Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private
respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and
furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy."
1

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other
expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's
discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
2

The transcript reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) Good Afternoon M'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na kung paano ka
napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.
CHUCHI Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
ESG Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
CHUCHI Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon
ESG Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi hanggang 10:00
p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States,
nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka
sa akin makakahingi.
CHUCHI Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.
ESG Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa
Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that on
your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.
ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.
ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your own merit alam ko
naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
ESG Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI Eh, di sana
ESG Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka
dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano ka puma-rito.
"Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.
ESG Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka puwede ka ng hindi
pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.
CHUCHI Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.
ESG Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok kung hindi ako.
Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCHI Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
ESG Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no, nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCHI Paano kita nilapastanganan?
ESG Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na.
Magsumbong ka.
3

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private
respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to
prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." An information charging
petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act No. 4200, committed
as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not
being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's conversation with said accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder secretly record the
said conversation and thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said recording to other
person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash,
agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by
R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to the communication.
4

From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the
case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989
null and void, and holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the
information based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in
grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.
5

Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent Court of Appeals denied in its
Resolution
6
dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue"
7
that the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the
taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to the
unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication.
8
In relation to this, petitioner
avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not
constitute a violation of R.A. 4200.
9
Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a
"private conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under
the said act.
10

We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal
interpretation would be either impossible
11
or absurb or would lead to an injustice.
12

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication
and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept,
or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the
party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who
records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator"
13
under this provision of
R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our
lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either
by the parties themselves or by third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy would not appear to be material.
Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not made by all the parties but by some parties and involved not criminal
cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for example civil cases or special proceedings
whereby a recording is made not necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent of
the parties because the actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the act may
be indicative of their intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would you say, Your Honor, that the intention is to
cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?
Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense but as evidence to be used in
Civil Cases or special proceedings?
Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken without the authorization
of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?
Senator Taada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the observation of one without his
knowing it and then using it against him. It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record
the intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.
Senator Taada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of directors where a tape
recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks
and observations are being made should know that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please be informed that whatever you
say here may be used against you." That is fairness and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he
makes damaging statements against his own interest, well, he cannot complain any more. But if you are going to
take a recording of the observations and remarks of a person without him knowing that it is being taped or recorded,
without him knowing that what is being recorded may be used against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if a party secretly
records a public speech, he would be penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is
done secretly.
Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the communication between one
person and another person not between a speaker and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional
Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the
private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically
alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a
private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor
General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be
regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed."
14

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private
conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from
the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing
or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation,
15
or signifies the "process by
which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)"
16

These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts"
which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the
privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore,
put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Taada in his
Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations being overheard. But this
statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people
have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. Free conversations are often characterized by
exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to be
taken seriously. The right to the privacy of communication, among others, has expressly been assured by our
Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must have recognized the nature of
conversations between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.
They must have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free
exchange of communication between individuals free from every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means.
17

In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
18
a case which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a
telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a
telephone extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein,
19
following the principle that
"penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused."
20
The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable
facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the
unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant
petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.

REPUBLIC BANK, Petitioner, v. COURT OF TAX APPEALS AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondents.

Asisteo S. San Agustin for Petitioner.

SYLLABUS

1. TAXATION; DOUBLE TAXATION DEFINED; NOT PRESENT WHEN ONE IS A PENALTY AND THE OTHER IS A TAX; CASE AT BAR.
The wisdom of this is not the province of the Court. It is clear from the statutes then in force that there was no double taxation
involved one was a penalty and the other was a tax. At any rate, We have upheld the validity of double taxation. (Double taxation:
when the same person is taxed by the same jurisdiction for the same purpose. [San Miguel Brewery, Inc. v. City of Cebu 43 SCRA 275,
280]) The payment of 1/10 of 1% for incurring reserve deficiencies (Section 106, Central Bank Act) is a penalty as the primary purpose
involved is regulation, while the payment of 1% for the same violation (Second Paragraph, Section 249, NIRC) is a tax for the
generation of revenue which is the primary purpose in this instance. Petitioner should not complain that it is being asked to pay twice
for incurring reserve deficiencies. It can always avoid this predicament by not having reserve deficiencies. Petitioners case is covered
by two special laws one a banking law and the other, a tax law. These two laws should receive such construction as to make them
harmonize with each other and with the other body of pre-existing laws. (Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Standard Eastern, Inc., 66
SCRA 113, 120)

2. ID.; RESERVE DEFICIENCY TAX; QUESTION ON THE COMPUTATION MUST BE RAISED AT THE EARLIEST STAGE. Corollary issue
raised by petitioner bank, is the question on how the respondent Commissioner computed reserve deficiency taxes considering that
Sec. 249, NIRC, speaks of computation of what it calls penalty on a per month basis while the Central Bank Act provides for the
computation of the penalty on a per day basis. It claims that respondent Commissioner never informed them of the details of these
assessments, considering the same involve complex and tedious computations. It is too late in the day for petitioner to raise this
matter for Us to resolve. The grounds alleged by the petitioner in its motion for reconsideration of the Commissioners assessments are
the very same grounds raised in these petitions. Petitioner did not ask the Commissioner to explain how it arrived in computing these
reserve deficiency taxes. Neither did petitioner raise this question before the Court of Tax Appeals.

3. ID.; ID.; LETTER OF INSTRUCTION NO. 1330; CONDONATION OF PENALTIES AND OTHER SANCTIONS; COVERAGE; NOT
APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. petitioner bank in its brief mentions that in Letter of Instruction No. 1330 issued by President Marcos
on June 6, 1983, the Central Bank was ordered to assist petitioner by way of full condonation of all penalties and other sanctions of
whatever kind, nature and description, as of the date they become due, on its legal reserve deficiencies. Consequently, petitioner
insists that it is now exempted from what it claims are the penalties imposed by the second paragraph of Section 249, NIRC. A careful
study of said LOI reveals that it was issued with respect to petitioner banks (thereafter renamed Republic Planters Bank) role in the
governments sugar production and procurement program as the financial arm of the sugar industry when the Philippine Sugar
Commission (PHILSUCOM), created by virtue of P.D. 388 1974), bought the petitioner bank from the Roman family. The petition at bar
involves the assessments for the years 1969 and 1970. This LOI definitely does not cover the years 1969 and 1970 as it was issued
only on June 6, 1983 and covers the period when PHILSUCOM bought the then ailing Republic Bank from the Roman family and
renamed it the Philippine Planters Bank to be used as its financial conduit for the sugar industry. Therefore, even on the thesis that the
payment made (Second paragraph, Section 249, NIRC) is a penalty, this "penalty" for 1969 and 1970 can not be condoned as said LOI
does not cover it.

D E C I S I O N

NOCON, J.:

Petitioner Republic Bank appeals the decision of public respondent Court of Tax Appeals dated September 30, 1982 dismissing its
Petition for Review, thereby affirming public respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenues assessment for petitioners reserve
deficiency taxes inclusive of 25% surcharge for the taxable years 1969 and 1970 in the amounts of P1,325,768.82 and P1,953,132.67,
respectively.

The antecedent facts as briefly summarized by the Solicitor General are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"On 14 September 1971, respondent Commissioner assessed petitioner the amount of P1,060,615.06, plus 25% surcharge in the
amount of P265,153.76, or a total of P1,325,768.82, as 1% monthly bank reserve deficiency tax for taxable year 1969.chanrobles
lawlibrary : rednad

"In a letter dated 6 October 1971, petitioner requested reconsideration of the assessment which respondent Commissioner denied in a
letter dated 26 February 1973.

"On 5 April 1973, respondent Commissioner assessed petitioner the amount of P1,562,506.14, plus 25% surcharge in the amount of
P390,626.53, or a total of P1,953,132.67, as 1% monthly bank reserve deficiency tax for taxable year 1970.

"In a letter dated 16 May 1973, petitioner requested reconsideration of the assessment which respondent Commissioner denied in a
letter dated 6 May 1974.

"Petitioner contends that Section 249 of the Tax Code is no longer enforceable, because Section 126 of Act 1459, which was allegedly
the basis for the imposition of the 1% reserve deficiency tax, was repealed by Section 90 of Republic Act 337, the General Banking Act,
and by Sections 100 and 101 of Republic Act 265.

"On 28 March 1973, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Tax Court, docketed as C.T.A. Case No. 2506, contesting the
assessment for the taxable year 1969. On 3 July 1974, a similar petition, docketed as C.T.A. Case No. 2618. was filed contesting the
assessment for the taxable year 1970.

"The cases, involving similar issues, were consolidated. After hearing, the Tax Court rendered a decision dated 30 September 1982
dismissing the petitions for review and upholding the validity of the assessments.

"Still not satisfied, petitioner filed this petition for review." 1

Petitioner urges that the issue to be resolved in this petition is:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHETHER SECTION 249 OF THE TAX CODE WHICH PROVIDES THAT THERE SHALL BE COLLECTED UPON THE AMOUNT OF
RESERVE DEFICIENCIES INCURRED BY THE BANK . . . AS PROVIDED IN SECTION ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-SIX OF ACT NUMBERED
ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED AND FIFTY-NINE (THE CORPORATION LAW) . . . ONE PER CENTUM PER MONTH HAS BEEN
RENDERED INOPERATIVE BY THE REPEAL OF THE AFORESAID REFERRED PROVISION, I.E., SECTION ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-SIX
OF THE CORPORATION LAW." 2

The second paragraph of Section 249 of the Tax Code of 1970 (C.A. No. 466 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6110) invoked by the
respondent Commissioner in making the assessments provides that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"There shall be collected upon the amount of reserve deficiencies incurred by the bank, and for the period of their duration, as
provided in section one hundred twenty-six of Act Numbered one thousand four hundred and fifty-nine, as amended by Act Numbered
three thousand six hundred and ten, one per centum per month." chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

which paragraph was based on Sec. 26 of R.A. 337, the General Banking Act, and Sections 100, 101, and 106 of R.A. 265, the Central
Bank Act, all providing for the reserve requirements on banking operations, while Section 126 of Act No. 1459 (The Corporation Law),
as amended by Art. 3610, reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 126. Whenever the reserve as defined in the last preceding section of any commercial banking corporation shall be below the
amount required in that section such commercial banking corporation shall not diminish the amount of such reserve by making any
new loans or discounts, or declare any dividend out of its profits until the required proportion between the aggregate amount of its
deposits and its reserve has been restored. Reserve deficiencies shall be penalized at the rate of one per centum per month upon the
amount of the deficiencies and for the periods of their duration in accordance with the regulation to be issued by the Bank
Commissioner. The penalty assessed shall be collected by the Collector of Internal Revenue in accordance with the rules, regulations
and procedure to be determined by him. In the case of any commercial banking corporation whose reserve is continuously deficient for
a period of thirty days, the business of such corporation may be wound up by the Bank Commissioner in accordance with section
sixteen hundred and thirty-nine of Act numbered twenty-seven hundred and eleven, as amended, known as the Administrative Code" 3

According to petitioner, Section 126 has been expressly repealed by Section 90 of the General Banking Act (R.A. No. 337), to
wit:chanrobles law library : red

"Sec. 90. Sections one hundred seventy-five to one hundred eighty-three and one hundred ninety-nine to two hundred seventeen of
the Code of Commerce, as amended, section one hundred three to one hundred forty-six and one hundred seventy-one to one
hundred ninety of Act Numbered fourteen hundred and fifty-nine, as amended; Acts Numbered Thirty-one hundred and fifty-four and
Thirty-five hundred and twenty, and all laws or parts thereof, including those parts of special charters of the Philippine National Bank
and other banking institutions in the Philippines which are inconsistent herewith, are hereby repealed.

Both petitioner and public respondent agree that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . The requirement on the maintenance of bank reserves, previously found in Section 126 of Act 1459 (The Corporation Law),
remained prescribed, after its repeal, in

a. Sec. 26, RA 337 4 subjecting the deposit liabilities of commercial banks including the Philippine National Bank to the reserve
requirements and other conditions prescribed by the Monetary Board in accordance with the authority granted to 1t under the Central
Bank Act.

b. Sec. 100, RA 265 5 requiring banks to maintain reserves against their deposit liabilities;

c. Sec. 101, RA 265 6 authorizing the Monetary Board to prescribe and to modify the minimum reserved ratios applicable to each
class of peso deposits;

d. Sec. 106, RA 265 7 imposing a penalty of 1/10 of 1% for violation of the Banking Law." 8

As petitioner Republic sees it, Section 249 of the Tax Code (CA 466) can no longer be enforced as the basis for which the tax is to be
computed under Section 126, Act. 1459, is no longer in force. The Central Bank Act (R.A. 265), specifically Sections 100, 101, 105 and
106, by providing for a whole new set of rules in regard to reserve requirements and reserve deficiencies of banks clearly show that it
was the legislative intent to remove the regulation of the operations of banks under the ambit of the Corporation Law (Art. 1459) and
to place them under the purview of Central Bank Act (R.A. No. 265) and the General Banking Act (R.A. 337).

Public respondents disagree and state that Section 249 of the then Tax Code (CA 466) is deemed to have ipso facto incorporated by
reference the new legislations on bank reserves after the repeal of Section 126, Act. 1459.

Petitioner Republic argues then that in case of a reserve deficiency, the violating bank would be liable at the same time for a tax of 1%
a month (Second paragraph, Section 249, NIRC) payable to the Bureau of Internal Revenue as well as a penalty of 1/10 of 1% a day
(Section 106, Central Bank Act) payable to the Central Bank. They argue that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"As we examine the second paragraph of Section 249 of the Tax Code, we find nothing therein which says that such imposition is a tax
rather than a penalty. It merely states that there shall be collected . . . as provided in Section one hundred twenty six of Act Numbered
one thousand four hundred and fifty-nine . . . one per centum per month. On the contrary, the provision referred to (Section 126 of
Act 1459) states that . . . reserve deficiencies shall be penalized at the rate of one per centum per month . . . the penalty assessed
shall be collected by the Collector of Internal Revenue. It would be wrong, therefore, to say that the imposition in Section 249 of the
Tax Code is a tax, not a penalty, because taken in the context of the referred statute, it is really a penalty. Such imposition was
provided in the Tax Code and payable to the Collector of Internal Revenue simply because at that time there was yet no Central Bank
Act and General Banking Act nor a Monetary Board of Central Bank to regulate the operation of banks." 9

After a careful consideration of the facts of the case and the pertinent laws involved, We vote to deny the
petition.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Firstly, we would like to state that We find unfortunate petitioners act of quoting out context the questioned provision in the Tax Code.
Petitioner alleged that the second paragraph of Section 249 of the Tax Code "merely states" that there "shall be collected . . . as
provided in Section one hundred twenty one of Act numbered one thousand four hundred and fifty nine . . . one per centum per
month."cralaw virtua1aw library

If petitioner had been candid and honest enough, it would have stated under what title and chapter of the Tax Code the second
paragraph of Section 249 falls. As it then stood, the law stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x


TITLE VIII MISCELLANEOUS TAXES

"Sec. 249. Tax on Banks . . .

"There shall be collected upon the amount of reserve deficiencies incurred by the bank, and for the period of their duration, as
provided in section one hundred twenty-six of Act numbered one thousand four hundred and fifty-nine, as amended by Act Numbered
Three thousand six hundred and ten, one per centum per month, . . . (As amended by Rep. Act No. 6110)" 10

Clearly, the law states a tax is to be collected.

As the law stood during the years the petitioner was assessed for taxes on reserve deficiencies (1969 & 1970), petitioner had to pay
twice the first, a penalty, to the Central Bank by virtue of Section 106 for violation of Secs. 100 and 101. all of the Central Bank Act
and the second, a tax, to the Bureau of Internal Revenue for incurring a reserve deficiency.

As correctly analyzed by the petitioner and public respondents, the new legislations on bank reserves merely provided the basis for
computation of the reserve deficiency of petitioner bank.

Petitioner submits that it was not the legislative intention that banks with reserve deficiencies would pay twice as the Tax Code (CA
466, as amended by P.D. 69) enacted on January 1, 1973 did not contain said questioned provision.

While petitioner might have a point, the wisdom of this legislation is not the province of the Court. 11 It is clear from the statutes then
in force that there was no double taxation involved one was a penalty and the other was a tax. At any rate, We have upheld the
validity of double taxation. 12 The payment of 1/10 of 1% for incurring reserve deficiencies (Section 106, Central Bank Act) is a penalty
as the primary purpose involved is regulation, 13 while the payment of 1% for the same violation (Second Paragraph, Section 249,
NIRC) is a tax for the generation of revenue which is the primary purpose in this instance. 14 Petitioner should not complain that it is
being asked to pay twice for incurring reserve deficiencies. It can always avoid this predicament by not having reserve deficiencies.
Petitioners case is covered by two special laws one a banking law and the other, a tax law. These two laws should receive such
construction as to make them harmonize with each other and with the other body of pre-existing laws. 15

Dura lex sed lex!
II


Corollary to this issue raised by petitioner bank, is the question on how the respondent Commissioner computed reserve deficiency
taxes considering that Sec. 249, NIRC, speaks of computation of what it calls penalty on a per month basis while the Central Bank Act
provides for the computation of the penalty on a per day basis. It claims that respondent Commissioner never informed them of the
details of these assessments, considering the same involve complex and tedious computations.

It is too late in the day for petitioner to raise this matter for Us to resolve.16 The grounds alleged by the petitioner in its motion for
reconsideration of the Commissioners assessments are the very same grounds raised in these petitions. Petitioner did not ask the
Commissioner to explain how it arrived in computing these reserve deficiency taxes. Neither did petitioner raise this question before the
Court of Tax Appeals.

Be that as it may, respondent Commissioner explained in compliance with Our Resolution of December 17, 1984, that:chanrobles.com :
virtual law library

"3. The reserve deficiency tax amounting to P1,325,768.82 and P1,953,132.67, including surcharge, was computed on the basis of the
monthly averages of reserve deficiencies using figures on daily reserve deficiencies as appearing in DSE Form No. 1 duly accomplished
by the bank, required to be filed regularly with the Department of Supervision and Examination of the Central Bank . . ." 17

Thus, what the respondent commissioner did was just to add up all the daily reserve deficiencies as stated by petitioner itself in DSE
Form No. 1 which it submitted to the Central Bank for one month, divide such total by the number of banking days in a month to get
the average monthly reserve deficiency. For example, for January, 1970, the total daily average of reserve deficiencies being
P175,228.031.73, the monthly average was obtained by dividing said figure by 21 banking days to get P8,344,196.75. The tax rate
applied was 1% to get the reserve deficiency tax of P83,441.97. 18 Obviously, the respondent commissioner could not apply the tax
rate of 1% on the daily reserve deficiency as the law (Second paragraph, Sec. 249, NIRC) calls only for a monthly computation.
Mathematically, this is the right procedure in obtaining the monthly average of the daily reserve deficiencies.

As can be, seen, even if petitioner had validly raised said issue, the respondent Commissioner merely followed the law to the letter.
III


Lastly, petitioner bank in its brief mentions that in Letter of Instruction No. 1330 issued by President Marcos on June 6, 1983, 19 the
Central Bank was ordered to assist petitioner by way of full condonation of all penalties and other sanctions of whatever kind, nature
and description, as of the date they become due, on its legal reserve deficiencies. Consequently, petitioner insists that it is now
exempted from what it claims are the penalties imposed by the second paragraph of Section 249, NIRC.

A careful study of said LOI reveals that it was issued with respect to petitioner banks (thereafter renamed Republic Planters Bank) role
in the governments sugar production and procurement program as the financial arm of the sugar industry when the Philippine Sugar
Commission (PHILSUCOM), created by virtue of P.D. 388 1974), bought the petitioner bank from the Roman family.

The LOI itself states that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x


"WHEREAS, IN PURSUIT OF THE GOVERNMENTS SUGAR PRODUCTION AND PROCUREMENT PROGRAM, REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK
INCURRED OVERDRAFTS IN ITS CLEARING ACCOUNT WITH THE CENTRAL BANK IN VIEW OF THE LATTERS INABILITY TO EFFECT
SUBSTANTIAL REGULAR LOAN RELEASES THRU ITS REDISCOUNTING WINDOW DUE TO CERTAIN CONSTRAINTS ON DOMESTIC
CEILINGS RESULTING IN THE DEPOSIT RESERVE DEFICIENCIES AND CORRESPONDING IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES FOR RESERVE
DEFICIENCIES;

"WHEREAS, CONSIDERING THE MAGNITUDE OF THE AMOUNT OF THE RESERVE PENALTIES WHICH MAY AFFECT ITS VIABILITY AND
IN ORDER TO RATIONALIZE THE SITUATION, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK BE GIVEN APPROPRIATE RELIEF
FROM ITS PRESENT PREDICAMENT BROUGHT ABOUT PRIMARILY BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GOVERNMENTS SUGAR
PRODUCTION AND PROCUREMENT PROGRAM AND NOT BY REASON OF ANY MISMANAGEMENT OR UNSOUND BANKING PRACTICE
ON THE OPERATION OF THE BANK." 20

The petition at bar involves the assessments for the years 1969 and 1970. This LOI definitely does not cover the years 1969 and 1970
as it was issued only on June 6, 1983 and covers the period when PHILSUCOM bought the then ailing Republic Bank from the Roman
family and renamed it the Philippine Planters Bank to be used as its financial conduit for the sugar industry. Therefore, even on the
thesis that the payment made (Second paragraph, Section 249, NIRC) is a penalty, this "penalty" for 1969 and 1970 can not be
condoned as said LOI does not cover it.chanrobles law library : red

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is denied with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melo, J., took no part.
Endnotes:


1. Rollo, pp. 132-133.

2. Rollo, pp. 113(d) to 113(e).

3. Rollo, p. 113-b.

4. Sec. 26. The deposit liabilities of commercial banks including the Philippine National Bank, shall be subject to the reserve
requirements and other conditions prescribed by the Monetary Board in accordance with the authority granted to it under the
provisions of the Central Bank Act.

5. Sec. 100. Reserve Requirements. In order to control the volume of money created by the credit operations of the banking system,
banks operating in the Philippines shall be required to maintain reserves against their deposit liabilities. The required reserves of each
bank shall be proportional to the volume of its deposit liabilities and shall ordinarily take the form of a deposit in the Central Bank of
the Philippines; nevertheless, the Monetary Board may, whenever circumstances warrant, permit the maintenance of part of the
required reserve in the form of assets other than peso deposits with the Central Bank. Reserve requirements shall be applied to all
banks uniformly and without discrimination.

6. Sec. 101. Required reserves against peso deposits. The Monetary Board is authorized to prescribe and modify the minimum
reserve ratios applicable to each class of peso deposits; Provided, however, That such ratios shall not be less than five per cent (5%)
or more than twenty-five per cent (25%) for time and savings deposits, and shall not be less than ten per cent (10%) or more than
fifty per cent (50%) for demand deposits.

Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph of this section, the Monetary Board may, in periods of inflation, prescribe
higher reserve ratios, but not exceeding 100 per cent, for any further increase in the deposits of each bank above the amounts
outstanding on the date on which the bank is notified of the requirement.

Whenever the reserve requirements established by the Monetary Board place any bank under obligation to maintain minimum reserves
in excess of twenty-five per cent (25%) of its total time or savings deposits, or in excess of fifty per cent (50%) of its total demand
deposits, the Central Bank may pay interest on said excess at a rate which shall not be higher than the Banks lower rediscount rate.

7. Sec. 106. Reserve deficiencies. Whenever the reserve position of any bank, computed in the manner specified in the preceding
section of this Act, is below the required minimum, the bank shall pay the Central Bank one-tenth of one per cent (1/10 of 1%) per day
on the amount of the deficiency; Provided, however, that banks shall ordinarily be permitted to off set any reserve deficiency occurring
on one or more days of the week with any excess reserves which they may hold on other days of the same week and shall be required
to pay the penalty only on the average daily deficiency during the week. In cases of abuse, the Monetary Board may deny any bank
the privilege of offsetting reserve deficiencies in the aforesaid manner.

If a bank chronically has a reserve deficiency, the Monetary Board may limit or prohibit the making of new loans or investments by the
bank and may require that part of all the net profits of the bank be assigned to surplus.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992
GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IMELDA SALAZAR, respondents.
Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.
Gerardo S. Alansalon for private respondent.

ROMERO, J.:
For private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, it would seem that her close association with Delfin Saldivar would mean the loss of her job.
In May 1982, private respondent was employed by Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GMCR) as general systems analyst.
Also employed by petitioner as manager for technical operations' support was Delfin Saldivar with whom private respondent was
allegedly very close.
Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company equipment and spare parts worth thousands of dollars under
the custody of Saldivar were missing, caused the investigation of the latter's activities. The report dated September 25, 1984 prepared
by the company's internal auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated that Saldivar had entered into a partnership styled Concave
Commercial and Industrial Company with Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of Elecon Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier
of petitioner often recommended by Saldivar. The report also disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioner's missing Fedders
airconditioning unit for his own personal use without authorization and also connived with Yambao to defraud petitioner of its property.
The airconditioner was recovered only after petitioner GMCR filed an action for replevin against Saldivar.
1

It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that Imelda Salazar violated company reglations by involving herself in
transactions conflicting with the company's interests. Evidence showed that she signed as a witness to the articles of partnership
between Yambao and Saldivar. It also appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of the Fedders airconditioner
but failed to inform her employer.
Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, petitioner company placed private respondent Salazar under preventive suspension for
one (1) month, effective October 9, 1984, thus giving her thirty (30) days within which to, explain her side. But instead of submitting
an explanations three (3) days later or on October 12, 1984 private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal
suspension, which she subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay and
damages, after petitioner notified her in writing that effective November 8, 1984, she was considered dismissed "in view of (her)
inability to refute and disprove these findings.
2

After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated July 16, 1985, ordered petitioner company to reinstate private respondent to
her former or equivalent position and to pay her full backwages and other benefits she would have received were it not for the illegal
dismissal. Petitioner was also ordered to pay private respondent moral damages of P50,000.00.
3

On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations, Commission in the questioned resolution dated December 29, 1987 affirmed the
aforesaid decision with respect to the reinstatement of private respondent but limited the backwages to a period of two (2) years and
deleted the award for moral damages.
4

Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for having committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the suspension and
subsequent dismissal of private respondent were illegal and in ordering her reinstatement with two (2) years' backwages.
On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for petitioner GMCR.
The inestigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin Saldivar's acts in conflict with his position as technical operations
manager, necessitated immediate and decisive action on any employee closely, associated with Saldivar. The suspension of Salazar was
further impelled by th.e discovery of the missing Fedders airconditioning unit inside the apartment private respondent shared with
Saldivar. Under such circumstances, preventive suspension was the proper remedial recourse available to the company pending
Salazar's investigation. By itself, preventive suspension does, not signify that the company has adjudged the employee guilty of the
charges she was asked to answer and explain. Such disciplinary measure is resorted to for the protection of the company's property
pending investigation any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee.
5

Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated Salazar's right to due process when she was promptly suspended.
If at all, the fault, lay with private respondent when she ignored petitioner's memorandum of October 8, 1984 "giving her ample
opportunity to present (her) side to the Management." Instead, she went directly to the Labor Department and filed her complaint for
illegal suspension without giving her employer a chance to evaluate her side of the controversy.
But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar's preventive suspension, we hold that her eventual separation from employment was
not for cause.
What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful dismissal so as to "make whole" the victim who has not merely lost her job which,
under settled Jurisprudence, is a property right of which a person is not to be deprived without due process, but also the compensation
that should have accrued to her during the period when she was unemployed?
Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:
Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee
except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
6
(Emphasis supplied)
Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code:
Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employments, the employer shall not terminate the services of an
employee except for a just cause as provided in the Labor Code or when authorized by existing laws.
Sec. 3. Reinstatement. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall by entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and to backwages."
7
(Emphasis supplied)
Before proceeding any furthers, it needs must be recalled that the present Constitution has gone further than the 1973 Charter in
guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor. Given the pro-poor orientation of
several articulate Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, it was not surprising that a whole new Article emerged on
Social Justice and Human Rights designed, among other things, to "protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for
the common good." 8 Proof of the priority accorded to labor is that it leads the other areas of concern in the Article on Social Justice,
viz., Labor ranks ahead of such topics as Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform, Urban Land Roform and Housing, Health, Women,
Role and Rights of Poople's Organizations and Human Rights.
9

The opening paragraphs on Labor states
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure,
humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits is may be provided by law.
10
(Emphasis supplied)
Compare this with the sole.provision on Labor in the 1973 Constitution under the Article an Declaration of Principles and State Policies
that provides:
Sec. 9. The state shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment, ensure equal
work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The
State shall ensure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective baegaining, security of tenure, and just and
humane conditions of work. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration.
11

To be sure, both Charters recognize "security of tenure" as one of the rights of labor which the State is mandated to protect. But there
is no gainsaying the fact that the intent of the framers of the present Constitution was to give primacy to the rights of labor and afford
the sector "full protection," at least greater protection than heretofore accorded them, regardless of the geographical location of the
workers and whether they are organized or not.
It was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who substantially contributed to the present formulation of the
protection to labor provision and proposed that the same be incorporated in the Article on Social Justice and not just in the Article on
Declaration of Principles and State Policies "in the light of the special importance that we are giving now to social justice and the
necessity of emphasizing the scope and role of social justice in national development."
12

If we have taken pains to delve into the background of the labor provisions in our Constitution and the Labor Code, it is but to stress
that the right of an employee not to be dismissed from his job except for a just or authorized cause provided by law has assumed
greater importance under the 1987 Constitution with the singular prominence labor enjoys under the article on Social Justice. And this
transcendent policy has been translated into law in the Labor Code. Under its terms, where a case of unlawful or unauthorized
dismissal has been proved by the aggrieved employee, or on the other hand, the employer whose duty it is to prove the lawfulness or
justness of his act of dismissal has failed to do so, then the remedies provided in Article 279 should find, application. Consonant with
this liberalized stance vis-a-vis labor, the legislature even went further by enacting Republic Act No. 6715 which took effect on March 2,
1989 that amended said Article to remove any possible ambiguity that jurisprudence may have generated which watered down the
constitutional intent to grant to labor "full protection."
13

To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence to show an authorized, much less a legal, cause for the dismissal of private
respondent, she had every right, not only to be entitled to reinstatement, but ay well, to full backwages."
14

The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment of backwages is, in the former, to restore
the dismissed employee to her status before she lost her job, for the dictionary meaning of the word "reinstate" is "to restore to a
state, conditione positions etc. from which one had been removed"
15
and in the latter, to give her back the income lost during the
period of unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past, would perforce make her "whole."
Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been thwarted when reinstatement has not been forthcoming and the hapless
dismissed employee finds himself on the outside looking in.
Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for denying reinstatement under the facts of the case and the law
applicable thereto; that reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the long passage of time (22 years of litigation) or because
of the realities of the situation;
16
or that it would be "inimical to the employer's interest; "
17
or that reinstatement may no longer be
feasible;
18
or, that it will not serve the best interests of the parties involved;
19
or that the company would be prejudiced by the
workers' continued employment;
20
or that it will not serve any prudent purpose as when supervening facts have transpired which
make execution on that score unjust or inequitable
21
or, to an increasing extent, due to the resultant atmosphere of "antipathy and
antagonism" or "strained relations" or "irretrievable estrangement" between the employer and the employee.
22

In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment of backwages and separation pay
23
or solely separation pay.
24

In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. In the first place the wording of the Labor Code is clear and
unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement. . . . and to his full backwages. . .
."
25
Under the principlesof statutory construction, if a statute is clears plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim index animi
sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by, the legislature in a statute
correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it differently.
26
The legislature is presumed to know the
meaning of the words, to:have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the
statute.
27
Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure. Neither does the provision
admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of the Court, there may be a ground or grounds for non-application of the above-cited
provision, this should be by way of exception, such as when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations
between the employer and the employee.
In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a position where he enjoys the trust and confidence of his
employer; and that it is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism may be generated as to adversely affect
the efficiency and productivity of the employee concerned.
A few examples, will suffice to illustrate the Court's application of the above principles: where the employee is a Vice-President for
Marketing and as such, enjoys the full trust and confidence of top management;
28
or is the Officer-In-Charge of the extension office of
the bank where he works;
29
or is an organizer of a union who was in a position to sabotage the union's efforts to organize the workers
in commercial and industrial establishments;
30
or is a warehouseman of a non-profit organization whose primary purpose is to
facilitate and maximize voluntary gifts. by foreign individuals and organizations to the Philippines;
31
or is a manager of its Energy
Equipment Sales.
32

Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately. Otherwisey reinstatement can never be possible
simply because some hostility is invariably engendered between the parties as a result of litigation. That is human nature.
33

Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one's right; otherwise an employee who shall assert
his right could be easily separated from the service, by merely paying his separation pay on the pretext that his relationship with his
employer had already become strained.
34

Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as systems analyst is one that may be characterized as a position
of trust and confidence such that if reinstated, it may well lead to strained relations between employer and employee. Hence, this does
not constitute an exception to the general rule mandating reinstatement for an employee who has been unlawfully dismissed.
On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence reposed in her by engaging in transactions that may have created conflict of
interest situations? Petitioner GMCR points out that as a matter of company policy, it prohibits its employees from involving themselves
with any company that has business dealings with GMCR. Consequently, when private respondent Salazar signed as a witness to the
partnership papers of Concave (a supplier of Ultra which in turn is also a supplier of GMCR), she was deemed to have placed. herself in
an untenable position as far as petitioner was concerned.
However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public respondent that such a circumstance did not create a conflict of interests situation. As
a systems analyst, Salazar was very far removed from operations involving the procurement of supplies. Salazar's duties revolved
around the development of systems and analysis of designs on a continuing basis. In other words, Salazar did not occupy a position of
trust relative to the approval and purchase of supplies and company assets.
In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss of confidence. As we have held countless times, while loss
of confidence or breach of trust is a valid ground for terminations it must rest an some basis which must be convincingly established.
35

An employee who not be dismissed on mere presumptions and suppositions. Petitioner's allegation that since Salazar and Saldivar lived
together in the same apartment, it "presumed reasonably that complainant's sympathy would be with Saldivar" and its averment that
Saldivar's investigation although unverified, was probably true, do not pass this Court's test.
36
While we should not condone the acts
of disloyalty of an employee, neither should we dismiss him on the basis of suspicion derived from speculative inferences.
To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's dismissal would be most inequitous because the bulk of the findings centered
principally oh her friend's alleged thievery and anomalous transactions as technical operations' support manager. Said report merely
insinuated that in view of Salazar's special relationship with Saldivar, Salazar might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar's
questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating private respondent is wanting from the records.
It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report came out after Saldivar had already resigned from GMCR on May 31, 1984.
Since Saldivar did not have the opportunity to refute management's findings, the report remained obviously one-sided. Since the main
evidence obtained by petitioner dealt principally on the alleged culpability of Saldivar, without his having had a chance to voice his side
in view of his prior resignation, stringent examination should have been carried out to ascertain whether or not there existed
independent legal grounds to hold Salatar answerable as well and, thereby, justify her dismissal. Finding none, from the records, we
find her to have been unlawfully dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated December 29, 1987 is hereby
AFFIRMED. Petitioner GMCR is ordered to REINSTATE private respondent Imelda Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent to her
salary for a period of two (2) years only.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., concurs in the result.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Padilla, JJ., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 109445 November 7, 1994
FELICITO BASBACIO, petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FRANKLIN DRILON in his capacity as Secretary of Justice,
respondent.
Amparita S. Sta. Maria for petitioner.

MENDOZA, J.:
This case presents for determination the scope of the State's liability under Rep. Act No. 7309, which among other things provides
compensation for persons who are unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but on appeal are acquitted and ordered released.
Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted of frustrated murder and of two counts of
frustrated murder for the killing of Federico Boyon and the wounding of the latter's wife Florida and his son Tirso, at Palo, Calanuga,
Rapu-Rapu, Albay, on the night of June 26, 1988. The motive for the killing was apparently a land dispute between the Boyons and
petitioner. Petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their bonds had been
cancelled.
Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only petitioner's appeal proceeded to judgment, however, as the appeal of the other accused
was dismissed for failure to file his brief.
On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove
conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. He had been pointed to by a daughter of Federico Boyon as the companion of Balderrama
when the latter barged into their hut and without warning started shooting, but the appellate court ruled that because petitioner did
nothing more, petitioner's presence at the scene of the crime was insufficient to show conspiracy.
Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, sec. 3(a), which provides for the payment of compensation to
"any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal."
1
The
claim was filed with the Board of Claims of the Department of Justice, but the claim was denied on the ground that while petitioner's
presence at the scene of the killing was not sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there was bad
blood between him and the deceased as a result of a land dispute and the fact that the convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there was
basis for finding that he was "probably guilty."
On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed the Board's ruling. Said the Secretary of Justice in his resolution dated March 11,
1993:
It is believed therefore that the phrase "any person . . . unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned" in Section 3(a)
of R.A. No. 7309 refers to an individual who was wrongly accused and imprisoned for a crime he did not commit,
thereby making him "a victim of unjust imprisonment." In the instant case, however, Claimant/Appellant cannot be
deemed such a victim since a reading of the decision of his acquittal shows that his exculpation is not based on his
innocence, but upon, in effect, a finding of reasonable doubt.
Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari. Neither Rule 45 nor Rep. Act No. 7309, however, provides for review by
certiorari of the decisions of the Secretary of Justice. Nonetheless, in view of the importance of the question tendered, the Court
resolved to treat the petition as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
Petitioner questions the basis of the respondent's ruling that to be able to recover under sec. 3(a) of the law the claimant must on
appeal be found to be innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted in the trial court. Through counsel he contends that the
language of sec. 3(a) is clear and does not call for interpretation. The "mere fact that the claimant was imprisoned for a crime which he
was subsequently acquitted of is already unjust in itself," he contends. To deny his claim because he was not declared innocent would
be to say that his imprisonment for two years while his appeal was pending was justified. Petitioner argues that there is only one
requirement for conviction in criminal cases and that is proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to present such proof,
the presumption that the accused is innocent stands and, therefore, there is no reason for requiring that he be declared innocent of the
crime before he can recover compensation for his imprisonment.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would require that every time an accused is acquitted on appeal he must be given
compensation on the theory that he was "unjustly convicted" by the trial court. Such a reading of sec. 3(a) is contrary to petitioner's
professed canon of construction that when the language of the statute is clear it should be given its natural meaning. It leaves out of
the provision in question the qualifying word "unjustly" so that the provision would simply read: "The following may file claims for
compensation before the Board: (a) any person who was accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a
judgment of acquittal."
But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted [and] imprisoned." The fact that his conviction is reversed and
the accused is acquitted is not itself proof that the previous conviction was "unjust." An accused may be acquitted for a number of
reasons and his conviction by the trial court may, for any of these reasons, be set aside. For example, he may be acquitted not
because he is innocent of the crime charged but because of reasonable doubt, in which case he may be found civilly liable to the
complainant, because while the evidence against him does not satisfy the quantum of proof required for conviction, it may nonetheless
be sufficient to sustain a civil action for damages.
2
In one case the accused, an alien, was acquitted of statutory rape with homicide
because of doubt as to the ages of the offended parties who consented to have sex with him. Nonetheless the accused was ordered to
pay moral and exemplary damages and ordered deported.
3
In such a case to pay the accused compensation for having been "unjustly
convicted" by the trial court would be utterly inconsistent with his liability to the complainant. Yet to follow petitioner's theory such an
accused would be entitled to compensation under sec. 3(a).
The truth is that the presumption of innocence has never been intended as evidence of innocence of the accused but only to shift the
burden of proof that he is guilty to the prosecution. If "accusation is not synonymous with guilt,"
4
so is the presumption of innocence
not a proof thereof. It is one thing to say that the accused is presumed to be innocent in order to place on the prosecution the burden
of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty. It is quite another thing to say that he is innocent and if he is convicted
that he has been "unjustly convicted." As this Court held in a case:
Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with homicide, we emphasize that we are not ruling
that he is innocent or blameless. It is only the constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the
prosecution to build an airtight case for conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do not
exist.
5

To say then that an accused has been "unjustly convicted" has to do with the manner of his conviction rather than with his innocence.
An accused may on appeal be acquitted because he did not commit the crime, but that does
not necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for having been the victim of an "unjust conviction." If his conviction was due
to an error in the appreciation of the evidence the conviction while erroneous is not unjust. That is why it is not, on the other hand,
correct to say as does respondent, that under the law liability for compensation depends entirely on the innocence of the accused.
The phrase "unjustly convicted" has the same meaning as "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment" in art. 204 of the Revised Penal
Code. What this Court held in In re Rafael C. Climaco
6
applies:
In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown beyond doubt
that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, and the same was made with
conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice . . . .
To hold a judge liable for the rendition of manifestly unjust judgment by reason of inexcusable negligence or
ignorance, it must be shown, according to Groizard, that although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe
in the performance of his duty, that diligence, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the rendering
of any public service. Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be
explained by a reasonable interpretation. Inexcusable mistake only exists in the legal concept when it implies a
manifest injustice, that is to say, such injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation, even
though there is a misunderstanding or error of the law applied, yet in the contrary it results, logically and reasonably,
and in a very clear and indisputable manner, in the notorious violation of the legal precept.
Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result of which the accused is unjustly imprisoned, but, in addition,
to an unjust accusation. The accused must have been "unjustly accused, in consequence of which he is unjustly convicted and then
imprisoned. It is important to note this because if from its inception the prosecution of the accused has been wrongful, his conviction
by the court is, in all probability, also wrongful. Conversely, if the prosecution is not malicious any conviction even though based on
less than the required quantum of proof in criminal cases may be erroneous but not necessarily unjust.
The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4, the question for the prosecutor in filing a case in court is not whether the accused is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt but only whether "there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and the accused is
probably guilty thereof." Hence, an accusation which is based on "probable guilt" is not an unjust accusation and a conviction based on
such degree of proof is not necessarily an unjust judgment but only an erroneous one. The remedy for such error is appeal.
In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to show that petitioner's conviction by the trial court was wrongful or that it was the
product of malice or gross ignorance or gross negligence. To the contrary, the court had reason to believe that petitioner and his co-
accused were in league, because petitioner is the father-in-law of Wilfredo Balderrama and it was petitioner who bore the victim a
grudge because of a land dispute. Not only that. Petitioner and his coaccused arrived together in the hut of the victims and forced their
way into it.
The Court of Appeals ruled there was no conspiracy only because there was no proof that he did or say anything on the occasion. Said
the appellate court.
Both eyewitness testimonies fail to show the appellant Felicito Basbacio to have committed any act at all. Both fail to
show Felicito Basbacio as having said anything at all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having committed
anything in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit the crimes charged against the defendants. It seems to be a frail
and flimsy basis on which to conclude that conspiracy existed between actual killer Wilfredo Balderrama and Felicito
Basbacio to commit murder and two frustrated murders on that night of June 26, 1988. It may be asked: where was
the coming together of the two defendants to an agreement to commit the crimes of murder and frustrated murder
on two counts? Where was Basbacio's contribution to the commission of the said crimes? Basbacio was as the
record shows nothing but part of the dark shadows of that night. . . .
One may take issue with this ruling because precisely conspiracy may be shown by concert of action and other circumstances. Why
was petitioner with his son-in-law? Why did they apparently flee together? And what about the fact that there was bad blood between
petitioner and the victim Federico Boyon? These questions may no longer be passed upon in view of the acquittal of petitioner but they
are relevant in evaluating his claim that he had been unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned before he was released because of his
acquittal on appeal. We hold that in view of these circumstances respondent Secretary of Justice and the Board of Claims did not
commit a grave abuse of its discretion in disallowing petitioner's claim for compensation under Rep. Act No. 7309.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

# Footnotes
1 The statute in pertinent parts provide:
Sec. 3. Who may File Claims. The following may file claims for compensation before the Board:
a) any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of
acquittal;
b) any person who was unjustly detained and released without being charged;
c) any victim of arbitrary or illegal detention by the authorities as defined in the Revised Penal Code under a final
judgment of the court; and
d) any person who is a victim of violent crimes. For purposes of this Act, violent crimes shall include rape and shall
likewise refer to offenses committed with malice which resulted in death or serious physical and/or psychological
injuries, permanent incapacity or disability, insanity, abortion, serious trauma, or committed with torture, cruelty or
barbarity.
Sec. 4. Award Ceiling. For victims of unjust imprisonment or detention, the compensation shall be based on the
number of months of imprisonment or detention and every fraction thereof shall be considered one month: Provided,
however, That in no case shall such compensation exceed One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) per month.
In all other cases, the maximum amount for which the Board may approve a claim shall not exceed Ten thousand
pesos (P10,000.00) or the amount necessary to reimburse the claimant the expenses incurred for hospitalization,
medical treatment, loss of wage, loss of support or other expenses directly related to the injury, whichever is lower.
This is without prejudice to the right of the claimant to seek other remedies under existing laws.
2 The Civil Code provides in Art. 29: "When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may
require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
"If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the
absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal
is due to that ground."
3 People v. Ritter, 194 SCRA 690 (1991).
4 People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59, 64 (1971).
5 Supra note 3 at 722.
6 55 SCRA 107, 119 (1974).

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 75222 July 18, 1991
RADIOLA-TOSHIBA PHILIPPINES, INC., through its assignee-in-insolvency VICENTE J. CUNA, petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. LEONARDO I. CRUZ, as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City,
Branch No. LVI, EMILIO C. PATINO, as assignee-in-insolvency of CARLOS and TERESITA GATMAYTAN, SHERIFF OF
ANGELES CITY, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ANGELES CITY, SANYO MARKETING CORPORATION, S & T ENTERPRISES INC.,
REFRIGERATION INDUSTRIES INC., and DELTA MOTOR CORPORATION, respondents.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.
Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. for private respondents.

BIDIN, J.:p
This is a petition for certiorari of the March 31, 1986 Decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court * in A.C-G.R. SP No. 04160
entitled "Radiola-Toshiba Philippines, Inc. vs. Hon. Leonardo I. Cruz, et al." denying the petition for certiorari and mandamus; and its
Resolution of July 1, 1986 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of this case, as found by the then Intermediate Appellate Court, are as follows:
On July 2, 1980, three creditors filed a petition for the involuntary insolvency of Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita
Gatmaytan, the private respondents herein, the case docketed as Special Proceeding No. 1548 of the then Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pampanga and Angeles City.
On July 9, 1980, the respondent court issued an order taking cognizance of the said petition and stating inter alia
that:
. . . the Court forbids the payment of any debts, and the delivery of any property owing and
belonging to said respondents-debtors from other persons, or, to any other persons for the use
and benefit of the same respondents-debtors and/or the transfer of any property by and for the
said respondents-debtors to another, upon petitioners' putting up a bond by way of certified and
reputable sureties. (Annex 1, Comment).
Counsel for the petitioners-creditors informed respondent sheriff Angeles City of the aforesaid order (Annex 2, Ibid)
and on March 26, 1981, also communicated with counsel for the petitioner herein regarding same order, apprising
the latter that "the personal and real property which have been levied upon and/or attached should be preserved till
the final determination of the petition aforementioned." (Annex 3, Ibid).
On April 12, 1983, petitioners-creditors filed second urgent motion for issuance of insolvency order and resolution of
the case, alleging among other things, that in November, 1982, they filed an urgent motion to issue insolvency order;
on December 2, 1982, they presented a motion to prohibit the city sheriff of Angeles City from disposing the personal
and real properties of the insolvent debtors, Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan; on January 18, 1983, they
(sic) appealed in the Bulletin Today issue of even date a news item to the effect that Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc. has
already shut down its factory, sometime in March 1983, through their representative, they caused to be investigated
the real properties in the names of Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan and they were surprised to find out
that some of the aforesaid properties were already transferred to Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc.; and that in view of such
development, it is their submission that without an insolvency order and a resolution of the case which was ripe for
resolution as early as March 3, 1982, the rights and interest of petitioners-creditors would be injured and
jeopardized. (Annex "C").
On April 15, 1983, petitioner filed an opposition to the said motion vis-a-vis the prayer that the insolvency order
(which has not been rendered yet by the court) be annotated on the transfer certificates of title already issued in its
name (Annex "D").
On April 22, 1983, judgment was rendered declaring the insolvency of respondents-debtors Carlos Gatmaytan and
Teresita Gatmaytan.
On April 28, 1983, petitioner filed a supplemental opposition to the same second urgent motion and motion to direct
respondent sheriff to issue a final certificate of sale for the properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 in its
favor (Annex "E").
On February 3, 1984, acting upon petitioner's motion claiming that ownership of certain real properties of the
insolvents had passed to it by virtue of foreclosure proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. 35946 of the former
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro Manila, which properties were not redeemed within the period
of redemption, respondent court issued an order disposing, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby, confirms the election of Mr. Emilio C. Patino, as assignee of all the
registered claimants in this case, and, in consequence thereof, the said assignee is hereby directed
to post a bond in the amount of P30,000.00 and to take his oath thereafter so as to be able to
perform his duties and discharge his functions, as such.
The Court, likewise, sets the meeting of all the creditors with the attendance, of course, of the
assignee, on March 9, 1984, at 8:30., as by that time the proposals, which the respective
representatives of the parties-claimants desire to clear with their principals, shall have already been
reported.
The assignee shall see to it that the properties of the insolvents which are now in the actual or
constructive custody and management of the receiver previously appointed by the Court on
petitioners' and claimants' proposals be placed under this actual or constructive custody and
management, such as he is able to do so, as the Court hereby dissolves the receivership previously
authorized, it having become a superfluity. (Annex "F").
On May 18, 1984, the Regional Trial Court, Branch CLII, Pasig, Metro Manila, in Civil Case No. 35946, issued an order
directing respondent Sheriff of Angeles City, or whoever is acting in his behalf, to issue within seven (7) days from
notice thereof a final deed of sale over the two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos.
18905 and 40430 in favor of petitioner. (Annex "G").
In said Civil Case No. 35946, a case for collection of sum of money covering the proceeds of television sets and other
appliances, the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro Manila, issued a writ of preliminary
attachment on February 15, 1980 upon application of the petitioner, as plaintiff, which put up a bond of
P350,000.00. On March 4, 1980, 3:00 P.M., levy on attachment was done in favor of petitioner on the real properties
registered in the names of spouses Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan under TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 of
the Registry of Deeds of Angeles City, per Entry No. 7216 on said titles. (Annex "A" and "B").
On December 10, 1980, a decision was rendered in favor of petitioner, ordering private respondents and their co-
defendant Peoples Appliance Center, Inc. to pay petitioner, jointly and severally, the sum of P721,825.91 plus
interest thereon of 14% per annum from October 12, 1979 until fully paid; P20,000.00, for and attorney's fees; and
the costs of suit (Annex "5", Comment). After the said decision in the aforementioned Civil Case No. 35946 became
final and executory, a writ of execution for the satisfaction thereof issued on March 18, 1981; and on May 4, 1981,
respondent sheriff of Angeles City sold at auction sale the attached properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and
40430, to petitioner as the highest bidder, and the certificate of sale was accordingly issued in its favor.
On September 21, 1982, the court ordered the consolidation of ownership of petitioner over said properties; but
respondent sheriff of Angeles City refused to issue a final certificate of sale in favor of petitioner.
On May 30, 1984, petitioners-creditors interposed their opposition, stating among other things, that subject motion is
improper and premature because it treats of matters foreign to the insolvency proceedings; and premature, for the
reason that the properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430-Angeles City were brought to the jurisdiction of the
insolvency court for the determination of the assets of the insolvents available for distribution to the approved
credits/liabilities of the insolvents. Petitioners-creditors theorized that the insolvency court is devoid of jurisdiction to
grant the motion referring to matters involved in a case pending before a coordinate court in another jurisdiction
(Annex "l").
Prior thereto or on July 13, 1984, to be precise, respondent court came out with its assailed extended order with the
following decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, and also for the reason stated in the aforequoted order issued in pursuance of a
similar motion of the movant, the Court denies, as it is hereby denied the motion of Radiola-
Toshiba, dated May 28, 1984 and directs the latter to participate in the supposed meeting of all the
creditors/claimants presided by the duly elected assignee. (Annex "J").
On September 8, 1984, herein petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Philippines, Inc. (RTPI, for short) filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
with respondent Intermediate Appellate Court.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court, in a Decision promulgated on March 31, 1986, denied petitioner's aforesaid petition. On April
19, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated July 1, 1986.
Hence, the instant petition. Herein petitioner raised two issues
1. WHETHER OR NOT CERTIORARI IS A REMEDY DESIGNATED FOR THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF JURISDICTION ONLY; and
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE REFUSAL OF THE COURTS TO ENFORCE THE LIEN OF PETITIONER ARISING FROM A LEVY OF
ATTACHMENT NOT MADE WITHIN ONE MONTH NEXT PRECEDING THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE INSOLVENCY PROCEEDING IS
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
The main issue in this case is whether or not the levy on attachment in favor of the petitioner is dissolved by the insolvency
proceedings against respondent spouses commenced four months after said attachment.
On this issue, Section 32 of the Insolvency Law (Act No. 1956, as amended), provides:
Sec. 32 As soon as an assignee is elected or appointed and qualified, the clerk of the court shall, by an instrument
under his hand and seal of the court, assign and convey to the assignee all the real and personal property, estate,
and effects of the debtor with all his deeds, books, and papers relating thereto, and such assignment shall relate
back to the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency, and shall relate back to the acts upon the adjudication
was founded, and by operation of law shall vest the title to all such property, estate, and effects in the assignee,
although the same is then attached on mesne process, as the property of the debtor. Such assignment shall operate
to vest in the assignee all of the estate of the insolvent debtor not exempt by law from execution. It shall dissolve
any attachment levied within one month next preceding the commencement of the insolvency proceedings and
vacate and set aside any judgment entered in any action commenced within thirty days immediately prior to the
commencement of insolvency proceedings and shall set aside any judgment entered by default or consent of the
debtor within thirty days immediately prior to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)
Relative thereto, the findings of the then Intermediate Appellate Court are undisputed that the levy on attachment against the subject
properties of the Gatmaytans, issued by the then Court of First Instance of Pasig in Civil Case No. 35946, was on March 4, 1980 while
the insolvency proceeding in the then Court of First Instance of Angeles City, Special Proceeding No. 1548, was commenced only on
July 2, 1980, or more than four (4) months after the issuance of the said attachment. Under the circumstances, petitioner contends
that its lien on the subject properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and was not dissolved thereby.
Private respondents, on the other hand, relying on Section 79 of the said law, which reads:
Sec. 79. When an attachment has been made and is not dissolved before the commencement of proceedings in
insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim upon which the attachment suit
was commenced is proved against the estate of the debtor, the plaintiff may prove the legal costs and disbursements
of the suit, and of the keeping of the property, and the amount thereof shall be a preferred debt.
and the fact that petitioner and its counsel have full knowledge of the proceedings in the insolvent case, argue that the subsequent
Certificate of Sale on August 3, 1981, issued in favor of petitioner over the subject properties, was issued in bad faith, in violation of
the law and is not equitable for the creditors of the insolvent debtors; and pursuant to the above quoted Section 79, petitioner should
not be entitled to the transfer of the subject properties in its name.
Petitioner's contention is impressed with merit. The provision of the above-quoted Section 32, of the Insolvency Law is very clear
that attachments dissolved are those levied within one (1) month next preceding the commencement of the insolvency proceedings
and judgments vacated and set aside are judgments entered in any action, including judgment entered by default or consent of the
debtor, where the action was filed within thirty (30) days immediately prior to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings. In
short, there is a cut off period one (1) month in attachment cases and thirty (30) days in judgments entered in actions commenced
prior to the insolvency proceedings. Section 79, on the other hand, relied upon by private respondents, provides for the right of the
plaintiff if the attachment is not dissolved before the commencement of proceedings in insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking
given by the defendant, if the claim upon which the attachment suit was commenced is proved against the estate of the debtor.
Therefore, there is no conflict between the two provisions.
But even granting that such conflict exists, it may be stated that in construing a statute, courts should adopt a construction that will
give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. This rule is expressed in the maxim, ut maqis valeat quam pereat or that
construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute its every word. Hence, where a statute is susceptible of
more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof
operative and effective and harmonious with each other (Javellana vs. Tayo, 6 SCRA 1042 [1962]; Statutory Construction by Ruben E.
Agpalo, p. 182).
Neither can the sheriff's sale in execution of the judgment in favor of the petitioner be considered as a fraudulent transfer or
preference by the insolvent debtors, which constitute a violation of Sec. 70 of the Insolvency Law. In the case of Velayo vs. Shell Co. of
the Philippines (100 Phil. 187, [1956]), this Court ruled that Sections 32 and 70 contemplate only acts and transactions occurring within
30 days prior to the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency and, consequently, all other acts outside of the 30-day period
cannot possibly be considered as coming within the orbit of their operation.
Finally, petitioner correctly argued that the properties in question were never placed under the jurisdiction of respondent insolvency
court so as to be made available for the payment of claim filed against the Gatmaytans in the insolvency proceedings.
Hence, the denial by respondent insolvency court to give due course to the attachment and execution of Civil Case No. 35946 of the
CFI of Rizal constitutes a freezing of the disposition of subject properties by the former which were not within its jurisdiction;
undeniably, a grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction, correctable by certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the March 31, 1986 decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby Reversed and SET ASIDE. The
attachment and execution sale in Civil Case No. 35946 of the former CFI of Rizal are given due course and petitioner's ownership of
subject properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 is ordered consolidated.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 104712 May 6, 1992
MANUEL T. DE GUIA, in his capacity as Councilor of the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the validity and the enforcement by respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) of its RESOLUTION NO. 2313, adopting rules and guidelines in the apportionment, by district, of the number of elective
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only one (1) legislative district and the Sangguniang Bayan of
municipalities in the Metro Manila Area for the preparation of the Project of District Apportionment by the Provincial Election
Supervisors and Election Registrars (Annex "A", Petition), RESOLUTION NO. 2379, approving the Project of District Apportionment
submitted pursuant to Resolution No. 2313 (Annex "B", Petition), and RESOLUTION UND. 92-010 holding that pars. (a), (b) and (c),
and the first sentence of par. (d), all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply to the May 11, 1992 elections (Annex "C", Petition).
Petitioner Manuel T. De Guia is an incumbent Member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila,
having been elected in the January 1988 local elections. He prays, more particularly, for reversal of the position of respondent insofar
as it affects the municipality of Paraaque and all the other municipalities in the Metro Manila Area. He claims that the second proviso
of par. (c), Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, which requires the apportionment into districts of said municipalities does not specify when the
members of their Sangguniang Bayan will be elected by district. He would consequently lean on par. (d) of Sec. 3, which immediately
succeeds par. (c), to support his view that the elected members of these municipalities mentioned in par. (c) should continue to be
elected at large in the May 11, 1992 elections.
Paragraph (d) states that "[F]or purposes of the regular elections on May 11, 1992, elective members of the Sangguniang Panlunsod
and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large in accordance with existing laws. However, beginning with the regular elections in
1995, they shall be elected by district." Petitioner therefore insists that the elected members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Paraaque
fall under this category so that they should continue to be elected at large until the 1995 regular elections.
Before addressing the crux of the controversy, the Court observes that petitioner does not allege that he is running for reelection,
much less, that he is prejudiced by the election, by district, in Paraaque. As such, he does
not appear to have a locus standi, a standing in law, personal or substantial interest.
1
He does not also allege any legal right that has
been violated by respondent. If for this alone, petitioner does not appear to have any cause of action.
However, considering the importance of the issue involved, concerning as it does the political exercise of qualified voters affected by
the apportionment, and petitioner alleging abuse of discretion and violation of the Constitution by respondent, We resolve to brush
aside the question of procedural infirmity, even as We perceive the petition to be one of declaratory relief. We so held similarly through
Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras in Osmea v. Commission on Elections.
2

Now on the meat of the dispute.
On November 18, 1991, Congress passed R.A. 7166, signed into law by the President on November 26, 1991. It is "An Act Providing for
Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes." At
issue in this case is the proper interpretation of Sec. 3 thereof which provides:
Sec. 3. Elections of Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan.
The elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be
elected as follows:
(a) For provinces with two (2) or more legislative districts, the elective members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall be elected by legislative districts . . .
(b) For provinces with only one (1) legislative district, the Commission shall divide them into two
(2) districts for purposes of electing the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan . . .
(c) The number and election of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and
Sangguniang Bayan in the Metro Manila Area, City of Cebu, City of Davao and any other city with
two (2) or more legislative districts shall continue to be governed by the provisions of Sections 2
and 3 of Republic Act No. 6636 . . . Provided, further, That, the Commission shall divide each of
the municipalities in Metro Manila Area into two (2) districts by barangay for purposes of
representation in the Sangguniang Bayan
. . . . and,
(d) For purposes of the regular elections on May 11, 1992, elective members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large in accordance with existing laws.
However, beginning with the regular elections in 1995, they shall be elected by district . . . .
On November 20, 1991, respondent COMELEC, invoking authority of the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, R.A. 6636, R.A. 6646
and R.A. 7166,
3
issued Resolution No. 2313 and the subsequent resolutions in question.
On February 20, 1992, in view of the perceived ambiguity in the meaning of par. (d), particularly in relation to par. (c), Sec. 3, R.A.
7166, petitioner filed with COMELEC a Motion for Clarification of its Resolution No. 2313 inquiring whether the members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Paraaque and the other municipalities of Metro Manila enumerated therein, which are all single-district
municipalities, would be elected by district in May 11, 1992 or in the 1995 regular elections.
Meanwhile, on March 3, 1992 COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2379 approving the guidelines submitted by the Provincial Election
Supervisors and Municipal Election Registrars concerned pursuant to Resolution No. 2313, and stating therein its purpose in
recommending to Congress the districting/apportionment of Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan seats, i.e., to reduce the
number of candidates to be voted for in the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections. In this Project of Apportionment, Paraaque together
with the other twelve (12) municipalities in the Metro Manila Area was divided into two (2) districts with six (6) elective councilors for
each district.
On March 10, 1992, COMELEC resolved petitioner's Motion for Clarification by interpreting Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, to mean that the election
of elective members of the Sangguniang Bayan, by district, of the thirteen (13) municipalities in the Metro Manila Area shall apply in
the May 11, 1992 elections (Resolution UND. 92-010, prom. March 10, 1992). Petitioner says that he received copy of Resolution UND.
92-010 on March 13, 1992.
On April 7, 1992, apparently not satisfied with this third Resolution of COMELEC, petitioner filed the instant petition asserting that
under par. (d), Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166 the elective members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and the Sangguniang Bayan, for purposes of
the May 11, 1992 regular elections, shall be elected at large in accordance with existing laws. He would include in this class of
sanggunian members to be elected at large those of the municipality of Paraaque.
Petitioner therefore imputes grave abuse of discretion to COMELEC in promulgating Resolution No. 2313, Resolution No. 2379 and
Resolution UND. 92-010 which clarifies, contrary to his view, that the district apportionment of the municipalities in the Metro Manila
Area is applicable to the May 11, 1992 regular elections.
We have carefully examined pars. (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, and its precursor bills on synchronized elections, Senate Bill
No. 1861 and House Bill No. 34811, and We realize the web of confusion generated by the seeming abstruseness in the language of
the law. Some framers of the law were even fazed at the empirical implications of some of its provisions, particularly Sec. 3 thereof,
and they admitted in fact that said provisions were susceptible of varied interpretations, as borne by the sponsorship and explanatory
speeches now spread in the Journals of Congress. Hence, We can understand why petitioner would interpret Sec. 3 as he would. But if
we pursue his course, we may conclude in absurdity because then there would have been no reason for R.A. 7166 to single out the
single-district provinces referred to in par. (b), and the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area mentioned in the second proviso of par.
(c), to be apportioned at once into two (2) districts each if the members of their respective sanggunian after all would still be elected at
large as they were in the 1988 elections.
No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile. We must therefore, as far as we can, divine its meaning,
its significance, its reason for being. As it has oft been held, the key to open the door to what the legislature intended which is vaguely
expressed in the language of a statute is its purpose or the reason which induced it to enact the statute. If the statute needs
construction, as it does in the present case, the most dominant in that process is the purpose of the act.
4
Statutes should be
construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed,
5
and they should be given such
construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.
6
A construction should be rejected
that gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted, and
that tends to defeat the ends which are sought to be attained by the enactment.
7

The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown in the explanatory note of Senate Bill No. 1861 which states in part:
This bill proposes to set the national and local elections for May 11, 1992, and provide for the necessary
implementing details. It also endorses reforms and measures to ensure the conduct of free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections. Specifically, it seeks to: (1) Reduce the number of positions to be voted for by providing
therein that the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan be
elected not at large, but by district . . . .
That respondent COMELEC is cognizant of this legislative intent of R.A. 7166 is reflected in the "WHEREAS" clauses constituting the
preamble to Resolution No. 2379. Thus
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections, in order to reduce the number of candidates to be voted for in the May 11,
1992 synchronized elections recommended, among others, to the Congress of the Philippines, the
districting/apportionment of sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan seats;
WHEREAS, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act 7166, and approved by the President of the
Philippines on November 26, 1991, adopting among others, the recommendation of the Commission on Elections
aforestated;
WHEREAS, pursuant to, and in implementation of Republic Act 7166, particularly Section 3 thereof, the Commission
promulgated Resolution No. 2313, directing the Provincial Election Supervisors and Election Registrars concerned to
submit, after consultation, public hearings, and consensus-taking with the different sectors in the community, the
Project of District Apportionment of single legislative-district provinces and municipalities in the Metro Manila area;
WHEREAS, the established criteria/guidelines in the determination of the district apportionment are as follows: a.
compactness, contiguity and adjacentness of territory; b. apportionment shall be based on the 1990 census of
population; c. no municipality, in the case of provinces, and no barangay, in the case of cities and municipalities,
shall be fragmented or apportioned into different districts.
This avowed policy of having sanggunian members elected by district is also manifest from the four corners of Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166. 8
Thus, a careful analysis of the provisions of Sec. 3 shows that the purpose of districting/apportionment of the sanggunian seats is to
reduce the number of positions to be voted for in the May 11, 1992, synchronized elections and ensure the efficiency of electoral
process. Considering that the single-district provinces and the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area, which are all single-districts, and
under pars. (b) and (c) have already been apportioned into two (2) districts, they will henceforth be electing the members of their
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Bayan by district in the coming May 11, 1992, elections, although under par. (d), the
single-district cities and all the municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area which are all likewise single-districts, will have to continue
electing at large the members of their Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan as they have yet to be apportioned. But
beginning the regular elections of 1995, they will all have to be elected by district. By then, COMELEC would have had enough time to
apportion the single-district cities and the municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area.
As they now stand in relation to the districting/apportionment of local government units for purposes of election under Sec. 3 of R.A.
7166, it is clear that: (1) for provinces with two (2) or more legislative districts contemplated in par. (a), they shall continue to be
elected by district; (2) for provinces with single legislative districts, as they have already been apportioned into two (2) districts each
under par. (b), they shall henceforth be elected likewise by district; (3) for cities with two (2) or more legislative districts, e.g., the
cities of Manila, Cebu and Davao, they shall also continue to be elected by district under the first part of par. (c); and (4) for the
thirteen (13) municipalities in the Metro Manila Area, which have already been apportioned into two (2) districts each under the second
proviso of par. (c), they shall likewise be elected by district in the regular elections of May 11, 1992.
Then, that should leave us the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single-district cities and the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipalities
outside Metro Manila, which remain single-districts not having been ordered apportioned under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166. They will have to
continue to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992, elections, although starting 1995 they shall all be elected by district to effect the
full implementation of the letter and spirit of R.A. 7166. That is the true import of par. (d). Consequently, as We view it, where he
stands, petitioner must fall.
WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion, much less grave, on the part of respondent, and for lack of merit, the instant petition is
DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 78687 January 31, 1989
ELENA SALENILLAS AND BERNARDINO SALENILLAS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HONORABLE RAYMUNDO SEVA, JUDGE OF BRANCH 38 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF CAMARINES NORTE and WILLIAM GUERRA, respondents.
Jose L. Lapak for petitioners.
Jose T. Atienza for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari which seeks the reversal and setting aside of the decision
1
of the Court of Appeals
2
dismissing
the petition for certiorari against Judge Raymundo Seva of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Norte and the private respondent,
William Guerra, involves a pure question of law i.e., the coverage and application of Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, known otherwise as the Public Land Act.
The facts are undisputed.
The property subject matter of the case was formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-1248, issued by virtue of Free Patent
Application No. 192765, in favor of the spouses, Florencia H. de Enciso and Miguel Enciso. The said original certificate of title was
inscribed in the Registration Book for the Province of Camarines Norte on December 10, 1961. On February 28, 1970, the patentees,
the Enciso spouses, by an Absolute Deed of Sale, sold the property in favor of the petitioners, the spouses Elena Salenillas and
Bernardino Salenillas for a consideration of P900.00. Petitioner Elena Salenillas is a daughter of the Encisos. As a result of the
aforementioned sale, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8104 of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte was issued in the name of
the Salenillas, cancelling Original Certificate of Title No. P-1248. On June 30, 1971, the petitioners mortgaged the property now
covered by T.C.T. No. T-8104 with the Rural Bank of Daet, Inc. The mortgage was subsequently released on November 22, 1973 after
the petitioners paid the amount of P1,000.00. Later, or on December 4, 1975, the petitioners again mortgaged the property, this time
in favor of the Philippine National Bank Branch, Daet, Camarines Norte as security for a loan of P2,500.00.
For failure of the petitioners to pay their loan, extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding, pursuant to Act No. 3135, was instituted by the
Philippine National Bank against the mortgage and the property was sold at a public auction held on February 27, 1981. The private
respondent, William Guerra, emerged as the highest bidder in the said public auction and as a result thereof a "Certificate of Sale" was
issued to him by the Ex Officio Provincial Sheriff of Camarines Norte. Ultimately, on July 12, 1983, a "Sheriff's Final Deed" was executed
in favor of the private respondent.
On August 17,1983, the Philippine National Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Norte at Daet, a motion for a writ of
possession. The public respondent, Judge Raymundo Seva of the trial court, acting on the motion, issued on September 22, 1983 an
order for the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the private respondent. When the deputy sheriff of Camarines Norte however,
attempted on November 17, 1983, to place the property in the possession of the private respondent, the petitioners refused to vacate
and surrender the possession of the same and instead offered to repurchase it under Section 119 of the Public Land Act. On August 15,
1984, another motion, this time for the issuance of an alias writ of possession was filed by the private respondent with the trial court.
The petitioners, on August 31, 1984, opposed the private respondents' motion and instead made a formal offer to repurchase the
property. Notwithstanding the petitioners' opposition and formal offer, the trial court judge on October 12, 1984 issued the alias writ of
possession prayed for the private respondent. The petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the order but their motion was denied.
Undeterred by their initial setback, the petitioners elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals by way of a petition for
certiorari claiming that the respondent trial court judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order dated October 12,
1984 granting the writ of possession, and the order dated October 22, 1984, denying their motion for reconsider consideration.
In a resolution dated January 23, 1985, the respondent appellate court gave due course to the petition; required the parties to submit
simultaneous memoranda in support to their respective positions; and restrained the trial court and the private respondent from
executing, implementing or otherwise giving effect to the assailed writ of possession until further orders from the court.
3
However, in
a decision promulgated on September 17, 1986, the respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the case for lack of merit. According to the
appellate court:
It must be noted that when the original owner, Florencia H. Enciso whose title, OCT No. P-1248, was issued on
August 9, 1961, executed a deed of absolute sale on February 28, 1970 of the property covered by said title to
spouses Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas, the five year period to repurchase the property provided for in
Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended could have already started. Prom this fact alone, the petition
should have been dismissed. However, granting that the transfer from parent to child for a nominal sum may not be
the "conveyance" contemplated by the law. We will rule on the issue raised by the petitioners.
4

xxx xxx xxx
Applying the case of Monge, et al. vs. Angeles, et al.,
5
the appellate court went on to hold that the five-year period of the petitioners
to repurchase under Section 119 of the Public Land Act had already prescribed. The point of reckoning, ruled the respondent court in
consonance with Monge is from the date the petitioners mortgaged the property on December 4, 1973. Thus, when the petitioners
made their formal offer to repurchase on August 31, 1984, the period had clearly expired.
In an effort to still overturn the decision, the petitioners moved for reconsideration. Their motion apparently went for naught because
on May 7, 1987, the respondent appellate court resolved to deny the same. Hence, this petition.
Before us, the petitioners maintain that contrary to the rulings of the courts below, their right to repurchase within five years under
Section 119 of the Public Land Act has not yet prescribed. To support their contention, the petitioners cite the cases of Paras vs. Court
of Appeals
6
and Manuel vs. Philippine National Bank, et al.
7

On the other side, the private respondent, in support of the appellate court's decision, states that the sale of the contested property by
the patentees to the petitioners disqualified the latter from being legal heirs vis-a-vis the said property. As such, they (the petitioners)
no longer enjoy the right granted to heirs under the provisions of Section 119 of the Public Land Act.
8

In fine, what need be determined and resolved here are: whether or not the petitioners have the right to repurchase the contested
property under Section 119 of the Public Land Act; and assuming the answer to the question is in the affirmative, whether or not their
right to repurchase had already prescribed.
We rule for the petitioners. They are granted by the law the right to repurchase their property and their right to do so subsists.
Section 119 of the Public Land Act, as amended, provides in full:
Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be
subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a period of five years from the date of the
conveyance.
From the foregoing legal provision, it is explicit that only three classes of persons are bestowed the right to repurchase the
applicant-patentee, his widow, or other legal heirs. Consequently, the contention of the private respondent sustained by the
respondent appellate court that the petitioners do not belong to any of those classes of repurchasers because they acquired the
property not through inheritance but by sale, has no legal basis. The petitioners-spouses are the daughter and son-in-law of the
Encisos, patentees of the contested property. At the very least, petitioner Elena Salenillas, being a child of the Encisos, is a "legal heir"
of the latter. As such, and even on this score alone, she may therefore validly repurchase. This must be so because Section 119 of the
Public Land Act, in speaking of "legal heirs," makes no distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
Moreover, to indorse the distinction made by the private respondent and the appellate court would be to contravene the very purpose
of Section 119 of the Public Land Act which is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family
the land that the State had gratuitously given him as a reward for his labor in clearing and cultivating it.
9
Considering that petitioner
Salenillas is a daughter of the spouses Florencia H. Enciso and Miguel Enciso, there is no gainsaying that allowing her (Elena) and her
husband to repurchase the property would be more in keeping with the spirit of the law. We have time and again said that between
two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.
Guided by the same purpose of the law, and proceeding to the other issue here raised, we rule that the five-year period for the
petitioners to repurchase their property had not yet prescribed.
The case of Monge et al. vs. Angeles, et al.,
10
cited as authority by the respondent Court of Appeals is inapplicable to the present
controversy. The facts obtaining there are substantially different from those in this case. In Monge the conveyance involved was a
pacto de retro sale and not a foreclosure sale. More importantly, the question raised there was whether the five-year period provided
for in Section 119 "should be counted from the date of the sale even if the same is with an option to repurchase or from the date the
ownership of the land has become consolidated in favor of the purchaser because of the homesteader's failure to redeem it.
11
It is
therefore understandable why the Court ruled there as it did. A sale on pacto de retro immediately vests title, ownership, and,
generally possession over the property on the vendee a retro, subject only to the right of the vendor a retro to repurchase within the
stipulated period. It is an absolute sale with a resolutory condition.
The cases
12
pointed to by the petitioner in support of their position, on the other hand, present facts that are quite identical to those
in the case at bar. Both cases involved properties the titles over which were obtained either through homestead or free patent. These
properties were mortgaged to a bank as collateral for loans, and, upon failure of the owners to pay their indebtedness, the mortgages
were foreclosed. In both instances, the Court ruled that the five-year period to. repurchase a homestead sold at public auction or
foreclosure sale under Act 3135 begins on the day after the expiration of the period of redemption when the deed of absolute sale is
executed thereby formally transferring the property to the purchaser, and not otherwise. Taking into account that the mortgage was
foreclosed and the mortgaged property sold at a public auction to the private respondent on February 27, 1981, with the "Sheriff's
Final Deed" issued on July 12, 1983, the two offers of the petitioners to repurchase the first on November 17, 1983, and the second,
formally, on August 31, 1984 were both made within the prescribed five-year period.
Now, as regards the redemption price, applying Sec. 30 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petitioners should reimburse the
private respondent the amount of the purchase price at the public auction plus interest at the rate of one per centum per month up to
November 17, 1983, together with the amounts of assessments and taxes on the property that the private respondent might have paid
after purchase and interest on the last named amount at the same rate as that on the purchase price.
13

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 17, 1986, and the Resolution dated May 7, 1987 of the Court of
Appeals, and the Orders dated September 22, 1983, October 12, 1984, and October 22, 1984 of the Regional Trial Court of Daet,
Camarines Norte, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one ENTERED directing the private respondent to reconvey the
subject property and to execute the corresponding deed of reconveyance therefor in favor of the petitioners upon the return to him by
the latter of the purchase price and the amounts, if any, of assessments or taxes he paid plus interest of one (1%) per centum per
month on both amounts up to November 17, 1983.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 93177 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN, MARIELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, CAPT. MANUEL ISON, COL. LUISITO
SANCHEZ, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO, LTC. ARSENIO TECSON, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO, LTC.
ERICSON AURELIO, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS, MAJ. CESAR DE LA
PERA, MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO, CAPT. DANILO LIM, CAPT. ELMER
AMON, CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, THE PTI INVESTIGATING PANEL COMPOSED OF: COL. MANUEL S.
MENDIOLA, COL. VIRTUD NORBERTO L. DAGZA MAJ. FELIX V. BALDONADO and MAJ. ESTELITO L. PORNEA and
GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14 COMPOSED OF: B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL.
ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA and CAPT. FRANCISCO T.
MALLILLIN, respondents.
No. 95020 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMIMO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY
FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Q.C., LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA.,
respondents.
No. 96948 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN. MARCELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO PN, CAPT. MANUEL ISON PN, LTC.
ROMELINO GOJO PN (M), LTC. ARSENIO TECSON PA, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ PA, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO PA, LTC.
ERICSON AURELIO PA, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA, LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER PA, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS PA, MAJ.
CESAR DE LA PENA PN (M): MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA PA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES PA, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO PA, CAPT.
DANILO LIM PA, CAPT. ELMER AMON PAF CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI COL. WILLY
FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF GENERAL
COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14, respondents.
No. 97454 August 2, 1991
AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RODOLFO BIAZON, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, PNP
DIRECTOR GENERAL MAJOR GEN. CESAR NAZARENO and LT. COL. ALBERTO OLARIO, Commanding Officer of the
PNP/INP Detention Center/Jail, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 86, CAPTAIN REYNALDO S.
RAFAEL, 1 LT SERVANDO A. BAOANAN PN(M), 1 LT. WILFREDO JIMENEZ PAF 1 LT. ATANACIO T. MACALAN JR PMM 2LT
ELISEO T. RASCO PC, 2LT JONAS CALLEJA PC, 2LT JAIRUS JS GELVEZON III PMM 2LT JOSELITO CABREROS PMM 2LT
MEMEL ROJAS PN(M) and 2LT HERMINIO L. CANTACO PC, respondents.
Armando M. Marcelo and Rainier L. Madrid for petitioners Luisito Sanchez, Tiburcio Fusillero, Ericson Aurelio, Levino Valencia, Danilo
Arnon Vergel Nacino, Florencio Flores, Benigno Junio and Joey Sarroza.
Manuel Q. Malvar for Rafael Galvez and Danny Lim.
Manuel E. Valenzuela for Arsenio Tecson
Mariano R. Santiago for Alfredo Oliveros.
Ricardo J.M. Rivera for Manuel Ison.
Castillo, Laman, Tan and Pantaleon for Danilo Pizarro.
Alfredo Lazaro for Romelino Gojo.
Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. for Jose Comendador.
Jonathan B.S. Rebong and Efren C. Carag for Marcelo Blando.
Pablito V. Sanidad for Franklin Brawner and Ericson Aurelio.
Efren C. Moncupa for All Tecson.
M.M. Lazaro & Associates for respondents Ligot and Ison .
Baldomero S.P. Gatbonton, Jr. for Jacinto Ligot.
Salvador B. Britanico for Cesar de la Pena.
Gilbert R.T. Reyes for Danilo Pizarro.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for petitioners in G.R. No. 93177.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:p
These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same parties and related issues arising from the same
incident.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 are officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup d' etat that took place on December 1 to 9,
1989.
The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman)
and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder).
In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, they are questioning the conduct of the Pre-Trial
Investigation PTI Panel constituted to investigate the charges against them and the creation of the General Court Martial GCM
convened to try them.
In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the legality of GCM No. 14, seek certiorari against its ruling denying them the
right to peremptory challenge as granted by Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408.
In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are assailed on certiorari on the
ground that he has no jurisdiction over GCM No. 14 and no authority either to set aside its ruling denying bail to the private
respondents.
In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in a petition for habeas
corpus directing the release of the private respondents. Jurisdictional objections are likewise raised as in G.R. No. 95020.
I
Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel had been constituted pursuant to Office Order No.
16 dated January 14, 1990, to investigate the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948. The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena
dated January 30, 1990, individually addressed to the petitioners, to wit:
You are hereby directed to appear in person before the undersigned Pre-Trial Investigating Officers on 12 Feb 90
9:00 a.m. at Kiangan Hall, Camp Crame Quezon City, then and there to submit your counter-affidavit and the
affidavits of your witnesses, if any, in the pre-trial investigation of the charge/charges against you for violence of
AWs _______________. DO NOT SUBMIT A MOTION TO DISMISS.
Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of your
right to submit controverting evidence.
On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn statements of witnesses, and death and
medical certificates of victims of the rebellion.
At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds, prompting the PTI Panel to grant them
10 days within which to file their objections in writing This was done through a Motion for Summary Dismissal dated February 21,
1990.
In a resolution dated February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5 days from notice to submit their
respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.
On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration of the foregoing denial and the PTI Panel gave them 7 days
within which to reduce their motion to writing. This was done on March 14,1990.
The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of War 71, which provides:
Art. 71. Charges Action upon. Charges and specifications must be signed by a person subject to military law, and
under the oath either that he has personal knowledge of, or has investigated, the matters set forth therein and that
the same are true in fact, to the best of his knowledge and belief.
No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a thorough and impartial investigation thereof
shall have been made. This investigation will include inquiries as to the truth of the matter set forth in said charges,
form of charges, and what disposition of the case should be made in the interest of justice and discipline. At such
investigation full opportunity shall be given to the accused to cross-examine witnesses against him if they are
available and to present anything he may desire in his own behalf, either in defense or mitigation, and the
investigating officer shall examine available witnesses requested by the accused. If the charges are forwarded after
such investigation, they shall be accompanied by a statement of the substance of the testimony taken on both sides.
(Emphasis supplied.)
They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted merely of a roll call and that no prosecution witnesses were presented
to reaffirm their affidavits. while the motion for summary dismissal was denied, the motion for reconsideration remains unresolved to
date and they have not been able to submit their counter-affidavits.
At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 96948 manifested that they were exercising their right to raise peremptory
challenges against the president and members of GCM No.14. They invoked Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 for this purpose. GCM No.
14 ruled, however, that peremptory challenges had been discontinued under P.D. No. 39.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by GCM No.14. He thereupon filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of
preliminary injunction. After considering the petition and the answer thereto filed by the president and members of GCM No.14, Judge
Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order granting provisional liberty to Ligot.
On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce the order for his release and to declare in contempt the
commanding officer of the PC/INP Jail for disobey 'ng the said order. He later also complained that Generals De Villa and Aguirre had
refused to release him "pending final resolution of the appeal to be taken" to this Court.
After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the provisional liberty of Ligot, as well as of intervenors Ltc Franklin Brawner,
Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecson and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros, and later of additional intervenors Ltc Romelino Gojo and Capt. Manuel Ison.
On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia:
(a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution granting the right to bail to all persons with the defined
exception is applicable and covers all military men facing court-martial proceedings. Accordingly, the assailed orders
of General Court- Martial No. 14 denying bail to petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken assumption that bail does
not apply to military men facing court-martial proceedings on the ground that there is no precedent, are hereby set
aside and declared null and void. Respondent General Court-Martial No. 14 is hereby directed to conduct proceedings
on the applications of bail of the petitioner, intervenors and which may as well include other persons facing charges
before General Court-Martial No. 14.
Pending the proceedings on the applications for bail before General Court-Martial No. 14, this Court reiterates its
orders of release on the provisional liberty of petitioner Jacinto Ligot as well as intervenors Franklin Brawner and
Arsenio Tecson.
On February 18, 1991, the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with this Court a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that
they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, where
it was raffled to respondent Judge Antonio P. Solano. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the
petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.
II
The Court has examined the records of this case and rules as follows.
It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given several opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial
investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990,
when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for
reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. This they did on March 13, 1990. The motion was in effect denied
when the PTI Panel resolved to recommend that the charges be referred to the General Court Martial for trial.
The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied due process because the investigation was resolved against them owing
to their own failure to submit their counter-affidavits. They had been expressly warned In the subpoena sent them that "failure to
submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of (their) right to submit
controverting evidence." They chose not to heed the warning. As their motions appeared to be dilatory, the PTI Panel was justified in
referring the charges to GCM No. 14 without waiting for the petitioners to submit their defense.
Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or
forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights.
There was in our view substantial compliance with Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel. Moreover, it is now settled that "even a failure to
conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court- martial of jurisdiction." We so held in Arula v. Espino,
1
thus:
xxx xxx xxx
But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-martial of jurisdiction.
The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is that it is directory, not mandatory, and in no way affects the
jurisdiction of a court-martial. In Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 93 L ed 986 (1949), the Court said:
We do not think that the pre-trial investigation procedure by Article 70 (The Philippine counter-part
is article of war 71, Commonwealth Act 408) can properly be construed as an indispensable pre-
requisite to the exercise of the Army General court martial jurisdiction.. The Article does serve
important functions in the administration of court-martial procedures and does provide safeguards
to an accused. Its language is clearly such that a defendant could object to trial in the absence of
the required investigation. In that event the court-martial could itself postpone trial pending the
investigation. And the military reviewing authorities could consider the same contention, reversing
a court- martial conviction where failure to comply with Article 70 has substantially injured an
accused. But we are not persuaded that Congress intended to make otherwise valid court-martial
judgments wholly void because pre-trial investigations fall short of the standards prescribed by
Article 70. That Congress has not required analogous pre-trial procedure for Navy court-martial is
an indication that the investigatory plan was not intended to be exalted to the jurisdictional level.
xxx xxx xxx
Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the Judge Advocate General of the Army did hold that
where there had been no pre-trial investigation, court-martial proceedings were void ab initio. But
this holding has been expressly repudiated in later holdings of the Judge Advocate General. This
later interpretation has been that the pre-trial requirements of Article 70 are directory, not
mandatory, and in no way effect the jurisdiction of a court-martial. The War Department's
interpretation was pointedly called to the attention of Congress in 1947 after which Congress
amended Article 70 but left unchanged the language here under consideration. compensable pre-
requisite to the exercise of Army general court-martial jurisdiction
A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pretrial investigation under article of war 71 would of
course be altogether irregular but the court-martial might nevertheless have jurisdiction. Significantly, this rule is
similar to the one obtaining in criminal procedure in the civil courts to the effect that absence of preliminary
investigation does not go into the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings.
As to what law should govern the conduct of the preliminary investigation, that issue was resolved more than two years ago in
Kapunan v. De Villa,
2
where we declared:
The Court finds that, contrary to the contention of petitioners, there was substantial compliance with the
requirements of law as provided in the Articles of War and P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911. The amended
charge sheets, charging petitioners and their co-respondents with mutiny and conduct unbecoming an officer, were
signed by Maj. Antonio Ruiz, a person subject to military law, after he had investigated the matter through an
evaluation of the pertinent records, including the reports of respondent AFP Board of Officers, and was convinced of
the truth of the testimonies on record. The charge sheets were sworn to by Maj. Ruiz, the "accuser," in accordance
with and in the manner provided under Art. 71 of the Articles of War. Considering that P.D. No. 77, as amended by
P.D. No. 911, is only of suppletory application, the fact that the charge sheets were not certified in the manner
provided under said decrees, i.e., that the officer administering the oath has personally examined the affiant and that
he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood its affidavit, does not invalidate said charge sheets.
Thereafter, a "pretrial investigation" was conducted by respondent Maj. Baldonado, wherein, pursuant to P.D. No. 77,
as amended by P.D. No. 911, petitioners were subpoenaed and required to file their counter-affidavit. However,
instead of doing so, they filed an untitled pleading seeking the dismissal of the charges against them. That
petitioners were not able to confront the witnesses against them was their own doing, for they never even asked
Maj. Baldonado to subpoena said witnesses so that they may be made to answer clarificatory questions in
accordance with P. D, No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911.
The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not been constitute in accordance with Article 8 of the Articles of War because General
Order No. M-6, which supposedly convened the body, was not signed by Gen. Renato de Villa as Chief of Staff.
Article of War No. 8 reads:
Art. 8. General Courts-Martial. The President of the Philippines, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the Chief of Constabulary and, when empowered by the President, the commanding officer of a major
command or task force, the commanding officer of a division, the commanding officer of a military area, the
superintendent of the Military Academy, the commanding officer of a separate brigade or body of troops may appoint
general courts-martial; but when any such commander is the accuser or the prosecutor of the person or persons to
be tried, the court shall be appointed by superior competent authority. ...
While it is true that General Order No. M-6 was not signed by Gen. De Villa, there is no doubt that he authorized it because the order
itself said it was issued "By Command of General De Villa" and it has not been shown to be spurious. As observed by the Solicitor
General, the Summary Disposition Form showed that Gen. De Villa, as Chief of Staff, AFP, actually constituted GCM No. 14 and
appointed its president and members. It is significant that General De Villa has not disauthorized or revoked or in any way disowned
the said order, as he would certainly have done if his authority had been improperly invoked. On the contrary, as the principal
respondent in G.R. No. 93177, he sustained General Order No. M 6 in the Comment filed for him and the other respondents by the
Solicitor General.
Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge, we note that this was originally provided for under Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408
(Articles of War), as amended by Rep. Act No. 242, on June 12, 1948, to wit:
Art. 18. Challenges. Members of general or special courts-martial may be challenged by the accused or the trial
judge advocate for cause stated to the court. The court shall determine the relevancy and validity thereof, and shall
not receive a challenge to more than one member at a time. Challenges by the trial judge advocate shall ordinarily be
presented and decided before those by the accused are offered. Each side shall be entitled to the peremptory
challenge, but the law member of the court shall not be challenged except for cause.
The history of peremptory challenge was traced in Martelino v. Alejandro,
3
thus:
In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after the passage in 1935 of Commonwealth Act No. 1
(otherwise known as the National Defense Act), except for a handful of Philippine Scout officers and graduates of the
United States military and naval academies who were on duty with the Philippine Army, there was a complete dearth
of officers learned in military law, its aside from the fact that the officer corps of the developing army was
numerically made equate for the demands of the strictly military aspects of the national defense program. Because of
these considerations it was then felt that peremptory challenges should not in the meanwhile be permitted and that
only challenges for cause, in any number, would be allowed. Thus Article 18 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth
Act No. 408), as worded on September 14, 1938, the date of the approval of the Act, made no mention or reference
to any peremptory challenge by either the trial judge advocate of a court- martial or by the accused. After December
17,1958, when the Manual for Courts-Martial of the Philippine Army became effective, the Judge Advocate General's
Service of the Philippine Army conducted a continuing and intensive program of training and education in military
law, encompassing the length and breadth of the Philippines. This program was pursued until the outbreak of World
War 11 in the Pacific on December 7, 1941. After the formal surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945, the officer corps
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines had expanded to a very large number, and a great many of the officers had
been indoctrinated in military law. It was in these environmental circumstances that Article of War 18 was amended
on June 12,1948 to entitle "each side" to one peremptory challenge, with the sole proviso that "the law member of
court shall not be challenged except for cause.
On September 27,1972, President Marcos issued General Order No. 8, empowering the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to create
military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as may be referred to them.
On November 7,1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters
relevant to military Tribunals). This decree disallowed the peremptory challenge, thus:
No peremptory challenge shall be allowed. Challenges for cause may be entertained to insure impartiality and good
faith. Challenges shall immediately be heard and determined by a majority of the members excluding the challenged
member. A tie vote does not disqualify the challenged member. A successfully challenged member shall be
immediately replaced.
On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1498, or the National Security Code, which was a compilation and
codification of decrees, general orders, LOI and policies intended "to meet the continuing threats to the existence, security and stability
of the State." The modified rule on challenges under P.D. No. 39 was embodied in this decree.
On January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of the state of martial law throughout the
Philippines. The proclamation revoked General Order No. 8 and declared the dissolution of the military tribunals created pursuant
thereto upon final determination of the cases pending therein.
P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and the other general orders mentioned therein. With the termination of
martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created thereunder, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased
automatically.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat
ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul.
Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in L P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the
apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No. 2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of
Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows the right to peremptory challenge.
We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the right to peremptory challenge remains withdrawn under P.D. No. 39.
To repeat for emphasis, this decree was itself withdrawn when martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so
withdrawn, it could still be considered no longer operative, having been cast out under the new dispensation as, in the words of the
Freedom Constitution, one of the "iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime.
The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive instruments of martial law. It is curious that the present government should
invoke the rules of that discredited body to justify its action against the accused officers.
The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory challenge may be exploited by a respondent in a court-martial trial to
delay the proceedings and defer his deserved Punishment. It is hoped that the accused officers in the cases at bar will not be so
motivated. At any rate, the wisdom of Com. Act No. 408, in the light of present circumstances, is a matter addressed to the law-makers
and not to this Court. The judiciary can only interpret and apply the laws without regard to its own misgivings on their adverse effects.
This is a problem only the political departments can resolve.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question the propriety of the petition for certiorari and mandamus and the petition for
habeas corpus filed by the private respondents with the Regional Trial Courts of Quezon City. It is argued that since the private
respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to
order their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceedings.
The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of BP 1 29, the Court of Appeals is vested with "exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities,
boards or commissions." Rather irrelevantly, the petitioners also cite the case of Yang v. Court of Appeals
4
where this Court held that
"appeals from the Professional Regulation Commission are now exclusively cognizable by the Court of Appeals.
It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the case cited refer to ordinary appeals and not to the remedies employed by the
accused officers before the respondent courts.
In Martelino, we observed as follows:
It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting power over the proceedings of courts-martial,
and that mere errors in their proceedings are not open to consideration. The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction.
But it is equally true that in the exercise of their undoubted discretion, courts-martial may commit such an abuse of
discretion what in the language of Rule 65 is referred to as "grave abuse of discretion" as to give rise to a
defect in their jurisdiction. This is precisely the point at issue in this action suggested by its nature as one for
certiorari and prohibition ... .
The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.
5
In the
absence of a law providing that the decisions, orders and ruling of a court-martial or the Office of the Chief of Staff can be questioned
only before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, we hold that the Regional Trial Court can exercise similar jurisdiction.
We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not
available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where
we observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.
The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows:
The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional
coverage on the right to bail.
Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the framework of democratic
system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the discharge of their duties and
responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their
activities outside of and against the existing political system.
xxx xxx xxx
National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable Court that release on bail of respondents
constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say 1,000 putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis
on bail, or if the assailed July 25,1990 Order were sustained, on "provisional" bail. The sheer number alone is already
discomforting. But, the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which could
very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court, and replace the same
with a system consonant with their own concept of government and justice.
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection clause is not acceptable. This guaranty
requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is
substantially different from others. The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are not.
But they cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.
On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 that they had not been charged after more than one year from their
arrest, our finding is that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial.
The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with this Court on February 18, 1991, and was referred to the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City for raffle, hearing and decision. It was heard on February 26, 1991, by the respondent court, where the petitioners
submitted the charge memorandum and specifications against the private respondents dated January 30, 1991. On February 12, 1991,
pursuant to Office Order No. 31-91, the PTI panel was created and initial investigation was scheduled on March 12, 1991 at 2:00 p.m.
On March 20, 1991, the private respondents received the copies of the charges, charge sheets and specifications and were required to
submit their counter-affidavits on or before April 11, 1991. There was indeed a delay of more than one year in the investigation and
preparation of the charges against the private respondents. However, this was explained by the Solicitor General thus:
... The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete it pre-charge investigation only after one (1) year
because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed coup. All of them, as well as
other witnesses, had to be interviewed or investigated, and these inevitably took months to finish. The pre-charge
investigation was rendered doubly difficult by the fact that those involved were dispersed and scattered throughout
the Philippines. In some cases, command units, such as the Scout Rangers, have already been disbanded. After the
charges were completed, the same still had to pass review and approval by the AFP Chief of Staff.
While accepting this explanation, the Court nevertheless must reiterate the following admonition:
This Court as protector of the rights of the people, must stress the point that if the participation of petitioner in
several coup attempts for which he is confined on orders of Adjutant General Jorge Agcaoili cannot be established
and no charges can be filed against him or the existence of a prima facie case warranting trial before a military
commission is wanting, it behooves respondent then Major General Rodolfo Biazon (now General) to release
petitioner. Respondents must also be reminded that even if a military officer is arrested pursuant to Article 70 of then
Articles of War, indefinite confinement is not sanctioned, as Article 71 thereof mandates that immediate steps must
be taken to try the person accused or to dissmiss the charge and release him. Any officer who is responsible for
unnecessary delay in investigating or carrying the case to a final conclusion may even be punished as a court martial
may direct.
6

It should be noted, finally, that after the decision was rendered by Judge Solano on February 26, 1991, the government filed a notice
of appeal ad cautelam and a motion for reconsideration, the latter was ultimately denied, after hearing, on March 4, 1991. The 48-
hour period for appeal under Rule 41, Section 18, of the Rules of Court did not run until after notice of such denial was received by the
petitioners on March 12, 1991. Contrary to the private respondents' contention, therefore, the decision had not yet become final and
executory when the special civil action in G.R. No. 97454 was filed with this Court on March 12, 1991.
III
Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well to reiterate the following observations of the Court in Arula:
The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of judgment and discretion (AW 71). A petition for
certiorari, in order to prosper, must be based on jurisdictional grounds because, as long as the respondent acted with
jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of
judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. Even an abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself
to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.
As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have not acted with grave abuse of discretion or without or in excess
of jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the Court and the reversal of the acts complained of by the petitioners. Such action is
indicated, however, in G.R. No. 96948, where we find that the right to peremptory challenge should not have been denied, and in G.R.
Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the private respondents should not have been ordered released.
ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is GRANTED, and the
respondents are DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of
War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also GRANTED, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the
private respondents are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado
and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.


Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
I concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Cruz, but I dissent insofar as he would deny bail to accused military
personnel.
The Constitution explicitly grants the right to bail to "all persons" before conviction, with the only exception of "those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong."
1
The Charter also states that "[T]he right to bail shall not
be impaired even if the writ of habeas corpus is suspended."
2
To deny the military officers here concerned of the right to bail is to
circumscribe the inclusive meaning of "all persons" the coverage of the right.
I believe that military officers fall within "persons".
The picture conjured up by the Solicitor General of "a scenario of say 1,000 putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or
if the assailed July 25, 1990 Order were sustained, on "provisional" bail [t]he sheer number alone is already discomforting . . . [b]ut,
the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which could very well result in the overthrow of duly
constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court, and replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of
government and justice."
3
But would a scenario of 1,000 murderers or drug pushers roaming the streets of the metropolis justify a
denial of the right to bail? Would not that dark picture painted by the Solicitor General be reproduced by 1,000 "equally dangerous"
elements of society?
We gave bail Senator Enrile and General Brawner. I find no reason why the petitioners should not be granted the same right.
The majority would point to tradition, supposed to be firmly settled, as an argument to deny bail. I submit, however, that tradition is
no argument. First, the Constitution does not say it. Second, we are a government of laws, not tradition.
If there are precedents that attest to the contrary, I submit that a reexamination is in order.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992
LYDIA O. CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION and THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, Republic Act No. 6683 was approved on 2 December 1988
providing for benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the government service as well as for involuntary separation
due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act, as follows:
Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, as well as the personnel of all local government
units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees,
regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the
date of separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the PC-INP are
excluded from the coverage of this Act.
Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application on 30 January 1989 with
respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation benefits
equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil
Service Commission yielded negative results.
1
Her letter for reconsideration dated 25 April 1989 pleaded thus:
xxx xxx xxx
With due respect, I think the interpretation of the Honorable Commissioner of RA 6683 does not conform with the
beneficent purpose of the law. The law merely requires that a government employee whether regular, temporary,
emergency, or casual, should have two consecutive years of government service in order to be entitled to its
benefits. I more than meet the requirement. Persons who are not entitled are consultants, experts and
contractual(s). As to the budget needed, the law provides that the Department of Budget and Management will
shoulder a certain portion of the benefits to be allotted to government corporations. Moreover, personnel of these
NIA special projects art entitled to the regular benefits, such (sic) leaves, compulsory retirement and the like. There
is no reason why we should not be entitled to RA 6683.
xxx xxx xxx
2

Denying the plea for reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) emphasized:
xxx xxx xxx
We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted. The provision of Section 3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC Circular
Letter No. 89-1 does not only require an applicant to have two years of satisfactory service on the date of
separation/retirement but further requires said applicant to be on a casual, emergency, temporary or regular
employment status as of December 2, 1988, the date of enactment of R.A. 6683. The law does not contemplate
contractual employees in the coverage.
Inasmuch as your employment as of December 31, 1988, the date of your separation from the service, is co-
terminous with the NIA project which is contractual in nature, this Commission shall sustain its original decision.
xxx xxx xxx
3

In view of such denial, petitioner is before this Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari, insisting that she is entitled to the
benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683. Her arguments:
It is submitted that R.A. 6683, as well as Section 3.1 of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 requires an
applicant to be on a casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment status. Likewise, the provisions of Section
23 (sic) of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 88-1, implementing guidelines of R.A. No. 6683, provides:
"2.3 Excluded from the benefits under R.A. No. 6683 are the following:
a) Experts and Consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to perform specific activities or
services with a definite expected output: i.e. membership in Task Force, Part-Time,
Consultant/Employees.
b) Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the Philippine
Constabulary and Integrated National Police (PC-INP).
c) Appointive officials and employees who retire or elect to be separated from the service for
optional retirement with gratuity under R.A. No. 1616, 4968 or with pension under R.A. No. 186, as
amended by R.A. No. 6680 or P.D. No. 1146, an amended, or vice- versa.
d) Officials and employees who retired voluntarily prior to the enactment of this law and have
received the corresponding benefits of that retirement/separation.
e) Officials and employees with pending cases punishable by mandatory separation from the
service under existing civil service laws, rules and regulations; provided that if such officials and
employees apply in writing within the prescriptive period for the availment of the benefits herein
authorized, shall be allowed only if acquitted or cleared of all charges and their application
accepted and approved by the head of office concerned."
Based on the above exclusions, herein petitioner does not belong to any one of them. Ms. Chua is a full time
employee of NIA entitled to all the regular benefits provided for by the Civil Service Commission. She held a
permanent status as Personnel Assistant A, a position which belongs to the Administrative Service. . . . If casuals and
emergency employees were given the benefit of R.A. 6683 with more reason that this petitioner who was holding a
permanent status as Personnel Assistant A and has rendered almost 15 years of faithful, continuous service in the
government should be similarly rewarded by the beneficient (sic) purpose of the law.
4

The NIA and the Civil Service Commission reiterate in their comment petitioner's exclusion from the benefits of Republic Act No. 6683,
because:
1. Petitioner's employment is co-terminous with the project per appointment papers kept by the Administrative Service in the head
office of NIA (the service record was issued by the Watershed Management and Erosion Control Project (WMECP), Pantabangan, Nueva
Ecija). The project, funded by the World Bank, was completed as of 31 December 1988, after which petitioner's position became
functus officio.
2. Petitioner is not a regular and career employee of NIA her position is not included in its regular plantilla. She belongs to the non-
career service (Sec. 6, P.D. No. 807) which is inherently short-lived, temporary and transient; on the other hand, retirement
presupposes employment for a long period. The most that a non-career personnel can expect upon the expiration of his employment is
financial assistance. Petitioner is not even qualified to retire under the GSIS law.
3. Assuming arguendo that petitioner's appointment is permanent, security of tenure is available only for the term of office (i.e.,
duration of project).
4. The objective of Republic Act No. 6683 is not really to grant separation or retirement benefits but reorganization
5
to streamline
government functions. The application of the law must be made consistent with the purpose for which it was enacted. Thus, as the
expressed purpose of the law is to reorganize the government, it will not have any application to special projects such as the WMECP
which exists only for a short and definite period. This being the nature of special projects, there is no necessity for offering its
personnel early retirement benefits just to induce voluntary separation as a step to reorganization. In fact, there is even no need of
reorganizing the WMECP considering its short and limited life-span.
6

5. The law applies only to employees of the national government, government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters
and local government units.
Due to the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting interpretations of the parties, the Court is called upon to define the different
classes of employees in the public sector (i.e. government civil servants).
Who are regular employees? The Labor Code in Art. 280 (P.D. No. 492, as amended) deems an employment regular where the
employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer. No equivalent definition can be found in P.D.No. 807 (promulgated on 6 October 1975, which superseded the Civil Service
Act of 1965 R.A. No. 2260) or in the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292 promulgated on 25 July 1987). The Early
Retirement Law itself (Rep. Act No. 6683) merely includes such class of employees (regular employees) in its coverage, unmindful that
no such specie is employed in the public sector.
The appointment status of government employees in the career service is classified as follows:
1. permanent one issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to which appointment is made, in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Service Act and the Rules and Standards promulgated in pursuance thereof;
7

2. temporary In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, a temporary
appointment should be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed except the
appropriate civil service eligibility: Provided, That such temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months, but the appointee may
be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available. 8
The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes the Career Service as:
(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate examination is required;
(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these include the faculty and academic
staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and technical positions in scientific or research institutions which
shall establish and maintain their own merit systems;
(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant
Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of
equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the
President.
(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are appointed by the President, such as
the Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs;
(5) Commission officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a separate merit system;
(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing governmental or proprietary
functions, who do not fall under the non-career service; and
(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled.
9

The Non-Career Service, on the other hand, is characterized by:
. . . (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and
(2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority
or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment
was made.
Included in the non-career service are:
1. elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;
2. secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the President and their
personal confidential staff(s);
3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their personal or confidential
staff;
4. contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special contract to
undertake a specific work or job requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be
accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year and performs or accomplishes the
specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring
agency.
5. emergency and seasonal personnel.
10

There is another type of non-career employee:
Casual where and when employment is not permanent but occasional, unpredictable, sporadic and brief in nature
(Caro v. Rilloroza, 102 Phil. 70; Manuel v. P.P. Gocheco Lumber Co., 96 Phil. 945)
Consider petitioner's record of service:
Service with the government commenced on 2 December 1974 designated as a laborer holding emergency status
with the NIA Upper Pampanga River Project, R & R Division.
11
From 24 March 1975 to 31 August 1975, she was a
research aide with temporary status on the same project. On 1 September 1975 to 31 December 1976, she was with
the NIA-FES III; R & R Division, then on 1 January 1977 to 31 May 1980, she was with NIA UPR IIS (Upper
Pampanga River Integrated Irrigation Systems) DRD. On 1 June 1980, she went to NIA W.M.E.C.P. (Watershed
Management & Erosion Control Project) retaining the status of temporary employee. While with this project, her
designation was changed to personnel assistant on 5 November 1981; starting 9 July 1982, the status became
permanent until the completion of the project on 31 December 1988. The appointment paper
12
attached to the
OSG's comment lists her status as co-terminus with the Project.
The employment status of personnel hired under foreign assisted projects is considered co-terminous, that is, they are considered
employees for the duration of the project or until the completion or cessation of said project (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 39, S.
1990, 27 June 1990).
Republic Act No. 6683 seeks to cover and benefits regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees who have rendered at least a
total of two (2) consecutive years government service.
Resolution No. 87-104 of the CSC, 21 April 1987, provides:
WHEREAS, pursuant to Executive Order No. 966 dated June 22, 1984, the Civil Service Commission is charged with
the function of determining creditable services for retiring officers and employees of the national government;
WHEREAS, Section 4 (b) of the same Executive Order No. 966 provides that all previous services by an
officer/employee pursuant to a duly approved appointment to a position in the Civil Service are considered creditable
services, while Section 6 (a) thereof states that services rendered on contractual, emergency or casual status are
non-creditable services;
WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the aforesaid provisions inasmuch as some contractual, emergency or casual
employment are covered by contracts or appointments duly approved by the Commission.
NOW, therefore, the Commission resolved that services rendered on contractual, emergency or casual status,
irrespective of the mode or manner of payment therefor shall be considered as creditable for retirement purposes
subject to the following conditions: (emphasis provided)
1. These services are supported by approved appointments, official records and/or other
competent evidence. Parties/agencies concerned shall submit the necessary proof of said services;
2. Said services are on full time basis and rendered prior to June 22, 1984, the effectivity date of
Executive Order No. 966; and
3. The services for the three (3) years period prior to retirement are continuous and fulfill the
service requirement for retirement.
What substantial differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency, seasonal, project, co-terminous or contractual personnel? All are
tenurial employees with no fixed term, non-career, and temporary. The 12 May 1989 CSC letter of denial
13
characterized herein
petitioner's employment as co-terminous with the NIA project which in turn was contractual in nature. The OSG says petitioner's status
is co-terminous with the Project. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of 1991 (5 April 1991) characterizes the status of a co-
terminous employee
(3) Co-terminous status shall be issued to a person whose entrance in the service is characterized by confidentiality
by the appointing authority or that which is subject to his pleasure or co-existent with his tenure.
The foregoing status (co-terminous) may be further classified into the following:
a) co-terminous with the project When the appointment is co-existent with the duration of a
particular project for which purpose employment was made or subject to the availability of funds
for the same;
b) co-terminous with the appointing authority when appointment is co-existent with the tenure
of the appointing authority.
c) co-terminous with the incumbent when appointment is co-existent with the appointee, in that
after the resignation, separation or termination of the services of the incumbent the position shall
be deemed automatically abolished; and
d) co-terminous with a specific period, e.g. "co-terminous for a period of 3 years" the
appointment is for a specific period and upon expiration thereof, the position is deemed abolished.
It is stressed, however, that in the last two classifications (c) and (d), what is termed co-terminous is the position,
and not the appointee-employee. Further, in (c) the security of tenure of the appointee is guaranteed during his
incumbency; in (d) the security of tenure is limited to a specific period.
A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency employees. We see no solid reason why the latter are
extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its
benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees. But specifically excluded from the benefits are
uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The
legislature would not have made a specific enumeration in a statute had not the intention been to restrict its meaning and confine its
terms and benefits to those expressly mentioned
14
or casus omissus pro omisso habendus est A person, object or thing omitted
from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.
15
Yet adherence to these legal maxims can result in
incongruities and in a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The case of Fegurin, et al. v. NLRC, et al.,
16
comes to mind where, workers belonging to a work pool, hired and re-hired continuously
from one project to another were considered non-project-regular and permanent employees.
Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in four (4) successive projects during a span of fifteen (15) years. Although no proof of
the existence of a work pool can be assumed, her service record cannot be disregarded.
Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
. . . In Felwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966, We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or
things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification
is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which
are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same
class.
17

Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause were we to sustain
respondents' submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees who are similarly situated as
those covered by said law. The maxim of Expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not be the applicable maxim in this case but the
doctrine of necessary implication which holds that:
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is always an omission that
may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation
may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is
enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication.
The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every
statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and
purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and
subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every
statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so
because the greater includes the lesser, expressed in the Maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus.
18

During the sponsorship speech of Congressman Dragon (re: Early Retirement Law), in response to Congressman Dimaporo's
interpellation on coverage of state university employees who are extended appointments for one (1) year, renewable for two (2) or
three (3) years,
19
he explained:
This Bill covers only those who would like to go on early retirement and voluntary separation. It is irrespective of the
actual status or nature of the appointment one received, but if he opts to retire under this, then he is covered.
It will be noted that, presently Pending in Congress, is House Bill No. 33399 (a proposal to extend the scope of the Early Retirement
Law). Its wording supports the submission that Rep. Act No. 6683 indeed overlooked a qualified group of civil servants. Sec. 3 of said
House bill, on coverage of early retirement, would provide:
Sec. 3. Coverage. It will cover all employees of the national government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, as well as the personnel of all local government units. The benefits authorized under this Act
shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual, emergency and contractual employees, regardless of age, who have
rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years government service as of the date of separation. The term
"contractual employees" as used in this Act does not include experts and consultants hired by agencies for a limited
period to perform specific activities or services with definite expected output.
Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the
coverage of this Act. (emphasis supplied)
The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law is to trim the bureaucracy, hence, vacated positions are deemed
abolished upon early/voluntary retirement of their occupants. Will the inclusion of co-terminous personnel (like the petitioner) defeat
such objective? In their case, upon termination of the project and separation of the project personnel from the service, the term of
employment is considered expired, the office functus officio. Casual, temporary and contractual personnel serve for shorter periods,
and yet, they only have to establish two (2) years of continuous service to qualify. This, incidentally, negates the OSG's argument that
co-terminous or project employment is inherently short-lived, temporary and transient, whereas, retirement presupposes employment
for a long period. Here, violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution becomes glaring because casuals are not even in the
plantilla, and yet, they are entitled to the benefits of early retirement. How can the objective of the Early Retirement Law of trimming
the bureaucracy be achieved by granting early retirement benefits to a group of employees (casual) without plantilla positions? There
would, in such a case, be no abolition of permanent positions or streamlining of functions; it would merely be a removal of excess
personnel; but the positions remain, and future appointments can be made thereto.
Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have rendered years of continuous service should be included in the
coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as long as they file their application prior to the expiration of their term, and as long as they
comply with CSC regulations promulgated for such purpose. In this connection, Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1990 (5 March
1990) implementing Rep. Act No. 6850,
20
requires, as a condition to qualify for the grant of eligibility, an aggregate or total of seven
(7) years of government service which need not be continuous, in the career or non-career service, whether appointive, elective,
casual, emergency, seasonal, contractual or co-terminous including military and police service, as evaluated and confirmed by the Civil
Service Commission.
21
A similar regulation should be promulgated for the inclusion in Rep. Act No. 6683 of co-terminous personnel
who survive the test of time. This would be in keeping with the coverage of "all social legislations enacted to promote the physical and
mental well-being of public servants"
22
After all, co-terminous personnel, are also obligated to the government for GSIS contributions,
medicare and income tax payments, with the general disadvantage of transience.
In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner's application for early retirement
benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary
retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said law. While the application was filed after expiration of
her term, we can give allowance for the fact that she originally filed the application on her own without the assistance of counsel. In
the interest of substantial justice, her application must be granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2) years
the minimum requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Let this case be remanded to the CSC-NIA for a favorable disposition of petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under Rep.
Act No. 6683, in accordance with the pronouncements in this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ.,
concur.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37251 August 31, 1981
CITY OF MANILA and CITY TREASURER, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
JUDGE AMADOR E. GOMEZ of the Court of First Instance of Manila and ESSO PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents-appellees.

AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the legality of the additional one-half percent (%) realty tax imposed by the City of Manila.
Section 64 of the Revised Charter of Manila, Republic Act No. 409, which took effect on June 18, 1949, fixes the annual realty tax at
one and one-half percent (1- %).
On the other hand, section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law, Republic Act No. 5447, which took effect on January 1, 1969, imposed
"an annual additional tax of one per centum on the assessed value of real property in addition to the real property tax regularly levied
thereon under existing laws" but "the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per centrum.
That maximum limit gave the municipal board of Manila the Idea of fixing the realty tax at three percent. So, by means of Ordinance
No. 7125, approved by the city mayor on December 26, 1971 and effective beginning the third quarter of 1972, the board imposed an
additional one-half percent realty tax. The ordinance reads:
SECTION 1. An additional annual realty tax of one-half percent (1/2%), or in short a total of three percent (3%)
realty tax (1-% pursuant to the Revised Charter of Manila; 1% per Republic Act No. 5447; and % per this
Ordinance) on the assessed value ... is hereby levied and imposed.
Esso Philippines, Inc. paid under protest the sum of P16,092.69 as additional one-half percent realty tax for the third quarter of 1972
on its land and machineries located in Manila.
On November 9, 1972, Esso filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the recovery of the said amount. It contended
that the additional one-half percent tax is void because it is not authorized by the city charter nor by any law (Civil Case No. 88827).
After hearing, the trial court declared the tax ordinance void and ordered the city treasurer of Manila to refund to Esso the said tax.
The City of Manila and its treasurer appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440 (which superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court).
The only issue is the validity of the tax ordinance or the legality of the additional one-half percent realty tax.
The petitioners in their manifestation of March 17, 1981 averred that the said tax ordinance is still in force; that Ordinance No. 7566,
which was enacted on September 10, 1974, imposed a two percent tax on commercial real properties (like the real properties of Esso
and that that two percent tax plus the one percent tax under the Special Education Fund Law gives a total of three percent realty tax
on commercial properties.
Esso Philippines, Inc., now Petrophil Corporation, in its manifestation of March 2, 1981, revealed that up to this time it has been paying
the additional one-half percent tax and that from 1975 to 1980 it paid the total sum of P4,206,240.71 as three percent tax on its real
properties.
In this connection, it is relevant to note that section 39(2) of the Real Property Tax Code, Presidential Decree No. 464, which took
effect on June 1, 1974, provides that a city council may, by ordinance, impose a realty tax "of not less than one half of one percent but
not more than two percent of the assessed value of real property".
Section 41 of the said Code reaffirms the one percent tax on real property for the Special Education Fund in addition to the basic two
percent realty tax.
So, there is no question now that the additional one-half percent realty tax is valid under the Real Property Tax Code. What is in
controversy is the legality of the additional one-half percent realty tax for the two-year period from the third quarter of 1972 up to the
second quarter of 1974.
We hold that the doctrine of implications in statutory construction sustains the City of Manila's contention that the additional one-half
percent realty tax is sanctioned by the provision in section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law that "the total real property tax shall
not exceed a maximum of three per centum.
The doctrine of implications means that "that which is plainly implied in the language of a statute is as much a part of it as that which
is expressed" (In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41, 45, 90; 82 C.J.S. 632, 73 Am Jur 2nd 404).
While the 1949 Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty tax at one and a half percent, on the other hand, the 1968 Special Education
Fund Law definitively fixed three percent as the maximum real property tax of which one percent would accrue to the Special Education
Fund.
The obvious implication is that an additional one-half percent tax could be imposed by municipal corporations. Inferentially, that law
fixed at two percent the realty tax that would accrue to a city or municipality.
And the fact that the 1974 Real Property Tax Code specifically fixes the real property tax at two percent confirms the prior intention of
the lawmaker to impose two percent as the realty tax proper. That was also the avowed intention of the questioned ordinance.
In invalidating the ordinance, the trial court upheld the view of Esso Philippines, Inc, that the Special Education Fund Law refers to a
contingency where the application of the additional one percent realty tax would have the effect of raising the total realty tax to more
than three percent and that it cannot be construed as an authority to impose an additional realty tax beyond the one percent fixed by
the said law.
At first glance, that appears to be a specious or reasonable contention. But the fact remains that the city charter fixed the realty tax at
1-% and the later law, the Special Education Fund Law, provides for three percent as the maximum realty tax of which one percent
would be earmarked for the education fund.
The unavoidable inference is that the later law authorized the imposition of an additional one-half percent realty tax since the
contingency referred to by the complaining taxpayer would not arise in the City of Manila.
It is true, as contended by the taxpayer, that the power of a municipal corporation to levy a tax should be expressly granted and
should not be merely inferred. But in this case, the power to impose a realty tax is not controverted. What is disputed is the amount
thereof, whether one and one-half percent only or two percent. (See sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. 2264.)
As repeatedly observed, section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law, as confirmed by the Real Property Tax Code, in prescribing a
total realty tax of three percent impliedly authorizes the augmentation by one-half percent of the pre-existing one and one- half
percent realty tax.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is reversed and set aside. The complaint of Esso Philippines, Inc. for recovery of the realty
tax paid under protest is dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion Jr., Fernandez and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Justice Abad Santos is on leave.
Justice Fernandez was designated to sit in the Second Division.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14129 August 30, 1962
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Padilla Law Office for defendant-appellee.
R E S O L U T I O N
REGALA, J.:
This resolution refers to a motion for reconsideration filed by the counsel for defendant-appellee, Guillermo Manantan.
Defendant-appellee does not dispute the correctness of this Court's ruling in the main case. He concedes that a justice of the peace is
covered by the prohibition of Section 54, Revised Election Code. However, he takes exception to the dispositive portion of this Court's
ruling promulgated on July 31, 1962, which reads:
For the above reasons, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case is remanded for trial
on the merits.
It is now urged by the defendant-appellee that the ultimate effect of remanding the case to the lower court for trial on the merits is to
place him twice in jeopardy of being tried for the same offense. He calls the attention of this Court to the fact that when the charge
against him was dismissed by the lower court, jeopardy had already attached to his person. To support his claim, he cites the case of
People vs. Labatete, G.R. No. L-12917, April 27, 1960.
Defendant-appellee's plea of double jeopardy should be rejected. The accused cannot now invoke the defense of double jeopardy.
When the government appealed to this Court the order of dismissal, defendant Manantan could have raised that issue by way of
resisting the appeal of the state. Then again, when defendant-appellee filed his brief, he could have argued therein his present plea of
double jeopardy. Yet, on neither occasion did he do so. He must, therefore, be deemed to have waived his constitutional right
thereunder. This is in accord with this Court's ruling in the cases of People vs. Rosalina Casiano, G.R. No. L-15309, February 16, 1961
and People vs. Pinuila, G.R. No. L-11374, May 30, 1958, hereunder quoted:
. . . defendant herein has filed a brief in which she limited herself to a discussion of the merits of the appeal. Thus, she not
only failed to question, in her brief, either expressly or impliedly, the right of the prosecution to interpose the present appeal,
but also, conceded in effect the existence of such right. She should be deemed, therefore, to have waived her aforementioned
constitutional immunity.1wph1.t
It is true that in People vs. Hernandez (49 O.G. 5342), People vs. Ferrer, L-9072 (October 23, 1956), People vs. Bao, L-12102
(September 29, 1959) and People vs. Golez, L-14160, we dismissed the appeal taken by the Government from a decision or
order of a lower court, despite defendant's failure to object thereto. However, the defendants in those cases, unlike the
defendant herein, did not file any brief. Hence, they had performed no affirmative act from which a waiver could be implied.
(People vs. Casiano, supra).
In his appeal brief, appellant's counsel does not raise this question of double jeopardy, confining himself as he does, to the
discussion of the evidence in the record, contending that the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. One aspect of this case as regards double jeopardy is that defense may be waived, and, that failure to urge it in the
appeal may be regarded as a waiver of said defense of double jeopardy.(People vs. Pinuila, supra).
There are other grounds raised by the defendant-appellee in this motion for reconsideration. The Court, however, does not believe that
they were well taken.
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the motion for reconsideration filed in this case, is, as it is hereby, denied.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33140 October 23, 1978
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., JOSE M. TUASON, NICASIO A. TUASON, TERESA TUASON, CELSO S. TUASON and SEVERO A.
TUASON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. HERMINIO C. MARIANO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal MANUELA AQUIAL, MARIA
AQUIAL, Spouses JOSE M. CORDOVA and SATURNINA C. CORDOVA, respondents.
Sison Law Office and Senensio O. Ortile for petitioners.
Hill & Associates Law Office for respondents Aquials.
Antonio E. Pesigan for respondents Cordovas.

AQUINO, J.:
This is another litigation regarding the validity of the much controverted Original Certificate of Title No. 735 covering the Santa Mesa
and D Estates of the Tuason mayorazgo or Entail with areas of 877 (879) and 1,625 hectares, respectively (Barrette vs. Tuason, 50
Phil. 888; Benin case, infra).
On October 1, 1965, Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in forma pauperis in the Court of First Instance of Rizal Pasig
Branch X, wherein they prayed that they be declared the owners of a parcel of land located at Balara, Marikina, Rizal (now Quezon
City) and bounded on the north by Sapang Mapalad, on the south by the land of Eladio, Tiburcio on the east by Sapang Kolotkolotan,
and on the west by Sapang Kuliat The land, which has an area of three hundred eighty-three quiones was allegedly acquired by their
father by means of a Spanish title issued to him on May 10, 1877 (Civil Case No. 8943).
They alleged that sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had illegally entered upon that land, they discovered that it had
been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of
defendants Mariano, Teresa, Juan, Demetrio and Augusta all surnamed Tuason pursuant to a decree issued on July 6. 1914 in Case No.
7681 of the Court of Land Registration.
They further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT No. 735, were issued to defendants J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.,
University of the Philippines and National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (Nawasa) which leased a portion of its land to defendant
Capitol Golf Club.
Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void due to certain irregularities in the land
registration proceeding. They asked for damages.
Defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, prescription, laches
and prior judgment. The plaintiffs opposed that motion. The lower court denied it. The grounds of the motion to dismiss were pleaded
as affirmative defenses in the answer of defendants Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They insisted that a preliminary hearing be
held on those defenses.
On January 25, 1967, the spouses Jose M. Cordova and Saturnina C. Cordova, who had bought eleven hectares of the disputed land
from the plaintiffs, were allowed to intervene in the case.
On September 5, 1970, the lower court issued an order requiring the parties the Register of Deeds of Rizal to produce in court on
October 16, 1970 OCT No. 735 and certain transfer certificates of title derived from that first or basic title. Later, the court required the
production in court of the plan of the land covered by OCT No. 735 allegedly for the purpose of determining whether the lands claimed
by the plaintiffs and the intervenors are included therein.
On February 11, 1971, the Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed the instant civil actions of certiorari and prohibition praying, inter
alia, that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the complaint and enjoined from proceeding in the said case. After the petitioners had
filed the proper bond, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued. Respondents Aquial and Cordova answered the petition. The parties,
except the Aquials, filed memoranda in lieu of oral argument.
The issue is whether OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be questioned at this late hour by respondents Aquial and
Cordova. The supposed irregularities in the land registration proceeding, which led to the issuance of the decree upon which OCT. No.
735 was based, are the same issues raised in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the lower court. The 1965 decision of Judge
Eulogio Mencias in those cases, in validating OCT No. 735, is annexed to the complaint of the Aquials. It is cited by them to support
their support their action and it might have encouraged them to ventilate their action in court.
On appeal to this Court, that decision was reversed and the validity of OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom was once more
upheld. (Benin vs. Tuason, L-26127, Alcantara vs. Tuason, L-26128 and Pili vs. Tuason, L-26129, all decided on June 28, 1974, 57
SCRA 531).
The ruling in the Benin, Alcantara and Pili cases was applied in Mara, Inc. vs. Estrella, L-40511, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 471. That ruling
is simply a reiteration or confirmation of the holding in the following cases directly or incidentally sustaining OCT No. 735: Bank of the
P. I. vs. Acua, 59 Phil. 183; Tiburcio vs. PHHC, 106 Phil. 447; Galvez and Tiburcio vs. Tuason y de la Paz, 119 Phil. 612; Alcantara vs.
Tuason, 92 Phil. 796; Santiago vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. 110 Phil. 16; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Bolaos, 95 Phil. 106; J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Santiago, 99 Phil. 615; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. De Guzman, 99 Phil. 281; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs.
Aguirre, 117 Phil. 110; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindong, 116 Phil. 1227; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal, 114 Phil. 42;
Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, L-30889, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 503, and People's Homesite and Housing Corporation vs. Mencias,
L-24114, August 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 1031.
Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been
settled) it becomes evident that respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding
the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.
It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated again and again, consuming the court's time and
energies at the expense of other litigants: Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litium." (Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, supra).
Finding the petition for certiorari and prohibition to be meritorious, the trial court is directed to dismiss Civil Case No. 8943 with
prejudice and without costs. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J, took no part.