Condominium - Possession

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1. Condominium Corporation v. Campos

Facts:
The petitioner, Sunset View Condominium
Corporation is a condominium corporation within the
meaning of Republic Act No. 4726 in relation to a duly
registered Amended Master Deed with Declaration of
Restrictions of the Sunset View Condominium Project
located at 2230 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City of which
said petitioner is the Management Body holding title to
all the common and limited common areas.
The private respondent, Aguilar-Bernares
Realty, a sole proprietorship owned and operated by
the spouses Emmanuel G. Aguilar and Zenaida B.
Aguilar, is the assignee of a unit, Solana, in the Sunset
View Condominium Project with La Perla Commercial,
Incorporated, as assignor. The La Perla Commercial,
Incorporated bought the Solana unit on installment
from the Tower Builders, Inc. The petitioner, Sunset
View Condominium Corporation, filed for the collection
of assessments levied on the unit against Aguilar-
Bernares Realty.
The private respondent filed a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint on the grounds (1) that the
complaint does not state a cause of action: (2) that the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject or nature
other action; and (3) that there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause.
The petitioner filed its opposition.
The motion to dismiss was granted by the
respondent Judge, pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act
No. 4726, a holder of a separate interest and
consequently, a shareholder of the plaintiff
condominium corporation; and that the case should be
properly filed with the Securities & Exchange
Commission which has exclusive original jurisdiction on
controversies arising between shareholders of the
corporation. the motion for reconsideration thereof
having been denied, the petitioner, alleging grave abuse
of discretion on the part of respondent Judge, filed the
instant petition for certiorari praying that the said
orders be set aside.

ISSUE: Whether the CFI or the City Courts have
jurisdiction over the claims filed by Sunset View, the
condominium corporation.

Held: Not every purchaser of a condominium unit is a
shareholder in the corporation. The Mater Deed
determines when ownership of the unit and
participation in the corporation vests in the purchaser.
The City Court and the CFI have jurisdiction.
The share of stock appurtenant to the unit will be
transferred accordingly to the purchaser of the unit only
upon full payment of the purchase price at which time
he will also become the owner of the unit.
Consequently, even under the contract, it is only the
owner of a unit who is a shareholder of the
Condominium Corporation. Inasmuch as owners is
conveyed only upon full payment of the purchase price,
it necessarily follows that a purchaser of a unit who has
not paid the full purchase price thereof is not The
owner of the unit and consequently is not a shareholder
of the Condominium Corporation.
In this case, the Master Deed provides
that ownership is transferred only upon full payment
of the purchase price.
Private respondents have not yet fully paid the
purchase price, hence they are not shareholders and
the SEC has no jurisdiction over the claims.

*now, special courts handle intra-corporate disputes

4. Heirs of Placido Miranda v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
Placido Miranda and his wife were owners of a parcel of
land. Upon their death, the land was administered by their son
Maximo who, in 1957, sold it to Agerico. In 1984, a free
patent title was issued to chariot, Agericos
daughter. Since then, Agerico has been in possession
and cultivation of the land in behalf of Charito who
became a resident of USA. In 1991, the heirs of Pl aci do
entered the l and and prevented Ageri co from
cul ti vati ng i t. They cl ai med ri ghtful ownership
and possession contending that Maximo was merely the
administrator of the land. Thus, Agerico and Charito
brought an action for forcible entry against the
heirs. Meanwhile, the heirs also filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity, annulment of title and deed of
sale, and cancellation of title and reconveyance with
damages and partition against Agerico and Charito. As
they involve the same parties and subject matter
and related issues, these cases have been consolidated.

Issue: Whether or not Agerico, and subsequently Charito, has
acquired the land by virtue of the deed of sale executed by Maximo?

Held: Yes.
1.) Agerico acquired the land by virtue of
the deed of sale executed by Maximo. Charito, towhom
the land was transferred has the certificate of title, tax
receipts, and evidence of p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e
l a n d f o r mo r e
t h a n 3 0 y e a r s . T a x r e c e i p t a n d d e c l a r a t i
o n s o f ownership for taxation, when coupled with proof of
actual possession of the property can be the basis of claim of
ownership through prescription.
2.)Ownership and other real rights over
immovable property are acquired by either ordinary or
extraordinary prescription. On the one hand, ordinary
prescription entails adverse p o s s e s s i o n
b y v i r t u e o f a t i t l e a n d i n g o o d f a i t h f o r
1 0 y e a r s . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , extraordinary
prescription is uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years without
need of title or good faith. In this case, therefore, on the
basis alone of possession for more
t h a n 3 0 y e a r s , Ag e r i c o a n d C h a r i t o s o w
n e r s h i p , a c q u i r e d t h r o u g h e x t r a o r d i n a r y
prescription, is beyond question.
3.)The heirs contend that under Art. 1391, CC,
they had a period of 4 years within which to
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b r i n g a n a c t i o n f o r a n n u l me n t a n d t h a t
t h i s p e r i o d c o mme n c e d t o r u n o n l y f r o m
November 1991, when they
al l egedl y di scovered the fraud commi tted agai
nst them. However, 1391, CC presupposes that no
acquisitive prescription has set in, for after the
favorabl e effects of acqui si ti ve prescri pti on
have set i n, ri ghts of ownershi p over a property
are rendered indisputable

6. Kasilag vs. Rodriguez

Facts: Responds, Rafaela Rodriguez, et al., children and
heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, commenced a
civil case to recover from the petitioner the possession
of the land and its improvements granted by way of
homestead to Emiliana Ambrosio (EA).
The parties entered into a contract of mortgage
of the improvements on the land acquired as
homestead to secure the payment of the indebtedness
for P1,000 plus interest. In clause V, the parties
stipulated that EA was to pay, w/in 4 1/2 yrs, the debt
w/ interest thereon, in w/c event the mortgage would
not have any effect; in clause VI, the parties agreed that
the tax on the land and its improvements, during the
existence of the mortgage, should be paid by the owner
of the land; in clause VII, it was covenanted that w/in 30
days from the date of the contract, the owner of the
land would file a motion in the CFI of Bataan asking that
cert. of title no. 325 be cancelled and that in lieu
thereof another be issued under the provisions of RA
496; in clause VIII the parties agreed that should EA fail
to redeem the mortgage w/in the stipulated period of 4
1/2 yrs, she would execute an absolute deed of sale of
the land in favor of the mortgagee, the petitioner, for
the same amount of the loan including unpaid interest;
and in clause IX it was stipulated that in case the motion
to be presented under clause VII should be disapproved
by the CFI-Bataan, the contract of sale of sale would
automatically become void and the mortgage would
subsist in all its force.
One year after the execution of the mortgage deed, it
came to pass that EA was unable to pay the stipulated
interest as well as the tax on the land and its
improvements. For this reason, she and the petitioner
entered into another verbal contract whereby she
conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on
condition that the latter would not collect the interest
on the loan, would attend to the payment of the land
tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and would
introduce improvements thereon.

HELD: The possession by the petitioner and his receipts
of the fruits of the land considered as integral elements
of the contract of antichresis are illegal and void
agreements because such contract is a lien and as such
is expressly prohibited by Sec 116 of Act No. 2874, as
amended. The CA held that petitioner acted In BF in
taking possession of the land because he knew that the
contract he made w/ EA was an absolute sale, and
further, that the latter could not sell the land because it
is prohibited by Sec. 116 of Act 2874.
xxx [A] person is deemed a possessor in BF when he
knows that there is a flaw in his title or in the manner of
its acquisition, by w/c it is invalidated.

The question to be answered is w/n the petitioner
should be deemed a possessor in GF because he was
unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its
acquisition by w/c it is invalidated. Ignorance of the flaw
is the keynote of the rule. From the facts as found by
the CA, we can neither deduce nor presume that the
petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the
manner of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition
contained in Sec. 116. This being the case, the question
is w/n GF may be premised upon ignorance of the laws.

Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be
the basis of GF but excusable ignorance may be such
basis (if it is based upon ignorance of a fact.) It is a fact
that the petitioner is not conversant w/ the laws
because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of
the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded
belief that he was not violating the prohibition
regarding the alienation of the land. In taking
possession thereof and in consenting to receive its
fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that
the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are
attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the
latter, as a lien, was prohibited by Sec. 116. Thus, as to
the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of sec.
116 is excusable and may be the basis of GF.
The petitioners being in GF, the respondents
may elect to have the improvements introduced by the
petitioner by paying the latter the value thereof,
P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to buy and have the
land where the improvements or plants are found, by
paying them its market value to be fixed by the court of
origin, upon hearing the parties.

8. Caram vs. Laureta

FACTS:
O n J u n e 1 0 , 1 9 4 5 , M a r c o s
M a t a c o n v e y e d a l a r g e t r a c t
o f agri cul tural l and covered by OCT No. 3019
i n favor of Cl aro Laureta, pl ai nti ff, the
respondent herei n. The deed of absol ute sal e
i n favor
of t h e p l a i n t i f f wa s n o t r e g i s t e r e d b e c a
u s e i t wa s n o t a c k n o wl e d g e d before a
notary publ i c or any other authori zed offi cer.
Si nce June 10, 1945, the plaintiff Laureta had been
and is in continuous, adverse and notorious occupation
of said land, without being molested, disturbed or
s t o p p e d b y a n y o f t h e d e f e n d a n t s o r
t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I n f a c t , Laureta had
been paying realty taxes due thereon and had
introduced improvements worth not less than
P20,000.00 at the time of the filing of the compl ai nt.
On May 5, 1947, the same l and covered by OCT
No. 3 0 1 9 wa s s o l d b y Ma r c o s Ma t a t o
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d e f e n d a n t F e r mi n Z .
C a r a m, J r . p e t i t i o n e r
h e r e i n . T h e d e e d o f s a l
e i n f a v o r o f C a r a m w a
s a c k n o wl e d g e d b e f o r e At t y . Ab e l a r d o A
p o r t a d e r a . On De c e mb e r 9 , 1947, the second
sale between Marcos Mata and Fermin Caram, Jr. was
r e g i s t e r e d wi t h t h e R e g i s t e r o f De e d s .
On t h e s a me d a t e , T r a n s f e r Certificate of
Title No. 140 was issued in favor of Fermin Caram Jr.
Thed e f e n d a n t F e r mi n C a r a m J r .
c l a i me d t h a t h e h a s n o k n o wl e d g e o r
i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e p r e v i o u s e n
c u m b r a n c e s , t r a n s a c t i o n s , a n d
alienations in favor of plaintiff until the filing of the
complaints.

ISSUE:
W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e k n o w l
e d g e p e t i t i o n e r o f a p r i o
r u n r e g i s t e r e d s a l e o f a t i t l e d p r o p e r t y
a t t r i b u t a b l e t o p e t i t i o n e r a n d equivalent in
law of registration of sale.
HELD:
Yes. There is no doubt then that Irespe and Aportadera,
acting
a s a g e n t s o f C a r a m , p u r c h a s e d t h e
p r o p e r t y o f Ma t a i n b a d f a i t h .
Appl yi ng the pri nci pl e of agency, Caram
as pri nci pal , shoul d al so be deemed to have acted
in bad faith. Since Caram was a registrant in bad fai th,
the si tuati on i s as i f there was no regi strati on
at al l . A possessor i n g o o d f a i t h i s o n e wh o
i s n o t a wa r e t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s i n h i s
t i t l e o r mode of acqui si ti on any fl aw whi ch
i nval i dates i t. Laureta was fi rst i n possessi on
of the property. He i s al so a possessor i n good
fai th. It i s true that Mata had alleged that the deed of
sale in favor of Laureta was procured by force. Such
defect, however, was cured when, after the
lapse of four years from the time the intimidation
ceased, Marcos Mata lost both his rights to file an
action for annulment or to set up nullity of the contract
as a defense in an action to enforce the same.

9. MWSS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Standard
FACTS: Twenty three checks were deposited by the
payees Dizon, Sison and Mendoza in their respective
current accounts with the PCIB and PBC. Thru the
Central Bank Clearing, these checks were presented for
payment by PBC and PCIB to the defendant PNB, and
were paid. At the time of their presentation to PNB
these checks bear the standard indorsement which
reads all prior indorsement and/or lack of endorsement
guaranteed.
Subsequent investigation however, conducted
by the NBI showed that Raul Dizon, Arturo Sison and
Antonio Mendoza were all fictitious persons.
NWSA addressed a letter to PNB requesting the
immediate restoration to its Account No. 6, of the total
sum of P3,457,903.00 corresponding to the total
amount of these twenty-three (23) checks claimed by
NWSA to be forged and/or spurious checks.

ISSUE: WON THE DRAWEE BANK WAS LIABLE FOR THE
LOSS UNDER SECTION 23 OF THE NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS LAW

HELD: No. The NBI does not declare or prove that the
signatures appearing on the questioned checks are
forgeries. These reports did not touch on the inherent
qualities of the signatures which are indispensable in
the determination of the existence of forgery. There
must be conclusive findings that there is a variance in
the inherent characteristics of the signatures and that
they were written by two or more different persons.
Forgery cannot be presumed. It must be established by
clear, positive, and convincing evidence. This was not
done in the present case.
Even if the twenty-three (23) checks in
question are considered forgeries, considering the
petitioners gross negligence, it is barred from setting
up the defense of forgery under Section 23 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law.
One factor which facilitate this fraud was the
delay in the reconciliation of bank (PNB) statements
with the NAWASA bank accounts. The records likewise
show that the petitioner failed to provide appropriate
security measures over its own records thereby laying
confidential records open to unauthorized persons.
We cannot fault the respondent drawee Bank
for not having detected the fraudulent encashment of
the checks because the printing of the petitioners
personalized checks was not done under the
supervision and control of the Bank. Under the
circumstances, therefore, the petitioner was in a better
position to detect and prevent the fraudulent
encashment of its checks

10. GEMINIANO v. CA

Lessor in good faith and Builders in Good faith are not
synonymous. Article 1678 may apply to the formers
case and Art 448 may apply to the latters case. If a
person knew that his stay would likely end or that he
knew somehow that he is not the owner of the land then
he is not a BPS in good faith.

FACTS:
The lot in question was originally owned by the mother
of the petitioner. Petitioner sold their unfinished
bungalow to the respondents for P6,000, with a
promise to sell the lot to the latter. The property was
later leased to the respondents for 7 years starting
November 1978 for P40 a month as evidenced by their
written lease contract. The respondents built their
house and introduced some improvements in the lot. In
1985 petitioners mother refused receiving monthly
rentals. It turned out that the lot in question was
subject to litigation which resulted to its acquisition by
Maria Lee which was sold to Salcedo, who further sold
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to Dionisio spouses. The property eventually came back
to the petitioner when the Dinisio spouses executed a
Deed of Quitclaim over the said property in favor of the
petitioners. As such, the lot was registered in the
latters names. (petitioners never lost possession of the
land because Lee and company never issued a writ of
possession against them).

In 1993, petitioners wrote a letter to respondents
demanding them to vacate the premises and when the
latter refused, petitioners filed in court. Respondents
claim that they should be entitled to buy the land
because of the promise of the petitioners to sell them
the land and because they were builders in Good faith.
The courts now are deciding which one to use: Art. 448
regarding builders and land owners in good faith or Art.
1678 regarding lessee in good faith who can be
reimbursed half of the expenses of the improvements if
the LO chooses to appropriate them and that such
lessee have the right to retain in the premises until fully
reimbursed.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the respondents were builders in
Good faith?
2) Whether Art 448 or 1678 should be applied?

RULING:
1) No, they were not builders in good faith. The
respondents knew that their stay would end after the
lease contract expires. They cant bank on the promise,
which was not in writing, of the petitioners that the
latter will sell the land to them. According to 1403, an
agreement for the sale of real property or an interest
therein is unenforceable, unless some note or
memorandum thereof be produced. Other than the
alleged promise by petitioner, respondents had no
other evidence to prove their claim.

2) They are mere lessees in good faith; therefore Art
1678 may apply if the lessor chooses to appropriate the
improvements. But since the petitioners refused to
exercise that option, the private respondents cant
compel them to reimburse the one-half value of the
house and improvements. Neither can they retain the
premises until reimbursement is made. The private
respondents sole right then is to remove the
improvements without causing any more impairment
upon the property leased than is necessary.

11. EDCA Publishing & Distributing Corp. v. Santos,
FACTS: Jose Cruz ordered by telephone 406 books from
EDCA Publishing and Distributing Corp. (EDCA), payable
on delivery. EDCA prepared the corresponding invoice
and delivered the books as ordered, for which Cruz
issued a check. Subsequently, Cruz sold 120 of the
books to Leonor Santos who paid him after verifying the
seller's ownership from the invoice he showed her.
Meanwhile, EDCA having become suspicious over a
second order placed by Cruz even before clearing of his
first check, made inquiries with the De la Salle College
where he had claimed to be a dean and was informed
that there was no such person in its employ. Further,
Cruz had no account with the Philippine Amanah Bank,
against which he had drawn the check. EDCA went to
the police, which arrested Cruz whose real name was
Tomas de la Pea. EDCA sought the assistance of the
police, and forced their way into the store of the Santos
and threatened her with prosecution for buying stolen
property. They seized the 120 books. Santos sued for
recovery of the books after demand for their return was
rejected by EDCA.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not EDCA was unlawfully deprived of the
books because the check issued by the impostor in
payment therefor was dishonored.
2.) Whether or not EDCA had the right to cease the
books that were sold to Santos.
HELD: 1.) No. EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of the
books. Article 559 of the Civil Code provides that the
possession of movable property acquired in good faith
is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost
any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof,
may recover it from the person in possession of the
same. If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the
owner has been unlawfully deprived has acquired it in
good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its
return without reimbursing the price paid therefor. A
contract of sale is perfected once agreement is reached
between the parties on the subject matter and the
consideration. Ownership in the thing sold shall not
pass to the buyer until full payment of the purchase
only if there is a stipulation to that effect. Otherwise,
the rule is that such ownership shall pass from the
vendor to the vendee upon the actual or constructive
delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase price has
not yet been paid. Non-payment only creates a right to
demand payment or to rescind the contract, or to
criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But
absent the stipulation above noted, delivery of the thing
sold will effectively transfer ownership to the buyer
who can in turn transfer it to another.
2.) No. Actual delivery of the books having been made,
Cruz acquired ownership over the books which he could
then validly transfer to the private respondents. The
fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a
matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the
title to the books acquired by the Santos spouses.
Therefore, EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of the
books and Santos had rights over the books.