CHAPTER 6 AND 7 CASES

G.R. No. 47065 June 26, 1940

PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., petitioner, vs.THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

C. de G. Alvear for petitioner.
Evaristo R. Sandoval for respondent.

LAUREL, J.:

The petitioner has been engaged for the past twenty years in the business of transporting passengers in the Province of Pangasinan and Tarlac and,
to a certain extent, in the Province of Nueva Ecija and Zambales, by means of motor vehicles commonly known as TPU buses, in accordance with
the terms and conditions of the certificates of public convenience issued in its favor by the former Public Utility Commission in cases Nos. 24948,
30973, 36830, 32014 and 53090. On August 26, 1939, the petitioner filed with the Public Service Commission an application for authorization to
operate ten additional new Brockway trucks (case No. 56641), on the ground that they were needed to comply with the terms and conditions of its
existing certificates and as a result of the application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. In the decision of September 26, 1939, granting the petitioner's
application for increase of equipment, the Public Service Commission ordered:

Y de acuerdo con que se provee por el articulo 15 de la ley No. 146 del Commonwealth, tal como ha sido enmendada por el articulo 1 de la Ley No.
454, por la presente se enmienda las condiciones de los certificados de convenciencia publica expedidos en los expedientes Nos. 24948, 30973,
36831, 32014 y la authorizacion el el expediente No. 53090, asi que se consideran incorporadas en los mismos las dos siguientes condiciones:

Que los certificados de conveniencia publica y authorizacion arriba mencionados seran validos y subsistentes solamente durante de veinticinco (25)
anos, contados desde la fecha de la promulgacion de esta decision.

Que la empresa de la solicitante porda ser adquirida por el Commonwealth de Filipinas o por alguna dependencia del mismo en cualquier tiempo
que lo deseare previo pago del precio d costo de su equipo util, menos una depreciacion razonable que se ha fijar por la Comision al tiempo de su
adquisicion.

Not being agreeable to the two new conditions thus incorporated in its existing certificates, the petitioner filed on October 9, 1939 a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the Public Service Commission on November 14, 1939. Whereupon, on November 20, 1939, the present
petition for a writ of certiorari was instituted in this court praying that an order be issued directing the secretary of the Public Service Commission to
certify forthwith to this court the records of all proceedings in case No. 56641; that this court, after hearing, render a decision declaring section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 454 unconstitutional and void; that, if this court should be of the opinion that section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454 is
constitutional, a decision be rendered declaring that the provisions thereof are not applicable to valid and subsisting certificates issued prior to June
8, 1939. Stated in the language of the petitioner, it is contended:

1. That the legislative powers granted to the Public Service Commission by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454, without limitation, guide or rule
except the unfettered discretion and judgment of the Commission, constitute a complete and total abdication by the Legislature of its functions in the
premises, and for that reason, the Act, in so far as those powers are concerned, is unconstitutional and void.

2. That even if it be assumed that section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454, is valid delegation of legislative powers, the Public Service Commission
has exceeded its authority because: (a) The Act applies only to future certificates and not to valid and subsisting certificates issued prior to June 8,
1939, when said Act took effect, and (b) the Act, as applied by the Commission, violates constitutional guarantees.

Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454, invoked by the respondent Public Service
Commission in the decision complained of in the present proceedings, reads as follows:

With the exception to those enumerated in the preceding section, no public service shall operate in the Philippines without possessing a valid and
subsisting certificate from the Public Service Commission, known as "certificate of public convenience," or "certificate of convenience and public
necessity," as the case may be, to the effect that the operation of said service and the authorization to do business will promote the public interests
in a proper and suitable manner.

The Commission may prescribed as a condition for the issuance of the certificate provided in the preceding paragraph that the service can be
acquired by the Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any instrumentality thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful equipment, less
reasonable depreciation; and likewise, that the certificate shall valid only for a definite period of time; and that the violation of any of these conditions
shall produce the immediate cancellation of the certificate without the necessity of any express action on the part of the Commission.

In estimating the depreciation, the effect of the use of the equipment, its actual condition, the age of the model, or other circumstances affecting its
value in the market shall be taken into consideration.

The foregoing is likewise applicable to any extension or amendment of certificates actually force and to those which may hereafter be issued, to
permits to modify itineraries and time schedules of public services and to authorization to renew and increase equipment and properties.

Under the first paragraph of the aforequoted section 15 of Act No. 146, as amended, no public service can operate without a certificate of public
convenience or certificate of convenience and public necessity to the effect that the operation of said service and the authorization to do business
will "public interests in a proper and suitable manner." Under the second paragraph, one of the conditions which the Public Service Commission may
prescribed the issuance of the certificate provided for in the first paragraph is that "the service can be acquired by the Commonwealth of the
Philippines or by any instrumental thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful equipment, less reasonable depreciation," a condition which is
virtually a restatement of the principle already embodied in the Constitution, section 6 of Article XII, which provides that "the State may, in the interest
of national welfare and defense, establish and operate industries and means of transportation and communication, and, upon payment of just
compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the Government. "Another condition which the
Commission may prescribed, and which is assailed by the petitioner, is that the certificate "shall be valid only for a definite period of time." As there is
a relation between the first and second paragraphs of said section 15, the two provisions must be read and interpreted together. That is to say, in
issuing a certificate, the Commission must necessarily be satisfied that the operation of the service under said certificate during a definite period
fixed therein "will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner." Under section 16 (a) of Commonwealth Act. No. 146 which is a
complement of section 15, the Commission is empowered to issue certificates of public convenience whenever it "finds that the operation of the
public service proposed and the authorization to do business will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner." Inasmuch as the
period to be fixed by the Commission under section 15 is inseparable from the certificate itself, said period cannot be disregarded by the
Commission in determining the question whether the issuance of the certificate will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner.
Conversely, in determining "a definite period of time," the Commission will be guided by "public interests," the only limitation to its power being that
said period shall not exceed fifty years (sec. 16 (a), Commonwealth Act No. 146; Constitution, Art. XIII, sec. 8.) We have already ruled that "public
interest" furnishes a sufficient standard. (People vs. Fernandez and Trinidad, G. R. No. 45655, promulgated June 15, 1938; People vs. Rosenthal
and Osmea, G. R. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939, citing New York Central Securities Corporation vs. U.S.A., 287 U.S. 12, 24,
25, 77 Law. ed. 138, 145, 146; Schenchter Poultry Corporation vs. I.S., 295, 540, 79 Law. ed. 1570, 1585; Ferrazzini vs. Gsell, 34 Phil., 697, 711-
712.)

Section 8 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides, among other things, that no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the
operation of a public utility shall be "for a longer period than fifty years," and when it was ordained, in section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 454, that the Public Service Commission may prescribed as a condition for the issuance of a certificate that it
"shall be valid only for a definite period of time" and, in section 16 (a) that "no such certificates shall be issued for a period of more than fifty years,"
the National Assembly meant to give effect to the aforesaid constitutional mandate. More than this, it has thereby also declared its will that the period
to be fixed by the Public Service Commission shall not be longer than fifty years. All that has been delegated to the Commission, therefore, is the
administrative function, involving the use discretion, to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of "public
interests in a proper and suitable manner." The fact that the National Assembly may itself exercise the function and authority thus conferred upon the
Public Service Commission does not make the provision in question constitutionally objectionable.

The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action and at the same time to forestall overaction which necessarily
results from undue concentration of powers, and thereby obtain efficiency and prevent deposition. Thereby, the "rule of law" was established which
narrows the range of governmental action and makes it subject to control by certain devices. As a corollary, we find the rule prohibiting delegation of
legislative authority, and from the earliest time American legal authorities have proceeded on the theory that legislative power must be exercised by
the legislature alone. It is frankness, however, to confess that as one delves into the mass of judicial pronouncement, he finds a great deal of
confusion. One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus non
potest delegari or delegata potestas non potest delegari, attributed to Bracton (De Legius et Consuetedinious Angliae, edited by G. E. Woodbine,
Yale University Press, 1922, vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also recognized in principle in the Roman Law (D. 17.18.3), has been made to adapt itself to
the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the
United States and England but in practically all modern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and Osmea, G. R. Nos. 46076 and 46077,
promulgated June 12, 1939.) Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation,
and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the
legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the court. (Dillon Catfish Drainage Dist, v. Bank of Dillon, 141 S. E. 274, 275, 143 S. Ct. 178;
State vs. Knox County, 54 S. W. 2d. 973, 976, 165 Tenn. 319.) In harmony with such growing tendency, this Court, since the decision in the case of
Compaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioner (34 Phil., 136), relied upon by the petitioner, has, in instances,
extended its seal of approval to the "delegation of greater powers by the legislature." (Inchausti Steamship Co. vs. Public Utility Commissioner, 44
Phil., Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus, 56 Phil., 446; People vs. Fernandez & Trinidad, G. R. No. 45655, promulgated June 15, 1938; People vs. Rosenthal
& Osmea, G. R. Nos. 46076, 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939; and Robb and Hilscher vs. People, G. R. No. 45866, promulgated June 12,
1939.).

Under the fourth paragraph of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 454, the power of the Public
Service Commission to prescribed the conditions "that the service can be acquired by the Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any instrumentality
thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful equipment, less reasonable," and "that the certificate shall be valid only for a definite period of
time" is expressly made applicable "to any extension or amendment of certificates actually in force" and "to authorizations to renew and increase
equipment and properties." We have examined the legislative proceedings on the subject and have found that these conditions were purposely made
applicable to existing certificates of public convenience. The history of Commonwealth Act No. 454 reveals that there was an attempt to suppress, by
way of amendment, the sentence "and likewise, that the certificate shall be valid only for a definite period of time," but the attempt failed:

x x x x x x x x x

Sr. CUENCO. Seor Presidente, para otra enmienda. En la misma pagina, lineas 23 y 24, pido que se supriman las palabras 'and likewise, that the
certificate shall be valid only for a definite period time.' Esta disposicion del proyecto autoriza a la Comision de Servicios Publicos a fijar un plazo de
vigencia certificado de conveniencia publica. Todo el mundo sabe que bo se puede determinar cuando los intereses del servicio publico requiren la
explotacion de un servicio publico y ha de saber la Comision de Servisios, si en un tiempo determinado, la explotacion de algunos buses en cierta
ruta ya no tiene de ser, sobre todo, si tiene en cuenta; que la explotacion de los servicios publicos depende de condiciones flutuantes, asi como del
volumen como trafico y de otras condiciones. Ademas, el servicio publico se concede por la Comision de Servicios Publicos el interes publico asi lo
exige. El interes publico no tiene duracion fija, no es permanente; es un proceso mas o menos indefinido en cuanto al tiempo. Se ha acordado eso
en el caucus de anoche.

EL PRESIDENTE PRO TEMPORE. Que dice el Comite?

Sr. ALANO. El Comite siente tener que rechazar esa enmienda, en vista de que esto certificados de conveniencia publica es igual que la franquicia:
sepuede extender. Si los servicios presentados por la compaia durante el tiempo de su certificado lo require, puede pedir la extension y se le
extendera; pero no creo conveniente el que nosotros demos un certificado de conveniencia publica de una manera que podria pasar de cincuenta
anos, porque seria anticonstitucional.

x x x x x x x x x

By a majority vote the proposed amendment was defeated. (Sesion de 17 de mayo de 1939, Asamblea Nacional.)

The petitioner is mistaken in the suggestion that, simply because its existing certificates had been granted before June 8, 1939, the date when
Commonwealth Act No. 454, amendatory of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, was approved, it must be deemed to have the right of holding
them in perpetuity. Section 74 of the Philippine Bill provided that "no franchise, privilege, or concession shall be granted to any corporation except
under the conditions that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress of the United States." The Jones Law, incorporating
a similar mandate, provided, in section 28, that "no franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or corporation except under the
conditions that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress of the United States." Lastly, the Constitution of the Philippines
provided, in section 8 of Article XIII, that "no franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or corporation, except under the condition that
it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the National Assembly when the public interest so requires." The National Assembly, by
virtue of the Constitution, logically succeeded to the Congress of the United States in the power to amend, alter or repeal any franchise or right
granted prior to or after the approval of the Constitution; and when Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and 454 were enacted, the National Assembly, to
the extent therein provided, has declared its will and purpose to amend or alter existing certificates of public convenience.

Upon the other hand, statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise by the state of its police power, are applicable not
only to those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to those already established and in operation.

Nor is there any merit in petitioner's contention, that, because of the establishment of petitioner's operations prior to May 1, 1917, they are not
subject to the regulations of the Commission. Statutes for the regulation of public utilities are a proper exercise by the state of its police power. As
soon as the power is exercised, all phases of operation of established utilities, become at once subject to the police power thus called into operation.
Procedures' Transportation Co. v. Railroad Commission, 251 U. S. 228, 40 Sup. Ct. 131, 64 Law. ed. 239, Law v. Railroad Commission, 184 Cal.
737, 195 Pac. 423, 14 A. L. R. 249. The statute is applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to
those already established and in operation. The 'Auto Stage and Truck Transportation Act' (Stats. 1917, c. 213) is a statute passed in pursuance of
the police power. The only distinction recognized in the statute between those established before and those established after the passage of the act
is in the method of the creation of their operative rights. A certificate of public convenience and necessity it required for any new operation, but no
such certificate is required of any transportation company for the operation which was actually carried on in good faith on May 1, 1917, This
distinction in the creation of their operative rights in no way affects the power of the Commission to supervise and regulate them. Obviously the
power of the Commission to hear and dispose of complaints is as effective against companies securing their operative rights prior to May 1, 1917, as
against those subsequently securing such right under a certificate of public convenience and necessity. (Motor Transit Co. et al. v. Railroad
Commission of California et al., 209 Pac. 586.)

Moreover, Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and 454 are not only the organic acts of the Public Service Commission but are "a part of the charter of
every utility company operating or seeking to operate a franchise" in the Philippines. (Streator Aqueduct Co. v. et al., 295 Fed. 385.) The business of
a common carrier holds such a peculiar relation to the public interest that there is superinduced upon it the right of public regulation. When private
property is "affected with a public interest it ceased to be juris privati only." When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public
has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the
extent of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by discounting the use, but so long as he maintains the use he must submit to
control. Indeed, this right of regulation is so far beyond question that it is well settled that the power of the state to exercise legislative control over
public utilities may be exercised through boards of commissioners. (Fisher vs. Yangco Steamship Company, 31 Phil., 1, citing Munn vs. Illinois, 94
U.S. 113; Georgia R. & Bkg. Co. vs. Smith, 128 U.S. 174; Budd vs. New York, 143 U.S. 517; New York etc. R. Co. vs. Bristol 151 U.S. 556, 571;
Connecticut etc. R. Co. vs. Woodruff, 153 U.S. 689; Louisville etc. Ry Co. vs. Kentucky, 161 U.S. 677, 695.) This right of the state to regulate public
utilities is founded upon the police power, and statutes for the control and regulation of utilities are a legitimate exercise thereof, for the protection of
the public as well as of the utilities themselves. Such statutes are, therefore, not unconstitutional, either impairing the obligation of contracts, taking
property without due process, or denying the equal protection of the laws, especially inasmuch as the question whether or not private property shall
be devoted to a public and the consequent burdens assumed is ordinarily for the owner to decide; and if he voluntarily places his property in public
service he cannot complain that it becomes subject to the regulatory powers of the state. (51 C. J., sec. 21, pp. 9-10.) in the light of authorities which
hold that a certificate of public convenience constitutes neither a franchise nor contract, confers no property right, and is mere license or privilege.
(Burgess vs. Mayor & Alderman of Brockton, 235 Mass. 95, 100, 126 N. E. 456; Roberto vs. Commisioners of Department of Public Utilities, 262
Mass. 583, 160 N. E. 321; Scheible vs. Hogan, 113 Ohio St. 83, 148 N. E. 581; Martz vs. Curtis [J. L.] Cartage Co. [1937], 132 Ohio St. 271, 7 N. E.
[d] 220; Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. vs. Sabellano, 59 Phil., 773.)

Whilst the challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and constitutional, we are, however, of the opinion that the decision of the
Public Service Commission should be reversed and the case remanded thereto for further proceedings for the reason now to be stated. The Public
Service Commission has power, upon proper notice and hearing, "to amend, modify or revoke at any time any certificate issued under the provisions
of this Act, whenever the facts and circumstances on the strength of which said certificate was issued have been misrepresented or materially
changed." (Section 16, par. [m], Commonwealth Act No. 146.) The petitioner's application here was for an increase of its equipment to enable it to
comply with the conditions of its certificates of public convenience. On the matter of limitation to twenty five (25) years of the life of its certificates of
public convenience, there had been neither notice nor opportunity given the petitioner to be heard or present evidence. The Commission appears to
have taken advantage of the petitioner to augment petitioner's equipment in imposing the limitation of twenty-five (25) years which might as well be
twenty or fifteen or any number of years. This is, to say the least, irregular and should not be sanctioned. There are cardinal primary rights which
must be respected even in proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S.,
(304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129), "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair
play." Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts
but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan vs. U.S., 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 :Law. ed. 1288.) In
the language of this Court in Edwards vs. McCoy (22 Phil., 598), "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the
board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without
or consideration." While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded,
namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, at least when directly attacked.
(Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more fundamental principle that the genius of constitutional government is contrary to
the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.

The decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case remanded to the Public Service Commission for further proceedings in accordance with
law and this decision, without any pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.



























CONNALLY V. SCUDDER, 160 N.E. 655

G.R. No. L-28790 April 29, 1968

ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS, as Commissioner of Land Registration, petitioner,
vs.
CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, as Secretary of Justice, and RAFAEL M. SALAS, as Executive Secretary, respondents.

Leandro Sevilla, Ramon C. Aquino and Lino M. Patajo for petitioner.
Claudio Teehankee for and in his own behalf as respondent.

REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:

Petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Secretary of Justice from investigating the official actuations of the
Commissioner of Land Registration, and to declare inoperative his suspension by the Executive Secretary pending investigation.

The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified Commissioner of Land Registration, a
position created by Republic Act No. 1151. By the terms of section 2 of said Act, the said Commissioner is declared "entitled to the same
compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance." The appropriation laws (Rep. Acts 4642, 4856 and
5170) in the item setting forth the salary of said officer, use the following expression:

1. One Land Registration Commissioner with the rank and privileges of district judge P19,000.00.

On March 7, 1968, respondent Secretary of Justice coursed to the petitioner a letter requiring him to explain in writing not later than March 9, 1968
why no disciplinary action should be taken against petitioner for "approving or recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation and
consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles." Noblejas answered and apprised the
Secretary of Justice that, as he enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments and compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he could only
be suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance, and, therefore, the papers relative to his case should
be submitted to the Supreme Court, for action thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R. A. No. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court.

On March 17, 1968, petitioner Noblejas received a communication signed by the Executive Secretary, "by authority of the President", whereby,
based on "finding that a prima facie case exists against you for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the public interest", petitioner was
"hereby suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the above charges."

On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the contentions advanced in his letter to the Secretary of Justice, claiming lack of
jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and praying for restraining writs. In their answer respondents admit the facts but denied that petitioner, as Land
Registration Commissioner, exercises judicial functions, or that the petitioner may be considered a Judge of First Instance within the purview of the
Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of Court 140; that the function of investigating charges against public officers is administrative or executive in
nature; that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary with non-judicial functions or duties except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of
judicial duties, as it would be in violation of the principle of the separation of powers.

Thus, the stark issue before this Court is whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of
the conferment upon him by the Statutes heretofore mentioned (Rep. Act 1151 and Appropriation Laws) of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the
Court of First Instance.

First to militate against petitioner's stand is the fact that section 67 of the Judiciary Act providing for investigation, suspension or removal of Judges,
specifically recites that "No District Judge shall be separated or removed from office by the President of the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall
exist in the judgment of the Supreme Court . . ." and it is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner of Land Registration is a District
Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary at all.

In the second place, petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance" includes by implication the right to be investigated
only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed upon its recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right being possessed
by a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges. These favoured officers include (a)
the Judicial Superintendent of the Department of Justice (Judiciary Act, sec. 42); (b) the Assistant Solicitors General, seven in number (Rep. Act No.
4360); (c) the City Fiscal of Quezon City (R.A. No. 4495); (d) the City Fiscal of Manila (R. A. No. 4631) and (e) the Securities and Exchange
Commissioner (R. A. No. 5050, s. 2). To adopt petitioner's theory, therefore, would mean placing upon the Supreme Court the duty of investigating
and disciplining all these officials, whose functions are plainly executive, and the consequent curtailment by mere implication from the Legislative
grant, of the President's power to discipline and remove administrative officials who are presidential appointees, and which the Constitution expressly
placed under the President's supervision and control (Constitution, Art. VII, sec. 10[i]).

Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the Solicitor General, another appointee of the President, could not be removed
by the latter, since the Appropriation Acts confer upon the Solicitor General the rank and privileges of a Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these
Justices are only removable by the Legislature, through the process of impeachment (Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par. 2).

In our opinion, such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the Legislature when it granted these executive officials the rank and
privileges of Judges of First Instance. This conclusion gains strength when account is taken of the fact that in the case of the Judges of the Court of
Agrarian Relations and those of the Court of Tax Appeals, the organic statutes of said bodies (Republic Act 1267, as amended by Act 1409; Rep. Act
No. 1125) expressly provide that they are to be removed from office for the same causes and in the same manner provided by law for Judges of First
Instance", or "members of the judiciary of appellate rank". The same is true of Judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations (Comm. Act No. 103) and of
the Commissioner of Public Service (Public Service Act, Sec. 3). It is thereby shown that where the legislative design is to make the suspension or
removal procedure prescribed for Judges of First Instance applicable to other officers, provision to that effect is made in plain and unequivocal
language.

But the more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas is that, if the Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of
"privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended
or removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental
doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and
simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials.

Justice Cardozo ruled in In re Richardson et al., Connolly vs. Scudder (247 N. Y. 401, 160 N. E. 655), saying:

There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislature to charge the judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonably incidental to
the fulfillment of judicial duties.

The United States Supreme Court said in Federal Radio Commission vs. General Electric Co., et al., 281 U.S. 469, 74 Law. Ed., 972,

But this court cannot be invested with jurisdiction of that character, whether for purposes of review or otherwise. It was brought into being by the
judiciary article of the Constitution, is invested with judicial power only and can have no jurisdiction other than of cases and controversies falling
within the classes enumerated in that article. It cannot give decisions which are merely advisory; nor can it exercise or participate in the exercise of
functions which are essentially legislative or administrative. Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., supra (261 U.S. 444, 67 L. ed. 736, 43 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 445) and cases cited; Postum Cereal Co. vs. California Fig Nut Co. supra (272 U.S. 700, 701, 71 L. ed. 481, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 284); Liberty
Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70, 74, 71 L. ed. 541, 544, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 282; Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Asso. 277 U.S. 274, 289, 72 L.
ed. 880, 884, 48 Sup. Ct. Rep. 507; Ex parte Bakelite Corp. 279 U.S. 438, 449, 73 L. ed. 789, 793, 49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 411. (Federal Radio
Commission v. General Electric Company, 281 U.S. 469, 74 L. ed. 972.) (Emphasis supplied.)

In this spirit, it has been held that the Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or
to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions; and a law requiring the
Supreme Court to arbitrate disputes between public utilities was pronounced void in Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co. (57 Phil.
600).1wph1.t

Petitioner Noblejas seeks to differentiate his case from that of other executive officials by claiming that under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151, he
is endowed with judicial functions. The section invoked runs as follows:

Sec. 4. Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper
step to be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented to him for registration, or where
any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with reference to any such matter, the question shall be submitted to the
Commissioner of Land Registration either upon the certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the
suggestion in writing by the party in interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, after consideration of the matter shown by the records certified to
him, and in case of registered lands, after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to
be made. His decision in such cases shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided, further, That, when a party in interest
disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law, said decision may be appealed to the Supreme
Court within thirty days from and after receipt of the notice thereof.

Serious doubt may well be entertained as to whether the resolution of a consulta by a Register of Deeds is a judicial function, as contrasted with
administrative process. It will be noted that by specific provision of the section, the decision of the Land Registration Commissioner "shall be
conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds" alone, and not upon other parties. This limitation1 in effect identifies the resolutions of the Land
Registration Commissioner with those of any other bureau director, whose resolutions or orders bind his subordinates alone. That the
Commissioner's resolutions are appealable does not prove that they are not administrative; any bureau director's ruling is likewise appealable to the
corresponding department head.

But even granting that the resolution of consultas by the Register of Deeds should constitute a judicial (or more properly quasi judicial) function,
analysis of the powers and duties of the Land Registration Commissioner under Republic Act No. 1151, sections 3 and 4, will show that the
resolution of consultas are but a minimal portion of his administrative or executive functions and merely incidental to the latter.

Conformably to the well-known principle of statutory construction that statutes should be given, whenever possible, a meaning that will not bring
them in conflict with the Constitution,2 We are constrained to rule that the grant by Republic Act 1151 to the Commissioner of Land Registration of
the "same privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance" did not include, and was not intended to include, the right to demand
investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon that Court's recommendation; for otherwise, the said grant of
privileges would be violative of the Constitution and be null and void. Consequently, the investigation and suspension of the aforenamed
Commissioner pursuant to sections 32 and 34 of the Civil Service Law (R. A. 2260) are neither abuses of discretion nor acts in excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the writs of prohibition and injunction applied for are denied, and the petition is ordered dismissed. No costs.


















































SPRINGER V. P.I., 277 U.S. 189

G.R. No. L-26979 April 1, 1927

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiffs,
vs.
MILTON E. SPINGER, DALAMACIO COSTAS, and ANSELMO HILARIO, defendants.

Attorney-General Jaranilla, F. C. Fisher, and Hugh C. Smith for plaintiff.
Jose Abad Santos; Ross, Lawrence and Selph; Paredes, Buencamino and Yulo;
Araneta and Zaragoza; Charles E. Tenney; Camus, Delgado and Recto and Mariano H. de Joya for defendants.

MALCOLM, J.:

This is an original action of quo warranto brought in the name of the Government of the Philippine Islands against three directors of the National Coal
Company who were elected to their positions by the legislative members of the committee created by Acts. Nos. 2705 and 2822. The purpose of the
proceeding is to test the validity of the part of section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822, which provides that "The voting
power of all such stock (in the National Coal Company) owned by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be vested exclusively in a
committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives."

The material facts are averred in the complaint of the plaintiff and admitted in the demurrer of the defendants.

The National Coal Company is a corporation organized and existing by virtue of Act No. 2705 of the Philippine Legislature as amended by Act No.
2822, and of the Corporation law. By the terms of the charter of the corporation, the Governor-General was directed to subscribe on behalf of the
Government of the Philippine Islands for at least fifty-one per cent of the capital of the corporation. The government eventually became the owner of
more than ninety-nine per cent of the thirty thousand outstanding shares of stocks of the National Coal Company. Only nineteen shares stand in the
names of private individuals.

On November 9, 1926, the Government-General promulgated Executive Order No. 37. Reference was made therein to opinions of the Judge
Advocate General of the United States Army and of the Acting Attorney-General of the United States wherein it was held that the provisions of the
statutes passed by the Philippine Legislature creating a voting committee or board of control, and enumerating the duties and powers thereof with
respect to certain corporations in which the Philippine Government is the owner of stock, are nullities. Announcement was made that on account of
the invalidity of the portions of the Acts creating the voting committee or board of control, the Governor-General would, thereafter, exercise
exclusivelythe duties and powers theretofore assumed by the voting committee or board of control. Notice of the contents of this executive order was
given to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. (24 Off. Gaz., 2419.)

A special meeting of the stockholders of the National Coal Company was called for December 6, 1926, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, for the purpose
of electing directors and the transaction of such other business as migh properly come before the meeting. Prior thereto, on November 29, 1926, the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives as members of the voting committee, requested the Governor-General to
convene the committee at 2:30 p. m., on December 6, 1926, to decide upon the manner in which the stock held by the Government in the National
Coal Company should be voted. TheGovernor-General acknowledged receipt of this communication but declined to participate in the proposed
meeting. The president of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives did in fact meet at the time and place specified in their letter
to the Governor-General. It was then and there resolved by them that at the special meeting of the stockholders, the votes represented by the stock
of the Government in the National Coal Company, should be cast in favor of five specified persons for directors of the company.

On December 6, 1926, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the special meeting of the stockholders of the National Coal Company was held in accordance
with the call. The Governor-General, through his representative, asserted the sole power to vote the stock of the Government. The president of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives attended the meeting and filed with the secretary of the company a certified copy of the
minutes of the meeting of the committee held at the office of the company a half hour before. The Governor-General, through his representative,
thereupon objected to the asserted powers of the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the latter likewise
objected to the assertion of the Governor-General.

The chair recognized the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives in their capacity as majority members of the
voting committee as the persons lawfully entitled to represent and vote the Government stock. To this the representative of the Governor- General
made protest and demanded that it be entered of record in the minutes. The vote cast by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives was in favor of Alberto Barretto,Milton E. Springer, Dalmacio Costas, Anselmo Hilario, and Frank B. Ingersoll. The Governor-
General through his represetative, alleging representation of the Government stock, cast his vote in favor of Alberto Barreto, Romarico Agcaoili,
Frank B. Ingersoll, H. L. Heath, and Salvador Lagdameo. The chair declared the ballot cast by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House as electing the names therein indicated, directors of the National Coal Company.

Immediately after the stockholder's meeting, the persons declared by the chairman to have been elected, met and undertook to organized the board
of directors of the National Coal Company by the election of officers. All the directors for whom the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives voted and who were declared elected at the meeting of the stockholders participated in this meeting. Included among
them, were the three defendants, Milton E. Springer, Dalmacio Costas, and Anselmo Hilario.

The applicable legal doctrines are found in the Organic Law, particularly in the Organic Act, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, and in statutes
enacted under authority of that Act, and in decisions interpretative of it.

The Government of the Philippine Islands is an agency of the Congress, the principal, has seen fit to entrust to the Philippine Government, the agent,
are distributed among three coordinate departments, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. It is true that the Organic Act contains no general
distributing clause. But the principle is clearly deducible from the grant of powers. It is expressly incorporated in our Administrative Code. It has time
and again been approvingly enforced by this court.

No department of the Government of the Philippine Islands may legally exercise any of the powers conferred by the Organic Law upon any of the
others. Again it is true that the Organic Law contains no such explicit prohibition. But it is fairly implied by the division of the Government into three
departments. The effect is the same whether the prohibition is expressed or not. It has repeatedly been announced by this court that each of the
branches of the Government is in the main independent of the others. The doctrine is too firmly imbedded in Philippine institutions to be debatable.
(Administrative Code sec. 17; Barcelon vs. Baker and Thompson [1905], 5 Phil., 87; U. S. vs. Bull [1910], 15 Phil., 7; Severino vs. Governor-General
and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros [1910], 16 Phil., 366; Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco vs. Crossfield [1910], 16 Phil., 534; Province of Tarlac vs.
Gale [1913], 26 Phil., 338; Concepcion vs. Paredes [1921], 42 Phil., 599; U. S. vs. Ang Tang Ho [1922], 43 Phil., 1; Abueva vs. Wood [1924], 45
Phil., 612; Alejandrino vs. Quezon [1924], 46 Phil., 83.)

It is beyond the power of any branch of the Government of the Philippine Islands to exercise its functions in any other way than that prescribed by
the Organic Law or by local laws which conform to the Organic Law. The Governor-General must find his powers and duties in the fundamental law.
An act of the Philippine Legislature must comply with the grant from Congress. The jurisdiction of this court and other courts is derived from the
constitutional provisions.

These canons of political science have more than ordinary significance in the Philippines. To the Government of the Philippine Islands has been
delegated a large degree of autonomy, and the chief exponent of that autonomy in domestic affairs is the Philippine Legislature. TheGovernor-
General on the other hand of the Government and symbolizes American sovereignty. That under such a political system, lines of demarcation
between the legislative and the executive departments are difficult to fix, and that attempted encroachments of one on the other may occur, should
not dissuade the Supreme Court, as the guardian of the constitution, from enforcing fundamental principles.

The Organic Act vests "the supreme executive power" in the Governor- General of the Philippine Islands. In addition to specified functions,he is
given "general supervision and control of all the departments and bureaus of the government of the Philippine Islands as far as is not inconsistent
with the provisions of this act. "He is also made "responsible for the faithful execution of the laws of the Philippine Islands and of the United States
operative within Philippine Islands."The authority of the Governor-General is made secure by the important proviso "that all executive functionsof
Government must be directly under the Governor-General or within one of the executive departments under thesupervision and control of the
Governor-General. "(Organic Act, secs. 21, 22.) By the Administrative Code, "the Governor-General, as chief Executive of the Islands, is charged
with the executive control of the Philippine Government, to be exercised in person or through the Secretaries of Departments, or other proper
agency, according to law." (Se.58)

The Organic Act grants general legislative power except as otherwise provided therein to the Philippine Legislature. (Organic Act, secs. 8, 12.) Even
before the approval of the existing Organic Act, it was held that the Philippine Legislature has practically the same powersin the Philippine Islands
within the sphere in which it may operate as the Congress of the United States. (Chanco vs. Imperial [1916], 34 Phil., 329.) The rule judicially stated
is now that an Act of the Philippine Legislature which has not been expressly disapproved by Congress is valid, unless the subject-matter has been
covered by Congressional legislation, or its enactment forbidden by some provision of the Organic Law. The legislative power of the Philippine
Government is granted in general terms subject to specific limitations. (Gaspar vs. Molina [1905], 5 Phil., 197; U. S. vs. Bull, supra; In re Guarina
[1913], 24 Phil., 37; U. S. vs. Limsiongco [1920],41 Phil., 94; Concepcion vs. Paredes, supra.)

An independent judiciary completes the governmental system. Thejudicial power is conferred on the Supreme Couts, Courts of FirstInstance, and
inferior courts. (Organic Act, se. 26)

It is axiomatic that the Philippine Legislature was provided to make the law, the office of the Governor-General to execute the law, and the judiciary
to construe the law. What is legislative, an executive, or a judicial act, as distinguished one from the other, is not alwayseasy to ascertain. A precise
classification is difficult. Negatively speaking, it has been well said that "The legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the executive
has no authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law." (U. S. vs. And Tang Ho, supra.)

It is legislative power which has been vested in the Philippine Legislature. What is legislative power? Judge Cooley says he understands it "to be the
authority, under the constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." Those matters which the constitution specifically confides to the
executive "the legislature cannot directly or indirectly take from his control." (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., pp. 126-131, 157-162.)
President Wilson in his authoritative work, "The State", page 487, emphasizes by italics that legislatures "are law making bodies acting within the
gifts of charters, and are by these charters in most cases very strictly circumscribed in their action." If this is true, the converse that legislative power
is not executive or judicial or governmental power needs no demonstration. The Legislature essentially executive or judicial. The Legislature cannot
make a law and them take part in its execution or construction. So the Philippine Legislature is not a partaker in either executive or judicial power,
except as thePhilippine Senate participates in the executive power through the Governor-General, and except as the Philippine Senate participates
in the executive power through having the right to confirm or reject nominations made by the Governor-General, and except as the Legislature
participates in the judicial power through being made the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its elective members and through
having the right to try its own members for disorderly behavior. The Philippine, Legislature may nevertheless exercise such auxiliary powers as are
necessary and appropriate to its indenpdence and to make its express powers effective. (McGrain vs. Daugherty [1927], 273 U. S., 135; 71 Law. ed.,
580.)

When one enters on a study of the abstract question, Where does the power to appoint to public office reside?, one is nearly buried in a mass of
conflicting authority. Yet we have been at pains to review all of the cases cited by counsel and others which have not been cited. Shaking ourselves
loose from the encumbering details of the decisions, we discern through them a few elemental truths which distiguish certain cases from others and
which point the way for us in the Philippines.

The first principle which is noticed is that the particular wording of the constitution involved, and its correct interpretation predetermines the result.
Does the constitutions deny the legislative body the right of exercising the appointing power. The legislature may not do so. (State vs. Kennon
[1857], 7 O. St., 547; Clark vs. Stanley[1872], 66 N. C., 28.) Does the constitution confer upon the government the power to prescribe the manner of
appointment. The authorities are in conflict as to whether the legislature the power to prescribe the manner of appointment. The authourities are in
conflict as to whether the legislature may itself make the appointment. Does the constitution merely contain the usual clause distributing the powers
of government and no clause regulating appointments. The weight of judicial opinion seems to be that the power of appointing to office is not
exclusively an executive function and that the legislature may not only create offices but may also fill them itself, but with a vigorous opposition in
most respectable quarters. (Contrast Pratt vs. Breckinridge [1901], 112 Ky., 1, and State vs.Washburn [1901], 167 Mo., 680, with People vs.
Freeman [1889], 80 Cal., 233, and Richardson vs. Young [1909], 122 Tenn., 471.)

The second thought running through the decisions is that in the state governments, the selection of persons to perform the functions of government
is primarily a prerogative of the people. The general powerto appoint officers is not inherent in any branch of the government. The people may
exercise their political rights directly or by delegation. Should the people grant the exclusive right of appointment to the governor, he possesses that
right; but if they should otherwise dispose of it, it must be performed as the sovereign has indicated. Inasmuch, however, as the legislative body is
the repository of plenary power, except as otherwise restricted, and the chief executive of the State is not, legislative bodies usually possess wide
latitude in the premises. But this situation does not obtain in the Philippines where the people are not sovereign, and where constitutional rights do
not flow from them but are granted by delegation from Congress.

It may finally be inferred from the books that the appointment of public officials is generally looked upon as properly an executive function. The power
of appointment can hardly be considered a legislative power. Appointments may be made by the Legislature of the courts, but when so made be
taken as an incident to the discharge of functions properly within their respective spheres. (State vs. Brill [1907], 100 Minn., 499; Stockman vs. Leddy
[1912], 55 Colo., 24; Spartanburg County vs. Miller [1924], 132 S. E., 673; Mechem on Public Officers, secs. 103-108; Mechem, The power of
Appoint to Office; Its Location and Limits, 1 Mich. Law Rev. [1903], 531.)

From the viewpoint of one outside looking in, it would seem that the State legislatures have all too often been permitted to emasculate the powers
properly belonging to the executive deparment, and that the governor of the State has been placed with the responsibility of administering the
government without the means of doing so. The operations of the executive department have been fundamentally variedby the legislative
department. The legislature has absorbed strength, the executive has lost it. This tendency has rather been tolerated than acquiesced in. The
executive should be clothed with sufficient power to administer efficiently the affairs of state. He should have complete control of the instrumentalities
through whom his responsibility is discharged. It is still true, as said by Hamilton, that "A feeble executive implies a geeble execution of the
government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be intheory, must be in
practice a bad government." The mistakes of State governments need not be repeated here..

The history of the power of appointment and the stand taken by the judiciary on the question in the State of Kentucky is of more than ordinary
interest. Kentucky was permitted to become an independent State by Virginia. The clause in the Kentucky constitution separating and guarding the
powers of government came from the pen of the author of the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson. He it was who, in a letter to Samuel
Kercheval, dated July 16, 1816, said: "Nomination to office iss an executive function. To give it to thelegislature, as we do is Virginia, is a violation of
the principle of the separation of powers. It swerves the members from correctness by the temptation to intrigue for office for themselves, and to a
corrupt barter for votes, and destroys responsibility by dividing it among a multitude." Possibly inspired to such action by the authorship of the portion
of the State constitution which was under consideration, in the early days of the Supreme Court of Kentucky, Mr. Chief Justice Robertson in the case
of Taylor vs. Commonwealth ([1830], 3 J. J.Marshall, 4010) announced that "Appointmets to office are intrinsically executive," but that it might be
performed by a judicial officer when the duties of the office pertains strictly to the court. This opinion was shaken in the case of Sinking Fund
Commissioners vs. George ([1898], 104 Ky., 260) only to be afterwards reaffirmed in Pratt vs. Breckinridge ([1901], 112 Ky., 1), and in Sibert vs.
Garrett ([1922], 246 S. W., 455). in the decision in the latter case, one of the most recent on the subject, the Supreme Court of Kentucky after
reviewing the authorities refused to be frightened by the bugaboo that numerically a greater number of courts take a contrary view. It said: "We are
convinced that they by doing so are inviting destruction of the constitutional barriers separating the departments of government, and that our
interpretation is much the sounder one and is essential to the future preservation of our constitutional form of government as originally intended by
the forefathers who conceived it. . . . Such power (of appointment) on the part of the Legislature, if a full exercise of it should be persisted in, would,
enable it to gradually absorb to itself the patronage and control of the greater part of the functioning agencies of the state and county governments,
and, thus endowed, it would be little short of a legislative oligarhy."

It is of importance, therefore, not to be confused by Statedecisions, and invariably to return to the exact provisions of the Philippine Organic Law
which should be searched out and effectuated.

The right to appoint to office has been confided, with certain well defined exceptions, by the Government of the United States to the executive branch
of the government which it has set up in the Philippines. Let the Organic Law speak upon this proposition.

The original government inaugurated in the Philippines after American occupation was military in nature, and exercised all the powers of
government, including, of course, the right to select officers. The original civil authority with administrative functions establishedhere was the second
Philippine Commission. President Mckinley, in his Instructions to the Commisions of April 7, 1900, ever since considered as the initial step taken to
introduce a constitutional government, provided that until further action should be taken by congress or otherwise, "The Commission will also have
power . . . . to appoint to office such officers under the judicial, educational, and civil- service systems, and in the municipal and departmental
goernments, as shall be provided for." When the first Civil Governor was appointed on June 21, 1901, the President again took account of the power
of appointment in the following language: The power to appoint civil officers, hererofore Governor, will be exercised by the Civil Governor with the
advice and consent of the commission." The Congress when it came to make legislative provision for the administration of the affairs of civil
government in the Philippine Islands, in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, the Philippine Bill, "approved, ratified and confirmed," the action of the
President, and in creating the office of Civil Governor and authorizing said Civil Governor to exercise powers of government to the extent and in the
manner set forth in the exectutive order date June 21, 1901. (Philippine Bill, sec. 1.) Congress in the same law provided that the Islands "shall
continue to be governed as thereby and herein provided." (See opinion of Attorney-General Araneta on the power of the Governor-General to
appoint and remove civil officers, 3 Op. Atty.-Gen., 563.)

Thus stood the right to appoint to office for fourteen years.

The Organic Act of August 29, 1916, included what follows on the subject of appointments. The governor-General "shall, unless otherwise herein
provided, appoint, by and with the consent of the Philippine Senate, such officers as may now be appointed by the Governor-General,or such as he
is authorized by law to appoint." (Organic Act, sec. 21.) The exception to the general grant is that the Philippine Legislature "shall provide for the
appointment and removal of the heads of the executive departments by the Governor-General." (Organic Act, sec. 22.) Each House of the Philippine
Legislature may also elect a presiding officer, a clerk, a sergeant at arms, and such other officers and assistants as may be required. (Organic Act,
sec. 18.) The Philippine Legislature is authorized to choose two Residentcommissioners to the United States. (Organic Act, sec. 20.) The prohibition
on the local Legislature, which has been thought of as referring to the Resident Commissioners, is that "No Senator or Representative shall, during
the time for which he may have been elected, be eligible to any office the election to which is vested in the Legislature, nor shall be appointed to any
office of trust or profit which shall have been created or the emoluments of which shall have been increased during such term." (Organic Act, sec.
18.)

The Administrative Code provides the following: "In addition to his general supervisory authority, the Governor-General shall have such specific
powers and duties as are expressly conferred or imposed onhim by law and also, in particular, the powers and duties set forth," including th special
powers and duties "(a) To nominate and appointofficials, conformably to law, to positions in the service of the Government of the Philippine Islands.
(b) To remove officials from office conformably to law and to declare vacant the offices held by such removed officials. For disloyalty to the
Government of theUnited States, the Governor-General may at any time remove a personfrom any position of trust or authority under the
Government of the Philippine Islands." (Sec. 64 [a], [b].) The Administrative Code lists the officers appointable by the Governor-General. (Sec. 66.)

It will be noticed that the Governor-General, in addition to being empowered to appoint the officers authorized by the Organic Act and officers who
thereafter he might be authorized to appoint, was to continue to possess the power to appoint such officers as could be appointed him when the
Organic Act wa approved. The careful phraseology of the law and the connection provided by the word "now" with prior Organic laws is noteworthy.
It would not be at all illogical to apply the same rule to the Governor-General in his relations with the Legislature which the judiciary uniformly applies
to the courts in their relations with the Legislature, which is, that the Legislature may add to, byt may not diminish, the jurisdiction of the courts The
Legislature may add to, but may not diminish, thepower of the Governor-General. (Organic Act, sec. 26; Barrameda vs. Moir [1913], 25 Phil., 44; In
re Guarina, supra; U. S. vs. Limsiongco, supra.)

It will also not escape attention that the only reference made to appointments by the Legislature relates to the selection of Secretaries of
Departments, of officers and employees for the Legislature, and of Resident Commissioners, from which it would naturally be inferred that no other
officers and employees may be chosen by it. The exceptions made in favor of the Legislature strengthen rather than weaken the grant to the
executive. The specific mention of the authority of the Legislature to name certainofficers is indicative of a purpose to limit the legislative authority in
the matter of selecting officers. The expression of one things not expressed. Had it been intended to give to the Philippine Legislature the power to
name individuals to fill the offices which it has created, the grant would have been included among the legislative powers and not among the
executive powers. The administrative controlof the Government of the Philippine Islands by the Governor-Generalto whom is confided the
responsibility of executing the laws excludes the idea of legislative control of administration.

Possibly, the situation may better be visualized by approching the question by a process of elimination. Is the power of appointment judicial? No one
so contends. Is the power of appointment legislative? Not so if the intention of the Organic Law be carried out and if the Legislature be confined to its
law-making function. Is the power of appointment executive? It is.

The exact question of where the power of appointment to office is lodged has never heretofore arisen in this jurisdiction. But a decision of this court
and a controlling decision of the United States Supreme Court are in point.

In Concepcion vs. Parades, supra, this court had before it a law which attempted to require a drawing of lots for judicial positionss in derogation of
executive power. The case was exhaustively argued andafter prolonged consideration, the questioned portion of the law was held invalid as in
violation of the provisions of the Organic Act. Following the lead of Kentucky, it was announced that "Appointment to office is intrinsically an
executive act involving the exercise of discretion."

In the case of Myers vs. United States ([1926], 272 U. S., 52; 71 Law. ed., 160), the United States Supreme Court had presented the question
whether, under the Constitution, the President has the exclusive power of removing executive officers of the United States whom he has appointed
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The answer was that he has. The decision is ephocal. The Chief Justice quoted from Madison the
following:

If there is a principle in our Constitution, indeed in any free Constitution more sacred than another, it is that which separates the legislative, executive
and judicial powers. If there is any point inwhich the separation of the legislative and executive powers ought to be maintained with great caution, it is
that which relates to officers and offices.

'The powers relative to offices are partly legislative and partly executive. The legislature creates the office, defines the powers, limits its duration and
annexes a compensation. This done, the legislative power ceases. They ought to have nothing to do with designating the man to fill the office. That I
conceive to be of an executive nature. Although it be qualified in the Constitution, I would not extend or stain that qualification beyond the limits
precisely fixed for it. We ought always to consider the Constitution with an eye to the principles upon which it was founded. In this point of view, we
shall readily conclude that if the legislaturedetermines the powers, the honors, and emoluments of an office, we should be insecure if they were to
designate the officer also. The nature of things restrains and confines the legislative and executive authorities in this respect; and hence it is that the
Constitution stipulates for the independence of each branch of the Government.' (1 Annals of Congress, 581, 582. Also see Madison in The
Federalist, Nos. 47, 46.).

The distinguished Chief Justice said:

"* * * The Constitution was so framed as to vest in the Congress all legislative powers therein granted, to vest in the President the executive power,
and to vest in one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as Congress might establish, the judicial power. From this division on principle, the
reasonable construction of the Constitutionmust be that the branches should be kept separate in all cases in which they were not expressly blended,
and the Constitution should be expounded to blend them no more than it affirmatively requires. Madison, 1 Annals of Congress, 497.

x x x x x x x x x

The vesting of the executive power in the President was essentially a grant of the power to execute the laws. But the President alone and unaided
could not execute the laws. He must execute them by the assistance of subordinates. This view has since been repeatedlyaffirmed by this court. . . .
As he is charged specifically to take care that they be faithfully executed, the reasonable implication, even in the absence of express words, was that
as part of his execute power he should select those who werre to act for him under his direction in the execution of the laws. The further implication
must be, in the absence of any express limitation respecting removals, that as his selection of administrative officers is essential to the execution of
the laws by him, so must be his power of removing those for whom he cannot continue to be responsible. (Fisher Ames, 1 Annals of Congress, 474.)
It was urged that the natural meaning of the term "executive power" granted the President included the appointment and removal of executive
subordinates. If such appointments and removals were not an exercise of the executive power, what were they? They cetainly were not the exercise
of legislative or judicial power in government as usually understood.

It is quite true that in state and colonial governments at the time of the Constitutional Convention, power to make appointments and removals had
sometimes been lodged in the legislatures or in the courts, but such a disposition of it was really vesting part of the executive power in another
branch of the Government.

x x x x x x x x x

We come now to a period in the history of the Government when both Houses of Congress attempted to removes this constitutionalconstruction and
to subject the power of removing executive officers appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate to the control of the Senate, indeed
finally to the assumed power in Congress to place the removal of such officers anywhere in the Government.

x x x x x x x x x

The extreme provisions of all this legislation were a full justification for the considerations so strongly advanced by Mr. Madison and his associates in
the First Congress, for insisting thatthe power of removal of executive officers by the President alone wasessential in the division of powers between
the executive and the legislative bodies. It exhibited in a clear degree the paralysis to which a partisan Senate and Congress could subject the
executive arm and destroy the principle of executive responsibility, and separation of the powers sought for by the framers of our Government, if the
President fhad no power of removal save by consent of the Senate. It was an attempt to redistribute the powers and minimized those of the
President.

x x x x x x x x x

For the reasons given, we must therefore hold that the provision of the law of 1876 by which the unrestricted power of removal of first class
postmasters is denied to the President is in violation of the Constitution and invalid.

Membership in the Committee created by Acts Nos. 2705 and 2822 is an office. No attempt will be made to accomplish the impossible, which is to
formulate an exact judicial definitions of term "office." The point is that the positions in question constitute an "office," whether within the meaning of
that word as used in the Code of Civil Procedure under the topic "Usurpation of Office," and in the jurisprudence of Ohio from which these portions of
the Code were taken; whether within the local definitions of "office" found in the Administrative Code and the Penal Code; or whether within the
constitutional definitions approved by the United States Supreme Court. (Code of Civil Procedure, secs. 197 et seq., 519; Act No. 136, sec. 17; State
vs. Kennon, supra, cited approvingly in Sheboygran co. vs. Parker [1865], 3 Wall., 93; Administrative Code, sec. 2; Penal Code, arts. 264, 401.)
Paraphrasing the United States Supreme Court in alate decision, there is not lacking the essential elements of a public station, permanent in
character, created by law, whose incidents and duties were prescribed by law. (Metcalf & Eddy vs. Mitchell [1926], 269 U. S., 514; U. S. vs. Maurice
[1823], 2 Brock., 96; U. S. vs.Hartwel [1867], 6 Wall., 385.) The Legislature did more than add incidentalor occasional duties to existing executive
offices for two of the members of the voting committee are representatives of thelegislative branch. The Supreme Court of North Carolina has held
that the Act of the General Assembly giving to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives the power to appoint
proxies and directors in all corporations in which the State has an interest, creates a public office and fills the same by appointment of the
Legislature. (Clark vs. Stanley [1872], 66 N. C., 28;Howerton vs. Tate [1873], 68 N. C., 498; Shoemaker vs. U. S. [1892], 147 U. S., 282; Advisory
Opinion to Governor [1905], 49 Fla., 269; Mechem on Public Officers, Ch. I.)

To tell the truth, it is possible that the earnestness of counsel has just led us to decide too much. Not for a moment should there be dismissed from
our minds the unusual and potently effective proviso of section 22 of the Organic Act, "That all executive functions of the government must be
directly under the Governor-General or within one of the executive departments under the supervision and control of the Governor-General." At the
very least,the performance of duties appurtenant to membership in the voting committee is an executive function on the Government, which the
Organic Act requires must be subject to the unhampered control of the Government-General. The administrative domination of a governmentally
organized and controlled corporation is clearly not a duty germane to the law-makingpower.

The incorporation of the National Coal Company has not served to disconnect the Company or the stock which the Government owns in it from the
Government and executive control. The Philippine Legislatureis empowered to create and control private corporations. (Martinez vs. La Asociacion
de Seoras Damas del Santo Asilo de Ponce [1909], 213 U. S., 20.) The National Coal Company is a private corporation.(National Coal Company is
a private corporation. (National Coal Company vs. Collector of Internal Revenue [1924], 46 Phil., 583.) By becoming a stockholder in the National
Coal Company, the Goverment divested itself of its sovereign character so far as respects the transactions of the corporation. (Bank of the U. S. vs.
Planters' Bank of Georgia [1824], 9 Wheat., 904.) Unlike the Government, the corporation may be sued without its consent, and is subject to
taxation. Yet the National Coal Company remains an agency or instrumentality of government. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in speaking of the Bank of
the United States said, "It was not created for its own sake, or for private purposes. It has never been supposed that Congress could create such a
corporation." (Osborn vs. Bank of the U. S. [1824], 9 Wheat., 738; National Bank vs. Commonwealth [1869], 9 Wall., 353; Railroad Co. vs. Peniston
[1873], 18 Wall., 5; Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co. vs. U. S. [1918], 250 U. S., 123.) Of the National Coal Company, it has been said by Mr.
Justice Johnson as the organ of the court in National Coal Company vs. Collector of Interanl Revenue, supra, that "The Government of the Philippine
Islands is made the majority stockholder, evidently in order to insure proper governmental supervision and control, and thus to place the Government
in a position to render all possible encouragement, assistance and help in the prosecution and furtherance of the company's business.' The analogy
is closer in the companionNational Bank case, No. 27225.

It further is inconvertible that the Government, like any other stockholder, is justified in intervening in the transactions in the corporation, and in
protecting its property rights in the corporation. Public funds were appropriated to create the National Coal Company. Those funds were used to
purchase stock. The voting of the government stock is the prerogative of the stockholder, not the prerogative of the corporation. It is transaction in,
but not of, the corporation. The stock is property. The Government, the owner of the majority stock in the company, naturally dominates the
management of its property. The Government may enforce its policies and secure relief in and through the corporation and as stockholder.

The situation will be better understood if it be recalled that, in addition to the National Coal company (Acts Nos. 2705 and 2822), the Philippine
Legislature has created the Philippine National Bank (Acts Nos. 2612, 2747, 2938, and 3174), the National Petroleum Company (Act No. 2814), the
National Development Company (Act No. 2849), the National Cement Company (Act No. 2855), and the NationalIron Company (Act No. 2862). The
aggregate authorized capital stock of these companies is P54,500,000. The Legislature has in each of these instances directed that a majority of the
shares of stock shall be purchased for the Government, and has appropriated money for this purpose. There have likewise been authorized
corporations for the promotion of the merchant marine (Act No. 2754). The stock of the Manila Railroad Company has been purchased for the
Government. (Acts Nos. 2574, 2752, and 2923.) All these are conspicuous instances of a paternally inclined government investing large sums in
business enterprises which after acquisition or organization have vitally concerned the Government. In all of the companies mentioned, the stock is
to be voted by a committee or board of control, consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. The power of the majority stckholders to vote the government stock in the corporation carries with it the right, under our
Corporation Law, to elect all the directors, to remove any or all of them, and to dissolve the corporation by voluntary proceedings. (Corporation Law,
secs. 31, 34, 62.) In the case of the Philippine National Bank, the law explicitly enumerates variousfunctions of the bank which may not be performed
without the express approval of the Board of Control. (Act No. 2938.)

Very important property rights are involved in the transactions in the governmental directed corporations. Just as surely as the duty of caring for
government property is neither judicial nor legislative in character is it as surely executive. Yet a majority of the voting committee or board of control
is made up of the presiding officers of the two houses of the Legislature and they are in a position to dictate action to the directors and subordinate
personel of these corporations.

Based on all the foregoing considerations, we deduce that the power of appointment in the Philippines appertains, with minor exceptions, to the
executive department; that membership in the voting committee in question is an office or executive function; that the National Coal Company and
similar corporations are instrumentalities of the Government; that the duty to look after government agencies and government property belongs to
the executive department; that the placing of members of the Philippine Legislature on the voting committee constitutes an invasion by the
Legislative Department of the provileges of the Executive Department. Under a system of government of delegated powers, under which delagation
legislative power vests in the Philippine Legislature and executive power vests in the Governor-General, and under which Governor-General and a
specified power of appointment resides in the Philippine Legislature, the latter cannot directly or indirectly perform functions of an executive nature
through the designation of its presiding officers as majority membersof a body which has executive functions. That is the meaning we gather from the
tri-partite theory of the division of powers. That is the purport of the provisions of the Organic Law. That has been the decided trend of persuasive
judicial opinion.

The intimation contained in the conclusions just reached does not necessarily mean that the plaintiff will be privileged to substitute the directors
designated by the Governor-General for those designated by the two presiding officers in the Legislature. The burden has heretofore been on the
defenfants. From this point, it will be on the plaintiff. It is well established in quo warranto proceedingsthat the failure of the defendant to prove his
title does not established that of plaintiff. (People vs. Thacher [1874], 10 N. Y., 525.)

The answer to the problem comes from two directions. The acting Attorney-General of the United States finds the solutions in the supreme executive
power entrusted to the Governor-General, while cousel for the plaintiff advance the rule of statutory construction pertaining to partial invalidity. We
are frank to say that we experience difficulty in following the lead of the law officer of the Government of the United States. The Governor-General
since the approval of the last Organic Act has had no prerogative powers. His powers are so clearly and distincly stated that there ought to be no
doubt as to what they are. Like the Legislature and the judiciary,like the most inconspicuous employee, the Governor-General must find warrant for
his every act in the law. At this stage of political development in the Philippines, no vague residuum of power should be left to lurk in any of the
provsions of the Organic Law.

Counsel for the plaintiff rely on a decision of this court (U. S. vs. Rodriguez [1918], 38 Phil., 759) as best expressing the local rule regarding statutes
void in part. Counsel for the defendants cite an earlier case (Barrameda vs. Moir [1913], 25 Phil., 44). As the principle announced in the last cited
case is the more comprehensive and is much fairer to the defendants, we give it preference. It was there announce:

Where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand
and be enfored. But in order to do this, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislature
would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete,
intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. The void provisions must be eliminated without causing results affecting the main
purpose of the Act in a manner contrary to the intention of the Legislature. The language used in the invalid part of a statute can have no legal force
or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the legislative will independently of the void part since the court has no power
to legislate.

Omitting reference to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representative in section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by
section 2 of Act No. 2822, it would then read: "The voting powerof all such stock owned by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be vested
exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor- General." Would the court be justified in so enforcing the law without itself intruding on the
legislative field?

The Philippine Legislature, as we have seen is authourized to create corporations and offices. The Legislature has lawfully provided for a National
Coal Company, but has unlawfully provided for two of its members to sit in the committee. Would this court be doing violence to the legislative will if
the votig power be continued solely in the hands of the Governor-General until different action is taken by the Legislature? We conclude that we
would not, for the reason that the primordial purpose of the Legislature was "to promote the business of developing coal deposits . . . and of mining .
. . and selling the coal contained in said deposits." (Act No. 2705, sec 2; Act No.2822, sec.1.) The incidental purpose of the Legislature was to
provide a method to vote the stock owned by the Government in the National Coal comapny. In the words of the United States Supreme Court, "The
striking out is not necessarily by erasing words, but it may be by disregarding the unconstitutional provision and reading the statute as if that
provision was not there." (Railroad companies vs. Schutte [1880], 103 U. S. 118; State vs. Westerfield [1897], 23 Nev., 468; State vs. Washburn,
supra; State vs. Wright [1913], 251 Mo., 325; State vs. Clausen [1919], 107 Wash.,667; 1 Lewis Sutherland, Statutory construction, Second ed. Ch.
IX.)

The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Clayton vs. People ([1890], 132 U. S., 632) is particularly applicable on account of relating to the
validity of an Act passed by a territorial legislature, the question of partial invalidity, and the contention likewise here made, that since the law in
question had been on the statute books for a number of years, it must be considered as having been impliedly ratified by the Congress. An Act of the
Legislature of Utah of 1878 had declared that the auditor and the treasurer shall be elected by the voters of the territory. In a decision handed down
in 1886, the Supreme Court of the territory of Utah held the act void because in conflict with the organic act creating the territory, which provided that
the governor, with the consent of the legislative council, shall appoint such officers. It further held that a territorial statute invalid when enacted is not
validated by the failureof the congress expressly to disapprove it. (People vs. Clayton [1886], 4 Utah, 421.) The United States Supreme Court on
appeal affirmed the judgment. It said:

It can hardly be admitted as a general proposition that under the power of Congress reserved in the Organic Acts of the territories to annul the Acts
of their legislature the absence of any action by Congress is to be construed to be a recognition of the power of the Legislature to pass laws in
conflict with the Act of Congress underwhich they were created. . . . We do not think that the acquiescenceof the people, or of the Legislature of
Utah, or of any of its officers, in the mode for appointing the auditor of public accounts, is sufficient to do away with the clear requirements of the
organic Act on that subject. It is also, we think, very clear that only that part of the Statute of Utah which is contrary to the Organic act, namely, that
relating to the mode of appointment of the officer, is invalid; that so much of it as creates the office of auditor of public accounts and treasurer of the
Territory is valid; and that it can successfully and appropriately be carried into effect by an appointment made by the governor and the Council of the
Territory, as required in the Act of Congress.

On the assumption, however, that the entire provision authorizing the voting committee be considered as wiped out, yet we think it would still devolve
on the Governor-General to protect the public interests and public property. He is made responsible for the execution of the laws, and he would be
unfaithful to that trust if, through inaction, instrumentalities of government should fail to function and government property should be permitted to be
dissipated.

Counsel for the dependants have injected the argument into the discussion that, as the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives are at least de facto officers, their right to act as members of the voting committee cannot be collaterally attacked, and that the
defendants in this suit are the de jure members of the board of directors of National Coal Company. Contentions such as there are out of harmony
with the avowed purpose to avoid technical obstruction, and to secure a definite expression of opinion on the main issue. However, it remains to be
said that this is a direct proceeding to test the right of the defendants to the offices to which they consider themselves entitled. The inquiry then may
go, as is proper in quo warranto proceedings, to the extent of determining the validity of the act authorizing the offices. The fallacy of the argument
relating to the de facto doctrine is that, although there may be a de facto officer in a de jure office, there cannot be a de facto officer in a de fact
office. There is no such thing as de facto office under an unconstitutional law. (Norton vs. Shelby County [1886], 188 U. S., 425.)

Before terminating, a few general observations may be appropriate.The case has been carefully prepared and elaborately argued. All parties appear
to desire to have the matter at issue definitely determined. We have endeavored to accomodate them. But in such a bitterly fought contest, the
ingenuity of counsel presses collateralpoints upon us which the court need not resolve. We thus find it unnecessary to express any opinion on the
propriety or legality of Executive Order No. 37, on that portion of section 18 of the Organic Act which disqualifies Senators or Representatives for
election or appointment to office and no other subsidiary matters. Need it be added that the court is solely concerned with arriving at a correct
decision on a purely legal question.

Every other consideration to one side, this remains certainThe congress of the United States clearly intended that the Governor- General's power
should be commensurate with his responsibility. The Congress never intended that the Governor-General should be saddled with the responsibility
of administering the government and of executing the laws but shorn of the power to do so. The interests of the Philippines will be best served by
strict adherence to the basic principles of constitutional government.

We have no hesitancy in concluding that so much of section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822, as purports to vest the
voting power of the government-owned stock in the National Coal Company in the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, is unconstitutional and void. It results, therefore, in the demurrer being overruled, and as it would be impractible for the defendants
to answer, judgment shall be rendered ousting and excluding them from the offices of directors of the National Coalcompany. So ordered, without
costs.










CASE DIGEST

50 Phil 259 Law on Public Officers Power to Appoint is Essentially Executive
Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the Philippine Congress. The law created it (Act No. 2822) provides that:
The voting power shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives.
In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which divested the voting rights of the Senate President and House
Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized that the voting right should be solely lodged in the Governor-General who is the head of the government
(President at that time was considered the head of state but does not manage government affairs). A copy of the said EO was furnished to the
Senate President and the House Speaker.
However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as well as the House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the
objection of the Governor-General, still elected Milton Springer and four others as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo warranto proceeding
in behalf of the government was filed against Springer et al questioning the validity of their election into the Board of NCC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate President as well as the House Speaker can validly elect the Board Members of NCC.

HELD: No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The Supreme Court emphasized that the legislature
creates the public office but it has nothing to do with designating the persons to fill the office. Appointing persons to a public office is essentially
executive. The NCC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It was created by Congress. To extend the power of Congress into allowing
it, through the Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is already an invasion of executive powers. The Supreme
Court however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the legislature may appoint persons to fill public office. Such exception can
be found in the appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices within the legislative branch this exception is allowable because it does not
weaken the executive branch.




































OCAMPO VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, L-7918

G.R. No. L-7918 May 25, 1955
MARIA GALASINAO, ANGELINA LAGON, MANUEL LAGON, ARMANDO LAGON, JOSE LAGON, JR., SERGIO LAGON, ROGELIO LAGON, and
JABUN JOSE LAGON III, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
ROSA M. AUSTRIA and TEODORO A. CARDENAS, defendants-appellants.
Eufronio A. Cardenasu for appellant.
Greg. V. Tengco for appellees.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya, certified to us by the Court of Appeals on the ground that only
questions of law are involved. The facts found by the trial court are as follows: On March 31, 1938 Jose Lagon, married to Maria Galasinao, acquired
homestead title (No. 47373) to two parcels of land in Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. On September 22, 1938 his homestead title was regi stered in the office
of the register of deeds of Nueva Vizcaya and Original Certificate of title No. 2178 issued in his favor. On May 17, 1944 he sold and said parcels of
land to Rosa M. Austria for P20,000, Japanese military notes. The deeds of sale was not registered until March 19, 1947, when the original title was
cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-444 issued in the name of Rosa M. Austria. Rosa M. Austria in turn sold the said lands on April 25,
1949 to Teodoro A. Cardenas. The sale inscribed in the office of the register of deeds on May 3, 1949 and the certificate of title in the name of Rosa
M. Austria cancelled, and another transfer certificate of title (No. T-1638) issued in the name of Teodoro A. Cardenas.
Jose Lagon died on February 18, 1945. The plaintiffs are Maria Galasinao, his widow, and Angelina, Manuel, Armando, Jose and Sergio, all
surnamed Lagon, children of the deceased and Maria Galasinao. The defendants are Rosa M. Austria and Teodoro A. Cardenas. The complaint in
this case was filed on September 16, 1949, but this was amended by a letter one dated March 14, 1950. The amended complaint alleges that the
sale made by Jose Lagon, husband, was in fraud of his wife, Maria Galasinao, but the court a quo found that said sale was not fraudulent as it was
made for the purpose of paying a mortgage on the lands contracted by both spouses with the Agricultural Bank, and furthermore that it was within
the scope of the power of the husband to sell and dispose of the conjugal properties defined in Article 1413 of the old Civil Code. The plaintiffs-
appellees, did not contest this finding of the trial court or its ruling thereon. The trial court also found that the sale of the homestead by Jose Lagon in
favor of Rosa M. Austria was approved by the Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources on August 11, 1944. Neither is this finding contested.
The trial court held that in accordance with section 50 of Act 496, which provides that registration is the operative act that conveys and affects the
land, the period within which the lands in question may be redeemed by the heirs of Jose Lagon under the provisions of Section 119 of the Public
Land Law (Commonwealth Act No. 141) should begin from March 19, 1947, the day when the deed of sale executed by Jose Lagon in favor of Rosa
M. Austria was registered in the office of the register of deeds. So it held that the redemption could still be enforced by the widow and legal heirs of
Jose Lagon, as the 5-year period provided in the law had not yet expired when the action was presented. It is only against this ruling of the court a
quo that the appeal has been made, defendant-appellant Teodoro A. Cardenas contending that the period within which redemption should be made
should be counted from the date of the deed of sale, May 17, 1944, because as between the parties thereto the said deed is valid and effective from
the date of conveyance.
Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 provides:
Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his
widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of conveyance.
Does "conveyance" as used above mean the actual sale or transfer, or does it mean the registration of the deed evidencing it? The trial court held
that "conveyance" implies registration, because section 50 of the Land Registration Act provided that the act of registration shall be the operative act
to convey and affect the land. And plaintiffs-appellees argue in support of this ruling that an unregistered deed does not convey title or ownership but
operates only as an executory contract to convey. Such a construction is belied by the language of the law (section 50, Land Registration Act) itself,
which is as follows:
. . . But no deed . . . shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of
authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration.
In a long line of decisions we have held, following the language of the law, that as between the parties to a contract of sale registration is not
necessary to make it valid and effective, for actual notice is equivalent to registration (Obras Pias vs. Devera Ignacio, 17 Phil., 45;
Gustilo vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil., 442; Quimson vs. Suarez, 45 Phil., 901; and Winkleman vs. Veluz, 43 Phil., 609). So, Pursuant to the foregoing
principle, that the purpose of registration is to give notice to third parties, we have held:
The peculiar force of a title under Act No. 496 is exhibited only when the purchaser has sold to innocent third parties the land described in the
conveyance. Generally speaking, as between vendor and vendee, the same rights and remedies exist with reference to land registered under the Act
as exist in relation to land not so registered. (Syllabus, Medina v. Imaz and Warner, Barnes & Co., 27 Phil., 314).
And in the case of Carillo vs. Salak,
1
G.R. No. L-4133, prom. May 13, 1952, we held that a sale of registered land which sale has not been registered
in the office of the register of deeds is valid and binding as between the parties themselves.
The cases cited by plaintiffs-appellees to support their contention refer to the lack of effect of unregistered sales as to subsequent registered
purchases and can have no application to the case at bar. The question now before us has already been expressly passed upon by Us in the case
of Galanza vs. Nuesa,
2
G.R. No. L-6628, prom. August 31, 1954. In that case, we held under a deed of sale of land acquired as homestead, which
grants the vendor the right to repurchase the land within 5 years from the execution of the deed of sale, said period of repurchase starts from the day
of the sale and not from the registration thereof in the office of the register of deeds. We said in that case that "the registration is intended to protect
the buyer against claims of third persons arising from subsequent alienations by the vendor, and is certainly not necessary to give effect as between
the parties to their deed of sale." It can be seen, therefore, that in so far as the owner of the homestead, Jose Lagon, is concerned, the conveyance
mentioned in section 119 of the Public Land Law is the actual date thereof, and not the date of the registration of the deed of sale.
One other point remains to be explained and that is whether the parties plaintiffs in this case, the widow and children of the deceased homesteader
Jose Lagon, can be considered as bound by the sale made by the husband and whether they can claim to be third parties as to whom registration
should be considered as the operative act of conveyance. As to the widow, the sale was executed by Jose Lagon in his capacity as administrator of
the conjugal partnership. Jose Lagon was the agent of the conjugal partnership, of which the widow is a partner, and under the general principles the
act of the authorized agent is the act of the partners themselves (2 American Jurisprudence, 169, 276). It is not, therefore, necessary that the widow
had actual notice of the sale, and she can not be considered a third person or party in relation thereto. The sale made by the husband is binding on
her (Cruz vs. Buenaventura, 84 Phil., 12, 46 Off. Gaz., 6032.)
As respects the children of Jose Lagon, the other plaintiffs-appellees, they may not be considered third parties because there is a privity of in interest
between them and their father. They only succeed to whatever rights their father had and what is valid and binding against him is also valid and
binding as against them.
For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendants absolved from the complaint. With costs
against the plaintiffs-appellees.
Pablo, Acting C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ.,concur.



















DE LA LLANA VS. ALBA
G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS,
BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON
AGUILA, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman, Commission on Audit, and RICARDO PUNO, Minister of
Justice, Respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:
This Court, pursuant to its grave responsibility of passing upon the validity of any executive or legislative act in an appropriate cases, has to resolve
the crucial issue of the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and
for Other Purposes." The task of judicial review, aptly characterized as exacting and delicate, is never more so than when a conceded legislative
power, that of judicial reorganization,
1
may possibly collide with the time-honored principle of the independence of the judiciary
2
as protected and
safeguarded by this constitutional provision: "The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior
until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court shall have the power to
discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Members, order their dismissal."
3
For the assailed legislation mandates that
Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court
of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the
termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the
Constitution has been ignored and disregarded,
That is the fundamental issue raised in this proceeding, erroneously entitled Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition
4
considered by this
Court as an action for prohibited petition, seeking to enjoin respondent Minister of the Budget, respondent Chairman of the Commission on Audit,
and respondent Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Petitioners
5
sought to bolster their claim by
imputing lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President his authority to fix the
compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when the reorganization shall be
deemed completed. In the very comprehensive and scholarly Answer of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza,
6
it was pointed out that there is no
valid justification for the attack on the constitutionality of this statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa to
reorganize the judiciary, the allegations of absence of good faith as well as the attack on the independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and
devoid of any support in law. A Supplemental Answer was likewise filed on October 8, 1981, followed by a Reply of petitioners on October 13. After
the hearing in the morning and afternoon of October 15, in which not only petitioners and respondents were heard through counsel but also the amici
curiae,
7
and thereafter submission of the minutes of the proceeding on the debate on Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, this petition was deemed submitted
for decision.
The importance of the crucial question raised called for intensive and rigorous study of all the legal aspects of the case. After such exhaustive
deliberation in several sessions, the exchange of views being supplemented by memoranda from the members of the Court, it is our opinion and so
hold that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional.
1. The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as Judge de la Llana is concerned, he certainly falls within the
principle set forth in Justice Laurel's opinion in People v. Vera.
8
Thus: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement."
9
The other petitioners as members of the bar and officers of the court cannot be considered as devoid of "any personal and
substantial interest" on the matter. There is relevance to this excerpt from a separate opinion in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections:
10
"Then
there is the attack on the standing of petitioners, as vindicating at most what they consider a public right and not protecting their rights as individuals.
This is to conjure the specter of the public right dogma as an inhibition to parties intent on keeping public officials staying on the path of
constitutionalism. As was so well put by Jaffe: 'The protection of private rights is an essential constituent of public interest and, conversely, without a
well-ordered state there could be no enforcement of private rights. Private and public interests are, both in substantive and procedural sense,
aspects of the totality of the legal order.' Moreover, petitioners have convincingly shown that in their capacity as taxpayers, their standing to sue has
been amply demonstrated. There would be a retreat from the liberal approach followed in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works,foreshadowed by the
very decision of People v. Vera where the doctrine was first fully discussed, if we act differently now. I do not think we are prepared to take that step.
Respondents, however, would hark back to the American Supreme Court doctrine in Mellon v. Frothingham with their claim that what petitioners
possess 'is an interest which is shared in common by other people and is comparatively so minute and indeterminate as to afford any basis and
assurance that the judicial process can act on it.' That is to speak in the language of a bygone era even in the United States. For as Chief Justice
Warren clearly pointed out in the later case of Flast v. Cohen, the barrier thus set up if not breached has definitely been lowered."
11

2. The imputation of arbitrariness to the legislative body in the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 to demonstrate lack of good faith does
manifest violence to the facts. Petitioners should have exercised greater care in informing themselves as to its antecedents. They had laid
themselves open to the accusation of reckless disregard for the truth, On August 7, 1980, a Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization was
organized.
12
This Executive Order was later amended by Executive Order No. 619-A., dated September 5 of that year. It clearly specified the task
assigned to it: "1. The Committee shall formulate plans on the reorganization of the Judiciary which shall be submitted within seventy (70) days from
August 7, 1980 to provide the President sufficient options for the reorganization of the entire Judiciary which shall embrace all lower courts, including
the Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the City and Municipal Courts, and all Special Courts, but excluding the Sandigan Bayan."
13
On
October 17, 1980, a Report was submitted by such Committee on Judicial Reorganization. It began with this paragraph: "The Committee on Judicial
Reorganization has the honor to submit the following Report. It expresses at the outset its appreciation for the opportunity accorded it to study ways
and means for what today is a basic and urgent need, nothing less than the restructuring of the judicial system. There are problems, both grave and
pressing, that call for remedial measures. The felt necessities of the time, to borrow a phrase from Holmes, admit of no delay, for if no step be taken
and at the earliest opportunity, it is not too much to say that the people's faith in the administration of justice could be shaken. It is imperative that
there be a greater efficiency in the disposition of cases and that litigants, especially those of modest means much more so, the poorest and the
humblest can vindicate their rights in an expeditious and inexpensive manner. The rectitude and the fairness in the way the courts operate must
be manifest to all members of the community and particularly to those whose interests are affected by the exercise of their functions. It is to that task
that the Committee addresses itself and hopes that the plans submitted could be a starting point for an institutional reform in the Philippine judiciary.
The experience of the Supreme Court, which since 1973 has been empowered to supervise inferior courts, from the Court of Appeals to the
municipal courts, has proven that reliance on improved court management as well as training of judges for more efficient administration does not
suffice. I hence, to repeat, there is need for a major reform in the judicial so stem it is worth noting that it will be the first of its kind since the Judiciary
Act became effective on June 16, 1901."
14
I t went to say: "I t does not admit of doubt that the last two decades of this century are likely to be
attended with problems of even greater complexity and delicacy. New social interests are pressing for recognition in the courts. Groups long
inarticulate, primarily those economically underprivileged, have found legal spokesmen and are asserting grievances previously ignored. Fortunately,
the judicially has not proved inattentive. Its task has thus become even more formidable. For so much grist is added to the mills of justice. Moreover,
they are likewise to be quite novel. The need for an innovative approach is thus apparent. The national leadership, as is well-known, has been
constantly on the search for solutions that will prove to be both acceptable and satisfactory. Only thus may there be continued national
progress."
15
After which comes: "To be less abstract, the thrust is on development. That has been repeatedly stressed and rightly so. All efforts
are geared to its realization. Nor, unlike in the past, was it to b "considered as simply the movement towards economic progress and growth
measured in terms of sustained increases in per capita income and Gross National Product (GNP).
16
For the New Society, its implication goes
further than economic advance, extending to "the sharing, or more appropriately, the democratization of social and economic opportunities, the
substantiation of the true meaning of social justice."
17
This process of modernization and change compels the government to extend its field of
activity and its scope of operations. The efforts towards reducing the gap between the wealthy and the poor elements in the nation call for more
regulatory legislation. That way the social justice and protection to labor mandates of the Constitution could be effectively implemented."
18
There is
likelihood then "that some measures deemed inimical by interests adversely affected would be challenged in court on grounds of validity. Even if the
question does not go that far, suits may be filed concerning their interpretation and application. ... There could be pleas for injunction or restraining
orders. Lack of success of such moves would not, even so, result in their prompt final disposition. Thus delay in the execution of the policies
embodied in law could thus be reasonably expected. That is not conducive to progress in development."
19
For, as mentioned in such Report, equally
of vital concern is the problem of clogged dockets, which "as is well known, is one of the utmost gravity. Notwithstanding the most determined efforts
exerted by the Supreme Court, through the leadership of both retired Chief Justice Querube Makalintal and the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro,
from the time supervision of the courts was vested in it under the 1973 Constitution, the trend towards more and more cases has continued."
20
It is
understandable why. With the accelerated economic development, the growth of population, the increasing urbanization, and other similar factors,
the judiciary is called upon much oftener to resolve controversies. Thus confronted with what appears to be a crisis situation that calls for a remedy,
the Batasang Pambansa had no choice. It had to act, before the ailment became even worse. Time was of the essence, and yet it did not hesitate to
be duly mindful, as it ought to be, of the extent of its coverage before enacting Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
3. There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional reforms," characterized in the Report as "both pressing and urgent."
21
It is worth noting,
likewise, as therein pointed out, that a major reorganization of such scope, if it were to take place, would be the most thorough after four
generations.
22
The reference was to the basic Judiciary Act generations . enacted in June of 1901,
23
amended in a significant way, only twice
previous to the Commonwealth. There was, of course, the creation of the Court of Appeals in 1935, originally composed "of a Presiding Judge and
ten appellate Judges, who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the
National Assembly,
24
It could "sit en banc, but it may sit in two divisions, one of six and another of five Judges, to transact business, and the two
divisions may sit at the same time."
25
Two years after the establishment of independence of the Republic of the Philippines, the Judiciary Act of
1948
26
was passed. It continued the existing system of regular inferior courts, namely, the Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance,
27
the
Municipal Courts, at present the City Courts, and the Justice of the Peace Courts, now the Municipal Circuit Courts and Municipal Courts. The
membership of the Court of Appeals has been continuously increased.
28
Under a 1978 Presidential Decree, there would be forty-five members, a
Presiding Justice and forty-four Associate Justices, with fifteen divisions.
29
Special courts were likewise created. The first was the Court of Tax
Appeals in 1954,
30
next came the Court of Agrarian Relations in 1955,
31
and then in the same year a Court of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
for Manila in 1955,
32
subsequently followed by the creation of two other such courts for Iloilo and Quezon City in 1966.
33
In 1967, Circuit Criminal
Courts were established, with the Judges having the same qualifications, rank, compensation, and privileges as judges of Courts of First Instance.
34

4. After the submission of such Report, Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the basis of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was introduced. After setting
forth the background as above narrated, its Explanatory Note continues: "Pursuant to the President's instructions, this proposed legislation has been
drafted in accordance with the guidelines of that report with particular attention to certain objectives of the reorganization, to wit, the attainment of
more efficiency in disposal of cases, a reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures which do not tend to the proper meeting out of justice.
In consultation with, and upon a consensus of, the governmental and parliamentary leadership, however, it was felt that some options set forth in the
Report be not availed of. Instead of the proposal to confine the jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate court merely to appellate adjudication, the
preference has been opted to increase rather than diminish its jurisdiction in order to enable it to effectively assist the Supreme Court. This
preference has been translated into one of the innovations in the proposed Bill."
35
In accordance with the parliamentary procedure, the Bill was
sponsored by the Chairman of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to which it was referred. Thereafter, Committee
Report No. 225 was submitted by such Committee to the Batasang Pambansa recommending the approval with some amendments. In the
sponsorship speech of Minister Ricardo C. Puno, there was reference to the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization. Thus: "On October
17, 1980, the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization submitted its report to the President which contained the 'Proposed Guidelines for
Judicial Reorganization.' Cabinet Bill No. 42 was drafted substantially in accordance with the options presented by these guidelines. Some options
set forth in the aforesaid report were not availed of upon consultation with and upon consensus of the government and parliamentary leadership.
Moreover, some amendments to the bill were adopted by the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government, to which The bill was
referred, following the public hearings on the bill held in December of 1980. The hearings consisted of dialogues with the distinguished members of
the bench and the bar who had submitted written proposals, suggestions, and position papers on the bill upon the invitation of the Committee on
Justice, Human Rights and Good Government."
36
Stress was laid by the sponsor that the enactment of such Cabinet Bill would, firstly, result in the
attainment of more efficiency in the disposal of cases. Secondly, the improvement in the quality of justice dispensed by the courts is expected as a
necessary consequence of the easing of the court's dockets. Thirdly, the structural changes introduced in the bill, together with the reallocation of
jurisdiction and the revision of the rules of procedure, are designated to suit the court system to the exigencies of the present day Philippine society,
and hopefully, of the foreseeable future."
37
it may be observed that the volume containing the minutes of the proceedings of the Batasang
Pambansa show that 590 pages were devoted to its discussion. It is quite obvious that it took considerable time and effort as well as exhaustive
study before the act was signed by the President on August 14, 1981. With such a background, it becomes quite manifest how lacking in factual
basis is the allegation that its enactment is tainted by the vice of arbitrariness. What appears undoubted and undeniable is the good faith that
characterized its enactment from its inception to the affixing of the Presidential signature.
5. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from
no infirmity. The ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr.
38
reiterated such a doctrine: "We find this point urged by respondents, to
be without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a
legal issue that is for the Courts to decide. It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents.
... And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The preliminary question laid at rest, we pass
to the merits of the case. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the
principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith."
39
The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Bendanillo, Sr. v.
Provincial Governor,
40
two earlier cases enunciating a similar doctrine having preceded it.
41
As with the offices in the other branches of the
government, so it is with the judiciary. The test remains whether the abolition is in good faith. As that element is conspicuously present in the
enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this petition becomes even more apparent. The concurring opinion of Justice Laurel
in Zandueta v. De la Costa
42
cannot be any clearer. This is a quo warranto proceeding filed by petitioner, claiming that he, and not respondent, was
entitled to he office of judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila. There was a Judicial Reorganization Act in 1936,
43
a year
after the inauguration of the Commonwealth, amending the Administrative Code to organize courts of original jurisdiction known as the Courts of
First Instance Prior to such statute, petitioner was the incumbent of such branch. Thereafter, he received an ad interim appointment, this time to the
Fourth Judicial District, under the new legislation. Unfortunately for him, the Commission on Appointments of then National Assembly disapproved
the same, with respondent being appointed in his place. He contested the validity of the Act insofar as it resulted in his being forced to vacate his
position This Court did not rule squarely on the matter. His petition was dismissed on the ground of estoppel. Nonetheless, the separate concurrence
of Justice Laurel in the result reached, to repeat, reaffirms in no uncertain terms the standard of good faith to preclude any doubt as to the abolition
of an inferior court, with due recognition of the security of tenure guarantee. Thus: " I am of the opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 145 in so far as it
reorganizes, among other judicial districts, the Ninth Judicial District, and establishes an entirely new district comprising Manila and the provinces of
Rizal and Palawan, is valid and constitutional. This conclusion flows from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior
to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions.
Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various
courts, subject to certain limitations in the case of the Supreme Court. It is admitted that section 9 of the same article of the Constitution provides for
the security of tenure of all the judges. The principles embodied in these two sections of the same article of the Constitution must be coordinated and
harmonized. A mere enunciation of a principle will not decide actual cases and controversies of every sort. (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New York,
198 U.S., 45; 49 Law. ed; 937)"
44
justice Laurel continued: "I am not insensible to the argument that the National Assembly may abuse its power and
move deliberately to defeat the constitutional provision guaranteeing security of tenure to all judges, But, is this the case? One need not share the
view of Story, Miller and Tucker on the one hand, or the opinion of Cooley, Watson and Baldwin on the other, to realize that the application of a legal
or constitutional principle is necessarily factual and circumstantial and that fixity of principle is the rigidity of the dead and the unprogressive. I do say,
and emphatically, however, that cases may arise where the violation of the constitutional provision regarding security of tenure is palpable and plain,
and that legislative power of reorganization may be sought to cloak an unconstitutional and evil purpose. When a case of that kind arises, it will be
the time to make the hammer fall and heavily. But not until then. I am satisfied that, as to the particular point here discussed, the purpose was the
fulfillment of what was considered a great public need by the legislative department and that Commonwealth Act No. 145 was not enacted purposely
to affect adversely the tenure of judges or of any particular judge. Under these circumstances, I am for sustaining the power of the legislative
department under the Constitution. To be sure, there was greater necessity for reorganization consequent upon the establishment of the new
government than at the time Acts Nos. 2347 and 4007 were approved by the defunct Philippine Legislature, and although in the case of these two
Acts there was an express provision providing for the vacation by the judges of their offices whereas in the case of Commonwealth Act No. 145
doubt is engendered by its silence, this doubt should be resolved in favor of the valid exercise of the legislative power."
45

6. A few more words on the question of abolition. In the above-cited opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta, reference was made to Act No. 2347
46
on
the reorganization of the Courts of First Instance and to Act No. 4007
47
on the reorganization of all branches of the government, including the courts
of first instance. In both of them, the then Courts of First Instance were replaced by new courts with the same appellation. As Justice Laurel pointed
out, there was no question as to the fact of abolition. He was equally categorical as to Commonwealth Act No. 145, where also the system of the
courts of first instance was provided for expressly. It was pointed out by Justice Laurel that the mere creation of an entirely new district of the same
court is valid and constitutional. such conclusion flowing "from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the
Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions."
48
The
challenged statute creates an intermediate appellate court,
49
regional trial courts,
50
metropolitan trial courts of the national capital region,
51
and
other metropolitan trial courts,
52
municipal trial courts in cities,
53
as well as in municipalities,
54
and municipal circuit trial courts.
55
There is even less
reason then to doubt the fact that existing inferior courts were abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa, the establishment of such new inferior courts
was the appropriate response to the grave and urgent problems that pressed for solution. Certainly, there could be differences of opinion as to the
appropriate remedy. The choice, however, was for the Batasan to make, not for this Court, which deals only with the question of power. It bears
mentioning that in Brillo v. Eage
56
this Court, in an unanimous opinion penned by the late Justice Diokno, citing Zandueta v. De la Costa, ruled: "La
segunda question que el recurrrido plantea es que la Carta de Tacloban ha abolido el puesto. Si efectivamente ha sido abolido el cargo, entonces
ha quedado extinguido el derecho de recurente a ocuparlo y a cobrar el salario correspodiente. Mc Culley vs. State, 46 LRA, 567. El derecho de un
juez de desempenarlo hasta los 70 aos de edad o se incapacite no priva al Congreso de su facultad de abolir, fusionar o reorganizar juzgados no
constitucionales."
57
Nonetheless, such well-established principle was not held applicable to the situation there obtaining, the Charter of Tacloban
City creating a city court in place of the former justice of the peace court. Thus: "Pero en el caso de autos el Juzgado de Tacloban no ha sido
abolido. Solo se le ha cambiado el nombre con el cambio de forma del gobierno local."
58
The present case is anything but that. Petitioners did not
and could not prove that the challenged statute was not within the bounds of legislative authority.
7. This opinion then could very well stop at this point. The implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, concededly a task incumbent on the
Executive, may give rise, however, to questions affecting a judiciary that should be kept independent. The all-embracing scope of the assailed
legislation as far as all inferior courts from the Courts of Appeals to municipal courts are concerned, with the exception solely of the Sandiganbayan
and the Court of Tax Appeals
59
gave rise, and understandably so, to misgivings as to its effect on such cherished Ideal. The first paragraph of the
section on the transitory provision reads: "The provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be
issued by the President. The Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts,
the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall continue to function as presently
constituted and organized, until the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the
said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold the office."
60
There is all the more reason then
why this Court has no choice but to inquire further into the allegation by petitioners that the security of tenure provision, an assurance of a judiciary
free from extraneous influences, is thereby reduced to a barren form of words. The amended Constitution adheres even more clearly to the long-
established tradition of a strong executive that antedated the 1935 Charter. As noted in the work of former Vice-Governor Hayden, a noted political
scientist, President Claro M. Recto of the 1934 Convention, in his closing address, in stressing such a concept, categorically spoke of providing "an
executive power which, subject to the fiscalization of the Assembly, and of public opinion, will not only know how to govern, but will actually govern,
with a firm and steady hand, unembarrassed by vexatious interferences by other departments, or by unholy alliances with this and that social
group."
61
The above excerpt was cited with approval by Justice Laurel in Planas v. Gil.
62
Moreover, under the 1981 Amendments, it may be affirmed
that once again the principle of separation of powers, to quote from the same jurist as ponente in Angara v. Electoral Commission,
63
"obtains not
through express provision but by actual division."
64
The president, under Article VII, shall be the head of state and chief executive of the Republic of
the Philippines."
65
Moreover, it is equally therein expressly provided that all the powers he possessed under the 1935 Constitution are once again
vested in him unless the Batasang Pambansa provides otherwise."
66
Article VII of the 1935 Constitution speaks categorically: "The Executive power
shall be vested in a President of the Philippines."
67
As originally framed, the 1973 Constitution created the position of President as the "symbolic
head of state."
68
In addition, there was a provision for a Prime Minister as the head of government exercising the executive power with the
assistance of the Cabinet
69
Clearly, a modified parliamentary system was established. In the light of the 1981 amendments though, this Court in Free
Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor
70
could state: "The adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary system in the amended Constitution
does not alter its essentially presidential character."
71
The retention, however, of the position of the Prime Minister with the Cabinet, a majority of the
members of which shall come from the regional representatives of the Batasang Pambansa and the creation of an Executive Committee composed
of the Prime Minister as Chairman and not more than fourteen other members at least half of whom shall be members of the Batasang Pambansa,
clearly indicate the evolving nature of the system of government that is now operative.
72
What is equally apparent is that the strongest ties bind the
executive and legislative departments. It is likewise undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its full authority to enact whatever legislation
may be necessary to carry out national policy as usually formulated in a caucus of the majority party. It is understandable then why in Fortun v.
Labang
73
it was stressed that with the provision transferring to the Supreme Court administrative supervision over the Judiciary, there is a greater
need "to preserve unimpaired the independence of the judiciary, especially so at present, where to all intents and purposes, there is a fusion
between the executive and the legislative branches."
74

8. To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent
Justices and judges under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution. There was a similar provision in the 1935 Constitution. It did not, however, go as
far as conferring on this Tribunal the power to supervise administratively inferior courts.
75
Moreover, this Court is em powered "to discipline judges of
inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal."
76
Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the
Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power.
77
Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the
abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an
office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of
security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no
distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary.
In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as
far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be
entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is
involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it
could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to
the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure
therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power, Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any
plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing tulle inferior courts, the power of removal of the present
incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not
readily discernidble except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic
principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be
preferred.
78
There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the Constitution enters into and forms part of every act to avoid any constitutional
taint must be applied Nuez v. Sandiganbayan,
79
promulgated last January, has this relevant excerpt: "It is true that other Sections of the Decree
could have been so worded as to avoid any constitutional objection. As of now, however, no ruling is called for. The view is given expression in the
concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar that in such a case to save the Decree from the direct fate of invalidity, they must be construed
in such a way as to preclude any possible erosion on the powers vested in this Court by the Constitution. That is a proposition too plain to be
committed. It commends itself for approval."
80
Nor would such a step be unprecedented. The Presidential Decree constituting Municipal Courts into
Municipal Circuit Courts, specifically provides: "The Supreme Court shall carry out the provisions of this Decree through implementing orders, on a
province-to-province basis."
81
It is true there is no such provision in this Act, but the spirit that informs it should not be ignored in the Executive Order
contemplated under its Section 44.
82
Thus Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand the most rigorous test of constitutionality.
83

9. Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon to reconcile or harmonize constitutional provisions. To be specific, the
Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the process to abolish existing ones. As noted in the
preceding paragraph, the termination of office of their occupants, as a necessary consequence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable from the
practical standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in this Tribunal. It is of the essence of constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is
precluded from acting within the boundaries of its conceded competence. That is why it has long been well-settled under the constitutional system
we have adopted that this Court cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid the task of reconciliation. As Justice Laurel put it so well in the previously cited
Angara decision, while in the main, "the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the
legislative and the judicial departments of the government, the overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments,
however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins."
84
It is well to recall another classic utterance from the
same jurist, even more emphatic in its affirmation of such a view, moreover buttressed by one of those insights for which Holmes was so famous
"The classical separation of government powers, whether viewed in the light of the political philosophy of Aristotle, Locke, or Motesquieu or of the
postulations of Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a relative theory of government. There is more truism and actuality in interdependence than in
independence and separation of powers, for as observed by Justice Holmes in a case of Philippine origin, we cannot lay down 'with mathematical
precision and divide the branches into water-tight compartments' not only because 'the great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and
divide fields of black and white but also because 'even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one
extreme to the other.'"
85
This too from Justice Tuazon, likewise expressing with force and clarity why the need for reconciliation or balancing is well-
nigh unavodiable under the fundamental principle of separation of powers: "The constitutional structure is a complicated system, and overlappings of
governmental functions are recognized, unavoidable, and inherent necessities of governmental coordination."
86
In the same way that the academe
has noted the existence in constitutional litigation of right versus right, there are instances, and this is one of them, where, without this attempt at
harmonizing the provisions in question, there could be a case of power against power. That we should avoid.
10. There are other objections raised but they pose no difficulty. Petitioners would characterize as an undue delegation of legislative power to the
President the grant of authority to fix the compensation and the allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed. A more careful reading
of the challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to have cautioned them against raising such an issue. The language of the statute is quite clear.
The questioned provisions reads as follows: "Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges, municipal Trial
Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such receive such compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the President
along the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1597."
87
The existence of a standard is thus clear. The basic postulate that underlies the doctrine of non-delegation is that it is the legislative body
which is entrusted with the competence to make laws and to alter and repeal them, the test being the completeness of the statue in all its terms and
provisions when enacted. As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta:
88
"To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the
very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication
may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.
It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried
out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and
regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not
have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole."
89
The undeniably strong links
that bind the executive and legislative departments under the amended Constitution assure that the framing of policies as well as their
implementation can be accomplished with unity, promptitude, and efficiency. There is accuracy, therefore, to this observation in the Free Telephone
Workers Union decision: "There is accordingly more receptivity to laws leaving to administrative and executive agencies the adoption of such means
as may be necessary to effectuate a valid legislative purpose. It is worth noting that a highly-respected legal scholar, Professor Jaffe, as early as
1947, could speak of delegation as the 'dynamo of modern government.'"
90
He warned against a "restrictive approach" which could be "a deterrent
factor to much-needed legislation."
91
Further on this point from the same opinion" "The spectre of the non-delegation concept need not haunt,
therefore, party caucuses, cabinet sessions or legislative chambers."
92
Another objection based on the absence in the statue of what petitioners
refer to as a "definite time frame limitation" is equally bereft of merit. They ignore the categorical language of this provision: "The Supreme Court
shall submit to the President, within thirty (30) days from the date of the effectivity of this act, a staffing pattern for all courts constituted pursuant to
this Act which shall be the basis of the implementing order to be issued by the President in accordance with the immediately succeeding
section."
93
The first sentence of the next section is even more categorical: "The provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance
with an Executive Order to be issued by the President."
94
Certainly petitioners cannot be heard to argue that the President is insensible to his
constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
95
In the meanwhile, the existing inferior courts affected continue functioning as
before, "until the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be
deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office."
96
There is no ambiguity. The incumbents of the courts thus
automatically abolished "shall cease to hold office." No fear need be entertained by incumbents whose length of service, quality of performance, and
clean record justify their being named anew,
97
in legal contemplation without any interruption in the continuity of their service.
98
It is equally
reasonable to assume that from the ranks of lawyers, either in the government service, private practice, or law professors will come the new
appointees. In the event that in certain cases a little more time is necessary in the appraisal of whether or not certain incumbents deserve
reappointment, it is not from their standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would be a reaffirmation of the good faith that will characterize its implementation
by the Executive. There is pertinence to this observation of Justice Holmes that even acceptance of the generalization that courts ordinarily should
not supply omissions in a law, a generalization qualified as earlier shown by the principle that to save a statute that could be done, "there is no canon
against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."
99
Where then is the unconstitutional flaw
11. On the morning of the hearing of this petition on September 8, 1981, petitioners sought to have the writer of this opinion and Justices Ramon C.
Aquino and Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera disqualified because the first-named was the chairman and the other two, members of the Committee on
Judicial Reorganization. At the hearing, the motion was denied. It was made clear then and there that not one of the three members of the Court had
any hand in the framing or in the discussion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. They were not consulted. They did not testify. The challenged legislation is
entirely the product of the efforts of the legislative body.
100
Their work was limited, as set forth in the Executive Order, to submitting alternative plan
for reorganization. That is more in the nature of scholarly studies. That the undertook. There could be no possible objection to such activity. Ever
since 1973, this Tribunal has had administrative supervision over interior courts. It has had the opportunity to inform itself as to the way judicial
business is conducted and how it may be improved. Even prior to the 1973 Constitution, it is the recollection of the writer of this opinion that either
the then Chairman or members of the Committee on Justice of the then Senate of the Philippines
101
consulted members of the Court in drafting
proposed legislation affecting the judiciary. It is not inappropriate to cite this excerpt from an article in the 1975 Supreme Court Review: "In the
twentieth century the Chief Justice of the United States has played a leading part in judicial reform. A variety of conditions have been responsible for
the development of this role, and foremost among them has been the creation of explicit institutional structures designed to facilitate
reform."
102
Also: "Thus the Chief Justice cannot avoid exposure to and direct involvement in judicial reform at the federal level and, to the extent
issues of judicial federalism arise, at the state level as well."
103

12. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are endowed with rights, to secure which a government is
instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it has to grant them either expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they exercise not for their
own benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in the language of ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust."
104
That is more
than a moral adjuration It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a public official certain rights. It does so to enable them to perform his functions
and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that the security of tenure provision to assure judicial independence is to be
viewed. It is an added guarantee that justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisal or untoward consequence. Their
judgments then are even more likely to be inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting
influence of base or unworthy motives. The independence of which they are assured is impressed with a significance transcending that of a purely
personal right. As thus viewed, it is not solely for their welfare. The challenged legislation Thus subject d to the most rigorous scrutiny by this
Tribunal, lest by lack of due care and circumspection, it allow the erosion of that Ideal so firmly embedded in the national consciousness There is this
farther thought to consider. independence in thought and action necessarily is rooted in one's mind and heart. As emphasized by former Chief
Justice Paras in Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice,
105
there is no surer guarantee of judicial independence than the God-given character and fitness of
those appointed to the Bench. The judges may be guaranteed a fixed tenure of office during good behavior, but if they are of such stuff as allows
them to be subservient to one administration after another, or to cater to the wishes of one litigant after another, the independence of the judiciary
will be nothing more than a myth or an empty Ideal. Our judges, we are confident, can be of the type of Lord Coke, regardless or in spite of the
power of Congress we do not say unlimited but as herein exercised to reorganize inferior courts."
106
That is to recall one of the greatest
Common Law jurists, who at the cost of his office made clear that he would not just blindly obey the King's order but "will do what becomes [him] as
a judge." So it was pointed out in the first leading case stressing the independence of the judiciary, Borromeo v. Mariano,
107
The ponencia of Justice
Malcolm Identified good judges with "men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are
permitted to perform the duties of the office undeterred by outside influence, and who are independent and self-respecting human units in a judicial
system equal and coordinate to the other two departments of government."
108
There is no reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 would be attended with deleterious consequences to the administration of justice. It does not follow that the abolition in
good faith of the existing inferior courts except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a
judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with independence its solemn duty or one recreant to the trust reposed in it. Nor should there be any fear
that less than good faith will attend the exercise be of the appointing power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an independent and
efficient judiciary is something to the credit of any administration. Well and truly has it been said that the fundamental principle of separation of
powers assumes, and justifiably so, that the three departments are as one in their determination to pursue the Ideals and aspirations and to fulfilling
the hopes of the sovereign people as expressed in the Constitution. There is wisdom as well as validity to this pronouncement of Justice Malcolm
in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Company,
109
a decision promulgated almost half a century ago: "Just as the Supreme Court, as the
guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department or the government, so should it as strictly confine its own
sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act."
110
To that basic postulate underlying our
constitutional system, this Court remains committed.
WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been shown, this petition is dismissed. No costs.
Makasiar and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., concur in the result.


Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:
I join the majority of my brethren in voting that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, is not unconstitutional as a whole
nor in any of its parts.
The issue of unconstitutionality raised by petitioners relates particularly to Section 44 of the Act which reads as follows:
SEC. 44. Transitory provisions. The provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by
the President. The Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts
of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall continue to function as presently constituted and
organized, until the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall
be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office. The cases pending in the old Courts shall e transferred to
the appropriate Courts constituted pursuant to this Act, together with the pertinent functions, records, equipment,. property and the necessary
personnel.
The applicable appropriations shall likewise be transferred to the appropriate courts constituted pursuant to this Act, to be augmented as may be
necessary from the funds for organizational changes as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 80. Said funding shall thereafter be included in the annual
General Appropriations Act.
It is contended by petitioners that the provision in the above section which mandates that "upon the declaration upon the President that the
reorganization contemplated in the Act has been completed), the said courts (meaning the Court of Appeals and all other lower courts, except the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals) shall be deemed abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office" trenches on all the
constitutional safeguards and guarantees of the independence of the judiciary, such as the security of tenure of its members (Section 7, Article X of
the Philippine Constitution of 1973), the prerogatives of the Supreme Court to administratively supervise all courts and the personnel thereof (Section
6, Id.) and principally, the power of the Supreme Court "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Members, order their
dismissal. " (Section 7, Id.)
On the other hand, respondents maintain that thru the above-quoted Section 44. the Batasan did nothing more than to exercise the authority
conferred upon it be Section I of the same Article of the Constitution which provides that The Judicial power shall be rested in one Supreme Court
and in such inferior courts as may be established by law." In other words, since all inferior courts are, constitutionally speaking, mere creatures of the
law (of the legislature it follows that it is within the legislature's power to abolish or reorganize them even if in so doing, it might result in the cessation
from office of the incumbents thereof before the expiration of their respective constitutionally fixed tenures. Respondents emphasize that the
legislative power in this respect is broad and indeed plenary.
Viewing the problem before Us from the above perspectives, it would appear that our task is either (1) to reconcile, on the one hand, the parliament's
power of abolition and reorganization with, on the other, the security of tenure of members of the judiciary and the Supreme Court's authority to
discipline and remove judges or (2) to declare that either the power of the Supreme Court or of the Batasan is more paramount than that of the other.
I believe. however, that such a manner of looking at the issue that confronts Us only confuses and compounds the task We are called upon to
perform. For how can there be a satisfactory and rational reconciliation of the pretended right of a judge to continue as such, when the position
occupied by him no longer exists? To suggest, as some do, that the solution is for the court he is sitting in not to be deemed abolished or that he
should in some way be allowed to continue to function as judge until his constitutional tenure expires is obviously impractical, if only because we
would then have the absurd spectacle of a judiciary with old and new courts functioning under distinct set-ups, such as a district court continuing as
such in a region where the other judges are regional judges or of judges exercising powers not purely judicial which is offensive to the Constitution.
The other suggestion that the incumbent of the abolished court should be deemed appointed to the corresponding new court is even worse, since it
would deprive the appointing authority, the president, of the power to make his own choices and would, furthermore, amount to an appointment by
legislation which is a Constitutional anachronism. more on this point later .
Inasmuch as pursuant to the analysis of the majority of the Members of this Court, in fact and in law, the structure of judicial system created by Batas
Pambansa 129 is substantially different from that under the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, hence the courts now existing are actually being
abolished, why do We have to indulge in any reconciliation or feel bound to determine whose power, that of the Batasang Pambansa or that of this
Court, should be considered more imperious? It being conceded that the power to create or establish carries with it the power to abolish, and it is a
legal axiom, or at least a pragmatic reality that the tenure of the holder of an office must of necessity end when his office no longer exists, as I see it,
be have no alternative than to hold that petitioners' invocation of the independence of the judiciary principle of the Constitution is unavailing ill the
cases at bar. It is as simple as that. I might hasten to add, in this connection, that to insist that what Batas Pambansa 129 is doing is just a renaming
and not a substantial and actual modification or alteration of the present judicial structure or system assuming a close scrutiny might somehow
support such a conclusion, is pure wishful thinking, it being explicitly and unequivocally provided in the section in question that said courts are
deemed abolished" and further, as if to make it most unmistakably emphatic, that "the incumbents thereat shall cease to hold office." Dura les, sed
les. As a matter of fact, I cannot conceive of a more emphatic way of manifesting and conveying the determined legislative intent about it.
Now, why am I yielding to the above reasoning and conclusion? Why don't I insist on championing the cause of the independence of the judiciary by
maintaining that the constitutional safeguards thereof I have already enumerated earlier must be respected in any reorganization ordained by the
parliament My answer is simple. Practically all the Members of the Court concede that what is contemplated is not only general reorganization but
abolition in other words, not only a rearrangement or remodelling of the old structure but a total demolition thereof to be followed by the building of
a new and different one. I am practically alone in contemplating a different view. True, even if I should appear as shouting in the wilderness, I would
still make myself a hero in the eyes of man justices and judges, members of the bar and concerned discerning citizens, all lovers of the judicial
independence, but understandably, I should not be, as I am not, disposed to play such a role virtually at the expense not only of my distinguished
colleagues but of the Batasang Pambansa that framed the law and, most of all, the President who signed and, therefore, sanctioned the Act as it is,
unless I am absolutely sure that my position is formidable, unassailable and beyond all possible contrary ratiocination, which I am not certain of, as I
shall demonstrate anon.
To start with, the jurisprudence, here and abroad, touching on the question now before Us cannot be said to be clear and consistent, much less
unshakeable and indubitably definite either way. None of the local cases
1
relied upon and discussed by the parties and by the Members of the Court
during the deliberations, such as Borromeo,
2
Ocampo,
3
Zandueta,
4
Brillo,
5
etc. can, to my mind, really serve as reliable pole stars that could lead
me to certainty of correctness.
Of course, my instinct and passion for an independent judiciary are uncompromising and beyond diminution. Indeed, my initial reactions, publicly
known, about Batas Pambansa 129 explaining academically its apparent tendency to invade the areas of authority of the Supreme Court, not to
speak of its dangerously impairing the independence of the judiciary, must have, I imagine, created the impression that I would vote to declare the
law unconstitutional. But, during the deliberations of the Court, the combined wisdom of my learned colleagues was something I could not discount
or just brush aside. Pondering and thinking deeper about all relevant factors, I have come to the conviction that at least on this day and hour there
are justifiable grounds to uphold the Act, if only to try how it will operate so that thereby the people may see that We are one with the President and
the Batasan in taking what appear to be immediate steps needed to relieve the people from a fast spreading cancer in the judiciary of our country.
Besides, the Philippines has somehow not yet returned to complete normalcy The improved national discipline so evident during the earlier days of
martial law, has declined at a quite discernible degree. Different sectors of society are demanding urgent reforms in their respective field And about
the most vehement and persistent, loud and clear, among their gripes, which as a matter of fact is common to all of them is that about the
deterioration in the quality of performance of the judges manning our courts and the slow and dragging pace of pending judicial proceedings. Strictly
speaking, this is, to be sure, something that may not necessarily be related to lack of independence of the judiciary. It has more to do with the
ineptness and/or corruption among and corruptibility of the men sitting in the courts in some parts of the country And what is worse, while in the
communities concerned the malady is known to factually exist and is actually graver and widespread, very few, if any individuals or even
associations and organized groups, truly incensed and anxious to be of help, have the courage and possess the requisite legal evidence to come out
and file the corresponding charges with the Supreme Court, And I am not vet referring to similar situations that are not quite openly known but
nevertheless just as deleterious. On the other hand, if all these intolerable instances should actually be formally brought to the Supreme Court, it
would be humanly impossible for the Court to dispose of them with desirable dispatch, what with the thousands of other cases it has to attend to and
the rather cumbersome strict requirements of procedural due process it has to observe in each and every such administrative case all of which are
time consulting. Verily, under the foregoing circumstances, it may be said that there is justification for the patience of the people about the possibility
of early eradication of this disease or evil in our judiciary pictured above to be nearing the breaking point.
Withal, we must bear in mind that judicial reorganization becomes urgent and inevitable not alone because of structural inadequacies of the system
or of the cumbersomeness and technicality-peppered and dragging procedural rules in force, but also when it becomes evident that a good number
of those occupying positions in the judiciary, make a mockery of justice and take advantage of their office for selfish personal ends and yet, as
already explained, those in authority cannot expeditiously cope with the situation under existing laws and rules. It is my personal assessment of the
present situation in our judiciary that its reorganization has to be of necessity two-pronged, as I have just indicated, for the most Ideal judicial system
with the most perfect procedural rules cannot satisfy the people and the interests of justice unless the men who hold positions therein possess the
character, competence and sense of loyalty that can guarantee their devotion to duty and absolute impartiality, nay, impregnability to an temptations
of graft and corruption, including the usual importunings and the fearsome albeit improper pressures of the powers that be. I am certain that the
Filipino people feel happy that Batas Pambansa 129 encompasses both of these objectives, which indeed are aligned with the foundation of the
principle of independence of the judiciary.
The above premises considered, I have decided to tackle our problem from the viewpoint of the unusual situation in which our judiciary is presently
perilously situated. Needless to say, to all of us, the Members of the Court, the constitutional guarantees of security of tenure and removal only by
the Supreme Court, among others, against impairment of the independence of the judiciary, which is one of the bedrock's and, therefore, of the
essence in any "democracy under a regime of justice, peace, liberty and equality (Preamble of the 1973 Constitution), are priceless and should be
defended, most of all by the Supreme Court, with all the wisdom and courage God has individually endowed to each of Us. Withal, we are all
conscious of the fact that those safeguards have never been intended to place the person of the judge in a singular position of privilege and
untouchability, but rather, that they are essentially part and parcel of what is required of an independent judiciary where judges can decide cases and
do justice to everyone before them ruat caelum. However, We find Ourselves face to face with a situation, in our judiciary which is of emergency
proportions and to insist on rationalizing how those guarantees should be enforced under such a circumstance seem to be difficult, aside from being
controversial. And so, in a real sense, We have to make a choice between adhering to the strictly legalistic reasoning pursued by petitioners, on the
one hand, and the broader and more practical approach, which as I have said is within the spirit at least of the Constitution.
My concept of the Constitution is that it is not just a cluster of high sounding verbiages spelling purely Idealism and nobility in the recognition of
human dignity, protection of individual liberties and providing security and promotion of the general welfare under a government of laws. With all
emphasis and vehemence, I say that the fundamental law of the land is a living instrument which translates and adapts itself to the demands of
obtaining circumstances. It is written for all seasons, except for very unusual instances that human ratiocination cannot justify to be contemplated by
its language even if read in its broadest sense and in the most liberal way. Verily, it is paramount and supreme in peace and in war, but even in
peace grave critical situations arise demanding recourse to extraordinary solutions. Paraphrasing the Spanish adage, "Grandes males, grandes
remedios ", such in ordinary problems justify exceptional remedies. And so, history records that in the face of grave crises and emergencies, the
most constitutionally Idealistic countries have, at one time or another, under the pressure of pragmatic considerations, adopted corresponding
realistic measures, which perilously tether along the periphery of their Charters, to the extent of creating impressions, of course erroneous, that the
same had been transgressed, although in truth their integrity and imperiousness remained undiminished and unimpaired.
The Philippines has but recently had its own experience of such constitutional approach. When martial law was proclaimed here in 1972, there were
those who vociferously shouted not only that the President had acted arbitrarily and without the - required factual bases contemplated in the
Commander-in-Chief clause of the 1935 Constitution, but more, that he had gone beyond the traditional and universally recognized intent of said
clause by utilizing his martial law powers not only to maintain peace and tranquility and preserve and defend the integrity and security of the state but
to establish a New Society The critics contended that martial law is only for national security, not for the imposition of national discipline under a New
Society.
Due to its relevancy to Our present discussion, it is well for everyone to bear in mind that in this jurisdiction, this concept of martial law has already
been upheld several times by this Court. 1, for one, accepted such a construction because I firmly believe that to impose martial law for the sole end
of suppressing an insurrection or rebellion without coincidentally taking corresponding measures to eradicate the root causes of the uprising is utter
folly, for the country would still continue to lay open to its recurrence.
I have made the foregoing discourse, for it is fundamentally in the fight of this Court's doctrines about the imposition of martial law as I have stated
that I prefer to base this concurrence. To put it differently, if indeed there could be some doubt as to the correctness of this Court's judgment that
Batas Pambansa 129 is not unconstitutional, particularly its Section 44, I am convinced that the critical situation of our judiciary today calls for
solutions that may not in the eyes of some conform strictly with the letter of the Constitution but indubitably justified by its spirit and intent. As 1 have
earlier indicated, the Charter is not just a construction of words to whose literal iron-clad meanings we must feel hidebound without regard to every
Constitution's desirable inherent nature of adjustability and adaptability to prevailing situations so that the spirit and fundamental intent and
objectives of the framers may remain alive. Batas Pambansa 129 is one such adaptation that comes handy for the attainment of the transcendental
objectives it seeks to pursue While, to be sure, it has the effect of factually easing out some justices and judges before the end of their respective
constitutional tenure sans the usual administrative investigation, the desirable end is achieved thru means that, in the light of the prevailing
conditions, is constitutionally permissible.
Before closing, it may not be amiss for me to point out that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, aside from what has been discussed about its effect on the
guarantees of judicial independence, also preempts, in some of its provisions, the primary rule-making power of the Supreme Court in respect to
procedure, practice and evidence. With the pardon of my colleagues, I would just like to say that the Court should not decry this development too
much. After all, the legislature is expressly empowered by the Charter to do so, (Section 5(5), Article X of the Constitution of 1973) so much so, that I
doubt if the Court has any authority to alter or modify any rule the Batasang Pambansa enunciates. Truth to tell, as Chairman of the Committee on
the Revision of the Rules of Court, for one reason or another, principally the lack of a clear consensus as to what some of my colleagues consider
very radical proposals voiced by me or my committee, We have regrettably procrastinated long enough in making our procedural rules more practical
and more conducive to speedier disposal and termination of controversies by dealing more with substantial justice.
So also have We, it must be confessed, failed to come up to expectations of the framers of the Constitution in our ways of disposing of administrative
complaints against erring and misconducting judges. Of course, We can excuse Ourselves with the explanation that not only are We overloaded with
work beyond human capability of its being performed expeditiously, but that the strict requisites of due process which are time consuming have
precluded Us from being more expeditious and speedy.
I feel I must say all of these, because if the above-discussed circumstances have not combined to create a very critical situation in our judiciary that
is making the people lose its faith and confidence in the administration of justice by the existing courts, perhaps the Court could look with more
sympathy at the stand of petitioners. I want all the sundry to know, however, that notwithstanding this decision, the independence of the judiciary in
the Philippines is far from being insubstantial, much less meaningless and dead. Batas Pambansa 129 has precisely opened our eyes to how,
despite doubts and misgivings, the Constitution can be so construed as to make it possible for those in authority to answer the clamor of the people
for an upright judiciary and overcome constitutional roadblocks more apparent than real.
To those justices, judges, members of the bar and concerned citizens whose eyes may be dimming with tears of disappointment and
disenchantment because of the stand I have chosen to adopt in these cases, may I try to assuage them by joining their fervent prayers that some
other day, hopefully in the near future, Divine Providence may dictate to another constitutional convention to write the guarantees of judicial
independence with ink of deeper hue and words that are definite, clear, unambiguous and unequivocal, in drawing the line of demarcation between
the Parliament and the Judiciary in the manner that in His Infinite wisdom would most promote genuine and impartial justice for our people, free, not
only from graft, corruption, ineptness and incompetence but even from the tentacles of interference and insiduous influence of the political powers
that be. Presently, I am constrained from going along with any other view than that the Constitution allows abolition of existing courts even if the
effect has to be the elimination of any incumbent judge and the consequent cutting of his constitutional tenure of office.
I cannot close this concurrence without referring to the apprehensions in some quarters about the choice that will ultimately be made of those who
will be eased out of the judiciary in the course of the implementation of Batas Pambansa 129. By this decision, the Court has in factual effect albeit
not in constitutional conception yielded generally to the Batasang Pambansa, and more specifically to the President, its own constitutionally
conferred power of removal of judges. Section 44 of the Batasan's Act declares that all of them shall be deemed to have ceased to hold office,
leaving it to the President to appoint those whom he may see fit to occupy the new courts. Thus, those who will not be appointed can be considered
as "ceasing to hold their respective offices", or, as others would say they would be in fact removed. How the President will make his choices is
beyond Our power to control. But even if some may be eased out even without being duly informed of the reason therefor, much less being given the
opportunity to be heard the past actuations of the President on all matters of deep public interest shouted serve as sufficient assurance that when lie
ultimately acts, he will faithfully adhere to his solemn oath "to do justice to every man hence, lie will equip himself first with the fullest reliable
information before acts. This is not only my individual faith founded on my personal acquaintance with the character and sterling qualities of
President Ferdinand E. Marcos. I dare say this is the faith of the nation in a man who has led it successfully through crises and emergencies, with
justice to all, with malice towards none. I am certain, the President will deal with each and every individual to be affected by this reorganization with
the best light that God will give him every moment he acts in each individual case as it comes for his decision
































ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION, 63 Phil. 139

G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936
JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR,respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the
Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the
election of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.
The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the respondents are as follows:
(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio
Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas;
(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said
district, for having received the most number of votes;
(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;
(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed the following resolution:
[No. 8]
RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRA QUIENES NO SE HA PRESENTADO PROTESTA.
Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra quienes no se hubiere presentado debidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion
de la presente resolucion sean, como por la presente, son aprobadas y confirmadas.
Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.
(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election
of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-
things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position
be nullified;
(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which provides:
6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya presentado en o antes de este dia.
(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral
Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the
National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the
election of its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said
period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period;
(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or
constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest against the election of a member of the National Assembly after confirmation;
(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal";
(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's
"Motion to Dismiss the Protest."
The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the writ prayed for:
(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the
National Assembly;
(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of said election contests, which power has been
reserved to the Legislative Department of the Government or the National Assembly;
(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the Constitution, whose exclusive jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the
merits of controversies submitted to them for decision and to matters involving their internal organization, the Electoral Commission can regulate its
proceedings only if the National Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so regulate such proceedings;
(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be respected and obeyed;
(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance appended to the Constitution and paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law
(No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United States) as well as under section 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the Constitution,
this Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental question herein raised because it involves an interpretation of the Constitution of
the Philippines.
On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf of the respondent Electoral Commission interposing the
following special defenses:
(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department invested with the
jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly"; that in adopting its
resolution of December 9, 1935, fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of protests against the election of any member of the National
Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied powers granted it by the Constitution to adopt the rules and
regulations essential to carry out the power and functions conferred upon the same by the fundamental law; that in adopting its resolution of January
23, 1936, overruling the motion of the petitioner to dismiss the election protest in question, and declaring itself with jurisdiction to take cognizance of
said protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial functions a an instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the Commonwealth
Government, and hence said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control of the Supreme Court;
(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against
whom no protest had thus far been filed, could not and did not deprive the electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election
protests filed within the time that might be set by its own rules:
(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi-judicial functions, created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative
Department, and is not an "inferior tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person" within the purview of section 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, against which prohibition would lie.
The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf on March 2, 1936, setting forth the following as his special
defense:
(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, there was no existing law fixing the period within
which protests against the election of members of the National Assembly should be filed; that in fixing December 9, 1935, as the last day for the filing
of protests against the election of members of the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission was exercising a power impliedly conferred upon it
by the Constitution, by reason of its quasi-judicial attributes;
(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, the last day fixed by paragraph 6 of
the rules of the said Electoral Commission;
(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by said respondent and over the parties thereto, and the
resolution of the Electoral Commission of January 23, 1936, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest was an act within the jurisdiction of
the said commission, and is not reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition;
(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of its members, and that such
confirmation does not operate to limit the period within which protests should be filed as to deprive the Electoral Commission of jurisdiction over
protest filed subsequent thereto;
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the Constitution, endowed with quasi-judicial functions, whose decision are
final and unappealable;
( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person, within the terms of sections
226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that neither under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II (should be article VIII) of the
Constitution and paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance appended thereto could it be subject in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions to a
writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court;
(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the united States) has no application to the case at
bar.
The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision, the petitioner prayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ
of injunction against the respondent Electoral Commission which petition was denied "without passing upon the merits of the case" by resolution of
this court of March 21, 1936.
There was no appearance for the other respondents.

The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the following two principal propositions:

1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and
in the affirmative,
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the election of
the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?
We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of the controversy. However, the question of jurisdiction having been
presented, we do not feel justified in evading the issue. Being a case prim impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with our sense of duty to
overlook the broader aspect of the question and leave it undecided. Neither would we be doing justice to the industry and vehemence of counsel
were we not to pass upon the question of jurisdiction squarely presented to our consideration.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in
our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a
check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may
become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National
Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National
Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the
appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its
power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their
support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its
power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the
judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however,
sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral
or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people,
acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a
republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific
limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon
governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not
provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be
mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the
limitation and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and
development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating
power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution
itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it
does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is
termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to
actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question
raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed
to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice
of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the governments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered that, in the
language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing must
also be its guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of their constitution." In the
Last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and
hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers.
In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of the herein petitioner to the said
body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of
protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the
National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power of
the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, submitted after
December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as
contended by the respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly,
then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protests against the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the
one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. From the very nature of the republican government established in our country in the light of
American experience and of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution
and defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for
a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.
Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is
beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral
Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between
department powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases. Discarding the
English type and other European types of constitutional government, the framers of our constitution adopted the American type where the written
constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have declined to follow the American example,
provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as
a recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to assume what is logically their function.
For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall have no power to examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap.
IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries whose constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed
this power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to constitutional
Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of 1931) especial
constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity
of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take
cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus
created in our constitutional system which may be in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer
them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the
opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject mater of the
present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass upon the second proposition and determine whether the Electoral
Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take cognizance of
the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation thereof by the National Assembly on
December 3, 1935. As able counsel for the petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the
Constitution which provides:
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six
Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the
party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." It is imperative,
therefore, that we delve into the origin and history of this constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its framers and the people who
adopted it so that we may properly appreciate its full meaning, import and significance.
The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the rule that "the assembly shall be
the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution of the United
States providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House of
Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members . . ." apparently in order
to emphasize the exclusive the Legislative over the particular case s therein specified. This court has had occasion to characterize this grant of
power to the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete"
G.R. No. L-3820
JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner, vs. LEON NAZARENO, Sergeant-at-arms, Philippine Senate, and EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, Director of
Prisons, respondents.

J.C. Orendain, Augusto Revilla, and Eduardo Arboleda for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo, Lorenzo Sumulong, Lorenzo Taada, and Vicente J. Francisco for respondents.
OZAETA, J.:

This is an original petition for habeas corpus to relieve the petitioner from his confinement in the New Bilibid Prison to which he has been committed
by virtue of a resolution adopted by the Senate on May 15, 1950, which reads as follows:
Whereas, Jean L. Arnault refused to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions
related to the said amount; Now, therefore, be it.
Resolved, that for his refusal to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 Jean L. Arnault be committed to the custody of the
Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal, until discharged by further order of the Senate or by the special
committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8, such discharge to be ordered when he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate or
to the said special committee the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection
therewith.
The facts that gave rise to the adoption of said resolution, insofar as pertinent here, may be briefly stated as follows:
In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista
and Tambobong for the sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. Of the first sum, P1,000,000 was paid to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident
American, thru his attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, the Associated Estates, Inc., represented by Jean L. Arnault, for alleged interest of the said Burt
in the Buenavista Estate. The second sum of P500,000 was all paid to the same Ernest H. Burt through his other attorney-in-fact, the North Manila
Development Co., Inc., also represented by Jean L. Arnault, for the alleged interest of the said Burt in the Tambobong Estate.
The original owner of the Buenavista Estate was the San Juan de Dios Hospital. The Philippine Government held a 25-year lease contract on said
estate, with an option to purchase it for P3,000,000 within the same period of 25 years counted from January 1, 1939. The occupation Republic of
the Philippines purported to exercise that option by tendering to the owner the sum of P3,000,000 and, upon its rejection, by depositing it in court on
June 21, 1944, together with the accrued rentals amounting to P3224,000. Since 1939 the Government has remained in possession of the estate.
On June 29, 1946, the San Juan de Dios Hospital sold the Buenavista Estate for P5,000,000 to Ernest H. Burt, who made a down payment of
P10,000 only and agreed to pay P5000,000 within one year and the remainder in annual installments of P500,000 each, with the stipulation that
failure on his part to make any of said payments would cause the forfeiture of his down payment of P10,000 and would entitle the Hospital to rescind
to sale to him. Aside from the down payment of P10,000, Burt has made no other payment on account of the purchase price of said estate.
The original owner of the Tambobong Estate was the Philippine Trust Company. On May 14, 1946, the Philippine Trust Company sold estate for the
sum of P1,200,000 to Ernest H. Burt, who paid P10,000 down and promise to pay P90,000 within nine months and the balance of P1,100,000 in ten
successive installments of P110,000 each. The nine-month period within which to pay the first installment of P90,000 expired on February 14, 1947,
without Burt's having paid the said or any other amount then or afterwards. On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed,
and delivered the Tambobong Estate to the Rural Progress Administration by an absolute deed of sale in consideration of the sum of P750,000. On
February 5, 1948, the Rural Progress Administration made, under article 1504 of the Civil Code, a notarial demand upon Burt for the resolution and
cancellation of his contract of purchase with the Philippine Trust Company due to his failure to pay the installment of P90,000 within the period of
nine months. Subsequently the Court of First Instance of Rizal ordered the cancellation of Burt's certificate of title and the issuance of a new one in
the name of the Rural Progress Administration, from which order he appealed to the Supreme Court.
[[
1
]]

It was in the face of the antecedents sketched in the last three preceding paragraphs that the Philippine Government, through the Secretary of
Justice as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Rural Progress Administration and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine
National Bank, from which the money was borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the latter part of October, 1949, as stated at
the outset.
On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which reads as follows:
RESOLUTION CREATING A SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE BUENAVISTA AND THE TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL.
WHEREAS, it is reported that the Philippine government, through the Rural Progress Administration, has bought the Buenavista and the Tambobong
Estates for the aggregate sum of five million pesos;
WHEREAS, it is reported that under the decision of the Supreme Court dated October 31, 1949, the Buenavista Estate could have been bought for
three million pesos by virtue of a contract entered into between the San Juan de Dios Hospital and Philippine Government in 1939;
WHEREAS, it is even alleged that the Philippine Government did not have to purchase the Buenavista Estate because the occupation government
had made tender of payment in the amount of three million pesos, Japanese currency, which fact is believed sufficient to vest title of Ownership in
the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to decisions of the Supreme Court sustaining the validity of payments made in Japanese military notes
during the occupation;
WHEREAS, it is reported that the Philippine Government did not have to pay a single centavo for the Tambobong Estate as it was already practically
owned by virtue of a deed of sale from the Philippine Trust Company dated September 3, 194, for seven hundred and fifty thousand pesos, and by
virtue of the recission of the contract through which Ernest H. Burt had an interest in the estate; Now, therefore, be it.
RESOLVED, That a Special Committee, be, as it hereby is, created, composed of five members to be appointed by the President of the Senate to
investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estate deals. It shall be the duty of the said Committee to determine whether the said purchase was
honest, valid, and proper and whether the price involved in the deal was fair and just, the parties responsible therefor, and any other facts the
Committee may deem proper in the premises. Said Committee shall have the power to conduct public hearings; issue subpoena orsubpoena duces
tecum to compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of documents before it; and may require any official or employee of any bureau,
office, branch, subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the Government to assist or otherwise cooperate with the Special Committee in the
performance of its functions and duties. Said Committee shall submit its report of findings and recommendations within two weeks from the adoption
of this Resolution.
The special committee created by the above resolution called and examined various witnesses, among the most important of whom was the herein
petitioner, Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was that involved in the apparent unnecessariness and
irregularity of the Government's paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he
seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from
the transaction at the expense of the Government.
Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the
same date he opened a new account in the name of Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine National Bank in which he deposited the two checks
aggregating P1,500,000; and that on the same occasion he draw on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account
of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the Philippine National Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed. It was the
desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave rise to the present case.
At first the petitioner claimed before the Committee:
Mr. ARNAULT (reading from a note). Mr. Chairman, for questions involving the disposition of funds, I take the position that the transactions were
legal, that no laws were being violated, and that all requisites had been complied with. Here also I acted in a purely functional capacity of
representative. I beg to be excused from making answer which might later be used against me. I have been assured that it is my constitutional right
to refuse to incriminate myself, and I am certain that the Honorable Members of this Committee, who, I understand, are lawyers, will see the justness
of my position.
At as subsequent session of the committee (March 16) Senator De Vera, a member of the committee, interrogated him as follows:
Senator DE VERA. Now these transactions, according to your own typewritten statement, were legal?
Mr. ARNAULT. I believe so.
Senator DE VERA. And the disposition of that fund involved, according to your own statement, did not violate any law?
Mr. ARNAULT. I believe so.
x x x x x x x x x
Senator DE VERA. So that if the funds were disposed of in such a manner that no laws were violated, how is it that when you were asked by the
Committee to tell what steps you took to have this money delivered to Burt, you refused to answer the questions, saying that it would incriminate
you?
Mr. ARNAULT. Because it violates the rights of a citizen to privacy in his dealings with other people.
x x x x x x x x x
Senator DE VERA. Are you afraid to state how the money was disposed of because you would be incriminated, or you would be incriminating
somebody?
Mr. ARNAULT. I am not afraid; I simply stand on the privilege to dispose of the money that has been paid to me as a result of a legal transaction
without having to account for any use of it.
But when in the same session the chairman of the committee, Senator Sumulong, interrogated the petitioner, the latter testified as follows:
The CHAIRMAN. The other check of P440,000 which you also made on October 29, 1949, is payable to cash; and upon cashing this P440,000 on
October 29, 1949, what did you do with that amount?
Mr. ARNAULT. I turned it over to a certain person.
The CHAIRMAN. The whole amount of P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Who was that certain person to whom you delivered these P440,000 which you cashed on October 29, 1949?
Mr. ARNAULT. I don't remember the name; he was a representative of Burt.
The CHAIRMAN. That representative of Burt to whom you delivered the P440,000 was a Filipino?
Mr. ARNAULT. I don't know.
The CHAIRMAN. You do not remember the name of that representative of Burt to whom you delivered this big amount of P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. I am not sure; I do not remember the name.
The CHAIRMAN. That certain person who represented Burt to whom you delivered the big amount on October 29, 1949, gave you a receipt for the
amount?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. Neither did you ask a receipt?
Mr. ARNAULT. I didn't ask.
The CHAIRMAN. And why did you give that certain person, representative of Burt, this big amount of P440,000 which forms part of the P1- million
paid to Burt?
Mr. ARNAULT. Because I have instructions to that effect.
The CHAIRMAN. Who gave you the instruction?
Mr. ARNAULT. Burt.
The CHAIRMAN. Where is the instruction; was that in writing?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. By cable?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. In what form did you receive that instruction?
Mr. ARNAULT. Verbal instruction.
The CHAIRMAN. When did you receive this verbal instruction from Burt to deliver these P440,000 to a certain person whose name you do not like to
reveal?
Mr. ARNAULT. I have instruction to comply with the request of the person.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, you said that instruction given to you by Burt was verbal?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. When was that instruction given to you by Burt?
Mr. ARNAULT. Long time ago.
The CHAIRMAN. In what year did Burt give you that verbal instruction; when Burt was still here in the Philippines?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. But at that time Burt already knew that he would receive the money?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. In what year was that when Burt while he was here in the Philippines gave you the verbal instruction?
Mr. ARNAULT. In 1946.
The CHAIRMAN. And what has that certain person done for Burt to merit receiving these P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. I absolutely do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. You do not know?
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. Burt did not tell you when he gave you the verbal instruction why that certain person should receive these P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. He did not tell me.
The CHAIRMAN. And Burt also authorized you to give this big amount to that certain person without receipt?
Mr. ARNAULT. He told me that a certain person would represent him and where could I meet him.
The CHAIRMAN. Did Burt know already that certain person as early as 1946?
Mr. ARNAULT. I presume much before that.
The CHAIRMAN. Did that certain person have any intervention in the prosecution of the two cases involving the Buenavista and Tambobong
estates?
Mr. ARNAULT. Not that I know of.
The CHAIRMAN. Is that certain person related to any high government official?
Mr. ARNAULT. No, I do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. Why can you not tell us the name of that certain person?
Mr. ARNAULT. Because I am not sure of his name; I cannot remember the name.
The CHAIRMAN. When gave that certain person that P440,000 on October 29, 1949, you knew already that person?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes, I have seen him several times.
The CHAIRMAN. And the name of that certain person is a Filipino name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I would say Spanish name.
The CHAIRMAN. And how about his Christian name; is it also a Spanish name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I am not sure; I think the initial is J.
The CHAIRMAN. Did he have a middle name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I never knew it.
The CHAIRMAN. And how about his family name which according to your recollection is Spanish; can you remember the first letter with which that
family name begins?
Mr. ARNAULT. S, D or F.
The CHAIRMAN. And what was the last letter of the family name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you seen that person again after you have delivered this P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Several times?
Mr. ARNAULT. Two or three times.
The CHAIRMAN. Here in Manila?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. And in spite of the fact that you met that person two or three times, you never were able to find out what was his name?
Mr. ARNAULT. If I knew, I would [have] taken it down. Mr. Peralta knows my name; of course, we have not done business. Lots of people in Manila
know me, but they don't know my name, and I don't know them. They sa{ I am "chiflado" because I don't know their names.
The CHAIRMAN. That certain person is a male or female?
Mr. ARNAULT. He is a male.
The CHAIRMAN. You are sure that he is a male at least?
Mr. ARNAULT. Let us say 38 or 40 years, more or less.
The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us, more or less, a description of that certain person? What is his complexion: light, dark or light brown?
Mr. ARNAULT. He is like the gentleman there (pointing to Senator Cabili), but smaller. He walks very straight, with military bearing.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you know the residence of that certain person to whom you gave the P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. During these frequent times that you met that certain person, you never came to know his residence?
Mr. ARNAULT. No, because he was coming to the office.
The CHAIRMAN. How tall is that certain person?
Mr. ARNAULT. Between 5-2 and 5-6.
On May 15, 1950, the petitioner was haled before the bar of the Senate, which approved and read to him the following resolution:
Be it resolved by the Senate of the Philippines in Session assembled:
That Jean L. Arnault, now at the bar of the Senate, be arraigned for contempt consisting of contumacious acts committed by him during the
investigation conducted by the Special Committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8 to probe the Tambobong and Buenavista estates deal of
October 21, 1949, and that the President of the Senate propounded to him the following interrogatories:
1. What excuse have you for persistently refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom you gave the P440,000 on October 29, 1949, a person
whose name it is impossible for you not to remember not only because of the big amount of money you gave to him without receipt, but also by your
own statements you knew him as early as 1946 when General Ernest H. Burt was still in the Philippines, you made two other deliveries of money to
him without receipt, and the last time you saw him was in December 1949?
Thereupon petitioner's attorney, Mr. Orendain, submitted for him a written answer alleging that the questions were incriminatory in nature and
begging leave to be allowed to stand on his constitutional right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. Not satisfied with that written
answer Senator Sumulong, over the objection of counsel for the petitioner, propounded to the latter the following question:
Sen. SUMULONG. During the investigation, when the Committee asked you for the name of that person to whom you gave the P440,000, you said
that you can [could] not remember his name. That was the reason then for refusing to reveal the name of the person. Now, in the answer that you
have just cited, you are refusing to reveal the name of that person to whom you gave the P440,000 on the ground that your answer will be self-
incriminating. Now, do I understand from you that you are abandoning your former claim that you cannot remember the name of that person, and
that your reason now for your refusal to reveal the name of that person is that your answer might be self-incriminating? In other words, the question
is this: What is your real reason for refusing to reveal the name of that person to whom you gave the P440,000: that you do not remember his name
or that your answer would be self-incriminating?
x x x x x x x x x
Mr. ORENDAIN. Mr. President, we are begging for the rules of procedure that the accused should not be required to testify unless he so desires.
The PRESIDENT. It is the duty of the respondent to answer the question. The question is very clear. It does not incriminate him.
x x x x x x x x x
Mr. ARNAULT. I stand by every statement that I have made before the Senate Committee on the first, second, and third hearings to which I was
made in my letter to this Senate of May 2, 1950, in which I gave all the reasons that were in my powers to give, as requested. I cannot change
anything in those statements that I made because they represent the best that I can do , to the best of my ability.
The PRESIDENT. You are not answering the question. The answer has nothing to do with the question.
Sen. SUMULONG. I would like to remind you , Mr. Arnault, that the reason that you gave during the investigation for not revealing the name of the
person to whom you gave the P440,000 is not the same reason that you are now alleging because during the investigation you told us: "I do not
remember his name." But, now, you are now saying: "My answer might incriminate me." What is your real position?
Mr. ARNAULT. I have just stated that I stand by my statements that I made at the first, second, and third hearings. I said that I wanted to be excused
from answering the question. I beg to be excused from making any answer that might be incriminating in nature. However, in this answer, if the detail
of not remembering the name of the person has not been included, it is an oversight.
Sen. SUMULONG. Mr. Arnault, will you kindly answer a simple question: Do you remember or not the name of the person to whom you gave the
P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not remember .
Sen. SUMULONG. Now, if you do not remember the name of that person, how can you say that your answer might be incriminating? If you do not
remember his name, you cannot answer the question; so how could your answer be self-incriminating? What do you say to that?
Mr. ARNAULT. This is too complicated for me to explain. Please, I do not see how to answer those questions. That is why I asked for a lawyer, so he
can help me. I have no means of knowing what the situation is about. I have been in jail 13 days without communication with the outside. How could
I answer the question? I have no knowledge of legal procedure or rule, of which I am completely ignorant.
x x x x x x x x x
Sen. SUMULONG. Mr. President, I ask that the question be answered.
The PRESIDENT. The witness is ordered to answer the question. It is very clear. It does not incriminate the witness.
x x x x x x x x x
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not remember. I stand on my constitutional rights. I beg to be excused from making further answer, please.
Sen. SUMULONG. In that mimeographed letter that you sent addressed to the President of the Senate, dated May 2, 1950, you stated there that you
cannot reveal the name of the person to whom you gave the P440,000 because if he is a public official you might render yourself liable for
prosecution for bribery, and that if he is a private individual you might render yourself liable for prosecution for slander. Why did you make those
statements when you cannot even tell us whether that person to whom you gave the P440,000 is a public official or a private individual We are
giving you this chance to convince the Senate that all these allegations of yours that your answers might incriminate you are given by you honestly or
you are just trying to make a pretext for not revealing the information desired by the Senate.
The PRESIDENT. You are ordered to answer the question.
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not even understand the question. (The question is restated and explained.)
Mr. ARNAULT. That letter of May 2, was prepared by a lawyer for me and signed it. That is all I can say how I stand about this letter. I have no
knowledge myself enough to write such a letter, so I had to secure the help of a lawyer to help me in my period of distress.
In that same session of the Senate before which the petitioner was called to show cause why he should not be adjudged guilty of contempt of the
Senate, Senator Sumulong propounded to the petitioner questions tending to elicit information from him as to the identity of the person to whom he
delivered the P440,000; but the petitioner refused to reveal it by saying that he did not remember. The President of the Senate then propounded to
him various questions concerning his past activities dating as far back as when witness was seven years of age and ending as recently as the post
liberation period, all of which questions the witness answered satisfactorily. In view thereof, the President of the Senate also made an attempt to illicit
the desired information from the witness, as follows:
The PRESIDENT. Now I am convinced that you have a good memory. Answer: Did you deliver the P440,000 as a gift, or of any consideration?
Mr. ARNAULT. I have said that I had instructions to deliver it to that person, that is all.
The PRESIDENT. Was it the first time you saw that person?
Mr. ARNAULT. I saw him various times, I have already said.
The PRESIDENT. In spite of that, you do not have the least remembrance of the name of that person?
Mr. ARNAULT. I cannot remember.
The PRESIDENT. How is it that you do not remember events that happened a short time ago and, on the other hand, you remember events that
occurred during your childhood?
Mr. ARNAULT. I cannot explain.
The Senate then deliberated and adopted the resolution of May 15 hereinabove quoted whereby the petitioner was committed to the custody of the
Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned until "he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate or to the aforesaid Special Committee the
name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith."
The Senate also adopted on the same date another resolution (No. 16) , to wit:
That the Special Committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8 be empowered and directed to continue its investigation of the Tambobong and
Buenavista Estates deal of October 21, 1949, more particularly to continue the examination of Jean L. Arnault regarding the name of the person to
whom he gave the P440,000 and other matters related therewith.
The first session of the Second Congress was adjourned at midnight on May 18, 1950.
The case was argued twice before us. We have given its earnest and prolonged consideration because it is the first of its kind to arise since the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines was adopted. For the first time this Court is called upon to define the power of either House of
Congress to punish a person not a member for contempt; and we are fully conscious that our pronouncements here will set an important precedent
for the future guidance of all concerned.
Before discussing the specific issues raised by the parties, we deem it necessary to lay down the general principles of law which form the
background of those issues.
Patterned after the American system, our Constitution vests the powers of the Government in three independent but coordinate Departments
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. The legislative power is vested in the Congress, which consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
(Section 1, Article VI.) Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence
of two-thirds of all its Members, expel a Member. (Section 10, Article VI.) The judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and in such inferior
courts as may be established by law. (Section 1, Article VIII.) Like the Constitution of the United States, ours does not contain an express provision
empowering either of the two Houses of Congress to punish nonmembers for contempt. It may also be noted that whereas in the United States the
legislative power is shared by and between the Congress of the United States, on the one hand, and the respective legislatures of the different
States, on the other the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to States being reserved to the States,
respectively, or to the people in the Philippines, the legislative power is vested in the Congress of the Philippines alone. It may therefore be said
that the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than the Congress of the United States or any State Legislature. Our form
of Government being patterned after the American system the framers of our Constitution having drawn largely from American institutions and
practices we can, in this case, properly draw also from American precedents in interpreting analogous provisions of our Constitution, as we have
done in other cases in the past. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry
with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to effect or change; and where the legislative body
does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience
has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or
complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. (McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S., 135; 71 L. ed., 580; 50 A.L R., 1.)
The fact that the Constitution expressly gives to Congress the power to punish its Members for disorderly behavior, does not by necessary
implication exclude the power to punish for contempt any other person. (Anderson vs. Dunn, 6, Wheaton, 204; 5 L. ed., 242.) But no person can be
punished for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless his testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to
inquire. (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377.)
Since, as we have noted, the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than either the Congress of the United States or a
State Legislature, we think it is correct to say that the field of inquiry into which it may enter is also wider. It would be difficult to define any limits by
which the subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded. It is not necessary to do so in this case. Suffice it to say that it must be coextensive with the
range of the legislative power.
In the present case the jurisdiction of the Senate, thru the Special Committee created by it, to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates
deal is not challenged by the petitioner; and we entertain no doubt as to the Senate's authority to do so and as to the validity of Resolution No. 8
hereinabove quoted. The transaction involved a questionable and allegedly unnecessary and irregular expenditure of no less than P5,000,000 of
public funds, of which Congress is the constitutional guardian. It also involved government agencies created by Congress to regulate or even
abolish. As a result of the yet uncompleted investigation, the investigating committee has recommended and the Senate approved three bills (1)
prohibiting the Secretary of Justice or any other department head from discharging functions and exercising powers other than those attached to his
own office, without ]previous congressional authorization; (2) prohibiting brothers and near relatives of any President of the Philippines from
intervening directly or indirectly and in whatever capacity in transactions in which the Government is a party, more particularly where the decision lies
in the hands of executive or administrative officers who are appointees of the President; and (3) providing that purchases of the Rural Progress
Administration of big landed estates at a price of P100,000 or more, shall not become effective without previous congressional confirmation.
[[
2
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We shall now consider and pass upon each of the questions raised by the petitioner in support of his contention that his commitment is unlawful.
First He contends that the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000, because such information is immaterial to, and will not serve, any intended or purported legislation and his refusal to answer the question
has not embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the legislative process. It is argued that since the investigating committee has already rendered its
report and has made all its recommendations as to what legislative measures should be taken pursuant to its findings, there is no necessity to force
the petitioner to give the information desired other than that mentioned in its report, to wit: "In justice to Judge Quirino and to Secretary Nepomuceno,
this atmosphere of suspicion that now pervades the public mind must be dissipated, and it can only be done if appropriate steps are taken by the
Senate to compel Arnault to stop pretending that he cannot remember the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 and answer the
questions which will definitely establish the identity of that person . . ." Senator Sumulong, Chairman of the Committee, who appeared and argued
the case for the respondents, denied that that was the only purpose of the Senate in seeking the information from the witness. He said that the
investigation had not been completed, because, due to the contumacy of the witness, his committee had not yet determined the parties responsible
for the anomalous transaction as required by Resolution No. 8; that, by Resolution No. 16, his committee was empowered and directed to continue
its investigation, more particularly to continue its examination of the witness regarding the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 and
other matters related therewith; that the bills recommended by his committee had not been approved by the House and might not be approved
pending the completion of the investigation; and that those bills were not necessarily all the measures that Congress might deem it necessary to
pass after the investigation is finished.
Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, we think the investigating committee has the
power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The
inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the
Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must
be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. So a witness may not be coerced to answer a question that obviously has no
relation to the subject of the inquiry. But from this it does not follow that every question that may be propounded to a witness must be material to any
proposed or possible legislation. In other words, the materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to any proposed or possible
legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are determined
by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single
question.
In this connection, it is suggested by counsel for the respondents that the power of the Court is limited to determining whether the legislative body
has jurisdiction to institute the inquiry or investigation; that once that jurisdiction is conceded, this Court cannot control the exercise of that
jurisdiction; and it is insinuated, that the ruling of the Senate on the materiality of the question propounded to the witness is not subject to review by
this Court under the principle of the separation of powers. We have to qualify this proposition. As was said by the Court of Appeals of New York: "We
are bound to presume that the action of the legislative body was with a legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and we have no right to
assume that the contrary was intended." (People ex rel. McDonald vs. Keeler, 99 N.Y., 463; 52 Am. Rep., 49; 2 N.E., 615, quoted with approval by
the Supreme Court of the United States in the said case of McGrain vs. Daugherty, it is necessary deduction from the decision in Re Chapman, 41 L.
ed., 1154, that where the questions are not pertinent to the matter under inquiry a witness rightfully may refuse to answer. So we are of the opinion
that where the alleged immateriality of the information sought by the legislative body from a witness is relied upon to contest its jurisdiction, the court
is in duty bound to pass upon the contention. The fact that the legislative body has jurisdiction or the power to make the inquiry would not preclude
judicial intervention to correct a clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of that power.
Applying the criterion laid down in the last two preceding paragraphs to the resolution of the issue under consideration, we find that the question for
the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot
be disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner, requires the Special Committee, among other things,
to determine the parties responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of the person to whom the
witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to that determination it is in fact the very thing sought to be determined. The
contention is not that the question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation or materiality to any proposed legislation. We
have already indicated that it is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question propounded to a witness is material to any
proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
It is said that the Senate has already approved the three bills recommended by the Committee as a result of the uncompleted investigation and that
there is no need for it to know the name of the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000. But aside from the fact that those bills have not yet
been approved by the lower house and by the President and that they may be withdrawn or modified if after the inquiry is completed they should be
found unnecessary or inadequate, there is nothing to prevent the Congress from approving other measures it may deem necessary after completing
the investigation. We are not called upon, nor is it within our province, to determine or imagine what those measures may be. And our inability to do
so is no reason for overruling the question propounded by the Senate to the witness.
The case of Re Chapman , 166 U.S., 661; 41 L. ed., 1154, is in point here. The inquiry there in question was conducted under a resolution of the
Senate and related to charges, published in the press, that senators were yielding to corrupt influences in considering a tariff bill then before the
Senate and were speculating in stocks the value of which would be affected by pending amendments to the bill. Chapman, a member of a firm of
stock brokers dealing in the stock of the American Sugar Refining Company, appeared before the committee in response to a subpoena and asked,
among others, the following questions:
Had the firm, during the month of March, 1894, bought or sold any stock or securities, known as sugar stocks, for or in the interest, directly or
indirectly, of any United Senate senator?
Was the said firm at that time carrying any sugar stock for the benefit of, or in the interest, directly or indirectly, of any United Senate senator?
He refused to answer the questions and was prosecuted under an Act of Congress for contempt of the Senate. Upon being convicted and sent to jail
he petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of habeas corpus. One of the questions decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States in that case was whether the committee had the right to compel the witness to answer said questions, and the Court held that the committee
did have such right, saying:
The questions were undoubtedly pertinent to the subject-matter of the inquiry. The resolution directed the committee to inquire whether any senator
has been, or is, speculating in what are known as sugar stocks during the consideration of the tariff bill now before the Senate." What the Senate
might or might not do upon the facts when ascertained, we cannot say, nor are we called upon to inquire whether such ventures might be defensible,
as contended in argument, but is plain that negative answers would have cleared that body of what the Senate regarded as offensive imputations,
while affirmative answers might have led to further action on the part of the Senate within its constitutional powers. (Emphasis supplied.)
It may be contended that the determination of the parties responsible for the deal is incumbent upon the judicial rather than upon the legislative
branch. But we think there is no basis in fact or in law for such assumption. The petitioner has not challenged the validity of Senate Resolution No. 8,
and that resolution expressly requires the committee to determine the parties responsible for the deal. We are bound to presume that the Senate has
acted in the due performance of its constitutional function in instituting the inquiry, if the act is capable of being so construed. On the other hand,
there is no suggestion that the judiciary has instituted an inquiry to determine the parties responsible for the deal. Under the circumstances of the
case, it appearing that the questioned transaction was affected by the head of the Department of Justice himself, it is not reasonable to expect that
the Fiscal or the Court of First Instance of Manila will take the initiative to investigate and prosecute the parties responsible for the deal until and
unless the Senate shall determined those parties are and shall taken such measures as may be within its competence to take the redress the wrong
that may have been committed against the people as a result of the transaction. As we have said, the transaction involved no less than P5,000,000
of public funds. That certainly is a matter of a public concern which it is the duty of the constitutional guardian of the treasury to investigate.
If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness
called relates to that subject, obedience, to its process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment. (Sullivan vs. Hill, 73 W. Va., 49; 79 S.E.,
670; 40 Ann. Cas. [1916 B.], 1115.)
The decision in the case of Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377, relied upon by the petitioner, is not applicable here. In that case the inquiry
instituted by the House of Representatives of the United States related to a private real-estate pool or partnership in the District of Columbia. Jay
Cook and Company had had an interest in the pool but become bankrupts, and their estate was in course of administration in a federal bankruptcy
court in Pennsylvania. The United States was one of their creditors. The trustee in the bankruptcy proceeding had effected a settlement of the
bankrupts' interest in the pool, and of course his action was subject to examination and approval or disapproval by the bankruptcy court. Some of the
creditors, including the United States, were dissatisfied with the settlement. The resolution of the House directed the Committee "to inquire into the
nature and history of said real-estate pool and the character of said settlement, with the amount of property involve, in which Jay Cooke and Co.
were interested, and the amount paid or to be paid in said settlement, with power to send for persons and papers, and report to this House." The
Supreme Court of the United States, speaking thru Mr. Justice Miller, pointed out that the resolution contained no suggestion of contemplated
legislation; that the matter was one in respect of which no valid legislation could be had; that the bankrupts' estate and the trustee's settlement were
still pending in the bankruptcy court; and that the United States and other creditors were free to press their claims in that proceeding. And on these
grounds the court held that in undertaking the investigation "the House of Representatives not only exceeded the limit of its own authority, but
assumed a power which could only be properly exercised by another branch of the government, because the power was in its nature clearly judicial."
The principles announced and applied in that case are: that neither House of Congress possesses a "general power of making inquiry into the
private affairs of the citizen"; that the power actually possessed is limited to inquires relating to matters of which the particular House has jurisdiction,
and in respect of which it rightfully may take other action; that if the inquiry relates to a matter wherein relief or redress could be had only by judicial
proceeding, it is not within the range of this power , but must be left to the court, conformably to the constitutional separation of government powers.
That case differs from the present case in two important respects: (1) There the court found that the subject of the inquiry, which related to a private
real-estate pool or partnership, was not within the jurisdiction of either House of Congress; while here if it is not disputed that the subject of the
inquiry, which relates to a transaction involving a questionable expenditure by the Government of P5,000,000 of public funds, is within the jurisdiction
of the Senate, (2) There the claim of the Government as a creditor of Jay Cooke and Company, which had had an interest in the pool, was pending
adjudication by the court; while here the interposition of the judicial power on the subject of the inquiry cannot be expected, as we have pointed out
above, until after the Senate shall have determined who the parties responsible are and shall have taken such measures as may be within its
competence to take to redress the wrong that may have been committed against the people as a result of the transaction.
It is interesting to note that the decision in the case of Killbourn vs. Thompson has evoked strong criticisms from legal scholars. (See Potts, Power of
Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt [1926], 74 U. Pa. L. Rev., 692-699; James L. Land is, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional
Power of Investigation [1926], 40 Harvard L. Rev., 153, 154, 214-220.) We quoted the following from Professor Land is' criticism: "Mr. Justice Miller
saw the case purely as an attempt by the House to secure to the Government certain priority rights as creditor of the bankrupt concern. To him it
assumed the character of a lawsuit between the Government and Jay Cooke and Co., with the Government, acting through the House, attempting to
override the orderliness of established procedure and thereby prefer a creditors' bill not before the courts but before Congress. That bankruptcy
proceedings had already been instituted against Jay Cooke and Co., in a federal court gave added impetus to such a conception. The House was
seeking to oust a court of prior acquired jurisdiction by an extraordinary and unwarranted assumption of "judicial power"! The broader aspect of the
investigation had not been disclosed to the Court. That Jay Cooke and Co.'s indebtedness and the particular funds in question were only part of the
great administrative problem connected with the use and disposition of public monies, that the particular failure was of consequence mainly in
relation to the security demanded for all government deposits, that the facts connected with one such default revealed the possibility of other and
greater maladministration, such considerations had not been put before the Court. Nor had it been acquainted with the every-day nature of the
particular investigation and the powers there exerted by the House, powers whose exercise was customary and familiar in legislative practice.
Instead of assuming the character of an extraordinary judicial proceeding, the inquiry, place in its proper background, should have been regarded as
a normal and customary part of the legislative process. Detailed definiteness of legislative purpose was thus made the demand of the court in
Killbournvs. Thompson. But investigators cannot foretell the results that may be achieved. The power of Congress to exercise control over a real-
estate pool is not a matter for abstract speculation but one to be determined only after an exhaustive examination of the problem. Relationship, and
not their possibilities, determine the extent of congressional power. Constitutionality depends upon such disclosures. Their presence, whether
determinative of legislative or judicial power, cannot be relegated to guesswork. Neither Congress nor the Court can predict, prior to the event, the
result of the investigation."
The other case relied upon by the petitioner is Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U.S., 521; 61. ed., 881. The question there was whether the House of
Representatives exceeded its power in punishing, as for contempt of its authority, the District Attorney of the Southern District of New York, who had
written, published, and sent to the chairman of one of its committees an ill-tempered and irritating letter respecting the action and purposes of the
committee in interfering with the investigation by the grand jury of alleged illegal activities of a member of the House of Representatives. Power to
make inquires and obtain evidence by compulsory process was not involved. The court recognized distinctly that the House of Representatives had
implied power to punish a person not a member for contempt, but held that its action in this instance was without constitutional justification. The
decision was put on the ground that the letter, while offensive and vexatious, was not calculated or likely to affect the House in any of its proceedings
or in the exercise of any of its functions. This brief statement of the facts and the issues decided in that case is sufficient to show the inapplicability
thereof to the present case. There the contempt involved consisted in the district attorney's writing to the chairman of the committee an offensive and
vexatious letter, while here the contempt involved consists in the refusal of the witness to answer questions pertinent to the subject of an inquiry
which the Senate has the power and jurisdiction to make . But in that case, it was recognized that the House of Representatives has implied power
to punish a person not a member of contempt. In that respect the case is applicable here in favor of the Senate's (and not of the Petitioner's )
contention.
Second. It is next contended for the petitioner that the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative
session, which ended on May 18, 1950. This contention is based on the opinion of Mr. Justice Malcolm, concurred in by Justices Street and Villa-
Real, in the case of Lopez vs. De los Reyes (1930), 55 Phil., 170. In that case it appears that on October 23, 1929, Candido Lopez assaulted a
member of the House of Representatives while the latter was going to the hall of the House of Representatives to attend the session which was then
about to begin, as a result of which assault said representative was unable to attend the sessions on that day and those of the two days next
following by reason of the threats which Candido Lopez made against him. By the resolution of the House adopted November 6, 1929, Lopez was
declared guilty of contempt of the House of Representatives and ordered punished by confinement in Bilibid Prison for a period of twenty-four hours.
That resolution was not complied with because the session of the House of Representatives adjourned at midnight on November 8, 1929, and was
reiterated at the next session on September 16, 1930. Lopez was subsequently arrested, whereupon he applied for the writ of habeas corpus in the
Court of First Instance of Manila, which denied the application. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, six justices voted to grant the writ: Justice
Malcolm, Street, and Villa-real, on the ground that the term of imprisonment meted out to the petitioner could not legally be extended beyond the
session of the body in which the contempt occurred; and Justices Johns, Villamor, and Ostrand, on the ground that the Philippine Legislature had no
power to punish for contempt because it was a creature merely of an Act of the Congress of the United States and not of a Constitution adopted by
the people. Chief Justice Avancea, Justice Johnson, and Justice Romualdez wrote separate opinions, concurring with Justice Malcolm, Street, and
Villa-Real, that the Legislature had inherent power to punish for contempt but dissenting from the opinion that the order of commitment could only be
executed during the particular session in which the act of contempt was committed.
Thus, on the question under consideration, the Court was equally divided and no decisive pronouncement was made. The opinion of Mr. Justice
Malcolm is based mainly on the following passage in the case of Anderson vs. Dunn, supra:
And although the legislative power continues perpetual, the legislative body ceases to exist on the moment of its adjournment or periodical
dissolution. It follows that imprisonment must terminate with that adjournment.
as well as on the following quotation from Marshall vs. Gordon, supra:
And the essential nature of the power also makes clear the cogency and application of the two limitations which were expressly pointed out in
Andersonvs. Dunn, supra, that is, that the power even when applied to subjects which justified its exercise is limited to imprisonment and such
imprisonment may not be extended beyond the session of the body in which the contempt occurred.
Interpreting the above quotations, Chief Justice Avancea held:
From this doctrine it follows, in my judgement, that the imposition of the penalty is limited to the existence of the legislative body, which ceases to
function upon its final periodical dissolution. The doctrine refers to its existence and not to any particular session thereof. This must be so, inasmuch
as the basis of the power to impose such penalty is the right which the Legislature has to self-preservation, and which right is enforceable during the
existence of the legislative body. Many causes might be conceived to constitute contempt to the Legislature, which would continue to be a menace to
its preservation during the existence of the legislative body against which contempt was committed.
If the basis of the power of the legislature to punish for contempt exists while the legislative body exercising it is in session, then that power and the
exercise thereof must perforce continue until the final adjournment and the election of its successor.
Mr. Justice Johnson's more elaborate opinion, supported by quotations from Cooley'sConstitutional Limitations and from Jefferson's Manual, is to the
same effect. Mr. Justice Romualdez said: "In my opinion, where as in the case before us, the members composing the legislative body against which
the contempt was committed have not yet completed their three-year term, the House may take action against the petitioner herein."
We note that the quotations from Anderson vs. Dunn and Marshall vs. Gordon relied upon by Justice Malcolm are obiter dicta. Anderson vs. Dunn
was an action of trespass against the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives of the United States for assault and battery and false
imprisonment. The plaintiff had been arrested for contempt of the House, brought before the bar of the House, and reprimanded by the Speaker, and
then discharged from custody. The question as to the duration of the penalty was not involved in that case. The question there was "whether the
House of Representatives can take cognizance of contempt committed against themselves, under any circumstances." The court there held that the
House of Representatives had the power to punish for contempt, and affirmed the judgment of the lower court in favor of the defendant. In
Marshall vs. Gordon, the question presented was whether the House had the power under the Constitution to deal with the conduct of the district
attorney in writing a vexatious letter as a contempt of its authority, and to inflict punishment upon the writer for such contempt as a matter of
legislative power. The court held that the House had no such power because the writing of the letter did not obstruct the performance of legislative
duty and did not endanger the preservation of the power of the House to carry out its legislative authority. Upon that ground alone, and not because
the House had adjourned, the court ordered the discharge of the petitioner from custody.
The case where the question was squarely decided is McGrain vs. Daugherty, supra. There it appears that the Senate had adopted a resolution
authorizing and directing a select committee of five senators to investigate various charges of misfeasance and nonfeasance in the Department of
Justice after Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty became its supervising head. In the course of the investigation the committee caused to be
served on Mally S. Daugherty, brother of Harry M. Daugherty and president of the Midland National Bank of Washington Court House, Ohio, a
subpoena commanding him to appear before it for the purpose of giving testimony relating to the subject under consideration. The witness failed to
appear without offering any excuse for his failure. The committee reported the matter to the Senate and the latter adopted a resolution, "That the
President of the Senate pro tempore issue his warrant commanding the Sergeant-at-Arms or his deputy to take into custody the body of the said
M.S. Daugherty wherever found, and to bring the said M.S. Daugherty before the bar of the Senate, then and there to answer such questions
pertinent to the matter under inquiry as the Senate may order the President of the Senate pro tempore to propound; and to keep the said M.S.
Daugherty in custody to await the further order of the Senate." Upon being arrested, the witness petitioned the federal court in Cincinnati for a writ
of habeas corpus. The federal court granted the writ and discharged the witness on the ground that the Senate, in directing the investigation and in
ordering the arrest, exceeded its power under the Constitution. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, one of the contentions of the
witness was that the case ha become moot because the investigation was ordered and the committee was appointed during the Sixty-eighth
Congress, which expired on March 4, 1926. In overruling the contention, the court said:
. . . The resolution ordering the investigation in terms limited the committee's authority to the period of the Sixty-eighth Congress; but this apparently
was changed by a later and amendatory resolution authorizing the committee to sit at such times and places as it might deem advisable or
necessary. It is said in Jefferson's Manual: "Neither House can continue any portion of itself in any parliamentary function beyond the end of the
session without the consent of the other two branches. When done, it is by a bill constituting them commissioners for the particular purpose." But the
context shows that the reference is to the two houses of Parliament when adjourned by prorogation or dissolution by the King. The rule may be the
same with the House of Representatives whose members are all elected for the period of a single Congress: but it cannot well be the same with the
Senate, which is a continuing body whose members are elected for a term of six years and so divided into classes that the seats of one third only
become vacant at the end of each Congress, two thirds always continuing into the next Congress, save as vacancies may occur through death or
resignation.
Mr. Hinds in his collection of precedents, says: "The Senate, as a continuing body, may continue its committees through the recess following the
expiration of a Congress;" and, after quoting the above statement from Jefferson's Manual, he says: "The Senate, however being a continuing body,
gives authority to its committees during the recess after the expiration of a Congress." So far as we are advised the select committee having this
investigation in charge has neither made a final report nor been discharged; nor has been continued by an affirmative order. Apparently its activities
have been suspended pending the decision of this case. But, be this as it may, it is certain that the committee may be continued or revived now by
motion to that effect, and if, continued or revived, will have all its original powers. This being so, and the Senate being a continuing body, the case
cannot be said to have become moot in the ordinary sense. The situation is measurably like that in Southern P. Terminal Co. vs. Interstate
Commerce Commission, 219 U. S., 498, 514-516; 55 L. ed., 310, 315, 316; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 279, where it was held that a suit to enjoin the
enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission did not become moot through the expiration of the order where it was capable of
repetition by the Commission and was a matter of public interest. Our judgment may yet be carried into effect and the investigation proceeded with
from the point at which it apparently was interrupted by reason of the habeas corpus proceedings. In these circumstances we think a judgment
should be rendered as was done in the case cited.
What has been said requires that the final order in the District Court discharging the witness from custody be reversed.
Like the Senate of the United States , the Senate of the Philippines is a continuing body whose members are elected for a term of six years and so
divided that the seats of only one-third become vacant every two years, two-thirds always continuing into the next Congress save as vacancies may
occur thru death or resignation. Members of the House of Representatives are all elected for a term of four years; so that the term of every Congress
is four years. The Second Congress of the Philippines was constituted on December 30, 1949, and will expire on December 30, 1953. The resolution
of the Senate committing the Petitioner was adopted during the first session of the Second Congress, which began on the fourth Monday of January
and ended in May 18, 1950.
Had said resolution of commitment been adopted by the House of Representatives, we think it could be enforced until the final adjournment of the
last session of the Second Congress in 1953. We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of
every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish
for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be
and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing
relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose
for which that the power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but logical to say
that the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the
periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in
cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
Mere reflection upon the situation at hand convinces us of the soundness of this proposition. The Senate has ordered an investigation of the
Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, which we have found it is within its competence to make. That investigation has not been completed
because of the refusal of the petitioner as a witness to answer certain questions pertinent to the subject of the inquiry. The Senate has empowered
the committee to continue the investigation during the recess. By refusing to answer the questions, the witness has obstructed the performance by
the Senate of its legislative function, and the Senate has the power to remove the obstruction by compelling the witness to answer the questions thru
restraint of his liberty until he shall have answered them. That power subsists as long as the Senate, which is a continuing body, persists in
performing the particular legislative function involved. To hold that it may punish the witness for contempt only during the session in which
investigation was begun, would be to recognize the right of the Senate to perform its function but at the same time to deny to it an essential and
appropriate means for its performance. Aside from this, if we should hold that the power to punish for contempt terminates upon the adjournment of
the session, the Senate would have to resume the investigation at the next and succeeding sessions and repeat the contempt proceedings against
the witness until the investigation is completed-an absurd, unnecessary, and vexatious procedure, which should be avoided.
As against the foregoing conclusion it is argued for the petitioner that the power may be abusively and oppressively exerted by the Senate which
might keep the witness in prison for life. But we must assume that the Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper bounds. And
if, contrary to this assumption, proper limitations are disregarded, the portals of this Court are always open to those whose rights might thus be
transgressed.
Third. Lastly, the petitioner invokes the privilege against self-incrimination. He contends that he would incriminate himself if he should reveal the
name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 if that person be a public official be (witness) might be accused of bribery, and if that person be a
private individual the latter might accuse him of oral defamation.
The ground upon which the witness' claim is based is too shaky, in firm, and slippery to afford him safety. At first he told the Committee that the
transactions were legal, that no laws were violated, and that all requisites had been replied with; but at the time he begged to be excused from
making answers "which might later be used against me." A little later he explained that although the transactions were legal he refused to answer
questions concerning them "because it violates the right of a citizen to privacy in his dealings with other people . . . I simply stand on my privilege to
dispose of the money that has been paid to me as a result of a legal transaction without having to account for the use of it." But after being
apparently convinced by the Committee that his position was untenable, the witness testified that, without securing any receipt, he turned over the
P440,000 to a certain person, a representative of Burt, in compliance with Burt's verbal instruction made in 1946; that as far as he know, that certain
person had nothing to do with the negotiations for the settlement of the Buenavista and Tambobong cases; that he had seen that person several
times before he gave him the P440,000 on October 29, 1949, and that since then he had seen him again two or three times, the last time being in
December, 1949, in Manila; that the person was a male, 39 to 40 years of age, between 5 feet, 2 inches and 5 feet, 6 inches in height. Butt the
witness would not reveal the name of that person on these pretexts: " I don't remember the name; he was a representative of Burt." "I am not sure; I
don't remember the name."
We are satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, what is the name of that person to whom you gave the P440,000? were
obviously false. His insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied
that he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave the P440,000 to a person to him unknown.
"Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify
would be so punishable." (12 Am. Jur., sec. 15, Contempt, pp. 399-400.) In the case of Mason vs. U.S., 61 L. ed., 1198, it appears that Mason was
called to testify before a grand jury engaged in investigating a charge of gambling against six other men. After stating that he was sitting at a table
with said men when they were arrested, he refused to answer two questions, claiming so to do might tend to incriminate him: (1) "Was there a game
of cards being played on this particular evening at the table at which you are sitting?" (2) "Was there a game of cards being played at another table
at this time?" The foreman of the grand jury reported the matter to the judge, who ruled "that each and all of said questions are proper and that the
answers thereto would not tend to incriminate the witness." Mason was again called and refused to answer the first question propounded to him, but,
half yielding to frustration, he said in response to the second question: "I don't know." In affirming the conviction for contempt, the Supreme Court of
the United States among other things said:
In the present case, the witness certainly were not relieved from answering merely because they declared that so to do might incriminate them. The
wisdom of the rule in this regard is well illustrated by the enforced answer, "I don't know ," given by Mason to the second question, after he had
refused to reply under a claim of constitutional privilege.
Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a representative of Burt in compliance with the
latter's verbal instruction, we find no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him. There is no
conflict of authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:
Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the Court. At least, it is not enough for the witness to say that the
answer will incriminate him. as he is not the sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the court,
from all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his general conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus
developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct answer to a question may criminate or not. . . . The fact that the testimony of a
witness may tend to show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional provision against self-
incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege by
reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person. ( 3 Wharton's Criminal Evidence,
11th ed., secs. 1135,1136.)
It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of the case whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer.
(People vs. Gonzo, 23 N.E. [2d], 210 [Ill. App., 1939].) A witness is not relieved from answering merely on his own declaration that an answer might
incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial judge to decide that question. (Mason vs. U.S., 244 U. S., 362; 61 L. ed., 1193, 1200.)
As against witness's inconsistent and unjustified claim to a constitutional right, is his clear duty as a citizen to give frank, sincere, and truthful
testimony before a competent authority. The state has the right to exact fulfillment of a citizen's obligation, consistent of course with his right under
the Constitution. The witness in this case has been vociferous and militant in claiming constitutional rights and privileges but patently recreant to his
duties and obligations to the Government which protects those rights under the law. When a specific right and a specific obligation conflict with each
other, and one is doubtful or uncertain while the other is clear and imperative, the former must give way to the latter. The right to life is one of the
most sacred that the citizen may claim, and yet the state may deprive him of it if he violates his corresponding obligation to respect the life of others.
As Mr. Justice Johnson said in Anderson vs. Dunn: "The wretch beneath the gallows may repine at the fate which awaits him, and yet it is not certain
that the laws under which he suffers were made for the security." Paraphrasing and applying that pronouncement here, the petitioner may not relish
the restraint of his liberty pending the fulfillment by him of his duty, but it is no less certain that the laws under which his liberty is restrained were
made for his welfare.
From all the foregoing, it follows that the petition must be denied, and it is so ordered, with costs.
Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
TUASON, J., dissenting:
The estates deal which gave the petitioner's examination by a committee of the Senate was one that aroused popular indignation as few cases of
graft and corruption have. The investigation was greeted with spontaneous outburst of applause by an outraged citizenry, and the Senate was rightly
commended for making the lead in getting at the bottom of an infamous transaction.
All the more necessary it is that we should approach the consideration of this case with circumspection, lest the influence of strong public passions
should get the batter of our judgment. It is trite to say that public sentiment fades into insignificance before a proper observance of constitutional
processes, the maintenance of the constitutional structure, and the protection of individual rights. Only thus can a government of laws, the foundation
stone of human liberty, be strengthened and made secure for that very public.
It is with these thoughts in mind that, with sincere regret, I am constrained to dissent.
The power of the legislative bodies under the American system of government to punish for contempt was at the beginning totally denied by some
courts and students of constitutional law, on the ground that this power is judicial in nature and belongs to the judiciary branch of the government
under the constitutional scheme. The point however is now settled in favor of the existence of the power. This rule is based on the necessity for the
attainment of the ends for which legislative body is created. Nor can the legitimacy of the purpose of the investigation which the Senate ordered in
this case be disputed. As a corollary, it was likewise legitimate and necessary for the committee to summon the petitioner with a command to
produce his books and documents, and to commit him to prison for his refusal or failure to obey the subpoena. And, finally, there is no question that
the arresting officers were fully justified in using necessary bodily force to bring him before the bar of the Senate when he feigned illness and stalled
for time in the mistaken belief that after the closing of the then current session of Congress he could go scot-free.
At the same time, there is also universal agreement that the power is not absolute. The disagreement lies in the extent of the power, and such
disagreement is to be found even between decisions of the same court. Anderson vs. Dunn, 6 Wheat., No. 204, may be said to have taken the most
liberal view of the legislature's authority and Kilbournvs. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, which partly overruled and qualified the former, the strictest. By
the most liberal standard the power is restricted "by considerations as to the nature of the inquiry, occasion, or action in connection with which the
contemptuous conduct has occurred." Punishment must be resorted to for the efficient exercise of the legislative function. Even Anderson vs. Dunn
speaks of the power as "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed."
Judged by any test, the question propounded to the witness does not, in my opinion, meet the constitutional requirement. It is obvious, I think, that
the query has nothing to do with any matter within the cognizance of the Congress. There is, on the contrary, positive suggestion that the question
has no relation to the contemplated legislation. The statement of the committee in its report that the information sought to be obtained would clear
the names of the persons suspected of having received the money, is, on the surface, the most or only plausible reason that can be advanced.
Assuming this to be the motive behind the question, yet little reflection will show that the same is beyond the scope of legislative authority and
prerogatives. It is outside the concern of the Congress to protect the honor of particular citizens except that of its own members' as a means of
preserving respect and confidence in that body. Moreover, the purported good intention must assume, if it is to materialize, that the persons under
suspicion are really innocent; for if they are not and the witness will tell the truth, the result will be to augment their disgrace rather than vindicate
their honor. This is all the more likely to happen because one of those persons, is judged from the committee's findings, the most likely one, to say
the least, who got the money.
If the process of deduction is pressed further, the reasonable conclusion seems to be that the object of the question is, to mention only one, to
prepare the way for a court action. The majority, decision indirectly admits or insinuates this to be the case. It says, "It appearing that the questioned
transaction was affected by the head of the Department of Justice himself, it is not reasonable to expect the fiscal or the Court of First Instance of
Manila will take the initiative to investigate and prosecute the parties responsible for the deal until and unless the Senate shall have determined who
those parties are and shall have taken such measures as may be within its competence to take, to redress the wrong that may have been committed
against the people as a result of the transaction." So here is an admission, implied if not express, that the Senate wants the witness to give names
because the fiscal or the courts will not initiate an action against parties who should be prosecuted. It is needless to say that the institution of a
criminal or civil suit is a matter that devolves upon other departments of the government, alien to the duties of the Congress to look after.
The Congress is at full liberty, of course, to make any investigation for the purpose of aiding the fiscal or the courts, but this liberty does not carry
with it the authority to imprison persons who refuse to testify.
In the intricacy and complexity of an investigation it is often impossible to foretell before its close what relation certain facts may bear on the final
results, and experience has shown that investigators and courts would do well to veer on the liberal side in the resolution of doubtful questions. But
the Senate is not now in the midst of an inquiry with the situation still in a fluid or tentative state. Now the facts are no longer confused. The
committee has finished its investigation and submitted its final report and the Senate has approved a bill on the bases of the facts found. All the
pertinent facts having been gathered, as is to be inferred from that the report and the nature of the Senate's action, every question, every fact, every
bit of testimony has taken a distinct meaning susceptible of concrete and definite evaluation; the task has been reduced to the simple process of
sifting the grain from the chaffs.
In the light of the committee's report and of the bill introduced and approved in the Senate, it seems quite plain that the express naming of the
recipient or recipients of the money is entirely unessential to anything the Senate has a right or duty to do in premises. Names may be necessary for
the purpose of criminal prosecution, impeachment or civil suit. In such proceedings, identities are essential. In some legislative investigations it is
important to know the names of public officials involved. But the particular disclosure sought of the petitioner here is immaterial to the proposed law.
It is enough for the Senate, for its own legitimate object, to learn how the Department of Justice had in the purchase, and to have a moral conviction
as to the identity of the person who benefited thereby. The need for such legislation and translated into the bill approved by the Senate is met by an
insight into a broad outline of the deal. To paraphrase the U.S. Supreme Court in Anderson vs. Dunn, although the passage was used in another
connection, legislation is a science of experiment and the relation between the legislator and the end does not have to be so direct as to strike the
eye of the former.
One of the proposed laws have prohibits brothers and near relatives of any president of the Philippines from intervening directly or indirectly in
transactions in which the Government is a party. It is stated that this is subject to change depending on the answer Arnault may give. This statement
is wide open to challenge.
If Arnault should Antonio Quirino it must be admitted that the bill would not be altered. But let us suppose that the witness will point to another man.
Will the result be any different? Will the Senate recall the bill? I can not perceive the slightest possibility of such eventuality. The pending bill was
framed on the assumption that Antonio Quirino was a party to the deal in question. As has been said, the committee entertains a moral conviction
that this brother of the President was the recipient of a share of the proceeds of sale. No amount of assurance by Arnault to the contrary would be
believed for truth. And, I repeat, the proposed legislation does not need for its justification legal evidence of Antonio Quirino's intervention in the
transaction.
All this in the first place. In the second place, it is not to be assumed that the present bill is aimed solely against Antonio Quirino whose relation to the
Administration is but temporary. It is more reasonable to presume that the proposed enactment is intended for all time and for all brothers of future
presidents, for in reality it is no more than an extension or enlargement of laws already found in the statute book which guard against temptations to
exploit official positions or influence to the prejudice of public interests.
The disputed question is, in fact, not only irrelevant but moot. This is decisive of the irrelevancy of this question. As has been noticed, the committee
has submitted its final report and recommendation, and a bill has been approved by the Senate calculated to prevent recurrence of the anomalies
exposed. For the purpose for which it was instituted the inquiry is over and the committee's mission accomplished.
It is true that the committee continues to sit during the recess of Congress, but it is obvious from all the circumstances that the sole and real object of
the extension of the committee's sittings is to receive the witness' answer in the event he capitulates. I am unable to see any new phase of the deal
which the Senate could legitimately wish to know, and the respondents and this Court have not pointed out any. That the committee has not sat and
nothing has been done so far except to wait for Arnault's answer is a convincing manifestation of the above conclusion.
The order "to continue its investigation" contained in Senate Resolution No. 16 cannot disguise the realities revealed by the Senate's actions already
referred to and by the emphasis given to the instruction "to continue its (committee's) examination of Jean L. Arnault regarding the name of the
person to whom he gave the P440,000." The instruction 'to continue the investigation' is not entitled to the blind presumption that it embraces matters
other than the revelation by the witness of the name of the person who got the money. Jurisdiction to deprive a citizen of liberty outside the usual
process is not acquired by innuendoes or vague assertions of the facts on which jurisdiction is made to depend. If the judgment of the court of law of
limited jurisdiction does not enjoy the presumption of legality, much less can the presumption of regularity be invoked for a resolution of a
deliberative body whose power to inflict punishment upon private citizens is wholly derived by implication and vehemently contested by some judges.
At any rate, "the stronger presumption of innocence attends accused at the trial", "and it is incumbent" upon the respondents "to show that the
question pertains to some matter under investigation." (Sinclair vs.U. S., 73 L. ed., 693.) This rule stems from the fact that the power is in derogation
of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, which presupposes " a trial in
which the rights of the parties shall be decided by a tribunal appointed by law, which tribunal is to governed by rules of law previously established."
Powers so dangerous to the liberty of a citizen can not be allowed except where the pertinence is clear. A Judge who abuses such power may be
impeached and he acts at all times under the sense of this accountability and responsibility. His victims may be reached by the pardoning power. But
if the Congress be allowed this unbounded jurisdiction of discretion, there is no redress, The Congress may dispoil of a citizen's life, liberty or
property and there is no power on earth to stop its hand. There is, there can be, no such unlimited power in any department of the government of the
Republic. (Loan Association vs. Topeka, 20 Wall, Nos. 662, 663; Taylor vs. Porter, 4 Hill No. N.Y. 140.)
The above rule and discussion apply with equal force to the instruction to the committee in the original resolution, "to determine the parties
responsible for the deal." It goes without saying that the congress cannot authorize a committee to do what it itself cannot do. In other words, the`
Senate could not insist on the disclosure of Arnault's accomplice in the present state of the investigation if the Senate were conducting the inquiry
itself instead of through a committee.
Our attention is called to the fact that "in the Philippines, the legislative power is vested in the Congress of the Philippines alone, and therefore that
the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than the Congress of the United States or any state legislature." From this
premise the inference is drawn that " the field of inquiry into it (Philippine Congress) may enter is also wider."
This argument overlooks the important fact that congressional or legislative committees both here and in the Unived States, do not embark upon
fishing expeditions in search of information which by chance may be useful to legislation. Inquiries entrusted to congressional committee, whether
here or in the United States, are necessarily for specific objects within the competence of the Congress to look into. I do not believe any reason, rule
or principle could be found which would sustain the theory that just because the United States Congress or a state legislature could legislate on, say,
only ten subjects and the Philippine Congress on twenty, the latter's power to commit to prison for contempt is proportionately as great as that of the
former. In the consideration of the legality of an imprisonment for the contempt by each House, the power is gauged not be the greater or lesser
number of subject matters that fall within its sphere of action, but by the answer to the question, has it jurisdiction over the matter under
investigation? Bearing this distinction in mind, it is apparent that the power of a legislature to punish for contempt can be no greater nor less than that
of any other. Were it possible for the Philippine Senate and the United States Senate to undertake an investigation of exactly identical anomalies in
their respective departments of justice, could it be asserted with any support of logic that one Senate has a wider authority to imprison for contempt
in such investigation simply because it has a "wider range of legislative field?"
It is said that the Senate bill has not been acted upon by the lower house and that even if it should pass in that chamber it would still have the
President's veto to hurdle. It has been expressly stated at the oral argument, and there is insinuation in this Court's decision, that the revelation of
the name or names of the person or persons who received the money may help in convincing the House of Representatives or the President of the
wisdom of the pending measure. Entirely apart from the discussion that the House of Representatives and the Chief Executive have their own idea of
what they need to guide them in the discharge of their respective duties, and they have the facilities of their own for obtaining the requisite data.
There is another objection, more fundamental, to the Senate invoking the interest or convenience of the other House or the President as ground of
jurisdiction. The House of Representatives and the President are absolutely independent of the Senate, in the conduct of legislative and
administrative inquiries, and the power of each House to imprison for contempt does not go beyond the necessity for its own self-preservation or for
making its express powers effective. Each House exercises this power to protect or accomplish its own authority and not that of the other House or
the President. Each House and the President are supposed to take care of their respective affairs. The two Houses and the Chief Executive act
separately although the concurrence of the three is required in the passage of legislation and of both Houses in the approval of resolutions. As the
U.S. Supreme Court in Kilbourn vs. Thompson, said, "No general power of inflicting punishment by the Congress (as distinct from a House is found
in the Constitution." "An act of Congress it said which proposed to adjudge a man guilty of a crime and inflict the punishment, will be
considered by all thinking men to be unauthorized by the Constitution."
Kilbourn vs. Thompson, supra, it is said can not be relied on in this case as a precedent because, so it is also said, "the subject of the inquiry, which
related to a private real-estate pool or partnership, was not within the jurisdiction of either House of Congress; while here it is not disputed that the
subject of the inquiry, which relates to a transaction involving a questionable expenditure by the Government of P5,000,000 of public funds, is within
the Jurisdiction of the Senate." Yet the remarks of Judge Land is which are quoted in the majority decision point out that the inquiry "was a normal
and customary part of the legislative process." Moreover, Kilbourn vs. Thompson is important, not for the matter it treated but for the principles it
enunciated.
It is also said that Kilbourn vs. Thompson did not meet with universal approval as Judge Land is' article above mentioned shows. The jurist who
delivered the opinion in that case, Mr. Justice Miller, was one of the "giants" who have ever sat on the Supreme Federal Bench, venerated and
eminent for the width and depth of his learning. Subsequent decisions, as far as I have been able to ascertain, have not rejected or criticized but
have followed it, and it still stands as a landmark in this branch of constitutional law.
If we can lean on private opinions and magazine articles for comfort, the petitioner can cite one by a legal scholar and author no less reknown and
respected than Judge Land is. I refer to Judge Wigmore who, referring to an investigation of the U.S. Department of Justice said in an article
published in 19 (1925) Illinois Law Review, 452:
The senatorial debauch of investigations poking into political garbage cans and dragging the sewers of political intrigue filled the winter of
1923-24 with a stench which has not yet passed away. Instead of employing the constitutional, manly, fair procedure of impeachment, the Senate
flung self-respect and fairness to the winds. As a prosecutor, the Senate presented a spectacle which cannot even be dignified by a comparison with
the persecutive scoldings of Coke and Scroggs and Jeffreys, but fell rather in popular estimate to the level of professional searchers of the municipal
dunghills.
It is far from my thought to subscribe to this vituperation as applied to our Senate. Certainly, this august body said not only do the right thing but is
entitled to the lasting gratitude of the people for taking the courageous stand it did in probing into an anomaly that robbed a depleted treasury of a
huge amount. I have tried to make it clear that my disagreement with the majority lies not in the propriety or constitutionality of the investigation but in
the pertinence to that investigation of a single question. The investigation, as had been said, was legal and commendable. My objection is that the
Senate having started within the bounds of its authority, has, in entire good faith, overstepped those bounds and trespassed on a territory reserved
to other branches of the government, when it imprisoned a witness for contumacy on a point that is unimportant, useless, impertinent and irrelevant,
let alone moot.
Thus understood, this humble opinion does not conflict with the views of Judge Land is and all other advocates of wide latitude for congressional
investigations. All are agreed, and the majority accept the proposition, that there is a limit to the legislative power to punish for contempt. The limit is
set in Anderson vs. Dunn which Judge Land is approved "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed."






















VICENTE SOTTO (January 21, 1949)
In re VICENTE SOTTO, for contempt of court.
Vicente Sotto in his own behalf.
FERIA, J.:
This is a proceeding for contempt of our court against the respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto, who was required by their Court on December 7, 1948, to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt to court for having issued a written statement in connection with the decision of this Court
in In re Angel Parazo for contempt of court, which statement, as published in the Manila Times and other daily newspapers of the locality, reads as
follows:
As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53.) interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a
local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a news published in his paper, I regret to
say that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency of
narrow mindedness o the majority of its members, In the wake of so many mindedness of the majority deliberately committed during these
last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To his effect, I
announce that one of the first measures, which as its objects the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, a
constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: the Supreme Court very of
today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo
and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary.
Upon his request, the respondent was granted ten days more besides the five originally given him to file his answer, and although his answer was
filed after the expiration of the period of time given him the said answer was admitted. This Court could have rendered a judgment for contempt after
considering his answer, because he does not deny the authenticity of the statement as it has been published. But, in order to give the respondent
ample opportunity to defend himself or justify the publication of such libelous statement, the case was set for hearing or oral argument on January 4,
the hearing being later postponed to January 10, 1949. As the respondent did not appear at the date set for hearing, the case was submitted for
decision.
In his answer, the respondent does not deny having published the above quoted threat, and intimidation as well as false and calumnious charges
against this Supreme Court. But he therein contends that under section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon this Supreme Court
the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, "this Court has no power to impose correctional penalties upon the
citizens, and that the Supreme Court can only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to be promulgated by Congress with the
approval of the Chief Executive." And he also alleges in his answer that "in the exercise of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution, the
respondent made his statement in the press with the utmost good faith and with no intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable
members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion, erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked, or intended to attack the honesty
or integrity of any one.' The other arguments set forth by the respondent in his defenses observe no consideration.
Rules 64 of the rules promulgated by this court does not punish as for contempt of court an act which was not punishable as such under the law and
the inherent powers of the court to punish for contempt. The provisions of section 1 and 3 of said Rule 64 are a mere reproduction of section 231 and
232 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, amended, in connection with the doctrine laid down by this Court on the inherent power if the
superior courts to punish for contempt is several cases, among them In re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944. That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all
courts of superior statue, is a doctrine or principle uniformly accepted and applied by the courts of last resort in the United States, which is applicable
in this jurisdiction since our Constitution and courts of justice are patterned as expounded in American Jurisprudence is as follows:
The power of inflicting punishment upon persons guilty of contempt of court may be regarded as an essential element of judicial authority,
IT is possessed as a part of the judicial authority granted to courts created by the Constitution of the United States or by the Constitutions
of the several states. It is a power said to be inherent in all courts general jurisdiction, whether they are State or Federal; such power exists
in courts of general jurisdiction independently of any special express grant of statute. In many instances the right of certain courts of
tribunals to punish for contempt is expressly bestowed by statue, but such statutory authorization is unnecessary, so far as the courts of
general jurisdiction are concerned, and in general adds nothing statutory authority may be necessary as concerns the inferior courts
statutory authority may be necessary to empower them to act. (Contempt, 12 Jur., pp. 418, 419.)
In conformity with the principle enunciated in the above quotation from American Jurisprudence, this Court, in In reKelly, held the following:
The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause, respecting the same, has always been considered as
misbehavior, tending to obstruct the administration of justice, and subjects such persons to contempt proceedings. Parties have a
constitutional right to have their fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public clamor. Every citizen has a
profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts, under the protection and
forms of law, free from outside coercion or interference. Any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the upon court, the parties, the
officers of the court, the counsel, etc., with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court
and is punishable. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all court. The summary power to commit and punish for contempt
tending to obstructed or degrade the administration of justice, as inherent in courts as essential to the execution of their powers and to the
maintenance of their authority is a part of the law of the land. (In reKelly, 35 Phil., 944, 945.)
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good
faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well
taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or modifying its decision. Had the respondent in the present
case limited himself to as statement that our decision is wrong or that our construction of the intention of the law is not correct, because it is different
from what he, as proponent of the original bill which became a law had intended, his criticism might in that case be tolerated, for it could not in any
way influence the final disposition of the Parazo case by the court; inasmuch as it is of judicial notice that the bill presented by the respondent was
amended by both Houses of Congress, and the clause "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the State" was
added or inserted; and that, as the Act was passed by Congress and not by any particular member thereof, the intention of Congress and not that of
the respondent must be the one to be determined by this Court in applying said act.
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press, the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the
decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is pending reconsideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to
intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the
Supreme Court and reducing the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members of Justices from eleven to seven, so as to
change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to
influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks
the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration
of justice, for in his above-quoted statement he says:
In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end
to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce that one of the first measures, which I will
introduce in the coming congressional sessions, will have as its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now the
Supreme Court of today constitutes a constant peril to liberty and democracy.
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately "so many blunders and injustices," that is to say, that it
has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the
decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the
honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme
Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or
protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this
Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps
chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very
shaky foundation.
Respondent's assertion in his answer that "he made his statement in the press with the utmost good faith and without intention of offending any of
the majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal," if true may mitigate but not exempt him from liability for contempt of court; but it is
belied by his acts and statements during the pendency of this proceeding. The respondent in his petition of December 11, alleges that Justice
Gregorio Perfecto is the principal promoter of this proceeding for contempt, conveying thereby the idea that this Court acted in the case through the
instigation of Mr. Justice Perfecto.
It is true that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and the press must be protected to its fullest extent, but license or abuse of liberty of
the press and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the
free exercise of the right of the citizen, is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary. As Judge Holmes very appropriately said U.
S vs Sullens (1929), 36 Fed. (2nd), 230, 238, 239: "The administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and distinct, are
equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press and the courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to
uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its prerogatives and the latter its jurisdiction. The right of legitimate
publicity must be scrupulously recognized and care taken at all times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary, in order to
dispose of judicial business unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the
administration of justice, this court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish for contempt. This Court must be permitted to proceed
with the disposition if its business in an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be
insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as a individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence
as an unprejudiced tribunal. . . ."
It is also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the
courts, he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L. R. A. [N.S.], 586, 594).
In view of all the foregoing, we find the respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto guilty of contempt of this Court by virtue of the above-quoted publication, and
he is hereby sentenced to pay, within the period of fifteen days from the promulgation of this judgment, a fine of P1,000, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The respondent is also hereby required to appear, within the same period, and show cause to this Court why he should not be disbarred form
practicing as an attorney-at-law in any of the courts of this Republic, for said publication and the following statements made by him during the
pendency of the case against Angel Parazo for contempt of Court.
In his statement to the press as published in the Manila Times in its issue of December 9, 1948, the respondent said "The Supreme Court can send
me to jail, but it cannot close my mouth; " and in his other statement published on December 10, 1948, in the same paper, he stated among others:
"It is not the imprisonment that is degrading, but the cause of the imprisonment." In his Rizal day speech at the Abellana High School in Cebu,
published on January 3, 1949, in the Manila Daily Bulletin, the respondent said that "there was more freedom of speech when American Justices sat
in the Tribunal than now when it is composed of our countrymen;" reiterated that "even if it succeeds in placing him behind bars, the court can not
close his mouth," and added: "I would consider imprisonment a precious heritage to leave for those who would follow me because the cause is noble
and lofty." And the Manila Chronicle of January 5 published the statement of the respondent in Cebu to the effect that this Court "acted with malice"
in citing him to appear before this Court on January 4 when "the members of this Court know that I came here on vacation." In all said statements the
respondent misrepresents to the public the cause of the charge against him for contempt of court. He says that the cause is for criticizing the
decision of this Court in said Parazo case in defense of the freedom of the press, when in truth and in fact he is charged with intending to interfere
and influence the final disposition of said case through intimidation and false accusations against this Supreme Court. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.




































92 SCRA 642

Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections, by a
plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, herein petitioner, who seasonably filed on November 24, 1971 a protest against the election of the former
with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the appreciation, counting and consideration of
votes in specified electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5) excessive campaign expenditures
and other violations of the 1971 Election Code.

Respondent Yu filed on November 29, 1971 his answer and counter-protest which petitioner answered on December 10, 1971. However, respondent
Yu withdrew his counter-protest after waiving the opening and revision of the ballot boxes specified therein.

Proceedings therein continued with respect to the election protest of petitioner before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV,
presided by respondent Judge, who initially took cognizance of the same as it is unquestionably a justiciable controversy.

In the meantime or on September 21, 1972, the incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines issued Proclamation No. 1081, placing the
entire country under Martial Law; and two months thereafter, more or less, or specifically on November 29, 1972, the 1971 Constitutional Convention
passed and approved a Constitution to supplant the 1935 Constitution; and the same was thereafter overwhelmingly ratified by the sovereign people
of the Republic of the Philippines on January 17, 1973; and on March 31, 1973, this Court declared that "there is no further judicial obstacle to the
new Constitution being considered in force and effect" (Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30 [1973]).

Thereafter or on October 10, 1973, at which time petitioner had already completed presenting his evidence and in fact had rested his case,
respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which ? principally) Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI ? a
political question has intervened in the case. Respondent Yu contended that "... the provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all local
governments have been superseded by the 1973 Constitution. Therefore, all local government should adhere to our parliamentary form of
government. This is clear in the New Constitution under its Article XI." He further submitted that local elective officials (including mayors) have no
more four-year term of office. They are only in office at the pleasure of the appointing power embodied in the New Constitution, and under Section 9
of Article XVII.

Petitioner vigorously opposed the motion to dismiss, and, relying mainly on Sections 7 and 8 of Article XVII (Transitory Provisions) of the New
Constitution and G.O. No. 3, contended that the New Constitution did not divest the Court of First Instance of its jurisdiction to hear and decide
election protests pending before them at the time of its ratification and effectivity; that the ratification of the New Constitution and its effectivity did not
automatically abolish the office and position of municipal mayor nor has it automatically cut short the tenure of the office, so as to render the issue as
to who is the lawfully elected candidate to said office or position moot and academic; that election protests involve public interest such that the same
must be heard until terminated and may not be dismissed on mere speculation that the office involved may have been abolished, modified or
reorganized; and that the motion to dismiss was filed manifestly for delay.

Respondent Yu replied pointing out, among others, that petitioner failed to refute the issue of political question; and reiterated his stand, expanding
his arguments on the political question, thus:

It is an undeniable fact that this case has its source from the 1971 elections for municipal mayoralty. Unsatisfied with the counting of votes held by
the Board of Canvassers, the herein protestant filed this present case. And before the termination of the same and pending trial, the Filipino people
in the exercise of their free will and sovereign capacity approved a NEW CONSTITUTION, thus a NEW FORM OF GOVERNMENT-
PARLIAMENTARY IN FORM was enforced. We find this provision under Article XI of the New Constitution, which provides:

SEC. 2. The National Assembly shall enact a local government code which may not thereafter be amended except by a majority vote of all its
members, defining a more responsive and accountable local government structure with an effective system of recall, allocating among the different
local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for the qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries,
powers, functions, and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. However, any
change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose.

It is respectfully submitted that the contention of the protestant to the effect that the New Constitution "shows that the office of the Municipal Mayor
has not been abolished ... ," is not ACCURATE. Otherwise, the provisions of Section 9 of Article XVII, is meaningless.

All officials and employees in the existing Government of the Republic shall continue in office until otherwise provided by law or decreed by the
incumbent President of the Philippines, ...

In the above-quoted provision is the protection of the officials and employees working in our government, otherwise, by the force of the New
Constitution they are all out of the government offices. In fact, in the case above-cited (Javellana) we are all performing our duties in accordance with
the New Constitution.

Therefore, election cases of the 1935 Constitution being interwoven in the political complexion of our new Constitution should be dismissed because
only those incumbent official and employees existing in the new government are protected by the transitional provisions of the New Fundamental
Law of the Land. The protestant, we respectfully submit, is not covered by the provisions of Section 9 Article XVII of the Constitution. And in case he
will win in this present case he has no right to hold the position of mayor of the town of Rosales, Pangasinan, because he was not then an official of
the government at the time the New Constitution was approved by the Filipino People. His right if proclaimed a winner is derived from the 1935
Constitution which is changed by the Filipino people.

On December 18, 1973, the trial court, presided by respondent Judge, sustained the political question theory of respondent Yu and ordered the
dismissal of the electoral protest. Thus:

There is no dispute that the Filipino people have accepted and submitted to a new Constitution to replace the 1935 Constitution, and that we are now
living under its aegis and protection. ...

xxx xxx xxx

Under Section 9, Article XVII, of the new Constitution, above-quoted, only those officials and employees of the existing Government of the Republic
of the Philippines like the protestee herein, are given protection and are authorized to continue in office at the pleasure of the incumbent President of
the Philippines, while under Section 2 of Article XI of the new Constitution, also above-quoted, the intention of completely revamp the whole local
government structure, providing for different qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties, is very clear. These
present questions of policy, the necessity and expediency of which are outside the range of judicial review. With respect to the fate of incumbent
oficials and employees in the existing Government of the Republic of the Philippines, as well as to the qualifications, election and removal, term of
office, salaries, and powers of all local officials under the parliamentary form of government ? these have been entrusted or delegated by the
sovereign people or has reserved it to be settled by the incumbent Chief Executive or by the National Assembly with full discretionary authority
therefor. As if to supplement these delegated powers, the people have also decreed in a referendum the suspension of all elections. Thus, in the
United States, questions relating to what persons or organizations constituted the lawful government of a state of the Union (Luther vs. Borden, 7
How. 1, 12, L. Ed 58), and those relating to the political status of a state (Highland Farms Dairy vs. Agnew, 57 S. et 549, 300 U.S. 608, 81 L.ed 835),
have been held to be political and for the judiciary to determine.

To the mind of the Court, therefore, the ratification and effectivity of the new Constitution has tainted this case with a political complexion above and
beyond the power of judicial review. As fittingly commented by Mr. Justice Antonio in a separate opinion in the Javellana, et al. cases, 69 0. G. No.
36, September 3, 1973, p. 8008:

The essentially political nature of the question is at once manifest by understanding that in the final analysis, what is assailed is not merely the
validity of Proclamation No. 1102 of the President, which is merely declaratory of the fact of the approval or ratification, but the legitimacy of the
government. It is addressed more to the frame-work and political character of this government which now functions under the new Charter. It seeks
to nullify a Constitution that is already effective. In other words, where a complete change in the fundamental law has been effected through political
action, the Court whose existence is affected by such a change is, in the words of Mr. Meville Fuller Weston "precluded from passing upon the fact of
change by a logical difficulty which is not to be surmounted as the change relates to the existence of a prior point in the Court's "chain of title" to its
authority and "does not relate merely to a question of the horizontal distribution of powers." It involves a matter which 'the sovereign has entrusted to
the so-called political departments or has reserved to be settled by its own extra-governmental action." The present Government functions under the
new Constitution which has become effective through political action. Judicial power presupposes an established government and an effective
constitution. If it decides at all as a court, it necessarily affirms the existence and authority of the Government under which it is exercising judicial
power.

The Court is not unaware of provisions of the new Constitution, particularly Sections 7 and 8, Article XVII (Transitory Provisions) decreeing that all
existing laws not inconsistent with the new Constitution shall remain operative until amended, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly, and
that all courts existing at the time of the ratification of the said new Constitution shall continue and exercise their jurisdiction until otherwise provided
by law in accordance with the new Constitution, and all cases pending in said courts shall be heard, tried and determined under the laws then in
force. Again, to the mind of the Court, these refer to matters raised in the enforcement of existing laws or in the invocation of a court's jurisdiction
which have not been "entrusted to the so-called political department or has reserved to be settled by its own extra governmental action.

Hence, this petition.

We reverse.

The thrust of the aforesaid political question theory of respondent Yu is that the 1973 Constitution, through Section 9 of Article XVII thereof, protected
only those incumbents, like him, at the time of its ratification and effectivity and are the only ones authorized to continue in office and their term of
office as extended now depends on the pleasure of, as the same has been entrusted or committed to, the incumbent President of the Philippines or
the Legislative Department; and that Section 2 of Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire local government
structure by the enactment of a local government code, thus presenting a question of policy, the necessity and expediency of which are outside the
range of judicial review. In short, for the respondent Judge to still continue assuming jurisdiction over the pending election protest of petitioner is for
him to take cognizance of a question or policy "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative or Executive
branch of the government."

I

There is an imperative need to re-state pronouncements of this Court on the new Constitution which are decisive in the resolution of the political
question theory of respondent Yu.

WE ruled:

1. That Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did not render moot and academic pending election protest cases (Santos vs. Casta?eda,
65 SCRA 114 [1975]; Euipilag vs. Araula, 60 SCRA 211 [1974]; Nunez vs. Averia, 57 SCRA 726 [1974]; Parades vs. Abad, L-36927, Sunga vs.
Mosueda, L-37715, Valley vs. Caro, L-38331, 56 SCRA 522, [1974]).

2. That "the constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were incumbent
officials or employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately encompassing every
person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under protest or contest" and that "subject to the constraints
specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the framers of our
new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a condidate for elective position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the
Election Code of 1971, commenced proceedings beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elect's
right to the contested office."' (Santos vs. Casta?eda, supra); and We rationalized that "the Constitutional Convention could not have intended, as in
fact it .did not intend, to shielf or protect those who had been unduly elected. To hold that the right of the herein private respondents to the respective
offices which they are now holding, may no longer be subject to question, would be tantamount to giving a stamp of approval to what could have
been an election victory characterized by fraud, threats, intimidation, vote buying, or other forms of irregularities prohibited by the Election Code to
preserve inviolate the sanctity of the ballot." (Parades, Sunga and Valley cases, supra).

3. That "the right of the private respondents (protestees) to continue in office indefinitely arose not only by virtue of Section 9 of Article XVII of the
New Constitution but principally from their having been proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a result of the November 8, 1971
elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly elected to their respective positions and consequently, have no right to hold the same,
perform their functions, enjoy their privileges and emoluments, then certainly, they should not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite term of office given to
them by said constitutional provision" (Parades, Sunga and Valley cases, supra).

4. That "until a subsequent law or presidential decree provides otherwise, the right of respondent (protestee) to continue as mayor rests on the
legality of his election which has been protested by herein petitioner. Should the court decide adversely against him the electoral protest, respondent
(protestee) would cease to be mayor even before a law or presidential decree terminates his tenure of office pursuant to said Section 9 of Article
XVII of the 1973 Constitution" (Euipilag, supra).

5. That "there is a difference between the 'term' of office and the 'right' to hold an office. A 'term' of office is the period during winch an elected officer
or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its functions and enjoy its privileges and emoluments. A 'right' to hold a public office is the just and
legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and responsibilities of the office. In other words, the 'term' refers to the period, duration of length of time
during which the occupant of an office is .entitled to stay therein whether such period be definite or indefinite. Hence, although Section 9, Article XVII
of the New Constitution made the term of the petitioners indefinite, it did not foreclose any challenge by the herein petitioners, in an election protest,
of the 'right' of the private respondents to continue holding their respective office. What has been directly affected by said constitutional provision is
the 'term' to the office, although the 'right' of the incumbent to an office which he is legally holding is co-extensive with the 'term' thereof," and that "it
is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution, the term of office of the private respondents expired, and that
they are now holding their respective offices under a new term. We are of the opinion that they hold their respective offices still under the term to
which they have been elected, although the same is now indefinite" (Parades, Sunga and Valley cases, supra).

6. That the New Constitution recognized the continuing jurisdiction of courts of first instance to hear, try and decide election protests: "Section 7 of
Article XVII of the New Constitution provides that 'all existing laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended,
modified or repealed by the National Assembly. 'And there has been no amendment, modification or repeal of Section 220 of the Election Code of
1971 which gave the herein petitioners the right to file an election contest against those proclaimed elected," and "according to Section 8, Article XVII
of the New Constitution 'all courts existing at the time of the ratification of this Constitution shall continue and exercise their jurisdiction until otherwise
provided by law in accordance with this Constitution, and all cases pending in said courts shall be heard, tried and determined under the laws then in
force.' Consequently, the Courts of First Instance presided over by the respondent-Judges should continue and exercise their jurisdiction to hear, try
and decide the election protests filed by herein petitioners" (Santos, Euipilag, Nunez, Parades, Sunga and Valley cases, supra).

While under the New Constitution the Commission on Elections is now the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly as well as elective provincial and city officials (par. 2 of Sec. 2, Article XII-C of the 1973
Constitution), such power does not extend to electoral contests concerning municipal elective positions.

7. That General Order No. 3, issued by the President of the Philippines merely reiterated his powers under Section 9 of Article XVII of the New
Constitution. The President did not intend thereby to modify the aforesaid constitutional provision (Euipilag, supra).

General Order No. 3, as amended by General Order No. 3-A, does not expressly include electoral contests of municipal elective positions as among
those removed from the jurisdiction of the courts; for said General Order, after affirming the jurisdiction of the Judiciary to decide in accordance with
the existing laws on criminal and civil cases, simply removes from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court certain crimes specified therein as well as the
validity, legality or constitutionality of any decree, order or acts issued by the President or his duly designated representative or by public servants
pursuant to his decrees and orders issued under Proclamation No. 1081.

8. That General Order No. 3 may not be invoked by the courts to avoid exercise of their jurisdiction because to do co "is nothing short of unwarranted
abdication of judicial', authority, which no judge duly imbued with the implications of the paramount principle of independence of the judiciary should
ever think of doing. It is unfortunate indeed that respondent Judge is apparently unaware that it is a matter of highly significant historical fact that this
Court has always deemed General Order No. 3 including its amendment by General Order No. 3-A as practically inoperative even in the light of
Proclamation No. 1081 of September 21, 1972 and Proclamation No. 1104 of January 17, 1973, placing the whole Philippines under martial law.
While the members of the Court are not agreed on whether or not particular instances of attack against the validity of certain Presidential decrees
raise political questions which the Judiciary would not interfere with, there is unanimity among Us in the view that it is for the Court rather than the
Executive to determine whether or not We may take cognizance of any given case involving the validity of acts of the Executive Department
purportedly under the authority of the martial law proclamations" (Lina vs. Purisima, 3 PHILAJUR 605, 610-611, 82 SCRA 344 [1978]).

II

1. In the light of the foregoing pronouncements, We hold that the electoral protest case herein involved has remained a justiciable controversy. No
political question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be
indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election protest. The term "political question" connotes what it means in
ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure" (Ta?ada vs. Cuenco, L-1052, Feb. 28, 1957). A broader
definition was advanced by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brennan in Baker vs. Carr (369 U.S. 186 [1962]): "Prominent on the surface of any case
held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due
coordinate branches of the government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question" (p. 217). And Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, then
an Associate Justice, of this Court fixed the limits of the term, thus: "The term has been made applicable to controversies clearly non-judicial and
therefore beyond its jurisdiction or to an issue involved in a case appropriately subject to its cognizance, as to which there has been a prior
legislative or executive determination to which deference must be paid (Cf. Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 [1946]; Lopez vs. Roxas, L-25716, July 28,
1966, 17 SCRA 756; Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, L-28196, Nov. 9, 1967, 21 SCRA 774). It 'has likewise been employed loosely to
characterize a suit where the party proceeded against is the President or Congress, or any branch thereof (Cf. Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62 [1937];
Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 [1946]). If to be delimited with accuracy; 'political questions' should refer to such as would under the Constitution be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority is vested either in the President or Congress. It is
thus beyond the competence of the judiciary to pass upon. ..." (Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448, 504-505 [1971]).

2. The only issue in the electoral protest case dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground of political question is who between protestant ? herein
petitioner ? and protestee ? herein respondent Yu ? was the duly elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan, and legally entitled to enjoy the rights,
privileges and emoluments appurtenant thereto and to discharge the functions, duties and obligations of the position. If the protestee's election is
upheld by the respondent Judge, then he continues in office; otherwise, it is the protestant, herein petitioner. That is the only consequence of a
resolution of the issue therein involved ? a purely justiciable question or controversy as it implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable,
an act or ommission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right (Tan vs. Republic, 107 Phil. 632-633
[1960]). Before and after the ratification and effectivity of the New Constitution, the nature of the aforesaid issue as well as the consequences of its
resolution by the Court, remains the same as above-stated.

3. Any judgment to be made on that issue will not in any way collide or interfere with the mandate of Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution,
as it will merely resolve who as between protestant and protestee is the duly elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan; hence, entitled to enjoy the
extended term as mandated by said provision of the New Constitution. As construed by this Court, the elective officials referred to in Section 9 of
Article XVII are limited to those duly elected as the right to said extended term was not personal to whosoever was incumbent at the time of the
ratification and effectivity of the New Constitution. Nor would such judgment preempt, collide or interfere with the power or discretion entrusted by the
New Constitution to the incumbent President or the Legislative Department, with respect to the extended term of the duly elected incumbents;
because whoever between protestant and protestee is declared the duly elected mayor will be subject always to whatever action the President or the
Legislative Department will take pursuant thereto.

4. Neither does Section 2 of Article XI stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest case with a political color. For simply, that section allocated unto
the National Assembly the power to enact a local government code "which may not thereafter be amended except by a majority of all its Members,
defining a more responsive and accountable local government allocating among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities,
and resources, and providing for their qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions and duties of local officials, and all other
matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units" but "... any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect
until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose." It is apparent at once that such power committed by the New
Constitution to the National Assembly will not be usurped or preempted by whatever ruling or judgment the respondent Judge will render in the
electoral protest case. Whoever will prevail in that contest will enjoy the indefinite term of the disputed office of mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the
existing set-up of local government in this country; subject always to whatever change or modification the National Assembly will introduce when it
will enact the local government code.

III

The construction made by respondent Judge of Sections 7 and 8 of Article XVII of the New Constitution "... that these refer to matters raised in the
enforcement of existing laws or in the invocation of a court's jurisdiction which have not been 'entrusted to the so-called political department or
reserved to be settled by its own extra-governmental action,"' strained as it is, cannot be sustained in view of the result herein reached on the issue
of political question as well as Our previous pronouncements as above restated on the same Sections 7 and 8 of the New Constitution.

WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE RESPONDENT COURT IS DIRECTED TO
IMMEDIATELY PROCEED WITH THE TRIAL AND DETERMINATION OF THE ELECTION PROTEST BEFORE IT ON THE MERITS. THIS
DECISION SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY UPON PROMULGATION HEREOF. NO COSTS.

Teehankee (Chairman), Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ,, concur.









































G.R. No. L-10520 February 28, 1957

LORENZO M. TAADA and DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, petitioners,
vs.
MARIANO JESUS CUENCO, FRANCISCO A. DELGADO, ALFREDO CRUZ, CATALINA CAYETANO, MANUEL SERAPIO, PLACIDO REYES, and
FERNANDO HIPOLITO in his capacity as cashier and disbursing officer, respondents.

Taada, Teehankee and Macapagal for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Troadio T. Quiazon, Jr. for respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

Petitioner Lorenzo M. Taada is a member of the Senate of the Philippines, and President of the Citizens Party, whereas petitioner Diosdado
Macapagal, a member of the House of Representatives of the Philippines, was one of the official candidates of the Liberal Party for the Senate, at
the General elections held in November, 1955, in which Pacita Madrigal Warns, Lorenzo Sumulong, Quintin Paredes, Francisco Rodrigo, Pedro
Sabido, Claro M. Recto, Domocao Alonto and Decoroso Rosales, were proclaimed elected. Subsequently, the elections of this Senators-elect-who
eventually assumed their respective seats in the Senate-was contested by petitioner Macapagal, together with Camilo Osias, Geronima Pecson,
Macario Peralta, Enrique Magalona, Pio Pedrosa and William Chiongbian-who had, also, run for the Senate, in said election-in Senate Electoral
Case No. 4, now pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal. .

The Senate, in its session of February 22, 1956, upon nomination of Senator Cipriano Primicias, on behalf of the Nacionalista Party, chose Senators
Jose P. Laurel, Fernando Lopez and Cipriano Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Upon nomination of petitioner Senator
Taada, on behalf of the Citizens Party, said petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as member of said Tribunal. Then, upon nomination of
Senator Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate, and over the objections of Senators Taada and Sumulong, the Senate
choose respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as members of the same Electoral Tribunal. Subsequently, the
Chairman of the latter appointed: (1) Alfredo Cruz and Catalina Cayetano, as technical assistant and private secretary, respectively, to Senator
Cuenco, as supposed member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon his recommendation of said respondent; and (2) Manuel Serapio and Placido
Reyes, as technical assistant and private secretary, respectively to Senator Delgado, as supposed member of said Electoral Tribunal, and upon his
recommendation.

Soon, thereafter, Senator Lorenzo M. Taada and Congressman Diosdado Macapagal instituted the case at bar against Senators Cuenco and
Delgado, and said Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as well as Fernando Hipolito, in his capacity as Cashier and
Disbursing Officer of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Petitioners allege that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate consists of 23
Senators who belong to the Nacionalista Party, and one (1) Senator-namely, petitioner, Lorenzo M. Taada-belonging to the Citizens Party; that the
Committee on Rules for the Senate, in nominating Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and the Senate, in choosing these respondents, as members of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, had "acted absolutely without power or color of authority and in clear violation .. of Article VI, Section 11 of the
Constitution"; that "in assuming membership in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, by taking the corresponding oath of office therefor", said respondents
had "acted absolutely without color of appointment or authority and are unlawfully, and in violation of the Constitution, usurping, intruding into and
exercising the powers of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal"; that, consequently, the appointments of respondents, Cruz, Cayetano, Serapio
and Reyes, as technical assistants and private secretaries to Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who caused said appointments to be made-as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are unlawful and void; and that Senators Cuenco and Delgado "are threatening and are about to take
cognizance of Electoral Case No. 4 of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as alleged members thereof, in nullification of the rights of petitioner Lorenzo M.
Taada, both as a Senator belonging to the Citizens Party and as representative of the Citizens Party in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in
deprivation of the constitutional rights of petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants to have their election protest tried and decided-by an
Electoral Tribunal composed of not more than three (3) senators chosen by the Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of
votes in the Senate and not more than the (3) Senators upon nomination of the Party having the second largest number of votes therein, together,
three (3) Justice of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, instead of by an Electoral Tribunal packed with five members belonging
to the Nacionalista Party, which is the rival party of the Liberal Party, to which the Petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants in Electoral
Case No. 4 belong, the said five (5) Nacionalista Senators having been nominated and chosen in the manner alleged.. hereinabove.".

Petitioners pray that:.

"1. Upon petitioners' filing of bond in such amount as may be determined by this Honorable Court, a writ of preliminary injunction be immediately
issued directed to respondents Mariano J. Cuenco, Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes,
restraining them from continuing to usurp, intrude into and/ or hold or exercise the said public offices respectively being occupied by them in the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, and to respondent Fernando Hipolito restraining him from paying the salaries of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina
Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, pending this action.

"2. After hearing, judgment be rendered ousting respondent Mariano J. Cuenco Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel
Serapio and Placido Reyes from the aforementioned public offices in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and that they be altogether excluded therefrom
and making the Preliminary injunction permanent, with costs against the respondents.".

Respondents have admitted the main allegations of fact in the petition, except insofar as it questions the legality, and validity of the election of
respondents Senators Cuenco and Delgado, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and of the appointment of respondent Alfredo Cruz,
Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes as technical assistants and private secretaries to said respondents Senators. Respondents,
likewise, allege, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that: (a) this Court is without power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the action
of the Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal; and (b) that the petition states no cause of action, because "petitioner Taada has
exhausted his right to nominate after he nominated himself and refused to nominate two (2) more Senators", because said petitioner is in estoppel,
and because the present action is not the proper remedy. .

I. Respondents assail our jurisdiction to entertain the petition, upon the ground that the power to choose six (6) Senators as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal has been expressly conferred by the Constitution upon the Senate, despite the fact that the draft submitted to the constitutional
convention gave to the respective political parties the right to elect their respective representatives in the Electoral Commission provided for in the
original Constitution of the Philippines, and that the only remedy available to petitioners herein "is not in the judicial forum", but "to bring the matter to
the bar of public opinion.".

We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the foregoing facts. To begin with, unlike the cases of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46
Phil., 83) and Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192)-relied upon by the respondents this is not an action against the Senate, and it does not seek to compel
the latter, either directly or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their duties as members of said House. Although the Constitution provides
that the Senate shall choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate.
(Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139, Suanes vs. Chief Accountant, 81 Phil., 818; 46 Off. Gaz., 462.).

Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the authority shall be exercised. As the author of a very enlightening study on
judicial self-limitation has aptly put it:.

"The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand, by whom certain powers shall be exercised, and on the other hand, to determine whether the
powers possessed have been validly exercised. In performing the latter function, they do not encroach upon the powers of a coordinate branch of
the, government, since the determination of the validity of an act is not the same, thing as the performance of the act. In the one case we are seeking
to ascertain upon whom devolves the duty of the particular service. In the other case we are merely seeking to determine whether the Constitution
has been violated by anything done or attented by either an executive official or the legislative." (Judicial Self-Limitation by Finkelstein, pp. 221, 224,
244, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 39; emphasis supplied,).

The case of Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra) cited by respondent refutes their own pretense. This Court exercised its jurisdiction over said case
and decided the same on the merits thereof, despite the fact that it involved an inquiry into the powers of the Senate and its President over the
Senate Electoral Tribunal and the personnel thereof. .

Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines. Yet, this does not detract from the
power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress 1 And, since judicial power includes the authority to inquire into the legality
of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said
Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government, may not be determined in the proper actions. Thus, in the exercise of the so-called "judicial
supremacy", this Court declared that a resolution of the defunct National Assembly could not bar the exercise of the powers of the former Electoral
Commission under the original Constitution. 2 (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra), and annulled certain acts of the Executive 3 as
incompatible with the fundamental law.

In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled without inquiring into the validity of an act of Congress
or of either House thereof, the courts have, not only jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which cannot be evaded without
violating the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual destruction. 4.

Neither are the cases of Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito (78 Phil., 1) and Cabili vs. Francisco (88 Phil., 654), likewise, invoked by respondents, in point. In
the Mabanag case, it was held that the courts could not review the finding of the Senate to the effect that the members thereof who had been
suspended by said House should not be considered in determining whether the votes cast therein, in favor of a resolution proposing an amendment
to the Constitution, sufficed to satisfy the requirements of the latter, such question being a political one. The weight of this decision, as a precedent,
has been weakened, however, by our resolutions in Avelino vs. Cuenco (83 Phil., 17), in which this Court proceeded to determine the number
essential to constitute a quorum in the Senate. Besides, the case at bar does not hinge on the number of votes needed for a particular act of said
body. The issue before us is whether the Senate-after acknowledging that the Citizens Party is the party, having the second largest number of votes
in the Senate, to which party the Constitution gives the right to nominate three (3) Senators for the Senate electoral Tribunal-could validly choose
therefor two (2) Nacionalista Senators, upon nomination by the floor leader of the Nacionalista Party in the Senate, Senator Primicias claiming to act
on behalf of the Committee on Rules for the Senate.

The issue in the Cabili case was whether we could review a resolution of the Senate reorganizing its representation in the Commission on
Appointments. This was decided in the negative, upon the authority of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (supra) and Vera vs. Avelino (supra), the main
purpose of the petition being "to force upon the Senate the reinstatement of Senator Magalona in the Commission on Appointments," one-half (1/2)
of the members of which is to be elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein. Hence, the issue
depended mainly on the determination of the political alignment of the members of the Senate at the time of said reorganization and of the necessity
or advisability of effecting said reorganization, which is a political question. We are not called upon, in the case at bar, to pass upon an identical or
similar question, it being conceded, impliedly, but clearly, that the Citizens Party is the party with the second largest number of votes in the Senate.
The issue, therefore, is whether a right vested by the Constitution in the Citizens Party may validly be exercised, either by the Nacionalista Party, or
by the Committee on Rules for the Senate, over the objection of said Citizens Party.

x x x x x x x x x

The only ground upon which respondents' objection to the jurisdiction of this Court and their theory to the effect that the proper remedy for petitioners
herein is, not the present action, but an appeal to public opinion, could possibly be entertained is, therefore, whether the case at bar raises merely a
political question, not one justiciable in nature.

In this connection, respondents assert in their answer that "the remedy of petitioners is not in the judicial forum, but, to use petitioner, Taada's own
words, to bring the matter to the bar of public opinion' (p. 81, Discussion on the Creation of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, February 21, 1956)." This
allegation may give the impression that said petitioner had declared, on the floor of the Senate, that his only relief against the acts complained of in
the petition is to take up the issue before the people- which is not a fact. During the discussions in the Senate, in the course of the organization of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, on February 21, 1956, Senator Taada was asked what remedies he would suggest if he nominated two (2) Nacionialista
Senators and the latter declined the, nomination. Senator Taada replied:.

"There are two remedies that occur to my mind right now, Mr. Senator; one is the remedy open to all of us that if we feel aggrieved and there is no
recourse in the court of justice, we can appeal to public opinion. Another remedy is an action in the Supreme Court. Of course, as Senator
Rodriguez, our President here, has said one day; "If you take this matter to the Supreme Court, you will lose, because until now the Supreme Court
has always ruled against any action that would constitute interference in the business of anybody pertaining to the Senate. The theory of separation
of powers will be upheld by the Supreme Court." But that learned opinion of Senator Rodriguez, our President, notwithstanding, I may take the case
to the Supreme Court if my right herein is not respected. I may lose, Mr. President, but who has not lost in the Supreme Court? I may lose because
of the theory of the separation of powers, but that does not mean, Mr. President, that what has been done here is pursuant to the provision of the
Constitution." (Congressional Record, Vol. III, p. 339; emphasis supplied.).

This statement did not refer to the nomination, by Senator Primicias, and the election, by the Senate, of Senators Cuenco and Delgado as members
of said Tribunal. Indeed, said nomination and election took place the day after the aforementioned statement of Senator Taada was made. At any
rate, the latter announced that he might "take the case to the Supreme Court if my right here is not respected.".

As already adverted to, the objection to our jurisdiction hinges on the question whether the issue before us is political or not. In this connection,
Willoughby lucidly states:.

"Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established principle is considered that it is not within the province of the courts to pass judgment
upon the policy of legislative or executive action. Where, therefore, discretionary powers are granted by the Constitution or by statute, the manner in
which those powers are exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore, concern themselves only with the question as to the
existence and extent of these discretionary powers.

"As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive departments are spoken of as the political departments of government because in
very many cases their action is necessarily dictated by considerations of public or political policy. These considerations of public or political policy of
course will not permit the legislature to violate constitutional provisions, or the executive to exercise authority not granted him by the Constitution or
by, statute, but, within these limits, they do permit the departments, separately or together, to recognize that a certain set of facts exists or that a
given status exists, and these determinations, together with the consequences that flow therefrom, may not be traversed in the courts." (Willoughby
on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326; emphasis supplied.).

To the same effect is the language used in Corpus Juris Secundum, from which we quote:.

"It is well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such
questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provisions.

"It is not easy, however, to define the phrase `political question', nor to determine what matters, fall within its scope. It is frequently used to designate
all questions that lie outside the scope of the judicial questions, which under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government." (16 C.J.S.,
413; see, also Geauga Lake Improvement Ass'n. vs. Lozier, 182 N. E. 491, 125 Ohio St. 565; Sevilla vs, Elizalde, 112 F. 2d 29, 72 App. D. C., 108;
emphasis supplied.).

Thus, it has been repeatedly held that the question whether certain amendments to the Constitution are invalid for non-compliance with the
procedure therein prescribed, is not a political one and may be settled by the Courts. 5 .

In the case of In re McConaughy (119 N.W. 408), the nature of political question was considered carefully. The Court said:.

"At the threshold of the case we are met with the assertion that the questions involved are political, and not judicial. If this is correct, the court has no
jurisdiction as the certificate of the state canvassing board would then be final, regardless of the actual vote upon the amendment. The question thus
raised is a fundamental one; but it has been so often decided contrary to the view contended for by the Attorney General that it would seem to be
finally settled.

x x x x x x x x x.

" .. What is generally meant, when it is, said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which, is to be exercised by the people in
their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government, with
discretionary power to act. See State vs. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 497, 51 L. R. A. 561; In Re Gunn, 50 Kan. 155; 32 Pac. 470, 948, 19 L. R. A. 519;
Green vs. Mills, 69 Fed. 852, 16, C. C. A. 516, 30 L. R. A. 90; Fletcher vs. Tuttle, 151 Ill. 41, 37 N. E. 683, 25 L. R. A. 143, 42 Am. St. Rep. 220.
Thus the Legislature may in its discretion determine whether it will pass a law or submit a proposed constitutional amendment to the people. The
courts have no judicial control over such matters, not merely because they involve political question, but because they are matters which the people
have by the Constitution delegated to the Legislature. The Governor may exercise the powers delegated to him, free from judicial control, so long as
he observes the laws and acts within the limits of the power conferred. His discretionary acts cannot be controllable, not primarily because they are
of a political nature, but because the Constitution and laws have placed the particular matter under his control. But every officer under a
constitutional government must act according to law and subject him to the restraining and controlling power of the people, acting through the courts,
as well as through the executive or the Legislature. One department is just as representative as the other, and the judiciary is the department which
is charged with the special duty of determining the limitations which the law places upon all official action. The recognition of this principle, unknown
except in Great Britain and America, is necessary, to the end that the government may be one of laws and not men'-words which Webster said were
the greatest contained in any written constitutional document." (pp. 411, 417; emphasis supplied.).

In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in
the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It
is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether the election of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and
spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional
mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination .. of the party having the second largest number of
votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the
choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be
mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection
therewith.

".. whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative department has by
statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with such
statute, and, particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights .." (16 C.J.S.,
439; emphasis supplied.).

It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue raised by the parties
herein.

II. Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Electoral Tribunal, valid and lawful?.

Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reads:.

"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall
be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes
and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman."
(Emphasis supplied.).

It appears that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate of the Philippines consists of twenty three (23) members of the Nacionalista
Party and one (1) member of the Citizens Party, namely, Senator Taada, who is, also, the president of said party. In the session of the Senate held
on February 21, 1956, Senator Sabido moved that Senator Taada, "the President of the Citizens Party, be given the privilege to nominate .. three
(3) members" of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 328-329), referring to those who, according to the
provision above-quoted, should be nominated by "the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate. Senator Taada objected
formally to this motion upon the-ground: (a) that the right to nominate said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal belongs, not to the Nacionalista
Party of which Senator Sabido and the other Senators are members-but to the Citizens Party, as the one having the second largest number of votes
in the Senate, so that, being devoid of authority to nominate the aforementioned members of said Tribunal, the Nacionalista Party cannot give it to
the Citizens Party, which, already, has such authority, pursuant to the Constitution; and (b) that Senator Sabido's motion would compel Senator
Taada to nominate three (3) Senators to said Tribunal, although as representative of the minority party in the Senate he has "the right to nominate
one, two or three to the Electoral Tribunal," in his discretion. Senator Taada further stated that he reserved the right to determine how many he
would nominate, after hearing the reasons of Senator Sabido in support of his motion. After some discussion, in which Senators Primicias, Cea, Lim,
Sumulong, Zulueta, and Rodrigo took part, the Senate adjourned until the next morning, February 22, 1956 (Do., do, pp. 329, 330, 332-333, 336,
338, 339, 343).

Then, said issues were debated upon more extensively, with Senator Sumulong, not only seconding the opposition of Senator Taada, but, also,
maintaining that "Senator Taada should nominate only one" member of the Senate, namely, himself, he being the only Senator who belongs to the
minority party in said House (Do., do., pp. 360-364, 369). Thus, a new issue was raised - whether or not one who does not belong to said party may
be nominated by its spokesman, Senator Taada - on which Senators Paredes, Pelaez, Rosales and Laurel, as well as the other Senators already
mentioned, expressed their views (Do., do., pp. 345, 349, 350, 354, 358, 364, 375). Although the deliberations of the Senate consumed the whole
morning and afternoon of February 22, 1956, a satisfactory solution of the question before the Senate appeared to be remote. So, at 7:40 p.m., the
meeting was suspended, on motion of Senator Laurel, with a view to seeking a compromise formula (Do., do., pp. 377). When session was resumed
at 8:10 p.m., Senator Sabido withdrew his motion above referred to. Thereupon, Senator Primicias, on behalf of the Nacionalista Party, nominated,
and the Senate elected, Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Subsequently, Senator Taada stated:.

"On behalf of the Citizens Party, the minority party in this Body, I nominate the only Citizens Party member in this Body, and that is Senator Lorenzo
M. Taada.".

Without an objection, this nomination was approved by the House. Then, Senator Primicias stood up and said:.

"Now, Mr. President, in order to comply with the provision in the Constitution, the Committee on Rules of the Senate-and I am now making this
proposal not on behalf of the Nacionalista Party but on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate-I nominate two other members to complete
the membership of the Tribunal: Senators Delgado and Cuenco.".

What took place thereafter appears in the following quotations from the Congressional Record for the Senate.

"SENATOR TAADA. Mr. President.

"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Quezon.

"SENATOR TAADA. I would like to record my opposition to the nominations of the last two named gentlemen, Senators Delgado and Cuenco, not
because I don't believe that they do not deserve to be appointed to the tribunal but because of my sincere and firm conviction that these additional
nominations are not sanctioned by the Constitution. The Constitution only permits the Nacionalista Party or the party having the largest number of
votes to nominate three.

"SENATOR SUMULONG. Mr. President.

"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Rizal.

"SENATOR SUMULONG. For the reasons that I have stated a few moments ago when I took the floor, I also wish to record my objection to the last
nominations, to the nomination of two additional NP's to the Electoral Tribunal.

"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Esta dispuesto el Senado a votar? (Varios Senadores: Si.) Los que esten conformes con la nominacion hecha por el
Presidente del Comite de Reglamentos a favor de los Senadores Delgado y Cuenco para ser miembros del Tribunal Electoral, digan, si. (Varios
Senadores: Si.) Los que no lo esten digan, no (Silencio.) Queda aprobada." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 377; emphasis
supplied.).

Petitioners maintain that said nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who belong to the Nacionalista Party-as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, are null and void and have been made without power or color of authority, for, after the nomination by said party, and the
election by the Senate, of Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of said Tribunal, the other Senators, who shall be members thereof,
must necessarily be nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, and such party is, admittedly, the Citizens
Party, to which Senator Taada belongs and which he represents.

Respondents allege, however, that the constitutional mandate to the effect that "each Electoral Tribunal shall be compose of nine (9) members," six
(6) of whom "shall be members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be", is mandatory; that when-after the nomination
of three (3) Senators by the majority party, and their election by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal-Senator Taada
nominated himself only, on behalf of the minority party, he thereby "waived his right to no two more Senators;" that, when Senator Primicias
nominated Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and these respondents were chosen by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, Said
Senator Primicias and the Senate merely complied with the aforementioned provision of the fundamental law, relative to the number of members of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and, that, accordingly, Senators Cuenco and Delgado are de jure members of said body, and the appointment of their
co-respondents, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes is valid and lawful.

At the outset, it will be recalled that the proceedings the organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal began with a motion of Senator Sabido to the
effect that "the distinguished gentleman from Quezon, the President of the Citizens Party, be given the privilege to nominate the three Members" of
said Tribunal. Senator Primicias inquired why the movant had used the word "privilege". Senator Sabido explained that the present composition of
the Senate had created a condition or situation which was not anticipated by the framers of our Constitution; that although Senator Taada formed
part of the Nacionalista Party before the end of 1955, he subsequently parted ways with" said party; and that Senator Taada "is the distinguished
president of the Citizens Party," which "approximates the situation desired by the framers of the Constitution" (Congressional Record for the Senate
Vol. III, pp. 329-330). Then Senator Lim intervened, stating:.

"At present Senator Taada is considered as forming the only minority or the one that has the second largest number of votes in the existing Senate,
is not that right? And if this is so, he should be given this as a matter of right, not as a matter of privilege. .. I don't believe that we should be allowed
to grant this authority to Senator Taada only as a privilege but we must grant it as a matter of right." (Id., id., p. 32; emphasis supplied.).

Similarly, Senator Sumulong maintained that "Senator Taada, as Citizens Party Senator, has the right and not a mere privilege to nominate,"
adding that:.

".. the question is whether we have a party here having the second largest number of votes, and it is clear in my mind that there is such a party, and
that is the Citizens Party to which the gentleman from Quezon belongs. .. We have to bear in mind, .. that when Senator Taada was included in the
Nacionalista Party ticket in 1953, it was by virtue of a coalition or an alliance between the Citizens Party and the Nacionalista Party at that time, and I
maintain that when Senator Taada as head of the Citizens Party entered into a coalition with the Nacionalista Party, he did not thereby become a
Nacionalista because that was a mere coalition, not a fusion. When the Citizens Party entered into a mere coalition, that party did not lose its
personality as a party separate and distinct from the, Nacionalista Party. And we should also remember that the certificate of candidacy filed by
Senator Taada in the 1953 election was one to the effect that he belonged to the Citizens Party .." (Id., id., p. 360; emphasis supplied.).

The debate was closed by Senator Laurel, who remarked, referring to Senator Taada:.

"..there is no doubt that he does not belong to the majority in the first place, and that, therefore, he belongs to the minority. And whether we like it or
not, that is the reality of the actual situation-that he is not a Nacionalista now, that he is the head and the representative of the Citizens Party. I think
that on equitable ground and from the point of view of public opinion, his situation .. approximates or approaches what is within the spirit of that
Constitution. .. and from the point of view of the spirit of the Constitution it would be a good thing if we grant the opportunity to Senator Taada to
help us in the organization of this Electoral Tribunal (Id., id., p. 376; emphasis supplied.).

The foregoing statements and the fact that, thereafter, Senator Sabido withdrew his motion to grant Senator Taada the "privilege" to nominate, and
said petitioner actually nominated himself "on behalf of the Citizens Party, the minority party in this Body"-not only without any, objection whatsoever,
but, also, with the approval of the Senate-leave no room for doubt that the Senate-leave no room for doubt that the Senate has regarded the Citizens
Party, represented by Senator Taada, as the party having the second largest number of votes in said House.

Referring, now, to the contention of respondents herein, their main argument in support of the mandatory character of the constitutional provision
relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is that the word "shall", therein used, is imperative in nature and that this is borne
out by an opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated February 1, 1939, pertinent parts of which are quoted at the footnote. 6.

Regardless of the respect due its author, as a distinguished citizen and public official, said opinion has little, if any, weight in the solution of the
question before this Court, for the practical construction of a Constitution is of little, if any, unless it has been uniform .." 6a Again, "as a general rule,
it is only in cases of substantial doubt and ambiguity that the doctrine of contemporaneous or practical construction has any application". As a
consequence, "where the meaning of a constitutional provision is clear, a contemporaneous or practical executive interpretation thereof is entitled to
no weight, and will not be allowed to distort or in any way change its natural meaning." The reason is that "the application of the doctrine of
contemporaneous construction is more restricted as applied to the interpretation of constitutional provisions than when applied to statutory
provisions", and that, "except as to matters committed by the Constitution, itself to the discretion of some other department, contemporary or
practical construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts, even in a doubtful case." Hence, "if in the judgment of the court, such construction is
erroneous and its further application is not made imperative by any paramount considerations of public policy, it may he rejected." (16 C. J. S., 71-
72; emphasis supplied.) 6b.

The aforemention opinion of the Secretary of Justice is not backed up by a, "uniform" application of the view therein adopted, so essential to give
thereto the weight accorded by the rules on contemporaneous constructions. Moreover, said opinion tends to change the natural meaning of section
11 of Article VI of the Constitution, which is clear. What is more, there is not the slightest doubt in our mind that the purpose and spirit of said
provisions do not warrant said change and that the rejection of the latter is demanded by paramount considerations of public policy. .

The flaw in the position taken in said opinion and by respondent herein is that, while, it relies upon the compulsory nature of the word "shall", as
regards the number of members of the Electoral Tribunals, it ignores the fact that the same term is used with respect to the method prescribed for
their election, and that both form part of a single sentence and must be considered, therefore, as integral portions of one and the same thought.
Indeed, respondents have not even tried to show and we cannot conceive-why "shall" must be deemed mandatory insofar as the number of
members of each Electoral Tribunal, and should be considered directory as regards the procedure for their selection. More important still, the history
of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution and the records of the Convention, refute respondents' pretense, and back up the theory of petitioners
herein.

Commenting on the frame of mind of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, when they faced the task of providing for the adjudication of
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the Legislative Department, Dr. Jose M. Aruego, a member of said
Convention, says:.

"The experience of the Filipino people under the provisions of the organic laws which left to the lawmaking body the determination of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of its members was not altogether satisfactory. There were many complaints against the lack of political justice in this
determination; for in a great number of cases, party interests controlled and dictated the decisions. The undue delay in the dispatch of election
contests for legislative seats, the irregularities that characterized the proceedings in some of them, and the very apparent injection of partisanship in
the determination of a great number of the cases were decried by a great number of the people as well as by the organs of public opinion.

"The faith of the people in the uprightness of the lawmaking body in the performance of this function assigned to it in the organic laws was by no
means great. In fact so blatant was the lack of political justice in the decisions that there was, gradually built up a camp of thought in the
Philippines inclined to leave to the courts the determination of election contests, following the practice in some countries, like England and Canada.

"Such were the conditions of things at the time of the meeting of the convention." (The Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Aruego, Vol. 1, pp.
257-258; emphasis supplied.).

This view is shared by distinguished members of the Senate. Thus, in its session of February 22, 1956, Senator Sumulong declared:.

".. when you leave it to either House to decide election protests involving its own members, that is virtually placing the majority party in a position to
dictate the decision in those election cases, because each House will be composed of a majority and a minority, and when you make each House
the judge of every election protest involving any member of that House, you place the majority in a position to dominate and dictate the decision in
the case and result was, there were so many abuses, there were so main injustices: committed by the majority at the expense and to the prejudice of
the minority protestants. Statements have been made here that justice was done even under the old system, like that case involving Senator
Mabanag, when he almost became a victim of the majority when he had an election case, and it was only through the intervention of President
Quezon that he was saved from becoming the victim of majority injustices.

"It is true that justice had sometimes prevailed under the old system, but the record will show that those cases were few and they were the rare
exceptions. The overwhelming majority of election protests decided under the old system was that the majority being then in a position to dictate the,
decision in the election protest, was tempted to commit as it did commit many abuses and injustices." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol.
111, p. 361; emphasis supplied.).

Senator Paredes, a veteran legislator and former Speaker of the House of Representatives, said:.

".. what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal was to create a sort of collegiate court composed of nine members: Three of them
belonging to the party having the largest number of votes, and three from the party having the second largest number votes so that these members
may represent the party, and the members of said party who will sit before the electoral tribunal as protestees. For when it comes to a party, Mr.
President, there ground to believe that decisions will be made along party lines." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 351; emphasis
supplied.).

Senator Laurel, who played an important role in the framing of our Constitution, expressed himself as follows:.

"Now, with reference to the protests or contests, relating to the election, the returns and the qualifications of the members of the legislative bodies, I
heard it said here correctly that there was a time when that was given to the corresponding chamber of the legislative department. So the election,
returns and qualifications of the members, of the Congress or legislative body was entrusted to that body itself as the exclusive body to determine
the election, returns and qualifications of its members. There was some doubt also expressed as to whether that should continue or not, and the
greatest argument in favor of the retention of that provision was the fact that was, among other things, the system obtaining in the United States
under the Federal Constitution of the United States, and there was no reason why that power or that right vested in the legislative body should not be
retained. But it was thought that would make the determination of this contest, of this election protest, purely political as has been observed in the
past." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 376; emphasis supplied.).

It is interesting to note that not one of the members of the Senate contested the accuracy of the views thus expressed.

Referring particularly to the philosophy underlying the constitutional provision quoted above, Dr. Aruego states:.

"The defense of the Electoral Commission was based primarily upon the hope and belief that the abolition of Party line because of the equal
representation in this body of the majority and the minority parties of the National Assembly and the intervention of some members of the Supreme
Court who, under the proposed constitutional provision, would also be members of the same, would insure greater political justice in the
determination of election contests for seats in the National Assembly than there would be if the power had been lodged in the lawmaking body itself.
Delegate Francisco summarized the arguments for the creation of the Electoral Commission in the following words:.

"I understand that from the time that this question is placed in the hands of members not only of the majority party but also of the minority party, there
is already a condition, a factor which would make protests decided in a non-partisan manner. We know from experience that many times in the many
protests tried in the House or in the Senate, it was impossible to prevent the factor of party from getting in. From the moment that it is required that
not only the majority but also the minority should intervene in these questions, we have already enough guarantee that there would be no tyranny on
the part of the majority.

`But there is another more detail which is the one which satisfies me most, and that is the intervention of three justices. So that with this intervention
of three justices if there would be any question as to the justice applied by the majority or the minority, if there would be any fundamental
disagreement, or if there would be nothing but questions purely of party in which the members of the majority as well as those of the minority should
wish to take lightly a protest because the protestant belongs to one of said parties, we have in this case, as a check upon the two parties, the
actuations of the three justices. In the last analysis, what is really applied in the determination of electoral cases brought before the tribunals of
justice or before the House of Representatives or the Senate? Well, it is nothing more than the law and the doctrine of the Supreme Court. If that is
the case, there will be greater skill in the application of the laws and in the application of doctrines to electoral matters having as we shall have three
justices who will act impartially in these electoral questions.

`I wish to call the attention of my distinguished colleagues to the fact that in electoral protests it is impossible to set aside party interests. Hence, the
best guarantee, I repeat, for the administration of justice to the parties, for the fact that the laws will not be applied rightfully or incorrectly as well as
for the fact that the doctrines of the Supreme Court will be applied rightfully, the best guarantee which we shall have, I repeat, is the intervention of
the three justices. And with the formation of the Electoral Commission, I say again, the protestants as well as the protestees could remain tranquil in
the certainty that they will receive the justice that they really deserve. If we eliminate from this precept the intervention of the party of the minority and
that of the three justices, then we shall be placing protests exclusively in the hands of the party in power. And I understand, gentlemen, that in
practice that has not given good results. Many have criticized, many have complained against, the tyranny of the majority in electoral cases .. I
repeat that the best guarantee the fact that these questions will be judged not only by three members of the majority but also by three members of
the minority, with the additional guarantee of the impartial judgment of three justices of the Supreme Court." (The Framing of the Philippine
Constitution by Aruego, Vol. I, pp. 261-263; emphasis supplied.).

The foregoing was corroborated by Senator Laurel. Speaking for this Court, in Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil., 139), he asserted:.

"The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority-men mature in years and experience. To be
sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political development of other countries of the world. When, therefore they deemed it wise to
create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested with the exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also
having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain
evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its
creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval
of the Constitution, the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom `ultimate justice of the people'. (Abraham Lincoln, First
Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.).

"From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised
by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the
knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of
partisan considerations which prompted the people acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral
Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan
influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme
Court," (Pp. 174-175.) 7.

As a matter of fact, during the deliberations of the convention, Delegates Conejero and Roxas said:.

"El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera pedir informacion del Subcomite de Siete.

"El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?" El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto. "El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft., dando tres miembrosala
mayoria, y otros t?-es a la minyoryia y atros a la Corte Suprerma, no cree su Senoria que este equivale pricticamente a dejar el asunto a los
miembros del Tribunal Supremo?.

"El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal a la Comision esta cotistuido en esa forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria como los de la
minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Saprema consideration la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es
suficiente para dar el triunbo.

"El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Senoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran
del partidisrno?.

"El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo." (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra, pp. 168-169; emphasis
supplied.).

It is clear from the foregoing that the main objective of the framers of our Constitution in providing for the establishment, first, of an Electoral
Commission, 8 and then 9 of one Electoral Tribunal for each House of Congress, was to insure the exercise of judicial impartiality in the disposition
of election contests affecting members of the lawmaking body. To achieve this purpose, two devices were resorted to, namely: (a) the party having
the largest number of votes, and the party having the second largest number of votes, in the National Assembly or in each House of Congress, were
given the same number of representatives in the Electoral Commission or Tribunal, so that they may realize that partisan considerations could not
control the adjudication of said cases, and thus be induced to act with greater impartiality; and (b) the Supreme Court was given in said body the
same number of representatives as each one of said political parties, so that the influence of the former may be decisive and endow said
Commission or Tribunal with judicial temper.

This is obvious from the very language of the constitutional provision under consideration. In fact, Senator Sabido-who had moved to grant to
Senator Taada the privilege" to make the nominations on behalf of party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate-agrees with it. As
Senator Sumulong inquired:.

"..I suppose Your Honor will agree with me that the framers of the Constitution precisely thought of creating this Electoral Tribunal so as to prevent
the majority from ever having a preponderant majority in the Tribunal." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 330; emphasis supplied.).

Senator Sabido replied:.

"That is so, .." (Id., p. 330.).

Upon further interpretation, Senator Sabido said:.

".. the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its composition is to maintain a balance between the two parties and make the
members of the Supreme Court the controlling power so to speak of the Electoral Tribunal or hold the balance of power. That is the ideal situation."
(Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 349; emphasis supplied.).

Senator Sumulong opined along the same line. His words were: .

"..The intention is that when the three from the majority and the three from the minority become members of the Tribunal it is hoped that they will
become aware of their judicial functions, not to protect the protestants or the protegees. It is hoped that they will act as judges because to decide
election cases is a judicial function. But the framers of, the Constitution besides being learned were men of experience. They knew that even
Senators like us are not angels, that we are human beings, that if we should be chosen to go to the Electoral Tribunal no one can say that we will
entirely be free from partisan influence to favor our party, so that in, case that hope that the three from the majority and the three from the minority
who will act as Judges should result in disappointment, in case they do not act as judges but they go there and vote along party liner, still there is the
guarantee that they will offset each other and the result will be that the deciding vote will reside in the hands of the three Justices who have no
partisan motives to favor either the protestees or the protestants. In other words, the whole idea is to prevent the majority from controlling and
dictating the decisions of the Tribunal and to make sure that the decisive vote will be wielded by the Congressmen or Senators who are members the
Tribunal but will be wielded by the Justices who, by virtue of their judicial offices, will have no partisan motives to serve, either protestants, or
protestees. That is my understanding of the intention of the framers of the Constitution when they decided to create the Electoral Tribunal.

x x x x x x x x x.

"My idea is that the intention of the framers of the constitution in creating the Electoral Tribunal is to insure impartially and independence in its
decision, and that is sought to be done by never allowing the majority party to control the Tribunal, and secondly by seeing to it that the decisive
vote in the Tribunal will be left in the hands of persons who have no partisan interest or motive to favor either protestant or protestee."
(Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 362-363, 365-366; emphasis supplied.).

So important in the "balance of powers" between the two political parties in the Electoral Tribunals, that several members of the Senate questioned
the right of the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate and, hence, of Senator Taada, as representative of the Citizens
Party-to nominate for the Senate Electoral Tribunal any Senator not belonging to said party. Senators Lim, Sabido, Cea and Paredes maintained that
the spirit of the Constitution would be violated if the nominees to the Electoral Tribunals did not belong to the parties respectively making the
nominations. 10.

It is not necessary, for the purpose of this decision, to determine whether the parties having the largest, and the second largest, number of votes in
each House may nominate, to the Electoral Tribunals, those members of Congress who do not belong to the party nominating them. It is patent,
however, that the most vital feature of the Electoral Tribunals is the equal representation of said parties therein, and the resulting equilibrium to be
maintained by the Justices of the Supreme Court as members of said Tribunals. In the words of the members of the present Senate, said feature
reflects the "intent" "purpose", and "spirit of the Constitution", pursuant to which the Senate Electoral Tribunal should be organized (Congressional
Record for the Senate, pp. 330, 337, 348-9, 350, 351, 355, 358, 362-3, 364, 370, 376).

Now then, it is well settled that "the purpose of all rules or maxims as to the construction or interpretation of statutes is to discover the true intention
of the law" (82 C. J. S., 526) and that.

"As a general rule of statutory construction, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof, and whatever is within the spirit of
statute is within the statute although it is not within the letter, while that which is within the letter, but not within the spirit of a statute, is not within the
statute; but, where the law is free and clear from ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded on the pretext of pursuing its spirit." (82 C. J. S.,
613.).

"There is no universal rule or absolute test by which directory provisions in a statute may in all circumstances be distinguished from those which are
mandatory. However, in the determination of this question, as of every other question of statutory construction, the prime object is to ascertain the
legislative intent. The legislative intent must be obtained front all the surrounding circumstances, and the determination does not depend on the form
of the statute. Consideration must be given to the entire statute, its nature, its object, and the consequences which would result from construing it
one way or the other, and the statute must be construed in connection with other related statutes. Words of permissive character may be given a
mandatory significance in order to effect the legislative intent, and, when the terms of a statute are such that they cannot be made effective to the
extent of giving each and all of them some reasonable operation, without construing the statute as mandatory, such construction should be given; ..
On the other hand, the language of a statute, however mandatory in form, may be deemed directory whenever legislative purpose can best be
carried out by such construction, and the legislative intent does not require a mandatory construction; but the construction of mandatory words as
directory should not be lightly adopted and never where it would in fact make a new law instead of that passed by the legislature. .. Whether a statute
is mandatory or directory depends on whether the thing directed to be done is of the essence of the thing required, or is a mere matter of form, and
what is a matter of essence can often be determined only by judicial construction. Accordingly, when a particular provision of a statute relates to
some immaterial matter, as to which compliance with the statute is a matter of convenience rather than substance, or where the directions of a
statute are given merely with a view to the proper, orderly, and prompt conduct of business, it is generally regarded as directory, unless followed by
words of absolute prohibition; and a statute is regarded as directory were no substantial rights depend on it, no injury can result from ignoring it, and
the purpose of the legislative can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed, with substantially the same result. On the other hand, a
provision relating to the essence of the thing to be done, that is, to matters of substance, is mandatory, and when a fair interpretation of a statute,
which directs acts or proceedings to be done in a certain way shows that the legislature intended a compliance with such provision to be essential to
the validity of the act or proceeding, or when same antecedent and pre-requisite conditions must exist prior to the exercise of power, or must be
performed before certain other powers can be exercise, the statute must be regarded as mandatory. (Id., pp. 869-874.) (See also, Words and
Phrases, Vol. 26, pp. 463-467; emphasis supplied.).

What has been said above, relative to the conditions antecedent to, and concomitant with, the adoption of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution,
reveals clearly that its framers intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure thereof is founded
upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority parties therein, with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are members of said
Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power. The procedure prescribed in said provision for the selection of members of the Electoral Tribunals
is vital to the role they are called upon to play. it constitutes the essence of said Tribunals. Hence, compliance with said procedure is mandatory, and
acts performed in violation thereof are null and void. 11.

It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case at bar, to seven (7),
instead of nine (9), members; but, it is conceded that the present composition of the Senate was not foreseen by the framers of our Constitution
(Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 329, 342, 349, 354, 359, 375). Furthermore, the spirit of the law prevails over its letter, and the
solution herein adopted maintains the spirit of the Constitution, for partisan considerations can not be decisive in a tribunal consisting of three (3)
Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3) members nominated by the majority party and either one (1) or two (2) members nominated by the party
having the second largest number of votes in the House concerned.

Upon the other hand, what would be the result of respondents' contention if upheld? Owing to the fact that the Citizens Party 12 has only one
member in the Upper House, Senator Taada felt he should nominate, for the Senate Electoral Tribunal, only said member of the Citizens Party. The
same is, thus, numerically handicapped, vis-a-vis the majority party, in said Tribunal. Obviously, Senator Taada did not nominate other two
Senators, because, otherwise, he would worsen the already disadvantageous position, therein, of the Citizens Party. Indeed, by the aforementioned
nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, if the same were sanctioned, the Nacionalista Party would have five (5) members in the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, as against one (1) member of the Citizens Party and three members of the Supreme Court. With the absolute majority
thereby attained by the majority party in said Tribunal, the philosophy underlying the same would be entirely upset. The equilibrium between the
political parties therein would be destroyed. What is worst, the decisive moderating role of the Justices of the Supreme Court would be wiped out,
and, in lieu thereof, the door would be thrown wide open for the predominance of political considerations in the determination of election protests
pending before said Tribunal, which is precisely what the fathers of our Constitution earnestly strove to forestall. 13.

This does not imply that the honesty, integrity or impartiality of Senators Cuenco and Delgado are being questioned. As a matter of fact, when
Senator Taada objected to their nomination, he explicitly made of record that his opposition was based, not upon their character, but upon the
principle involved. When the election of members of Congress to the Electoral Tribunal is made dependent upon the nomination of the political
parties above referred to, the Constitution thereby indicates its reliance upon the method of selection thus established, regardless of the individual
qualities of those chosen therefor. Considering the wealth of experience of the delegatesto the Convention, as lawyers of great note, as veteran
politicians and as leaders in other fields of endeavor, they could not, and did not, ignore the fact that the Constitution must limit itself to giving general
patterns or norms of action. In connection, particularly, with the composition of the Electoral Tribunals, they believed that, even the most well
meaning individuals often find it difficult to shake off the bias and prejudice created by political antagonisms and to resist the demands of political
exigencies, the pressure of which is bound to increase in proportion to the degree of predominance of the party from which it comes. As above
stated, this was confirmed by distinguished members of the present Senate. (See pp. 25-28, 33, 34, supra.).

In connection with the argument of the former Secretary of Justice to the effect that when "there is no minority party represented in the Assembly, the
necessity for such a check by the minority disappears", the following observations of the petitioners herein are worthy of notice:.

" Under the interpretation espoused by the respondents, the very frauds or terrorism committed by a party would establish the legal basis for the final
destruction of minority parties in the Congress at least. Let us suppose, for example, that in the Senate, the 15 or 16 senators with unexpired terms
belong to the party A. In the senatorial elections to fill the remaining 8 seats, all the 8 candidates of party A are proclaimed elected through alleged
fraud and/or terrorism. (The ouster of not less than 3 senators-elect in the elections held since liberation attests to the reality of election frauds and
terrorism in our country.) There being no senator or only one senator belonging to the minority, who would sit in judgment on the election candidates
of the minority parties? According to the contention of the respondents, it would be a Senate Electoral Tribunal made up of three Supreme Court
Justices and 5 or 6 members of the same party A accused of fraud and terrorism. Most respectfully, we pray this Honorable Court to reject an
interpretation that would make of a democratic constitution the very instrument by which a corrupt and ruthless party could entrench itself in power
the legislature and thus destroy democracy in the Philippines.

x x x x x x x x x.

".. When there are no electoral protests filed by the Minority party, or when the only electoral protests filed are by candidates of the majority against
members-elect of the same majority party, there might be no objection to the statement. But if electoral protests are filed by candidates of the
minority party, it is at this point that a need for a check on the majority party is greatest, and contrary to the observation made in the above-quoted
opinion, such a cheek is a function that cannot be successfully exercised by the 3 Justices of the Supreme Court, for the obvious and simple reason
that they could easily be outvoted by the 6 members of the majority party in the Tribunal.

x x x x x x x x x.

"In the case of the cited opinion of Secretary Abad Santos rendered in 1939, it, did not appear that there were minority party candidates who were
adversely affected by the ruling of the Secretary of Justice and who could have brought a test case to court." (Emphasis supplied.).

The defenses of waiver and estoppel set up against petitioner Taada are untenable. Although "an individual may waive constitutional provisions
intended for his benefit", particularly those meant for the protection of his property, and, sometimes, even those tending "to secure his personal
liberty", the power to waive does not exist when "public policy or public morals" are involved. (11 Am. Jur. 765; I Cooley's Constitutional Limitations,
pp. 368-371). The procedure outlined in the Constitution for the organization, of the Electoral Tribunals was adopted in response to the demands of
the common weal, and it has been held that where a statute is founded on public policy, those to whom it applies should not be permitted to waive its
provisions" (82 C. J. S., 874). Besides, there can be no waiver without an intent to such effect, which Senator Taada did not have. Again, the
alleged waiver or exhaustion of his rights does not justify the exercise thereof by a person or party, other than that to which it is vested exclusively by
the Constitution.

The rule estoppel is that "whenever a party has, by his declaration, act or omissions, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular
thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in a litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it" (Rule 69,
sec. 68 [a], Rules of Court). In the case at bar, petitioner Senator Taada did not lead the Senate to believe that Senator Primicias could nominate
Senators Cuenco and Delgado. On the contrary, said petitioner repeatedly asserted that his was the exclusive right to make the nomination. He,
likewise, specifically contested said nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado. Again, the rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact, not of law,
about the truth of which the other party is ignorant (see Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3, pp. 490, 495). Such is not the nature of the
situation that confronted Senator Taada and the other members of the Senate. Lastly, the case of Zandueta vs. De la Costa (66 Phil., 615), cited by
respondents, is not in point. Judge Zandueta assumed office by virtue of an appointment, the legality of which he later on assailed. In the case at
bar, the nomination and election of Senator Taada as member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal was separate, distinct and independent from the
nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have not been
nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution; that the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate not
more than three (3) members thereof to said Electoral Tribunal; that the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate has the
exclusive right to nominate the other three (3) Senators who shall sit as members in the Electoral Tribunal; that neither these three (3) Senators, nor
any of them, may be nominated by a person or party other than the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate or its
representative therein; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination and that the nomination of
Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election of said respondents by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and
void ab initio.

As regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, we are not prepared to hold, however, that their
appointments were null and void. Although recommended by Senators Cuenco and Delgado, who are not lawful members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, they were appointed by its Chairman, presumably, with the consent of the majority of the de jure members of said body 14 or, pursuant to
the Rules thereof. At any rate, as held in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra), the election of its personnel is an internal matter falling within the
jurisdiction and control of said body, and there is every reason to believe that it will, hereafter take appropriate measures, in relation to the four (4)
respondents abovementioned, conformably with the spirit of the Constitution and of, the decision in the case at bar.

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that, respondents Senators Mariano Jesus Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado have not been duly
elected as Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, that they are not entitled to act as such and that they should be, as they are hereby, enjoined
from exercising the powers and duties of Members of said Electoral Tribunal and from acting in such capacity in connection with Senate Electoral
Case No. 4 thereof. With the qualification stated above, the petition is dismissed, as regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel
Serapio and Placido Reyes. Without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., and Felix, JJ., concur.

DIGEST

FACTS: 103 Phil. 1051 Political Law Constitutional Law Political Question Defined Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition
senator was Lorenzo Taada who belonged to the Citizens Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the
bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is
provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority
party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the
minority were filled in by the NP. Taada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET
would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano
Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco
argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Taada and Macapagal was not to raise
the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.

HELD: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question. The term Political Question connotes what it means
in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked by Taada to decide upon the official acts of Senate.
The issue being raised by Taada was whether or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid which is a judicial question. Note
that the SET is a separate and independent body from the Senate which does not perform legislative acts.
But how should the gridlock be resolved?
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority members) must not come from the majority party. In this
case, the Chairman of the SET, apparently already appointed members that would fill in the minority seats (even though those will come from the
majority party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the SET (referring to those legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides,
the SET may set its own rules in situations like this provided such rules comply with the Constitution.














DAZA V SINGSON G.R. NO. 86344. DECEMBER 21, 1989.


Facts: On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the House of
Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159
and correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17 members.

On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including
therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.

The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his
seat by the respondent. Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the Commission on Appointments because
his election thereto is permanent under the doctrine announced in Cunanan v. Tan.

For his part, the respondent argues that the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. He also
maintains that he has been improperly impleaded, the real party respondent being the House of Representatives which changed its representation in
the Commission on Appointments and removed the petitioner. Finally, he stresses that nowhere in the Constitution is it required that the political
party be registered to be entitled to proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments.


Issue: Whether petitioners removal is unconstitutional;
Whether the election of Sen. Cuenco and Delgado to the Electoral Tribunal is unconstitutional;


Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated January 13, 1989, is LIFTED. The Court holds that the
respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to
Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. No pronouncement as to costs.


Ratio: If by reason of successful election protests against members of a House, or of their expulsion from the political party to which they belonged
and/or of their affiliation with another political party, the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House is materially changed, the
House is clothed with authority to declare vacant the necessary number of seats in the Commission on Appointments held by members of said
House belonging to the political party adversely affected by the change and then fill said vacancies in conformity with the Constitution.


In view of the Allied Majority of 1961

In the election for the House of Representatives held in 1961, 72 seats were won by the Nacionalista Party, 29 by the Liberal Party and 1 by an
independent. Accordingly, the representation of the chamber in the Commission on Appointments was apportioned to 8 members from the
Nacionalista Party and 4 from the Liberal Party. Subsequently, 25 members of the Nacionalista Party, professing discontent over the House
leadership, made common cause with the Liberal Party and formed what was called the Allied Majority to install a new Speaker and reorganize the
chamber.

It noted that the Allied Majority was a merely temporary combination as the Nacionalista defectors had not disaffiliated from their party and
permanently joined the new political group. Officially, they were still members of the Nacionalista Party. The reorganization of the Commission on
Appointments was invalid because it was not based on the proportional representation of the political parties in the House of Representatives as
required by the Constitution.


The Court held: The constitutional provision to the effect that "there shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve (12) Senators and
twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives elected by each House, respectively, on the basis of proportional REPRESENTATION OF
THE POLITICAL PARTIES THEREIN," necessarily connotes the authority of each House of Congress to see to it that this requirement is duly
complied with. As a consequence, it may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission, but also, subsequently
thereto.

In view of Congress authority

Lastly, we resolve that issue in favor of the authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on
Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes
must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal
disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.

In view of the Courts intervention

The Court would have preferred not to intervene in this matter, leaving it to be settled by the House of Representatives or the Commission on
Appointments as the bodies directly involved. But as our jurisdiction has been invoked and, more importantly, because a constitutional stalemate had
to be resolved, there was no alternative for us except to act, and to act decisively. In doing so, of course, we are not imposing our will upon the said
agencies, or substituting our discretion for theirs, but merely discharging our sworn responsibility to interpret and apply the Constitution. That is a
duty we do not evade, lest we ourselves betray our oath.

TANADA VS. ANGARA

PANGANIBAN, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Petitioners Senators Taada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by the Philippine Senate of the Presidents
ratification of the international Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the
mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give
preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods. Further, they
contended that the national treatment and parity provisions of the WTO Agreement place nationals and products of member countries on the
same footing as Filipinos and local products, in contravention of the Filipino First policy of our Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase
effectively controlled by Filipinos.

II. THE ISSUE

Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from
integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine Senate of the Presidents ratification of the Agreement
establishing the WTO.]

NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade liberalization and economic
globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized.

There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.

[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes
the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only
against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did
not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the
unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either.In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis
of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.

xxx xxx xxx

[T]he constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign
investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community. As explained by
Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of overdependence on external assistance for
even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international community.
Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the development
of natural resources and public utilities.

The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national treatment, and trade without discrimination cannot be struck down as
unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on
equality and reciprocity, the fundamental law encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets, thereby
demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that
can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete
internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to
grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.

xxx xxx xxx

It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to develop an independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is
equally true that such principles while serving as judicial and legislative guides are not in themselves sources of causes of action.
Moreover, there are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a trade policy that
serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity and the promotion of
industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets, thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged
impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.

That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it a
part of the law of the land is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no patent and gross arbitrariness or despotism by
reason of passion or personal hostility in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may even
agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to
attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial
power and duty. Ineludibly, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is
outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should
join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine in electing their policy
makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a member.



















Arnault v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950
D E C I S I O N
(En Banc)


OZAETA, J.:

I. THE FACTS

The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land, known as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An
intriguing question that the Senate sought to resolve was the apparent irregularity of the governments payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident
American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed
to have forfeited anyway long before. The Senate sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the
expense of the government.

Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions, was one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate
to its hearings. In the course of the investigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to whom he gave the amount of
Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.

Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment
until he answers the questions. He thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of his
detention.

II. THE ISSUE

1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the
Php440,000.00?
2. Did the Senate have the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session?
3. May the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by Arnault.]

1. Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom
he gave the Php440,000.00.

Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations
and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to
enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence
of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess
the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere
requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some
means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.

xxx xxx xxx

[W]e find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter
under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner, requires
the Special Committee, among other things, to determine the parties responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal , and it is obvious
that the name of the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to that determination it is in fact the very
thing sought to be determined. The contention is not that the question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation or
materiality to any proposed legislation. We have already indicated that it is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question
propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.

xxx xxx xxx

If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the
witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment.

2. YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session.

We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of
the last session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the
legislative body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed
during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed
legislation. To deny to such committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that the power
is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-
preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.

But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing body and which does not cease exist
upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress . . . There is no limit as to time to the Senates power to punish for contempt in cases where that
power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.

3. NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination.

Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the [P440,000.00] to a representative of Burt in
compliance with the latters verbal instruction, we find no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might
incriminate him. There is no conflict of authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:

Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the Court. At least, it is not enough for the witness to say
that the answer will incriminate him as he is not the sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the
court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his general conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus
developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct answer to a question may criminate or not. . . The fact that the testimony of a
witness may tend to show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional provision against self-
incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege by
reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person.

It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of the case whether the witness is justified in refusing
to answer. A witness is not relieved from answering merely on his own declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial
judge to decide that question.



































4 SCRA 1 Political Law Appointing Power Midnight Appointments

FACTS:
Dominador Aytona was one of those appointed by outgoing president Carlos Garcia during the last day of his term.
Aytona was appointed as the ad interim governor of the Central Bank. When the next president, Diosdado
Macapagal took his office, he issued Order No. 2 which recalled Aytonas position and at the same time he
appointed Andres Castillo as the new governor of the Central Bank. Aytona then filed a quo warranto proceeding
claiming that he is qualified to remain as the Central Bank governor and that he was validly appointed by the former
president. Macapagal averred that the ex-presidents appointments were scandalous, irregular, hurriedly done,
contrary to law and the spirit of which, and it was an attempt to subvert the incoming presidency or administration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Aytona should remain in his post.

HELD:
No. Had the appointment of Aytona been done in good faith then he would have the right to continue office. Here,
even though Aytona is qualified to remain in his post as he is competent enough, his appointment can nevertheless
be revoked by the president. Garcias appointments are hurried maneuvers to subvert the upcoming administration
and is set to obstruct the policies of the next president. As a general rule, once a person is qualified his appointment
should not be revoked but in here it may be since his appointment was grounded on bad faith, immorality and
impropriety. In public service, it is not only legality that is considered but also justice, fairness and righteousness.






































Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC
140 SCRA 455
January 7, 1986

FACTS:

11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national elections on
February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict
with the constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election.

Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos letter of conditional resignation did not create the actual vacancy
required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special election for
President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the
President is: irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the
winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation.

The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the
incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as
acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor
repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the
election is clean, fair and honest.

ISSUE:

Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the elections

HELD:

The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from
holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883
unconstitutional.

The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any restraining order, have turned the
issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the
lack of the actual vacancy of the Presidents office) which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign
capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in
the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to
elect a new president.
























Romulo v. Yniguez Digest
Romulo v Yniguez
G.R. No. 71908 February 4, 1986
Patajo, J.:

Facts:
1. Petitioners, representing more than one-fifth of all members of the Batasan in 1985, filed with the Batasan Resolution No. 644 and complaint calling
for the impeachment of President Marcos. Said resolution and complaint were referred by the Speaker to the Committee on Justice, Human Rights
and Good Government. The Committee found the complaint not sufficient in form and substance to warrant its further consideration and disapproved
and dismissed all the charges contained in the complaint attached. It then submitted its report which was duly noted by the Batasan and sent to the
archives.

2. On August 14, 1985, MP Ramon V. Mitra filed with the Batasan a motion praying for the recall from the archives of Resolution No. 644 and the
verified complaint attached thereto. Said motion was disapproved by the Batasan.

3. Hence, this petition for prohibition to restrain respondents from enforcing Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the Batasan Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings and mandamus to compel the Batasan Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to recall from the archives and
report out the resolution together with the verified complaint for the impeachment of the President of the Philippines.Petiti oner contend that said
provisions are unconstitutional because they amend Sec. 3 of Article XI I of the 1973 Constitution, without complying with the mandatory amendatory
process provided for under Article XVI of the Constitution, by empowering a smaller body to supplant and overrule the complaint to impeach
endorsed by the requisite 1/5 of all the members of the Batasan Pambansa and that said questioned provisions derail the impeachment proceedings
at various stages by vesting the Committee on Justice, etc. the power to impeach or not to impeach, when such prerogative belongs solely to
Batasan Pambansa as a collegiate body.

4. Petitioners further contend that Section 8 of the Rules is unconstitutional because it imposes an unconstitutional and illegal condition precedent in
order that the complaint for impeachment can proceed to trial before the Batasan. By requiring a majority vote of all the members of the Batasan for
the approval of the resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment, the Rules impose a condition not required by the Constitution for all that
Section 3, Article XIII requires is the endorsement of at least one-fifth of all The members of the Batasan for the initiation of impeachment
proceedings or for the impeachment trial to proceed.

5. Respondents Speaker and the Members of the Committee on Justice of the Batasan Pambansa contend that that the petition should be dismissed
because (1) it is a suit against the Batasan itself over which this Court has no jurisdiction; (2) it raises questions which are political in nature; (3) the
Impeachment Rules are strictly in consonance with the Constitution and even supposing without admitting that the Rules are invalid, their invalidity
would not nullify the dismissal of the complaint for impeachment for the Batasan as a body sovereign within its own sphere has the power to dismiss
the impeachment complaint even without the benefit of said Rules; and (4) the Court cannot by mandamus compel the Batasan to give due course to
the impeachment complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court can interfere with the Batasans power of impeachment

NO.
1. The dismissal by the majority of the members of the Batasan of the impeachment proceedings is an act of the Batasan as a body in the exercise of
powers that have been vested upon it by the Constitution beyond the power of this Court to review. This Court cannot compel the Batasan to conduct
the impeachment trial prayed for by petitioners. A dismissal by the Batasan itself as a body of the resolution and complaint for impeachment makes
irrelevant under what authority the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government had acted.

2. Aside from the fact that said Committee cannot recall from the Archives said resolution and complaint for impeachment without revoking or rescinding
the action of the Batasan denying MP Mitra's motion for recall (which of course it had no authority to do and, therefore, sai d Committee is in no
position to comply with any order from the Court for said recall) such an order addressed to the Committee would actually be a direct order to the
Batasan itself.

3. The Court held that if it has no authority to control the Philippine Senate, then it does not have the authority to control the actions of subordinate
employees acting under the direction of the Senate. The secretary, sergeant-at-arms, and disbursing officer of the Senate are mere agents of the
Senate who cannot act independently of the will of that body. Should the Court do as requested, there will be the spectacle presented of the court
ordering the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the disbursing officer of the Philippine Senate to do one thing, and the Philippine Senate ordering
them to do another thing.

4. The writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it clearly appears that the person to whom it is directed has the absolute power to execute it.





AVELINO VS CUENCA

On 18 Feb 1949, Senator Taada invoked his right to speak on the senate floor to formulate charges against the then Senate President Avelino. He request to do so
on the next session (21 Feb 1949). On the next session however, Avelino delayed the opening of the session for about two hours. Upon insistent demand by Taada,
Cuenco and Sanidad and others, Avelino was forced to open session. He however, together with his allies initiated all dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall Taada
from delivering his piece. Motions being raised by Taada et al were being blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even ruled Taada and Sanidad, among
others, as being out of order. Avelinos camp then moved to adjourn the session due to the disorder. Sanidad however countered and they requested the said
adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he was immediately followed by his followers. Senator Cabili then
stood up, and asked that it be made of record it was so made that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate
President Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate. Tanada was
subsequently recognized to deliver his speech. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidads Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate President. This was
unanimously approved and was even recognized by the President of the Philippines the following day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed a
quo warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the rightful Senate President.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case.
HELD: By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. This is in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the
controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the
judiciary. The SC should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to
choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his
remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not in the Supreme Court.
Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the resolution?
There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et al) may
not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other (Cuenco et al) twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be
different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less.
**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a hospital while Sen. Confesor was in the USA.
Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of the morning session (presided by Avelino)? Are there two sessions in one day? Was there a
quorum constituting such session?
The second session is a continuation of the morning session as evidenced by the minutes entered into the journal. There were 23 senators considered to be in
session that time (including Soto, excluding Confesor). Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution
declares that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, the House does not mean all the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute the
House. There is a difference between a majority of all the members of the House and a majority of the House, the latter requiring less number than the first.
Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested,
there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and
one abstained.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on March 14, 1949)
Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take cognizance of the case and that they are willing to bind themselves to the decision of the SC whether
it be right or wrong. Avelino contends that there is no constitutional quorum when Cuenco was elected president. There are 24 senators in all. Two are absentee
senators; one being confined and the other abroad but this does not change the number of senators nor does it change the majority which if mathematically
construed is + 1; in this case 12 (half of 24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There being only 12 senators when Cuenco was elected unanimously there was no quorum.
The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent events which j ustify its intervention. The Chief Justice
agrees with the result of the majoritys pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the constitutional
requirement in that regard has become a mere formalism, it appearing from the evidence that any new session with a quorum would result in Cuencos election as
Senate President, and that the Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has been trying to satisfy such formali sm by issuing compulsory processes
against senators of the Avelino group, but to no avail, because of the Avelinos persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, the
SC believes that the Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and that the majoritys ruling is in conformity with substantial
justice and with the requirements of public interest. Therefore Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate President and the petition is dismissed.











LANSANG VS. GARCIA [42 SCRA 448; L-33964; 11 Dec 1971]

Facts:

In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila,
for the presentation of its candidates in the general elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand grenades were thrown at the platform
where said candidates and other persons were. Eight persons were killed and many more injured. Proclamation 889 was issued by the President
suspending privilege of writ of habeas corpus stating that there is a conspiracy of rebellion and insurrection in order to forcibly seize political power.
Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed by persons (13) who have been arrested without a warrant.

It was stated that one of the safeguards of the proclamation was that it is to be applied to persons caught in flagrante delicto. Incidentally, Proc. 889-
A was issued as an amendment, inserting the word actually staging. Proc. 889-B was also issued lifting the suspension of privilege in 27 provinces,
3 sub-provinces and 26 cities. Proc. 889-C was issued restoring the suspension in 13 provinces and cities(mostly in Mindanao). Proc. 889-D further
lifted the suspension in 7 provinces and 4 cities. Only 18 provinces and sub-provinces and 2 cities whose privilege was suspended. Petitioners
maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, however
it became moot and academic since it was amended. Petitioners further contend that public safety did not require the issuance of proclamations
stating: (a) that there is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the Government was functioning normally, as
were the courts; (c) that no untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan, has actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d) that
the President's alleged apprehension, because of said plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and (e) that the Communist forces in the Philippines are
too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to such extent as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

A resolution was issued by majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence
of the factual bases for the proclamations. Now the Court resolves after conclusive decision reached by majority.


Issues:

(1) Whether or Not the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus)
belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive upon the courts and upon all other persons.

(2) Whether or Not public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus decreed in Proclamation No. 889-A.


Held:

The President has authority however it is subject to judicial review. Two conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the
privilege to the writ (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the
suspension of the privilege. President has three (3) courses of action: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. He had, already, called out the armed forces, proved
inadequate. Of the two other alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh.

Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has no ability, is negatived by the killing of 5 mayors, 20 barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there were
fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the Greater Manila Area in 1970. CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine major
labor organizations; has exploited the (11) major student or youth organizations; about thirty (30) mass organizations actively advancing the CPP.



















G.R. No. L-28790 April 29, 1968

ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS, as Commissioner of Land Registration, petitioner,
vs.
CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, as Secretary of Justice, and RAFAEL M. SALAS, as Executive Secretary, respondents.

Leandro Sevilla, Ramon C. Aquino and Lino M. Patajo for petitioner.
Claudio Teehankee for and in his own behalf as respondent.

REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:

Petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Secretary of Justice from investigating the official actuations of the
Commissioner of Land Registration, and to declare inoperative his suspension by the Executive Secretary pending investigation.

The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified Commissioner of Land Registration, a
position created by Republic Act No. 1151. By the terms of section 2 of said Act, the said Commissioner is declared "entitled to the same
compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance." The appropriation laws (Rep. Acts 4642, 4856 and
5170) in the item setting forth the salary of said officer, use the following expression:

1. One Land Registration Commissioner with the rank and privileges of district judge P19,000.00.

On March 7, 1968, respondent Secretary of Justice coursed to the petitioner a letter requiring him to explain in writing not later than March 9, 1968
why no disciplinary action should be taken against petitioner for "approving or recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation and
consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles." Noblejas answered and apprised the
Secretary of Justice that, as he enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments and compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he could only
be suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance, and, therefore, the papers relative to his case should
be submitted to the Supreme Court, for action thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R. A. No. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court.

On March 17, 1968, petitioner Noblejas received a communication signed by the Executive Secretary, "by authority of the President", whereby,
based on "finding that a prima facie case exists against you for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the public interest", petitioner was
"hereby suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the above charges."

On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the contentions advanced in his letter to the Secretary of Justice, claiming lack of
jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and praying for restraining writs. In their answer respondents admit the facts but denied that petitioner, as Land
Registration Commissioner, exercises judicial functions, or that the petitioner may be considered a Judge of First Instance within the purview of the
Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of Court 140; that the function of investigating charges against public officers is administrative or executive in
nature; that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary with non-judicial functions or duties except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of
judicial duties, as it would be in violation of the principle of the separation of powers.

Thus, the stark issue before this Court is whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of
the conferment upon him by the Statutes heretofore mentioned (Rep. Act 1151 and Appropriation Laws) of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the
Court of First Instance.

First to militate against petitioner's stand is the fact that section 67 of the Judiciary Act providing for investigation, suspension or removal of Judges,
specifically recites that "No District Judge shall be separated or removed from office by the President of the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall
exist in the judgment of the Supreme Court . . ." and it is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner of Land Registration is a District
Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary at all.

In the second place, petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance" includes by implication the right to be investigated
only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed upon its recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right being possessed
by a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges. These favoured officers include (a)
the Judicial Superintendent of the Department of Justice (Judiciary Act, sec. 42); (b) the Assistant Solicitors General, seven in number (Rep. Act No.
4360); (c) the City Fiscal of Quezon City (R.A. No. 4495); (d) the City Fiscal of Manila (R. A. No. 4631) and (e) the Securities and Exchange
Commissioner (R. A. No. 5050, s. 2). To adopt petitioner's theory, therefore, would mean placing upon the Supreme Court the duty of investigating
and disciplining all these officials, whose functions are plainly executive, and the consequent curtailment by mere implication from the Legislative
grant, of the President's power to discipline and remove administrative officials who are presidential appointees, and which the Constitution expressly
placed under the President's supervision and control (Constitution, Art. VII, sec. 10[i]).

Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the Solicitor General, another appointee of the President, could not be removed
by the latter, since the Appropriation Acts confer upon the Solicitor General the rank and privileges of a Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these
Justices are only removable by the Legislature, through the process of impeachment (Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par. 2).

In our opinion, such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the Legislature when it granted these executive officials the rank and
privileges of Judges of First Instance. This conclusion gains strength when account is taken of the fact that in the case of the Judges of the Court of
Agrarian Relations and those of the Court of Tax Appeals, the organic statutes of said bodies (Republic Act 1267, as amended by Act 1409; Rep. Act
No. 1125) expressly provide that they are to be removed from office for the same causes and in the same manner provided by law for Judges of First
Instance", or "members of the judiciary of appellate rank". The same is true of Judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations (Comm. Act No. 103) and of
the Commissioner of Public Service (Public Service Act, Sec. 3). It is thereby shown that where the legislative design is to make the suspension or
removal procedure prescribed for Judges of First Instance applicable to other officers, provision to that effect is made in plain and unequivocal
language.

But the more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas is that, if the Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of
"privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended
or removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental
doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and
simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials.

Justice Cardozo ruled in In re Richardson et al., Connolly vs. Scudder (247 N. Y. 401, 160 N. E. 655), saying:

There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislature to charge the judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonably incidental to
the fulfillment of judicial duties.

The United States Supreme Court said in Federal Radio Commission vs. General Electric Co., et al., 281 U.S. 469, 74 Law. Ed., 972,

But this court cannot be invested with jurisdiction of that character, whether for purposes of review or otherwise. It was brought into being by the
judiciary article of the Constitution, is invested with judicial power only and can have no jurisdiction other than of cases and controversies falling
within the classes enumerated in that article. It cannot give decisions which are merely advisory; nor can it exercise or participate in the exercise of
functions which are essentially legislative or administrative. Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., supra (261 U.S. 444, 67 L. ed. 736, 43 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 445) and cases cited; Postum Cereal Co. vs. California Fig Nut Co. supra (272 U.S. 700, 701, 71 L. ed. 481, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 284); Liberty
Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70, 74, 71 L. ed. 541, 544, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 282; Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Asso. 277 U.S. 274, 289, 72 L.
ed. 880, 884, 48 Sup. Ct. Rep. 507; Ex parte Bakelite Corp. 279 U.S. 438, 449, 73 L. ed. 789, 793, 49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 411. (Federal Radio
Commission v. General Electric Company, 281 U.S. 469, 74 L. ed. 972.) (Emphasis supplied.)

In this spirit, it has been held that the Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or
to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions; and a law requiring the
Supreme Court to arbitrate disputes between public utilities was pronounced void in Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co. (57 Phil.
600).1wph1.t

Petitioner Noblejas seeks to differentiate his case from that of other executive officials by claiming that under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151, he
is endowed with judicial functions. The section invoked runs as follows:

Sec. 4. Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper
step to be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented to him for registration, or where
any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with reference to any such matter, the question shall be submitted to the
Commissioner of Land Registration either upon the certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the
suggestion in writing by the party in interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, after consideration of the matter shown by the records certified to
him, and in case of registered lands, after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to
be made. His decision in such cases shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided, further, That, when a party in interest
disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law, said decision may be appealed to the Supreme
Court within thirty days from and after receipt of the notice thereof.

Serious doubt may well be entertained as to whether the resolution of a consulta by a Register of Deeds is a judicial function, as contrasted with
administrative process. It will be noted that by specific provision of the section, the decision of the Land Registration Commissioner "shall be
conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds" alone, and not upon other parties. This limitation1 in effect identifies the resolutions of the Land
Registration Commissioner with those of any other bureau director, whose resolutions or orders bind his subordinates alone. That the
Commissioner's resolutions are appealable does not prove that they are not administrative; any bureau director's ruling is likewise appealable to the
corresponding department head.

But even granting that the resolution of consultas by the Register of Deeds should constitute a judicial (or more properly quasi judicial) function,
analysis of the powers and duties of the Land Registration Commissioner under Republic Act No. 1151, sections 3 and 4, will show that the
resolution of consultas are but a minimal portion of his administrative or executive functions and merely incidental to the latter.

Conformably to the well-known principle of statutory construction that statutes should be given, whenever possible, a meaning that will not bring
them in conflict with the Constitution,2 We are constrained to rule that the grant by Republic Act 1151 to the Commissioner of Land Registration of
the "same privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance" did not include, and was not intended to include, the right to demand
investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon that Court's recommendation; for otherwise, the said grant of
privileges would be violative of the Constitution and be null and void. Consequently, the investigation and suspension of the aforenamed
Commissioner pursuant to sections 32 and 34 of the Civil Service Law (R. A. 2260) are neither abuses of discretion nor acts in excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the writs of prohibition and injunction applied for are denied, and the petition is ordered dismissed. No costs.


















































CHAPTER 7

Rodriguez v. Gella Digest

Rodriguez v Gella
G.R. No. L-6266 February 2, 1953
Paras, C.J.:

Facts:
1. Petitioners sought to invalidate Executive Orders (EO) 545 and 546 issued on November 10, 1952. EO 545 appropriated the sum of P37,850,500
for urgent and essential public works, while EO 546 set aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons,
floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities.

2. Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "in times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared
national policy." Accordingly the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, declaring (in section 1) the national policy that "the
existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines makes it necessary to invest the
President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency," and (in section 2) authorizing the President, "during the existence of
the emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section 1."

3. House Bill No. 727 sought to repeal all Emergency Powers Acts but was vetoed by the President. HB 727 may at least be considered as a
concurrent resolution of the Congress to formally declare the termination of the emergency powers.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Orders are still operative

NO.

1. EOs 545 and 546 must be declared as having no legal anchorage. The Congress has since liberation repeatedly been approving acts
appropriating funds for the operation of the Government, public works, and many others purposes, with the result that as to such legislative task the
Congress must be deemed to have long decided to assume the corresponding power itself and to withdraw the same from the President.

2. CA 671 was in pursuance of the constitutional provision, it has to be assumed that the National Assembly intended it to be only for a limited
period. If it be contended that the Act has not yet been duly repealed, and such step is necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers delegated
to the President, the result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be repealed by the Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do
so, the President may wield his veto.

3. If the President had ceased to have powers with regards to general appropriations, none can remain in respect of special appropriations;
otherwise he may accomplish indirectly what he cannot do directly. Besides, it is significant that Act No. 671 expressly limited the power of the
President to that continuing "in force" appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, so that, even assuming that the Act is still
effective, it is doubtful whether the President can by executive orders make new appropriations.

4. The specific power "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative" is a limitation on the
general power "to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfil its responsibilities and to maintain and
enforce its authority." Indeed, to hold that although the Congress has, for about seven years since liberation, been normally functioning and
legislating on every conceivable field, the President still has any residuary powers under the Act, would necessarily lead to confusion and
overlapping, if not conflict.

5. The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were careful in allowing delegation of legislative powers to the President for a
limited period "in times of war or other national emergency." They had thus entrusted to the good judgment of the Congress the duty of coping with
any national emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it alone must decide because emergency in itself cannot and should not create power. In
our democracy the hope and survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their faithful adherence to the
Constitution.










Araneta v Dinglasan Digest

Araneta v Dinglasan
G.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949
Tuason, J.:

Facts:
1. The petitions challenged the validity of executive orders issued by virtue of CA No. 671 or the Emergency Powers Act. CA 671 declared a state
of emergency as a result of war and authorized the President to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such emergency. However, the Act did not
fix the duration of its effectivity.

2. EO 62 regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. The petitioner, Araneta, is under prosecution in the CFI for violation of the
provisions of this EO 62 and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition.

3. EO 192, aims to control exports from the Philippines. Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Administrator of the Sugar
Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes. Both officials refuse to issue the required export license on the
ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by this EO.

4. EO 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other
purposes was assailed by petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party. He applied for a writ of
prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing the funds by virtue of this EO.

5. Finally, EO 226, which appropriated P6M to defray the expenses in connection with the national elections in 1949. was questioned by Antonio
Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter. He asked the Court to prevent "the respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that
amount or any part of it."

ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect

YES.
The Act fixed a definite limited period. The Court held that it became inoperative when Congress met during the opening of the regular session on
May 1946 and that EOs 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law . The session of the Congress is the point of expiration of the Act
and not the first special session after it.
Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21, 1947) regulating house and lot rentals, No. 192 (dated December 24, 1948) regulating exports, Nos. 225
and 226 (dated June 15,1949) the first appropriation funds for the operation of the Government from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and the second
appropriating funds for election expenses in November 1949, were therefore declared null and void for having been issued after Act No. 671 had
lapsed and/or after the Congress had enacted legislation on the same subjects. This is based on the language of Act 671 that the National Assembly
restricted the life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or
other causes brought on by the war.

























Summary: People vs. Vera (GR 45685, 16 November 1937)People vs. Vera
[GR 45685, 16 November 1937]First Division, Laurel (J): 4 concur, 2 concur in result

Facts:
The People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), arerespectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and
Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminalcase entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al."
(Criminal case 42649) of theCourt of First Instance (CFI) of Manila and GR 41200 of the Suprme Court. Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge adinterim of
the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of Cu Unjiengfor probation in the aforesaid criminal case. The
information in the said criminal case was filed with the CFI on 15October 1931, HSBC intervening in the case as private prosecutor. After a
protracted trial unparalleled in theannals of Philippine jurisprudence both in the length of time spent by the court as well as in the volume in
thetestimony and the bulk of the exhibits presented, the CFI, on 8 January 1934, rendered a judgment of convictionsentencing Cu Unjieng to
indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional to 8years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of
civil action to the offended party, HSBC. Uponappeal, the court, on 26 March 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from 5
years and 6months of prision correccional to 7 years, 6 months and 27 days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in allother respects. Cu
Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial whichwere denied on 17 December 1935, and final judgment was
accordingly entered on 18 December 1935. CuUnjieng thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States but thelatter denied the petition for certiorari in November, 1936. The Supreme Court, on 24 November 1936, denied the petition
subsequently filed by Cu Unjieng for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or newtrial and thereafter remanded the case to the
court of origin for execution of the judgment.Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation on 27 November 1936, before the trial court, under the
provisions of Act 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he
was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct inthe future. The CFI of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason
presiding, referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same 18 June 1937. Thereafter, the
CFI of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on 5 April 1937. On 2 April 1937, the Fiscal of the City of
Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution alsofiled an opposition on 5 April 1937, alleging, among
other things, that Act 4221, assuming that it has not beenrepealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1,
subsection (1),Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is notuniform throughout the
Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their
respective or otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on
the allegedunconstitutionality on Act 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI,
Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the private prosecutionexcept with respect to the questions raised concerning the
constitutionality of Act 4221. On 28 June 1937, JudgeJose O. Vera promulgated a resolution, concluding that Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda
racional" of the crime of which he stands convicted by the Supreme court in GR 41200, but denying the latter's petition for probation. On 3July 1937,
counsel for Cu Unjieng filed an exception to the resolution denying probation and a notice of intentionto file a motion for reconsideration. An
alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by counsel on13 July 1937. This was supplemented by an additional motion for
reconsideration submitted on 14 July 1937. Theaforesaid motions were set for hearing on 31 July 1937, but said hearing was postponed at the
petition of counselfor Cu Unjieng because a motion for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by 33 (34) attorneys had just been filed
with the trial court. On 6 August 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trialcourt for the issuance of an order of execution of the
judgment of this court in said case and forthwith to commitCu Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment. On 10 August 1937, Judge Vera issued
an order requiring all parties including the movants for intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on 14 August 1937. Onthe last-
mentioned date, the Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for execution of judgment in preference to the motion for leave
to intervene as amici curiae but, upon objection of counsel for CuUnjieng, he moved for the postponement of the hearing of both motions. The judge
thereupon set the hearing of the motion for execution on 21 August 1937, but proceeded to consider the motion for leave to intervene as amicicuriae
as in order. Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion for leave to intervene as amici curiaewas signed and submitted to court was
to have been heard on 19 August 1937. But at this juncture, HSBC and thePeople came to the Supreme Court on extraordinary legal process to put
an end to what they alleged was aninterminable proceeding in the CFI of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu
Unjiengfor delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts tocriticism and ridicule because of
the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng." The
scheduled hearing before the trialcourt was accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a temporary restraining order by the Supreme Court on
21August 1937.
Issue:
Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General and Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in present case.
Held:
YES. The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present
proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns thevalidity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or willsustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act 4221 really violates
theconstitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interestin having it set aside. Of greater
import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is themortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement
of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settledrule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.
Equal Protection of LawPeople v Vera 65 PHIL 56 (1937)
In criminal cases, the elements were laid down in Vera v. People:a. Accused is informed why he is proceeded against, and what charge he must
answer. b. Judgment of conviction is based on evidence that is not tainted by falsity, and after the defendant was heard.
If the prosecution produces the conviction based on untrue evidence, then it is guilty of depriving theaccused of due process. Thus false testimony
can be questioned by the accused regardless of the time that lapsed.
c. Judgment according to lawd. Tribunal with jurisdiction.

G.R. No. L-34674 October 26, 1931

MAURICIO CRUZ, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
STANTON YOUNGBERG, Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, respondent-appellee.

Jose Yulo for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Reyes for appellee.



OSTRAND, J.:

This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the
respondent, Stanton Youngberg, as Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle
imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. The petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits the
importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands.

Among other things in the allegation of the petition, it is asserted that "Act No. 3155 of the Philippine Legislature was enacted for the sole purpose of
preventing the introduction of cattle diseases into the Philippine Islands from foreign countries, as shown by an explanatory note and text of Senate
Bill No. 328 as introduced in the Philippine Legislature, ... ." The Act in question reads as follows:

SECTION 1. After March thirty-first, nineteen hundred and twenty-five existing contracts for the importation of cattle into this country to the contrary
notwithstanding, it shall be strictly prohibited to import, bring or introduce into the Philippine Islands any cattle from foreign countries: Provided,
however, That at any time after said date, the Governor-General, with the concurrence of the presiding officers of both Houses, may raise such
prohibition entirely or in part if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if decease among foreign cattle has ceased to be a menace to the
agriculture and live stock of the lands.

SEC. 2. All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect on its approval.

Approved, March 8, 1924.

The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was based
on two reasons, namely, (1) that if Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief demanded
because Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit the respondent from giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act
No. 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid.

The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by reason of the failure of the petitioner to file another complaint. From that order
of dismissal, the petitioner appealed to this court.

The appellee contends that even if Act No. 3155 be declared unconstitutional by the fact alleged by the petitioner in his complaint, still the petitioner
can not be allowed to import cattle from Australia for the reason that, while Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional, Act No. 3052 would
automatically become effective. Act No. 3052 reads as follows:

SECTION 1. Section seventeen hundred and sixty-two of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and eleven, known as the Administrative Code, is
hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 1762. Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. It shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to
import, bring or introduce live cattle into the Philippine Islands from any foreign country. The Director of Agriculture may, with the approval of the
head of the department first had, authorize the importation, bringing or introduction of various classes of thoroughbred cattle from foreign countries
for breeding the same to the native cattle of these Islands, and such as may be necessary for the improvement of the breed, not to exceed five
hundred head per annum: Provided, however, That the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation, bringing or introduction of
draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum: Provided, further, That all live cattle from foreign countries the importation, bringing or
introduction of which into the Islands is authorized by this Act, shall be submitted to regulations issued by the Director of Agriculture, with the
approval of the head of the department, prior to authorizing its transfer to other provinces.

"At the time of the approval of this Act, the Governor-General shall issue regulations and others to provide against a raising of the price of both fresh
and refrigerated meat. The Governor-General also may, by executive order, suspend, this prohibition for a fixed period in case local conditions
require it."

SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect six months after approval.

Approved, March 14, 1922.

The petitioner does not present any allegations in regard to Act No. 3052 to show its nullity or unconstitutionality though it appears clearly that in the
absence of Act No. 3155 the former act would make it impossible for the Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry to grant the petitioner a permit for
the importation of the cattle without the approval of the head of the corresponding department.

An unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal former laws or parts of laws by implication, since, being void, it is not inconsistent with such
former laws. (I Lewis Sutherland, Statutory Construction 2nd ed., p. 458, citing McAllister vs. Hamlin, 83 Cal., 361; 23 Pac., 357; Orange Country vs.
Harris, 97 Cal., 600; 32 Pac., 594; Carr vs. State, 127 Ind., 204; 11 L.R.A., 370, etc.)

This court has several times declared that it will not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes unless it is necessary to do so (McGirr vs. Hamilton
and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563, 568; Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad, 43 Phil., 259) but in this case it is not necessary to pass upon the
validity of the statute attacked by the petitioner because even if it were declared unconstitutional, the petitioner would not be entitled to relief
inasmuch as Act No. 3052 is not in issue.

But aside from the provisions of Act No. 3052, we are of the opinion that Act No. 3155 is entirely valid. As shown in paragraph 8 of the amended
petition, the Legislature passed Act No. 3155 to protect the cattle industry of the country and to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases through
importation of foreign cattle. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the public welfare and the development of the
resources of the country are objects within the scope of the police power (12 C.J., 927; 6 R.C.L., 203-206 and decisions cited therein; Reid vs.
Colorado, 187 U.S., 137, 147, 152; Yeazel vs. Alexander, 58 Ill., 254). In this connection it is said in the case of Punzalan vs. Ferriols and Provincial
Board of Batangas (19 Phil., 214), that the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, did not have the effect of denying to the Government of
the Philippine Islands the right to the exercise of the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. The facts
recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows that at the time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefor
and it cannot be said that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act. That being so, it is not for this court to avoid or vacate the Act upon
constitutional grounds nor will it assume to determine whether the measures are wise or the best that might have been adopted. (6 R.C.L., 243 and
decisions cited therein.)1awphil.net

In his third assignment of error the petitioner claims that "The lower court erred in not holding that the power given by Act No. 3155 to the Governor-
General to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation of the legislative powers." We do
not think that such is the case; as Judge Ranney of the Ohio Supreme Court in Cincinnati, Wilmington and Zanesville Railroad Co. vs.
Commissioners of Clinton County (1 Ohio St., 77, 88) said in such case:

The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no
valid objection can be made.

Under his fourth assignment of error the appellant argues that Act No. 3155 amends section 3 of the Tariff Law, but it will be noted that Act No. 3155
is not an absolute prohibition of the importation of cattle and it does not add any provision to section 3 of the Tariff Law. As stated in the brief of the
Attorney-General: "It is a complete statute in itself. It does not make any reference to the Tariff Law. It does not permit the importation of articles,
whose importation is prohibited by the Tariff Law. It is not a tariff measure but a quarantine measure, a statute adopted under the police power of the
Philippine Government. It is at most a `supplement' or an `addition' to the Tariff Law. (See MacLeary vs. Babcock, 82 N.E., 453, 455; 169 Ind., 228
for distinction between `supplemental' and `amendatory' and O'Pry vs. U.S., 249 U.S., 323; 63 Law. ed., 626, for distinction between `addition' and
`amendment.')"

The decision appealed from is affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.











People v. Rosenthal & Osmena
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee v. Jacob Rosenthal & Nicasio Osmena, defendants-appellants
En Banc
Doctrine: Due process & equal protection
Keywords: void of vagueness, equal protection, undue delegation of legislative authority
Date: June 12, 1939
Ponente: Justice Laurel

Facts:
Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmea were founders and shareholders of the O.R.O. Oil Company. The main objects and purposes of the
company are to mine, refine, market, buy and sell petroleum, natural gas and other oil products.
Rosenthal and Osmea were found guilty by the RTC in two cases of selling their shares to individuals without first obtaining the corresponding
written permit or license from the Insular Treasurer of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
This is in violation of Sections 2 & 5 of Act No. 2581, commonly known as the Blue Sky Law.
o Section 2 of said law provides that every person, partnership, association, or corporation attempting to offer to sell in the Philippines speculative
securities of any kind or character whatsoever, is under obligation to file previously with the Insular Treasurer the various documents and papers
enumerated therein and to pay the required tax of twenty-pesos.
o Sec 5, on the other hand, provides that whatever the said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands is satisfied, either with or without the examination
herein provided, that any person, partnership, association or corporation is entitled to the right to offer its securities as above defined and provided
for sale in the Philippine Islands, he shall issue to such person, partnership, association or corporation a certificate or permit reciting that such
person, partnership, association or corporation has complied with the provisions of this act, and that such person, partnership, association or
corporation, its brokers or agents are entitled to order the securities named in said certificate or permit for sale; that said Treasurer shall
furthermore have authority, whenever in his judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel said certificate or permit, and that an appeal from the
decision of the Insular Treasurer may be had within the period of thirty days to the Secretary of Finance.
The shares are said to be speculative because their value materially depended upon a promise of future promotion and development of the oil
business, rather than on actual tangible assets.
On appeal, Rosenthal & Osmena argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional on three grounds:
o 1) That it constitutes undue delegation of legislative authority to the Insular treasurer
o 2) that it does not afford equal protection before the law
o 3) that it is vague and ambiguous

Issue: WON the law is unconstitutional in any of the three grounds

Held: The law is CONSTITUTIONAL on all grounds alleged by the appellants.

Ratio:
That it constitutes undue delegation of legislative authority to the Insular treasurer
The Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Treasurer to follow in reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or
permit. The certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the person ,partnership, association or corporation applying therefor has
complied with the provisions of this Act, and this requirement, construed in relation to the other provisions of the law, means that a certificate or
permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the provisions of Act 2581 have been complied with. Upon the other hand, the authority of the
Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation is in the public interest. In view of
the intention and purpose of Act 2581 to protect the public against speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky
and against the sale of stock infly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations, we hold that
public interest in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or
cancellation of certificates or permits.
Act 2581 allows appeal from the decision of the Treasurer to the Sec of Finance. Hence, it cannot be contended that the Treasurer can act and
decide without any restraining influence.
The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action and at the same time to forestall over action which necessarily
results from undue concentration of powers, and thereby obtain efficiency and prevent despotism. Thereby, the rule of law was established which
narrows the range of governmental action and makes it subject to control by certain legal devices. As a corollary, we find the rule prohibiting
delegation of legislative authority, and from the earliest time American legal authorities have proceeded on the theory that legislative power must be
exercised by the legislative alone. It is frankness, however, to confess that as one delves into the mass of judicial pronouncements, he finds a great
deal of confusion.
the maxim delegatus non potest delegare or delegata potestas non potest delegare has beenmade to adapt itself to the complexities of modern
governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of subordinate legislation, in practically all modern governments.
Difficulty lies in fixing the limit and extent of the authority. While courts have undertaken to laydown general principles, the safest is to decide each
case according to its peculiar environment, having in mind the wholesome legislative purpose intended to be achieved.
Hall v Geiger-Jones: it is well-settled principle of law in this state that by legislative act a commission or board may be empowered to ascertain the
existence of facts, upon the finding of which may depend the right to continue in the practice of a profession or a regulated business.

that it does not afford equal protection before the law
o Another ground relied upon by appellants in contending that Act No. 2581 is unconstitutional is that it denies equal protection of the laws
because the law discriminates between an owner who sells his securities in a single transaction and one who disposes of them in repeated and
successive transactions.
o Hall vs. Geiger-Jones Co: "Prominent among such discriminations are . . . between an owner who sells his securities in a single transaction and
one who disposes of them in successive transactions; . . . " If a class is deemed to present a conspicuous example of what the legislature seeks to
prevent, the 14th Amendment allows it to be dealt with although otherwise and merely logically not distinguishable from others not embraced in the
law
that it is vague and ambiguous
o People vs. Fernandez and Trinidad. An Act will be declared void and inoperative on the ground of vagueness and uncertainty only upon a
showing that the defect is such that the courts are unable to determine, with any reasonable degree of certainty, what the legislature intended.
o In this connection we cannot pretermit reference to the rule that legislation should not be held invalid on the ground of uncertainty if susceptible
of any reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. An Act will not be declared inoperative and ineffectual on the ground that it
furnishes no adequate means to secure the purpose for which it is passed, if men of common sense and reason can devise and provide the means,
and all the instrumentalities necessary for its execution are within the reach of those intrusted therewith.

Judgement of lower court is affirmed, with modifications that the fines are reduced.
Rosenthal: from P500 -> P200 in each case
Osmena: from P1000 -> P500, from P2000 -> P1000
Subsidiary imprisonment for both in case of insolvency, and costs.



CERVANTES v. AUDITOR GENERAL
(G.R. No. L-4043, May 26, 1942)

FACTS
This is a petition to review a decision of Auditor General denying petitioners claim for quarters allowance as
manager of the National Abaca and other Fibers Corp. (NAFCO).
Petitioner was general manager in 1949 of NAFCO with annual salary of P15,000.00
NAFCO Board of Directors granted P400/mo. Quarters allowance to petitioner amounting to P1,650 for
1949.
This allowance was disapproved by the Central Committee of the government enterprise council under
Executive Order No. 93 upon recommendation by NAFCO auditor and concurred in by the Auditor general on two
grounds:
o a) It violates the charter of NAFCO limiting managers salary to P15,000/year.
o b) NAFCO is in precarious financial condition.

ISSUES: Whether or not Executive Order No. 93 exercising control over Government Owned and Controlled
Corporations (GOCC) implemented under R.A. No. 51 is valid or null and void.
Whether or not R.A. No. 51 authorizing presidential control over GOCCs is Constitutional.

DECISION: R.A. No. 51 is constitutional. It is not illegal delegation of legislative power to the executive as argued by
petitioner but a mandate for the President to streamline GOCCs operation. Executive Order 93 is valid because it
was promulgated within the 1 year period given. Petition for review DISMISSED with costs.






CALALANG v. WILLIAMS, 70 PHIL 726, GR No. 47800, December 2, 1940

FACTS:
The National Traffic Commission resolved that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along some major streets
such a Rizal Ave. in Manila for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The
Secretary of Public Works approved the resolution on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of
Manila have enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up
passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

ISSUE: Does the rule infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice? What is Social Justice?

HELD:
No. The regulation aims to promote safe transit and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the
public. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health,
and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated.
Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at
least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption
of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principles of Salus Populi est Suprema Lex.(Justice Laurel)

Facts: The National Traffic Commission recommended the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public
Works and Communication that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario St. extending from
Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarinas St. from 7:30 am to 12 pm and 1:30 pm to 5:30 pm and also along Rizal
Avenue from 7 am to 11 pm from a period of one year from the date of the opening of Colgante Bridge to traffic. It
was subsequently passed and thereafter enforce by Manila Mayor and the acting chief of police. Maximo Calalang
then, as a citizen and a taxpayer challenges its constitutionality.

Issue: Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works infringes upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice

Held: The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. It
is the promotion of the welfare of all people. It is neither communism, despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the state so that justice in its rational
and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.









Hirabayashi vs US
320 U.S. 81 (1943)

Facts:

After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt issued EO 9066 which was later endorsed by the Congress thru
HR. 1911 authorizing the Secretary of War to adapt measures in protecting the state against espionage and espionage.

General Dewitt then issued Public Proclamation No. 1 and 2 defining the military zones. Public Proclamation No. 3 was
released thereafter imposing curfew hours on all alien Japanese, all alien Germans, and all alien Italians including all
persons of Japanese ancestry, and that they all be confined within their respective residences between 8pm- 6am.

Hirabayashi failed twice to adhere to the curfew and was therefore sentenced to one month and one day imprisonment.

Issues:

WON EO 9066 is constitutional and that if it violates the Fifth Amendment as to descriminating citizens as to their race or
ancestry.

WON the congress unjustly delegated its powers to another in promulgating laws.


Held:

The US supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of EO 9066 pointing out the necessity to adapt such measures in
time of war to prevent the country from espionage and sabotage. In addition, the Supreme Court also upheld the
constitutionality of the Congress delegating its legislative function to another. The Proclamation No. 3, EO 9066 and HR
1911 should not be taken individually but is rather each as an affirmation of the other and that they are all in conformity.



















Restituto Ynot Vs IAC GR NO 74457 March 20 1987 CASE DIGEST
Facts

On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the
petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of
the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the
decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.

Issue:

Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?

Ruling:

The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in asic rule
prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court said that The reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court
do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter,
considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the
carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it
easier to kill them there

The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and
immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the instant case,
the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed
a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the
petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.


EMMANUEL PELAEZ vs. THE AUDITOR GENERAL
G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965
FACTS: During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section
68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33)
municipalities enumerated in the margin. Soon after the date last mentioned, or on November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as
Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary
injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure
of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by
Republic Act No. 2370 effective January 1, 1960 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. The third paragraph of
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of
Congress.
Respondent herein relies upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binagonan
ISSUE: W/N the President, who under this new law cannot even create a barrio, can create a municipality which is
composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities
HELD: On Cardona vs Municipality of Binangonan, such claim is untenable, for said case involved, not the creation of a new
municipality, but a mere transfer of territory from an already existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality (Binagonan),
likewise, existing at the time of and prior to said transfer. It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary,
in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature involving,
as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities the authority to create municipal
corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is strictly a legislative function or solely and
exclusively the exercise of legislative power
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or
administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in
itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate2 and (b) fix a
standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such
policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, wi th
reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate
upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also and this is worse to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent
with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks
and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix
the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does
it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.
The power of control under the provision Section 10 (1) of Article VII of the Consti implies the right of the President to interfere in the
exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national
government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local
governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of
checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the
President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act Within the scope of their authority. He may not
enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by
law, although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he
vote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may
be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal
from a decision of the corresponding provincial board.
Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its officials, by creating a
new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his office would thereby become
vacant. Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he could
compel local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him by
the Constitution.