Effects of framing, perspective taking, and perspective (affective focus) on choice

q
N.S. Fagley
a,
*
, Jennifer G. Coleman
b
, Andrew F. Simon
c
a
GSAPP, Rutgers University, 152 Frelinghuysen Rd., Piscataway, NJ 08854-8085, United States
b
Western New Mexico University, P.O. Box 680, 1000 West College Ave, Silver City, NM 88062, USA
c
Seton Hall University, 355 Jubilee Hall, 400 South Orange Ave, South Orange, NJ 07079, USA
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 11 February 2009
Received in revised form 14 July 2009
Accepted 4 October 2009
Available online 17 November 2009
Keywords:
Framing effect
Perspective taking
Affect
Decision making
Gain frame
Loss frame
Risky choice
Gender differences
a b s t r a c t
Two studies explored individual differences in perspective taking and perspective as moderators of risky
choice framing effects. Study 1 (N = 230) showed perspective taking moderates framing among women.
Study 2 (N = 256) experimentally manipulated two perspectives: a focus on feelings was expected to
increase the framing effect; a focus on thoughts was expected to decrease it. Given mens lower emo-
tional reactivity, we expected the affective focus would magnify framing effects among men, as they
appear less likely to spontaneously consider how they would feel. This was supported in follow-up anal-
yses of the ve-way interaction of frame, gender, feel, cognitive and affective perspective taking. Findings
suggest that larger framing effects seen for women in previous research may be due to differences in
whether one spontaneously considers how one would feel, that is, to individual differences in affective
perspective taking.
2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Prospect Theory and framing effects
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) demonstrated choices can be
inuenced by the framing (i.e. wording) of decision alternatives.
They asked participants to choose between programs for ghting
an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people
(p. 453). Participants received two options framed either positively
(in terms of the number of people saved) or negatively (in terms of
the number of people expected to die). The positive and negative
versions were objectively equivalent; the positive frame of the sure
thing option was 200 [of the 600 expected fatalities] will be saved
and the negative frame was 400 [of the 600] will die. Nevertheless,
most participants chose the sure thing when outcomes were
framed positively and the risky option (which stated there was a
1/3 probability none will die and a 2/3 probability 600 will die)
when outcomes were framed negatively.
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) argued that different frames
caused people to view the options from different vantage points,
leading them to adopt different reference points or perspectives.
They argued that from one vantage point, possible outcomes were
perceived as gains; whereas, from a different vantage point out-
comes were perceived as losses. Only the wording the framing
of the outcomes differed, which apparently affected perception
of the outcomes as gains or as losses. According to Prospect Theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), gains and losses are evaluated differ-
ently due to the shape of the value function, which is concave for
gains and convex for losses.
Although Prospect Theory predicts choices will be risk averse
for gains and risk seeking for losses, not all decision makers exhibit
framing effects (Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002). Subse-
quent research has identied numerous moderators such as a deci-
sion makers self-esteem (e.g. McElroy, Seta, & Waring, 2007),
neuroticism (e.g. Levin et al., 2002), mode of processing (e.g. McEl-
roy & Seta, 2003), and gender (e.g. Fagley & Miller, 1990, 1997;
Wang, Simons, & Bredart, 2001).
Although Prospect Theory does not identify potential modera-
tors of framing effects, one can be inferred. Tversky and Kahneman
(1981) argued that changes in frame prompt changes in a decision
makers perspective and reference point, affecting preference. They
related changes in frame to changes in perspective:
Alternative frames for a decision problem may be compared to
alternative perspectives on a visual scene. Veridical perception
requires that the perceived relative height of two neighboring
mountains, say should not reverse with changes of the vantage
point. Similarly, rational choice requires that the preference
between options should not reverse with changes in frame.
Because of imperfections of human perception and decision,
0191-8869/$ - see front matter 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.paid.2009.10.008
q
Results of study 1 were presented at the Annual Meeting of the American
Psychological Society, Chicago, 2004. Results of study 2 were presented at the
Annual Meeting of the Association for Psychological Science, New York City, 2006.
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 732 445 2000x123.
E-mail address: fagley@rci.rutgers.edu (N.S. Fagley).
Personality and Individual Differences 48 (2010) 264269
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however, changes of perspective often reverse the relative
apparent size of objects and the relative desirability of options
[italics added] (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 453).
That is, frame affects ones perspective and reference point,
affecting the relative desirability of options, affecting ones choices.
This implies that a tendency to spontaneously switch reference
points should be associated with reduced framing effects. That is,
their description of the process suggests perspective taking should
moderate framing effects. So although they did not suggest explic-
itly that individual differences in perspective taking moderate
framing effects, the fact that they argued that framing prompts
adopting different perspectives can be viewed as logically implying
that people higher in perspective taking would be more likely to
spontaneously switch perspectives or frames, reducing the impact
of initial frame. Additionally, research demonstrates seeing both
frames prior to choice reduces/eliminates framing effects (e.g.
Bernstein, Chapman, & Elstein, 1999). This is consistent with the
idea that using multiple perspectives would reduce framing effects.
2. Perspective taking
Perspective taking has been dened as the ability to under-
stand how a situation appears to another person and how that per-
son is reacting cognitively and emotionally to the situation
(Johnson, 1975, p. 241). Goreno and Crano (1998), however, de-
ned perspective taking as the capacity to take on multiple per-
spectives when processing information or forming decisions (p.
164), which is the broader conceptualization we adopt, that goes
beyond imagining what another person is thinking or feeling to in-
clude considering various perspectives, including other conceiv-
able ways of looking at a situation. Underwood and Moore
(1982) described three types of perspective taking: perceptual/vi-
sual, social-cognitive, and affective. As framing research does not
involve visual/perceptual problems, we focused only on cognitive
and affective perspective taking. Cognitive perspective taking
(CPT) is intellectually knowing another perspective, which includes
understanding what someone in a particular situation (including
oneself) would be thinking; whereas, affective perspective taking
(APT) is feeling things from another perspective, which includes
understanding what someone in a particular situation (including
oneself) would be feeling. Some scholars (e.g. Hogan, 1969) have
used the term empathy to refer to the latter. However, others re-
serve the term empathy for vicariously experiencing the emo-
tional reactions of others (Underwood & Moore, 1982). In sum,
researchers have conceptualized perspective taking as having both
cognitive and affective components (Duan & Hill, 1996; Redmond,
1995) and while denitions often focus on taking the perspective
of another person, a broader denition is used here.
Perspective taking has been examined in many areas. Develop-
ing the ability to take others perspectives, or decentering, is a mile-
stone in cognitive development (Piaget, 1928). Galinsky, Maddux,
Gilin, and White (2008) demonstrated that CPT facilitates effective
bargaining whereas empathy does not. Finally, Hynes, Baird, and
Grafton (2006) demonstrated different regions of the brain are
associated with APT vs. CPT.
We argue that individual differences in the propensity to view
problems from multiple perspectives, which includes looking at
decision situations from multiple perspectives and reframing
alternative options, moderates framing effects. Those high in CPT,
should be less inuenced by framing because they are more likely
to examine alternative viewpoints, spontaneously reframing the
decision alternatives. Therefore they are more likely to spontane-
ously generate the alternative frame, exposing themselves to both
frames, which should reduce the effect of the original frame
according to previous research (e.g. Bernstein et al., 1999).
However, high APT may be either a liability (as demonstrated
by Galinsky et al., 2008) interfering with effective use of CPT to
counteract initial frame or an advantage in which feelings are used
to inform decisions (as demonstrated by Seo and Barrett (2007)).
Although framing has been discussed as a way to prompt change
of vantage points and attendant reference points, to our knowledge
no published research has examined whether perspective taking
moderates framing effects.
3. Gender
We predict women will exhibit greater framing effects than
men, consistent with previous research (e.g. Fagley & Miller,
1990, 1997; Wang et al., 2001). Additionally, as women score high-
er in aspects of APT tapped by measures of empathy, emotional
reactivity, and emotional intelligence (e.g. Andrew, Cooke, & Mun-
cer, 2008; Brackett, Rivers, Shiffman, Lerner, & Salovey, 2006), we
predicted gender would interact with perspective taking and fram-
ing, though there is insufcient basis for a rm directional predic-
tion. One could argue that women would use their greater APT to
facilitate changes in viewpoint and assign value to potential out-
comes. This view focuses on the value of emotion in formulating
preferences. Alternatively, womens greater APT may signal greater
propensity to be overwhelmed with emotion. So high CPT may be
especially critical for women, in order to balance/neutralize
heightened emotion and reduce framing effects. An implication
of womens greater APT is that gender must be controlled to avoid
misleading correlations resulting from combining groups having
different means on predictor variables (Shavelson, 1996).
In sum, Tversky and Kahneman compared changes in frame with
changes in perspective. New frames, like new physical vantage
points, can change the relative prominence of features whether
the relative apparent height of mountains or the desirability of op-
tions. We built on this to hypothesize that individual differences in
perspective taking moderate framing effects, such that greater CPT
wouldbe associatedwithreducedframingeffects. Greater APTcould
either reduce or magnify framing effects, as theory and prior re-
search could justify either prediction. We also predicted women
wouldexhibit greater framing effects thanmen. Additionally, as wo-
men have exhibited greater APT in prior research, we hypothesized
that CPT may be more important in neutralizing framing for women
than men, especially if APT is not associated with reduced framing
effects. Finally, as women are expected to exhibit greater APT, it is
essential to control for gender when examining moderator effects
of APT, to avoid the combined groups problem (Shavelson, 1996).
4. Study 1
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
Participants were two-hundred-thirty undergraduates (145 wo-
men; 85 men).
4.1.2. Procedures
Participants were randomly assigned to framing condition,
completing three decision problems (framed either positively or
negatively), perspective taking measures, and demographic
questions.
4.1.3. Instruments
4.1.3.1. Cognitive perspective taking. The Multiple Perspectives Inven-
tory measures peoples capacity to adopt multiple perspectives
N.S. Fagley et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 48 (2010) 264269 265
when making judgments (Goreno & Crano, 1998, p. 163). This
20-Likert-item measure assessed CPT. Typical items include Dur-
ing conversation, I nd it easy to take the other persons point of
view and I reserve judgment until Ive considered all angles. In
this sample, coefcient alpha was .81 (M = 70.66, sd = 8.97). Goren-
o and Crano (1998) demonstrated the items load on a single fac-
tor and the scale shows good discriminant validity.
4.1.3.2. Affective perspective taking. The 18-Likert-item affective
subscale of the Social Decentering Scale (Redmond, 1995) provided
a measure of APT. Typical items include I feel the pain my closest
friends feel when they are in trouble and Sometimes when I day-
dream about situations Ive never experienced before, my day-
dreams evoke strong emotional reactions in me. In this sample,
coefcient alpha was .84 (M = 59.57, sd = 9.49).
4.1.3.3. Decision problems. The three decision problems involved
human life outcomes and presented a choice between a sure thing
and a probabilistic (risky) alternative of equal expected value.
The risky options were all all-or-none, and the probability of sav-
ing all/losing none was 1/3. They included slightly modied ver-
sions of Fagley and Millers (1987) cancer problem, Tversky and
Kahnemans (1981) disease problem, and Fischhoffs (1983) civil
defense problem. The lives at risk ranged between 120 and 600,
as Wang (1996) and Bloomeld (2006) demonstrated framing
may not occur when fewer than 60 are at risk. Positively framed
problems gave the number of people saved. Negatively framed
problems gave the number who would die. The dependent variable
was the number of risky choices, which could range from zero to
three. The mean was 1.66 (sd = 1.23); coefcient alpha was .76.
4.2. Results and discussion
A GLM analysis of the centered independent variables (frame,
gender, CPT, and APT) was computed on the number of risky
choices using SPSS. The analysis yielded two signicant effects:
frame, F(1, 214) = 25.10, p < .001, and the interaction of frame, gen-
der, CPT, and APT, F(1, 214) = 4.97, p = .027.
Follow-up analyses examined frame, CPT, and APT for men and
women separately. A GLM analysis of men yielded only an effect of
frame; F(1, 77) = 5.64, p = .020, g
2
= .064. A GLM analysis of women
yielded a main effect of frame, F(1, 137) = 30.21, p < .001, and a
three-way interaction of frame, CPT, and APT, F(1, 137) = 8.90,
p = .003.
To interpret this interaction, APT scores were dichotomized at
the womens median of 62. Women scored signicantly higher in
APT (M = 61.79, sd = 9.04) than men (M = 55.78, sd = 9.09) (see Ta-
ble 1), so the womens median score was used, rather than the
overall median. An analysis of frame, CPT, and their interaction
conducted on women scoring below the womens median on APT
yielded only an effect of frame; F(1, 63) = 9.93, p = .002, g
2
= .134.
The analysis of women scoring at-or-above the median on APT
yielded an effect of frame, F(1, 74) = 13.78, p < .001, and a signi-
cant interaction of frame and CPT, F(1, 74) = 4.66, p = .034 (see
Table 2).
Further examination of women scoring at-or-above the median
on APT was needed to interpret this interaction. When CPT scores
were dichotomized, frame was only signicant among women
scoring below the median on the CPT, F(1, 35) = 31.27, p < .001,
g
2
= .472. Frame was not signicant among women scoring at-or-
above the median on the CPT; F(1, 39) = 0.53, p = .470.
In sum, men showed a moderate framing effect of about 6% of
the variance, as indexed by g
2
. Women showed a more complex
pattern in which framing effects were moderated by CPT and APT
such that women lower in APT showed a framing effect of about
13% of the variance, regardless of their CPT. Women higher in
APT but lower in CPT showed a very large framing effect (about
47% of the variance). In contrast, women higher in both APT and
CPT did not exhibit a framing effect (Table 2). These ndings sug-
gest perspective taking may help explain differences in susceptibil-
ity to framing.
To provide additional evidence that perspective moderates re-
sponse to framing, we experimentally manipulated perspective in
study 2. We examined two perspectives a focus on feelings or
thoughts.
5. Study 2
Taking a personal perspective focusing on ones feelings was ex-
pected to heighten the effect of framing; whereas focusing on ones
thoughts was expected to decrease it. Given that research has doc-
umented women score higher in the emotional arena (e.g. Andrew
et al., 2008; Brackett et al., 2006) and men, in study 1, scored sig-
nicantly lower in APT, we expected that inducing a focus on affect
would increase framing effects especially among men.
Focusing on anticipated feelings may trigger emotions, such as
apprehension, fear, or anxiety, which may trigger the experien-
tial/intuitive mode of processing (Epstein, 1998), in which infor-
mation processing is largely automatic, based on intuition and
affect. It has been associated with larger framing effects (McElroy
& Seta, 2003). Additionally, Chang (2007) found that, for those in
a negative mood, framing effects regarding risky products were
large. One may evaluate options differently due to the emotion
generated by considering the dilemma. Or, the focus on affect
may direct attention away from problem features and toward one-
self and ones emotional reactions.
The complex relation between perspective taking and framing
effects seen in study 1 for women may be the result of conicting
effects of the two kinds of perspective taking. It may be that greater
CPT does reduce framing effects, while greater APT may increase
them. Mens signicantly lower APT could explain why their re-
sults are simpler they may primarily reect differences in CPT.
Or, equivalently, it may be that the greater APT of women could ex-
plain why their results are more complex they reect the com-
peting effects of CPT and APT. Results of study 1 suggest that
inducing a focus on ones feelings may increase framing effects,
especially among those lower in APT, as they may be less likely
Table 1
Mean affective perspective taking scores by study and sex.
Men Women t df p
Study 1 55.78 61.79 4.85 228 <.001
Study 2 55.68 61.03 4.35 254 <.001
Note: Scores could range from 18 to 90.
Table 2
Study 1: womens mean number of risky choices (and correlations between frame and
number of risky choices) by CPT and APT.
CPT APT
Low High
Positive Negative Positive Negative
High 1.00 1.92 1.33 1.70
r = .41 r = .16
Low 1.08 2.00 0.67 2.47
r = .36
a
r = .75
b
Note: CPT = cognitive perspective taking.
APT = affective perspective taking.
*
p < .05.
***
p < .001.
266 N.S. Fagley et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 48 (2010) 264269
to spontaneously consider how they would feel. Consequently, as
men exhibit signicantly lower APT, they are expected to show
the greatest increase in the magnitude of framing effects in re-
sponse to a focus on affect. Furthermore, it may be that the greater
APT of women provides the basis for the complex responses they
have to framing.
In contrast to the effects of a focus on what one would feel, a fo-
cus on what one would think may invoke analytical processing,
which previous research has demonstrated reduces framing effects
(e.g. McElroy & Seta, 2003). The analytical/rational mode of pro-
cessing may promote scrutinizing problem features, especially
quantitative aspects such as the number of people or dollars at risk,
saved, or lost. Peters et al. (2006) demonstrated numeracy moder-
ates framing effects. Analytical processing may also promote con-
sidering complementary numerical information omitted from the
frame and encourage quantitative reasoning.
In sum, the current study examined the moderating effects of an
affective and/or a cognitive focus on framing effects. A focus on
ones feelings was expected to increase the impact of framing,
especially among those lower in APT, such as men. A focus on ones
thoughts was expected to reduce framing effects.
5.1. Method
5.1.1. Participants and instruments
Two hundred fty-six undergraduates (149 women; 107 men)
responded to the same three decision problems and perspective
taking instruments used in study 1. They also reported their
gender.
5.1.2. Procedures
Perspective was experimentally manipulated. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of the eight cells of the design: 2 frame
(positive vs. negative) 2 affective perspective (feel: either say
what they would feel or not) 2 cognitive perspective (think:
either say what they would think or not). That is, within each fram-
ing condition, one fourth of the participants just responded to the
decision problems (control condition) and the perspective taking
measures. Those in this cell of the design were not asked to say
what they would feel or what they would think. In the other three
conditions, prior to making their choices, participants were asked
to take a moment and imagine the feelings [thoughts] [feelings
and thoughts] you would have if the situation described in the
decision problem involved your local community, so that it may af-
fect people you know. What would you be feeling [thinking] [feel-
ing and thinking]? Then they were asked to Please write your
feelings [thoughts] [feelings and thoughts] below. This was
viewed as a way of inducing them to consider their personal per-
spective, focusing on their feelings, thoughts, or both feelings and
thoughts regarding the dilemma. The feel condition promoted a fo-
cus on affect; whereas the think condition promoted a focus on
thoughts.
5.2. Results and discussion
Means and reliabilities were similar to study 1. A GLM analysis
was conducted on centered variables using SPSS. The independent
variables were frame, gender, feel (whether or not they were asked
to imagine what they would feel), think (whether or not they were
asked to imagine what they would think), CPT, and APT. The
dependent variable was the number of risky choices, which could
range from 0 to 3. The overall mean was 1.73 (sd = 1.24); coef-
cient alpha was .78.
The GLM analysis yielded eight signicant effects including the
interaction of frame, gender, feel, CPT and APT; F(1, 193) = 8.13,
p = .005. In addition to the ve-way interaction, there were three
signicant three-way interactions, a signicant two-way interac-
tion, and signicant main effects for CPT and frame.
Follow-up analysis of the signicant ve-way interaction exam-
ined the effects of frame, feel, CPT and APT separately for men and
women. A GLM analysis of women yielded a signicant effect of
frame; F(1, 133) = 15.52, p < .001, g
2
= .094. As shown in Fig. 1, wo-
men made more risky choices in the negative than in the positive
frame, regardless of whether they were asked to say what they
would feel. Analysis of men yielded a signicant effect of framing,
F(1, 91) = 4.93, p = .029 and a signicant interaction of frame and
feel, F(1, 91) = 4.63, p = .034. As seen in Fig. 1, men showed a fram-
ing effect only when they were asked to say what they would feel.
To more fully interpret this interaction among men, frame was
examined for each feel condition separately. In the no feel condi-
tion, there was no evidence frame affected choice; F(1, 56) = 0.08,
p = .783. In contrast, men in the feel condition showed a signi-
cant framing effect; F(1, 47) = 10.06, p = .003, g
2
= .176 (see Table 3
and Fig. 1). Table 4 shows the correlations between frame and the
number of risky options chosen for each feel condition by gender.
Say What They'd Feel Control
Feel Condition
2.20
2.00
1.80
1.60
1.40
1.20
1.00
0.80
N
u
m
b
e
r

o
f

R
i
s
k
y

C
h
o
i
c
e
s
Positive
Negative
FRAME
Men
Say What They'd Feel Control
Feel Condition
2.25
2.00
1.75
1.50
1.25
N
u
m
b
e
r

o
f

R
i
s
k
y

C
h
o
i
c
e
s
Positive
Negative
FRAME
Women
Fig. 1. Estimated marginal means of the number of risky choices as a function of
sex, feel condition, and frame.
N.S. Fagley et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 48 (2010) 264269 267
Adopting a personal perspective, focusing on what they would feel,
resulted in a moderately large framing effect among men
(r = .42). Otherwise, men did not appear susceptible to framing.
Women showed a framing effect, somewhat smaller in size,
regardless of whether they were asked to focus on what they
would feel.
6. General discussion
These ndings indicate that perspective taking the tendency
to adopt multiple perspectives moderates framing effects. Addi-
tionally, the particular perspective adopted by a decision maker af-
fects the magnitude of framing effects. Specically, when men
focus on affect by imagining what they would feel if the scenario
were happening in their local community, they are much more
inuenced by framing than when they do not, as indicated by
the g
2
of .176 for those in the feel condition. In contrast when
men are not explicitly asked to imagine how they would feel, they
show no framing effect. The choices of women, on the other hand,
are inuenced by framing regardless of whether or not they are
asked to imagine how they would feel (see Fig. 1).
These ndings suggest one factor leading to gender differences
in framing effects (e.g. Fagley & Miller, 1990, 1997; Wang et al.,
2001) may be that women may spontaneously consider how they
would feel when confronting such decisions; whereas, men may do
so only if specically instructed to. When men are asked explicitly
to consider how they would feel, then they exhibit framing effects
similar in size to women. This instruction does not signicantly
inuence womens responses, consistent with the idea that they
may do this spontaneously. Additional evidence supporting this
idea is that women exhibit signicantly higher APT in both
samples.
The think condition was intended to increase rationality, as it
asked participants explicitly what they would be thinking. Conse-
quently it was expected to decrease framing effects, especially
among women. But it may have failed to do so because most par-
ticipants may spontaneously consider what they would think if the
scenario were happening in their community, even without being
explicitly instructed to do so. This would explain why the results
of the think condition are similar to the control condition those
merely asked to make a choice. Additionally, imagining the sce-
nario was occurring in their community may have heightened
spontaneous emotional reactions among women even when asked
only what they would be thinking (rather than feeling).
Or, the think manipulation may not have been strong enough to
prompt greater use of the analytical mode of processing. The ques-
tion What would you be thinking? may not have focused their
attention sufciently on rational, critical evaluation of the scenario.
The wording is so ordinary, so like typical speech, that it may not
have been construed as asking for their rational, analytical view
of the situation, but just as asking for their view in general.
6.1. Connection to research on affect and decision making
Isen and Labroo (2003) suggested that positive affect facilitates
perspective taking and switches of perspective. Consequently, one
could speculate that positive affect should reduce framing effects
by promoting switches in perspective. We did not explicitly
manipulate affective valence, but in study 2, focusing on what
one would feel would be expected to produce negative affect (spe-
cically, anxiety or fear, because the situation they were imagining
involved deaths in their community). Following the reasoning of
Isen and Labroo, the negative affect would be expected to reduce
or inhibit switches in perspective, which should increase the mag-
nitude of framing effects. This is consistent with the increased
magnitude of framing effects we observed for men.
6.2. Limitations
These studies have limitations that should be considered when
interpreting the results. Participants were university students,
which may limit the generalizability of the results, as students
are younger and more educated than typical adults. Second, the
decisions were hypothetical rather than actual decisions faced by
the participants and whose consequences they would experience.
However, research has demonstrated that responses to hypotheti-
cal decision problems often are a reasonable proxy for responses to
real-life decisions (e.g. Khberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, & Perner,
2002). A third aspect of the research should also be noted. We used
only three decision problems, with two options (one certain and
one all-or-none), with one probability level (1/3), in one arena (hu-
man life outcomes). These actually represent both limitations and
strengths. Although some may view three decision problems as a
small sample from the universe of possible problems, it is large en-
ough that the ndings are not likely to be due to idiosyncrasies of a
particular decision problem, yet it is small enough that the partic-
ipants should not have gotten fatigued, bored, or developed a par-
ticular response set. Future studies may examine perspective
taking and affective focus with more options, other probability lev-
els, and in other arenas of outcome, such as nancial.
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Table 3
Study 2: mean number of risky choices by sex, frame, and feel condition.
Men Women
Frame
Negative Positive Negative Positive
No feel 1.59 1.50 2.15 1.56
Feel 2.22 1.09 2.23 1.29
Note: Scores could range from 0 to 3.
Table 4
Study 2: correlations between frame and number of risky choices by feel condition
and sex.
Men Women
No feel r = .037 r = .252
a
Feel r = .420
b
r = .389
b
*
p < .05.
**
p < .01.
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