Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special
Cases Division), VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA
DIONGSON, respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of
respondent. Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 05744 promulgated
on August 30, 1985 (Rollo, p. 108) ordering the dismissal of the
petition in Special Proceedings No, 591 ACEB and its Resolution
issued on October 23, 1985 (Rollo, p. 72) denying respondents'
(petitioners herein) motion for reconsideration.
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and
respondent Regional Trial Court of the Seventh Judicial
Region, Branch XIII (Cebu City), is hereby ordered to
dismiss the petition in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
The antecedents of the case, based on the summary of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, (Rollo, pp. 108-
109) are as follows:
On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City Branch XIII, a petition for the probate of the
will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to the same
petitioner of letters testamentary, docketed as Special Proceedings
No. 591 ACEB (Rollo, p. 29), on the premise that Nemesio Acain died
leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and
Jose and his sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were
instituted as heirs. The will allegedly executed by Nemesio Acain on
February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya (Rollo, p. 27) with a
translation in English (Rollo, p. 31) submi'tted by petitioner without
objection raised by private respondents. The will contained provisions
on burial rites, payment of debts, and the appointment of a certain
Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament. On the
disposition of the testator's property, the will provided:
THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our
properties. house, lands and money which I earned jointly
with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by me to
my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino, widower, of legal
age and presently residing at 357-C Sanciangko Street,
Cebu City. In case my brother Segundo Acain pre-
deceased me, all the money properties, lands, houses
there in Bantayan and here in Cebu City which constitute
my share shall be given to me to his children, namely:
Anita, Constantino, Concepcion, Quirina, laura, Flores,
Antonio and Jose, all surnamed Acain.
Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of
Segundo who are claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as the
petitioner in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June 25,
1984 the oppositors (respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a
legally adopted daughter of tile deceased and the latter's widow Rosa
Diongson Vda. de Acain filed a motion to dismiss on the following
grounds for the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these
proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and
the adopted daughter have been pretirited. (Rollo, p. 158). Said
motion was denied by the trial judge.
After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the
lower court, respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was
subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court by
Resolution of the Court dated March 11, 1985 (Memorandum for
Petitioner, p. 3; Rollo, p. 159).
Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private
respondents' petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the
petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio Acain in Special
Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed
this present petition for the review of respondent Court's decision on
December 18, 1985 (Rollo, p. 6). Respondents' Comment was filed on
June 6, 1986 (Rollo, p. 146).
On August 11, 1986 the Court resolved to give due course to the
petition (Rollo, p. 153). Respondents' Memorandum was filed on
September 22, 1986 (Rollo, p. 157); the Memorandum for petitioner
was filed on September 29, 1986 (Rollo, p. 177).
Petitioner raises the following issues (Memorandum for petitioner, p.
4):
(A) The petition filed in AC-G.R. No. 05744 for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction is not the
proper remedy under the premises;
(B) The authority of the probate courts is limited only to
inquiring into the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be
probated and it cannot pass upon the intrinsic validity
thereof before it is admitted to probate;
(C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore,
be admitted to probate. The preterition mentioned in
Article 854 of the New Civil Code refers to preterition of
"compulsory heirs in the direct line," and does not apply
to private respondents who are not compulsory heirs in
the direct line; their omission shall not annul the
institution of heirs;
(D) DICAT TESTATOR ET MERIT LEX. What the
testator says will be the law;
(E) There may be nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil
Code, that suggests that mere institution of a universal
heir in the will would give the heir so instituted a share in
the inheritance but there is a definite distinct intention of
the testator in the case at bar, explicitly expressed in his
will. This is what matters and should be in violable.
(F) As an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal interest
and standing to file the petition in Sp. Proc. No. 591 ACEB
for probate of the will of Nemesio Acain and
(G) Article 854 of the New Civil Code is a bill of attainder.
It is therefore unconstitutional and ineffectual.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not private respondents
have been pretirited.
Article 854 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all
of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living
at the time of the execution of the will or born after the
death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir;
but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they
are not; inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the
testator, the institution shall he effectual, without
prejudice to the right of representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced
heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned
therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 [1966];
Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]). Insofar as the
widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she
does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a
compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the
inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil code)
however, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent
Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has not
been questioned by petitioner (.Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp.
8-9). Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights
and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes
the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied
that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator
and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least
their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly
disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally
adopted child.
Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws
open to intestate succession the entire inheritance including "la
porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtual de legado mejora
o donacion" Maniesa as cited in Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra; Maninang
v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA [1982]). The only provisions which do
not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for
they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes
are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and
sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally
abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of
universal heirs-without any other testamentary disposition in the will-
amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully
worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no
leeway for inferential interpretation (Nuguid v. Nuguid), supra. No
legacies nor devises having been provided in the will the whole
property of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner
and his brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling the "Institution of
heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy (Neri v.
Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper legacies and devises
must, as already stated above, be respected.
We now deal with another matter. In order that a person may be
allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest
iii the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either
as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an interested party is
one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who
has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Sumilang v. Ramagosa,
21 SCRA 1369/1967). Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither
a devisee or a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary
disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real
property he is called upon to receive (Article 782, Civil Code). At the
outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, defined
under Article 782 of the Civil Code as a person called to the succession
either by the provision of a will or by operation of law. However,
intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted
child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not
an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the
probate of the will left by the deceased and Special Proceedings No.
591 A-CEB must be dismissed.
As a general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, except
when the questioned order is an oppressive exercise of j judicial
authority (People v. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465 [1981]; Vda. de Caldito
v. Segundo, 117 SCRA 573 [1982]; Co Chuan Seng v. Court of Appeals,
128 SCRA 308 [1984]; and Bautista v. Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587
[1985]). It is axiomatic that the remedies of certiorari and prohibition
are not available where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or
some other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law
(DD Comendador Construction Corporation v. Sayo (118 SCRA 590
[1982]). They are, however, proper remedies to correct a grave abuse
of discretion of the trial court in not dismissing a case where the
dismissal is founded on valid grounds (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of
Appeals, 125 SCRA 137 [1983]).
Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. As
stated by respondent Court, the general rule is that the probate court's
authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due
execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The
intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the Court has
declared that the will has been duly authenticated. Said court at this
stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic
validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17
SCRA 449 [1966]; Sumilang v. Ramagosa, supra; Maninang v. Court
of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]; Cayetano v. Leonides, 129 SCRA
522 [1984]; and Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 206
[1985]).
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the
situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the
will (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra). In Nuguid v. Nuguid
the oppositors to the probate moved to dismiss on the ground of
absolute preteriton The probate court acting on the motion held that
the will in question was a complete nullity and dismissed the petition
without costs. On appeal the Supreme Court upheld the decision of
the probate court, induced by practical considerations. The Court
said:
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for
probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the
contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught
that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the
court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will
come up once again before us on the same issue of the
intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of
time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the
practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we
might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the
provisions of the will in question. After all there exists a
justiciable controversy crying for solution.
In Saguimsim v. Lindayag (6 SCRA 874 [1962]) the motion to
dismiss the petition by the surviving spouse was grounded on
petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings which
was fully substantiated by the evidence during the hearing held in
connection with said motion. The Court upheld the probate court's
order of dismissal.
In Cayetano v. Leonides, supra one of the issues raised in the motion
to dismiss the petition deals with the validity of the provisions of the
will. Respondent Judge allowed the probate of the will. The Court held
that as on its face the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner
the respondent judge should have denied its probate outright. Where
circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions be passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of the will
is resolved, the probate court should meet the issue. (Nepomuceno v.
Court of Appeals,supra; Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra).
In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the
petition in Sp. Proceedings No. 591 ACEB of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu on the following grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal capacity
to institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3)
the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited (Rollo, p.
158). It was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 21,
1985 for the reason that "the grounds for the motion to dismiss are
matters properly to be resolved after a hearing on the issues in the
course of the trial on the merits of the case (Rollo, p. 32). A
subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court
on February 15, 1985 (Rollo, p. 109).
For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and
allowed the case to progress when on its face the will appears to be
intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were
instituted as universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact that one of
the private respondents had been preterited would have been an
exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort,
expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its
probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of
the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will
was resolved (Cayetano v. Leonides, supra; Nuquid v. Nuguid, supra.
The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by
private respondents.
Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are
indubitable, the defendants had the right to resort to the more speedy,
and adequate remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by
the trial court in not dismissing the case, (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of
Appeals, supra) and even assuming the existence of the remedy of
appeal, the Court harkens to the rule that in the broader interests of
justice, a petition for certiorari may be entertained, particularly where
appeal would not afford speedy and adequate relief. (Maninang Court
of Appeals, supra).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit and the questioned decision of respondent Court of Appeals
promulgated on August 30, 1985 and its Resolution dated October 23,
1985 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-57848 June 19, 1982
RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L.
MANINANG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and
BERNARDO S. ASENETA, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
A Petition to Review the Decision of April 28, 1981 of respondent
Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 12032-R entitled "Rafael E.
Maninang and Soledad L. Maninang vs. Hon. Ricardo Pronove,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig, Branch XI, and
Bernardo S. Aseneta".
Pertinent to the controversy are the following antecedental facts:
On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta, single, died at the Manila
Sanitarium Hospital at age 81. She left a holographic will, the
pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:
xxx xxx xxx
It is my will that all my real properties located in Manila,
Makati, Quezon City, Albay and Legaspi City and all my
personal properties shagllbe inherited upon my death by
Dra. Soledad L. Maninang with whose family I have lived
continuously for around the last 30 years now. Dra.
Maninang and her husband Pamping have been kind to
me. ... I have found peace and happiness with them even
during the time when my sisters were still alive and
especially now when I am now being troubled by my
nephew Bernardo and niece Salvacion. I am not
incompetent as Nonoy would like me to appear. I know
what is right and wrong. I can decide for myself. I do not
consider Nonoy as my adopted son. He has made me do
things against my will.
xxx xxx xxx
On June 9, 1977, petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for
probate of the Will of the decedent with the Court of First Instance-
Branch IV, Quezon City (Sp. Proc. No. Q-23304, hereinafter referred
to as the Testate Case).
On July 25, 1977, herein respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the
adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta,
instituted intestate proceedings with the Court of First Instance-
Branch XI, Pasig, Rizal (Sp. Proc. No. 8569, called hereinafter the
Intestate Case" for brevity).
On December 23, 1977, the Testate and Intestate Cases were ordered
consolidated before Branch XI, presided by respondent Judge.
Respondent Bernardo then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case
on the ground that the holographic will was null and void because he,
as the only compulsory heir, was preterited and, therefore, intestacy
should ensue. In support of said Motion to Dismiss, respondent
Bernardo cited the cases of Neri vs. Akutin (72 Phil. 322); Nuguid vs.
Nuguid (17 SCRA 449), and Ramos vs. Baldovino (2 CA Rep. 2nd,
878).
1

In her Opposition to said Motion to Dismiss, petitioner Soledad
averred that it is still the rule that in a case for probate of a Will, the
Court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of and resolution
on the extrinsic validity of the will; and that respondent Bernardo was
effectively disinherited by the decedent.
2

On September 8, 1980, the lower Court ordered the dismissal of the
Testate Case in this wise:
For reasons stated in the motion to dismiss filed by
petitioner Bernardo S. Aseneta which the Court finds
meritorious, the petition for probate of will filed by
Soledad L. Maninang and which was docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. Q-23304 is DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs.
On December 19, 1980, the lower Court denied reconsideration for
lack of merit and in the same Order appointed Bernardo as the
administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased Clemencia
Aseneta "considering that he is a forced heir of said deceased while
oppositor Soledad Maninang is not, and considering further that
Bernardo Aseneta has not been shown to be unfit to perform the
duties of the trust. "
Petitioners Maninang resorted to a certiorari Petition before
respondent Court of Appeals alleging that the lower Court exceeded
its jurisdiction in issuing the Orders of dismissal of the Testate Case
(September 8, 1980) and denial of reconsideration (December 19,
1980).
On April 28, 1981, respondent Court
3
denied certiorari and ruled that
the trial Judge's Order of dismissal was final in nature as it finally
disposed of the Testate Case and, therefore, appeal was the proper
remedy, which petitioners failed to avail of. Continuing, it said that
even granting that the lower Court committed errors in issuing the
questioned Orders, those are errors of judgment reviewable only by
appeal and not by Certiorari. 'Thus, this Petition before us.
We find that the Court a quo a quo acted in excess of its jurisdiction
when it dismissed the Testate Case. Generally, the probate of a Will is
mandatory.
No will shall pass either real or personal property unless
it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of
Court.
4

The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it,
because unless the Will is probated and notice thereof given to the
whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by Will
may be rendered nugatory.
5

Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity.
... The authentication of a will decides no other question
than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and
the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which
the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not
determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity
or efficiency (sic) of the provisions, these may be
impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its
authentication. The que0stions relating to these points
remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after
the will has been authenticated ....
6

Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the
provisions of the will cannot be entertained in Probate
proceeding because its only purpose is merely to
determine if the will has been executed in accordance
with the requirements of the law.
7

Respondent Bernardo, however, relies on the pronouncement
in Nuguid vs. Nuguid
8
, reading:
In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the Court's area
of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution
on, the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution
thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed
by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes
only after the court has declared that the will has been
duly authenticated.However, where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the
will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the Court
should meet that issue. (Emphasis supplied)
Our ruling in Balanay vs. Hon. Martinez
9
had a similar thrust:
The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's
intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been
established. The probate of a will might become an Idle
ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.
Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is
probated, the court should meet the issue.
The Nuguid and the Balanay cases provide the exception rather than
the rule. The intrinsic validity of the Wills in those cases was passed
upon even before probate because "practical considerations" so
demanded. Moreover, for the parties in the Nuguid case, the "meat of
the controversy" was the intrinsic validity of the Will; in fact, the
parties in that case "shunted aside the question of whether or not the
Will should be allowed probate." Not so in the case before us now
where the probate of the Will is insisted on by petitioners and a
resolution on the extrinsic validity of the Will demanded.
Moreover, in the Nuguid case, this Court ruled that the Will was
intrinsically invalid as it completely preterited the parents of the
testator. In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is
whether under the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent
had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a
valid disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse
concepts.
... Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's
will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because
they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned,
they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited." (Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil. 325).
Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition
depriving any compulsory heirs of his share in the
legitimate for a cause authorized by law." (Justice J.B.L.
Reyes and R.C. Puno, "An Outline of Philippine Civil
Law", 1956 ed., Vol. III, p. 8, citing cases) Disinheritance
is always "voluntary", preterition upon the other hand, is
presumed to be "involuntary" (Sanchez Roman, Estudios
de Derecho Civil 2nd edition, Volume 2.o p. 1131).
10

The effects of preterition and disinheritance are also totally different.
... The effects flowing from preterition are totally different
from those of disinheritance. Pretention under Article 854
of the New Civil Code shall annul the institution of heir.
This annulment is in toto, unless in the wail there are, in
addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises
or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918
of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul
the institution of heirs", but only "insofar as it may
prejudice the person disinherited", which last phrase was
omitted in the case of preterition (III Tolentino, Civil
Code of the Philippines, 1961 Edition, p. 172). Better
stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that
portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have
been illegally deprived.
11

By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination of
that controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. We
gather from the assailed Order of the trial Court that its conclusion
was that respondent Bernardo has been preterited We are of opinion,
however, that from the face of the Will, that conclusion is not
indubitable.
As held in the case of Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso
12

... it is as important a matter of public interest that a
purported will is not denied legalization on dubious
grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary
succession will be shaken to its foundation, ...
Coming now to the procedural aspect, suffice it to state that in view of
our finding that respondent Judge had acted in excess of his
jurisdiction in dismissing the Testate Case, certiorari is a proper
remedy. An act done by a Probate Court in excess of its jurisdiction
may be corrected by Certiorari.
13
And even assuming the existence of
the remedy of appeal, we harken to the rule that in the broader
interests of justice, a petition for certiorari may be entertained,
particularly where appeal would not afford speedy and adequate
relief.
WHEREFORE, the Decision in question is set aside and the Orders of
the Court of First Instance-Branch XI, Rizal, dated September 8, 1980
and December 19, 1980, are nullified. Special Proceeding No. Q-
23304 is hereby remanded to said Court of First Instance-Branch XI.
Rizal, therein to be reinstated and consolidated with Special
Proceeding No. 8569 for further proceedings.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 168660 June 30, 2009
HILARION, JR. and ENRICO ORENDAIN, represented by
FE D. ORENDAIN, Petitioners,
1

vs.
TRUSTEESHIP OF THE ESTATE OF DOA MARGARITA
RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J.:
This petition for certiorari, filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
assails the Order
2
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch
4 in SP. PROC. No. 51872 which denied petitioners (Hilarion, Jr. and
Enrico Orendain, heirs of Hilarion Orendain, Sr.) Motion to Dissolve
the Trusteeship of the Estate of Doa Margarita Rodriguez.
First, we revisit the long settled facts.
On July 19, 1960, the decedent, Doa Margarita Rodriguez, died in
Manila, leaving a last will and testament. On September 23, 1960, the
will was admitted to probate by virtue of the order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila City (CFI Manila) in Special Proceeding No. 3845.
On August 27, 1962, the CFI Manila approved the project of partition
presented by the executor of Doa Margarita Rodriguezs will.
At the time of her death, the decedent left no compulsory or forced
heirs and, consequently, was completely free to dispose of her
properties, without regard to legitimes,
3
as provided in her will. Some
of Doa Margarita Rodriguezs testamentary dispositions
contemplated the creation of a trust to manage the income from her
properties for distribution to beneficiaries specified in the will, to wit:
x x x x
CLAUSULA SEGUNDA O PANG-DALAWA: - x x x Ipinaguutos ko na
matapos magawa ang pagaayos ng aking Testamentaria at masara na
ang Expediente ng aking Testamentaria, ang lahat ng pagaare ko sa
aking ipinaguutos na pangasiwaan sa habang panahon ay ipagbukas
sa Juzgado ng tinatawag na "FIDEICOMISO" at ang ilalagay na
"fideicomisario" ang manga taong nasabi ko na sa itaas nito, at ang
kanilang gaganahin ay ang nasasabi sa testamentong ito na gaganahen
ng tagapangasiwa at albacea. x x x x
CLAUSULA TERCERA O PANG-TATLO: - Ipinaguutos ko na ang
kikitain ng lahat ng aking pagaare, na ang hindi lamang kasama ay
ang aking lupain na nasasabi sa Certificado de Transferencia de Titulo
No. 7156 (Lote No. 1088-C), Certificado Original de Titulo No. 4588
(LOTE No. 2492), Certificado Original de Titulo No. 4585 (Lote No.
1087) ng lalawigan ng Quezon, at ang bahaging maytanim na palay ng
lupang nasasaysay sa Certificado Original de Titulo No. 4587 (Lote
No. 1180) ng Quezon, ay IIPUNIN SA BANCO upang maibayad sa
anillaramiento, ang tinatawag na "estate Tax", ang "impuesto de
herencia" na dapat pagbayaran ng aking pinagbibigyan na kasama na
din ang pagbabayaran ng "Fideicomiso", gastos sa abogado na
magmamakaalam ng testamentaria at gastos sa Husgado. Ngunit bago
ipasok sa Banco ang kikitaen ng nabangit na manga gagaare, ay
aalisin muna ang manga sumusunod na gastos:
x x x x
CLAUSULA DECIMA O PANG-SAMPU: - Ipinaguutos ko na ang
manga pagaareng nasasabi sa Clausulang ito ay pangangasiwaan sa
habang panahon, at ito nga ang ipagbubukas ng "Fideicomiso" sa
Jusgado pagkatapos na maayos ang naiwanan kong pagaare. Ang
pangangasiwaang pagaare ay ang manga sumusunod:
x x x x
Ang lahat ng pagaaring nasasabe sa Clusulang ito (hindi kasama ang
"generator" at automovil) hindi maisasanla o maipagbibili kailan man,
maliban sa pagaaring nasa Quezon Boulevard, Maynila, na maaring
isanla kung walang fondo na gagamitin sa ipagpapaigui o
ipagpapagawa ng panibago alinsunod sa kaayusang hinihingi ng
panahon.
x x x x
CLAUSULA DECIMA SEGUNDA O PANG-LABING DALAWA: - Ang
kuartang matitipon sa Banco ayon sa tagubilin na nasasaysay sa
Clausulang sinusundan nito ay gagamitin sa manga sumusunod na
pagkakagastusan; at ganito din ang gagawin sa lahat ng aking pagaare
na nasasakop ng fideicomiso at walang ibang pinaguukulan. Ang
pagkakagastusan na ito ay ang sumusunod:
x x x x
CLAUSULA VIGESIMA CUARTA O PANG-DALAWANGPU AT APAT:
- Ipinaguutos ko sa aking manga Tagapangasiwa na sa fondong
ipinapasok sa Banco para sa gastos ng Nia Maria, Misa at iba pa,
kukuha sila na kakailanganin para maitulong sa manga sumusunod:
Florentina Luna, Roberta Ponce, Marciada Ponce, Benita Ponce,
Constancia Pineda, Regino Pineda, Tomas Payumo, Rosito Payumo,
Loreto Payumo, Brigido Santos at Quintin Laino, Hilarion Orendain
at manga anak. Ang manga dalaga kung sakali at inabutan ng
pagkamatay ko na ako ay pinagtiisan at hindi humiwalay sa akin,
kung magkasakit ay ipagagamot at ibabayad sa medico, at ibibili ng
gamot, at kung kailangan ang operacion ay ipaooperacion at ipapasok
sa Hospital na kinababagayan ng kaniyang sakit, at kahit
maypagkakautang pa sa "impuesto de herencia at estate tax" ay
ikukuha sa nasabing fondo at talagang ibabawas doon, at ang
paggagamot ay huag pagtutuusan, at ang magaalaga sa kanya ay
bibigyan ng gastos sa pagkain at sa viaje at iba pa na manga kailangan
ng nagaalaga. Kung nasa provincia at dadalhin ditto sa Maynila ay
bibigyan ng gastos sa viaje ang maysakit at ang kasama sa viaje, at ang
magaalaga ay dito tutuloy sa bahay sa Tuberias at Tanduay na
natatalaga sa manga may servicio sa akin, at kung mamatay at gusting
iuwi sa provincia ang bangkay ay iupa at doon ilibing at dapit ng Pare
at hated sa nicho na natotoka sa kanya. Ganito din ang gagawain kung
mayasawa man ay nasa poder ko ng ako ay mamatay. Ang wala sa
poder ko datapua at nagservicio sa akin, kaparis ng encargado, ang
gagawaing tulong ay ipagagamot, ibibili ng gamot at kung kailangan
ang operacion o matira sa Hospital, ipaooperacion at ipagbabayad sa
Hospital.
4
(emphasis supplied)
x x x x
As regards Clause 10 of the will which explicitly prohibits the
alienation or mortgage of the properties specified therein, we had
occasion to hold, in Rodriguez, etc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et
al.,
5
that the clause, insofar as the first twenty-year period is
concerned, does not violate Article 870
6
of the Civil Code. We
declared, thus:
The codal provision does not need any interpretation. It speaks
categorically. What is declared void is the testamentary disposition
prohibiting alienation after the twenty-year period. In the interim,
such a provision does not suffer from the vice of invalidity. It cannot
be stricken down. Time and time again, We have said, and We now
repeat, that when a legal provision is clear and to the point, there is no
room for interpretation. It must be applied according to its literal
terms.
Even with the purpose that the testatrix had in mind were not as
unequivocal, still the same conclusion emerges. There is no room for
intestacy as would be the effect if the challenged resolution of January
8, 1968 were not set aside. The wishes of the testatrix constitute the
law. Her will must be given effect. This is so even if there could be an
element of uncertainty insofar as the ascertainment thereof is
concerned. In the language of a Civil Code provision: "If a
testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of
doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative
shall be preferred." Nor is this all. A later article of the Civil Code
equally calls for observance. Thus: "The words of a will are to receive
an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect,
rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative;
and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which
will prevent intestacy."
x x x x
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that [Petra, Antonia and Rosa,
all surnamed Rodriguez] could not challenge the provision in
question. [They] had no right to vindicate. Such a right may never
arise. The twenty-year period is still with us. What would transpire
thereafter is still locked up in the inscrutable future, beyond the power
of mere mortals to foretell. At any rate, We cannot anticipate. Nor
should We. We do not possess the power either of conferring a cause
of action to a party when, under the circumstances disclosed, it had
none.
7

Almost four decades later, herein petitioners Hilarion, Jr. and Enrico
Orendain, heirs of Hilarion Orendain, Sr. who was mentioned in
Clause 24 of the decedents will, moved to dissolve the trust on the
decedents estate, which they argued had been in existence for more
than twenty years, in violation of Articles 867
8
and 870 of the Civil
Code, and inconsistent with our ruling in Rodriguez v. Court of
Appeals.
9

On April 18, 2005, the RTC issued the herein assailed Order:
10

The above-cited provisions of the civil code find no application in the
present motion to dissolve the trust created by the testatrix. There is
no question that the testamentary disposition of Doa Margarita
Rodriguez prohibiting the mortgage or sale of properties mentioned in
clause X of her Last Will and Testament forevermore is void after the
lapse of the twenty year period. However, it does not mean that the
trust created by [the] testatrix in order to carry out her wishes under
clauses 12, 13 and 24 will also become void upon expiration of the
twenty year period. As ruled by the Supreme Court in Emetrio
Barcelon v. CA, "the codal provision cited in Art. 870 is clear and
unequivocal and does not need any interpretation. What is declared
void is the testamentary disposition prohibiting alienation after the
twenty year period." Hence, the trustees may dispose of the properties
left by the testatrix in order to carry out the latters testamentary
disposition.
The question as to whether a trust can be perpetual, the same finds
support in Article 1013[,] paragraph 4 of the Civil Code, which
provides that "the Court, at the instance of an interested party or its
motion, may order the establishment of a permanent trust so that only
the income from the property shall be used." In the present case, the
testatrix directed that all the twenty five (25) pieces of property listed
in the tenth clause should be placed under the trusteeship and should
be perpetually administered by the trustees and a certain percentage
of the income from the trust estate should be deposited in a bank and
should be devoted for the purposes specifically indicated in the
clauses 12, 13 and 24.1awphi1
The wishes of the testatrix constitute the law. Her will must be given
effect. This is even if there could be an element of uncertainty insofar
as the ascertainment thereof is concerned. This Court so emphatically
expressed it in a decision rendered more than sixty years ago. Thus,
respect for the will of a testator as [an] expression of his last
testamentary disposition, constitutes the principal basis of the rules
which the law prescribes for the correct interpretation of all of the
clauses of the will; the words and provision therein written must be
plainly construed in order to avoid a violation of his intentions and
real purpose. The will of the testator clearly and explicitly stated must
be respected and complied with as an inviolable law among the parties
in interest. Such is the doctrine established by the Supreme Court of
Spain, constantly maintained in a great number of decisions.
Hence, this petition, positing the following issues:
1. WHETHER THE TRUSTEESHIP OVER THE
PROPERTIES LEFT BY DOA MARGARITA RODRIGUEZ
CAN BE DISSOLVED APPLYING ARTICLES 867 AND 870
OF THE CIVIL CODE.
2. WHETHER THE LOWER COURT IS CORRECT IN
STATING THAT THE ABOVE-CITED PROVISIONS OF
THE CIVIL CODE FINDS NO APPLICATION IN THE
PRESENT MOTION TO DISSOLVE THE TRUST CREATED
BY THE TESTATRIX.
3. CONCOMITANT THERETO, [WHETHER] THE LOWER
COURT [IS] CORRECT IN APPLYING ARTICLE 1013
PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
11

Before we delve into the foregoing issues, it is noteworthy that the
present petition, albeit captioned as a petition for certiorari, is actually
a petition for review on certiorari, raising only pure questions of law.
On more than one occasion, we have allowed erroneously labeled
actions based on the averments contained in the petition or
complaint.
12
Thus, we now disregard the incorrect designation and
treat this as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The issues being intertwined, we shall discuss them jointly.
Quite categorical from the last will and testament of the decedent is
the creation of a perpetual trust for the administration of her
properties and the income accruing therefrom, for specified
beneficiaries. The decedent, in Clause 10 of her will, listed a number
of properties to be placed under perpetual administration of the trust.
In fact, the decedent unequivocally forbade the alienation or mortgage
of these properties. In all, the decedent did not contemplate the
disposition of these properties, but only sought to bequeath the
income derived therefrom to various sets of beneficiaries.
On this score, we held in Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals
13
that the
perpetual prohibition was valid only for twenty (20) years. We
affirmed the CAs holding that the trust stipulated in the decedents
will prohibiting perpetual alienation or mortgage of the properties
violated Articles 867 and 870 of the Civil Code. However, we reversed
and set aside the CAs decision which declared that that portion of the
decedents estate, the properties listed in Clause 10 of the will, ought
to be distributed based on intestate succession, there being no
institution of heirs to the properties covered by the perpetual trust.
As previously quoted, we reached a different conclusion and upheld
the trust, only insofar as the first twenty-year period is concerned. We
refrained from forthwith declaring the decedents testamentary
disposition as void and the properties enumerated in Clause 10 of the
will as subject to intestate succession. We held that, in the interim,
since the twenty-year period was then still upon us, the wishes of the
testatrix ought to be respected.
Thus, at present, there appears to be no more argument that the trust
created over the properties of the decedent should be dissolved as the
twenty-year period has, quite palpably, lapsed.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the RTC ruled otherwise and held
that: (a) only the perpetual prohibition to alienate or mortgage is
declared void; (b) the trust over her properties stipulated by the
testatrix in Clauses 12, 13 and 24 of the will remains valid; and (c) the
trustees may dispose of these properties in order to carry out the
latters testamentary disposition.
We disagree.
Apparent from the decedents last will and testament is the creation of
a trust on a specific set of properties and the income accruing
therefrom. Nowhere in the will can it be ascertained that the decedent
intended any of the trusts designated beneficiaries to inherit these
properties. The decedents will did not institute any heir thereto, as
clearly shown by the following:
1. Clause 2 instructed the creation of trust;
2. Clause 3 instructed that the remaining income from
specified properties, after the necessary deductions for
expenses, including the estate tax, be deposited in a fund
with a bank;
3. Clause 10 enumerated the properties to be placed in trust
for perpetual administration (pangasiwaan sa habang
panahon);
4. Clauses 11 and 12 directed how the income from the
properties ought to be divided among, and distributed to
the different beneficiaries; and
5. Clause 24 instructed the administrators to provide
medical support to certain beneficiaries, to be deducted
from the fund deposits in the bank mentioned in Clauses 2
and 3.
Plainly, the RTC was mistaken in denying petitioners motion to
dissolve and ordering the disposition of the properties in Clause 10
according to the testatrixs wishes. As regards these properties,
intestacy should apply as the decedent did not institute an heir
therefor. Article 782, in relation to paragraph 2, Article 960 of the
Civil Code, provides:
Art. 782. An heir is a person called to the succession either by the
provision of a will or by operation of law.
x x x x
Art. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:
x x x x
(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the
property belonging to the testator. In such case, legal succession shall
take place only with respect to the property of which the testator has
not disposed;
x x x
We find as erroneous the RTCs holding that paragraph 4,
14
Article
1013 of the same code specifically allows a perpetual trust, because
this provision of law is inapplicable. Suffice it to state that the article
is among the Civil Code provisions on intestate succession, specifically
on the State inheriting from a decedent, in default of persons entitled
to succeed. Under this article, the allowance for a permanent trust,
approved by a court of law, covers property inherited by the State by
virtue of intestate succession. The article does not cure a void
testamentary provision which did not institute an heir. Accordingly,
the article cannot be applied to dispose of herein decedents
properties.
We are not unmindful of our ruling in Palad, et al. v. Governor of
Quezon Province, et al.
15
where we declared, thus:
Article 870 of the New Civil Code, which regards as void any
disposition of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable
for more than 20 years, is not violated by the trust constituted by the
late Luis Palad; because the will of the testator does not interdict the
alienation of the parcels devised. The will merely directs that the
income of said two parcels be utilized for the establishment,
maintenance and operation of the high school.
Said Article 870 was designed "to give more impetus to the
socialization of the ownership of property and to prevent the
perpetuation of large holdings which give rise to agrarian troubles."
The trust herein involved covers only two lots, which have not been
shown to be a large landholding. And the income derived therefrom is
being devoted to a public and social purpose the education of the
youth of the land. The use of said parcels therefore is in a sense
socialized. There is no hint in the record that the trust has spawned
agrarian conflicts.
16

In this case, however, we reach a different conclusion as the testatrix
specifically prohibited the alienation or mortgage of her properties
which were definitely more than the two (2) properties in the
aforecited case. The herein testatrixs large landholdings cannot be
subjected indefinitely to a trust because the ownership thereof would
then effectively remain with her even in the afterlife.
In light of the foregoing, therefore, the trust on the testatrixs
properties must be dissolved and this case remanded to the lower
court to determine the following:
1. The properties listed in Clause 10 of the will, constituting
the perpetual trust, which are still within reach and have
not been disposed of as yet; and
2. The intestate heirs of the decedent, with the nearest
relative of the deceased entitled to inherit the remaining
properties.
One final note. To obviate confusion, we clarify that the petitioners,
although correct in moving for the dissolution of the trust after the
twenty-year period, are not necessarily declared as intestate heirs of
the decedent. Our remand of the case to the RTC means that the
probate court should now make a determination of the heirship of the
intestate heirs of the decedent where petitioners, and all others
claiming to be heirs of the decedent, should establish their status as
such consistent with our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Hon. del
Rosario.
17

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4 in SP. PROC.
No. 51872 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trust approved by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4 in SP. PROC. No. 51872 is
DISSOLVED. We ORDER the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
4 in SP. PROC. No. 51872 to determine the following:
1. the properties listed in Clause 10 of Doa Margarita
Rodriguezs will, constituting the perpetual trust, which are
still within reach and have not been disposed of as yet; and
2. the intestate heirs of Doa Margarita Rodriguez, with the
nearest relative of the decedent entitled to inherit the
remaining properties.
SO ORDERED.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA
LUISA PALACIOS, Administratrix, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors,
JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors-
appellants.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:
The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate
estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez among the principal beneficiaries,
namely: his widow Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez; his two
grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his companion
Wanda de Wrobleski.
The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French
who lives in Paris, while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who
lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator provided for substitutions.
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December
11, 1964, with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was
admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed
administratrix of the estate. In due time she submitted an inventory of
the estate as follows:
INVENTARIO
Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de un te
rreno, con sus mejoras y edificaciones, situadoen
la Escolta,
Manila.............................................................
P500,000.00
Una sexta parte (1/6)
proindiviso de dos
parcelas de terreno situadas en Antipolo,
Rizal................... 658.34
Cuatrocientos noventa y uno
(491) acciones
de la 'Central Azucarera de la Carlota a P17.00
por accion
................................................................................
8,347.00
Diez mil ochocientos seize
(10,806) acciones
de la 'Central Luzon Milling Co.', disuelta y en
liquidacion a P0.15 por accion
..............................................1,620.90
Cuenta de Ahorros en el
Philippine Trust
Co.............................................................................
................. 2,350.73
TOTAL....................................
.......................... P512,976.97
MENOS:
Deuda al Banco de las Islas
Filipinas, garan-
tizada con prenda de las acciones de La Carlota
......... P 5,000,00
VALOR
LIQUIDO................................
........... P507,976.97
The testamentary dispositions are as follows:
A.En nuda propiedad, a D. Roberto y D. Jorge
Ramirez, ambas menores de edad, residentes en
Manila, I.F., calle 'Alright, No. 1818, Malate, hijos
de su sobrino D. Jose Ma. Ramirez, con
sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus respectivos
descendientes, y, en su defecto, con sustitucion
vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.
El precedente legado en nuda propiedad de la
participacion indivisa de la finca Santa Cruz
Building, lo ordena el testador a favor de los
legatarios nombrados, en atencion a que dicha
propiedad fue creacion del querido padre del
otorgante y por ser aquellos continuadores del
apellido Ramirez,
B.Y en usufructo a saber:
a. En cuanto a una tercera parte, a favor de la
esposa del testador, Da. Marcelle Ramirez,
domiciliada en IE PECO, calle del General
Gallieni No. 33, Seine Francia, con sustitucion
vulgar u fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de
Wrobleski, de Palma de Mallorca, Son Rapina
Avenida de los Reyes 13,
b.Y en cuanto a las dos terceras partes
restantes, a favor de la nombrada Da. Wanda de
Nrobleski con sustitucion vulgar v fideicomisaria
a saber:
En cuanto a la mitad de dichas dos terceras
partes, a favor de D. Juan Pablo Jankowski, de
Son Rapina Palma de Mallorca; y encuanto a la
mitad restante, a favor de su sobrino, D. Horace
V. Ramirez, San Luis Building, Florida St. Ermita,
Manila, I.F.
A pesar de las sustituciones fideiconiisarias
precedentemente ordinadas, las usufiructuarias
nombradas conjuntamente con los nudo
propietarios, podran en cualquier memento
vender a tercero los bienes objeto delegado, sin
intervencion alguna de los titulares
fideicomisaarios.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition
as follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts.
One part shall go to the widow 'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of
her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and
Roberto Ramirez "en nuda propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3)
of the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the
remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds:
(a) that the provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de
Wrobleski with respect to the widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan
Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to Wanda's
usufruct are invalid because the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda)
survived the testator; (b) that the provisions for fideicommissary
substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are not related to
the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in
Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a usufruct over real
property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an
alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution; and
that (d) the proposed partition of the testator's interest in the Santa
Cruz (Escolta) Building between the widow Marcelle and the
appellants, violates the testator's express win to give this property to
them Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of partition in
its order dated May 3, 1967. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto
have appealed to this Court.
1. The widow's legitime.
The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half
of the estate in full ownership. They admit that the testator's
dispositions impaired his widow's legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of
the Civil Code "If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he
shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate." And since
Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is entitled to one-half of his
estate over which he could impose no burden, encumbrance,
condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever. (Art. 904, par. 2,
Civil Code.)
It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants
question and justifiably so. It appears that the court a quo approved
the usufruct in favor of Marcelle because the testament provides for a
usufruct in her favor of one-third of the estate. The court a quo erred
for Marcelle who is entitled to one-half of the estate "en pleno
dominio" as her legitime and which is more than what she is given
under the will is not entitled to have any additional share in the estate.
To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the
testator's intention for as stated above his dispositions even impaired
her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.
2. The substitutions.
It may be useful to recall that "Substitution is the appoint- judgment
of another heir so that he may enter into the inheritance in default of
the heir originally instituted." (Art. 857, Civil Code. And that there are
several kinds of substitutions, namely: simple or common, brief or
compendious, reciprocal, and fideicommissary (Art. 858, Civil Code.)
According to Tolentino, "Although the Code enumerates four classes,
there are really only two principal classes of substitutions:
the simple and the fideicommissary. The others are merely variations
of these two." (111 Civil Code, p. 185 [1973].)
The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code
which reads:
ART. 859. The testator may designate one or
more persons to substitute the heir or heirs
instituted in case such heir or heirs should die
before him, or should not wish, or should be
incapacitated to accept the inheritance.
A simple substitution, without a statement of the
cases to which it refers, shall comprise the three
mentioned in the preceding paragraph, unless the
testator has otherwise provided.
The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as
follows:
ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by
virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir
instituted is entrusted with the obligation to
preserve and to transmit to a second heir the
whole or part of inheritance, shall be valid and
shall take effect, provided such substitution does
not go beyond one degree from the heir originally
instituted, and provided further that the fiduciary
or first heir and the second heir are living at time
of the death of the testator.
It will be noted that the testator provided for a vulgar substitution in
respect of the legacies of Roberto and Jorge Ramirez, the appellants,
thus: con sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus respectivos descendientes,
y, en su defecto, con substitution vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.
The appellants do not question the legality of the substitution so
provided. The appellants question the sustitucion vulgar y
fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de Wrobleski" in connection with
the one-third usufruct over the estate given to the widow Marcelle
However, this question has become moot because as We have ruled
above, the widow is not entitled to any usufruct.
The appellants also question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria in
connection with Wanda's usufruct over two thirds of the estate in
favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace v. Ramirez.
They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void because
Wanda survived the testator or stated differently because she did not
predecease the testator. But dying before the testator is not the only
case for vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal or incapacity to
accept the inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra.
Hence, the vulgar substitution is valid.
As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the
appellants are correct in their claim that it is void for the following
reasons:
(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez)
are not related to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the
Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution "provided such
substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally
instituted."
What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by
Tolentino as follows:
Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as
designation, substitution, or transmission. The Supreme
Court of Spain has decidedly adopted this construction.
From this point of view, there can be only one
tranmission or substitution, and the substitute need not
be related to the first heir. Manresa, Morell and Sanchez
Roman, however, construe the word "degree" as
generation, and the present Code has obviously followed
this interpretation. by providing that the substitution
shall not go beyond one degree "from the heir originally
instituted." The Code thus clearly indicates that the
second heir must be related to and be one generation
from the first heir.
From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be
either a child or a parent of the first heir. These are the
only relatives who are one generation or degree from the
fiduciary (Op. cit., pp. 193-194.)
(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the
usufruct to the substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the
Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits "that the testator contradicts
the establishment of a fideicommissary substitution when he permits
the properties subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual
agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked owners." (Brief, p. 26.)
3. The usufruct of Wanda.
The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the
estate in favor of Wanda is void because it violates the constitutional
prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens.
The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines. (Art. XIII.)
The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on
the ground that the Constitution covers not only succession by
operation of law but also testamentary succession. We are of the
opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to
acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for
otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any
alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to
a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of
Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the
land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of
aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez
is hereby ordered distributed as follows:
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;
One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge
Ramirez in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski
with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horace V. Ramirez.
The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No
special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981
BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V),
BENITO F. LEGARDA, ROSARIO L. VALDEZ, ALEJANDRO
LEGARDA, TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA, BENITO
LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y
FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ,
CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO
LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y
HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. TERESA
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
EDUARDO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F.
LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DONA FILOMENA ROCES
DE LEGARDA,respondents.

AQUINO, J.:1wph1.t
Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, dismissing her complaint for partition,
accounting, reconveyance and damages and holding, as not subject
to reserve troncal, the properties which her mother Filomena Races
inherited in 1943 from Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No. 73335). The
facts are as follows:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died
[Manila] on June 17, 1933. He was survived by his widow, Filomena
Races, and their seven children: four daughters named Beatriz,
Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named Benito,
Alejandro and Jose.
On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason
were partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo
and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz
who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March
19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. de
Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating
extrajudicially to herself the properties which she inherited from her
deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. The said properties consist of
the following: 1wph1.t
(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of
New York with a credit balance of P3,699.63.
(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated
Mining Company and a 1/7 interest in certain
shares of the San Miguel Brewery, Tuason &
Legarda, Ltd., Philippine Guaranty Company,
Insular Life Assurance Company and the Manila
Times.
(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos.
80226, 80237 to 80243 (7 titles), 80260, 80261
and 57512 of the Manila registry of deeds.
1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos.
48164, 84714, 48201, 48202, 48205, 48203,
48206, 48160 and 48192 of the Manila registry of
deeds;
1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475
of the registry of deeds of Rizal, now Quezon City;
1/14th of the property described in TCT No. 966
of the registry of deeds of Baguio;
1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles
described in TCT No. 41862 of the Manila registry
of deeds; 1/7th of the lots and improvements at
181 San Rafael describe in TCT Nos. 50495 and
48161 of the Manila registry of deeds;
1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163
of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets);
l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos.
48199 and 57551 of the Manila registry of deeds
(Streets and Estero):
2/21st of the property described in TCT No.
13458 of tile registry of deeds of T0ayabas.
These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the
affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Races succeeded her deceased
daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties
held proindiviso by her other six children.
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical
documents wherein she disposed of the properties, which she
inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons,
Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). The
document reads: 1wph1.t
A mis hijos :
Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos de Ben,
Mandu y Pepito, los bienes que he heredado de mi difunta
hija Filomena y tambien los acciones de la Destileria La
Rosario' recientemente comprada a los hermanos Values
Legarda.
De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un tote de
terreno que yo he 0donada a las Hijas de Jesus, en Guipit
La case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo Mandu solo
la casa; proque ella esta construida sobre terreno de los
hermanos Legarda Races. 1wph1.t
(Sgd.) FILOMENA ROCES LEGARDA
6 Marzo 1953
During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and
her six surviving children partitioned the properties consisting of the
one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the
children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y
De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to
probate as a holographic will in the order dated July 16, 1968 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 70878,
Testate Estate of Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda. The decree of
probate was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Legarda vs.
Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30,1976.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the
testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the
inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she inherited
from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said
properties are reservable properties which should be inherited by
Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the
children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That
motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed
on June 20, 1968 an ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters,
nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of
securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable
properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic
will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three daughters and
her three sons (See Paz vs. Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).
As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs.
Gonzales. ln this appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 she contends in
her six assignments of error that the lower court erred in not
regarding the properties in question as reservable properties under
article 891 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-
assignments of error contend that the lower court erred in not holding
that Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate of her daughter Filomena]
Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and hereditary shares in the
estate of her husband Benito Legarda y De la Paz and in not holding
that Mrs. Gonzales waived her right to the reservable properties and
that her claim is barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.
The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the
timeliness of Mrs. Gonzales' petition for review is a closed matter.
This Court in its resolution of December 16, 1971 denied respondents'
motion to dismiss and gave due course to the petition for review.
In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be
raised under undisputed facts. Since on the basis of the stipulated
facts the lower court resolved only the issue of whether the properties
in question are subject to reserva troncal that is the only legal issue to
be resolved in this appeal.
The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those
involving factual matters, cannot be resolved in this appeal. As the
trial court did not pass upon those issues, there is no ruling which can
be reviewed by this Court.
The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable
properties under article 891 of the Civil Code, formerly article 811, and
whether Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda could dispose of them in his
will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six children.
Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she
inherited from her daughter Filomena to the reservees within
the third degree and to bypass the reservees in the second degree or
should that inheritance automatically go to the reservees in the second
degree, the six children of Mrs. Legarda?
As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of
first impression. lt was resolved in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil.
480. Before discussing the applicability to this case of the doctrine in
the Florentino case and other pertinent rulings, it may be useful to
make a brief discourse on the nature of reserve troncal, also
calledlineal, familiar, extraordinaria o semi-troncal.
Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five
briefs in descanting on the nature of reserve troncal which together
with the reserva viudal and reversion legal, was abolished by the
Code Commission to prevent the decedent's estate from being
entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty in ownership caused by the
reservation (which uncertainty impedes the improvement of the
reservable property) and to discourage the confinement of property
within a certain family for generations which situation allegedly leads
to economic oligarchy, and is incompatible with the socialization of
ownership.
The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of
feudalism which fomented agrarian unrest. Moreover,
the reserves, insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship, is
considered unjust and inequitable.
However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code
Commission, restored the reserve troncal, a legal institution which,
according to Manresa and Castan Tobenas has provoked questions
and doubts that are difficult to resolve.
Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil
Code, now article 891, which reads: 1wph1.t
ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente
bienes que este hubiese adquirido por titulo lucrative de
otro ascendiente, o de un hermano, se halla obligado a
reservas los que hubiere adquirido por ministerio de la ley
en favor de los parientes que eaten dentro del tercer grade
y pertenezcan a la linea de donde los bienes proceden
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a
brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he
may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of
relatives who are within the third degree and who belong
to the line from which said property came.
In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by
gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a brother or
sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is
acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3)
the said ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of
relatives who are within the third degree from the deceased
descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the
said property came.
So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by
lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or brother
or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by
operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased
descendant (causante de la reserve) in favor of another ascendant,
the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede the
reservation, and (3) a third transmissions of the same property (in
consequence of the reservation) from the reservor to the reservees
(reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree from the
deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant,
brother or sister of the deceased descendant (6 Castan Tobenas
Derecho Civil, Part l, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).
If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve. Thus, where
one Bonifacia Lacerna died and her properties were inherited by her
son, Juan Marbebe, upon the death of Juan, those lands should be
inherited by his half-sister, to the exclusion of his maternal first
cousins. The said lands are not reservable property within the
meaning of article 811 (Lacerna vs. Vda. de Corcino, l l l Phil. 872).
The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or
brother or sister from whom the property was received by the
descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant
or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor
(reservista) the other ascendant who obtained the property from the
(prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the reserves (reservatario)
who is within the third degree from theprepositus and who belongs to
the (line o tronco) from which the property came and for whom the
property should be reserved by the reservor.
The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs.
Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098; Chua vs. Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, L-29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412). Fourth degree
relatives are not included (Jardin vs. Villamayor, 72 Phil. 392).
The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes
poseidos secularmente por una familia pasen bruscamente a titulo
gratuito a manos extraas por el azar de los enlaces y muertes
prematuras or impeder que, por un azar de la vide personas extranas a
una familia puedan adquirir bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado
en ella (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 6th Ed., 1980, p. 203;
Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
An illustration of reserve troncal is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25
Phil. 295. ln that case, Pedro Sablan inherited two parcels of land
from his father Victorians. Pedro died in 1902, single and without
issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited from him the two
parcels of land.
It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of
Marcelina. The reservees were Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the
paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan, the prepositus. Marcelina could
register the land under the Torrens system in her name but the fact
that the land was reservable property in favor of her two brothers-in-
law, should they survive her, should be noted in the title.
In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906.
Her one-half share of a parcel of conjugal land was inherited by her
daughter, Juliana Maalac. When Juliana died intestate in 1920, said
one-half share was inherited by her father, Anacleto Maalac who
owned the other one-half portion.
Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their
six children. lt was held that the said one-half portion was reservable
property in the hands of Anacleto Maalac and, upon his death,
should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot, sisters of
Maria and materna aunts of Juliana Maalac, who belonged to the
line from which said one-half portion came (Aglibot vs. Maalac 114
Phil. 964).
Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino vs
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo,
41 Phil. 915; Maghirang and Gutierrez vs. Balcita 46 Phil. 551; Lunsod
vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664;Dizon vs. Galang, 48 Phil. 601; Riosa vs.
Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Centeno vs. Centeno 52 Phil. 322; Velayo
Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89; Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil.
279; Fallorfina vs. Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the
descendant, or the one at the end of the line from which the property
came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. He is
called the prepositus(Cabardo vs. Villanueva. 44 Phil. 186, 190).
In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her
mother, Basilia Cabardo. When Cornelia died, her estate passed to her
father, Lorenzo Abordo. ln his hands, the property was reservable
property. Upon the death of Lorenzo, the person entitled to the
property was Rosa Cabardo, a maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was her
nearest relative within the third degree.
First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not
reservees. They cannot even represent their parents because
representation is confined to relatives within the third degree
(Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).
Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote
subject to the rule of representation. But the representative should be
within the third degree from the prepositus (Padura vs. Baldovino,
104 Phil. 1065).
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate
relationship and relationship by affinity are excluded.
Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the
recipient gives nothing in return such as donacion and succession
(Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 189-190, citing 6 Manresa,
Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 195 l, p. 360).
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death
of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of
his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line
from which the property came
(Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil. 349, 353).
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable
property but subject to the resolutory condition that such title is
extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is
a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject
to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional
ownership of the reservor. The transferee's rights are revoked upon
the survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor
but become indefeasible when the reservees predecease the reservor.
(Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil.
295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40
Phil. 480: Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279.)
The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee
a retro in a pacta de retro sale or to a fideicomiso conditional.
The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a
resolutory condition, meaning that if at the time of the reservor's
death, there are reservees, the transferee of the property should
deliver it to the reservees. lf there are no reservees at the time of the
reservor's death, the transferee's title would become absolute.
(Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944;
Mono vs. Nequia 93 Phil. 120).
On the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, expectant or
contingent right. His expectant right would disappear if he
predeceased the reservor. lt would become absolute should the
reservor predecease the reserves.
The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but
he can require that the reservable character of the property be
recognized by the purchaser (Riosa vs. Rocha 48 Phil. 737; Edroso vs.
Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).
There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the
reservable property is illegal for being a contract regarding future
inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96).
And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right which he
may alienate and dispose of conditionally. The condition is that the
alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the
reserves survives the reservor (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349,
353). 1wph1.t
The reservatario receives the property as a conditional
heir of the descendant (prepositus) said property merely
reverting to the line of origin from which it had
temporarily and accidentally stayed during
the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed
that there being reservatarios that survive the reservists,
the latter must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a
than interest in the reservable property. (J. J. B. L. Reyes
in Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios,
who are the ultimate acquirers of the property, can
already assert the right to prevent the reservista from
doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary
right, and, for this purpose, they can compel the
annotation of their right in the registry of property even
while the (reservista) is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de
Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).
This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that
corresponds to the natural heirs of the reservista lt is
likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the
estate of the reservista who may not dispose of them (it)
by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo
vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).
The latter, therefore, do not inherit from
the reservista but from the descendant (prepositus) of
whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa,
subject to the condition that they must survive
thereservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p. 286;
Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310,
cited by J. J.B.L. Reyes in Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960,
December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to
the prepositus becomes, "automatically and by operation of law, the
owner of the reservable property." (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105
Phil. l5.)
In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably
reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she
was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time of
her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of
the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs.
Legarda.
So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as
reservor, could convey the reservable properties by will or mortis
causa to the reservees within the third degree (her sixteen
grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees in the second degree,
her three daughters and three sons. As indicated at the outset, that
issue is already res judicata or cosa juzgada.
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to
her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she had
inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable
properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44
Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis
causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived
the reservor.
As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees
inherit the reservable properties from theprepositus, not from the
reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be
inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third degree from
the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs. Legarda.
She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property
should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition
of the reservable properties in favor of the reservees in the third
degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second
degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary
disposition cannot be allowed.
We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine
of Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, a similar case, where it was
ruled: 1wph1.t
Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by
the death of ascendant (reservista) together with his own
property in favor of another of his descendants as forced
heir, forms no part of the latter's lawful inheritance nor of
the legitime, for the reason that, as said property
continued to be reservable, the heir receiving the same as
an inheritance from his ascendant has the strict
obligation of its delivery to the relatives, within the third
degree, of the predecessor in interest (prepositus),
without prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part
of the property, if he has at the same time the right of
a reservatario (reserves).
ln the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his
second wife Severina Faz de Leon begot two children, Mercedes and
Apolonio III. These two inherited properties from their father. Upon
Apolonio III death in 1891, his properties were inherited by his
mother, Severina, who died in 1908. ln her will, she instituted her
daughter Mercedes as heiress to all her properties, including those
coming from her deceased husband through their son, Apolonio III.
The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife
Antonia Faz de Leon and the descendants of the deceased children of
his first marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino for the recovery of their
share in the reservable properties, which Severina de Leon had
inherited from Apolonio III which the latter had inherited from his
father Apolonio II and which Severina willed to her daughter
Mercedes.
Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties,
could not be disposed of in Severina's will in favor of Mercedes only.
That theory was sustained by this Court.
It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did
not form part of Severina's estate and could not be inherited from
her by her daughter Mercedes alone.
As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reserves, to
one-seventh of the properties. The other six sevenths portions were
adjudicated to the other six reservees.
Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound to
follow in this case the doctrine of theFlorentino case. That doctrine
means that as long as during the reservor's lifetime and upon his
death there are relatives within the third degree of
the prepositus regardless of whether those reservees are common
descendants of the reservor and the ascendant from whom the
property came, the property retains its reservable character. The
property should go to the nearest reservees. The reservor cannot, by
means of his will, choose the reserves to whom the reservable
property should be awarded.
The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva
troncal when the only relatives within the third degree are the
common descendants of the predeceased ascendant and the ascendant
who would be obliged to reserve is irrelevant and sans binding force in
the light of the ruling in the Florentino case.
It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question
are not reservable properties because only relatives within the third
degree from the paternal line have survived and that when Mrs.
Legarda willed the said properties to her sixteen grandchildren, who
are third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda and who belong to the
paternal line, the reason for the reserva troncal has been satisfied: "to
prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special
accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained
therein".
That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the
reservor willed the reservable properties to her daughter, a full-blood
sister of the prepositus and ignored the other six reservors, the
relatives of the half-blood of the prepositus.
In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable
property bequeathed by the reservor to her daughter does not form
part of the reservor's estate nor of the daughter's estate but should be
given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of the prepositus
within the third degree.
This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable
property to only one reserves it did not pass into the hands of
strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that the heiress of the
reservor was only one of the reservees and there is no reason founded
upon law and justice why the other reservees should be deprived of
their shares in the reservable property (pp. 894-5).
Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could
not dispose of in her will the properties in question even if the
disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third degree from
Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by operation of Article 891,
should go to Mrs. Legarda's six children as reservees within the
second degree from Filomena Legarda.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the
reservor but from the reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the
reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they
must survive the reservor (Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December
27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable
character due to the non-existence of third-degree relatives of
Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of the reservor, Mrs.
Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family, "except third-degree
relatives who pertain to both" the Legarda and Races lines.
That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been
extinguished only by the absence of reservees at the time of Mrs.
Legarda's death. Since at the time of her death, there were (and still
are) reservees belonging to the second and third degrees, the disputed
properties did not lose their reservable character. The disposition of
the said properties should be made in accordance with article 891 or
the rule on reserva troncal and not in accordance with the reservor's
holographic will. The said properties did not form part of Mrs.
Legarda's estate. (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l, 4).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. lt
is hereby adjudged that the properties inherited by Filomena Roces
Vda. de Legarda from her daughter Filomena Legarda, with all the
fruits and accessions thereof, are reservable properties which belong
to Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed
Legarda y Roces, as reservees. The shares of Rosario L. Valdes and
Benito F. Legarda, who died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should
pertain to their respective heirs. Costs against the private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13386 October 27, 1920
SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL
ALCALA, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MANUELA ALCALA and JOSE DEOCAMPO, defendants-
appellees.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellants.
Felipe Agoncillo for appellees.

JOHNSON, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Tayabas, absolving the defendants from all liability under
the plaintiff's complaint, without any finding as to costs.
Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda
Maria Nieva, married Francisco Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo
Deocampo was born.
Julian Nieva died intestate on April 19, 1889, and her said son, Alfeo
Deocampo, inherited from her, ab intestate, the parcels of land
described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint.
Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and without issue on July 7, 1890.
Thereupon the two parcels of land above-mentioned passed to his
father, Francisco Deocampo, by intestate succession. Thereafter
Francisco Deocampo married the herein defendant Manuela Alcala, of
which marriage was born Jose Deocampo, the other defendant herein.
Francisco Deocampo died on August 15, 1914, whereupon his widow
and son, the defendants herein, took possession of the parcels of land
in question, under the claim that the said son, the defendant Jose
Deocampoo (a minor) had inherited the same, ab intestate, from his
deceased father.
On September 30, 1915, the plaintiff herein, claiming to be an
acknowledged natural daughter of the said Juliana Nieva, instituted
the present action for the purposes of recovering from the defendants
the parcels of land in question, particularly described in Paragraphs V
and X of the complaint, invoking the provisions of article 811 of the
Civil Code.
The lower court held that, even granting, without deciding, that the
plaintiff was an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva, she
was not entitled to the property here in question because, in its
opinion, an illegitimate relative has no right to the reserva
troncal under the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
The first question presented by this appeal is, whether or not the
plaintiff is an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased
Juliana Nieva. It appears from the record that the said Juliana Nieva,
while unmarried, gave birth to the plaintiff on March 29, 1882, and
that the plaintiff was duly baptized as her natural daughter, of
unknown father (Exhibit C, baptismal certificate); that the said
Juliana Nieva nourished and reared her said child, the plaintiff
herein; that the plaintiff lived with her said mother until the latter was
married to Francisco Deocampo; that the said mother treated the
plaintiff, and exhibited her publicly, as a legitimate daughter.
(See testimony of Antero Gala, pp. 5-6; Prudencio de la Cuesta, pp. 16-
17; and Mamerto Palabrica, pp. 26-27, sten. notes.)
The foregoing facts, which are not controverted, are analogous to the
facts in the case of Llorente vs. Rodriguez (3 Phil., 697, 699). Under
the decision of this court in that case we are of the opinion and so
decide, without rediscussing here the law and legal principles
involved, that the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva is an acknowledged
natural daughter of Juliana Nieva. (See also In re estate of Enriquez
and Reyes, 29 Phil., 167.)
The other and more important question presented by this appeal is,
whether or not an illegitimate relative within the third degree is
entitled to the reserva troncal provided for by article 811 of the Civil
Code. That article reads as follows:
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property acquired by the latter gratuitously from some
other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by
operation of law for the benefit of relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which such property
came.
The property here in question was inherited, by operation by law, by
Francisco Deocampo from his son Alfeo Deocampo, who, in turn, had
inherited it, in the same manner, from his mother Juliana Nieva, the
natural mother of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is the natural sister of
Alfeo Deocampo, and she belongs to the same line from which the
property in question came. Was Francisco Deocampo obliged by law
to reserve said property for the benefit of the plaintiff, an illegitimate
relative within the third degree of Alfeo Deocampo? If he was, then,
upon his death, the plaintiff, and not his son the defendant Jose
Deocampo, was entitled to the said property; if he was not, the
plaintiff's action must fail.1awph!l.net
There can be no question whatever but that, under said article 811 of
the Civil Code, the plaintiff would be entitled to the property in
question if she were a legitimate daughter of Julian Nieva. (Edroso vs.
Sablan, 25 Phil., 295.) But in said article 811 the legislator uses the
generic terms "ascendant," "descendant," and "relatives," without
specifying whether or not they have to be legitimate. Does the
legislator, then, refer to legitimate as well as to illegitimate relatives?
Counsel for the appellant, in a lengthy and carefully prepared brief,
attempts to maintain the affirmative.
This question, so far as our investigation shows, has not been decided
before by any court or tribunal. However, eminent commentators on
the Spanish Civil Code, who have devoted their lives to the study and
solution of the intricate and difficult problems that may arise under
the provisions of that Code, have dealt with the very question now
before us, and are unanimous in the opinion that the provision of
article 811 of the Civil Code apply only tolegitimate relative. One of
such commentators, undoubtedly the best known of them all, is
Manresa. We believe we can do no better than to adopt his reasons
and conclusions, in deciding the question before us. In determining
the persons who are obliged to reserve under article 811, he says:
Is every ascendant, whether legitimate or not, obliged to
reserve? Should the natural father or grandfather reserve
the properties proceeding from the mother or other natural
ascendant? Article 811 does not distinguish; it speaks of the
ascendant, without attaching the qualification of legitimate,
and, on the other hand, the same reason that exists for
applying the provision to the natural family exists for
applying it to the legitimate family. Nevertheless, the article
in referring to the ascendant in an indeterminate manner
shows that it imposes the obligation to reserve only upon
the legitimate ascendant.
Let us overlook for the moment the question whether the
Code recognizes or does not recognize the existence of the
natural family, or whether it admits only the bond
established by acknowledgement between the father or
mother who acknowledges and the acknowledged children.
However it may be, it may be stated as an indisputable
truth, that in said Code, the legitimate relationship forms
the general rule and the natural relationship the exception;
which is the reason why, as may be easily seen, the law in
many articles speaks only of children or parents, of
ascendants or descendants, and in them reference is of
course made of those who are legitimate; and when it
desires to make a provision applicable only to natural
relationship, it does not say father or mother, but natural
father or natural mother; it does not say child, but natural
child; it does not speak of ascendants, brothers or parents
in the abstract, but of natural ascendants, natural brothers
or natural parents. (See, for example, articles 294, 302,
809, 810, 846, 935, to 938, 944 and 945 and 946 to 955.)
Articles 809 and 810 themselves speak only of ascendants.
Can it in any way be maintained that they refer to legitimate
as well as to natural ascendants? They evidently establish
the legitime of the legitimate ascendants included as forced
heirs in number 2 of article 807. And article 811, and as
we will see also article 812, continues to treat of this same
legitime. The right of the natural parents and children in the
testamentary succession in wholly included in the eighth
section and is limited to the parents, other ascendants of
such class being excluded in articles 807, No. 3, and
846. Therefore, the place which article 811 occupies in the
Code of proof that it refers only to legitimate ascendants.
And if there were any doubt, it disappears upon considering
the text of article 938, which states that the provisions of
article 811 applies to intestate succession, which is just
established in favor of the legitimate direct ascending line,
the text of articles 939 to 945, which treat of intestate
succession of natural parents, as well as that of articles 840
to 847, treating of their testamentary succession, which do
not allude directly or indirectly to that provision.
Lastly, the principle which underlies the exception which
article 811 creates in the right to succeed neither admits of
any other interpretation. Whether the provision is due to
the desire that the properties should not pass, by reason of
new marriage, out of the family to which they belonged, or
is directly derived from the system of the so-called "reserva
troncal," and whether the idea of reservation or that of
lineal rights (troncalidad) predominate the patrimony
which is intended to be preserved is that of the legitimate
family. Only to legitimate ascendants and descendants do
article 968 et seq. of the Code refer, arising as they do from
the danger of second or subsequent marriage; only to
legitimate parents do the special laws of Navarra, Aragon,
Vizcaya and Catalua concede the right to succeed with
respect to lineal properties (bienes troncales); only to the
legitimate ascendants does article 811 impose the duty to
reserve.
The convenience of amplifying the precept to natural
parents and ascendants may be raised just as the question
whether it would be preferable to suppress it altogether may
be raised; but in the realm of the statute law there is no
remedy but to admit that article 811, the interpretation of
which should on the other hand be strict was drafted by the
legislator with respect only to legitimate ascendants.
(Manresa, Codigo Civil, vol. 6, 3d ed., pp. 249-250.)
The same jurist, in determining the persons in whose favor the
reservation is established, says:
Persons in whose favor the reservation is established.
This is one of the most delicate points in the interpretation
of article 811. According to this article, the reservation is
established in favor of the parentswho are within the third
degree and belong to the line from which the properties
came.
It treats of blood, relationship, which is applicable to
questions on succession, according to articles 915 to 920. It
could not be otherwise, because relationship by affinity is
established between each spouse and the family of the
other, by marriage, and to admit it, would be to favor the
transmission of the properties of the family of one spouse to
that of the other, which is just what this article intends to
prevent.
It also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged
to reserve it a legitimate ascendant who inherits from a
descendant property which proceeds from the same
legitimate family, and this being true, there can be no
question, because the line from which the properties
proceed must be the line of that family and only in favor of
that line is the reservation established. Furthermore, we
have already said, the object is to protect the patrimony of
the legitimate family, following the precedents of the foral
law. And it could not be otherwise. Article 943 denies to
legitimate parents the right to succeed the natural child
and viceversa, from which it must be deduced that natural
parents neither have the right to inhering from legitimate
ones; the law in the article cited established a barrier
between the two families; properties of the legitimate family
shall never pass by operation of law to the natural family.
(Ibid. pp. 251-252.)
Scvola, after a very extended discussion of this same
subject, arrives at the same conclusion as Manresa. "La
reserva del articulo 811 es privilegio de la familia legitima.
(The reservation in article 811 is a privilege of the legitimate
family.)" (See Scvola, Codigo Civil, Vol. 14, pp. 211-224,
3401-305.)
Article 943, above referred to by Manresa, provides as follows:
A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab
intestate the legitimate children and relatives of the father
or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children
or relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated child.
To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural
brother, Alfeo Deocampo, by operation of law, would be a fragrant
violate of the express provision of the foregoing article (943).
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is
hereby affirmed, without any finding as to costs. So ordered.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981
BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V),
BENITO F. LEGARDA, ROSARIO L. VALDEZ, ALEJANDRO
LEGARDA, TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA, BENITO
LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y
FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ,
CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO
LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y
HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. TERESA
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
EDUARDO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F.
LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DONA FILOMENA ROCES
DE LEGARDA,respondents.

AQUINO, J.:1wph1.t
Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, dismissing her complaint for partition,
accounting, reconveyance and damages and holding, as not subject
to reserve troncal, the properties which her mother Filomena Races
inherited in 1943 from Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No. 73335). The
facts are as follows:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died
[Manila] on June 17, 1933. He was survived by his widow, Filomena
Races, and their seven children: four daughters named Beatriz,
Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named Benito,
Alejandro and Jose.
On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason
were partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo
and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz
who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March
19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. de
Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating
extrajudicially to herself the properties which she inherited from her
deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. The said properties consist of
the following: 1wph1.t
(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York
with a credit balance of P3,699.63.
(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining
Company and a 1/7 interest in certain shares of the San
Miguel Brewery, Tuason & Legarda, Ltd., Philippine
Guaranty Company, Insular Life Assurance Company and
the Manila Times.
(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226,
80237 to 80243 (7 titles), 80260, 80261 and 57512 of the
Manila registry of deeds.
1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164,
84714, 48201, 48202, 48205, 48203, 48206, 48160 and
48192 of the Manila registry of deeds;
1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the
registry of deeds of Rizal, now Quezon City; 1/14th of the
property described in TCT No. 966 of the registry of deeds
of Baguio;
1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described
in TCT No. 41862 of the Manila registry of deeds; 1/7th of
the lots and improvements at 181 San Rafael describe in
TCT Nos. 50495 and 48161 of the Manila registry of
deeds;
1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the
Manila registry of deeds (Streets);
l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and
57551 of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets and Estero):
2/21st of the property described in TCT No.
13458 of tile registry of deeds of T0ayabas.
These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the
affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Races succeeded her deceased
daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties
held proindiviso by her other six children.
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical
documents wherein she disposed of the properties, which she
inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons,
Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). The
document reads: 1wph1.t
A mis hijos :
Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos de Ben,
Mandu y Pepito, los bienes que he heredado de mi difunta
hija Filomena y tambien los acciones de la Destileria La
Rosario' recientemente comprada a los hermanos Values
Legarda.
De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un tote de
terreno que yo he 0donada a las Hijas de Jesus, en Guipit
La case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo Mandu solo
la casa; proque ella esta construida sobre terreno de los
hermanos Legarda Races. 1wph1.t
(Sgd.) FILOMENA ROCES
LEGARDA
6 Marzo 1953
During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and
her six surviving children partitioned the properties consisting of the
one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the
children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y
De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to
probate as a holographic will in the order dated July 16, 1968 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 70878,
Testate Estate of Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda. The decree of
probate was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Legarda vs.
Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30,1976.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the
testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the
inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she inherited
from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said
properties are reservable properties which should be inherited by
Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the
children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That
motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed
on June 20, 1968 an ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters,
nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of
securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable
properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic
will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three daughters and
her three sons (See Paz vs. Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).
As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs.
Gonzales. ln this appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 she contends in
her six assignments of error that the lower court erred in not
regarding the properties in question as reservable properties under
article 891 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-
assignments of error contend that the lower court erred in not holding
that Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate of her daughter Filomena]
Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and hereditary shares in the
estate of her husband Benito Legarda y De la Paz and in not holding
that Mrs. Gonzales waived her right to the reservable properties and
that her claim is barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.
The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the
timeliness of Mrs. Gonzales' petition for review is a closed matter.
This Court in its resolution of December 16, 1971 denied respondents'
motion to dismiss and gave due course to the petition for review.
In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be
raised under undisputed facts. Since on the basis of the stipulated
facts the lower court resolved only the issue of whether the properties
in question are subject to reserva troncal that is the only legal issue to
be resolved in this appeal.
The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those
involving factual matters, cannot be resolved in this appeal. As the
trial court did not pass upon those issues, there is no ruling which can
be reviewed by this Court.
The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable
properties under article 891 of the Civil Code, formerly article 811, and
whether Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda could dispose of them in his
will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six children.
Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she
inherited from her daughter Filomena to the reservees within
the third degree and to bypass the reservees in the second degree or
should that inheritance automatically go to the reservees in the second
degree, the six children of Mrs. Legarda?
As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of
first impression. lt was resolved in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil.
480. Before discussing the applicability to this case of the doctrine in
the Florentino case and other pertinent rulings, it may be useful to
make a brief discourse on the nature of reserve troncal, also
calledlineal, familiar, extraordinaria o semi-troncal.
Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five
briefs in descanting on the nature of reserve troncal which together
with the reserva viudal and reversion legal, was abolished by the
Code Commission to prevent the decedent's estate from being
entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty in ownership caused by the
reservation (which uncertainty impedes the improvement of the
reservable property) and to discourage the confinement of property
within a certain family for generations which situation allegedly leads
to economic oligarchy, and is incompatible with the socialization of
ownership.
The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of
feudalism which fomented agrarian unrest. Moreover,
the reserves, insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship, is
considered unjust and inequitable.
However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code
Commission, restored the reserve troncal, a legal institution which,
according to Manresa and Castan Tobenas has provoked questions
and doubts that are difficult to resolve.
Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil
Code, now article 891, which reads: 1wph1.t
ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente
bienes que este hubiese adquirido por titulo lucrative de
otro ascendiente, o de un hermano, se halla obligado a
reservas los que hubiere adquirido por ministerio de la ley
en favor de los parientes que eaten dentro del tercer grade
y pertenezcan a la linea de donde los bienes proceden
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a
brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he
may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of
relatives who are within the third degree and who belong
to the line from which said property came.
In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by
gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a brother or
sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is
acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3)
the said ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of
relatives who are within the third degree from the deceased
descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the
said property came.
So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by
lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or brother
or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by
operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased
descendant (causante de la reserve) in favor of another ascendant,
the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede the
reservation, and (3) a third transmissions of the same property (in
consequence of the reservation) from the reservor to the reservees
(reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree from the
deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant,
brother or sister of the deceased descendant (6 Castan Tobenas
Derecho Civil, Part l, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).
If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve. Thus, where
one Bonifacia Lacerna died and her properties were inherited by her
son, Juan Marbebe, upon the death of Juan, those lands should be
inherited by his half-sister, to the exclusion of his maternal first
cousins. The said lands are not reservable property within the
meaning of article 811 (Lacerna vs. Vda. de Corcino, l l l Phil. 872).
The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or
brother or sister from whom the property was received by the
descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant
or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor
(reservista) the other ascendant who obtained the property from the
(prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the reserves (reservatario)
who is within the third degree from theprepositus and who belongs to
the (line o tronco) from which the property came and for whom the
property should be reserved by the reservor.
The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs.
Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098; Chua vs. Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, L-29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412). Fourth degree
relatives are not included (Jardin vs. Villamayor, 72 Phil. 392).
The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes
poseidos secularmente por una familia pasen bruscamente a titulo
gratuito a manos extraas por el azar de los enlaces y muertes
prematuras or impeder que, por un azar de la vide personas extranas a
una familia puedan adquirir bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado
en ella (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 6th Ed., 1980, p. 203;
Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
An illustration of reserve troncal is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25
Phil. 295. ln that case, Pedro Sablan inherited two parcels of land
from his father Victorians. Pedro died in 1902, single and without
issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited from him the two
parcels of land.
It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of
Marcelina. The reservees were Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the
paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan, the prepositus. Marcelina could
register the land under the Torrens system in her name but the fact
that the land was reservable property in favor of her two brothers-in-
law, should they survive her, should be noted in the title.
In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906.
Her one-half share of a parcel of conjugal land was inherited by her
daughter, Juliana Maalac. When Juliana died intestate in 1920, said
one-half share was inherited by her father, Anacleto Maalac who
owned the other one-half portion.
Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their
six children. lt was held that the said one-half portion was reservable
property in the hands of Anacleto Maalac and, upon his death,
should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot, sisters of
Maria and materna aunts of Juliana Maalac, who belonged to the
line from which said one-half portion came (Aglibot vs. Maalac 114
Phil. 964).
Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino vs
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo,
41 Phil. 915; Maghirang and Gutierrez vs. Balcita 46 Phil. 551; Lunsod
vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664;Dizon vs. Galang, 48 Phil. 601; Riosa vs.
Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Centeno vs. Centeno 52 Phil. 322; Velayo
Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89; Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil.
279; Fallorfina vs. Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the
descendant, or the one at the end of the line from which the property
came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. He is
called the prepositus(Cabardo vs. Villanueva. 44 Phil. 186, 190).
In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her
mother, Basilia Cabardo. When Cornelia died, her estate passed to her
father, Lorenzo Abordo. ln his hands, the property was reservable
property. Upon the death of Lorenzo, the person entitled to the
property was Rosa Cabardo, a maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was her
nearest relative within the third degree.
First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not
reservees. They cannot even represent their parents because
representation is confined to relatives within the third degree
(Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).
Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote
subject to the rule of representation. But the representative should be
within the third degree from the prepositus (Padura vs. Baldovino,
104 Phil. 1065).
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate
relationship and relationship by affinity are excluded.
Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the
recipient gives nothing in return such as donacion and succession
(Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 189-190, citing 6 Manresa,
Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 195 l, p. 360).
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death
of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of
his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line
from which the property came
(Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil. 349, 353).
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable
property but subject to the resolutory condition that such title is
extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is
a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject
to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional
ownership of the reservor. The transferee's rights are revoked upon
the survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor
but become indefeasible when the reservees predecease the reservor.
(Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil.
295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40
Phil. 480: Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279.)
The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee
a retro in a pacta de retro sale or to a fideicomiso conditional.
The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a
resolutory condition, meaning that if at the time of the reservor's
death, there are reservees, the transferee of the property should
deliver it to the reservees. lf there are no reservees at the time of the
reservor's death, the transferee's title would become absolute.
(Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944;
Mono vs. Nequia 93 Phil. 120).
On the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, expectant or
contingent right. His expectant right would disappear if he
predeceased the reservor. lt would become absolute should the
reservor predecease the reserves.
The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but
he can require that the reservable character of the property be
recognized by the purchaser (Riosa vs. Rocha 48 Phil. 737; Edroso vs.
Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).
There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the
reservable property is illegal for being a contract regarding future
inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96).
And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right which he
may alienate and dispose of conditionally. The condition is that the
alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the
reserves survives the reservor (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349,
353). 1wph1.t
The reservatario receives the property as a conditional
heir of the descendant (prepositus) said property merely
reverting to the line of origin from which it had
temporarily and accidentally stayed during
the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed
that there being reservatarios that survive the reservists,
the latter must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a
than interest in the reservable property. (J. J. B. L. Reyes
in Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios,
who are the ultimate acquirers of the property, can
already assert the right to prevent the reservista from
doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary
right, and, for this purpose, they can compel the
annotation of their right in the registry of property even
while the (reservista) is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de
Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).
This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that
corresponds to the natural heirs of the reservista lt is
likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the
estate of the reservista who may not dispose of them (it)
by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo
vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).
The latter, therefore, do not inherit from
the reservista but from the descendant (prepositus) of
whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa,
subject to the condition that they must survive
thereservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p. 286;
Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310,
cited by J. J.B.L. Reyes in Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960,
December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to
the prepositus becomes, "automatically and by operation of law, the
owner of the reservable property." (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105
Phil. l5.)
In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably
reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she
was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time of
her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of
the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs.
Legarda.
So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as
reservor, could convey the reservable properties by will or mortis
causa to the reservees within the third degree (her sixteen
grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees in the second degree,
her three daughters and three sons. As indicated at the outset, that
issue is already res judicata or cosa juzgada.
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to
her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she had
inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable
properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44
Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis
causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived
the reservor.
As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees
inherit the reservable properties from theprepositus, not from the
reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be
inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third degree from
the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs. Legarda.
She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property
should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition
of the reservable properties in favor of the reservees in the third
degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second
degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary
disposition cannot be allowed.
We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine
of Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, a similar case, where it was
ruled: 1wph1.t
Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by
the death of ascendant (reservista) together with his own
property in favor of another of his descendants as forced
heir, forms no part of the latter's lawful inheritance nor of
the legitime, for the reason that, as said property
continued to be reservable, the heir receiving the same as
an inheritance from his ascendant has the strict
obligation of its delivery to the relatives, within the third
degree, of the predecessor in interest (prepositus),
without prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part
of the property, if he has at the same time the right of
a reservatario (reserves).
ln the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his
second wife Severina Faz de Leon begot two children, Mercedes and
Apolonio III. These two inherited properties from their father. Upon
Apolonio III death in 1891, his properties were inherited by his
mother, Severina, who died in 1908. ln her will, she instituted her
daughter Mercedes as heiress to all her properties, including those
coming from her deceased husband through their son, Apolonio III.
The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife
Antonia Faz de Leon and the descendants of the deceased children of
his first marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino for the recovery of their
share in the reservable properties, which Severina de Leon had
inherited from Apolonio III which the latter had inherited from his
father Apolonio II and which Severina willed to her daughter
Mercedes.
Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties,
could not be disposed of in Severina's will in favor of Mercedes only.
That theory was sustained by this Court.
It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did
not form part of Severina's estate and could not be inherited from
her by her daughter Mercedes alone.
As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reserves, to
one-seventh of the properties. The other six sevenths portions were
adjudicated to the other six reservees.
Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound to
follow in this case the doctrine of theFlorentino case. That doctrine
means that as long as during the reservor's lifetime and upon his
death there are relatives within the third degree of
the prepositus regardless of whether those reservees are common
descendants of the reservor and the ascendant from whom the
property came, the property retains its reservable character. The
property should go to the nearest reservees. The reservor cannot, by
means of his will, choose the reserves to whom the reservable
property should be awarded.
The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva
troncal when the only relatives within the third degree are the
common descendants of the predeceased ascendant and the ascendant
who would be obliged to reserve is irrelevant and sans binding force in
the light of the ruling in the Florentino case.
It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question
are not reservable properties because only relatives within the third
degree from the paternal line have survived and that when Mrs.
Legarda willed the said properties to her sixteen grandchildren, who
are third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda and who belong to the
paternal line, the reason for the reserva troncal has been satisfied: "to
prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special
accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained
therein".
That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the
reservor willed the reservable properties to her daughter, a full-blood
sister of the prepositus and ignored the other six reservors, the
relatives of the half-blood of the prepositus.
In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable
property bequeathed by the reservor to her daughter does not form
part of the reservor's estate nor of the daughter's estate but should be
given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of the prepositus
within the third degree.
This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable
property to only one reserves it did not pass into the hands of
strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that the heiress of the
reservor was only one of the reservees and there is no reason founded
upon law and justice why the other reservees should be deprived of
their shares in the reservable property (pp. 894-5).
Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could
not dispose of in her will the properties in question even if the
disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third degree from
Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by operation of Article 891,
should go to Mrs. Legarda's six children as reservees within the
second degree from Filomena Legarda.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the
reservor but from the reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the
reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they
must survive the reservor (Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December
27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable
character due to the non-existence of third-degree relatives of
Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of the reservor, Mrs.
Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family, "except third-degree
relatives who pertain to both" the Legarda and Races lines.
That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been
extinguished only by the absence of reservees at the time of Mrs.
Legarda's death. Since at the time of her death, there were (and still
are) reservees belonging to the second and third degrees, the disputed
properties did not lose their reservable character. The disposition of
the said properties should be made in accordance with article 891 or
the rule on reserva troncal and not in accordance with the reservor's
holographic will. The said properties did not form part of Mrs.
Legarda's estate. (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l, 4).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. lt
is hereby adjudged that the properties inherited by Filomena Roces
Vda. de Legarda from her daughter Filomena Legarda, with all the
fruits and accessions thereof, are reservable properties which belong
to Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed
Legarda y Roces, as reservees. The shares of Rosario L. Valdes and
Benito F. Legarda, who died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should
pertain to their respective heirs. Costs against the private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-29901 August 31, 1977
IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR CHUA and
REMEDIOS CHUA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V and SUSANA DE LA TORRE, in
her capacity as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of
Consolacion de la Torre, respondents.
Dominador G. Abaria and Primitivo Blanca for private respondent.
Rodrigo O. Delfinado for petitioners.

MARTIN, J.:
Petition for review of the decision of the respondent Court which
dismissed the complaint of petitioners in Civil Case No. 7839-A,
entitled "Ignacio Frias Chua, et al. vs. Susana de la Torre,
Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre"
It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S.
Militar alias Sy Quio he sired three children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo
and Manuel, all surnamed Frias Chua. When Patricia S. Militar died,
Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage with Consolacion de la
Torre with whom he had a child by the name of Juanita Frias Chua.
Manuel Frias Chua died without leaving any issue. Then in 1929, Jose
Frias Chua died intestate leaving his widow Consolacion de la Torre
and his son Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage and sons
Ignacio Frias Chua and Lorenzo Frias Chua of his first marriage. In
Intestate Proceeding No. 4816, the lower court issued an order dated
January 15, 1931
1
adjudicating, among others, the one-half (1/2,)
portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose
Frias Chua's widow, Consolacion de la Torre, the other half of Lot No.
399 in favor of Juanito Frias Chua, his son in the second marriage;
P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenze Frias chua; and P1,550.00 in favor of
Ignacio Frias, Chua, his sons of the first marriage. By virtue of said
adjudication, Transfer Certificate of Title No. TR-980 (14483)
2
dated
April 28, 1932 was issued by the Register of Deeds in the names of
Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua as owners pro-
indiviso of Lot No. 399.
On February 27, 1952, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died
intestate without any issue. After his death, his mother Consolacion de
la Torre succeeded to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399. In a
week's time or on March 6, 1952, Consolacion de la Torre executed a
declaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share
of her son Juanito as a result of which Transfer Certificate of Title No.
31796 covering the whole Lot No. 399 was issued in her name. Then
on March 5, 1966, Consolacion de la Torre died intestate leaving no
direct heir either in the descending or ascending line except her
brother and sisters.
In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. 7839-A, the petitioners herein, Ignacio Frias Chua, of the
first marriage and dominador and Remedios Chua, the supposed
legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, also of the
first marriage filed the complaint a quo
3
(subseqently segregated as a
distinct suit and docketed as Civil Case No. 7839-A) on May 11, 1966
before the respondent Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
Branch V, praying that the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 399 which
formerly belonged to Juanito Frias but which passed to Consolacion
de la Torre upon the latter's death, be declaredas a reservable
property for the reason that the lot in questionn was subject
to reserval troncal pursuant to Article 981 of the New Civil Code,
Private respondent as administratrix of the estate of individually the
complaint of petitioners
4

On July 29, 1986, the respondent Court rendered a decision
dismissing the complaint of petitioner. Hence this instant.
The pertinent provision of reserva troncal under the New Civil Code
provides:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inheritts from his
descendant any property which the latter may
have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendat, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired by
operation of law for the benefit of relatives who
are within the third degree and belong to the line
from which said property came.
Persuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property may be
impressed with a reservable character the following requisites must
exist, to wit: (1) that the property was acquired by a descendant from
an asscendant or from a brother or sister by gratuitous title; (2) that
said descendant died without an issue; (3) that the property is
inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that there
are relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which
said property came.
5
In the case before Us, all of the foregoing
requisites are present. Thus, as borne out by the records, Juanoito
Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate in 1952; he died
withour leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399
was acquired by his mother, Consolacion de la Torre died, Juannnito
Frias Chua who died intestate had relatives within the third degree.
These relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador Chua and
Remidios Chua, the suppose legitimate children of the deceased
Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the petitioners herein.
The crux of the problem in instant petition is focused on the first
requisit of reserva troncal whether the property in question was
acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father Jose Frias Chua,
gratuitously or not. In resolving this point, the respondent Court said:
It appears from Exh. "3", which is part of Exh.
"D", that the property in question was not
acquired by Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito
Frias Chua gratuitously but for a consideration,
namely, that the legatees were to pay the interest
and cost and other fees resulting from Civil Case
No. 5300 of this Court. As such it is undeniable
that the lot in question is not subject tot a reserva
troncal, under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code,
and as such the plaintiff's complaint must fail.
We are not prepared to sustain the respondent Court's conclusion that
the lot in question is not subject to areserva troncal under Art. 891 of
the New Civil Code. It is, As explained by Manresa which this Court
quoted with approval in Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, "The
transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient
does not give anything in return." It matters not whether the property
transmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges; what is essential
is that the transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere
liberality of the person making it, without imposing any obligation on
the part of the recipient; and that the person receiving the property
gives or does nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent Filipino
commentator,
6
"the essential thing is that the person who transmits it
does so gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring from the
transferee any prestation." It is evident from the record that the
transmission of the property in question to Juanito Frias Chua of the
second marriage upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua was by
means of a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous. It is true
that there is the order (Exh. "D") of the probate Court in Intestate
Proceeding No. 4816 which estates in express terms;
2. Se adjudicada pro el presente a favor de
Consolacion de la Torre, viuda, mayor de edad, y
de su hiju, Juanito Frias Chua, menor de edad,
todos residente de San Enrique, Negros
Occidental, I.F.,como herederos del finado Jose
Frias Chua Choo, estas propiadades:
14483
La parcela de terrenno concida por Lote No. 399
del Catsatro de la Carlota, Negros Occidental, de
191.954 metros cuadddrados y cubierto por el
Certificado de Titulo No. 11759, en partes equales
pro-indiviso; por con la obligscion de pagar a las
Standard Oil Co. of New York la deuda de
P3971.20, sus intereses, costas y demas gastos
resultantes del asunto civil No. 5300de este
jusgado
But the obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the
amount of P3,971.20 is imposed upon Consolacion de la Torre and
Juanito Frias Chua not personally by the deceased Jose Frias Chua in
his last will and testament but by an order of the court in the Testate
Proceeding No.4816 dated January 15, 1931. As long as the
transmission of the property to the heirs is free from any condition
imposed by the deceased himself and the property is given out of pure
generosity, itg is gratuitous. it does not matter if later the court orders
one of the heirs, in this case Juanito Frias Chua, to pay the Standare
oil co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20. This does not change the
gratuitous nature of the transmission of the property to him. This
being the case the lot in question is subject to reserva troncal under
Art, 891 of the New Civil Code.
It is contented that the distribution of the shares of the estate of Jose
Frias Chua to the respondent heirs or legatees was agreed upon by the
heirs in their project of partition based on the last will and testament
of Jose Frias Chua. But petitioners claim that the supposed Last Will
and Testament of Jose Frias Chua was never probated. The fact that
the will was not probated was admitted in paragraph 6 of the
respondents' answer.
7
There is nothing mentioned in the decision of
the trial court in Civil Case No. 7839 A which is the subject of the
present appeal nor in the order of January 15, 1931 of the trial court in
the Testate Estate Proceeding No. 4816 nor in the private
respondent's brief, that the Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias
Chua has ever been probated. With the foregoing, it is easy to deduce
that if the Last Will and Testament has in fact been probated there
would have been no need for the testamentary heirs to prepare a
project of partition among themselves. The very will itself could be
made the basis for the adjudication of the estate as in fact they did in
their project of partition with Juanito Frias Chua getting one-half of
Lot 399 by inheritance as a sone of the deceased Jose Frias Chua by
the latter's second marriage.
According to the record, Juanito Frias Chua died on February 27, 1952
without any issue. After his death his mother Consolation de la Torre
succeeded to his one-half pro-indiviso share of Lot 399. This was,
however, subject to the condition that the property was reservable in
character under Art. 891 of the Civil Code in favor of relatives within
the third degree of Jose Frias Chua from whom the property came.
These relatives are the petitioner herein.
It is claimed that the complaint of petitioners to recover the one-half
portion of Lot 399 which originally belonged to Juanito Frias Chua
has already prescribed when it was filed on May 11, 1966. We do not
believe so. It must be remembered that the petitioners herein are
claiming as reservees did not arise until the time the reservor,
Consolacion de la Torre, died in March 1966. When the petitioners
therefore filed their complaint to recover the one-half (1/2) portion of
Lot 399, they were very much in time to do so.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby
set aside. The petitioners Ignacio Frias Chua, Dominador Chua and
Remedios Chua are declared owners of 1/2 undivided portion of Lot
399; and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental is hereby ordered
to cancel. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering Lot No. 399
issued in the name of Consolacion de la Torre and to issue a new
Certificate of Title in the names of Consolacion de la Torre, 1/2
undivided portion; Ignacio Frias Chua, 1/4 undivided portion; and
Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, 1/4 undivided portion, of said
lot. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 190 October 18, 1977
RE: CLAIMS FOR BENEFITS OF THE HEIRS OF THE LATE
MARIO V. CHANLIONGCO, FIDELA B. CHANLIONGCO,
MARIO B. CHANLIONGCO II, MA. ANGELINA C.
BUENAVENTURA and MARIO C. CHANLIONGCO,
JR., claimants.+.wph!1
R E S O L U T I O N

MAKASIAR, J.:t.hqw
This matter refers to the claims for retirement benefits filed by the
heirs of the late ATTY. MARIO V. CHANLIONGCO an attorney in this
Court, under the provisions of R.A. No. 1616, as amended by R.A. No.
4986, which was approved by this Court in its resolution of August 19,
1976, effective on July 12, 1976 it a g from the records that at the time
of his death on July 12, 1976, Atty. Chanliongco was more than 63
years of age, with more than 38 years of service in the government. He
did not have any pending criminal administrative or not case against
him, neither did he have any money or property accountability. The
highest salary he received was P18,700.00 per annum.
The above named flied the appellants for benefits with the accruing
and with the Government Service System.
Aside from his widow, Dra. Fidel B. Chanliongco and an only Intimate
Mario it appears that there are other deceased to namely, Mrs.
Angelina C. , Jr., both born out of wedlock to Angelina R Crespo, and
duly recognized by the deceased. Except Mario, Jr., who is only 17
years of age, all the claimants are of legal age.
According to law, the benefits accruing to the deceased consist of: (1)
retirement benefits; (2) money value of terminal leave; (3) life
insurance and (4) refund of retirement premium.
From the records now before US, it appears that the GSIS had already
the release the life insurance proceeds; and the refund of rent to the
claimants.
What, therefore, to be settled are the retirement benefits and the
money value of leave, both of which are to be paid by this court as the
deceased's last employer.
The record also shows that the late Atty. Chanliongco died ab intestato
and that he filed or over to state in his application for membership
with the GSIS the beneficiary or benefits of his retirement benefits,
should he die before retirement. Hence, the retirement benefits shall
accrue to his estate and will be distributed among his Legal heirs in
with the benefits on intestate s , as in the caw of a fife if no benefit is
named in the policy (Vda. de vs. GSIS, L-28093, Jan. 30, 1971, 37
SCRA 315, 325).
Insofar therefore as the retirement benefits are WE adopt in toto, for
being in accordance with law, the GSIS determination of the amount
of the retirement the kill heirs and their e shares as indicated in its
letter to US, dated March 15, 1977, to wit: +.wph!1
(a) Amount of retirement grautity:
1
. Total creditable
service
37.57169 years
2. Highest rate of
salary
Pl,558.33333/mo.
3. Gratuity in
terms of months
50.14338 months
4. Amount of
gratuity (highest

salary) x (No. of
grautity months)
P78,140,10
(b) Legal heirs:
1
. Fidela B. Chanliongco. widow
2. Mario B. Chanliongco
II.
legitimate
son
3. Ma. Angelina C.
Buenaventura
illegitimate
child
4. Mario Chanliongco
Jr.
illegitimate
child
(c) Distribution
(1) 8/16 share to Mario
II
P39,070.050
(2) 4/16 share to the
widow, Fidela B.
Chanliongco
19,535.025
(3) 2/16 share, or
P9,767.5125 each to the
two illegitimate children
Ma. Angelina C.
Buenaventura and
Mario Chanliongco, Jr.
19 535 25
T O T A L P78.140.100
Coming now to the money value of the terminal leave, unpaid salary
and 10% adjustment pursuant to Budget Circular No. 240, dated July
22, 1974, this Court's Finance Officer, in a memorandum dated March
23, 1977, indicated the breakdown of these items as follows:
Unpaid salary for July
8-12, 1976 @
P1,416.66/mo. P228.49
10% salary adj. for
July 1-12, 1976
54.84
Money value of
terminal leave for the

period from July 13,
1976 to September

14,1977 @ P1,558.33 21,962.54
Sub-Total P22,9245.87
Less:
Withholding Tax P1,400.00
Supreme Court
Savings & Loan
Association 7,340.42 8.740.42
NET
PROCEEDS
P13,505.45
It further appears that at the time of his death the late Atty.
Chanliongco had an outstanding account with the Supreme Court
Savings & Loans Association in the sum of P7,340.42. Deduction this
amount plus another sum of P1,400.00, representing withhold tax
due from him, or a total of P8,740.42, from above sub-total sum of
P22,245.87. WE have at the net sum P13,505.45, available for
distribute to the claimants as follows:
1
. Fidela B.
Chanliongco

a. As her
conjugal share
P 6,752.72
b. As a legal heir P 1,688.18
2. Mario
Chanliongco
II
P 3,376.36
3. Ma.
Angelina C.
Buenaventura
844.10
4. Mario Jr. 844.09
T O T A L P13,505.45
It will be seen from the f distribution that the money value of the
unused vacation and sick leave, unpaid will and 10% adjustment due
to the has been treated as conjugal property. Accordingly, one-half
(l/2) goes to the widow as her share in the conjugal hip and the other
half P6,752.725 is to be distributed to the deceased's kill him, using
the same one WE used in distributing the retirement benefits. This is
so because "Vacation with pay is not a gratuity but is compensation
for services rendered." (Ramey vs. State, 296 NW 323, 296 Mich.
449).
WHEREFORE, THE CLAIMS ARE HEREBY APPROVED. THE
FINANCE AND/OR DISBURSING OFFICER OF THIS COURT IS
ORDERED To pay IMMEDIATELY TO EACH AND EVERY
CLAIMANT HE VARIOUS SUMS HEREUNDER INDICATED
OPPOSITE THEIR NAMES, AS FOLLOWS:
1
. FIDELA B. CHANLIONGCO
A. HER 4/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT GRATUITY P19,535.025
B. HER SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE OF TEAL LEAVE,
UNPAID SALARY AND 10% ADJUSTMENT:

(1) AS HER CONJUGAL SHARE 6,752.72
(2) AS A LEGAL HEIR P1,688.18
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HER P27,975.93
2. MARIO CHANLIONGCO II
A. HIS 8/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT GRATUITY P39,070.05
B. HIS SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE OF TERMINAL
LEAVE, UNPAID SALARY AND 10% ADJUSTMENT
3,376.36
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HIM P42,446.41
3. MA. ANGELINA C. BUENAVENTURA:
A. HER 2/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT GRATUITY P9,767.51
B. HER SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE OF TERMINAL
LEAVE, UNPAID SALARY AND 10% ADJUSTMENT
844.10
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HER P10,611.61
4. MARIO CHANLIONGCO JR. TO BE PAID THROUGH HIS
MOTHER AND NATURAL GUARDIAN, ANGELINA
CRESPO):

A. HIS 2/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT GRATUITY P9,767.51
B. HIS SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE OF TERMINAL
LEAVE, UNPAID SALARY AND 10% ADJUSTMENT
844.10
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HIM P10,611.61
SO ORDERED.