Malay Nationalism

the journal of policy history , Vol. 26, No. 2, 2014.
Donald Critchlow and Cambridge University Press 2014

doi:10.1017/S0898030614000050
a bdillah n oh
Malay Nationalism: A Historical
Institutional Explanation
In his tour of the Malay States on the east coast of the Malay peninsula in 1838,
Munshi Abdullah, a Muslim scholar, described an apathetic Malay polity,
where there existed all kinds of taboos between the ruler and the ruled and
that the Malay population could not criticise the unreasonable conduct of
kings without the risk of being sentenced to death.
1

Slightly over a hundred years later, in 1946, the Malay masses were
throwing their weight against their rulers in reaction to the British-proposed
Malayan Union. Te Malays felt that the Malayan Union would efectively
spell the end of Malay political dominance because it would grant non-
Malays citizenship status, employ equal citizenship rights, and revoke Malay
special status. By agreeing to the proposal, they felt, the Malay rulers had
short-changed Malay political rights.
2
Reacting to the event, Ayob Abdullah,
a political activist, reminded the Malay rulers of their responsibility toward
the Malay masses.
3
He also urged Malays to form political organizations since
they could no longer rely on their Rajas to defend their society.
4

Te transformation of the Malay masses from political apathy to political
activism surprised even the drafers of the Malayan Union. Edward Gent, the
main architect of the Malayan Union proposal, wrote to the State Secretary of
the Colonies expressing his surprise at Malays opposition to the Union,
saying the Malays showed considerable apprehension of any substantial
admission of non-Malays to citizenship rights.
5

What contributes to the transformation of the Malay masses from polit-
ical apathy to a determined and cogent portrayal of Malay nationalism in the
twentieth century? Was the show of Malay nationalism in 1946 an ad hoc
a bdillah n oh | 247
display? Or was Malay nationalism a product of a historical process that had
led to the transformation of the Malay polity?
Tis article attempts to answer these questions and will argue that Malay
nationalism was a result of the British colonial administrations inability to
remove completely de jure Malay power, even when the administration
managed to remove de facto Malay power. Tis inability to remove completely
Malay de jure power was due to the British fear that a complete dismantling
of Malay feudal structures would come at considerable fnancial and political
costs. However, it was this failure to remove Malay de jure power that set of a
path-dependent process, one where the colonial administration needed to
continue to factor in the Malay political presence within its policy calculations.
By factoring Malay de jure power, British policies created a self-reinforcing
process that not only engendered the development of Malay social and polit-
ical capacities but also created a network of Malay-based institutions that, in
aggregate, gave rise to Malay political expression.
By adopting the historical institutional tool, this article hopes to ofer a
new explanation to Malay nationalism. Indeed there have been many works
that provide historiographical description of Malaya and Malay nationalism.
6

Tough these works provide a good account of actors and issues involved in
Malay nationalism, they do not trace social, political, and economic processes
over the long term and do not place a premium on the fact that small policy
choices may add to building up a large outcome over a long period of time.
They either pay attention to specific Malay actors to explain nationalism
(Malay intellectuals, organizations) or pick historical moments to depict
Malay nationalism.
7
Take, for instance, one of the important works on Malay
nationalism by William Roff. Excellent as Roff s work is, the Origins of
Malay Nationalism is centered on one aspect of nationalism, one where new
social and political elite groups form the core of his analysis.
8
Rofs work
falls short of explaining the sources of the development of Malay political
expression. For instance, how is it possible that the twentieth century saw a
rapid growth of Malay elites? Also, what made the British administration
implement policies that favored the Malays in the earlier twentieth century
when such policies were clearly out of character with British liberal values?
More interestingly, what triggered the British change of policy toward Malays
in the twentieth century when none was put in place in the nineteenth
century? Why did the British allow the growth of the Malay intelligentsia or
later the growth of Malay organizations?
248 | Malay Nationalism
In arguing its case, I will highlight three critical episodes: the start of the
Pangkor Treaty and the murder of J. W. Birch, the formation of the Federated
Malay States (FMS), and the Malayan Union Proposal. Tese are important
episodes because they are attempts by the British administration, in varying
degrees, to manage resources and do away with existing Malay feudal
arrangements for purposes of economic imperatives.
In the first part of the article, I will discuss briefly the concepts that
are central to my argument; that is, path dependence and the nature of self-
reinforcing mechanism. Te second part will describe the Pangkor Treaty and
the murder of frst British Resident J. W. Birch, the formation of the Federated
Malay States, and the Malayan Union proposal. I will apply the concepts of
path dependence and describe the self-reinforcing process mechanism that
led to the growth of Malay political expression and nationalism. Te article
will conclude with some key points of and how path dependence could
help future works that attempt to understand Malaysias institutionalisation
process.
h istorical i nstitutionalism and p ath d ependence
A historical institutional analysis seeks to explain large outcomes, asks big
questions, and pays attention to historical process.
9
A historical institutional
analyst believes that detailed investigation of carefully chosen case studies
can provide a powerful tool for uncovering the sources of change.
10
A his-
torical institutional analyst also believes that institutional processes can best
be understood if they are studied over time.
11
Understandably, an integral
part of any historical institutional work is process tracing.
12
Indeed process
tracingalong with concepts like path dependence, timing, and sequence
helps ensure that historical episodes will be linked in a meaningful way before
they can offer explanation of a particular case.
13
In sum, historical institu-
tional work places a premium on context, historical moments, and processes
in order to understand policy outcomes.
As mentioned above, central to historical institutionalism is the concept
of path dependence. Path dependence has been increasingly employed to
explain political and social processes and forms a central tenet in major works
on state building.
14
Te term is open to various defnitions. Sewell defnes
path dependence as what happened at an earlier point in time will afect the
possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time.
15

Mahoney sees path dependence as specifcally those historical sequences in
which contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains
that have deterministic properties.
16
Levi perhaps provides a more lucid
description of path dependence when she describes that once a state has
started down a track, the costs of reversals are very high. Path dependence,
she says, entrenches certain institutional arrangements that efectively obstruct
an easy reversal of the initial choice.
17

Te above defnitions suggest that path dependence involves two things.
First, making that initial choice is important. Second, once a choice is made,
a self-reinforcing mechanism sets in where each step in a particular direction
makes it more dif cult to reverse course.
18
It is not that taking a reverse course
is impossible. Rather, the choice of reversal is increasingly dif cult because the
cost of reversal increases over time given actors investment on resources.
But what brings about path dependence and why do social, political, and
economic processes get stuck in a path-dependent mode? Perhaps two most
important works that deconstruct the logic of path dependence are those
carried out by economic historians Paul David and Brian Arthur.
19
Arthur,
for instance, suggests that path dependence is due to self-reinforcing mecha-
nisms. He describes four self-reinforcing mechanisms that encourage path
dependence: large setup costs, learning effects, coordination effects, and
adaptive expectations.
20
Simply put, the initial choice gets hard-wired within
an institutional setting and thus makes it harder for existing institutions to
adopt alternative technology.
21

Davids and Arthurs works have been extensively borrowed by political
scientists. Perhaps one of the best eforts at incorporating their works into
political science and public policy is the one carried out by Paul Pierson.
22
He
argues that the source of path dependence and self-reinforcing mechanism
lies in the nature of public good inherent in politics and public policy. He says
that the nonexcludable and nonrivalrous nature of public good gives rise to
the problem of collective action, opacity in political decisions, and the devel-
opment of institutional density that encourage self-reinforcing mechanisms.
Briefy, the collective-action problem refers to the inability of the political
market to arrive at an optimal decision as decisions in public policy are
based on the collective. Decisions are based on what each individual expects
others to decide for fear of choosing the wrong option. Tis fear to bet on the
wrong horse then encourages policymakers to adopt tried and tested solu-
tions rather than break away from institutions. As Pierson puts it, Despite
massive social, economic, and political changes over time, self-reinforcing
dynamics associated with collective action processespecially high start-up
costs, coordination efects, and adaptive expectationsmean that organiza-
tions will have a strong tendency to persist once they are institutionalised.
23

Te opacity in policy decision refers to the dif culty that policymakers
face in measuring policy outcomes. Public policy goals are more complex and
at times ambiguous. Given its complex nature, identifying and measuring
problems in public policy becomes problematic, making policy prone to inef-
ficiencies. Such complexity and opacity of policy only encourage actors to
keep investing in existing institutions, go for the tried and tested solution,
and adopt a path-dependent mode.
24
Institutional density refers to the per-
petuation of institutions as a result of path dependence. As North and David
point out, institutions bring about self-reinforcing mechanisms because
creating institutions involves high fxed costs, learning efects, coordination
effects, and adaptive expectations.
25
Institutions thus tend to make actors
invest in specialized skills, create mental maps over social and political realities,
and encourage the growth of networks with other individuals and organiza-
tions. Tis institutional density only encourages actors to adopt the chosen
path since any reversal would be costly.
Indeed Piersons argument ofers an interesting explanation to under-
standing British colonial policies and the resultant production of Malay political
expression. As I will demonstrate, British failure to completely remove Malay
power (due to fnancial and political costs) led to tried and tested solutions
that allowed for British de facto rule while at the same time it preserved Malay
de jure power. British policies that continued to factor Malay de jure power
then led to continued investment in institutions that further consolidated
Malay de jure power. Tis is well demonstrated in the British promotion of a
specialized Malay Administrative Service (MAS), British provision of Malay
education, and British allowance for the growth of Malay organizations.
In sum, this consistent factoring of Malay de jure power would then lead to
the growth of Malay nationalism.
t he s tart of b ritish r ule, j . w . b irch, and the r etraction
of m alay p olitical p ower
British policies in the early years afer the Pangkor Treaty of 1874 were critical
as they set the tone for future British policies with regards to indigenous power.
Te immediate years following the Pangkor Treaty saw the British adminis-
tration attempting to temper not only Malay de facto but, more important,
Malay de jure power. These attempts to retrench Malay political power,
however, ended up fulflling the British fear of incurring unnecessary costs
and led to the less-than-full retrenchment of Malay power. It forced the
administration to steer clear of removing Malay de jure power while at the
same time maintaining British de facto rule. The maintenance of Malay
de jure would then set of processes that, over time, resulted in the creation of
a Malay autonomous community with exclusive institutions.
Te British failure to assume complete control of the Malay States could
be due to several policy missteps. To start, the new British administration did
not have a clear blueprint on how to administer the Malay States.
26
Early
British of cers wrestled with the idea of how best to engage the old actors,
and this was made worse by the appointment of British of cers who had no
prior knowledge of the Malay States.
27
British of cers unfamiliarity with Malaya
was also not helped by the ambiguous nature of the Pangkor Agreement. Te
agreement refects an inherent tussle between efecting British rule and main-
taining Malay de facto and de jure power. On one hand, it seemed to keep
Malay political power as the terms of the treaty spelled out that the new gov-
ernment of the Malay States would be a government by advice. Tis efec-
tively meant that the British Resident would play a supporting role. On the
other hand, the Agreement also stipulated that the Malay ruler would have to
seek the advice of the British Resident and that the Residents advice must be
asked and acted upon on all questions other than those touching on Malay
religion and custom.
28
This clause effectively meant that the Residents
administrative power would far exceed that of the Malay ruler.
Such lack of know-how and ambiguity contributed to the mismatch in
expectations between British and Malay actors. For Peraks Sultan Abdullah
and the Malay Chiefs, the Agreement meant that Perak would only be pro-
vided with British advice and that the existing feudal arrangement would be
lef intact. Abdullah and other Malay rulers did not realize that the Pangkor
Treaty and the start of British administration would mean the beginning of a
process that would spell the end of the Malay feudal arrangement. British
of cials, however, had diferent expectations. For them, the Pangkor Treaty
meant the imposition of a new political and economic arrangement in place
of the old. To British of cials like Governor Jervois and Peraks frst Resident,
J. W. Birch, the agreement was viewed as a carte blanche to introduce a new
British system of administration.
Given such British expectations, British policy was geared toward redis-
tributing economic and political resources for purposes of economic devel-
opment that inadvertently involved managing Malayas signifcant actors.
Tis period saw Straits Governor William Jervois and Peraks frst Resident
J. W. Birch attempting to replace the Malay feudal arrangement, which was seen
as incompatible to British-style capitalism, to an administrative system that
would serve British economic imperatives. J. W. Birch introduced a new
administration and property rights laws. Literally overnight, Birch elimi-
nated the influence of Malay chiefs and denied their access to traditional
sources of revenue, which came from taxing resources under their territorial
control.
29
Under Birch, state revenue and expenditures were now handled
by British-appointed administrators. Taxes and charges on the use of river-
ways were now carried out by British appointed officers and police force.
To streamline revenue, Birch also imposed a unified taxation for opium,
spirits, and gambling administered by British appointed of cials.
However, it was Birchs fnal initiative to do away completely with Malay
feudal rule by annexing Perakwhich meant direct British rulethat marked
the British intention to fully dismantle Malay political presence. Birch was
murdered in November 1875, orchestrated by Malay chiefs and led by Sultan
Abdullah, the very prince who was the key fgure in initiating the start of British
rule. Birchs murder sparked political unrests in Perak. Te need to quell the
unrests came at a fnancial cost to the British government. Te crisis saw the
British government spending some 71,074 to bring peace to Perak.
30

Te Birch episode prompted the administration to scale back its eforts at
a major revamping of Malay administrative structures. Te Perak unrest sent
a reminder to the colonial administration of the costs involved in removing
completely Malay feudal rule.
31
It was increasingly evident to the British that
it would be best to maintain Malay de jure power while at the same time
assuming British de facto rule.
Britains new posture is evident from the numerous notes sent by the
Colonial Of ce to Straits of cers.
32
Te of ce called on the Straits Governor
to remind Residents to play the proper role of advisers, to work closely with
native rulers, and not to exercise too much discretion at removing the Malay
administrative system. Lord Carnarvon, for instance, was damning of Governor
Jervois for bypassing the colonial office by initiating a full annexation of
Perak. He wrote that the signal for resistance and attack was in opposition to
the whole tenor of my directions.
33

In 1878, the Straits Governor William Robinson asked the Selangor
Resident to reverse his decision to suspend a Malay State Council member,
reiterating that the residents have been placed in the Native states as advisers,
not as rulers. He warned residents that they would be held accountable
should trouble spring out due to their failure to assume the proper role as
advisers, not rulers.
34

British recognition of Malay de jure power is signifcant because it forced
the administration to continue to factor in the Malay political presence, even
when Malay de facto power continued to diminish. What this means is that
the colonial administration must continue to allow Malay rulers to assume
juridical power in state institutions even when British officials had a free
hand in dispensing economic resources and at times political resources. Put
diferently, the administration must continue to refer decisions to the state
council and the Malay rulers, even though these were ceremonial gestures. It
is this British need to constantly factor the juridical rights of Malay rulers that
allowed Malay rulers and Malays, through increased capacity building in the
coming years, to exercise their opinion and make demands. In the coming
years, Malays would make use of state instruments, introduced by the colo-
nial administration, to exercise their de jure status. Following Piersons (2004)
argument on institutional density and capacity building, British preservation
of Malay de jure power gave license to the growth of Malay social, economic,
and political capacities and the development of institutions that would pave
the way for growing Malay political expression. Tis linkage between Malay
de jure power and capacity building would be apparent in the coming years.
t he f ormation of the f ederal m alay s tates, i nstitutions,
m alay r ulers, and p an- m alay c onsciousness
Te formation of the Federated Malay States (FMS) in 1896 brought together
the states of Perak, Selangor, Pahang, and Negeri Sembilan under a common
administration. The FMS was meant to centralise control, lessen states
autonomy in order to protect the interest of new political and economic
actors.
35

Te FMS was yet another attempt by the colonial administration to further
diminish Malay de facto power. Under the new arrangement, a secretariat in
Kuala Lumpur would be headed by a Resident General, not the Malay rulers.
The Resident General would in turn report to the High Commissioner in
Singapore. The British Resident from each state would also report to the
Resident General. Te FMS also did away with the set of codes of individual
Malay states; under the new arrangement, there would be common legal,
taxation, and land-settlement codes.
36

Despite British eforts to consolidate de facto rule, the formation of the
FMS strengthened Malay de jure power. Te FMS introduced new institu-
tional arrangements that helped preserve Malay de jure power. One such
arrangement is the Conference of Malay Rulers. Te Conference represents
the paradox of British policy. It diminished Malay de facto power without
injuring Malay de jure power. Indeed, the Conference did not grant the rulers
legislative power; it merely served to remind the Malay rulers of their special
position within the administration.
37
It is through such instrument that
the Malay rulers started to voice their concerns on Malay development.
Tey used the Conference to voice displeasure over the marginalization of the
rulers executive and legislative role in running the state. At the second
meeting of the Conference of Rulers in July 1903, the Sultan of Perak, Sultan
Idris, commented on the confusion that came with the FMS centralization
efort, specifcally its power arrangement, saying that there cannot be two
masters to one vessel; neither can there be four Rulers over one country.
38
In
1905, Sultan Idris also complained that the new arrangement contravened the
Treaty of the Federation since it bypassed the authority of the Resident.
39

The FMS also created another instrument that consolidated British
de facto rule without injuring the Malay de jure positionthe Federal Council.
Formed in 1909, the council in efect was a council of all state councils
where policies that were deemed important to all states were now decided at
the federal level.
40
At the start, the Federal Council relegated further the posi-
tion of Malay rulers. In the Councils hierarchy, the High Commissioner was
made President of the Federal Council, not the Malay rulers. In fact, below
the High Commissioner was the Resident General. The four Malay rulers
only came afer the Resident General, and below them four unof cial members.
Tese unof cial members were drawn from European and Chinese business
interests. Whats more, these unof cial members were recommended not by
the Malay rulers but by the High Commissioner with the approval of his Majesty,
the King of England.
41

Te arrangement, however, was changed in the coming years. In a show
of growing confdence and political capacities, Malay rulers asked to be with-
drawn from the Federal Council. Tey argued that it was less dignifed for
them to be among other appointed commoners in the Federal Council. As a
result, an Upper House, similar to the House of Lords, was designed to
accommodate the Malay rulers. And in place of the Malay rulers in the Federal
Council, three unof cial Malay members were appointed to the house in 1927.
In the later years, Malay members like Raja Chulan and Dato Abdullah b.
Haji Dahan were active in voicing Malay issues, especially about education.
42

Another signifcant result of the FMS is that it gave rise to an unprece-
dented Pan-Malay consciousness. Te formation of the FMS with its atten-
dant institutions brought together the Malay rulers for the first time and
created an awareness of Malaya as a political entity.
43
Centralization
unwittingly encouraged the Malay rulers to approach issues from a Pan-Malay
perspective. Tis unprecedented level of cooperation was expressed by Frank
Swettenham, the Resident General, who said that so far, as I am aware no
Ruler of any of the four States had ever previously visited a neighbouring
Sultan with peaceful and friendly intentions.
44
Tis sentiment was echoed
by the Malay rulers. At the frst meeting of the rulers conference in 1897, the
Malay rulers expressed the signifcance of the ceremony saying that they are
met together for the frst time in history to discuss the afairs of the Malay
States.
45

More important, the formation of the FMS gave Malays a more orga-
nized platform to articulate social, political, and economic concerns. With
the FMS, the Malay rulers started to discuss issues that went beyond the
concern of their individual states. Tey started to voice displeasure over the
dilution of the executive and legislative role of Malay rulers and state councils.
In a visit to London in 1924, Sultan Iskandar of Perak met with the king and
British of cials from the colonial of ce and expressed his displeasure over the
FMS arrangement. He also wrote a memorandum to the colonial office
requesting that the original treaty (the Pangkor Engagement) should be
followed in its exact terms . . . and that the rulers should be treated as the
ruler with the Resident to carry out on his behalf and with his cooperation
policies decided upon in consultation with a stronger state council.
46
Te
demands made by the Malay rulers to reevaluate the Federal agreement were
heeded. In the year afer Sultan Iskandars visit to London in 1924, Governor
Guillemard made major changes to the federal arrangement. The new
arrangement provided more decision-making powers to Residents and State
councils.
47

Indeed, the creation of the FMS and attendant institutions in the twentieth
century helped concentrate Malay de jure power. Increasingly the colonial
administration continued to adopt policies that needed to factor in Malay
political consideration. Inadvertently, it created institutions that would lead
to the further development of Malay political and social capacities and the
formation of a dense Malay institutional network.
m alay e ducation p olicy
At the second Conference of Rulers in 1903, Malay rulers highlighted the
need for the administration to give priority to the Malay development agenda.
Te rulers recorded their unease at the socioeconomic underdevelopment
of Malays, pointing out that the formation of the FMS had encouraged the
increasingly alien and non-Malay character of government.
48

The rulers remarks prompted the colonial administration to address
Malay education and to make the provision of special facilities to instruct
Malays to become useful public servants.
49
Te concern gave rise to a report
on Malay education. Prepared by the Director of Education, R. J. Wilkinson,
the report proposed the setting of a residential school for the education
of Malays of good family, and for training of Malay boys for admission to
certain branches of the Government service.
50
The proposal was the first
comprehensive initiative that addressed Malay education. Prior to this, edu-
cation was not among the administrations list of top priorities.
51
Wilkinsons
proposal for a Malay education was initially met with a lukewarm response
by the High Commissioner, who has some doubts as to the ultimate success
of the scheme, but nevertheless he relented and agreed to provide for the
building of a school in 1905, but only as an experiment for three years.
52
Tis
reservation, however, proved unfounded. In the years to come, the school,
despite being highly underresourced, performed exceedingly well.
53

Te unexpected success of the school convinced British authority to
establish a permanent school. In 1909, the school was moved to a new site in
Kuala Kangsar and named the Malay College. In the coming years, the college
not only prepared Malay boys for administrative roles but also graduates who
would later serve in the Malay nationalistic struggle. Some of its famous grad-
uates include Ishak Mohd, who was instrumental in setting up the lef-wing
political party, the Kesatuan Kaum Muda (KMM), Tengku Ismail Tengku
Yasin, who set up the Selangor Malay Association, a political organization,
and Onn Jaafar, who would later found the United Malay National Organization
(UMNO).
Te schools success opened the way for more demands for Malay education.
However, there was a fear of Malay overeducation with of cials saying that
education might pose political risks. Tis fear was poignantly expressed by
R. H. Kenion, a state legislator, who said that the administration should
teach them [Malays] the dignity of manual labour so that they do not all
become Kranies (clerks) and I am sure you will not trouble which has arisen
in India through over education.
54

Despite such fears, the self-reinforcing nature of such a policy made
reversal not an option. In fact, the initial success of the Malay College only
raised expectations. It is not a surprise that the Malay College was followed by
the establishment of the Sultan Idris Training College (SITC) in 1922.
Te SITC is another case where the fnal outcome exceeded initial expec-
tations. At the start, the SITC was meant to be a vocational school. Te justi-
fication for a vocational school came from Richard Windstedt, who in a
report claimed that Malays were overeducated under the present curriculum
and that the bulk of the inhabitants must turn to agriculture and other
industries. Te Windstedt report then called for the removal of the ffh stan-
dard in Malay schools. In its place, the report recommended new modules in
drawing, horticulture, and basket making so as to teach Malays the dignity
of manual labour.
55
Te report warned that any ideal of education, not ad-
justed to local wants, must lead to economic dislocation and social unrest.
56

Windstedts initial objective, however, exceeded expectations. Te SITC
produced more than just vocational graduates. Instead of just producing hor-
ticulturalists, the college became a center for Malay literary activity. It drew
Malay students from across the peninsula and quickly became a meeting
place for bright Malay youths. The collegial atmosphere helped create a
common Malay consciousness and produced a Malay intelligentsia, some
of whom would go on to become leading scholars and national figures.
57

Prominent personalities associated with the college include Zainal Abidin
Ahmad or Zaaba, a prominent writer and scholar who headed the Translation
Bureau at the college until 1939. Another prominent graduate is Ibrahim
Yaacob, who would later found the Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM), a Malaya
radical nationalist party in 1938.
58
Te SITC graduates were also behind the
establishment of the popular Majaallah Guru, whose readership extended
beyond the teaching profession.
Te growth of Malay education coincided with increasing calls by Malay
leaders for more Malays to join the civil service. Tis was also aided by the
British administration announcement that measures be taken to freeze the
increase in the number of European of cers and to train and employ natives
and residents of the country in all subordinate positions in the service.
59

t he m alay c ivil s ervice
Recruitment of Malays into the civil service started in earnest only in 1910
with the introduction of the Malay Administrative Service (MAS)almost
forty years afer the Pangkor Treaty.
60
Together with the MAS, a Malay Proba-
tioner Scheme (MPS) was also introduced. The MPS was a recruitment
scheme where Malay boys were handpicked by Residents and enrolled in a
three-year program at the Malay College to take courses in correspondence,
treasury, and basic administration. Te best of these graduates would then be
placed under the newly introduced Malay Administrative Service (MAS).
61

Tese schemes came on the heels of a conjuncture of events; the formation of
the FMS, the increased calls by Malay rulers for more Malay administrators,
the emphasis on Malay education, and the need for local administrators due
to the recruitment freeze on British of cers.
Although having the MAS was a commendable start at increasing Malay
administrative capacity, it was never an equal of the elite Malayan Civil
Service (MCS). The MAS was described as a very junior branch of the
Malayan Civil Service.
62
Malay of cers played ancillary roles in the British
administration. Tese of cers mainly dealt with routine administrative tasks,
some confned to duties in rural areas, as settlement of cers in the land of ce,
or as Malay assistant secretaries. Promotion to the prestigious Malayan
Civil Service (MCS) was slow and remuneration was unattractive.
Despite the inferior nature of the service, the introduction of the MAS
paved the way for more Malay involvement in the civil service. Involvement
in the civil service raised expectations among Malay of cers and Malay rulers,
who expressed their unhappiness over the double standards between the
prestigious and exclusive nature of the MCS and the dismal incentive struc-
tures of the MAS.
63
In 1919, the High Commissioner pointed out the need for
more Malays in the civil service, saying more Malays need to take their
proper place in the administration and commercial life of these states.
64
In
1921, qualifed Malays were allowed entry into the MCS directly. In 1922, the
Malay role in the civil service took on greater momentum following the
Retrenchment Commission report. Te report came up with wide-ranging
policies that included giving preference to the appointment Malays to the
civil service. Te commission proposed that the proportion of Malays to local
born non-Malays in the civil service should ultimately be a ratio seven to
three.
65
Between 1921 and 1931, ten posts in the MCS were reserved for Malay
of cers. In 1923, British Residents of the FMS urged the government to absorb
more Malays into the Railways and the Postal and Telegraph Department.
66

In 1923, Guillemard, the High Commissioner, wrote to the Colonial Of ce
informing him that every efort is being made to bring forward the people
of the country to take part in the various departments of Government.
67
Tis was
in response to demands to include more Malays to the civil service. In fact, the
General Orders for the FMS specifed that Malays must receive preference in
flling all vacancies in the subordinate ranks of government employment.
68

Te demand for Malays to assume higher administrative posts took on
greater momentum in the 1930s. In a Federal Council proceeding in 1934,
Abdullah Dahan, one of the more vocal Malay representatives, made a
cutting remark that British policy on Malay civil service recruitment had not
gone far enough. Even though it was pleasing to see so many Malay peons,
Malay messengers, Malay punkah-pullers, Malay sailors, Malay police
constables and Malay gateman in the employment of railways, the Malays
also desire to have a fair share of the higher posts.
69

To sum up, institutions created in the twentieth century made the British
administration an accidental standard-bearer of Malay nationalism. Consistent
with the path-dependent argument, British policies raised initial expectations
that served only to raise more expectation. Without doubt, British af rmative
action that allowed Malays exclusive civil service positions triggered more
demands by elites for more Malay participation in the administration, which
increased Malay institutional capacity in the twentieth century. As Rof (1967)
puts it the exclusive MCS provided, Te principal avenue by which Malays
might acquire in the modern world the authority that was slipping from them
in the old and brought about the emergence of a new Malay leadership
group, English-educated and increasingly influenced by Western ideas of
government and social organisation.
70

m alay j ournalism and i nstitutional d ensity
Although the frst Malay Muslim publication was the Jawi Peranakan, estab-
lished in 1876, it was only in the twentieth century that we see signifcant
growth in Malay journalism. Tis growth coincided with the formation of the
FMS during a period that gave rise to a Pan-Malay consciousness. Te growth
in Malay journalism also came at a time when there were more Malay-Muslim
scholars who benefted from an improved economy and an expanded educa-
tion system.
An interesting observation is that from the 1920s, Malay publications
started to gravitate toward the Malay States, rather than Singapore and
Penang, just about the time when Malay education started to see more pro-
fessionals. The rise in Malay publications was startling. Between 1904 and
1917, there were no Malay publications in the Malay States.
71
However,
between 1920 and 1930, out of thirty-four new vernacular newspapers, twenty
were published in the Malay States.
72
Te global depression also did little to
stop the growth of Malay publications. Between 1930 and 1941, there were
eighty-one new Malay periodicals and journals. In 193536 alone, there were
twenty-fve new Malay publications.
73
Some of the prominent publications
were the Saudara (192641), Warta Malaya (193041), Lembaga (193541),
and Utusan Melayu (193941).
More tellingly, Malay newspapers in the twentieth century were more
than just newspapers. As Emmanuel describes, Malay newspapers were really
views papers as they became sites for Pan-Malay developmental concerns and
Malay nationalism. Emmanuels account of the Malay world is not altogether
inconsistent with Andersons assertion about the impact of print-capitalism
and how it gives meaning to imagined communities and produces atten-
dant nationalism. During these years, Malay publications carried new forms
of public opinion-making like the editorial, increased participation in the
media through letters to the editor and contributors articles, public readings
of newspapers, and the extension of newspapers into classrooms.
74
Articles
on Malay development or underdevelopment grew in intensity in the 1920s
and 1930s. Tey did not merely concentrate on Malays lack of capacity but
increasingly toward their development vis--vis non-Malays. An article in
the Saudara highlighted the advances made by the bangsa bangsa asing
(alien population), which was in sharp contrast to the progress made by
Malays who are still poor, backward and weak. Te article stresses that such
qualities should never be a part of the Malays, in their own land.
75

Malays fear of political and economic obsolescence was further stoked
by comments made by non-Malays regarding the consequent of Malayas
emerging plural society. Te British writer Arnold J. Toynbee in his book
A Journey to China or Things Which Are Seen , which was quoted in the
Majaallah Guru, states that he is convinced of the dominance of the Chinese
in Malayas political economy, noting that the race for wealth remains
between the British and the Chinese. Toynbee notes that he has not the
slightest of doubt that the Chinese will win and that a truly signifcant mark
that the British Empire can leave in Malaya when she withdraws is the trans-
formation of this country into the Nineteenth Province of China.
76

In another article published in the Majaallah Guru,
77
a British writer
named Somerville says that the days of the Malays are over and that a
Malays diminished dominance was not due to the doing of the British but
from their more industrious fellow Asiatic, the Chinese.
78

Te role of Malay newspapers in rallying Malay nationalism would not
be complete without mentioning the Utusan Melayu . Te Utusan Melayu was
founded in 1939, through an efort by a group of Malay journalists and activists
who wanted a publication that would be owned and financed as well as
stafed by Malays of the Archipelago.
79
In its early years, its articles did not
veer too much from other mainstream Malay newspapers, touching mainly
on issues of Malay underdevelopment. But in later years, the publication
became a standard-bearer for Malay nationalism. Te Utusan Melayu ofen
invoked the term Bangsa Melayu (the Malay race) rather than the particular
traditional attachment to the Kerajaan (the state) or raja (the monarchy).
80

Utusan publications were also peppered with terms like negeri (statehood),
tanah ayer/watan (indigenous), and tanah Melay u (Malay land).
81
These
terms powerfully evoked Malayness and contributed to a coherent Malay
political consciousness, which was aided further by an increasingly educated
Malay population who were more aware of their place in the development
process.
82
At times too, the paper made pungent remarks on non-Malays,
particularly Chinese. Some of the Utusan Melayu s more scathing articles
included titles such as Orang Melayu di-perbuat seperti lembu (Malays
treated like cattle) and Negeri BesarRakyat Miskin (Great CountryPoor
People).
83

It is important to note that establishing such Malay-based institutions
was no less helped by the presence of a small cohort of Malay intellectuals.
Given the limited number of Malay intellectuals, these personalities held
multiple appointmentsas editors, civil servants, and activiststhroughout
their career. Such multiple appointments helped in the transmission of Malay
political expression as they created symmetrical and consistent articulation
of nationalism across Malay institutions.
84
Some of these figures included
Zainal Abidin Ahmad (better known as Zaaba), Abdul Rahim Kajai, Ibrahim
Yakob, Eunos Abdullah, Onn Jaafar, and Burhannuddin Helmi.
It is apparent that the preservation of Malay de jure power by the colonial
administration improved Malay capacity. The logic of increasing returns
would also see the rapid growth of Malay social and political organizations,
creating a repertoire of Malay-based institutions in the 1930s.
85

m alay o rganizations and n ationalism
Malay organizational life is really a product of the twentieth century because
other than those organized around the aristocracy, Malays did not have a
Pan-Malay political and social organization. Tese new forms of Malay social
and political organization were the result of various factors: the dismantling
of the feudal economy, the expansion of the modern economic mode of pro-
duction, the formation of the FMS, the increasing accessibility of education,
and the emergence of a less stratifed nature of Malay society.
The first Malay social and political organization, unsurprisingly, was
formed in Singapore, the seat of the most rapid change in Malay social life.
Formed in 1926, the Kesatuan Melayu Singapura (KMS) or the Singapore
Malay Union had among its objectives: to pursue Malay social, political, and
economic interests by seeking representation in the British administration; to
advance Malay progress in the political, economic, and social felds; and to
encourage Malay education.
86
One of KMS notable achievements was its
ability to garner a more eclectic Malay leadership other than the Malay aris-
tocratic class. Te KMS founding fathers were Eunos Abdullah, Yusof Ishak,
and Embuk Suloh, all from a nonaristocratic background. Eunos Abdullah
was also the frst Malay representative in the Straits Legislative Council.
The formation of the KMS also set the pace for the formation of other
quasi-Malay political organizations in the Malay States. In September 1937, a
group of Malay professionals set up the Persatuan Melayu Perak (Perak Malay
Association) (PMA).
87
The Perak Malay Association was followed by the
establishment of the Persatuan Melayu Pahang (Pahang Malay Association)
on March 1938, founded by the likes of Tengku Ahmad, a member of the
Pahang royal house and Dato Hussein Mohd, a senior administrative of cer
in the Malayan Civil Service. In the same year, the Persatuan Melayu Selangor
(PMS) was formed by Tengku Ismail. Te PMS mooted various initiatives.
Among the notable ones: setting up an educational fund to sponsor students
for education in the Middle East and Europe; setting up a Malay university;
setting up a Malay Regiment and a Malay air force; and imposing restriction
on migration from outside the Malay Archipelago.
88

Te 1930s also saw the establishment of the Malay lef-wing movement.
One prominent movement was the Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM). Founded
in 1938 by Ibrahim Yaacob, a graduate of the Sultan Idris Training College
(SITC), the KMM was an outgrowth of the Belia Malaya (Malaya Youth), a
loose group established by SITC students in the early 1930s.
89
Te KMM drew
its membership from Malay teachers and graduates of the SITC and the newly
established Serdang Agricultural School. Besides Yaacob Ibrahim, another
prominent member of the KMM was Ishak Mohd, a former officer in the
Malay Administrative Service.
Te KMM adopted a more militant political struggle with its leadership
persuaded by Indonesias (Dutch East Indies) political struggle.
90
Yaacob
Ibrahim saw KMMs struggle as one that neither professed loyalty to the
Sultans and the British nor spoke of non cooperation, but worked toward the
nationalist feelings and teachings among its members, whose strength lay in
the lower classes.
91
It had thoughts of a political union with Dutch Indonesia
or to form an ambitious union encompassing the Borneo States, the Dutch
East Indies, and even the Philippines.
92

Despite its alternative political philosophy, KMMs political struggle
found little traction with the larger Malay population. One possible reason
for this failure could be that the Malayan public, still trained on feudal rule,
may have found KMMs anti-imperialist and republican stance dif cult to
digest. It also did not help that the KMMs leaders gave mixed signals as to the
partys political struggle. Even its famous founding member, Ishak Mohd,
gave conflicting remarks of the KMMs struggle. In contrast to Ibrahim
Yaacobs more militant stance, Ishak said that the KMM had no desire to
remove the British colonialist but served to stop Malays being exploited by
other races. Ibrahim Yaacob, however, was bent on ending British rule. In
early 1939, he established a pact with the Japanese government just before the
Japanese invasion of Malaya. With Japanese support, Ibrahim acquired the
daily Malay newspaper Warta Malaya to launch propaganda against the British
authority.
93

Te momentum to set up Malay political and social organizations was
boosted by the organization of the frst Pan-Malay National Congress in 1939.
The unprecedented congress encouraged delegates to make fervent initia-
tives, among them setting up a Pan-Malayan Malay association called the
Persekutuan Persatuan Persatuan Melayu Semenanjong Tanah Melayu
(Union of Malay Associations of the Malay Peninsula). The congress also
agreed to declare August 6 as the Malay national day or Hari Kebangsaan
Melayu.
Te success of the frst congress prompted the organization of another in
1940. Te second congress was larger and involved delegates from the Borneo
states of Brunei and Sarawak. The congress made even greater demands
regarding Malay development. Some of the resolutions included a demand to
preserve Malay culture and for the Malays to take an active role in the
running of the colonial administration. Other important suggestions raised
in the congress was the appointment of a Malay as Assistant Director of
Education. Te congress also urged the colonial government to appoint Malay
representatives in its entire external mission and to make English education
available to Malays.
94

It is evident that the events of the twentieth century made Malay society
by the 1940s a different society from that in the nineteenth century. The
formation of the FMS, far from emasculating Malay political dominance,
set of a series of institutions that contributed to the growth of a Pan-Malay
consciousness. Te logic of increasing returns determined that British pres-
ervation of Malay de jure power would lead to other consequences. Malay
political participation at the apex of British colonial institutions, for instance,
allowed Malay actors to make demands for resources, resulting in the ag-
glomeration of more Malay-based institutions. More important, the British
administrations allowance of Malay de jure power would also result in Malays
reevaluating Malay de facto power. Te Malayan Union episode presents a
classic example of the impact of British allowance for Malay de jure power
one where Malay de jure power would translate into demands for Malay
de facto power.
t he m alayan u nion
The Malayan Union project was to serve two objectives. First, a unified
Malaya would consolidate British administrative control. By the 1940s,
Malaya had become an indispensable part of the empire. Malayas rubber and
tin industry was the biggest contributor to the British economy and could
well help resuscitate its postwar economy.
95
Second, the Malayan Union was
the British response to Malayas emerging plural society. Te Chinese com-
munity, in particular, by now fgured as an important economic and political
factor. Chinese involvement in the resistance force during the Japanese war
also made it imperative for the colonial administration to incorporate the
Chinese community.
96

Te Union would make for a unitary state, amalgamating the Federated
Malay States (FMS), the Unfederated Malay States (UMS), and the Straits Set-
tlements (with the exception of Singapore) into one political entity. With the
Union, Malaya would come under Britains foreign jurisdiction acta British
crown colonythat will render unnecessary any further dependence on
Treaties with rulers in any future revision of the constitutional arrange-
ments.
97
The Union would replace the existing practice of indirect rule
through the Sultans with a central administration headed by a governor
based in Kuala Lumpur. More important, it would also grant non-Malays
citizenship status, employ equal citizenship rights, and revoke Malay special
status.
It is obvious that the net efect of the Union was another attempt to further
tweak the Malay political arrangement. Tis time it was not just the removal
of de facto but also de jure Malay political power. Te timing of the Union,
however, was out of sync. First, the buildup of Malay political and social
expression seen in the pre- and postwar years would naturally invite strong
Malay reaction against the proposal. Second, the British administration could
also not have picked a worse time to push such a radical proposal. The
Malayan Union project came in the midst of Malayas unprecedented ethnic
strife just afer the Japanese occupation.
98
Te ethnic clash, aided largely by
the Malayan Communist Party in the midst of a broken postwar economy,
added to Malay insecurity and anxiety, and it precipitated an unprecedented
show of Malay nationalism. Tird, the manner in which the Union was pro-
posed to the Malay rulers did little to help the British cause; it only invited
vehement Malay political protest. In making the proposal to the Malay rulers,
Harold McMichael, the British official in charge of obtaining the rulers
approval, was brazen in his approach. Te rulers were not allowed time to
think through the proposal. Tey were also not briefed on the specifcs of the
proposal since the details of the Malayan Union were still being worked out
during McMichaels visit.
99
Te Sultan of Kedah, for instance, complained
that McMichaels high-handed approach gave him little option but to agree
with the proposal. He remarked that he was presented with a verbal ultima-
tum as to the time limit and if he refused to sign, a successor, who would
sign it, would be appointed Sultan.
100

Te Sultan of Selangor also wrote of McMichaels haste and strong-arm
tactics. Te Sultan reported that he told McMichael that the terms of the pro-
posal were not clear to him, only to be told by McMichael that the object of
the Union is to ensure peace and progress and urged your Highness and the
other Rulers to give your consent and not to be a recalcitrant.
101

Te timing of the proposal and McMichaels attitude created the right
mix for a show of Malay expression. For the Malays, there was a well-placed
fear that the Malayan Union would only further relegate Malay political dom-
inance. Te Malayan Union proposal and McMichaels visit saw the Malay
organizational life picking up where it lef of before the war. In Johorwhich
incidentally was the state that saw the worst ethnic clashes between August
1945 and March 1946the Persatuan Melayu Johor (Johor Malay Association)
felt that its rights had been sold out by the Sultan and made clear that it no
longer wanted Sultan Ibrahim of Johor to be its ruler. In December 1945,
Onn Jaafar, an of cer in the Johor civil service and a member of the Federal
Council mobilized a mass protest against the Union.
102
Te show of Malay
protest gathered momentum in December 1945 and grew more intense afer
details of the Union were released in January 1946. In March 1946, the United
Malay National Organization (UMNO) was formed in Johor. Te UMNOs
prime objective was to urge the British government to withdraw the Malayan
Union proposal. Te UMNO made several initiatives. First, it pressured
Malay rulers to rethink the Malayan Union project, which the rulers subse-
quently did by petitioning the king of England. Second, the UMNO also
lobbied for external support by asking ex-British Malayan of cials to petition
against the Union. Te high point was the UMNOs ability to galvanize Malay
grassroots support and pressure Malay rulers to boycott the ceremony that
marked the installation of the new Governor General of the Malayan Union.
Tese incessant demands by the UMNO and its supporters resulted in the
Malayan Union project being abandoned in May 1946. In mid-July 1946, the
British government, the UMNO, and the Malay rulers agreed to replace
the Malayan Union with a Federation agreement. An interesting point is that
the working committee put in place to draf the Federation agreement was
made up of UMNO members and Malay rulers. Te drafing of the Federal
constitution was fnalized by mid-December 1946.
103

Te signifcant point of such a policy turnaround is that in attempting to
weaken further Malay de facto power and to tweak Malay de jure power, the
Malayan Union proposal only resulted in preserving Malay de jure power and
strengthening Malay nationalism. In fact, the invitation extended to the
UMNO members in drafing the Federation constitution and the restoration
of Malay rulers as head of Malay States consolidated Malay political infu-
ence. In short, Malay de jure power remained unblemished; Malay de facto
power began to show creeping signifcance.
c onclusion
By adopting a historical institutional analysis in the study of Malay nationalism,
I have tried to demonstrate that Malay nationalism was not an ad hoc display
but rather one that came from long historical processes. Malay political expres-
sion was a result of a path-dependent process, one where colonial policies
improved Malay political and administrative capacities and created institutions
that in aggregate gave rise to Malay political expression. Tese were made pos-
sible because British policies that attempted to abolish Malay feudal structures
did not go far enough; the policies only managed to weaken de facto power but
not de jure Malay power. As a result, Malays juridical status within the colonial
administration set in motion the development of Malay capacities that gave rise
to nationalism and generated a reevaluation of Malay de facto power.
Path dependence is central to this articles analysis. Te article has
shown two important characters of path dependence. First, that small, con-
tingent event could produce large consequences, one where an initial event
sets a particular course of action that would prove dif cult to reverse. Te
Birch murder and the consequent preservation of Malay de jure paved the
way for British policies to continue to factor Malay political signifcance
and create institutions that built Malay institutional capacity. Second, the
article has also highlighted that the nature of public good delivery creates a
self-reinforcing mechanism. Initial choice becomes locked in as coordi-
nation and learning efects stabilize actors expectations and contribute to
the perpetuation of specifc behavior and strategies.
104
When put this way,
path dependence, indeed historical institutionalism, could ofer a powerful
explanation to a larger project on explaining Malaysias state-building process.
It could explain, for instance, Slaters argument on how the UMNO continues
to defne Malay nationalism and how the Malay Sultans sit squarely within
the UMNO-led protection pact. Indeed, it could provide powerful insight in
appraising Malaysias development posture, in understanding the pace in
which Malaysia makes institutional changes and in explaining its resistance
to change.
Tun Abdul Razak School of Government,
University of Tun Abdul Razak
n o t e s
1. Munshi Abdullah, Hikayat Abdullah (Kuala Lumpur, 1974), 94 and 107.
2. Among other things, the Union would see a unitary state and place Malaya
under Britains foreign jurisdiction act and the granting of equal citizenship rights. Draf
Directive on Policy in Malaya in Appendix I of the report of War Cabinet Committee on
Malaya and Borneo, CAB 98/41, dated 18 May 1941, in Boon Kheng Cheah, Te Masked
Comrades (Singapore, 1979), 12.
3. A. J. Stockwell , British Policy and Malay Politics During the Malayan Union
Experiment, 19451948 ( Kuala Lumpur , 1979 ), 66 .
4. Ibid.
5. CO 537/1548 29 April 1946.
6. Baharuddin Shamsul Amri, Te Economic Dimension of Malay Nationalism: Te
Socio-Historical Roots of the New Economic Policy and Its Contemporary Implication,
Developing Economies 35, no. 3 (1997): 24061; Boon Kheng Cheah, The Erosion of
Ideological Hegemony and Royal Power and the Rise of Post, Journal of Southeast Asian
Studies 14, no. 1 (1988); William Rof, Te Origins of Malay Nationalism (New Haven, 1967),
T. H. and Ungku Silcock, Abdul Aziz, Nationalism in Malaya, in Asian Nationalism and
the West, ed. William L. Holland (New York, 1973); Radin Soernarno , Malay Nationalism
19001945 , Journal of Southeast Asian History 1 , no. 1 ( 1960 ): 9 15 .
7. See, for instance, Amri, Te Economic Dimension of Malay Nationalism;
Cheah, The Erosion of Ideological Hegemony and Royal Power and the Rise of Post;
Mark Emmanuel, Viewspapers: Te Malay Press of the 1930s, Journal of Southeast Asian
Studies 41, no. 1 (2010): 120.
8. Tis is put forward by Harry Benda in a reprint of Rof, Te Origins of Malay
Nationalism , ix.
9. See, for instance, James Mahoney , Path Dependence in Historical Sociology ,
Teory and Society 29 ( 2000 ): 507 48 ; Paul Pierson , Increasing Returns, Path Dependence,
and the Study of Politics , American Political Science Review 94 ( 2000 ): 251 67 ; Paul
Pierson , Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis ( Princeton , 2004 ) ; and
Douglass Cecil North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, Te
Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions (New York, 1990).
10. Paul Pierson , Review: When Efect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political
Change , World Politics 45 , no. 4 ( 1993 ): 595 628 , at 596.
11. Ibid.
12. Jack A. Goldstone, Comparative Historical Analysis and Knowledge Accumulation
in the Study of Revolutions, in Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, ed.
James and Dietrich Rueschemeyer Mahoney (Cambridge, 2006), 9.
13. Alexander George and Andrew Bennett , Case Studies and Teory Development in
the Social Sciences ( Cambridge, Mass ., 2005 ), 207 .
14. See works by Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier , Shaping the Political Arena:
Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America ( Princeton ,
1991 ) ; Tomas Ertman , Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and
Early Modern Europe ( New York , 1997 ) ; Stein Rokkan , Dimension of State Formation
and Nation Building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations in Europe , in Te
Formation of National States in Western Europe , ed. Charles Tilly ( Princeton , 1975 ), 562 600 ;
Charles Tilly and Gabriel Ardant , Te Formation of National States in Western Europe , ed.
Charles Tilly ( Princeton , 1975 ).
15. William H. Sewell , Tree Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology , ed. Terrance
Mcdonald ( Ann Arbor , 1996 ), 245 80.
16. Mahoney, Path Dependence in Historical Sociology, 507.
17. Margaret Levi , A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative
and Historical Analysis , in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure , ed.
Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman ( Cambridge , 1997 ), 19 41 , 265 .
18. Pierson, Politics in Time, 21.
19. W. Brian Arthur , Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy ( Ann
Arbor , 1994 ) ; Paul A. David , Clio and the Economics of QWERTY , American Economic
Review 75 , no. 2 ( 1985 ): 332 37.
20. Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy , 112. Te four
features highlighted are large setup or fxed costs. Given the large amount of investments
and high fxed costs, individuals and organizations have higher incentives to stay on a
particular technology or stick to a particular option: learning efects is a phenomenon
that shows once we are good at something we tend to be better at innovating it rather
than seek something entirely new; coordination efects relates how current adoption of
techniques would encourage the tying up with other related techniques to make it more
attractive; adaptive expectations relates to how the adoption and prevalence of an option
will limit our future choices, as we tend to not want to pick future wrong choices and
would hatch our bet on choices that would be successful. Arthur, Increasing Returns and
Path Dependence in the Economy , 112.
21. Stephen Krasner , Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective , Comparative Political
Studies 21 ( 1988 ): 66 94 ; Kathleen Ann Telen , How Institutions Evolve , in Comparative
Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences , ed. Dietrich Rueschemeyer and James Mahoney
( Cambridge , 2006 ) ; Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics ;
and North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance .
22. Pierson, Politics in Time .
23. Ibid., 34.
24. Douglass C. North , A Transaction Cost Teory of Politics , Journal of Teoretical
Politics 2 , no. 4 ( 1990 ): 362 .
25. Quoted in Pierson, Politics in Time , 35.
26. See C. D. Cowan , Nineteenth-Century Malaya: Te Origins of British Political Control
( London , 1961 ) ; and Joseph Kennedy , A History of Malaya, AD 14001959 ( London , 1962 ).
27. British of cers who were appointed had short stints with not enough time to
understand the complexity of the Malay States. Tese of cers were on normal tour of duty
for, for example, Harry Ord (served in the West Indies and Africa before Malaya), J. W. Birch
(served in Sri Lanka), and Andrew Clarke (served in Goldcoast, Australia, and New Zealand
before Malaya).
28. Eastern no. 35, CO 8824/773.
29. Kennedy, A History of Malaya , 171.
30. Te British government needed to bring military troops from India to quell the
unrest. Birchs murder emptied the Straits Treasury and the colonial office had to tap
the Colonial Fund. Cited in Emily Sadka, The Protected Malay States, 18741895 (Kuala
Lumpur, 1968), 96.
31. Tere was unrest frst in Perak and then smaller political skirmishes in Selangor,
Negeri Sembilan, and Pahang in the later years.
32. Sadka, Te Protected Malay States . Minute by Herbert Meade, 21 January 1876,
on Jervois to Carnarvon, 17 December 1876, CO 273/81; Ord to Anson, 28 December 1875,
Anson Correspondence.
33. 10 December 1876, no. 218, Lord Carnarvon to Jervois in C. Northcote Parkinson,
British Intervention in Malaya, 18671877 (Singapore, 1960), 271.
34. Hugh Low to Robinson, 28 May 1878, enclosed in Robinson to Hicks Beach, 171 of
13 June 1878, CO 273/94, cited in Sadka, Te Protected Malay States, 103.
35. Rupert Emerson , Malaysia: A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule ( Kuala Lumpur ,
1964 ), 176 .
36. Another reason ofen given for the formation of the FMS is that it was meant to
of oad the fnancial burden of the state of Pahang. Pahang was touted for its large min-
eral resources by the likes of Swettenham. Such economic promise did not materialize
and Pahang became a fnancial burden. In 1895, Pahangs expenditures were two and half
times that of its revenue, and the mining proceeds, which were touted to form the bulk of
Pahangs revenue, were less than 5 percent of the combined revenue of the mining proceeds
from the other three states. Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya , A History of
Malaysia , 2 nd ed. ( London , 2001 ), 185 .
37. Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 239.
38. Minutes of the sessions of the Conference of Chiefs of the FMS held at the
Conference Hall, Kuala Lumpur, 2123 July 1903, Supplement to the Selangor Government
Gazette, October 1903, cited in Jagjit Singh Sidhu, Administration in the Federated Malay
States, 18691920 (Kuala Lumpur, 1980), 119.
39. CO 273/1906, 10 February 1906.
40. CO 273/1906, 16 December 1905. Given the disquiet among the rulers on the sec-
ondary role played by the states, Sir John Andersen in his speech at the opening of the
council gave the assurance that nothing would change the existing arrangement. He said:
It was no small sacrifce of individuality on the part of the rulers to enter on the compact
of Federation. . . . Tey have done this in the full confdence based on the fact of the past
that whatever is done either by the British or by this council . . . will always be scrupulously
observed. . . . Tey are confdent that we will never forget that our powers are derived
wholly from their gif, and that we are here in a Malay country as the advisers and coun-
sellors of its Malay sovereigns, in High Commissioner to Resident General, 16 December
1905, in High Commissioner to CO, Confdential Dispatch.
41. Emerson, Malaysia , 149.
42. CO 717/55/7457. Proceedings of the Federal Council, 1926, in dispatch 295, 13 May
1927.
43. Rof, Te Origins of Malay Nationalism , 91. Te term British Malaya was frst
used by Governor Frederick Weld in 1883 during a presentation to the Royal Colonial
Institute, but it was not used in any of cial document by British of cials until 1903, when
Frank Swettenham used the term to describe his ambition of having a Malay empire that
encompassed Burma, the Straits Settlements, and North Borneo.
44. Reports on the Federated Malay States for 1897, C.9108, 3.
45. Reports on the Federated Malay States for 1897, C.9108, 4.
46. Robert Huessler , Te British Rule in Malaya: Te Malayan Civil Service and
Its Predecessors, 18671942 ( Oxford , 1981 ), 240 . Notes on G. E. Gents talks with Sultan
Iskandar, 2 August 1924, CO 717/39. Governor to Secretary of State, 1 October 1924, CO
717/34, Proceedings of the Federal Council, 25 November 1924, Sultans letter to Collins,
13 August 1924, CO 717/39. See also Rof, Te Origins of Malay Nationalism, 198.
47. Te new arrangement was also prompted by the disagreement between Governor
Guillemard and Resident General Maxwell on the proper role of the Resident General
with respect to his relationship with the governor. As a result of the power tussle between
the Resident General and the High Commisioner, the Resident General, because of his
superior knowledge of the Malay States, sometimes overruled the views and decision of
the High Commisioner. Governor Andersen changed the name Resident General to Chief
Secretary to refect a more subordinate role.
48. Rof, Te Origins of Malay Nationalism, 97.
49. Federated Malay States Annual Report on Education for 1903, 5, cited in
ibid., 100.
50. Wilkinson to Resident General, 24 February 1904, printed under paragraph 18 of
the Minutes of the Conference of Residents, March 1904, R-G File no. 422 of 1904, cited in
ibid., 100.
51. Te frst Malay vernacular school was set up in Klang, Selangor, in 1875 and the
frst Malay school in Perak started in 1883, Selangor State Secretariat 108/80; Perak Annual
Report 1883, Selangor State Secretariat 188087, 2123/87, cited in Sadka, Te Protected
Malay States , 289. Also, education was provided by individuals and centered on Islamic
education.
53. W. H. Treacher , British Malaya, with more Special Reference to the Federated
Malay States , Journal of the Society of Arts 55 ( 1907 ): 503 4.
54. Federal Council Proceedings 1915, B67.
55. Winstedt Report 1917, in Rof, Te Origins of Malay Nationalism , 140.
56. Education in Malaya, British Empire Exhibition: Malayan Series (London, 1924),
15, in ibid., 141.
57. Ibid., 147. Te college curriculum went beyond what Windstedt had in mind.
Rather than just train teachers in agriculture, handicrafs, and gardening, the founding
headmaster, T. S. Dussek, introduced literary education on Malay language and culture in the
hope that the graduate teachers would help upgrade the quality of vernacular education in
the Malay States. To encourage graduates of the college to join the British administration,
Dussek also promoted the idea that Malay language be used in government at the local level.
In the early years, textbooks from the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) were used. The
use of Indonesian texts could well infuence the thoughts of some its graduates toward
Malay nationalism. Tis is because, at the time, there was a signifcant nationalistic movement
in Indonesia against Dutch colonial rule.
58. Te KMM was inspired by the Indonesian nationalist struggle and went under-
ground to subvert the British colonial administration. Farish Noor, Islam Embedded, vol. 1
(Kuala Lumpur, 2004), 30.
59. Resident Generals Of ce, circular no. 68, 1902, cited in Rof, Te Origins of Malay
Nationalism , 99.
60. It should also be noted that in the early years after the Pangkor Treaty, the
appointment of Malays to the state administration was minimal. Tey involved Malay rulers
and chiefs who were co-opted into state functionaries as members of the State Councils
and as of cers such Assistant District Of cers, tax collectors, and village headmen. Tese
of cers were not trained and they were recruited on an ad hoc basis; the appointment of
Malay of cers was to compensate for the loss of income incurred by Malay chiefs as a result
of the dismantling of the feudal order. Mavis Puthucheary, Te Politics of Administration
(Kuala Lumpur, 1978), 10.
61. The scheme was initially called the scheme for the Employment of Malays
(Higher Subordinate Class) but was renamed Malay Probationer Scheme. Te boys were
handpicked by the individual Resident and short-listed by the Resident General, then sent
for three years to the Malay College, where they were trained in correspondence, trea-
sury work, and other administrative subjects. Te graduates were appointed to the Malay
Administrative Service (MAS).
63. Memorandum on the principal diferences between the 1910 and 1917 schemes,
cited in ibid.
64. Annual address of the High Commissioner, Federal Council Proceedings 1920,
B65, cited in ibid. 114.
65. See ibid., 116.
66. See ibid., 11719.
67. Dispatch, High Commisioner to Colonial Of ce, no. 682, 11 December 1923, in
Letter, Association of British Malaya to Under-Secretary of State for Colonies, 27 June
1923, in Dispatches re Correspondence with the Association of British Malaya on the
Administration and Finances of the Federated Malay States, appendix no. 4 to Federal
Council Proceedings 1924, C9495, in ibid., 117.
68. Clause 12 (viii) of the General Orders for FMS Government Esstablishments, as
amended in 1923, stipulated that for posts requiring a knowledge of Malay but of no other
language, preference should be given to Malays. Cited in ibid., 118.
69. Federal Council Proceedings 1934, B58.
71. William Rof, Guide to Malay Periodicals, 18761941 (Singapore, 1961), 16.
72. Ibid.
73. Rof, Te Origins of Malay Nationalism , 166.
74. Mark Emmanuel , Viewspapers: Te Malay Press of the 1930s , Journal of Southeast
Asian Studies 41 , no. 1 ( 2010 ): 1 20 .
75. Saudara , 15 October 1932.
76. Majallah Guru , March 1930, 4748, cited in Soernarno, Malay Nationalism, 12.
In Arnold J. Toynbee, A Journey to China or Tings Which Are Seen (London, 1931),
156. He said: When I touched at the Straits Settlements on my way out east I realized that
British Malaya was destined, by peaceful penetration to become a new Chinese province,
and I fancy, from what I have heard that the same destiny may be in store for Burma, Siam,
French Indo China, Dutch Indonesia and the Philippines. Cited in Emerson, Malaysia .
77. Te Majaallah Guru (Teachers Magazine) mostly published articles about Malay
underdevelopment. Eventually it became a major journal of reference. It drew readers
beyond the teaching community who were encouraged by articles critical of British
policies that hampered Malay economic and political progress.
78. Soernarno, Malay Nationalism, 12.
80. See A. C. Milner , Te Invention of Politics in Colonial Malaya ( Cambridge , 1995 ).
81. Kwen Fee Lian , Te Construction of Malay Identity across Nations Malaysia,
Singapore and Indonesia , Bijdragen tot de Taal: Land-en Volkenkunde 157 , no. 4 ( 2001 ):
861 79, at 86566.
82. See also A. C. Milner , Colonial Records History: British Malaya , Modern Asian
Studies 3 , no. 2 ( 1987 ): 76 82 , 97110.
83. Utusan Melayu, 31 May 1939 and 1 June 1939.
84. Zaaba held an appointment at the infuential Sultan Idris Training College (SITC);
he also headed various Malay publications. Burhannuddin Helmy and Yaacob Ibrahi
were graduates of SITC who became editors of Utusan Melayu and later led the lef-wing
Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM). Ishak Latif was an ex-civil servant who became a journalist;
he was one the founding members of the KMM. Onn Jaafar, who became a leading fgure in
Malay politics, was a member of the Johor State Council and also held editorial appointments
at Warta Malaya and Lembaga Malaya . Eunos Abdullah was a member of the legislative
council, president of the Kesatuan Melayu Singapura, and a key fgure at Utusan Melayu .
85. Among other notable publications were those by the Perseketuan Perbahathan
Orang Orang Islam (Muslim Debating Society), which published a fortnightly magazine
called Lidah Teruna (The Youths Voice). The Maharani Company, a trading setup,
published the fortnightly Perjumpaan Melayu (Te Malays Meeting); it was later replaced
by Panji Panji Melayu (Malay Honors). Despite its niche setup, Lidah Teruna (Perseketuan
Perbahathan Orang Orang Islam) and Panji Panji Melayu (the Maharani Company)
surprising covered Malay developmental issues and cultivated communitarian interests
among Malays. See Rof, Te Origins of Malay Nationalism , 16062.
86. Radin Soenarno , Malay Nationalism, 18961941 , Journal of Southeast Asian
History 1 , no. 01 ( 1960 ): 1 28 . 10. See also Meredith Weiss , Pricky Ambivalence: State,
Society, and Semidemocracy in Malaysia , Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 43 , no.
1 ( 2005 ): 61 81 .
87. See William Rof , Te Persatuan Melayu Selangor , Journal of Southeast Asian
History 9 ( 1968 ), 117 .
89. Soenarno, Malay Nationalism .
90. Ibid. 18. KMM was infuenced by the the Djong Djava and Jong Sumatra political
struggle.
92. Noor, Islam Embedded , 3233.
93. Under the support of the Japanese government, Ibrahim acquired the daily Malay
newspaper Warta Malaya to launch propaganda against the British authority. In 1940,
Ibrahim and a few of his followers, which included Ishak Mohamed, Ahmad Boestamam,
and Sutan Djenain, were arrested and imprisoned by the British authorities. Tey were
later released by the Japanese in 1942. Rof, Te Origins of Malay Nationalism , 234. During
the Japanese occupation, Ibrahim Yaacob worked closely with the Japanese forces and was
made commander-in-chief of the Malay arms group called Pembela Tanahayer (Defenders
of the Homeland) or PETA. See Soernarno, Malay Nationalism, 20.
94. Ungku Aziz T. H. Silcock, Nationalism in Malaya, in Asian Nationalism and the
West , ed. William L. Holland (New York, 1953). 285.
95. See Albert Lau Malayan Union Citizenship , Journal of Southeast Asian Studies
20 , no. 2 ( 1989 ).
96. In the 1930s, the British administration had foated the idea of citizenship rights
to Chinese given the rise of Chinese transnationalism and the need to circumvent Chinese
government citizenship rule of 1929 regarding the citizenship status of overseas Chinese.
97. Draf Directive on Policy in Malaya in Appendix I of the report of War Cabinet
Committee on Malaya and Borneo, CAB 98/41, dated 18 May 1941, in Cheah, Te Masked
Comrades , 12.
98. Afer the Japanese surrendered, the MCP conducted its own peoples court in
which suspected Japanese collaborators were rounded up and tried; if found guilty, they
were summarily executed. MCPs action took on an ethnic dimension. Its provocative
moves targeted Malays, on the grounds of collaborating with the Japanese forces. Although
there were Chinese among the collaborators, they were small in number. Malays and
Indians, however, were employed by the Japanese and, unlike the Chinese, played a small
role in the resistance against the Japanese. It was obvious to any observer at the time that
the MCP self-styled execution would take on ethnic proportions. See Boon Kheng Cheah,
Some Aspects of the Interregnum in Malaya (14 August3 September 1945), Journal of
Southeast Asian Studies 8, no. 1 (1977): 4874, at 70.
99. McMichael was also reprimanding in action. He was given permission to check
on the Malay rulers involvement during the Japanese war and, should he find them
corroborating with the Japanese, was given the authority to recommend another Malay
personage whom he deemed competent to sign the treaty.
100. Te Sultan of Kedah to Sir Frank Swettenham, cited in James de V. Allen , Te
Malayan Union, in Monograph Series no. 10 , Southeast Asia Studies , Yale University ( 1967 ): 169 .
101. Te Sultan of Selangor to Lord Marchwood, 18 February 1946, cited in Debates
on the Straits Settlements (Repeal) Bill in the House of Commons on 8 March 1946, from
appendix D in ibid., excerpt D.5, 17071.
102. On 21 August 1945, there were violent Chinese-Malay skirmishes in the district
of Muar-Batu Pahat, in the Johor State, and the BMA reported that refugees in Muar
amounted to ten thousand, whereas in Batu Pahat, there were four thousand. See Cheah,
Some Aspects of the Interregnum in Malaya, 70.
103. Nordin Sopiee , From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation ( Kuala Lumpur ,
1976 ), 38 39 .
104. Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan ; Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and
the Study of Politics; and Telen, How Institutions Evolve, 219.

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the journal of policy history , Vol. 26, No. 2, 2014.

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