Comparing Cultures Within Subjects

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Anthropological Theory
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DOI: 10.1177/1463499602002001290
2002 2: 98 Anthropological Theory
Robert W. Schrauf
a framework for cross-cultural study
Comparing cultures within-subjects : A cognitive account of acculturation as
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Anthropological Theory
Copyright 2002 SAGE Publications
(London, Thousand Oaks, CA
and New Delhi)
Vol 2(1): 98115
[1463-4996(200203)2:1;98115;022290]
Comparing cultures
within-subjects
A cognitive account of acculturation as a
framework for cross-cultural study
Robert W. Schrauf
Northwestern University Medical School, Chicago, USA
Abstract
Cross-culturally comparable units of culture may be found in the experience of
immigrants for whom certain experiential domainsof meaning from the rst culture
are brought into comparison and contrast with corresponding domains in the second
culture. The notion of domains is here developed out of semantic domain from
cognitive anthropology, cognitive domain from cognitive linguistics, and discourse
domain from second language acquisition. The clue to such domains is immigrants
coming to greater second language uency in some areas of experience and less in
other areas (communicative and cultural competence). These distinctions are used to
develop a cognitive theory of acculturation that focuses research on cultures within-
subjects(within immigrants) in contrast to the traditional focus on comparison
between cultural groups (between subjects). This article is speculative and derives
from work in cognitive anthropology, ethnographic report, studies of second language
acquisition, and psycholinguistic studies of bilingual memory.
Key Words
acculturation bilingualism cognitive anthropology immigration second
language acquisition units of culture
INTRODUCTION
Formal comparisons between two or more cultures require the denition and opera-
tionalization of units of culture. At lower levels of magnication, comparison is made
between cultural groups. The investigator looks at some cultural meaning system in one
group (for instance, healing among the BaKongo in Lower Zaire) and compares it to the
same system in another group (say, healing among the Amish in the state of Ohio in the
United States). Comparison is made between subjects (between cultural groups in this
case) in terms of the topic of interest to the cross-culturalist. In this case, medical
meaning systems are compared. This is made extraordinarily difcult, of course, by the
06 Schrauf (JB/D) 8/2/02 11:16 am Page 98
fact that meanings and behaviors are not isolated entities but are embedded in local
networks of meanings and behaviors. Furthermore, networks (unlike matrices, tables,
charts, and maps) do not display obvious seams, edges, fault lines, or borders. Add a
diachronic dimension let networks transform over time and the task becomes
mind-boggling.
At a higher level of magnication, it is possible to address the cross-cultural project,
not by comparing cultures at the level of the social group (the BaKongo vs. the Amish),
but rather at the level of the bicultural individual (e.g. the Taiwanese immigrant in Los
Angeles). Here, the investigator looks at cultural meaning systems as they meet and
coexist or are transformed or deteriorate and disappear within the experience of the
immigrant (e.g. kanpoand biomedicine vs. exclusive biomedicine). This comparison is
made within subjects distinguishing two cultural meaning systems within-individuals:
one from the culture of origin, the other from the culture of adoption. No doubt this
too is made extraordinarily difcult by the networks-of-meaning-problem just mentioned
exacerbated tremendously by variability among persons (personality, developmental
history, emotional state, and so on). Additionally, whereas in comparing cultures at the
level of the group, there is unquestionably two of something (one in Lower Zaire, the
other in Amish Ohio), in the case of the immigrant, there may be only one of some-
thing (something too syncretistic or too eclectic to be of much analytic use). After all,
multiple cultural combinations within individuals are possible. For these reasons, this
approach may not provide much more clarity a priori on the units of culture question.
It may, however, provide a great deal of clarity a posteriori on such units.
CULTURE CONTACT: BEFORE AND AFTER
What critically distinguishes the within-subjects approach is the fact that culture
contact causes change in the individual, and change is an observable process. The accul-
turation of the immigrant offers a window onto two comparable cultural meaning
systems beforeand after culture contact. Particularly illuminating in this regard is the
experience of the individual who emigrates as an adult. Having been enculturated in a
rst culture via childhood socialization, the adult immigrant engages in a new accul-
turative project in a second culture that may differ markedly from the cognitive and
affective expectations of reality that he or she developed as a child and youth. Tracking
such cultural adaptations within individuals who must negotiate these systems renders
this approach more akin to clinical research where a treatment is made and outcomes
monitored except in this case, and in true anthropological fashion, the treatment has
occurred in nature: people emigrate.
Methodologically, this simplies the issue of dening and operationalizing units of
comparison. While it is true that networks of meaning within subjects do not show
seams, borders, or edges any more than they do within whole societies, nevertheless, in
situation after situation, the immigrant is faced with nding out whether the cultural
meaning systems of his or her culture of origin will match the cultural meaning systems
of the culture of adoption. Thus, for example, there is growing immigration from
Mexico to the Piedmont area of North Carolina. Not surprisingly in this situation,
young Mexican women and men sometimes fall in love with Anglo women and men,
and the cultural meaning systems of romantic love and gender relations (e.g. rural
Mexican vs. urban US) are placed in comparison, contrast, and sometimes conict.
SCHRAUF Comparing cultures within-subjects
99
Monitoring these experiences of contrast, conict, and resolution will tell us what the
relevant categories (cultural units) are. These are cultural domains (Borgatti, 1994)
which may then serve as comparable units for cross-cultural research. As such they are
useful for cutting up real life for purposes of analysis (with no accompanying commit-
ment to their ontological status).
ONE CULTURE IS UNDERSTOOD IN TERMS OF ANOTHER
This approach capitalizes on the fact that observation and theory construction are always
limited to the insights generated by a comparison of two or more cultures at one time.
Contrastiveanalysisin studies of second-language acquisition provides the model describ-
ing this problem. Contrastive analysis (Gass, 1996; Lado, 1957; Selinker, 1992) argues
that learning a second language is made difcult by interferences from elements in the
rst language. That is, familiar phonetic, morphemic, and syntactic elements from the
rst language are transferred by learners into their productions of the second language.
For example, the English speaker learning French might put direct and indirect pronoun
objects after the verb instead of beforeit. In theory, the specic differences between the
native language and the target language (as linguistic systems) could be identied, and
these differences would predict the kinds of mistakes learners would make.
Contrastive analysis proved problematic for second language acquisition because the
analysis of differences between languages as systematic wholes did not successfully
predict actual difculties experienced by second language learners as individuals. Never-
theless, the original insight of contrastive analysis and the critique of it are instructive
for theapproach I haveadvocated for studyingacculturation. It isin fact theinterference
from immigrants culture of origin, in their attempt to adapt to the culture of adoption,
that brings the experience of acculturation into awareness so that it can be reected
upon. This interference must be studied on the ground, as it were, in the actual experi-
ence of immigrant adaptation.
The implication of a within-subjects approach to ethnography is that what we know
about any two cultures is shaped by (and limited to) the particular contrasts that emerge
as a result of the encounter between them. That is, if we study the Moroccan immigrant
to Andaluca, then what we know of the culture of Andaluca and the culture of north-
ern Morocco will be limited by the contrasts between the two cultures in the experience
of the immigrant. A different immigrant would foreground different contrasts. Thus, a
focus on the Breton who migrated to Andaluca could very well give us a somewhat
different picture of Andalusian culture. The dimensions of contrast would differ.
I suggest that this is a fundamental epistemological conundrum of cultural anthro-
pology. Common sense argues that research in both social science and human inter-
cultural experience is predicated on some common, if not universal, analytic categories
(else the conversation simply cannot continue). Yet in its most fundamental and con-
crete sense primary eldwork data in anthropology can only be gathered by comparing
one culture with another culture. Whether the comparison is between the anthropol-
ogists own culture and the culture of his or her eldwork, or between two cultures in
the immigrants process of acculturation, the anthropological project is inherently dyadic
and cross-cultural. The study of acculturation measuring cultural variability within-
subjects has the advantage of making immigrants experience of this duality the focus
of research.
ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 2(1)
100
DOMAIN-SPECIFIC LANGUAGE ACQUISITION
This article outlines a systematic approach to acculturation based on (1) the idea of
distinct experiential domains and (2) an extended analogy between acculturation and
second language acquisition. As I use it, the notion of domainrefers to a particular area
of human experience for which we possess a specic language: for example, we have a
specic way of talking about family relations and obligations, a specic way of talking
about work and occupation, a specic way of talking about sickness and health care,
about politics and laws, about games and sports, and so on. In this article I argue that
(1) the adult immigrant engages the new culture not all at once (indeed, such cognitive
overload would be paralyzing) but domain by domain, and (2) language shifts in experi-
ential domains provide the clues to patterns of acculturation.
This approach is by no means new in studies of immigration. The social science
measurement of acculturation in the United States relies largely on the measurement of
language shift (for review, see Dana, 1996). A quick review of acculturation scales
reveals that most include a subset of questions that require self-report about language
use and comprehension in particular domains. Questions focus on language use and/or
preference by domain: e.g. home, school, and work (Szapocznik et al., 1978). Questions
in the domain of media typically ask about language preference for movies, television,
books, newspapers (e.g. Cortes et al., 1994; Cuellar et al., 1995; Mendoza, 1989;
Szapocznik et al., 1978). Questions in the social domain ask about language-use with
nuclear family members, extended family members, friends, workmates, neighbors
(Mendoza, 1989; Schrauf and Rubin, 1998). Some scales ask for self-report of language
prociency across domains (Marin and Gamba, 1996; Schrauf and Rubin, 1998). Accul-
turation scales aggregate responses across domains to assess the level of acculturation for
individuals. My focus on individual domains provides a more ne-grained analysis of
acculturation patterns while simultaneously placing in relief shifts in cultural meaning
systems, thus making them more visible and easier to compare.
Stated succinctly the argument is as follows: most immigrants come to linguistic and
communicative competence in some second-language domains but not others. System-
atic study of the particular domains in which adjustments are made provides a clue to
units of cultural comparison and contrast. Central to this formulation are the concepts
of domain, competence, mental representation of bilingual discourse abilities, and the
actors goals and networks.
COGNITIVE, SEMANTIC, AND DISCOURSE DIMENSIONS
The rst key concept of this study is the notion of domain. It is developed more tech-
nically here out of three related bodies of theory: cognitive linguistics (cognitive
domain), cognitive anthropology (semantic domain), and studies in second language
acquisition (discourse domain). Generally speaking, the notion of experiential domain
developed in this article is cognitive and the level of analysis is the level of mental rep-
resentation in terms of schemas, mental models, prototypes, and symbols. Mental rep-
resentation in this sense is not restricted to ideational content but is meant to include
both motivational and emotional representation as well.
It is the province of cognitive anthropology to explore how cultural knowledge is rep-
resented in individual minds and across populations. Methods and theory include: con-
sensus analysis (Romney, 1994, 1999; Romney and Moore, 1998; Romney et al., 1986,
101
1996, 1997), culture model theory (DAndrade and Strauss, 1992; Holland and Quinn,
1987; Shore, 1996) and notions of distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1996; Lave, 1988;
Lave and Wenger, 1991). This approach differs from others that stress the emergence of
meanings in socio-cultural interaction (in psychology: Wertsch, 1998; in cultural
anthropology: Dilley, 1999; and in linguistic anthropology: Tedlock and Mannheim,
1995). As I shall argue later, however, mental representations carry with them the
history of their emergence in socio-cultural contexts (see also Schrauf and Rubin, in
press).
Cognitive domain
In cognitive linguistics, the notion of cognitive domain describes not some slice of
observable human experience to which language refers but rather to a psychological
context. Cognitive domains are mental experiences, representational spaces, concepts
or conceptual complexes (Langacker, 1987: 147). As we interactively acquire socio-
culturally mediated concepts, we develop the cognitive domains that are their internal,
mental contexts.
Cognitive domains arise from our mental experiences in the process of concept for-
mation, which in turn comes as the result of perception. While sensuous dimension
of perceptual processes should most probably be considered universal (global), the
physical, psychological, and sociological dimensions which constitute the basis for
concept formation emerge as a network of sociocultural factors and personal predis-
positions of language users, such as intelligence, education, emotions, beliefs, values,
attitudes, motivations, etc.; in short, they are idiosyncratic and/or culture-specic (or
local). Ultimately, cognitive domains emerge as products of cognition conditioned
by culture. (Tabakowska, 1999: 82)
Semantic domain
In cognitive anthropology, consensus analysis focuses on the representation of cultural
knowledge in semantic domains. In one sense, a semantic domain is a lexical-referential
organization of knowledge. A semantic domain may be dened as an organized set of
words, all on the same level of contrast, that refer to a single conceptual category, such
as kinship terms, animal names, color terms, or emotion terms (Romney et al., 2000:
518). Within a semantic domain, the meaning of a term is dened by its location rela-
tive to all the other terms (Romney et al., 2000: 518; for a review of semantic domain
in cognitive anthropology, see DAndrade, 1995). In an extended sense, a cultural
domain is made up of items which members of a culture recognize as belonging
together in a particular category. Operationally, such a domain may be established by
asking members of a culture to free-list as many items as possible that belong in the
domain. Items constituting a cultural domain need not be simply names, but may be
any of a number of relations (see Spradley, 1979, 1980; Werner and Schoepe, 1987).
Garcia Alba de Alba et al. (1998) asked members of a Mexican barrio, What causes high
blood pressure? and found that individuals of different age groups and educational level
produced very similar lists. Similarly, Caulkins (1998) asked Scottish entrepreneurs to
list kinds of business success and found considerable agreement among his informants
in the terms they used to depict success.
102
Where lists are too diverse, and where there is little agreement on the structure of the
domain, one may suspect that no unied cultural domain exists. Cultural domains,
then, are discovered empirically. Knowledge of cultural domains is not distributed uni-
formly in the population. Even apart from immigrants, some knowledge domains are
widely shared (e.g. how to get food in a restaurant) while others are narrowly shared
(how to x a car). For all people, and for immigrants, there is a tendency to learn and
internalize knowledge domains according to ones needs and goals and in culturally pre-
scribed ways.
Discourse domain
In second language acquisition studies, Discourse Domain Theory describes a discourse
domain as a topical area in which an individual feels knowledgeable and especially
invested. The theory predicts that for such domains, learners will produce second-
language talk that is more complex, more independent, and more coherent (Young,
1999: 110). They will also perceive themselves as more competent and invested in that
domain than in areas where they have not acquired a similar discourse competency
(Whyte, 1992, 1995). Domain and competence interact.
In this article, I use this composite notion of domain(cognitive, semantic, and dis-
course) to explain how the immigrant becomes selectively knowledgeable and linguisti-
cally competent in those second language/second culture domains in which he or she is
personally invested. Relative communicative competence signals patterns of accultura-
tion and highlights points of cultural comparison and contrast.
LINGUISTIC, COMMUNICATIVE, AND CULTURAL COMPETENCE
A second key concept in this study is competence. The notion developed here draws on
three further areas of research: in formal linguistics (linguistic competence), the ethnog-
raphy of speaking (communicative competence), and cognitive anthropology (cultural
competence).
Linguistic competence
A person with linguistic competence, in the Chomskyan understanding of the term
(Chomsky, 1965), is a person capable of forming all and only those sentences admiss-
ible in a given language. Such knowledge is comprised of the tacit knowledge under-
lying the grammatical structure of clauses and sentences (Ochs, 1988: 33).
Communicative competence
A person with communicative competence, in the tradition of the ethnography of speak-
ing (Hymes, 1972), is one who knows how language (e.g. specic genres and registers)
is used in particular speech situations. Native speakers of a language are those who attain
both linguistic and communicative competence via childhood language socialization.
Immigrants learning a second language in the culture of adoption can develop both lin-
guistic and communicative competence via everyday learning in their second culture.
Alternately, in the case where the exception proves the rule, persons acquiring a second
language in a classroom in their own country far from the cultural context in which that
language is naturally spoken may acquire linguistic but not communicative competence
(for distinctions between spontaneous and guided learning, see Klein, 1986).
103
Cultural competence
As an analog to linguistic and communicative competence, anthropologists have sug-
gested the notion of cultural competence (Agar, 1991). The process of acculturation into
a culture results in knowing whatever it is one has to know or believe in order to operate
in a manner acceptable to its members, and to do so in any role that they accept for any
one of themselves (Goodenough, 1964). Acculturation involves competence in the
ideational realm that constitutes a culture schemata, scripts, models, frames . . . that
are culturally constituted, socially distributed, and personally construed (Poole, 1994:
833). In the tradition of consensus analysis (Romney, 1994, 1999; Romney et al., 1986)
anthropologists also speak of cultural competence as the degree to which an individual
shares the knowledge (representations) held collectively by the group.
In this article, competence implies all three forms insofar as they are mutually related.
Obviously, some measure of linguistic competence undergirds communicative com-
petence, and attaining communicative competence implies knowledge of and practical
sensitivity to cultural nuances.
BECOMING BILINGUAL: COMPETENCE BY DOMAIN
Immigrants attain competence linguistic, communicative, and cultural domain by
domain, and not globally. One way of highlighting this fact is by way of contrast to
earlier formulations. In early psycholinguistic studies of bilingualism, Weinrich (1953)
and Ervin and Osgood (1954) distinguished between compound and coordinate bi-
linguals. Compound bilingualsare those who learn their two languages in one context.
This is the individual who grows up speaking two languages from birth, often in a multi-
lingual society. Coordinatebilingualsare those who learn one language in one (cultural)
context and a second language in another (cultural) context. This is the situation of the
prototypical adult immigrant envisioned in this article.
The compoundcoordinate distinction has not fared well for a number of reasons.
First, even compound bilinguals tend to develop variable linguistic and communicative
competence by domain. So, for example, in the multilingual society of Luxembourg
German is the language of elementary education, religion, and journalism; French is
the language of secondary education, ofcial usage, government bureaucracy, street
signage, and a few others, while Letzebuergesch, though functioning only in the L
(low)-variety (i.e. as the language of the home, street, workplace, etc.) is also an
admissible variety for addressing Parliament. (Schiffman, 1993: 136)
In addition, numerous studies of bilingualism by linguistic anthropologists have
explored how the use of one or the other language in multilingual societies may be gen-
dered (Burton et al., 1994; Harvey, 1999). Participants in these studies are compound
bilinguals who develop linguistic and communicative competence in different languages
for different domains. The reason is quite practical: acquiring equivalent lexical entries,
syntactic forms, and idiomatic uency for every domain of life is simply unnecessary.
The need to develop linguistic and communicative competence is situationally driven.
The case is even more obvious for coordinate bilinguals. For immigrants, acquisition
of communicative competence in the domain of work is usually vital, and therefore may
long precede communicative competence in domains such as kinship or politics.
104
Further, for some domains, persons may never develop communicative competence for
the simple reason that it would be superuous. Why should the El Salvadoran immi-
grant living in Washington, DC learn the appropriate English for Catholic practice (in
the domain of religion) if the relevant worshipping community is entirely Spanish,
rituals are conducted in Spanish, devotional materials are distributed in Spanish, and
Spanish speaking priests and nuns are readily available?In this sense, all bilinguals are
coordinate bilinguals.
MENTALLY REPRESENTED DISCOURSE HISTORIES
This anthropological notion of linguistic-communicative-cultural competencestands in
direct contrast to the narrower understanding of language uencyas it is often portrayed
in psycholinguistic studies of bilingualism. In these studies, the governing metaphor for
language is that language is a code. The code metaphor implies that (a) there are
objects-in-the-world, (b) there are names for those objects, and (c) the bilingual has two
sets of names for these objects (whereas the monolingual has just one set of names).
The code metaphor reduces language to its ostensive function and therefore offers an
extremely simplistic mode for semantic reference. From this perspective, language, at the
level of semantics, consists of a set of linguistic labels for non-linguistic things. This is
language as Wittgenstein understood it in Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus(Wittgenstein,
1961[1922]): word-elements must be hooked up with world-elements. Oftentimes in
cognitive studies of bilingualism, the objects-in-the-world are substituted by concepts
or images in the mind for which, again, the bilingual has two sets of labels. But
this does no more than drag the code metaphor inside the mind and substitutes non-
linguistic, mental referents for non-linguistic objects-in-the-world.
To Wittgenstein, sustained reection suggested that things were otherwise, and in the
Philosophical Investigations(Wittgenstein, 1953) he developed the notion that language
plays a wide variety of functions other than the ostensive. Thus, the meaning of any
utterance is constituted only within the particular language game that is being played.
At issue are meanings, not objects (and one need not be a symbolic anthropologist or
philosophical idealist to appreciate this point). To speak of language games is to speak
of cultural contexts, and meanings are thoroughly socio-cultural in the sense that they
are shaped by the context in which they emerge and are employed. Further, these con-
texts are essentially dialogic (Goodwin and Duranti, 1992; Tedlock and Mannheim,
1995).
Meaning, then, emerges in discourse. Meanings are negotiated, challenged, argued
about, imposed, altered or reinterpreted to reect changed circumstances or changed
goals and aspirations of individuals and groups. In brief, meanings are subjected to
manipulations (Holy, 1999: 53). Meanings are constituted in the discourse contexts in
which they are invoked. This is the force of pragmatics and indexicality in studies of lan-
guage-in-use (Hanks, 1996; Silverstein, 1976, 1987). Among the resources immigrants
learn to manipulate are the language registers, genres, idioms, and special vocabularies
that signal social belonging and facilitate goal attainment (Koven, 1998; Woolard,
1997). Moving from one network and domain to others, people can use linguistic
resources exibly to position themselves and others (Zentella, 1997). Language use
reects both a contextual strategy within local networks and the internalization of cul-
tural meaning systems. Thus, meanings are created anew in culturally-specic discourse
105
contexts. In sum, the bilingual is not an individual with alternate codes for some com-
monly available set of objects-in-the-world, but a person whose linguistic and com-
municative competence in a particular domain (from a history of discourse involvement
in that domain) enables him or her to engage in the ongoing conversation of other
persons also involved in that domain. Meanings are encoded in memory as the residue
of conversational dialogues and social uses of language through which they have come
about.
The notion that meaning is an achievement-in-discourse is not news to anthropolo-
gists, but what needs to be established anew is the notion that meaning does not emerge
ex nihilo(out of nothingness, as medieval theologians might have it) between two socio-
cultural agents interacting in a particular domain. The linguistic and communicative
competence of the cultural actors reects a discoursehistory of previousinvolvement in the
domainin which they interact. Cognitively, this discourse history is a series of mental
representations at lexical, syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic levels that undergird
competence in the domain (similar to the contextual representation necessary for the
determination of word meaning; Miller, 1999: 13). These are part and parcel of the
socio-culturally constituted meanings at issue. Thus, where cognitive studies of bi-
lingualism tend to reduce language to the mental coding of concepts and images,
anthropologists tend to locate the achievement of meaning in social interaction and
ignore the reality of the history of mental representations that actors bring to the
encounter. Both perspectives are critical: mental concepts and images are encoded
networks (histories) of meanings.
According to the foregoing, then, discourse histories are encoded in memory as
mental representations. Speakers access these representations when speaking. They may
also access them in response to experimental stimulation. Studies in cognitive psychol-
ogy of bilingual memory are now beginning to focus on how the semantic represen-
tations of bilinguals (the meanings-in-the-head) are in fact thoroughly cultural
concepts with intimate links to their appropriate lexical entries (Pavlenko, 1999; Schrauf
and Rubin, in press). This is the cognitive correlate to the work described earlier in
linguistic anthropology. The bilingual is the person who possesses these competencies
grounded in domain-specic discourse histories. Both the competence and discourse his-
tories are rooted in mental representations corresponding to a particular domain. These
experiences are the result of needing and developing competence in certain areas but not
others. Acculturation and second-language learning foster the development of a bilin-
gual mind as well as a bilingual speaker (Schrauf, 2000).
VARIABLE COMPETENCE IN DIFFERENT DOMAINS
Typically, therefore, the bilinguals two languages are used in particular and different
domains. This has several consequences. First, uency in either the rst or second
language will vary with the domain. For some domains, a person may be a balanced
bilingual, equally competent speaking either language, while for other domains he or
she may be adept in one language but limited (or wholly incapable) in the other. For
purposes of characterizing bilingual competence, it is important to determine relative
competence in key second-language domains (Schrauf and Rubin, 1998). Secondly,
communicative competence in any given domain is not constant, but varies over time.
Given second-language acquisition for a particular domain, a person may acquire uency
106
in that domain, fossilize at some point in that domain, or become linguistically and com-
municatively functional (but not uent) in that domain. Thirdly, sustained use of the
second language may cause rst language attrition in that domain (Schrauf, 1999). Over
time, the second language comes to replace the rst (Kenny, 1996), though in this latter
case it is probably more accurate to say that the rst language becomes inaccessible rather
than lost (Seliger, 1996).
By extension, given the close connection (though not identication) of communi-
cative and cultural competence, it is more accurate to say that cultural competence is
domain specic as well. As with second language acquisition, acculturation by domain
is situationally driven and occurs in some domains but not others. Moreover, accultur-
ation in any domain is by degree and varies over time. Finally, very advanced accultur-
ation in a given domain may result in a corresponding deculturation in the cultural
schemata of the culture of origin. Any psychological theory of acculturation must be
recalibrated to explain, not acculturation as a wholesale change in socio-cultural iden-
tity, but rather, acculturation as a process applying to individual cultural domains.
STRATEGIZING CULTURAL ADAPTION BY DOMAIN
For the monocultural individual who speaks only one language, cultural domains have
only one language associated with them. In contrast, for the bicultural/bilingual, any
given cultural domain may have two, or more, associated meaning systems and two lan-
guages. In this regard, it is important to note that acculturation is not a unilinear process
where acquisition of the cultural meanings, behaviors, and values of the adopted culture
necessarily implies a process of culture shedding (Berry, 1992) of those from the culture
of origin. Of course, for some individuals there isa loss of some cultural experience and
the replacement by another. Pavlenko (1998) has gathered the rst person accounts of
bilingual authors, all adult second language learners, and chronicled the stages of loss of
the rst language (and rst language identity) and subsequent gain and reconstruction.
Instructive in this regard are the reections of author Jan Novak:
My Czech had begun to deteriorate. There were times now when I could not recall
an everyday word, such as carrot, ler, or sloth. I would waste the day probing
the labyrinthine recesses of my memory because to get help from a dictionary seemed
only to legitimize the loss. . . . Computers, graft, football, and other things were
becoming easier to talk about in English. (Novak, 1994: 265; quoted in Pavlenko,
1998)
Most often a person retains and cultivates his or her ethnic identity and, at the same
time, engages the ideology and practices of the culture of adoption. LaFromboise et al.
(1993) refer to this as biculturalism. Furthermore, this process of assuming the new
cultural schemata and retaining or adjusting old ones is both an active and passive
process. That is, a person may make attitudinal and behavioral changes quite consciously,
while also acquiring new attitudes and patterns of action without awareness of the
change.
Insofar as adaptation to the larger culture is left to the individual (and not a forced
choice), the experience of acculturation may be characterized in four ways. Berry and his
colleagues (Berry, 1984; Berry et al., 1989, 1992) have identied four such acculturation
107
strategies (a 2x2 model) based on two variables: (a) the degree to which ones identity
in and the characteristics of the culture of origin are to be maintained (what I will call
ethnic maintenance), and (b) the degree to which the ideology and practices of the
wider culture are to be incorporated (what I will call cultural incorporation). Integration
describes high ethnic maintenance and high cultural incorporation (this is LaFromboises
biculturalism). Assimilation describes low ethnic maintenance and high cultural
incorporation. This is the unilineal strategy: adopting one culture means shedding the
other. Separationdescribes high ethnic maintenance and low cultural incorporation. This
is refusal to acculturate. Marginalizationdescribes both low ethnic maintenance and low
cultural incorporation. This is self-alienation from both the culture of origin and the
culture of adoption.
In the following I adopt Berrys strategy language with the caveat that not all adap-
tation or resistance is conscious and intentional. While the strategies just described may
be understood to apply to an individuals overall orientation toward their cultural experi-
ence, I suggest that individuals choose strategies for eachdomain according to their goals
and/or needs that may be met through acquiring competency in that domain. In any
cultural domain, one may have a variety of experiences and strategies of adaptation. This
reects the pluriformity of motives and needs that a person possesses in relation to a
specic domain. This notion articulates with the current anthropological wisdom that
individuals negotiate cultural ideologies and practices according to context. A domain
such as getting a university education is not just one site of meaning and activity and
therefore may require multiple strategies of adaptation, depending both on what is
required to act competently at the various sites and the goals and needs of the individual
actors.
As an example of linguistic and cultural preservation of some rst cultural domains
and adaptation to a second-culture domain, Diane Hoffman (1989a, 1989b) presents
ethnographic data on Iranian immigrants to the San Francisco Bay Area.
In any given linguistic community, when a language choice exists, certain domains
will be associated with preferential use of one language over another. For Iranians,
English was the language of the workplace, and its use connoted the values of techno-
logical expertise, efciency, and clear information exchange. (Farsi, on the other
hand, was associated with art, emotional expression, friendship, and social rene-
ment.) (Hoffman, 1989b: 127)
That the workplace domain required a language shift is not remarkable. Iranians will-
ingly negotiated the various requirements for competency in that domain: language,
technological skills, valuing efciency and clear information exchange. Hoffman notes
that Iranians adopted a strategy of blending both American professional values and the
English vocabulary associated with them into an Iranian cultural framework. This sug-
gests not the replacement but the integration of meaning systems. On the other hand,
in domains such as art and the ethnopsychology of emotion and friendship, Iranian
immigrants to San Francisco seemed to have little interest in adopting second-culture
meaning systems. This resistance is indicative of the cultural separation strategy
described earlier.
To talk of strategies and choices in acculturation to particular domains is to talk about
108
the actors intentions and indeed, as indicated in this article, much of the variability in
the degree of acculturation is explained by reference to the individuals intentions (con-
scious and unconscious). Just how much the immigrant wants to adopt the customs and
ways of thinking of the culture of adoption and how much she wants to preserve the
culture of origin is related to her needs and aims in a particular domain.
In both enculturation in the rst culture and acculturation in the second, one
learns the schemas of the new culture, and as psychological anthropologists have shown
(DAndrade and Strauss, 1992), schemas carry with them embedded goals. As Strauss
notes,
. . . cultural models(i.e. culturally formed cognitive schemas, Quinn & Holland,
1987) can havemotivational forcebecause these models not only label and describe
the world but also set forth goals (both conscious and unconscious) and elicit or
include desires (DAndrade, 1981, 1984, 1990). (Strauss 1992: 3, italics in original)
Whether anindividual comestofeel the(emotive) evocationof aparticular schemaor act
in accord with itsdirectives(motiveforce) ispartly dueto personal decision and shaped
by goalsat higher levels(Strauss, 1992). And, again, actingout of either therst culture
or thesecond cultureframework becomesaway of realizingtheseoverarchinggoals.
Again in Hoffmans study of Iranian immigrants (1989b), there is evidence that indi-
viduals choose different strategies of adaptation. Some negotiate adaptation to American
cultural meanings via a kind of cultural eclecticism, in which the learner consciously
picks and chooses what he or she perceives to be the self-consonant values present in the
other culture, adding them on to form a new and ideally improved version of the self
(Hoffman, 1989b: 42). For others, however, there is resistance to acculturation, and
whatever adaptations are necessary seem to entail either alienation or loss of self. In the
former case, the individual consciously and purposively takes up acculturation in par-
ticular domains. In the latter case, the individual struggles with adaptation as a threat
to identity. Some of the individual differences in acculturation are explained by actors
goals, both conscious and unconscious.
CONCLUSION
This article argues that units of culture can be empirically discovered by attending to
adult immigrants experience of culture contact. That is, as the immigrant encounters
what they do here, those things that he or she has always taken for granted are made
conscious and subject to reection. This process of culture contact takes place over time
and in different experiential domains, as new challenges are met and new needs made
manifest. Language shift is a principal clue to identifying these domains. As immigrants
develop competence in a new domain, they generally acquire new abilities to com-
municate with others about that domain. To some extent the ability to use this new
language is internalized and mental representations of that domain become bilingual.
These two insights (1) that acculturation takes place domain by domain, and (2) that
language shift is the clue to these changes provide the foundation for a cognitive theory
of acculturation. The theoretical framework comprises three concepts: experiential
domain, linguistic-communicative-cultural competence, and the mental encoding of
discoursehistories.
109
The concept of experiential domain is heir to three current but diverse uses of domain:
cognitive (from cognitive linguistics); semantic (from cognitive anthropology); and as
discourse (from second language acquisition). As noted, a domain is a series of mental
representations an imagistic and/or conceptual complex represented at a symbolic
level by a set of linguistic contrasts and about which a person is linguistically articulate
to some degree or another. For example, the domain of medical care (in the US) includes
the prototypical task of seeing a doctor. A person must know when and how to make
an appointment with a doctor, how to register with the nurse upon arrival, how to act
in the waiting room, how to carry on appropriate patient-doctor discourse about the
symptoms, how to arrange for payment with the insurance cards, how to get the pre-
scription completed, and so forth.
Individuals come to variable competence in experiential domains. My use of the
concept of competence folds together linguistic knowledge (knowing what the words,
syntax, and idioms are), communicative competence (knowing when to say what to
whom), and cultural competence (knowing the beliefs and practices of the group).
Such competence develops over time as the result of experience and social interaction
with many other people. Competence is therefore not a static capacity but rests on a
whole discoursehistory of multiple engagements in that domain. For example, one learns
about holidays from anticipating a free day with co-workers, by hearing advertisements
for holiday entertainment, by going to parades or by watching television. Talk shapes
experiences and shapes ones expectations about the experiences. In this critical sense,
meaning is an achievement of discourse over time. These discourse histories are
encoded in memory as mental representations. Each new engagement in the domain
depends on previously encoded mental representations and in turn reshapes the relevant
representations.
The immigrant, as a developing bilingual, arrives at new linguistic-communicative-
cultural competence in some experiential domains and not others. This process is gov-
erned in part by the exigencies of circumstance and in part by individual motivation and
personal ideology. In any given domain, survival may depend on coming to competence,
or, alternately, nothing may be lost by ignoring certain domains. Acculturation is in
part a matter of choice: an immigrant may abandon, resist, embrace, or mix cultural
competencies.
As immigrants engage the new culture in domain after domain, cognitive changes
take place. Discourse histories are modied and networks of mental representations are
transformed. Because the mental representations of their culture-of-origin no longer
work or are at odds with the appropriate representations for behavior in the culture-of-
adoption, the immigrant becomes conscious of the cognitive, semantic and discourse
domains that are now called into question. It is in the ongoing collision that the taken-
for-granted assumptions of the past now rise to the surface and are no longer taken for
granted. Through this process the immigrants themselves stand in a privileged position
to generate the content and form of these new domains and to reect on those of their
culture-of-origin. The anthropologist takes advantage of immigrants coming to aware-
ness of cultural beliefs and practices, now placed in question, and tracks the changes that
occur as acculturation takes place. It is the argument of this article that the changes
occasioned by acculturation will mark the relevant cultural units of analysis for the
anthropologist.
110
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Victor de Munck, Robert Moore, and an anonymous reviewer
of Anthropological Theory for reading and commenting on previous versions of this
paper. This research was supported by the National Institute of Aging Grant #R01
AG16340-01A1.
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ROBERT W. SCHRAUF is a medical and psychological anthropologist at the Buehler Center on Aging at
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