American Sociological Review 2014 McClintock 575 604

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DOI: 10.1177/0003122414536391
2014 79: 575 originally published online 9 June 2014 American Sociological Review
Elizabeth Aura McClintock
Beauty and Status: The Illusion of Exchange in Partner Selection?
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American Sociological Review
2014, Vol. 79(4) 575 604
American Sociological
Association 2014
DOI: 10.1177/0003122414536391
http://asr.sagepub.com
This article revisits the claim that individuals
(generally women) of relatively high physical
attractiveness barter their beauty to attract a
partner of higher socioeconomic status. This
beauty-status exchange model is popularized in
the trophy wife stereotype that pretty women
marry high-status men. Yet this popular focus
overlooks the role of matchingselecting a
partner with similar characteristics to oneself
that is well-documented in research on relation-
ships (e.g., McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook
2001). I unite the two literatures by modeling
exchange and matching as simultaneous and
competing processes that might vary in
relevance for different types of couples. Identi-
fying the conditions under which couples
exchange beauty and status provides insight
into processes of social mobility and stratifica-
tion. Additionally, beauty-status exchange is
highly relevant to gender inequality and to
sociobiological models of partner selection.
536391ASRXXX10.1177/0003122414536391American Sociological ReviewMcClintock
2014
a
University of Notre Dame
Corresponding Author:
Elizabeth Aura McClintock, 810 Flanner Hall,
University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556
E-mail: emcclint@nd.edu
Beauty and Status: The
Illusion of Exchange in
Partner Selection?
Elizabeth Aura McClintock
a
Abstract
Scholars have long been interested in exchange and matching (assortative mating) in romantic
partner selection. But many analyses of exchange, particularly those that examine beauty
and socioeconomic status, fail to control for partners tendency to match each other on
these traits. Because desirable traits in mates are positively correlated between partners and
within individuals, ignoring matching may exaggerate evidence of cross-trait beauty-status
exchange. Moreover, many prior analyses assume a gendered exchange in which women
trade beauty for mens status, without testing whether men might use handsomeness to
attract higher-status women. Nor have prior analyses fully investigated how the prevalence
of beauty-status exchange varies between different types of couples. I use data from the
National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health Romantic Pair Sample, a large (N = 1,507),
nationally representative probability sample of dating, cohabiting, and married couples, to
investigate how often romantic partners exchange physical attractiveness and socioeconomic
status, net of matching on these traits. I find that controlling for matching eliminates nearly all
evidence of beauty-status exchange. The discussion focuses on the contexts in which beauty-
status exchange is most likely and on implications these results have for market-based and
sociobiological theories of partner selection.
Keywords
marriage, demography, gender, social stratication, sociobiology
at SANTA CLARA UNIV on August 9, 2014 asr.sagepub.com Downloaded from
576 American Sociological Review 79(4)
Partner selection is important in reproduc-
ing group boundaries and social inequalities
(Gordon 1964; Rosenfeld 2008). Matching on
socioeconomic status compounds inequality:
high-earners partner with other high-earners
and low-earners with other low-earners
(Blossfeld and Buchholz 2009; Schwartz
2010; Schwartz and Mare 2005). However,
under a market model of partner selection, in
which choices are relatively unconstrained by
group boundaries and partners informally
exchange personal attributes, individuals
could leverage a desirable noneconomic trait
to achieve socioeconomic mobility. This
would undermine the tendency for partner
selection to reproduce existing patterns of
inequality. Under the beauty-status exchange
model, physical attractiveness might enable
class mobility for women, although such an
exchange would ensure womens economic
dependency on their husbands.
Indeed, partner selection is closely related
to gender inequality. Norms dictating that the
man be older and more successful in his
career reinforce power inequalities within
marriage (Presser 1975). Rules prescribing
these and other forms of marital hypergamy
may be weakening, but related stereotypes
that men prioritize a partners appearance and
women prioritize a partners status remain
strong. Such stereotypes are pre-feminist,
ignoring womens economic independence
and their valuation of mens physical attrac-
tiveness. Although these stereotypes may be
derived from both social structural and socio-
biological theories, the sociobiological litera-
ture is especially adamant that men will select
long-term partners on the basis of youth and
beauty, whereas women will select partners
who are good providers (Buss 1990, 1998).
Beauty-status exchange accords with the
popular conception of romantic partner selec-
tion as a competitive market process, a con-
ception widely accepted in both popular
culture and academia. Under the market
model of romantic relationship formation,
individuals negotiate an informal exchange
by trading their own assets for those of their
partner. This market metaphor has been
applied to the exchange of socioeconomic
status for other purportedly desired resources,
such as race (Fu 2001; Kalmijn 1993; Qian
1997; Schoen and Wooldredge 1989; but see
Rosenfeld 2005, 2010), homemaker skills
(Becker 1991), youth (Coles and Francesconi
2007; England and McClintock 2009), and
physical attractiveness (Burdett and Coles
2001; Carmalt et al. 2008; Elder 1969; Sassler
and Joyner 2011; Stevens, Owens, and
Schaefer 1990; Taylor and Glenn 1976; Udry
1977). In popular culture, the concept of a
gendered beauty-status exchange, in which an
economically successful man partners with a
beautiful trophy wife, is commonplace.
In practice, the related exchange-based the-
ory that individuals of low racial status but
high socioeconomic status partner with those
of high racial status and low socioeconomic
status (status-caste exchange) also bolsters
support for gender-stereotyped models of part-
ner selection. Proponents argue that low-status
white women partner with higher-status black
men (Fu 2001; Kalmijn 1993; Qian 1997; Sch-
oen and Wooldredge 1989) or that minority
women exchange beauty and sexual access for
white mens income (Sassler and Joyner 2011).
If this occurs, such couples would undermine
racial boundaries but reinforce female eco-
nomic dependency in marriage.
These market-based exchange models are
difficult to reconcile with the consistent empir-
ical finding that romantic partners tend to
match on many dimensions. In contradiction to
beauty-status exchange theory, economically
successful women partner with economically
successful men (Sweeney and Cancian 2004),
and physically attractive women partner with
physically attractive men (Murstein and
Christy 1976).
1
I attempt to resolve the empiri-
cal paradox presented by the evidence of
matching on physical attractiveness and on
socioeconomic status with the conflicting lit-
erature affirming beauty-status exchange. I
argue that the positive individual-level correla-
tion between physical attractiveness and socio-
economic status, combined with a tendency for
partners to match on both attractiveness and
status, might be easily misconstrued
McClintock 577
as beauty-status exchange, particularly in
regression models that do not fully account for
matching.
That said, although prior research may rely
on faulty empirical models, it is possible that
beauty-status exchange occurs in some cou-
ples. Although they are competing forces,
matching and exchange are not mutually
exclusivesome couples might match while
others engage in cross-trait exchange. Prior
research proposes that certain types of cou-
ples, such as less-committed or interracial
couples (Sassler and Joyner 2011), are espe-
cially likely to engage in beauty-status
exchange. My analysis examines the preva-
lence of matching and exchange among a
representative sample of young couples and
considers whether any subgroups dispropor-
tionately engage in beauty-status exchange.
Considering the contexts in which beauty-
status exchange might predominate provides
nuanced insight into processes of partner
selection and highlights the differential mean-
ings that couples may attach to their
relationships.
BACKGROUND
Matching in Partner Selection
The strongest force in partner selection is
matching, or assortative mating (in marriage,
endogamy): men and women select partners
with characteristics similar to their own.
Couples tend to be alike in education, age,
race, and religion (Bereczkei and Csanaky
1996; Blackwell and Lichter 2004; Mare
1991; Rosenfeld 2008; Schoen and Cheng
2006; Schoen and Weinick 1993; Stevens
1991). Of most relevance to this study, there
is strong evidence of matching on physical
attractiveness (Berscheid et al. 1971; Carmalt
et al. 2008; Feingold 1988; Kalick and Ham-
ilton 1986; Murstein 1972; Murstein and
Christy 1976; Stevens et al. 1990) and socio-
economic status (Blackwell and Lichter 2004;
Gardyn 2002; Mare 1991; Stevens 1991).
Prior literature suggests at least three
important forces generating matching: (1)
homophily, that is, individuals preferences
for similar (in-group) partners, (2) pressure
from third parties to select similar partners,
and (3) lack of contact with potential dissimi-
lar (out-group) partners (Kalmijn 1998).
These explanations are undoubtedly impor-
tant and may suffice to explain matching on
many traits, particularly traits for which pref-
erences vary greatly between individuals. For
these traits, such as religion, no one group is
generally desired more than others. Instead,
individuals want partners of their own group,
whatever that may be. But for other traits,
including income and physical attractiveness,
more is often assumed to be better. For these
consensually ranked traits, individuals may
prefer partners who are superior to them-
selves over partners who are their equals.
Additionally, in the case of physical attrac-
tiveness, it is not obvious that interested third
parties would object to dissimilarity or that
social-structural barriers prevent contact
between more and less physically attractive
individuals.
A competitive marriage market model
might explain some degree of matching on
consensually ranked traits, including physical
attractiveness. In a competitive market, every-
one may desire the most beautiful and wealth-
iest partners, but individuals will discover
that the most desirable partner they can attract
is one of their own level of desirability (see
Burdett and Coles 1997, 1999, 2001; Choo
and Siow 2006; Loughran 2002). Still, match-
ing on specific traits is not the only possible
outcome. Individuals might exchange a high
level of one desirable trait for a high level of
a different desirable trait in a partner, engag-
ing in cross-trait exchange while matching on
total desirability.
I am interested in physical attractiveness
and socioeconomic status because they are
often thought to be consensually ranked traits,
and existing theories of partner selection indi-
cate that such traits might be either matched
or exchanged. Despite the inherent tension
between theories purporting beauty-status
exchange and those arguing that couples will
match on these traits, the theories are not
incompatible. Some couples might match
while others exchange. Individuals might also
seek approximate equality on both beauty and
status but accept a limited tradeoff between
the twosuch as a slightly less-attractive
partner with slightly higher status.
Co-occurrence of Desirable Traits
Analyses endorsing matching and those
endorsing exchange generally overlook the
co-occurrence of (un)desirable traitsthat
beauty and status are positively correlated
within individuals. Perhaps partially because
physically attractive individuals are treated
preferentially, they enjoy improved school
performance, greater occupational success,
and higher earnings (Clifford and Walster
1973; Hamermesh and Biddle 1994; Haskins
and Ransford 1999; Jackson, Hunter, and
Hodge 1995; Langlois et al. 2000; Rosenblat
2008; Rosenblat and Mobius 2006; Singer
1964; Umberson and Hughes 1987; Wardle,
Waller, and Jarvis 2002). Also, income may
help individuals purchase goods and services
that enhance attractiveness, such as dental
care and gym memberships. Some of the
beauty-status correlation might be explained
by rater bias: for example, individuals thought
to be of higher-status nations are rated more
favorably (Kowner 1996).
2
The co-occurrence of desirable traits
encourages matching on multiple dimen-
sionscouples who match on one trait tend
toward similarity on related traits. This might
lead to overestimating the strength of match-
ing on any single dimension, considered alone
(Kalmijn 1998). For example, if college grad-
uates are (on average) better-looking than
nongraduates, matching on college status
facilitates matching on attractiveness. More
subtly, because the within-individual co-
occurrence of desirable traits might create a
spurious between-partner cross-trait correla-
tion of beauty and status, a bias toward
observing mens status and womens beauty
might cause matching to be misidentified as
exchange. If couples match on college status
and on attractiveness, college-educated men
would have prettier wives than less-educated
men (and college-educated women would
have handsomer husbands). Because physi-
cally attractive men and women average
higher socioeconomic status, partner match-
ing on status or attractiveness (or on both
traits) would create a positive correlation
between womens physical attractiveness and
mens socioeconomic status, and between
mens attractiveness and womens status,
even in the absence of beauty-status exchange.
In models that assume men value attrac-
tiveness and women value status, couples
would appear to engage in beauty-status
exchange even when they match. For exam-
ple, a high-earning man married to a pretty
wife might be interpreted as beauty-status
exchange by a researcher who only observes
male status and female beautybut if the
man is handsome and his wife a high-earner,
then the couple is matched on both traits.
Most prior studies of beauty-status exchange
assume a gendered importance of beauty and
status, overlooking mens attractiveness and
womens status and potentially misidentify-
ing matching as exchange. Analyses assum-
ing a stereotypically gendered importance of
beauty and status could thus erroneously, and
unintentionally, perpetuate these very stereo-
types. Also, because most prior studies
assume gendered exchange, it is unclear
whether patterns of beauty-status exchange
(insofar as they exist after controlling for
matching) are gender-symmetric.
Evidence of Exchange
Despite strong evidence of matching on phys-
ical attractiveness (Carmalt et al. 2008; Fein-
gold 1988; Murstein 1972; Murstein and
Christy 1976; Stevens et al. 1990) and on
socioeconomic status (Blackwell and Lichter
2004; Gardyn 2002; Mare 1991; Stevens et al.
1990), prior studies argue that physical attrac-
tiveness is traded for socioeconomic status
(Bjerk 2009; Carmalt et al. 2008; Elder 1969;
Taylor and Glenn 1976; Udry 1977). Specifi-
cally, early studies of beauty-status exchange
in partner selection propose a gendered
McClintock 579
exchange of womens beauty for mens status.
Such studies find that both physical attrac-
tiveness and education help a woman achieve
upward mobility through marriage (defined
as marrying a man of higher occupational
status than her father [Elder 1969; Udry
1977]) and help her marry a man of high
occupational status, in absolute terms (Taylor
and Glenn 1976). However, these analyses
exclude mens physical attractiveness and
therefore do not address how the co-occur-
rence of desirable traits within individuals
might encourage matching and might also
generate the illusion of exchange.
3
Control-
ling for both partners physical attractiveness
may not eliminate the relationship between
female beauty and male status, but it should at
least reduce this relationship substantially.
A recent article using the National Longi-
tudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add
Health) Romantic Pair data, a nationally rep-
resentative sample of young adult dating,
cohabiting, and marital partners, finds that for
both genders, personal assets including edu-
cation predict having a physically attractive
partner (Carmalt et al. 2008). The authors
interpret this as evidence of cross-trait beauty-
education exchange, but they fail to control
for the partners education. Because educa-
tion is strongly associated with physical
attractiveness within individuals (beauty and
education co-occur), it is unclear from this
study whether education is exchanged to
attain an attractive partner or whether the
findings are spurious and result from match-
ing. Therefore, I use the same data to evaluate
patterns of beauty-status exchange while con-
trolling for matching.
Some individuals certainly intend to trade
high levels of one trait for high levels of a dif-
ferent trait. Personal and online dating adver-
tisements are often couched in deal-making
language (Alterovitz and Mendelsohn 2009;
Davis 1990; Harrison and Saeed 1977). These
advertisements imply that some women hope
to trade their physical attractiveness for mens
financial security, and some men hope to trade
their socioeconomic status for a physically
attractive but lower-status partner. But
experimental studies indicate that women (and
men) will not compromise on physical attrac-
tiveness (Li et al. 2002; Li and Kenrick 2006;
Sprecher 1989). In practice, individuals might
be unwilling to make the cross-trait exchanges
that they anticipated making. Moreover,
women and men pursuing a gendered beauty-
status exchange in their advertisements might
be overlooking the importance of class-based
cultural compatibility. They may ultimately
value cultural similarity more than similarity
on tangible measures of status (income or
degree attainment) (Kalmijn 1994), but they
may realize the cultural importance of socio-
economic status only after meeting status-
disparate dates. For example, a man might
attach little importance to a prospective wifes
income or educational attainment per se, but
he might discover that the women with whom
he is most interpersonally compatible are
women of his own socioeconomic status.
Is More of a Good Thing Always
Better?
Prior studies espousing beauty-status
exchange implicitly assume that physical
attractiveness and social status are consensu-
ally ranked traits: that is, these traits can be
measured and partners with higher levels are
generally more desired (e.g., Elder 1969;
Taylor and Glenn 1976). Socioeconomic sta-
tus is an abstract concept, but it is often
approximated by education, income, or occu-
pation-tangible and quantifiable characteris-
tics. Despite some inevitable subjectivity in
evaluating physical attractiveness, prior stud-
ies report high inter-rater consensus (Langlois
et al. 2000; Murstein 1972). In the United
States, there may be racial differences in ideal
body shape (Cohn and Adler 1992; Lovejoy
2001; Webb, Looby, and Fults-McMurtery
2004), but assessment of facial attractiveness
does not vary by race (Cunningham et al.
1995; Moss, Miller, and Page 1975). Attrac-
tiveness and status are thus quantifiable.
However, neither men nor women report
attaching much importance to either trait. For
example, when asked to rank the importance
of 76 traits in a romantic partner, no measures
of appearance or socioeconomic status made
the top 10 (Buss and Barnes 1986). This and
similar studies find that men value appear-
ance more than women, whereas women
value socioeconomic indicators more than
men, but neither gender ranks physical attrac-
tiveness or socioeconomic status highly
(Furnham 2009; Howard, Blumstein, and
Schwartz 1987; Nevid 1984). (This gender
difference may be declining in recent cohorts
[Buss et al. 2001; Regan and Joshi 2003].)
In contrast to self-reported preferences,
experimental studies find that physical attrac-
tiveness is highly valued by both genders, and
that women also value mens socioeconomic
status (Li et al. 2002; Li and Kenrick 2006;
Sprecher 1989). Similarly, recent speed-
dating studies find that physical attractiveness
and earnings potential are both strong predic-
tors of attraction (Eastwick and Finkel 2008;
Fisman et al. 2006; Luo and Zhang 2009).
Consistent with these findings, women and
men using an online-dating website valued
physical attractiveness highly (Hitsch, Hort-
acsu, and Ariely 2010). Evidence from speed-
dating and online-dating studies is mixed
regarding gender differences in the relative
importance of attractiveness and earnings
potential.
Arguably, acted preferences in experi-
ments and real dating situations may be more
genuine indicators of true preferences than
are stated preferences (McClintock 2011)
and acted preferences indicate that when it
comes to beauty and status in romantic part-
ners, more is better. This is a necessary but
not sufficient condition for exchange to occur.
Exchange requires not only that these traits
are valued, but also that they are substituta-
ble. Yet individuals might be unwilling to
compromise on one dimension (e.g., by
accepting a homely partner), even when com-
pensated on another dimension (if the homely
partner were high-status). Indeed, acted pref-
erences suggest that both genders consider
physical attractiveness a necessity and disre-
gard potential partners who fail their attrac-
tiveness criteria (see Li and Kenrick 2006).
Union Status and Duration
Most studies purporting beauty-status
exchange restrict their analysis to married
couples. Only the most recent of these articles
(Carmalt et al. 2008) uses dating, cohabiting,
and married couples. I use these same data,
the National Longitudinal Study of Adoles-
cent Health Romantic Pair sample (2001 to
2002; N = 1,507). Insofar as commitment can
be assumed to increase as couples move from
dating to cohabitation to marriage, couples in
more committed relationships are more simi-
lar in race, education, and other traits (Black-
well and Lichter 2004; Joyner and Kao 2005).
Individuals may hold looser partner criteria
for short-term relationships, and dissimilar
couples may face higher dissolution rates
(McClintock 2010; Wang, Kao, and Joyner
2006). If beauty-status exchange is a form of
dissimilarity that increases instability, it would
be most prevalent in dating couples, less
prevalent among cohabiters, and least preva-
lent among married couples. Likewise,
beauty-status exchange would be less com-
mon in relationships of longer duration. In
addition to winnowing (the selective disso-
lution of less similar couples), romantic part-
ners may grow more similar over time due to
shared lifestyle (e.g., eating habits, exercise,
or encouragement to earn a higher degree).
However, entering into a beauty-status
exchange is most rational if one anticipates
marriage, because it is in marriage that eco-
nomic resources are most often shared. If so,
exchange would be most prevalent among
married couples, because not all dating and
cohabiting couples anticipate marriage. Cohab-
iting couples would be especially unlikely to
exchange beauty and status, because they are
generally more egalitarian than married cou-
ples (Brines and Joyner 1999) and are less
likely to pool resources (Hamplova and Le
Bourdais 2009). Indeed, some research sug-
gests that patterns of exchange evident among
married couples are not viable among cohabit-
ers, including the exchange of housework for
economic support (Brines and Joyner 1999)
and the exchange of racial caste for
McClintock 581
socioeconomic status (Blackwell and Lichter
2000; but see Rosenfeld 2005). If my analysis
produces evidence of beauty-status exchange,
differences in its prevalence by union status
(dating, cohabiting, married) might clarify
whether it is a source of instability or a viable
long-term strategy.
Interracial Couples
In a classic variant of cross-trait exchange in
partner selection, individuals of low racial
status but high socioeconomic status partner
with those of high racial status but low socio-
economic status (Davis 1941; Fu 2001;
Kalmijn 1993; Merton 1941; Schoen and
Wooldredge 1989). In practice, race-status
(status-caste) exchange, like beauty-status
exchange, is gender-stereotypical: lower-
status white women are thought to partner with
higher-status black men (Fu 2001; Kalmijn
1993; Qian 1997; Schoen and Wooldredge
1989). Although not entirely analogous to
beauty-status exchange (individuals desire
partners of higher status and greater beauty,
but generally prefer partners of their own race
[Yancey 2009]), race-status exchange theory
suggests that interracial couples might be
uniquely prone to engage in cross-trait
exchange. Indeed, Sassler and Joyner (2011)
find that minority women exchange beauty
and sexual access for white mens social sta-
tus (but their test is incomplete because they
omit mens physical attractiveness).
However, just as beauty-status exchange
conflicts with couple matching on beauty and
status, race-status exchange conflicts with
matching on race and status. Empirical sup-
port for race-status exchange is mixed and
controversial (Gullickson and Fu 2010;
Kalmijn 2010; Rosenfeld 2005, 2010). It is
beyond the scope of this article to test whether
couples engage in race-status exchange. I do,
however, consider whether patterns of beauty-
status exchange might differ for interracial
couples. Part A of the online supplement
(http://asr. sagepub. com/supplemental)
addresses beauty-status exchange among
interracial couples in greater depth.
HYPOTHESES
Prior research demonstrates some support for
the theory that individuals trade one desirable
trait to obtain a partner with more of a differ-
ent desirable trait, but in the case of beauty
and status there is stronger evidence in sup-
port of matching. I expect that patterns of
beauty-status exchange found in earlier stud-
ies are, at least in part, artifacts of matching
on partner traits not controlled for in the
model. However, prior research proposes that
the prevalence of beauty-status exchange may
differ for certain subgroups, such as interra-
cial and less-committed couples.
Understanding the prevalence of beauty-
status exchange is important for theoretical
conceptions of partner selection and for ste-
reotypes regarding the importance of beauty
and status for women and men. Gendered
beauty-status exchange is the most prominent
example of cross-trait exchange in the part-
ner market, especially in popular culture.
Questioning the frequency of cross-trait
exchange in a context in which it is generally
assumed to occur does not challenge the mar-
ket model in all contexts, but it weakens its
status as the predominant paradigm for under-
standing partner selection processes. Addi-
tionally, if there is no evidence of gendered
beauty-status exchange, this challenges the
evolutionary model of partner selection and
discredits common assumptions about wom-
ens and mens priorities for partners. Finally,
understanding the social contexts in which
beauty-status exchange may occur provides
insight into the varying meanings of young-
adult romantic relationships.
DATA AND MEASURES
Data
I use data from the 2001 to 2002 National
Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health
Romantic Pair sample, a supplementary data-
set to the 1994 to 2008 National Longitudinal
Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health).
Add Health is a nationally representative,
longitudinal survey of adolescents in grades 7
through 12 at the initial interview (Chantala
2006; Harris et al. 2009). In the third wave of
data collection (Wave III), respondents, who
were mainly in their early 20s, provided
information on romantic relationships. From
current relationships of minimum three-
months duration, approximately 500 dating,
500 cohabiting, and 500 marriage partners
were selected to complete a slightly modified
version of the Wave III interview. These
1,507 couples (3,014 individuals) make up
the Romantic Pair sample.
Women in the Romantic Pair sample aver-
age about 22 years old and men average about
23.5 years. Except for Carmalt and colleagues
(2008) who use these same data, prior analyses
use small convenience samples (Elder 1969;
Stevens et al. 1990) or datasets that measure
only one partners attractiveness (Elder 1969;
Taylor and Glenn 1976; Udry 1977). Respond-
ents in the Romantic Pair data are equivalent in
age to at least two of the samples used previ-
ouslyCarmalt and colleagues (2008) and
Stevens and colleagues (1990). The samples
used by Udry (1977) and Taylor and Glenn
(1976) benefit from substantial age variation
(25 to 40 years), but they measure only one
partners physical attractiveness, and attrac-
tiveness ratings were often made several years
after marriage. Thus, although the Romantic
Pair data may not be ideal due to the samples
young average age and limited age-range (18
to 43 years), it improves upon datasets used in
prior analyses. Like prior analyses, this study
inevitably excludes single individuals; supple-
mental analyses suggest that attractiveness and
status promote partnering (see Part B in the
online supplement).
Measures
Add Health interviewers rated respondents
physical attractiveness using five levels: (1)
very unattractive to (5) very attractive. An
average of several observers ratings is ideal,
but prior studies indicate high inter-rater reli-
ability in evaluating attractiveness (Langlois
et al. 2000; Murstein 1972). In the Add Health
data, interviewers ratings are positively and
significantly correlated across waves: the cor-
relation between Wave I and Wave III ratings
(six to seven years apart) is .17 ( p < .001);
between Wave II and Wave III ratings (five
years apart), the correlation is .20 ( p < .001).
When the same interviewer rated both part-
ners, there is no evidence of unconsciously
exaggerating their similarity. Indeed, the cor-
relation of her and his physical attractiveness is
slightly lower when both partners were inter-
viewed by the same interviewer (not shown).
Interviewers also rated respondents
grooming and personality attractiveness on
five-level scales, yielding a three-item per-
sonal attractiveness index (physical, groom-
ing, personality). I primarily present models
using the single-item measure of physical
attractiveness, but results using the index are
similar. Body mass index (BMI) is a ratio of
height to weight approximating thinness or
overweight. Self-rated health ranges from (1)
fair or poor to (4) excellent.
Years of education refers to years of com-
pleted education. Among respondents, 17 per-
cent of men and 25 percent of women were
enrolled in college full-time, but only in 11
percent of couples were both partners full-
time students. Expected/completed college
graduation status is a dichotomous variable
indicating whether a respondent was a college
graduate or enrolled in a four-year degree
program versus having never attended college
or having dropped out. This variable addresses
right-censoring.
To measure socioeconomic status, I use the
Duncan Socioeconomic Index (SEI; Ruggles
et al. 2010), a measure of occupational pres-
tige that I obtained from U.S. Census data
from the Integrated Public Use Microdata
Series (IPUMS; Minnesota Population Center
2013). I use both current and forecast (future)
SEI. To create forecast SEI, I regressed Wave
IV SEI (five years later; available only for
original respondents) on race, age, educational
attainment, current SEI, picture-vocabulary
test score at Wave III, parental income, paren-
tal education, and parental SEI. I estimated
models separately by gender. I then used
McClintock 583
these regressions to forecast SEI for all
respondents. I use current (actual) and fore-
cast (future) income, generated in the same
way as SEI, to measure personal income. For
fathers occupational status, I use the Duncan
SEI of the occupation that the respondents
father worked in when the respondent was an
adolescent. Working-class origins are deter-
mined by whether a respondents father had a
working-class occupation when the respond-
ent was an adolescent, defined by having a
Hollingshead score of four or lower (of seven
possible levels). This distinguishes profes-
sionals, lesser professionals, semi-profession-
als, small business owners, and medium farm
owners from technicians, small farm owners,
farm workers, and skilled manual workers.
To measure race, respondents were asked
which one race best describes them. Because
of strong racial matching, I classify couples
as both non-Hispanic white (51 percent), both
non-Hispanic black (15 percent), both other
race (includes Hispanic; 13 percent), and
mixed-race (21 percent). Using only her or
his race does not alter results. Age is couples
age in years at the time of the interview.
Union status equals dating, cohabiting, or
married, and relationship duration is meas-
ured in months. Pregnancy denotes whether
the female partner is pregnant.
METHODOLOGY
Absolute or Relative Measures of
Desirability?
A methodological concern when investigating
exchange in partner selection is whether to use
absolute measures or relative measures, like
the difference between partners endowments
of a given asset. Regression models using dif-
ference measures always incorporate equal
information on both partners. But such models
are not equivalent to models that use absolute
measures and include all of both partners
characteristics. In a difference model, the
coefficient on the partners outcome variable
is constrained to be one and absolute levels are
assumed to be unimportant.
Although prior studies tend to focus on
absolute measures (but see McNulty, Neff,
and Karney 2008), beauty-status exchange
theory is more applicable to relative meas-
ures. Exchange theory predicts that when one
partner possesses more of one asset, this will
be offset by the other partner possessing more
of a different asset: which partner has more of
a given asset is best measured by the differ-
ence in their endowments of that asset. The
assumption that each partners absolute level
of a given asset does not matter is also con-
sistent with an exchange model. For example,
a woman might marry a man who is less
physically attractive than she is because the
man has higher socioeconomic status than the
womanbut neither partner is necessarily
high or low in attractiveness or status, meas-
ured in absolute terms. In my analysis I use
both the absolute and the difference approach:
if couples truly engage in cross-trait beauty-
status exchange, evidence of exchange should
be robust across both models and should be
especially apparent in the difference models.
Are Log-Linear or Negative Binomial
Models More Appropriate?
Researchers studying other aspects of partner
selection, such as race-status exchange, often
use log-linear or negative binomial regression
models (e.g., Rosenfeld 2001, 2005, 2010).
Negative binomial models are a generalization
of log-linear regression models that relax
assumptions about the distribution of data
(Long 1997). These models are well-suited to
studying partner selection because the depen-
dent variable is the distribution of couples
(Agresti 1996). This addresses an important
weakness in prior analyses of beauty-status
exchange: the hypothesis that physical attrac-
tiveness is traded for socioeconomic status
does not indicate either attractiveness or status
as a dependent variable. As a result, some prior
studies arbitrarily use socioeconomic status as
the dependent variable (Elder 1969; Taylor and
Glenn 1976; Udry 1977), whereas others use
physical attractiveness (Carmalt et al. 2008) or
use both measures (Stevens et al. 1990).
Log-linear and negative binomial regres-
sion models are also particularly appropriate
for identifying patterns of matching or
exchange. Controlling for the distribution of
beauty and status among partnered men and
women, these models test which pairings are
overrepresented in the data (e.g., whether
beautiful low-status women are disproportion-
ately paired with unattractive high-status
men). Parameters directly model the tendency
for partners to match (by having equal levels
of a given trait) or exchange (when one part-
ner has a higher level of one trait and the other
partner has a higher level of another trait).
The Current Analysis
I begin by describing the co-occurrence of
desirable traits at the individual and couple
level to illustrate the importance of including
complete information on both partners char-
acteristics in regression models testing
exchange theories. To search for evidence of
exchange, I examine the differences between
partners endowments of desirable traits.
Finally, because it is couples who differ on a
given trait that might engage in cross-trait
exchange, I look for patterns of exchange
among this subgroup of couples.
I next consider multivariate regression
models, estimating models that ignore match-
ing and the within-individual correlation of
desirable traits and then adding variables to
fully control for these forces. Consistent with
prior work, I estimate models separately by
gender. All models include age, race, preg-
nancy status, relationship duration, and union
status. Next, to test for exchange more
directly, I estimate regression models using
difference measures (his minus her level of
each trait). Finally, I estimate negative bino-
mial regression models, a generalization of
log-linear models that are preferred when
data are scarce and over-dispersion is prob-
lematic (King 1989; Long 1997; Long and
Freese 2006). In these data, relatively few
couples have disparate levels of attractiveness
and socioeconomic statusdata are scarce in
these cells. I use various measures and model
specifications to test the robustness of results.
I primarily present results using the entire
sample, but some key results are also pre-
sented for subgroups suspected of engaging
in beauty-status exchangecouples who dif-
fer on attractiveness (N = 810) or college
status (N = 242), minority-female white-male
couples (N = 95), and couples involving a
working-class-origin woman (N = 1,146) or a
five-year or larger age gap favoring the man
(N = 206). I also discuss models estimated
separately by union status; models that inter-
act the effects of interest with union status,
relationship duration, class background, and
race; and models restricted to couples in the
top 25th percentile of the age distribution
(women 23 to 40 years and men 24 to 43
years, N = 378), non-student couples (N =
1,341), couples interviewed by the same
interviewer (N = 1,305), and minority-white
couples (N = 209).
Although no one variable is missing for a
large number of cases, many cases are miss-
ing data on at least one variable. Dropping
cases with missing data would reduce the
sample size to 1,408 and would likely intro-
duce bias (Acock 2005). I use the ICE (Impu-
tation by Chained Equations) procedure in the
statistical software program Stata 10.1
(Royston 2004) to impute missing data using
switching regression, an iterative multivaria-
ble regression technique. I show results from
regression models estimated using the MIM
procedure in Stata 10.1 (Royston 2004).
Descriptive statistics and regression models
calculated by dropping cases with missing
data are similar to those using MIM (not
shown).
RESULTS
Sample Characteristics
Table 1 presents summary statistics on all
variables, by gender. Women are rated more
physically attractive than men. This gender
difference in physical attractiveness exists in
the full Add Health sample (including among
single individuals; see Table S3 in the online
supplement), perhaps because women invest
more in personal care and cosmetics. If women
McClintock 585
in prior cohorts were rated as more attractive
than men, this may have created the illusion of
exchange. In prior cohorts, many women mar-
ried higher-status men simply because, on
average, men had more education and higher
occupational status than did women. Even if
all couples sought equality in physical attrac-
tiveness and status, men would have had
higher status while women would have been
more attractive. But this would have resulted
from gender differences in average endow-
ments of attractiveness and status rather than
from a beauty-for-status exchange. In con-
trast, in these data women surpass men in
educational attainment and occupational sta-
tus (SEI). This gender reversal reflects changes
in the general populationwomen now earn
more college degrees than men (DiPrete and
Table 1. Mean Characteristics by Gender; National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health
Romantic Pair Sample (2001 to 2002); N = 1,507
Women Men

Mean or
Proportion SD
Mean or
Proportion SD
Attractiveness
Physical attractiveness
a
3.63
***
.86 3.44 .75
Personal attractiveness index
a
3.67
***
.69 3.48 .62
Body mass index (BMI) 26.49
***
6.67 27.15 5.64
Self-rated health
b
2.92
***
.87 3.10 .84
Socioeconomic Status
Expected college graduate
c
.27
***
.22
Years of completed education 12.96
**
1.96 12.74 1.98
Current Duncan socioeconomic index (SEI)
d
28.66 27.34 28.31 24.89
Forecast Duncan socioeconomic index (SEI)
d
46.94
***
8.74 39.69 11.73
Current income ($10,000s) 11.96
***
17.69 19.69 22.65
Forecast income ($10,000s) 29.46
***
12.91 46.83 13.09
Working-class social origins
e
.76 .74
Demographic Characteristics
Age (years) 21.85
***
2.37 23.48 3.30
Race
White .59 .59
Black .17 .18
Other .24 .23
Pregnant .07
Relationship Characteristics
Relationship duration (months) 38.66 26.66 38.29 26.76
Married .36 .36
Cohabiting .36 .36
Dating .28 .28
Note: Descriptive statistics use multiple imputed datasets to estimate missing values.
a
Scored from 1 (very physically unattractive) to 5 (very physically attractive). The personal
attractiveness index reects respondents average rating on three measures of attractiveness: physical,
personality, and grooming.
b
From (1) fair or poor to (4) excellent.
c
This dichotomous variable indicates respondents who have completed a four-year college degree or are
currently enrolled in a four-year degree program.
d
A measure of occupational prestige. Ratings range from 0 (low) to 96 (high). Forecast SEI is projected
SEI at Wave IV when respondents will be in their late 20s.
e
I dene individuals of working-class social origins as having a father who worked in an occupation
with a Hollingshead rank of four or lower.
*
p < .05;
**
p < .01;
***
p < .001; p-values indicate signicant gender differences (two-tailed tests).
Table 2. Within-Individual Correlation of Desirable Characteristics; National Longitudinal
Study of Adolescent Health Romantic Pair Sample (2001 to 2002); N = 1,507
Women Men

Correlation of Her
Attractiveness and
Her Status
Correlation of His
Attractiveness
and His Status
Attractiveness EDU
d
GRAD
e
SEI
f
INC
g
EDU
d
GRAD
e
SEI
f
INC
g
Physical attractiveness .127
***
a
.155
***
a
.175
***
a
.065
*
a
.166
***
a
.156
***
a
.132
***
a
.096
***
a
Personal attractiveness
index
.179
***
b
.186
***
b
.222
***
b
.104
***
b
.230
***
b
.179
***
b
.197
***
b
.120
***
b
BMI, reverse-coded
c
.140
***
b
.207
***
b
.207
***
b
.043
b
.015
b
.071
**
b
.011
b
.028
b
Self-rated health .200
***
a
.191
***
a
.167
***
a
.102
***
a
.172
***
a
.166
***
a
.124
*
a
.102
***
a
Note: Descriptive statistics use multiple imputed datasets to estimate missing values.
a
Correlations and signicance tests involving one or more ordinal variables are calculated using
Spearmans Rho.
b
Correlations and signicance tests involving only interval variables are calculated using Pearsons
correlation.
c
Body mass index. Reverse-coded so that higher values indicate thinner (normatively more desirable)
physiques.
d
EDU is years of completed education.
e
GRAD is expected college graduation status.
f
SEI is projected future occupational status.
g
INC is projected future income.
*
p < .05;
**
p < .01;
***
p < .001 (two-tailed tests).
Buchman 2006), and single, childless, young
women out-earn their male counterparts
(Wiseman 2010). These gender differences in
education and occupational status observed in
the Add Health data are also evident among
respondents of a similar age in the 2000 U.S.
Census (authors calculations; not shown).
Co-occurrence of Desirable Traits
Table 2 demonstrates that the various dimen-
sions of desirability are strongly and posi-
tively correlated within individuals. Because
physically attractive individuals tend to be
high in socioeconomic status (and vice versa),
partner matching on one or both of these traits
might generate the illusion of cross-trait
between-partner exchange. The within-indi-
vidual correlations between desirable traits are
not strong enough to preclude exchange, but
they are strong enough to generate spurious
evidence of exchange. Additionally, when
desirable traits co-occur, matching on any one
trait encourages matching on related traits.
Between-Partner Similarity
Table 3 displays strong evidence of matching on
physical attractiveness, education, and occupa-
tional status (SEI). The correlations between her
and his expected college graduation status
(.575), years of completed education (.557), and
SEI (.546) are especially strong. The between-
partner correlation of attractiveness (.256) is
similar in magnitude to equivalent correlations
in all other samples known to the author (Barelds
et al. 2011; Stevens et al. 1990). None of the
statistically significant between-partner within-
trait correlations are negative, as predicted by an
exchange model in which high-status but
homely individuals are paired with low-status
but good-looking partners.
The various measures of one partners
desirability are also positively and signifi-
cantly correlated with other measures of the
other partners desirability. For example, the
correlation between her physical attractive-
ness and his years of completed education is
.186 ( p < .001). Prior studies present similar
587
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bivariate cross-trait associations as evidence
that men exchange socioeconomic status for
womens attractiveness (e.g., Elder 1969).
However, these same cross-trait correlations
are evident within individuals, and couple-
level within-trait correlations are generally
stronger than cross-trait correlations, so
matching may be a sufficient explanation.
The correlations in Table 3 might be mis-
leading if a minority of couples engage in
beauty-status exchange while the majority
match on these traits. Importantly, couples
who might engage in beauty-status exchange
are identifiable: they differ on some measure
of desirability (few couples differ on these
itemsfor example, 84 percent have the
same college graduation status). If beauty-
status exchange is prevalent, couples who
differ in status would have negatively corre-
lated attractiveness ratings. Equivalently,
couples who differ in attractiveness would
have negatively correlated status. Only cou-
ples with equal status or equal attractiveness
(who cannot be engaging in beauty-status
exchange) would have positively correlated
traits.
Estimating correlations separately by com-
binations of her and his status (or attractive-
ness) indicates that matching is the dominant
pattern for all groups (not shown). For exam-
ple, the correlation of her and his physical
attractiveness is .20 when both partners are
not expected to earn college diplomas ( p <
.001; 67 percent of couples belong to this
group), .30 when she is expected to graduate
from college but he is not ( p < .001; 11 per-
cent of couples), .34 when he is expected to
graduate from college but she is not ( p < .01;
5 percent of couples), and .25 when both are
expected to graduate from college ( p < .001;
17 percent of couples). In contradiction to the
beauty-status exchange model, the correlation
of her and his attractiveness is positive regard-
less of whether the couple differs on status. In
fact, correlations are stronger when the couple
differs on college status. Correlations of phys-
ical attractiveness by categorical measures of
her and his completed years of education and
quartiles of her and his SEI are also positive
for all groups.
Between-Partner Differences in
Endowments
If cross-trait exchange occurs, then when part-
ners possess an unequal amount of one par-
ticular trait, this should be offset by an
inequality in the other direction on some other
trait. For example, if one partner is physically
attractive and the other is not, the unattractive
partner should compensate by possessing
more of some other asset, such as education or
high occupational status. In this case, the dif-
ferences between the partners levels of these
desirable traits (his minus her level) would be
negatively correlated. Table 4 shows these
correlations for the entire sample and for sub-
groups thought to engage in gendered beauty-
status exchange. None of the differences in the
measures of socioeconomic status are signifi-
cantly and negatively correlated with the dif-
ference in physical attractiveness or with the
personal attractiveness index. Table S5 in the
online supplement presents equivalent corre-
lations using differences (his minus her) in an
expanded array of endowments.
I also examined average differences in
endowments for couples who differ on status
or attractiveness (not shown). If these couples
engage in cross-trait exchange, then when one
partner has an advantage on one trait, the
other partner should have an advantage on
another traitbut this is not the case in these
data. For example, when women are advan-
taged in college degree status (women are
better-educated), womens advantage in phys-
ical attractiveness is .26 (women are more
attractive). When partners have the same
degree status, womens advantage is .19.
When men are advantaged in degree status,
there is no gender difference in physical
attractiveness. This is the reverse of the pat-
tern predicted by exchange. For no measure
of status does the difference in attractiveness
change monotonically in the direction pre-
dicted by beauty-status exchange.
Conventional Regression Models
Table 5 presents regression models examin-
ing gender-stereotypical exchange, in which
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women might use attractiveness to obtain
high-status men, and models examining
reverse-stereotypical exchange, in which men
use attractiveness to obtain high-status
women. Results are similar in otherwise
equivalent models that use physical attrac-
tiveness as the dependent variable (see Table
S6 in the online supplement). The table pres-
ents status as the dependent variable because
more prior researchers have taken this
approach. Models GS-1a, GS-2a, and GS-3a
examine gender-stereotypical exchange (GS),
using womens physical attractiveness to pre-
dict mens socioeconomic status. Models
RS-1a, RS-2a, and RS-3a examine reverse-
stereotypical exchange (RS). Models GS-1b,
GS-2b, and GS-3b add the male partners
attractiveness and the female partners status
to test whether any apparent exchange of
attractiveness for status in Models GS-1a,
GS-2a, and GS-3a was due to matching on
attractiveness and to the within-individual
correlation of attractiveness with status. Mod-
els RS-1a, RS-2a, and RS-3a are equivalent
for reverse-stereotypical exchange.
In Models GS-2b and GS-3b (but not in
GS-1b), adding the male partners attractive-
ness and the female partners socioeconomic
status eliminates the apparent relationship
between womens attractiveness and mens
status. Fully controlling for both partners
traits has the same effect in Models RS-2b
and RS-3b. But there still remains evidence in
Models GS-1b and RS-1b that both genders
might exchange attractiveness for a more
educated partner, when measured by com-
pleted years of education (but not when meas-
ured by expected college graduation status).
Models including interactions to test for dis-
proportionate pairings (e.g., whether attrac-
tive low-status women disproportionately
partner with unattractive high-status men) do
not reveal evidence of beauty-status exchange
(not shown).
Difference Measures
The models displayed in Table 6 use the dif-
ference in physical attractiveness (his minus
her rating) to predict the difference (his minus
her) in the various measures of socioeco-
nomic status. This is arguably the most direct
and compelling test of beauty-status exchange;
I therefore present models for the entire
sample and for subgroups thought to engage
in beauty-status exchange. In no instance is
there support for exchange. The beauty-status
exchange model predicts that when one part-
ner has more beauty, the other partner will
have more statusif so, the differences in
these attributes would be negatively related.
Yet the differences in attractiveness and status
are not related (and coefficients are generally
positive). Models using the difference in sta-
tus to predict the difference in physical attrac-
tiveness likewise provide no evidence of
beauty-status exchange (not shown).
Table 6 indicates that the difference in age
is positively associated with the difference in
years of completed education (but not with
the difference in college degree). Respond-
ents are in their early 20s and many are still
finishing their educationuntil education is
completed, an older partner may temporarily
have more education. Given that men tend to
be somewhat older than their partners, they
often have a temporary advantage in com-
pleted years of schooling. This might gener-
ate the appearance of women dating up in
education, when it is actually an artifact of the
gendered age gap.
Negative Binomial Models
Table 7 presents results from three sets of
negative binomial models. I use negative
binomial models rather than log-linear mod-
els because of significant over-dispersion.
These models analyze the distribution of
cross-tabulated data so they require categori-
cal variables. Physical attractiveness is
divided into four groups (very physically
unattractive is combined with physically
unattractive). Occupational status (SEI) is
divided into four quartiles. Years of com-
pleted education is divided into four levels:
less than high school, high school graduate,
some college, and four-year college graduate
or higher. Tables using completed education
and SEI are 4x4x4x4. The table using
591
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McClintock 593
expected college graduation status is 2x2x4x4.
Equations are as follows:
(1a)
(1b)
(2a)
(2b)
(3a)
(3b)
MPA is the males physical attractiveness,
FPA is the females physical attractiveness,
MEDU is his completed education, FEDU is
her completed education, MGRAD is his
expected college graduation status, FGRAD is
her expected college graduation status, MSEI
is his occupational status, FSEI is her occupa-
tional status, matching on PA is matching on
physical attractiveness (equal to one if MPA =
FPA; equal to zero otherwise), matching on
EDU is matching on completed education (one
if MEDU = FEDU; zero otherwise), matching
on GRAD is matching on college graduation
status (one if MGRAD = FGRAD; zero other-
wise), matching on SEI is matching on
occupational status (one if MSEI = FSEI; zero
otherwise), PA-EDU exchange is gender-sym-
metric exchange of physical attractiveness for
completed education (one if MPA > FPA and
MEDU < FEDU; also one if MPA < FPA and
MEDU > FEDU; zero otherwise), PA-GRAD
exchange is gender-symmetric exchange of
physical attractiveness for expected college
graduation status (one if MPA > FPA and
MGRAD < FGRAD; one if MPA < FPA and
MGRAD > FGRAD; zero otherwise), PA-SEI
exchange is gender-symmetric exchange of
physical attractiveness for occupational status
(one if MPA > FPA and MSEI < FSEI; one if
MPA < FPA and MSEI > FSEI; zero other-
wise), FPA-MEDU exchange is gender-stereo-
typical exchange of the females physical
attractiveness for the males completed educa-
tion (one if MPA < FPA and MEDU > FEDU;
zero otherwise), FPA-MGRAD exchange is
gender-stereotypical exchange of her physical
attractiveness for his expected college gradua-
tion status (one if MPA < FPA and MGRAD >
FGRAD; zero otherwise), and FPA-MSEI
exchange is gender-stereotypical exchange of
her physical attractiveness for his status (one if
MPA < FPA and MSEI > FSEI; zero other-
wise). The remaining interactions (MPA x
MEDU, FPA x FEDU, MPA x MGRAD, FPA
x FGRAD, MPA x MSEI, and FPA x FSEI)
account for within-individual correlation of
physical attractiveness and status.
4
For each measure of socioeconomic sta-
tus, I first present a model testing for match-
ing and for gender-symmetric exchange
(either partner might trade attractiveness for
status or vice versa). I next add a parameter
modeling gender-stereotypical exchange
(men offer status and women offer attractive-
ness). All six models indicate a strong ten-
dency toward matching, but only one set of
models provides any evidence of beauty-sta-
tus exchange. Specifically, Model 1a indi-
cates gender-symmetric exchange of current
educational attainment for attractiveness.
There is no evidence of gender-stereotypical
exchangewomen are not significantly
more likely to trade attractiveness for status
than are men.
Log(P) = Constant + MPA + FPA + MEDU +
FEDU + MPA x MEDU + FPA x FEDU
+ Matching on PA + Matching on EDU
+ PA-EDU Exchange
Log(P) = Constant + MPA + FPA + MEDU +
FEDU + MPA x MEDU + FPA x FEDU
+ Matching on PA + Matching on EDU
+ PA-EDU Exchange + FPA-MEDU
Exchange
Log(P) = Constant + MPA + FPA + MGRAD +
FGRAD + MPA x MGRAD + FPA x
FGRAD + Matching on PA + Matching
on GRAD + PA-GRAD Exchange
Log(P) = Constant + MPA + FPA + MGRAD +
FGRAD + MPA x MGRAD + FPA x
FGRAD + Matching on PA + Matching
on GRAD + PA-GRAD Exchange +
FPA-MGRAD Exchange
Log(P) = Constant + MPA + FPA + MSEI + FSEI
+ MPA x MSEI + FPA x FSEI +
Matching on PA + Matching on
SEI + PA-SEI Exchange
Log(P) = Constant + MPA + FPA + MSEI + FSEI
+ MPA x MSEI + FPA x FSEI +
Matching on PA + Matching on SEI +
PA-SEI Exchange + FPA-MSEI
Exchange
594
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McClintock 595
MEASUREMENT
Alternative Measures
Evidence of matching is very robust to differ-
ent measures, but evidence of beauty-status
exchange is not robust. Partners levels of
other desirable traits (grooming, personality,
emotional supportiveness, self-rated health,
current occupational status, and current and
projected income) are generally positively
correlated (partial results in Table 3). The dif-
ferences (his minus her) in these other traits
are predominately uncorrelated or positively
correlated with the differences in attractive-
ness and status, whereas the exchange model
predicts negative correlations (see Table S5 in
the online supplement). Regression models
using alternative measures of socioeconomic
status do not produce evidence of beauty-
status exchange (see Table S7 in the online
supplement); measures include social mobil-
ity (an individual is socially mobile if her/his
partner has higher occupational status than
her/his father), current occupational status,
and current income. Using the attractiveness
index (physical, personality, grooming) pro-
duces equivalent results to those using the
single measure of physical attractiveness
(partial results in Table 3).
Life Course and Measurement Bias
To test whether the young age of the Roman-
tic Pair sample is biasing results, I estimated
models using only the oldest quartile of cou-
ples (women age 23 to 40 years and men age
24 to 43; results not shown). Beauty-status
exchange is no more evident among these
couples than among the entire sample. Still,
even the oldest fourth of couples are young,
making results difficult to generalize to older-
age marriages or to remarriages. The young
age of this sample is also problematic in that
education and occupational status in the early
20s might be poor indicators of long-term
economic prospects. To some extent, the mea-
sure of expected college graduation status
addresses this concern. Almost 85 percent of
couples share the same expected college
graduation status, and there is no evidence of
exchanging college status for beauty. Like-
wise, the measure of forecasted SEI tests
whether physically attractive individuals
leverage their beauty to obtain partners with
high future status. Actual SEI five years later
(Wave IV) is available for the original respon-
dents, and substituting it for projected SEI
does not change results. This is also true
when using forecasted and actual income.
This allays concerns that measures taken at
Wave III might be misleading. Finally, cur-
rent college enrollment status might bias
results if college students are particularly
likely to match on attractiveness or status.
However, only 11 percent of couples consist
of two full-time students and excluding them
does not change results.
SUBGROUP DIFFERENCES
Union Status
Conventional regression models (as in Table
5) estimated by union status (see Table S8 in
the online supplement) indicate that the
exchange effect in Models GS-1b and RS-1b
is driven by dating couples: only for dating
couples did one partners physical attractive-
ness predict the other partners years of edu-
cation. However, only when predicting
womens education did the difference by
union status reach statistical significance.
When the difference models (as in Table 6)
are estimated by union status, or when inter-
actions are added to test for differences by
union status, there is still no evidence of
beauty-status exchange for any group (not
shown). Similarly, I estimated the negative
binomial models by union status and also
estimated models interacting the exchange
and matching parameters with union status
(not shown). The exchange effect in Model 1a
(Table 7) is evident only for cohabiting and
dating couples (the difference by union status
is not statistically significant). Results do not
vary significantly by relationship duration
(divided into thirds) for any of the regression
analyses.
Race and Class Background
Elder (1969) and Taylor and Glenn (1976)
propose social-class differences in womens
propensity to use beauty as a means of secur-
ing a high-status husband, arguing that
women of working-class origins would need
beauty to compensate higher-status husbands
for the womens low class status.
5
Udry
(1977) also suggests differences between
black and white respondents, although with-
out elucidating the theoretical rationale for
expecting racial differences. Elder (1969),
Taylor and Glenn (1976), and Udry (1977) all
use regression models similar to those shown
in Table 5, so I estimated models like Model
GS-1b, GS-2b, and GS-3b, adding the wom-
ens fathers occupational status and the inter-
action of womens attractiveness with their
fathers occupational status (not shown). To
test whether gendered beauty-status exchange
varies by race, I estimated models like Model
GS-1b, GS-2b, and GS-3b in Table 5, adding
the interaction of womens attractiveness and
race (not shown). I did not find that beauty-
status exchange varies by fathers occupa-
tional status or that it is different for black
versus white women.
Interracial Couples
Sassler and Joyner (2011) find that couples
with the most disparate earnings are minor-
ity women partnered with white men, and
that these women are more likely to be rated
as attractive than are women in every
other racial combination. However, it is
impossible to conclude that minority women
trade their beauty for white mens status or
income without knowing how attractive the
men are. Sassler and Joyners analysis also
fails to account for race-gender differences
in earnings and for the full, five-level distri-
bution of attractiveness. My analysis of
average physical attractiveness rating, years
of education, college status, age, and income
by individual race and by couple race com-
bination does not suggest racialized, gender-
stereotypical cross-trait exchange (Table S2;
see Part A in the online supplement for fur-
ther discussion).
I also estimated regression models equiva-
lent to those in Table 5 for couples in which
either partner is a minority and the other is
white, and for couples in which the female is
a minority and the male is white (see Table S2
in the online supplement). There is some evi-
dence of beauty-status exchange among
minority-white couples when years of com-
pleted education is used as the measure of
status, but not when college graduation status
or SEI is used. This is the same pattern dis-
played in the larger population, so there is no
evidence that white-minority couples differ
from other couples in their propensity to
engage in beauty-status exchange.
Age-Discrepant Couples
Stereotypical trophy wives are not only prettier
but also younger. When restricting the sample to
the 206 couples in which the male partner is five
or more years older, estimates from regression
models equivalent to those in Table 5 (see Table
S9 in the online supplement) support reverse-
stereotypical exchange only when years of
education is used to measure status, not when
using college graduation status or SEI. Gender-
stereotypical exchange is not evident for any
measure of status. Altogether, there is weaker
evidence of beauty-status exchange among age-
discrepant couples than among the larger popu-
lation (possibly due partly to reduced power
resulting from the smaller sample size). Simi-
larly, there is little evidence of women (or men)
trading youth for status. In Table 6, the differ-
ence in age (his minus her) is positively associ-
ated with the difference in years of education,
but this is simply because the younger partner
temporarily has less education. For example, a
college sophomore dating a college senior has
two years less education, but this difference is
presumably transient. Consistent with this inter-
pretation, the difference in age is unrelated to
the difference in expected/completed college
graduation status.
Dissimilar Couples
I examined descriptive statistics (Table 4) and
regression models (Table 6 and Table S10 in
McClintock 597
the online supplement) restricting the sample
to couples who differ substantially on educa-
tion (by at least one degree level), on occupa-
tional status (by belonging to different
quartiles), or on physical attractiveness (by
one or more levels). It is the couples who dif-
fer on socioeconomic status or on attractive-
ness who might possibly exchange one trait
for the other, but partnering patterns among
these couples mirror those presented for the
entire sample. Despite a difference on one
dimension, these couples still tend toward
matching on other dimensions.
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
I first began with bivariate analyses and
found strong evidence of matching but no
evidence of beauty-status exchange. Second,
I estimated multivariate regression models
that are similar to those used in prior analyses
(by other authors) in that they do not account
for between-partner matching or for within-
individual correlation of desirable traits. In
these models there initially appears to be an
exchange of socioeconomic status for physi-
cal attractiveness, but it is generally elimi-
nated in a correctly specified model that
accounts for matching and for within-individ-
ual correlation of desirable traits (Table 5).
Third, I estimated models using difference
measures: these models provide a more direct
test of beauty-status exchange than do the
conventional multivariate regression models,
but they produced no evidence of exchange
(Table 6). Fourth, I estimated negative bino-
mial models (a generalization of log-linear
models), which are particularly well-suited to
identifying patterns of matching and
exchange. For only one measure of status is
there any support for beauty-status exchange,
although matching is evident for all measures
(Table 7). Patterns of beauty-status exchange
do not differ much (if at all) for interracial or
age-discrepant couples or for couples who
differ on beauty or status. The only possible
form of beauty-status exchange is gender-
symmetric exchange of current educational
attainment for physical attractiveness, but it is
not robust to all model specifications or alter-
native measures of status. Models estimated
by union status suggest that this possible
beauty-status exchange is limited to less-
committed relationships.
DISCUSSION
Using data on 1,507 couples in their early 20s
in married, cohabiting, and dating relation-
ships of minimum three-months duration, I
revisit the question of how often romantic
partners trade physical attractiveness for
socioeconomic status, uniting the research on
matching in partner selection with that on
beauty-status exchange. Prior literature presents
an empirical paradox, with some authors
demonstrating widespread matching on status
and on attractiveness and other authors argu-
ing that individuals commonly exchange
these traits (usually, that pretty women marry
high-status men). It is certainly possible that
some couples might match on attractiveness
and status while other couples exchange these
traitsthe theories are not mutually exclu-
sive. However, prior empirical support for
beauty-status exchange suffers from method-
ological limitations, leaving the prevalence
and distribution of beauty-status exchange
indeterminate.
There is a positive within-individual cor-
relation of physical attractiveness and socio-
economic statusindividuals advantaged on
one dimension tend to be advantaged on the
other. Given this, matching on attractiveness
and status creates a between-partner cross-
trait correlation between her beauty and his
status (and vice versa), even in the absence of
beauty-status exchange. This correlation
might be misconstrued as beauty-status
exchange in miss-specified models, including
the models used in prior analyses. Accord-
ingly, I investigated how much evidence of
exchange remains in correctly specified mod-
els that fully account for matching and for
within-individual correlation of desirable
traits. Results of this analysis have implica-
tions for general theoretical understandings of
partner selection and for sociobiological
explanations that assume a gendered beauty-
status exchange.
I found some support for beauty-status
exchange, but it is not robust to alternative
measures or model specifications. In conduct-
ing a quantitative analysis, the question
should not be whether a specific model can be
found that supports a given theory, but
whether that result is consistent across a
range of reasonable models and measures
(Leamer 1983; Rosenfeld 2005). Beauty-sta-
tus exchange is only evident when status is
measured by current years of education, the
most transient measure of status advantage
(compared to expected/completed college
graduation status, projected socioeconomic
status, and projected income). In the early
20s, when many individuals are still complet-
ing school, a difference in years of completed
education is often temporary and therefore
not indicative of true socioeconomic advan-
tage. Moreover, exchange of years of educa-
tion for physical attractiveness was evident in
the conventional multivariate regression
models and the negative binomial models, but
not in the difference models or the descriptive
analysis. This limited evidence of beauty-
status exchange is gender-symmetric (either
partner might trade beauty for status) and is
driven by less-committed couples (dating and
perhaps cohabiting couples).
This analysis suggests that some prior sup-
port for beauty-status exchange may have
resulted from between-partner matching and
the within-individual co-occurrence of desira-
ble traits. In these instances, the apparent
exchange effect is eliminated by accounting
for these forces or by testing for exchange
more directly (as in the difference models).
The inconsistent support for beauty-status
exchange in this analysis is not due to its inclu-
sion of dating and cohabiting couples. Were
this study limited to the 543 married couples,
there would be absolutely no evidence of
exchange, yet prior studies claim evidence of
exchange using much smaller married-couple
samples (Elder 1969; Taylor and Glenn 1976)
of equally narrow age range (Elder 1969).
Using the sample most comparable to prior
studies (married couples) refutes prior findings
even more unequivocally.
Admittedly, some prior studies claiming
evidence of gendered beauty-status exchange
examine earlier cohorts in which women had
greater incentive to use beauty as a means of
social mobility. Still, even these early studies
show an association between womens socio-
economic status and their physical attractive-
ness and between womens and mens
socioeconomic status (Elder 1969; Taylor and
Glenn 1976; Udry 1977). Additionally, two of
the studies focus on recent cohorts in which
women enjoyed reasonably equal access to
labor market opportunities (partnerships
formed in 2001 to 2002 in Carmalt and col-
leagues [2008]; partnerships formed in 1990 in
Stevens and colleagues [1990]). Moreover, the
absence of robust evidence for exchange in the
current analysis cannot be entirely attributed to
womens new economic independence: the
argument that women trade beauty for money
out of economic necessity implies that modern
women might use their labor market success to
secure physically attractive men with poor
labor market prospects (e.g., Press 2004), but
this occurs infrequently, if at all.
It is not just social structural theories that
predict women trade beauty for mens socio-
economic resources. The sociobiological
model makes the same prediction and sug-
gests little variation between cohorts. If mat-
ing strategies are genetically programmed,
they will change only across many genera-
tions. But among the recent cohort of young
adults in this study, partner choices are not
driven by hypothetical evolutionary adapta-
tions that cause men to value womens beauty
and women to value mens breadwinning.
That this gendered beauty-status exchange
does not occur casts doubt on the sociobio-
logical account of partnering. If evolutionary
adaptations for beauty-status exchange exist,
they are less impervious to social-structural
counter-forces than is usually assumed in
sociobiological models. An evolutionary
adaptation that is so completely nullified by
changing social conditions is an adaptation
that may very well not exist.
McClintock 599
What little evidence there is for beauty-
status exchange indicates that its prevalence
declines with commitment, insofar as dating
couples can be assumed to be least committed,
compared to cohabiting and married couples,
and married couples most committed. Beauty-
status disparate couples, like interracial cou-
ples, may undergo a winnowing process and
advance less often to higher levels of commit-
ment. Couples might think it would be a good
idea to trade beauty for status, only to find that
the status difference renders them incompati-
ble. Indeed, much of the tendency for partners
to be of similar socioeconomic status is driven
by a desire for cultural compatibility (Bourdieu
1984; Kalmijn 1994). Thus, a beautiful but
poorly educated woman might find she has
too little in common with college-educated
men for a viable companionate marriage.
Likewise, a college-educated man might value
a womans beauty more than her income, but
if he requires that his mate shares his middle-
class culture, this may preclude beauty-status
exchange. Only the very affluent could trade
wealth for beauty while still matching on edu-
cation and thus ensuring cultural compatibil-
ity. They may also be the only ones able to
afford a more beautiful partner, given indi-
viduals reluctance to compromise on beauty
(Li et al. 2002; Li and Kenrick 2006; Sprecher
1989). There are not enough wealthy individu-
als in these data to test that possibility.
Another explanation for the minimal evi-
dence of cross-trait beauty-status exchange in
these data is that social constraints limit oppor-
tunities to meet status-disparate partners.
About a quarter of respondents were enrolled
in or recently graduated from college, which
encourages educationally homogenous peer
groups and limits contact with potential educa-
tionally dissimilar partners. Obviously, select-
ing a partner of ones own educational level
precludes trading education for other desired
traits such as physical attractiveness. Given the
strong association between education and
occupational status, matching on education
also limits individuals ability to trade occupa-
tional status for physical attractiveness.
Unfortunately, the Romantic Pair sample
is limited to young couples of a recent cohort,
preventing an examination of beauty-status
exchange over the life course and between
cohorts. Gendered beauty-status exchange
may have been more prevalent in earlier
cohorts when women had less access to
employment, or it might be primarily a phe-
nomenon of later-age marriages or remar-
riages. Men who marry at older ages marry
down more in age (England and McClintock
2009), possibly indicating a tendency to trade
youth and beauty for socioeconomic status. In
these data I find no evidence of stereotypi-
cally gendered beauty-status exchange among
the 206 couples in which the husband is at
least five years older, but none of these men
exceed middle-age. Beauty-status exchange
may be uncommon among young couples
partly because few young adults have sub-
stantially older partners. Young couples might
attach more importance to similarity or face
greater structural constraints that ensure
matching. Beauty-status exchange may be
more common from the perspective of older
adults, particularly older men who have
amassed substantial wealth and frequently
marry much younger wives.
Additionally, the young age of the Roman-
tic Pair sample complicates measurement of
status attainment. Education and occupational
status in the early 20s can only estimate long-
term economic prospects. To the extent pos-
sible, I address this weakness by utilizing
current and forecasted measures of status.
Still, despite the age and cohort limitations,
the Add Health Romantic Pair data improve
upon datasets used in prior analyses, which
often use small convenience samples (Elder
1969; Stevens et al. 1990) or measure only
one partners attractiveness (Elder 1969; Tay-
lor and Glenn 1976; Udry 1977). To my
knowledge, the Romantic Pair dataset is the
only representative, large, probability sample
providing observer-rated attractiveness for
both romantic partners.
The near absence of beauty-status
exchange in these data does not imply the
absence of competition over these traits. If
other attributes are not traded for beauty,
competition for the most physically attractive
individuals would result in matching on
attractiveness. Thus, results are compatible
with a limited version of the market model, in
which markets are restricted to individuals
of similar social status or in which social
norms regarding beauty and status prohibit
cross-trait exchange while permitting compe-
tition within any one dimension. Alternatively,
the beauty-status exchange model may fail if
its implicit assumption that socioeconomic
status is a consensually ranked trait is invalid.
Many individuals might desire wealthy part-
ners, but assuming that status is consensually
ranked overlooks the importance of culture
and compatibility in modern unions.
Still, although it was unreliable, there was
some support for beauty-status exchange in
this analysis. It may be most common in less-
committed relationships, suggesting that
beauty-status exchange generates instability
(and early relationship dissolution) or is only
pursued when relationships have a short time-
horizon. Importantly, what evidence there
was for beauty-status exchange was gender-
symmetric, meaning that both men and
women trade attractiveness for status. By
failing to find evidence of gendered beauty-
status exchange, this article challenges the
relevance of evolutionary adaptations in
determining partner selection. If such adapta-
tions exist, they ought to be evident among
young adults of prime reproductive age
(regardless of whether these young adults are
consciously pursuing reproductive mates).
This article also demonstrates how the expec-
tations researchers bring to a topic may bias
their findings. Assuming that the importance
of beauty and status is gendered may cause
researchers to overlook mens attractiveness
and womens socioeconomic resources and
thus to misidentify matching as exchange.
Finally, this article questions the preeminence
of the market model of partner selection in
sociological research. Competition doubtless
occurs, and cross-trait exchange might be
common in other populations and along
dimensions other than beauty and status. But
among the young adults in these data, there is
strong evidence in favor of matching as the
dominant paradigm for selecting partners, at
least with regard to physical attractiveness
and socioeconomic status. In this context,
social structural barriers, compatibility, and
companionship may strongly influence part-
ner choice.
Data
This research uses data from Add Health, a program
project designed by J. Richard Udry, Peter S. Bearman,
and Kathleen Mullan Harris, and funded by a grant
P01-HD31921 from the National Institute of Child
Health and Human Development, with cooperative fund-
ing from 17 other agencies. Special acknowledgment is
due Ronald R. Rindfuss and Barbara Entwisle for assis-
tance in the original design. Persons interested in obtain-
ing data files from Add Health should contact Add
Health, Carolina Population Center, 123 W. Franklin
Street, Chapel Hill, NC 27516-2524 (addhealth@unc
.edu).
Acknowledgments
Thanks are due to Michael J. Rosenfeld, Paula England,
Shelley J. Correll, Matthijs Kalmijn, Christine R.
Schwartz, Jessica L. Collett, Erin Metz McDonnell,
David Wood, and four anonymous ASR reviewers for
their helpful comments on this article.
Notes
1. Equivalent empirical paradoxes regarding other
combinations of traits are beyond the scope of this
study.
2. Kanazawa and Kovar (2004) argue that insofar as
physical attractiveness, intelligence, and status are
heritable, beauty-status exchange would generate a
correlation between attractiveness and status in off-
spring. But I argue that this beauty-status exchange
may not occur.
3. Stevens and colleagues (1990) include male attrac-
tiveness and note strong similarity between spouses
physical attractiveness and education. They refute
the cross-trait exchange model due to a null find-
ing, not because they specify the regression model
correctly (they use the first partners education and
physical attractiveness to predict one of these traits
in the second partner, ignoring the second partners
other trait). Carmalt and colleagues 2008 dismiss
the null result in Stevens and colleagues, arguing
that the sample size may be too small to reveal pat-
terns of exchange that do in fact exist.
4. Excluding these parameters suppresses evidence
of exchange. The cells representing exchange are
sparse partly because these are the cells in which
individuals violate the usual pattern of having simi-
larly high (low) levels of attractiveness and status.
McClintock 601
5. These studies do not report whether the class dif-
ference is statistically significant. These analyses
also fail to control for matching, and thus do not
consider the spurious appearance of exchange that
is generated by matching.
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Elizabeth Aura McClintock is an Assistant Professor of
sociology at the University of Notre Dame. She studies
gender and inequality in the context of romantic and
sexual relationships, particularly in partner selection and
in negotiated outcomes within established relationships.
Her research addresses how intimate relationships reflect,
perpetuate, and potentially alter broader patterns of gen-
der, class, age, and racial inequality.

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