1

CARMEN C. VIUDA DE ORDOVEZA, petitioner,

vs.
HONORIA RAYMUNDO, respondent.
Petitioner is the appellee and respondent the appellant in a
case now pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, entitled
Domingo Ordoveza vs. Honoria Raymundo, and numbered
44763 in the records of the court. The period for the filing of
the appellant's brief in that case expired on March 20, 1936.
On March 31, 1936 the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal
for failure of the appellant to file her brief within the time
prescribed by the rules of the court, and ordered that after
fifteen days the record of the case be remanded to the court
below. On April 6, 1936 the appellant filed a petition for
reconsideration of the order dismissing the appeal, which
petition was denied on April 8, 1936. A second petition for
reconsideration was filed by the appellant, and in view thereof
the Court of Appeals on April 14, 1936, passed the following
resolution:
Upon consideration of the second petition of the attorneys for
the appellant in case G. R. 44763, Domingo Ordoveza vs.
Honoria Raymundo, etc. praying that the resolution of this
court of March 31, 1936, dismissing the appeal for failure to
file their brief be reconsidered; in view of the reasons given in
said petition and the special circumstances of the case, said
resolution is hereby set aside and the appeal reinstated;
provided, however, that the attorneys for the appellant shall
file their printed brief within five days from notice hereof.
On April 17,1936 the appellee filed a motion praying that the
resolution above quoted be reconsidered and set aside, which
motion was denied.
Upon the foregoing state of facts, the appellee filed this petition
for a writ of certiorariwith a view to having declared null and
void the order of the Court of Appeals restating the appeal.
Petitioner now contends (1) that the Court of Appeals had no
power to reinstate the appeal because it lost jurisdiction of the
case on April 5, 1936, in that fifteen days had already elapsed
from March 20, 1936, the date when the period fixed for the
filing of the appellant's brief expired; and (2) that granting that
the Court of Appeals retained jurisdiction of the case, it had no
authority to grant the appellant an additional period of five
days within which to file her brief.
By section 145-P of the Revised Administrative Code as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3, and in virtue of the
resolution adopted by the Court of Appeals on February 8,
1936, the rules of the Supreme Court governing the filing of
briefs and the dismissal of appeals are applicable to cases
cognizable by the Court of Appeals.
Rules 23 and 24 of the Supreme Court are pertinent to the
consideration of the present petition. The rules read as follows:
23. Motions for extension of time for the filing of briefs must be
presented before the expiration of the time mentioned in Rules
21 and 22, or within a time fixed by special order of the court.
No more than one extension of time for the filing of briefs shall
be allowed, and then only for good and sufficient cause shown,
to be demonstrated by affidavit.
24. If the appellant, in any civil case, fails to serve his brief
within the time prescribed by these rules the court may, on
motion of the appellee and notice to the appellant, or on its
own motion, dismiss the bill of exceptions or the appeal.
1. The first contention of the petitioner rests on the theory
developed in his argument that upon the failure of the
appellant to file her brief within the time prescribed by the
rules of the court, her appeal became, ipso facto, dismissed.
Consequently, he argues that at the expiration of the period of
fifteen days from March 20, 1936, the Court of Appeals lost
jurisdiction of the case, and had, therefore, no power to
reinstate the appeal. This view finds no support in the rules of
this court. Rule 24 above transcribed clearly indicates the
contrary view when it says that upon failure of the appellant to
file his brief within the period prescribed by the rules, the
court "may", on motion of the appellee and notice to the
appellant, or its own motion, dismiss the bill of exceptions or
the appeal. The use of the word "may" implies that the matter
of dismissing the appeal or not rests within the sound
discretion of the court, and that failure of the appellant to file
his brief within the time prescribed by the rules does not have
the effect of dismissing the appeal automatically. Viewed in
this light, the period of fifteen days must be counted in the
case under consideration not from March 20, 1936, but from
March 31, 1936. Having been entered on April 14, 1936, the
order reinstating the appeal came within such fifteen-day
period.
2. Granted that the Court of Appeals still had jurisdiction of
the case when it reinstated the appeal, it seem reasonable to
conclude that it also had authority to grant the appellant an
additional period of five days within which to file her brief. Rule
23 provides in specific terms that the court may by special
order fix a time within which motions for extension of time for
the filing of briefs must be presented. It would seem to be
within the spirit of this rule to hold that the court may grant
either the appellant or appellee an additional time for the filing
of his brief even without any previous application therefor.
Moreover, as the Supreme Court of the United States has aptly
observed, "it is always in the power of the court to suspend its
own rules, or to except a particular case from its operation,
whenever the purposes of justice require it." (U.
S. vs. Breitling, 20 How., 252; 15 Law. ed., 900, 902.)
We conclude that the Court of Appeals had authority to
reinstate the appeal in the aforesaid case numbered 44763 in
its records, and to grant the appellant an additional period of
file days within which to file her brief.
The petition for a writ of certiorari must be denied. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-64013 November 28, 1983
UNION GLASS & CONTAINER CORPORATION and CARLOS
PALANCA, JR., in his capacity as President of Union Glass
& Container Corporation, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION and
CAROLINA HOFILEA, respondents.
This petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks to annul and
set aside the Order of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, dated September 25, 1981, upholding its
jurisdiction in SEC Case No. 2035, entitled "Carolina Hofilea,
Complainant, versus Development Bank of the Philippines, et
al., Respondents."
Private respondent Carolina Hofilea, complainant in SEC
Case No. 2035, is a stockholder of Pioneer Glass
Manufacturing Corporation, Pioneer Glass for short, a
domestic corporation engaged in the operation of silica mines
and the manufacture of glass and glassware. Since 1967,
Pioneer Glass had obtained various loan accommodations from
the Development Bank of the Philippines [DBP], and also from
other local and foreign sources which DBP guaranteed.
As security for said loan accommodations, Pioneer Glass
mortgaged and/or assigned its assets, real and personal, to the
DBP, in addition to the mortgages executed by some of its
corporate officers over their personal assets. The proceeds of
said financial exposure of the DBP were used in the
construction of a glass plant in Rosario, Cavite, and the
operation of seven silica mining claims owned by the
corporation.
It appears that through the conversion into equity of the
accumulated unpaid interests on the various loans amounting
to P5.4 million as of January 1975, and subsequently
increased by another P2.2 million in 1976, the DBP was able to
gain control of the outstanding shares of common stocks of
Pioneer Glass, and to get two, later three, regular seats in the
corporation's board of directors.
Sometime in March, 1978, when Pioneer Glass suffered serious
liquidity problems such that it could no longer meet its
financial obligations with DBP, it entered into a dacion en pago
agreement with the latter, whereby all its assets mortgaged to
DBP were ceded to the latter in full satisfaction of the
corporation's obligations in the total amount of
P59,000,000.00. Part of the assets transferred to the DBP was
the glass plant in Rosario, Cavite, which DBP leased and
subsequently sold to herein petitioner Union Glass and
Container Corporation, hereinafter referred to as Union Glass.
On April 1, 1981, Carolina Hofilea filed a complaint before the
respondent Securities and Exchange Commission against the
DBP, Union Glass and Pioneer Glass, docketed as SEC Case
No. 2035. Of the five causes of action pleaded therein, only the
first cause of action concerned petitioner Union Glass as
transferee and possessor of the glass plant. Said first cause of

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action was based on the alleged illegality of the
aforesaid dacion en pagoresulting from: [1] the supposed
unilateral and unsupported undervaluation of the assets of
Pioneer Glass covered by the agreement; [2] the self-dealing
indulged in by DBP, having acted both as stockholder/director
and secured creditor of Pioneer Glass; and [3] the wrongful
inclusion by DBP in its statement of account of P26M as due
from Pioneer Glass when the same had already been converted
into equity.
Thus, with respect to said first cause of action, respondent
Hofilea prayed that the SEC issue an order:t.hqw
1. Holding that the so called dacion en pago conveying all
the assets of Pioneer Glass and the Hofilea personal
properties to Union Glass be declared null and void on the
ground that the said conveyance was tainted
with.t.hqw
A. Self-dealing on the part of DBP which was acting
both as a controlling stockholder/director and as
secured creditor of the Pioneer Glass, all to its
advantage and to that of Union Glass, and to the
gross prejudice of the Pioneer Glass,
B. That the dacion en pago is void because there was
gross undervaluation of the assets included in the so-
called dacion en pago by more than 100% to the
prejudice of Pioneer Glass and to the undue
advantage of DBP and Union Glass;
C. That the DBP unduly favored Union Glass over
another buyer, San Miguel Corporation,
notwithstanding the clearly advantageous terms
offered by the latter to the prejudice of Pioneer Glass,
its other creditors and so-called 'Minority
stockholders.'
2. Holding that the assets of the Pioneer Glass taken over
by DBP and part of which was delivered to Union Glass
particularly the glass plant to be returned accordingly.
3. That the DBP be ordered to accept and recognize the
appraisal conducted by the Asian Appraisal Inc. in 1975
and again in t978 of the asset of Pioneer Glass.
1

In her common prayer, Hofilea asked that DBP be sentenced
to pay Pioneer Glass actual, consequential, moral and
exemplary damages, for its alleged illegal acts and gross bad
faith; and for DBP and Union Glass to pay her a reasonable
amount as attorney's fees.
2

On April 21, 1981, Pioneer Glass filed its answer. On May 8,
1981, petitioners moved for dismissal of the case on the
ground that the SEC had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter or nature of the suit. Respondent Hofilea filed her
opposition to said motion, to which herein petitioners filed a
rejoinder.
On July 23, 1981, SEC Hearing Officer Eugenio E. Reyes, to
whom the case was assigned, granted the motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction. However, on September 25, 1981, upon
motion for reconsideration filed by respondent Hofilea,
Hearing Officer Reyes reversed his original order by upholding
the SEC's jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the
persons of petitioners. Unable to secure a reconsideration of
the Order as well as to have the same reviewed by the
Commission En Banc, petitioners filed the instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition to set aside the order of September
25, 1981, and to prevent respondent SEC from taking
cognizance of SEC Case No. 2035.
The issue raised in the petition may be propounded thus: Is it
the regular court or the SEC that has jurisdiction over the
case?
In upholding the SEC's jurisdiction over the case Hearing
Officer Reyes rationalized his conclusion thus:t.hqw
As correctly pointed out by the complainant, the present
action is in the form of a derivative suit instituted by a
stockholder for the benefit of the corporation, respondent
Pioneer Glass and Manufacturing Corporation, principally
against another stockholder, respondent Development
Bank of the Philippines, for alleged illegal acts and gross
bad faith which resulted in the dacion en
pagoarrangement now being questioned by complainant.
These alleged illegal acts and gross bad faith came about
precisely by virtue of respondent Development Bank of the
Philippine's status as a stockholder of co-respondent
Pioneer Glass Manufacturing Corporation although its
status as such stockholder, was gained as a result of its
being a creditor of the latter. The derivative nature of this
instant action can also be gleaned from the common
prayer of the complainant which seeks for an order
directing respondent Development Bank of the Philippines
to pay co-respondent Pioneer Glass Manufacturing
Corporation damages for the alleged illegal acts and gross
bad faith as above-mentioned.
As far as respondent Union Glass and Container
Corporation is concerned, its inclusion as a party-
respondent by virtue of its being an indispensable party to
the present action, it being in possession of the assets
subject of the dacion en pago and, therefore, situated in
such a way that it will be affected by any judgment
thereon,
3

In the ordinary course of things, petitioner Union Glass, as
transferee and possessor of the glass plant covered by
the dacion en pago agreement, should be joined as party-
defendant under the general rule which requires the joinder of
every party who has an interest in or lien on the property
subject matter of the dispute.
4
Such joinder of parties avoids
multiplicity of suits as well as ensures the convenient, speedy
and orderly administration of justice.
But since petitioner Union Glass has no intra-corporate
relation with either the complainant or the DBP, its joinder as
party-defendant in SEC Case No. 2035 brings the cause of
action asserted against it outside the jurisdiction of the
respondent SEC.
The jurisdiction of the SEC is delineated by Section 5 of PD No.
902-A as follows:t.hqw
Sec. 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative
function of the Securities and Exchange Commission
over corporations, partnerships and other forms of
associations registered with it as expressly granted under
existing laws and devices, it shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:
a] Devices and schemes employed by or any acts, of the
board of directors, business associates, its officers or
partners, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation
which may be detrimental to the interest of the public
and/or the stockholders, partners, members of
associations or organizations registered with the
Commission
b] Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or
partnership relations, between and among stockholders,
members or associates; between any or all of them and
the corporation, partnership, or association of which they
are stockholders, members or associates, respectively;
and between such corporation, partnership or
association and the state insofar as it concerns their
individual franchise or right to exist as such entity;
c] Controversies in the election or appointments of
directors, trustees, officers or managers of such
corporations, partnerships or associations.
This grant of jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the
nature and function of the SEC under the law. Section 3 of PD
No. 902-A confers upon the latter "absolute jurisdiction,
supervision, and control over all corporations, partnerships or
associations, who are grantees of primary franchise and/or
license or permit issued by the government to operate in the
Philippines ... " The principal function of the SEC is the
supervision and control over corporations, partnerships and
associations with the end in view that investment in these
entities may be encouraged and protected, and their activities
pursued for the promotion of economic development.
5

It is in aid of this office that the adjudicative power of the SEC
must be exercised. Thus the law explicitly specified and

3
delimited its jurisdiction to matters intrinsically connected
with the regulation of corporations, partnerships and
associations and those dealing with the internal affairs of such
corporations, partnerships or associations.
Otherwise stated, in order that the SEC can take cognizance of
a case, the controversy must pertain to any of the following
relationships: [a] between the corporation, partnership or
association and the public; [b] between the corporation,
partnership or association and its stockholders, partners,
members, or officers; [c] between the corporation, partnership
or association and the state in so far as its franchise, permit or
license to operate is concerned; and [d] among the
stockholders, partners or associates themselves.
The fact that the controversy at bar involves the rights of
petitioner Union Glass who has no intra-corporate relation
either with complainant or the DBP, places the suit beyond the
jurisdiction of the respondent SEC. The case should be tried
and decided by the court of general jurisdiction, the Regional
Trial Court. This view is in accord with the rudimentary
principle that administrative agencies, like the SEC, are
tribunals of limited jurisdiction
6
and, as such, could wield only
such powers as are specifically granted to them by their
enabling statutes.
7
As We held in Sunset View Condominium
Corp. vs. Campos, Jr.:
8
t.hqw
Inasmuch as the private respondents are not
shareholders of the petitioner condominium corporation,
the instant cases for collection cannot be a 'controversy
arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations
between and among stockholders, members or
associates; between any or all of them and the
corporation, partnership or association of which they are
stockholders, members or associates, respectively,' which
controversies are under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Securities & Exchange Commission,
pursuant to Section 5 [b] of P.D. No. 902-A. ...
As heretofore pointed out, petitioner Union Glass is involved
only in the first cause of action of Hofileas complaint in SEC
Case No, 2035. While the Rules of Court, which applies
suppletorily to proceedings before the SEC, allows the joinder
of causes of action in one complaint, such procedure however
is subject to the rules regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder
of parties.
9
Since petitioner has no intra-corporate
relationship with the complainant, it cannot be joined as party-
defendant in said case as to do so would violate the rule or
jurisdiction. Hofileas complaint against petitioner for
cancellation of the sale of the glass plant should therefore be
brought separately before the regular court But such action, if
instituted, shall be suspended to await the final outcome of
SEC Case No. 2035, for the issue of the validity of the dacion
en pago posed in the last mentioned case is a prejudicial
question, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved in the action against petitioner Union Glass.
Thus, Hofileas complaint against the latter can only prosper if
final judgment is rendered in SEC Case No. 2035, annulling
the dacion en pago executed in favor of the DBP.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted, and the
questioned Orders of respondent SEC, dated September 25,
1981, March 25, 1982 and May 28, 1982, are hereby set aside.
Respondent Commission is ordered to drop petitioner Union
Glass from SEC Case No. 2035, without prejudice to the filing
of a separate suit before the regular court of justice. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.1wph1.t
G.R. No. L-12902
CEFERINO MARCELO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
NAZARIO DE LEON, defendant-appellee.
Pedro D. Maldia and San Vicente and Jardiel for appellant.
Inciong and Bacalso for appellee.
BENGZON, J.:
The plaintiff has appealed from the order of judge Jose N.
Leuterio of the Nueva Ecija court of first instance, dismissing
his complaint whereby he had asked that defendant be
required to vacate a parcel of land and to pay damages. The
dismissal rested on two grounds, (a) the case pertained to the
Court of Agrarian Relations; and (b) as attorney-in-fact of the
true owner of the land, the plaintiff had no right to bring the
action.
The record disclose that on February 4, 1957, Ceferino
Marcelo, filed in the justice of the peace court of San Antonio,
Nueva Ecija, a complaint to recover possession of a lot of 2,000
square meters belonging to Severino P. Marcelo (who had given
him a full power-of-attorney) which was held by defendant "on
the understanding that one-half of all the products raised in
the occupied area, would be given" to the landowner. The
complaint alleged that after plaintiff had assumed the
administration of Severino Marcelo's properties, defendant
delivered the products corresponding to the owner; but when
in September 1956, plaintiff notified defendant that in addition
to giving half of the produce, he would have to pay a rental of
two pesos per month, the latter refused, and continued
refusing to pay such additional charges. Wherefore,
complainant prayed for judgment ordering defendant to leave
the premises and to pay damages and costs.
The defendant questioned the court's jurisdiction, arguing that
the matter involved tenancy relations falling within the
authority of the Agrarian Court; he also challenged the
capacity of plaintiff to sue. He lost in the justice of the peace
court; however, on appeal to the court of first instance, he
raised the same issues on a motion to dismiss, and then his
views prevailed.
In this appeal, plaintiff insists he merely filed ejectment or
detainer proceedings, which fall within the justice of the peace
court's jurisdiction. He claims the lot to be residential, and not
agricultural. On this point, His Honor noted that "the land
covered by the title of plaintiff's principal covers an area of
59,646 square meters situated in the barrio of San Mariano,
San Antonio, Nueva Ecija. This land obviously is agricultural,
and it is too much to presume that barrio folks would occupy
an area of 2,000 square meters more or less of land for a
residence. The cultivation of the land by the defendant and the
sharing of the products thereof with the owner of the land
characterize the relationship between the defendant and the
plaintiff's principal as one of the landlord and tenant.
Indeed, from the allegations of the complaint, one could
conclude that defendant had physical possession of the land
for the purpose of cultivating it and giving the owner a share in
the crop. This was agricultural tenancy of the kind called
"share tenancy". In judging this relationship, the 2-pesos-a-
month-rental alleged in the complaint may be disregarded,
because defendant never having agreed to such imposition, it
may not be held a part of the compensation payable for holding
the land. The circumstance that defendant built a dwelling on
the agricultural lot does not ipso facto make it residential
considering specially that the dwelling photograph
submitted with brief does not occupy more than 80 square
meters occupied by him. In this connection, plaintiff argues as
follows:
The defendant does not till or cultivate the land in order to
grow the fruit bearing trees because they are already full
grown. He does not even do the actual gathering, and after
deducting the expenses, he gives one-half of the fruits to the
plaintiff all in consideration of his stay in the land. He is not,
therefore, a tenant within the meaning of that term as used in
Republic Act. No. 1199 for "A tenant shall mean a person who,
himself and with the aid available from within his immediate
farm household, cultivate the land for purposes of production .
. ."
Anyone who had fruit trees in his yard, will disagree with the
above description of the relationship. He knows the caretaker
must water the trees, even fertilize them for better production,
uproot weeds and turn the soil, sometimes fumigate to
eliminate plants pests, etc. Those chores obviously mean
"working or cultivating" the land. Besides, it seems that
defendant planted other crops, (i.e. cultivated the lot) giving
the landowner his corresponding share.
Now, the statutes provide that "All cases involving
dispossession of a tenant by the landholder . . . shall be under
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of such court as may
now or hereafter be authorized by law to take cognizance of
tenancy relations and disputes". Sec. 2, Republic Act 1199);
and the court (Agrarian Relations) "shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to consider, investigate, decide and settle
all questions and matters involving all those relationships
established by law which determine the varying rights of
persons in cultivation and use of agricultural land where one
of the parties works the land". (Sec. 7, Republic Act 1267 as
amended byRepublic Act 1409.)
In Tumbagan vs. Vasquez, L-8719, July 17, 1956, we impliedly
held that where a farmland occupies agricultural land and

4
erects a house thereon, the tenancy relationship continues
subject to tenancy laws not to those governing leases.
In fact, the Agricultural Tenancy Law (Republic Act
1199) requires the landholder to give his tenant an area
wherein the latter may construct his dwelling (sec. 26), of
course without thereby changing the nature of their
relationship, from landowner and tenant to lessor and lessee.
At any rate, this action must fail upon the second ground of
defendant's motion to dismiss: the plaintiff is a
mere apoderado of the owner, Severino P. Marcelo.
[[
1
]]
The rule
is that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest, (sec 2, Rule 3).
However, plaintiff quotes that part of sec. 1 of Rule 72,
permitting "the legal representative" of any landlord to bring an
action of ejectment, and insists in his right now to litigate.
Supposing that "legal representative" as used in sec. 1,
includes attorneys-in-fact, we find that plaintiff's power
attached to the complaint, authorizes him to sue for and in the
name of Severino Marcelo, to "pursue any and all kinds of
suits and actions for me and in my name in the courts of the
land". This action is not in the name of plaintiff's principal.
For all the foregoing, the appealed order is affirmed with costs
chargeable against appellant.