Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 136781 October 6, 2000
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA,
MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA, ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO
PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN, and LUZON FARMERS PARTY, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA,
PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW-UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-
BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMEN-POWER, INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L,
AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAKBAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS,
ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS -- All Being Party-
List Parties/Organizations -- and Hon. MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. in His Capacity as Speaker of the
House of Representatives, respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 136786 October 6, 2000
AKBAYAN! (CITIZENS' ACTION PARTY), ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA
LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO), and ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVES (APEC),petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by Speaker
Manuel B. Villar, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN,
MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS
OCW, WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, FOUR "L", AWATU, PMP, ATUCP,
NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN,
KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS, respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 136795 October 6, 2000
ALAGAD (PARTIDO NG MARALITANG-LUNGSOD), NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF SMALL
COCONUT FARMERS' ORGANIZATIONS (NCSFCO), and LUZON FARMERS' PARTY
(BUTIL), petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN,
PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW,
ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP,
ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-
LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, and AABANTE KA PILIPINAS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
*

Prologue
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and Republic Act (RA) No.
7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed
twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the
party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid
votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is
entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."
Because the Comelec violated these legal parameters, the assailed Resolutions must be struck down for
having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The poll body is mandated to enforce and administer
election-related laws. It has no power to contravene or amend them. Neither does it have authority to decide
the wisdom, propriety or rationality of the acts of Congress.
Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations, methods and formulas to implement election laws -- not to
reject, ignore, defeat, obstruct or circumvent them.
In fine, the constitutional introduction of the party-list system - a normal feature of parliamentary democracies
- into our presidential form of government, modified by unique Filipino statutory parameters, presents new
paradigms and novel questions, which demand innovative legal solutions convertible into mathematical
formulations which are, in turn, anchored on time-tested jurisprudence.
The Case
Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari (with applications for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing (1)
the October 15, 1998 Resolution
1
of the Commission on Elections (Comelec), Second Division, in Election
Matter 98-065;
2
and (2) the January 7, 1999 Resolution
3
of the Comelec en banc, affirming the said
disposition. The assailed Resolutions ordered the proclamation of thirty-eight (38) additional party-list
representatives "to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided
under Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941."
The Facts and the Antecedents
Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of government -- the party-list
method of representation. Under this system, any national, regional or sectoral party or organization
registered with the Commission on Elections may participate in the election of party-list representatives who,
upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in the House of Representatives as regular members.
4
In effect,
a voter is given two (2) votes for the House -- one for a district congressman and another for a party-list
representative.
5

Specifically, this system of representation is mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, which
provides:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one
half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector."
Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the "selection or election" of party-list representatives,
Congress enacted RA 7941 on March 3, 1995. Under this statutes policy declaration, the State shall
"promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full,
free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible." (italics ours.)
The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are prescribed by this law (RA 7941) in this
wise:
"Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the
party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not
be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering
more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled
to not more than three (3) seats.
Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2847, prescribing the
rules and regulations governing the election of party-list representatives through the party-list system.
Election of the Fourteen Party-List Representatives
On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the national
elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On
June 26, 1998, the Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve (12)
parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes cast for the
party-list system. Two of the proclaimed representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5
percent of the votes. The proclaimed winners and the votes cast in their favor were as follows:
6

Party/Organization/
Coalition
Number of
Votes Obtained
Percentage
Total Votes
Nominees
1. APEC 503,487 5.5% Rene M. Silos
Melvyn D. Eballe
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% Leonardo Q. Montemayor
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% Diogenes S. Osabel
4. VETERANS
FEDERATION 304,802 3.33% Eduardo P. Pilapil
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% Joy A.G. Young
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% Ariel A. Zartiga
7. NCSCFO 238,303 2.60% Gorgonio P. Unde
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 2.57% Patricia M. Sarenas
9. AKBAYAN 232,376 2.54% Loreta Ann P. Rosales
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% Benjamin A. Cruz
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% Renato B. Magtubo
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 2.07% Cresente C. Paez
After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25, 1998, the Comelec en banc
further determined that COCOFED (Philippine Coconut Planters Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one party-
list seat for having garnered 186,388 votes, which were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the total votes cast for
the party-list system. Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S. Calderon, was proclaimed on September 8, 1998 as
the 14th party-list representative.
7

On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (Peoples Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government Towards
Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full
Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty
percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under the
Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal application of the two percent vote requirement
and the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would
be declared winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House.
Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations
8
filed their respective Motions for Intervention, seeking the same
relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the same grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASAs Petition was
joined by other party-list organizations in a Manifestation they filed on August 28, 1998. These organizations
were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-
KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP,
CUP, Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.
On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed Resolution granting
PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the 14
already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list representatives. It held that "at all times, the total number of
congressional
9
seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district representatives and twenty (20%)
percent party-list representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote requirement
prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list system,"
which should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled up." First, "the system was conceived
to enable the marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in the House of
Representatives." Second, "the system should represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society."
Third, "it should encourage [the] multi-party system." (Boldface in the original.) Considering these elements,
but ignoring the two percent threshold requirement of RA 7941, it concluded that "the party-list groups ranked
Nos. 1 to 51 x x x should have at least one representative." It thus disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (B.P.
881), Republic Act No. 7941 and other election laws, the Commission (Second Division) hereby resolves to
GRANT the instant petition and motions for intervention, to include those similarly situated.
ACCORDINGLY, the nominees from the party-list hereinbelow enumerated based on the list of names
submitted by their respective parties, organizations and coalitions are PROCLAIMED as party-list
representatives, to wit:
1. SENIOR CITIZENS
2. AKAP
3. AKSYON
4. PINATUBO
5. NUPA
6. PRP
7. AMIN
8. PAG-ASA
9. MAHARLIKA
10. OCW-UNIFIL
11. FCL
12. AMMA-KATIPUNAN
13. KAMPIL
14. BANTAY BAYAN
15. AFW
16. ANG LAKAS OCW
17. WOMENPOWER, INC.
18. FEJODAP
19. CUP
20. VETERANS CARE
21. 4L
22. AWATU
23. PMP
24. ATUCP
25. NCWP
26. ALU
27. BIGAS
28. COPRA
29. GREEN
30. ANAKBAYAN
31. ARBA
32. MINFA
33. AYOS
34. ALL COOP
35. PDP-LABAN
36. KATIPUNAN
37. ONEWAY PRINT
38. AABANTE KA PILIPINAS
to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided in Section 5, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941."
The foregoing disposition sums up a glaring bit of inconsistency and flip-flopping. In its Resolution No. 2847
dated June 25, 1996, the Comelec en banc had unanimously promulgated a set of "Rules and Regulations
Governing the Election of x x x Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System." Under these Rules
and Regulations, one additional seat shall be given for every two percent of the vote, a formula the Comelec
illustrated in its Annex "A." It apparently relied on this method when it proclaimed the 14 incumbent party-list
solons (two for APEC and one each for the 12 other qualified parties). However, for inexplicable reasons, it
abandoned said unanimous Resolution and proclaimed, based on its three "elements," the "Group of 38"
private respondents.
10

The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners on the basis of having
obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system, objected to the proclamation of the 38
parties and filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. They contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA
7941, only parties, organizations or coalitions garnering at least two percent of the votes for the party-list
system were entitled to seats in the House of Representatives; and (2) additional seats, not exceeding two for
each, should be allocated to those which had garnered the two percent threshold in proportion to the number
of votes cast for the winning parties, as provided by said Section 11.
Ruling of the Comelec En Banc
Noting that all the parties -- movants and oppositors alike - had agreed that the twenty percent membership of
party-list representatives in the House "should be filled up," the Comelec en banc resolved only the issue
concerning the apportionment or allocation of the remaining seats. In other words, the issue was: Should the
remaining 38 unfilled seats allocated to party-list solons be given (1) to the thirteen qualified parties that had
each garnered at least two percent of the total votes, or (2) to the Group of 38 - herein private respondents -
even if they had not passed the two percent threshold?
The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had hurdled the two percent vote
requirement "will mean the concentration of representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House
of Representatives to thirteen organizations representing two political parties, three coalitions and four
sectors: urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry x x x. Such strict application of the 2% 'threshold' does
not serve the essence and object of the Constitution and the legislature -- to develop and guarantee a full,
free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives x x x." Additionally, it "will also prevent this Commission from
complying with the constitutional and statutory decrees for party-list representatives to compose 20% of the
House of Representatives."
Thus, in its Resolution dated January 7, 1999, the Comelec en banc, by a razor-thin majority -- with three
commissioners concurring
11
and two members
12
dissenting -- affirmed the Resolution of its Second Division.
It, however, held in abeyance the proclamation of the 51st party (AABANTE KA PILIPINAS), "pending the
resolution of petitions for correction of manifest errors."
Without expressly declaring as unconstitutional or void the two percent vote requirement imposed by RA
7941, the Commission blithely rejected and circumvented its application, holding that there were more
important considerations than this statutory threshold.
Consequently, several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for the issuance of
temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction, were filed before this Court by the parties and
organizations that had obtained at least two per cent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.
13
In the
suits, made respondents together with the Comelec were the 38 parties, organizations and coalitions that had
been declared by the poll body as likewise entitled to party-list seats in the House of Representatives.
Collectively, petitioners sought the proclamation of additional representatives from each of their parties and
organizations, all of which had obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.
On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the Comelec "to CEASE and DESIST
from constituting itself as a National Board of Canvassers on 13 January 1999 or on any other date and
proclaiming as winners the nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions enumerated in the
dispositive portions of its 15 October 1998 Resolution or its 7 January 1999 Resolution, until further orders
from this Court."
On July 1, 1999, oral arguments were heard from the parties. Atty. Jeremias U. Montemayor appeared for
petitioners in GR No. 136781; Atty. Gregorio A. Andolana, for petitioners in GR No. 136786; Atty. Rodante D.
Marcoleta for petitioners in GR No. 136795; Attys. Ricardo Blancaflor and Pete Quirino Quadra, for all the
private respondents; Atty. Porfirio V. Sison for Intervenor NACUSIP; and Atty. Jose P. Balbuena for
Respondent Comelec. Upon invitation of the Court, retired Comelec Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong
acted as amicus curiae. Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez appeared, not for any party but also as a friend
of the Court.
Thereafter, the parties and the amici curiae were required to submit their respective Memoranda in
amplification of their verbal arguments.
14

The Issues
The Court believes, and so holds, that the main question of how to determine the winners of the subject party-
list election can be fully settled by addressing the following issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI
of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent
allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of
RA 7941 constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a qualified party
be determined?
The Courts Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees with petitioners that the assailed Resolutions should be
nullified, but disagrees that they should all be granted additional seats.
First Issue: Whether the Twenty Percent
Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory
The pertinent provision
15
of the Constitution on the composition of the House of Representatives reads as
follows:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one
half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector."
Determination of the Total Number of Party-List Lawmakers
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the
number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty per centum of the total number
of representatives including those under the party-list." We thus translate this legal provision into a
mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives

.80
x .20 = No. of party-list representatives
This formulation
16
means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be provided by
law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. To illustrate,
considering that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during the 1998 national elections, the
number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:
208

.80
x .20 = 52
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic question,
however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all
circumstances? Our short answer is "No."
Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling
The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party-list."
According to petitioners, this percentage is a ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to be filled up has been left
to Congress. In the exercise of its prerogative, the legislature enacted RA 7941, by which it prescribed that a
party, organization or coalition participating in the party-list election must obtain at least two percent of the
total votes cast for the system in order to qualify for a seat in the House of Representatives.
Petitioners further argue that the constitutional provision must be construed together with this legislative
requirement. If there is no sufficient number of participating parties, organizations or coalitions which could
hurdle the two percent vote threshold and thereby fill up the twenty percent party-list allocation in the House,
then naturally such allocation cannot be filled up completely. The Comelec cannot be faulted for the
"incompleteness," for ultimately the voters themselves are the ones who, in the exercise of their right of
suffrage, determine who and how many should represent them.
On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec, together with the respondent parties, avers that the twenty
percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory, and that the two percent vote requirement in RA
7941 is unconstitutional, because its strict application would make it mathematically impossible to fill up the
House party-list complement.
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally simple
message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-
list system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total
membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier, Congress
declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation" in the election of party-list representatives
in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute
legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and
coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list
system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have
"additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." Furthermore, no winning party, organization or
coalition can have more than three seats in the House of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of
Section 11(b) of the law provides:
"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent
(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided,
finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats."
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.
On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a "mathematical
impossibility," suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine whether to adjust or change this percentage
requirement rests in Congress.
17
Our task now, as should have been the Comelecs, is not to find fault in the
wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative
mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable, implement it within the context of the actual election
process.
Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial agencies, is to apply the
law as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. Unless declared unconstitutional, ineffective, insufficient
or otherwise void by the proper tribunal, a statute remains a valid command of sovereignty that must be
respected and obeyed at all times. This is the essence of the rule of law.
Second Issue: The Statutory Requirement and Limitation
The Two Percent Threshold
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations and
coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in
Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. We quote below a pertinent
portion of the Senate discussion:
"SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of continuity, I would want to follow up a point that was raised by, I
think, Senator Osmea when he said that a political party must have obtained at least a minimum percentage
to be provided in this law in order to qualify for a seat under the party-list system.
They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent of the votes cast, 5 percent or 10
percent of the votes cast. Otherwise, as I have said, this will actually proliferate political party groups and
those who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents
and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list
system, Mr. President."
18

A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the House of Representatives, as the
following shows:
"MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical formula which this computation is based at, arriving at a five
percent ratio which would distribute equitably the number of seats among the different sectors. There is a
mathematical formula which is, I think, patterned after that of the party list of the other parliaments or
congresses, more particularly the Bundestag of Germany."
19

Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote requirement, the specification of
which they left to Congress to properly determine. Constitutional Commissioner Christian S. Monsod
explained:
"MR. MONSOD. x x x We are amenable to modifications in the minimum percentage of votes. Our proposal is
that anybody who has two-and-a-half percent of the votes gets a seat. There are about 20 million who cast
their votes in the last elections. Two-and-a-half percent would mean 500,000 votes. Anybody who has a
constituency of 500,000 votes nationwide deserves a seat in the Assembly. If we bring that down to two
percent, we are talking about 400,000 votes. The average vote per family is three. So, here we are talking
about 134,000 families. We believe that there are many sectors who will be able to get seats in the Assembly
because many of them have memberships of over 10,000. In effect, that is the operational implication of our
proposal. What we are trying to avoid is this selection of sectors, the reserve seat system. We believe that it
is our job to open up the system and that we should not have within that system a reserve seat. We think that
people should organize, should work hard, and should earn their seats within that system."
20

The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law,
but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government
authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them.
21
But to have
meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people.
Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small
groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the
stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio"
22
to ensure meaningful local
representation.
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise and crystalline. When
the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not interpretation or circumvention.
23

The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit
An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and encourage a multiparty system
of representation. Again, we quote Commissioner Monsod:
"MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system
because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. But we
also wanted to avoid the problems of mechanics and operation in the implementation of a concept that has
very serious shortcomings of classification and of double or triple votes. We are for opening up the system,
and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a
ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the
party list system. This way, we will open it up and enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn
their seats among the fifty. x x x."
24

Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to three (3) for
each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the two percent vote
threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the legislature; thus,
no single group, no matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire
House.
We shall not belabor this point, because the validity of the three-seat limit is not seriously challenged in these
consolidated cases.
Third Issue: Method of Allocating Additional Seats
Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and having upheld the
constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the three-seat limit imposed under RA 7941, we now
proceed to the method of determining how many party-list seats the qualified parties, organizations and
coalitions are entitled to. The very first step - there is no dispute on this - is to rank all the participating parties,
organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectively referred to as "parties") according to the votes they each
obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as against the total number of votes cast for the party-list
system is then determined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast have an
assured or guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering more than two
percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." The
problem is how to distribute additional seats "proportionally," bearing in mind the three-seat limit further
imposed by the law.
One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment
One proposed formula is to allocate one additional seat for every additional proportion of the votes obtained
equivalent to the two percent vote requirement for the first seat.
25
Translated in figures, a party that wins at
least six percent of the total votes cast will be entitled to three seats; another party that gets four percent will
be entitled to two seats; and one that gets two percent will be entitled to one seat only. This proposal has the
advantage of simplicity and ease of comprehension. Problems arise, however, when the parties get very lop-
sided votes -- for example, when Party A receives 20 percent of the total votes cast; Party B, 10 percent; and
Party C, 6 percent. Under the method just described, Party A would be entitled to 10 seats; Party B, to 5
seats and Party C, to 3 seats. Considering the three-seat limit imposed by law, all the parties will each
uniformly have three seats only. We would then have the spectacle of a party garnering two or more times the
number of votes obtained by another, yet getting the same number of seats as the other one with the much
lesser votes. In effect, proportional representation will be contravened and the law rendered nugatory by this
suggested solution. Hence, the Court discarded it.
The Niemeyer Formula
Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula, which was developed by a German
mathematician and adopted by Germany as its method of distributing party-list seats in the Bundestag. Under
this formula, the number of additional seats to which a qualified party would be entitled is determined by
multiplying the remaining number of seats to be allocated by the total number of votes obtained by that party
and dividing the product by the total number of votes garnered by all the qualified parties. The integer portion
of the resulting product will be the number of additional seats that the party concerned is entitled to. Thus:
No. of remaining seats
to be allocated

Total no. of votes of
qualified parties
x
No. of votes of
party concerned
=
No. of additional
seats of party
concerned
(Integer.decimal)
The next step is to distribute the extra seats left among the qualified parties in the descending order of the
decimal portions of the resulting products. Based on the 1998 election results, the distribution of party-list
seats under the Niemeyer method would be as follows:
Party Number of
Votes
Guaranteed
Seats
Additional Extra
Seats
Total
1. APEC 503,487 1 5.73 1 7
2. ABA 321,646 1 3.66 1 5
3. ALAGAD 312,500 1 3.55 4
4. VETERANS 304,802 1 3.47 4
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 1 2.90 1 4
6. AKO 239,042 1 2.72 1 4
7. NCSCFO 238,303 1 2.71 1 4
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 1 2.68 1 4
9. AKBAYAN 232,376 1 2.64 4
10. BUTIL 215,643 1 2.45 3
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 1 2.21 3
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 1 2.16 3
13. COCOFED 186,388 1 2.12 3
Total 3,429,338 13 32 7 52
However, since Section 11 of RA 7941 sets a limit of three (3) seats for each party, those obtaining more than
the limit will have to give up their excess seats. Under our present set of facts, the thirteen qualified parties
will each be entitled to three seats, resulting in an overall total of 39. Note that like the previous proposal, the
Niemeyer formula would violate the principle of "proportional representation," a basic tenet of our party-list
system.
The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in the Philippine setting,
because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory character of the twenty percent allocation. True, both
our Congress and the Bundestag have threshold requirements -- two percent for us and five for them. There
are marked differences between the two models, however. As ably pointed out by private respondents,
26
one
half of the German Parliament is filled up by party-list members. More important, there are no seat limitations,
because German law discourages the proliferation of small parties. In contrast, RA 7941, as already
mentioned, imposes a three-seat limit to encourage the promotion of the multiparty system. This major
statutory difference makes the Niemeyer formula completely inapplicable to the Philippines.
Just as one cannot grow Washington apples in the Philippines or Guimaras mangoes in the Arctic because of
fundamental environmental differences, neither can the Niemeyer formula be transplanted in toto here
because of essential variances between the two party-list models.
The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines
It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm which demands an equally
unique formula. In crafting a legally defensible and logical solution to determine the number of additional
seats that a qualified party is entitled to, we need to review the parameters of the Filipino party-list system.
As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not
exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the
total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall
be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."
The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate "proportional representation" into a mathematical
formula that will not contravene, circumvent or amend the above-mentioned parameters.
After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the
members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party
is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All
parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be
considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall
thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to
compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number
of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by
virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled to two additional seats.
Another qualified party which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to the same number of seats, since it
garnered only fifty percent of the votes won by the first party. Depending on the proportion of its votes relative
to that of the first party whose number of seats has already been predetermined, the second party should be
given less than that to which the first one is entitled.
The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first party for two reasons: (1)
the ratio between said parties and the first party will always be less than 1:1, and (2) the formula does not
admit of mathematical rounding off, because there is no such thing as a fraction of a seat. Verily, an arbitrary
rounding off could result in a violation of the twenty percent allocation. An academic mathematical
demonstration of such incipient violation is not necessary because the present set of facts, given the number
of qualified parties and the voting percentages obtained, will definitely not end up in such constitutional
contravention.
The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales
27
that a fractional membership cannot be
converted into a whole membership of one when it would, in effect, deprive another party's fractional
membership. It would be a violation of the constitutional mandate of proportional representation. We said
further that "no party can claim more than what it is entitled to x x x."
In any case, the decision on whether to round off the fractions is better left to the legislature. Since Congress
did not provide for it in the present law, neither will this Court. The Supreme Court does not make the law; it
merely applies it to a given set of facts.
Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party
Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis given by the law
is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if
the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the
latter's number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing the number of seats to which the
first party is entitled is as follows:
Number of votes
of first party

Total votes for
party-list system
=
Proportion of votes of
first party relative to
total votes for party-list system
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of the
total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or
a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four
percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if
the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the maximum
number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the total number of available
seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus entitled to
three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which all the parties are entitled may exceed the
maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the House of Representatives.1wphi1
Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total votes cast, is entitled to one additional
seat or a total of two seats.
Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional seats the first
party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the number of additional seats of the other qualified parties.
As explained earlier, the use of the same formula for all would contravene the proportional representation
parameter. For example, a second party obtains six percent of the total number of votes cast. According to
the above formula, the said party would be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall.
However, if the first party received a significantly higher amount of votes -- say, twenty percent -- to grant it
the same number of seats as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of proportional
representation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes will have an equal number of
representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a
total of three seats; and the party receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion to those of the first
party.
Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are
entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the following complex
fraction:
Additional seats
for concerned
party
=
No. of votes of
concerned party

Total No. of votes
for party-list system

No. of votes of
first party

Total No. of
for party list system
x
No. of additional
seats allocated to
the first party
In simplified form, it is written as follows:
Additional seats
for concerned
party
=
No. of votes of
concerned party

No. of votes of
first party
x
No. of additional
seats allocated to
the first party
Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it would be entitled to is computed as
follows:
Additional seats
for concerned
party (ABA)
=
No. of votes
of ABA

No. of vites of
first party (APEC)
x
No. of additional
seats allocated to
the first party
Substituting actual values would result in the following equation:
Additional seats
for concerned
party (ABA)
=
321,646

503,487
x 1 =
.64 or 0 additional seat, since
rounding off is not to be applied
Applying the above formula, we find the outcome of the 1998 party-list election to be as follows:
Organization Votes
Garnered
%age of
Total
Votes
Initial
No.
of Seats
Additional
Seats
Total
1. APEC 503,487 5.50% 1 1 2
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.64
1
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% 1 312,500 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.62
1
4. VETERANS
FEDERATION
304,802 3.33% 1 304,802 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.61
1
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% 1 255,184 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.51
1
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% 1 239,042 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.47
1
7. NCSFO 238,303 2.60% 1 238,303 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.47
1
8. ABANSE! 235,548 2.57% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.47
1
PINAY
9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 2.54% 1 232,376 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.46
1
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% 1 215,643 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.43 1

11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% 1 194,617 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.39
1
12. COOP-
NATCCO
189,802 2.07% 1 189,802 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.38
1
13. COCOFED 186,388 2.04% 1 186,388 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.37
1
Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number of votes for the
other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result would be zero additional seat for each
of the other qualified parties as well.
The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of additional seats to
be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary. In fact,
most of the actual mathematical proportions are not whole numbers and are not rounded off for the reasons
explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a number of seats in excess of that
provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional representation is restricted by the three-
seat-per-party limit to a maximum of two additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of additional
representatives a party may be entitled to would result in a more accurate proportional representation. But the
law itself has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant parameter.
The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional seats happily coincides with the present
number of incumbents; namely, two for the first party (APEC) and one each for the twelve other qualified
parties. Hence, we affirm the legality of the incumbencies of their nominees, albeit through the use of a
different formula and methodology.
In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes our methodology for being too strict. We say, however, that our
formula merely translated the Philippine legal parameters into a mathematical equation, no more no less. If
Congress in its wisdom decides to modify RA 7941 to make it "less strict," then the formula will also be
modified to reflect the changes willed by the lawmakers.
Epilogue
In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight (38) herein
respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party-list seat, because it glaringly
violated two requirements of RA 7941: the two percent threshold and proportional representation.
In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the Comelec effectively arrogated
unto itself what the Constitution expressly and wholly vested in the legislature: the power and the discretion to
define the mechanics for the enforcement of the system. The wisdom and the propriety of these impositions,
absent any clear transgression of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, are beyond judicial review.
28

Indeed, the Comelec and the other parties in these cases - both petitioners and respondents - have failed to
demonstrate that our lawmakers gravely abused their discretion in prescribing such requirements. By grave
abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
29

The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related laws,
30
cannot simply
disregard an act of Congress exercised within the bounds of its authority. As a mere implementing body, it
cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or rationality of such act. Its recourse is to draft an amendment to the law
and lobby for its approval and enactment by the legislature.
Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any of its provisions by the strict
enforcement of RA 7941. It is basic that to strike down a law or any of its provisions as unconstitutional, there
must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the Constitution prohibits, the statute permits.
31

Neither can we grant petitioners prayer that they each be given additional seats (for a total of three each),
because granting such plea would plainly and simply violate the "proportional representation" mandated by
Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
The low turnout of the party-list votes during the 1998 elections should not be interpreted as a total failure of
the law in fulfilling the object of this new system of representation. It should not be deemed a conclusive
indication that the requirements imposed by RA 7941 wholly defeated the implementation of the system. Be it
remembered that the party-list system, though already popular in parliamentary democracies, is still quite new
in our presidential system. We should allow it some time to take root in the consciousness of our people and
in the heart of our tripartite form of republicanism. Indeed, the Comelec and the defeated litigants should not
despair.
Quite the contrary, the dismal result of the first election for party-list representatives should serve as a
challenge to our sectoral parties and organizations. It should stir them to be more active and vigilant in their
campaign for representation in the State's lawmaking body. It should also serve as a clarion call for innovation
and creativity in adopting this novel system of popular democracy.
With adequate information dissemination to the public and more active sectoral parties, we are confident our
people will be more responsive to future party-list elections. Armed with patience, perseverance and
perspicacity, our marginalized sectors, in time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of full representation in Congress
under the aegis of the party-list system, Philippine style.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Comelec are
SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of the fourteen (14) sitting party-list representatives - two for
APEC and one each for the remaining twelve (12) qualified parties - are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, Melo, and Vitug, JJ., in the result.
Puno , J., see separate concurring opinion.
Mendoza , J., dissents.
Kapunan, and Quisumbing, JJ., join the opinion of J. Mendoza.


Footnotes
*
At the outset of this case, I offered to inhibit myself from participating in these cases because,
prior to my appointment to this Court, I had been a general counsel and director of one of the
respondents. However, the Court unanimously resolved to deny my request for the following
reasons: (1) I was merely a voluntary non-compensated officer of the non-profit Philippine Chamber
of Commerce and Industry (PCCI), (2) the present case and its antecedents were not extant during
my incumbency at PCCI, and (3) this case involved important constitutional questions, and the
Court believed that all justices should as much as possible participate and vote. This Court action
was announced during the Oral Argument on July 1, 1999.
1
Rollo in GR No. 136781, pp. 62-71. Penned by Comm. Japal M. Guiani, concurred in by Comm.
Abdul Gani M. Marohombsar, Al. Haj.; with Pres. Comm. Julio F. Desamito, dissenting.
2
People's Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government Toward Alleviation of Poverty and
Social Advancement (PAG-ASA) v. Comelec.
3
Rollo in GR No. 136781, pp. 81-109. Per curiam, concurred in by Comm. and Officer-in-Charge
Luzviminda G. Tancangco, and Comms. Japal M. Guiani and Abdul Gani M. Marohombsar, Al. Haj.
Comms. Julio F. Desamito and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores dissented; while Comm. Manolo B.
Gorospe took no part, being "out of town."
4
See II Record of the Constitutional Commission 253.
5
10, RA 7941.
6
Commission on Elections, Party-List Canvass Report No. 16 (By Rank); Assailed Comelec en
banc Resolution, p. 22.
7
Resolution No. 3047-C, September 9, 1998.
8
People's Reform Party (PRP), Ang Lakas OCW, KAMPIL, Maharlika, Women Power, Inc.,
NACUSIP, Aniban Ng Mga Magsasaka, Mangingisda at Manggagawa sa Agrikultura Inc., All Trade
Unions Congress Party (ATUCP), and Anak-Mindanao (AMIN).
9
More accurately, it should be "House of Representatives."
10
See Dissenting Opinion of Comm. T.D. Flores and the Memorandum for petitioners in GR No.
136786 which was filed with the Court on July 12, 1999 and signed by Attys. Hans Leo J. Cacdac,
Raissa H. Jajurie and Manuel Senar.
11
Comms. Luzviminda G. Tancangco, Japal M. Guiani and Abdul Gani M. Marohombsar.
12
Comms. Julio F. Desamito and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores. Comm. Manolo B. Gorospe did not
vote, as he was "out of town."
13
The Petitions of PROMDI, ABANSE! PINAY and COOP-NATCCO were dismissed for procedural
deficiencies. SANLAKAS did not file any petition.
14
These consolidated cases were deemed submitted for resolution upon receipt by the Court of
Intervenor NACUSIP's Memorandum on July 20, 1999. This was signed by Attys. Froilan M.
Bacungan, Porfirio V. Sison and Zoilo V. de la Cruz. The writing of this Decision was, however,
assigned to this ponente only on September 26, 2000 during the deliberations and verbal
discussions of the contentious issues, wherein the Court, by majority vote, upheld his then
dissenting views.
15
5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution.
16
In their Consolidated Memorandum filed on July 12, 1999 and signed by Attys. Rodante B.
Marcoleta, Jeremias U. Montemayor, R.A.V. Saguisag, Romeo G. Roxas and Katrina Legarda-
Santos, petitioners submitted this similar computation:
"208 : = 208/4 = 52 or 208 : 0.8 (0.20) = 52"
17
See the Concurring Opinion of Comm. Tancangco, in which she posits that the "strict application"
of the two percent threshold may become a "mathematical impossibility," because "52 seats
multiplied by two percent yields a total of 104 percent." Though theoretically imaginable, such
feared impossibility will not ripen to a judicial controversy, because two percent of the votes will
never be achieved by each of 52 parties in the same election. In short, the fear is purely academic.
Besides, the mathematical impossibility wrongly assumes that the Constitution requires all 52 seats
to be filled up all the time. See also Memorandum for private respondents dated July 9, 1999 and
signed by Attys. Arturo M. Tolentino, C. Fortunato R. Balasbas and Miguel Amador S.O. Camero.
18
II Record of the Senate 145, Second Regular Session, Ninth Congress.
19
Transcript, House of Representatives, November 22, 1994, p. 34.
20
II Record of the Constitutional Commission 256.
21
Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Reviewer-Primer, 2nd ed.
(1992), p. 15.
22
5, Article VI of the Constitution.
23
Quijano v. Development Board, 35 SCRA 270, October 16, 1970; Luzon Surety v. de Garcia, 30
SCRA 111, October 31, 1969, cited in the Memorandum of the Solicitor General, filed on July 12,
1999 and signed by Sol. Gen. Ricardo P. Galvez, Asst. Sol. Gen. Cecilio O. Estoesta and Sol. Ma.
Antonia Edita C. Dizon.
24
Supra.
25
In its en banc Resolution No. 2847 dated June 25, 1996, Comelec adopted this simple formula,
but discarded it in the assailed Resolutions.
26
In fairness, the Group of 38 explains these differences in the context of its concluding plea to
dilute the two percent threshold. See Memorandum for private respondents, pp. 44-46.
27
214 SCRA 789, October 20, 1992; 219 SCRA 329, March 1, 1993 (Resolution on the Motion for
Reconsideration).
28
See Taada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997; Santiago v. Guingona, 298 SCRA 756,
November 18, 1998.
29
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 200, 209, June 4, 1996;
Santiago v. Guingona Jr., 298 SCRA 756, 786, November 18, 1998; People v. Court of Appeals
and Casan Maquiling, GR No. 128986, June 21, 1999.
30
2 (1), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
31
Garcia v. Commission on Elections, 227 SCRA 100, October 5, 1993.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
PUNO, J .:
I. Prefatory Statement
The case at bar is one of first impression and of immense difficulty. The constitutional issues involved are full
of slippery slopes but the most difficult one concerns the apportionment of additional seats to the parties that
hurdled the 2% threshold requirement. There is much to be admired in the mathematical formula forwarded
by our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, but with due respect, I find more attractive the
majority formula, crafted with equal expertise by another esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Artemio
Panganiban. To be sure, the two formulae may be faulted by mathematicians obsessed with exactitude but
the fault lies with the inexactitude of the law itself. However it may be, I join the majority of my brethren for I
find its geometry of the phrase "proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party,
organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system" more expressive
of the spirit of the Constitution, albeit, arguable.
II. Issues
The case at bar, however, is suffused with other significant constitutional issues. They are:
1. Is it a mandatory requirement that a party/organization/coalition should obtain at least 2% of the
total votes cast for the party-list system to be entitled to a seat?
2. Is it mandatory to fill up all the 52 seats allotted for the party-list representatives of the House of
Representatives as provided for under Article VI, Sec. 5(2) of the 1987 Constitution? If so, how are
the seats to be allocated?
3. Whether Sec. 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution requires that every time the number of district
representatives is increased from 200 there should be a corresponding increase in the number of
party-list representatives so that, as there are now 208 district representatives, there should be 52
party-list representatives constituting 20% of the total number of members of the House of
Representatives;
4. Whether the 2% threshold requirement in Section 11(b), R.A. 7941 is not unconstitutional; and
5. Whether the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b), R.A. 7941 is not unconstitutional.
In addition to the scholarly disquisitions of the majority opinion, I humbly offer the following:
III. Submissions
A. The 2% threshold requirement
Respondent Commission refused to give a strict and literal interpretation to the 2% requirement of Section 11
of R.A. 7941 on the ground that it runs contrary to the Constitution and the law which is "to enable the
marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives," "to
represent the broadest sector of the Philippine society," and "to encourage multi-party system." It likewise
proffered the thesis that to allow only the 13 proclaimed parties/organization to be represented in the House
of Representatives will result in the concentration of party-list representation to only a few sectors, namely
urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry. Thus, respondent Commission holds that all the sectors should
be equally represented and hence should be given one seat each.
Like the majority of the brethren, I cannot support such a stance. The Record of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, as well as that of the Senate deliberations, will clearly disclose a specific intent to
impose a minimum percentage of votes to be obtained, that is, at least two (2%) percent of the total
votes cast nationwide, in order that a party/organization/coalition under the party-list system may
have a seat in the House of Representatives. I quote relevant excerpts from the Record of the 1986
Constitutional Commission:
"a) MR. MONSOD. x x x Anybody who has at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote qualifies and the 50
seats are apportioned among all of these parties who get at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote.
"What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a constituency of, say, 500,000 nationwide
gets a seat in the National Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we allocate legislative districts,
we are saying that any district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat. There is no reason why a group that has a
national constituency, even if it is a sectoral or special interest group, should not have a voice in the National
Assembly. x x x If each of them gets only one percent or five of them get one percent, they are not entitled to
any representative. So, they will begin to think that if they really have a common interest, they should band
together, form a coalition and get five percent of the vote and, therefore, have two seats in the Assembly.
Those are the dynamics of a party list system.
"We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation while at the same time
making sure that those who really have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance to
have a seat in the National Assembly.
1

"b) MR. MONSOD. x x x When these parties register with the COMELEC, they would
simultaneously submit a list of the people who would sit in case they win the required number of
votes in the order in which they place them. x x x If they win the required number of votes, let us
say they win 400,000 votes, then they will have one seat. If they win 2 million votes, then they will
have five seats.
2

"c) MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party
list system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a
multiparty system. But we also wanted to avoid the problems of mechanics and operation in the
implementation of a concept that has very serious shortcomings of classification and of double or
triple votes. We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be
there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives
from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. This way, we
will open it up and enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn their seats among the
fifty. When we talk about limiting it, if there are two parties, then we are opening it up to the extent
of 30 seats. We are amenable to modifications in the minimum percentage of votes. Our proposal is
that anybody who has two-and-a-half percent of the votes gets a seat. There are about 20 million
who cast their votes in the last elections. Two-and-a-half percent would mean 500,000 votes.
Anybody who has a constituency of 500,000 votes, nationwide, deserves a seat in the Assembly. If
we bring that down to two percent, we are talking about 400,000 votes. The average vote per family
is three. So, here we are talking about 134,000 families. We believe that there are many sectors
who will be able to get seats in the Assembly because many of them have memberships over
10,000. In effect, that is the operational implication of our proposal. What we are trying to avoid is
this selection of sectors, the reserve seat system. We believe that it is our job to open up the
system and that we should not have within that system a reserve seat. We think that people should
organize, should work hard, and should earn their seats within that system.
3

"d) MR. TADEO. x x x Ngayon, sa ganitong kalagayan, gusto ko po lamang ipaliwanag ang party
list. Ang ibig sabihin nito, doon sa ilalim ng two-party system, kapag kumuha ka ng 51 percent,
iyong ibang partido ay wala nang nakuhang puwesto sa legislature. Ang ibig sabihin ng party list
system, makakuha ka lamang ng 2.5 percent ay mayroon ka nang isang puwesto.
4

Similarly, I call attention to the pertinent debates in the Senate, viz.:
"a) Senator Gonzales: Yes, Mr. President. But nonetheless, if his party qualifies, at least, for the
minimum number of the requirement to be entitled to a seat, then he would be proclaimed by the
Commission as having been elected under the party-list system.
5

"b) Senator Gonzales: For purposes of continuity, I would want to follow up a point that was raised
by, I think, Senator Osmena when he said that a political party must have obtained at least a
minimum percentage to be provided in this law in order to qualify for a seat under the party-list
system.
"They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent of the votes cast, 5 percent or 10
percent of the votes cast. Otherwise, as I have said, this will actually proliferate political party groups and
those who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents
and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under the name of party-list
system, Mr. President.
6

"c) Senator Tolentino: x x x Mr. President, the required number of votes here refers to the votes that
will qualify it for certain number of representatives. The phrase "required number of votes" simply
means here the number of votes that will qualify it to have a certain number of representatives in
the House of Representatives.
7

"d) Senator Gonzales: Would not all of them be entitled to a proportionate seat in the three
categories allocated for the party-list members?
"Senator Tolentino: If they do not receive the votes that would be needed in order to give them a
proportionate number of seats, then, of course, they would not have any seat in the category in which they
are.
"Senator Gonzales: That is why in my interpellation during our last session, I suggested that, probably, it
would be better to set a minimum percentage of votes to be received by them in order to qualify for a seat so
that we can, more or less, limit the party-list members to those who obtain a substantial portion of the votes
cast, Mr. President.
8

"e) Senator Gonzales: x x x The idea is to open the system so that it is not all or nothing. Kahit na
hindi manalo ang kaniyang kandidato but he obtained at least the minimum number of votes cast,
which I would propose later in order to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial
following can be represented, then the purpose of party-list system has already been achieved.
9

"f) Senator Gonzales: My amendment, Mr. President, will be x x x add the following: "Provided,
however that a political party or group whether national, regional, or sectoral must obtain at least
two (2) percent of the votes cast to be entitled to a seat."
"Senator Tolentino: A minimum of 2 percent of what?
"Senator Gonzales: My initial position, Mr. President, is the total votes cast nationwide. At least, it would have
a right to demand representation. Imagine a political party obtaining only 10,000 votes nationwide, it is
already entitled to a seat. I do not think that is doing justice to the representative system.
10

"g) Senator Gonzales: x x x We said that in the minimum number of votes for a political party,
whether national or regional or a sectoral organization to be entitled to the party list, it must have
received at least 2 percent of the votes cast in that category."
11

The rationale for the 2% threshold can thus be synthesized as follows:
1. to avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system as a fallback position;
12

2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose chances are very
low, from participating in the elections;
13

3. to avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system ;
4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn their seats within the
system;
14

5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of the elected
representatives in the legislative body, rather than owing to some degree their seats in the
legislative body either to an outright constitutional gift or to an appointment by the President of the
Philippines;
15

6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those who have
not really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents and, in
turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list
system;
16
and
7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be represented.
17

We are not at liberty to pass judgment on the wisdom of the law. The principle of separation of powers
prohibits this Court from engaging in judicial legislation. Both the legislative intent and the language of the law
as to the 2% threshold requirement are clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for further interpretation. It
demands our obeisance.
Respondent Commission is of the mind that the sectoral groups have a vested right to a seat in the House of
Representatives. It assumes that this is mandated by the law which aims to provide a party-list system where
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society can actively participate and attain the broadest
possible representation in the House of Representatives. The assumption cannot stand scrutiny.
First, in order that a sectoral group or party can participate under the party-list system, it should comply with
certain statutory requirements such as the filing, before the Comelec, of a manifestation (Section 4) and a
petition (Section 5) expressing its intent to participate in the party-list system. Comelec is required to verify
and review such petition, and is empowered to refuse or cancel the registration of a sectoral party on grounds
stated in the law.
Second, during the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission and the Senate, it was clear that the party-
list system is not synonymous with that of sectoral representation. Sectoral representation means that certain
sectors would have reserved seats; under the party-list system, there are no reserved seats for sectors.
18
The
party-list system recognizes the right of sectoral parties or organizations to register. Nonetheless, it only
enables these sectors to be part of the party, if they have the capacity, but it does not reserve any seat for the
sectors. To stress, it is not a reserve seat system.
19

Third, the framers of the Constitution knew that the sectoral groups suffer from major disadvantages in the
competitive election arena. They sought to remedy this inequality through an outright constitutional gift of
reserve seats for the first three terms of the sectoral representatives and no further. Thereafter, they have to
earn their seats through participation in the party-list system. Thus:
"MR. OPLE. x x x The ideal manner of securing functional representation is through a party list
system through popular suffrage so that when sectoral representatives get into a legislative body
on this basis, rather than direct regional or district representation, they can rise to the same majesty
as that of the elected representatives in the legislative body, rather than owing to some degree their
seats in the legislative body either to an outright constitutional gift or to an appointment by the
President of the Philippines. I think, therefore, this proposed amendment now meets this test. There
is an outright constitutional gift for the first two terms of the sectoral representatives but, after that,
they will have to earn the seats through participation in a party list system or, even beyond that, to
be direct competitors with established and more orthodox parties in the general political arena. I
see no reason why after having occupied seats in the House of Representatives for two terms, the
representatives of the sectors may not be able to combine their forces in order to form their own
political parties or become powerful adjuncts to existing political parties so that they will enjoy not
only the benefits of a party list system but also the benefits of being able to compete directly in the
wider political arena.
"x x x And after two or three terms, then they will be in a position to take full advantage of the party list system
so that on the basis of two-and-a-half percent or two percent of all the qualified voters in the country, one seat
is earned x x x. Let us assume that the representatives of these organizations x x x occupy the seats for two
terms, will not six years be enough for them to amalgamate their forces if there is enough basis of unification
so that, from their platform in the legislature, they can, through a party list system, amass as many seats as
are available now outside territorial representation? And beyond that, they can even rise to the level of a
major political party able to compete for territorial representation both for the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
"x x x Therefore, I support this amendment. It installs sectoral representation as a constitutional gift, but at the
same time, it challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of being elected representatives later on through a
party list system, and even beyond that, to become actual political parties capable of contesting political
power in the constitutional arena for major political parties."
20

Fourth, the objective of the party-list system is not alone to provide representation to sectoral groups but also
to accord proportionate representation for political parties participating in the election, so that those political
parties whose candidates did not win in any district but obtained a substantial amount of the votes cast by the
people will not be completely denied representation in the House.
21

Fifth, in the Senate, it was proposed that all the sectors mentioned in the law should be entitled to at least
one seat each.
22
This proposal was not approved for it is nowhere to be found in the present law. Thus, it
cannot be doubted that the lawmakers did not contemplate a reserve seat system for the sectoral groups.
Verily, the ruling of respondent Commission that the party-list groups from rank nos. 1 to 51 shall be given
one seat each so that all sectors are represented runs contrary to the intendment of the legislature.
There is no constitutional right to win elections, only the constitutional right to equal opportunity to
participate in and influence the selection of candidates. It is not a violation of equal protection to deny
legislative seats to losing candidates. The fact that minorities or interest groups in an electoral unit find
themselves consistently outvoted and without a person elected from their particular group is no basis for
invoking constitutional remedies where there is no indication that the complaining minority or interest group
has been denied access to the political system.
23

And neither can the sectoral groups claim discrimination simply because they failed to get a seat in the House
of Representatives. It is not enough to prove that some of the sectors are not represented because the party
or organization representing them failed to win in the elections. It must be shown that the party-list system
was conceived or operated as a purposeful device to further discriminate against them.
24

In the past, it cannot be gainsaid that there was a hostility against sectoral groups as their unelected
representatives were criticized as people who owed their seats to a constitutional provision and could not rise
to the same status or dignity as those elected by the people.
25
This criticism was laid to rest with the passage
of the party-list system where sectoral representatives had to undergo an election. To be sure, these sectoral
candidates were given a favored treatment. During the Senate deliberations on Senate Bill No. 1913, which
later became R.A. 7941, Senator Tolentino emphatically declared that the purpose of the party-list system is
"to give access to the House those who are considered as marginal political groups that cannot elect a
representative in one district, but when taken together nationally, they may be able to have a
representative."
26
But while given a favored treatment, the sectoral candidates were not guaranteed seats.
Indeed, the party-list system was devised to replace the reserve seat system. For unlike the reserve seat
system which assured sectoral groups of a seat in the House of Representatives, the party-list system merely
provides for a mechanism by which the sectoral groups can run for election as sectoral representatives. The
very essence of the party-list system is representation by election.
The lack of success in the elections is not indicative of a lack of access to the political system but rather from
a failure of the parties/organizations to turn out as many of the voters as will enable them to meet the required
number of votes. The access guideline touches upon whether the political processes are open to minorities or
sectoral groups, not on whether such groups are successful once access has been obtained.
27
The party-list
system was conceived in order to open the system to sectoral representation, but it does not warrant
representation for these sectors with absolute certainty.
Finally, Section 6 of R.A. 7941 provides that the Comelec may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of
any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional
or sectoral party if it fails to obtain at least two percent of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. If a sectoral party cannot even register
when it fails to obtain the 2% required number of votes, with more reason that it should not be entitled to get a
seat in the House of Representatives. An absurdity may arise where a sectoral party which failed to meet the
2% threshold is given a seat in the House but is actually disqualified for registration and therefore has no
legal personality and standing as such.
B. The 20% membership requirement for sectoral representatives
Respondent Commission held that a restriction on the allocation of seats only to those obtaining the 2%
threshold will prevent compliance with the purported constitutional and statutory mandate that the party-list
representatives shall be composed of 20% of the entire membership of the House of Representatives,
including the party list. The ruling is predicated on the supposition that the 20% requirement is mandatory and
that the law requires that all the seats apportioned to sectoral representatives must be filled up.
Article VI, Section 5, subparagraph 1 of the Constitution provides that "the House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members x x x who shall be elected from legislative
districts, x x x and those who x x x shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations." The record of the ConCom will show that the delegates considered this
provision as a grant of authority to the legislature, and hence should not be viewed as either directory or
mandatory.
28

Section 5 further provides, under subparagraph (2) thereof, that "the party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party list." Axiomatic is the
rule that a provision of law must be read in harmony with the other provisions. Consequently, subparagraph
(2) should be accorded a similar treatment as subparagraph (1), i.e., that it is neither directory nor mandatory,
but simply a grant of legislative authority.
In the exercise of such authority, Congress passed R.A. 7941 which contains exactly the same provision as
that found in the Constitution. The query is whether Congress intended the 20% requirement as a ceiling or
whether it intended all the seats allocated to sectoral groups to be filled up. Section 5 of Article VI, as
originally worded, provides that "the sectoral or party-list representatives shall in no case exceed twenty
percent of the entire membership of the House of Representatives." From the language thereof, it is clear that
the framers intended to simply impose a ceiling. Nevertheless, in its final form, the phrase "in no case exceed"
was deleted. Does this mean then that the 20% requirement was meant to be mandatory? A perusal of the
Record of the ConCom will negate this implication, thus:
"MR. GASCON. In the Gentlemans proposal, he has replaced the words SHALL APPOINT" by "MAY
APPOINT" which means there is a possibility that the President will not appoint. Will it not be best that to
make that assurance - since it was the intent, I believe, during our deliberation that either we should write an
ordinance with regard to sectoral representation or encourage an appointment by the President - we change
the words "MAY APPOINT" to "SHALL APPOINT"?
"x x x x x x x x x
"MR. MONSOD. x x x I would be more comfortable by just saying: "THE PRESIDENT MAY FILL."
"The President may have her commitments to labor and the peasant sector. But a directive on this point may
in fact be counterproductive because she may not have the full period to look into how to implement the
selection. If we do it that way, the President may be hurried into a selection because she has to comply with it
by July and it may not be a good or meaningful selection. It may be necessary that there will be, as
Commissioner Lerum said, various congresses in order to make it a real systematic choice. I do not know if
there is enough time. But why do we not leave it to the President to determine if there is time to do this
properly?"
29

The word "may" was used in the final version of the Constitution. Ostensibly, ConCom wanted to give the
President the discretion whether to appoint sectoral representatives or not. If the President does not, then
there can be vacancies in the seats allocated for sectoral representatives. Perforce, such an eventuality is not
highly improbable and cannot thus be disregarded or ignored.
The Senate deliberations on the matter are more revealing:
"1) Senator Alvarez: But, Mr. President, we already have a ceiling of 20 percent for party-list
representatives.
30

"2) Senator Herrera: So that if there will only be two organizations participating, even if we have to
give them the maximum, these two organizations will only be entitled to ten seats, and that will be
less than the number of 25 seats that are supposed to be covered under the party list system.
"Senator Tolentino: Yes, Mr. President. That is what is going to happen if we limit to five seats. But as had
been brought out in the interpellations last night, if we use as a basis the total number of votes cast for the
parties that are participating in the party-list system of election, then, perhaps, there would be no need of a
limitation to five seats because the proportion can be strictly applied.
"x x x x x x x x x
"Senator Maceda: Mr. President, just on this point. In the example given, if a party gets a certain percentage
of votes that should entitle it to seven seats or eight seats and then it is cut down to five seats - the first
computation will be to compute the percentage of all the parties, and they get a corresponding number of
seats - what happens to the excess since there is a limitation on five seats?
"Senator Tolentino: What is going to happen is, there may be vacancies under this system.
"Senator Maceda: I just wanted to clarify that.
"Senator Tolentino: That is why, I think, the basis must always be the total number of votes and give them
what is due them in the mathematical proportion.
"Senator Maceda: But even based on the total number of votes, we may have one or two major parties or
major labor organizations, for that matter, really getting more than five seats.
"Senator Tolentino: Yes, that is going to happen, Mr. President, if there is no limitation. But the alternative is
we will have some vacancies in the House of Representatives.
"Senator Maceda: Because the alternative to vacancies, if it is so provided in the law, would be to further
redistribute the vacancies. After providing for the parties that get a maximum of five seats, then the excess
could be reapportioned among all the parties that would not be getting the maximum of five seats.
"Senator Tolentino: That could be expressly provided for.
"Senator Maceda: Yes, that could be the other alternative. But as framed now, the result would be that there
would be vacancies if some parties get more than five seats.
"Senator Tolentino: That is right, Mr. President.
31

It bears to stress that in imposing a limitation on the number of seats to which a sectoral group or organization
may be entitled, the lawmakers anticipated that vacancies will occur. To obviate the possibility, it was
proposed in the Senate that "the excess of seats, if any, shall be proportionally allotted to the participants
entitled to a smaller number of seats." The purpose was to distribute proportionately the excess seats to
those who are lower in rank.
32
The proposal was approved in the Senate, but was not included in the final
version of the law. Hence, it stands to reason that the lawmakers did not intend to fill up the entire 20%
allotted to the sectoral groups. This is not at all surprising given the sentiment shared among members of the
House of Representatives against sectoral representation.
33

Respondent Commission further held that allocating the seats only to those obtaining the 2% threshold will
prevent compliance with the alleged constitutional mandate that the party-list representatives shall be
composed of 20% of the entire membership of the House of Representatives. Again, I beg to disagree for it
unduly assumes that the 2% threshold is not mandatory and that it is essential to fill up the entire 20% of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives. In effect, the respondent Commission effectively voids the 2%
threshold using the mandatory or directory nature of certain provisions of the law. This is too artificial a
technique of interpretation for what we ought to decipher is the real legislative intent, which can only be
ascertained from the nature and object of the act, and the consequences which would result from construing it
one way or another.
34
Using these guidelines, it is clear that the 2% threshold is mandatory while the 20%
requirement is but a ceiling.
A corollary issue raised is whether Article VI, Section 5(2) of the Constitution requires that everytime the
number of district representatives is increased from 200 there shall be a corresponding increase in the
number of party-list representatives. The answer can be found in the discussions of the Constitutional
Commission, to wit:
"MR. GASCON. I would like to ask a question. Is the intent of the proposal of Commissioner Monsod to
maintain the ratio of 80 percent legislative district and 20 percent party list representatives on a constant
basis?
"MR. MONSOD. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
"MR. GASCON. Regardless of the number of legislative representatives and the number of the party list
representatives?
"MR. MONSOD. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer."
Similarly, the Senate records reveal the following exchange between Senator Osmena and Senator Tolentino:
"Senator Osmena: x x x Going to paragraph (2), it states:
"The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party list.
And paragraph (1) states:
"The House shall be composed of not more than 250 members. Twenty percent of 250 would be 50. Is that
the total number to be elected? Or is it 20 percent of the existing membership of the House which, I think, is
207?
"The membership of the House is changing because every time we enact a law creating a province, a new
member is added. Like in the case of Mandaluyong, a newly created city, a new member is added.
"As a matter of fact, we have a bill before us - which I do not think is the right thing to do - which creates one
more seat in Makati through the operation of a simple law and not through reapportionment.
"In effect, Mr. President, the number of members of the House is not static. It can change from time to time. It
can increase or it can even conceivably decrease if there are mergers.
"What is the 20 percent going to be based on, Mr. President?
"Senator Tolentino: The 20 per centum would be what is provided already by law. I think the creation of new
cities may not automatically involve an increase in the number of members of the House but may have to wait
until a new district is provided by law, Mr. President.
"In other words, if that is the interpretation, then the membership will remain the same.
"But if we take a different view that every city or every new province is entitled, by the Constitution itself, to a
member, that means the number will actually change depending upon the number of seats that we add by the
creation of new urbanized cities or new provinces.
"That will mean that in every election where there is a party list system, the computation of the number of
seats for the party list will change."
35

Upon further clarification by Senator Lina, it was explained by Senator Tolentino that it will not be a fixed and
definite number of seats but that the party-list representatives shall constitute a given percentage of the total
number of the Members of the House of Representatives to be elected including those under the party-list.
36

C. The 3-seat limitation
The rationale for the 3-seat limit is to distribute party-list representation to as many party groups as possible.
According to Senator Tolentino, if one party will be allowed to dominate, then the idea of giving as much as
possible to the marginalized groups may be defeated.
37
The purpose is to allow as many as possible of the
marginalized groups that would be entitled to representation to have a seat in Congress,
38
and to have
enough seats left for those who are way below the list.
39
There is nothing offensive to this requirement as to
warrant a declaration of unconstitutionality. Indeed, the parties do not attack this provision as legally infirmed.
IV. Conclusion
The party list-system of election is one of the major innovations in our 1987 Constitution. The system gives
the poor and the powerless in our society a fighting chance to elect representatives in Congress who will act
as their real mouthpieces. In a country like ours where vested interest reigns and may reign till kingdom
come, this rare opportunity given by the Constitution to our less privileged people should be re-examined so
that the exercise of the privilege will not be diluted by undemocratic restraints. R.A. 7941 while brimming with
good intention can stand a lot of improvements. Hopefully, the bills filed and that may still be filed in Congress
improving R.A. 7941 may bring about the day when our democracy will be more vibrant, as they who have
less in life will have more in law because they themselves can make the law.
I vote with the majority.


Footnotes
1
Record of the ConCom, Vol. II, pp. 85-86.
2
Id., p. 253.
3
Id., p. 256.
4
Id., p. 562.
5
Record of the Senate, Vol. II, No. 33, p. 143.
6
Id., p. 145.
7
Id., No. 34, p. 164.
8
Id., p. 186.
9
Id., p. 343.
10
Id., No. 37, p. 349.
11
Id., No. 40, p. 511.
12
Id., p. 500.
13
Id., p. 501.
14
Record of the ConCom, Vol. II, p. 256.
15
Id., p. 567.
16
Record of the Senate, Vol. II, No. 33, p. 145.
17
Id., No. 37, p. 343.
18
Record of the ConCom, Vol. II, p. 85.
19
Id., p. 253.
20
Id., pp. 567-568.
21
Record of the Senate, Vol. II, No. 37, pp. 342-343.
22
Id., p. 352.
23
Shapiro v. State of Maryland, 336 F.Supp. 1205 (1972).
24
Nevett, et al. v. Sides, et al., 571 F.2d 209 (1978).
25
Record of the ConCom, Vol. V, p. 332.
26
Record of the Senate, Vol. II, No. 32, p. 127.
27
Clark, et al. v. Marengo County, et al., 469 F. Supp. 1150 (1979).
28
Record of the ConCom, Vol. V, p. 80.
29
Id., p. 335.
30
Record of the Senate, Vol. II, No. 32, p. 126.
31
Id., No. 34, p. 159.
32
Id., No. 37, pp. 195, 344.
33
See: Record of the Senate, Vol. II, No. 32, p. 129; No. 37, p. 351.
34
Menssen, et al. v. Eureka Unit Dist. No. 140, Woodford County, et al., 388 N.E.2d 273 (1979).
35
Record of the Senate, Vol. II, No. 33, pp. 137-138.
36
Id., No. 37, pp. 349-350.
37
Id., No. 32, p. 126.
38
Id., No. 33, p. 139.
39
Id., No. 34, p. 159.


DISSENTING
MENDOZA, J .:
My disagreement with the majority is in respect of its computation of the number of seats to which the parties,
organizations, and coalitions, which obtained more than 2 percent of the votes for the party-list system are
entitled to have under the Constitution and the implementing law, R.A. No. 7941. Beyond affirming the
election of the 14 party-list representatives as the majority does, I contend that 25 more should be proclaimed
to give each of the winning parties, organizations, and coalitions the maximum three seats allowed by law,
thus bringing the total number of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives to 39. I am afraid
that todays ruling, denying additional seats to the winning groups, bodes ill for the future of the party-list
system in this country.
I
To be sure, those who drafted the Constitution simply sketched out the basic features of proportional
representation, leaving it to Congress to flesh out the bare bones of an idea. The record of the Constitutional
Commission shows:
MR. RODRIGO: Then, I will propound my question to Commissioner Monsod whose name appears as
number one in the list.
My question have reference to the party list system and the sectoral representation in the House of
Representatives. I would like to preface my questions by stating that I am in favor of the basic idea of having
sectoral representation and representation by means of the party list in the House of Representatives.
However, from the very beginning, I already expressed my misgivings about the mechanics, the
practicableness of this idea. I think this is in line with the thinking of the Constitutional Commission on this
matter. We like this party list and sectoral representation, if they can be implemented properly. And we should
leave to the legislature the enactment of the implementing laws or the enabling acts. The legislature will have
more time to study the problem on how this can be implemented. The legislature can go into details on the
mechanics. This we cannot do in the Constitutional Commission because a Constitution must be brief,
concise and broad.
So, I am very glad when I read this proposed amendment which stated twice the phrase "AS PROVIDED BY
LAW." . . .
And so, my first question is: In the light of the phrase "AS PROVIDED BY LAW," do I take it that this party list
system and the sectoral representation provision will not take effect until an enabling act or an implementing
legislation shall have been enacted by Congress?
MR. MONSOD: Madam President, the first Assembly will be in March or April. But when we say "AS
PROVIDED BY LAW," it could really mean that it may be by ordinance appended to this Constitution or an
executive order by the incumbent President or, as the Gentleman has said, by law provided by the incoming
Congress. So, it could be any of these ways.
MR. RODRIGO: Madam President, we are all witnesses to the difficulty in arriving at a consensus of these
very novel ideas on the disputes that we have had. And up to now, there is no real consensus yet. Does the
Commissioner believe that we should really try to go into the details by enacting an ordinance to the
Constitution? In other words, should we force the issue? Should we insist that before this Constitution is
submitted to the people in a plebiscite, we shall have already defined the details on how this party list system
and sectoral representation can be implemented in the first election after the ratification of the Constitution?
MR. MONSOD: We just want to establish the principle of the party list system with sectoral representation in
the present Constitution. We can discuss whether the body in its collective wisdom feels that it is qualified or
should go into the ordinance after we have established the principle, and we will be guided by the vote or
judgment of this Commission.
1

When the fundamental law, therefore, emerged from the Commission, Art. VI, 5 merely provided:
SEC. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-
half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law except the religious sector.
Pursuant to its mandate under the Constitution, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941 which in pertinent parts
provides:
SEC. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives.-The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the
party-list.
. . . .
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering
more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled
to not more than three (3) seats.
Rep. Tito R. Espinosa, co-sponsor of the bill which became R.A. No. 7941, explained that the system
embodied in the law was largely patterned after the mixed party-list system in Germany. Indeed, the decision
to use the German model is clear from the exchanges in the Constitutional Commission between
Commissioners Blas F. Ople and Christian S. Monsod.
2
The difference between our system and that of
Germany is that whereas in Germany half (328) of the seats in the Bundestag are filled by direct vote and the
other half (328) are filled through the party-list system, in our case the membership of the House of
Representatives is composed of 80 percent district and 20 percent party-list representatives.
The party-list system of proportional representation is based on the Niemeyer formula, embodied in Art. 6(2)
of the German Federal Electoral Law, which provides that, in determining the number of seats a party is
entitled to have in the Bundestag, seats should be multiplied by the number of votes obtained by each party
and then the product should be divided by the sum total of the second votes obtained by all the parties that
have polled at least 5 percent of the votes. First, each party receives one seat for each whole number
resulting from the calculation. The remaining seats are then allocated in the descending sequence of the
decimal fractions. The Niemeyer formula was adopted in R.A. No. 7941, 11. As Representative Espinosa
said:
MR. ESPINOSA: [T]his mathematical computation or formula was patterned after that of Niemeyer formula
which is being practiced in Germany as formerly stated. As this is the formula or mathematical computation
which they have seen most fit to be applied in a party-list system. This is not just a formula arrived at because
of suggestions of individual Members of the Committee but rather a pattern which was already used, as I
have said, in the assembly of Germany.
3

The rules in 11 require a four-step process of distributing the seats for the party-list system. Using the
results of the last elections, the application of the rules in 11 is as follows:
Step 1. R.A. No. 7941, 11 states that "the parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections." The first step,
therefore, is to rank the groups taking part in the election for party-list seats and get the total number of votes
cast for all of them. Then determine which of them obtained at least 2 percent of the total votes cast. The
application of this rule shows that only 13 parties, organizations, and coalitions obtained at least 2 percent of
the total votes (9,155,309) cast for the party-list system.
Step 2. R.A. No. 7941, 11 provides that "the parties, organizations, or coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each." Since only 13
parties, organizations, and coalitions obtained at least 2 percent of the total votes cast, only they should
initially get one seat each. The results of applying Steps 1 and 2 are shown in Table 1:
Table 1
DETERMINATION OF 2 PERCENTERS AND INITIAL
DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS TO THEM
Group
Actual votes
received
Percentage of
votes cast for
party-list
Guaranteed
seat
1. APEC 503,487 5.50% 1
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% 1
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% 1
4. VETERANS FEDERATION 304,902 3.33% 1
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% 1
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% 1
7. NCSFO 338,303 2.60% 1
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 2.57% 1
9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 2.54% 1
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% 1
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% 1
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 2.07% 1
13. COCOFED 186,388 2.04% 1
14. SENIOR CITIZENS 143,444 1.57% 1
15. Other Parties 5,582,427 Each with
less than
2%



Total 9,155,309 100% 13
Step 3. R.A. No. 7941, 11 provides that "those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." The initial allocation of seats to the 13
parties and organizations which obtained at least 2 percent of the votes leaves 39 seats (52 minus 13)
available for further distribution. How should this be done? As stated earlier, Congress adopted the Niemeyer
formula for distributing seats in the Bundestag.
Accordingly, the number of additional seats to which a 2 percenter is entitled should be determined by
multiplying the number of seats remaining by the total number of votes obtained by that party and dividing the
product by the total number of votes (3,429,438) garnered by all the 2 percenters. The 2 percenters are each
entitled to the additional seats equivalent to the integer portion of the resulting product. Thus, APEC will have
five additional seats computed as follows:
39 x 503,487 = 5.73

3,429,438
The result of the application of this formula is shown in Column 4 of Table 2, with 32 seats (the sum of the
integer portions of the resulting products) being apportioned among the 2 percenters. The seats remaining
after the distribution of seats in accordance with Step 3 should be distributed to the two percenters in the
descending order of the decimal portions of the products shown in Column 4. This distribution of the
remaining seats is shown in Column 5.
Table 2
SECOND DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS
Group
Total votes
obtained
Guaranteed
seats
(1)
Additional
seats
(2)
Extra
seats
(3)
Total

(4)
1. APEC 503,487 1 5.73 1 7
2. ABA 321,646 1 3.66 1 5
3. ALAGAD 312,500 1 3.55

4
4. VETERANS
FEDERATION
304,902 1 3.47 4
5. PROMDI 255,184 1 2.90 1 4
6. AKO 239,042 1 2.72 1 4
7. NCSFO 238,303 1 2.71 1 4
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 1 2.68 1 4
9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 1 2.64 1 4
10. BUTIL 215,643 1 2.45

3
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 1 2.21

3
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 1 2.16

3
13. COCOFED 186,388 1 2.12

3


Total 3,429,438 13 32 7 52
It may be asked why, despite the fact that most of the parties have already exceeded the three-seat limit
while the rest have obtained three seats, the computation is still brought forward. The answer is that it is
possible that every party will get three or more seats after following the procedure in Step 3. The only reason
why, in the cases at bar, the results seem to make the distribution of excess seats superfluous is that the 2
percenters are not sufficiently numerous.
Indeed, the goal should be to fill all seats allowed for party-list representatives, which at present are 52. Thus,
Art. VI, 5(2) of the Constitution that "the party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party-list." This provision thus fixes a ratio of 80
percent district representatives to 20 percent party-list representatives. If in fact all seats reserved for party-
list representatives are not filled, that is due to the fact that the law limits parties, organizations, and coalitions
to three (3) seats each. To maintain this ratio, the entire number of seats for the party-list system, after
deducting the number of seats initially distributed to the 2 percenters, must be allocated to them.
The above formula is similar to that used by this Court in determining the proportional representation of
political parties in the Commission on Appointments of Congress. Art. VI, 18 of the Constitution provides that
the Commission shall be composed of "the President of the Senate as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators
and twelve Members of the House of Representatives elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein." In Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales,
4
this Court held:
5

As a result of the national elections held last May 11, 1992, the Senate is composed of the following members
or Senators representing the respective political affiliations:
LDP - 15 senators
NPC - 5 senators
LAKAS-NUCD - 3 senators
LP-PDP-LABAN - 1 senator
Applying the mathematical formula agreed to by the parties as follows:
No. of senators of a political party

Total No. of senators elected
x 12 seats
the resulting composition of the senate based on the rule of proportional representation of each political party
with elected representatives in the Senate, is as follows:
Political Party/
Political Coalition
Membership
Proportional
Representatives
LDP 15 7.5 members
NPC 5 2.5 members
LAKAS-NUCD 3 1.5 members
LP-PDP-LABAN 1 .5 members
Step 4. Finally, R.A. No. 7941, 11 provides that "each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not
more than three (3) seats." Hence, the 2 percenters, which are determined to be entitled to more than three
seats are finally allotted three seats each, or 38 seats in all, as shown in Column 8 of Table 3. This
incidentally leaves 13 seats in the House of Representatives for the party-list vacant.
Table 3
FINAL DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS
Party/organization/
coalition
Total number of
seats obtained
Seats in excess
of 3
Total number
seats allowed
1. APEC 7 4 3
2. ABA 5 2 3
3. ALAGAD 4 1 3
4. VETERANS
FEDERATION
4 1 3
5. PROMDI 4 1 3
6. AKO 4 1 3
7. NCSFO 4 1 3
8. ABANSE! PINAY 4 1 3
9. AKBAYAN! 4 1 3
10. BUTIL 3 - 3
11. SANLAKAS 3 - 3
12. COOP-NATCCO 3 - 3
13. COCOFED 3 - 3
TOTAL 52 13 39
On the basis of the foregoing computations, I reach the following conclusions:
1. The proclamation by the COMELEC of the 13 parties, which obtained at least 2 percent of the
votes cast for the party-list system, should be affirmed.
2. The 13 parties should be given two (2) additional seats, with the exception of APEC which
should be allotted only one (1) additional seat, thus giving each party the maximum three (3) seats
allowed by law, on the basis of votes obtained by them in proportion to the votes cast for all of
them. This means a total of 25 party-list representatives belonging to the 13 parties will be added to
the 14 now in office, bringing to 39 the total number of party-list representatives in the House.
3. The decision of the COMELEC en banc allocating seats to 38 other parties, all of which failed to
obtain at least 2 percent of the total votes cast, is set aside.
4. The proclamation of 25 additional party-list representatives will leave 13 seats for party-list
representatives vacant. While Art. VI, 5(b) of the Constitution fixes a ratio of 80 percent district to
20 percent party-list representatives, does not really require that all seats allotted to party-list
representatives - at present 52 - be filled.
The results of the application of the foregoing steps are summarized and explained in the Consolidated Table
appended to this opinion.
II
The majority holds that "the Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in
the Philippine setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory character of the twenty percent
allocation." Claiming that it is "obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique model which
demands an equally unique formula," the majority instead allocates seats to the winning groups in a manner
which cannot be justified in terms of the rules in 11. While it disavows any intention to "reinvent or second-
guess [the law]," the majority in reality does so and in the process engages in a bit of judicial legislation.
First. In determining the number of seats to which the first party is entitled, the majority applies the "one seat
for every 2 percent" rule.
6
But after once applying the rule to the highest ranking party, the majority does not
apply it to the rest of the 2 percenters. Indeed, it cannot consistently do so because it is mathematically
impossible to require that the 52 seats for party-list representatives be filled at the rate of 2 percent per seat.
That would mean that the votes needed to win the 52 seats is 104 percent of the votes cast in the election.
The majority admits this. It says that its "formula will be applicable only in determining the number of
additional seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the additional seats of the other
qualified parties."
If the formula applies only to the first party, then it is no formula at all because it is incapable of consistent and
general application. It is even iniquitous. If a party got 5.5 percent of the votes and is given two (2) seats, it is
hard to see why the next ranking party, which got 5 percent of the votes should get only one (1) seat.
Indeed, the law does not distinguish between the first ranking party and the rest of the other 2 percenters
insofar as obtaining additional seats are concerned. The law provides that "those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." The
operative word is "their" which refers to none other than the total number of votes cast for the 2 percenters.
The plain language of the law is that the basis for the allocation of additional seats is the total number of votes
cast for the 2 percenters. This rule applies to all parties obtaining more than 2 percent of the votes cast for the
winning parties.
Second. In determining the additional seats for the 2 percenters after determining the number of seats for the
first ranking party, the majority uses the following formula:
Additional seats
for concerned
party
=
No of votes of
concerned party

No. of votes of
first party
x
No. of additional
seats allocated to the
first party
R.A. No. 7941, 11 requires the determination of two types of proportions. The first is the determination of the
proportion of the votes obtained by a party in relation to the total number of votes cast for the party-list. The
purpose of the rule is to determine whether a party was able to hurdle the 2 percent threshold. The second is
the determination of number of votes a party obtained in proportion to the number of votes cast for all the
parties obtaining at least 2 percent of the votes. The purpose for determining the second proportion is to
allocate the seats left after the initial allocation of one (1) seat each to every 2 percenter. The total number of
votes obtained by a party in relation to the total number of votes obtained by all 2 percenters is multiplied by
the remaining number of seats.
If an analogy is needed to explain this formula, the remaining 39 seats may be likened to a pie to be
distributed among the 2 percenters. The way to distribute it is to use the weight of their individual votes in
relation to their total number of votes. There is no reason for using the number of votes of the first party as a
divisor since it is not the votes obtained by the first ranking party which are being distributed.
In truth, 11 does not say that those garnering more than 2 percent of the votes "shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to the number of additional seats given to the highest ranking party." What it says is that
such additional seats must be "in proportion to their total number of votes," the antecedent of "their" being
"those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes."
Third. I see no legal or logical basis for the majoritys fixation with designating the highest ranking participant
as a "first" party. This procedure, as admitted by the majority, assumes that the seats to be allocated to the
qualified parties depend on the seats of the so-called first party. One will search in vain the proceedings of
both Houses of Congress for a discussion of this procedure or even just a reference to it. There is none.
Fourth. Still it is argued that there should be a distinction between the number of seats for the first ranking
party and those for the rest of the 2 percenters. As an example, the majority cites the case of a first ranking
party obtaining 20 percent of the votes and the second ranking party obtaining 6 percent of the votes.
According to the majority, to give the two parties the same number of seats would be to violate the
"proportional representation parameter."
As already stated, however, the majoritys inordinate concern with the first ranking party is not consistently
carried to the other 2 percenters. The result is that if the first ranking party obtains 5.99 percent of the total
votes cast, the second ranking party 5.98 percent, and the last ranking party 2.0 percent, under the majoritys
formula, the .01 percent difference between the first and the second ranking party will justify the difference of
one (1) seat between them. However, the 3.98 percent difference between the second ranking party and the
last ranking party is disregarded by the majority. Indeed, even under the majoritys novel formula of
proportional representation, its own parameters are violated.
Fifth. In essence, the majority "formula" amounts simply to the following prescription: (1) follow the "1 seat for
every 2%" rule in allocating seats to the first ranking party only and (2) with respect to the rest of the 2
percenters, give each party one (1) seat, unless the first ranking party gets at least six percent, in which case
all 2 percenters with at least one-half of the votes of the first ranking party should get an extra seat. I cannot
see how this formula could have been intended by Congress. Only in a Pickwickian sense can the result of
the application of such "formula" be considered proportional representation.
Sixth. The formula adopted by the majority effectively deprives party-list representatives of representation
considering that it eliminates the ratio 4 district representatives to 1 party-list representative in the House.
This is so because, under the rule formulated by the majority, it becomes very difficult to reach the ceiling of
20 percent of the House. In the case at bar, to fill 52 seats in the House, the first ranking party would have to
obtain exactly 6 percent of the votes and 25 other parties must get at least 3 percent. In practical terms, this
formula violates the Constitution insofar as it makes it improbable to obtain the ceiling of 20 percent thereby
preventing the realization of the framerss intent of opening up the system to party-list representatives.
Seventh. The scheme adopted by the majority will prevent all 2 percenters, which are not the first ranking
party, from obtaining the maximum number of seats. This is so because, with their votes being proportioned
against the votes of the first ranking party, there will never be an instance where the additional seats of these
parties will be equivalent to 2. Again, this is contrary to R.A. No. 7941, 11 which contemplates the possibility
of more than one (1) party obtaining the maximum number of seats allowed by law.
_________________
Already, the proportion of party-list representatives to district representatives is small compared to the mixed
system in Germany where half of the seats (328) of the Bundestag are district representatives and the other
half (328) are reserved for party-list representatives. The ruling announced today would ensure that the
proportion of party-list representatives to the district representatives who constitute 80 percent of the total
membership in the House of Representatives is even less than 20 percent. The constitutional intent to afford
marginalized groups in our society to be represented in the House is thus frustrated if not subverted.
For these reasons, I vote to grant the petitions in these cases and to order the Commission on Elections to
proclaim as elected one additional nominee of APEC and two additional nominees of each of the following
parties, organizations, or coalitions: ABA, ALAGAD, VETERANS FEDERATION, PROMDI, AKO, NCSCFO,
ABANSE! PINAY, AKBAYAN!, BUTIL, SANLAKAS, COOP-NATCCO, and COCOFED.


Footnotes
1
2 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION (hereafter referred to as RECORD) 572-
573 (Session of August 1, 1986).
2
2 Record 258 (Session of July 25, 1986); 567-568 (Session of Aug. 1, 1986).
3
Transcript, House of Representatives, Session of November 22, 1994, pp. 66-67.
4
214 SCRA 789 (1992).
5
Id. at 791-92.
6
The rule is allegedly based on Resolution No. 2847 of the COMELEC. The resolution does not,
however, contain the alleged rule. To the contrary, it reiterates in 12 that "The parties,
organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-
list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes; Provided finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats each." It is only in the illustration attached as Annex A to the resolution where it is
stated that the computation under Column D of the Table of Allocation of Seats is made at the rate
of "1 seat for every 2%; maximum of 3 seats." How this was arrived at was not explained.




Consolidated Table
DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS
Group (1)
Actual
votes
received
1

(2)
Percentage of
votes cast for
party-list
2

(3)
Guaranteed
seat
3

(4)
Additional
seats
4

(5)
Extra
seats
5

(6)
Total
6

(7)
Seats
in
excess
of
3
(8)
Total
number
of seats
allowed
7

1. APEC 503,487 5.50% 1 5.73 1 7 4 3
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% 1 3.66 1 5 2 3
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% 1 3.55 4 1 3
4. VETERANS
FEDERATION
304,902 3.33% 1 3.47 4 1 3
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% 1 2.90 1 4 1 3
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% 1 2.72 1 4 1 3
7. NCSFO 338,303 2.60% 1 2.71 1 4 1 3
8. ABANSE!
PINAY
235,548 2.57% 1 2.68 1 4 1 3
9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 2.54% 1 2.64 1 4 1 3
10 BUTIL 215,643 2.36% 1 2.45 3 - 3
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% 1 2.21 3 - 3
12. COOP-
NATCCO
189,802 2.07% 1 2.16 3 - 3
13. COCOFED 186,388 2.04% 1 2.12 3 - 3
14. SENIOR
CITIZENS
143,444 1.57%
15. Other Parties 5,582,427 Each with less
than 2%

TOTAL 9,155,309 100% 13 32 7 52 13 39


1
COMELEC Canvass Report dated June 1, 1998.
2
Obtained by dividing the votes received by one party by the total number of votes cast for the
party-list system.
3
Pursuant to the first clause of R.A. No. 7941, 11(b) which provides: "The parties, organizations,
and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one seat each."
4
Pursuant to the second clause of R.A. No. 7941, 11(b) which provides: "Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion
to their total number of votes." This is obtained by dividing the total votes received by a 2 percenter
over the total votes received by all 2 percenters.
5
Allocated by ranking the decimal portions of the resulting products shown in Column 4.
6
Sum of integers in Column 4 & 5.
7
Pursuant to the third clause of R.A. NO. 7941 which provides: "Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats."
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 132875-76 February 3, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.
R E S O L U T I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who is now confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six
counts
1
is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge
the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite
his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
The issue raised is one of the first impression.
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly
incarcerated persons in general? In answering the query, we are called upon to balance relevant and
conflicting factors in the judicial interpretation of legislative privilege in the context of penal law.
The accused-appellant's "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member of House of
Representatives" was filed on the grounds that
1. Accused-appellant's reelection being an expression of popular will cannot be rendered inutile by
any ruling, giving priority to any right or interest not even the police power of the State.
2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative amounts to taxation without
representation.
3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts to his suspension/removal and
mocks the renewed mandates entrusted to him by the people.
4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice to be heard.
5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to attend sessions of the U.S.
Congress.
6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member thereof and urges a co-equal
branch of government to respect its mandate.
7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty of accused-appellant to
discharge his mandate.
8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when allowed to leave
jail.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign
electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress. Having
been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this
a covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be
defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free
people expects to achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite
of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by
law. Our first task is to ascertain the applicable law.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of Government-executive, legislative, and
judicial are subject to the majesty of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that
election or appointment to high government office, by itself, frees the official from the common restraints of
general law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher
the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather than exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, the latter
customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the
provision shows that privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an
exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be
extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department.
Sec 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the
sessions of Congress, and in going to and returning from the same, . . .
Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests.
A congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not
claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same general laws governing all persons still
to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal.
The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:
Art. VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable by not more
than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in
going to and returning from the same.
For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest. The
restrictive interpretation of immunity and intent to confine it within carefully defined parameters is illustrated by
the concluding portion of the provision, to wit:
. . . but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved the custody of the law within
twenty four hours after its adjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise such privilege
shall cease upon its failure to do so.
The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation of Congress to surrender
the subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The requirement that he should be attending sessions or
committee meetings has also been removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is in
session.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress' function to attend sessions is underscored by
Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which states that
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may
adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and
under such penalties, as such House may provide.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of
Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to
attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman
charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by law, it
has constitutional foundations.
Accused-appellant's reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos
2
, which states, inter alia, that
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To
do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When a people
have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with the knowledge of his life
and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of
any. It is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of
the people.
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the above-quoted ruling that the
Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of
office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same
way that preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a
congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense.
Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. As stated
in United States v. Gustilo,
3
it is the injury to the public which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It
is not the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied
bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.
4

The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into office cannot be supplanted
by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties
outside his regular place of confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant's arrest was issued, he fled and evaded capture
despite a call from his colleagues in the House of Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to
surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call he initially spurned
which accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This can not be countenanced because, to
reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-defined Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the
aims of the State's penal system.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions the Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several
motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons, to wit:
a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held at the Batasan Complex, Quezon
City, on the issue of whether to expel/suspend him from the House of Representatives;
b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati City;
c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati Medical Center, Makati City;
d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In this case, accused-appellant commuted
by chartered plane and private vehicle.
He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City,
when he was likewise allowed/permitted to leave the prison premises, to wit.
a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program" for the purpose of 1) establishing a
mahogany seedling bank and 2) planting mahogany trees, at the NBP reservation. For this
purpose, he was assigned one guard and allowed to use his own vehicle and driver in going to and
from the project area and his place of confinement.
b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati City.
c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City for his heart condition.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of Congress. Emergency or
compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the
authorities or upon court orders.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meeting for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him free
man with all the privilege appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-
appellant's status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction
system. Of particular relevance in this regard are the following observations of the Court in Martinez v. Morfe:
5

The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortified by policy considerations.
There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise
delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to
discharge their vital responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of their conscience
of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When
it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class,
without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be
considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the
same. There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can
perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression of the criminal law.
Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen
considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished.
To the fear that may be expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly go
after legislators belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguards
thrown around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an individual, would
constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the
judiciary would remain independent. It is trite to say that in each and every manifestation of judicial
endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence.
The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their
voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the
latter urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate. He also claims that the concept of
temporary detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and that he has always
complied with the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail.
We remain unpersuaded.1wphi1.nt
No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member of the House of Representatives
"[h]e is provided with a congressional office situated at Room N-214, North Wing Building, House of
Representatives Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City, manned by a full complement of staff paid for by
Congress. Through [an] inter-department coordination, he is also provided with an office at the Administration
Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he attends to his constituents." Accused-appellant further
admits that while under detention, he has filed several bills and resolutions. It also appears that he has been
receiving his salaries and other monetary benefits. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has been discharging
his mandate as a member of the House of Representative consistent with the restraints upon one who is
presently under detention. Being a detainee, accused-appellant should not even have been allowed by the
prison authorities at the National Penitentiary to perform these acts.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of
the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such
legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration,
if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at
any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws."
6
This simply
means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities
imposed.
7
The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither
partiality not prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a
Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same
class as all persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a
person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-
appellant asserts that the duty to legislative ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-
appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the
Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of
one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the
President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a
function depends on the need to its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling
under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular
affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and
order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others
who are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in
favor of or against groups or types of individuals.
8

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify
exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their
interests are disregarded.
9

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal
law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the
class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
10

Imprisonment is the restraint of a man's personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to prevent the free
exercise of his power of
locomotion.
11

More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of one's liberty. As a punishment, it is
restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is personal to the accused.
12
The term refers to the
restraint on the personal liberty of another; any prevention of his movements from place to place, or of his
free action according to his own pleasure and will.
13
Imprisonment is the detention of another against his will
depriving him of his power of locomotion
14
and it "[is] something more than mere loss of freedom. It includes
the notion of restraint within limits defined by wall or any exterior barrier."
15

It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an individual's status in
society.
16
Prison officials have the difficult and often thankless job of preserving the security in a potentially
explosive setting, as well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry into the
social mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment and elimination of certain
rights.
17

Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-appellant's claim that re-election to
public office gives priority to any other right or interest, including the police power of the State.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., and also in separate opinion of Justice Reyes.
Bellosillo, J., I concur in the main and separate opinion.
Melo, J., I join the majority as well as the separate opinion.
Puno, J., I concur with the main and separate opinion.
Vitug, J., I concur in both the ponencia and the separate opinion.
Mendoza, J., I concur in this as well as in the separate opinion of Justice Gonzaga-Reyes.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., See separate concurring opinion.


Separate Opinions
GONZAGA-REYES, J., concurring opinion;
For resolution in this case is a motion filed by accused-appellant Romeo G. Jalosjos, who has been convicted
by the trial court of two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, which judgment is
currently pending appeal before this Court. As a member of the House of Representatives, accused-appellant
claims that his constituents are deprived of representation by reason of his incarceration pending appeal of
the judgment of conviction and that he should therefore be allowed to discharge his legislative functions,
including attendance of legislative sessions and committee meetings.
I concur in the ponencia of my colleague Madame Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago in holding that accused-
appellant's motion is bereft of any legal merit.
The Bill of Rights provides
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpusis suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
1
(emphasis
supplied)
This constitutional provision denying the right to bail for offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the
evidence of guilt is strong is reiterated in Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz
Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless
of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of statutory rape, which is punishable by reclusion
perpetua. In People v. Divina
2
we held that the trial court's judgment of conviction imports that the evidence of
guilt of the crime charged is strong. Unquestionably, the continued incarceration of accused-appellant is a
valid and constitutionally mandated curtailment of his rights to provisional liberty pending appeal of his
conviction.
Neither may the constitutional provision granting immunity from arrest to legislators provide legal justification
for accused-appellant's motion. The Constitution states that
A Senator of Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more
than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No
Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof.
3

I agree with the ponencia that to allow accused-appellant to attend legislative sessions would constitute an
unjustified broadening of the privilege from the arrest bestowed by the Constitution upon members of
Congress. Neither the legislative history of this provision nor the general principles of official immunity support
an expanded interpretation of such privilege.
Unlike the present Constitution, the 1935 Constitution
4
limited the privilege from arrests to "all cases except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace." This provision was taken from the Philippine Autonomy Act of
1916, which was in turn based upon the American Constitution. In accordance with American precedents, the
word "treason, felony and breach of the peace" have been construed to include all indictable offenses.
5
Thus,
under the 1935 Constitution the freedom from arrest only encompassed civil arrest.
Under the 1973
6
and the 1987 Constitution, the privilege was broadened to include arrests for crimes
punishable by imprisonment of six years or less. Despite the expansion of the privilege, the rationale for
granting members of Congress immunity from arrest remained the same to ensure that they are not
prevented from performing their legislative duties.
7
In fact, the 1986 Constitutional Commission rejected the
proposal of one of its members to expand the scope of the parliamentary immunity to include searches
because, unlike arrest, it was not demonstrated that the conduct of searches would prevent members of
Congress from discharging their legislative functions.
8

It is a well-established principle that official immunity is a necessary adjunct to the vigorous and effective
performance of official functions. Members of Congress in particular, who are called upon to exercise their
discretion and judgment in enacting laws responsive to the needs of the people, would certainly be impeded
in the exercise of their legislative functions if every dissatisfied person could compel them to vindicate the
wisdom of their enactments in an action for damages or question their official acts before the courts.
9

It was never the intention of the framers of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions to shield a member of Congress
from the consequences of his wrongdoing. Thus, despite the widening of its scope to include criminal
offenses, the privilege from arrest is still circumscribed by the nature or the gravity of the offenses of which
the accused is charged. Hence, the commission of serious crimes, i.e., crimes punishable by afflictive
penalties or with capital punishment, does not fall within the scope of the constitutional privilege. A member of
Congress could only invoke the immunity from arrest for relatively minor offenses, punishable at most by
correctional penalties. As enunciated in Martinez v. Morfe,
10
"when it comes to freedom from arrest, it would
amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a
criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and
returning from the same"
The accused-appellant, having been convicted of statutory rape which is punishable by reclusion perpetua,
an afflictive penalty, is obviously not entitled to the privilege of parliamentary immunity and, proceeding from
the above stated rationale for legislative immunity, a liberal construction of the constitutional privilege is not in
order.
It should also be mentioned that, under the factual circumstances of this case, the applicability of this privilege
from arrest to accused-appellant is already moot and academic. The constitutional provision contemplates
that stage of the criminal process at which personal jurisdiction is sought to be acquired over the accused by
means of his arrest. Accused-appellant is no longer at the point of merely being arrested. As a matter of fact,
he has already been arrested, tried and convicted by the trial court.
Accused-appellant's contention that his re-election constitutes a renewal of his mandate and that such an
expression of the popular will should not be rendered inutile by even the police power of the State is hollow.
InAguinaldo v. Comelec,
11
Aguinaldo v. Santos
12
and in Salalima v. Guingona
13
we laid down the doctrine that
a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-
election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the
right to remove therefor. This doctrine of forgiveness or condonation cannot apply to criminal acts which the
re-elected official may have committed during his previous term.
14
The administrative liability of a public officer
is separate and distinct from his penal liability.1wphi1.nt
Penal laws are obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in Philippine territory. Since the Constitution itself
provides for the immunities from the general application of our criminal laws which a Senator or Member of
the House of Representatives may enjoy, it follows that any expansion of such immunities must similarly be
based upon an express constitutional grant.
I vote to deny the motion.


Footnotes
1
RTC Decision, pp. 54-55.
2
212 SCRA 768, at 773 [1992].
3
19 Phil, 208, 212.
4
Cubillo v. City Warden, 97 SCRA 771 [1980].
5
44 SCRA 37 [1972].
6
Art. III, Sec. 1.
7
Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155.
8
Skinuer v. Oklahoma, 315 US 535.
9
See Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, 2nd Edition, p. 548.
10
See Felwa v. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155: Dumlao v.
Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 392 [1980]; Ceniza v. Commission on Elections, 96 SCRA 763
(1980); People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12.
11
Black's Law Dictionary, Special Deluxe 5th Ed., p. 681.
12
20 Words And Phrases, Permanent Ed., p. 466, citing US v. Safeway Stores [Tex.] C.C.C.A. Kan.
140F 2d 834, 839 and US v. Mitchell, 163 F. 1014, 1016 at p. 470.
13
Ibid, p. 470, citing Pine v. Okzewski, 170 A. 825, 827, 112 N.J.L. 429.
14
Id., p. 472, citing US v. Benner, 24 Fed. Gas. 1084, 1087.
15
Id., citing Bird v. Jones, 4 N.Y. Leg. Obs. 158, 159.
16
Sheldon, Krantz, 1088 Supplement. The Law of Correction and Prisoners' Rights, 3rd Ed., p. 121.
17
Ibid.
GONZAGA-REYES, J., concurring opinion;
1
1987 Constitution, Art. III, sec. 13.
2
221 SCRA 209 (1993).
3
Art. VI, sec. 11.
4
Art. VI, sec. 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases
except treasons, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from the arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for
any speech and debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.
5
Martinez v. Morfe, 44 SCRA 22 (1972), citing Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425.
6
Art. VIII, sec. 9. A member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable by not
more than six years imprisonment, be privilege from arrest during his attendance at its sessions,
and in going to and returning from the same; but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the
member involved to the custody of the law within twenty-four hours after its adjournment for a
recess or for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so. A
member shall not be questioned nor held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Batasan or in any committee thereof.
7
1987 Constitution, II RECORD 90.
8
Ibid., 178-185.
9
Mechem, F.R., A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers (1890), 431.
10
Supra.
11
Res., G.R. Nos. 105128-30, May 14, 1992.
12
212 SCRA 768 (1992).
13
257 SCRA 55 (1996).
14
Salalima v. Guingona, id.

















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15905 August 3, 1966
NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants,
vs.
BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.
Liwag and Vivo and S. Artiaga, Jr. for plaintiffs and appellants.
Jose S. Zafra and Associates and V. M. Fortich Zerda for defendant and appellee.
CONCEPCION, C.J .:
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by
plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of
damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being
summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is not
libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication. This motion having been granted by
the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the corresponding order of dismissal.
The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in question is a privileged communication; and, if not,
(2) whether it is libelous or not.
The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication, defendant was a member of the House
of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense, and that pursuant to the
Constitution:
The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason,
felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of
the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein,
they shall not be questioned in any other place. (Article VI, Section 15.)
The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls within the
purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein" that is to say, in Congress used in this provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions,
such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in
session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts
performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official
discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to
perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.
1

The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint herein, it
was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably
was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be
so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any
Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is
not absolutely privileged.
Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are concerned? Addressed to the President, the communication
began with the following paragraph:
In the light of the recent developments which however unfortunate had nevertheless involved the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the unfair attacks against the duly elected members of
Congress of engaging in intriguing and rumor-mongering, allow me, Your Excellency, to address
this open letter to focus public attention to certain vital information which, under the present
circumstances, I feel it my solemn duty to our people to expose.1wph1.t
It has come to my attention that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious
study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists.
Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans" referred to in the second paragraph. The first
plan is said to be "an insidious plan or a massive political build-up" of then Secretary of National Defense,
Jesus Vargas, by propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to "be prepared to become a
candidate for President in 1961". To this end, the "planners" are said to "have adopted the sales-talk that
Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1 in the Philippines." Moreover, the P4,000,000.00
"intelligence and psychological warfare funds" of the Department of National Defense, and the "Peace and
Amelioration Fund" the letter says are "available to adequately finance a political campaign". It further
adds:
It is reported that the "Planners" have under their control the following: (1) Col. Nicanor Jimenez of
NICA,(2) Lt. Col. Jose Lukban of NBI, (3) Capt. Carlos Albert (PN) of G-2 AFP, (4) Col. Fidel
Llamas of MIS (5) Lt. Col. Jose Regala of the Psychological Warfare Office, DND, and (6) Major
Jose Reyna of the Public information Office, DND. To insure this control, the "Planners" purportedly
sent Lt. Col. Job Mayo, Chief of MIS to Europe to study and while Mayo was in Europe, he was
relieved by Col. Fidel Llamas. They also sent Lt. Col. Deogracias Caballero, Chief of Psychological
Warfare Office, DND, to USA to study and while Caballero was in USA, he was relieved by Lt. Col.
Jose Regala. The "Planners" wanted to relieve Lt. Col. Ramon Galvezon, Chief of CIS (PC) but
failed. Hence, Galvezon is considered a missing link in the intelligence network. It is, of course,
possible that the offices mentioned above are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have
absolutely no knowledge. (Emphasis ours.)
Among the means said to be used to carry out the plan the letter lists, under the heading "other operational
technique the following:
(a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the Philippines for Secretary Vargas to talk on
"Communism" and Apologetics on civilian supremacy over the military;
(b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and hundreds of letters "typed in two (2) typewriters
only" to Editors of magazines and newspapers, extolling Secretary Vargas as the "hero of
democracy in 1951, 1953, 1955 and 1957 elections";
(c) Radio announcements extolling Vargas and criticizing the administration;
(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of the Chief of Staff and an attempt to pack key
positions in several branches of the Armed Forces with men belonging to his clique;
(e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such a way as to give the impression that they
reflect the feeling of the people or the opposition parties, to undermine the administration.
Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat", in connection with which the "planners" had gone no further than the
planning stage, although the plan "seems to be held in abeyance and subject to future developments".
Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by trying to assuage the President and the public
with a loyalty parade, in connection with which Gen. Arellano delivered a speech challenging the authority
and integrity of Congress, in an effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind him, and gain popular
and civilian support.
The letter in question recommended.: (1) that Secretary Vargas be asked to resign; (2) that the Armed Forces
be divorced absolutely from politics; (3) that the Secretary of National Defense be a civilian, not a professional
military man; (4) that no Congressman be appointed to said office; (5) that Gen. Arellano be asked to resign
or retire; (6) that the present chiefs of the various intelligence agencies in the Armed Forces including the
chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other intelligence agencies mentioned elsewhere in the letter, be reassigned,
considering that "they were handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano", and that, "most probably,
they belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7) that all military personnel now serving civilian offices be
returned to the AFP, except those holding positions by provision of law; (8) that the Regular Division of the
AFP stationed in Laur, Nueva Ecija, be dispersed by batallion strength to the various stand-by or training
divisions throughout the country; and (9) that Vargas and Arellano should disqualify themselves from holding
or undertaking an investigation of the planned coup d'etat".
We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs' action for damages. Although
the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the unnamed persons therein alluded to as "planners",
and that, having been handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs "probably belong to the
Vargas-Arellano clique", it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that "it is of course possible" that
plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the
very document upon which plaintiffs' action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely
unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. We do
not think that this statement is derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover damages,
considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the
Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the
group therein described as "planners" include these two (2) high ranking officers.
It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written by the defendant, knowing that
it is false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to expose them to public hatred, contempt,
dishonor and ridicule, and to alienate them from their associates, but these allegations are mere conclusions
which are inconsistent with the contents of said letter and can not prevail over the same, it being the very
basis of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs allege in their complaint that said communication is false,
they could not have possibly meant that they were aware of the alleged plan to stage a coup d'etat or that
they were knowingly tools of the "planners". Again, the aforementioned passage in the defendant's letter
clearly implies that plaintiffs were not among the "planners" of said coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not
be "tools", much less, unwittingly on their part, of said "planners".
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192; Tenney vs. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367; Coffin vs. Coffin, 4 Mass 1.



















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-26526 May 27, 1974
GAUDENCIO E. ANTONINO, substituted by MAGNOLIA W. ANTONINO, administratrix of his
estate, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BRIGIDO R. VALENCIA, defendant-appellant.
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for plaintiff-appellee.
Eligio G. Lagman for defendant-appellant.

TEEHANKEE, J .:p
The Court finds that defendant-appellant has failed to discharge the burden of substantiating the errors of fact
and of law allegedly committed by the trial court in its appealed decision and therefore affirms in toto the
appealed judgment holding that defendant caused and was liable for the issuance and publication of the
libelous press release attacking the honor, integrity and reputation of plaintiff and rejecting defendant's
defense of qualified privilege and defensive libel and accordingly sentencing defendant to pay plaintiff the
sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages with interest at the legal rate plus P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and
costs of litigation.
This case arose as an aftermath of the November 1963 local elections when the official candidate of the
Liberal Party (Lorenzo Sarmiento) for governor in Davao lost to the Nacionalista Party standard bearer
(Vicente Duterte), and plaintiff Gaudencio E. Antonino then a senator of the Republic and LP head in that
province attributed the loss of the LP candidate to the support given by defendant Brigido R. Valencia then
Secretary of Public Works and Communications to the independent LP candidate (Constancio Maglana)
which divided the LP votes. In public statements widely quoted in the metropolitan newspapers, plaintiff
stated that had not defendant "sabotaged" and "double-crossed" the LP, its official candidate would have won
the election.
The cordial relations between the two LP leaders which had begun since their student days in the U.P.
College of Engineering became strained. In the Taliba issue of December 21, 1963, it was reported that
plaintiff would file unrevealed administrative charges against defendant with the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee.
On February 28, 1964, while plaintiff was still convalescing in the hospital from a heart attack on January 27,
1964 while attending a Senate session, he filed a formal request with the said Senate committee to
investigate the actions of defendant as Secretary of Public Works and Communications in connection with
certain specified alleged anomalous acquisitions of public works supplies and equipment, as follows: " 1. The
purchase by the department of 100 jeep-rollers costing P1,398,500 from the J.G.R. Enterprises covered by
DPWC purchase order No. A-2563; 2. The purchase of road signs from the Neils Enterprises making
available the P8 million reimbursable funds of the DPWC; 3. The purchase of 250,000 metric tons of cement
valued at $3,950,250 (M) from the Central Trust of China and the sale of such cement to private parties; and
4. The purchase of P194,500 worth of insulating transformers and accessories from the Peninsula
Enterprises."
1
Copy of the said charges were likewise furnished on March 5, 1964 by plaintiff to the
Commission on Appointments with the request that they be considered in passing upon defendant's
appointment to the Cabinet.
Plaintiff's charges as filed with the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee together with defendant's comments
thereon that they were "politically inspired" and had already been answered in the past and that records of the
transactions were open to public scrutiny were carried by the press, particularly in the Bulletin and Newsday
issues of March 5, 1964.
On the same day, March 5, 1964, a two-page press release was issued by the office of the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, Exhibit A, and the contents thereof were published or reported on the
front pages of the six metropolitan papers.
2

Portions of the said published press release are quoted thus: " a) Since Senator Antonino has stubbornly
continued telling lies about me, I have no recourse but start telling the truth about him; b) This is no play of
words and in due time I will file charges against the Senator before the Blue Ribbon Committee for reportedly
anomalous acts that can make him a disgrace to his Senate position; c) . . . for personal selfish reasons,
Antonino had taken advantage of his position as a member of the Monetary Board and even as a Senator; d)
Antonino `had suspicious connections with no less than 22 corporations when he became a member of the
Monetary Board;' e) Is it not the height of abuse of power to threaten an American with deportation and make
him cover from getting a concession because you are a Senator of the Philippines and in the end you get the
concession yourself? and f) I cannot avoid unmasking certain alleged high anomalous activities of the
Senator as a member of the Monetary Board and as a member of the Philippine Senate."
3

Plaintiff then filed on March 23, 1964 the present civil action in the Manila court of first instance for the
recovery against defendant of P1 million as moral damages, P100,000 as exemplary or corrective damages
and P50,000 as litigation expenses and attorney's fees.
Defendant claimed in his answer that he did not issue or cause the publication of the press release; that at
any rate, they were made in good faith and in self-defense and that they were qualifiedly privileged in
character. He sought by way of counterclaim from plaintiff the sum of P1.25 million as moral damages,
P100,000 as exemplary or corrective damages and P50,000 as litigation expense and attorney's fees, which
plaintiff disclaimed in due course as without basis.
After due trial, the lower court ruled against defendant, holding that defendant caused and was liable for the
issuance of the libelous press release and its publication in the papers and rejected his defenses of qualified
privilege and defensive libel. It accordingly rendered its judgment of May 21, 1966 sentencing defendant to
pay plaintiff "the sum of P50,000 as moral damages with interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from
the date of the filing of the complaint, plus P5,000 as attorney's fees and the costs of suit, while the
counterclaims of the defendant against the plaintiff are hereby dismissed."
Hence this direct appeal to this Court under the provisions of the Judiciary Act then in force as the amount
involved was more than P200,000.
4
During the course of the appeal, plaintiff died in a plane crash on
November 13, 1967 on the eve of the 1967 elections. As per the Court's resolution of March 3, 1969, the
motion of Senator Magnolia W. Antonino as administratrix to substitute her deceased husband as plaintiff-
appellee was granted.
Defendant-appellant raises questions of fact and of law in his brief.
On the question of fact, the Court finds that no error was committed by the trial court in finding that the press
release, Exhibit A, issued by the office of defendant as Secretary of Public Works and Communications was
issued or caused to be issued by him and the contents thereof to be published in the metropolitan press and
in not giving credence to defendant's vague denial and to the vague testimonies of two newsmen Aproniano
C. Borres and Laurencio Zabala who could not pinpoint the source of the press release which they simply
found on their desks in the evening but nevertheless accepted at face value and wrote up the contents
thereof as published in their papers on the next day.
The preponderance of the evidence of record, documentary and circumstantial, as marshalled by the trial
court in its decision clearly supports its finding of liability on defendant's part for the issuance and publication
of the offending press release, as follows:
1. The issues of several Manila newspapers of March 5, 1964, reproduced the specific
charges filed by the plaintiff against the defendant with the Blue Ribbon Committee,
which were numbered correlatively;
2. On the upper left corner of Exhibit A was typewritten `For release' and immediately
underneath was the date `March 5, 1964';
3. At the bottom of the first page of Exhibit A appears the following: `Valencia answered
point by point, the charges made against him, to wit:' followed on the second page
numbered correlatively, the first four of which were the brief but specific answers to the
charges of Senator Antonino, arranged in the same numerical order, followed on the
lower portion with a more detailed explanation;
4. The first sentence of the press release indicates the source thereof as the herein
defendant, if not directly at least impliedly
Public Works Secretary Brigido R. Valencia today fired his first
salvo against Senator Gaudencio E. Antonino saying he cannot
avoid unmasking certain alleged highly anomalous actuations of the
Senator as a member of the Monetary Board and as a member of
the Philippine Senate.
5. The second paragraph of the press release quoted a statement made by the
defendant reading as follows:
Since Senator Antonino has stubbornly continued telling lies about me, I have no
recourse but start telling the truth about him.
The defendant admitted that he made such statement in his office in the presence of
several persons, some of whom could be newspaper reporters (pp. 47-50, t.s.n. of
hearing of Sept. 15, 1965).
6. The first page of the press release made reference to two persons only the plaintiff
and thedefendant, with parts thereof consisting of quoted statements made by the
latter while the rest referred to reports and/or information which he received pertaining to
Senator Antonino which are derogatory of his character and integrity;
7. The answer to the specific charges made by the plaintiff against the defendant
contained on page 2 of the press release expressly states that it was made by Brigido
Valencia. Moreover, they mentioned specific figures, both as to quantity and amount, and
accordingly, only the defendant or one working in his office and under his authority, could
have obtained the same on short notice, considering that the charges of Senator
Antonino were publicized in Manila newspapers which came out in the morning of March
5, 1964. Finally, the said answers were reiterated in a more detailed and extensive
form in a signed statement by the defendant, which was published in the issues of the
Manila Chronicle of March 24, 1964 (Exh. 12-A) and the Manila Times of March 27, 1964
(Exh. 18);
8. The press release was dated March 5, 1964 and on the following day, six Manila
Dailies, five (5) of which are the leading metropolitan newspapers with big circulation,
played up the matters contained in the press release on the first pages thereof, with most
of them carrying the photographs of the defendant and plaintiff. Undoubtedly
the defendant could not have missed reading the published news item, and yet he did not
make any correction and/or denial of the matters attributed to him therein. The silence of
the defendant was in effect an admission that he was correctly quoted and the source of
the facts mentioned in the news items."
5

In his second and third assignments of error, defendant claims that the trial court erred in holding that the
press release is libelous and that it is not protected as a qualified privilege communication.
There can be no serious question as to the defamatory and libelous nature of the statements in defendant's
press release which depicted plaintiff as a consistent liar; that he prostituted his high public offices as
monetary board member and senator for personal ends and pecuniary gains; and imputed to him the
commission of certain serious offenses in violation of the Constitution and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
6

As defendant's imputations against plaintiff were not made privately nor officially as to be qualifiedly privilege
under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court correctly held that by virtue of their defamatory
and libelous nature against the honor, integrity and reputation of plaintiff, malice in law was presumed.
7
It
further correctly ruled that defendant had not overcome such presumption of malice, not having shown the
truth thereof, or that they were published with good intentions and with justifiable motive or even from the
most liberal standpoint that they were made in the exercise of the right of fair comment on the character, good
faith, ability and sincerity of public officials.
The trial court aptly observed that "(A)t the time of the publication of the defamatory imputation, the plaintiff
was not a candidate for any public office there being no election to be held and his term of office as Senator
would not expire until several years more. As a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was answerable
to said body for any misconduct committed as a Senator because it had the authority to take disciplinary
action against any member thereof. Had the defendant been prompted by a sense of duty, and not because
of malice, the charge at least with respect to the alleged threat made against an American, should have been
filed with the Senate or any of its Committees. The defendant did not do so but instead made the accusations
publicly by causing them to be given widest publication by all the metropolitan newspapers, obviously in
retaliation to the charge filed against him by the plaintiff with the Blue Ribbon. Committee of the Senate."
8

The trial court likewise properly rejected defendant-appellant's claim of defensive libel thus: "(S)tress had also
been laid by the defendant on the argument that he had been libeled by the plaintiff and accordingly the
former was justified to hit back with another libel. The emphasis laid had been misplaced and based upon
a wrong premise. The defendant was charged with the commission of certain anomalous transactions in his
capacity as Secretary of Public Works and Communications and the same were filed with the Investigation
Committee (Blue Ribbon) of the Senate of the Philippines and the Commission on Appointments. Accordingly,
the said charges, even assuming that they contain defamatory imputation, would not be libelous because the
letter sent by the plaintiff was a privileged communication."
9

As to defendant's counterclaim, the Court finds that the record amply supports the trial court's finding that
there was no evidence, direct or circumstantial, to hold plaintiff liable for the publication in the metropolitan
press of his charges against defendant with the Blue Ribbon Committee and the Commission on
Appointments, which were at any rate qualifiedly privileged. Furthermore, the trial court had aptly observed
that it was doubtful whether plaintiff's charges against defendant of political "sabotage" and "double-crossing"
could be held to be defamatory or libelous, since "(A) review of contemporary politics in our country tends to
show that no stigma of disgrace or disrepute befalls one who changes political parties. Neither is it unusual
for card-bearing party members to support candidates belonging to the other political party. As a matter of
fact, even way back during the time when the late President Quezon was the head of the Filipino participation
in the Government while the Philippines was still a dependency of the United States, he was quoted to have
stated that `My loyalty to my party ends when my loyalty to my country begins.' Presumably, on the basis of
this `classical' utterance of that dynamic and beloved former President of the Philippines that those who were
elected as official standard bearers of one party, after election switched to and affiliated with another political
party, are referred to as `patriots.'"
10

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed in toto. No costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Esguerra and Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., took no part.

Footnotes
1 Summarized in defendant-appellant's brief, p. 5.
2 Bulletin, Chronicle, Times, Herald, Evening News and Daily Record.
3 As summarized verbatim in plaintiff-appellee's brief, pp. 5-6.
4 Under Rep. Act 5440, approved Sept. 9, 1968, amending inter alia sec. 17 of the
Judiciary Act, the provision for direct appeal to the Supreme Court of all civil cases
involving more than P200,000 has been deleted and such appeals now go to the Court of
Appeals.
5 CFI decision, Rec. on Appeal, pp. 24-28, emphasis supplied.
6 "Words calculated to induce suspicion are sometimes more effective to destroy
reputation than false charges directly made." (Aquino, Vol. II, R.P.C, p. 1694).
7 Art. 354, Revised Penal Code provides: "Requirement for publicity. - Every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any
legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of
any statement, report or speech delivered in the said proceedings, or of any other act
performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions."
8 CFI decision, Rec. on App., pp. 34-35; emphasis supplied.
9 Idem; emphasis supplied.
10 Idem, p. 38.
















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991
ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 92202-03 July 30, 1991
SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.
Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for respondent Ong, Jr.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J .:p
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or not, in making that determination,
the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern
Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied
by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues raised in the petitions.
ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualificationsof their respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the
word soleemphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under the 1987
Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original and exclusive, viz:
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction
conferred (Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra at p. 162). The exercise of power by
the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as "intended
to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had originally remained in the legislature." (id.,
at p. 175) Earlier this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice
Malcolm as "full, clear and complete; (Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and
Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]) Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was
unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and
complete as that previously granted the Legislature and the Electoral Commission,
(Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA 140 [1968]) The same may be said with regard to the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal under the 1987 Constitution. (p. 401)
The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge
of all contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any
final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court
. . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any
authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same." (pp.
403-404)
When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under our constitutional grants of power?
In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the Supreme Court stated that the judgments of
the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary
jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of
such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law,
or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse." (at pp. 785-786)
In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that the power of the Electoral
Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process." The Court does not venture into the
perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent branches of the Government, It comes in
only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that
no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action.
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to
review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or not they
have acted within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental branch or agency
has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the
absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a matter which
by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide. (See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no
power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.
As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals, although not powers in the
tripartite scheme of the government, are, in the exercise of their functions independent organs independent
of Congress and the Supreme Court. The power granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as
complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. (Angara v. Electoral Commission,
63 Phil. 139 [1936])
In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the balance of powers, must
permit this exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign authority has place it.
(See Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919])
It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the present Constitution, the situation may exist as it
exists today where there is an unhealthy one-sided political composition of the two Electoral Tribunals. There
is nothing in the Constitution, however, that makes the HRET because of its composition any less
independent from the Court or its constitutional functions any less exclusive. The degree of judicial
intervention should not be made to depend on how many legislative members of the HRET belong to this
party or that party. The test remains the same-manifest grave abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the
HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.
ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the
Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which
he bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial
administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te
to Samar in the year 1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was able to establish an
enduring relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy assimilation into the community.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural
values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural
born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith
and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born in 1948.
The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and
shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila.
In the meantime, the father of the private respondent, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal
affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application
for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.
On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28,
1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of
naturalization was issued to him.
At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine years was finishing his
elementary education in the province of Samar. There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other
Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace were concerned.
Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in Laoang, Samar was burned to the
ground.
Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family constructed another one in place of their
ruined house. Again, there is no showing other than that Laoang was their abode and home.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education, went to
Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the family in 1975 when a fire gutted their second house
in Laoang, Samar. The respondent's family constructed still another house, this time a 16-door apartment
building, two doors of which were reserved for the family.
The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board
Examinations.
Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in
the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of
his family in Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in
drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the
mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born
Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it
was precisely amending the article on this subject.
The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up and spent his childhood
days.
In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.
For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and
correspondingly, voted there during those elections.
The private respondent after being engaged for several years in the management of their family business
decided to be of greater service to his province and ran for public office. Hence, when the opportunity came in
1987, he ran in the elections for representative in the second district of Northern Samar.
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their representative in Congress.
Even if the total votes of the two petitioners are combined, Ong would still lead the two by more than 7,000
votes.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-
born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine
citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected
citizenship before that date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against Filipino
women. There is no ambiguity in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz:
Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of section 4, would this
refer only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution or would it also cover those who elected it
under the 1973 Constitution?
Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine
citizenship by virtue of the provision of the 1935 Constitution whether
the election was done before or after January 17, 1973. (Records of
the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political
Rights and Obligations and Human Rights has more or less decided
to extend the interpretation of who is a natural-born citizen as
provided in section 4 of the 1973 Constitution by adding that persons
who have elected Philippine Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution
shall be natural-born? Am I right Mr. Presiding Officer?
Fr. Bernas: yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in the Reverend Father
Bernas' well written book, he said that the decision was designed
merely to accommodate former delegate Ernesto Ang and that the
definition on natural-born has no retroactive effect. Now it seems that
the Reverend Father Bernas is going against this intention by
supporting the amendment?
Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there has been an
evolution in my thinking. (Records of the Constitutional Commission,
Vol. 1, p. 189)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very important because his
election of Philippine citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen
but a natural-born Filipino citizen entitling him to run for Congress. . .
Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason
we will leave it to the body to approve that provision of section 4.
Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provision because it
strikes me as unfair that the Filipino citizen who was born a day
before January 17, 1973 cannot be a Filipino citizen or a natural-
born citizen. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p.
231)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an
inequitable situation. Between 1935 and 1973 when we were under
the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien
mothers were natural-born Filipinos. However, those born of Filipino
mothers but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and if they do elect, they become
Filipino citizens but not natural-born Filipino citizens. (Records of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 356)
The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the provision prospective from February
3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It must also be retroactive.
It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged in by the literal meaning
of its language. The spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter, especially where adherence to
the latter would result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970])
A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief
at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision which should prevail over the letter thereof. (Jarrolt
v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)
In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:
To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution, any constitution is not
to be construed narrowly or pedantically for the prescriptions therein contained, to
paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their
form but are organic living institutions, the significance of which is vital not formal. . . . (p.
427)
The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father
and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under
earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien
father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting accident of
time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same similarly situated members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental anomaly,
and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship
either before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment was meant to correct
the inequitable and absurd situation which then prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid which would have
been nil at the time had it not been for the curative provisions. (See Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage.
Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to
children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for
the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a
natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He
could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to
require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a
citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and
unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of
suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive
act of election of Philippine citizenship (p. 52; emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in
the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected citizenship as
they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no alien enclaves and no racial
distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father applied for naturalization
when the child was still a small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has worked for a sensitive government
agency. His profession requires citizenship for taking the examinations and getting a license. He has
participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has always considered himself a Filipino citizen. There is
nothing in the records to show that he does not embrace Philippine customs and values, nothing to indicate
any tinge of alien-ness no acts to show that this country is not his natural homeland. The mass of voters of
Northern Samar are frilly aware of Mr. Ong's parentage. They should know him better than any member of
this Court will ever know him. They voted by overwhelming numbers to have him represent them in Congress.
Because of his acts since childhood, they have considered him as a Filipino.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect
citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice
which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where
citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of
similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful
because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino
when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not only have
been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine
citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It observed that "when
protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalized Filipino. Section 15
of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in this
country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected Philippine citizenship for protestee by
declaring him as such." (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of his
premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after his death
and at this very late date just so we can go after the son.
The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This can not be done. In
our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity.
(See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970])
To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would run
against the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to rest. How can he be given a
fair opportunity to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak. To quote the words of the HRET "Ong Chuan's
lips have long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and obviously he could not use beyond where his
mortal remains now lie to defend himself were this matter to be made a central issue in this case."
The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan. Our function is to
determine whether or not the HRET committed abuse of authority in the exercise of its powers. Moreover, the
respondent traces his natural born citizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of his father.
The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a
Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both mother and father were Filipinos.
Respondent Ong could not have elected any other citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine
citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election, there was
no foreign nationality of his father which he could possibly have chosen.
There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as having committed manifest grave abuse of
discretion. The same issue of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by the Constitutional
Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the Constitution drafted by that
Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was declared and accepted as a natural born
citizen by both bodies.
Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the Constitutional Convention, the Batasang Pambansa,
and the respondent HRET, such a difference could only be characterized as error. There would be no basis to
call the HRET decision so arbitrary and whimsical as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.
What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong a natural born citizen?
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of
April 1899 and then residing in said islands and their children born subsequent thereto were conferred the
status of a Filipino citizen.
Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject?
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered Spanish Subjects, viz:
ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:
1. Persons born in Spanish territory.
2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of Spain.
3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.
4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the
Monarchy. (Emphasis supplied)
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This domicile, once established is
considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established. (Article 50, NCC; Article
40, Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949])
As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around 1895. Correspondingly, a
certificate of residence was then issued to him by virtue of his being a resident of Laoang, Samar. (Report of
the Committee on Election Protests and Credentials of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, September 7,
1972, p. 3)
The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even went beyond the turn of
the 19th century. It is also in this place were Ong Te set-up his business and acquired his real property.
As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te falls within the meaning of sub-paragraph 4 of Article
17 of the Civil Code of Spain.
Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned to the Philippines. The fact
that he died in China, during one of his visits in said country, was of no moment. This will not change the fact
that he already had his domicile fixed in the Philippines and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had
become a Spanish subject.
If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in a town under the
Monarchy of Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the Philippines for an inhabitant has been
defined as one who has actual fixed residence in a place; one who has a domicile in a place. (Bouvier's Law
Dictionary, Vol. II) Apriori, there can be no other logical conclusion but to educe that Ong Te qualified as a
Filipino citizen under the provisions of section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in concluding that the private respondent was a natural-born
Filipino.
The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that document presented to prove it were not in
compliance with the best the evidence rule. The petitioners allege that the private respondent failed to present
the original of the documentary evidence, testimonial evidence and of the transcript of the proceedings of the
body which the aforesaid resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was predicated.
On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall under the exceptions to the best
evidence rule.
It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the originals of the Committee Report No. 12, the
minutes of the plenary session of 1971 Constitutional Convention held on November 28, 1972 cannot be
found.
This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention; by Atty.
Nolledo, Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention; and by Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of the
U.P Law Center, in their respective testimonies given before the HRET to the effect that there is no
governmental agency which is the official custodian of the records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
(TSN, December 12, 1988, pp. 30-31; TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35; TSN, February 1, 1989, p. 44; TSN,
February 6, 1989, pp. 28-29)
The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the Assistant Secretary of the 1971
Constitutional Convention was the proper party to testify to such execution. (TSN, December 12, 1989, pp.
11-24)
The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as aforestated by Atty. Ricafrente,
Atty. Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the inability to produce, the law does not require the degree of
proof to be of sufficient certainty; it is enough that it be shown that after a bona fide diligent search, the same
cannot be found. (see Government of P.I. v. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817 [1918])
Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were adequately established, the contents of
the questioned documents can be proven by a copy thereof or by the recollection of witnesses.
Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the documentary evidence cited in the Committee
Report, the former member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Atty. Nolledo, when he was presented as a
witness in the hearing of the protest against the private respondent, categorically stated that he saw the
disputed documents presented during the hearing of the election protest against the brother of the private
respondent. (TSN, February 1, 1989, pp. 8-9)
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-president of the Constitutional Convention, states that
he was presiding officer of the plenary session which deliberated on the report on the election protest against
Delegate Emil Ong. He cites a long list of names of delegates present. Among them are Mr. Chief Justice
Fernan, and Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. The petitioners could have presented any one of the long list of delegates
to refute Mr. Ong's having been declared a natural-born citizen. They did not do so. Nor did they demur to the
contents of the documents presented by the private respondent. They merely relied on the procedural
objections respecting the admissibility of the evidence presented.
The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong to be a member of that
body. The HRET by explicit mandate of the Constitution, is the sole judge of the qualifications of Jose Ong,
Jr. to be a member of Congress. Both bodies deliberated at length on the controversies over which they
were sole judges. Decisions were arrived at only after a full presentation of all relevant factors which the
parties wished to present. Even assuming that we disagree with their conclusions, we cannot declare their
acts as committed with grave abuse of discretion. We have to keep clear the line between error and grave
abuse.
ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE
The petitioners question the residence qualification of respondent Ong.
The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution. The term "residence" has
been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the
1987 Constitution.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of residence vis-a-vis the
qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971
Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence
in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of
the elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of
residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or
is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, in so far as the regular members of
the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely
provides, among others, and a resident thereof, that is, in the district,
for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the
election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the
interpretation given to it was domicile. (Records of the 1987
Constitutional Convention, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986. p. 87)
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think
Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has
been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual
residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the
proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention
to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially
considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on
Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by
law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by
domicile and not physical and actual residence. (Records of the
1987 Constitutional Commission, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986, p. 110)
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word "residence" which regarded
it as having the same meaning as domicile.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, one
intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of a person from said
permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person. In
other words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang,
Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained
fixed therein even up to the present.
The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRET sufficiently established that after the fire that
gutted their house in 1961, another one was constructed.
Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their house in 1975, a sixteen-door apartment was built
by their family, two doors of which were reserved as their family residence. (TSN, Jose Ong, Jr., November
18,1988, p. 8)
The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he cannot,
therefore, be a resident of said place is misplaced.
The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of the private respondent's parents. Upon the
demise of his parents, necessarily, the private respondent, pursuant to the laws of succession, became the
co-owner thereof (as a co- heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were still in the names of his parents.
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court in the
case ofDe los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person should have a
house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in
a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be
tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age,
citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the candidate
should also own property in order to be qualified to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412 [1965])
It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration
as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence. (Faypon v.
Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954])
As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies and later
to practice his profession, There was no intention to abandon the residence in Laoang, Samar. On the
contrary, the periodical journeys made to his home province reveal that he always had the animus revertendi.
The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has, rather, undergone an interracial evolution.
Throughout our history, there has been a continuing influx of Malays, Chinese, Americans, Japanese,
Spaniards and other nationalities. This racial diversity gives strength to our country.
Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded nationals, if there is such a person, for there is none. To
mention a few, the great Jose Rizal was part Chinese, the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee was part
Chinese, and of course our own President, Corazon Aquino is also part Chinese. Verily, some Filipinos of
whom we are proud were ethnically more Chinese than the private respondent.
Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a special privilege which one
must forever cherish.
However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too harsh an
interpretation, have to unreasonably deny it to those who qualify to share in its richness.
Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization laws only the very affluent
backed by influential patrons, who were willing to suffer the indignities of a lengthy, sometimes humiliating,
and often corrupt process of clearances by minor bureaucrats and whose lawyers knew how to overcome so
many technical traps of the judicial process were able to acquire citizenship. It is time for the naturalization
law to be revised to enable a more positive, affirmative, and meaningful examination of an applicant's
suitability to be a Filipino. A more humane, more indubitable and less technical approach to citizenship
problems is essential.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Gancayco, JJ., took no part.


Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J ., dissenting:
I dissent.
These separate petitions for certiorari and mandamus seek to annul the decision * of respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the tribunal) dated 6 November 1989 which
declared private respondent Jose L. Ong, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a legal resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar, and the resolution of the tribunal dated 22 February 1990 denying petitioners'
motions for reconsideration.
In G.R. Nos. 92191-92, petitioner Co also prays that the Court declare private respondent Ong not qualified to
be a Member of the House of Representatives and to declare him (petitioner Co) who allegedly obtained the
highest number of votes among the qualified candidates, the duly elected representative of the second
legislative district of Northern Samar. In G.R. Nos. 92202-03, petitioner Balanquit prays that the Court declare
private respondent Ong and Co (petitioner in G.R. Nos. 92191-92) not qualified for membership in the House
of Representatives and to proclaim him (Balanguit) as the duly elected representative of said district.
Petitioners Antonio Y. Co, Sixto T. Balanquit, Jr. and private respondent Jose Ong Chuan, Jr. were among
the candidates for the position of Representative or Congressman for the second district of Northern Samar
during the 11 May 1987 congressional elections. Private respondent was proclaimed duly-elected on 18 May
1987 with a plurality of some sixteen thousand (16,000) votes over petitioner Co who obtained the next
highest number of votes.
Petitioners Co and Balanquit then filed separate election protests against private respondent with the tribunal,
docketed as HRET Cases Nos. 13 and 15 respectively. Both protests raised almost the same issues and
were thus considered and decided jointly by the tribunal.
The issues raised before the tribunal were the following:
1. Whether or not protestee (meaning, Ong) is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines in
contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution in relation to Sections 2
and 1(3), Article IV thereof; and
2. Whether or not protestee was a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar, in contemplation
of Section 6, Article VI of the same Constitution, for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the congressional elections of May 1987.
The respondent tribunal in its decision dated 6 November 1989 held that respondent Jose L. Ong is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and was a legal resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for the required period
prior to the May 1987 congressional elections. He was, therefore, declared qualified to continue in office as
Member of the House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines, representing the second legislative
district of Northern Samar.
The factual antecedents taken from the consolidated proceedings in the tribunal are the following:
1. The Protestee (Ong) was born on June 19, 1948 to the legal spouses Ong Chuan also
known as Jose Ong Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao. His place of birth is Laoang which is now
one of the municipalities comprising the province of Northern Samar (Republic Act No.
6132 approved on August 24, 1970 and the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution).
2. On the other hand, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China and arrived in Manila on
December 16, 1915. (Exhibit zz) Subsequently thereafter, he took up residence in
Laoang, Samar.
3. On February 4, 1932, he married Agrifina E. Lao. Their wedding was celebrated
according to the rites and practices of the Roman Catholic Church in the Municipality of
Laoang (Exh. E).
4. At the time of her marriage to Jose Ong Chuan, Agrifina E. Lao was a natural-born
Filipino citizen, both her parents at the time of her birth being Filipino citizens. (Exhibits E
& I)
5. On February 15, 1954, Jose Ong Chuan, desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship,
filed his petition for naturalization with the Court of First Instance of Samar, pursuant to
Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law.
6. On April 28, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Samar rendered a decision approving
the application of Jose Ong Chuan for naturalization and declaring said petitioner a
Filipino citizen "with all the rights and privileges and duties, liabilities and obligations
inherent to Filipino citizens. (Exh. E)
7. On May 15, 1957, the same Court issued an order:
(1) declaring the decision of this Court of April 28, 1955 final and
executory;
(2) directing the clerk of court to issue the corresponding Certificate
of Naturalization in favor of the applicant Ong Chuan who prefers to
take his oath and register his name as Jose Ong Chuan. Petitioner
may take his oath as Filipino citizen under Ms new christian name,
Jose Ong Chuan. (Exh. F)
8. On the same day, Jose Ong Chuan having taken the corresponding oath of allegiance
to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines as prescribed by Section 12 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, was issued the corresponding Certificate of Naturalization.
(Exh. G)
9. On November 10, 1970, Emil L. Ong, a full-brother of the protestee and a son born on
July 25, 1937 at Laoang, Samar to the spouses Jose Ong Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao,
was elected delegate from Northern Samar to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
10. By protestee's own -testimony, it was established that he had attended grade school
in Laoang. Thereafter, he went to Manila where he finished his secondary as well as his
college education. While later employed in Manila, protestee however went home to
Laoang whenever he had the opportunity to do so, which invariably would be as frequent
as twice to four times a year.
11. Protestee also showed that being a native and legal resident of Laoang, he registered
as a voter therein and correspondingly voted in said municipality in the 1984 and 1986
elections.
12. Again in December 1986, during the general registration of all voters in the country,
Protestee re-registered as a voter in Precinct No. 4 of Barangay Tumaguinting in Laoang.
In his voter's affidavit, Protestee indicated that he is a resident of Laoang since birth.
(Exh. 7)
1

Petitioners' motions for reconsideration of the tribunal's decision having been denied, petitioners filed the
present petitions.
In their comments, the respondents first raise the issue of the Court's jurisdiction to review the decision of the
House Electoral Tribunal, considering the constitutional provision vesting upon said tribunal the power and
authority to act as the sole judge of all contests relating to the qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives.
2

On the question of this Court's jurisdiction over the present controversy, I believe that, contrary to the
respondents' contentions, the Court has the jurisdiction and competence to review the questioned decision of
the tribunal and to decide the present controversy.
Article VIII, Section I of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The Constitution, it is true, constitutes the tribunal as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives. But as early as 1938, it was held
in Morrero vs.Bocar,
3
construing Section 4, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which provided that ". . . The
Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of the Members of the National Assembly," that:
The judgment rendered by the (electoral) commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except, in any event, "upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of
due process of law." (Barry vs. US ex rel. Cunningham, 279 US 597; 73 Law. ed., 867;
Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 35 Off. Gaz., 23.)
And then under the afore-quoted provisions of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, this Court is
duty-bound to determine whether or not, in an actual controversy, there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The present controversy, it will be observed, involves more than perceived irregularities in the conduct of a
congressional election or a disputed appreciation of ballots, in which cases, it may be contended with great
legal force and persuasion that the decision of the electoral tribunal should be final and conclusive, for it is, by
constitutional directive, made the sole judge of contests relating to such matters. The present controversy,
however, involves no less than a determination of whether the qualifications for membership in the House of
Representatives, as prescribed by the Constitution, have been met. Indeed, this Court would be unforgivably
remiss in the performance of its duties, as mandated by the Constitution, were it to allow a person, not a
natural-born Filipino citizen, to continue to sit as a Member of the House of Representatives, solely because
the House Electoral Tribunal has declared him to be so. In such a case, the tribunal would have acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as to require the exercise by this Court of
its power of judicial review.
Besides, the citizenship and residence qualifications of private respondent for the office of Member of the
House of Representatives, are here controverted by petitioners who, at the same time, claim that they are
entitled to the office illegally held by private respondent. From this additional direction, where one asserts an
earnestly perceived right that in turn is vigorously resisted by another, there is clearly a justiciable controversy
proper for this Court to consider and decide.
Nor can it be said that the Court, in reviewing the decision of the tribunal, asserts supremacy over it in
contravention of the time-honored principle of constitutional separation of powers. The Court in this instance
simply performs a function entrusted and assigned to it by the Constitution of interpreting, in a justiciable
controversy, the pertinent provisions of the Constitution with finality.
It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct constitutional (and/or
statutory) interpretation, in the context of the interactions of the three branches of the
government, almost always in situations where some agency of the State has engaged in
action that stems ultimately from some legitimate area of governmental power (the
Supreme Court in Modern Role, C.B. Sevisher, 1958, p. 36).
4

Moreover, it is decidedly a matter of great public interest and concern to determine whether or not private
respondent is qualified to hold so important and high a public office which is specifically reserved by the
Constitution only to natural-born Filipino citizens.
After a careful consideration of the issues and the evidence, it is my considered opinion that the respondent
tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its
questioned decision and resolution, for reasons to be presently stated.
The Constitution
5
requires that a Member of the House of Representatives must be a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read and write,
and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution defines natural-born (Filipino) citizens as:
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who
elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section I hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizen,
Article IV, Section 1, paragraph (3) of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
The Court in this case is faced with the duty of interpreting the above-quoted constitutional provisions. The
first sentence of Section 2 of Article IV states the basic definition of a natural-born Filipino citizen. Does
private respondent fall within said definition?
To the respondent tribunal,
Protestee may even be declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines under the first
sentence of Sec. 2 of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution because he did not have "to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship." It bears to repeat that on
15 May 1957, while still a minor of 9 years he already became a Filipino citizen by
declaration of law. Since his mother was a natural-born citizen at the time of her
marriage, protestee had an inchoate right to Philippine citizenship at the moment of his
birth and, consequently the declaration by virtue of Sec. 15 of CA 473 that he was a
Filipino citizen retroacted to the moment of his birth without his having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect such Philippine citizenship.
6

I regret that I am neither convinced nor persuaded by such kaleidoscopic ratiocination. The records show that
private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 to the spouses Jose Ong Chuan, a Chinese citizen, and
Agrifina E. Lao, a natural-born Filipino citizen, in Laoang, Northern Samar. In other words, at birth, private
respondent was a Chinese citizen (not a natural-born Filipino citizen) because his father was then a Chinese
citizen (not a naturalized Filipino citizen). Under the 1935 Constitution which was enforced at the time of
private respondent's birth on 19 June 1948, only those whose fathers were citizens of the Philippines were
considered Filipino citizens. Those whose mothers were citizens of the Philippines had to elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, in order to be considered Filipino citizens.
7

Following the basic definition in the 1987 Constitution of a natural-born citizen, in relation to the 1935
Constitution, private respondent is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, having been born a Chinese citizen by
virtue of the Chinese citizenship of his father at the time of his birth, although from birth, private respondent
had the right to elect Philippine citizenship, the citizenship of his mother, but only upon his reaching the age of
majority.
While under Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. 473) minor children of a naturalized citizen
(father), who were born in the Philippines prior to the naturalization of the parent automatically become
Filipino citizens,
8
this does not alter the fact that private respondent was not born to a Filipino father, and the
operation of Section 15 of CA 473 did not confer upon him the status of a natural-born citizen merely because
he did not have to perform any act to acquire or perfect his status as a Filipino citizen.
But even assuming arguendo that private respondent could be considered a natural-born citizen by virtue of
the operation of CA 473, petitioners however contend that the naturalization of private respondent's father
was invalid and void from the beginning, and, therefore, private respondent is not even a Filipino citizen.
Respondent tribunal in its questioned decision ruled that only a direct proceeding for nullity of naturalization
as a Filipino citizen is permissible, and, therefore, a collateral attack on Ong Chuan's naturalization is barred
in an electoral contest which does not even involve him (Ong Chuan).
Private respondent, for his part, avers in his Comment that the challenge against Ong Chuan's naturalization
must emanate from the Government and must be made in a proper/appropriate and direct proceeding for de-
naturalization directed against the proper party, who in such case is Ong Chuan, and also during his lifetime.
A judgment in a naturalization proceeding is not, however, afforded the character of impregnability under the
principle of res judicata.
9
Section 18 of CA 473 provides that a certificate of naturalization may be cancelled
upon motion made in the proper proceeding by the Solicitor General or his representative, or by the proper
provincial fiscal.
In Republic vs. Go Bon Lee,
10
this Court held that:
An alien friend is offered under certain conditions the privilege of citizenship. He may
accept the offer and become a citizen upon compliance with the prescribed conditions,
but not otherwise. His claim is of favor, not of right. He can only become a citizen upon
and after a strict compliance with the acts of Congress. An applicant for this high privilege
is bound, therefore, to conform to the terms upon which alone the right he seeks can be
conferred. It is his province, and he is bound, to see that the jurisdictional facts upon
which the grant is predicated actually exist and if they do not he takes nothing by this
paper grant.
xxx xxx xxx
Congress having limited this privilege to a specified class of persons, no other person is
entitled to such privilege, nor to a certificate purporting to grant it, and any such certificate
issued to a person not so entitled to receive it must be treated as a mere nullity, which
confers no legal rights as against the government, from which it has been obtained
without warrant of law.
"Naturalization is not a right, but a privilege of the most discriminating as well as delicate and exacting nature,
affecting public interest of the highest order, and which may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions
prescribed by law therefor."
11

Considering the legal implications of the allegation made by the petitioners that the naturalization of private
respondent's father Ong Chuan, is a nullity, the Court should make a ruling on the validity of said
naturalization proceedings. This course of action becomes all the more inevitable and justified in the present
case where, to repeat for stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is holding a public
office.
12

It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the citizenship of private respondent is derived from his
father. If his father's Filipino citizenship is void from the beginning, then there is nothing from which private
respondent can derive his own claimed Filipino citizenship. For a spring cannot rise higher than its source.
And to allow private respondent to avail of the privileges of Filipino citizenship by virtue of a void
naturalization of his father, would constitute or at least sanction a continuing offense against the Constitution.
The records show that private respondent's father, Jose Ong Chuan, took the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Philippine Government, as prescribed by Section 12 of CA 473 on the same day (15 May
1957) that the CFI issued its order directing the clerk of court to issue the corresponding Certificate of
Naturalization and for the applicant to take the oath of allegiance.
However, it is settled that an order granting a petition to take the requisite oath of allegiance of one who has
previously obtained a decision favorable to his application for naturalization, is appealable. It is, therefore,
improper and illegal to authorize the taking of said oath upon the issuance of said order and before the
expiration of the reglementary period to perfect any appeal from said order.
13

In Cua Sun Ke vs. Republic,
14
this Court held that:
Administration of the oath of allegiance on the same day as issuance of order granting
citizenship is irregular and makes the proceedings so taken null and void. (Republic vs.
Guy, 115 SCRA 244 [1982]; citing the case of Ong So vs. Republic of the Philippines,
121 Phil. 1381).
It would appear from the foregoing discussion that the naturalization of Jose Ong Chuan (private respondent's
father) was null and void. It follows that the private respondent did not acquire any legal rights from the void
naturalization of his father and thus he cannot himself be considered a Filipino citizen, more so, a natural-
born Filipino citizen.
But assuming that the CFI order of 15 May 1957 directing the clerk of court to issue the certificate of
naturalization to Ong Chuan and for the latter to take the oath of allegiance was final and not appealable, the
resulting naturalization of Ong Chuan effected, as previously stated, an automatic naturalization of private
respondent, then a minor, as a Filipino citizen on 15 May 1957, but not his acquisition or perfection of the
status of a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Let us now look into the question of whether or not private respondent acquired the status of a natural-born
Filipino citizen by reason of the undisputed fact that his mother was a natural-born Filipino citizen. This in turn
leads us to an examination of the second sentence in Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It
expands, in a manner of speaking, in relation to Section 1, paragraph (3) of the same Article IV, the status of
a natural-born Filipino citizen to those who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. The
right or privilege of election is available, however, only to those born to Filipino mothers under the 1935
Constitution, and before the 1973 Constitution took effect on 17 January 1973.
The petitioners contend that the respondent tribunal acted in excess of its jurisdiction or gravely abused its
discretion as to exceed its jurisdiction in "distorting" the conferment by the 1987 Constitution of the status of
"natural-born" Filipino citizen on those who elect Philippine citizenship all in its strained effort, according to
petitioners, to support private respondent's qualification to be a Member of the House of Representatives.
15

Petitioners argue that the clear, unambiguous wording of section 1(3) of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution
contemplates that only the legitimate children of Filipino mothers with alien father, born before 17 January
1973 and who would reach the age of majority (and thus elect Philippine citizenship) after the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution are entitled to the status of natural-born Filipino citizen.
16

The respondent tribunal in resolving the issue of the constitutional provisions' interpretation, found reason to
refer to the interpellations made during the 1986 Constitutional Commission. It said:
That the benevolent provisions of Sections 2 and 1(3) of Article IV of the 1987
Constitution was (sic) intended by its (sic) framers to be endowed, without distinction, to
all Filipinos by election pursuant to the 1935 Constitution is more than persuasively
established by the extensive interpellations and debate on the issue as borne by the
official records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
17

Although I find the distinction as to when election of Philippine citizenship was made irrelevant to the case at
bar, since private respondent, contrary to the conclusion of the respondent tribunal, did not elect Philippine
citizenship, as provided by law, I still consider it necessary to settle the controversy regarding the meaning of
the constitutional provisions in question.
I agree with respondent tribunal that the debates, interpellations petitions and opinions expressed in the 1986
Constitutional Commission may be resorted to in ascertaining the meaning of somewhat elusive and even
nebulous constitutional provisions. Thus
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction
is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of
the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the
people in ratifying the constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the
framers.
18

The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 2, Article IV in relation to Section
1(3) of the same Article, appear to negate the contention of petitioners that only those born to Filipino mothers
before 17 January 1973 and who would elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution, are to be considered natural-born Filipino citizens.
During the free-wheeling discussions on citizenship, Commissioner Treas specifically asked Commissioner
Bernas regarding the provisions in question, thus:
MR. TRENAS: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political
Rights and Obligations and Human Rights has more or less decided
to extend the interpretation of who is a natural-born Filipino citizen as
provided in Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution, by adding that
persons who have elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935
Constitution shall be considered natural-born. Am I right, Mr.
Presiding Officer?
FR BERNAS: Yes.
MR. TRENAS: And does the Commissioner think that tills addition to
Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution would be contrary to the spirit of
that section?
FR BERNAS: Yes, we are quite aware that it is contrary to the letter
really. But whether it is contrary to the spirit is something that has
been debated before and is being debated even now. We will recall
that during the 1971 Constitutional Convention, the status of natural-
born citizenship of one of the delegates, Mr. Ang, was challenged
precisely because he was a citizen by election. Finally, the 1971
Constitutional Convention considered him a natural-born citizen, one
of the requirements to be a Member of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. The reason behind that decision was that a person
under his circumstances already had the inchoate right to be a
citizen by the fact that the mother was a Filipino. And as a matter of
fact, the 1971 Constitutional Convention formalized that recognition
by adopting paragraph 2 of Section 1 of the 1971 Constitution. So,
the entire purpose of this proviso is simply to perhaps remedy
whatever injustice there may be so that these people born before
January 17, 1973 who are not naturalized and people who are not
natural born but who are in the same situation as we are considered
natural-born citizens. So, the intention of the Committee in proposing
this is to equalize their status.
19

When asked to clarify the provision on natural-born citizens, Commissioner Bernas replied to Commissioner
Azcuna thus:
MR. AZCUNA: With respect to the proviso in Section 4, would this
refer only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution or would it also cover those who elected it
under the 1935 Constitution?
FR BERNAS: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine
citizenship by virtue of the provision of the 1935 Constitution,
whether the election was done before or after 17 January 1973.
20

And during the period of amendments. Commissioner Rodrigo explained the purpose of what now appear as
Section 2 and Section 1, paragraph (3) of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, thus:
MR. RODRIGO: The purpose of that proviso is to remedy an
inequitable situation. Between 1935 and 1973, when we were under
the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien
mothers were natural-born Filipinos. However, those born of Filipino
mothers but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and, if they do elect, they become
Filipino citizens, yet, but not natural-born Filipino citizens.
The 1973 Constitution equalized the status of those born of Filipino mothers and those
born of Filipino fathers. So that from January 17, 1973 when the 1973 Constitution took
effect, those born of Filipino mothers but of alien fathers are natural-born Filipino citizens.
Also, those who are born of Filipino fathers and alien mothers are natural-born Filipino
citizens.
If the 1973 Constitution equalized the status of a child born of a Filipino mother and that
born of a Filipino father, why do we not give a chance to a child born before January 17,
1973, if and when he elects Philippine citizenship, to be in the same status as one born
of a Filipino father namely, natural-born citizen.
Another thing I stated is equalizing the status of a father and a mother vis-a-vis the child.
I would like to state also that we showed equalize the status of a child born of a Filipino
mother the day before January 17, 1973 and a child born also of a Filipino mother on
January 17 or 24 hours later. A child born of a Filipino mother but an alien father one day
before January 17, 1973 is a Filipino citizen, if he elects Philippine citizenship, but he is
not a natural-born Filipino citizen. However, the other child who luckily was born 24 hours
later maybe because of parto laborioso is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
21

It would appear then that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution in defining a natural-born Filipino
citizen was to equalize the position of Filipino fathers and Filipino mothers as to their children becoming
natural-born Filipino citizens. In other words, after 17 January 1973, effectivity date of the 1973
Constitution, all those born of Filipino fathers (with alien spouse) or Filipino mothers (with alien spouse) are
natural-born Filipino citizens. But those born to Filipino mothers prior to 17 January 1973 must still elect
Philippine citizenship upon their reaching the age of majority, in order to be deemed natural-born Filipino
citizens. The election, which is related to the attainment of the age of majority, may be made before or after
17 January 1973. This interpretation appears to be in consonance with the fundamental purpose of the
Constitution which is to protect and enhance the people's individual interests,
22
and to foster equality among
them.
Since private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 (or before 17 January 1973) to a Filipino mother (with an
alien spouse) and should have elected Philippine citizenship on 19 June 1969 (when he attained the age of
majority), or soon thereafter, in order to have the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen under the 1987
Constitution, the vital question is: did private respondent really elect Philippine citizenship? As earlier stated, I
believe that private respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship, contrary to the ruling of the respondent
tribunal.
The respondent tribunal, on this issue, ruled as follows:
Where a person born to a Filipino mother and an alien father had exercised the right of
suffrage when he came of age, the same constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship. (Florencio vs. Mallare) [sic] The acts of the petitioner in registering
as a voter, participating in elections and campaigning for certain candidates were held by
the Supreme Court as sufficient to show his preference for Philippine citizenship.
Accordingly, even without complying with the formal requisites for election, the
petitioner's Filipino citizenship was judicially upheld.
23

I find the above ruling of the respondent tribunal to be patently erroneous and clearly untenable, as to amount
to grave abuse of discretion. For it is settled doctrine in this jurisdiction that election of Philippine citizenship
must be made in accordance with Commonwealth Act 625. Sections 1 and 2
24
of the Act mandate that the
option to elect Philippine citizenship must be effected expressly not impliedly.
The respondent tribunal cites In re: Florencio Mallare
25
which held that Esteban Mallare's exercise of the right
of suffrage when he came of age, constituted a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
Mallare, cited by respondent tribunal as authority for the doctrine of implied election of Philippine citizenship,
is not applicable to the case at bar. The respondent tribunal failed to consider that Esteban Mallare reached
the age of majority in 1924, or seventeen (17) years before CA 625 was approved and, more importantly,
eleven (11) years before the 1935 Constitution (which granted the right of election) took effect.
To quote Mr. Justice Fernandez in Mallare:
Indeed, it would be unfair to expect the presentation of a formal deed to that effect
considering that prior to the enactment of Commonwealth Act 625 on June 7, 1941, no
particular proceeding was required to exercise the option to elect Philippine citizenship,
granted to the proper party by Section 1, subsection 4, Article IV of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution.
26

Moreover, Esteban Mallare was held to be a Filipino citizen because he was an illegitimate (natural)
child of a Filipino mother and thus followed her citizenship. I therefore agree with the petitioners'
submission that, inciting the Mallare case, the respondent tribunal had engaged in an obiter dictum.
The respondent tribunal also erred in ruling that by operation of CA 473, the Revised Naturalization Law,
providing for private respondent's acquisition of Filipino citizenship by reason of the naturalization of his
father, the law itself had already elected Philippine citizenship for him. For, assuming arguendo that the
naturalization of private respondent's father was valid, and that there was no further need for private
respondent to elect Philippine citizenship (as he had automatically become a Filipino citizen) yet, this did not
mean that the operation of the Revised Naturalization Law amounted to an election by him of Philippine
citizenship as contemplated by the Constitution. Besides, election of Philippine citizenship derived from one's
Filipino mother, is made upon reaching the age of majority, not during one's minority.
There is no doubt in my mind, therefore, that private respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority in 1969 or within a reasonable time thereafter as required by CA 625.
Consequently, he cannot be deemed a natural-born Filipino citizen under Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV of the
1987 Constitution.
Based on all the foregoing considerations and premises, I am constrained to state that private respondent is
not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines in contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution in
relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof, and hence is disqualified or ineligible to be a Member of the
House of Representatives.
At this point, I find it no longer necessary to rule on the issue of required residence, inasmuch as the
Constitution requires that a Member of the House of Representatives must be both a natural-born Filipino
citizen and a resident for at least one (1) year in the district in which he shall be elected.
The next question that comes up is whether or not either of the petitioners can replace private respondent as
the Representative of the second legislative district of Northern Samar in the House of Representatives.
I agree with respondent tribunal that neither of the petitioners may take the place of private respondent in the
House of Representatives representing the second district of Northern Samar. The ruling of this Court
in Ramon L.Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) EN BANC and Luis L. Lardizabal,
27
is
controlling. There we held that Luis L. Lardizabal, who filed the quo warranto petition, could not replace
Ramon L. Labo, Jr. as mayor of Baguio City for the simple reason that as he obtained only the second
highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City for
mayor of that City.
A petition alleging that the candidate-elect is not qualified for the office is, in effect, a quo warranto proceeding
even if it is labelled an election protest.
28
It is a proceeding to unseat the ineligible person from office but not
necessarily to install the protestant in his place.
29

The general rule is that the fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes are cast for an ineligible candidate in
an election does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected.
In such a case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity.
30

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have the highest
number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure
can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes
cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676).
As early as 1912, this Court has already declared that the candidate who lost in an
election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event that the candidate who won is
found ineligible for the office to which he was elected. This was the ruling in Topacio v.
Paredes (23 Phil. 238)
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the
office because of fraud or irregularities in the election is quite
different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold
such an office. . . . If it be found that the successful candidate
(according to the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in an
illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the
former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not,
strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally
cast ballots. . . .
31

The recognition of Emil L. Ong by the 1971 Constitutional Convention as a natural-born Filipino
citizen, in relation to the present case.
Private respondent, as previously stated, is a full brother of Emil L. Ong, both of them having the same father
and mother.
Private respondent, relying on a resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
32
to the effect that Emil L.
Ong was a natural-born Filipino citizen, alleged before the House Electoral Tribunal that, by analogy, he is
himself a natural-born Filipino citizen. This submission, while initially impressive, is, as will now be shown,
flawed and not supported by the evidence. Not even the majority decision of the electoral tribunal adopted the
same as the basis of its decision in favor of private respondent. The tribunal, in reference to this submission,
said:
Be that as it may and in the light of the Tribunal's disposition of protestee's citizenship
based on an entirely different set of circumstances, apart from the indisputable fact that
the matters attempted to be brought in issue in connection therewith are too far removed
in point of time and relevance from the decisive events relied upon by the Tribunal, we
view these two issues as being already inconsequential.
33

The electoral tribunal (majority) instead chose to predicate its decision on the alleged citizenship by
naturalization of private respondent's father (Ong Chuan) and on the alleged election of Philippine
citizenship by private respondent.
Emil L. Ong, was elected delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. Electoral protests, numbers EP-07
and EP-08, were filed by Leonardo D. Galing and Gualberto D. Luto against Emil L. Ong, contesting his
citizenship qualification. The Committee on Election Protests Credentials of the 1971 Contitution Convention
heard the protests and submitted to the Convention a report dated 4 September 1972, the dispositive portion
of which stated:
It appearing that protestee's grandfather was himself a Filipino citizen under the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898,
thus conferring upon protestee's own father, Ong Chuan, Philippine citizenship at birth,
the conclusion is inescapable that protestee himself is a natural-born citizen, and is
therefore qualified to hold the office of delegate to the Constitutional Convention.
34

On 28 November 1972, during a plenary session of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, the election protests
filed against Emil L. Ong were dismissed, following the report of the Committee on Election Protests and
Credentials.
35

It is evident, up to this point, that the action of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong
is, to say the least, inconclusive to the case at bar, because
a) the 1971 Constitutional Convention decision in the Emil L. Ong case involved the
1935Constitution; the present case, on the other hand involves the 1987 Constitution:
b) the 1935 Constitution contained no specific definition of a "natural-born citizen" of the
Philippines; the 1987 Constitution contains a precise and specific definition of a "natural-
born citizen" of the Philippines in Sec. 2, Art. IV thereof and private respondent does not
qualify under such definition in the 1987 Constitution;
c) the decision of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong was a
decision of apolitical body, not a court of law. And, even if we have to take such a
decision as a decision of aquasi-judicial body (i.e., a political body exercising quasi-
judicial functions), said decision in the Emil L. Ong case can not have the category or
character of res judicata in the present judicial controversy, because between the two (2)
cases, there is no identity of parties (one involves Emil L. Ong, while the other involves
private respondent) and, more importantly, there is no identity of causes of action
because the first involves the 1935 Constitution while the second involves the 1987
Constitution.
But even laying aside the foregoing reasons based on procedural rules and logic, the evidence submitted
before the electoral tribunal and, therefore, also before this Court, does not support the allegations made by
Emil L. Ong before the 1971 Constitutional Convention and inferentially adopted by private respondent in the
present controversy. This leads us to an interesting inquiry and finding.
The 1971 Constitutional Convention in holding that Emil L. Ong was a "natural-born citizen" of the Philippines
under the 1935 Constitution laid stress on the "fact" and this appears crucial and central to its decision
that Emil L. Ong's grandfather, Ong Te became a Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and,
therefore, his descendants like Emil L. Ong (and therefore, also private respondent) became natural-born
Filipinos. The 1971 Constitutional Convention said:
Ong Te Emil Ong's grandfather, was a Spanish subject residing in the Philippines on
April 11, 1899 and was therefore one of the many who became ipso facto citizens of the
Philippines under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law expressly
declared that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who continued to reside therein and
who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 as well as their children born subsequent
thereto, "shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands." (Section 4,
Philippine Bill of
1902).
36

The "test" then, following the premises of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, is whether or not Ong Te
private respondent's and Emil L. Ong's grandfather was "an inhabitant of the Philippines who continued to
reside therein and was a Spanish subject on April 11, 1899." If he met these requirements of the Philippine
Bill of 1902, then, Ong Te was a Filipino citizen; otherwise, he was not a Filipino citizen.
Petitioners (protestants) submitted and offered in evidence before the House Electoral Tribunal exhibits W, X,
Y, Z ,AA, BB, CC, DD and EE which are copies of entries in the "Registro de Chinos" from years 1896 to
1897 which show that Ong Te was not listed as an inhabitant of Samar where he is claimed to have been a
resident. Petitioners (protestants) also submitted and offered in evidence before the House Electoral Tribunal
exhibit V, a certification of the Chief of the Archives Division, Records and Management and Archives Office,
stating that the name of Ong Te does not appear in the "Registro Central de Chinos" for the province of
Samar for 1895. These exhibits prove or at least, as petitioners validly argue, tend to prove that Ong Te was
NOT a resident of Samar close to 11 April 1899 and, therefore, could not continue residing in Samar,
Philippines after 11 April 1899, contrary to private respondent's pretense. In the face of these proofs or
evidence, private respondent FAILED TO PRESENT ANY REBUTTAL OR COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE,
except the decision of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong, previously discussed.
It is not surprising then that, as previously noted, the majority decision of the House Electoral Tribunal skirted
any reliance on the alleged ipso facto Filipino citizenship of Ong Te under the Philippine Bill of 1902. It is
equally not surprising that Ong Chuan, the son of Ong Te and father or private respondent, did not even
attempt to claim Filipino citizenship by reason of Ong Te's alleged Filipino citizenship under the Philippine Bill
of 1902 but instead applied for Philippine citizenship through naturalization.
Nor can it be contended by the private respondent that the House Electoral Tribunal should no longer have
reviewed the factual question or issue of Ong Te's citizenship in the light of the resolution of the 1971
Constitutional Convention finding him (Ong Te to have become a Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of
1902. The tribunal had to look into the question because the finding that Ong Te had become a Filipino citizen
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 was the central core of said 1971 resolution but as held in Lee
vs. Commissioners of
Immigration:
37

. . . Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case, whatever the corresponding Court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata,
hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.
Which finally brings us to the resolution of this Court in Emil L. Ong vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 67201, 8
May 1984. In connection with said resolution, it is contended by private respondent that the resolution of the
1971 Constitutional Convention in the Emil L. Ong case was elevated to this Court on a question involving
Emil L. Ong's disqualification to run for membership in the Batasang Pambansa and that, according to private
respondent, this Court allowed the use of the Committee Report to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
To fully appreciate the implications of such contention, it would help to look into the circumstances of the case
brought before this Court in relation to the Court's action or disposition. Emil L. Ong and Edilberto Del Valle
were both candidates for the Batasang Pambansa in the 14 May 1984 election. Valle filed a petition for
disqualification with the Commission on Election on 29 March 1984 docketed as SPC No. 84-69 contending
that Ong is not a natural-born citizen. Ong filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the
judgment of the 1971 Constitutional Convention on his status as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines bars
the petitioner from raising the Identical issue before the COMELEC. (G.R. No. 67201, Rollo, p. 94) The
motion was denied by the COMELEC, thus, prompting Emil L. Ong to file with this Court a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R.
No. 67201.
In a resolution dated 8 May 1984, this Court resolved to issue a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
respondent COMELEC from holding any further hearing on the disqualification case entitled "Edilberto Del
Valle vs. Emil Ong(SPC No. 84-69) except to dismiss the same. (G.R. Nos. 92202-03, Rollo, p. 335)
This Court, in explaining its action, held that:
Acting on the prayer of the petitioner for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
and considering that at the hearing this morning, it was brought out that the 1971
Constitutional Convention, at its session of November 28, 1972, after considering the
Report of its Committee on Election Protests and Credentials, found that the protest
questioning the citizenship of the protestee (the petitioner herein) was groundless and
dismissed Election Protests Nos. EP 07 and EP 08 filed against said petitioner (p.
237, Rollo), the authenticity of the Minutes of said session as well as of the said
Committee's Report having been duly admitted in evidence without objection and bears
out, for now, without need for a full hearing, that petitioner is a natural-born citizen, the
Court Resolved to ISSUE, effective immediately, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
enjoining respondent COMELEC from holding any further hearing on the disqualification
case entitled Edilberto Del Valle vs. Emil Ong (SPC No. 84-69) scheduled at 3:00 o'clock
this afternoon, or any other day, except to dismiss the same.This is without prejudice to
any appropriate action that private respondent may wish to take after the elections.
(emphasis supplied)
It is thus clear that the resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 67201 was rendered without the benefit of a
hearing on the merits either by the Court or by the COMELEC and merely on the basis of a Committee's
Report to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and that this Court (and this is quite significant) did not
foreclose any appropriate action that Del Valle (therein petitioner) may wish to take after the elections.
It is thus abundantly clear also that to this Court, the resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
recognizing Emil L. Ong as a natural-born citizen under the 1935 Constitution did not foreclose a future or
further proceeding in regard to the same question and that, consequently, there is no vested right of Emil L.
Ong to such recognition. How much more when the Constitution involved is not the 1935 Constitution but the
1987 Constitution whose provisions were never considered in all such proceedings because the 1987
Constitution was still inexistent.
A final word. It is regrettable that one (as private respondent) who unquestionably obtained the highest
number of votes for the elective position of Representative (Congressman) to the House of Representatives
for the second district of Northern Samar, would have had to cease in office by virtue of this Court's
decision, if the full membership of the Court had participated in this case, with the result that the legislative
district would cease to have, in the interim, a representative in the House of Representatives. But the
fundamental consideration in cases of this nature is the Constitution and only the Constitution. It has to be
assumed, therefore, that when the electorate in the second legislative district of Northern Samar cast the
majority of their votes for private respondent, they assumed and believed that he was fully eligible and
qualified for the office because he is a natural-born Filipino citizen. That erroneous assumption and belief can
not prevail over, but must yield to the majesty of the Constitution.
This is a sad day for the Constitution. As I see it, the Constitution mandates that members of the House of
Representatives should be "natural-born citizens of the Philippines". The voting majority of the present Court
says, "Filipino citizens will do." This is bad enough. What is worse is, the same voting majority, in effect, says,
"even aliens will do as well."
WHEREFORE, my vote is clear: to declare private respondent Jose L. Ong Chua, Jr., as he clearly is, NOT a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and therefore NOT QUALIFIED to be a Member of the House of
Representatives, Congress of the Philippines.
Narvasa, J., Paras, J. and Regalado, J., dissenting.
SARMIENTO, J ., concurring:
I concur with the majority.
(1)
I wish to point out first that the question of citizenship is a question of fact, and as a rule, the Supreme Court
leaves facts to the tribunal that determined them. I am quite agreed that the Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, as the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the membership in the House, as follows:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated
by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under
the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.
1

is the best judge of facts and this Court can not substitute its judgment because it thinks it knows
better.
In the case of Aratuc v. Commission on Elections,
2
it was held that this Court can not review the errors of the
Commission on Elections (then the "sole judge" of all election contests) in the sense of reviewing facts and
unearthing mistakes and that this Court's jurisdiction is to see simply whether or not it is guilty of a grave
abuse of discretion. It is true that the new Constitution has conferred expanded powers on the Court,
3
but as
the Charter states, our authority is "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
4
It
is not to review facts.
"Grave abuse of discretion" has been defined as whimsical exercise of power amounting to excess of
jurisdiction, or otherwise, to denial of due process of law.
5

I find none of that here.
As the majority indicates, Jose Ong's citizenship is a matter of opinion with which men may differ, but
certainly, it is quite another thing to say that the respondent Tribunal has gravely abused its discretion
because the majority has begged to differ. It does not form part of the duty of the Court to remedy all
imagined wrongs committed by the Government.
The respondent Tribunal has spoken. According to the Tribunal, Jose Ong is a Filipino citizen and
consequently, is possessed of the qualifications to be a member of the House. As the sole judge, precisely, of
this question, the Court can not be more popish than the pope.
(2)
I can not say, in the second place, that the Decision in question stands exactly on indefensible grounds. It is
to be noted that Jose Ong had relied on the Report dated September 4, 1972 of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention Committee
6
on Election Protests and Credentials, in which the Committees upheld the
citizenship, and sustained the qualification to sit as Delegate, of Emil Ong, Jose Ong's full blood brother.
According to the Report, Ong Te the Ongs' grandfather, was already a Filipino citizen having complied with
the requirements on Filipinization by existing laws for which his successors need not have elected Filipino
citizenship. I quote:
xxx xxx xxx
There is merit in protestee's claim. There can hardly be any doubt that Ong Te
protestees's grandfather, was a Spanish subject residing in the Philippines on April 11,
1899, and was therefore one of the many who became ipso facto citizens of the
Philippines under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law expressly
declared that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who continued to reside therein and
who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, as well as their children born subsequent
thereto, "shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands" (Sec. 4,
Philippine Bill of 1902). Excepted from the operation of this rule were Spanish subjects
who shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance
with the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. But under the Treaty of Paris, only
Spanish subjects who were natives of Peninsular Spain had the privilege of preserving
their Spanish nationality.
7

xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
As earlier noted, protestee's grandfather established residence in the Philippines in 1895,
as shown by the Registro Central de Chinos. He was also issued a certificate of
registration. He established a business here, and later acquired real property. Although
he went back to China for brief visits, he invariably came back. He even brought his
eldest son, Ong Chuan, to live in the Philippines when the latter was only 10 years old.
And Ong Chuan was admitted into the country because, as duly noted on his landing
certificate, his father, Ong Te had been duly enrolled under CR 16009-36755 i.e., as a
permanent resident. Indeed, even when Ong Te went back to China in the 1920's for
another visit, he left his son, Ong Chuan, who was then still a minor, in the Philippines
obviously because he had long considered the Philippines his home. The domicile he
established in 1895 is presumed to have continued up to, and beyond, April 11, 1899, for,
as already adverted to, a domicile once acquired is not lost until a new one is gained.
The only conclusion then can thus be drawn is that Ong Te was duly domiciled in the
Philippines as of April 11, 1899, within the meaning of par. 4, Art. 17, of the Civil Code of
1889 and was, consequently, a Spanish subject, he qualified as a Filipino citizen
under the provisions of Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
8

It is true that Ong Chuan, the Ong brothers' father, subsequently sought naturalization in the belief that he
was, all along, a Chinese citizen, but as the Report held:
Protestants, however, make capital of the fact that both Ong Te and his son, Ong Chuan
(protestee's father), appear to have been registered as Chinese citizens even long after
the turn of the century. Worse, Ong Chuan himself believed the was alien, to the extent
of having to seek admission as a Pilipino citizen through naturalization proceedings. The
point, to our mind, is neither crucial nor substantial. Ong's status as a citizen is a matter
of law, rather than of personal belief. It is what the law provides, and not what one thinks
his status to be, which determines whether one is a citizen of a particular state or not.
Mere mistake or misapprehension as to one's citizenship, it has been held, is not a
sufficient cause or reason for forfeiture of Philippine citizenship; it does not even
constitute estoppel (Palanca vs. Republic, 80 Phil. 578, 584). Too, estoppel applies only
to questions of fact and not of law (Tanada v. Cuenco, L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957).
9

It is to be noted that the Report was unanimously approved by the Committee, and on November 28, 1972,
approved without any objection by the Convention in plenary session.
10

I am not, of course, to be mistaken as acting as mouthpiece of Emil Ong, but in all candor, I speak from
experience, because when the Convention approved the Report in question, I was one of its vice-presidents
and the presiding officer.
It is to be noted finally, that the matter was elevated to this Court (on a question involving Emil Ong's
qualification to sit as member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa)
11
in which this Court allowed the use of
the Committee Report.
Faced with such positive acts of the Government, I submit that the question of the Ong's citizenship is a
settled matter. Let it rest.
It is true that Electoral Protest Nos. EP-07 and EP-08 of the Convention as well as G.R. No. 67201 of this
Court, involved Emil Ong and not his brother; I submit, however, that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for
the gander.
I also submit that the fundamental question is whether or not we will overturn the unanimous ruling of 267
delegates, indeed, also of this Court.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J ., dissenting:
I dissent.
These separate petitions for certiorari and mandamus seek to annul the decision * of respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the tribunal) dated 6 November 1989 which
declared private respondent Jose L. Ong, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a legal resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar, and the resolution of the tribunal dated 22 February 1990 denying petitioners'
motions for reconsideration.
In G.R. Nos. 92191-92, petitioner Co also prays that the Court declare private respondent Ong not qualified to
be a Member of the House of Representatives and to declare him (petitioner Co) who allegedly obtained the
highest number of votes among the qualified candidates, the duly elected representative of the second
legislative district of Northern Samar. In G.R. Nos. 92202-03, petitioner Balanquit prays that the Court declare
private respondent Ong and Co (petitioner in G.R. Nos. 92191-92) not qualified for membership in the House
of Representatives and to proclaim him (Balanguit) as the duly elected representative of said district.
Petitioners Antonio Y. Co, Sixto T. Balanquit, Jr. and private respondent Jose Ong Chuan, Jr. were among
the candidates for the position of Representative or Congressman for the second district of Northern Samar
during the 11 May 1987 congressional elections. Private respondent was proclaimed duly-elected on 18 May
1987 with a plurality of some sixteen thousand (16,000) votes over petitioner Co who obtained the next
highest number of votes.
Petitioners Co and Balanquit then filed separate election protests against private respondent with the tribunal,
docketed as HRET Cases Nos. 13 and 15 respectively. Both protests raised almost the same issues and
were thus considered and decided jointly by the tribunal.
The issues raised before the tribunal were the following:
1. Whether or not protestee (meaning, Ong) is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines in
contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution in relation to Sections 2
and 1(3), Article IV thereof; and
2. Whether or not protestee was a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar, in contemplation
of Section 6, Article VI of the same Constitution, for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the congressional elections of May 1987.
The respondent tribunal in its decision dated 6 November 1989 held that respondent Jose L. Ong is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and was a legal resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for the required period
prior to the May 1987 congressional elections. He was, therefore, declared qualified to continue in office as
Member of the House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines, representing the second legislative
district of Northern Samar.
The factual antecedents taken from the consolidated proceedings in the tribunal are the following:
1. The Protestee (Ong) was born on June 19, 1948 to the legal spouses Ong Chuan also
known as Jose Ong Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao. His place of birth is Laoang which is now
one of the municipalities comprising the province of Northern Samar (Republic Act No.
6132 approved on August 24, 1970 and the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution).
2. On the other hand, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China and arrived in Manila on
December 16, 1915. (Exhibit zz) Subsequently thereafter, he took up residence in
Laoang, Samar.
3. On February 4, 1932, he married Agrifina E. Lao. Their wedding was celebrated
according to the rites and practices of the Roman Catholic Church in the Municipality of
Laoang (Exh. E).
4. At the time of her marriage to Jose Ong Chuan, Agrifina E. Lao was a natural-born
Filipino citizen, both her parents at the time of her birth being Filipino citizens. (Exhibits E
& I)
5. On February 15, 1954, Jose Ong Chuan, desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship,
filed his petition for naturalization with the Court of First Instance of Samar, pursuant to
Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law.
6. On April 28, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Samar rendered a decision approving
the application of Jose Ong Chuan for naturalization and declaring said petitioner a
Filipino citizen "with all the rights and privileges and duties, liabilities and obligations
inherent to Filipino citizens. (Exh. E)
7. On May 15, 1957, the same Court issued an order:
(1) declaring the decision of this Court of April 28, 1955 final and
executory;
(2) directing the clerk of court to issue the corresponding Certificate
of Naturalization in favor of the applicant Ong Chuan who prefers to
take his oath and register his name as Jose Ong Chuan. Petitioner
may take his oath as Filipino citizen under Ms new christian name,
Jose Ong Chuan. (Exh. F)
8. On the same day, Jose Ong Chuan having taken the corresponding oath of allegiance
to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines as prescribed by Section 12 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, was issued the corresponding Certificate of Naturalization.
(Exh. G)
9. On November 10, 1970, Emil L. Ong, a full-brother of the protestee and a son born on
July 25, 1937 at Laoang, Samar to the spouses Jose Ong Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao,
was elected delegate from Northern Samar to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
10. By protestee's own -testimony, it was established that he had attended grade school
in Laoang. Thereafter, he went to Manila where he finished his secondary as well as his
college education. While later employed in Manila, protestee however went home to
Laoang whenever he had the opportunity to do so, which invariably would be as frequent
as twice to four times a year.
11. Protestee also showed that being a native and legal resident of Laoang, he registered
as a voter therein and correspondingly voted in said municipality in the 1984 and 1986
elections.
12. Again in December 1986, during the general registration of all voters in the country,
Protestee re-registered as a voter in Precinct No. 4 of Barangay Tumaguinting in Laoang.
In his voter's affidavit, Protestee indicated that he is a resident of Laoang since birth.
(Exh. 7)
1

Petitioners' motions for reconsideration of the tribunal's decision having been denied, petitioners filed the
present petitions.
In their comments, the respondents first raise the issue of the Court's jurisdiction to review the decision of the
House Electoral Tribunal, considering the constitutional provision vesting upon said tribunal the power and
authority to act as the sole judge of all contests relating to the qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives.
2

On the question of this Court's jurisdiction over the present controversy, I believe that, contrary to the
respondents' contentions, the Court has the jurisdiction and competence to review the questioned decision of
the tribunal and to decide the present controversy.
Article VIII, Section I of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The Constitution, it is true, constitutes the tribunal as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives. But as early as 1938, it was held
in Morrero vs.Bocar,
3
construing Section 4, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which provided that ". . . The
Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of the Members of the National Assembly," that:
The judgment rendered by the (electoral) commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except, in any event, "upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of
due process of law." (Barry vs. US ex rel. Cunningham, 279 US 597; 73 Law. ed., 867;
Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 35 Off. Gaz., 23.)
And then under the afore-quoted provisions of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, this Court is
duty-bound to determine whether or not, in an actual controversy, there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The present controversy, it will be observed, involves more than perceived irregularities in the conduct of a
congressional election or a disputed appreciation of ballots, in which cases, it may be contended with great
legal force and persuasion that the decision of the electoral tribunal should be final and conclusive, for it is, by
constitutional directive, made the sole judge of contests relating to such matters. The present controversy,
however, involves no less than a determination of whether the qualifications for membership in the House of
Representatives, as prescribed by the Constitution, have been met. Indeed, this Court would be unforgivably
remiss in the performance of its duties, as mandated by the Constitution, were it to allow a person, not a
natural-born Filipino citizen, to continue to sit as a Member of the House of Representatives, solely because
the House Electoral Tribunal has declared him to be so. In such a case, the tribunal would have acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as to require the exercise by this Court of
its power of judicial review.
Besides, the citizenship and residence qualifications of private respondent for the office of Member of the
House of Representatives, are here controverted by petitioners who, at the same time, claim that they are
entitled to the office illegally held by private respondent. From this additional direction, where one asserts an
earnestly perceived right that in turn is vigorously resisted by another, there is clearly a justiciable controversy
proper for this Court to consider and decide.
Nor can it be said that the Court, in reviewing the decision of the tribunal, asserts supremacy over it in
contravention of the time-honored principle of constitutional separation of powers. The Court in this instance
simply performs a function entrusted and assigned to it by the Constitution of interpreting, in a justiciable
controversy, the pertinent provisions of the Constitution with finality.
It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct constitutional (and/or
statutory) interpretation, in the context of the interactions of the three branches of the
government, almost always in situations where some agency of the State has engaged in
action that stems ultimately from some legitimate area of governmental power (the
Supreme Court in Modern Role, C.B. Sevisher, 1958, p. 36).
4

Moreover, it is decidedly a matter of great public interest and concern to determine whether or not private
respondent is qualified to hold so important and high a public office which is specifically reserved by the
Constitution only to natural-born Filipino citizens.
After a careful consideration of the issues and the evidence, it is my considered opinion that the respondent
tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its
questioned decision and resolution, for reasons to be presently stated.
The Constitution
5
requires that a Member of the House of Representatives must be a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read and write,
and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution defines natural-born (Filipino) citizens as:
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who
elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section I hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizen,
Article IV, Section 1, paragraph (3) of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
The Court in this case is faced with the duty of interpreting the above-quoted constitutional provisions. The
first sentence of Section 2 of Article IV states the basic definition of a natural-born Filipino citizen. Does
private respondent fall within said definition?
To the respondent tribunal,
Protestee may even be declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines under the first
sentence of Sec. 2 of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution because he did not have "to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship." It bears to repeat that on
15 May 1957, while still a minor of 9 years he already became a Filipino citizen by
declaration of law. Since his mother was a natural-born citizen at the time of her
marriage, protestee had an inchoate right to Philippine citizenship at the moment of his
birth and, consequently the declaration by virtue of Sec. 15 of CA 473 that he was a
Filipino citizen retroacted to the moment of his birth without his having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect such Philippine citizenship.
6

I regret that I am neither convinced nor persuaded by such kaleidoscopic ratiocination. The records show that
private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 to the spouses Jose Ong Chuan, a Chinese citizen, and
Agrifina E. Lao, a natural-born Filipino citizen, in Laoang, Northern Samar. In other words, at birth, private
respondent was a Chinese citizen (not a natural-born Filipino citizen) because his father was then a Chinese
citizen (not a naturalized Filipino citizen). Under the 1935 Constitution which was enforced at the time of
private respondent's birth on 19 June 1948, only those whose fathers were citizens of the Philippines were
considered Filipino citizens. Those whose mothers were citizens of the Philippines had to elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, in order to be considered Filipino citizens.
7

Following the basic definition in the 1987 Constitution of a natural-born citizen, in relation to the 1935
Constitution, private respondent is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, having been born a Chinese citizen by
virtue of the Chinese citizenship of his father at the time of his birth, although from birth, private respondent
had the right to elect Philippine citizenship, the citizenship of his mother, but only upon his reaching the age of
majority.
While under Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. 473) minor children of a naturalized citizen
(father), who were born in the Philippines prior to the naturalization of the parent automatically become
Filipino citizens,
8
this does not alter the fact that private respondent was not born to a Filipino father, and the
operation of Section 15 of CA 473 did not confer upon him the status of a natural-born citizen merely because
he did not have to perform any act to acquire or perfect his status as a Filipino citizen.
But even assuming arguendo that private respondent could be considered a natural-born citizen by virtue of
the operation of CA 473, petitioners however contend that the naturalization of private respondent's father
was invalid and void from the beginning, and, therefore, private respondent is not even a Filipino citizen.
Respondent tribunal in its questioned decision ruled that only a direct proceeding for nullity of naturalization
as a Filipino citizen is permissible, and, therefore, a collateral attack on Ong Chuan's naturalization is barred
in an electoral contest which does not even involve him (Ong Chuan).
Private respondent, for his part, avers in his Comment that the challenge against Ong Chuan's naturalization
must emanate from the Government and must be made in a proper/appropriate and direct proceeding for de-
naturalization directed against the proper party, who in such case is Ong Chuan, and also during his lifetime.
A judgment in a naturalization proceeding is not, however, afforded the character of impregnability under the
principle of res judicata.
9
Section 18 of CA 473 provides that a certificate of naturalization may be cancelled
upon motion made in the proper proceeding by the Solicitor General or his representative, or by the proper
provincial fiscal.
In Republic vs. Go Bon Lee,
10
this Court held that:
An alien friend is offered under certain conditions the privilege of citizenship. He may
accept the offer and become a citizen upon compliance with the prescribed conditions,
but not otherwise. His claim is of favor, not of right. He can only become a citizen upon
and after a strict compliance with the acts of Congress. An applicant for this high privilege
is bound, therefore, to conform to the terms upon which alone the right he seeks can be
conferred. It is his province, and he is bound, to see that the jurisdictional facts upon
which the grant is predicated actually exist and if they do not he takes nothing by this
paper grant.
xxx xxx xxx
Congress having limited this privilege to a specified class of persons, no other person is
entitled to such privilege, nor to a certificate purporting to grant it, and any such certificate
issued to a person not so entitled to receive it must be treated as a mere nullity, which
confers no legal rights as against the government, from which it has been obtained
without warrant of law.
"Naturalization is not a right, but a privilege of the most discriminating as well as delicate and exacting nature,
affecting public interest of the highest order, and which may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions
prescribed by law therefor."
11

Considering the legal implications of the allegation made by the petitioners that the naturalization of private
respondent's father Ong Chuan, is a nullity, the Court should make a ruling on the validity of said
naturalization proceedings. This course of action becomes all the more inevitable and justified in the present
case where, to repeat for stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is holding a public
office.
12

It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the citizenship of private respondent is derived from his
father. If his father's Filipino citizenship is void from the beginning, then there is nothing from which private
respondent can derive his own claimed Filipino citizenship. For a spring cannot rise higher than its source.
And to allow private respondent to avail of the privileges of Filipino citizenship by virtue of a void
naturalization of his father, would constitute or at least sanction a continuing offense against the Constitution.
The records show that private respondent's father, Jose Ong Chuan, took the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Philippine Government, as prescribed by Section 12 of CA 473 on the same day (15 May
1957) that the CFI issued its order directing the clerk of court to issue the corresponding Certificate of
Naturalization and for the applicant to take the oath of allegiance.
However, it is settled that an order granting a petition to take the requisite oath of allegiance of one who has
previously obtained a decision favorable to his application for naturalization, is appealable. It is, therefore,
improper and illegal to authorize the taking of said oath upon the issuance of said order and before the
expiration of the reglementary period to perfect any appeal from said order.
13

In Cua Sun Ke vs. Republic,
14
this Court held that:
Administration of the oath of allegiance on the same day as issuance of order granting
citizenship is irregular and makes the proceedings so taken null and void. (Republic vs.
Guy, 115 SCRA 244 [1982]; citing the case of Ong So vs. Republic of the Philippines,
121 Phil. 1381).
It would appear from the foregoing discussion that the naturalization of Jose Ong Chuan (private respondent's
father) was null and void. It follows that the private respondent did not acquire any legal rights from the void
naturalization of his father and thus he cannot himself be considered a Filipino citizen, more so, a natural-
born Filipino citizen.
But assuming that the CFI order of 15 May 1957 directing the clerk of court to issue the certificate of
naturalization to Ong Chuan and for the latter to take the oath of allegiance was final and not appealable, the
resulting naturalization of Ong Chuan effected, as previously stated, an automatic naturalization of private
respondent, then a minor, as a Filipino citizen on 15 May 1957, but not his acquisition or perfection of the
status of a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Let us now look into the question of whether or not private respondent acquired the status of a natural-born
Filipino citizen by reason of the undisputed fact that his mother was a natural-born Filipino citizen. This in turn
leads us to an examination of the second sentence in Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It
expands, in a manner of speaking, in relation to Section 1, paragraph (3) of the same Article IV, the status of
a natural-born Filipino citizen to those who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. The
right or privilege of election is available, however, only to those born to Filipino mothers under the 1935
Constitution, and before the 1973 Constitution took effect on 17 January 1973.
The petitioners contend that the respondent tribunal acted in excess of its jurisdiction or gravely abused its
discretion as to exceed its jurisdiction in "distorting" the conferment by the 1987 Constitution of the status of
"natural-born" Filipino citizen on those who elect Philippine citizenship all in its strained effort, according to
petitioners, to support private respondent's qualification to be a Member of the House of Representatives.
15

Petitioners argue that the clear, unambiguous wording of section 1(3) of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution
contemplates that only the legitimate children of Filipino mothers with alien father, born before 17 January
1973 and who would reach the age of majority (and thus elect Philippine citizenship) after the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution are entitled to the status of natural-born Filipino citizen.
16

The respondent tribunal in resolving the issue of the constitutional provisions' interpretation, found reason to
refer to the interpellations made during the 1986 Constitutional Commission. It said:
That the benevolent provisions of Sections 2 and 1(3) of Article IV of the 1987
Constitution was (sic) intended by its (sic) framers to be endowed, without distinction, to
all Filipinos by election pursuant to the 1935 Constitution is more than persuasively
established by the extensive interpellations and debate on the issue as borne by the
official records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
17

Although I find the distinction as to when election of Philippine citizenship was made irrelevant to the case at
bar, since private respondent, contrary to the conclusion of the respondent tribunal, did not elect Philippine
citizenship, as provided by law, I still consider it necessary to settle the controversy regarding the meaning of
the constitutional provisions in question.
I agree with respondent tribunal that the debates, interpellations petitions and opinions expressed in the 1986
Constitutional Commission may be resorted to in ascertaining the meaning of somewhat elusive and even
nebulous constitutional provisions. Thus
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction
is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of
the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the
people in ratifying the constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the
framers.
18

The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 2, Article IV in relation to Section
1(3) of the same Article, appear to negate the contention of petitioners that only those born to Filipino mothers
before 17 January 1973 and who would elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution, are to be considered natural-born Filipino citizens.
During the free-wheeling discussions on citizenship, Commissioner Treas specifically asked Commissioner
Bernas regarding the provisions in question, thus:
MR. TRENAS: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political
Rights and Obligations and Human Rights has more or less decided
to extend the interpretation of who is a natural-born Filipino citizen as
provided in Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution, by adding that
persons who have elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935
Constitution shall be considered natural-born. Am I right, Mr.
Presiding Officer?
FR BERNAS: Yes.
MR. TRENAS: And does the Commissioner think that tills addition to
Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution would be contrary to the spirit of
that section?
FR BERNAS: Yes, we are quite aware that it is contrary to the letter
really. But whether it is contrary to the spirit is something that has
been debated before and is being debated even now. We will recall
that during the 1971 Constitutional Convention, the status of natural-
born citizenship of one of the delegates, Mr. Ang, was challenged
precisely because he was a citizen by election. Finally, the 1971
Constitutional Convention considered him a natural-born citizen, one
of the requirements to be a Member of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. The reason behind that decision was that a person
under his circumstances already had the inchoate right to be a
citizen by the fact that the mother was a Filipino. And as a matter of
fact, the 1971 Constitutional Convention formalized that recognition
by adopting paragraph 2 of Section 1 of the 1971 Constitution. So,
the entire purpose of this proviso is simply to perhaps remedy
whatever injustice there may be so that these people born before
January 17, 1973 who are not naturalized and people who are not
natural born but who are in the same situation as we are considered
natural-born citizens. So, the intention of the Committee in proposing
this is to equalize their status.
19

When asked to clarify the provision on natural-born citizens, Commissioner Bernas replied to Commissioner
Azcuna thus:
MR. AZCUNA: With respect to the proviso in Section 4, would this
refer only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution or would it also cover those who elected it
under the 1935 Constitution?
FR BERNAS: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine
citizenship by virtue of the provision of the 1935 Constitution,
whether the election was done before or after 17 January 1973.
20

And during the period of amendments. Commissioner Rodrigo explained the purpose of what now appear as
Section 2 and Section 1, paragraph (3) of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, thus:
MR. RODRIGO: The purpose of that proviso is to remedy an
inequitable situation. Between 1935 and 1973, when we were under
the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien
mothers were natural-born Filipinos. However, those born of Filipino
mothers but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and, if they do elect, they become
Filipino citizens, yet, but not natural-born Filipino citizens.
The 1973 Constitution equalized the status of those born of Filipino mothers and those
born of Filipino fathers. So that from January 17, 1973 when the 1973 Constitution took
effect, those born of Filipino mothers but of alien fathers are natural-born Filipino citizens.
Also, those who are born of Filipino fathers and alien mothers are natural-born Filipino
citizens.
If the 1973 Constitution equalized the status of a child born of a Filipino mother and that
born of a Filipino father, why do we not give a chance to a child born before January 17,
1973, if and when he elects Philippine citizenship, to be in the same status as one born
of a Filipino father namely, natural-born citizen.
Another thing I stated is equalizing the status of a father and a mother vis-a-vis the child.
I would like to state also that we showed equalize the status of a child born of a Filipino
mother the day before January 17, 1973 and a child born also of a Filipino mother on
January 17 or 24 hours later. A child born of a Filipino mother but an alien father one day
before January 17, 1973 is a Filipino citizen, if he elects Philippine citizenship, but he is
not a natural-born Filipino citizen. However, the other child who luckily was born 24 hours
later maybe because of parto laborioso is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
21

It would appear then that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution in defining a natural-born Filipino
citizen was to equalize the position of Filipino fathers and Filipino mothers as to their children becoming
natural-born Filipino citizens. In other words, after 17 January 1973, effectivity date of the 1973
Constitution, all those born of Filipino fathers (with alien spouse) or Filipino mothers (with alien spouse) are
natural-born Filipino citizens. But those born to Filipino mothers prior to 17 January 1973 must still elect
Philippine citizenship upon their reaching the age of majority, in order to be deemed natural-born Filipino
citizens. The election, which is related to the attainment of the age of majority, may be made before or after
17 January 1973. This interpretation appears to be in consonance with the fundamental purpose of the
Constitution which is to protect and enhance the people's individual interests,
22
and to foster equality among
them.
Since private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 (or before 17 January 1973) to a Filipino mother (with an
alien spouse) and should have elected Philippine citizenship on 19 June 1969 (when he attained the age of
majority), or soon thereafter, in order to have the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen under the 1987
Constitution, the vital question is: did private respondent really elect Philippine citizenship? As earlier stated, I
believe that private respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship, contrary to the ruling of the respondent
tribunal.
The respondent tribunal, on this issue, ruled as follows:
Where a person born to a Filipino mother and an alien father had exercised the right of
suffrage when he came of age, the same constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship. (Florencio vs. Mallare) [sic] The acts of the petitioner in registering
as a voter, participating in elections and campaigning for certain candidates were held by
the Supreme Court as sufficient to show his preference for Philippine citizenship.
Accordingly, even without complying with the formal requisites for election, the
petitioner's Filipino citizenship was judicially upheld.
23

I find the above ruling of the respondent tribunal to be patently erroneous and clearly untenable, as to amount
to grave abuse of discretion. For it is settled doctrine in this jurisdiction that election of Philippine citizenship
must be made in accordance with Commonwealth Act 625. Sections 1 and 2
24
of the Act mandate that the
option to elect Philippine citizenship must be effected expressly not impliedly.
The respondent tribunal cites In re: Florencio Mallare
25
which held that Esteban Mallare's exercise of the right
of suffrage when he came of age, constituted a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
Mallare, cited by respondent tribunal as authority for the doctrine of implied election of Philippine citizenship,
is not applicable to the case at bar. The respondent tribunal failed to consider that Esteban Mallare reached
the age of majority in 1924, or seventeen (17) years before CA 625 was approved and, more importantly,
eleven (11) years before the 1935 Constitution (which granted the right of election) took effect.
To quote Mr. Justice Fernandez in Mallare:
Indeed, it would be unfair to expect the presentation of a formal deed to that effect
considering that prior to the enactment of Commonwealth Act 625 on June 7, 1941, no
particular proceeding was required to exercise the option to elect Philippine citizenship,
granted to the proper party by Section 1, subsection 4, Article IV of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution.
26

Moreover, Esteban Mallare was held to be a Filipino citizen because he was an illegitimate (natural)
child of a Filipino mother and thus followed her citizenship. I therefore agree with the petitioners'
submission that, inciting the Mallare case, the respondent tribunal had engaged in an obiter dictum.
The respondent tribunal also erred in ruling that by operation of CA 473, the Revised Naturalization Law,
providing for private respondent's acquisition of Filipino citizenship by reason of the naturalization of his
father, the law itself had already elected Philippine citizenship for him. For, assuming arguendo that the
naturalization of private respondent's father was valid, and that there was no further need for private
respondent to elect Philippine citizenship (as he had automatically become a Filipino citizen) yet, this did not
mean that the operation of the Revised Naturalization Law amounted to an election by him of Philippine
citizenship as contemplated by the Constitution. Besides, election of Philippine citizenship derived from one's
Filipino mother, is made upon reaching the age of majority, not during one's minority.
There is no doubt in my mind, therefore, that private respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority in 1969 or within a reasonable time thereafter as required by CA 625.
Consequently, he cannot be deemed a natural-born Filipino citizen under Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV of the
1987 Constitution.
Based on all the foregoing considerations and premises, I am constrained to state that private respondent is
not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines in contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution in
relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof, and hence is disqualified or ineligible to be a Member of the
House of Representatives.
At this point, I find it no longer necessary to rule on the issue of required residence, inasmuch as the
Constitution requires that a Member of the House of Representatives must be both a natural-born Filipino
citizen and a resident for at least one (1) year in the district in which he shall be elected.
The next question that comes up is whether or not either of the petitioners can replace private respondent as
the Representative of the second legislative district of Northern Samar in the House of Representatives.
I agree with respondent tribunal that neither of the petitioners may take the place of private respondent in the
House of Representatives representing the second district of Northern Samar. The ruling of this Court
in Ramon L.Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) EN BANC and Luis L. Lardizabal,
27
is
controlling. There we held that Luis L. Lardizabal, who filed the quo warranto petition, could not replace
Ramon L. Labo, Jr. as mayor of Baguio City for the simple reason that as he obtained only the second
highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City for
mayor of that City.
A petition alleging that the candidate-elect is not qualified for the office is, in effect, a quo warranto proceeding
even if it is labelled an election protest.
28
It is a proceeding to unseat the ineligible person from office but not
necessarily to install the protestant in his place.
29

The general rule is that the fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes are cast for an ineligible candidate in
an election does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected.
In such a case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity.
30

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have the highest
number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure
can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes
cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676).
As early as 1912, this Court has already declared that the candidate who lost in an
election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event that the candidate who won is
found ineligible for the office to which he was elected. This was the ruling in Topacio v.
Paredes (23 Phil. 238)
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the
office because of fraud or irregularities in the election is quite
different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold
such an office. . . . If it be found that the successful candidate
(according to the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in an
illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the
former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not,
strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally
cast ballots. . . .
31

The recognition of Emil L. Ong by the 1971 Constitutional Convention as a natural-born Filipino
citizen, in relation to the present case.
Private respondent, as previously stated, is a full brother of Emil L. Ong, both of them having the same father
and mother.
Private respondent, relying on a resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
32
to the effect that Emil L.
Ong was a natural-born Filipino citizen, alleged before the House Electoral Tribunal that, by analogy, he is
himself a natural-born Filipino citizen. This submission, while initially impressive, is, as will now be shown,
flawed and not supported by the evidence. Not even the majority decision of the electoral tribunal adopted the
same as the basis of its decision in favor of private respondent. The tribunal, in reference to this submission,
said:
Be that as it may and in the light of the Tribunal's disposition of protestee's citizenship
based on an entirely different set of circumstances, apart from the indisputable fact that
the matters attempted to be brought in issue in connection therewith are too far removed
in point of time and relevance from the decisive events relied upon by the Tribunal, we
view these two issues as being already inconsequential.
33

The electoral tribunal (majority) instead chose to predicate its decision on the alleged citizenship by
naturalization of private respondent's father (Ong Chuan) and on the alleged election of Philippine
citizenship by private respondent.
Emil L. Ong, was elected delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. Electoral protests, numbers EP-07
and EP-08, were filed by Leonardo D. Galing and Gualberto D. Luto against Emil L. Ong, contesting his
citizenship qualification. The Committee on Election Protests Credentials of the 1971 Contitution Convention
heard the protests and submitted to the Convention a report dated 4 September 1972, the dispositive portion
of which stated:
It appearing that protestee's grandfather was himself a Filipino citizen under the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898,
thus conferring upon protestee's own father, Ong Chuan, Philippine citizenship at birth,
the conclusion is inescapable that protestee himself is a natural-born citizen, and is
therefore qualified to hold the office of delegate to the Constitutional Convention.
34

On 28 November 1972, during a plenary session of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, the election protests
filed against Emil L. Ong were dismissed, following the report of the Committee on Election Protests and
Credentials.
35

It is evident, up to this point, that the action of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong
is, to say the least, inconclusive to the case at bar, because
a) the 1971 Constitutional Convention decision in the Emil L. Ong case involved the
1935Constitution; the present case, on the other hand involves the 1987 Constitution:
b) the 1935 Constitution contained no specific definition of a "natural-born citizen" of the
Philippines; the 1987 Constitution contains a precise and specific definition of a "natural-
born citizen" of the Philippines in Sec. 2, Art. IV thereof and private respondent does not
qualify under such definition in the 1987 Constitution;
c) the decision of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong was a
decision of apolitical body, not a court of law. And, even if we have to take such a
decision as a decision of aquasi-judicial body (i.e., a political body exercising quasi-
judicial functions), said decision in the Emil L. Ong case can not have the category or
character of res judicata in the present judicial controversy, because between the two (2)
cases, there is no identity of parties (one involves Emil L. Ong, while the other involves
private respondent) and, more importantly, there is no identity of causes of action
because the first involves the 1935 Constitution while the second involves the 1987
Constitution.
But even laying aside the foregoing reasons based on procedural rules and logic, the evidence submitted
before the electoral tribunal and, therefore, also before this Court, does not support the allegations made by
Emil L. Ong before the 1971 Constitutional Convention and inferentially adopted by private respondent in the
present controversy. This leads us to an interesting inquiry and finding.
The 1971 Constitutional Convention in holding that Emil L. Ong was a "natural-born citizen" of the Philippines
under the 1935 Constitution laid stress on the "fact" and this appears crucial and central to its decision
that Emil L. Ong's grandfather, Ong Te became a Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and,
therefore, his descendants like Emil L. Ong (and therefore, also private respondent) became natural-born
Filipinos. The 1971 Constitutional Convention said:
Ong Te Emil Ong's grandfather, was a Spanish subject residing in the Philippines on
April 11, 1899 and was therefore one of the many who became ipso facto citizens of the
Philippines under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law expressly
declared that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who continued to reside therein and
who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 as well as their children born subsequent
thereto, "shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands." (Section 4,
Philippine Bill of
1902).
36

The "test" then, following the premises of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, is whether or not Ong Te
private respondent's and Emil L. Ong's grandfather was "an inhabitant of the Philippines who continued to
reside therein and was a Spanish subject on April 11, 1899." If he met these requirements of the Philippine
Bill of 1902, then, Ong Te was a Filipino citizen; otherwise, he was not a Filipino citizen.
Petitioners (protestants) submitted and offered in evidence before the House Electoral Tribunal exhibits W, X,
Y, Z ,AA, BB, CC, DD and EE which are copies of entries in the "Registro de Chinos" from years 1896 to
1897 which show that Ong Te was not listed as an inhabitant of Samar where he is claimed to have been a
resident. Petitioners (protestants) also submitted and offered in evidence before the House Electoral Tribunal
exhibit V, a certification of the Chief of the Archives Division, Records and Management and Archives Office,
stating that the name of Ong Te does not appear in the "Registro Central de Chinos" for the province of
Samar for 1895. These exhibits prove or at least, as petitioners validly argue, tend to prove that Ong Te was
NOT a resident of Samar close to 11 April 1899 and, therefore, could not continue residing in Samar,
Philippines after 11 April 1899, contrary to private respondent's pretense. In the face of these proofs or
evidence, private respondent FAILED TO PRESENT ANY REBUTTAL OR COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE,
except the decision of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong, previously discussed.
It is not surprising then that, as previously noted, the majority decision of the House Electoral Tribunal skirted
any reliance on the alleged ipso facto Filipino citizenship of Ong Te under the Philippine Bill of 1902. It is
equally not surprising that Ong Chuan, the son of Ong Te and father or private respondent, did not even
attempt to claim Filipino citizenship by reason of Ong Te's alleged Filipino citizenship under the Philippine Bill
of 1902 but instead applied for Philippine citizenship through naturalization.
Nor can it be contended by the private respondent that the House Electoral Tribunal should no longer have
reviewed the factual question or issue of Ong Te's citizenship in the light of the resolution of the 1971
Constitutional Convention finding him (Ong Te to have become a Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of
1902. The tribunal had to look into the question because the finding that Ong Te had become a Filipino citizen
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 was the central core of said 1971 resolution but as held in Lee
vs. Commissioners of
Immigration:
37

. . . Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case, whatever the corresponding Court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata,
hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.
Which finally brings us to the resolution of this Court in Emil L. Ong vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 67201, 8
May 1984. In connection with said resolution, it is contended by private respondent that the resolution of the
1971 Constitutional Convention in the Emil L. Ong case was elevated to this Court on a question involving
Emil L. Ong's disqualification to run for membership in the Batasang Pambansa and that, according to private
respondent, this Court allowed the use of the Committee Report to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
To fully appreciate the implications of such contention, it would help to look into the circumstances of the case
brought before this Court in relation to the Court's action or disposition. Emil L. Ong and Edilberto Del Valle
were both candidates for the Batasang Pambansa in the 14 May 1984 election. Valle filed a petition for
disqualification with the Commission on Election on 29 March 1984 docketed as SPC No. 84-69 contending
that Ong is not a natural-born citizen. Ong filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the
judgment of the 1971 Constitutional Convention on his status as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines bars
the petitioner from raising the Identical issue before the COMELEC. (G.R. No. 67201, Rollo, p. 94) The
motion was denied by the COMELEC, thus, prompting Emil L. Ong to file with this Court a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R.
No. 67201.
In a resolution dated 8 May 1984, this Court resolved to issue a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
respondent COMELEC from holding any further hearing on the disqualification case entitled "Edilberto Del
Valle vs. Emil Ong(SPC No. 84-69) except to dismiss the same. (G.R. Nos. 92202-03, Rollo, p. 335)
This Court, in explaining its action, held that:
Acting on the prayer of the petitioner for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
and considering that at the hearing this morning, it was brought out that the 1971
Constitutional Convention, at its session of November 28, 1972, after considering the
Report of its Committee on Election Protests and Credentials, found that the protest
questioning the citizenship of the protestee (the petitioner herein) was groundless and
dismissed Election Protests Nos. EP 07 and EP 08 filed against said petitioner (p.
237, Rollo), the authenticity of the Minutes of said session as well as of the said
Committee's Report having been duly admitted in evidence without objection and bears
out, for now, without need for a full hearing, that petitioner is a natural-born citizen, the
Court Resolved to ISSUE, effective immediately, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
enjoining respondent COMELEC from holding any further hearing on the disqualification
case entitled Edilberto Del Valle vs. Emil Ong (SPC No. 84-69) scheduled at 3:00 o'clock
this afternoon, or any other day, except to dismiss the same.This is without prejudice to
any appropriate action that private respondent may wish to take after the elections.
(emphasis supplied)
It is thus clear that the resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 67201 was rendered without the benefit of a
hearing on the merits either by the Court or by the COMELEC and merely on the basis of a Committee's
Report to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and that this Court (and this is quite significant) did not
foreclose any appropriate action that Del Valle (therein petitioner) may wish to take after the elections.
It is thus abundantly clear also that to this Court, the resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
recognizing Emil L. Ong as a natural-born citizen under the 1935 Constitution did not foreclose a future or
further proceeding in regard to the same question and that, consequently, there is no vested right of Emil L.
Ong to such recognition. How much more when the Constitution involved is not the 1935 Constitution but the
1987 Constitution whose provisions were never considered in all such proceedings because the 1987
Constitution was still inexistent.
A final word. It is regrettable that one (as private respondent) who unquestionably obtained the highest
number of votes for the elective position of Representative (Congressman) to the House of Representatives
for the second district of Northern Samar, would have had to cease in office by virtue of this Court's
decision, if the full membership of the Court had participated in this case, with the result that the legislative
district would cease to have, in the interim, a representative in the House of Representatives. But the
fundamental consideration in cases of this nature is the Constitution and only the Constitution. It has to be
assumed, therefore, that when the electorate in the second legislative district of Northern Samar cast the
majority of their votes for private respondent, they assumed and believed that he was fully eligible and
qualified for the office because he is a natural-born Filipino citizen. That erroneous assumption and belief can
not prevail over, but must yield to the majesty of the Constitution.
This is a sad day for the Constitution. As I see it, the Constitution mandates that members of the House of
Representatives should be "natural-born citizens of the Philippines". The voting majority of the present Court
says, "Filipino citizens will do." This is bad enough. What is worse is, the same voting majority, in effect, says,
"even aliens will do as well."
WHEREFORE, my vote is clear: to declare private respondent Jose L. Ong Chua, Jr., as he clearly is, NOT a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and therefore NOT QUALIFIED to be a Member of the House of
Representatives, Congress of the Philippines.
Narvasa, J., Paras, J. and Regalado, J., dissenting.
SARMIENTO, J ., concurring:
I concur with the majority.
(1)
I wish to point out first that the question of citizenship is a question of fact, and as a rule, the Supreme Court
leaves facts to the tribunal that determined them. I am quite agreed that the Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, as the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the membership in the House, as follows:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated
by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under
the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.
1

is the best judge of facts and this Court can not substitute its judgment because it thinks it knows
better.
In the case of Aratuc v. Commission on Elections,
2
it was held that this Court can not review the errors of the
Commission on Elections (then the "sole judge" of all election contests) in the sense of reviewing facts and
unearthing mistakes and that this Court's jurisdiction is to see simply whether or not it is guilty of a grave
abuse of discretion. It is true that the new Constitution has conferred expanded powers on the Court,
3
but as
the Charter states, our authority is "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
4
It
is not to review facts.
"Grave abuse of discretion" has been defined as whimsical exercise of power amounting to excess of
jurisdiction, or otherwise, to denial of due process of law.
5

I find none of that here.
As the majority indicates, Jose Ong's citizenship is a matter of opinion with which men may differ, but
certainly, it is quite another thing to say that the respondent Tribunal has gravely abused its discretion
because the majority has begged to differ. It does not form part of the duty of the Court to remedy all
imagined wrongs committed by the Government.
The respondent Tribunal has spoken. According to the Tribunal, Jose Ong is a Filipino citizen and
consequently, is possessed of the qualifications to be a member of the House. As the sole judge, precisely, of
this question, the Court can not be more popish than the pope.
(2)
I can not say, in the second place, that the Decision in question stands exactly on indefensible grounds. It is
to be noted that Jose Ong had relied on the Report dated September 4, 1972 of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention Committee
6
on Election Protests and Credentials, in which the Committees upheld the
citizenship, and sustained the qualification to sit as Delegate, of Emil Ong, Jose Ong's full blood brother.
According to the Report, Ong Te the Ongs' grandfather, was already a Filipino citizen having complied with
the requirements on Filipinization by existing laws for which his successors need not have elected Filipino
citizenship. I quote:
xxx xxx xxx
There is merit in protestee's claim. There can hardly be any doubt that Ong Te
protestees's grandfather, was a Spanish subject residing in the Philippines on April 11,
1899, and was therefore one of the many who became ipso facto citizens of the
Philippines under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law expressly
declared that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who continued to reside therein and
who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, as well as their children born subsequent
thereto, "shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands" (Sec. 4,
Philippine Bill of 1902). Excepted from the operation of this rule were Spanish subjects
who shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance
with the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. But under the Treaty of Paris, only
Spanish subjects who were natives of Peninsular Spain had the privilege of preserving
their Spanish nationality.
7

xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
As earlier noted, protestee's grandfather established residence in the Philippines in 1895,
as shown by the Registro Central de Chinos. He was also issued a certificate of
registration. He established a business here, and later acquired real property. Although
he went back to China for brief visits, he invariably came back. He even brought his
eldest son, Ong Chuan, to live in the Philippines when the latter was only 10 years old.
And Ong Chuan was admitted into the country because, as duly noted on his landing
certificate, his father, Ong Te had been duly enrolled under CR 16009-36755 i.e., as a
permanent resident. Indeed, even when Ong Te went back to China in the 1920's for
another visit, he left his son, Ong Chuan, who was then still a minor, in the Philippines
obviously because he had long considered the Philippines his home. The domicile he
established in 1895 is presumed to have continued up to, and beyond, April 11, 1899, for,
as already adverted to, a domicile once acquired is not lost until a new one is gained.
The only conclusion then can thus be drawn is that Ong Te was duly domiciled in the
Philippines as of April 11, 1899, within the meaning of par. 4, Art. 17, of the Civil Code of
1889 and was, consequently, a Spanish subject, he qualified as a Filipino citizen
under the provisions of Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
8

It is true that Ong Chuan, the Ong brothers' father, subsequently sought naturalization in the belief that he
was, all along, a Chinese citizen, but as the Report held:
Protestants, however, make capital of the fact that both Ong Te and his son, Ong Chuan
(protestee's father), appear to have been registered as Chinese citizens even long after
the turn of the century. Worse, Ong Chuan himself believed the was alien, to the extent
of having to seek admission as a Pilipino citizen through naturalization proceedings. The
point, to our mind, is neither crucial nor substantial. Ong's status as a citizen is a matter
of law, rather than of personal belief. It is what the law provides, and not what one thinks
his status to be, which determines whether one is a citizen of a particular state or not.
Mere mistake or misapprehension as to one's citizenship, it has been held, is not a
sufficient cause or reason for forfeiture of Philippine citizenship; it does not even
constitute estoppel (Palanca vs. Republic, 80 Phil. 578, 584). Too, estoppel applies only
to questions of fact and not of law (Tanada v. Cuenco, L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957).
9

It is to be noted that the Report was unanimously approved by the Committee, and on November 28, 1972,
approved without any objection by the Convention in plenary session.
10

I am not, of course, to be mistaken as acting as mouthpiece of Emil Ong, but in all candor, I speak from
experience, because when the Convention approved the Report in question, I was one of its vice-presidents
and the presiding officer.
It is to be noted finally, that the matter was elevated to this Court (on a question involving Emil Ong's
qualification to sit as member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa)
11
in which this Court allowed the use of
the Committee Report.
Faced with such positive acts of the Government, I submit that the question of the Ong's citizenship is a
settled matter. Let it rest.
It is true that Electoral Protest Nos. EP-07 and EP-08 of the Convention as well as G.R. No. 67201 of this
Court, involved Emil Ong and not his brother; I submit, however, that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for
the gander.
I also submit that the fundamental question is whether or not we will overturn the unanimous ruling of 267
delegates, indeed, also of this Court.
Footnotes
Sarmiento J.: concurring
1 CONST., art. VI, sec. 17.
2 Nos. L-49705-09; 49717-21, February 8, 1979, 88 SCRA 251.
3 CONST., supra, art. VIII, sec. 1.
4 Supra.
5 Robles v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5,
1990, 181 SCRA 780.
6 Galing v. Ong, Elec. Protest No. EP-07 (Const. Con), September 4, 1972; Luto v. Ong,
Elec. Protest, No. EP-08 (Const. Con) September 4, 1972; Liwag, Juan, Chmn.
7 Rept., Comm. on Election Protests and Credentials (Const. Con.), September 4, 1972,
3.
8 Id., 4-5.
9 Id., 5-6.
10 The Delegates present were as follows:
Delegate
Abalos E.
Delegate Bacaltos
Delegate
Ablan
Delegate Badelles
Delegate
Abueg
Delegate Baguilat
Delegate
Abundo
Delegate Baradi
Delegate Adil Delegate Barbers
Delegate
Alanis
Delegate Bautista
Delegate
Alano
Delegate Belo
Delegate
Amante
Delegate Blancia
Delegate Anni Delegate Bongbong
Delegate Delegate Borja
Apalisok
Delegate
Arabejo
Delegate Borra
Delegate
Borromeo
Delegate Laggui
Delegate
Buen
Delegate Lazo
Delegate
Bugnosen
Delegate Ledesma
C.
Delegate
Cainglet
Delegate Legaspi
Delegate
Calderon C.
Delegate Leviste C.
Delegate
Calderon P.
Delegate Lim P.
Delegate
Caliwara
Delegate Lim R.
Delegate
Camello
Delegate Macaraya
Delegate
Campomanes
Delegate Macias
Delegate
Canilao
Delegate Madrillejos
Delegate
Carrillo
Delegate Momenta
Delegate
Castillo P.
Delegate
Castro
Delegate
Catan
Delegate
Ceniza
Delegate
Clements
Delegate
Delegate Mapupuno
Delegate Marino
Delegate Mendiola
Delegate Mijares
Delegate Misa
Delegate Montejo
Delegate Montinola
Corpus
Delegate
David
Delegate
Davide
Delegate De
Guzman
Delegate De
la Serna
Delegate
Encarnacion
Delegate
Espiritu A.C.
Delegate
Estaniel
Delegate
Estrella
Delegate
Exmundo
Delegate
Flores A.
Delegate
Flores T.
Delegate
Garcia J.
Delegate
Gaudiel
Delegate
Gonzaga
Delegate
Delegate Olmedo
Delegate Ong
Delegate Ozamiz
Delegate Panotes
Delegate Pepito
Delegate Pimentel A.
Delegate Quibranza
Delegate Quintero
Delegate Quirino
Delegate Reyes G.
Delegate Rodriguez
B.
Delegate Rodriguez
P.
Delegate Romualdo
Delegate Sabio
Delegate Salazar A.
Delegate Sangkula
Delegate Santillan
Delegate Santos O.
Delegate Sarmiento
Delegate Serapio
Delegate Serrano
Guevara
Delegate
Guirnalda
Delegate
Guzman
Delegate
Hilado
Delegate
Hocson
Delegate
Ignacio
Delegate
Kintanar J.
Delegate
Lachica
Delegate
Lagamon
Delegate
Tabuena
Delegate
Tanopo
Delegate
Tingson
Delegate
Tolentino
Delegate
Trono
Delegate
Tupaz A.
Delegate
Delegate Sinco
Delegate Britanico
Delegate Cabal
Delegate Calaycay
Delegate Calderon J.
Delegate Capulong
Delegate Castilo N.
Delegate Catubig
Delegate Cea
Delegate Claver
Delegate Concordia
Delegate Cruz
Delegate De la Cruz
Delegate De la Paz
Delegate De Lima
Delegate De los
Reyes
Delegate De Pio
Delegate Deavit
Delegate Esparrago
Delegate Espina
Delegate Espiritu R.
Valdez
Delegate
Velasco
Delegate
Verzola
Delegate Villar
Delegate
Vinzons
Delegate
Viterbo
Delegate Yap
Delegate Yulo
A.
Delegate Yulo
J.G.
Delegate
Zafra
The President
Delegate
Abad
Delegate
Abalos F.
Delegate
Abubakar
Delegate
Aguilar
Delegate
Albano
Delegate
Delegate Fajardo
Delegate Falgui
Delegate Fernan
Delegate Fernandez
Delegate Gangan
Delegate Garcia A.
Delegate Garcia F.
Delegate Garda L.P.
Delegate Garcia L.M.
Delegate Gordon
Delegate Gunigundo
Delegate Hermoso
Delegate Hortinela
Delegate Imperial
Delegate Jamir
Delegate Johnston
Delegate Juaban
Delegate Kintanar S.
Delegate Laurel
Delegate Raquiza
Delegate Restor
Aldaba
Delegate
Alfelor
Delegate
Alonto
Delegate
Amatong
Delegate
Ampatuan
Delegate
Angara
Delegate
Angala
Delegate
Antonio
Delegate
Araneta T.
Delegate
Aruego
Delegate
Astilla
Delegate
Azcuna
Delegate
Balane
Delegate
Balindong
Delegate
Barrera
Delegate
Delegate Reyes B.
Delegate Reyes C.
Delegate Reyes J.
Delegate Reyes P.
Delegate Robles
Delegate Roco
Delegate Rosales
Delegate Ruben
Delegate Sagadal
Delegate Sagmit
Delegate Saguin
Delegate Salazar R.
Delegate Salva
Delegate
Sambolawan
Delegate Sanchez
Delegate Santelices
Delegate Santiago
Delegate Santos E.
Delegate Sarraga
Delegate Sarte
Delegate Sawit
Bengzon
Delegate
Ledesma F.
Delegate
Ledesma O.
Delegate
Leido
Delegate
Lobregat
Delegate
Lobrin
Delegate
Locsin J.
Delegate
Locsin M.
Delegate
Madarang
Delegate
Martinez
Delegate
Mastura
Delegate
Matas
Delegate
Mendoza
Delegate
Molina
Delegate
Mantilla
Delegate
Delegate Seares
Delegate Sevilla
Delegate Siguion
Reyna
Delegate Sinsuat
Delegate Sison A.
Delegate Sison E.
Delegate Sorongan
Delegate Suarez
Delegate Syjuco
Delegate Teodoro
Delegate Teves
Delegate Tirador
Delegate Tirol
Delegate Tocao
Delegate Trillana
Delegate Tupaz D.
Delegate Yaneza
Delegate Yaranon
Delegate Yniguez
Delegate Yuzon
Delegate Zosa
Mordeno
Delegate
Nisce
Delegate
Nuguid
Delegate Oca
Delegate
Opinion
Delegate
Ordonez
Delegate
Ortega
Delegate Ortiz
P.
Delegate Ortiz
R.
Delegate
Pacificador
Delegate
Padiernos
Delegate
Padua C.
Delegate
Padua M.
Delegate
Pangandaman
Delegate
Parades
Delegate Pat
Delegate
Pimentel V.
Delegate
Pingoy
Delegate
Ponchinlan
Delegate
Primicias
Delegate
Purisma
Delegate
Puruganan
Delegate
Puzon
Delegate
Quintos
Delegate
Ramos
Delegate
Valera
Delegate
Veloso D.
Delegate
Veloso I.
Delegate
Villadelgado
Delegate
Yancha

11 Ong v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 67201, May 8, 1984.
Padilla J.: dissenting
* With the concurrence of Congressmen Mario L. Tagarao, David A. Ponce De Leon,
Simeon E. Garcia, Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. and Jose E. Calingasan; Justices Ameurfina
A. Melencio-Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz, Florentino P. Feliciano and Congressman Antonio
H. Cerilles dissented.
1 G.R. Nos. 92191-92, Rollo, pp. 21-23.
2 Section 17, Article VI, 1987 Constitution.
3 No. 45352, October 31, 1938, 66 Phil. 429.
4 Chartered Bank Employees Association vs. Ople, G.R. No. 44717, August 28, 1985,
138 SCRA 273. Article VI, Section 6.
6 G.R. No. 92191-92, Rollo, pp. 41-42.
7 Article III, Section 1 (3) and (4),1935 Constitution provide:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are -citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
8 Burca vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-24252, January 30, 1967, 19 SCRA 186.
9 Sia Reyes vs. Deportation Board, No. L-31763, May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 478.
10 G.R. No. L-11499, April 29, 1961, 1 SCRA citing U.S. vs. Sponrer, 175 Fed. 440.
11 Cuaski Tan Si vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-18006, October 31, 1962, 6 SCRA 545.
12 Labo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1.
13 Tan vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-28706, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 353.
14 G.R. No. L-29674, April 8, 1988, 159 SCRA 477.
15 G.R. Nos. 92191-92, Rollo, p. 7.
16 G.R. Nos. 92202-03, Rollo, p. 23.
17 G.R. Nos. 92191-92, Rollo, p. 30.
18 Nitafan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. L-78780, July 23, 1987, 152
SCRA 284.
19 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 189.
20 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 228.
21 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 356.
22 Acar vs. Rosal, G.R. No. L-21707, March 18, 1967, 19 SCRA 625.
23 G.R. No. 92191-92, Rollo, p. 40.
24 Sections 1 and 2, C.A. 625 state:
SECTION 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4),
section 1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be signed
and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths,
and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the
aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of
the Philippines.
"SECTION 2. If the party concerned is absent from the Philippines, he may make the
statement herein authorized before any officer of the Government of the United States
authorized to administer oaths, and he shall forward such statement together with his
oath of allegiance, to the Civil Registry of Manila."
25 Administrative Case No. 533, September 12, 1974, 59 SCRA 45.
26 In Re: Florencio Mallare, supra, p. 52.
27 G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1.
28 Luison vs. Garcia, No. L-10981, April 25, 1958, 103 Phil. 453.
29 Topacio vs. Paredes, No. 8069, October 7, 1912, 23 Phil. 238.
30 Llamoso vs. Ferrer, et al. No. L-2470. August 30, 1949, 84 Phil. 490.
31 Geronimo vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 60504, May 14, 1985,136 SCRA 435.
32 Two (2) of the members of said 1971 Constitutional Convention are now distinguished
members of the Court, namely, Sarmiento and Davide, JJ. and they are part of the voting
majority in this case.
33 G.R. Nos. 92191-92, Rollo, pp. 42-43.
34 G.R. Nos. 92202-03, Rollo, p. 196.
35 G.R. Nos. 92202-03, Rollo, p. 211.
36 G.R. Nos. 92202-03, Rollo, p. 193.
37 G.R. No. L-23446, 20 December 1971, 42 SCRA 561.



EN BANC
[G.R. No. 137000. August 9, 2000]
CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO
LOPEZ, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PURISIMA, J .:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999,
respectively, of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition for
disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao Oriental.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western
Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet,
Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left
Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.
On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate
Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in the electoral process
not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board Member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and was elected governor of
Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo
warranto, docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground therefor her alleged Australian
citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine
citizenship, the Commission on Elections en banc dismissed the petition, ratiocinating thus:
A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the impugned resolution shows that respondent was
able to produce documentary proofs of the Filipino citizenship of her late father... and consequently, prove her
own citizenship and filiation by virtue of the Principle of Jus Sanguinis, the perorations of the petitioner to the
contrary notwithstanding.
On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged important documents . . . no other evidence substantial in
nature surfaced to confirm the allegations of petitioner that respondent is an Australian citizen and not a
Filipino. Express renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63
is an equivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and consequence. The evidence
adduced by petitioner are inadequate, nay meager, to prove that respondent contemplated renunciation of
her Filipino citizenship.
[1]

In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-election as
governor of Davao Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for disqualification,
docketed as SPA No. 95-066 before the COMELEC, First Division, contesting her Filipino
citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC, reiterating
substantially its decision in EPC 92-54.
The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she ran for
re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was
questioned by the herein petitioner, Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-336.
On July 17, 1998, the COMELECs First Division came out with a Resolution dismissing the
petition, and disposing as follows:
Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply and We are to dispose the instant case on the merits
trying it de novo, the above table definitely shows that petitioner herein has presented no new evidence to
disturb the Resolution of this Commission in SPA No. 95-066. The present petition merely restates the same
matters and incidents already passed upon by this Commission not just in 1995 Resolution but likewise in the
Resolution of EPC No. 92-54. Not having put forth any new evidence and matter substantial in nature,
persuasive in character or sufficiently provocative to compel reversal of such Resolutions, the dismissal of the
present petition follows as a matter of course.
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no new matters and issues tendered, We find no
convincing reason or impressive explanation to disturb and reverse the Resolutions promulgated by this
Commission in EPC 92-54 and SPA. 95-066. This Commission RESOLVES as it hereby RESOLVES to
DISMISS the present petition.
SO ORDERED.
[2]

Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution but to no
avail. The same was denied by the COMELEC in its en banc Resolution of January 15, 1999.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition; questioning the
citizenship of private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.
The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a
Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public office because (1) her father, Telesforo
Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino
citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby making
her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she
renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration
and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified
to by the Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC
Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly
qualified to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor.
Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent is an Australian citizen,
placing reliance on the admitted facts that:
a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as an Australian national and
was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988;
b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), and
c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.
Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and circumstances, the private
respondent had renounced her Filipino citizenship. He contends that in her application for alien
certificate of registration and immigrant certificate of residence, private respondent expressly
declared under oath that she was a citizen or subject of Australia; and said declaration forfeited
her Philippine citizenship, and operated to disqualify her to run for elective office.
As regards the COMELECs finding that private respondent had renounced her Australian
citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of
Australia and had her Australian passport cancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified to by the
Australian Embassy here in Manila, petitioner argues that the said acts did not automatically
restore the status of private respondent as a Filipino citizen. According to petitioner, for the
private respondent to reacquire Philippine citizenship she must comply with the mandatory
requirements for repatriation under Republic Act 8171; and the election of private respondent to
public office did not mean the restoration of her Filipino citizenship since the private respondent
was not legally repatriated. Coupled with her alleged renunciation of Australian citizenship,
private respondent has effectively become a stateless person and as such, is disqualified to run
for a public office in the Philippines; petitioner concluded.
Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections erred in applying the principle
of res judicata to the case under consideration; citing the ruling in Moy Ya Lim Yao vs.
Commissioner of Immigration,
[3]
that:
xxx Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative
case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and
again as the occasion may demand. xxx
The petition is unmeritorious.
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a
child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as
opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis
of place of birth.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace,
Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of
Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year before
the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the
Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the
country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of
August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of the Philippine
islands. The Philippine Bill of 1902 defined Philippine citizens as:
SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on
the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in the Philippine Islands, and
their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and
as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United
States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. (underscoring ours)
The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:
SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April,
eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected
to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight,
and except such others as have since become citizens of some other country: Provided, That the Philippine
Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who cannot come within the foregoing provisions, the
natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the
laws of the United States if residing therein. (underscoring ours)
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11,
1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private
respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a
fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine
citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth,
Telesforos daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of
the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus
sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to wit:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority,
elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship,
was subsequently retained under the 1973
[4]
and 1987
[5]
Constitutions. Thus, the herein private
respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino
father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine
citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also
claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent is a
Filipino citizen, she has nonetheless renounced her Philippine citizenship. To buttress this
contention, petitioner cited private respondents application for an Alien Certificate of Registration
(ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988, and the issuance
to her of an Australian passport on March 3, 1988.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country
upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in
time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted: and
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her
husbands country, she acquires his nationality.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be
express. Petitioners contention that the application of private respondent for an alien certificate
of registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest in the
case of Aznar vs. COMELEC
[6]
and in the more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and
COMELEC.
[7]

In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a
holder of a certificate stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino,
and that an application for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of
his Philippine citizenship.
And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that respondent
Manzano was registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
and was holding an American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate
of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just assertions of his American nationality before the
termination of his American citizenship.
Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an
Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an
effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino
citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be
express.
[8]
As held by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien
certificate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of ones
citizenship. The application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of registration,
and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere
acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. Thus,
at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino, as
well.
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in
another country has not been included as a ground for losing ones Philippine citizenship. Since
private respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioners claim that
respondent must go through the process of repatriation does not hold water.
Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the private respondent had dual
citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of
Republic Act 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which states:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
Again, petitioners contention is untenable.
In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified dual citizenship as
used in the Local Government Code and reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the
1987 Constitution on dual allegiance.
[9]
Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may,
without performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different
countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court explained that dual citizenship as a
disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced:
xxx the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854, xxx 20 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification.
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically
disqualify her from running for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with
dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate
of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship.
[10]
The filing of a certificate
of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as
a dual citizen.
[11]
This is so because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a
Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an
effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private respondent filed
her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.
Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent executed a
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February 11,
1992, the Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled, as certified to by Second
Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the
COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her renunciation was effective, petitioners claim that private
respondent must go through the whole process of repatriation holds no water.
Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or
administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is generally not considered res
judicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging the same; citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao
vs. Commissioner of Immigration.
[12]
He insists that the same issue of citizenship may be
threshed out anew.
Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle of res
judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. However, in the
case of Burca vs. Republic,
[13]
an exception to this general rule was recognized. The Court ruled
in that case that in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship,
the following must be present:
1) a persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a
party;
2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof,
and
3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not
foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may somehow be
placed on these antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to make the effort easier or
simpler.
[14]
Indeed, there appears sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the Commission on
Elections in SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC 92-54 which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of
the herein private respondent. The evidence adduced by petitioner is substantially the same
evidence presented in these two prior cases. Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or
supervening event to warrant a reversal of such prior resolutions. However, the procedural issue
notwithstanding, considered on the merits, the petition cannot prosper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the COMELEC Resolutions, dated
July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, in SPA No. 98-336 AFFIRMED.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged qualified to run for governor
of Davao Oriental. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., abroad on official business.



[1]
Rollo, p. 31.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 57-58.
[3]
141 SCRA 292, 367.
[4]
Article III, Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1.....Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
2.....Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
3.....Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen
hundred and thirty-five.
4.....Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
[5]
Article IV, Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1.....Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution
2.....Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
3.....Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and
4.....Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
[6]
185 SCRA 703.
[7]
G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999.
[8]
Commonwealth Act 63, Section 1.
[9]
Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.
[10]
Mercado vs. Manzano, supra.
[11]
Ibid.
[12]
41 SCRA 292, supra.
[13]
51 SCRA 248.
[14]
Moy Ya Lim Yao, supra, pp. 366-367.




EN BANC
G.R. No. 96859 October 15, 1991
MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., Speaker, House of Representatives, and (Hon. QUIRINO D. ABAD
SANTOS, JR.) HON. CAMILO L. SABIO Secretary, House of representatives, respondent.
Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa and Enrique M. Fernando for petitioner.

DAVIDE, JR., J .:p
Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del
Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. He took his oath of office on 9 January 1987 and thereafter
performed the duties and enjoyed the rights and privileges pertaining thereto.
On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the Commission on Elections a Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The election was scheduled
for 17 February 1990.
Upon being informed of this development by the Commission on Elections, respondents Speaker and
Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of the House
of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code. As reported by the
Speaker in the session of 9 February 1990:
The Order of Business today carries a communication from the Commission on Elections
which states that the Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo of the Second District of Lanao
del Sur filed a certificate of candidacy for the regional elections in Muslim Mindanao on
February 17, 1990. The House Secretariat, performing an administrative act, did not
include the name of the Honorable Ali Dimaporo in the Rolls pursuant to the provision of
the Election Code, Article IX, Section 67, which states: Any elective official whether
national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a
permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso
factoresigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.' The word 'ipso
facto' is defined in Words and Phrases as by the very act itself by the mere act. And
therefore, by the very act of the (sic) filing his certificate of candidacy, the Honorable Ali
Dimaporo removed himself from the Rolls of the House of Representatives; and,
therefore, his name has not been carried in today's Roll and will not be carried in the
future Rolls of the House. ...
Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter dated 28 June 1990 and addressed to
respondent Speaker, expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as elected
Member of Congress." The record does not indicate what action was taken on this communication, but it is
apparent that petitioner failed in his bid to regain his seat in Congress since this petition praying for such relief
was subsequently filed on 31 January 1991.
In this petition, it is alleged that following the dropping of his name from the Roll, petitioner was excluded from
all proceedings of the House of Representatives; he was not paid the emoluments due his office; his staff was
dismissed and disbanded; and his office suites were occupied by other persons. In effect, he was virtually
barred and excluded from performing his duties and from exercising his rights and privileges as the duly
elected and qualified congressman from his district.
Petitioner admits that he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of Muslim
Mindanao. He, however, maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman because Section 67,
Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under the present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and
therefore not applicable to the present members of Congress.
In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House of
Representatives, as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be shortened, are
provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that "the Senators, Members of the
House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of
June 30, 1992;" while Section 7, Article VI states: "The Members of the House of Representatives shall be
elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth
day of June next following their election." On the other hand, the grounds by which such term may be
shortened may be summarized as follows:
a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment
in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an
election contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.
He asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is
repugnant to these constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a congressman's term of
office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution. For if it were the intention of the framers to include the
provisions of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 as among the means by which the term of a
Congressman may be shortened, it would have been a very simple matter to incorporate it in the present
Constitution. They did not do so. On the contrary, the Constitutional Commission only reaffirmed the grounds
previously found in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and deliberately omitted the ground provided in Section
67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881.
On the premise that the provision of law relied upon by respondents in excluding him from the Roll of
Members is contrary to the present Constitution, petitioner consequently concludes that respondents acted
without authority. He further maintains that respondents' so-called "administrative act" of striking out his name
is ineffective in terminating his term as Congressman. Neither can it be justified as an interpretation of the
Constitutional provision on voluntary renunciation of office as only the courts may interpret laws. Moreover, he
claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman holds another office
or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another
office or employment.
In sum, petitioner's demand that his rights as a duly elected member of the House of Representatives be
recognized, is anchored on the negative view of the following issues raised in this petition:
A.
IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT
CONSTITUTION?
B.
COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY,
'BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING HIM FROM EXERCISING
HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND
PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?
On the other hand, respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General contend that Section 67, Article IX
of B.P. Blg. 881 is still operative under the present Constitution, as the voluntary act of resignation
contemplated in said Section 67 falls within the term "voluntary renunciation" of office enunciated in par. 2,
Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. That the ground provided in Section 67 is not included in the
Constitution does not affect its validity as the grounds mentioned therein are not exclusive. There are, in
addition, other modes of shortening the tenure of office of Members of Congress, among which are
resignation, death and conviction of a crime which carries a penalty of disqualification to hold public office.
Respondents assert that petitioner's filing of a Certificate of Candidacy is an act of resignation which estops
him from claiming otherwise as he is presumed to be aware of existing laws. They further maintain that their
questioned "administrative act" is a mere ministerial act which did not involve any encroachment on judicial
powers.
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 reads:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one
which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
The precursor of this provision is the last paragraph of Section 2 of C.A. No. 666, which reads:
Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the one
for which he has been lastly elected, shall be considered resigned from his office from
the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Section 27 of Article II of Republic Act No. 180 reiterated this rule in this wise:
Sec. 27. Candidate holding office. Any elective provincial, municipal or city
official running for an office, other than the one which he is actually holding, shall be
considered resigned from office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
The 1971 Election Code imposed a similar proviso on local elective officials as follows:
Sec. 24. Candidate holding elective office. Any elective provincial, sub-provincial, city,
municipal or municipal district officer running for an office other than the one which he is
holding in a permanent capacity shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Every elected official shall take his oath of office on the day his term of office
commences, or within ten days after his proclamation if said proclamation takes place
after such day. His failure to take his oath of office as herein provided shall be considered
forfeiture of his right to the new office to which he has been elected unless his failure is
for a cause or causes beyond his control.
The 1978 Election Code provided a different rule, thus:
Sec. 30. Candidates holding political offices. Governors, mayors, members of various
sanggunians, or barangay officials, shall, upon filing of a certificate of candidacy, be
considered on forced leave of absence from office.
It must be noted that only in B.P. Blg. 881 are members of the legislature included in the enumeration of
elective public officials who are to be considered resigned from office from the moment of the filing of their
certificates of candidacy for another office, except for President and Vice-President. The advocates of
Cabinet Bill No. 2 (now Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881) elucidated on the rationale of this inclusion,
thus:
MR. PALMARES:
In the old Election Code, Your Honor, in the 1971 Election Code, the
provision seems to be different I think this is in Section 24 of
Article III.
Any elective provincial, sub-provincial, city, municipal or municipal
district officer running for an office other than the one which he is
holding in a permanent capacity shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
May I know, Your Honor, what is the reason of the Committee in
departing or changing these provisions of Section 24 of the old
Election Code and just adopting it en toto? Why do we have to
change it? What could possibly be the reason behind it, or the
rationale behind it?
MR. PEREZ (L.):
I have already stated the rationale for this, Mr. Speaker, but I don't mind repeating it. The
purpose is that the people must be given the right to choose any official who belongs to,
let us say, to the Batasan if he wants to run for another office. However, because of the
practice in the past where members of the legislature ran for local offices, but did not
assume the office, because of that spectacle the impression is that these officials were
just trifling with the mandate of the people. They have already obtained a mandate to be
a member of the legislature, and they want to run for mayor or for governor and yet when
the people give them that mandate, they do not comply with that latter mandate, but still
preferred (sic) to remain in the earlier mandate. So we believe, Mr. Speaker, that the
people's latest mandate must be the one that will be given due course. ...
Assemblyman Manuel M. Garcia, in answer to the query of Assemblyman Arturo Tolentino on the
constitutionality of Cabinet Bill No. 2, said:
MR. GARCIA (M.M.):
Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Speaker, on the part of the Committee, we made this proposal based on
constitutional grounds. We did not propose this amendment mainly on the rationale as
stated by the Gentlemen from Manila that the officials running for office other than the
ones they are holding will be considered resignednot because of abuse of facilities of
power or the use of office facilities but primarily because under our Constitution, we have
this new chapter on accountability of public officers. Now, this was not in the 1935
Constitution. It states that (sic) Article XIII, Section 1 Public office is a public trust.
Public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain accountable to the people.
Now, what is the significance of this new provision on accountability of public officers?
This only means that all elective public officials should honor the mandate they have
gotten from the people. Thus, under our Constitution, it says that: 'Members of the
Batasan shall serve for the term of 6 years, in the case of local officials and 6 years in the
case of barangay officials. Now, Mr. Speaker, we have precisely included this as part of
the Omnibus Election Code because a Batasan Member who hold (sic) himself out with
the people and seek (sic) their support and mandate should not be allowed to deviate or
allow himself to run for any other position unless he relinquishes or abandons his office.
Because his mandate to the people is to serve for 6 years. Now, if you allow a Batasan or
a governor or a mayor who was mandated to serve for 6 years to file for an office other
than the one he was elected to, then, that clearly shows that he has not (sic) intention to
service the mandate of the people which was placed upon him and therefore he should
be considered ipso facto resigned. I think more than anything that is the accountability
that the Constitution requires of elective public officials. It is not because of the use or
abuse of powers or facilities of his office, but it is because of the Constitution itself which I
said under the 1973 Constitution called and inserted this new chapter on accountability.
Now, argument was said that the mere filing is not the intention to run. Now, what is it
for? If a Batasan Member files the certificate of candidacy, that means that he does not
want to serve, otherwise, why should he file for an office other than the one he was
elected to? The mere fact therefore of filing a certificate should be considered the overt
act of abandoning or relinquishing his mandate to the people and that he should
therefore resign if he wants to seek another position which he feels he could be of better
service.
As I said, Mr. Speaker, I disagree with the statements of the Gentleman from Manila
because the basis of this Section 62 is the constitutional provision not only of the fact that
Members of the Batasan and local officials should serve the entire 6-year term for which
we were elected, but because of this new chapter on the accountability of public officers
not only to the community which voted him to office, but primarily because under this
commentary on accountability of public officers, the elective public officers must serve
their principal, the people, not their own personal ambition. And that is the reason, Mr.
Speaker, why we opted to propose Section 62 where candidates or elective public
officers holding offices other than the one to which they were elected, should be
considered ipso factoresigned from their office upon the filing of the certificate of
candidacy."
It cannot be gainsaid that the same constitutional basis for Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 remains
written in the 1987 Constitution. In fact, Section 1 of Article XI on "Accountability of Public Officers" is more
emphatic in stating:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Obviously then, petitioner's assumption that the questioned statutory provision is no longer operative does not
hold water. He failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public officials, this
statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging
them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that
should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with the
constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the
mandate which they have received from their constituents.
In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress,
petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office. As succinctly distinguished by the Solicitor General:
The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by
the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an officer actually holds the office
(tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer.
Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not
change the duration of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for
another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. The term remains and his
successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion.
That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a
mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its application to present
members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members
of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such constitutional
expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the
tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. As held in the case of State ex rel. Berge vs.
Lansing, the expression in the constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not
necessarily exclude all others. Neither does it preclude the legislature from prescribing other grounds. Events
so enumerated in the constitution or statutes are merely conditions the occurrence of any one of which the
office shall become vacant not as a penalty but simply as the legal effect of any one of the events. And would
it not be preposterous to say that a congressman cannot die and cut his tenure because death is not one of
the grounds provided for in the Constitution? The framers of our fundamental law never intended such
absurdity.
The basic principle which underlies the entire field of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is
that by enactment of legislation, a constitutional measure is presumed to be created. This Court has
enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of legislative enactment. To justify the nullification of a
law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice.
The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not to be applied with the same rigor in construing a
constitution as a statute and only those things expressed in such positive affirmative terms as plainly imply
the negative of what is not mentioned will be considered as inhibiting the power of legislature. The maxim is
only a rule of interpretation and not a constitutional command. This maxim expresses a rule of construction
and serves only as an aid in discovering legislative intent where such intent is not otherwise manifest.
Even then, the concept of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution is
broad enough to include the situation envisioned in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. As discussed by
the Constitutional Commissioners:
MR. MAAMBONG:
Could I address the clarificatory question to the Committee? The term 'voluntary
renunciation' does not only appear in Section 3; it appears in Section 6.
MR. DAVIDE:
Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG:
It is also a recurring phrase all over the constitution. Could the Committee please
enlighten us exactly what 'voluntary renunciation' means? Is this akin to abandonment?
MR. DAVIDE:
Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he cannot circumvent the restriction by merely
resigning at any given time on the second term.
MR. MAAMBONG:
Is the Committee saying that the term voluntary renunciation is more general than
abandonment and resignation?
MR. DAVIDE:
It is more general, more embracing.
That the act, contemplated in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, of filing a certificate of candidacy for
another office constitutes an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the elective office presently being
held is evident from this exchange between then Members of Parliament Arturo Tolentino and Jose Rono:
MR. RONO:
My reasonable ground is this: if you will make the person ... my, shall we say, basis is
that in one case the person is intending to run for an office which is different from his
own, and therefore it should be considered, at least from the legal significance, an
intention to relinquish his office.
MR. TOLENTINO:
Yes ...
MR. RONO:
And in the other, because he is running for the same position, it is otherwise.
MR. TOLENTINO:
Yes, but what I cannot see is why are you going to compel a person to quit an office
which he is only intending to leave? A relinquishment of office must be clear, must be
definite.
MR. RONO:
Yes, sir. That's precisely, Mr. Speaker, what I'm saying that while I do not disagree with
the conclusion that the intention cannot be enough, but I am saying that the filing of the
certificate of candidacy is an over act of such intention. It's not just an intention; it's
already there.
In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, a case involving Section 27 of R.A. No. 180 above-quoted, this Court
categorically pronounced that "forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the
certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the
certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the
ousted official. Thus, as We had occasion to remark, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in Castro vs. Gatuslao:
... The wording of the law plainly indicates that only the date of filing of the certificate of
candidacy should be taken into account. The law does not make the forfeiture dependent
upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable, since the vacating is
expressly made as of the moment of the filing of the certificate of candidacy. ...
As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another office produces automatically the permanent
forfeiture of the elective position being presently held, it is not necessary, as petitioner opines, that the other
position be actually held. The ground for forfeiture in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is different
from the forfeiture decreed in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of voluntary
renunciation of office under Section 7, par. 2 of Article VI of the Constitution.
The legal effects of filing a certificate of candidacy for another office having been spelled out in Section 67,
Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881 itself, no statutory interpretation was indulged in by respondents Speaker and
Secretary of the House of Representatives in excluding petitioner's name from the Roll of Members. The
Speaker is the administrative head of the House of Representatives and he exercises administrative powers
and functions attached to his office. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-
General perform ministerial functions. It was their duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll considering
the unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the Commission on Elections
communicated to the House of Representatives that petitioner had filed his certificate of candidacy for
regional governor of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear and
unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. It was their ministerial duty to do so. These
officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the
duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these
officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing
duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government
from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest
and benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law
may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his office.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Feleciano, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., took no part.


Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J ., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.
I believe that the Speaker and the Secretary of the House of Representatives have no power, in purported
implementation of an invalid statute, to erase from the Rolls of the House the name of a member duly elected
by his sovereign constituents to represent them in Congress.
The rejection of the bid of the Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo to retain his seat in Congress may appear
logical, politically palatable, and and salutary to certain quarters. But I submit that it is in cases like the
present petition where the Court should be vigilant in preventing the erosion of fundamental concepts of the
Constitution. We must be particularly attentive to violations which are cloaked in political respectability,
seemingly defensible or arguably beneficial and attractive in the short run.
It is a fundamental priciple in Constitutional Law that Congress cannot add by statute or administrative act to
the causes for disqualification or removal of constitutional officers. Neither can Congress provide a different
procedure for disciplining Constitution. This is a true for the President and the members of Congress itself.
The causes and procedures for removal found in the Constitution are not mere diciplinary measures. They
are intended to protect constitutional officers in the unhampered and indepedent discharge of their functions.
It is for this reason that the court should ensure that what the Constitution provides must be followed.
The Constitutuion provides how the tenure of members of Congress may be shortened:
A. Forefeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or subsidiaries (Art. VI, Section 13);
B. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior (Art. VI, Sec. 16[3]);
C. Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribubal in an election
contest (Art. VI, Sec. 17);
D. Voluntary renunciation of office (Art. VI, Sec. 7, par. 2). (See Petition, p. 8)
The respondents would now add to the above provisions, an enactment of the defunct Batasang Pambansa
promulgated long before the present Constitution took effect. B.P. Blg. 881, Article IX, Section 67 provides:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one
which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy. (Petition, p. 8)
I take exception to the Solicitor General's stand that the grounds for removal mentioned in the Constitution
are not exclusive. They are exclusive. The non-inclusion of physical causes like death, being permanently
comatose on a hospital bed, or disappearance in the sinking of a ship does not justify in the slightest an act of
Congress expelling one of its members for reasons other than those found in the Constitution. Resignation is
provided for by the Constitution. It is voluntary renunciation. So is naturalization in a foreign country or
express renunciation of Philippine citizenship. Conviction of a crime carrying a penalty of disqualification is a
disqualification against running for public office. Whether or not the conviction for such a crime while the
Congressman is in office may be a ground to expel him from Congress is a matter which we cannot
decide obiter. We must await the proper case and controversy. My point is Congress cannot by statute or
disciplinary action add to the causes for disqualification or removal of its members. Only the Constitution can
do it.
The citation of the precursors of B.P. 881 namely, Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 665, Section 27 of
Article II of Rep. Act No. 180, the 1971 Election Code, and the 1978 Election Code does not help the
respondents. On the contrary, they strengthen the case of the petitioner.
It may be noted that all the earlier statutes about elective officials being considered resigned upon the filing of
a certificate of candidacy refer to non-constitutional officers. Congress has not only the power but also the
duty to prescribe causes for the removal of provincial, city, and municipal officials. It has no such power when
it comes to constitutional officers.
It was not alone egoistic self-interest which led the legislature during Commonwealth days or Congress in the
pre-martial law period to exclude their members from the rule that the filing of a certificate of candidacy for
another office meant resignation from one's current position. It was also a recognition that such a provision
could not be validly enacted by statute. It has to be in the constitution.
Does running for another elective office constitute voluntary renunciation of one's public office? In other
words, did the Speaker and the House Secretary correctly interpret the meaning of "voluntary renunciation"
as found in the Constitution?
From 1935 when the Constitution was promulgated up to 1985 when B.P. 881 was enacted or for fifty long
years, the filing of a certificate of candidacy by a Senator or member of the House was not voluntary
renunciation of his seat in Congress. I see no reason why the passage of a statute by the Batasang
Pambansa should suddenly change the meaning and implications of the act of filing and equate it with
voluntary renunciation. "Voluntary" refers to a state of the mind and in the context of constitutional
requirements should not be treated lightly. It is true that intentions may be deduced from a person's acts. I
must stress, however, that for fifty years of ourconstitutional history, running for a local government position
was not considered a voluntary renunciation. Congressman Dimaporo is steeped in the traditions of earlier
years. He has been engaged in politics even before some of his present colleagues in Congress were born.
Neither the respondents nor this Court can state that he intended to renounce his seat in Congress when he
decided to run for Regional Governor. I submit that we should not deny to him the privilege of an existing
interpretation of "voluntary renunciation" and wrongly substitute the interpretation adopted by the
respondents.
In interpreting the meaning of voluntary renunciation, the Court should also be guided by the principle that all
presumptions should be in favor of representation.
As aptly stated by the petitioner:
We should not lose sight of the fact that what we are dealing with here is not the mere
right of the petitioner to sit in the House of Representatives, but more important, we are
dealing with the political right of the people of the Second Legislative District of Lanao del
Sur to representation in Congress, as against their disenfranchisement by mere
'administrative act' of the respondents.
Such being the case, all presumptions should be strictly in favor of representation and strictly against
disenfranchisement.
And if disenfranchisement should there be, the same should only be by due process of law, both substantive
and procedural, and not by mere arbitrary, capricious, and ultra vires, administrative act' of the respondents.
(Reply to Comment, p. 5)
The invocation of the principle of accountability found in Article XI of the Constitution does not empower the
legislature to add to the grounds for dismissing its members. When Congressman Dimaporo ran for Regional
Governor, he was not trifling with the mandate of his people. He wanted to serve a greater number in an
autonomous, more direct, and intimate manner. He claims (a mistaken claim according to the Commission on
Elections sustained by this Court) that he was cheated of victory during the elections for regional officers. He
wants to continue serving his people. I fail to see how the principle of accountability and faithfulness to a trust
could be applied to this specific cause of Congressman Dimaporo.
For the Foregoing reasons, I VOTE to GRANT the petition.
Padilla and Bidin, JJ., concur.
# Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J ., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.
I believe that the Speaker and the Secretary of the House of Representatives have no power, in purported
implementation of an invalid statute, to erase from the Rolls of the House the name of a member duly elected
by his sovereign constituents to represent them in Congress.
The rejection of the bid of the Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo to retain his seat in Congress may appear
logical, politically palatable, and and salutary to certain quarters. But I submit that it is in cases like the
present petition where the Court should be vigilant in preventing the erosion of fundamental concepts of the
Constitution. We must be particularly attentive to violations which are cloaked in political respectability,
seemingly defensible or arguably beneficial and attractive in the short run.
It is a fundamental priciple in Constitutional Law that Congress cannot add by statute or administrative act to
the causes for disqualification or removal of constitutional officers. Neither can Congress provide a different
procedure for disciplining Constitution. This is a true for the President and the members of Congress itself.
The causes and procedures for removal found in the Constitution are not mere diciplinary measures. They
are intended to protect constitutional officers in the unhampered and indepedent discharge of their functions.
It is for this reason that the court should ensure that what the Constitution provides must be followed.
The Constitutuion provides how the tenure of members of Congress may be shortened:
A. Forefeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or subsidiaries (Art. VI, Section 13);
B. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior (Art. VI, Sec. 16[3]);
C. Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribubal in an election
contest (Art. VI, Sec. 17);
D. Voluntary renunciation of office (Art. VI, Sec. 7, par. 2). (See Petition, p. 8)
The respondents would now add to the above provisions, an enactment of the defunct Batasang Pambansa
promulgated long before the present Constitution took effect. B.P. Blg. 881, Article IX, Section 67 provides:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one
which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy. (Petition, p. 8)
I take exception to the Solicitor General's stand that the grounds for removal mentioned in the Constitution
are not exclusive. They are exclusive. The non-inclusion of physical causes like death, being permanently
comatose on a hospital bed, or disappearance in the sinking of a ship does not justify in the slightest an act of
Congress expelling one of its members for reasons other than those found in the Constitution. Resignation is
provided for by the Constitution. It is voluntary renunciation. So is naturalization in a foreign country or
express renunciation of Philippine citizenship. Conviction of a crime carrying a penalty of disqualification is a
disqualification against running for public office. Whether or not the conviction for such a crime while the
Congressman is in office may be a ground to expel him from Congress is a matter which we cannot
decide obiter. We must await the proper case and controversy. My point is Congress cannot by statute or
disciplinary action add to the causes for disqualification or removal of its members. Only the Constitution can
do it.
The citation of the precursors of B.P. 881 namely, Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 665, Section 27 of
Article II of Rep. Act No. 180, the 1971 Election Code, and the 1978 Election Code does not help the
respondents. On the contrary, they strengthen the case of the petitioner.
It may be noted that all the earlier statutes about elective officials being considered resigned upon the filing of
a certificate of candidacy refer to non-constitutional officers. Congress has not only the power but also the
duty to prescribe causes for the removal of provincial, city, and municipal officials. It has no such power when
it comes to constitutional officers.
It was not alone egoistic self-interest which led the legislature during Commonwealth days or Congress in the
pre-martial law period to exclude their members from the rule that the filing of a certificate of candidacy for
another office meant resignation from one's current position. It was also a recognition that such a provision
could not be validly enacted by statute. It has to be in the constitution.
Does running for another elective office constitute voluntary renunciation of one's public office? In other
words, did the Speaker and the House Secretary correctly interpret the meaning of "voluntary renunciation"
as found in the Constitution?
From 1935 when the Constitution was promulgated up to 1985 when B.P. 881 was enacted or for fifty long
years, the filing of a certificate of candidacy by a Senator or member of the House was not voluntary
renunciation of his seat in Congress. I see no reason why the passage of a statute by the Batasang
Pambansa should suddenly change the meaning and implications of the act of filing and equate it with
voluntary renunciation. "Voluntary" refers to a state of the mind and in the context of constitutional
requirements should not be treated lightly. It is true that intentions may be deduced from a person's acts. I
must stress, however, that for fifty years of ourconstitutional history, running for a local government position
was not considered a voluntary renunciation. Congressman Dimaporo is steeped in the traditions of earlier
years. He has been engaged in politics even before some of his present colleagues in Congress were born.
Neither the respondents nor this Court can state that he intended to renounce his seat in Congress when he
decided to run for Regional Governor. I submit that we should not deny to him the privilege of an existing
interpretation of "voluntary renunciation" and wrongly substitute the interpretation adopted by the
respondents.
In interpreting the meaning of voluntary renunciation, the Court should also be guided by the principle that all
presumptions should be in favor of representation.
As aptly stated by the petitioner:
We should not lose sight of the fact that what we are dealing with here is not the mere
right of the petitioner to sit in the House of Representatives, but more important, we are
dealing with the political right of the people of the Second Legislative District of Lanao del
Sur to representation in Congress, as against their disenfranchisement by mere
'administrative act' of the respondents.
Such being the case, all presumptions should be strictly in favor of representation and strictly against
disenfranchisement.
And if disenfranchisement should there be, the same should only be by due process of law, both substantive
and procedural, and not by mere arbitrary, capricious, and ultra vires, administrative act' of the respondents.
(Reply to Comment, p. 5)
The invocation of the principle of accountability found in Article XI of the Constitution does not empower the
legislature to add to the grounds for dismissing its members. When Congressman Dimaporo ran for Regional
Governor, he was not trifling with the mandate of his people. He wanted to serve a greater number in an
autonomous, more direct, and intimate manner. He claims (a mistaken claim according to the Commission on
Elections sustained by this Court) that he was cheated of victory during the elections for regional officers. He
wants to continue serving his people. I fail to see how the principle of accountability and faithfulness to a trust
could be applied to this specific cause of Congressman Dimaporo.
For the Foregoing reasons, I VOTE to GRANT the petition.
Padilla and Bidin, JJ., concur.
# Footnotes
1 Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
2 Annex "C" of Petition; Rollo, 24.
3 Annex "E" of Petition; Id., 30.
4 Rollo, 8 and 14.
5 June 1941.
6 Emphasis supplied.
7 Emphasis supplied.
8 No. 1296.
9 Records of the Batasang Pambansa, 8 October 1985. Underscoring supplied.
10 Records of the Batasang Pambansa, 21 October 1985. Underscoring supplied.
11 Compared to the provision in the 1973 Constitution which reads:
"Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees shall serve with the
highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, and shall remain
accountable to the people."
12 Memorandum for Respondents, 9.
13 Underscoring supplied.
14 Neb. 514, 64 NW 1104.
15 McKittrick vs. Wilson, 350 M 486, 166 SW2d 499, 143 ALR 465.
16 People ex rel. Fleming vs. Shorb, 100 Cal 537 P. 163.
17 Am Jur. 2d, p. 63.
18 People vs. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90; Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30; Paredes,
et al. vs. Executive Secretary, 128 SCRA 6.
19 State ex rel. Atty. Gen. vs. Martin, 60 Ark. 343, 30 SW 421.
20 State vs. Driscoll, 54 P. 2d 571, 576, 101 Mont. 348.
21 Garrison vs. City of Shreveport, 154 So. 622, 624, 179 La. 605.
22 Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, p. 591, 19 July to 6 August 1986.
23 Records of the Batasang Pambansa, 21 October 1985, Underscoring supplied.
24 1 July 1967, 20 SCRA 620, 625.
25 Phil. 94, 196.
26 Section 8, Rule III, Rules of the House of Representatives.
27 Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone, 42 Phil 818.
28 Burton vs. U.S., 202 U.S. 344.
29 Am Jur 926.



EN BANC
G.R. No. 150605 December 10, 2002
EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official capacities as Speaker
and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, respectively,
and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J .:
In a democracy, the first self-evident principle is that he who has been rejected by the people cannot
represent the people. Respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin lost to petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. by 17,903
votes in the May 14, 2001 elections as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. The most
sophisticated legal alchemy cannot justify her insistence that she should continue governing the people of
Leyte against their will. The enforcement of the sovereign will of the people is not subject to the discretion of
any official of the land.
This is a Petition for Mandamus and Quo Warranto directed against respondents Speaker Jose De Venecia
and Secretary-General Roberto P. Nazareno of the House of Representatives to compel them to implement
the decision of the Commission on Elections en banc by (a) administering the oath of office to petitioner as
the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, and (b) registering the name of the
petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, and against respondent Ma. Victoria L.
Locsin for usurping, intruding into, and unlawfully holding and exercising the said public office on the basis of
a void proclamation.
The facts are uncontroverted. Petitioner and respondent Locsin were candidates for the position of
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte during the May 14, 2001 elections. At that time, petitioner
was the Mayor of Ormoc City while respondent Locsin was the sitting Representative of the 4th legislative
district of Leyte. On May 8, 2001, one Josephine de la Cruz, a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, filed
directly with the COMELEC main office a Petition for Disqualification
1
against the petitioner for indirectly
soliciting votes from the registered voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, in violation of Section 68 (a) of
the Omnibus Election Code. It was alleged that the petitioner used the equipments and vehicles owned by the
City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and
Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him. Attached to the
petition are the (a) Affidavits of Basilio Bates,
2
Danilo D. Maglasang,
3
Cesar A. Laurente;
4
(b) Joint Affidavit of
Agripino C. Alferez and Rogelio T. Salvera;
5
(c) Extract Records from the Police Blotter executed by Police
Superintendent Elson G. Pecho;
6
and (d) Photographs showing government dump trucks, haulers and
surfacers and portions of public roads allegedly filled-in and surfaced through the intercession of the
respondent.
7
The case was docketed as SPA No. 01-208 and assigned to the COMELEC's Second Division.
On May 10, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order delegating the hearing and reception of
evidence on the disqualification case to the Office of the Regional Director of Region VIII.
8
On May 11, 2001,
the COMELEC Second Division sent a telegram informing the petitioner that a disqualification case was filed
against him and that the petition was remanded to the Regional Election Director for investigation.
9

At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the Regional Election Director had yet to hear the
disqualification case. Consequently, petitioner was included in the list of candidates for district
representative and was voted for. The initial results showed that petitioner was the winning candidate.
On May 16, 2001, before the counting could be finished, respondent Locsin joined as intervenor in SPA No.
128 and filed a "Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of Respondent [herein petitioner]" with the
COMELEC Second Division.
10
Respondent Locsin alleged that "the evidence on record against respondent is
very strong and unless rebutted remains." She urged the Commission to set the hearing of the disqualification
case and prayed for the suspension of the proclamation of the respondent "so as not to render the present
disqualification case moot and academic." A copy of the Motion was allegedly served on petitioner by
registered mail but no registry receipt was attached thereto.
11

On May 18, 2001, respondent Locsin filed a "Second Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of
Respondent" stating "there is clear and convincing evidence showing that the respondent is undoubtedly
guilty of the charges against him and this remains unrebutted by the respondent." A copy of the Motion was
sent to the petitioner and the corresponding registry receipt was attached to the pleading.
12
The records,
however, do not show the date the petitioner received the motion.
On the same day, May 18, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Ex-Parte Order
13
directing the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in case he obtains the
highest number of votes by reason of "the seriousness of the allegations in the petition for
disqualification."
14
It also directed the Regional Election Director to speed up the reception of evidence and to
forward immediately the complete records together with its recommendation to the Office of the Clerk of the
Commission.
15
As a result, petitioner was not proclaimed as winner even though the final election results
showed that he garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin's 53,447 votes.
16

At the time that the COMELEC Second Division issued its Order suspending his proclamation, the petitioner
has yet to be summoned to answer the petition for disqualification. Neither has said petition been set for
hearing. It was only on May 24, 2001 that petitioner was able to file an Answer to the petition for his
disqualification with the Regional Election Director, alleging that: (a) he has not received the summons
together with the copy of the petition; (b) he became aware of the matter only by virtue of the telegram sent
by the COMELEC Second Division informing him that a petition was filed against him and that the Regional
Election Director was directed to investigate and receive evidence therewith; and (c) he obtained a copy of
the petition from the COMELEC Regional Office No. 8 at his own instance.
17
Petitioner further alleged that the
maintenance, repair and rehabilitation of barangay roads in the municipalities of Matag-ob and Kananga were
undertaken without his authority, participation or directive as City Mayor of Ormoc. He attached in his Answer
the following: (a) Affidavit of Alex B. Borinaga;
18
(b) Copy of the Excerpt from the Minutes of the Regular
Session of Barangay Monterico;
19
(c) Affidavit of Wilfredo A. Fiel;
20
(d) Supplemental Affidavit of Wilfredo A.
Fiel;
21
and (e) Affidavit of Arnel Y. Padayao.
22

On May 25, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension,
23
alleging that (a) he did not receive
a copy of the Motion to Suspend his Proclamation and hence, was denied the right to rebut and refute the
allegations in the Motion; (b) that he did not receive a copy of the summons on the petition for disqualification
and after personally obtaining a copy of the petition, filed the requisite answer only on May 24, 2001; and (c)
that he received the telegraph Order of the COMELEC Second Division suspending his proclamation only on
May 22, 2001. He attached documentary evidence in support of his Motion to Lift the Suspension of his
proclamation, and requested the setting of a hearing on his Motion.
24

On May 30, 2001, an oral argument was conducted on the petitioner's Motion and the parties were ordered to
submit their respective memoranda.
25
On June 4, 2001, petitioner submitted his Memorandum
26
in support of
his Motion assailing the suspension of his proclamation on the grounds that: (a) he was not afforded due
process; (b) the order has no legal and factual basis; and (c) evidence of his guilt is patently inexistent for the
purpose of suspending his proclamation. He prayed that his proclamation as winning congressional candidate
be expediently made, even while the disqualification case against him continue upon due notice and hearing.
He attached the following additional evidence in his Memorandum: (a) Copy of certification issued by PNP
Senior Inspector Benjamin T. Gorre;
27
(b) Certification issued by Elena S. Aviles, City Budget Officer;
28
(c)
Copy of certification issued by Wilfredo A. Fiel, City Engineer of Ormoc;
29
(d) Joint Affidavit of Antonio Patenio
and Pepito Restituto;
30
and (e) Affidavits of Demetrio Brion,
31
Igmedio Rita
32
and Gerardo
Monteza.
33
Respondent Locsin's memorandum also contained additional affidavits of his witnesses.
34

Petitioner's Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension, however, was not resolved. Instead, on June 14,
2001, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated its Resolution
35
in SPA No. 01-208 which found the
petitioner guilty of indirect solicitation of votes and ordered his disqualification. It directed the "immediate
proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes xxx." A copy of said
Resolutionwas sent by fax to the counsel of petitioner in Cebu City in the afternoon of the following day.
36

By virtue of the said Resolution, the votes cast for petitioner, totaling 71,350, were declared stray even
before said Resolution could gain finality. On June 15, 2001, respondent Locsin was proclaimed as the
duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Leyte. It issued a Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates for Member of
the House of Representatives stating that "MA. VICTORIA LARRAZABAL LOCSIN obtained a total of FIFTY
THREE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN (53,447) votes representing the highest number of
votes legally cast in the legislative district for said office."
37
Respondent Locsin took her oath of office on
June 18, 2001 and assumed office on June 30, 2001.
On June 20, 2001, petitioner seasonably filed with the COMELEC en banc a Motion for
Reconsideration
38
from the June 14, 2001 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division which ordered his
disqualification, as well as an Addendum to the Motion for Reconsideration.
39
Petitioner alleged in his Motion
for Reconsideration that the COMELEC Second Division erred: (1) in disqualifying petitioner on the
basis solely of the dubious declaration of the witnesses for respondent Locsin; (2) in adopting in toto the
allegations of the witnesses for respondent Locsin; and (3) in promulgating the resolution in violation of its
own rules of procedure and in directing therein the immediate proclamation of the second highest 'vote
getter.' Respondent Locsin and her co-petitioner in SPA No. 01-208 filed a joint Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration.
40

On June 21, 2001, petitioner filed with the COMELEC en banc a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Proclamation,
41
docketed as SPC No. 01-324, assailing the validity of the proclamation of respondent Locsin
who garnered only the second highest number of votes. Respondent Locsin filed her Answer alleging that:
(1) the Commission lost jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because of the proclamation of Locsin and
that any question on the "election, returns, and qualification" of Locsin can only be taken cognizance of by the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); (2) the case should be filed and heard in the first
instance by a Division of the Commission and not directly by the Commission en banc; and (3) the
proclamation of Locsin was valid because she received the highest number of valid votes cast, the votes of
Codilla being stray.
On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed an Urgent Manifestation
42
stating that he was deprived of a fair hearing on
the disqualification case because while the documentary evidence adduced in his Memorandum was in
support of his Motion for the lifting of the suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC Second
Division instead ruled on the main disqualification case. In consonance with his prayer that a full-dress
hearing be conducted on the disqualification case, he submitted Affidavits of additional witnesses
43
which he
claims would refute and substantially belie the allegations of petitioner's/intervenor's witnesses. A
Reply,
44
Rejoinder
45
and Sur-Rejoinder
46
were respectively filed by the parties. Consequently, the motion for
reconsideration in SPA No. 01-208 and the petition for declaration of nullity in SPC No. 01-324 were
submitted for resolution.
From the records, it appears that initially, a "Resolution" penned by Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier, dated
July 24, 2001, was submitted to the Office of the Chairman, dismissing the petition for declaration of nullity for
lack of jurisdiction and denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Codilla.
47
Commissioners
Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. and Resurreccion Z. Borra submitted their respective dissenting opinions
48
to the
Javier resolution. It bears emphasis that Commissioner Tuason, Jr. was the ponente of the Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division which ordered the disqualification of petitioner but after considering the additional
evidence presented by the latter, he concluded that the totality of the evidence was clearly in petitioner's
favor. Equally worth mentioning is the fact that Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion, who was the Presiding
Commissioner of the Second Division, also dissented and voted to grant Codilla's motion for reconsideration
on the ground that "[T]he people of Leyte have spoken and I respect the electorate's will. x x x."
49

On August 29, 2001, then COMELEC Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo issued a "Vote and Opinion and
Summary of Votes" reversing the resolution of the Second Division and declaring the proclamation of
respondent Locsin as null and void. The dispositive portion reads:
"JUDGMENT
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, I concur with Commissioner Resurreccion Z. Borra,
Commissioner Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. and Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion, in SPA No. 01-208, to GRANT
the motion for reconsideration and to REVERSE the resolution of the Commission (Second Division)
promulgated on June 1, 2001, disqualifying Codilla; and subsequently, in SPC No. 01-324, to GRANT the
petition of Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and declare as null and void the proclamation of losing candidate Locsin.
Accordingly:
1. On the Motion for Reconsideration of the disqualification resolution against Codilla, promulgated
by the Commission (Second Division) on June 14, 2001 (SPA No. 01-208), I vote:
(a) to GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent-movant Eufrocino M. Codilla,
Sr., and to REVERSE the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated
on June 14, 2001, for insufficiency of evidence;
(b) to lift the order of suspension of proclamation of petitioner Codilla, issued by the
Commission (Second Division) on May 18, 2001, having been issued without hearing and
without any finding that the evidence of guilt of petitioner Codilla is strong and, thus, null
and void;
(c) to nullify the order contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division)
promulgated on June 14, 2001, for "(t)he immediate proclamation of the candidate who
garnered the highest number of votes, to the exclusion of respondent" and the concurrent
order for "the Provincial Board of Canvasser (sic) of Leyte to immediately reconvene and
thereafter proclaim forthwith the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes
counting out the Respondent" the same being violative of election laws, established
jurisprudence, and resolutions of the Commission;
(d) to nullify the ruling contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division)
promulgated o June 14, 2001, that the votes of respondent Codilla are "considered stray
and invalid" said ruling being issued on the basis of an inapplicable decision, and
contrary to established jurisprudence;
(e) to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte, upon the finality of this
resolution, to reconvene and proclaim petitioner Codilla as the winning candidate for
Representative of the Fourth Legislative district of Leyte to comply with its ministerial duty
to proclaim the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes in the elections for
that position; and
(f) to order intervenor-oppositor Locsin, upon the finality of this resolution, to vacate the
office of Representative of the House of Representatives representing the Fourth
legislative district of Leyte and, for this purpose, to inform the House of Representatives
through the Honorable Speaker of this resolution for its attention and guidance; and
2. On the petition for Declaration of Nullity of proclamation of respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin (SPC No. 01-
324), I vote:
(a) to GRANT the petition of Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and declare as null and void the
proclamation of losing candidate Locsin, the proclamation being violative of election laws,
established jurisprudence, and resolutions of the Commission on Elections;
(b) to lift the order of suspension of proclamation of petitioner Codilla, issued by the Commission
(Second Division) on May 18, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208, having been issued without hearing and
without any finding that the evidence of guilt of petitioner Codilla is strong and, thus, null and void;
(c) to nullify the order contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division)
promulgated on June 14, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208, for "(t)he immediate proclamation of the
candidate who garnered the highest number of votes, to the exclusion of respondent" and the
concurrent order for "the provincial Board of Canvasser (sic) of Leyte to immediately reconvene and
thereafter proclaim forthwith the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes counting out
the Respondent" the same being violative of election laws, established jurisprudence, and
resolutions of the Commission;
(d) to nullify the ruling contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division)
promulgated on June 14, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208, that the votes of respondent Codilla are
"considered stray and invalid" said ruling being issued on the basis of an inapplicable decision, and
contrary to established jurisprudence;
(e) to order the provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte, upon the finality of this resolution, to
reconvene and proclaim petitioner Codilla as the winning candidate for Representative of the
Fourth legislative district of Leyte he (sic) having garnered the highest number of votes in the
elections for the position; and
(f) to order respondent Locsin, upon the finality of this resolution, to vacate the office of
Representative of the House of Representatives representing the Fourth Legislative district of Leyte
and, for this purpose, to inform the House of Representatives through the Honorable Speaker of
this resolution for its attention and guidance.
Summary of Votes
Considering the FOUR (4) VOTES of the Chairman and Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra, Florentino A.
Tuason, Jr., and Ralph C. Lantion, to grant the Motion for Reconsideration of Codilla and reverse the
disqualification Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) in SPA No. 01-208, promulgated on June 14,
2001, and as an inevitable consequence, in voting to grant the petition for declaration of nullity of the
proclamation of Ma. Victoria L. Locsin in SPC No. 01-324, the verdict/opinion of the Chairman and the three
(3) Commissioners taken together now stands, as it is, the MAJORITY DECISION of the Commission En
Banc in both cases; and the "Resolution" submitted by three (3) Commissioners, namely, Commissioner
Rufino S.B. Javier, Commissioner Luzviminda G. Tancangco, and Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, is
considered, as it is, the MINORITY DECISION of the Commission En Banc in both cases.
The MAJORTIY DECISION was arrived at after proper consultation with those who joined the majority. The
Chairman and the three (3) Commissioners comprising the majority decided that no one will be assigned to
write a Majority Decision. Instead, each one will write his own separate opinion. Commissioners Borra,
Tuason, Jr. and the undersigned Chairman submitted separate opinions. Commissioner Lantion wrote an
explanation on his vote."
50

The aforequoted judgment was adopted in a "Vote of Adoption" signed by Commissioners Ralph C. Lantion,
Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr.
51

Respondent Locsin did not appeal from this decision annulling her proclamation. Instead, she filed a
"Comment and Manifestation"
52
with the COMELEC en banc questioning the procedure and the manner by
which the decision was issued. In addition, respondent Locsin requested and was issued an opinion by
House of Representatives Executive Director and Chief Legal Counsel Leonardo B. Palicte III declaring that
the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to nullify the proclamation of respondent Locsin after she had taken her
oath and assumed office since it is the HRET which is the sole judge of election, returns and qualifications of
Members of the House.
53
Relying on this opinion, respondent Locsin submitted a written privileged speech to
the House during its regular session on September 4, 2001, where she declared that she will not only
disregard but will openly defy and disobey the COMELEC en banc resolution ordering her to vacate her
position.
54

On September 6, 2001, the COMELEC en banc issued an Order
55
constituting the members of the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Leyte to implement the aforesaid decision. It likewise ordered the Board to reconvene
and "proclaim the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes in the district, as the duly-elected
Representative of the Fourth Legislative district of Leyte, and accordingly issue a Certificate of Canvass and
Proclamation of Winning Candidate for Member of the House of Representatives x x x, based on the
city/municipal certificates of canvass submitted beforehand to the previous Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Leyte x x x."
On September 12, 2001, petitioner Codilla was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as the
duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, having obtained a total of 71,350
votes representing the highest number of votes cast in the district.
56
On the same day, petitioner took his oath
of office before Executive Judge Fortunito L. Madrona of the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City.
57

On September 14, 2001, petitioner wrote the House of Representatives, thru respondent Speaker De
Venecia, informing the House of the August 29, 2001 COMELEC en banc resolution annulling the
proclamation of respondent Locsin, and proclaiming him as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte.
58
Petitioner also served notice that "I am assuming the duties and responsibilities
as Representative of the fourth legislative district of Leyte to which position I have been lawfully elected and
proclaimed. On behalf of my constituents, I therefore expect that all rights and privileges intended for the
position of Representative of the fourth legislative district of Leyte be accorded to me, including all physical
facilities and staff support." On the basis of this letter, a Memorandum
59
dated October 8, 2001 was issued by
Legal Affairs Deputy Secretary-General Gaudencio A. Mendoza, Jr., for Speaker De Venecia, stating that
"there is no legal obstacle to complying with the duly promulgated and now final and executory
COMELEC Decision of August 29, 2001 x x x."
These notwithstanding, and despite receipt by the House of Representatives of a copy of the COMELEC en
banc resolution on September 20, 2001,
60
no action was taken by the House on the letter-appeal of petitioner.
Hence, petitioner sought the assistance of his party, LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, which sent a letter
61
addressed to
respondent Speaker De Venecia, dated October 25, 2001, and signed by Party President Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr., Secretary-General Heherson T. Alvarez, and Region VIII Party Chairman Sergio Antonio F.
Apostol, requesting the House of Representatives to act decisively on the matter in order that petitioner "can
avail of whatever remedy is available should their action remain unfavorable or otherwise undecisive."
In response, Speaker De Venecia sent a letter
62
dated October 30, 2001, stating that:
"We recognize the finality of the COMELEC decision and we are inclined to sustain it. However, Rep. Locsin
has officially notified the HOUSE in her privilege speech, inserted in the HOUSE Journal dated September 4,
2001, that she shall 'openly defy and disobey' the COMELEC ruling. This ultimately means that implementing
the decision would result in the spectacle of having two (2) legislators occupying the same congressional
seat, a legal situation, the only consideration, that effectively deters the HOUSE's liberty to take action.
In this light, the accepted wisdom is that the implementation of the COMELEC decision is a matter
that can be best, and with finality, adjudicated by the Supreme Court, which, hopefully, shall act on it
most expeditiously." (emphases supplied)
Hence, the present petition for mandamus and quo warranto.
Petitioner submits that by virtue of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc which has become final and
executory for failure of respondent Locsin to appeal therefrom, it has become the ministerial duty: (1) of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, as its Administrative Head and Presiding Officer, to implement the
said resolution of the COMELEC en banc by installing him as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte; and (2) of the Secretary-General, as official custodian of the records of the House,
to formally register his name in the Roll of Members of the House and delete the name of respondent Locsin
therefrom. Petitioner further contends that respondent Locsin has been usurping and unlawfully holding the
public office of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte considering that her premature
proclamation has been declared null and void by the COMELEC en banc. He alleges that the action or
inaction of public respondents has deprived him of his lawful right to assume the office of Representative of
the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
In his Comment,
63
public respondent Speaker De Venecia alleged that mandamus will not lie to compel the
implementation of the COMELEC decision which is not merely a ministerial duty but one which requires the
exercise of discretion by the Speaker of the House considering that: (1) it affects the membership of the
House; and (2) there is nothing in the Rules of the House of Representatives which imposes a duty on the
House Speaker to implement a COMELEC decision that unseats an incumbent House member.
In his Comment,
64
public respondent Secretary-General Nazareno alleged that in reading the name of
respondent Locsin during the roll call, and in allowing her to take her oath before the Speaker-elect and sit as
Member of the House during the Joint Session of Congress, he was merely performing official acts in
compliance with the opinions
65
rendered by House of Representatives Chief Counsel and Executive Director
Leonardo C. Palicte III stating that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to declare the proclamation of
respondent Locsin as null and void since it is the HRET which is the sole judge of all election, returns and
qualifications of Members of the House. He also contends that the determination of who will sit as Member of
the House of Representatives is not a ministerial function and cannot, thus, be compelled by mandamus.
Respondent Locsin, in her Comment,
66
alleged that the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction over an
action for quo warranto involving a member of the House of Representatives for under Section 17, Article VI
of the Constitution it is the HRET which is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives. She likewise asserts that this Court cannot issue
the writ of mandamus against a co-equal legislative department without grossly violating the principle of
separation of powers. She contends that the act of recognizing who should be seated as a bona fide member
of the House of Representatives is not a ministerial function but a legislative prerogative, the performance of
which cannot be compelled by mandamus. Moreover, the prayer for a writ of mandamus cannot be directed
against the Speaker and Secretary-General because they do not have the authority to enforce and implement
the resolution of the COMELEC.
Additionally, respondent Locsin urges that the resolution of the COMELEC en banc is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction. First, it should have dismissed the case pending before it after her proclamation and after she had
taken her oath of office. Jurisdiction then was vested in the HRET to unseat and remove a Member of the
House of Representatives. Second, the petition for declaration of nullity is clearly a pre-proclamation
controversy and the COMELEC en banc has no original jurisdiction to hear and decide a pre-proclamation
controversy. It must first be heard by a COMELEC Division. Third, the questioned decision is actually a
"hodge-podge" decision because of the peculiar manner in which the COMELEC disposed of the case.
Finally, respondent Locsin asserts that the matter of her qualification and eligibility has been categorically
affirmed by the HRET when it dismissed the quo warranto case filed against her, docketed as HRET Case
No. 01-043, entitled "Paciano Travero vs. Ma. Victoria Locsin," on the ground that "the allegations stated
therein are not proper grounds for a petition for quo warranto against a Member of the House of
Representatives under section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code and Rule 17 of the HRET Rules, and that
the petition was filed late."
67

In his Reply,
68
petitioner asserts that the remedy of respondent Locsin from the COMELEC decision was to
file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, not to seek an opinion from the Chief Legal Counsel of the
House of Representatives; that the HRET has no jurisdiction over a petition for declaration of nullity of
proclamation which is based not on ineligibility or disloyalty, but by reason that the candidate proclaimed as
winner did not obtain the highest number of votes; that the petition for annulment of proclamation is a pre-
proclamation controversy and, hence, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to
section 242 of B.P. Blg. 881
69
and section 3, Article IX (C) of the Constitution; that respondent Speaker De
Venecia himself recognizes the finality of the COMELEC decision but has decided to refer the matter to the
Supreme Court for adjudication; that the enforcement and implementation of a final decision of the
COMELEC involves a ministerial act and does not encroach on the legislative power of Congress; and that
the power to determine who will sit as Member of the House does not involve an exercise of legislative power
but is vested in the sovereign will of the electorate.
The core issues in this case are: (a) whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin by the COMELEC
Second Division is valid; (b) whether said proclamation divested the COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction to
review its validity; and (c) assuming the invalidity of said proclamation, whether it is the ministerial duty of the
public respondents to recognize petitioner Codilla, Sr. as the legally elected Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte vice respondent Locsin.
I
Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin is valid.
After carefully reviewing the records of this case, we find that the proclamation of respondent Locsin is null
and void for the following reasons:
First. The petitioner was denied due process during the entire proceedings leading to the
proclamation of respondent Locsin.
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 3402
70
sets the procedure for disqualification cases pursuant to section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, viz:
"C. PETITION TO DISQUALIFY A CANDIDATE PURSUANT TO SEC. 68 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION
CODE AND PETITION TO DISQUALIFY FOR LACK OF QUALIFICATIONS OR POSSESSING SAME
GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION
(1) The verified petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
and the verified petition to disqualify a candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing same
grounds for disqualification, may be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of
candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.
(2) The petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be
filed in ten (10) legible copies by any citizen of voting age, or duly registered political party,
organization or coalition of political parties against any candidate who in an action or protest in
which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of:
2.a having given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the
voters or public officials performing electoral functions;
2.b having committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;
2.c having spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the
Omnibus Election Code;
2.d having solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95,
96, 97 and 104 of the Omnibus Election Code;
2.e having violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc,
sub-paragraph 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office.
x x x x x x x x x
(4) Upon payment of the filing fee of P1,000.00 and legal research fee of P20.00, the offices
concerned shall docket the petition and assign to it a docket number which must be consecutive,
according to the order of receipt and must bear the year and prefixed as SPA with the
corresponding initial of the name of the office, i.e. SPA (RED) No. C01-001; SPA (PES) No. C01-
001;
(5) Within three (3) days from filing of the petitions, the offices concerned shall issue summons to
the respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition and its enclosures, if any;
(6) The respondent shall be given three (3) days from receipt of summons within which to file his
verified answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition in ten (10) legible copies, serving a copy
thereof upon the petitioner. Grounds for Motion to Dismiss may be raised as an affirmative defense;
(7) The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In lieu of the testimonies, the parties shall submit
their affidavits or counter-affidavits and other documentary evidences including their position paper;
(8) The hearing must be completed within ten (10) days from the date of the filing of the answer.
The hearing officer concerned shall submit to the Clerk of the Commission through the fastest
means of communication, his findings, reports and recommendations within five (5) days from the
completion of the hearing and reception of evidence together with the complete records of the case;
(9) Upon receipt of the records of the case of the findings, reports and recommendation of the
hearing officer concerned, the Clerk of the Commission shall immediately docket the case
consecutively and calendar the same for raffle to a division;
(10) The division to whom the case is raffled, shall after consultation, assign the same to a member
who shall pen the decision, within five (5) days from the date of consultation."
Resolution No. 3402 clearly requires the COMELEC, through the Regional Election Director, to issue
summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition and its enclosures, if any, within
three (3) days from the filing of the petition for disqualification. Undoubtedly, this is to afford the respondent
candidate the opportunity to answer the allegations in the petition and hear his side. To ensure compliance
with this requirement, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requires the return of the summons together with
the proof of service to the Clerk of Court of the COMELEC when service has been completed, viz:
"Rule 14. Summons
x x x x x x x x x
Section 5. Return.- When the service has been completed by personal service, the server shall give notice
thereof, by registered mail, to the protestant or his counsel and shall return the summons to the Clerk of Court
concerned who issued it, accompanied with the proof of service.
Section 6. Proof of Service.- Proof of service of summons shall be made in the manner provided for in the
Rules of Court in the Philippines."
Thereafter, hearings, to be completed within ten (10) days from the filing of the Answer, must be conducted.
The hearing officer is required to submit to the Clerk of the Commission his findings, reports and
recommendations within five (5) days from the completion of the hearing and reception of evidence together
with the complete records of the case.
(a) Petitioner was not notified of the petition for his disqualification through the service of summons
nor of the Motions to suspend his proclamation.
The records of the case do not show that summons was served on the petitioner. They do not contain a copy
of the summons allegedly served on the petitioner and its corresponding proof of service. Furthermore,
private respondent never rebutted petitioner's repeated assertion that he was not properly notified of the
petition for his disqualification because he never received summons.
71
Petitioner claims that prior to receiving
a telegraphed Order from the COMELEC Second Division on May 22, 2001, directing the District Board of
Canvassers to suspend his proclamation, he was never summoned nor furnished a copy of the petition for his
disqualification. He was able to obtain a copy of the petition and the May 22 Order of the COMELEC Second
Division by personally going to the COMELEC Regional Office on May 23, 2001. Thus, he was able to file his
Answer to the disqualification case only on May 24, 2001.
More, the proclamation of the petitioner was suspended in gross violation of section 72 of the Omnibus
Election Code which provides:
"Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority.- The Commission and the courts shall give priority to
cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered
not later than seven days before the election in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not
prevent his proclamation and assumption to office." (emphases supplied)
In the instant case, petitioner has not been disqualified by final judgment when the elections were conducted
on May 14, 2001. The Regional Election Director has yet to conduct hearing on the petition for his
disqualification. After the elections, petitioner was voted in office by a wide margin of 17,903. On May 16,
2001, however, respondent Locsin filed a Most Urgent Motion for the suspension of petitioner's proclamation.
The Most Urgent Motion contained a statement to the effect that a copy was served to the petitioner through
registered mail. The records reveal that no registry receipt was attached to prove such service.
72
This violates
COMELEC Rules of Procedure requiring notice and service of the motion to all parties, viz:
"Section 4. Notice.- Notice of a motion shall be served by the movant to all parties concerned, at least three
(3) days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the motion. For good cause shown, the motion
may be heard on shorter notice, especially on matters which the Commission or the Division may dispose of
on its own motion.
The notice shall be directed to the parties concerned and shall state the time and place of the hearing of the
motion.
Section 5. Proof of Service.- No motion shall be acted upon by the Commission without proof of service of
notice thereof, except when the Commission or a Division is satisfied that the rights of the adverse party or
parties are not affected."
Respondent's Most Urgent Motion does not fall under the exceptions to notice and service of motions. First,
the suspension of proclamation of a winning candidate is not a matter which the COMELEC Second Division
can dispose of motu proprio. Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646
73
requires that the suspension must be "upon motion
by the complainant or any intervenor", viz:
"Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.- Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason, a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission (COMELEC) shall
continue with the trial or hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong." (emphases supplied)
Second, the right of an adverse party, in this case, the petitioner, is clearly affected. Given the lack of service
of the Most Urgent Motion to the petitioner, said Motion is a mere scrap of paper.
74
It cannot be acted upon by
the COMELEC Second Division.
On May 18, 2001 at exactly 5:00 p.m.,
75
respondent Locsin filed a Second Most Urgent Motion for the
suspension of petitioner's proclamation. Petitioner was served a copy of the Second Motion again by
registered mail. A registry receipt
76
was attached evidencing service of the Second Most Urgent Motion to the
petitioner but it does not appear when the petitioner received a copy thereof. That same day, the COMELEC
Second Division issued an Order suspending the proclamation of petitioner. Clearly, the petitioner was not
given any opportunity to contest the allegations contained in the petition for disqualification. The Order was
issued on the very same day the Second Most Urgent Motion was filed. The petitioner could not have
received the Second Most Urgent Motion, let alone answer the same on time as he was served a copy
thereof by registered mail.
Under section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, the COMELEC can suspend proclamation only when evidence of the
winning candidate's guilt is strong. In the case at bar, the COMELEC Second Division did not make any
specific finding that evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong. Its only basis in suspending the proclamation
of the petitioner is the "seriousness of the allegations" in the petition for disqualification. Pertinent portion of
the Order reads:
"Without giving due course to the petition xxx the Commission (2
nd
Division), pursuant to Section 72 of the
Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6, Republic Act No. 6646 xxx and considering the serious
allegations in the petition, hereby directs the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the
proclamation of respondent, if winning, until further orders."
77
(emphases supplied)
We hold that absent any finding that the evidence on the guilt of the petitioner is strong, the COMELEC
Second Division gravely abused its power when it suspended his proclamation.
(b) The COMELEC Second Division did not give ample opportunity to the petitioner to adduce
evidence in support of his defense in the petition for his disqualification.
All throughout the proceeding, no hearing was conducted on the petition for disqualification in gross violation
of section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to "continue with the trial or hearing
of the action, inquiry, or protest." This is also in violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3402 requiring the
Regional Election Director to complete the hearing and reception of evidence within ten (10) days from
the filing of the Answer, and to submit his findings, reports, and recommendations within the five (5) days
from completion of the hearing and the reception of evidence.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension of his proclamation on May 25, 2001. Although an
oral argument on this Motion was held, and the parties were allowed to file their respective memoranda, the
Motion was not acted upon. Instead, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution on the petition for
disqualification against the petitioner. It was based on the following evidence: (a) the affidavits attached to the
Petition for Disqualification; (b) the affidavits attached to the Answer; and (c) the respective memoranda of the
parties.
On this score, it bears emphasis that the hearing for Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension cannot be
substituted for the hearing in the disqualification case. Although intrinsically linked, it is not to be supposed
that the evidence of the parties in the main disqualification case are the same as those in the Motion to Lift
the Order of Suspension. The parties may have other evidence which they may deem proper to present only
on the hearing for the disqualification case. Also, there may be evidence which are unavailable during the
hearing for the Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension but which may be available during the hearing for the
disqualification case.
In the case at bar, petitioner asserts that he submitted his Memorandum merely to support his Motion to Lift
the Order of Suspension. It was not intended to answer and refute the disqualification case against him. This
submission was sustained by the COMELEC en banc. Hence, the members of the COMELEC en banc
concluded, upon consideration of the additional affidavits attached in his Urgent Manifestation, that the
evidence to disqualify the petitioner was insufficient. More specifically, the ponente of the challenged
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division held:
"Indeed, I find from the records that the May 30, 2001 hearing of the COMELEC (Second Division) concerns
only the incident relating to the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension of Proclamation. It also appears that the
order for the submission of the parties' respective memoranda was in lieu of the parties' oral argument on the
motion. This would explain the fact that Codilla's Memorandum refers mainly to the validity of the issuance of
the order of suspension of proclamation. There is, however, no record of any hearing on the urgent motion for
the suspension of proclamation. Indeed, it was only upon the filing of the Urgent Manifestation by Codilla
that the Members of the Commission (Second Division) and other Members of the Commission en
banc had the opportunity to consider Codilla's affidavits. This time, Codilla was able to present his
side, thus, completing the presentation of evidentiary documents from both sides."
78
(emphases
supplied)
Indeed, careful reading of the petitioner's Memorandum shows that he confined his arguments in support of
his Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension. In said Memorandum, petitioner raised the following issues: (a) he
was utterly deprived of procedural due process, and consequently, the order suspending his proclamation is
null and void; (b) the said order of suspension of proclamation has no legal and factual basis; and (c)
evidence of guilt on his part is patently inexistent for the purpose of directing the suspension of his
proclamation.
79
He urged the COMELEC Second Division to conduct a full dress hearing on the main
disqualification case should the suspension be lifted.
80

(c) the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying the petitioner is not based on
substantial evidence.
The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division cannot be considered to be based on substantial evidence.
It relied merely on affidavits of witnesses attached to the petition for disqualification. As stressed, the
COMELEC Second Division gave credence to the affidavits without hearing the affiants. In reversing said
Resolution, the COMELEC en banc correctly observed:
"Lacking evidence of Codilla, the Commission (Second Division) made its decisions based mainly on the
allegation of the petitioner and the supporting affidavits. With this lopsided evidence at hand, the result was
predictable. The Commission (Second Division) had no choice. Codilla was disqualified."
81

Worse, the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, even without the evidence coming from the
petitioner, failed to prove the gravamen of the offense for which he was charged.
82

Petitioner allegedly violated section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code which reads:
"Section 68. Disqualifications.- Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party is declared by
final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other
material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing official functions,
xxx shall be disqualified from continuing as candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding office"
To be disqualified under the above-quoted provision, the following elements must be proved: (a) the
candidate, personally or through his instructions, must have given money or other material consideration; and
(b) the act of giving money or other material consideration must be for the purpose of influencing, inducing, or
corrupting the voters or public officials performing electoral functions.
In the case at bar, the petition for disqualification alleged that (a) petitioner ordered the extraction, hauling and
distribution of gravel and sand, and (b) his purpose was to induce and influence the voters of Kananga and
Matag-ob, Leyte to vote for him. Pertinent portion of the petition reads:
"[T]he respondent [herein petitioner], within the election period, took advantage of his current elective position
as City Mayor of Ormoc City by illegally and unlawfully using during the prohibited period, public equipments
and vehicles belonging to and owned by the City Government of Ormoc City in extracting, hauling and
distributing gravel and sand to the residents and voters of the Municipalities of Kananga and Matag-ob Leyte,
well within the territorial limits of the 4th Congressional District of Leyte, which acts were executed without
period, and clearly for the illicit purpose of unduly inducing or directly corrupting various voters of Kananga
and Matag-ob, within the 4th legislative district of Leyte, for the precise purpose of inducing and influencing
the voters/beneficiaries of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte to cast their votes for said respondent."
83

The affidavits relied upon by the COMELEC Second Division failed to prove these allegations. For instance,
Cesar A. Laurente merely stated that he saw three (3) ten-wheeler dump trucks and a Hyundai Payloader
with the markings "Ormoc City Government" extracting and hauling sand and gravel from the riverbed
adjacent to the property owned by the Codilla family.
84

Agripino C. Alferez and Rogelio T. Sulvera in their Joint Affidavit merely stated that they saw white trucks
owned by the City Government of Ormoc dumping gravel and sand on the road of Purok 6, San Vicente,
Matag-ob, Leyte. A payloader then scattered the sand and gravel unloaded by the white trucks.
85

On the other hand, Danilo D. Maglasang, a temporary employee of the City Government of Ormoc assigned
to check and record the delivery of sand and gravel for the different barangays in Ormoc, stated as follows:
"3. That on April 20, 2001, I was ordered by Engr. Arnel Padayo, an employee of the City Engineering Office,
Ormoc City to go to Tagaytay, Kangga (sic), Leyte as that will be the source of the sand and gravel. I inquired
why we had to go to Kananga but Engr. Padayao said that it's not a problem as it was Mayor Eufrocino M.
Codilla, Sr. who ordered this and the property is owned by the family of Mayor Codilla. We were to deliver
sand and gravel to whoever requests from Mayor Codilla."
86

Similarly, the Affidavit of Basilio Bates cannot prove the offense charged against the petitioner. He alleged
that on April 18, 2001, a white truck with the marking "City Government of Ormoc" came to his lot at
Montebello, Kananga, Leyte and unloaded mixed sand and that the driver of the truck told him to "vote for
Codilla as a (sic) congressman during election."
87
His statement is hearsay. He has no personal knowledge of
the supposed order of the petitioner to distribute gravel and sand for the purpose of inducing the voters to
vote for him. The same could be said about the affidavits of Randy T. Merin,
88
Alfredo C. De la Pea,
89
Miguel
P. Pandac,
90
Paquito Bregeldo, Cristeta Alferez , Glicerio Rios,
91
Romulo Alkuino, Sr.,
92
Abner Casas,
93
Rita
Trangia,
94
and Judith Erispe
95
attached to respondent Locsin's Memorandum on the Motion to Lift the
Suspension of Proclamation.
Also valueless are the affidavits of other witnesses
96
of respondent Locsin, all similarly worded, which alleged
that the petitioner ordered the repair of the road in Purok 6, Barangay San Vicente, Matag-ob, Leyte and the
flattening of the area where the cockfights were to be held. These allegations are extraneous to the charge in
the petition for disqualification. More importantly, these allegations do not constitute a ground to disqualify the
petitioner based on section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
To be sure, the petition for disqualification also ascribed other election offenses against the petitioner,
particularly section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz:
"Section 261. Prohibited Acts.- The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling.- (1) Any person who gives, offers or promises money or anything
of value, gives or promises any office or employment, franchise or grant, public or private, or make
or offers to make an expenditure, directly or indirectly, or cause an expenditure to be made to any
person, association, corporation, entity or community in order to induce anyone or the public in
general, to vote for or against any candidate or withhold his vote in the election, or to vote for or
against any aspirant for the nomination or choice of a candidate in a convention or similar selection
process of a political party.
x x x x x x x x x
(o) Use of public funds, money deposited in trust, equipment, facilities owned or controlled by the
government for an election campaign.- Any person who uses under any guise whatsoever directly
or indirectly, xxx (3) any equipment, vehicle, facility, apparatus, or paraphernalia owned by the
government or by its political subdivisions, agencies including government-owned or controlled
corporations, or by the Armed Forces of the Philippines for any election campaign or for any
partisan political activity x x x."
However, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated
in section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of
COMELEC jurisdiction.
97
They are criminal and not administrative in nature. Pursuant to sections
265 and 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, the power of the COMELEC is confined to the conduct
of preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses for the purpose of prosecuting the
alleged offenders before the regular courts of justice, viz:
"Section 265. Prosecution.- The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have
the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under
this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other
prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission
fails to act on any complaint within four months from his filing, the complainant may file the
complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and
prosecution, if warranted.
x x x x x x x x x
Section 268. Jurisdiction.- The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and
decide any criminal action or proceeding for violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of
failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdictions of metropolitan or municipal trial
courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases."
The COMELEC Second Division grievously erred when it decided the disqualification case based on section
261 (a) and (o), and not on section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
(d) Exclusion of the votes in favor of the petitioner and the proclamation of respondent Locsin was
done with undue haste.
The COMELEC Second Division ordered the exclusion of the votes cast in favor of the petitioner, and the
proclamation of the respondent Locsin, without affording the petitioner the opportunity to challenge the same.
In the morning of June 15, 2001, the Provincial Board of Canvassers convened, and on the strength of the
said Resolution excluding the votes received by the petitioner, certified that respondent Locsin received the
highest number of votes. On this basis, respondent Locsin was proclaimed.
Records reveal that the petitioner received notice of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division only
through his counsel via a facsimile message in the afternoon of June 15, 2001
98
when everything was already
fait accompli. Undoubtedly, he was not able to contest the issuance of the Certificate of Canvass and the
proclamation of respondent Locsin. This is plain and simple denial of due process.
The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. When a party is deprived of that basic fairness,
any decision by any tribunal in prejudice of his rights is void.
Second. The votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered "stray" and respondent cannot
be validly proclaimed on that basis.
The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division in SPA No. 01-208 contains two dispositions: (1) it ruled
that the petitioner was disqualified as a candidate for the position of Congressman of the Fourth District of
Leyte; and (2) it ordered the immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of
votes, to the exclusion of the respondent [herein petitioner].
As previously stated, the disqualification of the petitioner is null and void for being violative of due process
and for want of substantial factual basis. Even assuming, however, that the petitioner was validly disqualified,
it is still improper for the COMELEC Second Division to order the immediate exclusion of votes cast for the
petitioner as stray, and on this basis, proclaim the respondent as having garnered the next highest number of
votes.
(a) The order of disqualification is not yet final, hence, the votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot
be considered "stray."
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code require a final judgment before
the election for the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered "stray." Hence, when a candidate has
not yet been disqualified by final judgment during the election day and was voted for, the votes cast in his
favor cannot be declared stray. To do so would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom
sovereignty resides.
99
For in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment during the
election day, the people voted for him bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the
honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise
of the powers of government.
100

This principle applies with greater force in the case at bar considering that the petitioner has not been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified not only before but even after the elections. The
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying the petitioner did not attain finality, and hence,
could not be executed, because of the timely filing of a Motion for Reconsideration. Section 13, Rule 18 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Finality of Decisions and Resolutions reads:
"Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions.- (a) In ordinary actions, special proceedings, provisional
remedies and special reliefs, a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall become final and
executory after thirty (30) days from its promulgation.
(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall become
final and executory after five (5) days in Special Actions and Special Cases and after fifteen (15) days in all
other proceedings, following their promulgation.
(c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or resolution of a Division shall
become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days in Special Actions and Special Cases and
after fifteen (15) days in all other actions or proceedings, following its promulgation." (emphasis
supplied)
In this wise, COMELEC Resolution No. 4116,
101
issued in relation to the finality of resolutions or decisions in
disqualification cases, provides:
"This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the Commission en banc or division, particularly on
Special Actions (Disqualification Cases).
Special Action cases refer to the following:
(a) Petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy;
(b) Petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate;
(c) Petition to disqualify a candidate; and
(d) Petition to postpone or suspend an election.
Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of decisions or resolutions on
special action cases (disqualification cases) the Commission, RESOLVES, as it is hereby RESOLVED, as
follows:
(1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the Commission on disqualification cases shall
become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the
Supreme Court;
(2) the decision or resolution of a Division on disqualification cases shall become final and
executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed;
(3) where the ground for disqualification case is by reason of non-residence, citizenship, violation of
election laws and other analogous cases and on the day of the election the resolution has not
become final and executory the BEI shall tally and count the votes for such disqualified candidate;
(4) the decision or resolution of the En Banc on nuisance candidates, particularly whether the
nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory;
(5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly where the nuisance
candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory after the
lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which case, the
votes cast shall not be considered stray but shall be counted and tallied for the bona fide candidate.
All resolutions, orders and rules inconsistent herewith are hereby modified or repealed."
Considering the timely filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, the COMELEC Second Division gravely abused
its discretion in ordering the immediate disqualification of the petitioner and ordering the exclusion of the
votes cast in his favor. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is very clear that a timely
Motion for Reconsideration shall suspend the execution or implementation of the resolution, viz:
Section 2. Period for filing Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or
ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro
forma, suspends the execution or implementation of the decision, resolution, order or ruling."
(emphases supplied)
(b) Respondent Locsin, as a mere second placer, cannot be proclaimed.
More brazen is the proclamation of respondent Locsin which violates the settled doctrine that the candidate
who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate
is disqualified.
102
In every election, the people's choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed
will must at all times be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving
him the highest number of votes cast in the election for the office, no one can be declared elected in his
place.
103
In Domino v. COMELEC,
104
this Court ruled, viz:
"It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed winner and imposed as
representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they
do not choose him. To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received that (sic) other votes
would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voters. He could not be considered the first among the
qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the qualified candidate, the conditions would have
substantially changed.
x x x x x x x x x
The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the election fails entirely,
that the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because
the law then as now only authorizes a declaration in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes,
and does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such
case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity. To allow the defeated and
repudiated candidate to take over the elective position despite his rejection by the electorate is to
disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of
democracy and the people's right to elect officials of their choice."
105

Respondent Locsin proffers a distinction between a disqualification based on personal circumstances such as
age, residence or citizenship and disqualification based on election offenses. She contends that the election
of candidates later disqualified based on election offenses like those enumerated in section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code should be invalidated because they violate the very essence of suffrage and as such,
the votes cast in his favor should not be considered.
106

This contention is without merit. In the recent case of Trinidad v. COMELEC,
107
this Court ruled that the
effect of a judgment disqualifying a candidate, after winning the election, based on personal circumstances or
section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is the same: the second placer could not take the place of the
disqualified winner.
Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin divested the COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction to review its
validity.
Respondent Locsin submits that the COMELEC en banc has no jurisdiction to annul her proclamation. She
maintains that the COMELEC en banc was been divested of jurisdiction to review the validity of her
proclamation because she has become a member of the House of Representatives. Thus, she contends that
the proper forum to question her membership to the House of Representatives is the House of
Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
We find no merit in these contentions.
First. The validity of the respondent's proclamation was a core issue in the Motion for
Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner.
In his timely Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc, petitioner argued that the COMELEC
Second Division erred thus:
"(1) in disqualifying petitioner on the basis solely of the dubious declaration of the witnesses for
respondent Locsin;
(2) in adopting in toto the allegations of the witnesses for respondent Locsin; and
(3) in promulgating the resolution in violation of its own rules of procedure and in directing
therein the immediate proclamation of the second highest 'vote getter.'" (emphases supplied)
In support of his third assignment of error, petitioner argued that "the Second Division's directive for the
immediate proclamation of the second highest vote-getter is premature considering that the Resolution has
yet to become final and executory."
108
Clearly, the validity of respondent Locsin's proclamation was made a
central issue in the Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner. Without doubt, the
COMELEC en banc has the jurisdiction to rule on the issue.
The fact that the Petition for Nullity of Proclamation was filed directly with the COMELEC en banc is of no
moment. Even without said Petition, the COMELEC en banc could still rule on the nullity of respondent's
proclamation because it was properly raised in the Motion for Reconsideration.
Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC en banc to review, on motion for
reconsideration, decisions or resolutions decided by a division, viz:
"Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All
such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of
decision shall be decided by the Commission en banc."
Pursuant to this Constitutional mandate, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
"Rule 19. Motions for Reconsideration.-
Section 1. Grounds for Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion for reconsideration may be filed on
the grounds that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision, order or ruling, or that the said
decision, order or ruling is contrary to law.
Section 2. Period for filing Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation
thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution or implementation of the
decision, resolution, order or ruling."
Section 3. Form and Contents of Motion for Reconsideration.- The motion shall be verified and shall
point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the decision, resolution, order or ruling which are
not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making express reference to the
testimonial or documentary evidence or to the provisions of law alleged to be contrary to such
findings or resolutions.
Section 4. Effect of Motion for Reconsideration on Period to Appeal.- A motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order or ruling when not pro forma, suspends the running of the period to
elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.
Section 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed Of.- Upon the filing of a motion to reconsider
a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court concerned shall, within
twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall
within two (2) days thereafter certify the case to the Commission en banc.
Section 6. Duty of the Clerk of Court of the Commission to set Motion for Hearing.- The Clerk of
Court concerned shall calendar the motion for reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission
en banc within ten (10) days from the certification thereof." (emphases supplied)
Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division
suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction
to review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet
unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its
execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent as the duly
elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no jurisdiction in the
instant case.
Respondent contends that having been proclaimed and having taken oath as representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte, any question relative to her election and eligibility should be brought before the
HRET pursuant to section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
109

We reject respondent's contention.
(a) The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division has not yet been
resolved by the COMELEC en banc.
To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration.
The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET
cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.
In Puzon vs. Cua,
110
even the HRET ruled that the "doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has been made
and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest
involving members of the House of Representatives, could not have been immediately applicable due to
the issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements themselves." This is because
the HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a
division or en banc.
(b) The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent Locsin.
Respondent Locsin maintains that the proper recourse of the petitioner is to file a petition for quo
warranto with the HRET.
A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines.
111
In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic
of the Philippines is in question. There is no issue that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume
office.
A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly elected and proclaimed for
having obtained the highest number of votes but whose eligibility is in question at the time of such
proclamation. It is evident that respondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the
HRET. She lost the elections to the petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent nullity. Her
premature assumption to office as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte was void from the
beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the respondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner,
to unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding.
III
Whether it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to
recognize petitioner Codilla, Sr. as the legally elected Representative
of the 4th legislative district of Leyte vice respondent Locsin.
Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a verified petition for
mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
112
For a petition for mandamus to
prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not
purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined,
clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is
one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide
how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial
only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.
113

In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of
the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of
discretion on the part of the public respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered
71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The
COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for
Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the
proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this
Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory.
In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte has been finally
settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law
demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of
law except the reign of chaos and confusion.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Mandamus is granted. Public Speaker of the House of Representatives
shall administer the oath of petitioner EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., as the duly-elected Representative of
the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Public respondent Secretary-General shall likewise register the name of
the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives after he has taken his oath of office.
This decision shall be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., no part.


Footnotes


1
Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. I, pp. 1-7.
2
Id., Annex "A-1," p. 8.
3
Id., Annex "A-2," p. 9.
4
Id., Annex "A-4," p. 11.
5
Id., Annex "A-3," p. 10.
6
Id., Annexes "A-5" to "A-6," pp. 12-13.
7
Id., Annexes "B-1" to "B-5," pp. 14-18.
8
Id., p. 23.
9
Id., p. 21.
10
Id., pp. 24-26. From the Records, it appears that respondent Locsin did not file a separate Motion
for Intervention.
11
Id., p. 26.
12
Id., Registry Receipt No. 78660, p. 30.
13
Id., pp. 36-40.
14
Id., p. 39.
15
Id., pp. 39-40.
16
Id., p. 234.
17
Id., pp. 74-79.
18
Id., Annex "1," pp. 80-81.
19
Id., Annex "1-A," p. 82.
20
Id., Annex "2," pp. 83-84.
21
Id., Annex "2-A," pp. 122-123.
22
Id., Annex "3," pp. 124-125.
23
Id., pp. 41-46.
24
Id., p. 47.
25
Id., p. 71.
26
Id., pp. 211-233.
27
Id., Annex "4," p. 281.
28
Id., Annex "6," p. 283.
29
Id., Annex "7," p. 284.
30
Id., Annex "8," pp. 285-286.
31
Id., Annex "9," p. 287.
32
Id., Annex "10," p. 288.
33
Id., Annex "11," p. 421.
34
Id., pp. 92-93.
35
Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol II, pp. 6-20.
36
Id., Annexes "B" and "C", pp. 57-76.
37
Id., Annex "D-1", p. 138.
38
Id., pp. 23-41.
39
Id., p. 87.
40
Id., pp. 174-192.
41
Records, SPC No. 01-324, pp. 1-14.
42
Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. II, pp. 163-165.
43
Id., pp. 166-173. Annex "A" contains the Affidavits of Edgardo Apuya, Carmelita Manongsong,
Danilo Pingoy, Rolando Viovicente, and Samuel Antipuesto; Annex "B" includes the Affidavits of
Samuel Antipuesto, Pastora Capuyan and Feliciano Apuya; Annex "C" consists of Affidavits of
Agripino Beltran, Taciana Beltran, Samuel Antipuesto, Buenaventura Tasan, Rustico Alogbate,
Pastora Capuyan, Feliciano Apuya, Ellen Pingoy and Joel Ranolas; Annex "D" contains the
Affidavits of Noel Gomez and Jovito Laurente; and Annex "E" contains the Affidavit of Roman
Domasin.
44
Records, SPC No. 01-324, pp. 108-115.
45
Id., pp. 43-163.
46
Id., pp. 212-219.
47
Petition, Annex B-2; Rollo, pp. 149-159.
48
Petition, Annexes B-4 and B-5; Rollo, pp. 162-179.
49
Rollo, pp. 40-44.
50
Petition, Annex B; Rollo, pp. 40-146.
51
Id., Annex B-1; id., pp. 147-148.
52
Rollo, pp. 323-337.
53
Memorandum dated August 31, 2001; Rollo, pp. 403-407.
54
Petition, Annex D-1; Rollo, pp. 216-225.
55
Id., Annex E; id., pp. 226-233.
56
Id., Annex A; id., p. 34.
57
Id., Annex A-5; id., p. 39.
58
Id., Annex F; id., pp. 234-242.
59
Id., Annex H-1; id., pp. 245-249.
60
Id., Annex G; id., p. 243.
61
Id., Annex I; id., pp. 250-255.
62
Id., Annex J; id., pp. 256-257.
63
Rollo, pp. 281-287.
64
Id., pp. 382-401.
65
The first Memorandum of Chief Counsel Palicte III dated July 22, 2001 was issued at the
instance of Secretary General Nazareno on the basis of a Memorandum issued by COMELEC
Chairman Benipayo ordering the investigation of the Provincial Board of Canvassers and the
Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte in connection with the proclamation of respondent Locsin,
id., pp. 408-412. A second Memorandum reiterating his previous opinion was issued on August 31,
2001 pursuant to a request made by respondent Locsin relative to the COMELEC En Banc
Resolution of August 29, 2001, id., pp. 403-407.
66
Rollo, pp. 288-348.
67
Resolution dated October 18, 2001, HRET Case No. 01-043; Annex 5, Comment of Respondent
Locsin; Rollo, pp.377-379.
68
Rollo, pp. 426-454.
69
Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, December 3, 1985.
70
Rules Delegating to COMELEC Field Officials the Hearing and Reception of Evidence of
Disqualification Cases Filed in Connection with the May 14, 2001 National and Local Elections,
December 15, 2000.
71
See petitioner's Answer, Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. I, p. 74; Motion to Lift Suspension of
Proclamation, id., p. 42; Memorandum, id., p. 343; Motion for Reconsideration, id., vol. II, p. 24.
72
Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. I, p. 26.
73
The Electoral Reform Law of 1987, January 5, 1988.
74
Cledera vs. Sarmiento, 39 SCRA 562 (1971); Andra v. CA, 60 SCRA 379 (1979); Sembrano v.
Ramirez, 166 SCRA 30 (1988).
75
Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. I, p. 27.
76
Id., p. 30, Registry Receipt No. 78660.
77
Id., pp. 36-40.
78
Rollo, p. 89.
79
Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. I, pp. 214-228.
80
Id., pp. 229-231.
81
Rollo, p. 89.
82
Id., pp. 95-102.
83
Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. I, p. 3.
84
Id., p. 11.
85
Id., p. 10.
86
Id., p. 9.
87
Id., p. 8.
88
Id., p. 304.
89
Id., p. 306
90
Id., p. 307.
91
Id., p. 310.
92
Id., p. 312.
93
Id., p. 313.
94
Id., p. 318.
95
Id., p. 319.
96
See Affidavits of Arnel Surillo, id., p. 308; Tolentino Denoy, id., p. 314; Jerome Ychon, id., p. 315;
Benjamin Aparis, id., p. 316; and Rene Maurecio, id., p. 317.
97
Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure states: "Section 1. Authority of the Commission to
Prosecute Election Offenses.- The Commission shall have the exclusive power to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election laws and to
prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law."
98
Copy of the facsimile message was attached to the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. See
Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. II, p. 57-76.
99
Labo v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 (1989).
100
Reyes v. COMELEC, 254 SCRA 514 (1996); Nolasco v. COMELEC, 275 SCRA 762 (1997).
101
May 7, 2001.
102
Labo v. COMELEC, supra; Abella v. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253 (1991); Aquino v. COMELEC,
supra.
103
Benito v. COMELEC, 235 SCRA 546 (1994).
104
310 SCRA 546 (1999).
105
Id., pp. 573-574 (citations omitted).
106
Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. II, p. 87.
107
315 SCRA 175 (1999).
108
Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. II, p. 37.
109
"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective
members."
110
HRET Case No. 42, July 25, 1988, 1 HRET 32-33.
111
Rule 17, Revised Rules of HRET provides: "Quo Warranto.- A verified petition for quo warranto
contesting the election of a Member of the House of Representatives shall be filed by any
candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office,
within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner."
112
Section 3 of Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
113
Samson v. Barrios, 63 Phil. 198 (1936); Lemi v. Valencia, 26 SCRA 203 (1968); Meralco
Securities Corp. v. Savellano, et al., 177 SCRA 804 (1982), as cited in I Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium 714 (1997).















EN BANC
G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented herein by its
secretary-general, MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner,
vs.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR
JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS
ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG
OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and others under
"Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO;
LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION; LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO;
AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY
HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under "Political Parties" of Omnibus Resolution No.
3785. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP;
LIBERAL PARTY; MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP; and BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J .:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our
people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered
to participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized
and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but active participants in
the mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those which
now dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would
desecrate this lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for
traditional politics.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No.
3785
1
issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the
participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list
elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system
was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-
marginalized or overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed by sectoral
parties, organizations and political parties. According to the Comelec, "[v]erifications were made as to the
status and capacity of these parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the
last party w[as] heard. With the number of these petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural
requirements, review of these petitions as well as deliberations takes a longer process in order to arrive at a
decision and as a result the two (2) divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual
resolution on political parties. These numerous petitions and processes observed in the disposition of these
petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which were promulgated only
on 10 February 2001."
2

Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated
December 22, 2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their
intention to participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose
registrations were denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to
participate in the party-list elections. Still other registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond the
deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties and
organizations, but denied those of several others in its assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No.
3785, which we quote:
"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of proportional representation
scheme will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or
organization to directly participate in this electoral window.
"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of proportional representation' in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections.
"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the fact that there is a need to
keep the number of sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping only
those who substantially comply with the rules and regulations and more importantly the sufficiency of the
Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions."
3

On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying that "the names
of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and
that said certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said
respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be proclaimed.
4
On April 11,
2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and
Nomination against some of herein respondents.
5

On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualification cases to file Comments
within three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001,
6
but subsequently reset it to
May 3, 2001.
7
During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to
submit their respective memoranda.
8

Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a
Petition
9
before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001,
10
the Court directed respondents to
comment on the Petition within a non-extendible period of five days from notice.
11

On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition,
12
docketed as GR No.
147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001,
13
the
Court ordered the consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second
Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral
Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the Comelec may proceed with the counting and canvassing of
votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of
the Court.
Thereafter, Comments
14
on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on May 17, 2001, the Oral
Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in open court, the parties were directed to submit
their respective Memoranda simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days.
15

Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the following issues:
"1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically, is there
no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?
"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors
and organizations.
"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785."
16

The Court's Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the Comelec which will determine,
after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed
Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this Decision.
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65
Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is improper because there are other
plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.
17
The Office of the Solicitor General
argues that petitioners should have filed before the Comelec a petition either for disqualification or for
cancellation of registration, pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-
A
18
dated November 9, 2000.
19

We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections
of 2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution
20
and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before
this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc; hence,
no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure.
21

The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a Petition for Cancellation of
Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents.
22
The Comelec, however, did not act on
that Petition. In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court,
for there was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the urgency of
petitioner's action; to this date, the Comelec has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a
resolution may just be a formality because the Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General, has made
its position on the matter quite clear.
In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
23
It has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the
presence of other remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved,
and in case of urgency."
24
Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme
urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system, which this Court must
urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles,
precepts, doctrines, or rules."
25

Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue
involves the principle of social justice x x x when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the
need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available."
26

Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of political parties in the
party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution."
27
For its part, Petitioner
Bayan Muna objects to the participation of "major political parties."
28
On the other hand, the Office of the
Solicitor General, like the impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow
political parties to participate in the party-list elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to
all "registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations."
29

We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified
from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered
under the party-list system.
"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for
those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall
not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of
canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in
accordance with law."
30

During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod pointed out that the
participants in the party-list system may "be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party,
UNIDO,
31
Magsasaka, or a regional party in Mindanao."
32
This was also clear from the following exchange
between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople:
33

"MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP,
Liberal at Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga partido."
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system,
in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to
win a seat in Congress.
34
He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we
found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about
1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have
no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if
they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and
objectives of the party-list system."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either
a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines "political party"
as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general
conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office."
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party-list
system. We quote the pertinent provision below:
"x x x
"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not
be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
x x x"
Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political party
-- or any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or
organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution
and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification
of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector." (Emphasis supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the Constitutional
Commission declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give "genuine power to our people" in
Congress. Hence, when the provision was discussed, he exultantly announced: "On this first day of August
1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our national history, by giving genuine power to our
people in the legislature."
35

The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases
like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite
the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the
State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."
The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the
Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable" the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino
citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole.
The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and underrepresented," and
"lack
of
well-defined constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the
party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or
oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as
exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented,
because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and
truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5.
36
Concurrently,
the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y] " refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group,
like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with
disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and
underrepresented" become members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to
those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves.
Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become
members of the House of Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied
according to its express terms.
37

The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system are
enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for
purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the
election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system
as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations,
attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition
agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall
include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the
clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental
principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and
their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or
related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in
immediate association.
38

The Party-List System Desecrated by the OSG Contentions
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that RA No.
7941 "does not limit the participation in the party-list system to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors of society."
39
In fact, it contends that any party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6
40
of
RA 7941 may participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an
organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmarias Village could participate in the party-
list elections.
41

The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). We
stress that the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens specifically those belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties to be elected to the House of
Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and
underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and overrepresented
can participate desecrates the spirit of the party-list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be
appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly
disparate; hence, the OSG's position to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast,
and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan
42
admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of
bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could not join the party-list system as representatives of their
respective sectors.
43

While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither
marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic clout engenders political power
more awesome than their numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate
from the size of one's constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the number and amount of
one's bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in
poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted -- to give them not
only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the
specific concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger
affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new
hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past the farm
hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement to come out and
participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated during the last elections. The State cannot
now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional district
elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the
House of Representatives were set aside for the party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who
normally controlled 80 percent of the seats in the House could participate in the party-list elections for the
remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the
congressional district elections and the party-list elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system,
44
in order to enhance the
chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation in the House of Representatives through
the simplest scheme possible.
45
Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who have never
gotten a foothold within it -- those who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need the
"simplest scheme possible" to do so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system to those who have
long been within it -- those privileged sectors that have long dominated the congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when compared to a student
dormitory "open house," which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open
house" is for the benefit of outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even
without such special privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is only for the "outsiders" who
cannot get elected through regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented
who already fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party-list
system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented,
contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the
underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended
beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are neither
marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy
must permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties and other organizations under the
party-list system.
Refutation of the Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V. Mendoza, are
anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the Constitution as culled from their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary source from which to
ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the
words in which the constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained.
46
In
other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal
should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of
the provision being construed.
47

Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary
48
that "the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention [may be consulted]
in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution x x x only when other guides fail as
said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in
the constitutional convention 'are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating
the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much
less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental
law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face.' The proper interpretation
therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers'
understanding thereof."
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in clear terms: the
mechanics of the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In
understanding and implementing party-list representation, we should therefore look at the law first. Only when
we find its provisions ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of construction be resorted to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain words. Section 2 thereof
unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing congressional representatives was designed to
"enable underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole x x x." The criteria for participation is well defined. Thus, there is no need for
recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to the proceedings of Congress. In any event, the framers'
deliberations merely express their individual opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in construing the
meaning and purpose of the constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not an issue here.
Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must be applied plainly and simply.
Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy
of the law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system
discussed above. The OSG as its counsel admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-
marginalized and overrepresented, could field candidates in the party-list elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the
Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion.
49
Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they
find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it.
50

In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright disqualification of the major
political parties Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMP on the ground that under Comelec
Resolution No. 4073, they have been accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political parties
in the May 14, 2001 elections. It argues that because of this, they have the "advantage of getting official
Comelec Election Returns, Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x." We note, however, that this
accreditation does not refer to the party-list election, but, inter alia, to the election of district representatives
for the purpose of determining which parties would be entitled to watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act
No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination of whether respondents
herein and, for that matter, all the 154 previously approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to
participate in the party-list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because
"it is a government entity using government resources and privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of
facts.
51
It is not equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an opportunity to show that
they qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision, before they can be deprived of their right to
participate in and be elected under the party-list system.
Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter to determine, after
summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-
list elections comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down
the following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show -- through its
constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record -- that it
represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership
should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of
interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of
Representatives." In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political
parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and
underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other similarly situated political parties admitted
as much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows:
"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the political party must
claim to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?
ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes."
52

Third, in view of the objections
53
directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is
allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector may
not be represented in the party-list system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is demonstrated by
the following discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
"MR. OPLE. x x x
In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international networks of members and
supporters, in order to circumvent this prohibition, decides to form its own political party in emulation of those
parties I had mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and philosophies from well-established religious
faiths, will that also not fall within this prohibition?
MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition, then certainly the
Comelec can pierce through the legal fiction."
54

The following discussion is also pertinent:
"MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS," he is not, of
course, prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be elected by, say, the indigenous community sector to
represent their group.
REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni Kristo, the Catholic
Church, the Protestant Church et cetera."
55

Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall not be registered."
56
The
prohibition was explained by a member
57
of the Constitutional Commission in this wise: "[T] he prohibition is
on any religious organization registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a priest
running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a political
party."
58

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the
grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious
purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third
parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered."
59

Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to comply
with election laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list
system seeks to "enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties x x x to become members of the House of Representatives." A party or an
organization, therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or
assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a
group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government.
The participation of the government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal
60
and
unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so.
Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a
bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30)
during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented
sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino
citizens "who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the
interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the
working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine
representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise
be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as
a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the nominee of a
party, national or regional, is not going to represent a particular district x x x."
61

Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives."
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that those who have less in life
should have more in law. The party-list system is one such tool intended to benefit those who have less in life.
It gives the great masses of our people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and
the prejudiced, and even to those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation for them to
come out of their limbo and seize the opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents that
the party-list system is, without any qualification, open to all. Such position does not only weaken the electoral
chances of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the
party-list system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it
would further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization.
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the Constitution and RA 7941 are
nothing more than a play on dubious words, a mockery of noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar
of people empowerment. Surely, this could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution and
the makers of RA 7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct
summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines
enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list
elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have
garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The Comelec is
further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice hereof.1wphi1.nt
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to refrain from proclaiming any
winner" during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the Comelec itself will have complied
and reported its compliance with the foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt thereof. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., in the result.
Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., join the dissent of J. Vicente M. Mendoza.
Ynares-Santiago, J., abroad on official business.


Footnotes
1
Signed by Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo and Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco, Rufino
S. B. Javier, Ralph C. Lantion, Mehol K. Sadain, Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason
Jr.
2
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, p. 13; Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 40.
3
Ibid., pp. 21-22; Rollo, pp. 48-49.
4
Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 272-273.
5
Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 250-263.
6
Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 282-283.
7
See Rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 223.
8
TSN (GR No. 147589 and 147613), May 17, 2001, p. 49.
9
Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 4-73.
10
Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 74.
11
Comments were filed by MAD, Bagong Bayani, The True Marcos Loyalists, the Comelec, Partido
ng Masang Pilipino, the Liberal Party, the Office of the Solicitor General, CREBA, Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP, the Philippine Local Autonomy Movement, Aksyon Demokratiko, Citizens' Drug Watch
Foundation, Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, Ang Lakas ng OCW, and Sports and Health
Foundation.
12
Rollo (GR No. 147613), pp. 3-45.
13
Rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 46.
14
These were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Comelec, the Bagong Bayani
Organization, Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga, and the Philippine Local Autonomy Movement.
15
Memoranda were filed by Petitioners Bayan Muna and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party;
and Respondents Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga, CREBA, the Bagong Bayani Organization, the
Office of the Solicitor General, and Aksyon Demokratiko. Manifestations instead of memoranda
were filed by Lakas-NUCD and OCW.
16
See the May 17, 2001 Resolution, p. 2; Rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 88.
17
See, e.g., the Bagong Bayani Organization's Memorandum, pp. 3-4; Aksyon Demokratiko's
Memorandum, pp. 2-3; and MAD's Memorandum, pp. 3-6.
18
Rules and regulations governing the filing of a petition for registration, a manifestation to
participate, and the names of nominees under the party-list system of representation in connection
with the May 14, 2001 national and local elections.
19
OSG's Memorandum, pp. 6-14; Rollo (GR No. 147613), pp. 151-159.
20
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, provides: "Judicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
21
"SECTION 1. What pleadings are not allowed. The following pleadings are not allowed:
x x x
d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in election
offense cases;
x x x "
22
Docketed as SPA 01-113. As earlier noted, Akbayan also filed before the Comelec a similar
Petition, docketed as SPA-01-109. See Annexes 1 and 2, Comment of the Office of the Solicitor
General; Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 250 et seq. and 266 et seq.
23
Section 1, Rule 65. See Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222, October 16, 1996; BF
Corporation v. CA, 288 SCRA 267, March 27, 1998; GSIS v. Olisa, 304 SCRA 421, March 10,
1999; National Steel Corporation v. CA, GR No. 134437, January 31, 2000; Sahali v. Comelec, GR
No. 134169, February 2, 2000
24
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 269 SCRA 316, March 7, 1997, per Panganiban, J. See also ABS-
CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Commission on Elections, GR No. 133486, January 28, 2000;
Central Bank v. Cloribel, 44 SCRA 307, April 11, 1972.
25
Salonga v. Cruz Pao, 134 SCRA 438, February 18, 1985, per Gutierrez, Jr., J. See also Taada
v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997; Guingona v. Gonzales, 219 SCRA 326, March 1, 1993.
26
ABS-CBN v. Comelec, GR No. 133486, January 28, 2000, per Panganiban, J.
27
Petition of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, p. 15; Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 18.
28
Petition of Bayan Muna, p. 18; Rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 20.
29
OSG Comment, p. 18; Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 244.
30
Emphasis supplied. See also 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution.
31
It may be noted that when the Constitution was being drafted in the early days of the post-Marcos
era, UNIDO was the dominant political party.
32
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 86.
33
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 570.
34
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 86.
35
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 561.
36
Infra.
37
Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 747, February 26, 1997; Ramirez v. CA, 248 SCRA 590,
September 28, 1995.
38
82 C.J.S. Statutes 331.
39
OSG Comment, p. 18; Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 244.
40
Infra.
41
TSN, May 17, 2001, pp. 147-148.
42
Counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko.
43
TSN, May 17, 2001, pp. 178-180.
44
Supra. See also 6, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, which reads: "A free and open party system
shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of
this Article."
45
Section 2 of RA 7941 states in part as follows: "x x x. Towards this end, the State shall develop
and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing
their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest
scheme possible."
46
JM Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413, February 18, 1970; cited in
Ruben C. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., p. 311. See also Gold Creek Mining Corp. v.
Rodriguez, 66 Phil 259, 264 (1938).
47
See Agpalo, Ibid., p. 313.
48
194 SCRA 317, February 22, 1991, per Fernan, CJ; quoting Commonwealth v. Ralph, 111 Pa
365, 3 Atl 220.
49
Taada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997. See also Santiago v. Guingona, 298 SCRA 756,
November 18, 1998; Miranda v. Aguirre, 314 SCRA 603, September 16, 1999; Garcia v. HRET,
312 SCRA 353, August 12, 1999.
50
Veterans Federation Party et al. v. Comelec et al., GR No. 136781, October 6, 2000.
51
See Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 278, February 18, 1999; Inciong Jr. v. CA, 257
SCRA 578, June 26, 1996; Palomado v. NLRC, 257 SCRA 680, June 28, 1996; Heirs of the Late
Teodoro Guaring Jr. v. CA, 269 SCRA 283, March 7, 1997; Sesbreo v. Central Board of
Assessment Appeals, 270 SCRA 360, March 24, 1997; PCGG v. Cojuangco Jr., 302 SCRA 217,
January 27, 1999.
52
TSN, May 17, 2001, p. 180.
53
Petition of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, p. 16; Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 19.
54
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 636.
55
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 589.
56
2 (5), Article IX (C).
57
Christian S. Monsod.
58
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 634
59
See also 11, Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A.
60
See 2 (4), Article IX (B) of the Constitution. See also Article 261 (o), BP 881.
61
The bicameral conference committee on the disagreeing provision of Senate Bill No. 1913 and
House Bill No. 3040, January 31, 1994, p. 4.


EN BANC
G.R. No. 179271 July 8, 2009
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY
(BANAT), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers), Respondent.
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.
AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR
CITIZENS),Intervenor.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179295
BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION
AND HARMONY TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., and ABONO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
CARPIO, J .:
The House of Representatives, represented by Speaker Prospero C. Nograles, filed a motion for leave to
intervene in G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295. The House of Representatives filed a motion for clarification in
intervention and enumerated the issues for clarification as follows:
A. There are only 219 legislative districts and not 220. Accordingly, the alloted seats for party-list
representation should only be 54 and not 55. The House of Representatives seeks clarification on
which of the party-list representatives shall be admitted to the Roll of Members considering that the
Court declared as winners 55 party-list representatives.
B. The House of Representatives wishes to be guided on whether it should enroll in its Roll of
Members the 32 named party-list representatives enumerated in Table 3 or only such number of
representatives that would complete the 250 member maximum prescribed by Article VI, Sec. 5(1)
of the Constitution. In the event that it is ordered to admit all 32, will this act not violate the above-
cited Constitutional provision considering that the total members would now rise to 270.
C. The Court declared as unconstitutional the 2% threshold only in relation to the distribution of
additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. Yet, it
distributed first seats to party-list groups which did not attain the minimum number of votes that will
entitle them to one seat. Clarification is, therefore, sought whether the term "additional seats" refer
to 2nd and 3rd seats only or all remaining available seats. Corollary thereto, the House of
Representatives wishes to be clarified whether there is no more minimum vote requirement to
qualify as a party-list representative.
D. For the guidance of the House of Representatives, clarification is sought as to whether the
principle laid down in Veterans that "the filling up of the allowable seats for party-list representatives
is not mandatory," has been abandoned.
1

On the other hand, Armi Jane Roa-Borje (Roa-Borje), third nominee of Citizens Battle Against Corruption
(CIBAC), filed a motion for leave for partial reconsideration-in-intervention, alleging that:
The Supreme Court, in ruling on the procedure for distribution of seats, has deprived without due process and
in violation of the equal protection clause, parties with more significant constituencies, such as CIBAC,
Gabriela and APEC, in favor of parties who did not even meet the 2% threshold.
2

Following the Courts Decision of 21 April 2009, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) submitted to this
Court on 27 April 2009 National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 09-001. NBC Resolution No. 09-
001 updated the data used by this Court in its Decision of 21 April 2009. The total votes for party-list is now
15,723,764 following the cancellation of the registration of party-list group Filipinos for Peace, Justice and
Progress Movement (FPJPM). Moreover, the total number of legislative districts is now 219 following the
annulment of Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Thus, the
percentage and ranking of the actual winning party-list groups are different from Table 3 of the Decision in
G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.
The Number of Members of the House of Representatives
in the 2007 Elections
Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Emphasis supplied)
The 1987 Constitution fixes the maximum number of members of the House of Representatives at 250.
However, the 1987 Constitution expressly allows for an increase in the number of members of the House of
Representatives provided a law is enacted for the purpose. This is clear from the phrase "unless otherwise
provided by law" in Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The Legislature has the option to
choose whether the increase in the number of members of the House of Representatives is done by
piecemeal legislation or by enactment of a law authorizing a general increase. Legislation that makes
piecemeal increases of the number of district representatives is no less valid than legislation that makes a
general increase.
In 1987, there were only 200 legislative districts. Twenty legislative districts were added by piecemeal
legislation after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution:
Republic Act Year Signed
into Law
Legislative District
1 7160 1992 Biliran
2 7675 1994 Mandaluyong City
3 7854 1994 Makati (2nd District)
4 7878 1995 Apayao
5 7896 and 7897 1995 Guimaras
6 7926 1995 Muntinlupa City
7 8470 1998 Compostela Valley
8 8487 1998 Taguig City (2nd District)
9 8526 1998 Valenzuela City (2nd District)
10 9229 2003 Paraaque (2nd District)
11 9230 2003 San Jose del Monte City
12 8508 and 9232 1998 and 2003 Antipolo (1st District)
13 9232 2003 Antipolo (2nd District)
14 9269 2004 Zamboanga City (2nd District)
15 9355 2006 Dinagat Island
16 9357 2006 Sultan Kudarat (2nd District)
17 9360 2006 Zamboanga Sibugay (2nd District)
18 9364 2006 Marikina City (2nd District)
19 9371 2007 Cagayan de Oro (2nd District)
20 9387 2007 Navotas City
Thus, for purposes of the 2007 elections, there were only 219 district representatives. Navotas City became a
separate district on 24 June 2007, more than a month after the 14 May 2007 elections.
The Number of Party-List Seats
in the 2007 Elections
Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads in part:
The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. x x x
The 1987 Constitution fixes the ratio of party-list representatives to district representatives. This ratio
automatically applies whenever the number of district representatives is increased by law. The mathematical
formula for determining the number of seats available to party-list representatives is
Number of seats available
to legislative districts

x .20 =
Number of seats available to
party-list representatives
.80
As we stated in our Decision of 21 April 2009, "[t]his formula allows for the corresponding increase in the
number of seats available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created by
law." Thus, for every four district representatives, the 1987 Constitution mandates that there shall be one
party-list representative. There is no need for legislation to create an additional party-list seat whenever four
additional legislative districts are created by law. Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution automatically
creates such additional party-list seat.
We use the table below to illustrate the relationship between the number of legislative districts and the
number of party-list seats for every election year after 1987.
Election
Year
Number of Legislative
Districts
Number of
Party-List Seats
Total Number of Members of the
House of Representatives
1992 200 50 250
1995 206 51 257
New Districts:
Biliran
Mandaluyong City
Makati (2nd District)
Apayao
Guimaras
Muntinlupa City

1998 209 52 261
New Districts:
Compostela Valley
Taguig City (2nd District)
Valenzuela City (2nd
District)

2001 209 52 261
2004 214 53 267
New Districts:
Paraaque City (2nd
District)
San Jose del Monte City
Antipolo (1st District)
Antipolo (2nd District)
Zamboanga City (2nd
District)

2007 219 54 273
New Districts:
Dinagat Island

Sultan Kudarat (2nd
District)
Zamboanga Sibugay (2nd
District)
Marikina City (2nd District)
Cagayan de Oro (2nd
District)
2010 220 55 275
New District:
Navotas City
(assuming no additional
districts are created)

We see that, as early as the election year of 1995, the total number of members of the House of
Representatives is already beyond the initial maximum of 250 members as fixed in the 1987 Constitution.
Any change in the number of legislative districts brings a corresponding change in the number of party-list
seats. However, the increase in the number of members of the House of Representatives went unnoticed as
the available seats for party-list representatives have never been filled up before. As of the oral arguments in
G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295, there were 220 legislative districts. Fifty-five party-list seats were thus
allocated. However, the number of legislative districts was subsequently reduced to 219 with our ruling on 16
July 2008 declaring void the creation of the Province of Sharif Kabunsuan.
3
Thus, in the 2007 elections, the
number of party-list seats available for distribution should be correspondingly reduced from 55 to 54.
The filling-up of all available party-list seats is not mandatory. Actual occupancy of the party-list seats
depends on the number of participants in the party-list election. If only ten parties participated in the 2007
party-list election, then, despite the availability of 54 seats, the maximum possible number of occupied party-
list seats would only be 30 because of the three-seat cap. In such a case, the three-seat cap prevents the
mandatory allocation of all the 54 available seats.
Under Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941, garnering 2% of the total votes cast guarantees a party one seat. This
2% threshold for the first round of seat allocation does not violate any provision of the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, the Court upholds this 2% threshold for the guaranteed seats as a valid exercise of legislative
power.1avvphi1
In the second round allocation of additional seats, there is no minimum vote requirement to obtain a party-list
seat because the Court has struck down the application of the 2% threshold in the allocation of additional
seats. Specifically, the provision in Section 11(b) of the Party-List Act stating that "those garnering more than
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in the proportion to their total number of
votes" can no longer be given any effect. Otherwise, the 20 percent party-list seats in the total membership of
the House of Representatives as provided in the 1987 Constitution will mathematically be impossible to fill up.
However, a party-list organization has to obtain a sufficient number of votes to gain a seat in the second
round of seat allocation. What is deemed a sufficient number of votes is dependent upon the circumstances
of each election, such as the number of participating parties, the number of available party-list seats, and the
number of parties with guaranteed seats received in the first round of seat allocation. To continue the
example above, if only ten parties participated in the 2007 party-list election and each party received only one
thousand votes, then each of the ten parties would receive 10% of the votes cast. All are guaranteed one
seat, and are further entitled to receive two more seats in the second round of seat allocation.
Similarly, a presidential candidate may win the elections even if he receives only one thousand votes as long
as all his opponents receive less than one thousand votes. A winning presidential candidate only needs to
receive more votes than his opponents. The same policy applies in every election to public office, from the
presidential to the barangay level. Except for the guaranteed party-list seat, there is no minimum vote
requirement before a candidate in any election, for any elective office, can be proclaimed the winner. Of
course, the winning candidate must receive at least one vote, assuming he has no opponents or all his
opponents do not receive a single vote.
In the absence of a minimum vote requirement in the second round of party-list seat allocation, there is no
need to belabor the disparity between the votes obtained by the first and last ranked winning parties in the
2007 party-list elections. In the same manner, no one belabors the disparity between the votes obtained by
the highest and lowest ranked winners in the senatorial elections. However, for those interested in comparing
the votes received by party-list representatives vis-a-vis the votes received by district representatives, the
162,678 votes cast in favor of TUCP, the last party to obtain a party-list seat, is significantly higher than the
votes received by 214 of the 218 elected district representatives.
4

The Actual Number of Party-List Representatives
in the 2007 Elections
The data used in Table 3 of our Decision promulgated on 21 April 2009 was based on the submissions of the
parties. We used the figures from Party-List Canvass Report No. 32, as of 6:00 p.m. of 31 August 2007. The
NBC issued NBC Report No. 33 on 11 June 2008, updating the 31 August 2007 report. The parties did not
furnish this Court with a copy of NBC Report No. 33. In any case, we stated in the dispositive portion of
our Decision that "[t]he allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance
with the procedureused in Table 3 of this decision." Party-List Canvass Report No. 32 is not part of the
procedure.1avvphi1
The computation of the COMELEC in NBC No. 09-001 applying the procedure laid down in our Decision
requires correction for purposes of accuracy. Instead of multiplying the percentage of votes garnered over the
total votes for party-list by 36, the COMELEC multiplied the percentage by 37. Thirty-six is the proper
multiplier as it is the difference between 54, the number of available party-list seats, and 18, the number of
guaranteed seats. Only the figures in column (C) are affected. The allocation of seats to the winning party-
list organizations, however, remains the same as in NBC No. 09-001. Our modification of the
COMELECs computation in NBC No. 09-001 is shown below:
Rank Party
Votes
Garnered
Votes Garnered
over
Total Votes for
Party List, in %
(A)
Guaranteed
Seat
(First Round)
(B)
Additional
Seats
(Second
Round)
(C)
(B) plus (C), in
whole integers
(D)
Applying the three
seat cap
(E)
1 BUHAY 1,169,338 7.44% 1 2.68 3 N.A.
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,189 6.23% 1 2.24 3 N.A.
3 CIBAC 755,735 4.81% 1 1.73 2 N.A.
4 GABRIELA 621,266 3.95% 1 1.42 2 N.A.
5 APEC 619,733 3.94% 1 1.42 2 N.A.
6 A Teacher 490,853 3.12% 1 1.12 2 N.A.
7 AKBAYAN 466,448 2.97% 1 1.07 2 N.A.
8
5
ALAGAD 423,165 2.69% 1 1 2 N.A.
9 COOP-
NATCCO
409,987 2.61% 1 1 2 N.A.
10 BUTIL 409,168 2.60% 1 1 2 N.A.
11 BATAS 385,956 2.45% 1 1 2 N.A.
12 ARC 374,349 2.38% 1 1 2 N.A.
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,323 2.36% 1 1 2 N.A.
14 AMIN 347,527 2.21% 1 1 2 N.A.
15 ABONO 340,002 2.16% 1 1 2 N.A.
16 YACAP 331,623 2.11% 1 1 2 N.A.
17 AGAP 328,814 2.09% 1 1 2 N.A.
18 AN WARAY 321,516 2.04% 1 1 2 N.A.
19 UNI-MAD 251,804 1.60% 0 1 1 N.A.
20 ABS 235,152 1.50% 0 1 1 N.A.
21 ALIF 229,267 1.46% 0 1 1 N.A.
22 KAKUSA 229,036 1.46% 0 1 1 N.A.
23 KABATAAN 228,700 1.45% 0 1 1 N.A.
24 ABA-AKO 219,363 1.40% 0 1 1 N.A.
25 SENIOR
CITIZENS
213,095 1.36% 0 1 1 N.A.
26 AT 200,030 1.27% 0 1 1 N.A.
27 VFP 196,358 1.25% 0 1 1 N.A.
28 ANAD 188,573 1.20% 0 1 1 N.A.
29 BANAT 177,068 1.13% 0 1 1 N.A.
30 ANG
KASANGGA
170,594 1.08% 0 1 1 N.A.
31 BANTAY 169,869 1.08% 0 1 1 N.A.
32 ABAKADA 166,897 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A.
33 1-UTAK 165,012 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A.
34 TUCP 162,678 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.
35 COCOFED 156,007 0.99% 0 0 0 N.A.
Total 18 54
Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) and Ang Laban ng Indiginong
Filipino (ALIF) both have pending cases before the COMELEC. The COMELEC correctly deferred the
proclamation of both BATAS and ALIF as the outcome of their cases may affect the final composition of party-
list representatives. The computation and allocation of seats may still be modified in the event that the
COMELEC decides against BATAS and/or ALIF.
To address Roa-Borjes motion for partial reconsideration-in-intervention and for purposes of computing the
results in future party-list elections, we reiterate that in the second step of the second round of seat allocation,
the preference in the distribution of seats should be in accordance with the higher percentage and higher
rank, without limiting the distribution
to parties receiving two-percent of the votes.
6
To limit the distribution of seats to the two-percenters would
mathematically prevent the filling up of all the available party-list seats.
In the table above, CIBAC cannot claim a third seat from the seat allocated to TUCP, the last ranked party
allocated with a seat. CIBAC's 2.81% (from the percentage of 4.81% less the 2% for its guaranteed seat) has
a lower fractional seat value after the allocation of its second seat compared to TUCP's 1.03%. CIBAC's
fractional seat after receiving two seats is only 0.03 compared to TUCP's 0.38 fractional seat. Multiplying
CIBAC's 2.81% by 37, the additional seats for distribution in the second round, gives 1.03 seat, leaving 0.03
fractional seat. Multiplying TUCP's 1.03% by 37 gives a fractional seat of 0.38, higher than CIBAC's fractional
seat of 0.03. The fractional seats become material only in the second step of the second round of seat
allocation to determine the ranking of parties. Thus, for purposes of the second step in the second round of
seat allocation,
7
TUCP has a higher rank than CIBAC.
Roa-Borjes position stems from the perceived need for absolute proportionality in the allocation of party-list
seats. However, the 1987 Constitution does not require absolute proportionality in the allocation of party-list
seats. Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties and
organizations. (Boldfacing and italicization supplied)
The phrase "legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area
in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio" in Section 5(1) of Article VI requires that legislative districts shall be apportioned according to
proportional representation. However, this principle of proportional representation applies only to legislative
districts, not to the party-list system. The allocation of seats under the party-list system is governed by the
last phrase of Section 5(1), which states that the party-list representatives shall be "those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected through a party-list system," giving the Legislature wide discretion in formulating
the allocation of party-list seats. Clearly, there is no constitutional requirement for absolute proportional
representation in the allocation of party-list seats in the House of Representatives.
Section 2, on Declaration of Policy, of R.A. No. 7941 provides that the "State shall promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system
of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof x x x." However, this
proportional representation in Section 2 is qualified by Section 11(b)
8
of the same law which mandates a
three-seat cap, which is intended to bar any single party-list organization from dominating the party-list
system. Section 11(b) also qualifies this proportional representation by imposing a two percent cut-off for
those entitled to the guaranteed seats. These statutory qualifications are valid because they do not violate the
Constitution, which does not require absolute proportional representation for the party-list system.
To summarize, there are four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election system:
1. Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of the House of Representatives is the
maximum number of seats available to party-list organizations, such that there is automatically one
party-list seat for every four existing legislative districts.
2. Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the party-list elections guarantees a party-list
organization one seat. The guaranteed seats shall be distributed in a first round of seat allocation to
parties receiving at least two percent of the total party-list votes.
3. The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall
be distributed to the party-list organizations including those that received less than two percent of
the total votes. The continued operation of the two percent threshold as it applies to the allocation
of the additional seats is now unconstitutional because this threshold mathematically and physically
prevents the filling up of the available party-list seats. The additional seats shall be distributed to
the parties in a second round of seat allocation according to the two-step procedure laid down in
the Decision of 21 April 2009 as clarified in this Resolution.
4. The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat cap is intended by the Legislature to prevent
any party from dominating the party-list system. There is no violation of the Constitution because
the 1987 Constitution does not require absolute proportionality for the party-list system. The well-
settled rule is that courts will not question the wisdom of the Legislature as long as it is not violative
of the Constitution.
These four parameters allow the mathematical and practical fulfillment of the Constitutional provision that
party-list representatives shall comprise twenty percent of the members of the House of Representatives. At
the same time, these four parameters uphold as much as possible the Party-List Act, striking down only that
provision of the Party-List Act that could not be reconciled anymore with the 1987 Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the Courts Decision of 21 April 2009 in the present case is clarified accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice


Footnotes
1
Urgent Motion for Clarification in Intervention, pp. 6-17.
2
Motion for Partial Reconsideration-in-Intervention, p. 11.
3
Bai Sandra S.A. Sema v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. Nos. 177597 & 178628, 16 July
2008, 558 SCRA 700.
4
Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), pp. 1148-1163.
5
The product of the percentage and the remaining available seats of all parties ranked eight and
below is less than one.
6
In our Decision of 21 April 2009, we stated: "[W]e do not limit our allocation of additional seats in
Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate
is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900 [now
15,723,764], the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the
second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats,
38 [now 37], which is the difference between the 55 [now 54] maximum seats reserved under the
Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the
product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share in
the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in
rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 [now
37] seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine
the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled."
7
Id.
8
SECTION 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of
Representatives including those under the party-list.
x x x
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall
be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each:
Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided,
finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats. (Emphasis supplied)



SEPARATE OPINION
NACHURA, J .:
This will clarify my position in these consolidated cases.
I concurred in the April 24, 2009 ponencia of the Honorable Justice Antonio T. Carpio subject to my
submission that Section 11,
1
Republic Act No. 7941
2
or the Party-List System Act, insofar as it requires a two
percent (2%) threshold vote to entitle a party, sectoral organization or coalition to a seat in the House of
Representatives under the party-list system, is unconstitutional. As explained in my Separate Opinion, the 2%
minimum vote requirement poses an insurmountable barrier to the full implementation of Section 5 (2), Article
VI of the Philippine Constitution.
My advocacy, however, does not extend to the complete disregard of a threshold vote. I expressed full
agreement with [now Chief] Justice Reynato S. Puno who, in his Separate Concurring Opinion in Veterans
Federation Party v. Commission on Elections,
3
validated the need for a minimum vote requirement, in order
1. to avaoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system as a fallback position;
2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose chances are very
low, from participating in the elections;
3. to avoid the reserve seat system from opening up the system;
4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard and earn their seats within the
system;
5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of the elective
representatives in the legislative body, rather than owing to some degree their seats in the
legislative body either to an outright constitutional gift or to an appointment by the President of the
Philippines;
6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those who have
not really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents and, in
turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list
system; and
7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be represented.
4

Thus, we proposed that, until Congress shall have effected an acceptable amendment to Section 11, R.A.
7941, we should abide by the sensible standard of "proportional representation" and adopt a gradually
regressive threshold vote requirement, inversely proportional to the increase in the number of party-list seats.
Expressed differently, we do not propose that Section 11 or a paragraph thereof be scrapped for being
unconstitutional. It is only the ratio of 2% that we find as unconstitutionalthe steady increase in the party-list
seat allotment as it keeps pace with the creation of additional legislative districts, and the foreseeable growth
of party-list groups, the fixed 2% vote requirement/ratio is no longer viable. It does not adequately respond to
the inevitable changes that come with time; and it is, in fact, inconsistent with the Constitution, because it
prevents the fundamental law from ever being fully operative.
Obviously, the ponencia did not fully accept our submission. It declared as unconstitutional the 2% threshold
vote only with respect to the second round of allocating party-list seats (on the additional seats); it continued
to apply the 2% minimum vote requirement for entitlement to a seat under the first round of allocation (on the
guaranteed seats). This, clearly, was not the intent of our modified concurrence to the ponencia, as
expressed in our Separate Opinion.
As expressed in that opinion, the formula which must be adoptedscrapping only the 2% ratio but still
adopting a threshold vote requirement, is as follows:
100%
(Total number of votes cast for party-list)

54 party-list seats (as clarified)
= 1.8518%
Clearly, the minimum vote requirement will gradually lessen as the number of party-list seats increases. Thus,
in a scenario in which there are 100 party-list seats, the threshold vote is computed as follows:
100%
(Total number of votes cast for party-list)

100 party-list seats
= 1%
This is the more logical and equitable formula. It would judiciously respond to the inevitable changes in the
composition of the House of Representatives; it would open opportunities for the broadest peoples
representation in the House of Representatives; and more importantly, it would not violate the Constitution.
Moreover, the threshold vote requirement, as enacted by Congress and as validated by this Court in
Veterans, is maintained.
Additionally, the formula will not be discriminatory as it will not only apply in the first round of allocation of
seats, but will also be applicable in the second round. While I do not wish to belabor the point, the erroneous
application by the ponencia of a threshold vote (2%) in the first round of allocation of seats, and its disregard
in the second round, might cause an unintended transgression of the equal protection clause, which requires
that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to the rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.
5

Thus, as I have expressed before, with respect to the fixed threshold vote of 2% (only the ratio) in Section 11
of R.A. No. 7941, I join the Court in declaring it unconstitutional, since all enactments inconsistent with the
Constitution should be invalidated.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice


Footnotes
1
The provision reads in full:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of
Representatives including those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the
basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth
Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall
be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That
those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. [Emphasis
supplied]
2
Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES
THROUGH THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR"; approved
on March 3, 1995.
3
G.R. No. 136781, October 6, 2000; 342 SCRA 244.
4
Id. at 290.
5
Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, supra note 11, at 711-712.












EN BANC

G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and ROBERTO R.
TOBIAS, JR. petitioners,
vs.
HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.
Estrella, Bautista & Associates for petitioners.

BIDIN, J .:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to
only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this
legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A.
No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of
Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the
voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A.
No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49
thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution.
Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:
As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district
with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage
of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall
become the new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected
at the same election.
Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes the "one
subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall
be expressed in the title thereof.
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter
embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and
(2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675
since the said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the
title of the law. Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a subject distinct from that stated in the title of the law,
the "one subject-one bill" rule has not been complied with.
Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) of the Constitution, which
provide, to wit:
Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations.
Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall
make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this
section.
Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under
Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives
beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said
division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the
minimum population requirements. And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of preempting
the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the statutory conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand
indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution:
. . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).
Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that the creation of a separate
congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a
subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and
logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily
includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so
as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the
constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather
than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses
the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."
The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further elucidated in Lidasan v.
Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of
the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the
subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation" (emphasis supplied).
Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to the effect that there is no mention in
the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum
requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, the same does not
suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed
through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the
minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that
all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the
enactment of said laws.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set
forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows
that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The
inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if
Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional
representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to have separate legislative
districts, the assailed Section 49 of R.A.
No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion
legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it
was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49
thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners present further arguments against the
validity thereof.
Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on
R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit
since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants
of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of
status of neighboring Mandaluyong.
Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has resulted in "gerrymandering," which is the
practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As
correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the
assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having
consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency has in
fact been diminished, which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.













EN BANC

G.R. No. 118702 March 16, 1995
CIRILO ROY G. MONTEJO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
SERGIO A.F. APOSTOL, intervenor.

PUNO, J .:
More than political fortunes are at stake in the case at bench. Petitioner Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, representing
the First District of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC,
redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates the principle of equality of
representation. To remedy the alleged inequity, petitioner seeks to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from his
district to the Second District of the province. Intervenor Sergio A.F. Apostol, representing the Second District,
vigorously opposed the inclusion ofTolosa in his district. We gave due course to the petition considering that,
at bottom, it involves the validity of the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of
redistricting and reapportionment.
The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of five (5) legislative districts.
1

The first district
2
covers Tacloban City and the municipalities of Alangalang, Babatngon, Palo, San Miguel,
Sta. Fe, Tanauan and Tolosa.
The second district
3
is composed of the municipalities of Barugo, Barauen, Capoocan, Carigara, Dagami,
Dulag, Jaro, Julita, La Pat, Mayorga, MacArthur, Pastrana, Tabontabon, and Tunga.
The third district
4
is composed of the municipalities of Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian,
Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, Tabango, and Villaba.
The fourth district
5
is composed of Ormoc City and the municipalities of Albuera, Isabel, Kananga, Matagob,
Merida, and Palompon.
The fifth district
6
is composed of the municipalities of Abuyog, Bate, Baybay, Hilongos, Hindang, Inopacan,
Javier, Mahaplag, and Matalom.
Biliran, located in the third district of Leyte , was made its sub-province by virtue of Republic Act No. 2141
Section 1 of the law spelled out enacted on April 8, 1959.
7

Section 1 of the law spelled out the municipalities comprising the sub-province, viz.: "Almeria, Biliran,
Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the territories comprised therein."
On January 1, 1992, the Local Government Code took effect. Pursuant to its Section 462, the sub-province of
Biliran became a regular province. It provides:
Existing sub-provinces are hereby converted into regular provinces
upon approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be
held in the sub-provinces and the original provinces directly affected.
The plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC simultaneously
with the national elections following the effectivity of this code. The
new legislative districts created as a result of such conversion shall
continue to be represented in Congress by the duly-elected
representatives of the original districts out of which said new
provinces or districts were created until their own representatives
shall have been elected in the next regular congressional elections
and qualified.
The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
held on May 11, 1992. As a consequence of the conversion, eight (8) municipalities of the Third District
composed the new province of Biliran, i.e., Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan,
Maripipi, and Naval. A further consequence was to reduce the Third District to five (5) municipalities with a
total population of 145,067 as per the 1990 census.
To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the province of
Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent representatives of the province
and other interested parties. On December 29, 1994, it promulgated Resolution No. 2736 where, among
others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of
the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte. The composition of the First District which includes the
municipality of Tolosaand the composition of the Fifth District were not disturbed. After the movement of
municipalities, the composition of the five (5) legislative districts appeared as follows:
First District: Population Registered
Voters
(1990) (1994)
1. Tacloban City, 137,190 81,679
2. Alangalang, 33,375 20,543
3. Babatngon, 17,795 9,929
4. Palo, 38,100 20,816
5. San Miguel, 13,438 8,167
6. Sta. Fe, 12,119 7,497
7. Tanauan and, 38,033 22,357
8. Tolosa; 13,299 7,700

TOTAL 303,349 178,688
Second District: Population Registered
Voters
(1990) (1994)
1. Barugo, 23,817 13,237
2. Barauen, 46,029 23,307
3. Carigara 38,863 22,036
4. Dagami, 25,606 16,519
5. Dulag, 33,020 19,375
6. Jaro, 31,727 17,139
7. Julita, 9,944 6,196
8. La Paz, 14,311 9,003
9. Mayorga, 10,530 5,868
10. Mac Arthur, 13,159 8,628
11. Pastrana, 12,565 7,348
12. Tabontabon, and 7,183 4,419
13. Tunga; 5,413 3,387

TOTAL 272,167 156,462
Third District: Population Registered
Voters
(1990) (1994)
1. Calubian, 25,968 16,649
2. Leyte, 32,575 16,415
3. San Isidro, 24,442 14,916
4. Tabango, 29,743 15,48
5. Villaba, 32,339 21,227
6. Capoocan, and 23,687 13,595
7. Palompon; 45,745 27,474

TOTAL 214,499 125,763
Fourth District: Population Registered
Voters
(1990) (1994)
1. Ormoc City, 129,456 75,140
2. Albuera, 32,395 17,493
3. Isabel, 33,389 21,889
4. Kananga, 36,288 19,873
5. Matagob, 15,474 9,407
6. Merida, and 22,345 12,474

TOTAL 269,347 155,995
Fifth District: Population Registered
Voters
(1990) (1994)
1. Abuyog, 47,265 28,682
2. Bato, 28,197 116,13
3. Baybay, 82,281 47,923
4. Hilongos, 48,617 26,871
5. Hindang, 16,272 9,659
6. Inopacan, 16,894 10,401
7. Javier, 18,658 11,713
8. Mahaplag, and 22,673 13,616
9. Matalom 28,291 16,247

TOTAL 309,148 181,242
Petitioner Montejo filed a motion for reconsideration calling the attention of respondent COMELEC, among
others, to the inequitable distribution of inhabitants and voters between the First and Second Districts. He
alleged that the First District has 178,688 registered voters while the Second District has 156,462 registered
voters or a difference of 22,226 registered voters. To diminish the difference, he proposed that the
municipality of Tolosa with 7,7000 registered voters be transferred from the First to the Second District. The
motion was opposed by intervenor, Sergio A.F. Apostol. Respondent Commission denied the motion ruling
that: (1) its adjustment of municipalities involved the least disruption of the territorial composition of each
district; and (2) said adjustment complied with the constitutional requirement that each legislative district shall
comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.
In this petition, petitioner insists that Section I of Resolution No. 2736 violates the principle of equality of
representation ordained in the Constitution. Citing Wesberry v. Sanders,
8
he argues that respondent
COMELEC violated "the constitutional precept that as much as practicable one man's vote in a congressional
election is to be worth as much as another's." The Solicitor General, in his Comment, concurred with the
views of the petitioner. The intervenor, however, opposed the petition on two (2) grounds: (1) COMELEC has
no jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. 2736; and (2) assuming it has jurisdiction, said Resolution is in
accord with the Constitution. Respondent COMELEC filed its own Comment alleging that it acted within the
parameters of the Constitution.
We find section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 void.
While the petition at bench presents a significant issue, our first inquiry will relate to the constitutional power
of the respondent COMELEC
9
to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another legislative
district in the province of Leyte. The basic powers of respondent COMELEC, as enforcer and administrator of
our election laws, are spelled out in black and white in section 2(c), Article IX of the Constitution. Rightly,
respondent COMELEC does not invoke this provision but relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to
make laws. The Ordinance is entitled "Apportioning the Seats of the House of Representatives of the
Congress of the Philippines to the Different Legislative Districts in Provinces and Cities and the Metropolitan
Manila Area." Its substantive sections state:
Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the House of Representatives of the
First Congress of the Philippines under the Constitution proposed by the 1986
Constitutional Commission and subsequent elections, and until otherwise provided by
law, the Members thereof shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila Area as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor
adjustments of the reapportionment herein made.
Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may
hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of Members as it
may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the
standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution.
The number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province
was created or where the city, whose population has so increased, is geographically
located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such
adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Ordinance was made necessary because Proclamation No. 3
10
of President Corazon C. Aquino,
ordaining the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, abolished the Batasang
Pambansa.
11
She then exercised legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution.
12

The Ordinance was the principal handiwork of then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
13
now a
distinguished member of this Court. The records reveal that the Constitutional Commission had to resolve
several prejudicial issues before authorizing the first congressional elections under the 1987 Constitution.
Among the vital issues were: whether the members of the House of Representatives would be elected by
district or by province; who shall undertake the apportionment of the legislative districts; and, how the
apportionment should be made.
14
Commissioner Davide, Jr. offered three (3) options for the Commission to
consider: (1) allow President Aquino to do the apportionment by law; (2) empower the COMELEC to make the
apportionment; or (3) let the Commission exercise the power by way of an Ordinance appended to the
Constitution.
15
The different dimensions of the options were discussed by Commissioners Davide, Felicitas S.
Aquino and Blas F. Ople. We quote the debates in extenso, viz.:
16

xxx xxx xxx
MR. PADILLA. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Padilla is recognized.
MR. PADILLA. I think I have filed a very simple motion by way of amendment by
substitution and this was, I believe, a prior or a proposed amendment. Also, the chairman
of the Committee on the Legislative said that he was proposing a vote first by the
Chamber on the concept of whether the election is by province and cities on the one
hand, or by legislative districts on the other. So I propose this simple formulation which
reads: "FOR THE FIRST ELECTION UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION THE LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICTS SHALL BE APPORTIONED BY THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS." I
hope the chairman will accept the proposed amendment.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
MR. DAVIDE. The effect is, more or less, the same insofar as the apportionment is
concerned, but the Bernas-Sarmiento et al. proposal would also provide for a mandate
for the apportionment later, meaning after the first election, which will in effect embody
what the Commission had approved, reading as follows: "Within three years following the
return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standards provided in this section."
So, Mr. Presiding Officer, may I request for a suspension of the session, so that all the
proponents can work together.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The session is suspended.
It was 3:33 p.m.
RESUMPTION OF SESSION
At 3:40 p.m., the session was resumed.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The session is resumed.
Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Mr. Presiding Officer, as a compromise, I wonder if the Commission will
allow this. We will just delete the proposed subparagraph (4) and all the capitalized
words in paragraph (5). So that in paragraph (5), what would be left would only be the
following: "Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall
make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this
section."
But we shall have an ordinance appended to the new Constitution indicating specifically
the following: "FOR PURPOSES OF THE ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE FIRST CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION IMMEDIATELY
FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE
1986 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION AND SUBSEQUENT ELECTIONS AND UNTIL
OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW, THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE ELECTED FROM LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS
APPORTIONED AMONG THE PROVINCES, CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN
MANILA AREA AS FOLLOWS."
And what will follow will be the allocation of seats to Metropolitan Manila Area, to the
provinces and to the cities, without indicating the municipalities comprising each of the
districts. Then, under Section 2, we will mandate the COMELEC to make the actual
apportionment on the basis of the number of seats provided for and allocated to each
province by us.
MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Aquino is recognized.
MS. AQUINO. I have to object to the provision which will give mandate to COMELEC to
do the redistricting. Redistricting is vitally linked to the baneful practices of cutting up
areas or spheres of influence; in other words, gerrymandering. This Commission, being a
nonpartisan, a nonpolitical deliberative body, is in the best possible situation under the
circumstances to undertake that responsibility. We are not wanting in expertise and in
time because in the first place, the Committee on the Legislative has prepared the report
on the basis of the recommendation of the COMELEC.
MR. OPLE. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Ople is recognized.
MR. OPLE. I would like to support the position taken by Commissioner Aquino in this
respect. We know that the reapportionment of provinces and cities for the purpose of
redistricting is generally inherent in the constituent power or in the legislative power. And
I would feel very uncertain about delegating this to a quasi-judicial body even if it is one
of the constitutional offices created under this Constitution. We have the assurance of
Commissioner Davide, as chairman of the Committee on the Legislative, that even given
the very short time remaining in the life of this Commission, there is no reason why we
cannot complete the work of reapportionment on the basis of the COMELEC plan which
the committee has already thoroughly studied and which remains available to the
Constitutional Commission.
So, I support the position taken by Commissioner Aquino, Mr. Presiding Officer. I think, it
is the safest, the most reasonable, and the most workable approach that is available to
this Commission.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What does Commissioner Davide say:
MR. DAVIDE. The issue now is whether this body will make the apportionment itself or
whether we will leave it to the COMELEC. So, there arises, therefore, a prejudicial
question for the body to decide. I would propose that the Commission should now decide
what body should make the apportionment. Should it be the Commission or should it be
the COMELEC? And the Committee on the Legislative will act accordingly on the basis of
the decision.
MR. BENGZON. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Bengzon is recognized.
MR. BENGZON. Apropos of that, I would like to inform the body that I believe the
Committee on the Legislative has precisely worked on this matter and they are ready with
a list of apportionment. They have, in fact, apportioned the whole country into various
districts based on the recommendation of the COMELEC. So they are ready with the list
and if this body would wish to apportion the whole country by district itself, then I believe
we have the time to do it because the Committee on the Legislative is ready with that
particular report which need only to be appended to the Constitution. So if this body is
ready to accept the work of the Committee on the Legislative we would have no problem.
I just would like to give that information so that the people here would be guided
accordingly when they vote.
MR. RODRIGO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. I just would like to ask Commissioner Davide some questions.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Davide may yield if he so
desires.
MR. DAVIDE. Gladly.
MR. RODRIGO. Will this apportionment which we are considering apply only to the first
election after the enactment of the Constitution?
MR. DAVIDE. On the basis of the Padilla proposal, it will be for the first election; on the
basis of the Sarmiento proposal, it will only apply to the first election.
MR. RODRIGO. And after that, Congress will have the power to reapportion.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. RODRIGO. So, if we attach this to the Constitution the reapportionment based on
the COMELEC study and between the approval of the Constitution and the first election
the COMELEC no longer has the power to change that even a bit.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) Commissioner Regalado is recognized.
MR. REGALADO. May I address a clarificatory question to Commissioner Davide?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Gentleman will please proceed.
MR. REGALADO. On the basis of the Commissioner's proposed apportionment and
considering the fact that there will be a corresponding reduction to 183 seats, would there
be instances representation of under non-representation?
MR. DAVIDE. None at all, Mr. Presiding Officer. I can assure the Commission that there
will be no case of inequitable distribution. It will come out to be one for every 350 to
400,000 inhabitants.
MR. REGALADO. And that would be within the standard that we refer.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. REGALADO. Thank you.
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The Floor Leader is recognized.
MR. RAMA. The parliamentary situation is that there was a motion by Commissioner
Sarmiento to mandate COMELEC to do the redistricting. This was also almost the same
motion by Commissioner Padilla and I think we have had some kind of meeting of minds.
On the other hand, there seems to be a prejudicial question, an amendment to the
amendment as suggested by Commissioner Aquino, that instead of the COMELEC, it
should be this Commission that shall make the redistricting. So may I ask Commissioner
Aquino, if she insists on that idea, to please formulate it into a motion so we can vote on
that first as an amendment to the amendment.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).Commissioner Aquino is recognized.
MS . AQUINO. The motion is for this Commission to undertake the apportionment of the
legislative districts instead of the proposal that COMELEC be given the mandate to
undertake the responsibility.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. SARMIENTO. May I be clarified, Mr. Presiding Officer. Is it the motion or the
proposed amendment?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The proposed amendment.
MR. SARMIENTO. May we move for the approval of this proposed amendment which we
substitute for paragraphs 4 and 5.
MR. DAVIDE. May I request that it should be treated merely as a motion to be followed
by a deletion of paragraph 4 because that should not really appear as a paragraph in
Section 5; otherwise, it will appear very ugly in the Constitution where we mandate a
Commission that will become functus officioto have the authority. As a matter of fact, we
cannot exercise that authority until after the ratification of the new Constitution.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What does Commissioner Sarmiento say?
MR. SARMIENTO. It is accepted, Mr. Presiding Officer. So, may I move for the approval
of this proposed amendment.
MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Aquino is recognized.
MS. AQUINO. Would that require a two-thirds vote or a simple plurality to adopt that
motion?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). That will require a two-thirds vote.
MS. AQUINO. Thank you. Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SARMIENTO. May I restate the motion, Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) The Gentleman may proceed.
MR. SARMIENTO. May I move that this Commission do the reapportionment legislative
districts.
MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What is the pleasure of Commissioner Aquino?
MS. AQUINO. May I be clarified again on the motion. Is Commissioner Sarmiento,
therefore, adopting my motion? Would it not be right for him to move that the COMELEC
be mandated?
MR. SARMIENTO. No, we accepted the amendment. It is already the Commission that
will be mandated.
MS. AQUINO. So, the Gentlemen has accepted the amendment the amendment.
Thank you.
MR. SARMIENTO. I am voting that this Commission do the reapportionment.
VOTING
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Let us proceed to vote.
As many as are in favor, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised their hand.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member raised his hand.)
The results show 30 votes in favor and none against; the motion is approved.
Clearly then, the Constitutional Commission denied to the COMELEC the major power of legislative
apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the COMELEC "to
make minoradjustments of the reapportionment herein made." The meaning of the phrase "minor adjustments
was again clarified in the debates
17
of the Commission, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
MR. GUINGONA. This is just clarificatory, Mr. Presiding Officer. In Section 2, the
Commission on Elections is empowered to make minor adjustments on the
apportionment made here.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. GUINGONA. We have not set any time limit for this.
MR. DAVIDE. We should not set a time limit unless during the period of amendments a
proposal is made. The authority conferred would be on minor corrections or
amendments, meaning to say, for instance, that we may have forgotten an intervening
municipality in the enumeration, which ought to be included in one district. That we shall
consider a minor amendment.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Romulo). Commissioner de Castro is recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
I was about to ask the committee the meaning of minor adjustment. Can it be possible
that one municipality in a district be transferred to another district and call it a minor
adjustment?
MR. DAVIDE. That cannot be done, Mr. Presiding Officer. Minor, meaning, that there
should be no change in the allocations per district. However, it may happen that we
have forgotten a municipality in between which is still in the territory of one assigned
district, or there may be an error in the correct name of a particular municipality because
of changes made by the interim Batasang Pambansa and the Regular Batasang
Pambansa. There were many batas pambansa enacted by both the interim and the
Regular Batasang Pambansa changing the names of municipalities.
MR. DE CASTRO. So, the minor adjustment may be made only if one of the
municipalities is not mentioned in the ordinance appended to, and it will be up for the
COMELEC now to adjust or to put such municipality to a certain district.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. For instance, we may not have the data
regarding a division of a municipality by the interim Batasang Pambansa or the Regular
Batasang Pambansa into two municipalities, meaning, a mother municipality and the new
municipality, but still actually these are within the geographical district area.
MR. DE CASTRO. So the minor adjustment which the COMELEC cannot do is that, if, for
example, my municipality is in the First District of Laguna, they cannot put that in any
other district.
MR. DAVIDE. That is not even a minor correction. It is a substantive one.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
Consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments, Section 3 of the Ordinance did not also
give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another
district. The power granted by Section 3 to the respondent COMELEC is to adjust the number
of members (not municipalities) "apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created. . .
."
Prescinding from these premises, we hold that respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736 transferring the
municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the
Third District of Leyte.
It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular province brought about an
imbalance in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the five (5) legislative districts of the province of
Leyte. This imbalance, depending on its degree, could devalue a citizen's vote in violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Be that as it may, it is not proper at this time for petitioner to raise this
issue using the case at bench as his legal vehicle. The issue involves a problem of reapportionment of
legislative districts and petitioner's remedy lies with Congress. Section 5(4), Article VI of the Constitution
categorically gives Congress the power to reapportion, thus: "Within three (3) years following the return of
every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards
provided in this section." In Macias v. COMELEC,
18
we ruled that the validity of a legislative apportionment is
a justiciable question. But while this Court can strike down an unconstitutional reapportionment, it cannot itself
make the reapportionment as petitioner would want us to do by directing respondent COMELEC to transfer
the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the municipality of Capoocan
of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of the
province of Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We also deny the Petition praying for the transfer of the
municipality of Tolosafrom the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Ordinance Appended to the Constitution.
2 Represented by Congressman Cirilo Roy G. Montejo.
3 Represented by Congressman Sergio A.F. Apostol.
4 Represented by Congressman Alberto S. Veloso.
5 Represented by Congressman Carmelo J. Locsin.
6 Represented by Congressman Eriberto V. Loreto.
7 Section 9, Article XVIII of the Constitution provides:
"A sub-province shall continue to exist and operate until it is converted into a regular
province or until its component municipalities are reverted to the mother province."
8 376 US 1. See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US 533; WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 US
633, Maryland Commission For Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 US 656, etc.
9 The power of the respondent COMELEC to redistrict does not appear to have been
disputed by the parties in the proceedings below.
10 Promulgated March 26, 1986 and otherwise known as Freedom Constitution.
11 See Article I, Section 3 of Proclamation No. 3.
12 See Section 1, Article II of Provisional Constitution.
13 He was the Chairman of the Committee on the Legislative. The other co-sponsors of
the Ordinance, introduced in the Commission as Resolution No. 551, were
Commissioners Azcuna, Sumulong, Calderon, Alonto, Jamir, Lerum, Guingona,
Abubakar, Rodrigo, Aquino, Concepcion, de los Reyes, Jr., Garcia and Treas.
14 Record of Constitutional Commission, October 9, 1986 session, p. 686.
15 Ibid, p. 687.
16 Ibid, pp. 692-694, 700.
17 Records of Constitution Commission, Session of October 13, 1986, pp. 950-951.
18 No. L-18684, September 14, 1961, 3 SCRA 1.











EN BANC
G.R. No. 176970 December 8, 2008
ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J .:
Before us is the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus,
1
with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction, filed by Rogelio Bagabuyo (petitioner) to
prevent the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing Resolution No. 7837 on the ground
that Republic Act No. 9371
2
- the law that Resolution No. 7837 implements - is unconstitutional.
BACKGROUND FACTS
On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro's then Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula filed and sponsored
House Bill No. 5859: "An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City of
Cagayan De Oro."
3
This law eventually became Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9371.
4
It increased Cagayan de Oro's
legislative district from one to two. For the election of May 2007, Cagayan de Oro's voters would be classified
as belonging to either the first or the second district, depending on their place of residence. The constituents
of each district would elect their own representative to Congress as well as eight members of
the Sangguniang Panglungsod.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 9371 apportioned the City's barangays as follows:
Legislative Districts - The lone legislative district of the City of Cagayan De Oro is hereby
apportioned to commence in the next national elections after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth,
barangays Bonbon, Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua, Iponan, Baikingon, San Simon,
Pagatpat, Canitoan, Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi, Taglimao, Tuburan, Pigsag-an,
Tumpagon, Bayanga, Mambuaya, Dansulihon, Tignapoloan and Bisigan shall comprise the first
district while barangays Macabalan, Puntod, Consolacion, Camaman-an, Nazareth, Macasandig,
Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman, FS Catanico, Tablon, Agusan, Puerto, Bugo, and Balubal and
all urban barangays from Barangay 1 to Barangay 40 shall comprise the second district.
5

On March 13, 2007, the COMELEC en Banc promulgated Resolution No. 7837
6
implementing R.A. No. 9371.
Petitioner Rogelio Bagabuyo filed the present petition against the COMELEC on March 27, 2007.
7
On 10 April
2008, the petitioner amended the petition to include the following as respondents: Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita; the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management; the Chairman of the
Commission on Audit; the Mayor and the members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cagayan de Oro
City; and its Board of Canvassers.
8

In asking for the nullification of R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds, the
petitioner argued that the COMELEC cannot implement R.A. No. 9371 without providing for the rules,
regulations and guidelines for the conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or conversion
of a local government unit. He prayed for the issuance of an order directing the respondents to cease and
desist from implementing R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Resolution No. 7837, and to revert instead to
COMELEC Resolution No. 7801 which provided for a single legislative district for Cagayan de Oro.
Since the Court did not grant the petitioner's prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction, the May 14 National and Local Elections proceeded according to R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution
No. 7837.
The respondent's Comment on the petition, filed through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that: 1)
the petitioner did not respect the hierarchy of courts, as the Regional Trial Court (RTC) is vested with
concurrent jurisdiction over cases assailing the constitutionality of a statute; 2) R.A. No. 9371 merely
increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang
Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; 3) the criteria established under
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition
or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such
creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and 4)
R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oro's territory, population and income
classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.
The petitioner argued in his reply that: 1) pursuant to the Court's ruling in Del Mar v. PAGCOR,
9
the Court
may take cognizance of this petition if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction; 2) Cagayan de Oro City's reapportionment under R.A. No.
9371 falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of
cities under Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; 3) the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common denominator - the material change in the
political and economic rights of the local government units directly affected, as well as of the people therein;
4) a voter's sovereign power to decide on who should be elected as the entire city's Congressman was
arbitrarily reduced by at least one half because the questioned law and resolution only allowed him to vote
and be voted for in the district designated by the COMELEC; 5) a voter was also arbitrarily denied his right to
elect the Congressman and the members of the city council for the other legislative district, and 6)
government funds were illegally disbursed without prior approval by the sovereign electorate of Cagayan De
Oro City.
10

THE ISSUES
The core issues, based on the petition and the parties' memoranda, can be limited to the following
contentious points:
1) Did the petitioner violate the hierarchy of courts rule; if so, should the instant petition be
dismissed on this ground?
2) Does R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro City,
or does it involve the division and conversion of a local government unit?
3) Does R.A. No. 9371 violate the equality of representation doctrine?
OUR RULING
Except for the issue of the hierarchy of courts rule, we find the petition totally without merit.
The hierarchy of courts principle.
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
andhabeas corpus.
11
It was pursuant to this original jurisdiction that the petitioner filed the present petition.
While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals
12
and the RTCs,
13
a direct invocation of the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly
and especially set out in the petition. Reasons of practicality, dictated by an increasingly overcrowded docket
and the need to prioritize in favor of matters within our exclusive jurisdiction, justify the existence of this rule
otherwise known as the "principle of hierarchy of courts." More generally stated, the principle requires that
recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.
14

Among the cases we have considered sufficiently special and important to be exceptions to the rule, are
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto against our nation's lawmakers when the
validity of their enactments is assailed.
15
The present petition is of this nature; its subject matter and the
nature of the issues raised - among them, whether legislative reapportionment involves a division of Cagayan
de Oro City as a local government unit - are reasons enough for considering it an exception to the principle of
hierarchy of courts. Additionally, the petition assails as well a resolution of the COMELEC en banc issued to
implement the legislative apportionment that R.A. No. 9371 decrees. As an action against a COMELEC en
banc resolution, the case falls under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court that in turn requires a review by this Court
via a Rule 65 petition forcertiorari.
16
For these reasons, we do not see the principle of hierarchy of courts to be
a stumbling block in our consideration of the present case.
The Plebiscite Requirement.
The petitioner insists that R.A. No. 9371 converts and divides the City of Cagayan de Oro as a local
government unit, and does not merely provide for the City's legislative apportionment. This argument
essentially proceeds from a misunderstanding of the constitutional concepts of apportionment of legislative
districts and division of local government units.
Legislative apportionment is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as the determination of the number of
representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body.
17
It is the allocation
of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to
equalize population and voting power among the districts.
18
Reapportionment, on the other hand, is
the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the
constitutional requirement of equality of representation.
19

Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of the 1987 Constitution lays down the rules on legislative
apportionment under its Section 5 which provides:
Sec. 5(1). (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty
members unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations.
x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, continuous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.
Separately from the legislative districts that legal apportionment or reapportionment speaks of, are the local
government units (historically and generically referred to as "municipal corporations") that the Constitution
itself classified into provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
20
In its strict and proper sense, a
municipality has been defined as "a body politic and corporate constituted by the incorporation of the
inhabitants of a city or town for the purpose of local government thereof."
21
The creation, division, merger,
abolition or alteration of boundary of local government units, i.e., of provinces, cities, municipalities,
and barangays, are covered by the Article on Local Government (Article X). Section 10 of this Article
provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political unit directly affected.
Under both Article VI, Section 5, and Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution, the authority to act has been
vested in the Legislature. The Legislature undertakes the apportionment and reapportionment of legislative
districts,
22
and likewise acts on local government units by setting the standards for their creation, division,
merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries and by actually creating, dividing, merging, abolishing local
government units and altering their boundaries through legislation. Other than this, not much commonality
exists between the two provisions since they are inherently different although they interface and relate with
one another.
The concern that leaps from the text of Article VI, Section 5 is political representation and the means to make
a legislative district sufficiently represented so that the people can be effectively heard. As above stated, the
aim of legislative apportionment is "to equalize population and voting power among districts."
23
Hence,
emphasis is given to the number of people represented; the uniform and progressive ratio to be observed
among the representative districts; and accessibility and commonality of interests in terms of each district
being, as far as practicable, continuous, compact and adjacent territory. In terms of the people represented,
every city with at least 250,000 people and every province (irrespective of population) is entitled to one
representative. In this sense, legislative districts, on the one hand, and provinces and cities, on the other,
relate and interface with each other. To ensure continued adherence to the required standards of
apportionment, Section 5(4) specifically mandates reapportionment as soon as the given standards are met.
In contrast with the equal representation objective of Article VI, Section 5, Article X, Section 10 expressly
speaks of how local government units may be "created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered." Its concern is the commencement, the termination, and the modification of local
government units' corporate existence and territorial coverage; and it speaks of two specific standards that
must be observed in implementing this concern, namely, the criteria established in the local government code
and the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Under the
Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) passed in 1991, the criteria of income, population and land area are
specified as verifiable indicators of viability and capacity to provide services.
24
The division or merger of
existing units must comply with the same requirements (since a new local government unit will come into
being), provided that a division shall not reduce the income, population, or land area of the unit affected to
less than the minimum requirement prescribed in the Code.
25

A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement of a
plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any
creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government unit.
26
In contrast, no
plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision. In Tobias v. Abalos,
27
a
case that arose from the division of the congressional district formerly covering San Juan and Mandaluyong
into separate districts, we confirmed this distinction and the fact that no plebiscite is needed in a legislative
reapportionment. The plebiscite issue came up because one was ordered and held for Mandaluyong in the
course of its conversion into a highly urbanized city, while none was held for San Juan. In explaining why this
happened, the Court ruled that no plebiscite was necessary for San Juan because the objective of the
plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as required by Article X, Section 10
the Local Government Code; the creation of a new legislative district only followed as a consequence. In
other words, the apportionment alone and by itself did not call for a plebiscite, so that none was needed for
San Juan where only a reapportionment took place.
The need for a plebiscite under Article X, Section 10 and the lack of requirement for one under Article VI,
Section 5 can best be appreciated by a consideration of the historical roots of these two provisions, the nature
of the concepts they embody as heretofore discussed, and their areas of application.
A Bit of History.
In Macias v. COMELEC,
28
we first jurisprudentially acknowledged the American roots of our apportionment
provision, noting its roots from the Fourteenth Amendment
29
of the U.S. Constitution and from the
constitutions of some American states. The Philippine Organic Act of 1902 created the Philippine
Assembly,
30
the body that acted as the lower house of the bicameral legislature under the Americans, with the
Philippine Commission acting as the upper house. While the members of the Philippine Commission were
appointed by the U.S. President with the conformity of the U.S. Senate, the members of the Philippine
Assembly were elected by representative districts previously delineated under the Philippine Organic Act of
1902 pursuant to the mandate to apportion the seats of the Philippine Assembly among the provinces as
nearly as practicable according to population. Thus, legislative apportionment first started in our country.
The Jones Law or the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 maintained the apportionment provision, dividing the
country into 12 senate districts and 90 representative districts electing one delegate each to the House of
Representatives. Section 16 of the Act specifically vested the Philippine Legislature with the authority to
redistrict the Philippine Islands.
Under the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Section 5 retained the concept of legislative apportionment together
with "district" as the basic unit of apportionment; the concern was "equality of representation . . . as an
essential feature of republican institutions" as expressed in the leading case of Macias v. COMELEC.
31
The
case ruled that inequality of representation is a justiciable, not a political issue, which ruling was reiterated
in Montejo v. COMELEC.
32
Notably, no issue regarding the holding of a plebiscite ever came up in these
cases and the others that followed, as no plebiscite was required.
Article VIII, Section 2 of the 1973 Constitution retained the concept of equal representation "in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" with each
district being, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. This formulation was
essentially carried over to the 1987 Constitution, distinguished only from the previous one by the presence of
party-list representatives. In neither Constitution was a plebiscite required.
The need for a plebiscite in the creation, division, merger, or abolition of local government units was not
constitutionally enshrined until the 1973 Constitution. However, as early as 1959, R.A. No. 2264
33
required, in
the creation of barrios by Provincial Boards, that the creation and definition of boundaries be "upon petition of
a majority of the voters in the areas affected." In 1961, the Charter of the City of Caloocan (R.A. No. 3278)
carried this further by requiring that the "Act shall take effect after a majority of voters of the Municipality of
Caloocan vote in favor of the conversion of their municipality into a city in a plebiscite." This was followed up
to 1972 by other legislative enactments requiring a plebiscite as a condition for the creation and conversion of
local government units as well as the transfer of sitios from one legislative unit to another.
34
In 1973, the
plebiscite requirement was accorded constitutional status.
Under these separate historical tracks, it can be seen that the holding of a plebiscite was never a requirement
in legislative apportionment or reapportionment. After it became constitutionally entrenched, a plebiscite was
also always identified with the creation, division, merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries of local
government units, never with the concept of legislative apportionment.
Nature and Areas of Application.
The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of may, in a sense, be called a political unit because
it is the basis for the election of a member of the House of Representatives and members of the local
legislative body. It is not, however, a political subdivision through which functions of government are carried
out. It can more appropriately be described as a representative unit that may or may not encompass the
whole of a city or a province, but unlike the latter, it is not a corporate unit. Not being a corporate unit, a
district does not act for and in behalf of the people comprising the district; it merely delineates the areas
occupied by the people who will choose a representative in their national affairs. Unlike a province, which has
a governor; a city or a municipality, which has a mayor; and a barangay, which has a punong barangay, a
district does not have its own chief executive. The role of the congressman that it elects is to ensure that the
voice of the people of the district is heard in Congress, not to oversee the affairs of the legislative district. Not
being a corporate unit also signifies that it has no legal personality that must be created or dissolved and has
no capacity to act. Hence, there is no need for any plebiscite in the creation, dissolution or any other similar
action on a legislative district.
The local government units, on the other hand, are political and corporate units. They are the territorial and
political subdivisions of the state.
35
They possess legal personality on the authority of the Constitution and by
action of the Legislature. The Constitution defines them as entities that Congress can, by law, create, divide,
abolish, merge; or whose boundaries can be altered based on standards again established by both the
Constitution and the Legislature.
36
A local government unit's corporate existence begins upon the election and
qualification of its chief executive and a majority of the members of its Sanggunian.
37

As a political subdivision, a local government unit is an "instrumentality of the state in carrying out the
functions of government."
38
As a corporate entity with a distinct and separate juridical personality from the
State, it exercises special functions for the sole benefit of its constituents. It acts as "an agency of the
community in the administration of local affairs"
39
and the mediums through which the people act in their
corporate capacity on local concerns.
40
In light of these roles, the Constitution saw it fit to expressly secure
the consent of the people affected by the creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of
local government units through a plebiscite.
These considerations clearly show the distinctions between a legislative apportionment or reapportionment
and the division of a local government unit. Historically and by its intrinsic nature, a legislative apportionment
does not mean, and does not even imply, a division of a local government unit where the apportionment takes
place. Thus, the plebiscite requirement that applies to the division of a province, city, municipality
or barangay under the Local Government Code should not apply to and be a requisite for the validity of a
legislative apportionment or reapportionment.
R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Res. No. 7837
R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a reapportionment legislation passed in accordance with the
authority granted to Congress under Article VI, Section 5(4) of the Constitution. Its core provision - Section 1 -
provides:
SECTION 1. Legislative Districts. - The lone legislative district of the City of Cagayan de Oro is
hereby apportioned to commence in the next national elections after the effectivity of this Act.
Henceforth, barangays Bonbon, Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua, Iponan, Baikingon,
San Simon, Pagatpat, Canitoan, Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi, Taglimao, Tuburan,
Pigsag-an, Tumpagon, Bayanga, Mambuaya, Dansulihon, Tignapoloan and Bisigan shall comprise
the first district while barangays Macabalan, Puntod, Consolacion, Camaman-an, Nazareth,
Macansandig, Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman, FS Catanico, Tablon, Agusan, Puerto, Bugo and
Balubal and all urban barangays from Barangay 1 to Barangay 40 shall comprise the second
district.
Under these wordings, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political and corporate entity takes place or is
mandated. Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a single unit and its administration is not divided along
territorial lines. Its territory remains completely whole and intact; there is only the addition of another
legislative district and the delineation of the city into two districts for purposes of representation in the House
of Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution does not come into play and no plebiscite
is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two districts.
Admittedly, the legislative reapportionment carries effects beyond the creation of another congressional
district in the city by providing, as reflected in COMELEC Resolution No. 7837, for additional Sangguniang
Panglunsod seats to be voted for along the lines of the congressional apportionment made. The effect on the
Sangguniang Panglunsod, however, is not directly traceable to R.A. No. 9371 but to another law - R.A. No.
6636
41
- whose Section 3 provides:
SECTION 3. Other Cities. - The provision of any law to the contrary notwithstanding the City of
Cebu, City of Davao, and any other city with more than one representative district shall have eight
(8) councilors for each district who shall be residents thereof to be elected by the qualified voters
therein, provided that the cities of Cagayan de Oro, Zamboanga, Bacolod, Iloilo and other cities
comprising a representative district shall have twelve (12) councilors each and all other cities shall
have ten (10) councilors each to be elected at large by the qualified voters of the said cities:
Provided, That in no case shall the present number of councilors according to their charters be
reduced.
However, neither does this law have the effect of dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro into two political and
corporate units and territories. Rather than divide the city either territorially or as a corporate entity, the effect
is merely to enhance voter representation by giving each city voter more and greater say, both in Congress
and in the Sangguniang Panglunsod.
To illustrate this effect, before the reapportionment, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city
council members citywide for its population of approximately 500,000.
42
By having two legislative districts,
each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro now effectively has two congressmen, each one
representing 250,000 of the city's population. In terms of services for city residents, this easily means better
access to their congressman since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as against the 500,000
he used to represent. The same goes true for the Sangguniang Panglungsod with its ranks increased from 12
to 16 since each legislative district now has 8 councilors. In representation terms, the fewer constituents
represented translate to a greater voice for each individual city resident in Congress and in the Sanggunian;
each congressman and each councilor represents both a smaller area and fewer constituents whose fewer
numbers are now concentrated in each representative. The City, for its part, now has twice the number of
congressmen speaking for it and voting in the halls of Congress. Since the total number of congressmen in
the country has not increased to the point of doubling its numbers, the presence of two congressman (instead
of one) from the same city cannot but be a quantitative and proportional improvement in the representation of
Cagayan de Oro City in Congress.
Equality of representation.
The petitioner argues that the distribution of the legislative districts is unequal. District 1 has only 93,719
registered voters while District 2 has 127,071. District 1 is composed mostly of rural barangays while District 2
is composed mostly of urban barangays.
43
Thus, R.A. No. 9371 violates the principle of equality of
representation.
A clarification must be made. The law clearly provides that the basis for districting shall be the number of the
inhabitants of a city or a province, not the number of registered voters therein. We settled this very same
question in Herrera v. COMELEC
44
when we interpreted a provision in R.A. No. 7166 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2313 that applied to the Province of Guimaras. We categorically ruled that the basis for
districting is the number of inhabitants of the Province of Guimaras by municipality based on the official 1995
Census of Population as certified to by Tomas P. Africa, Administrator of the National Statistics Office.
The petitioner, unfortunately, did not provide information about the actual population of Cagayan de Oro City.
However, we take judicial notice of the August 2007 census of the National Statistics Office which shows
thatbarangays comprising Cagayan de Oro's first district have a total population of 254,644, while the second
district has 299,322 residents. Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the
districts.
45
The Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard
in gauging equality of representation.
46
In fact, for cities, all it asks is that "each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand shall have one representative," while ensuring representation for every
province regardless of the size of its population. To ensure quality representation through commonality of
interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that
every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory.
Thus, the Constitution leaves the local government units as they are found and does not require their division,
merger or transfer to satisfy the numerical standard it imposes. Its requirements are satisfied despite some
numerical disparity if the units are contiguous, compact and adjacent as far as practicable.
The petitioner's contention that there is a resulting inequality in the division of Cagayan de Oro City into two
districts because the barangays in the first district are mostly rural barangays while the second district is
mostly urban, is largely unsubstantiated. But even if backed up by proper proof, we cannot question the
division on the basis of the difference in the barangays' levels of development or developmental focus as
these are not part of the constitutional standards for legislative apportionment or reapportionment. What the
components of the two districts of Cagayan de Oro would be is a matter for the lawmakers to determine as a
matter of policy. In the absence of any grave abuse of discretion or violation of the established legal
parameters, this Court cannot intrude into the wisdom of these policies.
47

WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice


WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
*
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice


Footnotes
*
On leave.
1
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2
"An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City of Cagayan De
Oro."
3
Rollo, p. 214.
4
Id., p. 25.
5
Id., p. 25.
6
Id., pp. 23-24.
7
Id., pp. 3-22.
8
Id., pp. 60-93
9
G.R. No. 138298, November 29, 2000, 346 SCRA 485.
10
Rollo, pp. 123-148.
11
CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 5(1).
12
Sec. 9 (1), B.P. Blg. 129.
13
Sec. 21 (1), B.P. Blg. 129.
14
See: People v. Cuaresma, G.R. No. 67787, April 18, 1989, 172 SCRA 415.
15
Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998, 298 SCRA 756.
16
See: Bautista v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 154796-97, October 23, 2003, 414 SCRA 299.
17
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, p. 91.
18
Clapp, James E., Dictionary of Law (2000), p. 33.
19
Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 17, p. 1137.
20
CONSTITUTION, Art. X, Sec. 1.
21
Martin, Public Corporations, Revised 1983 Edition, p. 5.
22
Article VI, Section 5; Montejo v. COMELEC, 312 Phil. 492 (1995).
23
Supra note 18.
24
Section 7, Local Government Code.
25
CONSTITUTION, Art. X, Sec. 10.
26
SEC. 10. Plebiscite Requirement. - No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Said
plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) within one hundred
twenty (120) days from the date of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless
said law or ordinance fixes another date.
27
G.R. No. 114783, December 8, 1994, 239 SCRA 106.
28
G.R. No. L-18684, September 14, 1961, 113 Phil. 1 (1961).
29
The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides the basis for the requirement of an
equitable apportionment scheme. See generally, Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, cited in Macias
v. COMELEC, supra note 28.
30
People v. Santiago, 43 Phil 120 (1922).
31
Supra note 28.
32
G.R. No. 118702, March 16, 1995.
33
"An Act Amending the Laws Governing Local Governments by Increasing their Autonomy and
Reorganizing Provincial Governments."
34
A plebiscite was a conditio sine qua non in the creation of municipal corporations including, but
not limited to, the following: 1) the City of Angeles, R.A. 3700; 2) the Municipality of Pio Duran in
the Province of Albay, R.A. 3817; 3) the Provinces of Northern Samar, Eastern Samar and Western
Samar, R.A. 4221; 4) the Provinces of Agusan del Norte and Agusan del Sur, R.A. 4979. The prior
approval of a majority of the qualified voters of certain sitios of the Municipality of Anilao was also
required before the transfer of the same sitios to the Municipality of Banate under R.A. 4614 took
effect.
35
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., G.R. No. 135962,
March 27, 2000, 328 SCRA 836.
36
CONSTITUTION, Article X, Secs. 3 and 10; Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., The Local Government Code
of 1991: The Key to National Development, p. 5.
37
Sec. 14, Local Government Code.
38
Lidasan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967, 21 SCRA 496.
39
Ibid.
40
Section 15 of the Local Government Code provides: Political and Corporate Nature of Local
Government Units. - Every local government unit created or recognized under this Code is a body
politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law. As such, it
shall exercise powers as a political subdivision of the national government and as a corporate entity
representing the inhabitants of its territory.
41
Enacted into law on November 6, 1987.
42
As provided by COMELEC Res. No. 7801 that COMELEC Res. No. 7837 superseded.
43
Rollo, p. 71.
44
G.R. No. 131499, November 17, 1999, 318 SCRA 337.
45
Total Population by Province, City, Municipality and Barangay: as of August 1, 2007
<http://www.census.gov.ph/data/sectordata/2007/region%2010.pdf>, last accessed November 5,
2008.
46
Harlan, dissenting opinion in Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 citing Allied Stores of Ohio v.
Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 and McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, in which the Supreme Court ruled
that the Equal Protection Clause does not demand of legislation "finicky or exact conformity to
abstract correlation xxx. The Constitution is satisfied if a legislature responds to the practical living
facts with which it deals. Through what precise points in a field of many competing pressures a
legislature might most suitably have drawn its lines is not a question for judicial re-examination. It is
enough to satisfy the Constitution that in drawing them the principle of reason has not been
disregarded. And what degree of uniformity reason demands of a statute is, of course, a function of
the complexity of the needs which the statute seeks to accommodate."
47
Tobias v. Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783, December 8, 1994, 239 SCRA 106.










EN BANC

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J .:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at
which it is aimed.
1
The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of
Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a
period of not less than one year immediately preceding the election."
2
The mischief which this provision
reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or
newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from
an elective office to serve that community."
3

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of
the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following
information in item no. 8:
4

RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District
of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"
5
with the
Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In
his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency
requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in
Voter Registration Record 94-No. 3349772
6
and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be
issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy."
7

On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry
"seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate.
8
On the same day, the
Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the
ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having already
lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should
have been filed on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline.
9

Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head
Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the
head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her
original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation"
10
which she sought to rectify
by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has
always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.
11
Impugning respondent's motive in filing the
petition seeking her disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a
voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner
immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a
resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered
as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six month actual residence therein,
petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First
District to the Second District and pursued such a move up to the Supreme Court, his
purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the congressional
election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen,
seeking the creation of another legislative district to remove the town of Tolosa out of the
First District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having
failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same objective, as it
is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for the judgment and verdict
of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and
clean elections on May 8, 1995.
12

On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to
1,
13
came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009
meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3)
canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy.
14
Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the validity of
amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of
candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one year residency requirement, the Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven"
(months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and,
therefore, an amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred that she thought
that what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence
of origin or domicile in the First Legislative District, to which she could have responded
"since childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban
City, a component of the First District, to which she always intended to return whenever
absent and which she has never abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she
tried to discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she has been a
resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although she only
became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she
has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before
coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa, respondent
announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate
for the District. However, this intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election
Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not
Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering
in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake."
Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of
her Answer, she was quite aware of "residence of origin" which she interprets to be
Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of
Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what was asked was her actual and
physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there is none in the question
that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks
clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately
preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation,
therefore, is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she cited
the case ofAlialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the case of
Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to the "inconsequential deviations which
cannot affect the result of the election, or deviations from provisions intended primarily to
secure timely and orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme Court in that case
considered the amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant case, the
amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an inconsequential deviation.
The change in the number of years of residence in the place where respondent seeks to
be elected is a substantial matter which determines her qualification as a candidacy,
specially those intended to suppress, accurate material representation in the original
certificate which adversely affects the filer. To admit the amended certificate is to
condone the evils brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the
detriment of the integrity of the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in
order to prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be
committed before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency
the respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in
her Voter's Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that
she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said
registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to the
election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the
cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be
re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3)
different documents show the respondent's consistent conviction that she has transferred
her residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of
time, starting in the last week of August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up to
7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe in the
respondent's contention that it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be
admitted by this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that
respondent has not complied with the one year residency requirement of the Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with
"domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or
for like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294;
Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she returned
to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan,
Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District
since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification where she is
otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts
admitted by the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and
worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in
Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San
Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel,
Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she served as member of the
Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila and later on served as
the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have served these positions if she had not
been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of
candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San
Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter
with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her
registration in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or transferred to
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that she could not have been a
resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of
candidacy because she became a resident of many places, including Metro Manila. This
debunks her claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the
First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her
domicile. She registered as a voter in different places and on several occasions declared
that she was a resident of Manila. Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she
is considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in other
different places. In the case of Romualdez vs. RTC(226 SCRA 408) the Court explained
how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3) intention to abandon
the old domicile. In other words there must basically be animus manendi with animus non
revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with
her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she
is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she
spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct
indicative of such intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always
intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove that intention,
is not conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence
to show that her conduct, one year prior the election, showed intention to reside in
Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had
been a resident of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of
Leyte "since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First
District of Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on January
28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In
doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration Record that she resided in the municipality
of Tolosa for a period of six months. This may be inconsequential as argued by the
respondent since it refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove
that she was a resident of the First District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa
leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had been a resident of the district for six
months only.
15

In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
16
of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for
the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte.
17
The
Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to
DENY it, no new substantial matters having been raised therein to warrant re-
examination of the resolution granting the petition for disqualification.
18

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of
the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First
District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution
directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of
votes.
19

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner of
the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass
completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass
showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent
Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the First
District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this
court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may be
classified into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of
Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner
outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases
under Article 78 of the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive
jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the
application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC seems to
be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous
with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual
residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to
the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of
meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations,
the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic
20
this court took the
concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for
business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that
they disclose intent."
21
Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or
physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is
the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between
residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the
resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or
health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his
purpose is established it is residence.
22
It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different
residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons,
he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic,
23
we
laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a
place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a
residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile
is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have
but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of
residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any
means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will
constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political
laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the
fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray,
24
the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which imports
not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention."
25
Larena vs. Teves
26
reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the
qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros
Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino,
27
held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a
profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of
residence.
28
So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law
cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the
intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have
placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually
means only "domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the
Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence
or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly
are concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, "and a resident
thereof", that is, in the district for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of
the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given
to it was domicile.
29

xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner
Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a
matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back
to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a
provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad
may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be
by domicile and not physical residence.
30

In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,
31
this Court concluded that the framers of the
1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it
as having the same meaning as domicile.
32

In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency
requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned
entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as
seven (7) months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in
determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement.
The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for
a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to
his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in
the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the
questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the
period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was
"since childhood" in the space provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the
COMELEC's Second Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when
herein petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the
First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa,
not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the First District, which is
Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said
certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed
immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years
and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of
petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her legal
residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 the first requiring actual residence
and the second requiring domicile coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a
voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This
honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact
were established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the
Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the
time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously
lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's
domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First,
according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also
registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in
San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang
Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had not been a
resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and
maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a
given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to
study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence.
Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since
childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many
places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between
(actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves,
33
supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house wherein
he lives with his family in a municipality without having ever had the intention of
abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with his family in another
municipality, has his residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having
registered as an elector in the other municipality in question and having been a candidate
for various insular and provincial positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the
latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino,
34
We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying
goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other places, practice of his
avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who left
his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot
but for professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent
himself from his professional or business activities; so there he registers himself as voter
as he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity
to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in national elections.
Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence
of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the registration of a
voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to
constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the natural
desire and longing of every person to return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of
attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by positive proof of
abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition that
petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC
was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not
only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional
commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881).
35

What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's domicile,
which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution:
36

In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in
Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from high school. She pursued her
college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where she
earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still
in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker
Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married
ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and
registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in
1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a
voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the
Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San
Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped
to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent
ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy
wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro
Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held
various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally
point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born
in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached
her adulthood there and eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons.
Even during her husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close
ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her
province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held
positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or consent.
These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of
Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the
majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin because
she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she
"abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said
place by merely expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is
gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile
of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her father brought his family back
to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate:
37

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a
new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed
to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of
continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate
abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time.
38
In the case at bench, the
evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this
court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an
abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant
the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law
as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly
established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence."
39
The presumption
that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred
from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where
the two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both
terms imply relations between a person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one
of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the necessity of physical
presence.
40

Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt
the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the
Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the
female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses
her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los
Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el
marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which means
wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual
residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation
is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same provision which
means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the
family to another home or place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to
domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to another not
only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance more consistent with
the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen
and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different
domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the
husband to fix a single place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which
obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:
Art. 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect
and fidelity and render mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This takes into
account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband
has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that
they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to
"residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the
husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further
explains:
Residence and Domicile Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to
particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and the
ultimate decision must be made from a consideration of the purpose and intent with
which the word is used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times they are
distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person
in a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and
a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other hand, domicile can
exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once
residence has been established in one place, there be an intention to stay there
permanently, even if residence is also established in some other
place.
41

In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the marriage is not
an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a common matrimonial residence,
our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations
42
where the spouses could not be compelled to live with
each other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her husband or,
for obviously practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one).
In De la Vina vs. Villareal
43
this Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile
separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause
for divorce."
44
Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to choose a new
domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to live separately
from her husband either by taking new residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that
the wife could not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de
Arroyo
45
the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the province of
the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and
render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair
are invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are
disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt,
may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At
best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to
live under the same roof; and he experience of those countries where the courts of
justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy
of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical
Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either
husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it, that court would make a
mandatory decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case of disobedience,
requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this
practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such
orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen,
President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice,
expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was not the same as that which
prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the
restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but
could not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing
sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy
of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be
procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an
order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can
discover, has ever attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to
live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to follow and live
with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The
decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the
Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided
many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the State of
Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by
process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have affirmed
an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital
domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a particular disposition
of certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as
administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue
to her from the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11)
But it does not appear that this order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was
sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her in
respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her
disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for
contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged
by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The
problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan,
Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's
residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what
petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been incorporated, as
a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family
Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters,
the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly
different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes
in the concept of women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual
agreement between the spouses.
46

Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil
Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is
concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife the term residence should only be
interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law
delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of
origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only
acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the
country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this
was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the
Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house
in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our
homeland."
47
Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while
living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to
the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of
disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in
various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover,
and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to
her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical
for us to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive
act of selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife
gains a domicile different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this point, we
are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting
petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the assailed
resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code.
48
Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of
Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally
construed to be merely directory,
49
"so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on
the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it."
50
The difference
between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same
view held by several American authorities, this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that:
51

The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on
grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by
disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a
limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be entered without the consent of
counsel, it was held that "the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with
impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which
relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose
of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute
under examination was construed merely to be directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a decision
after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our
courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having
failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881,
52
it is
evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending
disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of
petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole
judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only
after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives.
53
Petitioner not being a member of
the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to ignore or
deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously
a distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of election
laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred
ideals, including the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established principles of principles of law
to deny an individual what he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to
repeat the mistakes of the past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for
a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions
dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby
directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative
of the First District of Leyte.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.



Separate Opinions

PUNO, J ., concurring:
It was Aristotle who taught mankind that things that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are
unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness.
1
Like other candidates, petitioner has
clearly met the residence requirement provided by Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.
2
We cannot
disqualify her and treat her unalike, for the Constitution guarantees equal protection of the law. I proceed from
the following factual and legal propositions:
First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were domiciled
in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the place. Petitioner went to
school and thereafter worked there. I consider Tacloban as her initial domicile, both her domicile of origin and
her domicile of choice. Her domicile of origin as it was the domicile of her parents when she was a minor; and
her domicile of choice, as she continued living there even after reaching the age of majority.
Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos. By contracting marriage, her domicile became subject to change by law, and the right to change it
was given by Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the
wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the
Republic.
3
(Emphasis supplied)
In De la Via v. Villareal and Geopano,
4
this Court explained why the domicile of the wife ought to
follow that of the husband. We held: "The reason is founded upon the theoretic identity of person
and interest between the husband and the wife, and the presumption that, from the nature of the
relation, the home of one is the home of the other. It is intended to promote, strengthen, and secure
their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony prevail."
5
In accord
with this objective, Article 109 of the Civil Code also obligated the husband and wife "to live
together."
Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner's marriage to former President Marcos ipso
facto resulted in the loss of her Tacloban domicile. I respectfully submit that her marriage by itself alone did
not cause her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of the Civil Code merely gave the husband the right
to fix the domicile of the family. In the exercise of the right, the husband may explicitly choose the prior
domicile of his wife, in which case, the wife's domicile remains unchanged. The husband can
also implicitly acquiesce to his wife's prior domicile even if it is different. So we held in de la Via,
6

. . . . When married women as well as children subject to parental authority live, with the
acquiescence of their husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from where the latter live,
they have their ownindependent domicile. . . .
It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different domicile by the
husband that will change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The
domiciliary decision made by the husband in the exercise of the right conferred by Article 110 of the
Civil Code binds the wife. Any and all acts of a wife during her coverture contrary to the domiciliary
choice of the husband cannot change in any way the domicile legally fixed by the husband. These
acts are void not only because the wife lacks the capacity to choose her domicile but also because
they are contrary to law and public policy.
In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former President Marcos exercised his right to fix the family
domicile and established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he was then the congressman. At that particular
point of time and throughout their married life, petitioner lost her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte. Since
petitioner's Batac domicile has been fixed by operation of law, it was not affected in 1959 when her husband
was elected as Senator, when they lived in San Juan, Rizal and where she registered as a voter. It was not
also affected in 1965 when her husband was elected President, when they lived in Malacaang Palace, and
when she registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila. Nor was it affected when she served as a member of
the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila during the
incumbency of her husband as President of the nation. Under Article 110 of the Civil Code, it was only her
husband who could change the family domicile in Batac and the evidence shows he did not effect any such
change. To a large degree, this follows the common law that "a woman on her marriage loses her own
domicile and by operation of law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what
she believes or intends."
7

Fourth. The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the death on September 28, 1989 of former
President Marcos on petitioner's Batac domicile. The issue is of first impression in our jurisdiction and two (2)
schools of thought contend for acceptance. One is espoused by our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice
Davide, Jr., heavily relying on American authorities.
8
He echoes the theory that after the husband's death, the
wife retains the last domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change.
I do not subscribe to this submission. The American case law that the wife still retains her dead husband's
domicile is based on ancient common law which we can no longer apply in the Philippine setting today. The
common law identified the domicile of a wife as that of the husband and denied to her the power of acquiring
a domicile of her own separate and apart from him.
9
Legal scholars agree that two (2) reasons support this
common law doctrine. The first reason as pinpointed by the legendary Blackstone is derived from the view
that "the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband."
10
The second reason lies
in "the desirability of having the interests of each member of the family unit governed by the same
law."
11
The presumption that the wife retains the domicile of her deceased husband is an extension of this
common law concept. The concept and its extension have provided some of the most iniquitous jurisprudence
against women. It was under common law that the 1873 American case of Bradwell v. Illinois
12
was decided
where women were denied the right to practice law. It was unblushingly ruled that "the natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life
. . . This is the law of the Creator." Indeed, the rulings relied upon by Mr. Justice Davide in CJS
13
and AM JUR
2d
14
are American state court decisions handed down between the years 1917
15
and 1938,
16
or before the
time when women were accorded equality of rights with men. Undeniably, the women's liberation movement
resulted in far-ranging state legislations in the United States to eliminate gender inequality.
17
Starting in the
decade of the seventies, the courts likewise liberalized their rulings as they started invalidating laws infected
with gender-bias. It was in 1971 when the US Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed,
18
struck a big blow for women
equality when it declared as unconstitutional an Idaho law that required probate courts to choose male family
members over females as estate administrators. It held that mere administrative inconvenience cannot justify
a sex-based distinction. These significant changes both in law and in case law on the status of women
virtually obliterated the iniquitous common law surrendering the rights of married women to their husbands
based on the dubious theory of the parties' theoretic oneness. The Corpus Juris Secundum editors did not
miss the relevance of this revolution on women's right as they observed: "However, it has been declared that
under modern statutes changing the status of married women and departing from the common law theory of
marriage, there is no reason why a wife may not acquire a separate domicile for every purpose known to the
law."
19
In publishing in 1969 theRestatement of the Law, Second (Conflict of Laws 2d), the reputable
American Law Institute also categorically stated that the view of Blackstone ". . . is no longer held. As the
result of statutes and court decisions, a wife now possesses practically the same rights and powers as her
unmarried sister."
20

In the case at bench, we have to decide whether we should continue clinging to the anachronistic common
law that demeans women, especially married women. I submit that the Court has no choice except to break
away from this common law rule, the root of the many degradations of Filipino women. Before 1988, our laws
particularly the Civil Code, were full of gender discriminations against women. Our esteemed colleague,
Madam Justice Flerida Ruth Romero, cited a few of them as follows:
21

xxx xxx xxx
Legal Disabilities Suffered by Wives
Not generally known is the fact that under the Civil Code, wives suffer under certain
restrictions or disabilities. For instance, the wife cannot accept gifts from others,
regardless of the sex of the giver or the value of the gift, other than from her very close
relatives, without her husband's consent. She may accept only from, say, her parents,
parents-in-law, brothers, sisters and the relatives within the so-called fourth civil degree.
She may not exercise her profession or occupation or engage in business if her husband
objects on serious grounds or if his income is sufficient to support their family in
accordance with their social standing. As to what constitutes "serious grounds" for
objecting, this is within the discretion of the husband.
xxx xxx xxx
Because of the present inequitable situation, the amendments to the Civil Law being
proposed by the University of the Philippines Law Center would allow absolute divorce
which severes the matrimonial ties, such that the divorced spouses are free to get
married a year after the divorce is decreed by the courts. However, in order to place the
husband and wife on an equal footing insofar as the bases for divorce are concerned, the
following are specified as the grounds for absolute divorce: (1) adultery or having a
paramour committed by the respondent in any of the ways specified in the Revised Penal
Code or (2) an attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner which amounts
to attempted parricide under the Revised Penal Code; (3) abandonment of the petitioner
by the respondent without just cause for a period of three consecutive years; or (4)
habitual maltreatment.
With respect to property relations, the husband is automatically the administrator of the
conjugal property owned in common by the married couple even if the wife may be the
more astute or enterprising partner. The law does not leave it to the spouses to decide
who shall act as such administrator. Consequently, the husband is authorized to engage
in acts and enter into transactions beneficial to the conjugal partnership. The wife,
however, cannot similarly bind the partnership without the husband's consent.
And while both exercise joint parental authority over their children, it is the father whom
the law designates as the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the
unemancipated child.
Taking the lead in Asia, our government exerted efforts, principally through legislations, to eliminate
inequality between men and women in our land. The watershed came on August 3, 1988 when our
Family Code took effect which, among others, terminated the unequal treatment of husband and
wife as to their rights and responsibilities.
22

The Family Code attained this elusive objective by giving new rights to married women and by abolishing sex-
based privileges of husbands. Among others, married women are now given the joint right to administer the
family property, whether in the absolute community system or in the system of conjugal partnership;
23
joint
parental authority over their minor children, both over their persons as well as their properties;
24
joint
responsibility for the support of the family;
25
the right to jointly manage the household;
26
and, the right to
object to their husband's exercise of profession, occupation, business or activity.
27
Of particular relevance to
the case at bench is Article 69 of the Family Code which took away the exclusive right of the husband to fix
the family domicile and gave it jointly to the husband and the wife, thus:
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the
court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live
abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such
exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.
(Emphasis supplied)
Article 69 repealed Article 110 of the Civil Code. Commenting on the duty of the husband and wife
to live together, former Madam Justice Alice Sempio-Diy of the Court of Appeals specified the
instances when a wife may now refuse to live with her husband, thus:
28

(2) The wife has the duty to live with her husband, but she may refuse to do so in certain
cases like:
(a) If the place chosen by the husband as family residence is
dangerous to her Life;
(b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive conduct
or insults, making common life impossible;
(c) If the husband compels her to live with his parents, but she
cannot get along with her mother-in-law and they have constant
quarrels (Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, CA, 46 OG 6122);
(d) Where the husband has continuously carried illicit relations for 10
years with different women and treated his wife roughly and without
consideration. (Dadivas v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92);
(e) Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no money
to his family for food and necessities, and at the same time insulting
his wife and laying hands on her. (Panuncio v. Sula, CA, 34 OG
129);
(f) If the husband has no fixed residence and lives a vagabond life as
a tramp (1 Manresa 329);
(g) If the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home (Gahn
v. Darby, 38 La. Ann. 70).
The inescapable conclusion is that our Family Code has completely emancipated the wife from the
control of the husband, thus abandoning the parties' theoretic identity of interest. No less than the
late revered Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes who chaired the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP
Law Center gave this insightful view in one of his rare lectures after retirement:
29

xxx xxx xxx
The Family Code is primarily intended to reform the family law so as to emancipate the
wife from the exclusive control of the husband and to place her at parity with him insofar
as the family is concerned.The wife and the husband are now placed on equal standing
by the Code. They are now joint administrators of the family properties and exercise joint
authority over the persons and properties of their children. This means a dual authority in
the family. The husband will no longer prevail over the wife but she has to agree on all
matters concerning the family. (Emphasis supplied)
In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as started
and perpetuated by the common law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the
wife still retains the domicile of her dead husband. Article 110 of the Civil Code which provides the
statutory support for this stance has been repealed by Article 69 of the Family Code. By its repeal,
it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are not free to resurrect it by giving it further effect in any way
or manner such as by ruling that the petitioner is still bound by the domiciliary determination of her
dead husband.
Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to consider our Constitution and its firm guarantees of
due process and equal protection of
law.
30
It can hardly be doubted that the common law imposition on a married woman of her dead husband's
domicile even beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to women. It is a gender-based discrimination and
is not rationally related to the objective of promoting family solidarity. It cannot survive a constitutional
challenge. Indeed, compared with our previous fundamental laws, the 1987 Constitution is more concerned
with equality between sexes as it explicitly commands that the State ". . . shall ensure fundamental equality
before the law of women and men." To be exact, section 14, Article II provides: "The State recognizes the role
of women in nation building, and shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men. We
shall be transgressing the sense and essence of this constitutional mandate if we insist on giving our women
the caveman's treatment.
Prescinding from these premises, I respectfully submit that the better stance is to rule that petitioner
reacquired her Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989. This is the necessary consequence
of the view that petitioner's Batac dictated domicile did not continue after her husband's death; otherwise, she
would have no domicile and that will violate the universal rule that no person can be without a domicile at any
point of time. This stance also restores the right of petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away
by Article 110 of the Civil Code, a right now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution.
Likewise, I cannot see the fairness of the common law requiring petitioner to choose again her Tacloban
domicile before she could be released from her Batac domicile. She lost her Tacloban domicile not through
her act but through the act of her deceased husband when he fixed their domicile in Batac. Her husband is
dead and he cannot rule her beyond the grave. The law disabling her to choose her own domicile has been
repealed. Considering all these, common law should not put the burden on petitioner to prove she has
abandoned her dead husband's domicile. There is neither rhyme nor reason for this gender-based burden.
But even assuming arguendo that there is need for convincing proof that petitioner chose to reacquire her
Tacloban domicile, still, the records reveal ample evidence to this effect. In her affidavit submitted to the
respondent COMELEC, petitioner averred:
xxx xxx xxx
36. In November, 1991, I came home to our beloved country, after several requests for
my return were denied by President Corazon C. Aquino, and after I filed suits for our
Government to issue me my passport.
37. But I came home without the mortal remains of my beloved husband, President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, which the Government considered a threat to the national security
and welfare.
38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately live and reside in Tacloban
City or in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, even if my residences there were not livable as they had
been destroyed and cannibalized. The PCGG, however, did not permit and allow me.
39. As a consequence, I had to live at various times in the Westin Philippine Plaza in
Pasay City, a friend's apartment on Ayala Avenue, a house in South Forbes Park which
my daughter rented, and Pacific Plaza, all in Makati.
40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of my
brother in San Jose, Tacloban City, and pursued my negotiations with PCGG to recover
my sequestered residences in Tacloban City and Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
40.1 In preparation for my observance of All Saints' Day and All
Souls' Day that year, I renovated my parents' burial grounds and
entombed their bones which had been excalvated, unearthed and
scattered.
41. On November 29, 1993, I formally wrote PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for
permissions to
. . . rehabilitate . . . (o)ur ancestral house in Tacloban and farmhouse
in Olot, Leyte . . . to make them livable for us the Marcos family to
have a home in our own motherland.
xxx xxx xxx
42. It was only on 06 June 1994, however, when PCGG Chairman Gunigundo, in his
letter to Col. Simeon Kempis, Jr., PCGG Region 8 Representative, allowed me to repair
and renovate my Leyte residences. I quote part of his letter:
Dear Col. Kempis,
Upon representation by Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos to this Commission,
that she intends to visit our sequestered properties in Leyte, please
allow her access thereto. She may also cause repairs and
renovation of the sequestered properties, in which event, it shall be
understood that her undertaking said repairs is not authorization for
her to take over said properties, and that all expenses shall be for
her account and not reimbursable. Please extend the necessary
courtesy to her.
xxx xxx xxx
43. I was not permitted, however, to live and stay in the Sto. Nio Shrine residence in
Tacloban City where I wanted to stay and reside, after repairs and renovations were
completed. In August 1994, I transferred from San Jose, Tacloban City, to my residence
in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, when PCGG permitted me to stay and live there.
It is then clear that in 1992 petitioner reestablished her domicile in the First District of Leyte. It is not
disputed that in 1992, she first lived at the house of her brother in San Jose, Tacloban City and
later, in August 1994, she transferred her residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Both
Tacloban City and the municipality of Olot are within the First District of Leyte. Since petitioner
reestablished her old domicile in 1992 in the First District of Leyte, she more than complied with the
constitutional requirement of residence
". . . for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election," i.e., the
May 8, 1995 elections.
The evidence presented by the private respondent to negate the Tacloban domicile of petitioner is nil. He
presented petitioner's Voter's Registration Record filed with the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct 10-A
of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte wherein she stated that her period of residence in said barangay was six (6)
months as of the date of her filing of said Voter's Registration Record on January 28, 1995.
31
This statement
in petitioner's Voter's Registration Record is a non-prejudicial admission. The Constitution requires at least
one (1) year residence in thedistrict in which the candidate shall be elected. In the case at bench, the
reference is the First District of Leyte. Petitioner's statement proved that she resided in Olot six (6) months
before January 28, 1995 but did not disprove that she has also resided in Tacloban City starting 1992. As
aforestated, Olot and Tacloban City are both within the First District of Leyte, hence, her six (6) months
residence in Olot should be counted not against, but in her favor. Private respondent also presented
petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995
32
where she placed seven (7) months after Item
No. 8 which called for information regarding "residence in the constituency where I seek to be elected
immediately preceding the election." Again, this original certificate of candidacy has no evidentiary value
because an March 1, 1995 it was corrected by petitioner. In her Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy,
33
petitioner wrote "since childhood" after Item No. 8. The amendment of a certificate of candidacy
to correct a bona fide mistake has been allowed by this Court as a matter of course and as a matter of right.
As we held in Alialy v. COMELEC,
34
viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
The absence of the signature of the Secretary of the local chapter N.P in the original
certificate of candidacy presented before the deadline September 11, 1959, did not
render the certificate invalid.The amendment of the certificate, although at a date after
the deadline, but before the election, was substantial compliance with the law, and the
defect was cured.
It goes without saying that petitioner's erroneous Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995
cannot be used as evidence against her. Private respondent's petition for the disqualification of
petitioner rested alone on these two (2) brittle pieces of documentary evidence petitioner's
Voter's Registration Record and her original Certificate of Candidacy. Ranged against the evidence
of the petitioner showing her ceaseless contacts with Tacloban, private respondent's two (2) pieces
of evidence are too insufficient to disqualify petitioner, more so, to deny her the right to represent
the people of the First District of Leyte who have overwhelmingly voted for her.
Fifth. Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that "bona fide candidates for any public office
shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination."
35
A detached reading of the records of the
case at bench will show that all forms of legal and extra-legal obstacles have been thrown against petitioner
to prevent her from running as the people's representative in the First District of Leyte. In petitioner's Answer
to the petition to disqualify her, she averred:
36

xxx xxx xxx
10. Petitioner's (herein private respondent Montejo) motive in filing the instant petition is
devious. When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to
register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte,
petitioner (Montejo) immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter
stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." (Annex
"2" of respondent's affidavit, Annex "2"). After respondent (petitioner herein) had
registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six-month actual residence
therein, petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of
Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such move up to the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 118702, his purpose being to remove respondent (petitioner
herein) as petitioner's (Montejo's) opponent in the congressional election in the First
District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking to create
another legislative district, to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District and to
make it a part of the new district, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass
the Senate. Having, failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition, for the
same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit himself along with respondent
(petitioner herein) for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of
Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995.
These allegations which private respondent did not challenge were not lost
to the perceptive eye of Commissioner Maambong who in his Dissenting Opinion,
37
held:
xxx xxx xxx
Prior to the registration date January 28, 1995 the petitioner (herein private
respondent Montejo) wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban City not to allow respondent
(petitioner herein) to register thereat since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban
City. The purpose of this move of the petitioner (Montejo) is not lost to (sic) the
Commission. In UND No. 95-001 (In the matter of the Legislative Districts of the
Provinces of Leyte, Iloilo, and South Cotabato, Out of Which the New Provinces of
Biliran, Guimaras and Saranggani Were Respectively Created), . . . Hon. Cirilo Roy G.
Montejo, Representative, First District of Leyte, wanted the Municipality of Tolosa, in the
First District of Leyte, transferred to the Second District of Leyte. The Hon. Sergio A.F.
Apostol, Representative of the Second District of Leyte, opposed the move of the
petitioner (Montejo). Under Comelec Resolution No. 2736 (December 29, 1994), the
Commission on Elections refused to make the proposed transfer. Petitioner (Montejo)
filed "Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution
No. 2736" which the Commission denied in a Resolution promulgated on February 1,
1995. Petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition for certiorari before the Honorable Supreme
Court (Cirilo Roy G. Montejo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 118702) questioning
the resolution of the Commission. Believing that he could get a favorable ruling from the
Supreme Court, petitioner (Montejo) tried to make sure that the respondent (petitioner
herein) will register as a voter in Tolosa so that she will be forced to run as
Representative not in the First but in the Second District.
It did not happen. On March 16, 1995, the Honorable Supreme Court unanimously
promulgated a "Decision," penned by Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it
transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and
the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third
District of the province of Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We also
deny the Petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa
from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte.
No costs.
Petitioner's (Montejo's) plan did not work. But the respondent (petitioner herein) was
constrained to register in the Municipality of Tolosa where her house is instead of
Tacloban City, her domicile. In any case, both Tacloban City and Tolosa are in the First
Legislative District.
All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank harassments and
invidious discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal access to a public office. We cannot
commit any hermeneutic violence to the Constitution by torturing the meaning of equality, the end
result of which will allow the harassment and discrimination of petitioner who has lived a
controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow. There is but one Constitution for all
Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a "different" Constitution, and the worst way to interpret
the Constitution is to inject in its interpretation, bile and bitterness.
Sixth. In Gallego v. Vera,
38
we explained that the reason for this residence requirement is "to exclude a
stranger or newcomer, unacquainted, with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with
the latter, from an elective office to serve that community . . . ." Petitioner's lifetime contacts with the First
District of Leyte cannot be contested. Nobody can claim that she is not acquainted with its problems because
she is a stranger to the place. None can argue she cannot satisfy the intent of the Constitution.
Seventh. In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to effectuate the will of the
electorate. The election results show that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-one
(70,471) votes, while private respondent got only Thirty-Six Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty-Three (36,833)
votes. Petitioner is clearly the overwhelming choice of the electorate of the First District of Leyte and this is
not a sleight of statistics. We cannot frustrate this sovereign will on highly arguable technical considerations.
In case of doubt, we should lean towards a rule that will give life to the people's political judgment.
A final point. The case at bench provides the Court with the rare opportunity to rectify the inequality of status
between women and men by rejecting the iniquitous common law precedents on the domicile of married
women and by redefining domicile in accord with our own culture, law, and Constitution. To rule that a
married woman is eternally tethered to the domicile dictated by her dead husband is to preserve the
anachronistic and anomalous balance of advantage of a husband over his wife. We should not allow the dead
to govern the living even if the glories of yesteryears seduce us to shout long live the dead! The Family Code
buried this gender-based discrimination against married women and we should not excavate what has been
entombed. More importantly, the Constitution forbids it.
I vote to grant the petition.
Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.
FRANCISCO, J ., concurring:
I concur with Mr. Justice Kapunan's ponencia finding petitioner qualified for the position of Representative of
the First Congressional District of Leyte. I wish, however, to express a few comments on the issue of
petitioner's domicile.
Domicile has been defined as that place in which a person's habitation is fixed, without any present intention
of removing therefrom, and that place is properly the domicile of a person in which he has voluntarily fixed his
abode, or habitation, not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it his
permanent home (28 C.J.S. 1). It denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business,
or pleasure, or for like reasons one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense
that they disclose intent. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966, 969)
Domicile is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law attributes to every individual a
domicile of origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family, or of the person on whom
he is legally dependent at the time of his birth. While the domicile of origin is generally the place where one is
born or reared, it maybe elsewhere (28 C.J.S. 5). Domicile of choice, on the other hand, is the place which
the person has elected and chosen for himself to displace his previous domicile; it has for its true basis or
foundation the intention of the person (28 C.J.S. 6). In order to hold that a person has abandoned his
domicile and acquired a new one called domicile of choice, the following requisites must concur, namely, (a)
residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (b) intention to remain there or animus manendi, and (c) an
intention to abandon the old domicile oranimus non revertendi (Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226
SCRA 408, 415). A third classification is domicile by operation of law which attributes to a person a domicile
independent of his own intention or actual residence, ordinarily resulting from legal domestic relations, as that
of the wife arising from marriage, or the relation of a parent and a child (28 C.J.S. 7).
In election law, when our Constitution speaks of residence for election purposes it means domicile (Co v.
Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 713; Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, 651).
To my mind, public respondent Commission on Elections misapplied this concept, of domicile which led to
petitioner's disqualification by ruling that petitioner failed to comply with the constitutionally mandated one-
year residence requirement. Apparently, public respondent Commission deemed as conclusive petitioner's
stay and registration as voter in many places as conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her established
domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. In several decisions, though, the Court has laid down the rule that
registration of a voter in a place other than his place of origin is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or
loss of such residence (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 300). Respondent Commission offered no cogent
reason to depart from this rule except to surmise petitioner's intent of abandoning her domicile of origin.
It has been suggested that petitioner's domicile of origin was supplanted by a new domicile due to her
marriage, a domicile by operation of law. The proposition is that upon the death of her husband in 1989 she
retains her husband's domicile, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, until she makes an actual change thereof. I find this
proposition quite untenable.
Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioner's domicile of origin which was involuntarily supplanted with another, i.e., Batac,
Ilocos Norte, upon her marriage in 1954 with then Congressman Marcos. By legal fiction she followed the
domicile of her husband. In my view, the reason for the law is for the spouses to fully and effectively perform
their marital duties and obligations to one another.
1
The question of domicile, however, is not affected by the
fact that it was the legal or moral duty of the individual to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. 11). Thus, while
the wife retains her marital domicile so long as the marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon the
latter's termination, for the reason behind the law then ceases. Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage was
ended by the death of her husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and unfair situation of having been
freed from all wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which no longer serves any meaningful purpose.
It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon her husband's
death without even signifying her intention to that effect. It is for the private respondent to prove, not for
petitioner to disprove, that petitioner has effectively abandoned Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for
some other place/s. The clear rule is that it is the party (herein private respondent) claiming that a person has
abandoned or lost his residence of origin who must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or
loss (Faypon v. Quirino, supra at 298; 28 C.J.S. 16), because the presumption is strongly in favor of an
original or former domicile, as against an acquired one (28 C.J.S. 16). Private respondent unfortunately
failed to discharge this burden as the record is devoid of convincing proof that petitioner has acquired whether
voluntarily or involuntarily, a new domicile to replace her domicile of origin.
The records, on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner has complied with the constitutional one-year
residence requirement. After her exile abroad, she returned to the Philippines in 1991 to reside in Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte, but the Presidential Commission on Good Government which sequestered her residential
house and other properties forbade her necessitating her transient stay in various places in Manila (Affidavit
p.6, attached as Annex I of the Petition). In 1992, she ran for the position of president writing in her certificate
of candidacy her residence as San Juan, Metro Manila. After her loss therein, she went back to Tacloban
City, acquired her residence certificate
2
and resided with her brother in San Jose. She resided in San Jose,
Tacloban City until August of 1994 when she was allowed by the PCGG to move and reside in her
sequestered residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 6).
3
It was in the same month of August
when she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila in order to
register anew as voter of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, which she did on January 28, 1995. From this sequence of
events, I find it quite improper to use as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement the date
when she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila. The fact which
private respondent never bothered to disprove is that petitioner transferred her residence after the 1992
presidential election from San Juan, Metro Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein until
August of 1994. She later transferred to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 7). It appearing that both Tacloban
City and Tolosa, Leyte are within the First Congressional District of Leyte, it indubitably stands that she had
more than a year of residence in the constituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has
satisfactorily complied with the one-year qualification required by the 1987 Constitution.
I vote to grant the petition.
ROMERO, J ., separate opinion:
Petitioner has appealed to this Court for relief after the COMELEC ruled that she was disqualified from
running for Representative of her District and that, in the event that she should, nevertheless, muster a
majority vote, her proclamation should be suspended. Not by a straightforward ruling did the COMELEC
pronounce its decision as has been its unvarying practice in the past, but by a startling succession of "reverse
somersaults." Indicative of its shifting stance vis-a-vis petitioner's certificate of candidacy were first, the action
of its Second Division disqualifying her and canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy by a vote of 2-1 on
April 24, 1995; then the denial by the COMELEC en banc of her Motion for Reconsideration on May 7, 1995,
a day before the election; then because she persisted in running, its decision on
May 11, 1995 or three days after the election, allowing her proclamation in the event that the results of the
canvass should show that she obtained the highest number of votes (obviously noting that petitioner had won
overwhelmingly over her opponent), but almost simultaneously reversing itself by directing that even if she
wins, her proclamation should nonetheless be suspended.
Crucial to the resolution of the disqualification issue presented by the case at bench is the interpretation to be
given to the one-year residency requirement imposed by the Constitution on aspirants for a Congressional
seat.
1

Bearing in mind that the term "resident" has been held to be synonymous with "domicile" for election
purposes, it is important to determine whether petitioner's domicile was in the First District of Leyte and if so,
whether she had resided there for at least a period of one year. Undisputed is her domicile of origin,
Tacloban, where her parents lived at the time of her birth. Depending on what theory one adopts, the same
may have been changed when she married Ferdinand E. Marcos, then domiciled in Batac, by operation of
law. Assuming it did, his death certainly released her from the obligation to live with him at the residence fixed
by him during his lifetime. What may confuse the layman at this point is the fact that the term "domicile" may
refer to "domicile of origin," "domicile of choice," or "domicile by operation of law," which subject we shall not
belabor since it has been amply discussed by theponente and in the other separate opinions.
In any case, what assumes relevance is the divergence of legal opinion as to the effect of the husband's
death on the domicile of the widow. Some scholars opine that the widow's domicile remains unchanged; that
the deceased husband's wishes perforce still bind the wife he has left behind. Given this interpretation, the
widow cannot possibly go far enough to sever the domiciliary tie imposed by her husband.
It is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband unilaterally to fix the residence or domicile of
the family, as laid down in the Civil Code,
2
but to continue giving obeisance to his wishes even after the
rationale underlying the mutual duty of the spouses to live together has ceased, is to close one's eyes to the
stark realities of the present.
At the other extreme is the position that the widow automatically reverts to her domicile of origin upon the
demise of her husband. Does the law so abhor a vacuum that the widow has to be endowed somehow with a
domicile? To answer this question which is far from rhetorical, one will have to keep in mind the basic
principles of domicile. Everyone must have a domicile. Then one must have only a single domicile for the
same purpose at any given time. Once established, a domicile remains until a new one is acquired, for no
person lives who has no domicile, as defined by the law be is subject to.
At this juncture, we are confronted with an unexplored legal terrain in this jurisdiction, rendered more murky
by the conflicting opinions of foreign legal authorities. This being the state of things, it is imperative as it is
opportune to illumine the darkness with the beacon light of truth, as dictated by experience and the necessity
of according petitioner her right to choose her domicile in keeping with the enlightened global trend to
recognize and protect the human rights of women, no less than men.
Admittedly, the notion of placing women at par with men, insofar as civil, political and social rights are
concerned, is a relatively recent phenomenon that took seed only in the middle of this century. It is a historical
fact that for over three centuries, the Philippines had been colonized by Spain, a conservative, Catholic
country which transplanted to our shores the Old World cultures, mores and attitudes and values. Through
the imposition on our government of the Spanish Civil Code in 1889, the people, both men and women, had
no choice but to accept such concepts as the husband's being the head of the family and the wife's
subordination to his authority. In such role, his was the right to make vital decisions for the family. Many
instances come to mind, foremost being what is related to the issue before us, namely, that "the husband
shall fix the residence of the family."
3
Because he is made responsible for the support of the wife and the rest
of the family,
4
he is also empowered to be the administrator of the conjugal property, with a few
exceptions
5
and may, therefore, dispose of the conjugal partnership property for the purposes specified
under the law;
6
whereas, as a general rule, the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the
husband's consent.
7
As regards the property pertaining to the children under parental authority, the father is
the legal administrator and only in his absence may the mother assume his powers.
8
Demeaning to the wife's
dignity are certain strictures on her personal freedoms, practically relegating her to the position of minors and
disabled persons. To illustrate a few: The wife cannot, without the husband's consent, acquire any gratuitous
title, except from her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the fourth
degree.
9
With respect to her employment, the husband wields a veto power in the case the wife exercises her
profession or occupation or engages in business, provided his income is sufficient for the family, according to
its social standing and his opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds.
10
Most offensive, if not
repulsive, to the liberal-minded is the effective prohibition upon a widow to get married till after three hundred
days following the death of her husband, unless in the meantime, she has given birth to a child.
11
The mother
who contracts a subsequent marriage loses the parental authority over her children, unless the deceased
husband, father of the latter, has expressly provided in his will that his widow might marry again, and has
ordered that in such case she should keep and exercise parental authority over their children.
12
Again, an
instance of a husband's overarching influence from beyond the grave.
All these indignities and disabilities suffered by Filipino wives for hundreds of years evoked no protest from
them until the concept of human rights and equality between and among nations and individuals found
hospitable lodgment in the United Nations Charter of which the Philippines was one of the original signatories.
By then, the Spanish "conquistadores" had been overthrown by the American forces at the turn of the
century. The bedrock of the U.N. Charter was firmly anchored on this credo: "to reaffirm faith in the
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and
women." (Emphasis supplied)
It took over thirty years before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit, owing largely to the burgeoning
of the feminist movement. What may be regarded as the international bill of rights for women was
implanted in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) adopted by the U.N. General Assembly which entered into force as an international
treaty on September 3, 1981. In ratifying the instrument, the Philippines bound itself to implement
its liberating spirit and letter, for its Constitution, no less, declared that "The Philippines. . . adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations."
13
One such
principle embodied in the CEDAW is granting to men and women "the same rights with regard to
the law relating to the movement of persons and the freedom to choose their residence and
domicile."
14
(Emphasis supplied).
CEDAW's pro-women orientation which was not lost on Filipino women was reflected in the 1987 Constitution
of the Philippines and later, in the Family Code,
15
both of which were speedily approved by the first lady
President of the country, Corazon C. Aquino. Notable for its emphasis on the human rights of all individuals
and its bias for equality between the sexes are the following provisions: "The State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human rights"
16
and "The State recognizes the role of women
in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men."
17

A major accomplishment of women in their quest for equality with men and the elimination of discriminatory
provisions of law was the deletion in the Family Code of almost all of the unreasonable strictures on wives
and the grant to them of personal rights equal to that of their husbands. Specifically, the husband and wife are
now giventhe right jointly to fix the family domicile;
18
concomitant to the spouses' being jointly responsible for
the support of the family is the right and duty of both spouses to manage the household;
19
the administration
and the enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly;
20
the father and mother
shall now jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of their unemancipated common child
21
and
several others.
Aware of the hiatus and continuing gaps in the law, insofar as women's rights are concerned, Congress
passed a law popularly known as "Women in Development and Nation Building Act"
22
Among the rights given
to married women evidencing their capacity to act in contracts equal to that of men are:
(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit arrangements
under the same conditions as men;
(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting agricultural
credit, loans and non material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian reform and land
resettlement programs;
(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and
(4) Married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for passports, secure visas
and other travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses.
As the world draws the curtain on the Fourth World Conference of Women in Beijing, let this Court now be the
first to respond to its clarion call that "Women's Rights are Human Rights" and that "All obstacles to women's
full participation in decision-making at all levels, including the family" should be removed. Having been herself
a Member of the Philippine Delegation to the International Women's Year Conference in Mexico in 1975, this
writer is only too keenly aware of the unremitting struggle being waged by women the world over, Filipino
women not excluded, to be accepted as equals of men and to tear down the walls of discrimination that hold
them back from their proper places under the sun.
In light of the inexorable sweep of events, local and global, legislative, executive and judicial, according more
rights to women hitherto denied them and eliminating whatever pockets of discrimination still exist in their
civil, political and social life, can it still be insisted that widows are not at liberty to choose their domicile upon
the death of their husbands but must retain the same, regardless?
I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound by the domicile
of the departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically revert to her domicile of
origin, but exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile of origin. In returning to Tacloban and
subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner
amply demonstrated by overt acts, her election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to her
domicile of origin. Added together, the time when she set up her domicile in the two places sufficed to meet
the one-year requirement to run as Representative of the First District of Leyte.
In view of the foregoing expatiation, I vote to GRANT the petition.
VITUG, J ., separate opinion:
The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates.
The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our legal system that sets up ideals and
directions and render steady our strides hence. It only looks back so as to ensure that mistakes in the past
are not repeated. A compliant transience of a constitution belittles its basic function and weakens its goals. A
constitution may well become outdated by the realities of time. When it does, it must be changed but while it
remains, we owe it respect and allegiance. Anarchy, open or subtle, has never been, nor must it ever be, the
answer to perceived transitory needs, let alone societal attitudes, or the Constitution might lose its very
essence.
Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either by express statement or
by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51).
The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and Section 17 of Article VI of the fundamental law.
These provisions read:
Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-
five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a
period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated
by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under
the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.
The Commission on Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to enforce and administer "all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ." (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that, there being
nothing said to the contrary, should include its authority to pass upon the qualification and disqualification
prescribed by law ofcandidates to an elective office. Indeed, pre-proclamation controversies are expressly
placed under the COMELEC's jurisdiction to hear and resolve (Art. IX, C, Sec. 3, Constitution).
The matter before us specifically calls for the observance of the constitutional one-year residency
requirement. The issue (whether or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is basically a question of
fact or at least inextricably linked to such determination. The findings and judgment of the COMELEC, in
accordance with the long established rule and subject only to a number of exceptions under the basic
heading of "grave abuse of discretion," are not reviewable by this Court.
I do not find much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to me to be a plain matter. Generally, the
term "residence" has a broader connotation that may mean permanent (domicile), official (place where one's
official duties may require him to stay) or temporary (the place where he sojourns during a considerable
length of time). For civil law purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil
obligations, the domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code).
In election cases, the controlling rule is that heretofore announced by this Court in Romualdez vs. Regional
Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City (226 SCRA 408, 409); thus:
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus:
"(t)he term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile," which
imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." "Domicile" denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons,
one intends to return. . . . . Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting
another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there
must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to
remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must
basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain
in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile
must be actual.
Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with having
committed grave abuse of discretion in its assailed resolution.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of the
Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. It signifies that the protestee must have theretofore been duly
proclaimed and has since become a "member" of the Senate or the House of Representatives. The question
can be asked on whether or not the proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial function of the
Commission on Elections dictated solely on the number of votes cast in an election exercise. I believe, it is
not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the performance of which, being adequately defined, does not allow the
use of further judgment or discretion. The COMELEC, in its particular case, is tasked with the full
responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be required by law before a
proclamation is properly done.
The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue encroachment on the ultimate
exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are
explicitly within their exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were otherwise, would be the effect of the
Court's peremptory pronouncement on the ability of the Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its own
judgment in a contest "relating to the election, returns and qualification" of its members.
Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base on the applicability to this case of Section
6 of Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, each providing thusly:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission and the courts
shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end
that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in
which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason,
a candidate is not declared by final, judgment before an election to be disqualified, and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of
the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and
assumption to office.
I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not so much the
specific instances they ostensibly would cover as the principle they clearly convey. Thus, I will not scoff at the
argument that it should be sound to say that votes cast in favor of the disqualified candidate, whenever
ultimately declared as such, should not be counted in his or her favor and must accordingly be considered to
be stray votes. The argument, nevertheless, is far outweighed by the rationale of the now prevailing doctrine
first enunciated in the case of Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238 [1912]) which, although later abandoned
in Ticzon vs. Comelec (103 SCRA 687 [1981]), and Santos vs. COMELEC (137 SCRA 740 [1985]), was
restored, along with the interim case of Geronimo vs. Ramos (136 SCRA 435 [1985]), by the Labo (176
SCRA 1 (1989]), Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 297 [1992]) and, most
recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436 [1994]) rulings. Benito vs.Comelec was a unanimous decision penned by
Justice Kapunan and concurred in by Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado,
Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza (Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were on official
leave). For easy reference, let me quote from the first Labo decision:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo
warrantopetition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is
that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was
obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, (137
SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was
proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a
turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregard as stray. In effect, the
second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the
Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la
Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with three dissenting (Teehankee,
Acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and another two reserving their
vote. (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.) One was on official leave. (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in
favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435) which represents the
more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first
announced in 1912 in Topacio v.Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members
of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, with Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera,
Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concurring) without any
dissent, although one reserved his vote, (Makasiar, J.) another took no part, (Aquino, J.)
and two others were on leave. (Fernando, C.J. and Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the Court
held:
. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has
not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner
and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of
which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not
choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those
who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election
for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of
government that no one can be declared elected and no measure
can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality
of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p.
676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to
be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily
entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared
the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible
person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in
the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on
the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive,
qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless. (at pp. 20-
21)
Considering all the foregoing, I am constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petition.
MENDOZA, J ., separate opinion:
In my view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to disqualify
candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. I think that it
has none and that the qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by
filing a petition for quo warranto or an election protest in the appropriate forum, not necessarily in the
COMELEC but, as in this case, in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this
case took part in the proceedings in the COMELEC is of no moment. Such proceedings were unauthorized
and were not rendered valid by their agreement to submit their dispute to that body.
The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized proceedings for determining a candidate's
qualifications for an office before his election. There are none in the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881),
in the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646), or in the law providing for synchronized elections (R.A.
No. 7166). There are, in other words, no provisions for pre-proclamation contests but only election protests
or quo warrantoproceedings against winning candidates.
To be sure, there are provisions denominated for "disqualification," but they are not concerned with a
declaration of the ineligibility of a candidate. These provisions are concerned with the incapacity (due to
insanity, incompetence or conviction of an offense) of a person either to be a candidate or to continue as a
candidate for public office. There is also a provision for the denial or cancellation of certificates of candidacy,
but it applies only to cases involving false representations as to certain matters required by law to be stated in
the certificates.
These provisions are found in the following parts of the Omnibus Election Code:
12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority
insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of
more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary
pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon
the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been
removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence,
unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis added)
68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a
party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign
an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of
Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the
office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country
shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person
has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis
added)
78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not
later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis added)
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646):
6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and; upon motion for the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added).
7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The
procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel
a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
and the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160):
40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of on administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to
reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
The petition filed by private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo in the COMELEC, while entitled "For Cancellation
and Disqualification," contained no allegation that private respondent Imelda Romualdez-Marcos made
material representations in her certificate of candidacy which were false, it sought her disqualification on the
ground that "on the basis of her Voter Registration Record and Certificate of Candidacy, [she] is disqualified
from running for the position of Representative, considering that on election day, May 8, 1995, [she] would
have resided less than ten (10) months in the district where she is seeking to be elected." For its part, the
COMELEC's Second Division, in its resolution of April 24, 1995, cancelled her certificate of candidacy and
corrected certificate of candidacy on the basis of its finding that petitioner is "not qualified to run for the
position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte" and not
because of any finding that she had made false representations as to material matters in her certificate of
candidacy.
Montejo's petition before the COMELEC was therefore not a petition for cancellation of certificate of
candidacy under 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but essentially a petition to declare private respondent
ineligible. It is important to note this, because, as will presently be explained, proceedings under 78 have for
their purpose to disqualify a person from being a candidate, whereas quo warranto proceedings have for their
purpose to disqualify a person from holding public office. Jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving
members of the House of Representatives is vested in the Electoral Tribunal of that body.
Indeed, in the only cases in which this Court dealt with petitions for the cancellation of certificates of
candidacy, the allegations were that the respondent candidates had made false representations in their
certificates of candidacy with regard to their citizenship,
1
age,
2
or residence.
3
But in the generality of cases in
which this Court passed upon the qualifications of respondents for office, this Court did so in the context of
election protests
4
or quo warranto proceedings
5
filed after the proclamation of the respondents or protestees
as winners.
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before
electionthe qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for determining
his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts
constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial
question which should be determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification is
being sought. That is why it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will
not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he
has been voted for and he has won, either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.
6

Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his
domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is
amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the
determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8,
1995. This is contrary to the summary character of proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is
why the law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its
officers.
7
The law is satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the
position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to be made after the election
and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false representations made in
certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice
President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, 15) The purpose is to
preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole
judges" under the Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress or of the
President and Vice President, as the case may be.
By providing in 253 for the remedy of quo warranto for determining an elected official's qualifications after
the results of elections are proclaimed, while being conspicuously silent about a pre-proclamation remedy
based on the same ground, the Omnibus Election Code, or OEC, by its silence underscores the policy of not
authorizing any inquiry into the qualifications of candidates unless they have been elected.
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the
COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25, 1 the following:
Grounds for disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications
of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any
act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing
as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule.
Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the
COMELEC, in the exercise of its rulemaking power under Art. IX, A, 6 of the Constitution, cannot do. It is
noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the
right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age,
residence and citizenship of voters. (Art. IX, C, 2(3))
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification
is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are
proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification"
proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code and in 40 of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual
from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is
to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other
hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public
office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is not
disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We
have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications
prescribed in 2 of the law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of disqualifications provided in
4.
Indeed, provisions for disqualifications on the ground that the candidate is guilty of prohibited election
practices or offenses, like other pre-proclamation remedies, are aimed at the detestable practice of "grabbing
the proclamation and prolonging the election protest,"
8
through the use of "manufactured" election returns or
resort to other trickery for the purpose of altering the results of the election. This rationale does not apply to
cases for determining a candidate's qualifications for office before the election. To the contrary, it is the
candidate against whom a proceeding for disqualification is brought who could be prejudiced because he
could be prevented from assuming office even though in end he prevails.
To summarize, the declaration of ineligibility of a candidate may only be sought in an election protest or action
forquo warranto filed pursuant to 253 of the Omnibus Election Code within 10 days after his proclamation.
With respect to elective local officials (e.g., Governor, Vice Governor, members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, etc.) such petition must be filed either with the COMELEC, the Regional Trial Courts, or
Municipal Trial Courts, as provided in Art. IX, C, 2(2) of the Constitution. In the case of the President and
Vice President, the petition must be filed with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (Art. VII, 4, last paragraph),
and in the case of the Senators, with the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in the case of Congressmen, with the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. (Art. VI, 17) There is greater reason for not allowing before the
election the filing of disqualification proceedings based on alleged ineligibility in the case of candidates for
President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives, because of the same
policy prohibiting the filing of pre-proclamation cases against such candidates.
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95-009; that its
proceedings in that case, including its questioned orders, are void; and that the eligibility of petitioner Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos for the office of Representative of the First District of Leyte may only be inquired into by
the HRET.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition and to annul the proceedings of the Commission on Elections in SPA
No. 95-009, including its questioned orders doted April 24, 1995, May 7, 1995, May 11, 1995 and May 25,
1995, declaring petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos ineligible and ordering her proclamation as
Representative of the First District of Leyte suspended. To the extent that Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure authorizes proceedings for the disqualification of candidates on the ground of ineligibility for the
office, it should considered void.
The provincial board of canvassers should now proceed with the proclamation of petitioner.
Narvasa, C.J., concurs.
PADILLA, J ., dissenting:
I regret that I cannot join the majority opinion as expressed in the well-written ponencia of Mr. Justice
Kapunan.
As in any controversy arising out of a Constitutional provision, the inquiry must begin and end with the
provision itself. The controversy should not be blurred by what, to me, are academic disquisitions. In this
particular controversy, the Constitutional provision on point states that "no person shall be a member of the
House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and on the day of the election,
is at least twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read and write, and except the party list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than
one year immediately preceding the day of the election." (Article VI, section 6)
It has been argued that for purposes of our election laws, the term residence has been understood as
synonymous with domicile. This argument has been validated by no less than the Court in numerous
cases
1
where significantly the factual circumstances clearly and convincingly proved that a person does not
effectively lose his domicile of origin if the intention to reside therein is manifest with his personal presence in
the place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
With this basic thesis in mind, it would not be difficult to conceive of different modalities within which the
phrase "a resident thereof (meaning, the legislative district) for a period of not less than one year" would fit.
The first instance is where a person's residence and domicile coincide in which case a person only has to
prove that he has been domiciled in a permanent location for not less than a year before the election.
A second situation is where a person maintains a residence apart from his domicile in which case he would
have the luxury of district shopping, provided of course, he satisfies the one-year residence period in the
district as the minimum period for eligibility to the position of congressional representative for the district.
In either case, one would not be constitutionally disqualified for abandoning his residence in order to return to
his domicile of origin, or better still, domicile of choice; neither would one be disqualified for abandoning
altogether his domicile in favor of his residence in the district where he desires to be a candidate.
The most extreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a person maintains several residences in
different districts. Since his domicile of origin continues as an option as long as there is no effective
abandonment (animus non revertendi), he can practically choose the district most advantageous for him.
All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered by the unambiguous limitation that "for a period of not
less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election", he must be a resident in the district where
he desires to be elected.
To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term "residence" is to
be synonymous with "domicile." In other words, the candidate's intent and actual presence in one district must
in allsituations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. And this, because of a definite
Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar with the environment and problems of a district he intends to
represent in Congress and the one-year residence in said district would be the minimum period to acquire
such familiarity, if not versatility.
In the case of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos, the operative facts are distinctly set out in the now assailed
decision of the Comelec 2nd Division dated 24 April 1995 (as affirmed by the Comelec en banc)
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in
Tacloban from 1938 to 1948 when she graduated from high school. She pursued her
college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University of Tacloban, where she
earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese High
School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late
Speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she
married ex-president Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte.
She lived with him in Batac, Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her
husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived
together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965 when her husband
was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in
Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
During the Marcos presidency, respondent served as a Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila. She claimed
that in February 1986, she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu,
Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992 respondent ran for
election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she
indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila. On
August 24, 1994, respondent filed a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro
Manila, requesting for cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters in
Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila, in order that she may be re-registered or
transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. (Annex 2-B, Answer). On August 31, 1994,
respondent filed her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration
(Annex 2-C, Answer) stating that she is a duly registered voter in 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas,
San Juan, Metro that she intends to register at Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
On January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. She filed with the Board of Election Inspectors CE Form No. 1, Voter
Registration Record No. 94-3349772, wherein she alleged that she has resided in the
municipality of Tolosa for a period of 6 months (Annex A, Petition).
On March 8, 1995, respondent filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor,
Leyte, a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte wherein she also alleged that she has been a resident in the constituency where
she seeks to be elected for a period of 7 months. The pertinent entries therein are as
follows:
7. PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION: House-
wife/ Teacher/ Social Worker
8. RESIDENCE (complete address): Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte
Post Office Address for election purposes: Brgy.
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
9. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY
WHEREIN I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING ELECTION:
________ Years Seven Months
10. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF,
OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said office; That I will support and defend the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That I
will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly-constituted
authorities; That the obligation imposed by my oath is assumed voluntarily, without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and That the facts stated herein are true to the
best of my knowledge.
(Sgd.)
Imelda
Romual
dez-
Marcos
(Signat
ure of
Candid
ate)
2

Petitioner's aforestated certificate of candidacy filed on 8 March 1995 contains the decisive component or
seed of her disqualification. It is contained in her answer under oath of "seven months" to the query of
"residence in the constituency wherein I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election."
It follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that
petitioner is disqualified from the position of representative for the 1st congressional district of Leyte in the
elections of
8 May 1995, for failure to meet the "not less than one-year residence in the constituency (1st district, Leyte)
immediately preceding the day of election
(8 May 1995)."
Having arrived at petitioner's disqualification to be a representative of the first district of Leyte, the next
important issue to resolve is whether or not the Comelec can order the Board of Canvassers to determine and
proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates for representative in said district.
I am not unaware of the pronouncement made by this Court in the case of Labo vs. Comelec, G.R. 86564,
August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1 which gave the rationale as laid down in the early 1912 case of Topacio
vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 that:
. . . . Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have
received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a
fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared
elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or
plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to
be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily
entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared
the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible
person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in
the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on
the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive,
qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.
Under Sec. 6 RA 6646, (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for other
purposes) (84 O.G. 905, 22 February 1988) it is provided that:
. . . Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and,
upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may, during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his
guilt is strong.
There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain and unambiguous meaning of the
provision quoted above. As the law now stands, the legislative policy does not limit its concern with the effect
of a final judgement of disqualification only before the election, but even during or after the election. The law
is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a disqualified candidate SHALL NOT BE COUNTED. The law
has also validated the jurisdiction of the Court or Commission on Election to continue hearing the petition for
disqualification in case a candidate is voted for and receives the highest number of votes, if for any reason,
he is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified.
Since the present case is an after election scenario, the power to suspend proclamation (when evidence of
his guilt is strong) is also explicit under the law. What happens then when after the elections are over, one is
declared disqualified? Then, votes cast for him "shall not be counted" and in legal contemplation, he no
longer received the highest number of votes.
It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner simply because a
"winning candidate is disqualified," but that the law considers him as the candidate who had obtained the
highest number of votes as a result of the votes cast for the disqualified candidate not being counted or
considered.
As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason why this Court should
not re-examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that "the
qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility" most especially when it is mandated by no
less than the Constitution.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to
proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of votes, from among the qualified candidates, as the
duly elected representative of the 1st district of Leyte.
Hermosisima, Jr. J., dissent.
REGALADO, J ., dissenting:
While I agree with same of the factual bases of the majority opinion, I cannot arrive conjointly at the same
conclusion drawn therefrom Hence, this dissent which assuredly is not formulated "on the basis of the
personality of a petitioner in a case."
I go along with the majority in their narration of antecedent facts, insofar as the same are pertinent to this
case, and which I have simplified as follows:
1. Petitioner, although born in Manila, resided during her childhood in the present
Tacloban City, she being a legitimate daughter of parents who appear to have taken up
permanent residence therein. She also went to school there and, for a time, taught in one
of the schools in that city.
2. When she married then Rep. Ferdinand E. Marcos who was then domiciled in Batac,
Ilocos Norte, by operation of law she acquired a new domicile in that place in 1954.
3. In the successive years and during the events that happened thereafter, her husband
having been elected as a Senator and then as President, she lived with him and their
family in San Juan, Rizal and then in Malacanang Palace in San Miguel, Manila.
4. Over those years, she registered as a voter and actually voted in Batac, Ilocos Norte,
then in San Juan, Rizal, and also in San Miguel, Manila, all these merely in the exercise
of the right of suffrage.
5. It does not appear that her husband, even after he had assumed those lofty positions
successively, ever abandoned his domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte where he
maintained his residence and invariably voted in all elections.
6. After the ouster of her husband from the presidency in 1986 and the sojourn of the
Marcos family in Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A., she eventually returned to the Philippines in
1991 and resided in different places which she claimed to have been merely temporary
residences.
7. In 1992, petitioner ran for election as President of the Philippines and in her certificate
of candidacy she indicated that she was then a registered voter and resident of San
Juan, Metro Manila.
8. On August 24, 1994, she filed a letter for the cancellation of her registration in the
Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila in order that she
may "be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." On August 31, 1994,
she followed this up with her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous
Registration wherein she stated that she was a registered voter in Precinct No. 157-A,
Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro Manila and that she intended to register in Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte.
9. On January 28, 1995, petitioner registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte, for which purpose she filed with the therein Board of Election Inspectors a
voter's registration record form alleging that she had resided in that municipality for six
months.
10. On March 8, 1995, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she alleged that she had been a
resident for "Seven Months" of the constituency where she sought to be elected.
11. On March 29, 1995, she filed an "Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy"
wherein her answer in the original certificate of candidacy to item "8. RESIDENCE IN
THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK, TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING
THE ELECTION:" was changed or replaced with a new entry reading "SINCE
CHILDHOOD."
The sole issue for resolution is whether, for purposes of her candidacy, petitioner had complied with the
residency requirement of one year as mandated by no less than Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
I do not intend to impose upon the time of my colleagues with a dissertation on the difference between
residence and domicile. We have had enough of that and I understand that for purposes of political law and,
for that matter of international law, residence is understood to be synonymous with domicile. That is so
understood in our jurisprudence and in American Law, in contradistinction to the concept of residence for
purposes of civil, commercial and procedural laws whenever an issue thereon is relevant or controlling.
Consequently, since in the present case the question of petitioner's residence is integrated in and inseparable
from her domicile, I am addressing the issue from the standpoint of the concept of the latter term, specifically
its permutations into the domicile of origin, domicile of choice and domicile by operation of law, as understood
in American law from which for this case we have taken our jurisprudential bearings.
My readings inform me that the domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or what is termed the "domicile of
origin," constitutes the domicile of an infant until abandoned, or until the acquisition of a new domicile in a
different place.
1
In the instant case, we may grant that petitioner's domicile of origin,
2
at least as of 1938, was
what is now Tacloban City.
Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is, domicile by birth, domicile by
choice, and domicile by operation of law. The first is the common case of the place of birth or domicilium
originis, the second is that which is voluntarily acquired by a party or domicilium propio motu; the last which is
consequential, as that of a wife arising from marriage,
3
is sometimes called domicilium necesarium. There is
no debate that the domicile of origin can be lost or replaced by a domicile of choice or a domicile by operation
of law subsequently acquired by the party.
When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by operation of law, not only
international or American but of our own enactment,
4
she acquired her husband's domicile of origin in Batac,
Ilocos Norte and correspondingly lost her own domicile of origin in Tacloban City.
Her subsequent changes of residence to San Juan, Rizal, then to San Miguel, Manila, thereafter to
Honolulu, Hawaii, and back to now San Juan, Metro Manila do not appear to have resulted in her thereby
acquiring new domiciles of choice. In fact, it appears that her having resided in those places was by reason of
the fortunes or misfortunes of her husband and his peregrinations in the assumption of new official positions
or the loss of them. Her residence in Honolulu and, of course, those after her return to the Philippines were,
as she claimed, against her will or only for transient purposes which could not have invested them with the
status of domiciles of choice.
5

After petitioner's return to the Philippines in 1991 and up to the present imbroglio over her requisite residency
in Tacloban City or Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, there is no showing that she ever attempted to acquire any other
domicile of choice which could have resulted in the abandonment of her legal domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte.
On that score, we note the majority's own submission
6
that, to successfully effect a change of domicile, one
must demonstrate (a) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, (b) a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and (c) acts which correspond with the
purpose.
We consequently have to also note that these requirements for the acquisition of a domicile of choice apply
whether what is sought to be changed or substituted is a domicile of origin (domicilium originis) or a domicile
by operation of law (domicilium necesarium). Since petitioner had lost her domicilium originis which had been
replaced by her domicilium necesarium, it is therefore her continuing domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte which, if
at all, can be the object of legal change under the contingencies of the case at bar.
To get out of this quandary, the majority decision echoes the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Regalado
E. Maambong in SPA 95-009 of the Commission on Elections,
7
and advances this novel proposition.
It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of
her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952 (sic, 1954). By operation
of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her marriage became
Batac, Ilocos Norte although there were no indications of an intention on her part to
abandon her domicile of origin. Because of her husband's subsequent death and through
the operation of the provisions of the New Family Code already in force at the time,
however, her legal domicile automatically reverted to her domicile of origin. . . .
(Emphasis supplied).
Firstly, I am puzzled why although it is conceded that petitioner had acquired a domicilium necesarium in
Batac, Ilocos Norte, the majority insists on making a qualification that she did not intend to abandon her
domicile of origin. I find this bewildering since, in this situation, it is the law that declares where petitioner's
domicile is at any given time, and not her self-serving or putative intent to hold on to her former domicile.
Otherwise, contrary to their own admission that one cannot have more than one domicile at a time,
8
the
majority would be suggesting that petitioner retained Tacloban City as (for lack of a term in law since it does
not exist therein) the equivalent of what is fancied as a reserved, dormant, potential, or residual domicile.
Secondly, domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be recovered likewise in accordance with law.
However, we are here being titillated with the possibility of an automatic reversion to or reacquisition of a
domicile of origin after the termination of the cause for its loss by operation of law. The majority agrees that
since petitioner lost her domicile of origin by her marriage, the termination of the marriage also terminates that
effect thereof. I am impressed by the ingeniousness of this theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the
mother of inventions. Regretfully, I find some difficulty in accepting either the logic or the validity of this
argument.
If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of choice, he thereby voluntarily
abandons the former in favor of the latter. If, thereafter, he abandons that chosen domicile, he does not per
se recover his original domicile unless, by subsequent acts legally indicative thereof, he evinces his intent and
desire to establish the same as his new domicile, which is precisely what petitioner belatedly and, evidently
just for purposes of her candidacy, unsuccessfully tried to do.
One's subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot automatically restore his domicile of origin,
not only because there is no legal authority therefor but because it would be absurd Pursued to its logical
consequence, that theory of ipso jure reversion would rule out the fact that said party could already very well
have obtained another domicile, either of choice or by operation of law, other than his domicile of origin.
Significantly and obviously for this reason, the Family Code, which the majority inexplicably invokes,
advisedly does not regulate this contingency since it would impinge on one's freedom of choice.
Now, in the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily abandoned her domicile of choice (unless we assume
that she entered into the marital state against her will) but, on top of that, such abandonment was further
affirmed through her acquisition of a new domicile by operation of law. In fact, this is even a case of
both voluntary andlegal abandonment of a domicile of origin. With much more reason, therefore, should we
reject the proposition that with the termination of her marriage in 1989, petitioner had supposedly per
se and ipso facto reacquired her domicile of origin which she lost in 1954. Otherwise, this would be
tantamount to saying that during the period of marital coverture, she was simultaneously in possession and
enjoyment of a domicile of origin which was only in a state of suspended animation.
Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect that while after the husband's death the wife has the right to
elect her own domicile,
9
she nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased husband until she makes
an actual change.
10
In the absence of affirmative evidence, to the contrary, the presumption is that a wife's
domicile or legal residence follows that of her husband and will continue after his death.
11

I cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of the majority's theory based on Articles 68 and 69 of
the Family Code. All that is of any relevance therein is that under this new code, the right and power to fix the
family domicile is now shared by the spouses. I cannot perceive how that joint right, which in the first place
was never exercised by the spouses, could affect the domicile fixed by the law for petitioner in 1954 and, for
her husband, long prior thereto. It is true that a wife now has the coordinate power to determine
the conjugal or family domicile, but that has no bearing on this case. With the death of her husband, and each
of her children having gotten married and established their own respective domiciles, the exercise of that joint
power was and is no longer called for or material in the present factual setting of this controversy. Instead,
what is of concern in petitioner's case was the matter of her having acquired or not her own domicile of
choice.
I agree with the majority's discourse on the virtues of the growing and expanded participation of women in the
affairs of the nation, with equal rights and recognition by Constitution and statutory conferment. However, I
have searched in vain for a specific law or judicial pronouncement which either expressly or by necessary
implication supports the majority's desired theory of automatic reacquisition of or reversion to the domicilium
originis of petitioner. Definitely, as between the settled and desirable legal norms that should govern this
issue, there is a world of difference; and, unquestionably, this should be resolved by legislative articulation but
not by the eloquence of the well-turned phrase.
In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954 and not having automatically
reacquired any domicile therein, she cannot legally claim that her residency in the political constituency of
which it is a part continued since her birth up to the present. Respondent commission was, therefore, correct
in rejecting her pretension to that effect in her amended/corrected certificate of candidacy, and in holding her
to her admission in the original certificate that she had actually resided in that constituency for only seven
months prior to the election. These considerations render it unnecessary to further pass upon the procedural
issues raised by petitioner.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, I vote to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
DAVIDE, JR., J ., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority written by Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, more
particularly on the issue of the petitioner's qualification.
Under Section 7, Subdivision A, Article IX of the Constitution, decisions, orders, or rulings of the COMELEC
may be brought to this Court only by the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
(Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]; Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 [1989]).
Accordingly, a writ of certiorari may be granted only if the COMELEC has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion (Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court). Since the COMELEC has,
undoubtedly, jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition, the only issue left is whether it acted with
grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the petitioner.
My careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged resolution of 24 April 1995 of the COMELEC Second
Division and the En Banc resolution of 7 May 1995 discloses total absence of abuse of discretion, much less
grave abuse thereof. The resolution of the Second Division dispassionately and objectively discussed in
minute details the facts which established beyond cavil that herein petitioner was disqualified as a candidate
on the ground of lack of residence in the First Congressional District of Leyte. It has not misapplied,
miscomprehended, or misunderstood facts or circumstances of substance pertinent to the issue of her
residence.
The majority opinion, however, overturned the COMELEC's findings of fact for lack of proof that the petitioner
has abandoned Tolosa as her domicile of origin, which is allegedly within the First Congressional District of
Leyte.
I respectfully submit that the petitioner herself has provided the COMELEC, either by admission or by
documentary evidence, overwhelming proof of the loss or abandonment of her domicile of origin, which is
Tacloban City and not Tolosa, Leyte. Assuming that she decided to live again in her domicile of origin, that
became her second domicile of choice, where her stay, unfortunately, was for only seven months before the
day of the election. She was then disqualified to be a candidate for the position of Representative of the First
Congressional District of Leyte. A holding to the contrary would be arbitrary.
It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice was either Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte.
Nevertheless, she lost it by operation of law sometime in May 1954 upon her marriage to the then
Congressman (later, President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by operation of law is that domicile which
the law attributes to a person, independently of his own intention or actual residence, as results from legal
domestic relations as that of the wife arising from marriage (28 C.J.S. Domicile 7, 11). Under the governing
law then, Article 110 of the Civil Code, her new domicile or her domicile of choice was the domicile of her
husband, which was Batac, Ilocos Norte. Said Article reads as follows:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the
wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the
Republic.
Commenting thereon, civilist Arturo M. Tolentino states:
Although the duty of the spouses to live together is mutual, the husband has a
predominant right because he is empowered by law to fix the family residence. This right
even predominates over some rights recognized by law in the wife. For instance, under
article 117 the wife may engage in business or practice a profession or occupation. But
because of the power of the husband to fix the family domicile he may fix it at such a
place as would make it impossible for the wife to continue in business or in her
profession. For justifiable reasons, however, the wife may be exempted from living in the
residence chosen by the husband. The husband cannot validly allege desertion by the
wife who refuses to follow him to a new place of residence, when it appears that they
have lived for years in a suitable home belonging to the wife, and that his choice of a
different home is not made in good faith. (Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code of the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 339).
Under common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own domicile and, by operation of law, acquires
that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends. Her domicile is
fixed in the sense that it is declared to be the same as his, and subject to certain limitations, he can change
her domicile by changing his own (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile 48, 37).
It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of the Family Code, the fixing of the family domicile is
no longer the sole prerogative of the husband, but is now a joint decision of the spouses, and in case of
disagreement the court shall decide. The said article uses the term "family domicile," and not family
residence, as "the spouses may have multiple residences, and the wife may elect to remain in one of such
residences, which may destroy the duty of the spouses to live together and its corresponding benefits"
(ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, [1988], 102).
The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin upon the death of her husband, which the
majority opinion adopts to overcome the legal effect of the petitioner's marriage on her domicile, is
unsupported by law and by jurisprudence. The settled doctrine is that after the husband's death the wife has a
right to elect her own domicile, but she retains the last domicile of her husband until she makes an actual
change (28 C.J.S. Domicile 12, 27). Or, on the death of the husband, the power of the wife to acquire her
own domicile is revived, but until she exercises the power her domicile remains that of the husband at the
time of his death (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile 62, 45). Note that what is revived is not her domicile of origin
but her power to acquire her own domicile.
Clearly, even after the death of her husband, the petitioner's domicile was that of her husband at the time of
his death which was Batac, Ilocos Norte, since their residences in San Juan, Metro Manila, and San
Miguel, Manila, were their residences for convenience to enable her husband to effectively perform his official
duties. Their residence in San Juan was a conjugal home, and it was there to which she returned in 1991
when she was already a widow. In her sworn certificate of candidacy for the Office of the President in the
synchronized elections of May 1992, she indicated therein that she was a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila.
She also voted in the said elections in that place.
On the basis of her evidence, it was only on 24 August 1994 when she exercised her right as a widow to
acquire her own domicile in Tolosa, Leyte, through her sworn statement requesting the Election Officer of San
Juan, Metro Manila, to cancel her registration in the permanent list of voters in Precinct 157 thereat and
praying that she be "re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, the place of [her] birth and
permanent residence" (photocopy of Exhibit "B," attached as Annex "2" of private respondent Montejo's
Comment). Notably, she contradicted this sworn statement regarding her place of birth when, in her Voter's
Affidavit sworn to on 15 March 1992 (photocopy of Exhibit "C," attached as Annex "3," Id.), her Voter
Registration Record sworn to on 28 January 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "E," attached as Annex "5," Id.), and
her Certificate of Candidacy sworn to on 8 March 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "A," attached as Annex "1," Id.),
she solemnly declared that she was born in Manila.
The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of origin. Is it Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte? In the
affidavit attached to her Answer to the petition for disqualification (Annex "I" of Petition), she declared under
oath that her "domicile or residence is Tacloban City." If she did intend to return to such domicile or residence
of origin why did she inform the Election Officer of San Juan that she would transfer to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte,
and indicate in her Voter's Registration Record and in her certificate of candidacy that her residence is Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte? While this uncertainty is not important insofar as residence in the congressional district is
concerned, it nevertheless proves that forty-one years had already lapsed since she had lost or abandoned
her domicile of origin by virtue of marriage and that such length of time diminished her power of recollection
or blurred her memory.
I find to be misplaced the reliance by the majority opinion on Faypon vs. Quirino (96 Phil. 294 [1954]), and the
subsequent cases which established the principle that absence from original residence or domicile of origin to
pursue studies, practice one's profession, or engage in business in other states does not constitute loss of
such residence or domicile. So is the reliance on Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides
that transfer of residence to any other place by reason of one's "occupation; profession; employment in
private and public service; educational activities; work in military or naval reservations; service in the army,
navy or air force, the constabulary or national police force; or confinement or detention in government
institutions in accordance with law" is not deemed as loss of original residence. Those cases and legal
provision do not include marriage of a woman. The reason for the exclusion is, of course, Article 110 of the
Civil Code. If it were the intention of this Court or of the legislature to consider the marriage of a woman as a
circumstance which would not operate as an abandonment of domicile (of origin or of choice), then such
cases and legal provision should have expressly mentioned the same.
This Court should not accept as gospel truth the self-serving claim of the petitioner in her affidavit (Annex "A"
of her Answer in COMELEC SPA No. 95-009; Annex "I" of Petition) that her "domicile or residence of origin is
Tacloban City," and that she "never intended to abandon this domicile or residence of origin to which [she]
always intended to return whenever absent." Such a claim of intention cannot prevail over the effect of Article
110 of the Civil Code. Besides, the facts and circumstances or the vicissitudes of the petitioner's life after her
marriage in 1954 conclusively establish that she had indeed abandoned her domicile of origin and had
acquired a new oneanimo et facto (KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, A Treatise on Residence and Domicile,
[1934], 214, 326).
Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioner's claim that she "merely committed an honest
mistake" in writing down the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement in
the certificate of candidacy. Such a claim is self-serving and, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, would
be all sound and fury signifying nothing. To me, she did not commit any mistake, honest or otherwise; what
she stated was the truth.
The majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who asserts a fact or the affirmative of
an issue has the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency vs. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 [1991];
P.T. Cerna Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993]). Having admitted marriage to the then
Congressman Marcos, the petitioner could not deny the legal consequence thereof on the change of her
domicile to that of her husband. The majority opinion rules or at least concludes that "[b]y operation of law
(domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her marriage automatically became Batac, Ilocos
Norte." That conclusion is consistent with Article 110 of the Civil Code. Since she is presumed to retain her
deceased husband's domicile until she exercises her revived power to acquire her own domicile, the burden
is upon her to prove that she has exercised her right to acquire her own domicile. She miserably failed to
discharge that burden.
I vote to deny the petition.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J ., concurring:
It was Aristotle who taught mankind that things that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are
unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness.
1
Like other candidates, petitioner has
clearly met the residence requirement provided by Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.
2
We cannot
disqualify her and treat her unalike, for the Constitution guarantees equal protection of the law. I proceed from
the following factual and legal propositions:
First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were domiciled
in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the place. Petitioner went to
school and thereafter worked there. I consider Tacloban as her initial domicile, both her domicile of origin and
her domicile of choice. Her domicile of origin as it was the domicile of her parents when she was a minor; and
her domicile of choice, as she continued living there even after reaching the age of majority.
Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos. By contracting marriage, her domicile became subject to change by law, and the right to change it
was given by Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the
wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the
Republic.
3
(Emphasis supplied)
In De la Via v. Villareal and Geopano,
4
this Court explained why the domicile of the wife ought to
follow that of the husband. We held: "The reason is founded upon the theoretic identity of person
and interest between the husband and the wife, and the presumption that, from the nature of the
relation, the home of one is the home of the other. It is intended to promote, strengthen, and secure
their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony prevail."
5
In accord
with this objective, Article 109 of the Civil Code also obligated the husband and wife "to live
together."
Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner's marriage to former President Marcos ipso
facto resulted in the loss of her Tacloban domicile. I respectfully submit that her marriage by itself alone did
not cause her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of the Civil Code merely gave the husband the right
to fix the domicile of the family. In the exercise of the right, the husband may explicitly choose the prior
domicile of his wife, in which case, the wife's domicile remains unchanged. The husband can
also implicitly acquiesce to his wife's prior domicile even if it is different. So we held in de la Via,
6

. . . . When married women as well as children subject to parental authority live, with the
acquiescence of their husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from where the latter live,
they have their ownindependent domicile. . . .
It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different domicile by the
husband that will change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The
domiciliary decision made by the husband in the exercise of the right conferred by Article 110 of the
Civil Code binds the wife. Any and all acts of a wife during her coverture contrary to the domiciliary
choice of the husband cannot change in any way the domicile legally fixed by the husband. These
acts are void not only because the wife lacks the capacity to choose her domicile but also because
they are contrary to law and public policy.
In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former President Marcos exercised his right to fix the family
domicile and established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he was then the congressman. At that particular
point of time and throughout their married life, petitioner lost her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte. Since
petitioner's Batac domicile has been fixed by operation of law, it was not affected in 1959 when her husband
was elected as Senator, when they lived in San Juan, Rizal and where she registered as a voter. It was not
also affected in 1965 when her husband was elected President, when they lived in Malacaang Palace, and
when she registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila. Nor was it affected when she served as a member of
the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila during the
incumbency of her husband as President of the nation. Under Article 110 of the Civil Code, it was only her
husband who could change the family domicile in Batac and the evidence shows he did not effect any such
change. To a large degree, this follows the common law that "a woman on her marriage loses her own
domicile and by operation of law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what
she believes or intends."
7

Fourth. The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the death on September 28, 1989 of former
President Marcos on petitioner's Batac domicile. The issue is of first impression in our jurisdiction and two (2)
schools of thought contend for acceptance. One is espoused by our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice
Davide, Jr., heavily relying on American authorities.
8
He echoes the theory that after the husband's death, the
wife retains the last domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change.
I do not subscribe to this submission. The American case law that the wife still retains her dead husband's
domicile is based on ancient common law which we can no longer apply in the Philippine setting today. The
common law identified the domicile of a wife as that of the husband and denied to her the power of acquiring
a domicile of her own separate and apart from him.
9
Legal scholars agree that two (2) reasons support this
common law doctrine. The first reason as pinpointed by the legendary Blackstone is derived from the view
that "the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband."
10
The second reason lies
in "the desirability of having the interests of each member of the family unit governed by the same
law."
11
The presumption that the wife retains the domicile of her deceased husband is an extension of this
common law concept. The concept and its extension have provided some of the most iniquitous jurisprudence
against women. It was under common law that the 1873 American case of Bradwell v. Illinois
12
was decided
where women were denied the right to practice law. It was unblushingly ruled that "the natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life
. . . This is the law of the Creator." Indeed, the rulings relied upon by Mr. Justice Davide in CJS
13
and AM JUR
2d
14
are American state court decisions handed down between the years 1917
15
and 1938,
16
or before the
time when women were accorded equality of rights with men. Undeniably, the women's liberation movement
resulted in far-ranging state legislations in the United States to eliminate gender inequality.
17
Starting in the
decade of the seventies, the courts likewise liberalized their rulings as they started invalidating laws infected
with gender-bias. It was in 1971 when the US Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed,
18
struck a big blow for women
equality when it declared as unconstitutional an Idaho law that required probate courts to choose male family
members over females as estate administrators. It held that mere administrative inconvenience cannot justify
a sex-based distinction. These significant changes both in law and in case law on the status of women
virtually obliterated the iniquitous common law surrendering the rights of married women to their husbands
based on the dubious theory of the parties' theoretic oneness. The Corpus Juris Secundum editors did not
miss the relevance of this revolution on women's right as they observed: "However, it has been declared that
under modern statutes changing the status of married women and departing from the common law theory of
marriage, there is no reason why a wife may not acquire a separate domicile for every purpose known to the
law."
19
In publishing in 1969 theRestatement of the Law, Second (Conflict of Laws 2d), the reputable
American Law Institute also categorically stated that the view of Blackstone ". . . is no longer held. As the
result of statutes and court decisions, a wife now possesses practically the same rights and powers as her
unmarried sister."
20

In the case at bench, we have to decide whether we should continue clinging to the anachronistic common
law that demeans women, especially married women. I submit that the Court has no choice except to break
away from this common law rule, the root of the many degradations of Filipino women. Before 1988, our laws
particularly the Civil Code, were full of gender discriminations against women. Our esteemed colleague,
Madam Justice Flerida Ruth Romero, cited a few of them as follows:
21

xxx xxx xxx
Legal Disabilities Suffered by Wives
Not generally known is the fact that under the Civil Code, wives suffer under certain
restrictions or disabilities. For instance, the wife cannot accept gifts from others,
regardless of the sex of the giver or the value of the gift, other than from her very close
relatives, without her husband's consent. She may accept only from, say, her parents,
parents-in-law, brothers, sisters and the relatives within the so-called fourth civil degree.
She may not exercise her profession or occupation or engage in business if her husband
objects on serious grounds or if his income is sufficient to support their family in
accordance with their social standing. As to what constitutes "serious grounds" for
objecting, this is within the discretion of the husband.
xxx xxx xxx
Because of the present inequitable situation, the amendments to the Civil Law being
proposed by the University of the Philippines Law Center would allow absolute divorce
which severes the matrimonial ties, such that the divorced spouses are free to get
married a year after the divorce is decreed by the courts. However, in order to place the
husband and wife on an equal footing insofar as the bases for divorce are concerned, the
following are specified as the grounds for absolute divorce: (1) adultery or having a
paramour committed by the respondent in any of the ways specified in the Revised Penal
Code or (2) an attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner which amounts
to attempted parricide under the Revised Penal Code; (3) abandonment of the petitioner
by the respondent without just cause for a period of three consecutive years; or (4)
habitual maltreatment.
With respect to property relations, the husband is automatically the administrator of the
conjugal property owned in common by the married couple even if the wife may be the
more astute or enterprising partner. The law does not leave it to the spouses to decide
who shall act as such administrator. Consequently, the husband is authorized to engage
in acts and enter into transactions beneficial to the conjugal partnership. The wife,
however, cannot similarly bind the partnership without the husband's consent.
And while both exercise joint parental authority over their children, it is the father whom
the law designates as the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the
unemancipated child.
Taking the lead in Asia, our government exerted efforts, principally through legislations, to eliminate
inequality between men and women in our land. The watershed came on August 3, 1988 when our
Family Code took effect which, among others, terminated the unequal treatment of husband and
wife as to their rights and responsibilities.
22

The Family Code attained this elusive objective by giving new rights to married women and by abolishing sex-
based privileges of husbands. Among others, married women are now given the joint right to administer the
family property, whether in the absolute community system or in the system of conjugal partnership;
23
joint
parental authority over their minor children, both over their persons as well as their properties;
24
joint
responsibility for the support of the family;
25
the right to jointly manage the household;
26
and, the right to
object to their husband's exercise of profession, occupation, business or activity.
27
Of particular relevance to
the case at bench is Article 69 of the Family Code which took away the exclusive right of the husband to fix
the family domicile and gave it jointly to the husband and the wife, thus:
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the
court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live
abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such
exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.
(Emphasis supplied)
Article 69 repealed Article 110 of the Civil Code. Commenting on the duty of the husband and wife
to live together, former Madam Justice Alice Sempio-Diy of the Court of Appeals specified the
instances when a wife may now refuse to live with her husband, thus:
28

(2) The wife has the duty to live with her husband, but she may refuse to do so in certain
cases like:
(a) If the place chosen by the husband as family residence is
dangerous to her Life;
(b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive conduct
or insults, making common life impossible;
(c) If the husband compels her to live with his parents, but she
cannot get along with her mother-in-law and they have constant
quarrels (Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, CA, 46 OG 6122);
(d) Where the husband has continuously carried illicit relations for 10
years with different women and treated his wife roughly and without
consideration. (Dadivas v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92);
(e) Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no money
to his family for food and necessities, and at the same time insulting
his wife and laying hands on her. (Panuncio v. Sula, CA, 34 OG
129);
(f) If the husband has no fixed residence and lives a vagabond life as
a tramp (1 Manresa 329);
(g) If the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home (Gahn
v. Darby, 38 La. Ann. 70).
The inescapable conclusion is that our Family Code has completely emancipated the wife from the
control of the husband, thus abandoning the parties' theoretic identity of interest. No less than the
late revered Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes who chaired the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP
Law Center gave this insightful view in one of his rare lectures after retirement:
29

xxx xxx xxx
The Family Code is primarily intended to reform the family law so as to emancipate the
wife from the exclusive control of the husband and to place her at parity with him insofar
as the family is concerned.The wife and the husband are now placed on equal standing
by the Code. They are now joint administrators of the family properties and exercise joint
authority over the persons and properties of their children. This means a dual authority in
the family. The husband will no longer prevail over the wife but she has to agree on all
matters concerning the family. (Emphasis supplied)
In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as started
and perpetuated by the common law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the
wife still retains the domicile of her dead husband. Article 110 of the Civil Code which provides the
statutory support for this stance has been repealed by Article 69 of the Family Code. By its repeal,
it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are not free to resurrect it by giving it further effect in any way
or manner such as by ruling that the petitioner is still bound by the domiciliary determination of her
dead husband.
Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to consider our Constitution and its firm guarantees of
due process and equal protection of
law.
30
It can hardly be doubted that the common law imposition on a married woman of her dead husband's
domicile even beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to women. It is a gender-based discrimination and
is not rationally related to the objective of promoting family solidarity. It cannot survive a constitutional
challenge. Indeed, compared with our previous fundamental laws, the 1987 Constitution is more concerned
with equality between sexes as it explicitly commands that the State ". . . shall ensure fundamental equality
before the law of women and men." To be exact, section 14, Article II provides: "The State recognizes the role
of women in nation building, and shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men. We
shall be transgressing the sense and essence of this constitutional mandate if we insist on giving our women
the caveman's treatment.
Prescinding from these premises, I respectfully submit that the better stance is to rule that petitioner
reacquired her Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989. This is the necessary consequence
of the view that petitioner's Batac dictated domicile did not continue after her husband's death; otherwise, she
would have no domicile and that will violate the universal rule that no person can be without a domicile at any
point of time. This stance also restores the right of petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away
by Article 110 of the Civil Code, a right now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution.
Likewise, I cannot see the fairness of the common law requiring petitioner to choose again her Tacloban
domicile before she could be released from her Batac domicile. She lost her Tacloban domicile not through
her act but through the act of her deceased husband when he fixed their domicile in Batac. Her husband is
dead and he cannot rule her beyond the grave. The law disabling her to choose her own domicile has been
repealed. Considering all these, common law should not put the burden on petitioner to prove she has
abandoned her dead husband's domicile. There is neither rhyme nor reason for this gender-based burden.
But even assuming arguendo that there is need for convincing proof that petitioner chose to reacquire her
Tacloban domicile, still, the records reveal ample evidence to this effect. In her affidavit submitted to the
respondent COMELEC, petitioner averred:
xxx xxx xxx
36. In November, 1991, I came home to our beloved country, after several requests for
my return were denied by President Corazon C. Aquino, and after I filed suits for our
Government to issue me my passport.
37. But I came home without the mortal remains of my beloved husband, President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, which the Government considered a threat to the national security
and welfare.
38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately live and reside in Tacloban
City or in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, even if my residences there were not livable as they had
been destroyed and cannibalized. The PCGG, however, did not permit and allow me.
39. As a consequence, I had to live at various times in the Westin Philippine Plaza in
Pasay City, a friend's apartment on Ayala Avenue, a house in South Forbes Park which
my daughter rented, and Pacific Plaza, all in Makati.
40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of my
brother in San Jose, Tacloban City, and pursued my negotiations with PCGG to recover
my sequestered residences in Tacloban City and Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
40.1 In preparation for my observance of All Saints' Day and All
Souls' Day that year, I renovated my parents' burial grounds and
entombed their bones which had been excalvated, unearthed and
scattered.
41. On November 29, 1993, I formally wrote PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for
permissions to
. . . rehabilitate . . . (o)ur ancestral house in Tacloban and farmhouse
in Olot, Leyte . . . to make them livable for us the Marcos family to
have a home in our own motherland.
xxx xxx xxx
42. It was only on 06 June 1994, however, when PCGG Chairman Gunigundo, in his
letter to Col. Simeon Kempis, Jr., PCGG Region 8 Representative, allowed me to repair
and renovate my Leyte residences. I quote part of his letter:
Dear Col. Kempis,
Upon representation by Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos to this Commission,
that she intends to visit our sequestered properties in Leyte, please
allow her access thereto. She may also cause repairs and
renovation of the sequestered properties, in which event, it shall be
understood that her undertaking said repairs is not authorization for
her to take over said properties, and that all expenses shall be for
her account and not reimbursable. Please extend the necessary
courtesy to her.
xxx xxx xxx
43. I was not permitted, however, to live and stay in the Sto. Nio Shrine residence in
Tacloban City where I wanted to stay and reside, after repairs and renovations were
completed. In August 1994, I transferred from San Jose, Tacloban City, to my residence
in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, when PCGG permitted me to stay and live there.
It is then clear that in 1992 petitioner reestablished her domicile in the First District of Leyte. It is not
disputed that in 1992, she first lived at the house of her brother in San Jose, Tacloban City and
later, in August 1994, she transferred her residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Both
Tacloban City and the municipality of Olot are within the First District of Leyte. Since petitioner
reestablished her old domicile in 1992 in the First District of Leyte, she more than complied with the
constitutional requirement of residence
". . . for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election," i.e., the
May 8, 1995 elections.
The evidence presented by the private respondent to negate the Tacloban domicile of petitioner is nil. He
presented petitioner's Voter's Registration Record filed with the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct 10-A
of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte wherein she stated that her period of residence in said barangay was six (6)
months as of the date of her filing of said Voter's Registration Record on January 28, 1995.
31
This statement
in petitioner's Voter's Registration Record is a non-prejudicial admission. The Constitution requires at least
one (1) year residence in thedistrict in which the candidate shall be elected. In the case at bench, the
reference is the First District of Leyte. Petitioner's statement proved that she resided in Olot six (6) months
before January 28, 1995 but did not disprove that she has also resided in Tacloban City starting 1992. As
aforestated, Olot and Tacloban City are both within the First District of Leyte, hence, her six (6) months
residence in Olot should be counted not against, but in her favor. Private respondent also presented
petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995
32
where she placed seven (7) months after Item
No. 8 which called for information regarding "residence in the constituency where I seek to be elected
immediately preceding the election." Again, this original certificate of candidacy has no evidentiary value
because an March 1, 1995 it was corrected by petitioner. In her Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy,
33
petitioner wrote "since childhood" after Item No. 8. The amendment of a certificate of candidacy
to correct a bona fide mistake has been allowed by this Court as a matter of course and as a matter of right.
As we held in Alialy v. COMELEC,
34
viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
The absence of the signature of the Secretary of the local chapter N.P in the original
certificate of candidacy presented before the deadline September 11, 1959, did not
render the certificate invalid.The amendment of the certificate, although at a date after
the deadline, but before the election, was substantial compliance with the law, and the
defect was cured.
It goes without saying that petitioner's erroneous Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995
cannot be used as evidence against her. Private respondent's petition for the disqualification of
petitioner rested alone on these two (2) brittle pieces of documentary evidence petitioner's
Voter's Registration Record and her original Certificate of Candidacy. Ranged against the evidence
of the petitioner showing her ceaseless contacts with Tacloban, private respondent's two (2) pieces
of evidence are too insufficient to disqualify petitioner, more so, to deny her the right to represent
the people of the First District of Leyte who have overwhelmingly voted for her.
Fifth. Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that "bona fide candidates for any public office
shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination."
35
A detached reading of the records of the
case at bench will show that all forms of legal and extra-legal obstacles have been thrown against petitioner
to prevent her from running as the people's representative in the First District of Leyte. In petitioner's Answer
to the petition to disqualify her, she averred:
36

xxx xxx xxx
10. Petitioner's (herein private respondent Montejo) motive in filing the instant petition is
devious. When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to
register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte,
petitioner (Montejo) immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter
stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." (Annex
"2" of respondent's affidavit, Annex "2"). After respondent (petitioner herein) had
registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six-month actual residence
therein, petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of
Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such move up to the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 118702, his purpose being to remove respondent (petitioner
herein) as petitioner's (Montejo's) opponent in the congressional election in the First
District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking to create
another legislative district, to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District and to
make it a part of the new district, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass
the Senate. Having, failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition, for the
same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit himself along with respondent
(petitioner herein) for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of
Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995.
These allegations which private respondent did not challenge were not lost
to the perceptive eye of Commissioner Maambong who in his Dissenting Opinion,
37
held:
xxx xxx xxx
Prior to the registration date January 28, 1995 the petitioner (herein private
respondent Montejo) wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban City not to allow respondent
(petitioner herein) to register thereat since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban
City. The purpose of this move of the petitioner (Montejo) is not lost to (sic) the
Commission. In UND No. 95-001 (In the matter of the Legislative Districts of the
Provinces of Leyte, Iloilo, and South Cotabato, Out of Which the New Provinces of
Biliran, Guimaras and Saranggani Were Respectively Created), . . . Hon. Cirilo Roy G.
Montejo, Representative, First District of Leyte, wanted the Municipality of Tolosa, in the
First District of Leyte, transferred to the Second District of Leyte. The Hon. Sergio A.F.
Apostol, Representative of the Second District of Leyte, opposed the move of the
petitioner (Montejo). Under Comelec Resolution No. 2736 (December 29, 1994), the
Commission on Elections refused to make the proposed transfer. Petitioner (Montejo)
filed "Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution
No. 2736" which the Commission denied in a Resolution promulgated on February 1,
1995. Petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition for certiorari before the Honorable Supreme
Court (Cirilo Roy G. Montejo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 118702) questioning
the resolution of the Commission. Believing that he could get a favorable ruling from the
Supreme Court, petitioner (Montejo) tried to make sure that the respondent (petitioner
herein) will register as a voter in Tolosa so that she will be forced to run as
Representative not in the First but in the Second District.
It did not happen. On March 16, 1995, the Honorable Supreme Court unanimously
promulgated a "Decision," penned by Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it
transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and
the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third
District of the province of Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We also
deny the Petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa
from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte.
No costs.
Petitioner's (Montejo's) plan did not work. But the respondent (petitioner herein) was
constrained to register in the Municipality of Tolosa where her house is instead of
Tacloban City, her domicile. In any case, both Tacloban City and Tolosa are in the First
Legislative District.
All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank harassments and
invidious discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal access to a public office. We cannot
commit any hermeneutic violence to the Constitution by torturing the meaning of equality, the end
result of which will allow the harassment and discrimination of petitioner who has lived a
controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow. There is but one Constitution for all
Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a "different" Constitution, and the worst way to interpret
the Constitution is to inject in its interpretation, bile and bitterness.
Sixth. In Gallego v. Vera,
38
we explained that the reason for this residence requirement is "to exclude a
stranger or newcomer, unacquainted, with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with
the latter, from an elective office to serve that community . . . ." Petitioner's lifetime contacts with the First
District of Leyte cannot be contested. Nobody can claim that she is not acquainted with its problems because
she is a stranger to the place. None can argue she cannot satisfy the intent of the Constitution.
Seventh. In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to effectuate the will of the
electorate. The election results show that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-one
(70,471) votes, while private respondent got only Thirty-Six Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty-Three (36,833)
votes. Petitioner is clearly the overwhelming choice of the electorate of the First District of Leyte and this is
not a sleight of statistics. We cannot frustrate this sovereign will on highly arguable technical considerations.
In case of doubt, we should lean towards a rule that will give life to the people's political judgment.
A final point. The case at bench provides the Court with the rare opportunity to rectify the inequality of status
between women and men by rejecting the iniquitous common law precedents on the domicile of married
women and by redefining domicile in accord with our own culture, law, and Constitution. To rule that a
married woman is eternally tethered to the domicile dictated by her dead husband is to preserve the
anachronistic and anomalous balance of advantage of a husband over his wife. We should not allow the dead
to govern the living even if the glories of yesteryears seduce us to shout long live the dead! The Family Code
buried this gender-based discrimination against married women and we should not excavate what has been
entombed. More importantly, the Constitution forbids it.
I vote to grant the petition.
Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.
FRANCISCO, J ., concurring:
I concur with Mr. Justice Kapunan's ponencia finding petitioner qualified for the position of Representative of
the First Congressional District of Leyte. I wish, however, to express a few comments on the issue of
petitioner's domicile.
Domicile has been defined as that place in which a person's habitation is fixed, without any present intention
of removing therefrom, and that place is properly the domicile of a person in which he has voluntarily fixed his
abode, or habitation, not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it his
permanent home (28 C.J.S. 1). It denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business,
or pleasure, or for like reasons one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense
that they disclose intent. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966, 969)
Domicile is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law attributes to every individual a
domicile of origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family, or of the person on whom
he is legally dependent at the time of his birth. While the domicile of origin is generally the place where one is
born or reared, it maybe elsewhere (28 C.J.S. 5). Domicile of choice, on the other hand, is the place which
the person has elected and chosen for himself to displace his previous domicile; it has for its true basis or
foundation the intention of the person (28 C.J.S. 6). In order to hold that a person has abandoned his
domicile and acquired a new one called domicile of choice, the following requisites must concur, namely, (a)
residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (b) intention to remain there or animus manendi, and (c) an
intention to abandon the old domicile oranimus non revertendi (Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226
SCRA 408, 415). A third classification is domicile by operation of law which attributes to a person a domicile
independent of his own intention or actual residence, ordinarily resulting from legal domestic relations, as that
of the wife arising from marriage, or the relation of a parent and a child (28 C.J.S. 7).
In election law, when our Constitution speaks of residence for election purposes it means domicile (Co v.
Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 713; Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, 651).
To my mind, public respondent Commission on Elections misapplied this concept, of domicile which led to
petitioner's disqualification by ruling that petitioner failed to comply with the constitutionally mandated one-
year residence requirement. Apparently, public respondent Commission deemed as conclusive petitioner's
stay and registration as voter in many places as conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her established
domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. In several decisions, though, the Court has laid down the rule that
registration of a voter in a place other than his place of origin is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or
loss of such residence (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 300). Respondent Commission offered no cogent
reason to depart from this rule except to surmise petitioner's intent of abandoning her domicile of origin.
It has been suggested that petitioner's domicile of origin was supplanted by a new domicile due to her
marriage, a domicile by operation of law. The proposition is that upon the death of her husband in 1989 she
retains her husband's domicile, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, until she makes an actual change thereof. I find this
proposition quite untenable.
Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioner's domicile of origin which was involuntarily supplanted with another, i.e., Batac,
Ilocos Norte, upon her marriage in 1954 with then Congressman Marcos. By legal fiction she followed the
domicile of her husband. In my view, the reason for the law is for the spouses to fully and effectively perform
their marital duties and obligations to one another.
1
The question of domicile, however, is not affected by the
fact that it was the legal or moral duty of the individual to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. 11). Thus, while
the wife retains her marital domicile so long as the marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon the
latter's termination, for the reason behind the law then ceases. Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage was
ended by the death of her husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and unfair situation of having been
freed from all wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which no longer serves any meaningful purpose.
It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon her husband's
death without even signifying her intention to that effect. It is for the private respondent to prove, not for
petitioner to disprove, that petitioner has effectively abandoned Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for
some other place/s. The clear rule is that it is the party (herein private respondent) claiming that a person has
abandoned or lost his residence of origin who must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or
loss (Faypon v. Quirino, supra at 298; 28 C.J.S. 16), because the presumption is strongly in favor of an
original or former domicile, as against an acquired one (28 C.J.S. 16). Private respondent unfortunately
failed to discharge this burden as the record is devoid of convincing proof that petitioner has acquired whether
voluntarily or involuntarily, a new domicile to replace her domicile of origin.
The records, on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner has complied with the constitutional one-year
residence requirement. After her exile abroad, she returned to the Philippines in 1991 to reside in Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte, but the Presidential Commission on Good Government which sequestered her residential
house and other properties forbade her necessitating her transient stay in various places in Manila (Affidavit
p.6, attached as Annex I of the Petition). In 1992, she ran for the position of president writing in her certificate
of candidacy her residence as San Juan, Metro Manila. After her loss therein, she went back to Tacloban
City, acquired her residence certificate
2
and resided with her brother in San Jose. She resided in San Jose,
Tacloban City until August of 1994 when she was allowed by the PCGG to move and reside in her
sequestered residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 6).
3
It was in the same month of August
when she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila in order to
register anew as voter of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, which she did on January 28, 1995. From this sequence of
events, I find it quite improper to use as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement the date
when she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila. The fact which
private respondent never bothered to disprove is that petitioner transferred her residence after the 1992
presidential election from San Juan, Metro Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein until
August of 1994. She later transferred to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 7). It appearing that both Tacloban
City and Tolosa, Leyte are within the First Congressional District of Leyte, it indubitably stands that she had
more than a year of residence in the constituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has
satisfactorily complied with the one-year qualification required by the 1987 Constitution.
I vote to grant the petition.
ROMERO, J ., separate opinion:
Petitioner has appealed to this Court for relief after the COMELEC ruled that she was disqualified from
running for Representative of her District and that, in the event that she should, nevertheless, muster a
majority vote, her proclamation should be suspended. Not by a straightforward ruling did the COMELEC
pronounce its decision as has been its unvarying practice in the past, but by a startling succession of "reverse
somersaults." Indicative of its shifting stance vis-a-vis petitioner's certificate of candidacy were first, the action
of its Second Division disqualifying her and canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy by a vote of 2-1 on
April 24, 1995; then the denial by the COMELEC en banc of her Motion for Reconsideration on May 7, 1995,
a day before the election; then because she persisted in running, its decision on
May 11, 1995 or three days after the election, allowing her proclamation in the event that the results of the
canvass should show that she obtained the highest number of votes (obviously noting that petitioner had won
overwhelmingly over her opponent), but almost simultaneously reversing itself by directing that even if she
wins, her proclamation should nonetheless be suspended.
Crucial to the resolution of the disqualification issue presented by the case at bench is the interpretation to be
given to the one-year residency requirement imposed by the Constitution on aspirants for a Congressional
seat.
1

Bearing in mind that the term "resident" has been held to be synonymous with "domicile" for election
purposes, it is important to determine whether petitioner's domicile was in the First District of Leyte and if so,
whether she had resided there for at least a period of one year. Undisputed is her domicile of origin,
Tacloban, where her parents lived at the time of her birth. Depending on what theory one adopts, the same
may have been changed when she married Ferdinand E. Marcos, then domiciled in Batac, by operation of
law. Assuming it did, his death certainly released her from the obligation to live with him at the residence fixed
by him during his lifetime. What may confuse the layman at this point is the fact that the term "domicile" may
refer to "domicile of origin," "domicile of choice," or "domicile by operation of law," which subject we shall not
belabor since it has been amply discussed by theponente and in the other separate opinions.
In any case, what assumes relevance is the divergence of legal opinion as to the effect of the husband's
death on the domicile of the widow. Some scholars opine that the widow's domicile remains unchanged; that
the deceased husband's wishes perforce still bind the wife he has left behind. Given this interpretation, the
widow cannot possibly go far enough to sever the domiciliary tie imposed by her husband.
It is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband unilaterally to fix the residence or domicile of
the family, as laid down in the Civil Code,
2
but to continue giving obeisance to his wishes even after the
rationale underlying the mutual duty of the spouses to live together has ceased, is to close one's eyes to the
stark realities of the present.
At the other extreme is the position that the widow automatically reverts to her domicile of origin upon the
demise of her husband. Does the law so abhor a vacuum that the widow has to be endowed somehow with a
domicile? To answer this question which is far from rhetorical, one will have to keep in mind the basic
principles of domicile. Everyone must have a domicile. Then one must have only a single domicile for the
same purpose at any given time. Once established, a domicile remains until a new one is acquired, for no
person lives who has no domicile, as defined by the law be is subject to.
At this juncture, we are confronted with an unexplored legal terrain in this jurisdiction, rendered more murky
by the conflicting opinions of foreign legal authorities. This being the state of things, it is imperative as it is
opportune to illumine the darkness with the beacon light of truth, as dictated by experience and the necessity
of according petitioner her right to choose her domicile in keeping with the enlightened global trend to
recognize and protect the human rights of women, no less than men.
Admittedly, the notion of placing women at par with men, insofar as civil, political and social rights are
concerned, is a relatively recent phenomenon that took seed only in the middle of this century. It is a historical
fact that for over three centuries, the Philippines had been colonized by Spain, a conservative, Catholic
country which transplanted to our shores the Old World cultures, mores and attitudes and values. Through
the imposition on our government of the Spanish Civil Code in 1889, the people, both men and women, had
no choice but to accept such concepts as the husband's being the head of the family and the wife's
subordination to his authority. In such role, his was the right to make vital decisions for the family. Many
instances come to mind, foremost being what is related to the issue before us, namely, that "the husband
shall fix the residence of the family."
3
Because he is made responsible for the support of the wife and the rest
of the family,
4
he is also empowered to be the administrator of the conjugal property, with a few
exceptions
5
and may, therefore, dispose of the conjugal partnership property for the purposes specified
under the law;
6
whereas, as a general rule, the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the
husband's consent.
7
As regards the property pertaining to the children under parental authority, the father is
the legal administrator and only in his absence may the mother assume his powers.
8
Demeaning to the wife's
dignity are certain strictures on her personal freedoms, practically relegating her to the position of minors and
disabled persons. To illustrate a few: The wife cannot, without the husband's consent, acquire any gratuitous
title, except from her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the fourth
degree.
9
With respect to her employment, the husband wields a veto power in the case the wife exercises her
profession or occupation or engages in business, provided his income is sufficient for the family, according to
its social standing and his opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds.
10
Most offensive, if not
repulsive, to the liberal-minded is the effective prohibition upon a widow to get married till after three hundred
days following the death of her husband, unless in the meantime, she has given birth to a child.
11
The mother
who contracts a subsequent marriage loses the parental authority over her children, unless the deceased
husband, father of the latter, has expressly provided in his will that his widow might marry again, and has
ordered that in such case she should keep and exercise parental authority over their children.
12
Again, an
instance of a husband's overarching influence from beyond the grave.
All these indignities and disabilities suffered by Filipino wives for hundreds of years evoked no protest from
them until the concept of human rights and equality between and among nations and individuals found
hospitable lodgment in the United Nations Charter of which the Philippines was one of the original signatories.
By then, the Spanish "conquistadores" had been overthrown by the American forces at the turn of the
century. The bedrock of the U.N. Charter was firmly anchored on this credo: "to reaffirm faith in the
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and
women." (Emphasis supplied)
It took over thirty years before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit, owing largely to the burgeoning
of the feminist movement. What may be regarded as the international bill of rights for women was
implanted in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) adopted by the U.N. General Assembly which entered into force as an international
treaty on September 3, 1981. In ratifying the instrument, the Philippines bound itself to implement
its liberating spirit and letter, for its Constitution, no less, declared that "The Philippines. . . adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations."
13
One such
principle embodied in the CEDAW is granting to men and women "the same rights with regard to
the law relating to the movement of persons and the freedom to choose their residence and
domicile."
14
(Emphasis supplied).
CEDAW's pro-women orientation which was not lost on Filipino women was reflected in the 1987 Constitution
of the Philippines and later, in the Family Code,
15
both of which were speedily approved by the first lady
President of the country, Corazon C. Aquino. Notable for its emphasis on the human rights of all individuals
and its bias for equality between the sexes are the following provisions: "The State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human rights"
16
and "The State recognizes the role of women
in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men."
17

A major accomplishment of women in their quest for equality with men and the elimination of discriminatory
provisions of law was the deletion in the Family Code of almost all of the unreasonable strictures on wives
and the grant to them of personal rights equal to that of their husbands. Specifically, the husband and wife are
now giventhe right jointly to fix the family domicile;
18
concomitant to the spouses' being jointly responsible for
the support of the family is the right and duty of both spouses to manage the household;
19
the administration
and the enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly;
20
the father and mother
shall now jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of their unemancipated common child
21
and
several others.
Aware of the hiatus and continuing gaps in the law, insofar as women's rights are concerned, Congress
passed a law popularly known as "Women in Development and Nation Building Act"
22
Among the rights given
to married women evidencing their capacity to act in contracts equal to that of men are:
(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit arrangements
under the same conditions as men;
(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting agricultural
credit, loans and non material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian reform and land
resettlement programs;
(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and
(4) Married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for passports, secure visas
and other travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses.
As the world draws the curtain on the Fourth World Conference of Women in Beijing, let this Court now be the
first to respond to its clarion call that "Women's Rights are Human Rights" and that "All obstacles to women's
full participation in decision-making at all levels, including the family" should be removed. Having been herself
a Member of the Philippine Delegation to the International Women's Year Conference in Mexico in 1975, this
writer is only too keenly aware of the unremitting struggle being waged by women the world over, Filipino
women not excluded, to be accepted as equals of men and to tear down the walls of discrimination that hold
them back from their proper places under the sun.
In light of the inexorable sweep of events, local and global, legislative, executive and judicial, according more
rights to women hitherto denied them and eliminating whatever pockets of discrimination still exist in their
civil, political and social life, can it still be insisted that widows are not at liberty to choose their domicile upon
the death of their husbands but must retain the same, regardless?
I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound by the domicile
of the departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically revert to her domicile of
origin, but exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile of origin. In returning to Tacloban and
subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner
amply demonstrated by overt acts, her election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to her
domicile of origin. Added together, the time when she set up her domicile in the two places sufficed to meet
the one-year requirement to run as Representative of the First District of Leyte.
In view of the foregoing expatiation, I vote to GRANT the petition.
VITUG, J ., separate opinion:
The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates.
The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our legal system that sets up ideals and
directions and render steady our strides hence. It only looks back so as to ensure that mistakes in the past
are not repeated. A compliant transience of a constitution belittles its basic function and weakens its goals. A
constitution may well become outdated by the realities of time. When it does, it must be changed but while it
remains, we owe it respect and allegiance. Anarchy, open or subtle, has never been, nor must it ever be, the
answer to perceived transitory needs, let alone societal attitudes, or the Constitution might lose its very
essence.
Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either by express statement or
by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51).
The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and Section 17 of Article VI of the fundamental law.
These provisions read:
Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-
five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a
period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated
by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under
the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.
The Commission on Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to enforce and administer "all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ." (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that, there being
nothing said to the contrary, should include its authority to pass upon the qualification and disqualification
prescribed by law ofcandidates to an elective office. Indeed, pre-proclamation controversies are expressly
placed under the COMELEC's jurisdiction to hear and resolve (Art. IX, C, Sec. 3, Constitution).
The matter before us specifically calls for the observance of the constitutional one-year residency
requirement. The issue (whether or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is basically a question of
fact or at least inextricably linked to such determination. The findings and judgment of the COMELEC, in
accordance with the long established rule and subject only to a number of exceptions under the basic
heading of "grave abuse of discretion," are not reviewable by this Court.
I do not find much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to me to be a plain matter. Generally, the
term "residence" has a broader connotation that may mean permanent (domicile), official (place where one's
official duties may require him to stay) or temporary (the place where he sojourns during a considerable
length of time). For civil law purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil
obligations, the domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code).
In election cases, the controlling rule is that heretofore announced by this Court in Romualdez vs. Regional
Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City (226 SCRA 408, 409); thus:
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus:
"(t)he term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile," which
imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." "Domicile" denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons,
one intends to return. . . . . Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting
another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there
must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to
remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must
basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain
in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile
must be actual.
Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with having
committed grave abuse of discretion in its assailed resolution.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of the
Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. It signifies that the protestee must have theretofore been duly
proclaimed and has since become a "member" of the Senate or the House of Representatives. The question
can be asked on whether or not the proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial function of the
Commission on Elections dictated solely on the number of votes cast in an election exercise. I believe, it is
not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the performance of which, being adequately defined, does not allow the
use of further judgment or discretion. The COMELEC, in its particular case, is tasked with the full
responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be required by law before a
proclamation is properly done.
The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue encroachment on the ultimate
exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are
explicitly within their exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were otherwise, would be the effect of the
Court's peremptory pronouncement on the ability of the Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its own
judgment in a contest "relating to the election, returns and qualification" of its members.
Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base on the applicability to this case of Section
6 of Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, each providing thusly:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission and the courts
shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end
that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in
which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason,
a candidate is not declared by final, judgment before an election to be disqualified, and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of
the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and
assumption to office.
I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not so much the
specific instances they ostensibly would cover as the principle they clearly convey. Thus, I will not scoff at the
argument that it should be sound to say that votes cast in favor of the disqualified candidate, whenever
ultimately declared as such, should not be counted in his or her favor and must accordingly be considered to
be stray votes. The argument, nevertheless, is far outweighed by the rationale of the now prevailing doctrine
first enunciated in the case of Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238 [1912]) which, although later abandoned
in Ticzon vs. Comelec (103 SCRA 687 [1981]), and Santos vs. COMELEC (137 SCRA 740 [1985]), was
restored, along with the interim case of Geronimo vs. Ramos (136 SCRA 435 [1985]), by the Labo (176
SCRA 1 (1989]), Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 297 [1992]) and, most
recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436 [1994]) rulings. Benito vs.Comelec was a unanimous decision penned by
Justice Kapunan and concurred in by Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado,
Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza (Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were on official
leave). For easy reference, let me quote from the first Labo decision:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo
warrantopetition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is
that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was
obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, (137
SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was
proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a
turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregard as stray. In effect, the
second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the
Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la
Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with three dissenting (Teehankee,
Acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and another two reserving their
vote. (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.) One was on official leave. (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in
favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435) which represents the
more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first
announced in 1912 in Topacio v.Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members
of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, with Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera,
Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concurring) without any
dissent, although one reserved his vote, (Makasiar, J.) another took no part, (Aquino, J.)
and two others were on leave. (Fernando, C.J. and Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the Court
held:
. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has
not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner
and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of
which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not
choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those
who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election
for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of
government that no one can be declared elected and no measure
can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality
of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p.
676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to
be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily
entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared
the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible
person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in
the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on
the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive,
qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless. (at pp. 20-
21)
Considering all the foregoing, I am constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petition.
MENDOZA, J ., separate opinion:
In my view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to disqualify
candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. I think that it
has none and that the qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by
filing a petition for quo warranto or an election protest in the appropriate forum, not necessarily in the
COMELEC but, as in this case, in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this
case took part in the proceedings in the COMELEC is of no moment. Such proceedings were unauthorized
and were not rendered valid by their agreement to submit their dispute to that body.
The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized proceedings for determining a candidate's
qualifications for an office before his election. There are none in the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881),
in the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646), or in the law providing for synchronized elections (R.A.
No. 7166). There are, in other words, no provisions for pre-proclamation contests but only election protests
or quo warrantoproceedings against winning candidates.
To be sure, there are provisions denominated for "disqualification," but they are not concerned with a
declaration of the ineligibility of a candidate. These provisions are concerned with the incapacity (due to
insanity, incompetence or conviction of an offense) of a person either to be a candidate or to continue as a
candidate for public office. There is also a provision for the denial or cancellation of certificates of candidacy,
but it applies only to cases involving false representations as to certain matters required by law to be stated in
the certificates.
These provisions are found in the following parts of the Omnibus Election Code:
12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority
insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of
more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary
pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon
the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been
removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence,
unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis added)
68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a
party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign
an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of
Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the
office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country
shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person
has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis
added)
78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not
later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis added)
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646):
6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and; upon motion for the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added).
7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The
procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel
a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
and the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160):
40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of on administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to
reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
The petition filed by private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo in the COMELEC, while entitled "For Cancellation
and Disqualification," contained no allegation that private respondent Imelda Romualdez-Marcos made
material representations in her certificate of candidacy which were false, it sought her disqualification on the
ground that "on the basis of her Voter Registration Record and Certificate of Candidacy, [she] is disqualified
from running for the position of Representative, considering that on election day, May 8, 1995, [she] would
have resided less than ten (10) months in the district where she is seeking to be elected." For its part, the
COMELEC's Second Division, in its resolution of April 24, 1995, cancelled her certificate of candidacy and
corrected certificate of candidacy on the basis of its finding that petitioner is "not qualified to run for the
position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte" and not
because of any finding that she had made false representations as to material matters in her certificate of
candidacy.
Montejo's petition before the COMELEC was therefore not a petition for cancellation of certificate of
candidacy under 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but essentially a petition to declare private respondent
ineligible. It is important to note this, because, as will presently be explained, proceedings under 78 have for
their purpose to disqualify a person from being a candidate, whereas quo warranto proceedings have for their
purpose to disqualify a person from holding public office. Jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving
members of the House of Representatives is vested in the Electoral Tribunal of that body.
Indeed, in the only cases in which this Court dealt with petitions for the cancellation of certificates of
candidacy, the allegations were that the respondent candidates had made false representations in their
certificates of candidacy with regard to their citizenship,
1
age,
2
or residence.
3
But in the generality of cases in
which this Court passed upon the qualifications of respondents for office, this Court did so in the context of
election protests
4
or quo warranto proceedings
5
filed after the proclamation of the respondents or protestees
as winners.
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before
electionthe qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for determining
his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts
constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial
question which should be determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification is
being sought. That is why it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will
not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he
has been voted for and he has won, either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.
6

Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his
domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is
amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the
determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8,
1995. This is contrary to the summary character of proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is
why the law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its
officers.
7
The law is satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the
position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to be made after the election
and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false representations made in
certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice
President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, 15) The purpose is to
preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole
judges" under the Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress or of the
President and Vice President, as the case may be.
By providing in 253 for the remedy of quo warranto for determining an elected official's qualifications after
the results of elections are proclaimed, while being conspicuously silent about a pre-proclamation remedy
based on the same ground, the Omnibus Election Code, or OEC, by its silence underscores the policy of not
authorizing any inquiry into the qualifications of candidates unless they have been elected.
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the
COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25, 1 the following:
Grounds for disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications
of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any
act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing
as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule.
Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the
COMELEC, in the exercise of its rulemaking power under Art. IX, A, 6 of the Constitution, cannot do. It is
noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the
right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age,
residence and citizenship of voters. (Art. IX, C, 2(3))
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification
is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are
proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification"
proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code and in 40 of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual
from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is
to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other
hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public
office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is not
disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We
have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications
prescribed in 2 of the law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of disqualifications provided in
4.
Indeed, provisions for disqualifications on the ground that the candidate is guilty of prohibited election
practices or offenses, like other pre-proclamation remedies, are aimed at the detestable practice of "grabbing
the proclamation and prolonging the election protest,"
8
through the use of "manufactured" election returns or
resort to other trickery for the purpose of altering the results of the election. This rationale does not apply to
cases for determining a candidate's qualifications for office before the election. To the contrary, it is the
candidate against whom a proceeding for disqualification is brought who could be prejudiced because he
could be prevented from assuming office even though in end he prevails.
To summarize, the declaration of ineligibility of a candidate may only be sought in an election protest or action
forquo warranto filed pursuant to 253 of the Omnibus Election Code within 10 days after his proclamation.
With respect to elective local officials (e.g., Governor, Vice Governor, members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, etc.) such petition must be filed either with the COMELEC, the Regional Trial Courts, or
Municipal Trial Courts, as provided in Art. IX, C, 2(2) of the Constitution. In the case of the President and
Vice President, the petition must be filed with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (Art. VII, 4, last paragraph),
and in the case of the Senators, with the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in the case of Congressmen, with the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. (Art. VI, 17) There is greater reason for not allowing before the
election the filing of disqualification proceedings based on alleged ineligibility in the case of candidates for
President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives, because of the same
policy prohibiting the filing of pre-proclamation cases against such candidates.
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95-009; that its
proceedings in that case, including its questioned orders, are void; and that the eligibility of petitioner Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos for the office of Representative of the First District of Leyte may only be inquired into by
the HRET.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition and to annul the proceedings of the Commission on Elections in SPA
No. 95-009, including its questioned orders doted April 24, 1995, May 7, 1995, May 11, 1995 and May 25,
1995, declaring petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos ineligible and ordering her proclamation as
Representative of the First District of Leyte suspended. To the extent that Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure authorizes proceedings for the disqualification of candidates on the ground of ineligibility for the
office, it should considered void.
The provincial board of canvassers should now proceed with the proclamation of petitioner.
Narvasa, C.J., concurs.
PADILLA, J ., dissenting:
I regret that I cannot join the majority opinion as expressed in the well-written ponencia of Mr. Justice
Kapunan.
As in any controversy arising out of a Constitutional provision, the inquiry must begin and end with the
provision itself. The controversy should not be blurred by what, to me, are academic disquisitions. In this
particular controversy, the Constitutional provision on point states that "no person shall be a member of the
House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and on the day of the election,
is at least twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read and write, and except the party list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than
one year immediately preceding the day of the election." (Article VI, section 6)
It has been argued that for purposes of our election laws, the term residence has been understood as
synonymous with domicile. This argument has been validated by no less than the Court in numerous
cases
1
where significantly the factual circumstances clearly and convincingly proved that a person does not
effectively lose his domicile of origin if the intention to reside therein is manifest with his personal presence in
the place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
With this basic thesis in mind, it would not be difficult to conceive of different modalities within which the
phrase "a resident thereof (meaning, the legislative district) for a period of not less than one year" would fit.
The first instance is where a person's residence and domicile coincide in which case a person only has to
prove that he has been domiciled in a permanent location for not less than a year before the election.
A second situation is where a person maintains a residence apart from his domicile in which case he would
have the luxury of district shopping, provided of course, he satisfies the one-year residence period in the
district as the minimum period for eligibility to the position of congressional representative for the district.
In either case, one would not be constitutionally disqualified for abandoning his residence in order to return to
his domicile of origin, or better still, domicile of choice; neither would one be disqualified for abandoning
altogether his domicile in favor of his residence in the district where he desires to be a candidate.
The most extreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a person maintains several residences in
different districts. Since his domicile of origin continues as an option as long as there is no effective
abandonment (animus non revertendi), he can practically choose the district most advantageous for him.
All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered by the unambiguous limitation that "for a period of not
less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election", he must be a resident in the district where
he desires to be elected.
To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term "residence" is to
be synonymous with "domicile." In other words, the candidate's intent and actual presence in one district must
in allsituations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. And this, because of a definite
Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar with the environment and problems of a district he intends to
represent in Congress and the one-year residence in said district would be the minimum period to acquire
such familiarity, if not versatility.
In the case of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos, the operative facts are distinctly set out in the now assailed
decision of the Comelec 2nd Division dated 24 April 1995 (as affirmed by the Comelec en banc)
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in
Tacloban from 1938 to 1948 when she graduated from high school. She pursued her
college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University of Tacloban, where she
earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese High
School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late
Speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she
married ex-president Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte.
She lived with him in Batac, Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her
husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived
together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965 when her husband
was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in
Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
During the Marcos presidency, respondent served as a Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila. She claimed
that in February 1986, she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu,
Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992 respondent ran for
election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she
indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila. On
August 24, 1994, respondent filed a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro
Manila, requesting for cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters in
Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila, in order that she may be re-registered or
transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. (Annex 2-B, Answer). On August 31, 1994,
respondent filed her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration
(Annex 2-C, Answer) stating that she is a duly registered voter in 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas,
San Juan, Metro that she intends to register at Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
On January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. She filed with the Board of Election Inspectors CE Form No. 1, Voter
Registration Record No. 94-3349772, wherein she alleged that she has resided in the
municipality of Tolosa for a period of 6 months (Annex A, Petition).
On March 8, 1995, respondent filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor,
Leyte, a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte wherein she also alleged that she has been a resident in the constituency where
she seeks to be elected for a period of 7 months. The pertinent entries therein are as
follows:
7. PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION: House-
wife/ Teacher/ Social Worker
8. RESIDENCE (complete address): Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte
Post Office Address for election purposes: Brgy.
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
9. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY
WHEREIN I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING ELECTION:
________ Years Seven Months
10. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF,
OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said office; That I will support and defend the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That I
will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly-constituted
authorities; That the obligation imposed by my oath is assumed voluntarily, without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and That the facts stated herein are true to the
best of my knowledge.
(Sgd.)
Imelda
Romual
dez-
Marcos
(Signat
ure of
Candid
ate)
2

Petitioner's aforestated certificate of candidacy filed on 8 March 1995 contains the decisive component or
seed of her disqualification. It is contained in her answer under oath of "seven months" to the query of
"residence in the constituency wherein I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election."
It follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that
petitioner is disqualified from the position of representative for the 1st congressional district of Leyte in the
elections of 8 May 1995, for failure to meet the "not less than one-year residence in the constituency (1st
district, Leyte) immediately preceding the day of election (8 May 1995)."
Having arrived at petitioner's disqualification to be a representative of the first district of Leyte, the next
important issue to resolve is whether or not the Comelec can order the Board of Canvassers to determine and
proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates for representative in said district.
I am not unaware of the pronouncement made by this Court in the case of Labo vs. Comelec, G.R. 86564,
August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1 which gave the rationale as laid down in the early 1912 case of Topacio
vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 that:
. . . . Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have
received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a
fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared
elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or
plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to
be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily
entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared
the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible
person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in
the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on
the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive,
qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.
Under Sec. 6 RA 6646, (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for other
purposes) (84 O.G. 905, 22 February 1988) it is provided that:
. . . Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and,
upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may, during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his
guilt is strong.
There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain and unambiguous meaning of the
provision quoted above. As the law now stands, the legislative policy does not limit its concern with the effect
of a final judgement of disqualification only before the election, but even during or after the election. The law
is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a disqualified candidate SHALL NOT BE COUNTED. The law
has also validated the jurisdiction of the Court or Commission on Election to continue hearing the petition for
disqualification in case a candidate is voted for and receives the highest number of votes, if for any reason,
he is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified.
Since the present case is an after election scenario, the power to suspend proclamation (when evidence of
his guilt is strong) is also explicit under the law. What happens then when after the elections are over, one is
declared disqualified? Then, votes cast for him "shall not be counted" and in legal contemplation, he no
longer received the highest number of votes.
It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner simply because a
"winning candidate is disqualified," but that the law considers him as the candidate who had obtained the
highest number of votes as a result of the votes cast for the disqualified candidate not being counted or
considered.
As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason why this Court should
not re-examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that "the
qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility" most especially when it is mandated by no
less than the Constitution.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to
proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of votes, from among the qualified candidates, as the
duly elected representative of the 1st district of Leyte.
Hermosisima, Jr. J., dissent.
REGALADO, J ., dissenting:
While I agree with same of the factual bases of the majority opinion, I cannot arrive conjointly at the same
conclusion drawn therefrom Hence, this dissent which assuredly is not formulated "on the basis of the
personality of a petitioner in a case."
I go along with the majority in their narration of antecedent facts, insofar as the same are pertinent to this
case, and which I have simplified as follows:
1. Petitioner, although born in Manila, resided during her childhood in the present
Tacloban City, she being a legitimate daughter of parents who appear to have taken up
permanent residence therein. She also went to school there and, for a time, taught in one
of the schools in that city.
2. When she married then Rep. Ferdinand E. Marcos who was then domiciled in Batac,
Ilocos Norte, by operation of law she acquired a new domicile in that place in 1954.
3. In the successive years and during the events that happened thereafter, her husband
having been elected as a Senator and then as President, she lived with him and their
family in San Juan, Rizal and then in Malacanang Palace in San Miguel, Manila.
4. Over those years, she registered as a voter and actually voted in Batac, Ilocos Norte,
then in San Juan, Rizal, and also in San Miguel, Manila, all these merely in the exercise
of the right of suffrage.
5. It does not appear that her husband, even after he had assumed those lofty positions
successively, ever abandoned his domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte where he
maintained his residence and invariably voted in all elections.
6. After the ouster of her husband from the presidency in 1986 and the sojourn of the
Marcos family in Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A., she eventually returned to the Philippines in
1991 and resided in different places which she claimed to have been merely temporary
residences.
7. In 1992, petitioner ran for election as President of the Philippines and in her certificate
of candidacy she indicated that she was then a registered voter and resident of San
Juan, Metro Manila.
8. On August 24, 1994, she filed a letter for the cancellation of her registration in the
Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila in order that she
may "be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." On August 31, 1994,
she followed this up with her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous
Registration wherein she stated that she was a registered voter in Precinct No. 157-A,
Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro Manila and that she intended to register in Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte.
9. On January 28, 1995, petitioner registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte, for which purpose she filed with the therein Board of Election Inspectors a
voter's registration record form alleging that she had resided in that municipality for six
months.
10. On March 8, 1995, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she alleged that she had been a
resident for "Seven Months" of the constituency where she sought to be elected.
11. On March 29, 1995, she filed an "Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy"
wherein her answer in the original certificate of candidacy to item "8. RESIDENCE IN
THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK, TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING
THE ELECTION:" was changed or replaced with a new entry reading "SINCE
CHILDHOOD."
The sole issue for resolution is whether, for purposes of her candidacy, petitioner had complied with the
residency requirement of one year as mandated by no less than Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
I do not intend to impose upon the time of my colleagues with a dissertation on the difference between
residence and domicile. We have had enough of that and I understand that for purposes of political law and,
for that matter of international law, residence is understood to be synonymous with domicile. That is so
understood in our jurisprudence and in American Law, in contradistinction to the concept of residence for
purposes of civil, commercial and procedural laws whenever an issue thereon is relevant or controlling.
Consequently, since in the present case the question of petitioner's residence is integrated in and inseparable
from her domicile, I am addressing the issue from the standpoint of the concept of the latter term, specifically
its permutations into the domicile of origin, domicile of choice and domicile by operation of law, as understood
in American law from which for this case we have taken our jurisprudential bearings.
My readings inform me that the domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or what is termed the "domicile of
origin," constitutes the domicile of an infant until abandoned, or until the acquisition of a new domicile in a
different place.
1
In the instant case, we may grant that petitioner's domicile of origin,
2
at least as of 1938, was
what is now Tacloban City.
Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is, domicile by birth, domicile by
choice, and domicile by operation of law. The first is the common case of the place of birth or domicilium
originis, the second is that which is voluntarily acquired by a party or domicilium propio motu; the last which is
consequential, as that of a wife arising from marriage,
3
is sometimes called domicilium necesarium. There is
no debate that the domicile of origin can be lost or replaced by a domicile of choice or a domicile by operation
of law subsequently acquired by the party.
When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by operation of law, not only
international or American but of our own enactment,
4
she acquired her husband's domicile of origin in Batac,
Ilocos Norte and correspondingly lost her own domicile of origin in Tacloban City.
Her subsequent changes of residence to San Juan, Rizal, then to San Miguel, Manila, thereafter to
Honolulu, Hawaii, and back to now San Juan, Metro Manila do not appear to have resulted in her thereby
acquiring new domiciles of choice. In fact, it appears that her having resided in those places was by reason of
the fortunes or misfortunes of her husband and his peregrinations in the assumption of new official positions
or the loss of them. Her residence in Honolulu and, of course, those after her return to the Philippines were,
as she claimed, against her will or only for transient purposes which could not have invested them with the
status of domiciles of choice.
5

After petitioner's return to the Philippines in 1991 and up to the present imbroglio over her requisite residency
in Tacloban City or Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, there is no showing that she ever attempted to acquire any other
domicile of choice which could have resulted in the abandonment of her legal domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte.
On that score, we note the majority's own submission
6
that, to successfully effect a change of domicile, one
must demonstrate (a) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, (b) a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and (c) acts which correspond with the
purpose.
We consequently have to also note that these requirements for the acquisition of a domicile of choice apply
whether what is sought to be changed or substituted is a domicile of origin (domicilium originis) or a domicile
by operation of law (domicilium necesarium). Since petitioner had lost her domicilium originis which had been
replaced by her domicilium necesarium, it is therefore her continuing domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte which, if
at all, can be the object of legal change under the contingencies of the case at bar.
To get out of this quandary, the majority decision echoes the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Regalado
E. Maambong in SPA 95-009 of the Commission on Elections,
7
and advances this novel proposition.
It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of
her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952 (sic, 1954). By operation
of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her marriage became
Batac, Ilocos Norte although there were no indications of an intention on her part to
abandon her domicile of origin. Because of her husband's subsequent death and through
the operation of the provisions of the New Family Code already in force at the time,
however, her legal domicile automatically reverted to her domicile of origin. . . .
(Emphasis supplied).
Firstly, I am puzzled why although it is conceded that petitioner had acquired a domicilium necesarium in
Batac, Ilocos Norte, the majority insists on making a qualification that she did not intend to abandon her
domicile of origin. I find this bewildering since, in this situation, it is the law that declares where petitioner's
domicile is at any given time, and not her self-serving or putative intent to hold on to her former domicile.
Otherwise, contrary to their own admission that one cannot have more than one domicile at a time,
8
the
majority would be suggesting that petitioner retained Tacloban City as (for lack of a term in law since it does
not exist therein) the equivalent of what is fancied as a reserved, dormant, potential, or residual domicile.
Secondly, domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be recovered likewise in accordance with law.
However, we are here being titillated with the possibility of an automatic reversion to or reacquisition of a
domicile of origin after the termination of the cause for its loss by operation of law. The majority agrees that
since petitioner lost her domicile of origin by her marriage, the termination of the marriage also terminates that
effect thereof. I am impressed by the ingeniousness of this theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the
mother of inventions. Regretfully, I find some difficulty in accepting either the logic or the validity of this
argument.
If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of choice, he thereby voluntarily
abandons the former in favor of the latter. If, thereafter, he abandons that chosen domicile, he does not per
se recover his original domicile unless, by subsequent acts legally indicative thereof, he evinces his intent and
desire to establish the same as his new domicile, which is precisely what petitioner belatedly and, evidently
just for purposes of her candidacy, unsuccessfully tried to do.
One's subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot automatically restore his domicile of origin,
not only because there is no legal authority therefor but because it would be absurd Pursued to its logical
consequence, that theory of ipso jure reversion would rule out the fact that said party could already very well
have obtained another domicile, either of choice or by operation of law, other than his domicile of origin.
Significantly and obviously for this reason, the Family Code, which the majority inexplicably invokes,
advisedly does not regulate this contingency since it would impinge on one's freedom of choice.
Now, in the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily abandoned her domicile of choice (unless we assume
that she entered into the marital state against her will) but, on top of that, such abandonment was further
affirmed through her acquisition of a new domicile by operation of law. In fact, this is even a case of
both voluntary andlegal abandonment of a domicile of origin. With much more reason, therefore, should we
reject the proposition that with the termination of her marriage in 1989, petitioner had supposedly per
se and ipso facto reacquired her domicile of origin which she lost in 1954. Otherwise, this would be
tantamount to saying that during the period of marital coverture, she was simultaneously in possession and
enjoyment of a domicile of origin which was only in a state of suspended animation.
Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect that while after the husband's death the wife has the right to
elect her own domicile,
9
she nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased husband until she makes
an actual change.
10
In the absence of affirmative evidence, to the contrary, the presumption is that a wife's
domicile or legal residence follows that of her husband and will continue after his death.
11

I cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of the majority's theory based on Articles 68 and 69 of
the Family Code. All that is of any relevance therein is that under this new code, the right and power to fix the
family domicile is now shared by the spouses. I cannot perceive how that joint right, which in the first place
was never exercised by the spouses, could affect the domicile fixed by the law for petitioner in 1954 and, for
her husband, long prior thereto. It is true that a wife now has the coordinate power to determine
the conjugal or family domicile, but that has no bearing on this case. With the death of her husband, and each
of her children having gotten married and established their own respective domiciles, the exercise of that joint
power was and is no longer called for or material in the present factual setting of this controversy. Instead,
what is of concern in petitioner's case was the matter of her having acquired or not her own domicile of
choice.
I agree with the majority's discourse on the virtues of the growing and expanded participation of women in the
affairs of the nation, with equal rights and recognition by Constitution and statutory conferment. However, I
have searched in vain for a specific law or judicial pronouncement which either expressly or by necessary
implication supports the majority's desired theory of automatic reacquisition of or reversion to the domicilium
originis of petitioner. Definitely, as between the settled and desirable legal norms that should govern this
issue, there is a world of difference; and, unquestionably, this should be resolved by legislative articulation but
not by the eloquence of the well-turned phrase.
In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954 and not having automatically
reacquired any domicile therein, she cannot legally claim that her residency in the political constituency of
which it is a part continued since her birth up to the present. Respondent commission was, therefore, correct
in rejecting her pretension to that effect in her amended/corrected certificate of candidacy, and in holding her
to her admission in the original certificate that she had actually resided in that constituency for only seven
months prior to the election. These considerations render it unnecessary to further pass upon the procedural
issues raised by petitioner.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, I vote to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
DAVIDE, JR., J ., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority written by Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, more
particularly on the issue of the petitioner's qualification.
Under Section 7, Subdivision A, Article IX of the Constitution, decisions, orders, or rulings of the COMELEC
may be brought to this Court only by the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
(Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]; Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 [1989]).
Accordingly, a writ of certiorari may be granted only if the COMELEC has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion (Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court). Since the COMELEC has,
undoubtedly, jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition, the only issue left is whether it acted with
grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the petitioner.
My careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged resolution of 24 April 1995 of the COMELEC Second
Division and the En Banc resolution of 7 May 1995 discloses total absence of abuse of discretion, much less
grave abuse thereof. The resolution of the Second Division dispassionately and objectively discussed in
minute details the facts which established beyond cavil that herein petitioner was disqualified as a candidate
on the ground of lack of residence in the First Congressional District of Leyte. It has not misapplied,
miscomprehended, or misunderstood facts or circumstances of substance pertinent to the issue of her
residence.
The majority opinion, however, overturned the COMELEC's findings of fact for lack of proof that the petitioner
has abandoned Tolosa as her domicile of origin, which is allegedly within the First Congressional District of
Leyte.
I respectfully submit that the petitioner herself has provided the COMELEC, either by admission or by
documentary evidence, overwhelming proof of the loss or abandonment of her domicile of origin, which is
Tacloban City and not Tolosa, Leyte. Assuming that she decided to live again in her domicile of origin, that
became her second domicile of choice, where her stay, unfortunately, was for only seven months before the
day of the election. She was then disqualified to be a candidate for the position of Representative of the First
Congressional District of Leyte. A holding to the contrary would be arbitrary.
It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice was either Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte.
Nevertheless, she lost it by operation of law sometime in May 1954 upon her marriage to the then
Congressman (later, President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by operation of law is that domicile which
the law attributes to a person, independently of his own intention or actual residence, as results from legal
domestic relations as that of the wife arising from marriage (28 C.J.S. Domicile 7, 11). Under the governing
law then, Article 110 of the Civil Code, her new domicile or her domicile of choice was the domicile of her
husband, which was Batac, Ilocos Norte. Said Article reads as follows:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the
wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the
Republic.
Commenting thereon, civilist Arturo M. Tolentino states:
Although the duty of the spouses to live together is mutual, the husband has a
predominant right because he is empowered by law to fix the family residence. This right
even predominates over some rights recognized by law in the wife. For instance, under
article 117 the wife may engage in business or practice a profession or occupation. But
because of the power of the husband to fix the family domicile he may fix it at such a
place as would make it impossible for the wife to continue in business or in her
profession. For justifiable reasons, however, the wife may be exempted from living in the
residence chosen by the husband. The husband cannot validly allege desertion by the
wife who refuses to follow him to a new place of residence, when it appears that they
have lived for years in a suitable home belonging to the wife, and that his choice of a
different home is not made in good faith. (Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code of the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 339).
Under common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own domicile and, by operation of law, acquires
that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends. Her domicile is
fixed in the sense that it is declared to be the same as his, and subject to certain limitations, he can change
her domicile by changing his own (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile 48, 37).
It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of the Family Code, the fixing of the family domicile is
no longer the sole prerogative of the husband, but is now a joint decision of the spouses, and in case of
disagreement the court shall decide. The said article uses the term "family domicile," and not family
residence, as "the spouses may have multiple residences, and the wife may elect to remain in one of such
residences, which may destroy the duty of the spouses to live together and its corresponding benefits"
(ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, [1988], 102).
The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin upon the death of her husband, which the
majority opinion adopts to overcome the legal effect of the petitioner's marriage on her domicile, is
unsupported by law and by jurisprudence. The settled doctrine is that after the husband's death the wife has a
right to elect her own domicile, but she retains the last domicile of her husband until she makes an actual
change (28 C.J.S. Domicile 12, 27). Or, on the death of the husband, the power of the wife to acquire her
own domicile is revived, but until she exercises the power her domicile remains that of the husband at the
time of his death (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile 62, 45). Note that what is revived is not her domicile of origin
but her power to acquire her own domicile.
Clearly, even after the death of her husband, the petitioner's domicile was that of her husband at the time of
his death which was Batac, Ilocos Norte, since their residences in San Juan, Metro Manila, and San
Miguel, Manila, were their residences for convenience to enable her husband to effectively perform his official
duties. Their residence in San Juan was a conjugal home, and it was there to which she returned in 1991
when she was already a widow. In her sworn certificate of candidacy for the Office of the President in the
synchronized elections of May 1992, she indicated therein that she was a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila.
She also voted in the said elections in that place.
On the basis of her evidence, it was only on 24 August 1994 when she exercised her right as a widow to
acquire her own domicile in Tolosa, Leyte, through her sworn statement requesting the Election Officer of San
Juan, Metro Manila, to cancel her registration in the permanent list of voters in Precinct 157 thereat and
praying that she be "re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, the place of [her] birth and
permanent residence" (photocopy of Exhibit "B," attached as Annex "2" of private respondent Montejo's
Comment). Notably, she contradicted this sworn statement regarding her place of birth when, in her Voter's
Affidavit sworn to on 15 March 1992 (photocopy of Exhibit "C," attached as Annex "3," Id.), her Voter
Registration Record sworn to on 28 January 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "E," attached as Annex "5," Id.), and
her Certificate of Candidacy sworn to on 8 March 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "A," attached as Annex "1," Id.),
she solemnly declared that she was born in Manila.
The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of origin. Is it Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte? In the
affidavit attached to her Answer to the petition for disqualification (Annex "I" of Petition), she declared under
oath that her "domicile or residence is Tacloban City." If she did intend to return to such domicile or residence
of origin why did she inform the Election Officer of San Juan that she would transfer to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte,
and indicate in her Voter's Registration Record and in her certificate of candidacy that her residence is Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte? While this uncertainty is not important insofar as residence in the congressional district is
concerned, it nevertheless proves that forty-one years had already lapsed since she had lost or abandoned
her domicile of origin by virtue of marriage and that such length of time diminished her power of recollection
or blurred her memory.
I find to be misplaced the reliance by the majority opinion on Faypon vs. Quirino (96 Phil. 294 [1954]), and the
subsequent cases which established the principle that absence from original residence or domicile of origin to
pursue studies, practice one's profession, or engage in business in other states does not constitute loss of
such residence or domicile. So is the reliance on Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides
that transfer of residence to any other place by reason of one's "occupation; profession; employment in
private and public service; educational activities; work in military or naval reservations; service in the army,
navy or air force, the constabulary or national police force; or confinement or detention in government
institutions in accordance with law" is not deemed as loss of original residence. Those cases and legal
provision do not include marriage of a woman. The reason for the exclusion is, of course, Article 110 of the
Civil Code. If it were the intention of this Court or of the legislature to consider the marriage of a woman as a
circumstance which would not operate as an abandonment of domicile (of origin or of choice), then such
cases and legal provision should have expressly mentioned the same.
This Court should not accept as gospel truth the self-serving claim of the petitioner in her affidavit (Annex "A"
of her Answer in COMELEC SPA No. 95-009; Annex "I" of Petition) that her "domicile or residence of origin is
Tacloban City," and that she "never intended to abandon this domicile or residence of origin to which [she]
always intended to return whenever absent." Such a claim of intention cannot prevail over the effect of Article
110 of the Civil Code. Besides, the facts and circumstances or the vicissitudes of the petitioner's life after her
marriage in 1954 conclusively establish that she had indeed abandoned her domicile of origin and had
acquired a new oneanimo et facto (KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, A Treatise on Residence and Domicile,
[1934], 214, 326).
Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioner's claim that she "merely committed an honest
mistake" in writing down the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement in
the certificate of candidacy. Such a claim is self-serving and, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, would
be all sound and fury signifying nothing. To me, she did not commit any mistake, honest or otherwise; what
she stated was the truth.
The majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who asserts a fact or the affirmative of
an issue has the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency vs. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 [1991];
P.T. Cerna Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993]). Having admitted marriage to the then
Congressman Marcos, the petitioner could not deny the legal consequence thereof on the change of her
domicile to that of her husband. The majority opinion rules or at least concludes that "[b]y operation of law
(domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her marriage automatically became Batac, Ilocos
Norte." That conclusion is consistent with Article 110 of the Civil Code. Since she is presumed to retain her
deceased husband's domicile until she exercises her revived power to acquire her own domicile, the burden
is upon her to prove that she has exercised her right to acquire her own domicile. She miserably failed to
discharge that burden.
I vote to deny the petition.
Footnotes
1 Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580 (1881).
2 CONST, art. VI, states:
Sec. 6. No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless
he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is
at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and except the party-
list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election.
See, Jarrolt v. Mabberly, supra, note 1.
3 Gallego vs. Vera, 73 Phil. 453 (1941).
4 Rollo, p. 114, Annex "D".
5 Rollo, p. 110, Annex "D".
6 Rollo, p. 113.
7 Rollo, p. 111.
8 Rollo, p. 115, Annex "E".
9 Signed by Virgilo S. Oledan, Provincial Election Supervisor IV, Leyte; Rollo,
p. 116, Annex "F".
10 Rollo, p. 117, Annex "G". Petitioner explained the circumstances
surrounding the filling up of the original certificate thus:
1. On March 8, 1995, I filed my certificate of candidacy for Member of the
House of Representatives (Congresswoman) of the First Legislative District of
the province of Leyte, which was drafted by Mr. Filomeno A. Zeta.
2. I learned lately that Congressman Cirilo Montejo wants to disqualify me as I
allegedly lack residence in the constituency because of the entry of the word
"SEVEN" in Item No. 8 of my certificate of candidacy.
3. I read my certificate of candidacy before signing it and thought of the word
"RESIDENCE" to mean actual or physical residence, and the word "SEVEN"
merely reflected my actual and physical residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte.
3.1. The word "SEVEN" was placed on my certificate of candidacy to indicate
that at lease one (1) month had passed from my registration as voter of Tolosa,
Leyte, on January 28, 1995, when I wrote "06" months under "PERIOD OF
RESIDENCE" as my actual or physical residence in the town.
4. I thought then that the sense in Item No. 10 of my certificate of candidacy
stating "THAT I AM eligible for said Office" was sufficient to affirm that I
possess all the qualifications, including my residence, for Member of the House
of Representatives for which I am aspiring in the May 8, 1995 elections.
5. The fact, however, is that my domicile or residence of origin is Tacloban
City, a component city of the First Legislative District of Leyte I never intended
to abandon this domicile or residence of origin to which I always intended to
return whenever absent; indeed in 1992, I returned to Tacloban City to live and
stay there. On November 5, 1992; I bought my Residence Certificate No.
15226186L there, which is made an integral part hereof as Annex "I" (Annex
"2" hereof).
11 Id., at p. 120. See also, Rollo, p. 130-133, Annex "I", petitioner's Affidavit
explaining her residence:
13. I established my domicile, however in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City in
1938, when was little over eight (8) years old. Shortly after my mother died on
April 7, 1938, my widowed father, Vicente Orestes Romualdez, brought me
and my brothers. . .and my sisters to Tacloban, Leyte (now Tacloban City) his
hometown.
xxx xxx xxx
18. I have always considered Tacloban City as my permanent residence or
residence of origin have not abandoned and have never intended to abandon
my permanent residence or residence of origin there. To it I always intend to
return whenever absent.
19. In 1952, I went to Manila to work with my cousin, the late speaker
Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives.
20. In May, 1954, I married President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still
the congressman of Ilocos, Norte.
21. As a dutiful wife who loved him deeply, I lived with him in Batac, Ilocos
Norte and registered as a voter there.
22. In 1965, my husband was elected President of the Republic of the
Philippines. Together, we lived in Malacaang Palace and I registered as a
voter in San Miguel, Manila.
23. My registration as voter in Batac, Ilocos Norte; San Juan, Rizal (now San
Juan, Metro Manila); and San Miguel, Manila, was for convenience because I
had to live with my husband to serve him when he was congressman, Senator
and President of the Republic of the Philippines. During those years however, I
never intended nor desired to abandon my domicile or residence of origin in
Tacloban City, which I established since I was a child.
xxx xxx xxx
33. Throughout the Marcos Presidency, I spent most of my birthday
anniversaries and attended the Sto. Nini Fiesta in Tacloban City. I regularly
visited my domicile or residence of origin in Leyte and even held important
functions and entertained guests and foreign dignitaries there.
34. After President Ferdinand E. Marcos and I, together with our children and
innocent grandchildren were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii, in
February, 1986, my Leyte properties were sequestered by the PCGG, and
were destroyed and cannibalized.
xxx xxx xxx
38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately live and reside in
Tacloban City or in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte even if my residences there were not
livable as they had been destroyed and cannibalized. The PCGG, however, did
not permit and allow me.
xxx xxx xxx
40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of
my brother in San Jose, Tacloban City, and pursued my negotiations with
PCGG to recover my sequestered residences in Tacloban City and Barangay
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
12 Rollo, p. 122.
13 Commissioners Manolo B. Gorospe and Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores formed
the majority opinion. Commissioner Remedies A. Salazar-Fernando dissented.
14 Rollo, p. 64.
15 Rollo, p. 57-64.
16 Petitioner filed a "Motion to Recall Resolution Promulgated on April 24,
1995 and to Dismiss the Petition Because of Lapse of Jurisdiction;
Alternatively, Motion for Reconsideration." The Commission's May 7, 1995
Resolution treated the same simply as a Motion for Reconsideration.
17 Commissioners Regalado E. Maambong, Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando
and Julio F. Desamito dissented. All filed separate dissenting opinions. In
disqualifying petitioner, the majority held:
As it stands now, only the Certificate of Candidacy respondent filed on March
8, 1995, stands, and on the basis of the entries therein, she is disqualified to
run for failure to meet the constitutional requirement of one (1) year of
residence in the place where she wanted to be elected.
18 Rollo, p. 78, Annex "B".
19 Rollo, Annex "D".
20 19 SCRA 966 (1967). See also, Corre v. Corre, 100 Phil. 221 (1956).
21 Id. at 969.
22 Uytengsu v. Republic, 95 Phil. 890 (1954).
23 Id.
24 52 Phil. 645 (1928).
25 Citing People v. Bender 144 N.Y.S., 145.
26 61 Phil. 36 (1934).
27 96 Phil. 294 (1954).
28 Id, see also Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 (1966); Nuval v. Guray, supra
note 22.
29 II RECORD OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 110 (July
22, 1986).
30 Id.
31 199 SCRA 692 (1991).
32 Id, at 714.
33 61 Phil. 36 (1934).
34 96 Phil. 294, 299-300 (1954).
35 B.P. 881, sec. 117 states:
xxx xxx xxx
Any person who transfers residence to another city, municipality or country
solely by reason of his occupation; profession; employment in private or public
service; educational activities; work in military or naval reservations; service in
the army, navy or air force; the constabulary or national police force; or
confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with law
shall not be deemed to have lost his original residence.
36 Rollo, p. 38.
37 18 Am Jur 219-220.
38 20 Am Jur 71.
39 TOLENTINO 1 COMMENTARIES & JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL
CODE, 220 (1987).
40 Id.
41 TOLENTINO, 1 COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON CIVIL
CODE, 220 (1987).
42 Under modern laws, it is clear that many exceptions to the rule that the
domicile of the wife is determined by that of her husband must obtain.
Accordingly, the wife may acquire another and separate domicile from that of
her husband where the theoretical unity of the husband and wife is dissolved,
as it is by the institution of divorce proceedings; or where the husband has
given cause for divorce; or where there is a separation of the parties by
agreement, or a permanent separation due to desertion of the wife by the
husband or attributable to cruel treatment on the part of the husband; or where
there has been a forfeiture by the wife of the benefit of the husband's domicile.
9 R.C.L., 545, cited in De La Vina, supra. If the law allows the wife to
automatically revert to her original domicile or acquire a new domicile under
these situations, all the more should it sanction a reversion or the
acquisition of a new domicile by the wife upon the death of her husband.
43 41 Phi. 13 (1920).
44 The rule that the wife automatically acquires or follows her husband's
domicile is not an absolute one. A specific situation recognized in Spanish
jurisprudence involves the one in which husband acquiesces (1 Manresa 223)
or gives his tacit consent (Scaevola, Civil Code; 354.)
45 42 Phil. 54 (1921).
46 Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy recognizes the same Civil Code distinction.
However, taking another approach, she writes:
(6) The above Article (Article 69, FC) uses the term "family domicile" instead of
family residence because the spouses may have multiple residences, and the
wife may elect to remain in one of such residences, which may destroy the
duty of the spouses to live together and its corresponding benefits. SEMPIO-
DIY, HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 102
(1988).
47 Rollo, pp. 132-133.
48 The provision reads: Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall
be decided after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election.
49 Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51 (1983).
50 American Tupe Founders Co. v. Justice's Court, 133 Cal. 819, 65 Pac. 742;
Heillen v. Phillipps, 88 Cal. 557, 26 Pac. 366; Drake v. Bagley, 69 Mo. App. 39;
State v. Davis, 194 Mo. 585.
51 Supra, note 39, citing Huffines v. Gold 154 Tenn. 583, 588; 288 S.W. 353,
354.
52 Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted
for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Sec. 7 Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate Candidacy.
The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
53 CONST., art. VI, sec. 11 states:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all questions relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members. . . .
PUNO, J., concurring:
1 Aristotle, Ethica Nichomachea, bk., v. 3, 1131 (a) (W. Ross translation, 1925
ed).
2 It provides: "No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives
unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines and on the day of the
election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and except
the party list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall
be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election." (Emphasis supplied)
3 There are two (2) other instances when a married woman may have a
domicile different from the husband: (1) if they are legally separated pursuant
to par. 1, Art. 106 of the Civil Code, and (2) if the husband forcibly ejects the
wife from the conjugal home to have illicit relations with another. (De la Via v.
Villareal and Geopano, 41 Phil. 13 [1920]).
4 Op cit.
5 Id., at pp. 16-17.
6 Id., at p. 20, citing 1 Manresa 223.
7 25 AM JUR 2nd S. 48, p. 37.
8 28 CJS on Domicile, S. 12, 27; 25 AM JUR 2nd on Domicile S. 62, 46.
9 28 CJS, S. 12, p. 24.
10 Restatement of the Law, 2d, Conflict of Laws 2d., S. 21, p. 84.
11 Ibid.
12 83 U.S. 442; 21 Law Ed. 442; S.C. 16 Wall 130.
13 Supra.
14 Supra.
15 In re Green's Estate, 191 N.Y.S. 757, 117 Misc. 800, 165 N.Y.S. 1063, 99
Misc. 582.
16 Clark et al. v. Baker et al., 196 SE 750, 186 Ga 65.
17 Lefcourt, Women and The Law, 1990 ed.
18 404 US 71.
19 28 CJS S. 12, p. 25 citing Shute v. Sargent, 36 A 282, 67 N.H. 305.
20 Op cit., p. 84.
21 Women's Status in Philippine Society, UP Law Center, 1979, pp. 4-6.
22 In submitting the draft of the Family Code to President Corazon Aquino, the
Civil Code Revision Committee stated:
Close to forty years of experience under the Civil Code adopted in 1949 and
changes and developments in all aspects of Filipino Life since then have
revealed the unsuitability of certain provisions of that Code, implanted from
foreign sources, to Philippine culture; the unfairness, unjustness, and gaps or
inadequacies of others; and the need to attune them to contemporary
developments and trends.
In particular to cite only a few instances (1) the property regime of
conjugal partnership of gains is not in accord with Filipino custom, especially in
the rural areas, which is more congenial to absolute community of property; (2)
there have considerably been more grounds for annulment of marriage by the
Church than those provided by the Code, thus giving rise to the absurd
situation of several marriages already annulled under Canon Law but still
considered subsisting under the Civil Law and making it necessary to make the
grounds for annulment under both laws to coincide; (3) unequal treatment of
husband and wife as to rights and responsibilities, which necessitates a
response to the long-standing clamor for equality between men and women
now mandated as a policy to be implemented under the New Constitution; (4)
the inadequacy of the safeguards for strengthening marriage and the family as
basic social institutions recognized as such by the New Constitution; (5) recent
developments have shown the absurdity of limiting the grounds for legal
separation to the antiquated two grounds provided under the Civil Code; (6) the
need for additional safeguards to protect our children in the matter of adoption
by foreigners; and (7) to bring our law on paternity and filiation in step with or
abreast of the latest scientific discoveries." (Emphasis supplied)
23 Article 96, Family Code.
24 Article 225, Family Code.
25 Article 70, Family Code.
26 Article 71, Family Code.
27 Article 73, Family Code.
28 Op cit., Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, pp. 98-99.
29 As cited in Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, pp. 184-
185.
30 Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
31 Exhibit "E"; see also Exhibit "B" in SPA No. 95-001.
32 Exhibit "A" in SPA No. 95-009.
33 Exhibit "2" in SPA No. 95-009.
34 2 SCRA 957, 960 (1961); See Canceran v. COMELEC, 107 Phil. 607
(1960); Gabaldon v. COMELEC, 99 Phil. 898 (1956).
35 Section 26, Article II of the Constitution also provides: "The State shall
guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service . . . ."
36 Annex "G," Petition.
37 Petition, Annex "B-1" pp. 6-7.
38 73 Phil. 453, 459 (1951).
FRANCISCO, J., concurring:
1 See Articles 68-73 of E.O. 209, as amended, otherwise known as The Family
Code of the Philippines.
2 Residence Certificate No. 15226186L, dated Nov. 5, 1992.
3 PCGG Chairman Gunigundo's letter addressed to Col. Kempis.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
1 Art. VI, Sec. 6, Const.: "No person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on
the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and
write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district
in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period not less than
one year immediately preceding the day of the election."
2 Art. 110: "The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may
exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in
the service of the Republic.
3 Art. 110, Civil Code.
4 Art. 111, Civil Code.
5 Art. 112, Civil Code.
6 Art. 171, Civil Code.
7 Art. 172, Civil Code.
8 Art. 320, Civil Code.
9 Art. 114, Civil Code.
10 Art. 117, Civil Code.
11 Art. 84, Civil Code.
12 Art. 328, Civil Code.
13 Art. II, Sec. 2, Const.
14 Part IV, Art. 15, Paragraph 4, CEDAW.
15 Executive Order No. 209, July 6, 1987, as amended by Executive Order No.
227, July 17,1987, which took effect on August 3, 1988.
16 Art. II Sec. 11, Const.
17 Art. II, Sec. 14, Const.
18 Art. 69, Family Code.
19 Art. 71, Family Code.
20 Art. 96, Family Code.
21 Art. 225, Family Code.
22 Republic Act No. 7192 approved February 12, 1992.
23 Ibid., Sec. 5.
MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:
1 Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 211 SCRA 297 (1992) (for mayor).
2 Loong v. COMELEC, 216 SCRA 760 (1992) (for regional vice governor).
3 Abella v. Larrazabal, 180 SCRA 509 (1989); Abella v. COMELEC, 201 SCRA
253 (1991) (for provincial governor).
4 Co. v. HRET, 199 SCRA 692 (1991) (election protest against a
Congressman).
5 Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 (1954) (quo warranto against a governor);
Gallego v. Verra, 73 Phil. 453 (1941) (quo warranto against a mayor); Larena
v. Teves, 61 Phil. 36 (1934) (quo warranto against a provincial board member);
Tanseco v. Arteche, 57 Phil. 227 (1932) (quo warranto against a governor):
Yra v. Abao, 52 Phil. 380 (1928) (quo warranto against a municipal
president); Vivero v. Murillo, 52 Phil. 694 (1929) (quo warranto against a
municipal president). Cf. Aznar v. COMELEC, 185 SCRA 703 (1990) (quo
warranto although prematurely filed, against a governor-elect).
6 R.A. No. 6646, 6; Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, supra note 1.
7 OEC, 76.
8 Lagumbay v. COMELEC, 16 SCRA 175 (1966).
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
1 Nuval vs. Guray, G.R. No. 30241, December 29, 1928; Larena vs. Teves,
G.R.
No. 42439, December 10, 1934; Gallego vs. Verra, G.R. No. 48641, November
24, 1941; De los Reyes vs. Solidum, G.R. No. 42798. August 31, 1935;
but see Romualdez vs. RTC, Br. 7 Tacloban City, where a sudden departure
from the country was not deemed "voluntary" so as to constitute abandonment
of domicile both in fact and in law.
2 Annex "A" Petition, pp. 2-4.
REGALADO, J., dissenting:
1 Struble vs. Struble, Tex. Civ. App., 177 S.W. 2d, 279, 283.
2 This is also referred to as natural domicile or domicile by birth (Johnson vs.
Twenty-One Bales, 13 Fed. Cas. 863).
3 Story, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 46; Railroad Co. vs. Kimbrough, 115 Ky 512, 74
S.W. 229; and Johnson vs. Harvey, 261 Ky. 522, 88 S.W. 2d 42, 46, 47, as
cited in Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed.
4 Article 110, Civil Code.
5 Towson vs. Towson, 126 Va. 640, 102 S.E. 48, 52; Fisher vs. Jordan, C.C.A.
Tex., 116 F. 2d. 183, 186; Minick vs. Minick, 111 Fla. 469, 149 So. 483, 488;
Hartzler vs. Radeka, 265 Mich. 451, 251 N.W. 554.
6 Citing 18 Am. Jur. 219-220.
7 Montejo vs. Marcos, En Banc, May 10, 1995.
8 Citing 20 Am. Jur. 71.
9 Cheely vs. Clayton, D.C., 110 U.S. 701, L. Ed. 298.
10 In re Gates' Estate, 191 N.Y.S. 757, 117 Misc. 800 In re Green's Estate,
164 N.Y.S. 1063, 99 Misc. 582, affirmed 165 N.Y.S. 1088, 179 App. Div. 890,
as reported in 28 C.J.S. 27.
11 Clark vs. Baker, 196 S.E. 750, 186 Ga. 65, op. cit. 37.