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In adhoc network, routing
mechanism has three layers
namely Network, Physical and
MAC layers. Modifying some
parameters of routing messages
and selective forwarding attacks
are attacks [! in network layer.
"hey are denoted as #ray hole
attack and $lack hole attack [%!.
Gray hole attack
#ray hole is a node that can
switch from &ehaving correctly
to &ehaving like a &lack hole
that is it is actually an attacker
and it will act as a normal node.
'o we can(t identify easily the
attacker since it &ehaves as a
normal node. )very node
maintains a routing ta&le that
stores the ne*t hop node
information which is a route
packet to destination node.
Black hole Attack
It is a type of denial of
service attack in which malicious
node attract all packets &y giving
a shortest route to reach the
destination and intercept all the
data packets in that [+! process. It
leads to packet drop attack.
It affects end,to,end delay,
throughput, network load, packet
loss in the network and it degrade
the network performance.
A Packet may &e dropped
[-! due to following reasons such
U!tea"#e!! o$ %e"#&'
Packet may &e dropped due
to corruption and &roken links
Gee&#e!! o$ o"e
Packet may &e dropped due
to overflow of transmission
/ueue and lack of energy
Sel$#!he!! o$ o"e
Packet may &e dropped due
to saving of its own energy
%al#c#o&!e!! o$ o"e
Packet is dropped due to
malignant act of a node.
MAN)"s &y their dynamic
nature are more vulnera&le to
attack than wired net,works. "he
fle*i&ility provided &y the open
&roadcast medium and the
cooperativeness of the mo&ile
devices 0which have generally
different resource and
computational capacities, and run
usually on &attery power1
introduces new security risks.
2isks should &e identified and
appropriate actions to &e taken.
In other cases it is accepted that
vulnera&ilities e*ist and seek to
take appropriate action when
there is an attack. As a result,
intrusion detection is a part of
security for MAN)"s. Many
intrusion detection systems have
&een proposed for wired
networks &ut
MAN)"s specific features make
direct application of these
approaches to MAN)"s
impossi&le. New approaches
need to &e developed or else
e*isting approaches need to &e
adapted for MAN)"s.
3atchdog and Pathrater [4!
form the &asis for many of packet
dropping detection techni/ues.
"he first techni/ue is the
3atchdog that identifies
mis&ehaving mo&ile nodes and
second techni/ue is the Pathrater
that helps routing protocols to
avoid these nodes. $ut, it can(t
detect malicious node in the
presence of weakness
receiver collision
am&iguous collision
limited transmission power
partial dropping
false mis&ehavior report
"35AC6 [7! is to detect
mis&ehaving links &y
acknowledging every data packet
transmitted over each three
consecutive nodes along the path
from the source to the
destination. 8pon retrieval of a
data packet, each node along the
route is re/uired to send &ack an
acknowledgement packet to the
node that is two hops away from
it down the route. It has
disadvantages such as unwanted
network overhead due to
acknowledgement re/uired &y
every data packet sent and it
degrade network performance.
',AC6 0'elective
"35AC61 [7!, a derivative of
the "35AC6 scheme, reduces
this e*tra traffic due to
"35AC6. In this, instead of
sending &ack a "35AC6 packet
every time when a data packet is
received, a node waits until a
certain num&er of data packets
0through the same triplet1 arrive.
"he node then sends &ack one
"35AC6 packet
acknowledging multiple data
packets that have &een received
so far. It also suffers from
network overhead.
AC6nowledgement 0AAC61
[9:! is a com&ination of an
)nhanced,"35AC6 0),
"35AC61, which detects
mis&ehaving node instead of
mis&ehaving link and an end,to
end acknowledgment scheme, to
reduce the routing overhead of
"35AC6. It can(t detect false
mis&ehavior report and forge
acknowledgement packets.
Adaptive AC6nowledgement1
[99! is to overcome three
weakness of watchdog scheme
such as false mis&ehavior report,
limited transmission power and
receiver collision. It also solves
forged acknowledgement and
false mis&ehavior report in the
a&ove acknowledgement
schemes. It consists of three parts
0i1 Acknowledge 0AC61 0ii1
'ecure,AC6nowledgement 0',
AC61 0iii1 Mis&ehavior 2eport
Authentication 0M2A1. AC6 and
',AC6 could not a&le to detect
malicious nodes, if false
mis&ehavior report is used &y
malicious node.
3ith M2A scheme, Manet
can find alternative route to reach
destination node due to its
dynamic topology. )AAC6 is
capa&le of detecting malicious
nodes despite the e*istence of
false mis&ehavior report.
Acknowledgement should &e
digitally signed using ;igital
'ignature Algorithm 0;'A1 to
prevent the intermediate node
from forging the ',AC6 packet.
Network performance is
affected &y routing overhead, due
to use of &oth acknowledgement
packets and digital signatures.
It is solved &y using 8se a
hy&rid key
management scheme to further
reduce the network overhead
caused &y digital signature.
Adopt a key e*change
mechanism to
eliminate the re/uirement of pre
distri&uted keys.
<ig . =y&rid 6ey 'cheme
After e*ecution of the key
management module, a shared
key is invoked. "his is used &y
&oth source and destination for
further communication
confidentially. In this way, all the
important data packets are
transmitted to the destination
with only minimum data packet
;etection of Packet dropping
is always threat to security in
MAN)"s and it uses several
acknowledgement schemes such
as "35AC6, ',AC6, AAC6
and )AAC6 to overcome the
defect. "hus, )AAC6 overcome
defects in all other schemes and
still suffer from higher 2outing
5verhead 0251 due to use of
digital signature and
acknowledgement packets used
&etween source node and
destination node. In this paper, it
gives hy&rid key management
scheme to overcome 2outing
5verhead 0251 &y deleting
malicious node(s route. 'ource
node and destination node &oth
authenticate with a shared key to
transfer data packets &etween
them. 5nly a node with
authenticated key can form a
route to reach destination node.
"hus, =y&rid key management
scheme avoids routing overhead
&y deleting malicious node(s
route in MAN)".
So&rce No"e
)y*r#" Key
%aa+e'et %o"&le
Tr&!t A&thor#ty
De!t#at#o No"e
No Data Packet
,%al#c#o&! No"e!-
D a t a
P a c k e t
. # t h k e y