity. 2eaders should be reminded that akistan achie+ed an
important milestone in its first-e+er democratic transition, from one elected go+ernment
to the next, in #$'(. The subse/uent milestone should not be the next transition but
electoral reforms as only these can take polls and democracy a /ualitati+e step forward.
The writer works with Punjab Lok Sujag, a research and advocacy group.
Published in Dawn, July 2th, 2!"#
"omment
&mail
rint
"omment
&mail