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IN RE APPLICATION OF MAX SHOOP FOR

ADMISSION TO PRACTICE LAW


FACTS:

Max Shoop is applying for admission to practice
law in the Philippines under Par. 4 of the Rules
for the Examination of Candidates for Admission
to the Practice of Law. It was shown in his
application that he was practicing for more than
5 years in the highest court of the State of New
York. The said rule requires that: New York
State by comity confers the privilege of
admission without examination under similar
circumstances to attorneys admitted to practice
in the Philippine Islands. (Aside from comity, the
satisfactory affidavits of applicants must show
they have practiced at least 5 years in any
(district or circuit or highest) court of the US or
territory of it. But admission is still in the
discretion of the court.) The rule of New York
court, on the other hand, permits admission
without examination in the discretion of the
Appellate Division in several cases:1. Provided
that the applicant also practiced 5 years as a
member of the bar in the highest law court in
any other state or territory of the American
Union or in the District of Columbia2. The
applicant practiced 5 years in another country
whose jurisprudence is based on the principles
of the English Common Law (ECL).

ISSUE:

WON under the New York rule as it exists the
principle of comity is established

HELD:

The Philippines is an UNORGANIZED
TERRITORY of the US, under a civil gov't.
Established by the Congress In interpreting and
applying the bulk of the written laws of
this jurisdiction, and in rendering its decisions in
cases NOT covered by the letter of the written
law, this court relies upon the theories and
precedents of Anglo-American cases, subject
to the limited exception of those instances where
the remnants of the Spanishwritten law present
well-defined civil law theories and of the
fewcases where such precedents
are inconsistent with local customsand institutions.-
The jurisprudence of this jurisdiction is based
upon the ECL in itspresent day form of Anglo-
American Common Law to an almostexclusive
extent.- New York permits conferring privileges on
attorneys admitted topractice in the Philippines
similar to those privileges accorded bythe rule of
this court. - Petition granted. Decision is based
on theinterpretation of the NY rule; doesnt
establish a precedent withrespect to
future Applications.

Reasoning On
TERRITORY:a. Comity would exist if we are a
territory of the USb. We are NOT an organized
territory incorporated into the UnitedStates butc.
We are NOT a "foreign country" or "another
country" eitherd. Like Puerto Rico, we may not
be incorporated but we are aterritory since the
US Congress legislates for us and we havebeen
granted a form of territorial government, so to
that extentwe are a territory according to the US
Atty. Gen.

GOVERNMENT VS. SPRINGER
Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal
Company (NCC) was created by the Philippine
Congress. The law created it (Act No. 2822)
provides that: The voting power shall be
vested exclusively in a committee consisting of
the Governor-General, the President of the
Senate, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.

In November 1926, the Governor-General
(Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which
divested the voting rights of the Senate
President and House Speaker in the NCC. The
EO emphasized that the voting right should be
solely lodged in the Governor-General who is
the head of the government (President at that
time was considered the head of state but does
not manage government affairs). A copy of the
said EO was furnished to the Senate President
and the House Speaker.

However, in December 1926, NCC held its
elections and the Senate President as well as
the House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37
and the objection of the Governor-General, still
elected Milton Springer and four others as Board
of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo
warranto proceeding in behalf of the government
was filed against Springer et al questioning the
validity of their election into the Board of NCC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Senate President as well as
the House Speaker can validly elect the Board
Members of NCC.

HELD:

No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with
the doctrine of separation of powers. The
Supreme Court emphasized that the legislature
creates the public office but it has nothing to do
with designating the persons to fill the office.
Appointing persons to a public office is
essentially executive. The NCC is a government
owned and controlled corporation. It was created
by Congress. To extend the power of Congress
into allowing it, through the Senate President
and the House Speaker, to appoint members of
the NCC is already an invasion of executive
powers. The Supreme Court however notes that
indeed there are exceptions to this rule where
the legislature may appoint persons to fill public
office. Such exception can be found in the
appointment by the legislature of persons to fill
offices within the legislative branch this
exception is allowable because it does not
weaken the executive branch

MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS
Facts:

Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from
the presidency and was forced into exile.
Corazon Aquinos ascension into presidencywas
challenged by failed coup attempts as well as by
plots of Marcos loyalists and the Marcoses
themselves. Marcos, in his deathbed, has
signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to
die. But President Aquino, considering the dire
consequences to the nation of his return has
stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of
Mr. Marcos and his family. Hence, this petition
for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to
order the respondents to issue travel documents
to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of
his family and to enjoin the implementation of
the President's decision to bar their return to the
Philippines.

Issues:

Whether or not the President has the power to
bar the return of Marcos to the Philippines.
Assuming that she has the power to bar, was
there a finding made that there is a clear and
present danger to the public due to the return?
And have the requirements of due process been
complied with in the making of the finding?

HELD: Petition Dismissed.

The request of the Marcoses must not be
treated only in the light of constitutional
provisions, it must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual
unstated powers of the President which are
implicit in to the paramount duty residing in that
office to safeguard and protect general welfare.
Such request or demand should submit to the
exercise of a broader discretion on the part of
the President to determine whether it must be
granted or denied.

It is found by the Court that from the pleadings
filed by the parties, from their oral arguments,
and the facts revealed during the briefing in
chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the National
Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and
respondents were represented, that there exist
factual bases for the President's decision.
Hence, this act cannot be said to have been
done arbitrarily or capriciously. Further, the
ponencia (the coups, the communist threat,
peace and order issues especially in Mindanao,
Marcos loyalists plotting) bolsters the conclusion
that the return of Marcos will only exacerbate the
situation in the country.

Another reason of the Court...We cannot also
lose sight of the fact that the country is only now
beginning to recover from the hardships brought
about by the plunder of the economy attributed
to the Marcoses and their close associates and
relatives, many of whom are still here in the
Philippines in a position to destabilize the
country, while the Government has barely
scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts
to recover the enormous wealth stashed away
by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions.

Facts:

After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the
presidency, he and his family fled to Hawaii.
Now in his deathbed, petitioners are asking the
court to order the respondents to issue their
travel documents and enjoin the implementation
of the Presidents decision to bar their return to
the Philippines. Petitioners contend under the
provision of the Bill of Rights that the President
is without power to impair their liberty of abode
because only a court may do so within the limits
prescribed by law. Nor, according to the
petitioners, may the President impair their right
to travel because no law has authorized her to
do so.

Issue:

Does the president have the power to bar the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines?

Ruling:

The President has the obligation, under the
Constitution to protect the people, promote their
welfare and advance national interest.

This case calls for the exercise of the
Presidents power as protector of the peace. The
president is not only clothed with extraordinary
powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked
with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace
and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in
times when no foreign foe appears on the
horizon.

The documented history of the efforts of the
Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the
country bolsters the conclusion that their return
at this time would only exacerbate and intensify
the violence directed against the state and
instigate more chaos.

The State, acting through the Government, is
not precluded from taking preemptive actions
against threats to its existence if, though still
nascent they are perceived as apt to become
serious and direct protection of the people is the
essence of the duty of the government.

The Supreme Court held that the President did
not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion in determining the return of the
petitioners at the present time and under present
circumstances poses a serious threat to national
interest and welfare prohibiting their return to the
Philippines. The petition is DISMISSED.

IN RE CUNANAN
Facts:

Congress passed Republic Act Number 972,
commonly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of
1953. In accordance with the said law, the
Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the
bar those candidates who had obtained an
average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75
percent.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful
postwar candidates filed petitions for admission
to the bar invoking its provisions, while other
motions for the revision of their examination
papers were still pending also invoked the
aforesaid law as an additional ground for
admission. There are also others who have
sought simply the reconsideration of their grades
without, however, invoking the law in question.
To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the
court first reviewed the motions for
reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not
they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.

Issue: Whether or Not RA No. 972 is
constitutional and valid.

Held:

RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its
author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates
who suffered from insufficiency of reading
materials and inadequate preparation.
In the judicial system from which ours has been
evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment
and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the
practice of the profession and their supervision
have been indisputably a judicial function and
responsibility. We have said that in the judicial
system from which ours has been derived, the
admission, suspension, disbarment or
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice
of the profession is concededly judicial.
On this matter, there is certainly a clear
distinction between the functions of the judicial
and legislative departments of the government.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power
to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by
Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities may say,
merely to fix the minimum conditions for the
license.
Republic Act Number 972 is held to be
unconstitutional.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
In the manner of the petitions for Admission to
the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to
1953; Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners.

In recent years few controversial issues have
aroused so much publicinterest and concern as
R.A. 972 popularly known as the Bar Flunkers
Act of 1953. Generally a candidate is deemed
passed if he obtains a general ave of 75% in all
subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject,
although for the past few exams the passing
grades were changed depending on the
strictness of the correcting of the bar
examinations (1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948-
70% 1949-74%, 1950-1953 75%).

Believing themselves to be fully qualified
to practice law as those reconsidered and
passed by the S.C., and feeling that they have
been discriminated against, unsuccessful
candidates who obtained averages of a few
percentages lower than those admitted to the
bar went to congress for, and secured in 1951
Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the
president after he was given advise adverse to
it. Not overriding the veto, the senate then
approved senate bill no. 372 embodying
substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill.
The bill then became law on June 21, 1953

Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to
its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates
who suffered from insufficiency of reading
materials and inadequate preparations. By and
large, the law is contrary to public interest since
it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had
inadequate preparation for the practice of law
profession, as evidenced by their failure in the
exams.

Angara vs. electoral commission
FACTS:

In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and
the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were
candidates voted for the position of member of
the National Assembly for the first district of the
Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara
was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for
the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took
his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in
session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8
confirming the election of the members of the
National Assembly against whom no protest had
thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed
before the Electoral Commission a Motion of
Protest against the election of Angara. On Dec
9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of
which fixed said date as the last day for the filing
of protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the NA,
notwithstanding the previous confirmation made
by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss
arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation,
Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued
back by claiming that EC proclamation governs
and that the EC can take cognizance of the
election protest and that the EC cannot be
subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such
matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election
protest.

HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC
emphasized that in cases of conflict between the
several departments and among the agencies
thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final
arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism
devised finally to resolve the conflict and
allocate constitutional boundaries.

That judicial supremacy is but the power of
judicial review in actual and appropriate cases
and controversies, and is the power and duty to
see that no one branch or agency of the
government transcends the Constitution, which
is the source of all authority.

That the Electoral Commission is an
independent constitutional creation with specific
powers and functions to execute and perform,
closer for purposes of classification to the
legislative than to any of the other two
departments of the government.

That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly.