The Structure of Argumentation

State-of-the-Art: The Structure of Argumentation
A. FRANCISCA SNOECK HENKEMANS

Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric
Spuistraat 134
1012 VB Amsterdam
The Netherlands
E-mail: a.f.snoeck.henkemans@hum.uva.nl
ABSTRACT. In this paper, a survey is presented of the main approaches to the structure of
argumentation. The paper starts with a historical overview of the distinctions between various
types of argument structure. Next, the main definitions given in the various approaches are
discussed as well as the methods that are proposed to deal with doubtful cases.
KEY WORDS: argument structure, complex argumentation, complementary argumentation,
convergent reasoning, coordinatively compound argumentation, cumulative argumentation,
linked reasoning, multiple argumentation, premise structure, serial reasoning
1. INTRODUCTION
The structure of argumentation is an important issue for current approaches
to the theory and practice of argument analysis. Recurrent questions are:
How can one lay bare the structure of a complex argument? Which types
of structures should be distinguished and on what grounds?
Laying out the structure of an argument is not only necessary to under-
standing how arguers defend their positions, but is also indispensable for
evaluating their argumentation. An overall judgment of the quality of a
complex argument requires not just a clear picture of individual arguments,
but also insight into the relations among these arguments.
1
If it is not clear
whether or not an individual argument (or reason) is independent of other
arguments that make up the complex argument, it cannot be clear just how
damaging are the consequences of a negative evaluation of that argument.
In most approaches, at least three types of argument structure are dis-
tinguished: (1) serial reasoning (or subordinate argumentation), (2) linked
reasoning (or coordinate argumentation), and (3) convergent reasoning
(or multiple argumentation). Reasoning is serial if one of the reasons
supports the other. If reasoning is linked, each of the reasons given are
directly related to the standpoint, and the reasons work together as a unit.
When each reason separately supports the standpoint (to some degree),
the reasoning is convergent. A complex argument can combine all of these
types of argument structure.
Although at first sight there seems to be agreement on the relevant
types of distinctions between argument structures, on closer inspection,
Argumentation

14: 447473, 2000.
2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
authors disagree with each other on a number of points. Often the same
terminology is used for distinctions that differ in crucial respects. Moreover,
the various characterizations of argument structures reflect fundamental
differences of approach to argumentation. The most important difference
is that between structural (or logical) approaches, in which attention is
paid only to the structural aspects of argument structure as they manifest
themselves in the product of the reasoning process, and functional (or dialec-
tical) approaches, in which the emphasis is on the process within which
these structures arise, and the functions the various argument structures fulfil
in this process.
Apart from differences in definitions of argumentation structures and
differences of approach, there is much discussion about the best method
of analysis, especially in doubtful cases where there is room for more than
one interpretation. For some authors, the ambiguities in the definitions
and the problems of analysis have been a reason to question the impor-
tance of the distinctions. They argue that distinguishing between the various
argument structures is often so difficult in practice that it is better not to
make these distinctions at all. This is especially true for the notoriously
problematic distinction between linked and convergent arguments.
Finally, there is also disagreement about the history of the distinctions,
in particular about the origins of the linked-convergent distinction. Since
more insight into the historical backgrounds of the distinctions between
various types of argument structure might enhance our understanding of
the current controversies, this survey begins with a historical overview.
Section 3 discusses the main definitions of linked and convergent argument
structures (or their equivalents) that are given in current approaches. Section
4 is devoted to the various methods proposed in the literature to deal with
doubtful cases.
2. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Attention to the analysis of argument structure first appeared in American
debate and logic textbooks in the second half of the previous century. Two
major influences are identifiable in these textbooks: classical rhetoric and
Enlightenment rhetorical theorists such as Campbell and Whately.
Although the concepts are not fully developed, and the contemporary
terminology is absent, argument structures similar to our present day
concepts were present in nascent form in both the classical rhetorical
tradition and the 18th century Enlightenment rhetorics. The functional
approach, in which the independence or interdependence of arguments is
determined by the requirements for the burden of proof to be met by the
arguer, can be found both in the classical and the Enlightenment rhetoric.
The logical approach, in which the term argument structure refers to
relationships among premises within different inference types, is promi-
448 A. FRANCISCA SNOECK HENKEMANS
nent in the work of Enlightenment rhetoricians. They make a distinction
between the type of linkage between premises in a deductive argument or
proof and the way in which premises are combined in an inductive (or
moral) argument: in the latter argument the premises each separately
lend some degree of support to the conclusion (and are in that sense
independent), but they need to be combined to make the conclusion (more)
probable.
Classical rhetoric
In early Roman rhetoric, both subordinate arguments and arguments con-
sisting of a number of reasons in direct support of a (sub)standpoint were
distinguished.
2
In Ciceros De Inventione, a specific type of complex
argument is discussed, the epicheirema, also called the five-part argument.
Kennedy (1994) gives the following description of the five-part argument:
it is in fact a kind of amplification of the Aristotelian syllogism and enthymeme in
which a proposition (part 1) is supported by a variety of reasons (part 2), then a second
proposition (what would be the minor premise in a syllogism) is stated (part 3), and
that is followed by a variety of reasons for believing it (part 4). The fifth part then states
the conclusion. Such an argument in Greek is sometimes called an epicheirema, liter-
ally a handful. (120)
Since part 2 and part 4 consist of reasons in support of another reason,
they can be seen as serial reasoning or subordinate argumentation. In both
cases, the support provided by the subordinate argumentation should consist
of a variety of reasons. Cicero gives the following example of support for
the minor premise Of all things nothing is better governed than the
universe:
And then [. . .] they introduce another proof, that is of the minor premise, in this way:
For the risings and the settings of the constellations keep a fixed order, and the changes
of the seasons not only proceed in the same way by a fixed law but are also adapted to
the advantage of all nature, and the alternation of night and day has never through any
variations done any harm. All these points are proof that the nature of the world is
governed by no ordinary intelligence. (De Inventione, 1. 59)
It is not clear whether these reasons are supposed to form one combined
defence (and are thus a case of linked reasoning) or whether they should
lend independent support (and are a case of convergent reasoning).
Also in the classical theory of stasis, the concepts of dependent and inde-
pendent reasons seem to have been recognized, albeit it not explicitly. The
issues that had to be proven in a criminal court case differed depending
on whether the arguers position was that of the defendant or that of the
prosecutor.
3
In choosing the status for his defence, according to Quintilian,
the defendant has four options:
There are four different methods which may be employed in every case, and he who is
going to plead should study them as first essentials. For, to begin with the defendant,
THE STRUCTURE OF ARGUMENTATION 449
far the strongest method of self-defence is, if possible, to deny the charge. The second
best is when it is possible to reply that the particular act with which you are charged
was never committed. The third and most honourable is to maintain that the act was
justifiable. If none of these lines of defence are feasible, there remains the last and only
hope of safety: [. . .] we must evade the charge with the aid of some point of law,
making it appear that the action has been brought against us illegally. (Quintilian 3, 6,
8384)
Each of these ways to defend the accused is, in principle, a sufficient
defense. It is, however, also possible to combine different types of defenses.
Quintilian gives the following explanation of the reasons for using such a
multiple defense:
There are also a number who are in doubt as to a form of defence which I may
exemplify as follows: If I murdered him, I did right; but I did not murder him. What,
they ask, is the value of the first part, if the second can be proved, since they are mutually
inconsistent, and if anyone employs both arguments, we should believe neither? This
contention is partly justified; we should employ the second alone if the fact can be
proved without a doubt. But if we have any doubts as to being able to prove the stronger
argument, we shall do well to rely on both. Different arguments move different people.
[. . .] one who is confident of his powers as a marksman may be content with one shaft,
whereas he who has no such confidence will do well to launch several and give fortune
a chance to come to his assistence. (Quintilian 4, 5, 1314)
The prosecutor makes use of the same issues in choosing his main argu-
ments, but he has to prove all four points in order to make his case:
The accuser [. . .] must prove that something was done, that a particular act was done,
that it was wrongly done, and that he brings his charge according to law. (Quintilian 3,
6, 85)
In view of the requirements of the burden of proof, the prosecutors main
reasons for finding the accused guilty must be regarded as interdependent,
since the success of the argument as a whole depends on the success of each
of its component parts.
4
A different type of interdependency is at stake in the following fragment
from the Rhetorica ad Herennium, where the ideal order of the arguments
is discussed:
In the Proof and Refutation of arguments it is appropriate to adopt an Arrangement of
the following sort: (1) the strongest arguments should be placed at the beginning and at
the end of the pleading; (2) those of medium force, and also those that are neither useless
to the discourse nor essential to the proof, which are weak if presented separately and
individually, but become strong and plausible when conjoined with the others, should
be placed in the middle. (Rhetorica ad Herennium 3, 10, 18)
Unlike the prosecutors main arguments, some of the arguments that are
supposed to be placed in the middle are not essential to the proof according
to the author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium. The reason for their depen-
dency on other arguments is that they are too weak to stand on their own,
and they become stronger when combined with the other arguments.
Enlightenment Rhetoric
In The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1991/1776), Campbell makes a distinction
between scientific evidence and moral evidence. One of the main dif-
ferences between these two types of evidence is a difference in structure:
whereas scientific evidence consists of a set of interdependent premises
which together form one argument, moral evidence consists of a number
of independent arguments:
scientific evidence is simple, consisting of only one coherent series, every part of which
depends on the preceding, and, as it were, suspends the following: moral evidence is
generally complicated, being in reality a bundle of independent proofs. The longest
demonstration is but one uniform chain, the links whereof, taken severally, are not to
be regarded as so many arguments, and consequently when thus taken, they conclude
nothing; but taken together, and in their proper order, they form one argument, which is
perfectly conclusive. (45)
Although each of the reasons given in moral reasoning is independent of
the others, with each new reason the conclusion may become more likely:
In moral reasoning, [. . .] there is often a combination of many distinct topics of argument,
no way dependent on one another. Each hath a certain portion of evidence belonging to
itself, each bestows on the conclusion a particular degree of likelihood, of all which
accumulated the credibility of the fact is compounded. (1991/1776: 45)
Campbell acknowledges that it is possible to give more than one indepen-
dent proof of the same proposition, but he believes that there is not much
point in doing this:
It is true, the same theorem may be demonstrable in different ways, and by different
mediums; but as a single demonstration, clearly understood, commands the fullest con-
viction, every other is superfluous. (1991/1776: 45)
Campbell also gives a description of the consequences that will result
from taking away one or more parts of a demonstration or of a moral
argument:
[A demonstration] may be compared to an arch, no part of which can subsist indepen-
dently of the rest. If you make any breach in it, you destroy the whole. [. . .] [Moral
reasoning] may be compared to a tower, the height whereof is but the aggregate of the
heights of the several parts reared above one another, and so may be gradually diminished,
as it was gradually raised. (1991/1776: 4546)
Whately discusses two different ways in which reasons may be combined
in order to produce a stronger argument (and thus may be considered as
linked). A first type of case consists of reasons which separately have
little or no weight, but which can lend sufficient support to a conclusion
when taken together:
The remark above made, as to the force of concurrent testimonies, even though each,
separately, might have little or none, but whose accidental agreement in a falsehood would
be extremely improbable, is not solely applicable to the Argument from Testimony, but
may be extended to many arguments of other kinds also; in which a similar calculation
of chances will enable us to draw a conclusion, sometimes even amounting to moral
certainty, from a combination of data which singly would have had little or no weight.
(1846: 74)
In inductions, according to Whately, mentioning just one instance can in
some cases suffice to justify a general conclusion. But if not, then a number
of instances are needed to support the conclusion:
In human affairs [. . .] our uncertainty respecting many of the circumstances that may
affect the result, obliges us to collect many coinciding instances to warrant even a probable
conclusion. (1846: 88)
Instead of combining a number of reasons of the same type (i.e., a number
of testimonies, signs or instances), it is also possible to produce a stronger
argument by combining different types of reasons. A second type of linkage
(implicitly) distinguished by Whately consists of a combination of dif-
ferent types of reason, where the one reason is a means of showing that
specific objections against the other reason (that there are certain
exception-making circumstances to the general rule or warrant under-
lying that reason) are not valid:
the a priori Argument and Example support each other, when used in conjunction
[. . .]. A sufficient Cause being established, leaves us still at liberty to suppose that
there may have been circumstances which will prevent the effect from taking place; but
Examples subjoined show that these circumstances do not, at least always, prevent that
effect. (1846: 138)
From his discussion of issues related to the burden of proof (112), it becomes
clear that Whately also allows for the possibility of putting forward more
reasons than are required, so as a result the defense as a whole consists
of a number of independent reasons. If the arguer has the presumption,
then the burden of proof belongs with the other side and putting forward
further evidence in support of the presumption amounts to giving an
argument ex abundanti (a superfluous argument).
It is a point of great importance to decide in each case [. . .] on which side the Presumption
lies, and to which belongs the [onus probandi] Burden of Proof. For though it may often
be expedient to bring forward more proofs than can be fairly demanded of you, it is always
desirable, when this is the case, that it should be known, and that the strength of the
cause should be estimated accordingly. (1846: 112)
5
So, there is nothing against doing this, provided it is made clear to the
opponent that one is doing more than required.
The early textbooks
American textbooks on argumentation and debate that started appearing
in the 50s to a large extent reflected the traditional views on argument
structure. But there were also a number of new developments. Modern
tradition has it that Monroe Beardsley (1950) was the first to represent
the structure of argumentation by using diagrams (consisting of numbered
statements and arrows indicating support relationships). Beardsley also intro-
duced part of the terminology that is still used by informal logicians to refer
to the different argument structures. He gives the following definitions:
In a convergent argument, several independent reasons support the same conclusion
[. . .] In a divergent argument, the same reason supports several conclusions [. . .] A
serial argument contains a statement that is both a conclusion and a reason for a further
conclusion (1950: 19).
Thomas claims credit as the first to distinguish between linked and con-
vergent arguments rather than as others have thought, Beardsley:
The distinction between linked and convergent inferences was not drawn by Beardsley,
not even in his fourth edition of Thinking Straight. It was introduced in the 1973 edition
of PRNL [Practical Reasoning in Natural Language]. Beardsley represented linked and
convergent inferential relationships alike, using multiple arrows for (what I call) linked
relationships, as if all reasoning with multiple reasons were convergent (except that this
distinction did not exist in his system). The concept of linked reasoning, and the distinction
between it and convergent reasoning, needed to be added to Beardsleys system of analysis
before it could be generally applied at all (1986: 457)
As far as the terminology is concerned, this seems to be correct, but similar
distinctions between interdependent and independent reasons were already
made before 1973. One example is Mills (1968), who makes a distinction
between cases where there is one conclusion with several coordinate
reasons and cases where one has one conclusion supported by two or more
pairs of coordinate reasons. The latter type of structure is more likely to
be a case than an argument. An example of the first type of structure is:
Conclusion: Our top debaters are top scholars
Reasons:
1. They are John, Mary, and Jim.
2. John has a 3.9
3. Mary has a 3.8
4. Jim has a 3.7
Mills (1968: 182183)
An example of the second type of structure, according to Mills, would be
a case on a value proposition where each pair of reasons consists of a
criterion and its application.
6
Mills also introduces a diagram convention
for making the distinction between these two types of structures (1968: 183).
From his examples, it becomes clear that Mills does make a distinction
between arguments with a structure comparable to a linked argument (the
first type) and a structure which is comparable to a convergent argument
(the second type, where each pair of reasons taken together constitutes an
independent reason).
Just as in the classical and enlightenment tradition, for most of the earlier
textbook authors, the distinction between interdependent and independent
reasons coincides with the distinction between the structure of premises
in a deductive argument and the structure in an inductive (or non-deduc-
tive) argument.
The distinction then is that in a deductive argument the premises need
to be taken together to constitute a reason, whereas in an inductive argument
a combination of reasons is needed to make the conclusion (more or less)
probable. McBurney, ONeill and Mills (1951) explain that a combination
of (inductive) analogies may strengthen the support for a conclusion:
From a series of analogies showing the success of a certain project, we argue that it
will be successful in a particular case. [. . .] Reasoning from analogy becomes increas-
ingly strong as the number of comparisons is increased, or in other words, as the analogies
are cumulated (1951: 108)
And Ray and Zavos (1966) explicitly compare deductive arguments to a
chain of links, and contrast this with the more gradual type of support
supplied by induction and arguments from circumstance:
7
Deductive reasoning is often compared to a chain. The last link in the chain is depen-
dent not to some degree but totally on the connection of every other link. [. . .] Induction
and argument from circumstance can be better compared to the relation of the legs of a
table to the tabletop. Each leg, though cooperating with the others, supports the top
independent of the other legs (at least to a point). (1966: 101)
In the early textbooks, the tradition of the classical theory of stasis, in which
it depends on the requirements of proof that the arguer must meet what
the resulting structure of his argument is, is also preserved. A good example
of a textbook in which the latter approach is taken is Windes and Hastings
Argumentation and Advocacy (1965).
According to Windes and Hastings, the issues an advocate needs to prove
in order to establish the guilt of X in an embezzlement case are:
1. Certain property was misappropriated.
2. X misappropriated the property.
3. The misappropriation was fraudulent, i.e., without the consent of the owner.
4. The property was for the personal use of X (1965: 75).
In such cases, the issues taken together form one linked argument and the
advocate has to provide sufficient evidence for each of the issues:
Usually there is one over-all argument leading directly to the proposition, and the elements
of this argument are further supported by sub-arguments. The over-all argument states
the issues and the sub-arguments are contentions in support of the issues [. . .] Each
one of the issues must be established for the proposition [X is guilty of embezzlement]
to be established. If any issue is not proved, then the proposition is not proved (1965:
215216).
The task of the opponent (the negative advocate) is easier: The other party
can logically defeat the proposition by defeating one of these issues (1965:
232).
Apart from cases where the advocate needs to put forward a number
of interdependent reasons (corresponding to the issues) in order to defend
the proposition, Windes and Hastings also discuss the possibility of con-
structing an argument with independent lines of reasoning:
Another aspect of case building to note is that independent lines of reasoning may lead
to the same conclusion. We may, for example, use three reasoning processes to support
the conclusion the corn crop of Dullnia is failing.
1. Dulnia is buying corn on the world market. (Reasoning from effect to cause.)
2. The testimony of an agricultural expert who visited Dullnia. (Testimonial evidence.)
3. The presence of drought and poor growing conditions this year. (Cause to effect).
In this series of arguments, rather than having a clear set of issues to be established, the
proof of the proposition depends on the number and plausibility of the component argu-
ments. In such cases, one strong one may be sufficient, but the more independent argu-
ments which lead to the same conclusion, the more probable is that conclusion. (1965:
216218)
For Windes and Hastings, two criteria seem to be relevant in determining
whether arguments are interdependent or not: (1) whether the arguments
given by the arguer form part of a clear set of issues that should be estab-
lished (the burden of proof-criterion), and (2) whether the argumentation
as a whole is based on one reasoning process or whether the arguer uses
different reasoning processes (the different types of argument-criterion).
3. CURRENT APPROACHES
Since the 70s, a large number of textbooks have appeared in which it has
become customary to devote attention to analyzing the structure of argu-
ments and to ways of portraying this structure in a diagram. With the
exception of van Eemeren and Grootendorsts (1992) pragma-dialectical
textbook, all these books are written by informal logicians. It is not until
the 90s that the subject of argument structure starts receiving a more
theoretical treatment. In the journals Informal Logic and Argumentation, the
distinctions made by informal logicians between different types of struc-
ture are discussed. Also, three monographs on argument structure appear,
each of which proposes a dialectical approach to argument structure.
Since most of the discussion has centered on problems involved in the
distinction between linked and convergent arguments, I shall restrict my
further discussion of the literature to these two types of structure.
The textbook distinctions
Thomas (1986, 1st edition 1973) was the first to use the terms linked
and convergent in describing interdependent and independent premise
support, and his way of portraying these two structures has become standard.
Although Thomas has had a large influence on all later informal logic
accounts of argument structure, his own definitions of these two types of
structures are different from those of many of the other authors. Whereas
most informal logicians continue the tradition of associating linked argu-
ments with deductive reasoning and convergent arguments with inductive
reasoning (or other types of non-deductive reasoning), Thomas deviates from
this tradition:
The natural-logic concept of linked inference [. . .] bridges the supposed sharp line of
the traditional induction-deduction dichotomy, severely straining [. . .] the traditional theory
that induction and deduction comprise two completely different kinds of inference
[. . .] Both of these supposedly different types of reasoning receive identical diagram-
matic representations. (1986: 461)
Thomas gives the following definitions of linked and convergent rea-
soning:
When a step of reasoning involves the logical combination of two or more reasons, they
are diagrammed as linked. (1986: 58)
When two or more reasons do not support a conclusion in a united or combined way,
but rather each reason supports the conclusion completely separately and independently
of the other, the reasoning is convergent. (1986: 60)
8
Both deductively valid reasoning and inductive reasoning from several
similar items of evidence are analysed as linked by Thomas. In the case
of inductive reasoning, the reason for linking the premises is not that each
reason separately does not give any support to the conclusion, but that
the support is stronger when the reasons are combined (1986: 59).
Linked arguments form one single argument, whereas convergent argu-
ments consist of separate arguments:
9
A convergent argument is equivalent to separate arguments (or evidence coming from
separate areas) for the same conclusion. (1986: 61)
The closest formal approximation to the natural-logic portrayal of convergent inference
would perhaps be two separate deductions leading to two different tokens of the same con-
clusion. (1986: 459)
For this reason, convergent arguments are less vulnerable than linked
arguments to criticism of the acceptability of their premises:
An important feature of convergent reasoning is that the support given to the conclu-
sion by each separate reason, or line of reasoning, would remain unaffected even if the
other [. . .] reason(s) were false. (1986: 61)
10
Pinto and Blairs (1993) definitions closely resemble Thomas distinction
between linked and convergent arguments. They make a distinction between
a group of premises that together form one inference and independent
groups of premises which can be seen as parallel inferences to arrive at
the same conclusion:
What makes for groups of premisses which are independent of each other? The fact that
the premisses work in combination to support the conclusion constitutes them as a set
or group, and the fact that the premisses of each group are able to provide their support
without any help from premisses in any other group make them independent of each
other (1993: 77).
From their examples it becomes clear that just like in Thomas approach,
a premise group may both consist of premises that deductively entail the
conclusion, and of premises that taken together make a conclusion likely
or plausible (1993: 111).
Independent groups of premises should be evaluated separately for
inference strength:
you should consider each independent group separately and try to judge how strongly
its premisses taken together are linked to the conclusion (109).
Even though independent groups of inferences (or parallel inferences)
are to be evaluated separately, they are linked up by Pinto and Blair when
diagramming their structure. This becomes clear from step three in their
diagramming method:
Step 3: Make a full diagram showing all the inferences in the reasoning. In doing so,
link up any [. . .] parallel inferences (1993: 260)
Pinto and Blair do not specify what the consequences are for the overall
evaluation if one of the groups of premises provides strong support, but
the other weak. The fact that they link parallel inferences in the diagram-
matic representation, however, suggests that they think that the groups of
premises should be assessed in combination in evaluating the overall
strength of the argument.
Whereas Thomas and Pinto and Blair analyze both deductive and non-
deductive arguments as linked, Goviers (1992) distinction between linked
and convergent support more or less coincides with the distinction between
deductive and non-deductive arguments, albeit that she also considers
analogies as linked:
In most deductively valid arguments, and in analogies, the support provided by the
premises is linked, not convergent. There are exceptions, as when a person offers two
separate premises, both of which deductively entail the conclusion, but this is quite rare.
There are arguments in which support is convergent and in which the premises do not
entail the conclusion nor support it by analogy [. . .] These arguments we call conduc-
tive arguments. [. . .] Some philosophers have referred to these arguments based on
separately relevant factors as good reasons arguments. The relevant factors provide reasons
for the conclusion, though they do not deductively entail it. (1992: 308309)
Linked arguments are thus deductions or analogies, and convergent argu-
ments are non-deductive (i.e. conductive) unless they consist of two
premises that each deductively entail the conclusion, but, according to
Govier, One might also insist that such a case represents several argu-
ments all with the same conclusion (1992: 356).
11
As soon as a premise can be seen as separately relevant, the argument
is analyzed as convergent by Govier, even if the premises need to be taken
together to provide sufficient support to the conclusion. But analyzing an
argument as convergent has no further consequences for the evaluation: It
is not the case that each of the premises should then be separately assessed.
Govier claims that the separate premises in a convergent argument should
always be treated as a unit:
12
There are [. . .] two basic facts to understand right now about the way in which premises
support conclusions. First, premises should be considered together in their support. Second,
they may be linked or convergent. In the latter case, it would be possible to see each
premise as providing a separate reason or separate bit of evidence, in support of the
conclusion, but the whole argument requires us to think of these separate strands together,
as the weight of support accumulates. (1992: 48)
Groarke, Tindale and Fisher (1997) and Copi and Cohen (1990) give similar
definitions as Govier of linked and convergent premises.
13
Groarke, Tindale
and Fisher make the distinction in the following way:
Linked premises work together. Taken independently, they do not support the arguments
conclusion. Convergent premises do not require each other, for they support the conclu-
sion independently of the arguments other premises. (1997: 35)
If all of the premises but one of a convergent argument were to be taken
away, we would have a weaker argument, but the premise would still
provide some evidence for the conclusion. None of the premises requires
one of the other premises for this to be the case (1997: 36). In other
words, the premises are independent in the sense that they are separately
relevant, that is, lend some support to a conclusion by themselves.
According to Copi and Cohen, premises depend on each other if each
premise supports the conclusion through the mediation of the other premiss
(1990: 20). If one of two interdependent premises were true, but the other
not, the conclusion would have been given no support at all (20). Two
premises support a conclusion independently if each supplies some warrant
for accepting the conclusion and would do so even in the absence of the
other premiss. (1990: 19). How independent are the arguments then in a
convergent argument, according to Copi and Cohen? Do they consider them
as separate arguments for the same conclusion, as Thomas does? This is
not the case:
Emerging practice is to say that it is one argument with two independent premisses. The
principle seems to be that the number of conclusions determines the number of arguments.
So by a single argument is meant an argument to a single conclusion, regardless of
how many premisses are adduced in its support. (1990: 1920)
However, this remark does not really clarify what exactly Copi and Cohen
mean by independent premises, since they now introduce a new crite-
rion for the singleness of an argument: the number of conclusions instead
of the probative force of the individual reasons.
Johnson and Blair (1994) use a different definition of single argument
than Copi and Cohen: they speak of a single argument if it contains one
premise set and one conclusion (1994: 37). Premises belong to one set,
if they are relevant in combination (p. 36). Convergent arguments consist
of a combination of two or more premise sets, and therefore of a combi-
nation of arguments:
When there are, in effect, two or more distinct independent grounds for a conclusion, think
of each ground as a separate argument. (1994: 38)
Convergent arguments can typically be found in a case, which consists
(minimally) of arguments for the claim and arguments against the claim
(1994: 247). Each distinct argument for a claim is called a line of
argument. In cases where the premises constitute several independent
lines of arguments, the relevance is checked for each premise individu-
ally, but the sufficiency of these premises should be established by
considering them as a whole:
Check the premises individually for relevance. [. . .] Finally, check for sufficiency: Do
the premises, taken together, satisfy the sufficiency requirement? Do they provide enough
support for the conclusion? (1994: 269)
From this comparison of informal logical approaches to argument struc-
ture, a number of differences emerge. For Thomas, premises are
interdependent both when no premise separately lends any support to the
conclusion, whereas the combination of premises does and when each
premise separately provides some support to the conclusion, but the com-
bination of premises forms a stronger argument than each premise by
itself. Both deductive and non-deductive arguments consisting of premises
whose separate support is too weak for them to stand on their own are
analyzed as linked by Thomas. Only if each reason alone would be enough,
if true, to support the conclusion, and if the falseness of one reason would
not weaken a step of reasoning from the other to the conclusion, the rea-
soning may be regarded as convergent. Linked arguments are seen as
equivalent to one single argument, whereas convergent arguments are
regarded as a combination of single arguments, which should be sepa-
rately evaluated for their strength of support. Pinto and Blair seem to employ
similar definitions of linked and convergent arguments as Thomas. They
also think independent groups of premises should be assessed separately for
their strength of support, but they are less clear as to how these separate
assessments should be used in the overall evaluation of an argument.
Other authors (such as Govier, Copi and Cohen, and Groarke, Tindale
and Fisher) employ a more restricted definition of interdependency:
Arguments are interdependent only when they are separately irrelevant to
the conclusion and relevant in combination. As soon as premises can be
seen as separately relevant (as providing some support to the conclusion),
they are considered to be independent, and thus convergent. This is also
the case if they can only in combination lend sufficient support to the
conclusion. To the evaluation of whether the amount of support the premises
lend to the conclusion is sufficient, it makes no difference whether the
premises are independent or interdependent in these approaches: they are
always considered together in their support during the evaluation.
Johnson and Blairs position seems to be intermediate: on the one hand,
just like Thomas and Pinto and Blair, they consider convergent arguments
as separate arguments. On the other hand, they claim that the sufficiency
of support should always be assessed by checking whether the different
premises (or reasons) taken together provide sufficient support for the
conclusion. It is unclear in their approach what the consequences would
be for the evaluation of the argument as a whole if one of the lines of
argument would be flawed but one or more of the other arguments would
prove to be acceptable.
15
In Johnson and Blairs view, the question of
whether an argument is single or convergent is only important for deter-
mining whether one should take the premises together in determining their
relevance, or whether each premise should in principle be relevant by
itself. The singleness or complexity of an argument does not make any
difference to the evaluation of the strength of the argument: in either case,
the premises are considered as a whole. Although Johnson and Blair observe
that convergent arguments are typical of a case, in which one should
respond adequately to relevant objections, they do not devote any atten-
tion to the connection between the burden of proof and the argument
structures that result from arguers attempts to fulfil their obligations.
Although at first sight the definitions given by van Eemeren and
Grootendorst (1992) seem to resemble the definitions provided by Thomas,
Johnson and Blair and Pinto and Blair, there is an important difference: both
the equivalent of a linked argument (coordinatively compound argumenta-
tion) and the equivalent of a convergent argument (multiple argumentation)
are seen as forms of complex argumentation consisting of a number of single
argumentations:
Analytically, complex argumentation can always be broken down into single argumen-
tations. (1992: 73)
The distinction between coordinative and multiple argumentation is there-
fore not that coordinative argumentation describes the relations between
premises within one single argument and that multiple argumentation
consists of a combination of single arguments, but that the relations between
the single arguments that constitute these two types of complex argument
are different. In multiple argumentation, the constituent single argumen-
tations are, in principle, alternative defenses of the same standpoint (1992:
73). In coordinatively compound argumentation, unlike in multiple argu-
mentation, all the component single argumentations are, in principle,
necessary for a conclusive defense of the standpoint (1992: 77).
In pragma-dialectics, unlike in most informal logical approaches, coor-
dinatively compound argumentation always consists of a combination of
(independently relevant) arguments, that nonetheless need to be taken
together for reasons of sufficiency. Coordinatively compound argumenta-
tion is therefore comparable to the concept of a convergent argument in
the definitions given by Govier, Groarke, Tindale and Fisher and Copi
and Cohen. The premise structure of a single argument is not dealt with
by van Eemeren and Grootendorst in the context of argument structure.
Premise structure is seen as an issue of a different hierarchical nature than
argument structure. Each separate argument in a coordinatively compound
argumentation can be analyzed as a single argument, consisting of two
premises, one of which is usually left unexpressed.
16
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst give the following two examples to
explain the difference between the two structures. Example (1) is an example
of a multiple argument; example (2) of a coordinative argument:
(1) Postal deliveries in Holland are not perfect. You cannot be sure that a letter will be
delivered the next day, that it will be delivered to the right address and that it will
be delivered early in the morning. (1992: 73)
(2) Postal deliveries in Holland are perfect. You can be sure that a letter will be deliv-
ered the next day, that it will be delivered to the right address, and that it will be
delivered early in the morning. (1992: 77)
In example (1), each of the single argumentations is in principle sufficient
to defend the standpoint. What would be the reason for an arguer to produce
multiple argumentation if one single argument might have sufficed? Van
Eemeren and Grootendorst mention the following possible reasons:
It is possible that the speaker tries to cater for various kinds of doubt about his stand-
point, pertaining to different aspects. [. . .] Multiple argumentation can also be used for
rhetorical reasons: the profusion of arguments makes the defense appear stronger. The
speaker gives the impression of having taken account of every possible objection to his
standpoint. [. . .] Because acceptance is liable to gradations, in producing a multiplicity
of arguments the speaker may gradually overcome the last remaining morsel of doubt
in the listener. It may also simply be that after one argument the speaker advances
another quite different sort of argument in the hope that it will be more successful.
(1992: 74)
In example (2), the three argumentations that support the standpoint that
postal deliveries in Holland are perfect are interdependent: Only if they are
taken together, they are deemed to provide sufficient grounds for accepting
the standpoint. If [any] of the single argumentations proves to be unac-
ceptable, the entire coordinatively compound argumentation falls apart
(1992: 77).
The main reason given by van Eemeren and Grootendorst for putting
forward a coordinative argument is :
in many cases, it is not possible to remove all the antagonists doubts by means of one
argument. When defending his standpoint, the protagonist then has to advance two or more
connected arguments that, only when taken together, are supposed to constitute a well-
rounded and conclusive defence. (1992: 77)
Each individual argument (or reason) in a coordinative argumentation gives
some partial support to the standpoint, but the degree of support per
argument may vary:
Although the term coordinative may suggest that the argumentation consists of a series
of arguments that are equally important, this need not be so. It is, for instance quite possible
for one argument to account for, say, 60% of the cogency of the argumentation, the next
for 10%, and the third for 20%.
Apart from the fact that the concept of argument structure applies to
combinations of single arguments in van Eemeren and Grootendorsts
approach, a second difference with the informal logicians approach is
that they explicitly connect argument structures with the dialectical situa-
tion: it depends on the antagonists doubts and the way the arguer attempts
to deal with these doubts what the resulting structure of his argument will
be. In this respect, the pragma-dialectical approach can be seen as a con-
tinuation of the functional aproach of the theory of stasis and debate.
Theoretical approaches
In the 1990s, three monographs on argument structure appeared: Freemans
(1991) Dialectics and the Macrostructure of Arguments, Snoeck
Henkemans (1992) Analysing Complex Argumentation and Waltons (1996)
Argument Structure; A Pragmatic Theory. What these three approaches have
in common are, first, dissatisfaction with the unclear and ambiguous way
in which the concepts of independent and interdependent arguments have
been defined in the literature, second, the aims of arriving at more precise
definitions and giving a functional justification of structural distinctions
by means of a dialectical approach. Whereas Freeman and Snoeck
Henkemans each propose a dialectical model of argument structure, Waltons
contribution mainly consists in a critical discussion of the existing defini-
tions and tests for deciding whether an argument is linked or convergent.
He supports the dialectical approaches to argument structure, and introduces
a new system of diagramming argument structure.
Freemans (1991) thesis is that argument structures should be analyzed
as the results of argumentative processes, i.e. of challenger-respondent
dialogues.
17
His approach to argument structure is to a large extent based
on the procedural model introduced in Toulmins The Uses of Argument
(1958). In Freemans view, a theory of argument structure should provide
a clear-cut demarcation of argument structures. Such a theory should provide
a rationale for distinguishing different types of argumentative elements and
structural configurations (1991: 37).
In his endeavor to provide such a rationale, Freeman takes the basic
dialectical situation as a starting-point: a respondent develops an argument
in response to the questions of a challenger. The situation is dialectical,
and not merely dialogical, if the challengers questions are aimed at criti-
cally testing the claim and if the whole interactive process is clearly
regimented.
In the basic dialectical situation, the challenger can ask three types of
basic dialectical or argument generating questions: acceptability ques-
tions, relevance questions and ground adequacy questions. Each of these
questions calls for a specific elaboration of the argument by the respon-
dent and results in a different type of argument structure.
18
Linked and convergent argument structures (as well as other types of
argument structure) are analyzed as answers to different types of dialec-
tical questions: a linked structure is the result of the respondents answer
by means of a relevance explaining premiss (9394) to the question
of relevance (Why is that reason relevant to the claim?). A convergent
structure results from the arguer giving more evidence for the conclusion
in response to a ground adequacy question (Can you give me another
reason?) (95). Then, the result of the exchange is an argument with premises
that are each independently relevant to the conclusion.
For Freeman, linked structure is exclusively connected with the question
of relevance: premisses are linked when we need to take them together
or they are intended to be taken together to see why we have a relevant
reason for the conclusion (1991: 94) According to Freeman, the source
of confusion in the definitions of linked structure in most textbooks is the
lack of clarity as to whether the arguments are linked because each of the
premisses by itself is irrelevant to the conclusion, or because each of the
premisses by itself provides insufficient support for it. In addition to the
normal concept of a linked argument, Freeman introduces a second type
of linkage, modal linkage. Freeman introduces a special notation for this
type of linkage. In this way, he thinks, we have a perspicuous way of
accomodating some intuitions of those who want to link, while still keeping
modality and relevance issues distinct (1991: 104). In modal linkage,
each premise constitutes a separate reason for the conclusion, but the pre-
misses only in combination lend sufficient support to the conclusion. Snoeck
Henkemans (1994) points out that it is questionable whether Freeman has
indeed succeeded in achieving his aim of clarifying the distinction between
linked and convergent arguments:
This solution merely adds to the confusion concerning the concepts of linked and con-
vergent structure: an argument can now be (modally) linked and convergent at the same
time. Another problem is that Freeman ignores the possibility that a convergent argument
consists of premisses that are not only separately relevant but also have sufficient weight
by themselves: in his approach, all convergent arguments are modally linked. Instead
of clarifying the distinction between linked and convergent arguments, his solution amounts
in fact to drawing a distinction between two types of linked argument. (1994: 320321)
Snoeck Henkemans (1992) gives a pragma-dialectical analysis of multiple
and coordinative argumentation as resulting from different types of defen-
sive moves aimed at removing different forms of criticism. This analysis
can be seen as an elaboration of van Eemeren and Grootendorsts (1984)
pragma-dialectical discussion procedure, in which different types of argu-
mentation are regarded as functional means to further the resolution of a
difference of opinion. Snoeck Henkemans (9293) develops a model in
which rules are given for responding to criticism. The type of criticism
and the way an arguer chooses to deal with this criticism determines the
form of complex argumentation that will arise in a discussion. When an
arguers attempt to get his standpoint accepted on the basis of an argument
meets with criticism, the arguer can use various types of argumentative
strategies to make his standpoint acceptable as yet. He can advance more
arguments to anwer the criticism, he can attempt to counter the criticism
with new arguments, or he can withdraw the original argument and under-
take a new attempt at defending the standpoint.
If the antagonist has criticized the argument for reasons of sufficiency,
the protagonist can attempt to remove the criticism by supplementing his
argument with another argument. This can be done in two ways. The pro-
tagonist can add one or more arguments that in combination with the
argument given earlier should suffice to convince the antagonist of the
acceptability of the standpoint (direct defense). The protagonist can also
refute the counterargument that has been used by the antagonist against
the original argument (indirect defense). Both types of defense result in
coordinative argumentation, but in the direct defense case the argumenta-
tion is called cumulative and in the indirect defense case it is called
complementary.
19
In both cases, the arguments that are put forward must
be combined, because the arguer can only convince the opponent of the
acceptability of the standpoint if he succeeds in removing the opponents
doubt, or criticism regarding the sufficiency of the argumentation.
In multiple argumentation, the only connection between the arguments
is that they are all advanced as a defense of the same standpoint. In a
completely externalized discussion, a protagonist who finds that he is not
capable of dealing with the antagonists criticism, may withdraw his
argument and undertake a new attempt to defend the standpoint. The
argumentation is then multiple in the sense that more than one attempt to
defend the standpoint has been undertaken, but the final result is in fact a
single argument. In an implicit discussion this is different. In anticipation
of a possible non-acceptance of his argument, the protagonist may advance
a new argument. Each of these arguments is a separate attempt to defend
the standpoint, and is motivated by the (potential) failure of a previous
attempt.
In his approach to argument structure, Walton (1996: xiv) proclaims to
use methods similar to Freeman (1991) and Snoeck Henkemans (1992), and
to take a pragma-dialectical approach, although some of his solutions will
be different. His main goals are to develop more refined guidelines for
identifying linked and convergent arguments and to rescue and refine the
technique of argument diagramming. Walton discusses numerous examples
of linked and convergent arguments and develops a classification and ter-
minology of the different tests used in the literature to determine whether
an argument is linked or convergent.
Walton discusses the following five tests (for simplicity, he applies
them only to two premise arguments):
1. Falsity/No Support Test: If one premise is false, the conclusion is not given any support.
2. Suspension/Insufficient Proof Test: If one premise is suspended (not proved, not known
to be true) the conclusion is not given enough support to prove it.
3. Falsity/Insufficient Proof Test: If one premise is false, the conclusion is not given
enough support to prove it.
4. Suspension/No Support Test: If one premise is suspended (not proved, not known to
be true), the conclusion is not given any support.
5. Degree of Support Test: reasons are dependent when together they make the overall
strength of the argument much greater than they would considered separately (1996:
119120, 127).
Whereas the first four tests are based on the idea of whether the conclu-
sion is given enough or any support to prove it and are thus absolutistic,
all-or-nothing kinds of tests (121), the Degree of Support Test is a matter
of degrees.
20
In order to determine which of these tests should best be used, Walton
thinks one should consider the purpose of distinguishing between these
structures, the evaluation of argumentation:
The critic needs to know whether it is necessary to refute both the [. . .] premises, or if
it is enough to find fault with just the one, in order for the whole argument to fall down.
[. . .] From this point of view, the pragma-dialectical viewpoint represented by the van
Eemeren and Grootendorst conception of the linked-convergent distinction is basically the
right one, because it is centrally concerned with the question of whether a set of premises
is sufficient for a conclusion, where sufficient means adequate to resolve the other partys
doubts in a context of a critical discussion. (1996: 175)
Walton adopts a functional interpretation of the linked-convergent distinc-
tion, meaning that it relates to how the premises of an argument function
together in supporting the conclusion in a context of dialogue (1996:
177). Seen from this perspective, the fact that there are many cases where
it is hard to determine whether an argument is linked or convergent are
not an indication that the linked-convergent distinction is vague or inco-
herent: it is possible to see why, in many cases, it is difficult or even
impossible to determine categorically whether the argument is linked or
convergent. The reason: there just isnt enough evidence given to enable
us to determine how the argument is being used in the given context
(178).
Waltons conclusion is that the Suspension/Insufficient Proof Test is
the best test in the sense that it is congenial to our pragmatic theory of
argument because of its frankly dialectical conception of an argument as
a dialectical exchange. According to Walton, this test is used by pragma-
dialecticians such as van Eemeren and Grootendorst and Snoeck
Henkemans. Applying this test is problematic, however, since it is extremely
difficult in practice to determine whether or not the support for a conclu-
sion is sufficient (180181). Moreover, the fact that this text contextualizes
the distinction between coordinative and multiple argumentation may be
positive in itself, but it also makes the test more difficult to apply in cases
where this contextual background is not available. In such cases, according
to Walton, the Degree of Support Test is most useful to determine whether
the argument can best be analyzed as linked or as convergent (1996:
179181).
Finally, Walton also proposes a new method of diagramming linked and
convergent arguments, the graph method:
The most important thing is to see that, by changing from the old notation to the graph
method, we are freed from always being forced to model an argument as either linked
or convergent. It is for this reason that the recommendation is made here that we should
move from the existing method of argument diagramming to the new method of
reasoning graphs (1996: 187).
21
4. METHODS IN THE ANALYSIS OF DOUBTFUL CASES
According to Snoeck Henkemans, (1992: 43), the problem of making a
choice between a linked or a convergent analysis of an argument, is not
simply caused by a lack of clarity in the definitions, but also by the lack
of information concerning clues in the verbal presentation. Van Eemeren
and Grootendorst (1992: 7585) are an exception: they mention a number
of words and expressions that can be indicative of coordinatively compound
and multiple argumentation. Examples of indicators of multiple argumen-
tation are: quite apart from, and then I havent even mentioned the fact
that, and needless to add that. Indicators of coordinatively compound
argumentation are: in addition to the fact, when it is also remembered
that, as well as the fact that.
Snoeck Henkemans (1992) adds three types of clues to van Eemeren
and Grootendorsts indicators of argumentative structure: pragmatic clues
in the way the arguer has presented the standpoint, dialogical clues in his
references to criticism, and dialectical clues following from the assump-
tion that he observes the procedural norms for a critical discussion,
specifically those norms that are related to the burden of proof.
22
Among
the pragmatic clues are expressions by means of which the arguer indi-
cates the force of his standpoint, and the quantifying elements in the
propositional content of the standpoint: they influence the burden of proof.
Among the dialogical clues are the arguers acknowledgements and refu-
tations of counterarguments. Among the dialectical clues are the procedural
norms pertaining to a critical discussion. One of them concerns the require-
ments an arguer should meet if his argumentation is to defend the
acceptability, or unacceptability, of a speech act; the other concerns the
requirements he should meet to justify the use of a particular argumenta-
tion scheme. These two types of requirement enable the analyst to determine
whether, in order to lend sufficient support to the standpoint, the argu-
ments that are advanced should be taken together, or whether they should
be taken to stand by themselves.
In cases where there is doubt as to whether an argument should be
analyzed as linked or convergent, informal logicians generally instruct the
analyst to apply the types of tests that have been classified by Walton (1996).
Groarke, Tindale and Fisher (1997) are an example:
If you have difficulty deciding whether you should join one premise P to another, ask
whether the support it provides for the conclusion depends on some other premise(s) (1997:
36)
Problems in deciding on the right structure of an argument are generally
attributed to a lack of clarity in the definitions, and the absence of clear
and decisive tests. According to Walton, when diagramming arguments,
there are many cases where there is room for more than one interpretation.
23
This leads to a pedagogical problem in argumentation courses, which is
compounded by the use of short contextual examples as arguments, con-
joined with the use of a test that appears to be precise, decisive, and
non-contextual (1996: 108). In a functional approach in which it depends
crucially on the context of dialogue how the structure of a given argument
should be analyzed, one should be prepared to accept that there will be cases
where there is not enough contextual evidence to enable a well-founded
decision (1996: 178). Apart from contextual evidence (evidence concerning
the type of dialogue, the stage of the dialogue and the burden of proof),
the analyst can make use of structural evidence (evidence of the type of
reasoning (deductive, practical) being used) and textual evidence (indi-
cator words, such as My one reason for believing is this, and my other
reason is that and This reason, taken along with my other reason [. . .]
shows that my conclusion is true), which give clues as to how the argument
is structured. Once all these types of evidence have been collected, the
relevant test can be applied as a fourth resource that may help in the iden-
tification of the argument.
Some authors propose a special policy for problematic cases. The policy
which both Thomas (1986) and Nolt (1984: 32) propose for doubtful cases
is to start with a linked interpretation. To Nolt, the main reason for
advocating this policy is that it is the most charitable: he thinks that in
borderline cases an argument is usually strongest if it is regarded as linked.
Thomas realizes that there may be situations where the policy might not
be to the advantage of the arguer:
Probably, you will want to separate reasons, and diagram reasoning as convergent, anytime
you suspect that one of the lines of reasoning is bad, while the other line of reasoning
is good (1986: 65)
Thomas justifies his approach by saying that it is in accordance with his
Principle of Charity: When unclarity exists, analyze reasoning in whatever
way it gives the greatest strength (1986: 89). Snoeck Henkemans (1992)
objects to this solution because she thinks that the analysis and the evalu-
ation of an argument are mixed up in this policy.
24
The question of whether
the arguers reasons are good or bad, only becomes relevant when the
argumentation is evaluated. In deciding on whether the argumentation is
best analyzed as convergent or as linked, a different issue is at stake:
The decision on whether to analyze the argumentation as linked or as convergent only
depends on the degree of support which the premisses, either separately or jointly, lend
to the standpoint, and should not be confused with an assessment of the acceptability of
the premisses (1992: 42)
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992: 8182) propose a policy, called the
strategy of maximally argumentative analysis, which is the converse of
Nolts and Thomas policy. In cases that cannot be decided on pragmatic
grounds, they advise to start by analysing the argumentation as multiple (i.e.
convergent). They motivate this strategy as follows:
By way of this strategy, all single argumentations are being given the greatest possible
credit [. . .] analyzing the structure as multiple can, at the same time, be called more
and less charitable than analyzing it as coordinative. It is more charitable, because in
multiple argumentation each individual argument is supposed to have its own, indepen-
dent argumentative force and, in addition, dropping one unacceptable argument does
not automatically undermine the whole argumentation. It is less charitable, because in
multiple argumentation, in principle, all the individual arguments must be separately
conclusive. More important than charity, however, is from a dialectical perspective that
the quality of each and every individual argument shall be examined critically (1992:
8181)
5. CONCLUSION
Two approaches to argument structure, the functional approach of the
classical theory of stasis (and of the debate tradition) and the logical
approach of identifying argument structure with different inference types,
have continued to exist until present. Dialectical approaches to complex
argumentation can be seen as a continuation of the tradition of viewing
argument structures as the result of an arguers attempts to deal adequately
with an opponents objections in a context of dialogue. Just as in clas-
sical status theory, it depends on the requirements the arguer should meet
to provide sufficient support for his standpoint (and thus on the dialogical
context) whether or not these arguments should be taken together, or seen
as separate, alternative defenses. In contrast with all informal logical
approaches (and with Freemans dialectical approach), argument structures
in pragma-dialectics are always analyzed as combinations of single argu-
ments. As a result, a large category of linked arguments dealt with by
informal logicians, i.e. those linked arguments that are equivalent to one
single argument, falls outside the scope of the pragma-dialectical treat-
ment of argument structures.
In informal logic, the logical tradition is still predominant. Informal
logicians are either concerned with describing different types of premise
structure within one (deductive or non-deductive) inference, or with dis-
tinguishing between arguments with one inference and arguments consisting
of a number of inferences, that is, with the distinction between single and
complex argumentation.
The definitions given in informal logic of the key concepts, linked and
convergent arguments, differ considerably. The guidelines that are given for
evaluating linked and convergent arguments also vary from author to author.
Authors who give a narrow definition of linked arguments, regarding only
premises as interdependent that need to be taken together in order to be
relevant, generally advise to always consider all the premises together when
evaluating the argument, regardless of the structure of the argument. In
this interpretation of argument structure, part of the rationale for making the
distinction between interdependent and independent arguments is lost. There
also seems to be a general (though unsupported) belief among informal
logicians that structures consisting of combinations of separate arguments
are extremely rare, and therefore not worth any serious attention. This belief
in itself may be traced back to the logical tradition where presenting more
than one independent proof is, generally speaking, superfluous. In the
context of our everyday discussions, however, one can rarely be sure that
a defense that should be conclusive will really convince our opponent and
one is often at the same time addressing several opponents with different
views. Presenting a number of arguments which would, if acceptable, each
provide sufficient support to the conclusion, may then often be the only
realistic option.
NOTES
1
A complex argument is an argument that consists of a number of single arguments for
a conclusion. A single or individual argument is the equivalent of a reason.
2
The Aristotelian sorites can also be analysed as a serial argument in support of the
major premise.
3
In his study of classical status theory, Braet (1984: 55) points out that classical rhetori-
cians seem to have had some idea of the difference in burden of proof for the defendant
and the prosecutor, but that they did not devote any systematic attention to this difference.
The emphasis was always on the defendant. Quintilian is an exception.
4
The same difference in obligations for the defendant and the prosecutor is found at the
sublevels of the argumentation. Cicero (De Inventione 2, 3233) points out that the prose-
cutor cannot just prove that the accused had a motive for his crime unless he also proves
that the character of the defendant is consistent with his having such a motive (and vice versa).
The defendant should show that the accused has never committed any offence, and this
argument will be strengthened if it can be shown that when he had an opportunity of doing
a dishonest deed with impunity he had no desire to do so (Cicero, De Inventione 2, 35).
5
In refuting an opponents argument though, one should be careful not to adduce much more
than is sufficient to prove ones conlusion, according to Whately, since otherwise ones
opponents may become distrustful (1846: 165).
6
Mills gives the following example: Installment buying is harmful if it encourages people
to live beyond their means, and it does so; it is harmful if it causes inflation, and it does
so, etc. (1968: 183)
7
Ray and Zavos (1966: 99) give the following definition of an argument from circumstance:
[It] is an argument in which a number of particulars are brought to bear on some point. It
is usually used to prove the occurrence of some past event.
8
According to Thomas, a more important criterion for the independency of premises is
that the falseness of one reason would not weaken the step from the other to the conclu-
sion than that each of them individually supports the conclusion: It is possible to have a
correct convergent diagram in which the result of combining the separated reasons would
(if this were done) be a stronger argument than either reason provides alone, as long as the
negation or falsity of the various separated reasons would not decrease the support given
by the other(s) to the conclusion. (1986: 62)
9
Yanal (1991: 139) gives a similar analysis of the distinction between dependent and
interdependent reasons: What [. . .] is the difference between dependent and independent
reasons? [. . .] Dependent reasons form one argument; independent reasons form multiple
arguments.
10
The idea that convergent arguments are less vulnerable than linked arguments is all myth
according to Conway (1991: 155): Even when premises clearly work together, we know
perfectly well that the falsity of one need not necessitate rejecting the entire argument.
With any sort of argument, when we find that one of the premises are false, we dismiss
the unacceptable premises and evaluate the support on the basis of those that remain. We
do not need a notion of convergent support to enable us to do this. Conway concludes that
we can very well do without the notion of convergence (156).
11
It is not clear to which category inductive generalizations belong in Goviers classifica-
tion.
12
According to Conway (1991: 148149), if individual relevance is the criterion for
convergence, the distinction does not correspond to our intuitions about the separateness
of premises. Moreover, an argument being convergent on this criterion cannot serve as an
instruction to evaluate each line of support separately or to evaluate the degree of support
of the premises for the conclusion in any other particular way. Conway concludes: if there
is any evaluative importance to the linked/convergent distinction, understood in this way, it
is not in the area of the degree of support premises give to a conclusion (149).
13
Similar definitions of linked and convergent arguments as Goviers are also given by
Kelley (1988: 687), albeit that he uses the terms additive and nonadditive premises.
Fishers (1988: 19) definition of independent arguments is somewhat different, since he
analyzes independent reasons as reasons that are intended by the author to lend conclusive
support to the conclusion by themselves: reasons may be presented as independently justi-
fying a conclusion so that if you accept one of the reasons the author expects you to
accept the conclusion. Nolts (1984) criterion for independence is ambiguous: on the one
hand he seems to consider arguments as interdependent if they form one inference, and
independent if they each constitute a separate inference; on the other hand he recommends
combining inferences to produce a single inference in cases where such a combined infer-
ence would make a stronger case (1984: 32). In this respect, his approach is more like Thomas
approach.
14
Vorobej (1995b) gives similar defintions as Govier (1992) and Copi and Cohen (1990),
but also introduces a third category of premise structure: the hybrid argument. In conver-
gent arguments, according to Vorobej, each premise, in isolation, is relevant to or provides
a reason in support of the conclusion (289). If a set of premises is relevant to the conclu-
sion, whereas no subset of the premise set is relevant to the conclusion, an argument is
linked (290). In hybrid arguments, the relation between the premises is asymmetric. One
premise (or premise set) is relevant on its own and another premise (or premise set) is not
relevant to the conclusion on its own. The latter premise (or premise set) supplements the
other premise (set): taken together, the premises provide a better argument for the conclu-
sion than the one relevant premise (or premise set) alone (292).
15
According to Conway (1991: 149), there are many authors who are unclear as to how
the evaluation of convergent arguments should take place: Remarkably, most who claim
that the linked/convergent distinction is important for evaluation say nothing about how to
evaluate convergent arguments.
16
Even though each coordinative argument is analysed as composed of a number of single
argumentations that each consist of two premises, one of which has been left unexpressed,
in reconstructing a coordinative argument, one combined unexpressed premise is made explicit.
This is done to make it clear that it is only in combination that the arguments are supposed
to lend sufficient support to the standpoint. For instance, in an example of a coordinative
argument that is provided by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992: 89), two single arguments
are given for the standpoint that The Telegraph is a good newspaper: 1. The Telegraph
contains facts, news and background information; 2. The Telegraph is a common-sense
newspaper. In the diagram of this argument the following unexpressed premise is made
explicit: A newspaper that combines quality with wisdom is good.
17
The basic ideas of Freemans approach were already introduced earlier, in an article in
Informal Logic (1985) and in his textbook Thinking Logically (1988).
18
Freeman thinks that there is independent confirmation for the fact that these questions
are central to any argumentative exchange, since they pertain to the three criteria for argument
appraisal distinguished by most informal logicians, they parallel Grices (1975) conversational
maxims and are also represented in Reschers (1977) challenging moves of formal disputa-
tion.
19
The terms cumulative and complementary stem from an unpublished manuscript of
Pinto and Blair. In this manuscript, they distinguish between three types of interdepen-
dency: linked premiss sets, cumulative premiss sets and complementary premiss sets.
Snoeck Henkemans (1992: 94) analyzes linked premiss sets (which consist of a minor and
a major premise) as single arguments. Explicitizing an unexpressed premise in response to
an arguers reaction is, according to her, only adequate in cases where there is a problem
concerning the comprehensibility, not the acceptability of the argument. Since all forms of
complex argumentation are seen by her as attempts to remove an opponents doubt or
criticism, and thus to resolve a problem concerning the acceptability of a given argument,
making explicit the unexpressed premise cannot result in complex argumentation. Cumulative
and complementary arguments are regarded by Snoeck Henkemans as two different ways
answering criticism of the sufficiency of one of the other arguments: if the attempt to
answer criticism consists of adding another argument that supports the standpoint directly,
the coordinative argumentation is cumulative. If it consists of a refutation of a counter-
argument, the coordinative argumentation is complementary (1992: 174). These two types
of support are reminiscent of Whatelys (1846: 88, 138) ways of combining arguments.
20
In the discussion of the informal logical distinction between linked and convergent
arguments, the tests that are used to identify linked and convergent reasoning are often subject
of discussion. According to Vorobej (1994), most authors propose isolation tests for linked
arguments (tests that require the analyst to find out whether the premises are relevant in
isolation, or whether they provide less support in isolation than taken together). The problem
with those tests is that (in a weak form) they yield the result that any argument with a
single irrelevant, superfluous premise is linked, and they do not classify all deductively
valid arguments as linked. The latter is the case because many deductively valid arguments
contain no premises which are independently irrelevant to the conclusion (149). Vorobejs
own alternative is to use an elimination test, which says that an argument is linked if the type
of (positive) support which its premises offer its conclusion would be weakened upon
elimination of at least one of its premises (1994: 151). On this test, every deductively valid
argument (with two exceptions) is linked, all analogical arguments are linked, and all argu-
ments positively corroborating hypotheses. The test classifies as convergent all conductive
arguments and inductive generalizations. Isolation-relevance tests are comparable to Waltons
Suspension/No Support Test and the Elimination test is similar to Waltons Degree of Support
Test. Vorobej acknowledges that his Elimination test cannot do justice to the idea that in a
linked argument all the premises must be considered together if we are to recognize a per-
suasive case for accepting the conclusion and that convergent arguments are equivalent
to, and ought to be treated as more than one single argument (156). However, he believes
such ideas are of questionable value insofar as they tend to generate accounts of the
linked/convergent distinction which seriously run the risk of undermining the significance
of that very distinction (157). This is because, according to Vorobej, convergent arguments
consisting of multiple arguments are extremely rare. (1994: 157).
21
Apart from the fact that I fail to see the advantage of not having to make a decision
between a linked or a convergent diagram, I do not think this is correct. Walton explains
that with the graph method, linked arguments all get the same number, while convergent
diagrams receive different numbers (1996: 187).
22
A difference between the indicators of multiple and coordinative argumentation mentioned
by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992) and the clues offered by Snoeck Henkemans, is
that the first type of clues indicate how the author intends the text to be understood, whereas
the second type of clues are clues about how reasons offered in support of a conclusion support
the argument according to the most charitable analysis.
23
Both Walton (1996) and Snoeck Henkemans (1992) mention a similar type of argument
of which it may be difficult to establish in practice whether it is linked or convergent.
Walton calls this type of argument evidence-accumulating(132-133), Snoeck Henkemans
cumulative coordinative argumentation. According to Snoeck Henkemans (1992: 175), it
is predictable that multiple argumentation will be particularly difficult to distinguish from
cumulative argumentation, because it is not always clear whether the arguer may be assumed
to anticipate that he will have to withdraw some of his arguments, or whether he may be
assumed to believe that the arguments he has advanced strengthen each other.
24
According to Vorobej (1994: 153), classifying arguments as either linked or convergent
inevitably involves adopting an evaluative point of view during the analysis. The objection
might therefore be raised that there is little point invoking a distinction between linked
and convergent arguments as an aid to argument evaluation if the distinction can be drawn
only after engaging in that very process of evaluation. But Vorobej thinks this objection is
not sound. Appraising an argument requires several stages. Therefore, the fact that some
distinction is drawn by employing evaluative concepts and adopting an evaluative point of
view does not preclude that distinction from serving a useful purpose in the evaluative
enterprise (153).
25
Vorobej makes a similar observation. He claims that determining whether an argument
is linked or convergent requires appraising the actual degree of logical support provided by
(various combinations of) the premises. Although this means that the linked/convergent
distinction does not operate purely at the descriptive level, the process of evaluation is not
over once the structure of the argument has been decided on, and the way one should go about
the evaluation also differs depending on the outcome of the analysis (1994: 153).
REFERENCES
Beardsley, M. C.: 1950, Practical Logic, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs NJ.
Beardsley, M. C.: 1975, Thinking Straight. Principles of Reasoning for Readers and Writers,
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs NJ.
Braet, A.: 1984, De Klassieke Statusleer in Modern Perspectief [The Classical Status Doctrine
in a Modern Perspective]. Wolters-Noordhoff, Groningen.
Cicero: 1968, Ad C. Herennium. De Ratione Dicendi (Rhetorica ad Herennium), Heineman,
London.
Cicero: 1968, De Inventione, Heineman, London.
Campbell, G.: 1776/1991, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (Lloyd F. Bitzer ed.). Southern Illinois
University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville.
Conway, D. A. : 1991, On the Distinction between Convergent and Linked Arguments,
Informal Logic 13, 145158.
Copi, I. M. and C. Cohen, 1990, Introduction to Logic, Eighth edition. Macmillan, New York.
Eemeren, F. H. van and R. Grootendorst: 1984, Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions.
A Theoretical Model for the Analysis of Discussions Directed towards Solving Conflicts
of Opinion, Foris: New York.
Eemeren, F. H. van and R. Grootendorst: 1992, Argumentation, Communication and Fallacies.
A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective, Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale NJ.
Fisher, A.: 1988, The Logic of Real Arguments, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Freeman, J. B.: 1985, Dialectical Situations and Argument Analysis. Informal Logic 7,
151162.
Freeman, J. B.: 1988, Thinking Logically. Basic Concepts for Reasoning, Prentice Hall,
Englewood Cliffs NJ.
Freeman, J. B.: 1991, Dialectics and the Macrostructure of Arguments. A Theory of Argument
Structure, Foris, Berlin/New York.
Govier, T.: 1992, A Practical Study of Argument, Third edition. Wadsworth, Belmont CA.
Grice, H. P.: 1975, Logic and Conversation, in P. Cole and J. L. Morgan (eds.), Syntax
and Semantics III, Academic Press, New York, 4158.
Groarke, L., C. Tindale and L. Fisher: 1997, Good Reasoning Matters! A Constructive
Approach to Critical Thinking, Second edition. Oxford University Press, Toronto/New
York.
Johnson, R. H. and J. A. Blair: 1994, Logical Self-Defense, McGraw-Hill, New York.
Kelley, D.: 1988, The Art of Reasoning, Norton, London.
Kennedy, G. A.: 1994, A New History of Classical Rhetoric, Princeton University Press,
Princeton NJ.
McBurney, J. H., J. M. ONeill and G. E. Mills: 1951, Argumentation and Debate: Techniques
of a Free Society, Macmillan, New York.
Mills, G. E.: 1968, Reason in Controversy, Second edition, Allyn and Bacon, Boston.
Murphy, J. J. and R. A. Katula: 1994, A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric, Hermagoras
Press, Davis CA.
Nolt, J. E.: 1984, Informal Logic. Possible Worlds and Imagination, McGraw-Hill, New York.
Pinto, R. C. and J. A. Blair: 1993, Reasoning. A Practical Guide, Prentice Hall, Englewood
Cliffs NJ.
Quintilian: 1969, Books I and II, Heineman, London.
Ray, J. and H. Zavos: 1966, Reasoning and argument: Deduction and Induction, in G. A.
Miller and T. R. Nilsen (eds.), Perspectives on Argumentation, Scott, Foresman and
Company, Chicago, Chapter 3, 51109.
Snoeck Henkemans, A. F.: 1992, Analysing Complex Argumentation. The Reconstruction
of Multiple and Coordinatively Compound Argumentation in a Critical Discussion, Sicsat,
Amsterdam.
Snoeck Henkemans, A. F.: 1994, Review of Freeman (1991), Argumentation 8, 319321.
Thomas, S. N.: 1986, Practical Reasoning in Natural Language. Third edition. Prentice-
Hall, Englewood Cliffs NJ.
Toulmin, S.E.: 1958, The Uses of Argument, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Vorobej, M.: 1994, The TRUE Test of Linkage. Informal Logic 16, 147157.
Vorobej, M.: 1995a, Linked Arguments and the Validity Requirement, Argumentation 9,
291-304.
Vorobej, M.: 1995b, Hybrid Arguments, Informal Logic 17, 289296.
Walton, D.: 1996, Argument Structure: A Pragmatic Theory, University of Toronto Press,
Toronto.
Whately, R.: 1846, Elements of Rhetoric: Comprising an Analysis of the Laws of Moral
Evidence and of Persuasion, with Rules for Argumentative Composition and Elocution,
D. Ehninger (reprint edition, 1963), Southern Illinois Press, Carbondale.
Windes, R. and A. Hastings: 1965, Argumentation and Advocacy, Random House, New York.
Yanal, R. J. : 1991), Dependent and independent reasons, Informal Logic 13, 137144.

The Structure of Argumentation

Diunggah oleh

Informasi Dokumen

Deskripsi Asli:

Hak Cipta

Format Tersedia

Bagikan dokumen Ini

Bagikan atau Tanam Dokumen

Opsi Berbagi

Apakah menurut Anda dokumen ini bermanfaat?

Apakah konten ini tidak pantas?

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

The Structure of Argumentation

Diunggah oleh

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

State-of-the-Art: The Structure of Argumentation

A. FRANCISCA SNOECK HENKEMANS

Anda mungkin juga menyukai