Asia's Slippery Slope

ASIAS SLIPPERY SLOPE: TRIANGULAR TENSIONS,
IDENTITY GAPS, CONFLICTING REGIONALISM, AND

DIPLOMATIC IMPASSE TOWARD NORTH KOREA

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South Koreas Triangular Relatons
Japan-South Korea-U.S. Relatons
Sue Mi Terry
The Seoul-Beijing-Tokyo Triangle: Terra-centric
Nordpolitk vs. Oceanic Realpolitk
Sung-Yoon Lee
China-South Korea-U.S. Relatons
Gilbert Rozman
Russia, China, and the Korean Peninsula
Valery Denisov and Alexander Lukin
Natonal Identty Approaches to
East and South Asia
Japans Natonal Identty Gaps: A Framework for
Analysis of Internatonal Relatons in Asia
Gilbert Rozman
Natonal Identty and Attudes Toward North
Korean Defectors
Jiyoon Kim
Bridging the Chinese Natonal Identty Gap:
Alternatve Identtes in Hong Kong and Taiwan
Syaru Shirley Lin
Identty and Strategy in Indias Asia-Pacic Policy
Deepa M. Ollapally
Divergence on Economic Regionalism
Asia-Pacic Regional Economic Integraton:
U.S. Strategy and Approach
Mathew P. Goodman
Japan and Regional Integraton Dominoes:
Golden Opportunity or Another Politcal Failure?
Takashi Terada
Korean Bridge: Balancing Asian Economic
Regionalism Between the United States and China
Jin Kyo Suh
Chinas Choice: To Lead or to Follow on
Asian Economic Integraton
Zhang Xiaotong
New Thinking on Diplomacy Toward North Korea
South Koreas Search for a New Diplomatc
Strategy Toward North Korea; Trustpolitk
as a Goldilocks Approach?
Shin-wha Lee
What to Do about North Korea
Mark Fitzpatrick
Purge of Jang Song-Taek and its Impact on Chinas
Policy Toward North Korea
Zhu Feng and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga
ASIAS SLIPPERY SLOPE: TRIANGULAR
TENSIONS, IDENTITY GAPS,
CONFLICTING REGIONALISM, AND
DIPLOMATIC IMPASSE TOWARD
NORTH KOREA
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF:
GILBERT ROZMAN
Vol. 25
2014
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF: GILBERT ROZMAN, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
JOINT
U.S.KOREA
ACADEMIC
STUDIES
1800 K Street NW, Suite 1010
Washington, DC 20006
www.keia.org | @KoreaEconInst
t. 202.464.1982
Joint U.S.-Korea
Academic Studies
2014 | Volume 25
Editor-in-Chief
Gilbert Rozman
Princeton University
Contents
KEI Board of Directors .......................................................................................................................... i
KEI Advisory Council ............................................................................................................................ ii
About the Korea Economic Insttute of America ................................................................................ ii
Preface ................................................................................................................................................ iv
SOUTH KOREAS TRIANGULAR RELATIONS
Introducton .......................................................................................................................................... 2
Sue Mi Terry ......................................................................................................................................... 7
The Seoul-Beijing-Tokyo Triangle: Terra-centric Nordpolitk vs. Oceanic Realpolitk
Sung-Yoon Lee .................................................................................................................................... 23
Gilbert Rozman................................................................................................................................... 43
Valery Denisov and Alexander Lukin .................................................................................................. 55
NATIONAL IDENTITY APPROACHES TO EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
Introducton ........................................................................................................................................ 74
Japans Natonal Identty Gaps: A Framework for Analysis of Internatonal Relatons in Asia
Gilbert Rozman................................................................................................................................... 79
Natonal Identty and Attudes Toward North Korean Defectors
Jiyoon Kim .......................................................................................................................................... 95
Bridging the Chinese Natonal Identty Gap: Alternatve Identtes in Hong Kong and Taiwan
Syaru Shirley Lin ............................................................................................................................... 113
Identty and Strategy in Indias Asia-Pacifc Policy
Deepa M. Ollapally ........................................................................................................................... 135
DIVERGENCE ON ECONOMIC REGIONALISM
Introducton ...................................................................................................................................... 152
Asia-Pacifc Regional Economic Integraton: U.S. Strategy and Approach
Mathew P. Goodman ...................................................................................................................... 157
Japan and Regional Integraton Dominoes: Golden Opportunity or Another Politcal Failure?
Takashi Terada ................................................................................................................................. 171
Korean Bridge: Balancing Asian Economic Regionalism Between the United States and China
Jin Kyo Suh ........................................................................................................................................ 187
Chinas Choice: To Lead or to Follow on Asian Economic Integraton
Zhang Xiaotong ................................................................................................................................ 201
NEW THINKING ON DIPLOMACY TOWARD NORTH KOREA
Introducton ...................................................................................................................................... 218
South Koreas Search for a New Diplomatc Strategy Toward North Korea: Trustpolitk as a
Goldilocks Approach?
Shin-wha Lee .................................................................................................................................... 221
Mark Fitzpatrick ............................................................................................................................... 239
Purge of Jang Song-Taek and its Impact on Chinas Policy Toward North Korea
Zhu Feng and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga ................................................................................ 255
Contributors ....................................................................................................................................... 265
KEI Editorial Board
Editor-in-Chief: Gilbert Rozman, Princeton University
KEI Editor: Nicholas Hamisevicz
Contract Editor: Gimga Group
Design: Gimga Group
The Korea Economic Insttute of America is registered under the Foreign Agents Registraton Act as
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KEI is not engaged in the practce of law, does not render legal services, and is not a lobbying organizaton.
The views expressed in this publicaton are those of the authors. While this monograph is part of
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members of the Board or of the Advisory Council.
Copyright 2014 Korea Economic Insttute of America
www.keia.org
Printed in the United States of America. ISSN 2167-3462
ii i | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
KEI Board of Directors
Sukhan Kim, Esq.
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld
Dr. Won-ho Kim
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
Dr. Yoon-Shik Park
George Washington University
Professor David Steinberg
Georgetown University
Officer
The Honorable Donald Manzullo
President & CEO
KEI Advisory Council
Chair
The Honorable Stephen W. Bosworth
Harvard Kennedy School
Mr. Bradley Babson
U.S.-Korea Insttute at SAIS
Dr. Claude Barfeld
American Enterprise Insttute
Dr. John Bennet
Former KEI President
Dr. Thomas Cargill
University of Nevada, Reno
His Excellency Yoon-je Cho
Sogang University
Dr. Nicholas Eberstadt
American Enterprise Insttute
Mr. Robert Fallon
Phosplatn Therapeutcs LLC
Mr. Gordon Flake
Perth USAsia Centre
The Honorable Thomas Hubbard
McLarty Associates
The Honorable James Kelly
EAP Associates, LLC
Dr. Abraham Kim
The Maureen and Mike Mansfeld Center
Mr. Andrew Kim
Sit/Kim Internatonal
Mr. Spencer Kim
CBOL Corporaton
Mr. Bruce Klingner
The Heritage Foundaton
Dr. Kirk Larsen
Brigham Young University
His Excellency Tae-sik Lee
Former Ambassador to the U.S.
Dr. Young-Sun Lee
Yonsei University
Dr. Wonhyuk Lim
Korea Development Insttute
Mr. Paul McGonagle
Consultant
The Honorable Mark C. Minton
The Korea Society
Dr. G. Mustafa Mohatarem
General Motors Corporaton
Dr. Chung-in Moon
Yonsei University
Dr. Hugh T. Patrick
Columbia University
The Honorable Ernest Preeg
Manufacturers Alliance/MAPI
Dr. Mitchell Reiss
Washington College
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Henry L. Stmson Center
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JR Shafer Insight
His Excellency Joun-yung Sun
Kyungnam University
Mr. Robert Warne
Mr. Joseph Winder
iv iii | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
About the Korea Economic
Institute of America
The Korea Economic Insttute of America (KEI) is a leading not-for-proft policy outreach and
educatonal organizaton focused on promotng economic, politcal, and security relatons
between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea. Located in Washington, D.C., KEI aims to
broaden and deepen understanding among American policy leaders, opinion makers, and
the public about developments in Korea and the value of the U.S.-Korea relatonship. Since its
founding in 1982, the Insttute has organized programs across North America and published
research on a diverse range of issues, including U.S.-Korea trade and investments, the North
Korea nuclear program, alliance issues, the role of Korean Americans in U.S. politcs, and
Chinas growing role in the Asia-Pacifc region. Through its publicatons, outreach programs,
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KEI's current accomplishments include:
Publishing three celebrated annual compilaton volumesOn Korea, Joint U.S.-
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Hostng a premier luncheon program every year on Korean American Day to
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For more informaton about these programs and upcoming events at KEI, please visit our
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KEI is contractually afliated with the Korea Insttute for Internatonal Economic Policy (KIEP), a public policy
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Preface
As the President and CEO of the Korea Economic Insttute of America (KEI), I am constantly
reminded of the importance of relatonships. At KEI, we utlize our established relatonships
and develop new ones to promote dialogue and understanding between the U.S. and the
Republic of Korea about the importance of a strong U.S.-Korea alliance and the rising Asia-
Pacifc region. For 25 years, one way KEI has done this is by invitng leading Korea and Asia
experts from around the world to its annual academic symposium. For the past three years,
KEI has developed a relatonship with the Associaton of Asian Studies (AAS), and we now
incorporate our symposium into the AAS annual conference. This allows KEI to reach a wide
academic audience, enhance its university contacts, and provide quality panel discussions
and papers on important issues. KEI provides the AAS annual conference with tmely, policy-
relevant panels, especially in the feld of economics.
Much of the recent success with this publicaton and its individual chapters these past few
years is owed to the fortunate relatonship KEI has with Dr. Gilbert Rozman, the emeritus
Musgrave Professor of Sociology at Princeton University. Dr. Rozman serves as the Editor-
in-Chief for this Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies volume and as an advisor to KEIs eforts
with the AAS conference. His knowledge and skills have helped enhance the scholarship
and insight generated in this volume.
The importance of relatonships in Asia has been well-documented. This volume examines
the growing dynamics of multlateral partnerships for economic and politcal purposes.
Economic relatons have signifcantly defned the rise of the Asia-Pacifc, and this volume
has an excellent set of chapters assessing the future of regional economic relatons
through big, multlateral arrangements like the Trans-Pacifc Partnership and the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership as well as other smaller, multlateral partnerships.
Another group of papers looks at the important relatonship between natonal identty and
how countries pursue foreign policy. Lastly, a new leader in North Korea has made countries
reassess their relatonship with North Korea and develop new ways to interact with this
difcult regime.
This volume incorporates the works of scholars examining more deeply the core issues of
some of the big trends in relatonships in Asia. Our academic symposium demonstrates
KEIs efort to provide constructve conversaton and insightul analysis that will provide
the policies for a strong U.S.-Korea alliance and U.S. foreign policy in Asia to ensure these
trends develop in a positve directon. Whether you have a new or contnuing relatonship
with reading this publicaton, we hope you enjoy the 25
th
editon of the Joint U.S.-Korea
Academic Studies volume and the excellent work inside.
The Honorable Don Manzullo
President & CEO, Korea Economic Insttute of America
July 2014
SOUTH KOREAS TRIANGULAR RELATIONS
Rozman: Introducton | 3 2 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
in J apan-ROK relations. Terry assesses thecauses of thedownward slidein thesebilateral
relations, identifes factors that would be expected to bring the two states closer, and ends with
suggestions for U.S. action to draw its two allies into closer alignment. Her detailed list of
what is complicating relations will be familiar to informed readers. It catalogues a relationship
in distress after a year of deterioration. As the Obama administration intensifed its efforts
from March to facilitate closer ties between the two and more trilateralism, Terrys checklist
of what could be done warrants closer attention. She updated it in light of the trilateral summit
and new developments.
Terry also compiles a list of reasons for fnding a basis for hope that the Japan-ROK leg of the
triangle will become less problematic. Although public perceptions in both states are at their
nadir, they have fuctuated sharply. Just a few years ago they were improving to the extent many
were optimistic about the future. Moreover, there was a growing sense that both cultural affnity
and aspects of national identity other than the four plus decades of Japanese imperialism and
annexation would keep narrowing the gap. Terry concludes her cultural coverage with, the
current low in relations could yield to another period of increased cooperation in responseto
the right security or economic incentives. Another factor that could bring the two closer with
the United States playing a leading role is the North Korean threat. Since the late 1990s, this
recurring threat has led to tentative moves to improve relations, including military cooperation,
and some in South Korea recognize that the urgency of this has been growing. A third factor
the way China uses its rising powerwith seemingly divisive impact of late may turn into a
force for closer relations. Terry recognizes anxiety in South Korea over recent Chinese moves
and leaves open the possibility that it will increase and have an impact on relations with Japan.
She considers the Park administration, despite the failure to reach an agreement on intelligence
sharing, as recognizing the beneft of the military cooperation already achieved. When she adds
this list to existing close economic relations, the case for stable relations grows even stronger.
The frst chapter concludes with suggestions for what the United States should do to reinforce
the weak leg in the U.S.-Japan-ROK triangle. Terry writes, The priority should be to
encourage the involvement of both Seoul and Tokyo in multilateral security structures, and
for them to develop joint strategies for addressing common threats and objectives in areas
such as maritime security, missile defense, anti-submarine and mine warfare, and ODA. She
envisions the United States as an honest broker, facilitating progress and tamping down
tensions. If preliminary steps prove fruitful, it could launch a concerted diplomatic effort to try
to resolve the outstanding issues between the two countries. With this proposal, which draws a
parallel with U.S. diplomacy on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, Terry concentrates her discussion
on how to forge a cohesive alliance triangle.
The second chapter considers the China-Japan-South Korea regional integration triangle as a
struggle between what Sung-Yoon Lee calls terra-centric nordpolitik vs. oceanic realpolitik.
It treats South Korea as the swing country, determining whether this triangle tilts toward China
at the expense of Japan and maritime national interests or toward Japan in order to protect vital
economic interests and with due regard for the strategic implications, beginning with North
Korea. In Lees opinion, the tilt is occurring, Seoul is apathetic toward Tokyo, and it is not
acting very strategically. To support this argument, he starts with public opinion data showing
that not only is Abe Shinzo less popular than Xi Jinping, he is less popular than Kim Jong-un.
Sung-Yoon Lee fnds that Roh Moo-hyun proved that bashing Japan has public appeal even if
Introduction
The discussion at the AAS meetings on March 29, 2014 included not only the four authors,
but also Thomas Christensen, moderator, and Evans Revere, presenter on the Sino-ROK-U.S.
triangle. It came within days of the trilateral summit that boosted Japan-ROK-U.S. relations. In
the background was concern raised by Russians in the past few weeks about the implications of
the Ukraine crisis for Sino-Russian ties and the triangle linking them to the Korean Peninsula.
The timing was propitious for a wide-ranging assessment of triangular security involving
South Korea, not least due to President Park Geun-hyes Northeast Asia Peace and Security
Initiative, which aims to transform international relations in the region. As President Barack
Obama prepared to travel to Tokyo and Seoul on the frst legs of his spring trip to Asia, there
was more direct criticism of China by high U.S. offcials accompanying more tangible support
for Japan and in response to more vigorous Chinas efforts to portray Japan as a militarist state
trying to contain it. The Sino-Japan-U.S. triangle is not the object of our analysis here, but its
shadow extends to all four of the triangles we examine. A synopsis of the discussion was posted
on www.theasanforum.org in May 2014.
Recently South Koreas place in triangular confgurations has risen to the forefront in discussions
of international relations in the Asia-Pacifc region. The chapters of Section I explore four
triangles that encompass the ROK. In this introduction, I compare these triangles, searching for
commonalities as well as differences. At one extreme, South Korea could stand at the fulcrum
of each geometrical formation, serving as a bridge or even a balancer between the other two
sides. At the other, it could be left as a marginal factortwo great powers dealing with each
other with scant regard for how South Korean interests are affected. The four triangles differ
on this dimension, as on how they impact Seouls policy toward North Korea and the regional
balance of power. Taken together, these triangles reveal a region in abrupt, unexpected fux.
In the frst months of 2014, the previous upbeat response toward Parks trustpolitik diplomacy
was rapidly fading. Japanese charged that this was nothing more than a tilt toward China, an
extended honeymoon that put the U.S. alliance system in East Asia at risk. Russians saw a
reaffrmation of the U.S. alliance, notably in the response to the crisis in Ukraine, and warned that
Russia would draw closer to China and be more supportive of North Korea. Chinese kept their
ambivalence, which had suffced in 2013 to raise expectations in Seoul, but with no indication of
serious interest in joint approaches to multilateral diplomacy, such as Parks Northeast Asia Peace
and Security Initiative. The U.S. response to South Korea was to continue to urge it to cooperate
more with Japan on security and to join actively in preparations to resist Chinese maritime
aggression, but with the understanding that on the most important joint taskvigilance toward
North KoreaSouth Korea will strive for Chinas trust. Yet, the pressure suddenly mounted to
tilt the triangle toward Washington as Vice President Biden made clear in his December visit to
Seoul and Obama reiterated in his late April visit. Despite talk of a visit by Xi Jinping to Seoul
not long afterwards, Parks stronger warnings about the consequences of another North Korean
nuclear test and her agreement to expand missile defense interoperability with the United States
were indications that Chinas preferences are now outweighed by U.S. ones.
Section I opens with a chapter on the triangle on which Seoul has the greatest leverage, the
alliance U.S.-Japan-ROK triangle. Sue Terry emphasizes Obamas pivot as the driving
force in this triangle, but she warns that it has hit a snag, owing to a sharp deterioration
Positive reinforcement for Seoul serves as a reward to Park for her continuous, conciliatory
efforts and a warning to Kim Jong-un against his disregard of Chinas guidance. Consideration
of more multilateral cooperation with China is Seouls way of building hope that China will
fnally agree to excluding North Korea until it takes a sharp turn toward regional cooperation.
Obliged to prioritize crises in other areas, Washington is not adverse to this conciliatory
bilateral atmosphere between the other two countries. At present, this is the least problematic
of the triangles, but the potential exists for abrupt change.
Section I closes with coverage of the China-Russia-South Korea continental triangle. At the
time of the Six-Party Talks it appeared to be relatively unproblematic, in large part because
Sino-Russian cooperation regarding the peninsula centered on North Korea and neither of their
relationships to South Korea posed a problem for this cooperation. In 2009-11 there were times
when Russia seemed to take a harder line toward Pyongyang. Yet, its role on the peninsula is
marginal compared to the much greater signifcance of Chinas economic and political ties.
Moscow was generally deferential, accepting Chinas leadership in return for seeking Chinas
support on issues in other regions. If Moscow dreamed of a north-south corridor from the Far
East of Russia to Busan rather than the east-west corridor from Northeast China to Seoul that
is Beijings preference, there was so little prospect of success for its plan that it posed little
problem for Sino-Russian relations. South Korea was mostly aloof from any maneuvering
between these countries with different corridors in mind.
The chapter by Denisov and Lukin presents a Russian viewpoint on the continental triangle.
They emphasize that Russia blamed the United States for the North Korean impasse and found
Chinas thinking sympathetic. Having written the paper in Russian and awaiting the editors
translation, the authors perceived a far-reaching transformation in Russo-U.S. relations as a
result of the Ukraine crisis in March 2014. They added a conclusion with a more dire argument
about the spillover from Eastern Europe to Northeast Asia. In their view, Russia will view North
Korea through the lens of what appears to be a new cold war, join with China in supporting it
more strongly, and take a harder line toward South Korea as an ally of the United States. While
this conclusion is not incorporated into the bulk of the chapter, it refects the thinking that had
gained ascendancy in Moscow. The shadow of the United States looms over this triangle,
limiting South Koreas options and giving North Korea room for maneuver, as geopolitics
trumps economics in reasoning.
The Ukraine crisis of 2014 raises the question of how the Sino-U.S.-Russian triangle will
evolve, leaving South Korea on the periphery. On March 15, 2014 the Security Council
voted 13 in favor, one abstention, and one against with a veto in regard to the U.S.-initiated
resolution to support the territorial integrity of Ukraine and reject the referendum in Crimea to
secede. Russia cast the veto, and China abstained. This is but the opening gambit in triangular
management of the crisis, suffcient for the Russians to expect at least tacit Chinese support
but unclear about the spillover into Northeast Asia in the coming months and years. The
strategic Sino-U.S.-Russian triangle will loom in the background as South Korea maneuvers
in the context of the four triangles inclusive of it, deeply conscious that North Korea is closely
watching the Ukraine crisis as well with the possibility it can see an opening. By early May
Sino-Russia cooperation was less in doubt, further narrowing Seouls options.
it comes at the expense of the national interest, and he charges Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-
hye with following the same script. While this is a continuing pattern among South Korean
leaders, Lee discerns something new in Parks gullible approach to China.
Others doubt that Park is tilting toward China even if the relationship between Park and Abe
is horrible and probably irremediable. Yet, just juxtaposing Parks pursuit of Xi and shunning
of Abe leaves a seriously incomplete picture. The two issues of greatest importance in South
Korean thinking about the world beyond their borders are North Korea and the history of
Japanese annexation. Together they constitute a century of anguish with powerful impact on
national identity. Unlike the way China behaved in 2010 when North Korea twice attacked the
South, Japan professes to help constrain the Norths aggression, sharing in a common mission.
In contrast, at odds with the way Japan approached historical issues over most of the past two
decades, Abe has been insensitive to South Korean concerns. His offensive language in the
eyes of South Koreans is parallel to Chinas offensive indifference three years before. Yet,
the contrast of 2013-14 does not amount to a tilt. On matters of security, the presence of a
virtual alliance by virtue of the alliance each has with the United States is reinforced by quiet
cooperation between the armed forces of both states. On matters of universally-shared values
and distrust of Chinese oneshowever much current events may obscure itthe two states are
also largely in accord. This is a multi-dimensional triangle.
The third chapter focuses on the U.S.-China-South Korea security triangle with greatest impact
on North Korea. Whereas many discussions of this triangle take U.S. policy as the starting
point and recent commentaries have emphasized South Korean policies to reshape triangular
dynamics, this chapter argues that China is in the drivers seat. Given the narrow orientation
of the U.S-ROK alliance in comparison to the U.S.-Japan alliance and the predominant stress
in Sino-ROK relations, the fact that China is the gateway to North Korea makes it the object
of attention by the other two states in matters of a triangular nature. To grasp the nature of
triangularity, one needs frst to recognize the divergent objectives of these three states in
dealing with North Korea.
In the chapter on this triangle, I consider Chinas overall geopolitical/geocultural objectives
and its three bilateral relations with North Korea, South Korea, and the United States. On
North Korea, I argue that the position assumed by Valery Denisov and Aleksander Lukin
to be that of Putin in the wake of the Ukraine crisis and elaborated more fully by Georgy
Toloraya, accepting the revival of a cold war and offering more support to North Korea as
the enemy of the United States and its ally, South Korea, differs from Chinas attitude toward
North Korea. Instead, China seeks to pressure North Korea into policies supportive of its goals
for economic reform, peninsular transformation, and change in the regional balance of power
without making a sharp break with the United States. China benefts from drawing Seoul closer
and keeping Washington interested in a new type of great power relations, both desirable
at a time of more tensions with Japan. As long as Sino-U.S. cooperation on North Korea is
proceeding in a positive manner, South Korea would not be forced to resume the tilt toward
the U.S. side of 2008-12 and could seek advantage in riding on the heels of ties between the
two great powersnot troublesome to U.S. offcials, since they are confdent of the strength
of this bilateral relationship as the bedrock in the overall triangle. Yet, in 2014 the balance was
tipping to greater Sino-U.S. rivalry, more U.S. pressure on Seoul to solidify the alliance in
ways troubling to Beijing, and less scope for Park.
7 6 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Sue Mi Terry
Terry: South Korea-Japan-U.S. Relatons | 9 8 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
drawn over Japans forcible recruitment of as many as 200,000 young women and girls to
serve in military brothels.
4
The Koreans have been demanding a sincere apology, compensation for these comfort
women, and for the Japanese government to accept legal responsibility for its historical
conduct. Comfort women and their advocates maintain that they did not beneft from the
grants South Korea received from the 1965 normalization between Seoul and Tokyo and that
the government of Park Chung-hee (father of the current president) did not represent them
when he accepted Japanese reparations at the time. Moreover, the South Koreans believe
that the Japanese government is evading its legal responsibility. While it helped to create the
now-defunct Asian Womens Fund (established in 1995 and dissolved in 2007) to express
a sense of national atonement from the Japanese people to former comfort women, they
point out that AWF was nominally a non-governmental organization and, therefore, did not
represent an offcial state redress of their grievances.
5
For its part, the Japanese government has steadfastly maintained that the 1951 San Francisco
Peace Treaty signed between Washington and Tokyo and the 1965 normalization have settled
all postwar claims of compensation. Tokyo also maintains that it has both acknowledged and
apologized numerous times for its various crimes during WWII, including its role regarding
comfort women. Among these, the Kono Statement issued by Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono
Yohei in 1993 made a formal apology endorsed by the Japanese government to the comfort
women and others affected by the war.
6
The Japanese want to know, in essence: How
much longer and how many times more should we apologize? A July 2013 Pew poll shows
apology fatigue; a strong majority of Japanese (63 percent) thought Tokyo has suffciently
apologized for its military actions in the 1930s and 1940s and no further apology is needed.
7

A number of Japanese, mostly from the right wing of the ruling LDP, cannot resist fanning
the fames by claiming either that comfort women were necessary or, more frequently, that
their condition was not as bad as critics claim.
8
This is further enfamed when some call
for a revision of the Kono Statement, however unlikely that is, and when the government
protests against statues that are springing up in the United States and South Korea in honor
of the victims.
The controversy has grown since Abe came into offce in February 2013 in part because as
prime minister in 2006-2007 he argued that there was no evidence that any of the comfort
women had been coerced into prostitution.
9
Abevoiced doubts about thevalidity of theKono
Statement and even went as far as to periodically suggest that his government might consider
revising it, although in March 2014 he did fnally announce that his administration would not
revise this landmark apology made to comfort women. From the South Korean perspective,
time is running out. Just 56 of the 239 women who publicly acknowledged their experiences
as comfort women are still alive, and many are in their late eighties.
10
South Korean public
interest in the fate of the comfort women has surged since the Constitutional Court ruling on
August 20, 2011, which held that inaction on the part of the South Korean government was
unconstitutional. It held that the government was obliged to be more diplomatically active
on behalf of the victims to secure an apology and compensation, and that its failure to seek
a solution with Japan constitutes infringement on the basic human rights of the victims and
violation of the Constitution.
11
In the United States, too, the issue of comfort women has
In November 2011, the Obama administration announced that the United States would be
pivoting towards the Asia-Pacifc and away from the Middle East, expanding its already
signifcant role in the region. Underlying this rebalancing is President Obamas belief
that U.S. strategy and priorities needed to be adjusted to take account of the fact that Asia
is now the center of gravity for national security and economic interests. The United States,
he believes, needs to do more to safeguard U.S. interests in this vital region by reassuring
allies, keeping trade fowing, deterring North Korea, keeping China in check as it acts in
an increasingly assertive fashion in the South China and East China Seas, and addressing
myriad lesser threats from piracy to terrorism.
1
As the Obama administration tried to implement this pivot to Asia, it hit a snag. To
succeed, it must have the cooperation of South Korea and Japan, Americas two closest allies
in Northeast Asia, but since the announcement of the pivot, their relationship has soured
considerably, making it diffcult to present a united front in dealing with an increasingly
assertive China and an erratic and belligerent North Korea. Since coming to offce in February
2013, President Park Geun-hye has yet to hold a bilateral summit with her counterpart, Prime
Minister Abe Shinzo. While going so far as to say that she would be willing to meet with
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, Park said that holding a summit with Abe is pointless
if Japan continues to stick to the same historical perceptions and repeat its past comments
and without a formal apology from Japan for wartime wrongdoings.
2
President Obama was
only able to bring the two leaders together for the frst time on the sidelines of the Nuclear
Security Summit at The Hague in late March 2014. Abe, for his part, caused predictable
consternation in Seoul in late December 2013 with his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, which
honors Japans war-dead, including 14 convicted Class A war criminals from World War II
in part because he believes Park has shown little interest in rapprochement. Then on January
28, 2014, the Abe government announced that it will revise existing middle and high school
teaching guidelines to refer to the disputed islets with South Korea (and China) as integral
territories of Japan, further angering them.
3
In both cases, Abe likely fgured he has nothing
to lose by catering to his right-wing supporters and doing what he has wanted to do all along
since the relationship was not improving in any case.
This chapter begins by examining the major factors responsible for the downward trajectory
of South Korea-Japanese relations, then looks at factors that should bring the two powers
together, and fnally concludes with some suggestions for how the United States can bring
its two allies into closer alignment as part of a tripartite security relationship. At a time of
strained budgets in Washington, this is one of the most important issues it can tackle to
enhance security and prosperity in East Asia.
Major Issues in Korean-Japanese Relations
The factors exacerbating Seoul-Tokyo relations are many, including the following.
The comfort women, a Korean grievance, dates to the last part of Japans colonization
of Korea when it was embroiled in World War II. The abuse of sex slaves from occupied
countries, including Korea, China, the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies, has proved to
be a painful memory for South Koreans, not least because it was repressed for nearly half
a century. Only in 1990 did the frst South Korean women lift the veil of shame they had
Control does have potentially signifcant economic implications. Both countries believe that
the surrounding area is one of their most fertile fshing grounds and that gas reserves of
unknown size may lie nearby. In November 1998, South Korea and Japan renewed a 1965
treaty that set a provisional fshing zone around the islands. Under the agreement, fshing
boats from Japan and South Korea were allowed to operate in each others 200-nautical-mile
exclusive economize zone if they obtained permits, with fshing quotas and conditions for
such operations to be determined by the two countries every year.
19
This agreement laid the
foundation for a subsequent 2002 fsheries accord in which each state agreed to lower its
catch quota in order to preserve depleted fsh stocks around the islets.
A major diplomatic crisis ensued in 2005 after Japans Shimane prefectural government
declared February 22 to be Takeshima Day. Competing claims began to escalate. In 2006,
in one of the worst incidents, Korea dispatched 20 gunboats and threatened to use force to
prevent Japanese maritime survey ships from approaching the islands.
20
As thetwo sides
edged toward confrontation, rhetoric escalated and nationalist public opinion was mobilized,
particularly in South Korea. Last-minute diplomatic effortswith quiet, behind-the-scenes
U.S. supportresulted in a temporary stand-down, but the patchwork agreement was
followed by a hardening of positions that does not bode well for a solution to the dispute.
21
President Lee Myung-bak made an unprecedented trip to the islands on August 10, 2012,
making him the frst leader from either country to do so. The move was widely seen as
an attempt to boost Lees falling approval rating but also served to worsen ties between
Tokyo and Seoul. Provocations continue on both sides. Most recently, on January 28,
2014, Tokyo announced a revision to the state teaching guidelines for middle- and high-
school textbooks, which instructs teachers to describe the contested island as an integral
part of J apaneseterritory.
22
Constitutional revision and Japans military capabilities, for Koreans, are exacerbating
conditions as Japan attempts to increase its armed forces and expand its freedom to deploy
them. Constitutional change has been at the forefront of political debate since Abe and the LDP
regained power. Citing growing security risks in Asia and the lack of a right to collective self-
defense as inhibiting Japans status as a normal country, Abe calls revising the constitution
his historic mission.
23
He plans to start by revising Article 96, which stipulates that a two-
thirds vote in the Diet and a public referendum is required for constitutional change, and
replace it with a provision that would require just a simple majority for amendments. Abe
next wants to alter Article 9, the renunciation-of-war clause imposed upon Japan following
WWII, which states: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order,
the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat
or use of force as means of settling international disputes. Further, it stipulates that land,
sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.
24
Abes goal is
to rewrite Article 9 by stating that Japan refrains from the use of force to settle international
disputes, rather than prohibiting the maintenance of a military force. He wants to create a full-
fedged military, or National Defense Force (as opposed to todays Self-Defense Force), with
the right to launch pre-emptive military strikes and to engage in collective self-defense to
aid the militaries of its allies, including the United States. These changes are justifed on the
basis of changing regional security dynamics, including Chinas military build-up and the
ongoing standoff with China over the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and threats
gained visibility because of the efforts of Korean-American activist groups. Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton instructed the State Department to refer to them as sex slaves, rather
than the euphemistic term comfort women, to Japans dismay.
12
Yasukuni Shrine, a symbol of historical revisionism, which Abe visited in December 2013,
sparks fear in South Korea that Japan is pursuing an aggressive, right-wing agenda. Abes
visit predictably ignited a frestorm of condemnation from South Korea (as well as China)
and even a rare admonition from the United States. South Koreans argue that such actions
demonstrate a lack of Japanese remorse for imperial-era aggression and are proof that Japan
has not completely rid itself of its militarist tendencies. The controversy over the Shrine
frst surfaced when Emperor Hirohito refused to visit it from 1978 until his death in 1989,
13

following the internment of 14 Class A war criminals nearly two decades after the frst Class
B and C war criminals were included.
14
Since the 1978 decision, no Japanese emperor has
visited Yasukuni, but prime ministers Nakasone Yasuhiro, Hashimoto Ryutaro, and Koizumi
Junichiro preceded Abe in doing so. The leaders of the Democratic Party of Japan refrained
from visiting the Shrine while in power. Abe and others defend their visits, saying that it is a
national religious institution, which honors the dead of previous wars, not just war criminals
or others who died in WWII. They thus claim that the visits are meant to pay their respects to
the souls who have died in the service of Japan through history, not to honor war criminals.
15
South Koreans note, however, that Yasukuni is not just a memorial. It also contains a museum
visited by thousands of Japanese school children every year, which presents Japans 20
th

century wars in a nationalistic, if not outright xenophobic, manner. The museum glorifes
kamikaze pilots but plays down the fact that Japan began the war with China and with the
United States (which is blamed for provoking the attack on Pearl Harbor), and it does not
give any but the most oblique attention to the atrocities committed by Japan, including the
Rape of Nanking. Yasukuni visits are thus a potent reminder to the South Koreans that the
Japanese government consistently fails to fully acknowledge its atrocities and its failure to
educate its young people about those crimes.
The territorial dispute over two tiny rocky islets in the Sea of Japan (East Sea), known as
Dokdo in Korea (solitary islands) and Takeshima (bamboo islands) in Japan, arises from
Korean claims that it was the frst to discover the islets and displayed acts of sovereignty
in administering them as an appendage of Ulleungdo, a bigger neighboring island, and
that it was unable to protest Japans annexation of them in 1905 as part of its conquest of
Korea. The crux of Japans argument is that the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which outlined
how Japans colonial empire was to be dismantled
16
and forced Japan to recognize Koreas
independence and renounce all right, title and claim to Korea, did not require Japan to
renounce its claim to the islets. Thus, it is still the legal ruler. But shortly after the treaty
was signed, on January 18, 1952, South Korea declared its sovereignty by setting up the
Rhee Line, which essentially retained the MacArthur Line (the boundary MacArthur
established after WWII that remained in the San Francisco Treaty), which included the
waters surrounding the rocks.
17
The Japanese government protested, claiming that this was
a unilateral act in contravention of international law, but the rocks have been under de facto
South Korean control ever since. South Korea was not a party to the 1951 treaty; so it does
not necessarily feel bound by all of its terms.
18
not appearing too close to Japan while maintaining effective cooperation. Park also has a
history as an advocate for comfort women seeking restitution from Japan and therefore is
particularly offended by Abes stance on this issue.
Abes outspoken nationalist views do not bode well for improved relations. His comments
and actions on controversial historical issues suggest that he has personally embraced
a revisionist view, which denies that the crux of Japans empire was oppression and
victimization of its neighbors. He has been tied to groups such as Nippon kaigi kyokai which
argue that Japan should be applauded for liberating much of East Asia from Western colonial
powers, the Tokyo War Crimes tribunal was illegitimate, and the killings by Japanese troops
during the Rape of Nanking were either exaggerated or fabricated.
32
During his frst term in offce, Abe backtracked on his most controversial statements that
upset South Korea, but in April 2013, he made comments to the Diet that suggested that his
government would not reaffrm the apology for Japans wartime actions issued by Prime
Minister Murayama Tomiichi in 1995, which is regarded as Japans most signifcant offcial
apology for wartime acts. He added that the defnition of aggression has yet to be frmly
determined by academics or the international community.
33
Is There Hope for Improved Relations?
This summary of issues that divide Tokyo and Seoul might suggest that there is no hope for
an improvement in relations. That would be an unduly pessimistic conclusion. There are
reasons to be more optimistic about the prospects for cooperating more closely, given the
right conditionsespecially the right push from their common ally, the United States.
Public Perceptons are in Constant Flux
In 2010, South Koreans viewed Japan almost as favorably as China, South Koreas largest
trading partner.
34
Less than four years later, Japan is viewed almost as unfavorably as North
Korea. While this is a refection of how toxic relations have become, it is also a sign of how
public attitudes can change. In the 1990s, Korea-Japan relations appeared to be trending up
after the Kono Statement and the Murayama apology. Monuments and museums were built in
Japan to commemorate the victims of WWII and more wartime atrocities were addressed in
Japanese textbooks.
35
In 1998, when President Kim Dae-jung came into the offce and initiated
his Sunshine Policy towards North Korea, seeking reconciliation through engagement,
he employed a similar strategy of active engagement in his dealings with Japan. During an
offcial visit to Japan in 1998 he and Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo declared their intent to
improve South Korean-Japanese relations through political, security, economic and cultural
exchanges.
36
This led to increased collaboration on regional security matters relating to North
Korea and dialogue between the two nations militaries.
37
Increased cultural contact positively affected mutual public perceptions. A Korean ban
on Japanese cultural imports (such as songs and movies) enacted after 1945 was lifted
and, in 2002, Japan and South Korea successfully co-hosted the World Cup.
38
Imports of
Japanese products, including cars and electronic goods, surged 82.9 percent from 2002
to 2008. The percentage of Japanese who said they liked Korea reached 63.1 percent
in 2009, the highest total since the survey began in 1978.
39
Japanese consumers became
from North Korea including missile launches. Abe and others argue Japan cannot fulfll its
obligations under collective security agreements and within the United Nations without a
normal military force.
Changing the Constitution remains a highly divisive issue in Japan and could take years.
Changing Article 9 is particularly diffcult. It has become a deeply embedded part of Japans
own national identity. More than a legal statement, it is a statement of Japanese values and
culture as they have developed since 1945. To many Japanese, it is a source of pride that
theirs is the one country to renounce war. Abes critics argue that changing the amendment
conditions is an act of defance against a state founded on a Constitution.
25
A majority of
Japanese (56 percent) oppose changing the Constitution, although opposition has declined by
11 percent since 2006, when some 67 percent were against it.
26
Given the current pushback
from opposition parties, peace groups, and the media, Abe for now is treading cautiously and
focusing on a drive to reinterpret the current language frst, asserting the right to exercise
collective self-defense, rather than seeking outright revision.
Abes strongest argument is that there is already a considerable gulf between the reality
of Japans defense posture and any reasonable reading of Article 9. Military spending is
already the ffth largest in the world at $46.9 billion,
27
it has the most sophisticated navy in
Asia (after the U.S. Navy), and it is in the process of developing a sophisticated, two-tiered
ballistic missile defense (BMD) program. Moreover, Japan has sent its forces to Iraq and
on refueling missions in the Indian Ocean in support of the Afghanistan war, in addition to
contributing to offcial UN peacekeeping operations.
28
Abe can argue that leaving Article 9
unchanged, even as Japan expands its military missions and capabilities, is hypocritical and
counter-productive because the Constitution is being undermined.
While the United States sides with South Korea on the issue of comfort women and the
Yasukuni Shrine and stays strictly neutral on territorial disputes, it is in Abes corner on
constitutional revisionism. Having Japan play a more active role in collective security will
decrease the burden on the United States, which is dealing with rising debt and a falling
defense budget. But Korea is clearly wary of Japanese ambitions, and fears, rather improbably,
that constitutional revision symbolizes a return to militarism and aggression. Recent polling
data from the Asan Institute suggests that 62 percent of Koreans view Japan as a credible
military threat.
29
When respondents were asked to rank Japan on a scale of 1 to 10 (10 being
most favorable), they gave an average score of 2.7. For North Korea, the equivalent fgures
were 70 percent and 2.4, which suggests that South Koreans view the Stalinist dictatorship
as only slightly more menacing than their democratic neighbor.
30
A separate Pew Research
Poll in July 2013 found that 77 percent of South Koreans had an unfavorable view of Japan.
Favorable views have declined by 25 points since 2008.
31
The impact of personalities, namely those of Park and Abe, is contributing to the strain in
relations. Park Geun-hye has a particular burden to avoid appearing too favorable towards
Japan, given her fathers past as an offcer in Japans army, fuent in Japanese, who later
signed the treaty to normalize relations. While it helped in rapid economic development,
most South Koreans still feel it failed to properly address suffering imposed by Japans
occupation. Parks domestic political foes brand her father as pro-Japan, a powerful stigma
for South Korean politicians. As a result, Park is under domestic pressure to walk a fne line,
included Ieodo, it drew a negative response from Seoul,
45
which extended its own ADIZ to
include the disputed territory. South Korean perceptions of China have suffered: In a July
2013 Pew poll, 78 percent of South Koreans had a favorable view of the United States while
just 46 percent had a favorable view of China.
46
Military Cooperaton
In response primarily to the threat posed by North Korea, but also to some extent because
of the looming challenge from China, Seoul and Tokyo have taken preliminary steps to
exchange observers during military exercises and allow participation by the other power in
what had been bilateral training events with the United States. In June 2012, Seoul and Tokyo
were on the verge of signing a bilateral military agreement known as the General Security
of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) to improve joint security capabilities, but
less than an hour before the ceremony, Seoul canceled due to faring public criticism and
legislative backlash. This would have been the frst military pact between Seoul and Tokyo
since the end of Japanese occupation and would have provided a legal framework for the
exchange and protection of classifed information about North Koreas nuclear and missile
programs, potential military incursions, and terrorist or cyber attacks, and also about Chinas
rising military power.
47
The agreement would have provided South Korea with access to
information collected by Japans high-tech intelligence satellites, AEGIS ships, and early-
warning and anti-submarine aircraft.
Despite the failure to conclude GSOMIA and current souring of the relationship, the Park
administration is well aware that improving military cooperation with Japan is benefcial
because it enhances South Korean security. Japan also provides a critical base of support
for U.S. forces which would defend South Korea during a confict with Pyongyang. Seven
U.S. bases in Japan are designated as part of the United Nations Command Rear and would
serve as a staging area during a Korean crisis. Japan would also likely be a key economic
contributor to Korean unifcation, including aid, food and medicine, and even civilian and
medical personnel. Japan could also offer development assistance and aid.
Economic Ties
The close economic relationship between Seoul and Tokyo is another strong force for
stability despite fare-ups over historical and territorial disputes. They are the two most
mature market economies in East Asia. Japan is Koreas third largest trading partner after
China and the United States, while Korea is Japans third largest export destination. South
Korea continues to rely on Japanese FDI because Japans niche technologies are needed
to complete many Korean consumer products for export. Between 1962 and 2011, Japan
was Koreas second largest FDI provider, with $28.2 billion or 15.1 percent of total FDI.
48

Japans FDI in South Korea more than doubled from 2011 to 2012 to hit $4.54 billion,
which is more than the $4.01 billion that Korea received from China, Taiwan, Hong Kong,
Singapore, and Malaysia combined.
Both countries suffered from the 2008 fnancial crisis, and the Japanese economy has
been further hurt by the great earthquake that struck eastern Japan in March 2011. These
developments brought new momentum to map out a coordination strategy through enhanced
cross-border FDI. Since the earthquake, Japan has been looking to relocate some domestic
fascinated by Korean singers and TV and movie stars as part of a Korean wave, or hallyu,
of pop culture. An increasing number of tourists have followed on the heels of these cultural
exchanges, reaching 4.84 million in 2007.
40
In 2012, 3.5 million Japanese accounted for the
largest group of foreigners to visit South Korea.
41
This indicates that cooperative Korea-Japan relations are possible given the right conditions.
There were motivating factors for both sides to come together for the Obuchi-Kim declaration
in 1998. A year earlier Japan faced a security crisis due to North Koreas test fring of a
missile over the Japanese mainland. Meanwhile Kim Dae-jung came into offce with South
Korea still reeling from the IMF fnancial crisis in 1997 and saw Japan as a potential source
of assistance.
42
The current low in relations could yield to another period of increased
cooperation in response to the right security or economic incentives.
The North Korean Threat
Since the mid-1990s, growing South Korean and Japanese concerns over the North Korean
military threat have triggered tentative moves to improve bilateral relations and military
cooperation. This effort assumed greater urgency after Pyongyangs dangerous provocations
during 2010-2013: sinking the South Korean corvette Cheonan, killing all 46 seamen; shelling
the island of Yeonpyeong, killing four people; testing a third nuclear device; launching
short-range missiles; and threatening a war against Seoul and Washington. Japan clearly
shares Seouls concerns about these actions. Not only have North Korean missiles fown
through Japanese airspace, it has admitted abducting Japanese citizens, and it has regularly
threatened Japan. One South Korean offcial explained, As North Korea raises its threat
of provocation, a consensus has formed that there needs to be closer military cooperation
among [South Korea, Japan, and the United States].
43
Another commented that the need for
South Korea and Japan to share military intelligence became clear each time North Korea
tested a nuclear weapon or launched a long-range missile, but the lack of an accord made
that impossible.
44
The China Factor
China is another potentially common security concern, although the threat perceptions are
quite different in Tokyo and Seoul. Tokyos immediate concerns regarding China are its
military modernization program and its actions regarding Japans southwestern islands.
Since 2010, there has been a rapid increase in the number of Chinese vessels and aircraft
that come close to, or enter, Japanese territorial waters and airspace in the East China Sea,
resulting in Japanese and Chinese patrol ships in almost daily contact in waters surrounding
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. China has been developing new gas felds in the area near
Japans claimed median line, and various Chinese offcials have been questioning Japans
claim to sovereignty over Okinawa.
South Korean-Chinese relations are generally good, but there is anxiety in South Korea
about the rise of China, fostered by Chinas claim to the ancient Korean kingdom of Koguryo
(covering parts of the northern and central Korean Peninsula), Chinese fshermens illegal
fshing in South Korean waters, Beijings support for North Korea, and territorial disputes
over a submerged rock in the East China Sea known as Ieodo to Koreans and Suyan Rock to
the Chinese. When China recently declared an Air Defense Identifcation Zone (ADIZ) that
exercises as well, particularly those relating to maritime and air-defense contingencies,
with U.S. forces based in Japan and South Korea included as appropriate.
Missile defense offers a particularly fruitful area for cooperation: the United States should
encourage South Korea to engage in trilateral missile defense cooperation exercises in
order to implement a multilayered regional missile defense network that includes both
South Korea and Japan. An inability to defend against missile launchings leaves South
Korea and Japan vulnerable to attack and more susceptible to North Korean threats.
The United States has tried to develop common missile defense infrastructure to guard
the region against missile attacks from North Korean and Chinese launch sites but has
achieved only mixed results. By linking U.S., South Korean, and Japanese sensors, the
allies could better deter and, if needed, defeat future North Korean missile attacks, while
protecting vital U.S. military capabilities based in Japan or Guam, and minimizing the risk
that a North Korea provocation could lead to an all-out confict.
To make such cooperation possible, Washington should privately urge continued progress
toward implementing the scrapped military agreement, GSOMIA, and logistics-sharing
agreements. This will require deft public diplomacy from the Park government to convince
the South Korean public and legislature of the mutual benefts of the accords. The three
countries should also emphasize trilateral cooperation in ASW and mine warfare. As
South Korean Vice Admiral Jung Ho-sub noted, The problem is that the ROK Navy
alone cannot deal with a North Korean submarine threat . . . It does not have suffcient
intelligence on when and where North Korean submarines might infltrate. It also has
limited ASW assets for the protection of SLOCs (Sea Lines of Communication) around the
major harbors and the vital waters near the Korean Strait. Also, an insuffcient number of
US naval assets are permanently stationed around South Koreas vital sea-lanes.
52
J apan
could help fll this gap with its strong ASW and mine-sweeping capabilities. The GSOMIA
would enable Seoul and Tokyo to share intelligence on the North Korean submarine threat,
enhancing joint exercises and cooperation. Their navies, notes Vice Admiral Jung Ho-sub,
are uniquely suited for multilateral cooperation because of their intrinsic unobtrusive
nature as over-the-horizon security forces, out of public view.
53
Trilateral training can
occur far from the Korean Peninsula. Mine-sweeping exercises near the Strait of Hormuz
and joint patrols to combat Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden, for example, not only could
serve common allied interests but also develop skills and familiarity that could be applied
in aKorean crisis.
There are numerous other areas in which all three countries could cooperate, including
joint peacekeeping missions, counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, counter-narcotics,
cyberspace, humanitarian assistance, and disaster operations. Beyond the military realm,
they can work together in providing ODA to Southeast Asia and elsewhere. ODA has
been the cornerstone of its foreign policy since Japan began allocating aid to Southeast
Asian nations in 1954 and over the past half century, it has provided more than one-third
of all the ODA that members of ASEAN have received.
54
Japan continues to be the largest
provider of economic aid to Southeast Asia and its largest source of FDI. As a former
benefciary of development cooperation, South Korean aid is also substantial in Southeast
Asia. It has maintained close economic and diplomatic relationships with ASEAN, as one
parts and component factories to earthquake-free destinations. Korea proved to be ideal,
with only a few hours of delivery time separating the two locations, and, while South Korean
frms pay high wages, its workers also have high productivity.
The 2008 crisis changed Japanese views of the Korean economy. Japanese once viewed
South Korea as a cormorant economya term coined by Japanese economist Komuro
Naoki to indicate that, although Korea exports fnished products, it loses much of its profts
by buying parts and materials from Japan.
49
This view became untenable after South Korea
recovered faster than Japan from the downturn. Economic disparities between the two
countries have also dramatically diminished as Korea has pushed forward. GNI per capita in
Japan was 8.4 times that of South Korea in 1973; by 2012, the lead had shrunk to 1.8 times.
Korean electronics manufacturers Samsung and LG have overtaken Japanese rivals such as
Sony and Panasonic in manufacturing smart phones and high-defnition TVs. Japans new-
found respect was evident during the 2008 crisis when the two cooperated as near equals to
implement an aggressive economic stimulus plan and currency swap agreement.
Looking Forward: The Future
of the Japan-South Korea-U.S.
Strategic Relationship
The Obama administration is making a renewed effort to reaffrm its desire to enhance
security and economic ties in the Asia Pacifc region. President Obama visited Asia in
late April, including Tokyo and Seoul, with the principle objective of demonstrating his
commitment to rebalance from the Middle East to East Asia. But for Washingtons
strategy to work, stronger bilateral ties between Seoul and Tokyo and a more robust
triangular security structure are needed in light of growing North Korean and Chinese
security threats to the region and the declining budget of the U.S. armed forces. Enhanced
cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo can increase Americas capacity to deal with regional
threats by redistributing military roles and responsibilities among its most capable allies.
History and other contentious issues, however, make a truly triangular relationship diffcult
to achieve. The South Korea-Japan leg of the relationship is not solid; sometimes it is
practically nonexistent. It is imperative that Washington does more to try to bring its close
Asian allies together. It can start by facilitating contact and reconciliation on smaller and
less contentious issues of mutual concern, as it did when it convened a trilateral meeting
at The Hague in March, coupled with track two initiatives involving knowledgeable
former U.S. policymakers and experts in South Korea-Japan relations. If these initiatives
bear fruit, they could lead to a broader reconciliation effort. The priority should be to
encourage the involvement of both Seoul and Tokyo in multilateral security structures,
and for them to develop joint strategies for addressing common threats and objectives in
areas such as maritime security, missile defense, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and mine
warfare, and ODA.
In the maritime sphere, South Korea and Japan should build on the Defense Trilateral
Talks that have been held annually since 2008.
50
Trilateral naval drills, held most recently
in October 2013, should be intensifed.
51
Parallel involvement should be expanded to other
centuries, of tension and outright confict to establish close working relationships. Think
of France and Germany. A similar transformation will not occur anytime soon in the South
Korea-Japan relationship, but there are many shared interests to bring the two neighbors
together. With a little help from Washington it is quite possible, even probable, that they will
be able to enhance cooperation with each other and with the United States in ways that will
make Northeast Asia more secure.
Endnotes
1. Hillary Clinton, Americas Pacifc Century, Foreign Policy, November 2011; Tom Donilon,
America is Back in the Pacifc and will Uphold the Rules, Financial Times, November 27,
2011.
2. Lucy Williamson, South Korea President Park: No Purpose to Japan Talks, BBC News Asia,
November 3, 2013.
3. Ankit Panda, New Japanese Teaching Guidelines Treat Senkakus, Kurils, Takeshima As
Integral Territories, The Diplomat, January 28, 2014.
4. Lack of offcial documentation has made estimates of the total number of comfort women
diffcult. Numbers range from as low as 20,000 from some Japanese scholars to as high as
410,000 from Chinese scholars. Historians have arrived at various estimates by looking at
surviving documentation. Yoshimi Yoshiaki, who conducted the frst academic study on the
topic, estimated the number to between 50,000 and 200,000. International media sources repeat
the fgure of about 200,000 young women recruited or kidnapped to serve in Japanese military
brothels. The Comfort Women Issue and the Asian Womens Fund, Asian Womens Fund,
http://web.archive.org/web/20070628152156/http://www.awf.or.jp/woman/pdf/ianhu_ei.pdf;
CarolineRose, Sino-Japanese relations: facing the past, looking to the future (London:
Routledge, 2005), 10, 88; Akemi Nakamura, Were they teen-rape slaves or paid pros? The
Japan Times, March 20, 2007; Sex Slaves Put Japan on Trial, BBC News, December 8, 2000;
Stop Violence Against Women: Comfort Women, Amnesty International Factsheet, http://
www.amnesty.org.nz/fles/Comfort-Women-factsheet.pdf.
5. The Asian Womens Fund, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/
policy/women/fund/.
6. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono on the Result of the Study on the Issue
of Comfort Women, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/
women/fund/state9308.html.
7. Japanese Publics Mood Rebounding: Abe Highly Popular, China and South Korea Very
Negative Toward Japan, Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, July 11, 2013, http://www.
pewglobal.org/2013/07/11/japanese-publics-mood-rebounding-abe-strongly-popular/.
8. Hiroko Tabuchi, Women Forced into WWII Brothels Served Necessary Role, Osaka Mayor
Says, International New York Times, May 13, 2013.
9. Alexis Dudden and Kono Mizoguchi, Abes Violent Denial: Japans Prime Minister and the
Comfort Women, The Asia-Pacifc Journal: Japan Focus, March 1, 2007.
10. Peter Ford, Korea to Japan: Time Running Out for Comfort Women Resolution, The
Christian Science Monitor, October 20, 2013.
11. Tetsuya Hakoda, Politics Derailed Resolution of Comfort Women Issue at Last Minute, The
Asahi shimbun, October 8, 2013.
12. Comfort Women Were Sex Slaves, Chosun Ilbo, July 13, 2012.
13. Philip Brasor, Notes on Yasukuni and a week that will live in infamy, The Japan Times,
August 20, 2006.
14. Hirohito visits to Yasukuni stopped over war criminals, The Japan Times, July 21, 2008.
15. See, for example, Andrew Browne, Japans Abe Defends Yasukuni Shrine Visit, The Wall
Street Journal, January 22, 2014.
of its important trade and investment partners, but South Korea has insuffcient ODA
experience as a donor.
55
Well-chosen, noncompetitive aid projects could enhance mutual
cooperation between Japan and Korea, either on a bilateral or multilateral basis.
The United States, Japan, and Korea should initiate trilateral security talks that build on
existing trilateral foreign and defense minister talksheld with Secretary of Defense Chuck
Hagel several times in the past year and the July 1, 2013 foreign ministers meeting with
Secretary of State John Kerry in Bruneito exchange views on North Korea and a wide
range of issues.
56
The purpose of creating such discussion forums with both foreign and
defense ministers from all three countries is to encourage development of a joint strategic
vision that better incorporates the missions, roles, and capabilities of their militaries as well
as coordination on related diplomatic issues, especially regarding Southeast Asia and the
East and South China Seas. Freedom of navigation, and opposition to arbitrary and sudden
declarations of ADIZs are also issues on which the three countries share common concerns
and prescriptions. Finally, a comprehensive trilateral plan should include a strategy for
Korean contingencies, including aid and development contributions.
To enable these talks to bear fruit, leaders in both Tokyo and Seoul should begin by defusing
tensions at home by discouraging infammatory propaganda. Refraining from visiting
Yasukuni Shrine again, Abe and other Japanese leaders should cease making insensitive
remarks regarding comfort women, and stop escalating propaganda on the territorial issue.
In return, Park could at a minimum exercise quiet diplomacy, as advocated by Gerald
Curtis, on the Dokdo/Takeshima issue, since it is not in the national interest to provoke
Japanese nationalism when Korea already has effective control.
In all these areas the United States could act as an honest broker, facilitating progress and
tamping down tensions. If such preliminary steps prove fruitful, it could launch a more
concerted diplomatic effort to try to resolve the outstanding issues between the two countries.
That may sound improbable, but Kerry was until very recently engaged in an active effort to
bridge the historical differences between Israelis and Palestiniansa process that has scant
chance of immediate success because, in addition to everything else, Israel is a pro-Western
democracy and the Palestinian territories (half ruled by Fatah, the other half by Hamas) are
not. While signifcant differences between South Korea and Japan will not be easily resolved,
the two pro-American democracies have many shared interests, and even elements of shared
culture, which the Israelis and Palestinians lack. The odds of success in Japan-South Korea
talks are actually higher than in Israel-Palestinian talks. Imagine if Kerry were to engage in
the kind of intensive shuttle diplomacy between Tokyo and Seoul that Henry Kissinger
employed in the 1970s to allow Israel to reach an agreement with its historic enemy, Egypt.
The effort might still fail, but then again it could succeedespecially if both South Korea
and Japan receive the kind of focused, high-level American attention which Israel and the
Palestinian Authority currently receive.
Conclusion
The South Korea-Japan relationship is as troubled as any relationship in the world between
mature liberal democracies, and there is plenty of historical reason why this should be so,
but history does not have to be destiny. Many other nations have overcome decades, even
40. US-Korea Academic Symposium, 102; Seri Quarterly.
41. Insight: Do South Koreans really hate Japan, The Asahi Shimbun, June 21, 2013.
42. Chung-in Moon and Seung-won Suh. Security, Economy, and Identity Politics: Japan-South
Korean Relations under the Kim Dae-Jung Government, Korea Observer Vol. 36, No. 4
(Winter 2005); pp. 561602.
43. Jeong Yong-soo, 3-Wary Military Drill Would Be a First, Joongang Ilbo, May 9, 2012.
44. Cabinet Approves Military Pact with Japan, Chosun Ilbo, June 28, 2012.
45. Berkshire J. Miller, Is the China-South Korea Honeymoon Over? The Diplomat, http://
thediplomat.com/2013/11/is-the-china-south-korea-honeymoon-over/.
47. Seongho Sheen and Jina Kim, What Went Wrong with the ROK-Japan Military Pact? Asia
Pacifc Bulletin Number 176, July 31, 2012.
48. Korea-Japan Economic Cooperation Amid a New East Asian Integration, p. 50.
49. Cited in June Park, Korea-Japan Relations Moved Toward co-Evolution, Seri Quarterly,
January 2011.
50. U.S., Japan, and Republic of Korea Defense Trilateral Talks Joint Statement, U.S.
Department of Defense, January 31, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.
aspx?releaseid=15796.
51. U.S., Japan hold joint naval drill, Diplomacy, October 10, 2013.
52. Vice Admiral Jung Ho-sub, ROKUSJapan Naval Cooperation in the Korean Peninsula
Area: Prospects for Multilateral Security Cooperation, International Journal of Korean
Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2012), pp. 201-02, http://www.icks.org/publication/
pdf/2012-SPRING-SUMMER/9.pdf.
53. Ibid, 193.
54. Amy Thernstrom, Japanese ODA at 50: An Assessment, Asia Program Special Report, No.
128, February 2005.
55. Hyunghwan Joo, Koreas ODA Policy: Past, Present and Future, Ministry of Strategy and
Finance, November 2012, http://devpolicy.anu.edu.au/pdf/2012/events/20121129-Koreas-
ODA-Policy-Hyunghwan-Joo.pdf.
56. U.S.-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Meeting, U.S. Department of State, July 1, 2013,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/07/211388.htm; Joint Statement of the Japan, Republic
of Korea, United States Defense Ministerial Talks, U.S. Department of Defense, June 1, 2013,
http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=16054.
16. Treaty of Peace with Japan, September 8, 1951, article 2(a). Also cited in Kimie Hara, Cold
War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacifc: Divided Territories in the San Francisco System (New York:
Routledge Japanese Studies Series, 2007): p. 46.
17. 60 Years of the Republic: The Syngman Rhee Line, Chosun Ilbo, January 23, 2013.
18. Kimie Hara, Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacifc, p. 47.
19. South Korea, Japan Agree Fisheries Treaty, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacifc, November 28,
1998.
20. Ibid., 219.
21. Thomas U. Berger, War, Guilt, and World Politics After World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2012): p. 219.
22. Japan: teachers to call Senkaku and Takeshima islands Japanese territory, The Guardian,
January 28, 2014.
23. PM Abe says its his historic mission to change Japans Constitution, Japan Daily Press,
August 13, 2013.
24. The Constitution of Japan, http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Japan.
25. Takao Yamada, Fighting back the push for Article 96 amendment, The Manichi Japan, May
13, 2013.
27. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2013, http://milexdata.sipri.org; Isabel Reynolds, Japan
Defense Budget to Increase for First Time in 11 Years, Bloomberg News, January 30, 2013;
Liu Yunlong, Japan increases military expansion for next year, Global Times, December 26,
2013.
28. Michael Green and Nicholas Szechenyi, Routledge Handbook of Japanese Politics (New York:
Routledge, 2011), p. 334; Richard Sameuls, Securing Japan: Tokyos Grand Strategy and the
Future of East Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007): p. 98.
29. Jiji Kyodo, 62% of South Koreans Regard Japan as a Military Threat: Think Tank Poll.
The Japan Times Online, October 30, 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/10/30/
national/62-of-south-koreans-regard-japan-as-a-military-threat-think-tank-poll/#.UqIvtJHfI4S.
30. Jiji Kyodo, 62% of South Koreans Regard Japan as a Military Threat.
32. Emma Chanlett-Avery, Mark Manyin, William Cooper, Ian Rinehart, United States
Congressional Research Service. Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, May 1, 2013,
pp. 5-6.
33. Reiji Yoshida, Buoyant Abes true colors emerging, The Japan Times, April 26, 2013.
34. Friedhoff, Karl, and Chungku Kang. Rethinking Public Opinion on Korea-Japan Relations.
Issue Brief. The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, September 13, 2013, http://mansfeldfdn.org/
mfdn2011/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Asan-Public-Opinion-Issue-Brief-Rethinking-Public-
Opinion-on-Korea-J apan-Relations.pdf.
35. Thomas U. Berger, War, Guilt, and World Politics After World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2012).
36. MOFA: Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration A New Japan-Republic of Korea
Partnership towards the Twenty-First Century, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/korea/
joint9810.html (accessed on December 9, 2013).
37. Victor Cha, Japan-Korea Relations Comparative Connections, Vol. 1, No.1, http://csis.org/
publication/comparative-connections-v1-n1-japan-korea-relations-rooting-pragmatic.
38. Victor Cha, Japan-Korea Relations Comparative Connections, Vol. 2, No. 3, http://csis.org/
programs/pacifc-forum-csis/comparative-connections/vol-2-no-3-oct-2000.
39. Cabinet Offce, Public Survey on Diplomacy, December 14, 2009, quoted in June Park,
Korea-Japan Relations Move Toward Co-Evolution, Seri Quarterly, January 2011.
The Seoul-Beijing-Tokyo Triangle:
Terra-centric Nordpolitk
vs. Oceanic Realpolitk
Sung-Yoon Lee
Lee: Seoul-Beijing-Tokyo Triangle | 25 24 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
dictatorship) actually favor the leader of China (a single-party communist dictatorship that
shares with the DPRK an alliance forged in blood)
2
over the leader of Japan (a wealthy
democracy and neighbor to which it is strategically aligned by virtue of the U.S. alliance
structure in the region) may seem counterintuitive.
3
Even higher on the counterintuitive scale is
preference for Kim Jong-un, a third-generation totalitarian leader who apparently was behind
North Koreas torpedoing of a South Korean navy ship and the shelling of an inhabited island
in 2010, and who brutally keeps tens of thousands of innocent North Koreans as political
prisoners in gulags,
4
over Japans elected leaderAbes occasional irritating remarks and
deeds that seem to deny Japans past criminal actions against Korea notwithstanding.
Opinion surveys are often unreliable as public opinion is fckle. Moreover, a nations
foreign policy, purportedly pursued in the national interest, may not correlate closely with
the prevailing opinion of the day. Hence, South Koreans apparent counterintuitive attitude
toward the leaders of Japan, North Korea, and China may variously be considered a transient
phenomenon, a manifestation of irrational ethno-nationalism, or not particularly germane to
actual policy vis--vis these three powers. On the frst proposition that the publics aversion
to the Japanese leader, and by extension his government, may be a transitory phenomenon, in
actuality, relations between Seoul and Tokyo have steadily declined since 2012. In particular,
with Lee Myung-baks visit in August 2012 to Dokdo (Takeshima), the bilateral relationship
took a noticeable dip.
5
Upon arrival, Lee, the frst South Korean head of state to visit the
territory, declared to the squadron of ROK police offcers guarding the islets, Dokdo is
truly our territory, and its worth defending with our lives,
6
deliberately fanning the fames
of Korean nationalism.
Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko condemned Lees visit as completely unacceptable,
pledging to take a resolute stance on this matter,
7
while his foreign minister characterized
the visit as utterly unacceptable and recalled his ambassador in Seoul.
8
With both the
return of Abe and the election of Park Geun-hye as president in December 2012, prospects
for improved bilateral relations seemed to improve; however, the trajectory of decline in the
bilateral relationship has only dipped more steeply since the leadership transitions took place
in Seoul and Tokyo.
9
On the second proposition that South Koreans strong sentiments against Japan betray their
irrational nature,
10
it is clear that few actions are as effective in domestic politics as fanning
the fames of anti-Japanese sentiment. After Shimane Prefecture in 2005 designated February
22 as Takeshima Day,
11
invoking the decision a hundred years earlier placing Takeshima
(Dokdo) under it, Roh Moo-hyun responded a week later, on March 23, that South Korea
was on the verge of a tough diplomatic war with Japan.
12
Casting this decision as a portent
of a greater threat, Roh wrote in a letter addressed to his fellow Koreans, We cannot sit back
and watch Japan justify its history of aggression and colonization and pursue hegemonic
power againThe issue concerns the future of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia.
13

Infammatory rhetoric often begets even more infammatory rhetoric, and Japans Nihon
Keizai shimbun questioned Rohs leadership, painting him as one easily swayed by public
opinion, even going so far as to call his emotional language just like North Korea.
14

Democratic Party of Japan (DJP) lawmaker Nishimura Shingo went so far as to characterize
Rohs remarks as tantamount to throwing the Korea-Japan relationship into a ditch
15
History has shown that a power vacuum on the Korean Peninsula is an invitation to
aggression. The 60-year-period from the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 to the end of the
Korean War stands in marked contrast to the 60-year-period of de facto peace since 1953. In
the former, four major wars enveloped Korea and its vicinity, including the Russo-Japanese
War of 1904-05 and the Second Sino-Japanese War. In the latter, the balance of power has
been maintained primarily by virtue of the U.S.-ROK alliance, albeit at the cost of periodic
lethal attacks and threats from North Korea. This chapter addresses the historical lessons
of power shift in Northeast Asia for contemporary international politics and the strategic
implications of South Koreas embrace of China and its seeming inability to overcome, in
Korean parlance, issues of the past with Japan.
In the present security dynamics in Northeast Asia, which closely resemble the Cold War
confguration of the U.S.-Japan-ROK alliance vs. the PRC-Russia-DPRK contingent, South
Koreas recent tilt toward China and apathy for Japan come at considerable potential cost to
its own long-term national interest as well as peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Its need
to protect its vital economic relations with China and not jeopardize the overall relationship
is evident; but its future security and commercial interests can best be advanced within the
U.S.-led alliance structureeven with the bilateral historical issues between Seoul and
Tokyo. The next major geopolitical shift or change in the status quo in the region will
likely emanate from North Korea. China, which, arguably, nods in approval at North Koreas
provocations while issuing occasional protestations, is poised to further bolster its signifcant
leverage vis--vis Pyongyang and Seoul by exploiting its North Korea card in the long-
term strategic competition against the United States. Beijings seemingly unrelenting
strategic support of Pyongyang has serious implications for North Koreas denuclearization
and Korean unifcation, a reality that remains unaffected by the bonhomie overfowing from
the Park Geun-hye-Xi Jinping summit on June 26, 2013. Unable to withstand the military
threat coming from North Korea and China on its own, Japan has dramatically bolstered
its U.S. alliance, as borne out in the October 3, 2013 meeting of the U.S.-Japan Security
Consultative Committee (SCC). Is Seoul now the weakest link in this military standoff?
South Koreas Not-So-Strategic Triangular
Relations with China and Japan
A snapshot of South Korea in early March 2014 may lend weight to the following unproven
dictum (embraced by this particular author): Triangular relations among states may at times
be as convoluted and toxic as those among individuals. According to a March 3 phone survey
of 1000 South Koreans by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, asking respondents to rate
the leaders of North Korea, Japan, the United States, China, and Russia, Kim Jong-un came
out ahead of Abe Shinzo by a margin of 1.3 to 1.1 on the surveys zero-to-ten scale, zero
being the least favorable.
1
Among the leaders of fve nations, Barack Obama led with a
score of 6.2, followed by Xi Jinping at just under 5, with Vladimir Putin next at 3.5, before
popularity plummeted to the depths seen only for Kim and Abe.
That South Koreans overall favor Obama, the leader of the sole treaty ally, makes sense to
observers. However, the notion that citizens of an open democracy (that faces an existential
threat from the DPRK, an alternate Korean state that is ruled by a menacing dynastic
The above passage is noteworthy for the conspicuous absence of Chinese subject-object
agreement. The frst sentence omits altogether Chinas stance on North Koreas continued
nuclear testing and its ever-growing nuclear arsenal. The second sentence fails to identify just
whose nuclear weapons development the two sides are addressing; that is, whether or not
the extended nuclear deterrence that the United States provides the ROK is also taken into
account in this indictment. Just whom the Chinese have in mind as the greatest threat to the
region and the world with its nuclear weapons development, whether it is tiny North Korea
or the gargantuan United States, is left unsaid. Above all, the denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula, a phrase that made its offcial international debut in the September 19, 2005 joint
statement of the Six-Party Talks, means, in both North Korean and Chinese parlance, not only
a nuclear-free DPRK, but more pointedly, the abrogation of the U.S.-ROK alliance and the
dislodging of the U.S. nuclear umbrella from the ROK.
25
In issuing the above words in its
joint statement, China maintained its strategic ambiguity on North Koreas nuclear weapons
programs and the denuclearization of North Korea. The real question here is to what extent
the ROK was aware of this duplicity and went along with itor whether Park actually came
away from the summit believing that Xi was ingenuous in staunchly opposing North Koreas
nuclear weapons, as the above passage might, at frst glance, suggest. By the ROK foreign
ministrys self-congratulatory assessment of Parks visit as having opened a new era in
Korea-China ties, and in dubbing the summit a trip of heart and trust, coming just two days
after the visit, one may be forgiven for not being able to take a frm position on this question.
Furthermore, during the visit Park purportedly asked Xi to honor a Korean nationalist, Ahn
Jung-geun, who shot to death Ito Hirobumi, a prominent Japanese leader, at a rail station
in Harbin on October 26, 1909, by building a statue of Ahn at the station.
26
Chinanot only
obliged, but went considerably further and built a small-but-protective memorial hall over
Ahns statue, which opened on January 19, 2014. Japan condemned the memorial, with
Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide claiming that South Korea and China were banding
together. Even before the opening of the memorial, Suga in November 2013 had called
Ahn a criminal, while warning against the tacit Sino-South Korean front against Japan,
remarking that the construction of the memorial was not helpful for Japan-South Korea
relations.
27
Suga also unintentionally baited South Korea and China to strike back with
the following provocative statement: We recognize Ahn Jung-Geun as a terrorist who was
sentenced to death for killing our countrys frst prime minister.
28
Japans labeling of Ahn, who is universally respected in South Korea, as a terrorist
predictably prompted a prompt reply. Hong Moon-jong, secretary-general of the governing
party retorted, If Ahn Jung-guen was a terrorist, then Japan was a terrorist state for having
mercilessly invaded and plundered countries around it, while Cho Tae-yong, foreign
ministry spokesperson, called Sugas remarks ignorant and anti-historical, adding that
he could not repress his astonishment.
29
Two days later, China entered the fray. Foreign
ministry spokesperson Qin Gang, when asked to address the question of Ahn as a terrorist,
replied: Ahn Jung-geun is, in history, an upholder of justice who fought against Japans
aggression. If Ahn Jung-geun were a terrorist, what about the 14 Class A war criminals of
WWII honored in the Yasukuni Shrine? If the establishment of the Ahn Jung-geun Memorial
Hall were a tribute to the terrorist, what about the Japanese leaders visit to the Yasukuni
Shrine where Class A war criminals are enshrined?
30
Park Geun-hye, at the time chairwoman of the opposition Grand National Party, opined,
I cannot but wonder whether President Rohs remarks are appropriate;
16
yet within
days his approval rating jumped from 20 percent to 48 percent, with 89 percent of South
Koreans supporting Rohs feisty remarks.
17
Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon stated that Rohs
statements represented the ROK governments strategic mind, justifying it after the fact,
for by all accounts the foreign ministry was kept in the dark about Rohs letter until its
contents became public. A precedent was set, potentially at the cost of the national interest.
The lessons were clear: It paid to antagonize Japan when the South Korean public felt Japan
had been the provocateur. What is more, bashing Japan has the added advantage of winning
over North Korea,
18
which is an attractive proposition to any elected South Korean leader
intent on improving ties with Pyongyang and chalking up a North Korea legacy.
On the third proposition, whether the publics distaste for Abe impinges on actual ROK
foreign policy, it is apparent that Park Geun-hye came into offce with predetermined views
not only on Abe and South Koreas bilateral relations with Japan but also on Xi Jinping
and Seouls bilateral relations with Beijing. Chinas ascendance in world affairs over the
past decade has been all the more pronounced in the international politics of the Korean
Peninsula and the region as a whole.
19
Whereas it exercised no real infuence over the course
of events during the frst North Korean nuclear crisis in the early 1990s, since the second
nuclear crisis fared up in October 2002, Beijing has assumed a central role, both as the
key determinant in negotiations and as the key arbiter of any meaningful punishment to be
meted out against North Korea for its continued provocations. More than in any other period
since its defeat in the Sino-Japanese War and its consequent loss of infuence, China enjoys
great sway over the future course of the peninsula. Its economic infuence is irreplaceable to
Pyongyang, and it is a factor that Seoul is extremely reluctant to defy.
20
Park has placed great importance on continuing to strengthen bilateral relations with China.
Barely a month after her election victory on December 19, 2012, she broke with tradition and
dispatched her frst special envoys abroad to Beijing instead of Washington.
21
Sequencing of
summit meetings with leaders of key neighboring states is not without symbolism. What is
more telling than the frst destination for her special envoys was that she chose not to send
any envoy to Tokyoalthough she did receive an envoy representing Abe in early January.
22
When Park paid a state visit to China from June 27 to 30, she was given, as the joint
statement published by Xinhua stated, a grand welcome and warm hospitality by the
Chinese Government and people.
23
But buried underneath the diplomatic language of
mutual respect and in spite of substantive specifc action plans pledging to open a hot
line between the foreign ministers and establish a Sino-ROK Joint Committee for People-
to-People Exchanges, was a classic formulation of Chinese ambidexterity:
The ROK side expressed worry at the DPRKs continued nuclear testing, and
explicitly stated that it will never recognize the DPRKs possession of nukes in
any circumstance. The two sides unanimously hold the view that nuclear weapon
development seriously threatens peace and stability in Northeast Asia, including
the Korean Peninsula, and the world. The two sides affrm that achieving
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula [emphasis added] and maintaining
peace and stability there is in the common interest of all parties, and they
unanimously agree to work for this.
24
the balance of power in the region and the world, with a rapidly rising China and a declining
United States much in the same manner as the scene 400 years ago with the revisionist
Manchus on the ascendance and the status quo power Ming in decline.
For North Korea, in the aftermath of the Korean War, its maritime neighbors, South Korea
and Japan, and the world beyond the Pacifc Ocean, effectively became a dead end. Both
Joseon Korea in the seventeenth century and North Korea in the twentieth century turned
inward, away from the ocean, and became the quintessential quasi-isolated continental state.
The ramifcations of such a terra-centric policy on the respective mentalities of the Korean
leadership and conditions of life, respectively, of the people of Joseon and the Democratic
Peoples Republic of Korea, hardly require elaboration.
In contrast, South Korea, coming out of the Korean War, pursued a dramatically new course.
Heavily depending on its patron the United States, it oriented itself toward the Pacifc and
the world beyond for the frst time in Korean history. Its rise to maritime prominence as a
major trading nation of the world captures the essence of the South Korean state today: a
global leader in shipping, electronics, and a thriving democracy. Yet, as much as South Korea
has beneftted from its dependent relationship with the United States and as much debt as it
owes, the rapid rise of China over the past two decades has engendered an atavistic nostalgia
for China in the traditional vassal state, a romantic attachment rooted in an abstract sense of
cultural debt that Korea oweseven going back to Ming Chinas deliverance of Joseon. South
Koreans largely remain unencumbered by the ghosts of history in having fought against the
PRC in the Korean War or, in a marked contrast to complex feelings toward the United States,
considerations of funkeyism when viewing China today. Flunkeyism is a term often used
by North Korea to deride South Koreans disposed toward serving the great (sadaeju-ui:
), which, in plain language, means being servile to the United States. For example, an
articlein theRodong Sinmun last October charged, Flunkeyism and dependence on foreign
forces are an inveterate bad habit of the south [sic] Korean ruling quarters.
35
At the heart of the Norths derision lies Korean ethnic nationalism, in particular,
determination to be self-reliant and independent of external powers in shaping the future of
theethnic Korean nation.
36
Ethnic nationalism (minjokjuui: ) is hardly native or
exclusive to Korea. However, in the Korean context, and particularly in the common lexical
confguration uri minkokggiri (by the Korean ethnic nation ourselves), the term has an
unmistakable connotation of Korean exceptionalism and exclusivity. This phrase is featured
in the frst article of the South-North Joint Declaration signed by Kim Dae-jung and Kim
Jong-il at the 2000 Pyongyang summit signifying the spirit and method by which the Koreans
will determine their future. The same Korean phrase transliterated slightly differently, uri
minzokkiri, is the offcial name of a website run by the Committee for the Peaceful Unifcation
of the Fatherland, a major arm of the North Korean propaganda machinery founded in
1961 under the auspices of the Workers Party of Korea. Unmistakably, national identity
politics resonate in both the North and the South, and in the latter, with particular force in
the context of South Koreas asymmetrical relationship with the United States. Since Koreas
liberation from Japanese colonialism in 1945, the founding of the Republic of Korea in 1948,
through Americas deliverance of the ROK in the Korean War, to Seouls ongoing dependent
relationship Washington today, ethnic nationalism has been a psychic force in South Koreas
relationship with the United States.
37
Parks request to Xi to build a memorial in Ahn Jung-geuns honor, in both principle and
historical viewpoint, may be irreproachable. But that the overture was made by the head
of state of the Republic of Korea to the head of state of the Peoples Republic of China
unnecessarily created the impression in Japan that the two were working in concert against
J apan.
31
From South Koreas perspective, the request would best have come from a lower-
level offcial instead of Park herself, for there will likely come a day when the convoluted
and toxic nature of the triangular relations among Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing will prompt
Park to seek Japans support in advancing South Koreas interests vis--vis China. South
Korea and China may be aligned by the common history of victimization by imperial Japan,
but the formal task of remembrance, commemoration, and rectifcation of history, especially
international history, is best left to historians and academics instead of heads of state.
South Koreas Propensity to Tilt
toward China
Historically, Koreas most pressing need to fnd security within the context of trilateral
relations with China and Japan came in a war, which tore Korean lives apart and devastated
the Korean land. It touched the lives of the vast majority of Koreans. It was a war that saw
Chinese troops cross the Yalu River and dramatically alter the fortunes on the battlefeld,
forcing their foes to remain largely confned to the southern half of the peninsula. At its
end, all the major belligerents claimed victory, while no doubt remained as to who were its
greatest victims. A major international war in Northeast Asia that shook the status quo in the
region and presaged the contrasting vicissitudes of national fortune among the combatants,
it was theImjin Waeran of 1592-98, referred to in English as Hideoyoshis invasionsthe
most spectacular manifestation of Korea-China-Japan triangular tensions in history.
32
The parallels between this war and the Korean War of 1950-53 are striking. Although the two
tragic events stand more than 350 years apart, from a Korean perspective, commonalities
immediately draw attention: the leaderships vulnerability, ineptitude, and ignorance of the
strategic environment in the lead-up to the war; its helplessness in the prosecution of the war
and ceasefre negotiations; and new security challenges that enveloped the Korean Peninsula
in the postwar era. Following Japans invasions in the 1590s, Joseon Korea fell into a long
period of decline, closing itself off for the next 300 years from foreign intercourse except
with China and intermittent contact with Japan. The implications of this mindset and self-
seclusion would bepainfully felt in theearly twentieth century, as Korea, unableto copewith
the drastically different international order into which it was pulled, was colonized by Japan.
Even in the near term, the Korean monarchy, coming out of the Imjin War, found itself
caught between a declining Ming China, to which it owed allegiance and debt,
33
and anew
rising power in Manchuria that the Confucian Korean leadership regarded as barbarian. King
Injo would misread the strategic environment and side with the Ming, while alienating
the Manchus. The result was two devastating and humiliating Manchu invasions of Korea,
the frst in 1627 and the second in 1636. The latter Manchu campaign, in particular, has
been dramatized into a morality play, a best-selling two-volume history by Han Myonggi.
Its running theme is the critical need for South Korea today to choose sides wisely in the
so-called G-2 era.
34
The main message is that South Korea today is caught up in a shift in
party, with party leader Park Geun-hye assailing Rohs notion of taking a neutral, balancing
role in the region while maintaining a strong alliance with the United States. The role of
a balancer is possible only when we have the power and capability, and other countries
recognize us as a balancer. But China, Japan, Russia and even North Korea do not recognize
us as a balancer, Park said in a speech at the National Assembly. She went on to warn: If
we break away from the alliance with the United States and isolate ourselves diplomatically,
it will do no good for our national interest.
41
Criticism of Roh was not confned to his
opposition party. Even Stephen Bosworth, former U.S. ambassador to South Korea and one
not known for his immoderate views or undiplomatic remarks, warned that any attempt by
South Korea to play the role of the balancer in the region would be to punch above its
weight class and that if South Korea were bent on pursuing that role, one could not rule
out the possibility of damaging the alliance.
42
Needless to say, Park has not shown any inclination to align her nation with China to the
detriment of the alliance with the United States. Parks bona fde pro-U.S. stance has never
come into question, and it is all but an open secret that Washington was relieved and pleased
by Parks election in December 2012. Neither has she made any remarks such as Whats
wrong with being anti-American? as Roh did during his bid for the presidency in 2002,
43
or
stir up controversy during her visit to China as Roh did, upon being queried on the Chinese
fgures he most respects during a visit to China in 2003, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.
44

It is also exceedingly unlikely that any former high-ranking U.S. offcial ever will come to
call Park anti-American and probably a little crazy, as former Defense Secretary Robert
Gates did Roh in his memoir.
45
Therefore, the controversies and strains in the ROK-U.S.
bilateral relationship may be said to be confned to the Roh presidency. At the same time,
the structural imperatives of the triangular relations among South Korea, Japan, and China
favor China, at a cost to the U.S.-led trilateral quasi-alliance among Washington, Seoul, and
Tokyo, whenever friction between Seoul and Tokyo comes to the fore. As much as the Obama
administration may sympathize with South Koreas indignation at the Abe administration for
its frequent undiplomatic remarks and, in particular, Abes visit to the Yasukuni Shrine last
December, it can only regard a South Korea that openly turns its back on Japan as a strategic
liability, for any fssure among the three nations can only favor Chinas strategic interests.
Furthermore, there is no question that since the Park-Xi summit, South Korea has far more
actively pursued diplomacy with China than with Japan, in variety and degree, on issues
ranging from negotiations on a free trade agreement, increased cooperation on international
security issues, and cultural, humanities, and technological exchange programs. In particular,
ROK national security chief Kim Jang-soo and Chinese State Counselor Yang Jiechi met
in Seoul in mid-November and agreed to open strategic dialogue channels on diplomacy
and security policies governing both countries. Meanwhile, South Korea and Japan held
all of three open meetings between July and December, two of which addressed free trade
agreement issues in a trilateral setting involving China.
46
Since the early 1950s, the United States has intermittently played the role of intermediary
between South Korea and Japan. The exigencies of the Korean War created a pressing need
for it to seek to improve relations between Seoul and Tokyo. Washington arranged for the
frst bilateral meeting between the two nations during the war, in October 1951, in Tokyo.
At the outset, the Korean delegate, Kim Young-shik, called for an apology from Japan
In contrast to complex attitudes bordering on an inferiority complex toward Japan and the
United States, which occasionally manifest themselves in large-scale, organized protests
against these countries, contemporary attitudes toward China are characterized by relatively
high tolerance for Chinese misdeeds against Koreawhich suggests a misguided shade
of superiority complex. For example, in April 2008, the Olympic torch relay through
Seoul, on its way to the Summer Olympics in Beijing, triggered a violent clash between
thousands of Chinese nationals and anti-Beijing South Korean and Tibetan human rights
activists. In the melee, hundreds of Chinese, some armed with poles and pipes, were seen
attacking Tibetans and their South Korean supporters, not to mention journalists and the
South Korean riot police. Several chased the police into the lobby of the Seoul Plaza Hotel,
an upscale hotel just across the street from City Hall, and repeatedly thrust their weapons
at the police. This unusual infringement on South Korean sovereignty initially did trigger
indignation and anti-Chinese commentary in the South Korean media and chat rooms.
38
But
the anger and animosity were short-lived. The spectacle of thousands of Chinese nationals
assaulting South Korean citizens, including the national police, in the South Korean capital
in broad daylight certainly did not lead to any kind of organized political protest in front of
the PRC embassy in Seoul or sustained civic movement against the Chinese government.
Such apparent collective equanimity stands in contrast to the outpouring of indignation
and massive demonstration at a far less serious contemporaneous case of perceived foreign
infringementthat from the United States. South Koreas resumption of the import of
U.S beef triggered widespread, unfounded fears of debilitating health implications from
consuming U.S. beef, and widespread anger at both Seoul and Washington for colluding
in this racket. Anger and ambivalence toward the United States unleashed massive protests
that virtually shut down downtown Seoul for over two months,
39
while occasional news
reports on questionable Chinese-produced foodsranging from fake to tainted to harmful
entering the South Korean market have produced to date no such social movement. Even
Chinas provocative announcement on November 23, 2013, of an East China Sea Air Defense
Identifcation Zone (ADIZ), which impinges on South Korean jurisdiction, triggered no
serious anti-Chinese rhetoric or protests, whereas such a declaration by Japan would most
likely have resulted in a very different reaction in South Korea.
Were the publics acute sensitivity to perceived U.S. or Japanese infringement and relative
composure in the face of actual Chinese infringement not refected in South Koreas foreign
policy, such phenomena may not merit attention in the context of South Koreas international
relations. However, South Koreas latent attachment to China over the United States came
close to becoming offcial policy, when President Roh, during a speech at the air force
academy in February 2005 declared that South Korea would assume the role of balancer
in Northeast Asia. Rohs statement variously suggested an intermediary role for South
Korea in the region, aligning with China against Japan, and checking U.S. strategic policy
in the region by inching away from Washington and closer to Beijing. These concerns were
confrmed in subsequent months by the Roh governments repeated calls for an independent
military, which would not be drawn into a confict started by the United States, and decrease
in military exchanges with Japanas well as Rohs diplomatic war statement in March,
while elevating military ties with China and vetoing even discussions with the United States
of joint contingency operations in North Korea in the event of a change in the status quo in the
North.
40
Rohs balancer statement immediately drew criticism from the main opposition
whether on security issues like joining the U.S.-led missile defense system or on economic
issues like joining the Trans-Pacifc Partnership (TPP).
53
The trilateral relations among the
three nations today resemble less an equilateral or even an isosceles triangle, with equal
distance maintained between Beijing and Seoul and between Beijing and Tokyo. Rather,
they resemble more a scalene triangle with a fuctuating, but shorter, distance maintained
between Beijing and Seoul than between Beijing and Tokyo.
Implications for the Seoul-Beijing-Tokyo
Triangle and Regional Security
The trilateral relations among South Korea, China, and Japan cannot be properly considered
outside the context of the long-term strategic competition between the United States and
China and the growing ballistic missile and nuclear threat posed by North Korea. The
United States, as the preeminent military power in the world, is unlikely to compromise
its strategic goals of containing China and North Korea, the principal source of threat in
Northeast Asia. To what extent its two allies in the region, Japan and South Korea, support
U.S. policy objectives, will determine the nature of the Seoul-Beijing-Tokyo triangle in
the near term.
On October 3, 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel
laid a wreath at Chidorigafuchi National Cemetery in Tokyo and paid their respects to
unidentifed Japanese war dead from the Pacifc War. It was the frst time that two U.S.
cabinet ministers paid such homage in the postwar era as well as in the history of U.S.-
Japan relations. This remarkable show of solidarity and resolve not to let historical issues
mar the bilateral relationship would not have been possible without the mutual trust and
genuine friendship built over the past 68 years on the shared values of democracy, the
rule of law, free and open markets, and respect for human rights. This symbolic act was a
statement that the United States recognized Japan as a global political power and a stalwart
partner in facing the complex regional security environment, as mentioned in the meeting
of the U.S.-Japan SCC in Tokyo on the same day. In simple terms, this environment means
the challenges and threats posed by the blood alliance between China and North Korea.
The United States also expressed its support for Japans decision to establish its own
National Security Council and contribute more proactively to maintaining both regional
and global peace and security, welcoming Japans decision to review its legal procedures
in order to exercise collective self-defense. In particular, the United States and Japan, for
the sake of a more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities, decided to expand
security and defense cooperation in the Asia-Pacifc region and beyond by revising the
1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation by the end of 2014.
54
This is a
noteworthy development as it presumes Japans collective self-defense as a fait accompli
and thereby implies Japans considerably expanded global security role in the future. This
newly elevated alliance also means U.S. support for Japans right to missile interception.
The two sides agreed to establish a more interoperable and fexible force posture that
enables side-by-side and agile contingency response in order to counter challenges against
security and international norms.
for its invasion and colonial rule of Korea. The meeting fell apart in acrimony.
47
In 1953,
the United States arranged for another meeting between the two sides in Tokyo. Kubota
Kanichiro, the Japanese delegate, told the Korean delegation that the United States violated
international law in liberating Korea and establishing the ROK prior to concluding a peace
treaty with Japan, in redistributing Japanese-held Korean properties to Koreans, and in
repatriating Japanese nationals from Korea. Kubota also insisted that Koreans should be
grateful for all the improvements made by Japan during the occupation of Korea, and that
Japans compulsory occupation of Korea...was benefcial to the Korean people. Kubota
also said the South Koreans were servile to the powerful and high-handed to the weak,
adding that efforts should be started to bring down the South Korean administration of
Syngman Rhee.
48
Kubotas remarks refected sentiments stated earlier by a member of the
Diet, that we refuse to stand in silence watching...Koreans...swaggering about as if they
were nationals of victorious nations...it is most deplorable that those who lived under our
law and order until the last moment of the surrender should suddenly alter their attitude to
act like conquerors.
49
No further meetings between Seoul and Tokyo took place until 1958.
The different strategic implications between South Koreas strained relationship with Japan
during the Cold War and today are apparent. In the former period, South Korea not only did
not have diplomatic relations with China, but was, in view of its poverty and corresponding
international standing, nothing resembling the key regional economic player that it is today.
Until the 1980s, when the Japanese textbooks issue became a thorn in Sino-Japanese and
South Korean-Japanese relations, South Koreas apathy or even animosity toward Japan
offered little strategic value to China, since Beijings leverage vis--vis Seoul was limited.
Chinas primary concern in its relationship with both South Korea and Japan for most of
the Cold War era was the presence of U.S. troops in these countries. However, since the end
of the Cold War and the normalization of diplomatic relations between South Korea and
China in 1992, China has found a new economic means of pressuring South Korea, and, in
recent years, has grown increasingly bold in sending that admonitory message to Seoul. For
example, an editorial in the Global Times in July 2012 warned Seoul:
South Korea benefts from Chinese prosperity, and a rational South Korea should
continue to play the role of a balancer in Northeast Asia. A military alliance
between South Korea and Japan poses a potential threat to China. As a result,
China should frmly oppose the move and try to persuade South Korea not to
further its military alliance with Japan and the U.S.
Ahead of Obamas visit to Japan and South Korea in late April, the United States has in recent
months exhorted its two allies in Northeast Asia to improve relations and not exacerbate the
situation.
51
In fact, Park and Abe held their frst formal talks in a trilateral setting with Obama
during the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague in late March.
52
This marked the frst
formal meeting between the leaders of South Korea and Japan since the trilateral meeting
among Lee Myung-bak, Noda, and Hu Jintao in Beijing on May 14, 2012, which ended an
unusually long lull in bilateral summit diplomacy between Seoul and Tokyo.
The triangular dynamics among South Korea, Japan, and China today favor China,
principally due to the occasional fssure in the bilateral relationship between Seoul and
Tokyo and Seouls propensity to hedge in its relationship with China and the United States,
Just days before invading South Korea in June 1950, North Korea reached out to the South
for high-level talks on unifcation. Kim Il-sung started the Korean War in order to complete
the North Korean revolution, which remains the highest goal of the North Korean state
today. It was a high-risk gamble, the biggest gamble by the Kim dynasty to date. In short,
Kim needed to deceive his enemy with a smokescreen before he attacked.
On the eve of detonating a bomb at the Martyrs Mausoleum in Rangoon, Burma on October
9, 1983, targeting President Chun Doo-hwan, North Korea asked Chinas help in conveying
that it sought direct bilateral talks with the Reagan administration. Beijing gladly obliged,
and the next day the bomb went off, killing 17 South Korean offcials and four Burmese
nationals. This was an important operation for Pyongyang, because the previous year Kim
Il-sung had offcially anointed his son, Jong-un, heir. The untested heir apparent needed
to prove his military mettle against the despised South Korean head of state. Hence, the
smokescreen was a crucial tactic in advancing Pyongyangs objectives.
On March 3, 2010, North Korea sought military talks with the South. On March 26, it
torpedoed theCheonan. On October 30 of that year, the two Koreas held their last family
reunion meetings. On November 11, the North called for talks on Mt. Kumgang. On
November 23, it shelled a South Korean island, killing four South Korean nationals. This
was the crucial year for Kim Jong-un coming out, which he did by name in late September
and, in person, standing next to his father on the reviewing stand at a military parade on
October 10, Party Founding Day. The inexperienced heir, compelled to prove his military
mettle, resorted to strategic deception before attacking the South in March and November
of that year.
Kim Jong-un used the same tactic on the eve of his long-range missile test on December
12, 2012. On December 8, the North publicly extended its timeline to late-December for
launching, as it said, a satellite into space. This led many North Korea watchers to speculate
that it may be having second thoughts in the face of Chinese pressure. On December 10, the
North stated that it was having technical diffculties, prompting observers to assume that it
was abandoning the planned launch. In this way, it caught many offcials in Washington off-
guard when it went ahead with the launch on the morning of December 12, exactly one week
before the South Korean presidential electiona perfect window of opportunity to remind
the South Korean public that it needs to be appeased.
The Norths strategic objectives remain the same. Kim Jong-un may appreciate food, fertilizer,
and other blandishments from the South, but he can live without them. Yet, what he does
need is to raise the stakes yet again by reminding his neighbors that North Korea is a political
factor with which they need to deal. Translated into plain language, that means provoke with
another weapons test so that Kims bigger neighbors will, after a decent interval following
condemnatory pronouncements, go into damage-control mode and appease Pyongyang once
again with negotiations and tacit acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear state.
In short, as the North has little to lose in canceling all talks and reverting to its strategy of
provocations and limited attacks, it likely will do that again soon. When that time comes,
Japan will reaffrm its alliance with the United States and strengthen its defense posture
against North Korea. China will express its displeasure at Pyongyang in meaningless
On his way to Japan, Hagel paid a visit to South Korea and met with Park. The meeting,
according to The New York Times, came as something of a shock.
55
Instead of reviewing
and confrming ways to jointly meet the security challenge from China and North Korea,
Park delivered a lecture about Japans total absence of sincerity over the suffering that
imperial Japan caused Korea in the last century and fnished with a request of her own: that
Washington force Tokyo to behave.
56
As with Xi on the Ahn Jung-geun memorial, Park,
in trying to rectify her nations history with Japan by appealing to a foreign statesman, was
acting like an historian instead of a president. The contrast between Japan and South Korea
must have been stark for the U.S. government. The United States and Japan fought a vicious
war against each other, but the two nations do not preoccupy themselves with or bicker over
events of the past. Instead, the two allies focus on meeting the security threat from the
region, although neither faces a direct existential threat from either China or North Korea.
South Korea, on the other hand, does face a direct, if not an imminent, existential threat
from North Korea, which China supports. Despite the recent thaw in inter-Korean relations,
marked by the frst vice-ministerial level talks between the two Koreas since 2007, which led
to temporary reunion meetings between separated families, North Korea is bound to provoke
the South again with a weapons test or even a direct, if not limited, attack. Since Kim Jong-
uns dramatic purge of his uncle, Jang Song-taek, in December 2013, the impression has
spread in Seoul that the Kim regime may be unstable due to political intrigues compounded
by internal stresses, and, as a result, the North is reaching out to the South for economic aid.
This view does not fully take into consideration that demonstrative punishment of alleged
offenders, along with their family and minions, has remained the key instrument of regime
preservation throughout the states existence. Violent and pervasive purges were critical
during the formative years under Kim Il-sung, following the disastrous outcome of the greatest
gamble by the dynasty, the Korean War.
57
Likewise, when Kim Jong-il was attempting to
consolidate his rule in the mid-1990s he sent tremors though the military establishment by
executing hundreds of people suspected of planning a coup within the Sixth Army Corps.
58
The latest purge in North Korea may not be a harbinger of any meaningful change for the
better in that country. The drama surrounding Jangs swift fall has triggered widespread
speculation, ranging from instability and imminent coup, to popular uprising. Beyond
doubt, the prolonged decay of the North Korean system, accentuated by a catastrophic
famine in the mid- to late-1990s, has thoroughly disillusioned portions of the elite with their
political system. But there is no reliable indication that the Kim regime is on the brink of a
crisis or unable to govern. North Korea will soon enough return to its strategy of periodic
provocations, and South Korea will once again see that China, despite its thinly veiled
disdain for the leadership in Pyongyang, will go to extremes to defend it. China will refrain
from taking action that may destabilize the Kim regime, despite signing onto UN Security
Council resolutions purporting to punish Pyongyang.
South Korea should fully be aware that the recent peace offensive by Pyongyang is more
likely a smokescreen before a provocation than a genuine overture seeking reconciliation.
All states, to varying degree, practice strategic deceptionor sending out mixed signals
in order to mislead or deceive ones adversary. North Korea has taken this to a lethal
level. Blatant deception on the eve of a provocative act has been its mode of operation
since at least 1950.
11. See Martin Faiola, Island Comes Between South Korea and Japan, The Washington Post,
March 17, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A41813-2005Mar16.html
(accessed March 9, 2014).
12. Cho Bok-rae, Roh Daetongryeong Ilbon jeongbu-ae danhohui sijeong yogu halgeot [Roh
to make frm demand of Japan to rescind action], Yonhap News, March 23, 2005, http://news.
naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=104&oid=001&aid=0000951221
13. Min Seong-jae, Roh sees diplomatic war with Japan, World Security Network, March 24,
2005.
14. Chosun Ilbo, March 24, 2005.
15. Clouds over Korea-Japan relations after Roh message, The Korea Herald, March 2,
2005, http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=108&oid=044&a
id=0000049934 (accessed March 17, 2014).
16. Park Song-wu, GNP Hits Rohs Diplomacy on Japan, Korea Times, March 24, 2005, http://
www.koreatimes.com/article/235225 (accessed March 17, 2014).
17. Park Yong-bae, 35% Jijiui Uimi [The meaning of 35% approval rating], Jugan Hankook [The
Hankook Weekly], November 21, 2005, http://weekly.hankooki.com/lpage/column/200511/
wk2005112111172037660.htm# (accessed March 17, 2005).
18. Japans Ambition to Grab Tok Islet Denounced in S. Korea, Korean Central News Agency,
March 23, 2005, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2005/200503/news03/23.htm#7 (accessed
March 17, 2014). The Korean Central News Agency followed up in subsequent days with
denunciatory reports of its own: See KCNA on Japans Reckless Moves for Territorial
Expansion, March 24, 2005; Japans Claim to Tok Islet Flayed, March 26, 2005; and
Japans Claim to Tok Islet Slammed, March 29, 2005.
19. An editorial titled Asias Trilateral Trade Talks, in The New York Times, March 6, 2014, in
calling for greater cooperation among China, Japan, and South Korea, if only for the sake of
economic interests governing the trilateral relations, states: As for China, its rise is the worlds
big story. Under Mr. Xis leadership, China is now inclined to demand special privileges,
believing that it should be granted more deference by its neighbors. But it behooves Beijings
leaders to understand that Chinas expanding economic and military power cannot be sustained
without deep engagement with the interdependent global economy. http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/03/07/opinion/asias-trilateral-trade-talks.html (Accessed May 13, 2014).
20. Dick K. Nanto and Mark E. Manyin, China-North Korea Relations, Congressional Research
Service, December 28, 2010, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41043.pdf (accessed March
18, 2014). For a short, recent summation of the bilateral relationship, see Jayshree Bajoria and
Beina Xu, The China-North Korea Relationship, Council on Foreign Relations, February 18,
2014, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097 (accessed March 18,
2014). For overall China-South Korea relations, see Jae Ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner:
Korea-China Relations and the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007),
in particular pp. 1-10. Chung argues, on p. 11, South Korea faces a strategic conundrum
concerning how it can maintain amicable relationships with both the United States and China,
given that the former has no control whatsoever over the relationship between the latter two
and that Sino-American relations possess many sources of serious friction.
21. See Kim Oi-hyun, Park Geun-hye will send frst special envoys to China, The Hankyoreh
January 17, 2013, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/570129.html
(accessed February 9, 2014).
22. Choe Sang-Hun, Japanese Envoy Tries to Mend Ties with South Korea, The New York Times,
January 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/05/world/asia/japanese-envoy-tries-to-
mend-ties-with-south-korea.html?_r=0 (accessed February 9, 2014).
23. See China-South Korea issue joint statement on regional issues, 27 June 13, BBC Monitoring
Newsfle (accessed March 9, 2014).
24. China-South Korea issue joint statement on regional issues, 27 June 13.
diplomatic language such as unacceptable and provocative, while in actuality increasing
aid to North Korea as it did in the aftermath of each of Pyongyangs three nuclear tests to
date. South Korea, in that feeting moment of clarity, will see that Japan is actually a tacit
ally and Chinaan unstated foe.
Endnotes
1. Alastair Gale, In Seoul, Kim Jong Un Preferred to Shinzo Abe, The Wall Street Journal,
March 4, 2014.
2. See the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance Between the Peoples
Republic of China and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, signed on July 11, 1961,
in particular, Article II, which calls on both contracting parties to render immediate military
and other assistance by all means in the event the other party is subjected to an armed attack
by any state or several states jointly. China_DPRK.htm, http://www.marxists.org/subject/
china/documents/china_dprk.htm (accessed Mar. 9, 2014). See also Chen Jian, Chinas Road
to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia
3. For generous praise of Japans postwar success: Japanese decisions have been the most
farsighted and intelligent of any major nation of the postwar era even while the Japanese
leaders have acted with the understated, anonymous style characteristic of their culture, see
Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 324. For an analysis of
the alliance structure, see Victor D. Cha, Alliance Despite Antagonism: The U.S.-Korea-Japan
Security Triangle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). While this chapter does not
cast its arguments within any framework of international relations theory, its main approach is
grounded in realism, according to which, as Cha notes on p.2, states with common allies and
common enemies should be friendly.
4. See Kim Jong-un Masterminded Attacks on S. Korea, Chosun Ilbo, August 3, 2011, http://
english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/08/03/2011080300499.html (accessed March 9,
2014). For a detailed account of the horrifc conditions in the political prisoner concentration
camps, see United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on
Human Rights in the Democratic Peoples Republic of KoreaA/HRC/25/CRP.1, 208-
245, released on February 17, 2014, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIDPRK/
Pages/ReportoftheCommissionofInquiryDPRK.aspx (accessedMarch 9, 2014). For a concise
account of the prison camps, see Joshua Stanton and Sung-Yoon Lee, World must awaken
to North Koreas camps of horror, CNN.com, February 17, 2014 (updated), http://www.cnn.
com/2013/12/07/opinion/lee-stanton-north-korea/ (accessed March 9, 2014).
5. Takeshi Kamiya and Daisuke Ikuta, Lees Takeshima trip likely to undo Japan-South Korea
progress, The Asahi Shimbun, August 11, 2012, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/
politics/AJ201208110060 (accessed March 9, 2014).
6. Choe Sang-Hun, The New York Times, August 10, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/11/
world/asia/south-koreans-visit-to-disputed-islets-angers-japan.html?_r=0 (accessed March 9,
2014).
7. Mariko Oi, South Koreas Lee Myung-bak visits disputed islands, BBC News, August 10,
2012, at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-19204852 (accessed March 9, 2014).
8. Why Japan is angry over South Koreas visit to an island, The Christian Science Monitor,
August 10, 2014, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacifc/2012/0810/Why-Japan-is-
angry-over-South-Korea-s-visit-to-an-island (accessed March 9, 2014).
9. In early March 2014 Japanese offcials spoke of reexamining the Kono Statement, and
Foreign Minister Yun Byung-Se took the issue to the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva.
See Sarah Kim, Japan hedges on comfort women, Joongang Daily, March 8, 2014, http://
koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=2986030 (accessed March 9,
2014).
10. A senior Japanese policymaker told the author in December 2013: Its actually much easier to
deal with the Chinese than the South Koreans, because at least the Chinese are rational.
35. Dependence on Foreign Forces will Lead to Ruin: Rodong Sinmun, Korean Central News
Agency, October 22, 2013, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2013/201310/news22/20131022-13ee.
html (accessed March 19, 2014). The next month, the KCNA even adopted sexism and further
charged that Park Geun-hye has to play the coquette with the U.S. and fatter it, and that the
Park group are political prostitutes and traitors. Servile Attitude of Political Waiting Maid:
News Analyst, Korean Central News Agency, November 12, 2013, http://www.kcna.co.jp/
item/2013/201311/news12/20131112-07ee.html (accessed March 19, 2014).
36. What Gilbert Rozman terms national identity politics. In the context of contemporary
Japanese foreign policy, see Gilbert Rozman, A National Identity Approach to Japans Late
2013 Foreign Policy Thinking, The Asan Forum, January 25, 2014, http://www.theasanforum.
org/a-national-identity-approach-to-japans-late-2013-foreign-policy-thinking/ (accessed March
18, 2014).
37. See David I. Steinberg, ed., Korean Attitudes toward the United States: Changing Dynamics
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005).
38. Kim Tae-jong, Anti-Chinese Sentiment Looms After Torch Relay, The Korea Times, April
28, 2008, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2008/04/117_23257.html (accessed
March 19, 2014).
39. Jack Kim, Anti-U.S. beef protest draws 100,000 S. Koreans, Reuters, May 31, 2008, http://
www.reuters.com/article/2008/05/31/us-korea-protest-idUSSEO21734120080531 (accessed
March 19, 2014). Clashes over U.S. beef in South Korea, CNN, June 2, 2008, http://edition.
cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/06/01/skorea.usbeef/index.html?eref=edition (accessed March
19, 2014).
40. Seouls Balancing Role, The Wall Street Journal, May 31, 2005, http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB111748666613046386 (accessed March 19, 2014).
41. Choe Sang-Hun, South Koreas balancer policy attacked, The New York Times, April 9,
2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/08/world/asia/08iht-seoul.html (accessed March 19,
2014).
42. Hanmi Gwangye Daedam: Gyunhyungja-yeok Hanguk Chyegeup Neomeoseon Il [Korea-
U.S. Dialogue: Balancer Role Punching above Koreas Weight Class], Chosun Ilbo, April 18,
2005, http://news.chosun.com/svc/content_view/content_view.html?contid=2005041870318
43. Choe Sang-Hun, Despair Overwhelmed Former South Korean Leader Embroiled in Scandal,
The New York Times, May 23, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/24/world/asia/24roh.
html?pagewanted=all (accessed March 20, 2014).
44. Yang Sang-hoon, Self Respect and the 50th Anniversary, Chosun Ilbo, July 15, 2003, http://
english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2003/07/15/2003071561006.html (accessed March 19,
2014).
45. Lee Chi-dong, In memoir, Gates calls ex-Korean President Roh crazy, Yonhap News,
January 15, 2014, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2014/01/15/13/0301000000AEN20
140115000100315F.html (accessed March 20, 2014).
46. See Scott Snyder and See-won Byun, China-Korea Relations: Crying Uncle No More:
Stark Choices for Relations, Comparative Connections, January 2014. Note in particular
the chronology of China-Korea relations from September to December 2013 at the end of the
article, http://csis.org/fles/publication/1303qchina_korea.pdf (accessed March 20, 2014).
47. Robert T. Oliver, A History of the Korean People in Modern Times: 1800 to the Present
(Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1993), p. 250.
48. Jun Sato, Japanese offcial calls Seoul arrogant in 1953 offcial document, Asahi Shimbun,
June 19, 2013, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201306190011 (accessed
March 20, 2014).
49. Robert T. Oliver, A History of the Korean People in Modern Times, p. 250.
50. S. Korea must stick to role of balancer, Global Times, July 3, 2012, http://english.
peopledaily.com.cn/90883/7863524.html (accessed March 19, 2014).
51. Lim Min-hyuk, Obama, Naedal Sunbangjeon Han Il Hwahwe Weonhae [Obama Seeks
South Korea-Japan Rapprochement ahead of Visit Next Month], Chosun Ilbo, March 17,
2014, http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/03/17/2014031700179.html?related_all
(accessed March 19 2014).
25. Richard C. Bush and Jonathan D. Pollack, North Koreas Nuclear Ambitions: Hiding in
Plain Sight, Brookings, February 18, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/
posts/2014/02/18-north-korea-nuclear-ambitions-bush-pollack (accessed March 18, 2014).
For a typical North Korean stand on this, see Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the
DPRKs Invariable Stand, Korean Central News Agency, September 29, 2013, http://www.
kcna.co.jp/item/2013/201309/news29/20130929-06ee.html (accessed March 18, 2014); South
Koreas Strategic Rigidity Obstructive to North-South DialogueChinese Newspaper,
Korean Central News Agency, June 1, 2011, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2011/201106/
news01/20110601-26ee.html (accessed March 18, 2014). For the variance in views of
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula between Seoul and Beijing, see Seoul, Beijing
Agree on Denuclearized Korean Peninsula, Voice of America, June 27, 2013: If we look
at the offcial Chinese documents on denuclearization, what they mean is a denuclearization
of the complete peninsula, not just North Korea, she [Dong Xiangrong] said, adding that,
contrarily, South Korea is solely interested in preventing the North from developing nuclear
weapons. http://www.voanews.com/content/seoul-beijing-agree-on-denuclearized-korean-
peninsula/1690379.html (accessed March 18, 2014).
26. Jane Perlez, China Exhibit, Part of an Anti-Japan Campaign, Refects an Escalating Feud,
The New York Times, February 8, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/world/asia/china-
exhibit-part-of-an-anti-japan-campaign-refects-an-escalating-feud.html (accessed March 18,
2014).
27. Toko Sekiguchi, Seoul, Beijing Find New Common Ground Against Tokyo, The Wall Street
Journal, November 19, 2013, http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2013/11/19/seoul-beijing-
fnd-new-common-ground-against-tokyo/ (accessed March 18, 2014).
28. Emily Rauhala, 104 Years Later, a Chinese Train Station Platform is Still the Site of Anti-
Japanese Rancor, Time, January 30, 2014, http://time.com/2609/104-years-later-a-chinese-
train-station-platform-is-still-the-site-of-anti-japanese-rancor/ (accessed March 18, 2014). Mr.
Suga went on to say, The co-ordinated move by China and South Korea based on a one-sided
view [of history] is not conducive to building peace and stability, calling the memorial
extremely regrettable, See Japan protest over Korean assassin Ahn Jung-geun memorial in
China, BBC, January 20, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-25808437 (accessed
March 18, 2014). See also Gil Yun-hyung, Japanese government voices disapproval of Ahn-
Jung-geun memorial, The Hangyoreh, January 21, 2014, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_
edition/e_international/620717.html (accessed March 18, 2014).
29. S. Korean ruling party executive calls Japan terrorist state after hero criticized, The Japan
Times, January 21, 2014, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/01/21/national/s-korean-
ruling-party-exec-calls-japan-terrorist-state-after-hero-criticized/#.Uyg97Pl5MrU (accessed
March 18, 2014); Seo Jae-jun, Jeongbu, Suga Il Gwanbang Janggwan Baleon Gyutan
[ROK condemns Chief Cabinet Secretary Sugas statement], News 1, January 20, 2014, http://
news1.kr/articles/1504015 (accessed March 18, 2014).
30. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gangs Regular Press Conference on January 22, 2014,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, January 22, 2014, http://www.
fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1121675.shtml.
31. Even during the Park-Xi summit in late June 2013, major daily newspapers like Asahi
Shimbun, Yomiuri, Sankei, and Nikkei had all indicated such.
32. Samuel Hawley, The Imjin War: Japans Sixteenth-century Invasion of Korea and Attempt to
Conquer China (Seoul: The Royal Asiatic Society Korea Branch, 2005), p. 563-86; Kenneth
M. Swope, A Dragons Head and a Serpents Tail: Ming China and the First Great East Asian
War, 1592-1598 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009), pp. 284-99.
33. Kenneth M. Swope, A Dragons Head and a Serpents Tail, p. 285. Swope cites Gari Ledyard:
[O]ne is forced to conclude that for all the heroics and turtle-boats, it was the Chinese alliance
that was the most crucial military element in Koreas survival. In the wake of North Koreas
invasion in 1950, it was the U.S. that was the most critical element in the Republic of Koreas
survival.
34. Han Myonggi, Byeongja horan (Seoul: Pureun Yeoksa, 2013).
52. South Korea, Japan leaders set to meet amid possibly thawing ties: media, Reuters,
March 20, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/19/us-japan-korea-usa-
idUSBREA2I0VX20140319 (accessed March 20, 2014).
53. On the frst point, see Lee Chi-dong, Missile defense dilemma dogging S. Korea, Yonhap
News, October 25, 2013, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2013/10/25/13/04010000
00AEN20131025000100315F.html (accessed March 20, 2014). On the latter, see Jennifer Lind,
Between Giants: South Korea and the U.S.-China Rivalry, The Atlantic, July 19, 2012, http://
www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/07/between-giants-south-korea-and-the-us-
china-rivalry/260060/ (accessed March 20, 2014).
54. Joint Statement of Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee, October 3, 2013, http://
iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/10/20131003283979.html#axzz2wZ4VlJUY
55. Martin Fackler and Choe Sang-Hun, A Growing Chill Between South Korea and Japan
Creates Problems for the U.S., The New York Times, November 23, 2014, http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/11/24/world/asia/a-growing-chill-between-south-korea-and-japan-creates-problems-
for-the-us.html (accessed March 20, 2014).
56. Martin Fackler and Choe Sang-Hun, A Growing Chill Between South Korea and Japan
Creates Problems for the U.S.
57. See Andrei Lankov, Crisis in North Korea: The Failure of De-Stalinization, 1956 (Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 2005).
58. Kim Jong Ils Bloody Purges, Chosun Ilbo, June 9, 2010, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/
html_dir/2010/06/09/2010060900794.html (accessed March 20, 2014).
Gilbert Rozman
Rozman: China-South Korea-U.S. Relatons | 45 44 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
encouraging veteran fgure, Park Geun-hye, cultivated its support. No wonder China gave
Park reason to proceed,
6
particularly against the background of its demonization of Japan
and Parks own acrimonious relationship with Abe Shinzo. No triangular framework in Asia
offered China as much promise as this one, with China, perhaps, anticipating that ROK-U.S.
relations would eventually be made more complicated by differences in how to deal with
Chinaas well as J apan.
Seeing no utility for the Six-Party Talks, the United States has continued under the Obama
administration to make sure that on North Korean issues it would permit as little distance
as possible between its position and that of South Korea, even as it also put management
of North Korea at the top of its many priorities in working with China. Thus, triangularity
was built into the U.S. approach to what has long been the most serious security challenge
in the region. Yet, casting a shadow on this triad was the growing sense that other security
challenges were growing, including those in the South China and East China seas that put the
United States and China in direct opposition to each other. In contrast to Seouls eagerness
for sustaining the triangle with a narrow, shared focus and Beijings ambition to utilize the
triangle for a broader, ultimately divisive purpose, Washington approached the triangle much
more cautiously, viewing it through the prism of multiple, conficting frameworks.
Past Dynamics in the Sino-South
Korean-U.S. Triangle
Until South Korea pursued normalization of relations with China from the end of the
1980s, alliance relations were scarcely affected by Chinas behavior, apart from the closer
ties resulting from Chinese reinforcement of North Korean belligerence and the increasing
appeals after Sino-U.S. normalization by both Washington and Seoul to Beijing to seize
the opportunity for a change in its policies toward the peninsula. Given U.S. blessing for
nordpolitik and Chinas reluctance to range beyond trade relations with South Korea,
prior to Sino-ROK normalization the triangle also did not draw much concern. The alliance
seemed impervious to normalizing contacts.
During the decade between normalization and the second nuclear crisis over North Korea,
leading soon to the Six-Party Talks, new factors infuenced triangular ties. As North Korea
sunk into famine amidst isolation in the mid-90s, Seoul became bolder about seeking more
support from Beijing and relying less on its ally, especially when Kim Dae-jung launched
the Sunshine Policy. The rapidly growing economic relations gave the public on both
sides reason to see growing potential for other types of ties. With China lying low in its
regional policies and eventually embracing proposals for multilateralism and with Seoul
becoming enthusiastic for regional diplomacy as well, the scope of interactions expanded
with Washington on the outside.
7
Anger at Japan was rising in China with the patriotic
education campaign, and sporadically spiked in South Korea too as a democratic society
now more sensitive to affronts. In these circumstances, awareness of a national identity
gap was minimized: they saw each other mostly as economic partners working together
for regionalism, while each was more conscious of identity gaps with the United States (as
anti-American sentiments spread in South Korea to 2003) and Japan. With the election of
After the collapse of the Six-Party Talks in 2008 and the confrontational setting of 2009-12
when Sino-South Korean relations were mostly troubled, a new dynamic has emerged in the
China-South Korea-U.S. triangle under Xi Jinping, Park Geun-hye, and Barack Obama. In
this chapter I review earlier dynamics over a quarter century, assess the triangle as recently
seen from each of the three corners, and refect on the challenges that lie ahead that could
alter the current dynamics. In the shadows of this triangle is North Korea, whose policies
continue to exert a decisive impact.
This triangle matters primarily for three compelling reasons. First, it is the foremost
challenge in South Korean diplomacy, which is concerned, above all, with managing North
Korea.
1
Second, it is a litmus test for Chinas strategic thinking, whose policies to North
Korea are of prime concern to South Korea and, at times, the United States.
2
Finally, it is the
principal arena for how the United States is managing North Korea, well understood by all of
thesecountries.
3
Even when the ostensible subject at both diplomatic settings and academic
seminars is bilateral relations involving any two of these countries, the discussion turns
ineluctably to this broader triangular context. On the sixtieth anniversary of the U.S.-ROK
alliance when commentators considered new challenges for the alliance, China cast a deep
shadow, as North Korea long has. In the same year when Park actively wooed Xi to improve
relations, the U.S. alliance was never far in the background. Even in Sino-U.S. relations with
their far greater scope, North Korea is arguably the frst priority and that means, especially
to the U.S. side, coordinating closely with South Korea on this aspect of Sino-U.S. relations.
4

Triangularity has been unmistakably advancing in 2013-14, as Sino-ROK diplomacy grew
noticeably more active and the United States gave, at least, its tacit support. In early 2014,
the dynamic was changing, as U.S. disappointment with Chinas dealings with North Korea
was refected in greater efforts to strengthen U.S.-ROK deterrence.
In the case of South Korea, Park Geun-hyes slogans of trustpolitik and Northeast Asia
Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI) cannot be discussed in depth without turning
into an examination of the triangle with the United States and China. Unlike Japan, which
is pressing the United States to solidify two vs. one in a triangle seen as containing Chinese
aggression, South Korea is searching for multilateralism drawing China and the United
States closer. This is a more complicated process, especially in recent months, as the Sino-
U.S. gap has widened. When Park was greeted eagerly in Washington in May 2013, then
Koreans watched the Obama-Xi Sunnylands summit hopefully in June 2013, and fnally
Park had what was considered a successful visit to Beijing that same month, prospects
for a South Korean initiative to capitalize on the triangle appeared to rise. By early 2014
they had dimmed, but Seoul was ready to try to operationalize Parks ideas, which, at a
general level, had been greeted in 2013 with interest.
5
In the background were increased
contacts with North Korea, which China welcomed as a possible path to resuming the Six-
Party Talks while the United States responded doubtfully that there was little prospect of
a breakthrough.
For China, the triangle with South Korea and the United States has a different meaning rooted
less in a priority for denuclearization and reunifcation than in a geostrategic and geo-cultural
outlook on a future Northeast Asia in which U.S. infuence is greatly reduced. In 2013 an
unpredictable new leader, Kim Jong-un, responded defantly to Chinas advice, while an
called the culture wars fought both on the Internet and through the mass media in the years
of Lee Myung-baks tenure.
11
However discomforted China seems to be at times with North
Koreas hide-bound regime, it is considered by many in the party and security establishment,
as well as like-minded citizens on Chinas side, in an essentially polarized world and region
in national identity, not economic, terms.
Given the failure of Pyongyang to coordinate with Beijing in handling diplomatic, economic,
and military challenges, a fexible strategy has been required to manage relations with Seoul
and Washington in regard to peninsular non-economic affairs. Seouls degree of deference
has changed over the past two decades, as has Beijings interest in talking with Seoul
about Pyongyang. Rising deference under Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, despite its
limitations, drew a positive response. Signs of reduced deference under Lee Myung-bak,
exacerbated by anger at Beijings silence over the North Korean attacks in 2010, elicited a
negative response. Knowing how China is becoming more or less cooperative while making
North Korea ever more economically and diplomatically dependent on it, Park Geun-hye
has tried to fnd the Goldilocks solution of coordinating while drawing a red line against
rewarding North Korea without meaningful reciprocal actions. At a time when the leadership
in Beijing is frustrated with Pyongyang, that strategy is acceptable. The result has been more
encouragement to Seoul to coordinate closer with Beijing and more emphasis on positive
cooperation with Washington.
In 2013-14 there are clear reasons why Beijing is encouraging Seoul, but one should be wary
of drawing wider conclusions about some signifcant change of direction. As noted above, it
is both a reward to Park for her continuous, conciliatory efforts and a warning to Kim Jung-
un against his disregard of Chinas guidance. Kim has it within his power to change Chinas
calculus. If he is more respectful of its strategy, which would lead to some de-escalation
of his provocative military build-up and embrace of economic reform, he could tilt the
balance, perhaps in the process dividing South Korean society and its government from
the presumed, more skeptical U.S. reaction. Other reasons for Beijing to convey a positive
outlook toward Seoul is that this is in line with the ongoing strategy of isolating Tokyo and
keeping Washington interested in a new type of great power relations. At a time when
its strategic priorities are in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, calming tensions
further north serves a broader strategic objective. Finally, an upbeat atmosphere with Seoul
can promote talks for a China-Korea FTA, serving as an urgent counterweight to the U.S.-
Japan pursuit of TPP, which would create a regional economic framework worrisome to
China, even if some economic reformers might use it to advance domestic changes.
While a small number of articles published in China have suggested a recent change of
heart toward North Korea, raising the prospects for closer coordination with both South
Korea and the United States, many other Chinese publications continue to put the onus
on these two countries for the existence of the crisis on the peninsula and for the ongoing
failure to take essential steps to resolve it.
12
If Russian sources are to be believed, then
the message they have heard from Chinese offcials is decidedly on the side of this
majority of Chinese writings. Georgy Toloraya on March 13, 2014 made this point clearly,
accentuating what Alexander Lukin writes in the conclusion to his chapter. He describes the
Crimean crisis as proof that the West is working to contain Russia and that this will affect
problems elsewhere, including on the Korean Peninsula, where the Cold War never ended.
Roh Moo-hyun as president at the end of 2002, South Koreans were emboldened to express
greater resentment toward the United States but were restrained toward China.
The Sino-ROK-U.S. triangle in the fnal years of Roh Moo-hyuns tenure gave one
impression and during the period of Lee Myung-baks tenure gave quite a different one.
In the Roh era, Seoul groped for a role between Washington and Beijing: to be a hub, to
have an independent voice on North Korea, and even to be a balancer. Yet, Roh found
that he lacked the clout with either great power and real leverage over North Korea to
gain much traction. China showed its disregard with the mood of the South Korean public
with its Koguryo claims, revealing its arrogance about history with serious implications
for trust in dealing with the future of North Korea. U.S. distrust came in response to
Rohs unilateral offers to North Korea, complicating the strategy for denuclearization and
playing into Chinas strategy. Roh found that he had little room to maneuver; he misjudged
the confguration of the triangle, as a still cautious China faced an assertive George W.
Bush administration.
8
This was a time of incipient triangularity, but Sino-U.S. cooperation
on North Korea limited its scope. The external environment did not give the Seoul the
opportunity Roh sought.
Lee faced a newly assertive China, which might have been more receptive to Roh but now
was dismissive of Lees efforts to prioritize U.S relations, given suspicions that there was
no chance of improving North Korean relations. In 2009 Beijing shifted toward support for
Pyongyang despite its belligerence, and Lee drew even closer to Washington.
9
This remained
the pattern until Lees presidential term ended with triangularity largely in abeyance. Indeed,
deteriorating Sino-U.S. relations in the face of aggressive Chinese moves and the Obama
rebalance to Asia marginalized Seoul. A challenge for Park when she took offce was to
reactivate this moribund triangle. It appeared that she had the initiative, but China, under
its new leader, Xi Jinping, has not relinquished its role as the driving force in the region,
attentive to U.S. relations, intensifying rivalry with Japan, and the diffcult challenge of
North Koreas conduct.
The Chinese Angle on the
Sino-South Korean-U.S. Triangle
When China entered the Korean War it was alarmed about American troops on its border,
the extension of power of a distrusted regime in South Korea, the failure of a fellow socialist
state, and the global balance of power after it had already leaned to one side toward the
Soviet Union and away from the U.S.-led capitalist bloc of states. Fifty years later, as it
grew more deeply involved in the Korean Peninsula with the encouragement of the Sunshine
Policy and North Koreas new diplomatic strategy, leading to the Six-Party Talks, a similar
set of concerns were in the forefront. While many observers focused on Chinas vague
concern about peace and stability and others decided that Chinas priority was preventing
a massive outfow of refugees across its border, there was always ample evidence that
foremost in its calculations was continued wariness about U.S. troops and infuence on a
long-sensitive border as well as the balance of power implications from the removal of not
just a buffer state but an enemy state of the United States and its allies.
10
Moreover, distrust
of the leadership and the society of South Korea is deep-seated, as refected in what could be
important than human rights, the DPRK statement, according to this interpretation,
is a message to China that it too values sovereignty over human rights and should not
be criticizing a like-minded country. In asserting that the United States would be well
advised to mind its own business, being aware of where it stands, before talking nonsense
about others affairs, the statement may be making China the real target. It was a sign
of troubled relations, which facilitated the greater triangular cooperation with Seoul and
Washington in 2013 and early 2014.
The personal communication detects a veiled back-and-forth between Beijing and
Pyongyang over the nuclear issues and the Jang matter.
16
This refects recalibrating
of Chinas position, perhaps in part due to the purge of Jang Song-taek and the group
forging economic ties with China, and a sharpening of the resistance from North Korea.
Against this backdrop, South Korea and the United States are naturally reticent about
doing something that may cause China to reconsider its posture. The danger from North
Korea seems to be growing, and China is the driving force in responding as the United
States and South Korea keep a close watch and tailor their triangular actions accordingly.
The overall point is that in 2013 Chinas posture toward Pyongyang had been good for
triangularity. After the Jang purge, Chinas concern over North Korea may have turned
more to instability, reverberating in comments to U.S. offcials that led them to conclude
that China was less inclined to put adequate pressure on North Korea. The dynamics in
triangular or quadrangular relations keep impacting the diplomacy toward Pyongyang, but
Chinas calculations are what matter most.
North Korea has it within its power to change the dynamics of the triangle as seen in
China. Overtures to Beijing could widen the Sino-U.S. divide and leave Seoul in more
of a quandary. New cooperation with Seoul as well as Beijing could put Washington in
a quandary. Chinas strategy for North Korea is likely to be at sharp variance with the
strategies of the other two countries; so its stance, refecting frustration over the failure
of that strategy, is the most favorable for this triangle, but it is uncertain to last. A more
bellicose North Korea is more likely to sustain this sort of triangularity than would a more
fexible, North Korea, recognizing that it has continued options for diplomacy. Yet, even
if Pyongyang grows more assertive, Chinese calculations of U.S. relationsmore somber
in the light of Obamas late April tour of East Asiacould be decisive. It is this Chinese
response that puts the triangle in new doubt.
The South Korean Angle on the
Of the three countries, South Korea continues to take triangularity most seriously.
It is anxious not to be left as a middle power to the mercy of two great powers making
decisions about the Korean Peninsula on the basis of their own national interests or national
identities. Washington could snub its ally over a preoccupation with human rights or urgent
denuclearization without adequate consideration of the dynamics of inter-Korean relations
or the security priorities in South Korea. Even more likely, Beijing could marginalize South
Korea, given the importance it places on the North.
Expecting Russo-U.S. cooperation to dry up, he sees closer Sino-Russian coordination.
In the past, Toloraya adds, Russia opposed the U.S. strategy to isolate and eventually
dismantle the North Korean regime, using the nuclear issue as a pretext, but it was in
agreement in showing concern about the Norths impact on non-proliferation, military
provocations such as missile launches, and human rights. Russia backed UN resolutions,
implemented sanction agreements, and had most of its banks refuse to deal with the North.
Now, however, he argues, more Russians will see the nuclear deterrent of North Korea
as justifed, it will be more lenient about investing in the North, and may even assist in
modernizing the Norths industrial infrastructure. Suggesting that Russians will perceive
the U.S. threat of military intervention in Ukraine as similar to U.S. conduct toward North
Korea, Toloraya warns that Russias position will probably shift closer to Chinese views,
which could contribute to the renewal of confrontation between continental and maritime
powers. In this argument, the Russian specialist on Korea assumes a Chinese posture that
supports North Korea and welcomes such a shift from Russia toward a joint posture of
threeversus threeon peninsular affairs.
13
Tolorayas interpretation of Chinese thinking about North Korea omits the tensions of late
in Sino-North Korean relations. It tries to ft Chinas thinking into a renewed Cold War
framework, showcased in Russia during the crisis over Ukraine. Yet, the idea that China
considers the situation in Ukraine grounds for military confict and a renewal of the Cold
War appears to be an exaggeration. Russia may be desperate in early 2014 and determined
to reestablish what it can of the Soviet Unions range of control, but China has no cause for
similar desperation. Moreover, for China, North Korea is not some pawn in a great power
Cold War, but a target for transforming the entire Korean Peninsula and reshaping the balance
of power in East Asia. Lack of cooperation by Pyongyang in Beijings strategy requires a
Chinese response, not just indifference because it is time to turn harshly against the United
States and South Korea, as a U.S. ally. A closer look at Sino-North Korean tensions makes
this clearer.
In late February 2014 Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin visited Pyongyang. In early
March Foreign Minister Wang Yi made a statement about the Korean Peninsula.
14
A
strong warning by North Korea on March 14 directed at the United States could be seen
as an indirect response to Chinas diplomacy. In one personal communication, it was
suggested, although diffcult to verify, that this opens a window on secretive interactions
between Beijing and Pyongyang. First, Wang Yi reemphasized Chinas insistence on the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In the DPRK statement, there is no open criticism
of this position, but the United States is accused of behaving foolishly by opposing the
DPRKs nuclear deterrence and letting loose a string of reckless remarks.
15
Onewonders
who really is blamed for reckless remarks. Second, Wang called for restraint, goodwill,
and building mutual trust before noting the DPRK accusation against the United States
for a policy aimed at undermining the ideology of the DPRK...and swallowing up all
Koreans and the whole of Korea by force of arms for aggression. Third, Wang is reported
to have called for dialogue and opposed confrontation, which will only bring tension and
war. In turn, the DPRK accuses the U.S. patience strategy of hoping the DPRK will
make changes frst and responds that the DPRK will wait with a high degree of patience
for leadership change in the United States. Insisting that national sovereignty is more
The U.S. Angle on the
From the perspective of Washington, there is little awareness of the signifcance of South
Korea as a factor boosting bilateral to trilateral relations. Washington views Seoul as
important in coordinating on responses to Pyongyangs behavior, but in the absence of any
optimism about denuclearization or resumption of diplomacy with the prospect of leading
to that essential objective, Seoul is seen primarily as a force for holding the line. As for its
diplomatic dealings with Beijing, they are viewed not as a way to change Chinese thinking,
but as reinforcement of the frequent talks between U.S. and Chinese leaders to fnd some
common ground, especially in the event of new North Korean provocations. Few think that
Chinese leaders with their strong convictions about how to keep the North Korean regime
afoat are in the mood to take South Korean proposals seriously. In short, the Seoul-Beijing
path to management of the North Korean challenge is welcomed, but it is not perceived to be
a promising alternative to the Washington-Beijing pathway or to have strategic gravitas that
would warrant conceiving of it as part of a triangular confguration.
Washington is ambivalent about closer Seoul-Beijing ties, welcoming them when it thinks
that they play a constructive role in managing the North Korean threat. When concern
about Roh Moo-hyuns encouragement of anti-Americanism and dalliance with great power
balancing and idealistic enablement of North Korea was at a peak, Washington was doubtful
about Rohs policies. Also, when Chinese cooperation over North Korea appears to be in
doubt, U.S. offcials question the effcacy of counting on its support. Yet, for the most part,
since the 1990s, Washington has emphasized new efforts to encourage Beijing to play a
more active role and has considered Seoul a positive infuence toward that objective. Thus,
reassured by Park Geun-hyes close consultations with the Obama administration, U.S.
offcials have not deviated from the response that there is no distance at all between the
policies of thetwo states.
In mid-2013, celebrations of the sixtieth anniversary of the U.S.-ROK alliance paid
homage to its enduring success and expressed optimism about its renewal in the face of
new challenges. Yet, there was already a cloud over rising diffculties in the context of
triangular relations, especially with Japan but also with China and, to a lesser degree,
with North Korea. This cloud darkened considerably over the Japanese triangle in the
fall of 2013, and even more in the frst months of 2014, but the shadow of the Chinese
triangle was not immune to such anxiety. After all, relations between Japan and China
kept worsening, and Sino-U.S. relations also deteriorated to some degree. To the extent
that Seouls relations with Beijing appear to be out of step with Washingtons, and some
would argue with Tokyos too, this complicates the Sino-ROK-U.S. triangle. Clashing
appeals from Tokyo and Seoul to Washington in seminars before D.C. think tank audiences
brought new challenges to the surface.
As long as Beijing keeps pressure on Pyongyang, avoids coercive actions in the East and
South China seas, and does not join Moscow in what may be construed as moves leading
to a new cold war, then Washington is unlikely to object to Seoul sustaining its measured
overtures to Beijing centered on managing Pyongyang. Yet, much could go wrong between
Washington and Beijing, leaving Seoul with little leverage. There is an assumption in the
Park Geun-hye has seized the opportunity of Xi Jinpings more impatient response to
Kim Jong-un and Barack Obamas continued strategic patience to take the lead in the
triangulation of diplomacy toward North Korea. She has articulated slogans for the new
approach, suggesting that Seoul is the initiator in building trust among the three countries
and in striving for a multilateral replacement or interim supplement for the Six-Party Talks.
Washington has delegated to Park both tactical leadership in moves to test Pyongyangs
readiness to change course and diplomatic fexibility in seeing what further steps Beijing
will take in support of common objectives. Beijing is willing to discuss North Korea with
more seriousness than before and shows signs of accepting Parks balance of engagement
and insistence on denuclearization. Given this triangular atmosphere, offcials and public
opinion in Seoul are emboldened to think that it is on the right track and should devise new
ways of working together.
Some may exaggerate Seouls role, overlooking the limited room available for it to operate
and the temporary circumstances that allow this. They may be correct in thinking that
Obama is satisfed with current arrangements within the triangle and with Seoul-Beijing
relations, but Chinas behavior in maritime disputes and Japans tensions with China could
reverberate to Seouls detriment. Even more problematic is the assumption that Beijing is
deferential to South Korea as having an inherent right to speak on peninsular matters. There
is a dearth of exploration of its motives, although even during the Park-Xi summit Chinese
wording was carefully parsed to reveal uncertain alignment of thinking. The old problem
of overestimation of what Seoul can accomplishseen especially under Kim Dae-jung and
Roh Moo-hyunis diffcult to avoid. That is not to say that Seoul is without options in
todays setting.
Eschewing the ambitions inherent in the notion of a balancer, Park can continue to seek
opportunities to serve as a facilitator. If Pyongyang decides to be provocative in ways that
stretch the forbearance of Washington and Beijing as well as Seoul, she is likely to have a
constructive opening to assist the two great powers in fnding a common response. This is
not likely to be easy, given different views of sanctions and military build-ups or exercises
in response to North Korean actions. Yet, there is little optimism that Kim Jong-un will
opt for any course other than provocations; so Park may have considerably more time to
explore ways to keep working with Xi and Obama. If the Northeast Asia Peace and Security
Initiative starts slowly with modest ambitions, it may prove to be accepted by the other two
states as constructive. More likely is an outcome where it gains little traction as great power
rivalries deepen.
There is little upside to Seouls quest for a more active role and considerable room for
disappointment. The two principal problems are the presumed incompatibility between
Beijing and Seouls strategic thinking about North Korea, and the rising potential for sharper
discord between Beijing and Washington. As one or both of these problems comes to the
forefront, there is little that Seoul can do. The fact that Vladimir Putin is renewing Cold War
images with his foreign policy and rhetoric and Abe Shinzo is oblivious to the strategic costs
of his historical revisionism makes the challenges ahead even harder for Park to navigate.
She needs to lower expectations.
complicating Seouls attempts to maintain a balance between Washington and Beijing. At the
same time, the Tokyo-Seoul-Washington triangle is strengthening in the spring of 2014. As
Sue Mi Terry shows, U.S. efforts can and now are boosting this triangle. While the changes
do not go far to support what Sung-Yoon Lee considers to be a more balanced Beijing-
Seoul-Tokyo triangle, they strengthen the deterrence triangle in advance of Pyongyangs
next move. For Beijing, remaining hostile to Tokyo and turning more critical of Washington
while welcoming new overtures from Moscow, the conditions that boosted the value of
Seoul in triangular contexts, especially with Washington, may now be fading away.
Endnotes
1. Gilbert Rozman, ed., South Korean Strategic Thought toward Asia (New York: Palgrave
Macillan, 2008).
2. Gilbert Rozman, Chinese Strategic Thought toward Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, rev.
edit., 2012).
3. Jonathan D. Pollack, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security
(London: Routledge, 2011).
4. Editorial Staff, Asan Washington Forum Synopsis Part 2: The Alliance and North Korea,
Open Forum, The Asan Forum, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Sept.-Oct. 2013).
5. Editorial Staff, Washington Insights, Open Forum, The Asan Forum, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Jan.-Feb.
2014).
6. Gilbert Rozman, Ch. 9, South Korean National Identity Gaps with China and Japan, in
Gilbert Rozman, ed., Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies--Asia at a Tipping Point: Korea, the
Rise of China, and the Impact of Leadership Transitions (editor), (Korea Economic Institute,
2012): pp. 141-58.
7. Chung Jaeho, Chungguk oe busang goa Hanbando oe mirae (Seoul: Seoul University Press, 2011).
8. Jonathan D. Pollack, ed., Korea: The East Asian Pivot (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press,
2005); Jonathan D. Pollack, ed., Asia Eyes America: Regional Perspectives on U.S.-Asia
Pacifc Strategy in the 21
st
Century (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2007).
9. Scott Snyder, Chinas Rise and the Two Korea: Politics, Economics, Security (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner, 2009).
10. Gilbert Rozman, ed., Chinas Foreign Policy: Who Makes It, and How Is It Made? (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
11. Gilbert Rozman, Ch. 7, Chinese National Identity and East Asian National Identity Gaps, in
Gilbert Rozman, ed., National Identities and Bilateral Relations: Widening Gaps in East Asia
and Chinese Demonization of the United States, (Washington DC and Stanford, CA: Woodrow
Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 2013): pp, 203-32.
12. For summaries of some Chinese articles on this subject, see Country Report: China, bi-
monthly since the summer of 2013 in www.theasanforum.org.
13. Georgy Toloraya, A Tale of Two Peninsulas: How Will the Crimean Crisis Affect Korea? 38
North, March 13, 2014.
14. China Will Not Allow War or Instability on the Korean Peninsula, Xinhuanet, March 8, 2014
(accessed on April 25, 2014).
15. Korean Central News Agency, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2014/201403/news14/20140314-
14ee.html (accessed on April 25, 2014).
16. Personal communication to the author from a specialist who prefers not to be cited on April
18, 2014.
United States that the U.S.-ROK alliance leg of the triangle is the determining factor when
security is in doubt, and that would be strengthened.
Uncertainty arises from the economic ties between China and South Korea, which strategic
analysts tend to overlook. Although there have been trade wars in which China showed
a ruthless response, few anticipate the sort of economic pressure that China exhibited at
times toward Japan or the Philippines. As seen in the economic sanctions placed on Russia
in response to its actions in Crimea as well as on North Korea and Iran, linkages between
security and economics are intensifying. These can affect the way triangularity evolves in a
time of crisis and hardball policies.
Conclusion
The China-South Korea-U.S. triangle puts Seoul between two great powers testing each
other for regional hegemony and infuence in the Korean Peninsula. One power is consumed
with the threat of nuclear weapons to be deliverable by long-range missiles and fnds
North Korea anathema for its egregious human rights violations. It expects and fnds South
Korea to be of like mind and a close ally, but the threat perceptions of the two differ, as
does the impact of national identity. In turn, the other power prioritizes transforming the
regional balance of power and considers criticism of human rights to be a prelude to charges
against its own political system. Its view of South Korea is more ambivalent, doubting its
security thinking, the way values affect its policies, and its intentions toward North Korea in
reunifcation. Add to this mix the sharply opposed attitudes toward the ROK-U.S. alliance
and we are left with a combustible mix of three bilateral relations that ft together awkwardly
in certain circumstances, but have the potential to grind against each other for reasons such
as North Korea shifting to engagement with China and a degree of economic reform, North
Korea enticing South Korea with gestures of national identity appeal, Sino-U.S. relations
deteriorating over one of many causes, and U.S. policies turning more infexible and
intolerant of South Korean overtures to China or North Korea.
If we recognize that China is the driving force in the triangle, we should ask under what
circumstances does it welcome the triad working together for common cause. In 2013-
14 such circumstances were present: Chinese anger at North Korea, Chinese eagerness
to isolate Japan and damage its relations with South Korea, willingness by China to
emphasize improving relations with the United States, a conciliatory mood in Seoul and by
the South Korean president toward China, South Korean hesitation to broaden the alliance
with the United States into arenas beyond the peninsula, and an upbeat atmosphere in
Sino-South Korean FTA negotiations and economic ties. It is these factors that bring
positive triangularity to the fore. With other triangles in which South Korea is involved
more troubled, there may be spillover damaging to this triangle of highest priority. It is
advancing, but in precarious circumstances.
As Valery Denisov and Alexander Lukin argue, North Korea is a geopolitical target for both
Russia and China, which is becoming more salient to Russia in 2014 as it perceives Ukraine
through the lens of a new cold war. Instead of this triangle being a force for South Korean
economic engagement of North Korea in the development of infrastructure of region-wide
signifcance, it is turning more into a basis of pressure against the ROK-U.S. alliance,
Russia, China, and the
Korean Peninsula
Denisov and Lukin: Russia, China, and the Korean Peninsula | 57 56 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
with China. Much of the chapter concerns the relations of China with both the DPRK
and South Korea and its handling of inter-Korean ties, as seen in Russia. In 2013-14 the
increasing seriousness of the situation is prompting new assessments in Russia, which are
discussed as well in the concluding section.
The Leadership Course of Vladimir Putin
The pragmatic foreign policy course under the leadership of Vladimir Putin is free of
ideology, both communism and early Yeltsin Westernism, and is directed at forming
around Russia an independent center of power, which foresees the establishment of normal
partnership relations with all countries, above all Russias neighbors. This is necessary both
for the development of economic relations, which are directed at strengthening the economic
power of Russia, and at world recognition of Moscow as an important foreign policy player.
From this point of view, Asian neighbors are doubly important, since apart from the usual
signifcance, they make possible the diversifcation of Russian foreign policy activity, which
previously had given too much weight to the West. Moreover, in the East its political and
economic model meets with much more understanding than in the West. The same applies
to the reception given to the shift in Russias outlook on North Korea, which was met with
enthusiasm in China from the start of Putins presidency, but with U.S. concern.
The Korean Peninsula is important from several perspectives. First, Russia is interested in the
security of its borders, consequently in the political stability of both Korean states. Any war
or loss of control in developments on the peninsula, in consideration of the presence in North
Korea of nuclear weapons, could easily directly affect the adjoining Russian territory, capable
of causing casualties, an ecological catastrophe, a food of refugees, and other dangerous
consequences. As a neighbor of North Korea, China expresses these same concerns. Second,
both Koreas are economic partners of Russia, with South Korea Russias third trading
partner in Asia after China and Japan and an important investor in the Russian economy.
Such cooperation plays an especially big role for the Russian Far East, the development of
which is an important strategic issue for Moscow. It is signifcant too that ties with it serve
as a useful balance for what many consider to be one-sided dependency on China. Trade
with the DPRK is not large, but, after all, it is a neighboring country. Besides, realization
of a whole range of large-scale trans-Korean projects are tied to its participation or, at least,
consent. These two factors account for a third: Russian interest in a quick resolution of the
nuclear problem of the DPRK. For this, it actively cooperates with all of the partners in the
Six-Party Talks. Thus, for very pragmatic reasons, Russia is interested in peace and stability
on the Korean Peninsula, through cooperation with both Korean governments.
Since the breakdown of the Six-Party Talks in 2008 there has often been tension on
how to strike a balance between pressuring North Korea toward denuclearization and
restarting the talks on terms that leave the path to denuclearization less clear. China has
urged unconditional resumption of the talks, while the United States and South Korea
have put conditions on any resumption, as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates explained,
having grown tired of buying the same horse twice.
1
Russia backs the Chinese position.
It is more optimistic that progress can be made in this fashion, compared to U.S., South
Korea, or Japanese offcials. This results in triangular relations whereby Seoul encourages
Korea traditionally occupies an important place in Russias foreign policy directed at Asia.
That was the case at the turn of the twentieth century and in the Soviet period. In the frst
years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia pursued a one-sided course oriented to the
West; however, soon geopolitical and geo-economic realities obliged it to become active in
Asia. This reorientation was tied both to global tendencies, above all the shift in the center
of world politics and economics to the Asia-Pacifc region, and to disappointment with the
Western approach, characterized by a lack of understanding and hostility. These general
tendencies were not slow to make an impact on Russias approach to the Korean Peninsula.
A course was chosen to forge normal partnership relations with both Korean governments.
This occurred against the background of rapidly improving relations with China. Thus, from
the outset in the second half of the 1990s, there was a triangular element to Russias thinking
on how to deal with the divided Korean Peninsula in the context of its Asian policies.
As Russias relations with China were rapidly improving and its relations with the United
States were deteriorating in the frst decade of the twenty-frst century, North Korea was seen
through the lens of a triangle within a quadrangle within a hexagon. The quadrangle was the
prism of U.S. pursuit of unipolarity, which was approaching the North Korean nuclear crisis
in a manner that stood in the way of a political solution, and kept the triangle of Russia,
China, and North Korea from pursuing a compromise plan that would lead to successful,
multi-stage agreements combining assurances of regime security, assistance in support of
economic development and reform, and denuclearization as well as a peace treaty. The
hexagon included South Korea, which could be cooperative with Russia because of shared
economic interests in a corridor through North Korea, and Japan, which generally was seen
as siding with the United States and having a major role only at a later stage of negotiations.
Blaming the U.S. hardline policy no less than North Korean suspicions for stalling the
negotiations, Russia rested its hopes primarily on its relations with North Korea and China.
Assessments of the triangle with China and North Korea posed a problem, given the general
atmosphere of not offcially criticizing either of these countries. While there are alternative
viewpoints publicly expressed in Russia, the mainstream, including many with offcial or
semi-offcial positions, is careful not to deviate much from this advisory. Two prevailing
arguments followed: 1) North Korea is not interested in the possession of nuclear weapons
except as a pressure tactic to achieve reasonable goals, primarily from the United States
and its allies; and 2) China shares Russias thinking in the Six-Party Talks framework, and
the two countries can work closely together for mutual beneft. The problem with these
assumptions is that the DPRKs behavior defed Russian expectations at various points
as it more clearly supported development indicative of a desire to be a nuclear weapons
state with supportive missile capacity, and Russians often suspected China of opposition to
reunifcation of the peninsula and aspirations to put North Korea under its own domination.
The two other states in Russias primary triangle were driving forces in the struggle over how
to handle the nuclear crisis, while Russia was often relegated to a reactive role.
This chapter emphasizes the Russian side of the triangle. It argues that policy under President
Vladimir Putin has been pragmatic, puts priority on the Korean Peninsula, andsince the
breakdown in the Six-Party Talkshas been struggling to fnd balance that will achieve
denuclearization as well as other objectives. This struggle is linked to Russias bilateral
relations with both the DPRK and South Korea as well as to its challenges in coordination
which was reached in Kim Jong-ils August 2011 visit to Russia. Yet, two projects have
recently been realized: the September 2003 construction of a 54 km. railway segment
connecting the ice-free Korean port of Rajin with the Russian border city of Khasan at a
cost of 5.5 billion rubles; and modernization of the Rajin terminal at a cost of 3.5 billion
rubles. A big step forward was the September 2012 signing of an agreement on North
Koreas $11 billion debt.
The DPRKs missile and nuclear actions have had a negative infuence on bilateral relations.
Moscow has continuously stood for a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula, does not accept the
DPRKs nuclear status, and participates in international sanctions that were imposed by the
Security Council. On December 2, 2013 a presidential order was signed on fulflling Security
Council resolution 2094, providing the legal basis for implementation of this response to
the February 2013 nuclear test in violation of Security Council resolutions. It was tied to
the need to stop the DPRKs nuclear and missile programs, but it did not touch the essential
needs of the population of that country. Fulflling its international responsibilities, Moscow
did everything possible to soften Pyongyangs reaction and not harm its economic interests.
Testifying to this is the fact that the order was not written until almost a year after the Security
Council resolution. Moreover, an offcial pronouncement for the media stressed that Russias
sanctions do not extend to Russians who support ties with North Korean partners in fnance,
trade, and science and culture, areas not connected to nuclear and missile activities of the
DPRK. It was mentioned also that in case Pyongyang met the demands on all of its missile
and nuclear programs and returned to the non-proliferation treaty regime and subscribed
to the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, the sanctions would be dropped, opening the
possibility for development of trade, investment, and other international ties.
2
Russia remains convinced that a resolution of the North Korean nuclear program must
be found strictly through political-diplomatic means, through restoration of the Six-Party
Talks. Moscow is interested in having in the DPRK a good, reliable, and predictable
neighbor, to develop multi-sided relations with it built on the principles of international
law, no interference in internal affairs, mutual respect, equality, and mutual beneft. It seeks
to prod the DPRK into rational policies, notably cooperation with the ROK. Precisely for
this reason Moscow offcially welcomed the reopening of the Kaeseong industrial complex
in August 2013 and expressed the hope that on the basis of this experience constructive
dialogue would ensue on other problems, thus reducing tension, strengthening security, and
forging an atmosphere of trust and cooperation on the Korean Peninsula.
3
At the same time,
in relations with Pyongyang, Moscow often feels dissatisfed with attempts to deceive its
partner and pursue objectives incompatible with recognized international norms, which at
times are characteristic of DPRK policies.
Russia and South Korea
Political and economic relations between Moscow and Seoul are developing stably today.
This is facilitated by mutual economic interests: South Koreas in resources, and Russias
in investment, but also from the geopolitical situation, complicated relations between Seoul
and Tokyo and the strengthening of China. Periodically, the heads of government exchange
visits. Trade and investment cooperation has grown markedly in recent years; however, as
Moscow to be more demanding on Pyongyang, while Beijing prefers to follow its own
logic with a priority on preventing instability in North Korea. Moscow also worries about
instability there, agreeing with Beijing.
Russia and the DPRK
Russian authorities well understand the character of the North Korean regime. Indeed, the
majority of people who fnd themselves in power in Russia recall the USSR of the Brezhnev
period, which reminds them of communist North Korea, albeit distinguished by a softer
regime. At the same time, a debate is under way in Russias ruling elite about what policy is
needed toward Pyongyang. Holding quite a strong position in this are the heirs to communist
ideology and approaches of the Cold War era, who continue to view world processes as a
battle with the United States on all fronts. In their opinion, any anti-American force, even
more, a radical one such as the Pyongyang regime, is a valuable partner. Although such an
approach is usually not articulated in offcial documents, supporters can infuence concrete
decisions. A second group concentrated around allies of former Acting Prime Minister
Egor Gaidar, on the contrary, starts from its western ideology, viewing North Korea with
extreme skepticism. However, decisions taken toward the peninsula, as a rule, are based
on the pragmatic course described above. This breakdown into three approaches with one
deemed pragmatic and the others seen as extreme is similar to the way Chinese describe their
calculus, also suggesting that policies in the West are ideological and not pragmatic, while
their approach is not extreme support for North Korea.
In Russia the starting point is that in the present circumstances the DPRK scarcely has
any chance to escape from its deep economic crisis, which is increasingly of a systematic
character. The ruling regime is incapable of reforming the economy of the country, fearing
loss of control over the situation and, with it, loss of authority. At the same time, despite
the depth of the crisis, spontaneous collapse of the regime in the near future is hardly
possible. From all appearances, the young Kim Jong-un has succeeded in strengthening
his authority. Moreover, China would hardly allow the collapse of the DPRK. It is deeply
drawn into the problems of North Korea and concerned about them and will continue to
do everything possible to keep future developments under control and satisfy Chinas
interests there and on the peninsula as a whole. Awareness of Chinas stance informs
Russias approach to the DPRK too.
Improved relations with Pyongyang were one expression of the overall evolution of Russian
foreign policy to a less one-sided and more pragmatic course. Russia strives to sustain good
neighbor relations with the DPRK, maintaining political dialogue through the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. Over the past ten years the two sides have signed more than 40 inter-
governmental and inter-agency agreements. The 2000 treaty replaced that of 1961, removing
the mutual defense requirement, formally ending the alliance and the role of a shared ideology
in favor of the principles of international law. Trade is at an insignifcant $100-150 million
per year, refecting North Koreas diffculty in supplying traditional exports and delays in
payment or absence of any payment for goods received.
These factors make it impossible to realize much-advertised triangular projects with South
Koreaa gas pipeline, a railroad corridor, and electric transmission lines, agreement to
Pyongyangs announcement of its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty came as a surprise. The offcial statement of the Russian Foreign Ministry issued on
January 10, 2003 expressed deep concern.
The Russian approach to the crisis over North Korean WMD should be seen against the
general background of Moscows vision of the situation on the Korean Peninsula and of
the non-proliferation issue in general. The proliferation of nuclear weapons is extremely
damaging for the world as a whole, and it is at odds with Russian national interests to a
greater degree than the interests of other major powers. Russia is the only state in the world
that has the possibility of conducting a retaliatory nuclear strike against the United States.
In this respect, it is one of the two most powerful countries in the world. Thus, proliferation
devalues its military power and, consequently, its infuence in the world. For Washington, for
instance, proliferation is not so critical, since it is frst in other respects. In the case of Russia,
this is the only factor that puts it on a level with the United States above other countries. As a
permanent member of the Security Council, it is one of fve (although important), but not one
of two. In todays circumstances, when all other indicators show Russia far behind not only
the United States but many other countries, proliferation, especially near Russias borders, is
not only dangerous, it undermines Russias infuence in the world.
Russia has participated actively in the Six-Party Talks since 2003. In order to fnd an approach
for resolving the nuclear problem on the peninsula, it actively cooperates with China. The
two began right away to seek a peaceful resolution of the problem. In a joint communiqu
of February 27, 2003, the foreign ministers of the two countries expressed deep concern
over thesituation on thepeninsula.
5
The Korean question was given a substantial place in
the joint declaration during the visit of Hu Jintao on May 26-28, 2003.
6
Subsequently, the
two sides continued close cooperation and consultations on this issue. They jointly called
for the continuation of the Six-Party Talks in periods when they had ceased and for peaceful
resolution of the nuclear problem by diplomatic means. At present, several times a year Igor
Morgulov and Wu Dawei discuss this matter.
Moscow has all sorts of reasons to feel deeply dissatisfed with Pyongyangs actions on the
nuclear issue, which, from Moscows point of view, undermine regional security, and create
multiple problems. Russia and the DPRK, having restored cooperative relations at the end
of the 20th century and signed a series of important political and legal documents, expressed
their frm intention to make an active effort on behalf of security and stability around the
world. If there is danger of aggression toward either of them or in a situation of a threat to
peace and security or also in case of a need for consultations and joint action, Russia and
the DPRK expressed readiness without delay to contact each other. This key position of the
Pyongyang Declaration has actually been ignored by the North Korean side, which started
on the path of escalating the rocket and nuclear crisis, leading to the anti-North Korean
resolutions 1695 and 1718. Despite the fact that shortly afterwards there was success in
reaching compromise agreements in the context of the Six-Party Talks, questions remain
about Pyongyangs observance of the obligations it took upon itself in these joint documents.
From Russias point of view, it is necessary, above all, to verify North Koreas nuclear sites.
This requires restoring offcial relations between the DPRK and the IAEA and conducting
inspections of the sites on the basis of existing norms and rules.
before, Russian exports are mainly natural resources, and the ROKs are fnished goods.
Change in the structure of Russian exports is proceeding very slowly, and this is not
satisfactory to the Russian side. Investment cooperation is picking up in tempo, especially
in the extraction of oil and gas but also in the assembly of automobiles. South Korean
car companies annually supply more than 200,000 vehicles, including those assembled on
Russian territory.
After Park Geun-hye took offce, there have been two summits, one in the context of the
G-20 in St. Petersburg in September and the other in Korea in November, when President
Putin achieved agreement on an entire array of bilateral cooperation. The eight signed
documents included: removing visa requirements, establishing cultural centers, forming an
investment platform, cooperating in the establishment in Russia of a center for shipbuilding,
and cooperating in the area of transportation. Trade has reached about $25 billion, cumulative
investment in the Russian economy has hit $2.5 billion, although it is not increasing rapidly,
and the summit joint declaration specifed concrete measures for strengthening cooperation
in technology too.
A lot of attention in the Park-Putin talks was given to the situation on the Korean Peninsula.
Moscow and Seoul frmly declared the unacceptability of the DPRK acquiring rocket
and nuclear capabilities. It was strongly underlined that North Korea cannot acquire the
status of a nuclear weapons state. The two sides were united that the DPRK must fulfll its
international obligations and promises to denuclearize as well as Security Council resolutions
and Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. Moscow and Seoul declared their support for the
resumption of this negotiating process for managing the nuclear problem on the Korean
Peninsula. The memorandum of understanding signed during the summit called for steel
giant POSCO, Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., and Korea Railroad Corp. to participate in the
Rajin-Khasan development project.
Speaking at a press conference in January 2014, Park Geun-hye assessed the current level
of South Korean-Russian relations. In relations with Russia until now, there were various
problems, she noted, answering a journalists question on designated events. However, in the
course of two summits we have been able to resolve many problems and draw closer.
4
On
January 1 an agreement on visa-free entry for a period of up to sixty days went into effect.
Russias Approach to the WMD Crisis
and Korean Contingencies
Russia has always supported and will continue to support the non-nuclear status of the
Korean Peninsula and the non-proliferation of WMD and the means to acquire them in this
region. It actively works for and will continue to work for a political resolution of the nuclear
crisis on the peninsula. It condemned both the rocket and nuclear ambitions of the DPRK,
taking a principled stance on these questions, as in the rocket launch in June 2006 and the
nuclear test in October of that year. Russia directly participated in preparing Security Council
(rocket and nuclear) resolutions 1695 and 1718, which not only called on the DPRK to
halt these programs, but also contained concrete measures for curbing its military potential,
specifed by means of political management of complex problems on the Korean Peninsula.
a balanced policy to develop relations with both Koreas. Its approach, which has the most
infuence on Pyongyang, differs from Moscows approach. If in Russia only a minority of the
elite sympathize with the Norths leadership and consider it necessary to maintain it in power,
in China there are much more complex feelings about this. On the one hand, one fnds great
dissatisfaction with Pyongyangs course in developing nuclear weapons, considering their
proliferation and possession by such an unpredictable regime unacceptable. On the character
of the regime there are also no special illusions. Chinese experts close to ruling circles openly
call it feudal, dictatorial, medieval, etc. at international conferences. At the same time,
across a wide spectrum of Chinese society, in ruling circles, and especially in the armed forces,
there are powerful historical feelings about the North Korean communist brothers. Relations
between the two regimes have a long history, colored by many patriotic myths. China saved
the North Korean regime in 1953, sacrifcing thousands of volunteers, whose exploits are
remembered in monuments found in many Chinese cities. Still alive and having infuence are
people who were participants in the war with the South, and scattered across all of North China
are memorials to the heroes of that war. For the leadership now to follow a course of complete
isolation of North Korea would be to recognize the complete failure and thoughtlessness of its
entire policy toward the peninsula, beginning with the formation of the PRC and that thousands
of heroes of the Korean War died in vain. This is very hard psychologically and politically.
There is other geopolitical thinking in China, including those who regard the reunifcation of
Korea as inevitable and interference in this process as mindless, citing the need to develop
relations with the South and making the most of the unfolding situation. Yet, another point
of view is also infuential, supporting the opinion that a unifed, strong, democratic Korea,
in which the United States maintains considerable infuence, does not correspond to Chinas
interests since it could become a serious competitor and unfavorably impact on the internal
situation in the PRC.
In recent decades China has done a lot to prevent destabilization of the situation in North
Korea, which encountered great diffculty (the death of Kim Il-sung; U.S., Japanese, South
Korean, and other military, political, and economic pressure; international sanctions, the
death of Kim Jong-il). The persistent economic crisis remains a serious destabilizing factor.
The (songun or military frst) line from 1995 is costly, in 2011 comprising about 20 percent
of the GDP or $7.6 billion, and intensifcation of indoctrination with the ideas of juche has
driven the country into a dead end. Attempts at quasi-reforms have failed. The ruling elite
dares not go close to the edge of economic transformation, recognizing the danger that it
would losepower.
The death of Kim Jong-il, a leader who had caused a lot of grief to his ally, was taken
quietly in Beijing. The Chinese leadership on the surface reacted positively to Kims
decision to make his young son Kim Jong-un the heir to his power, and even prior to his
fathers death the son was invited to visit China. The change in party leadership after the
18th Party Congress and later in government positions had little effect on Beijings support
for a leader, who in conditions of international isolation had to listen to Beijings advice.
Under the yoke of severe international sanctions, Pyongyang is widening its economic ties
with the PRC, which provides substantial help in energy and foodstuffs. Trade rose from
$3.5 to $5.6 billion from 2010 to 2011, when they signed a new agreement on economic and
technological cooperation.
For objectivity, it is necessary to acknowledge that the nuclear problem on the peninsula
has been aroused not only by DPRK. There were also attempts by South Korea to develop
its nuclear potential. In the 1970s the government of Park Chung-hee was on the verge of
building an atomic bomb, and only the sharp U.S. reaction forced it to set aside this ambition,
but it did not stop attempts to engage in related non-peaceful activities. It is known that in
1982 and 2000 the ROK was conducting secret work on the enrichment of uranium, about
which it had to confess and inform the IAEA. Although this fact did not lead to a wide-
ranging anti-South Korean reaction in the international community, it was a signal that the
IAEA had to watch the nuclear activities of Seoul closely too. Experts consider it to have
contemporary nuclear technology (about 20 nuclear reactors), putting it on the list of states
(more than 30 in all) that the IAEA views as able to build nuclear weapons. In this light,
Russia seeks an active role in pursuit of an all-around, diplomatic resolution of the Korean
nuclear crisis, turning the peninsula into a zone free of WMD.
Starting from what has been said above, we can specify some characteristics of future Russian
policies toward the Korean Peninsula. Russia will continue to try to develop equal relations
with both Korean governments on the basis of principles of international law. It will avoid
dilatory or hasty changes in policy. Considering the economic situation in the North and the
unpredictability of the regime, Russia will accelerate development of economic cooperation
with the South. It will exert itself on behalf of disarmament steps, including the withdrawal
of armed forces by both sides from areas bordering the DMZ under strict international
control. While developing mutually benefcial economic ties with the DPRK, it will strive to
establish a mechanism for the infow of South Korean investment into the Russian economy
and take steps for the entrance of Russian business into the high-tech sectors of the South
Korean economy, as it also pursues three-sided cooperation in rail transportation linking
trans-Korean and Trans-Siberian lines and in other sectors.
Future Russian policy will depend heavily on the overall atmosphere in international relations
and especially on relations with the United States. If relations with Washington develop,
Moscow can take a more active position, e.g. in urging China to exert greater pressure on
the DPRK. In case of deterioration in Russo-U.S. relations, Russia will stick to the prior
line of weakening sanctions and verbal exhortations to the North Korean regime. A separate
question is Russian behavior in case of sudden destabilization of the situation in the DPRK,
connected to the death of the leader and a struggle for power. Here Moscows actions would
be directed, above all, at reducing the danger of any military confict, nuclear accident, or
uncontrolled exodus of migrants onto its territory. In that situation, it would be ready to
cooperate with other DPRK neighbors, above all, the PRC and South Korea, in search of
some way to bring the situation under control.
China and the Korean Peninsula
In Beijings policy toward the Korean Peninsula we can distinguish both overlapping
approaches to the DPRK and ROK and specifc types of conduct toward each. The main
difference in these approaches is that North Korea is an important military and political
ally of the PRC in Asia, and South Korea belongs to an opposing camp as a strategic ally
of the United States. This distinction, however, is somewhat neutralized by Beijings line of
North Korean refugees in China pose a serious problem, as seen in the recent transfer of
more than 30 of them to the DPRK, complicating relations with Seoul, which demands that
they be sent to South Korea. An agreement exists with the DPRK whereby each side returns
to the other anyone who illegally crossed their border. This is an unwelcome problem, which
China promises to solve on the basis of domestic law and international rights, and in the
spirit of humanism.
8
Any solution is likely to refect Chinas overall goals: to maintain the
stability of the North Korean regime, to strengthen infuence over its new leader, to prod him
into economic reform to end the deep crisis, and not to allow dangerous exacerbation of the
situation on thepeninsula.
China and South Korea
Chinas policy toward South Korea is well thought out, without leading to the rupture
in relations that occurred with Soviet-South Korean normalization. On the whole, it has
succeeded in maintaining balanced political relations with both sides, while boosting
cooperation with Seoul to a massive scale, climbing to more than $250 billion in trade and
securing 70 percent of the foreign investment by the ROK. The goal is $300 billion in trade in
2015, as the two sides negotiate the conclusion of an FTA. The rise in economic cooperation
is accompanied by cultural infuence on both sides. Chinas Korea policy is seen with rising
concern by a certain part of South Koreas ruling elite, fearing hegemonism. Seoul has not
concealed its disappointment over Chinas support for North Koreas position on the sinking
of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. In turn, Beijing reacts with growing
concern to the intensifed ROK-US military-political alliance aimed at the United States
incorporating South Korea into a global anti-missile defense. It expressed dissatisfaction
with their October 12 agreement on missiles, which gave Seoul the right to extend the range
of its rockets from 300 to 800 km.
In the ROK the Koguryo issue drew a sharp reaction. Seoul called the PRC claim that this
ancient state was part of China historical terrorism, and the public condemned as rewriting
history Chinas conception of Koguryo as its regional vassal. On the South Korean side,
scholars remember Manchuria in this period belonging to the Korean state, while regarding,
as do North Koreans, its territory as the historical lands of Korea. Recently a new thorn in
bilateral relations is the underground Iedo (Suyan) rock (island), over which Beijing intends
to extend its rights, listing it as an object for regular patrols by ship and plane. When China in
late 2013 declared its air defense identifcation zone, Seoul offcially protested and declared
that it would not recognize the zone. In turn, Beijing is critical about Seouls plans to establish
a research station in the Yellow Sea on reefs where the exclusive economic zones cross with
implications for claims in future negotiations. One more complicating factor is illegal fshing
in the ROK economic zone, as in 2011 when the Korean coast guard caught Chinese in the
act and one of their offcers was killed, resonating in anti-Chinese emotions. Subsequent
negotiations to prevent a similar incident did not stop the ROK from strictly controlling
such illegal fshing. Uneasiness also occurred over Beijings attempt to appropriate the song
Arirang and other Korean cultural symbols and traditions.
Despite such disturbing elements, China in the foreseeable future will persist in its course
of strengthening all-around ties with South Korea, striving to reduce the infuence of the
Chinese business was planting the seeds of its presence in the North Korean economy. Joint
management was established on two islands rented by China on the Yalu River and in the
Rason trade zone, enclaves until recently run by Jang Song-taek. China invested about $400
million in developing the zone at Rason, where more than 60 of its frms operated and to
which a railway spur from Hunchun was being extended. It declared its readiness to supply
to the DPRK credits of more than $10 billion for developing infrastructure and extracting
coal, iron ore, and other mineral deposits. Realization of large projects is scarcely possible,
given Security Council sanctions; however, in the opinion of experts, China intentionally
does not notice Pyongyangs violations of the sanctions regime, and it is not distinguished
by its strict observance of the Security Council resolutions.
China provides substantial humanitarian assistance each year, and unlike the West, does not
require monitoring its distribution. Military cooperation also is developing with the DPRK,
closed from public purview with both sides limiting offcial announcements on contacts that
occur under an agreement on military and technical cooperation. In light of sanctions, both
sides prefer not to advertise their cooperation. The DPRK has a substantial debt of more than
$5 billion, which it hopes will some day be forgiven.
The abrupt removal of Jang Song-taek from the political arena at the end of 2013 raised
concern in China. On the one hand, even for the DPRK, it is extraordinary in recent years
for one of the highest leaders to be executed, and it is evidence of political instability in a
neighbor and ally. On the other, removal of a person with good ties to Beijing along with
offcial charges that he was working on behalf of another state (clearly hinting at China)
was a blow. At least Chinese were accustomed to working with him. Yet, offcial responses
were restrained, characterizing the matter as the DPRKs internal affair as hope was
expressed to see the DPRK maintain political stability and realize economic development
and people there lead a happy life...We hope and believe that China-DPRK economic
cooperation and trade will move ahead in a sound and steady manner, added the foreign
ministry spokesmen.
7
Given the complex military and political situation on the peninsula
and the dead end on the nuclear question, Beijing remains careful and vigilant.
Of late, economic ties have acquired more signifcance in Sino-North Korean relations.
Overcoming many obstacles, Chinese business is extending its presence in the Rason
economic zone, establishing more than 100 joint ventures with more than 150 Chinese
companies working there. Chinese have rented on a long-term lease two wharves at the port
of Rajin, and China has a triangular project with the ROK to build a railroad and highway
across the entire span of the DPRK, intended to compete with Russias triangular project
linking the railroad of the ROK and DPRK with Russias. Despite its dissatisfaction with the
behavior of its strategic ally, China has no intention of altering its fundamental approach, as
before regarding it as an important geopolitical factor in its opposition to the United States,
whose policies, from Chinas point of view are directed against the expansion of Chinas
infuence on the Korean Peninsula and in all of Northeast Asia.
The international isolation into which the United States and its allies drive Pyongyang leave
it with no other options besides drawing closer politically and economically to China. As an
ally, China can help in overcoming an economic crisis, offering more massive assistance, but
Beijing refrains from that as it strives to persuade Pyongyang to start on the path of reform.
inter-Korean cooperation of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, which had given birth to
hopes in both North and South Korea for reunifcation. China supports the idea of peaceful
unifcation of Korea through a gradual process, during which attention should concentrate
on strengthening security and stability on the peninsula, fnding a political resolution of the
nuclear crisis, developing dialogue beginning in inter-Korean relations, and realizing various
forms of cooperation and exchanges.
Verbally supporting the unity of Korea, Beijing, nonetheless, would never agree to the
presence in a unifed Korea of foreign military bases and troops. A remark by Kim Dae-jung
during his presidency about that possibility was taken extremely negatively by the Chinese.
Beijing also fears that further delay in resolving the nuclear problem will provoke a regional
arms race, leading to the emergence in Northeast Asia of new nuclear powers (Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan). Chinese are actively pressing for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks,
taking various initiatives to reanimate the negotiating process (Wu Daweis three-stage plan
calls for productive inter-Korean dialogue, then negotiations between the DPRK and the
United States, and last, full-fedged Six-Party Talks).
Beijing condemned the DPRK nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, participating actively in the
Security Council resolutions that imposed strict sanctions on it. Beijing put pressure on
Kim Jong-il, introducing economic restrictions, succeeding in stopping the nuclear weapons
program and fulflling the Joint Statement of Sept. 19, 2005. Despite its general assurances
about readiness to return to the Six-Party Talks without conditions, Pyongyang prefers to
reach an agreement on the nuclear problem with the United States. China welcomed the
February 2012 North Korea-U.S. agreement reached in Beijing for a moratorium on nuclear
tests and long-distance rocket launches and to halt the enrichment of uranium and agree
to IAEA inspections of nuclear objects. It also approved of the two agreeing to fulfll the
obligations set forth by the Six-Party Talks in the Joint Statement. In mid-April Pyongyangs
declaration of its launch of a satellite in honor of the centenary of the birth Kim Il-sung
drew a sharp negative reaction from the world community. While China did not support this
action, it was put in an awkward position and called on Seoul to preserve peace and show
restraint. Plans by Pyongyang to launch missiles were condemned in December as well,
by the Russian Foreign Ministry, which appealed on December 3 for it to stop, and on the
next day by China, which indicated that it has constantly recommended to Pyongyang not
to arouse the world community with such launches, but its opinion has yet to be accepted.
When the launch occurred on December 12, the response from Beijing was negative, but less
severe than at the time of prior launches.
In February 2013 Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi frmly condemned the DPRKs new nuclear
test. Tension in bilateral relations led to some incidents of the seizure of Chinese fshing
boats by the North Korean coast guard. A strange situation arose: repeatedly recommending
that its ally observe the UN sanctions and repeatedly being rebuffed, China loses face, but
it does not adopt more decisive measures. Why? It is not a matter of not being in a position
to exert effective pressure, since 90 percent of the DPRK energy and 40-45 percent of DPRK
foodstuffs depend on China. Rather, China has not decided and is hardly likely to decide
on such sanctions. On the one hand, it is dissatisfed that Pyongyang creates problems for
countries in the region and the whole world. Therefore, China joins in UN sanctions and
United States and Japan and defend its interests on the southern part of the peninsula.
Chinas signifcance for South Korean foreign policy noticeably rose after Park Geun-
hye became president, as hopes persist for Chinas help in resolving the nuclear crisis,
reestablishing inter-Korean dialogue, and, in the fnal analysis, reunifcation. Parks June
2013 visit to Beijing confrmed her vision of relations. This summit showed the intention
of both sides to improve strategic cooperation, but standing in the way of such cooperation
is the U.S.-ROK alliance.
Beijing and Inter-Korean Relations
Offcially, Beijing supports and does all it can for improving DPRK-ROK relations. They
found hope in the golden decade of 1998-2008 when relations developed very well in
many spheres when Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun were in offce. Bilateral trade rose,
large-scale economic projects were realized, humanitarian contacts were actively cultivated,
and both sides entered into negotiations for reducing military tension on the peninsula.
When Lee Myung-bak came to power at the head of the conservative political establishment
relations were thrown back to a time of sharp military-political opposition, even to the
threshold of military confict in 2010. Thanks to the efforts of Russia and China the two
Korean sides succeeded in averting this danger. Inter-Korean relations are now complex.
In 2011 the ROK conducted more than 40 military maneuvers, some involving American
forces. At the beginning of 2012 the two undertook new maneuvers in South Korea. All
of this aroused Pyongyang, leading in March to an especially intense propaganda war as
the two allies proceeded with operation Key Resolve. Many meetings and demonstrations
organized in the DPRK called for the start of a holy war against the traitorous regime of
Lee Myung-bak. North Korea continues insistently to seek a South Korean apology for not
expressing condolences at the death of Kim Jong-il, making also the following demands:
1. Fulfll the agreements in the joint summit declarations of June 15, 2000 and
October 4, 2007
2. Stop accusing the DPRK of participating in the sinking of the Cheonan and
shelling of Yeonpyeong
3. Stop military maneuvers aimed against the DPRK
4. Begin practical work for the denuclearization of the peninsula
5. Stop the psychological warfare against the DPRK
6. Restore inter-Korean cooperation and exchanges
7. Accept North Korean proposals to replace the 1953 armistice with a new
peace mechanism
8. Abrogate the 1948 national security law and other laws, directed against the
Korean nation and unifcation of the country
Pyongyang refused attempts to launch dialogues with the Lee Myung-bak administration
and hoped that in the April 2012 parliamentary elections and the December presidential
elections forces would come to power with which it would succeed in restoring political
dialogue and broadening economic tiesforces standing for resumption of the course of
context of quadrangular relations of Russia-China-DPRK-USA, the tendency is increasing to
counteract the attempts by the United States and its allies to liquidate or weaken the North
Korean regime with the possibility of more intensive support for the DPRK. Although the
DPRK is unpredictable, it is an ally in the overall geopolitical struggle.
The frst signs of the softening of the position of Russia regarding the DPRKs military
adventurism already are present. The Russian Foreign Ministry did not condemn Pyongyang
for its launch of a medium-range rocket of the Nodong class in March 2014. The Information
Department only called for all interested sides to use restraint from actions that could lead
to aggravation of the situation on the Korean Peninsula.
9
Later in March, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Russia actually laid the blame for the artillery exchange between the
two Koreas on Seoul and its allies, accusing them of provoking the North by means of
conducting large-scale military exercises.
10
Without doubt, such a change of position was a direct result of the sharp reaction of the West
to the reunifcation of Crimea with Russia. Moscow also in this way expressed its gratitude
to Pyongyang for Pyongyangs support for its position during the voting on the question of
the legitimacy of the referendum in Crimea at the UN General Assembly, where the DPRK
wound up being among only 11 countries that voted against the anti-Russian resolution.
Seeking not to be isolated, Russia is striving to strengthen relations with critics of the West
in other parts of theworld.
It is hard to believe that such changes could proceed without consideration of the position
of Russias strategic partnerthe PRC. In contrast to the West, the reaction of Beijing to the
hostility to Russia over Ukraine was taken, on the whole, as approval of Russia. China did
not support the West in Ukraine since it sees the crisis as engineered by the West aiming at
world domination. In countering this tendency, in Chinas view, Russia is a valuable ally. A
commentary by Xinhua news agency on March 7 entitled The Wests Fiasco in Ukraine
was very sympathetic to Russias actions and critical of those of the West: Russia
may no longer be interested in competing for global preeminence with the West, but when
it comes to cleaning up a mess the West created in the countrys backyard, Russian leaders
once again proved their credibility and shrewdness in planning and executing effective
counter moves.
11
In short, Beijing is happy that someone was brave and resolute enough to
take effective measures against Western hegemonism. But it is also comfortable that this
was not China, and the Ukrainian crisis would not worsen Sino-U.S. relations that China
values. It would also divert U.S. attention from an alleged plot of encircling China and
limiting its legitimately growing infuence in East Asia. Therefore, Beijing rejected any kind
of sanctions against Russia. Generally, China sees the current situation in Ukraine as a mess
created by the Wests ineffective and greedy policy. The Xinhua commentary asserted,
For the rest of the world, once again, people see another great country torn apart because of
a clumsy and selfsh West that boasts too many lofty ideals but always comes up short of
practical solutions.
12
By mess Beijing usually means a situation created by Western
sponsored actions aimed at undermining stable (often authoritarian) regimes all over the
world, which in Beijings opinion can effectively secure the countrys economic development
and growing cooperation with China. This term was used to describe the Tiananmen crisis in
1989, color revolutions in Arab states, etc. Beijings regime sees countering this tendency
even far from Chinas borders as a means of protecting itself since it understands that
often expresses its dissatisfaction with the DPRKs actions. On the other hand, we should not
forget that the DPRK is the only offcial ally of the PRC, sealed in a treaty of 1961 obliging
each side to respond quickly with military and all other possible means of assistance in the
event of an armed attack on the other. This is the only treaty of mutual defense that China
has with another country.
A refusal to support the DPRK would signify recognition that the heroes of the war, whose
example is taught to schoolchildren, fell in vain. Moreover, for Chinese communists it would
be equivalent to wiping away the countrys entire foreign policy practically from the formation
of the PRC, dealing a serious blow to the PRCs legitimacy. No less important are geopolitical
considerations. A majority of offcial Chinese analysts consider that the main problem with the
foreign policy of the country is U.S. attempts to contain its development, for which it organizes
along Chinas entire perimeter a military-political encirclement. In this situation, even a
sometimes disobedient, allied DPRK is a useful geopolitical resource. Excessive pressure on
it could lead to its economic collapse, bringing a food of refugees, political instability, etc.
Moreover, unifcation of the two Koreas, which could result from such a collapse, would allow
American infuence to grow stronger in a new, more powerful state.
For these reasons Beijing strives to apply moderate pressure on Pyongyang, nudging it to
a more rational foreign policy and more decisive internal reforms; however, this course
scarcely leads to real results. Any serious market reforms would result in more openness,
which would lead the people to understand the real situation in the country, bringing about
the regimes collapse and reunifcation. Therefore, Pyongyang is hardly likely to take that
path, preferring to continue with a policy of trading threats for assistance.
However the problem of rockets and nuclear weapons unfolds, in our opinion, in the DPRK
there is still a chance for managing the situation politically. Beijing continues to support the
DPRK, which is an important strategic bastion in its battle with the United States for infuence
in Northeast Asia, including the Korean Peninsula. In China it is well understood that if there
is not out of the ordinary, uncontrolled collapse of the regime, any resolution of the Korean
problem, due to its complexity, will require more than one decade. To achieve a comprehensive
solution, which assumes above all political resolution of the nuclear crisis, conclusion of a peace
treaty in place of the armistice, establishment of constructive relations between the two states
on the peninsula, creation of conditions for peaceful coexistence of the DPRK and ROKall
of this is possible under conditions of maintaining the status quo. Chinas Korean policy is
based precisely on this, and will bebased in theforeseeablefuture. Chineseareconvinced that
normalization of inter-Korean relations and a long period of peaceful coexistence can open the
way for a gradual advance to unifcation of the Korean Peninsula.
Conclusion
The approach of Russia and China to the problems of the Korean Peninsula will be determined,
even in the long term, by triangular relations with Moscow and Beijing. These very relations
are quite strong both due to mutual economic dependence and, to a great degree, to geopolitical
reasons. The general state of international relations, especially the rise in tension in Europe,
contributes to Moscow and Beijing drawing closer and their joint inclination to contain
attempts at world domination by the United States and the West. In connection with this, in the
the same tactics can be used by the West in China. From this point of view China would
only welcome Russias growing will to counter Western expansion, and they both may be
interested in having Pyongyang on their side.
The only thing China does not offcially support is Russias decision to annex Crimea. That
is why it chose to obtain during the voting at the Security Council. Here Beijings position
will be similar to that on the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia: generally
supportive of Russias actions, but not approving of undermining the territorial integrity of
existing states. Chinas approach is determined by its own separatist problems in Taiwan,
Tibet, and Xinjiang.
In the current situation the other sides of the hexagon (Japan and South Korea) will be
seen by Moscow and Beijing as allies of the United States, and the approach to them will
depend on what position they take. Tokyo and Seoul may not want to sacrifce important
trade and economic ties with Russia and China on account of European problems distant
from them, and will stick to moderate policies. However, in case of serious differences
over the DPRK (e.g. the departure of Russia and China from the sanctions regime as a
consequence of the growing general confrontation with the West), they will have to more
frmly support their allies.
Endnotes
1. As quoted in: David E. Sanger, U.S. Weighs Intercepting North Korean Shipments, The New
York Times, June 7, 2009, p. A1.
2. Soobshchenie dlia SMI, December 3, 2013, http://mid.ru/bdomp/ns-rasia.nsf/1083b7937ae580a
e432569e7004199c2/44257b100055e10444257c36005ad738!OpenDocument.
3. Kommentarii Departamenta informatsii i pechati MID Rossii v svyazi s vozobnovleniem
raboty Kesonskogo promyshlennogo kompleksa, August 15, 2013, http://mid.ru/bdomp/ns-
rasia.nsf/1083b7937ae580ae432569e7004199c2/44257b100055e10444257bc800303a7d!Open
Document.
4. Oleg Kiryanov, Park Geun-hye poobeshchala koreitsam obedinenie s KNDR, Rossiiskaia
gazeta, January 7, 2014, http://www.rg.ru/2014/01/07/obyedineniye-site.html.
5. Sovmestnoe kommiunike ministrov inostrannykh del RF i KNR o situatsii na Koreiskom
poluostrove, February 27, 2003, http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-rasia.nsf/1083b7937ae580ae43
2569e7004199c2/31235f84bd5abd2b43256cde00218120!OpenDocument.
6. Sovmestnaia deklaratsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki, May 27,
2003, http://www.rg.ru/ofcial/doc/ros-kit.shtm.
7. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Leis Regular Press Conference on December 13,
2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t1108768.shtml.
8. KBS World Radio, February 29, 2012.
9. Commentary of the Department of Information and Print of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Russia concerning the Launch in the DPRK of a Medium-Range Rocket, March 26, 2014.
10. Kommentarii Departamenta informatsii i pechati MID Rossii otnositelno razvitiia obstanovki
vokrug Koreiskogo poluostrova, March 31, 2014, http://mid.ru/bdomp/ns-rasia.nsf/1083b7937
ae580ae432569e7004199c2/44257b100055e10444257cac0045e217!OpenDocument.
11. Ming Jinwei, The Wests Fiasco in Ukraine, Xinhua, March 7, 2014, http://english.
peopledaily.com.cn/90777/8558083.html.
12. Ming Jinwei, The Wests Fiasco in Ukraine.
NATIONAL IDENTITY APPROACHES
TO EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
in Hong Kong and Taiwan, a generic ethnic identifcation is changing, infused with ideals for
civil identity with implications for attitudes toward unifcation with others long perceived as
sharing the same broad ethnic identity. A similarity is that the civic identity associated with
North Korea as well as with China stands in sharp contrast to local ideals.
Kim observes that young people are more welcoming of North Korean defectors despite their
weaker ethnic identity. A lower degree of ethnic identity helps a person to have a positive
and sympathetic sentiment toward North Korean defectors as well as a more accommodating
attitude toward immigrants from the United States, China, and Japan. Koreans stopped
seeing North Korean defectors from the perspective of ethnic identity, but began to see them
through the lens they use to see immigrants from other countries. About 70 percent of South
Koreans, Kim shows, do not see North Korea as one of us. This has important implications
for how reunifcation might proceed, dimming its prospects, similar to fndings that identities
in Hong Kong and Taiwan cast doubt on unifcation.
Elsewhere in Section II we observe the outward shift from proximity to Chinas historical
and cultural infuence, introducing in another chapter a case study of recent Japanese thinking
about national identity gaps with countries of the utmost signifcance. The backlash against
China is intense, but instead of Japan drawing deeper into the U.S. orbit, the dominant
school in Japanese national identity debate is prioritizing sharper rejection of the U.S.-
led international community and also the associated regional community represented by
South Korea (despite claims to favor both the U.S. alliance and the community it leads). My
chapter on Japan is a second attempt to analyze how in late 2013 four schools of thought
were debating current challenges to national identity. Whereas the prior attempt focused on
views of national security, a 21
st
century economic order, and the role of values in diplomacy,
this chapter ranges across six objects of national identity gaps, highlighting two of them
China and South Koreataking account of two othersthe United States and ASEAN
and making reference to two other objects of identity gapsNorth Korea and Russia.
Although the Japanese case turns our attention away from ethnic identity with an impact on
unifcation prospects, it also points to challenges associated with the shadow of China or
even North Korea, while demonstrating the limits of internationalism as an identity, which
some may want to juxtapose to civic identity. For Japan, we fnd evidence mostly in daily
newspapers for a wider range of identity options, at one end an extreme version of ethnic
identity centered on state pride linked to history, and at the other the postwar tradition of
pacifsm as distortion of internationalism with scant regard for responsibility in resolving
international challenges. Yet, under Abe Shinzo, the main trend is a statist identity, which
claims to favor the international community even as it treats bilateral gaps in identity in a
manner that further accentuates Japans distinctiveness.
In discussing the national identity gap with China, I consider how it has weakened the school
advocating pacifsm and for a time strengthened the internationalist school, but Abe saw an
opportunity to boost ethnic nationalism and, even more, statism, through an image of Japan
under siege. Breaking down responses into six dimensions of national identity, I fnd that
China opens the door to re-center Japans national identity on a strong state as well as to
prioritize a proud nation, as internationalists are being outfanked. In the case of the identity
gap with South Korea, success in branding it as mired in scold diplomacy and beyond
Introduction
The chapters in Section II explore changes in national identity in Asia in the shadow of both
the U.S. struggle to reaffrm its leadership of the international community and Chinas intense
advocacy of a national and regional community in opposition to that community. Against
the backdrop of a tug-of-war between these rivals over identity transformation, we observe
responses along the borders of the PRC. Commonalities can be found in attitudes of avoidance
of falling deeply into the sweep of one or the other powers national identity, while there are
also clear differences in how each of Chinas neighbors is bolstering and even intensifying its
own national identity. The areas coveredHong Kong and Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and
Indiadiffer in the closeness of their bonds to the United States, the nature and intensity of
the appeal by China, and the urgency each feels toward reaffrming a more distinct identity.
Section II incorporates dual coverage of Hong Kong and Taiwan, both of which are now
rapidly integrating with the PRC, which is insistent that they share Chinese identity. Pressure
is greatest of all on Hong Kong, whose sovereignty was transferred in 1997 to China, to
become more Chinese in a manner defned by Beijing. Taiwan serves as a convenient
comparison because it has more space to distance itself from Chinese identity since Beijing
has not consummated its intention to impose its sovereignty.
Shirley Lin fnds that instead of an increase in Chinese identity, as desired by China, local
identities have intensifed. She focuses on the widening gap between the two as well as the
soft and hard approaches China uses to try to narrow them. Noting the deepening economic
and social integration that would appear to work in Chinas favor, Lin is careful to defne the
national identities she is covering and to point to survey data. For instance, she notes that
a December 2013 poll showed that despite strong PRC efforts in Hong Kong at patriotic
education, just 12 percent of young people are identifying as primarily Chinese, barely one-
third the fgure in 1997. In Taiwan the gap in identity is even more glaring, we are informed.
Young people are identifying as non-Chinese or not exclusively Chinese, as indicated in a
spring 2013 poll which found that nearly 90 percent of respondents under the age of 34 are
identifying simply as Taiwanese, compared to 76 percent in the other three age groups.
Various causes are indicated for the widening identity gaps before attention is shifted to
strategies for narrowing these gaps, ranging from propaganda and education to sanctions
and legislation. Looking ahead, Lin doubts that any of these strategies will work without a
redefned, inclusive Chinese national identity, which is nowhere on the horizon.
The second chapter in Section II centers on South Koreas recent rethinking of national identity
in an environment where Chinas shadow remains far enough away to turn attention from
Chineseness to sinocentrism, both direct and indirect through North Korea, while the U.S.
shadow is also blurred by identity sentiments linked to North Korea. In this context, Koreanness
is acquiring new meaning, as separation from the outside world is rapidly declining. Jiyoon
Kim anchors her analysis on attitudes seen in polling data toward North Korean detectors.
Expecting that the rise of civic identity will change how people view unifcation, which is
associated with strong ethnic identity, she frst clarifes how these two poles of identity are
changing. In 2013, abiding by the Korean political and legal system was identifed as the
most important measuring criterion for being Korean, and, unlike in the recent past, the least
important factor was having the Korean bloodline, indispensible in ethnic nationalism. As
In these four chapters we learn that if ethnic identity poses a major threat to civic identity, then
the latter will intensify. In turn, it will have policy implications averse to regimes that count
on ethnic identity to ensnarl those seen as compatriots. At the same time, if internationalism
looms as the obvious realist choice in the face of new dangers from a great power rival, the
alternative of autonomy and a strengthened state and ethnic identity can be more appealing
given lingering past identities. The rise of China and prospects for sinocentrism are linked
to these distinct responses, as is the success of the U.S. rebalance in forging a network of
regional partners.
cooperation due to history education, allowed the conservatives to snub those who prioritized
both universal values and internationalist security identity. In the frst months of 2014 the
national identity gap with the United States had widened, offering further evidence of how
internationalism is too weak in current conditions of a country feeling itself under siege to
withstand appeals to statism of an exclusive nation. Yet, other schools of thought retain a
wide following, and Japans identity is in fux. The U.S. image also improved somewhat in
the spring of 2014 through summits with Obama.
Section II concludes with India, the most distant of these cases from both the U.S. and
Chinese identity shadows, but still, to a not inconsiderable extent, infuenced by them.
Chapter 8 demonstrates that this proud civilization still makes keeping its distance from
the United States a priority. As observers anticipated victory at the polls of the intensely
identity-conscious BJP, India appeared poised to join Japan in responding to the increasingly
polarized environment by a distinctly autonomous and defant national identity at odds with
the international community, represented by the United States. Deepa Ollapally shows how
realist explanations fall short on a range of Indian foreign policy issues related to the United
States and China, Instead, a deep-rooted legacy of national identity prevails. She has the
most expansive list of this group of authors of foreign policy perspectives linked to national
identity, pointing to six groups that she combines into four schools. While she argues that
pragmatists, represented by great power realists and liberal globalists, have gained strength
over the past two decades, she fnds that standard and soft nationalists now hold sway.
In looking closely at responses to the United States and China, Ollapally found that
India became consumed with a debate about how the U.S. vision threatened its strategic
autonomy, while it was averse to embracing the rebalance strategy. Also, in reacting to the
widening trade defcit with China, government offcials and industry leaders led the way in
minimizing concern. She writes that India essentially spurned what realists would see as a
strategic opportunity with the U.S. rebalance, and meanwhile, took a much more relaxed
view of what realists (and more mercantilist economists) would see as a threat from the
highly skewed trade defcit with China. She attributes these responses to the concept of
autonomy in the global arena, born from a particular combination of colonial trauma and
perceived civilizational status. Entrenched assumptions about national identity come with
a longstanding view that it is the United States that poses a special danger of undermining
that identity, she writes. She predicts that China will continue to fare well, with economic
advantage in the forefront as seen by the liberal-globalist school, supported by the standard
nationalist government and tacit support from some great power realists and soft nationalists.
Without this identity prism, Indias policies would be hard to explain.
The failure of realism to take hold for India has a parallel in the weakness of Japans
internationalism. In both of these cases covered in Section II, we fnd a country caught
between a closer embrace offered by the United States and a potential threat coming from
China. The choice made may appear more realist in Japan, but it too prioritizes autonomy.
In these two important partners for forging a network to manage the rise of China in accord
with internationalist principles, the affrmation of autonomy may come as a surprise to
international relations theorists. National identity analysis is a valuable tool for incorporating
discourse on foreign policy into scholarship.
Japans Natonal Identty Gaps:
A Framework for Analysis of
Internatonal Relatons in Asia
Gilbert Rozman
Rozman: Japans Natonal Identty Gaps | 81 80 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
policy statements regarding China, notably those made by Vice President Joe Biden during
his stops in Tokyo, Beijing, and Seoul in early December.
5
Later in that month Abe hosted
the ten ASEAN states in a summit that raised interest in whether an identity overlap with
ASEAN could revive Japans goal of Asianism, a longstanding aspiration that Abe had
reasserted in visits to all ten states over the year. In November a 2 + 2 meeting of foreign
and defense ministers brought Russian offcials to Tokyo for the frst consultations of this
kind, intensifying interest in a breakthrough in bilateral relations with special signifcance
due to Russias past place in Japanese thinking, which Abe and President Vladimir Putin
had promised to pursue. Finally, in December North Koreas execution of Jang Song-taek
reignited alarm that a state threatening Japan was taking an even more extreme course of
militarism. All of these developments were followed closely in Japan, fueling debates on
national identity, not just the usual realist concerns.
This chapter comprises three parts. First, I review the national identity framework and the
role of national identity gaps with special attention to relations in East Asia and Japans
place in them. Second, I identify Japans four schools of thought in the context of foreign
policy challenges while also focusing on the six national identity gaps as discussed in late
2013 Japanese sources, concentrating on gaps with China and South Korea, and weighing
the mix of attitudes toward internationalism centered on the United States and what is left of
Asianism centered on ASEAN. Third, I compare how the four schools are searching for their
own view on these identity gaps in order to steer foreign policy and national identity in their
direction. At the end, I draw conclusions about applying this framework
The National Identity Framework and
the Impact of National Identity Gaps
National identity is a narrative about how ones country is distinctive and superior. It is
transformed not only through top-down initiatives and, in some countries, contestation over
domestic policies that legitimate a way of thinking, but also through changes in the way other
salient countries are perceived as threatening or reinforcing to ones national identity. As an
example, during the Cold War anti-communism, centering on views of the Soviet Union was
a major force in debates over national identity in Japan as well as the United States. Using a
six-dimensional framework to specify national identity, I compare countries, trace changes
over time, and estimate the scale of national identity gaps with a small number of other
countries that loom as signifcant others. For each dimension, I suggest its relevance to the
identity gaps in East Asia, especially to Japans place in them.
The ideology dimension in the 1990s was thought to be a thing of the past after the Cold
War had ended. Japans foreign policy in the postwar era was often described as bereft of
ideology: mercantilist, pragmatic, and a product of a standoff between conservatives and
progressives, whose ideological leanings were cancelled out by the others presence. For
China lying low in accord with Deng Xiaopings dictum and South Korea democratized and
quickly shedding its past obsession with anti-communism, economics appeared to be the
driver of foreign policy with a pragmatic penchant for narrowing identity differences.
On December 26 Chinas leadership commemorated the 120th anniversary of Mao Zedongs
birth by bowing before his statue at the mausoleum in his honor on Tiananmen Square. On
December 27 Abe Shinzo became the frst prime minister since Koizumi Junichiro to visit
the Yasukuni Shrine with few in doubt about the historical revisionist thinking behind his
visit. Memories that in the 1980s had appeared to be consigned to the dustbin of history
had come roaring back at enormous cost to prior trust that China was putting Maoism far
behind it and Japan was leaving militarism in the past. These were not isolated incidents
of recognition of the deep roots of individual leaders and elites, but powerful signals of
reconstructed national identities at odds with what had been widely anticipated during the
heyday of Sino-Japanese relations, bound to exacerbate bilateral gaps between identities.
Confdent of its rising power, China was prepared to be more defant of world opinion as
well as assertive in reclaiming its socialist identity in the face of public apathy or dissent,
while Japans leadership was already treated as a pariah in China and South Korea but had
an electoral mandate for the coming three years; so it was ready to be defant as well. Below
I concentrate on how sources in Japan frame relations with the states critical to its national
identity, focusing on writings from late 2013 as identity gaps were intensifying.
The framework applied in this chapter represents the third stage in the analysis of how
national identities impact international relations. The frst stage involves comparisons of
identities, including the introduction of a six-dimensional framework, and examination of
their evolution in relation to general attitudes toward foreign relations.
1
The second stage
incorporates the concept of national identity gaps, focusing on how bilateral relations are
shaped by obsessions about how signifcant others fgure into mutual perceptions of
national identity.
2
In the third stage, individual countries are evaluated for how their array
of national identity gaps infuences their debates on identity and pattern of international
relations. While I have taken some tentative steps to analyze Chinese views of a mixture of
national identity gaps,
3
in this frst systematic attempt to advance to the third stage I assess
the case of Japan. In doing so, I build on the foundation established in my recent article on
how four Japanese schools of thought are debating three current challenges for national
identity.
4
Below, I proceed with discussions of the four schools in late 2013 and range across
six objects of national identity gaps, highlighting two of them (China and South Korea),
taking account two others (the United States and ASEAN), and making reference to two
additional objects of identity gaps (North Korea and Russia).
At the end of 2013 multiple national identity gaps drew awareness beyond anything seen
earlier. Although individual gaps had increasingly become the center of attention, this was an
unprecedented overlap in concern over many gaps that matter for Japans national identity.
The announcement by China in late November of an Air Defense Information Zone (ADIZ)
overlapping with Japans zone in the East China Sea and ratcheting up the tensions over
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island dispute showcased Japans most alarming gap. If many saw
this as a realist struggle over territory, Japanese as well as Chinese pointed to an identity
divide over history and even ideology. Earlier in November back-to-back visits by Secretary
of Defense Chuck Hagel to Seoul and Tokyo put the identity gap with South Korea fully
in the spotlight, as President Park Geun-hye used the occasion to lash out again against
Japan, defying U.S. efforts to help its allies fnd a path forward. To many in Japan there
was also renewed concern about the identity gap with the United States in response to U.S.
freedoms, and cross-societal networks once viewed with optimism as mechanisms for a
transition away from authoritarianism. In China, Japanese society is no longer the victim of
militarism to 1945 but a willing collaborator in it and in its ongoing revival. If a decade ago
the Korea wave was perceived as a sign that Japanese were recognizing the similarities
of their society and Korea, todays hate Korea wave movement signals a perceived gap
in vertical identity. Economic ties are not leading to narrow social divides. Blame is readily
assigned to states that arouse public opinion due to social susceptibility.
The horizontal dimension refers to attitudes toward both the international and regional
communities as well as to the United States. The widening Sino-U.S. split is one factor in
this dimension becoming more problematic for Japans relations with its neighbors. Yet,
Sino-Japanese differences over regionalism have widened in stages from the early 2000s,
as have differences over the global order. On this dimension, there is a sharp distinction
between the deepening Sino-Japanese gap and the generally narrowing ROK-Japanese gap,
since South Korea also supports a U.S.-led global system and fears sinocentrism. Yet, deep
suspicions of each others thinking about regionalism add to ROK-Japan mistrust.
National identities have intensifed, contributing to widening identity gaps. The Chinese
leadership has aroused the public and then pointed to its strong feelings as reason for not
compromising on symbols of identity. Abes electoral victories owe something to newly
aroused national identity, although economic frustration and then renewed confdence from
Abenomics play a large role. Park has chosen to intensify national identity as well, fnding
Japan a convenient target. If the overall national identity gap is considered to be the sum of
the estimated gap in the above fve dimensions and serves as a measure of the intensity of
the bilateral gap, then at the beginning of 2014 the intensity of Japans gap with China is at a
level unseen since normalization of relations, exceeding the peaks reached in 2005 and 2010
over specifc issues. Meanwhile, the ROK-Japan gap, which had been narrowing in 2008-11,
reversed course, and it is now quite wide, but not on all dimensions. Japans gap with North
Korea remains very wide, much more than with South Korea. In contrast, Japans gaps with
the United States, ASEAN, and Russia have all narrowed, even as they remain important
for a comprehensive understanding of how gaps are interrelated in the debate over identity.
Whether made more precise by public opinion polls, media content analysis, or other means,
these gaps are driving tensions.
Comparisons of Responses of
Four Schools of Thought to
Bilateral Identity Gaps
Reviewing Japanese discussions of international relations, I have identifed four schools
of thought: kokkashugi (statism), minzokushugi (ethnic nationalism), kokusaishugi
(internationalism), and heiwashugi (pacifsm). Their views on current foreign policy
questions can be found in daily newspapers and monthly journals, and on the shelves of
bookstores in Japan. The Abe cabinet has a heavy representation of the frst two schools,
even when it was steered toward kokusaishugi by advisors such as the frst head of the new
National Security Council, Yachi Shotaro. Although the infuence of heiwashugi receded
Many expected a liberal outlook on ideology, prizing freedom (of politics, markets, and
society) to spread without serious encumbrances. Japan was assumed to be Asias leader.
This picture of liberalism supportive of regional and global integration was misleading. In
Japan as well as in China and elsewhere, the view prevailed that the United States was
using globalization for its own ideological ends, which had to be resisted by widening the
identity gap with it. When the LDP regained its dominance in 1996 after the weakening
of progressive parties, Japans conservatives were less encumbered about asserting their
ideology. As China gained confdence with double-digit economic growth and the end of
most sanctions imposed after June 4, 1989, the ideological priorities of the Communist Party
rose to the fore. In 2013 Abe Shinzo and Xi Jinping each carried these ideological drives to
transform national identity to new heights. The former has a revisionist agenda that extends
well beyond the historical dimension, while the latter champions the China Dream as a
combination of socialism, Confucianism/sinocentrism, and anti-imperialism. In their rival
visions, the other country fgures importantly as a target useful for boosting ones own
national identity, widening the gap, and creating a downward spiral in which demonization
of the other is convenient for desired intensifcation of ones own identity.
Apart from ideology, the temporal dimension is a principal concern in the intensifcation
of national identity in both Japan and China. Many in Japan thought that over time the
weight of historical memory would diminish, but it has grown, provoked at times by the top
leaders of Japan defant of outside opinion and aroused by leaders in China and also South
Korea playing the history card. The temporal dimension has seen widening gaps as post-
normalization efforts at reconciliation and post Cold War economic integration are being
overshadowed by accusations that Japan has reverted to pre-1945 militarism, that China
has succumbed to pre-Deng Xiaoping communism, and that South Korea is incapable of
escaping from emotions whipped up a half century ago against Japan. In this thinking, the
post-Cold War decades have not brought a new era because identities are rooted in previous
periods, stretching back to images of premodern divides in East Asia.
6
The Yasukuni Shrine
is a symbol of the temporal dimension for Japan and its neighbors.
The sectoral dimension includes political and economic identity, but gaps in the region
are now centered on cultural national identity. The earlier notion that a shared legacy of
Confucianism and Chinese culture (including Chinese characters in their writing sytems)
would be an advantage in going beyond economic regionalism to forge a community
proved incorrect. Instead, each side is drawing sharp civilizational lines between states,
especially Japan and its neighbors, allowing little room for mutual acceptance. These
divides are compounded by Chinas dichotomy between Eastern and Western civilization,
seeing the latter as contaminating Japan as well as South Korea in addition to other sources
of a civilizational gap. Culture wars eclipsed attempts at cultural understanding, such as
the visits of Japan and Chinas leaders in 2007-08 to Qufu and Nara respectively.
7
This gap
will not be easy to narrow since narratives in East Asian countries are prone to showcase
a clash of civilizations.
On the vertical dimension, prospects for sister-city relations and other civil society ties have
faded in the face of condemnations of each others internal social organization. In Japan,
China is seen as communist, led by leaders intent on thwarting ethnic identities, media
between them has widened. Xi and Abe avail themselves of this gap to serve their particular
groups identity aspirations, as the four schools of Japanese thought respond for their own
identity objectives to what is transpiring in these bilateral relations.
Japanese fervently hoped to construct relations with China from the time of normalization
in 1972 on the basis of pragmatism, mutual economic advantage, a shared sense of what
is threatening each others security, and eventually a forward-looking approach to forging
an East Asian regional community. Yet, for many Japanese who wield political infuence,
eagerness to remove national identity from relations with China was accompanied by no
less enthusiasm to restore national identity from its troubled state in the postwar era. The
pretense that national identity was not at stake was belied by their obsession. Similarly,
in China, Deng Xiaopings approach to international relations and economic development
was trumpeted as the triumph of pragmatism, even including the way bilateral relations
with Japan were advancing. However, for the Chinese Communist Party reasserting pride
in its history along with forging a national identity to replace the wreckage of Maoism,
left pragmatism toward Japan in a perilous state. Neither Japans conservative schools nor
Chinese communists prioritized bilateral ties enough to jeopardize identity goals.
The kokkashugi school views China as a dangerous threat, but also as an opportunity to
transform Japans national identity in a manner long desired. To make this case, it argues
that: 1) what holds Japan back is its erroneous thinking under the continued spell of the
heiwashugi group of traitors that have spread lies such as about the comfort women; 2)
the United States is unreliable in defending Japan and has a national identity at odds with
Japan that leaves in doubt acceptance of its universal values; 3) China is a paper tiger
that does not pose a big threat and faces its own empire-threatening collapse; and 4) if
Japan stands up, breaking free of the postwar regimes stranglehold, it can, at last, defend
its national interests, regain pride in its identity, and compete with China.
9
In this outlook,
postwar J apaneseidentity is treated asheiwashugi and equated with hating the state, and real
independence is seen as breaking free of both pro-U.S. and pro-Chinese attitudes, in this way
reviving the Japanese spirit (seishin) focused on the state, not the individual.
Reactions to China in Japan have signaled major changes in how Japan views national identity
as a force in international relations, shifting from anti-communism in the 1960s, to idealism
about an historic bond that transcends Cold War polarization in the 1970s, to Asianism under
Japans leadership in the 1980s, to parallel pursuit of globalization under U.S. leadership
and regionalism as Chinas equal partner with Japan serving as the bridge in the 1990s, to
management of a more assertive China in tandem with a stronger U.S. alliance in the 2000s,
to reemergence as a normal country in opposition to hegemonism by China in the 2010s.
All dimensions of national identity are at play. China opens the door for the kokkashugi
school to re-center Japans national identity on a strong state or for the minshushugi school
to at least prioritize a proud nation. Internationalists see it as a challenge that helps overcome
not only pacifsm but also the self-isolating right-wing identity obsessions since Chinas
growing threat shows the urgency of realist policies. At the same time, the diminishing
circle of progressives sought to keep alive a pathway to an East Asian community, but their
heiwashugi was at the mercy of Xi Jinpings exclusive China Dream that became linked
to gap widening with Japan and Abes instrumental use of the wider gap to press Japanese
to abandon this outlook. In responding more intemperately to China than the United States
after the Cold War, it was somewhat revived by the DPJ in 2009, became linked to anti-
nuclear energy sentiments after September 11, 2011, and has found new life as opposition to
a still suspect Abe on national identity issues in 2013, as in its resistance to the Secrecy Law
passed at the end of the year with aspects seen as shielding the government far more than in
the United States from having to share information on security and foreign policy.
In late 2013 Japan faced an unprecedented overlap in foreign policy challenges. In my recent
article, I compared the responses of the four schools to the overall national security challenge,
to the challenge of TPP in an anticipated 21
st
century economic order, and to the challenge
of incorporating values into diplomacy.
8
Here I concentrate on responses to national identity
gaps with China and South Korea as well as with four other countries or regional groupings
of signifcance for identity issues in Japans foreign policy. The six dimensions of identity
are in play to differing degrees in relations with the six countries.
Laid low by the Fukushima disaster in 2011, Japan was blindsided by the actions of both
China and South Korea in 2012, and in 2013, taking an assertive posture, faced a hostile
environment with no sign of amelioration. The details of these bilateral relations need no
repetition here, given the extensive, ongoing news coverage. What merits close scrutiny
is the nature of the national identity gap between Japan and its two important neighbors,
showcasing how deteriorating relations have been interpreted and what must be done in
order to improve the situation. Attention has lingered on the role of island disputes, the
Yasukuni Shrine, and the comfort women issue as symbols of troubled relations, but this
chapter puts them in a broader context by considering various dimensions of identity.
The Natonal Identty Gap with China
Chinese relations with Japan have deteriorated sharply, but explanations for this negative
transformation with far-reaching implications for the reordering of East Asia are usually
too narrow and event-driven to capture the driving forces behind it. In 2005 as relations
between these two countries hit a new low since 1972, explanations centered on visits by
the Japanese prime minister to the Yasukuni Shrine. Five years later relations suffered a
bigger blow explained by tensions over a Chinese ship ramming a Japanese coast guard
vessel. Then in 2012 the deepest slump in relations yet was attributed to Chinas reaction to
the nationalization of property on the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. The assumption each time
was that if aparticular incident had not occurred, relations would not havesuffered ablow.
Viewing this bilateral relationship through the lens of national identities, especially as an
example of a sharp national identity gap, opens the way to systematic analysis. The Sino-
Japanese relationship, this approach concludes, was imperiled by forces internal to each
country, long gathering strength, and also manifest in relations with other countries.
Japan has had an abnormal national identity since 1945. The political divide between its
conservatives unwilling to challenge a determined band of historical revisionists and its
progressives enamored of pacifsm and emboldened by the Constitution imposed during
the U.S. Occupation is a refection of an identity chasm yet to be resolved. In turn, China
has had an abnormal national identity since 1978, under the sway of communists, who kept
waiting for a chance to reassert an identity that has been downplayed, while being supportive
of globalization in some dimensions. As China and Japans identities have been clarifed in
ways that many in each country see as bringing normalcy to their quest at home, the gap
Murayama, and Obuchi said in the 1990s in recognition of the immorality of past conduct,
they draw the line at negating the postwar era and renegotiating normalization on the basis
of legalistic rulings, such as those handed down by Korean courts. Fearful of devastating
consequences for Japanese national identity and vulnerability to aggressive Chinese moves
to reopen postwar agreements, internationalists think that there is another way forward with
South Korea. They think that progress was being made, including in narrowing the bilateral
identity gap, even on the comfort women issue. In 2012 the Noda cabinet was making
sincere efforts, yet vague on the nature of the money being used, to get beyond the Korean
court ruling through new forms of payment to these women from the government budget.
Although they concur in blaming Lee Myung-bak and then Park Geun-hye for taking a self-
righteous tone and moving beyond the bounds of seeking a compromise solution, they do not
succumb to the hopelessness on the right as they await new prospects, perhaps with a U.S.
role, for focusing on shared identity.
Searching for optimism in relations with South Korea, Asahi Shimbun pointed to therenewal
after two years in November 2013 of Diet member diplomacy, which could be an opening
wedge for joint efforts to make the 50
th
anniversary of normalization in 2015 a time of
recommitment to improved relations.
12
Seeking a U.S. role calming emotions, the newspaper
claimed to detect signs in Japan in support of a new tone toward the South. By the spring of
2014, Barack Obama had arranged a trilateral summit and had visited both Tokyo and Seoul,
breathing fresh life to security cooperation even if the impact on the Japan-ROK national
identity gap remained very limited.
Writing off South Korea for its self-righteous hate, widening to an extreme the identity
gap, Abe and his supporters were free to ignore its concerns and U.S. ones as well, in steps
to intensify Japans national identity. When Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine, he put an end
to talk that some sort of deal, such as what Noda had been attempting in 2012, would be
pursued to assuage Parks hostility toward Japan. Yomiuri Shimbun articulated this sense
of hopelessness, discussing hate Japan thinking, bringing up the example of a South
Korean who called the atomic bombs dropped in 1945 divine retribution on Japan, writing
pointedly about Parks invitation to China to construct a statue to the martyr who in 1909
assassinated Ito Hirobumi, an icon of Japans history, and defying international etiquette by
repeatedly attacking Japan in meetings with world leaders.
13
Whereas by the late 1990s China had become the primary foreign test of differences in
Japanese thinking about international relations, South Korea is the more important test
today. It is also a test of Japanese-U.S. relations, seen in pressure on Abe not to visit the
Yasukuni Shrine but to prioritize improving relations with South Korea, followed by the
defant Abe visit at years end. The two conservative schools rally behind Abes move,
but the internationalists are disappointed since the goal of changing national identity has
been allowed to trump realism. The heiwashugi camp objects to this move as an effort to
decisively shift the balance of Japans national identity, further marginalizing their views.
Treating Park and South Korea as mired in scold diplomacy and beyond cooperation due
to history education, the conservatives snubbed those who prioritized both universal values
and internationalist security identity.
14
As seen in the spillover of the Japan-South Korea
dispute to Virginia, where Korean Americans made headway in eliciting promises to require
textbooks to add East Sea next to Sea of Japan, the clash was spreading.
15
Skillful U.S.
desired and visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, Abe made it clear that he would not give priority
to kokusaishugi, but its boosters had nowhere else to turn but to Abe in the face of Chinas
protracted aggressive behavior.
The response in Japan to Abes Yasukuni visit saw the kokusaishugi forces in the lead,
complaining that countless U.S. warnings had been dismissed and that Japan would be
blamed for new troubles in the region. The heiwashugi camp was energized to condemn
the implications for reverting to a vertical identity at odds with democratic, postwar Japan
and putting the nail in the coffn of East Asian regionalism, inclusive of South Korea. The
kokkashugi school was elated with this boost to its ideal national identity. That left the
minzokushugi advocates in a quandary, approving of Abes restoration of pride in the nation
but torn over how rash action threatening to disrupt a fragile environment in domestic and
international opinion could make such pride too dependent on a narrow ideological goal. The
newspapers were split, but the public still largely supported Abe.
The Natonal Identty Gap with South Korea
South Korean relations with Japan have fuctuated more sharply, suffering a blow when
Lee Myung-bak became obsessive about the comfort women issue from the end of 2011
and, especially, when he defed Japanese opinion by visiting Dokdo (Takeshima) Island in
August 2012. After Park Geun-hye became president in February 2013 shortly after Abe
Shinzo regained the prime ministers post in Japan, relations remained at their nadir. Again,
the assumption was that if leaders had exercised more caution, relations not only would
have stayed calm, but actually were on an upward trajectory. In this case, I argue that the
assumption was correct; however, I point to a less sharp national identity gap as continuing
to threaten relations, while considering how national identities have been changing in order
to assess what must be done to overcome the current divide.
Whereas in the heiwashugi camp one fnds the view that Japan can fnd common ground
with South Korea since the national identity gap is not so wide, the kokkashugi forces see
South Korea as close to Chinas historical viewpoint and a gap so wide that there is little
point in trying to narrow it. As refected in articles in Yomiuri Shimbun, thesenseof utter
hopelessness in 2013 extends to the minzokushugi camp. Losing the public relations fght in
the United States to South Korea in the spring after Abe spoke provocatively, as in raising
doubts that there is a common standard of aggression, Japan could fght more aggressively
to make its case (as conservative camps argued), could avoid being entangled in such issues
(as the kokusaikashugi camp preferred), or could renew what conservatives call apology
diplomacy in line with the national identity legacy they want to eradicate.
In their obsession with the temporal dimension, the kokkashugi school insists that J apan
saved Korea from its debilitating cultural legacy for modernization and fought against the
Kim Il-sung forces for the beneft of the Korean people.
10
Widening the gap over history,
they write that South Koreans have a self-destructive view of their own history rooted in the
humiliation of having lost their independence, and once they grew less dependent on Japan
for economic cooperation in the 1990s, this identity was unreservedly vented.
11
Thekokusaishugi camp envisions a way out with South Korea that reaffrms realism, but does
not reopen Japans postwar diplomacy, which is well regarded. Appreciating what Kono,
wooing ASEAN, which is linked to efforts at least since the Fukuda Doctrine of the 1970s
and even suggestive of some sort of shared values, if no longer Asian values that many in the
1980s-90s saw as a special identity bond distinct from universal values.
The opposition to TPP is more about rejection of narrowing the identity gap with the United
States than about making a statement about ASEAN. For schools of thought on both the
right and the left, the United States is an identity threat. For the kokkashugi advocates, it
was the force that broke the spirit of the Japanese state, and a new opening that specifcally
targets state restrictions on market forces compounds the problem. For the heiwashugi
camp, the security alliance with the United States denied Japan a unique role in bridging
geopolitical differences, and saddling up closer with economics adding to the impact of
alliance strengthening is not the solution. ASEAN lacks such signifcance.
Southeast Asia still has allure as the most promising arena for an independent Japanese
foreign policy. U.S. rebalancing is welcome, but it is viewed with skepticism for both its
staying power and its prospect of realizing a broader strategy than geopolitical goals. In a
way, Japan is also rebalancing, refocusing on ASEAN after a decade when it had ceded the
initiative to China. Given recent wariness about overdependency on Chinas economy amid
uncertain relations and Chinas rise on the economic ladder, increased FDI in the Southeast
Asian developed developing countries is already occurring. Not willing to concede that
Japan had lost Southeast Asia, Abe threw himself into moves to regain a large role in the
region. Various schools of thought saw this differently, asking how closely was this aligned
with U.S. strategy? What was the intended balance between regionalism and globalism? And
to what extent was this a response to China? The idea that ASEAN is cohesive and strong
enough to forge in 2015 the integrated community that it has proposed or that Japan would
beneft as its principal advocate begged the question of how Japan in the midst of multiple
great powers could gain a leading role.
The Natonal Identty Gaps with North Korea and Russia
When Jang Song-taek drew intensive coverage, the old Japanese obsession with the
abductions issue was rarely mentioned. One source did indicate that he was the point man
for Japanese efforts to resume talks on possible additional abductees, but its main concern
was that after North Korea chose a parallel strategy of guns and butter in March 2013, the
new developments meant that the military had won and guns would take precedence.
18
If
most sources showed little sympathy for Chinas failed diplomacy with the North, Asahi
Shimbun credited China with a strategy for working closely with Zhang to boost efforts at
establishing special economic zones and introducing the market mechanism, following with
resumption of the Six-Party Talks and relaxation of economic sanctions, and thus helping
to stabilize the country and reduce its sense of isolation. It concluded that this failure was
bad for China, while hinting that it was bad for Japan too, which could have benefted from
Chinese-led diplomacy.
19
Yomiuri Shimbun makes a similar point about the danger of this
victory of hardline military leaders, but it leaves the impression that Chinas strategy for
restarting the Six-Party Talks on the basis of Sino-U.S. cooperation while North Korea is
90 percent reliant on China for foreign trade has drawbacks for Japan.
20
This is less pointed
than Sankei Shimbun warnings that a weak United States is falling for Chinas maneuvering,
which plays into a broader strategy of isolating Japan.
21
intervention fnally managed to keep thing in check as Washington sought to change the
subject from national identity to security threats facing both of its allies.
The Natonal Identty Gaps with the United States and ASEAN
Kokubun Ryosei puts in perspective anticipation of the fortieth anniversary of Japan-
ASEAN dialogue relations, which was celebrated with a summit in December 2013. It was
the arena, from the time the United States was pulling away from Vietnam and Japan was
establishing its production networks backed by substantial ODA, where leaders saw an
opportunity to turn the weight of a great economic power into the status of a great cultural
power and into a transition to a great political power. Southeast Asia also served as an arena
for shaping relations with China: in 1972-92 as a model for how Japan could be a partner in
a vertical order; in 1992 through the 2000s as a driver toward regionalism; and recently as
the venue for intense competition. In 2013 Japan had raised its sights. Kokubun contrasts
the new approach to the region with earlier ones as equal cooperation and expansion to non-
economic cooperation. It is also characterized by Japans stress on ASEAN as a unit rather
than bilateral relations and by its embrace of ASEAN centrality for a broad range of pursuits,
something that contrasts with U.S. and Chinese approaches. Unlike in the past, Japan is
prioritizing security, stressing values, and building on ties to ASEAN in reaching further to
Australia and India.
16
Yet, left unclear is whether it will avoid a backlash in ASEAN, which
hesitates to be dragged into a policy that might be construed as containment of China, and
how in its advocacy of collective security and universal values as well as in TPP Japan could
avoid being seen as a middle power in the service of regionalism under the sway of U.S.-
led globalization. Hopes that ASEAN will be of considerable value for bolstering Japans
national identity may, thus, be infated.
Boosters of TPP see it as opening the gates to internationalism centering on ties to the United
States and ASEAN. After two lost decades leading to a negative image of Japan abroad and
often at home too, TPP provides a chance to build on the restoration of self-confdence and
improvement in Japans image in the international community in 2013. It would become a
major part of the global fow of money, goods, and peopleno longer a periphery as many
perceived; a world rule-maker, rather than the marginal state left as the G-8 lost clout
when it was eclipsed by the G-20; and a major player in the 21
st
century economic order at
a time China, left out of TPP, loses some of its centrality to that order.
17
Establishing the TPP
would also narrow the longstanding divide between Japan and the United States in economic
national identity, which peaked during the trade disputes of the 1980s and early 1990s and is
still felt after KORUS FTA solidifed U.S.-ROK ties while Japan has remained an outlier in
establishing FTAs. Much discussion of TPP in Japan is about its non-economic consequences.
TPP negotiations and the early initiative behind it put the spotlight on Southeast Asia, raising
some hopes that the new grouping would showcase an identity overlap with the region, joining
in forging a high-level pact that achieves an unprecedented degree of integration and agreement
on rules for a new era, which Chinas FTAs with Southeast Asian states cannot match.
New security realities have paved the way for greater internationalism, focused on the
United States but extending to Australia, India, and other states recognized as targets of
defensive realignment. The fact of piggybacking on U.S. initiatives may be overlooked as
Japanese seek to put their own identity spin on such outreach. This particularly applies to
too wide to bridge. Also, there is little room for U.S. involvement, given the huge Sino-U.S.
national identity gap. It follows that Japans gap with South Korea should be separated from
the gap with China in a strategy that allows some role for the United States. Japans other
identity gaps have only a secondary role.
Gaps with ASEAN, Russia, and North Korea are best seen in triangular or quadrangular
context. ASEAN may have been viewed as the gateway to Asianism, a Japanese identity
viewed as an alternative to the West, especially joining in a U.S.-centered identity. Yet, it is
now the battleground with China, in which Japan is affrming U.S. values. Russia long was
seen as the object of joint identity polarization with the United States, and then it was viewed
as a target for a breakthrough to a normal Japan free of the legacy of defeat if a territorial
deal could be reached. While some still cling to that improbable outcome, more recognize
that it is now grouped with China as a joint target with the United States. In the case of North
Korea, it too has been treated as a shortcut to acceptance in Asia apart from South Korea,
but it should be seen as a source of shared identity with South Korea and the United States.
Japans identity gaps have been artifcially enlarged by illusions about recovering some of
the identity lost in 1945 and achieving breakthroughs in Asia separate from the United States
and South Korea. More clarity about what these gaps really signify and how Japan can
manage them is needed. In the process, internationalism must gain relative to the other three
schools of identity for Japan to make these changes.
Kokkashugi is the throwback to pre-1945, which isolates Japan in all of the identity gaps.
Success in TPP negotiations and well-conceived U.S. efforts to boost universal values in
joint statements would work against the revival of this statist approach. Minzokushugi is a
reminder of the spike in Japanese national identity of the 1980s before the collapse of the
bubble economy. Joint U.S.-South Korean efforts to reduce the identity gap between the
two U.S. allies may keep this way of thinking under control. The more Japan recognizes
what it has in common with South Korea, the less likely it is to insist on ethnic national
feelings stressing homogeneity and separation from its regional background. In the case of
heiwashugi, China and North Korea are making this untenable. We should expect no revival
of pacifsm, even if Abe has sought to misappropriate the label with his active pacifsm,
translated differently in English. Kokusaishugi is Japans best hope for foreign policy with
all of its neighbors and the United States. Even Abe must pay lip service to it despite aspiring
to something else. The challenge for U.S. diplomacy is to steer Abe more in this direction,
using South Korea and ASEAN in the endeavor. To push back against Abe too strongly
would make it easier for him to retreat to the two more conservative approaches, as would
giving him a free hand with no resistance. U.S. pursuit of triangular relations relieves it of
a one-on-one confrontation, while using outside pressure on Abe. This proved effective for
Obama, but only in a preliminary way, in the spring of 2014,
In her chapter, Deepa Ollapally demonstrates the interplay of two national identity gaps for
India, also showing how various schools of thought respond to these gaps in deciding on
their foreign policy preferences. Similar to Japan, India faces China and the United States
as it confronts national security challenges without being able to shake loose from strong
disagreements about national identity. Comparisons of the two cases help to explain why the
foreign policy outcome under the sway of national identity has diverged sharply.
Russia has lost much of its signifcance for national identity, as Japanese tended to ignore
it after negotiations stalled on the territorial issue in 2002. The fact that Putin and Abe
had relaunched talks in an upbeat manner again raised the question of what an agreement
would mean for Japans national identity. Failure when pursuit was taken seriously had
intensifed identity focused on a gap with the Soviet Union and then Russia. Many now
have other identity concerns on their mind, but Abes pursuit of Putin persists, leading the
conservative side to see an opening for the return of four islands and an identity coup and
some internationalists to envision Putin turning somewhat from China to Japan, boosting
Japans internationalist identity. Russia remains part of the national identity mix in 2014.
By concentrating on one symbol of the identity gap, Japan left the door open to reviewing
its approach even in circumstances that seemed doubtful to others. When hopes rose for a
breakthrough with Russia on the Northern Territories, however one-sided the evidence
cited, the fact that Putins image was widening Russias gap with other states, even prior to
his aggression against Ukraine in March 2014, did not seem to matter. Allowing the abduction
issue to drive thinking about North Korea potentially had a similar effect. In late spring Abe
was continuing to distance Japan from U.S.-led pressure on Putin for his aggressive behavior
in Ukraine, after agreeing on some sanctions in awareness that the Russian precedent of
changing territorial boundaries by force could be used by China.
Conclusion
Over a quarter century much has been written about national identity in China and Japan,
but it has generally been missing fve essentials that social scientists profess to welcome.
First, it has been largely descriptive without a framework for analysis of these identities.
Second, it has rarely been comparative, facilitating analysis of similarities and differences
in various countries, including China and Japan. Third, it has lacked specifcity to make
possible estimates of the degree of change in identity over time, critical to the analysis of
causality. Fourth, it has only been haphazardly linked to studies of international relations,
allowing for analysis of how clashing national identities impact ties between countries of
special signifcance for each other. Finally, the absence of all of these elements has made it
diffcult to formulate theories of national identity and identity gaps in dyadic relations. In my
recent writings I have sought to add these fve essentials, beginning with a six-dimensional
framework and proceeding to examination of various national identity gaps.
Much has been written recently about historical tensions in Northeast Asia, taking a narrow
approach to specifc disputes, especially centered on Japan. To make progress in bilateral
relations it is important to put them in a wider context. This would give one hope that a
path forward can be found for ameliorating Japan-South Korea relations. After all, their
national identity gap is much smaller than that between Japan and China, and they share
universal values and national interests to a far greater degree. Given the U.S. role in handling
historical issues affecting this relationship in the 1950s, there is reason to think that limited,
but timely, U.S. involvement to try to refocus Japan-South Korean identity concerns as well
as to boost trilateralism, could make a difference in 2014. In contrast, prospects for China-
Japan relations are much grimmer. When the specifc issues that have most troubled relations
of late are put in the broader context of national identities, the conclusion is that the gap is
Endnotes
1. Gilbert Rozman, ed., East Asian National Identities: Common Roots and Chinese
Exceptionalism (Washington, DC and Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and
Stanford University Press, 2012).
2. Gilbert Rozman, ed., National Identities and Bilateral Relations: Widening Gaps in East Asia
and Chinese Demonization of the United States (Washington, DC and Stanford, CA: Woodrow
Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 2013).
3. Gilbert Rozman, ed., National Identities and Bilateral Relations, pp. 203-64; Gilbert Rozman,
The Sino-Russian Challenge to the World Order: National Identities and International
Relations (Washington, DC and Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford
4. A National Identity Approach to Japans Late 2013 Thinking, The Asan Forum, Issue 4 (Jan-
Feb. 2014).
5. For more on the U.S.-Japan and South Korean-Japan identity gaps, see Washington Insights,
the Open Forum, The Asan Forum, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 2014).
6. Gilbert Rozman, ed., U.S. Leadership, History, and Bilateral Relations in Northeast Asia,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
7. Gilbert Rozman, Narrowing the Values Gap in Sino-Japanese Relations: Lessons from 2006-
2008, in Gerrit Gong and Victor Teo, eds., Reconceptualizing the Divide: Identity, Memory,
and Nationalism in Sino-Japanese Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing,
2010): pp. 25-51.
8. Gilbert Rozman, A National Identity Approach to Japans Late 2013 Thinking.
9. Sapio, No. 1, 2014.
10. Sankei Shimbun, December 5, 2013, p. 7.
12. Asahi Shimbun, November 30, 2013.
13. Yomiuri Shimbun, November 24, 2013, p. 4.
15. The Washington Post, January 30, 2014, p. 1.
16. Kokubun Ryosei, Sosetsu, and 1972 nen taisei kara senryakuteki gokei e: taichu gaiko,
and Yamakage Susumu, Gaiko inishiatibu shikinseki: tai Tonanajia gaiko no senryakuteki
juyosei, in Kokubun Ryosei, ed., Nihon no gaiko, Vol. 4, Taigai seisaku chiiki hen (Tokyo:
Iwanami shoten, 2013: pp. 1-14, 111-42, pp. 143-70.
17. Suzuki Akira, TPP wa Nihon saiko no kirifuda da, 2014 nen no ronten (Tokyo: Bungei
shunju, 2013): pp. 38-39.
18. Sankei Shimbun, December 4, 2013.
19. Asahi Shimbun, December 4, 2013, p. 3.
20. Yomiuri Shimbun, December 5, 2013.
Natonal Identty and Attudes
Toward North Korean Defectors
Jiyoon Kim
Kim: Natonal Identty and Attudes Toward North Korean Defectors | 97 96 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
civic identity and ethnic identity.
3
On the one hand, all citizens enjoy the same rights and
responsibilities under the law, and civic culture is defned by education and socialization. On
the other hand, the same ancestry, pre-historic myths, and memories play an indispensible
role in forming the ethnic component of national identity. The civic and ethnic components
are not mutually exclusive but often exist together. The overshadowing of one component
can occur, but the two components are likely to coexist in many cases. Jones and Smiths
analysis of surveys demonstrates that nationalism in many countries is comprised of both.
South Korean identity can also be viewed in terms of these two components. The myth
of Dangun epitomizes the ethnic identity shared by the Korean people, both North and
South. The public is likely to believe that Koreans are descendants of Dangun and have
belonged to a single race since the pre-historic period. As Shin notes, the strongest rationale
for unifcation of the two Koreas comes from this ethnic identity, which has been a part of
continuous efforts to unify and restore unity on the Korean Peninsula.
4
In contrast, constructivists argue that the Korean nation is a new concept created by
nationalists in the late nineteenth century. For instance, Andre Schmid asserts that Korean
ethnic nationalism stems from the efforts to separate Korea from China and to ft Korea
into the modern international system.
5
For these scholars, although Korea has maintained
exceptional territorial integrity for a long period, the country has not met the conditions for
primordial ethnic nationalism. For instance, civilizational identity stemming from Chinese
Confucianism overpowered society, and Korean elites conformed to Chinese civilization
rather than forming a cultural and ethnic nation limited to residents of the Chosun dynasty.
If so, why is there such a strong emphasis on ethnic unity and a shared bloodline in Korea?
Behind this phenomenon lies Japanese racial discrimination in the 1900s. Shin asserts that
Korean nationalism became ethnic in the late 1920s to resist the brutal Japanese colonial
rule. Even after Korean independence, however, ethnic nationalism did not fade. On the
contrary, it became stronger. The division of Korea propelled competition between the South
and the North for the prize of one legitimate ethnic Korea. Shin also accurately notes that
race, ethnicity, and nation were confated in Korean nationalism, evidenced in the frequent
usage of the term minjok, sometimes implying ethnicity, and, at other times, implying
nation.
6
Unifcation became a raison dtre for both Koreas, and ethnic nationalism has
been the driving force, which explains the Souths continued economic assistance to the
North since the late 1990s, despite it still being at war against the North.
7
Recently, there has been growing concern that Korean ethnic nationalism will be transformed
into South Korean nationalism. Kang Won-Taek and Lee Nae-Youngs edited volume,
Understanding Korean Identity: Through the Lens of Opinion Surveys, frst took a serious
look at such a transformation. Kang admits that Korean nationalism has been maintained by
an ethnic myth for a long period; however, he predicts that ethnic-oriented Korean nationalism
will soon be challenged because of changing demography and changing national identity as a
consequence. He expresses concern that Korean nationalism will soon be replaced by South
Korean nationalism, which may displace the rationale for unifcation with North Korea.
8
Kang and Lee use the East Asia Institutes surveys in 2005 and 2010 to examine national
identity among South Koreans. Following Anthony Smiths criteria, they use seven questions
South Korea has traditionally valued ethnic homogeneity. While that mentality remains, the
emergence of a demographic shift is challenging the way South Koreans view national identity,
or Koreanness. The immigration infux in South Korea is reported to have surpassed 3.1
percent of the total population in 2013 and has been increasing for the past ten years.
1
As a new demographic composition emerges, we can cautiously predict that this phenomenon
will have an infuence on public understanding of Koreanness. For example, this new attitude
toward national identity can be expected to infuence perspectives on immigrants living
in South Korea, fostering tolerance toward the presence of other ethnic groups and their
acceptance as Koreans. Of course, the increased number of foreign workers and immigrants
may induce more antagonistic feelings against them. A transformation in national identity
appears unavoidable. On the one hand, the Korean people may cultivate a more ethnically
oriented national identity in resistance to outsiders. On the other, civic national identity
may overshadow the ethnic element. The change in national identity is anticipated to be
followed by other important consequences, one of which is how people view unifcation with
North Korea, which is closely associated with strong ethnic identity. Will the strengthened
multiethnic character of society increase civic identity? Will the shift in national identity
make people less supportive of unifcation? These are the guiding questions in this chapter.
This chapter investigates attitudes of South Koreans toward North Korean defectors in light
of the recent changes of national identity taking place within South Korea. North Korean
defectors are of interest because they can provide a proxy view of South Koreans toward
North Korea. In particular, as they are the people who have fed from a country with which
South Koreans share a history and ethnic bond, and ultimately with whom they expect to
unify, how they are seen and treated attests to a broader set of views related to reunifcation.
North Korean defectors become South Korean citizens as soon as they register themselves
at the resident center. From that point on, they receive the same status, responsibilities, and
privileges as any ordinary South Korean. However, living in a completely different system is
never an easy task, which makes them similar to other immigrants. Conficts between North
Korean defectors and South Koreans occur persistently and are likely to become an important
social issue in the foreseeable future, much more so if unifcation should take place.
By focusing on changing views on national identity, I delve into the factors that infuence
the South Korean publics attitude toward North Korean defectors. I frst examine national
identity shared by South Koreans in an increasingly multiethnic society. Then I analyze how
North Korean defectors are perceived by South Koreans, in the context of their national
identity. These analyses are deepened through the use of survey data. I conclude the chapter
with a discussion of the implications of the results for a unifed Korea.
The Korean National Identity
The subject of South Koreans sense of national identity with regard to North Korean defectors
is essentially a question of whether South Koreans see them as us or them. National
identity is a loosely defned term, but according to Wiggins, et.al, it is a persons belief or
emotion toward a country or a nation to which she or he belongs.
2
Numerous studies have
been conducted based on Anthony Smiths division of national identity into two components:
The changes observed in the 2013 study are dramatic and, more importantly, it appears
that they have been, by and large, driven by the young generation. As Table 2 indicates,
ethnic identity is less important to the Korean youth than it is to the old generation. The
phenomenon is particularly visible in questions that ask whether Koreans need to be born in
Korea and have the Korean bloodline. Only 56.5 percent of those in their twenties thought
that one should be born in Korea to be considered a Korean. Also, 56.9 percent of them
thought that having the Korean bloodline is important for a Korean. The numbers differ for
older Koreans. 88.1 percent of whom in their sixties and over thought that a Korean should
beborn in Korea.
Table 1. Preconditons for Koreanness
Year Important
Not
important
ETHNIC COMPONENT
Being born in Korea
2005 81.9 17.7
2010 87.7 12.2
2013 69.0 27.9
Having the Korean bloodline
2005 80.9 18.3
2010 84.1 15.4
2013 65.8 30.4
Living in Korea for most of one's life
2005 64.6 34.7
2010 78.2 21.5
2013 66.1 30.2
CIVIC COMPONENT
Maintaining Korean natonality
2005 88.2 11.1
2010 89.4 10.5
2013 88.4 9.1
Being able to speak and write in Korean
2005 87.0 12.6
2010 87.8 12.2
2013 91.7 6.7
Abiding by the Korean politcal and legal system
2005 77.5 20.6
2010 87.3 12.4
2013 93.4 4.2
Understanding Korean traditons
2005 80.9 18.3
2010 85.9 14
2013 91.5 6.1
Source: Asan Daily Poll (Nov. 29-Dec. 1, 2013)
to determine ones degree of civic and ethnic identity.
9
I used results from the 2013 Asan
Daily Poll in which the same questions used by Kang and Lee were asked to the South
Korean public. Of the seven criteria, three measure the strength of a respondents ethnic
identity regarding North Korean defectors. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree
with the following statements. A Korean is someone who: (1) is born in Korea, (2) has the
Korean bloodline, and (3) lives in Korea for most of ones life. The remaining four measure
the strength of ones civic identity. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the
following statements. A Korean is someone who: (4) possesses Korean nationality, (5) is
able to speak and write the Korean language, (6) abides by the Korean political and legal
system, and (7) understands the Korean traditions.
10
Table 1 presents Asans 2013 results compared with Kang and Lees 2005 and 2010 studies.
In 2013, abiding by the Korean political and legal system was identifed as the most
important measuring stick for being Korean. Surprisingly, the least important factor was
having the Korean bloodline, which has been widely considered to be the indispensible
component of ethnic nationalism (See Table 1).
Notable declines were detected in the number of those who agreed that a person should
be born in Korea and have the Korean bloodline to be considered Korean. In 2005 and
2010, 81.9 percent and 87.7 percent of respondents, respectively, agreed that being born in
Korea was important. However, 2013 saw a huge decline with only 69.0 percent agreeing
with the statement. In contrast, the number of those who think that birth in Korea is not
important more than doubled to 27.9 percent. A similar tendency can be seen with regard
to the statement that Koreans should have a Korean bloodline. The numbers were nearly
80 percent in both 2005 and 2010 while dropping to 65.8 percent in 2013. As many as 30.4
percent of respondents thought that sharing the same bloodline is not important for one to be
considered a Korean. The percentage of respondents who consider living in Korea for most
of ones life important was also relatively low (66.1 percent).
Questions that measure civic identity showed similar, if not greater, importance than
before. Approximately 88 percent of respondents answered that keeping Korean nationality
was important, which is only a 1 percent drop from the 2010 result. The ability to use
the Korean language remained important as well, with 91.7 percent of respondents in
agreement. Two elements of civic identity became more important as a measurement of
Koreanness. In 2005, 77.5 percent agreed that respecting the Korean political and legal
system was essential. In 2013, that number rose to 93.4 percent, the highest percentage
among all the survey questions. Conversely, those who think that this is not important for
measuring Koreanness dropped to 4.2 percent, compared to 20.6% percent in 2005. The
survey also shows that the public views understanding Korean traditions as a signifcant
measurement for being Korean. While 80.9 percent of respondents considered it to be so
in 2005, the number rose to 91.5 percent in 2013.
(27.6 percent), and this is as high as those of the older generations. Ethnic identity, which has
played a role of uniting North Korea and South Korea as one Korea, is apparently weakening
and fewer people perceive North Korea as one of us. The distance between North Korea
and South Korea is extended, and it is much more serious among youth. The next question
is, does it infuence those who are originally from North Korea and living in South Korea as
a citizen of the latter?
Going Ethnic or Civic?
The common misperception regarding North Koreans defectors is that their defections are
driven solely by political reasons. However, according to Jang Joon-oh and his colleague Go
Sung-Hos survey in 2010, about 54 percent of North Korean defectors came to the South
at the risk of their own lives for economic reasons.
12
Political defection accounted for only
19.2 percent (see Table 4). From this result, the defectors are not particularly different from
other immigrant groups.
Table 3. Views on North Korea by the South Korean Public
One of us Neighbor Stranger Enemy
No
interest
TOTAL 21.8 32.0 8.9 22.4 10.0
20s 14.1 26.6 15.3 27.6 14.0
30s 21.5 42.5 10.1 13.5 10.4
40s 27.3 33.1 8.6 15.7 9.6
50s 25.9 31.1 5.1 28.1 6.8
60s or over 19.3 25.8 5.6 28.8 9.4
Source: Asan Daily Poll (Mar. 29-Mar. 31, 2014)
Table 4. Motvatons of North Korean Defectors to Escape
Reasons %
Poverty 54
Family problem (domestc violence) 2
Politcal reason 14
Followed one's family 16
Other 14
Source: Jang, Joon-oh and Sung-Ho Go. Survey result used in North Korean Defectors: Crime &
Countermeasures, 2010
From Table 2, it is apparent that South Koreans national identity is undergoing a signifcant
change. Once heavily centered on ethnic identity, it is now moving toward civic identity.
This fnding appears closely related to the responses to survey questions on unifcation.
From numerous surveys, it is frequently reported that fewer South Koreans want immediate
unifcation with North Korea. The number of young people who do not seek unifcation at
all is increasing as well. For instance, the recent survey of the Asan Institutes Daily Poll
suggests that only 17 percent of the Korean public agree that unifcation should be done
as soon as possible. It is only 10 percent of those who are in their twenties who think that
unifcation needs to be done as soon as possible. On the contrary, 21.9 percent of them want
the two Koreas to stay the same as separated without unifcation.
11
In addition, the perspective on North Korea does not give suffcient reason for unifcation
founded in ethnic nationalism. According to the numbers in Table 3, only 21.8 percent of
South Koreans see North Korea as one of us. A plurality of South Koreans considers North
Korea as a neighbor (32 percent), and 22.4 percent of them indeed consider North Korea as
an enemy. The young generation tends to feel distanced from North Korea more than the
elderly do. Only 14.1 percent of respondents in their twenties answer North Korea is one
of us. On the other hand, a plurality of the young generation sees North Korea as an enemy
Table 2. Preconditons for Koreanness: by Age Groups
20s 30s 40s 50s
60s or
over
ETHNIC COMPONENT
Being born in Korea
Important 56.5 64.3 68.5 80.3 88.1
Not Important 43.5 35.7 31.5 19.7 11.9
Important 56.9 63.8 59.3 75.0 87.2
Not Important 43.1 36.2 40.7 25.0 12.8
Living in Korea for most of
ones life
Important 61.0 61.4 67.8 75.1 78.5
Not Important 39.0 38.6 32.2 24.9 21.5
CIVIC COMPONENT
Important 90.1 86.8 89.4 93.3 96.6
Not Important 9.9 13.2 10.6 6.7 3.5
Being able to speak and write
in Korean
Important 92.0 93.8 90.9 94.2 95.5
Not Important 8.0 6.2 9.1 5.8 4.5
Abiding by the Korean politcal
and legal system
Important 94.5 94.4 97.1 95.8 96.9
Not Important 5.5 5.6 2.9 4.2 3.1
Understanding Korean
traditons
Important 91.2 95.1 89.8 95.9 98.5
Not Important 8.8 4.9 10.2 4.1 1.5
Some studies also fnd that socio-demographic factors have infuence on how one thinks
about the defectors. For instance, the level of education and age are positively associated
with the attitude toward North Korean defectors.
14
Another stream of research relates North Korean defectors to tolerance of immigrants. They
pay attention to the fact that defectors are from a country with a completely different political
and economic system, as well as cultural environment. In this regard, they are treated in a
manner similar to foreign immigrants. Sohn and Lee analyze South Koreans attitude toward
North Korean defectors from this perspective. They fnd how much a person is tolerant
or generous on immigrant issues is a signifcant determinant. They use ones opinion on
multicultural Korea and on protection of immigrants rights to measure the persons level
of tolerance on North Korean defectors. They found a somewhat contradictory outcome:
ones opinion of multicultural Korea is adversely related to the attitude toward North Korean
defectors, but protecting immigrants rights is positively associated with this attitude.
15
The
result begs for clarifcation, but at least gives an idea of changing attitudes toward North
Korean defectors.
In a similar vein, one of the many determinants of ones tolerance of outsiders is national
economic outlook. This is due to the perception that immigrants can be a threat in the job
market. The level of threat posed by immigrants can be expected to be greater and the attitude
toward them aggravated when the economy is not performing well. Thus, ones perception
of the national economy is considered to be a signifcant factor in deciding whether or not
one welcomes outsiders.
16
Considering that those most vulnerable in a depressed economy
are less educated and in the low-income group, the level of education and of income can
be factors that measure ones tolerance of outsiders. Kwon tests these hypotheses for North
Korean defectors, fnding a limited impact of subjective perceptions of the national economy
on South Koreans attitude toward North Korean defectors. She explains that the limited
impact comes from the still small fraction of North Korean defectors in the labor market of
South Korea. Also, she asserts that the fact that North Korean defectors generally work as
unskilled laborers means that they do not pose much threat to South Koreans.
17
Adding to earlier works, I examine the sense of national identity of South Koreans and its
impact on their attitude toward North Korean defectors. There has been a strong sense of
ethnic identity assumed when it comes to North Korean defectors. The foremost element
that distinguishes these defectors from other immigrant groups is the fact that they are from
North Korea, the country South Koreans have believed will become unifed with them for
more than sixty years. Sohn and Lee use this framework and demonstrate how national
identity plays out in ones attitude toward North Korean defectors. They fnd a mixed result:
civic identity and ethnic pride are positively related to ones view of North Korean defectors,
while national pride is negatively related.
18
While the study is groundbreaking, the data they
used was collected in 2010, which turned out to have quite different responses on national
identity from the data in 2013.
I examine this in association with the changed national identity of South Koreans, using the
Daily Poll conducted by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies between November 29 and
December 1, 2013. The Asan Daily Poll used in this chapter had a sample size of 1,000.
Many believe that South Korea welcomes North Korean defectors with open arms, taking
satisfaction that the oppressive North Korean regime is the reason for the escape, and feeling,
above all, that the defectors share the same Koreanness ethnically, which is the reason for
tendering citizenship as soon as they arrive in South Korea. Nonetheless, that underlying
principle that we share the same ethnic origin and unconditionally accept the newcomers
appears to be under transformation. According to the East Asia Institutes survey on Koreans
identity in 2005 and 2010, South Koreans were demonstrating a changed attitude toward the
acceptance of North Korean defectors into their society. As displayed in Table 5, there is
rather a signifcant change in peoples opinion on this. In 2005, a plurality of South Koreans
(46.2 percent) answered that South Korea should admit all North Korean defectors, since
they are Koreans after all. In 2010, the percentage of people who think that way decreased to
38.1 percent. Instead, almost a majority of South Koreans thought that defectors should be
selectively admitted to Korea, conditioned on the economic and diplomatic situation (49.9
percent), an increase of 11.1 percent compared with the result in 2005.
The volume of previous studies on South Koreans attitude toward North Korean defectors
is meager, and scholarship has primarily focused on the policy arena. However, more studies
have shown concern with South Koreans views of North Korean defectors as the number
of defectors has increased dramatically. According to the Ministry of Unifcation statistics,
the number of defectors continued to increase until 2011, when 2,706 residents of North
Korea arrived in South Korea. The number decreased to 1,516 in 2013. Altogether, 26,124
defectors had settled down in South Korea by the end of that year.
What is driving the change in opinion by South Koreans regarding North Korean defectors?
The preliminary studies that examine individual attitudes toward North Korean defectors
in South Korea can be classifed into three dimensions.
13
Earlier studies conducted by
Kim, Jeong, and Yang focus on psychological aspects of South Koreans, which infuence
their attitude toward North Korean defectors at an individual level. For instance, Kim and
Jeong test contact theory relating to opinions of North Korean defectors. Depending on the
experience of contacting or being exposed to defectors, they fnd that people have different
attitudes toward them. Without contact people tend to have sentiments of both sympathy
and wariness. In addition, overall feeling toward North Korea and the North Korean people
turned out to be infuential in determining ones attitude toward the defectors. Those who feel
alienated from North Korea in general are estranged toward North Korean defectors as well.
Table 5. Acceptance of North Korean Defectors
2005 2010
Should not admit them for politcal/economic burden 8.0 9.0
Conditonal on economic/diplomatc situaton 38.8 49.9
Should admit all of them b/c they are Koreans 46.2 38.1
Source: EAI Survey, Sohn & Lee (2012)
those who are in their sixties or over did. In fact, 66 percent of South Korean youth have
positive sentiment toward them. Only 52.6 percent of the elderly, who are believed to have
the strongest ethnic bond with North Koreans, have any positive opinion of North Korean
defectors. While there is a high proportion of dont know answers, it is surprising to see
that the youth are more welcoming despite their distant memory and weak ethnic identity of
belonging to one, extended Korea. This is indeed an interesting fnding because South Korean
youth are known to be as conservative as the elderly when it comes to national security issues.
In addition, they tend to be as hostile toward North Korea as the elderly. It appears that Korean
youth are particularly apt to discern North Korea from North Korean people and defectors.
Yet, it is not certain if identity politics plays any sort of a role (See Table 7).
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
23.3
18.1
45.7
32.8
22.7
50.9
35.0
34.1
49.2
33.8
40.6
60.4
32.2
43.0
60.3
20s 30s 40s 50s 60s
United States positve Japan positve China positve
Figure 1. Positve Feelings Toward Immigrants by Age Groups
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
48.9
63.8
23.9
54.0
68.4
35.3
51.6 52.1
34.7
52.8
45.0
20.5
54.3
40.4
21.2
20s 30s 40s 50s 60s
United States negatve Japan negatve China negatve
Figure 2. Negatve Feelings Toward Immigrants by Age Groups
I frst measure a respondents attitude toward North Korean defectors and other immigrants
from the United States, Japan, and China. The respondents were asked how they view each
migrant group and their answers were originally coded on a four-step scale, 1=very negative
and 4=very positive. I recoded the responses to normalize the scale (very negative=0;
very positive=1). In order to measure favorability, we asked questions about perceptions
of immigrants from various countries and North Korea defectors.
19
The average favorability
of North Korean defectors was .59, which was the highest, followed by immigrants from the
United States (Table 6). This is a notable result considering the usual country favorability
ratings, which, according to the Asan Institutes Daily Poll in December 2013, showed that
North Korea and Japan were the two least favored countries.
20
The United States was most
favored by Koreans. However, when it comes to immigrants, the public showed the closest
connection with North Korean defectors. This implies that South Koreas negative perception
of North Korea as a country does not have bearing on their connection with North Koreans.
One aspect to note is the difference in the South Korean publics perception of immigrants
from the United States, Japan, and China by age group. In particular, those who are in their
twenties show higher favorability toward immigrants from Japan than immigrants from
China, which is reversed for the elderly. While 54.3 percent of those in their 20s view
immigrants from China negatively, 40.4 percent of them so view immigrants from Japan. On
the contrary, it is 48.9 percent of those who are in their sixties whose attitudes are negative
about immigrants from China. Antagonistic feeling toward Japan by this age cohort is much
stronger; so that the percentage of them who see immigrants from Japan negatively is as
high as 63.8 percent. Considering the argument that ethnic national identity of Koreans had
originated from imperial Japans racial discrimination against Korean people during colonial
times, these numbers corroborate what I found above on national identity. South Korean youth
are apparently overcoming hostile feelings originating from the colonial period, which are
believed to be based on ethnic national identity, against Japan.
21
(See Figure 1 and Figure 2)
Next, I examined the views of North Korean defectors by age group. Previously, the data
demonstrated that South Korean youth have weaker ethnic identity than the elderly. In
addition, this group has a hostile attitude toward North Korea. Those fndings may lead
us to the conclusion that the young generation is more antagonistic toward North Korean
defectors. Despite their weak ethnic bond, the outcome is the opposite. Whereas only 14.7
percent of those who are in their twenties disliked North Korean defectors, 29.2 percent of
Table 6. Feelings Toward Immigrants and North Korean Defectors
Favorability
North Korea Defectors 0.59
Immigrants from China 0.41
Immigrants from USA 0.55
Immigrants from Japan 0.36
the United States. While no gap was distinguished between civic identity scores of respondents
who have positive and negative attitudes toward immigrants from the United States, there
exist ethnic identity score differences. Apparently, those who have a stronger degree of ethnic
identity tend to have a negative attitude toward immigrants from the United States, which was
exactly the same propensity as seen in attitudes toward North Korean defectors (see Table 9).
Table 8. Ethnic v. Civic Identty by Age Groups
Ethnic identty (A) Civic identty (B) Diference (B A)
20s 2.72 3.44 0.72
30s 2.84 3.49 0.65
40s 2.88 3.52 0.64
50s 3.16 3.60 0.44
60s 3.44 3.74 0.30
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 9. Ethnic and Civic Components: North Korean Defectors v.
Immigrants from US
North Korean
defector
Immigrants from
the United States
ETHNIC COMPONENT
Being born in Korea
Positve toward 3.08 3.09
Negatve toward 3.25 3.26
Living in Korea for most of
ones life
CIVIC COMPONENT
in Korean
in Korean
Understanding
Korean traditons
At the heart of this study is analysis of the impact of different types of national identity on
attitudes toward North Korean defectors, centering on the distinction between ethnic identity
and civic identity. For each question, I coded incrementally from 1 to 4, noting that 1 means do
not agree at all while 4 means agree very much (2=do not agree, 3=agree on the whole). For
instance, we ask a question whether or not being born in Korea is important to being Korean, a
respondent chooses an answer, then the average score is calculated from the quantifed answer
to measure the level of agreement with the statement by respondents. The higher the score,
the more Koreans think the element is important. Also, for the purpose of convenience, I
classifed attitudes toward North Korean defectors into two categories, positive or negative.
For comparison, attitudes toward immigrants from the United States are added on the side as a
reference. According to conventional wisdom, it is expected that those who have strong ethnic
identity have more sympathetic and positive sentiments to North Korean defectors than those
who have weak ethnic identity because strong ethnic identity is supposed to connect the South
and the North. The result is, surprisingly, the opposite again.
First, I examine the generational difference on identity politics by comparing the scores (see
Table 8). As the results in Table 7 demonstrate, most South Koreans consider that civic identity
is more important than ethnic identity regardless of age group. Nonetheless, a large difference
in the perceptions of signifcance is present among South Korean youth. The ethnic identity
score for those who are in their twenties is 2.72 which is the lowest across age groups, and the
civic identity score is 3.44. The difference of these two scores for this age cohort is .72, which
is the largest across all generations. Compared with this, the spread between civic and ethnic
identity scores for the elderly is much smaller. The result bodes well for changing national
identity among the young generation.
Those who have a sympathetic and positive attitude toward North Korean defectors are less
likely to agree that having the Korean bloodline is important to being Korean (2.95 v. 3.27).
This tendency is found in all ethnic components. Those who think that living in Korea and
being born in Korea are important qualities for being Korean tend to have a less favorable
attitude toward North Korean defectors. When it comes to civic identity components, no
discernible difference is found between those who have positive and negative attitudes toward
North Korean defectors. A quite similar tendency is found in attitudes toward immigrants from
Table 7. Feelings Toward North Korean Defectors by Age Groups
20s 30s 40s 50s 60s Total
Very negatve 3.7 5.5 2.8 4.5 6.5 4.7
Negatve 11.0 20.0 13.3 21.2 22.7 18.2
Positve 55.8 52.4 60.2 53.9 41.4 51.9
Very positve 9.8 6.9 9.0 5.7 11.2 8.6
Dont Know 19.0 13.8 12.3 13.1 16.6 14.9
Refused 0.6 1.4 2.4 1.6 1.8 1.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Conclusion
On January 6, 2014, President Park Geun-hye held her frst press conference since her
inauguration. Although it took almost a year, she was successful in generating a huge media
buzz. She laid out her economic plan, explained her position on the ongoing National
Intelligence Service scandal and the prosecution process, and went through her foreign policies
for 2014. What caught the most attention from the media and the Internet was her statement on
Korean unifcation. During the Q&A session, she declared that, unifcation, in my opinion, is
hitting the jackpot (daebak). Since the word daebak is a term most often used by the young
generation and is slang not often used by politicianslet alone the presidentit instantly
became the most searched word on the Internet.
On December 31, 2013, The Chosun Ilbo, the newspaper in Korea with the largest number of
subscribers, began a project entitled, Special Report: Unifcation is the Future. The report
provided analyses of experts from various felds regarding the economic benefts South
Korea can expect from unifcation. For example, the report quoted the famous investor Jim
Rogers, who claimed that he would invest all his fortune in Korea if the Korean Peninsula
were to be unifed.
Thanks to Parks press conference and the Unifcation is the Future project, unifcation
quickly became a national buzzword. However, efforts to raise awareness of the economic
benefts of unifcation underscore the fact that the South Korean public has deep reservations
about it, most likely due to the perception that unifcation will be expensive, especially after
witnessing the German unifcation.
Parks remarks on the economic benefts of unifcation can be viewed as a good political move
and an appropriate answer that addresses the publics economic concerns. However, unifcation
can be a jackpot only on the condition that the public still yearns for national unifcation.
What if South Koreans no longer share an ethnic identity with North Koreans? Also, how
would we mediate the discrepancies between the two peoples of the North and the South?
These questions certainly shake the ground of the unifcation norm assumed by government
and give reason to reconsider the whole economic beneft argument.
This study demonstrates that South Koreans do not view North Korean defectors in the
framework of ethnic nationalism. Rather, they have begun to view the issue similar to an
immigration issue. The important question for us, then, is what can we do to prepare for
unifcation in which North and South Koreans can coexist together? Ironically, the answer
seems to depend on how tolerant and mature the South Korean public is toward different ethnic
groups. Given these fndings, dealing with North Koreans under the assumption that they are
one of us appears nave and even dangerous. While it may go against the Korean norm,
moving forward with the approach that North Koreans and South Koreans are members of two
different countries, rather than one ethnic race, may be more realistic and practical. On that
regard, fostering civic identity can provide an answer.
* The author is thankful to Mr. John J. Lee for his assistance.
I then generated indices for two identities by calculating the average values of responses
to each question and conducted a t-test to compare different attitudes toward North Korean
defectors. Simply put, the average scores of ethnic identity and civic identity are calculated
and tested to see if there exists any signifcant difference between respondents who have
positive and negative attitudes toward North Korean defectors. The test result confrms what
I found above. The average score of ethnic identity for those who have a positive attitude
is 2.98, while it is 3.22 for those who have a negative attitude. The difference was .23, a
statistically signifcant fnding. On the contrary, there was no signifcant difference in civic
identity scores between these two groups. For those who have a positive attitude, the civic
identity score was 3.59, and for those who have a negative attitude, it was 3.60 (see Table 10).
In sum, we can conclude that as a person sympathizes more with North Korean defectors, he or
she is less likely to appreciate ethnic identity. In other words, a lower degree of ethnic identity
helps a person have a positive and sympathetic sentiment toward North Korean defectors.
This is, as a matter of fact, the same relationship I fnd in the analysis of immigrants. Those
who have a lower level of ethnic identity tend to have a more accommodating attitude toward
immigrants from the United States, China, and Japan. The civic identity did not discern the
attitudinal differences.
22
It is expected that ethnic identity will have an adverse relationship with regard to a person's
attitude toward immigrants and, more broadly, immigration issues. That is, the stronger
one's degree of ethnic identity, the less favorable attitude he or she has on immigrants and
immigration issues. On the contrary, those who have stronger civic identity are more likely
to have a favorable attitude. The result, therefore, implies that Koreans stopped seeing North
Korean defectors from the perspective of ethnic identity, but began to see them through the lens
that they use to see immigrants from other countries.
23
This result partially explains why we see a much more favorable attitude toward North Korean
defectors by South Korean youth. They emphasize civic identity more than ethnic identity to
become Korean. Once they see North Korean defectors without the ethnic lens, North Korean
defectors are one of various migrant groups. On that premise, young people who have strong
civic identity and a low ethnic one are likely to display a more accommodating attitude toward
the defectors wherever they come from.
Table 10. Diference in Ethnic/Civic Identtes by Attude
Toward North Korean Defectors
Ethnic Identty Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Negatve 220 3.22 0.66
Positve 594 2.98 0.71
Diference = 0.23 t = 4.27
Civic Identty Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Negatve 220 3.60 0.42
Positve 607 3.59 0.42
Diference = 0.01 t = .37
18. Ae-Lee Sohn and Nae-Young Lee, A Study on the Attitude of South Koreans Toward North
Korean Defectors.
19. The question was asked in a plain way such as what do you think about immigrants from the
country (the United States, China, Japan)? Only for North Korean defectors, we did not use
the term immigrants but straightforwardly referred them to North Korean defectors.
20. On a 1 to 4 scale, Japan scored 2.57 and North Korea 2.37.
21. While the perceptions of immigrants vary across generational groups, ideological differences
are hard to fnd.
22. I examined the ethnic identity score and attitudes toward North Korean defectors by age group
so as to check if the age effect is overpowering. That is, the elderly who are believed to have
a high ethnic identity score tend to have less positive attitudes toward North Korean defectors
than the youth, which may result in a positive relationship between the high ethnic identity
score and the negativity toward North Korean defectors. In fact, the ethnic identity score was
higher among the groups negatively seeing North Korean defectors across generations except
for those in their twenties. Ethnic identity scores of those in their 20s were almost exactly
the same for both negative and positive viewers of North Korean defectors. For all other
generational groups, those who view North Korean defectors negatively tend to have high
ethnic identity scores.
23. The result corroborates the fnding of the aforementioned Daily Poll results on South Korean
views toward North Korea.
Endnotes
1. Korea Immigration Service Monthly Statistics, November 2013, http://www.immigration.go.kr/
HP/COM/bbs_003/ListShowData.do?strNbodCd=noti0097&strWrtNo=128&strAnsNo=A&str
OrgGbnCd=104000&strRtnURL=IMM_6070&strAllOrgYn=N&strThisPage=1&strFilePath=i
mm/.
2. James A. Wiggins, Beverly B. Wiggins, James Wilfrid Vander Zanden, Social Psychology (New
York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1994).
3. Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Reno, Nevada: University of Nevada Press, 1991); Jones,
F. L., and Philip Smith, Individual and Social Bases of National Identity: A Comparative
Multi-level Analysis, European Sociological Review, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2001), pp. 103-18.
Anthony D. Smith, The Myth of the Modern Nation and the Myths of Nations, Ethnic and
Racial Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1988): pp. 1-26.
4. Gi-Wook Shin, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2006).
5. Andre Schmid, Korea Between Empires, 1895-1919 (New York: Columbia University Press,
2002); Jang, Won Joon, Multicultural Korea. Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 10,
No. 2 (2009): pp. 94-104.
6. Gi-Wook Shin, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea. Also, see the explanation of minjok and
nationalism in Chung-in Moon, Unravelling National Identity in South Korea: Minjok and
Gukmin, in Gilbert Rozman, ed., East Asian National Identities: Common Roots and Chinese
Exceptionalism (Washington, DC and Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and
Stanford University Press, 2012): pp. 219-37.
7. For insights into the growth of Korean nationalism relating to anti-Americanism, see Gi-Wook
Shin, South Korean Anti-Americanism: A Comparative Perspective. Asian Survey, Vol. 36,
No. 8 (1996): pp. 787-801.
8. Won-Taek Kang and Nae-Young Lee, Understanding Korean Identity: Through the Lens of
Opinion Surveys (Seoul: East Asia Institute, 2011).
9. Anthony D. Smith, The Myth of the Modern Nation and the Myths of Nations.
10. Won-Taek Kang and Nae-Young Lee, Understanding Korean Identity.
11. Asan Daily Poll, March 29 and March 31. Another interesting fnding is that the South Korean
public is most concerned about ideological and cultural confusion after unifcation (31.4%).
Economic cost follows as 30% of respondents states the most concerning issue of post-
unifcation.
12. Joon-Oh Jang and Sung-Ho Go, North Korean Defectors: Crime & Countermeasures (Seoul:
Korean Institute of Criminology, 2010).
13. Ae-Lee Sohn and Nae-Young Lee, A Study on the Attitude of South Koreans toward North
Korean Defectors: Focusing on National Identity and Multi-Cultural Acceptability, Journal of
Asia-Pacifc Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2012), pp. 5-34; Young-Soo Kim, South Korean Students
Perception toward North Korean Defectors, Journal of Strategy, Vol. 10 (1998), pp. 125-
55; Ki-Seon Jeong, Effects of South Koreans Social Psyhological Attitudes towards North
Koreans on Their Aspiration for Unifcation, Korean Journal of Sociology, Vol. 32 (1998),
pp. 427-48; Kye-Min Yang & Jean-Kyung Jeong The Effects of Contact with North Korean
Residents on Trust and Acceptance by South Koreans, Korean Journal of Psychology, Vol.
11, No.1 (2005), pp. 97-115; Soo-Hyun Kwon, Individual Attitudes toward North Korean
Immigrants, Journal of Korean Politics, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2011), pp. 129-53.
14. Myoung-Jin Lee, Yu-Jung Choi and Set-Byol Choi, Multi-Cultural Society and Social
Distance for Foreigners in Korean Society Survey Research, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2010): pp. 63-85.
15. Ae-Lee Sohn and Nae-Young Lee, A Study on the Attitude of South Koreans Toward North
Korean Defectors.
16. Jack Citrin, Donald P. Green, Christopher Muste, and Cara Wong, Public Opinion Toward
Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 59,
No. 3 (1997): pp. 858-81.
17. Soo-Hyun Kwon, Individual Attitudes toward North Korean Immigrants.
Bridging the Chinese Natonal
Identty Gap: Alternatve Identtes
in Hong Kong and Taiwan
Syaru Shirley Lin
Lin: Bridging the Chinese Natonal Identty Gap | 115 114 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
As for Taiwan, Beijing introduced a series of economic measures to encourage cross-
Strait integration after 2008, in an attempt to strengthen the position of the pro-
unifcation KMT, which had just returned to power after eight years of rule by the
pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). In June 2010, Beijing and
Taipei signed the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA),
a preferential trade agreement (PTA) with an early harvest list that specifed which
goods and services would be liberalized frst. Similar to CEPA, ECFA is a framework
agreement that needs further negotiations to broaden the scope of liberalization. Beijing
and Taipei also signed agreements allowing Chinese tourists to visit Taiwan, which had
not been permitted. Group tours have been allowed since 2008, and a restricted number
of individual travelers were also permitted starting in 2011.
Due to these liberalization measures, Hong Kong has become an even more important
gateway to China. Since Chinas opening in 1979, Hong Kong has become the leading
source of foreign direct investment (FDI) for China. As of 2013, China is also the leading
source of FDI for Hong Kong. In 2013, China is responsible for over half of Hong Kongs re-
exports and exports.
2
Similarly, Taiwans two-way trade with China has risen signifcantly
and exceeded $124.4 billion in 2013, accounting for 21.6 percent of Taiwans total foreign
trade. Cumulative direct investment into China reached 62.7 percent of Taiwans total FDI,
at $133.7 billion as of year-end 2013, which is only a fraction of the real amount, given
that most Taiwanese investments in China fow through Hong Kong and other offshore
entities, making Taiwan one of Chinas leading investors.
3
Aside from trade and investment, Chinese tourists play an increasingly important role
in the two economies, creating growth and jobs. In 2013, 40.7 million Chinese tourists
visited Hong Kong, constituting 75 percent of total foreign visitors, and 2.8 million
Chinese tourists visited Taiwan, constituting 36 percent of total foreign visitors.
4
In
addition, since the handover about 150 Chinese immigrants qualify to become Hong
Kong residents per day, including primarily family members of Hong Kong residents
and a limited number of professionals and investors. The number of new immigrants will
soon reach one million, in a city of only seven million residents. Chinese immigration
to Taiwan had been restricted to spousal reunions in the past, but those restrictions have
since been relaxed to include professionals, with the cumulative number of immigrants
now at more than 720,000, in an island of 23 million people.
5
Beijings most signifcant economic measure integrating the three regions was to allow
Hong Kong and Taiwan to become offshore renminbi (RMB) centers, since 2004
and 2013, respectively. Because of capital controls, RMB earnings from trade and
investment could not be converted into home currencies. With this new status, Hong
Kong and Taiwan businesses and individuals are able to convert RMB into their local
currencies. Furthermore, with increased RMB liquidity in these two offshore markets,
fnancial institutions will be able to gather deposits and offer RMB products.
6
Some
believe that the creation of these offshore RMB centers will produce a Greater China
fnancial industry that will bind the three markets more closely together.
7
After more than one hundred years of colonial rule, China regained sovereignty over Hong
Kong in 1997 and is now seeking the eventual return of Taiwan, which has enjoyed de
facto independence since the Kuomintang (KMT) government retreated there from the
mainland in 1949. China has continued to expand its social and economic ties with Hong
Kong and Taiwan. However, despite Chinas deepening economic integration with Hong
Kong and Taiwan and the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong from Britain to China in
1997, surveys show that there has been no increase in Chinese identity among the people
in Hong Kong or Taiwan. Instead, there is a rise in local identities. Beijing is determined
to bridge the identity gap in both regions in the belief that the development of a Chinese
national identity is necessary to ensure political stability and territorial integrity. Its aim is to
prevent Taiwan from declaring de jure independence and to secure the eventual unifcation
of Taiwan with the rest of China, and with regard to Hong Kong, it seeks to ensure that the
continued progress toward direct elections does not produce an unacceptable legislature or
chief executive. Promoting Chinese national identity in both Hong Kong and Taiwan is seen
as important to achieving those goals.
China has employed both soft approaches, such as introducing national education and
patriotic propaganda, and hard tactics, such as visa denials to those whom it believes are
promoting a local identity. Neither strategy has been effective in bridging the identity gap.
This chapter seeks to understand the widening gap between a Chinese national identity and
the alternative local identities that are gaining ground in both regions, and to assess the
prospect that people in either region will regain or adopt a Chinese national identity.
Deepening Economic and
Social Integration
After China began its program of economic reform and opening in the 1980s, it did so primarily
through Hong Kong and Taiwan, whose businessmen beneftted greatly from being the frst
investors to take advantage of cheap labor and favorable policies for Overseas Chinese.
Initially, Chinas goals were primarily economic, but in the last decade, China has given even
greater priority to economic and social integration with Hong Kong and later, Taiwan, this time
not just to promote Chinas own economic growth, but also in the hope such integration would
enhance peoples sense of Chinese national identity.
This renewed emphasis on cross-border integration began in 2003, when Hong Kong experienced
an outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and a dramatic economic slowdown
under an already unpopular chief executive, C.H. Tung. Beijing tried to revitalize Hong
Kongs economy by the Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement
(CEPA), which granted Hong Kong preferential access to the Chinese market. The industries
receiving preferential terms under CEPA now constitute 58.5 percent of Hong Kongs GDP. To
date, CEPA is the most liberalized free trade agreement (FTA) signed by Beijing. When Taiwan
and China signed liberalization measures in services that went beyond what CEPA granted,
CEPA was immediately amended in June 2013 to keep pace.
1
Furthermore, the Individual Visit
Scheme was introduced in 2003, which greatly eased the restrictions on mainland Chinese
tourists coming to Hong Kong.
repression. With over 120 cases of self-immolation of Tibetans in the last three years and
arrests of Uighurs, including professionals and intellectuals who speak up for minority rights,
Beijings record of governance of regions that were promised autonomy for people with
different values has not been comforting.
15
Defniton and Measurement of Identty
In both regions, identity has been primarily defned in two ways. The frst is self-identifcation:
whether one chooses to identity oneself as Chinese, or adopt an alternative local identity.
The second is preference for the regions political structure and status, in particular, support
for OCTS in Hong Kong and for unifcation in Taiwan. These two dimensions of identity
have been measured through public opinion polls in both regions for many years.
The Identty Gap in Hong Kong
From 1846 to 1997, both the British and Chinese governments depoliticized the city and
avoided mobilizing strong national sentiment in order to minimize anti-colonial sentiments.
The local sense of identity that developed was rooted more in social and economic factors than
in political institutions. Residents viewed Hong Kong society as much more developed and
free compared to China, and took pride in speaking Cantonese, rather than Mandarin.
16
In December 2013, more than sixteen years after the handover to Beijing, a survey found
that 62.4 percent still saw themselves as having primarily a Hong Kong identity, either
a Hong Konger in China for 27.6 percent or a Hong Konger for 34.8 percent of the
respondents. This was an increase from the 56.7 percent in 1997. Only 36.5 percent called
themselves a Chinese in Hong Kong or a Chinese, a decline from 38.7 percent in
1997. More alarmingly, despite years of patriotic education, 87.6 percent of people
under 29 years old identifed themselves as having primarily a Hong Kong identity. Only
Figure 1. Ethnic Identy - Hongkonger in broad sense
(per poll, by age group) (8/1997-12/2013)
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
Date of Survey
18-29 30+ Overall
Source: HKU POP, December 2013
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1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
The Growing Identity Gap
Beijings Defniton of Natonal Identty
Beijing has always defned its core interests as the perpetuation of CCP leadership and the socialist
system, the preservation of Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the promotion of
national unifcation.
8
In the case of Hong Kong and Taiwan, strengthening a Chinese national
identity, especially among the younger generation, is particularly important. President Xi Jinping
concluded one of his frst China Dream speeches at the 12
th
National Peoples Congress (NPC)
by calling for Hong Kong compatriots to prioritize the interests of the nation, and for Taiwan
compatriots to be united in creating a new future for the Chinese nation.
9
He appealed for
contributions from compatriots in Hong Kong and Taiwan in realizing the great rejuvenation
of the Chinese nation.
10
To Beijing, the political component of a Chinese national identity
is acceptance of increasing Chinese infuence in Hong Kong under the One Country Two
Systems (OCTS) formula and future unifcation of Taiwan under the one China principle.
China had welcomed the resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong, as a way not only of
restoring national dignity after a century of humiliation, but also of showing that the successful
governance of Hong Kong could be the model for governing Taiwan were unifcation to be
achieved. Deng Xiaopings OCTS formula was devised specifcally with Taiwan in mind, but
it was also applied to Hong Kong as an interim system for ffty years following the handover.
The structure of the OCTS is laid out in Hong Kongs Basic Law, adopted by the NPC in 1984,
to ensure a high degree of political, economic, and legal autonomy for what was to become a
special administrative region (SAR). Although Hong Kong people seemed to accept the Basic
Law and OCTS, they had had no say in the development of either, and there remained much
ambiguity as to how Hong Kong would be governed over the next ffty years.
11
As a precondition to peace talks, Beijing has always insisted on Taipeis acceptance of the
one China principle, which provides that there is only one China, Taiwan is part of China,
and Beijing is the only legitimate government of this China.
12
Taiwanesehavevoted for their
legislators since 1992 and directly elected their president since 1996, and the island has its
own army. An increasingly assertive and hostile China refuses to acknowledge the legitimacy
of the elected Taiwanese government and has never renounced force against its Taiwanese
compatriots. Only one of the two dominant political parties in Taiwan, the KMT, has accepted
the one China principle, and then only partially. Under the 92 Consensus, reached with
Beijing in 1992, the KMT accepts that there is only one China of which Taiwan is a part, but
has never acknowledged that Beijing is the sole government to represent this one China. The
DPP continues to adhere to the principle that Taiwanese, not Beijing, must decide Taiwans
future, and opposes establishing reunifcation as an a priori goal.
13
Beijing has also emphasized that China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan are all one nation ethnically.
Since people in Hong Kong and Taiwan are predominantly Han Chinese, they acknowledge
their Chinese roots, but this does not translate easily into a common national identity.
14
While
Beijing stresses common ethnicity, people in Hong Kong and Taiwan place at least equal
weight on strong civic values that Beijing either rejects or does not fully implement, such as
freedom of speech, the rule of law and an independent judiciary, an open market economy, a
clean bureaucracy, and democratic institutions. In particular, many look with great sympathy
at how minorities in autonomous regions like Tibet and Xinjiang have suffered from political
support for its ultimate goal of national unifcation. After the lifting of martial law in 1987,
and as Beijing secured more diplomatic relations and membership in all major international
institutions, Taiwanese began an open and long debate over their national identity with
increasing criticism of the KMT-imposed Chinese identity and growing support for a more
Taiwaneseidentity.
22
This was refected in the attempt by the DPP government to shift the
focus of school curricula to be more Taiwan-centric. At the same time, the earlier primordial
defnition of that identity has given way to a new Taiwanese identity, defned less in terms
of ethnicity and more as a commitment to the interests of the people of Taiwan and the
islands new civic values and democratic institutions.
In a June 2013 poll conducted by the Election Study Center of Taiwans National Chengchi
University (ESC), fully 93.6 percent of Taiwanese identifed themselves as Taiwanese
or Both Taiwanese and Chinese. The exclusively Taiwanese category has increased
more dramatically than the dual identity, rising from 17.6 percent in 1992 to 57.5 percent
in 2013. Only 3.6 percent identifed themselves as Chinese in 2013, a decline from 25.5
percent in 1992.
23
In two decades, a primarily Taiwanese identity has been accepted by the
majority. Ironically, despite greater economic interdependence with China, the Taiwanese
have continued to move away from a full or partial Chinese identity.
24
Although the
increase in a local identity is across all age groups, the increase was higher in the younger
generations, just as in Hong Kong. Young people do not think of China as an enemy and
are open-minded about their relationship with China, but they have a frm sense of a local
identity. Their attitude is no longer anti-Chinese but just non-Chinese and Taiwanese.
25
In order to analyze the similarities and differences between the two regions rising local
identities, HKIAPS and Taiwans Academia Sinica conducted a joint China Impact
study in April and May of 2013. Using a common questionnaire, the team found a high
correlation between age and local identity in both regions. For Taiwanese respondents
under the age of 34, nearly 90 percent identifed themselves as simply, Taiwanese,
compared to 76 percent in the other three age groups.
26
In terms of preference for
unifcation or independence (known as future-national-status, or FNS), the June 2013 ESC
polls showed that support for immediate unifcation had dwindled to only 2.1 percent. The
majority preferred the status quo, 58.0 percent in 2013 vs. 12.9 percent in 1994. Support
for autonomy, either the status quo or immediate or eventual independence had risen from
24.0 percent to 81.3 percent, while support for immediate or eventual unifcation had
dropped to half of the level of two decades earlier. In terms of OCTS, the Taiwanese are
equally skeptical. Polls in the last twenty years have repeatedly shown low acceptance
rates of unifcation, the one China principle, or OCTS.
27
Most believe that any of these
outcomes would only curtail Taiwans autonomy, especially as they watch Hong Kongs
autonomy erode. When self-identifcation is juxtaposed with FNS, it is clear that national
identity on Taiwan is evolving rapidly in one directionaway from being Chinese or
part of a Chinese state (see Figure 3).
28
This trend is clear even when respondents are permitted to express their preference under
hypothesized conditions. Academia Sinica has conducted surveys every fve years to show
these conditional FNS preferences. The latest poll in 2010 showed the continued decline
(29.6 percent vs. 54.1 percent in 1995, 48.2 percent in 2000, and 37.5 percent in 2005) in
support for unifcation, even if China were to become democratic.
29
11.8 percent of the young people identifed themselves as primarily Chinese, about one-
third of the 31.6 percent recorded in 1997 (see Figure 1).
17
In a separate 2013 Baptist
University study, which showed the same trend but divided the respondents by profession,
not one of the 93 students surveyed wanted to be known as simply Chinese.
18
The second measure of Chinese identity used here is the degree of confdence that Hong Kong
people have in OCTS. In July 1997, the percentage who felt confdent about their political
system exceeded 63.6 percent but has since dropped to 49.2 percent. Conversely, those who
lacked confdence in the system had risen from 18.1 percent to 42.3 percent (see Figure 2).
19

The degree of confdence is primarily dependent on whether people believe Hong Kong enjoys
autonomy, free of Beijings interference and irrespective of changes in CCP leadership. This
is especially tied to perceptions of whether Beijing will allow universal suffrage as provided
for in Hong Kongs Basic Law.
20
From 2007, the tenth anniversary of the handover, to 2013,
confdence in OCTS dropped more dramatically than in previous years, declining 27 percentage
points in both the POP polls and the surveys conducted by Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacifc
Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong (HKIAPS), the two leading polling centers in
Hong Kong.
21
No matter which measure of identity is examined, whether self-identifcation or
confdence in OCTS, the identity gap is widening, not narrowing.
The Identty Gap in Taiwan
The gap between a Chinese identity and an alternative local identity is even more glaring.
During the Cold War, after ffty years of Japanese colonial rule, the KMT attempted to impose
a Chinese identity on Taiwanese in order to maintain its authoritarian rule and to maintain
Figure 2. People's Condence in "One Country, Two Systems"
(per poll) (7/1997 - 12/2013)
1
5
/
7
/
1
9
9
7
2
3
-
2
4
/
9
/
1
9
9
7
2
2
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2
3
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/
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9
9
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3
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9
9
8
8
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6
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4
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4
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4
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4
/
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6
6
-
1
2
/
1
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/
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0
0
6
2
2
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5
/
1
0
/
2
0
0
7
2
5
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2
6
/
8
/
2
0
0
8
1
6
-
2
1
/
6
/
2
0
0
9
9
-
1
3
/
6
/
2
0
1
0
5
-
1
0
/
9
/
2
0
1
1
5
-
1
3
/
1
2
/
2
0
1
2
9
-
1
2
/
1
2
/
2
0
1
3
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
-10%
Date of Survey
Condent Not Condent Net Value
Source: HKU POP, December 2013
are now described as locusts, swarming into Hong Kong to denude the city of some of its
most valuable assets. The more Hong Kong people interact with the mainland Chinese in
China and in Hong Kong and become aware of the endemic problems throughout China, the
more committed they are to maintain autonomy.
33
Similar problems from intense social interactions with mainland Chinese have arisen in
Taiwan. Although Chinese tourists are reported to bring Taiwan an additional $300 million of
revenue per year, the impact on Taiwans environment and way of life are creating problems
on a daily basis. From reports of visitors exhibiting uncivilized behavior to tourist groups
taking up the entire daily admission quota for the National Palace Museum, the Taiwanese
have been shocked and resentful.
34
These episodes are seen as typical, not exceptional.
Although Hong Kong and Taiwan have beneftted in terms of overall growth and
employment as a result of CEPA, ECFA, and the liberalization of tourism, the gains are
not perceived as being evenly distributed. After the conclusion of CEPA, inequality in
Hong Kong widened dramatically, with the Gini coeffcient increasing from 0.518 in
1996 to 0.537 in 2011, one of the highest in developed economies, worse than the United
States and Singapore.
35
Many members of the middle class feel that the additional tourist
revenues do not beneft them, only the business elites and real estate companies amidst
skyrocketing real estate prices. Young people believe that their prospects for local jobs and
college placements are being reduced by integration.
36
Nearly a third of the Hong Kong
people feel dissatisfed with how SAR government has handled relations with the central
government, up from 12.3 percent in 1997.
37
Similarly, instead of creating good will among a broad spectrum of Taiwanese, ECFA and
its related agreements have led to intense domestic debates about the benefts and costs of
becoming more integrated with the PRC.
38
Taiwanese analysts have concluded that high
trade dependence on China has been associated with a rising poverty rate and inequality,
and the working class increasingly believes they have been hurt by the implementation of
ECFA.
39
After its signing, Taiwan became even more polarized between pro-China and anti-
China groups. Nor has the increase in Taiwanese identity in terms of both self-identifcation
and FNS preference for autonomy been reversed. The Service Trade Agreement (STA)
signed in June 2013 as a supplement to ECFA opens more industries to mutual investments,
but is perceived to threaten Taiwans economic security and job prospects. There has been
widespread criticism of the STA and the pro-independence Taiwan Solidarity Union fat
out opposes it.
40
The KMT governments attempt in March 2014 to move the STA to a
legislative foor vote without conducting a review of each provision has resulted in the
largest student-led protest in Taiwans history. The students occupied the legislature for
three weeks and did not end the protest until the government agreed to adopt a legislative
framework to guide consideration of all future cross-Strait negotiations.
Polls have corroborated that the negative consequences of economic integration have
widened the national identity gap. The Hong Kong-Taiwan China Impact joint project
highlights how identity is closely related to perceptions of economic prospects.
41
Someone
who believes that economic integration will beneft his family was much more likely to
identify himself as Chinese. Conversely, the perception that economic integration with
China will hurt ones familys economic prospects is associated with a high degree of a local
Causes of the Identity Gap
What is it about those more intense interactions that have caused identity in the two societies
to pull away from China, and their attitudes to become less positive? The increased number
of tourists and immigrants explains much of the growing identity gap. With only 7.2 million
people living in 1,104 square km, Hong Kong will see the number of mainland Chinese
tourists rise to 70 million in three years and 100 million in 2023, offcials estimate.
30
Polls conducted on the Individual Visit Scheme have indicated the strong negative reaction
most people in Hong Kong feel toward Chinese tourists, despite the benefts they bring to
Hong Kongs economy.
31
Mainland tourists overrun downtown shopping areas and attractions
previously the domain of Hong Kong locals and the much smaller number of overseas
tourists.
32
The working class immigrants and students coming from China have put pressure
on the citys limited resources, from housing and maternity wards to university placements.
Repeated problems with tainted baby formula among mainland babies have led to thousands
of Chinese coming to Hong Kong to buy imported baby formula and creating a shortage.
A similar problem is the insuffcient supply of maternity wards after mainland mothers
started to fock to Hong Kong to give birth to obtain residency for their children, crowding
out local mothers. New immigrants, many of whom are from low-income families, place
more burdens on the citys welfare and education systems. Wealthy Chinese immigrants and
visitors are resented as well, since they are believed to be bidding up real estate prices and
fooding Hong Kong schools with students willing and able to pay full tuition. Once derided
as clumps of earth, given their rural backgrounds and unsophisticated ways, mainlanders
Identy of Taiwanese or
Both Taiwanese and Chinese
Preference for Unicaon as soon as possible and
Maintain status quo, move toward unicaon
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Year of Survey
Source: Compiled by author according to data from ESC, Important Political Attitude Trend
Distribution, June 2013.
Figure 3. Taiwanese Self-idencaon and Preference for
Future-Naonal-Status (1994-2013)
World Health Organization (WHO). When Beijing hosted the 2008 Olympics, it permitted
Hong Kong to host the equestrian events. Beijing has also exposed Hong Kong to Chinese
icons in order to foster patriotism. After successful space explorations, Chinese astronauts
visited Hong Kong in October 2003 and June 2012, before visiting any other Chinese cities.
Chinas gold medalists from the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2012 London Olympics also
visited the city after the closing ceremonies.
To further consolidate Chinese identity among Hong Kong people, Beijing requested the
inclusion of national education, enhancing students understanding of our country and
national identity in school curricula.
45
During the frst years after the handover, there was
little systematic attempt to introduce national education, but in 2007, when President Hu
Jintao attended the tenth anniversary handover celebration in Hong Kong, he stressed that
Hong Kong should provide more national education for young people.
46
Hong Kongs
Education Bureau then proposed reforms requesting schools to strengthen national education
and a special department focusing on national identity was set up in the Education Bureau.
Teachers were given resources to teach students about national fag raising, the national
anthem and national identity. Finally, Chief Executive Donald Tsang proposed that national
education become mandatory in his 2011 policy address.
47
The proposal generated intense opposition, involving an unusual degree of collaboration
among different societal groups. In response to concerns that such reforms amounted to
government-sponsored brainwashing, the publicity director of Beijings liaison offce
defended the policy by saying national education in school was necessary brainwashing
and internationally accepted practice.
48
Some schools set evaluation criteria for students
that included supporting the country even if the people believe that the country has done
wrong.
49
Furthermore, in multi-ethnic, multi-lingual Hong Kong, many raised doubts
about the curriculum guide that also contained ethnocentric language calling for national
unity based on geography, blood, and ethnic commonalities. In April 2012, the Education
Bureau declared that national education must be introduced over three years for primary and
secondary schools, but on July 29, more than 90,000 citizens, including educators, parents,
and students, joined a successful protest to demand the order be retracted.
50
Since Beijing does not exercise sovereignty over Taiwan, it cannot try to reshape the
educational system in the same way as it does in Hong Kong. Instead, it focuses on sending
both positive and negative messages. One theme has been to insist on a renewed commitment
to unifcation under the one China principle. Relatedly, Chinese leaders have been intent
on promoting a Chinese national identity in Taiwan. In 2011 Hu Jintao asked the people on
both sides of the Strait to enhance the sense of a common national identity [and] heal
wounds of the past.
51
The Director of the Taiwan Affairs Offce Wang Yi, at a cross-Strait
conference in June 2012, reminded the Taiwanese audience that recent favorable policies
such as allowing the import of Taiwanese rice to China depended on people across the Strait
deepening their identity as one family.
52
Conversely, Beijing has sought to denigrate local identity as a form of false consciousness,
the product of identity politics and foreign intervention. Beijing has criticized the DPP
government for de-Sinifcation of curricula and has regularly accused pollsters in Hong
Kong of working for foreigners to deny their Chinese identity.
53
Recent attacks on the protests
identity.
42
As the two societies perceive that integration with China is damaging to their
economy, a distinct local identity becomes ever more consolidated.
In addition, identity appears to be correlated with class. In Hong Kong, the less educated
and lower income individuals are more likely to assume a Chinese identity. Many of these
are recent Chinese immigrants, who retain their original Chinese identity and depend on
public welfare and social services provided by a local government linked to Beijing. In
contrast, the more educated individuals are more likely to assume a local identity. These
middle-class professionals are unlikely to view economic integration with China to be
benefcial to their families.
43
In Taiwan, educational level is not highly correlated with
identity, but income level is. High-income individuals, many of whom were mainland
Chinese who came to Taiwan with the KMT and have beneftted from doing business
in China, are more likely to assume a Chinese identity. The middle and lower classes
in Taiwan are predominantly native Taiwanese whose ancestors immigrated to Taiwan
hundreds of years ago and do not visit China frequently, if at all. For them, integration
with China robs Taiwan of jobs and creates inequality. With increased interaction with
mainland Chinese and visits to China, Taiwanese have found that they are not regarded as
Chinese and have developed a stronger and distinct sense of separate identity. In addition,
Taiwans rural and working classes are more supportive of democratic values, as they were
the ones who had fought against the KMT for Taiwans democratization and, therefore,
fnd it diffcult to associate themselves with Chinas non-democratic political system or
accept unifcation under Beijings authoritarian rule.
44
Beijings Strategy to Bridge the Gap
In short, social and economic integration with China has made local identities more salient
in both regions. These identities are perceived to be eroding the legitimacy of Beijings
rule over Hong Kong and reducing the support for Taiwans unifcation with China. Beijing
has thus been attempting through a variety of strategies to reverse the trends toward local
identities so as to instill a greater sense of Chinese identity.
One strategy is the use of economic incentives to reward supporters and penalize opponents
in both regions. Beijing has offered favorable business opportunities in China to pro-Beijing
individuals and their families like the frst chief executive of Hong Kong C.H. Tung and
the former KMT chairman Lien Chan, both of whose families have extensive businesses
in China. Firms that do not toe the party line are penalized, like Apple Daily, the leading
newspaper in Hong Kong that is highly critical of Beijing headed by the pro-democracy
Jimmy Lai, or Chi Mei Corporation, the largest ABS plastics producer owned by the former
DPP-supporter Wen-long Shi.
Sof Power Through Propaganda and Educaton
After Hong Kong was reincorporated, Beijing was very mindful to utilize softer power,
hoping that this would reinforce a sense of Chinese identity in Hong Kong. For example,
China supported the continued representation of Hong Kong in international organizations,
and promoted the appointment of individuals from Hong Kong to leading positions in
international organizations, as exemplifed by Margaret Chan, the director-general of the
Similar to Beijings efforts in Hong Kong, exasperated by the re-election of DPP president
Chen Shui-bian, whom it regarded as a supporter of Taiwanese identity and independence,
the NPC passed an Anti-Secession Act in March 2005. It stipulated that should Taiwan
move toward independence, Beijing would use force. The Anti-Secession Act was intended
to deter any attempt to declare independence or even reduce Taiwans commitment to
eventual unifcation. With an increasing number of more accurate missiles deployed by
China across the Taiwan Strait, this was not an empty threat. But the laws enactment
fueled a massive public demonstration in Taipei, involving all the political parties, with
approximately one million participants. Another strategy has been to isolate Taiwan
internationally, successfully excluding it from almost all international organizations,
or restricting Taipeis participation so that the invitation is subject to Chinas approval,
including for the WHO or the International Civil Aviation Organization, and only on an
ad hoc basis. By narrowing Taiwans feasible options, Beijing hopes to reshape Taiwans
national identity.
The Growing Importance of
a Common Identity
Hong Kongs 2017 Chief Executve Electon
Beijing believes that a more Chinese identity is necessary to gain acceptance of Chinese
restrictions on Hong Kongs political autonomy. Immediately after the resumption of
sovereignty, Beijing established a liaison offce in Hong Kong. Over time, Beijing has
increasingly reiterated that the degree of autonomy granted by the Basic Law is limited and
that in the OCTS formula, one country should be given priority over the two systems.
Hong Kong people have often reacted strongly when offcials in the liaison offce or in
Beijing appeared to be intervening in local affairs.
57
In particular, Beijing would like to
control the redefnition of Hong Kongs electoral systems for the 2016 Legislative Council
election and the 2017 election of the chief executive, fearing that universal suffrage would
encourage the development and expression of local sentiments.
58
This is despitethefact that
the Standing Committee of the NPC announced in 2007 that the chief executive may be
chosen by universal suffrage in 2017 and after that, it may apply to the Legislative Council.
59

The selection of successive chief executives who are regarded as puppets of Beijing has
culminated in widespread calls for universal suffrage for the next chief executive in 2017,
with an open nominating process, as the ultimate expression of the Hong Kong peoples
emerging identity. Beijing wants to ensure that no candidate for chief executive unacceptable
to Beijing is nominated, let alone elected, and that pro-Beijing legislators will enjoy a
majority in the legislature.
In contrast, recent polls have shown that the people of Hong Kong are not only demanding
the preservation of Hong Kongs autonomy and the protection of civil rights but are also
seeking the development of more democratic institutions including universal suffrage of
both the Legislative Council and the Chief Executive.
60
In response, Beijing has encouraged
discussions that would promote Beijings core national interests and enhance peoples
Chinese identity. But there is little cohesion even among Beijing loyalists, as was shown in
the election of C.Y. Leung as Hong Kongs Chief Executive in 2012, whom many business
against national education and the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong have continued
this line of argument, accusing the leaders of working with foreign forces to divide the
Chinese people and of employing identity politics for their own political gain.
54
Similarly,
Beijing denies that a Taiwanese identity is a genuine popular sentiment that has arisen
spontaneously. Instead Beijing portrays it as an outcome of political contestation, engineered
by pro-independence political leaders for their own political gain, and resulting from the
collusion between those leaders and foreign forces conspiring to undermine Beijing.
Hardline Strategies of Sanctons and Legislaton
Beijing cannot rely solely on soft power to prevent Chinese national identity from eroding in
Hong Kong and Taiwan, but has used tougher measures as well. Even before Hong Kongs
handover, it refused to allow entry to Hong Kong to people who might be offensive to
Beijing, including pro-democracy activists, Falun Gong members, and supporters of Tibetan
independence. In some cases, Beijing detained Hong Kong residents when they crossed the
border, most recently Yiu Mantin, the Hong Kong publisher of an upcoming book about Xi
Jinping.
55
For Taiwanese, Beijing selectively grants visas to offcials and politicians based on
good behavior and has regularly denied visas to pro-independence activists or leaders from
the DPP or other pro-independence parties. For both regions, Beijing has tried to ostracize
organizations and individuals such as journalists who are considered to be undermining what
Beijing regards as key aspects of national identity, denying them visas and opportunities,
such as prohibiting universities and state-owned companies to work with them.
Beijing has also enacted or demanded legislation aimed at what it regards as treasonable
behavior or secessionist movements. In 2003, it pressured C.H. Tung to introduce a security
law, as provided in Article 23 of Hong Kongs Basic Law, which would criminalize activities
that constituted sedition, secession, or subversion. When this legislation was introduced
in 2002, it aroused a protest involving half a million people, the largest in Hong Kongs
history since 1989. Although the legislation required by Article 23 failed to pass, Beijing has
continued to press for its passage, and Hong Kongs current chief executive, C.Y. Leung, has
acknowledged that the SAR government has constitutional responsibility to do so.
Whether hard or soft, Beijings strategies to promote national identity have tended to be
counterproductive. The more it threatens those who oppose Chinese policies and rewards
those who support them, the more local identity appears to be strengthened. As one writer
describes it, Hong Kong people have developed less of a political boundary with China since
1997, but more of a psychological boundary. They have accepted Beijing as their sovereign,
but feel strongly that their freedom, rule of law, and independent judiciary separate them.
56
Given that Beijing has no ability to monitor Taiwanese internally, as it does in Hong
Kong, and is intent on taking over Taiwan, its strategy toward Taiwan is even more heavy-
handed than toward Hong Kong. After democratization, when Taiwan began the search
for its identity and opened the debate over unifcation, the initial strategy was simply to
infuence the presidential election in order to infuence Taiwanese identity, especially in
terms of FNS. Beijing made direct threats to pressure the Taiwanese not to vote for pro-
independence candidates by lobbing missiles in the Taiwan Strait in 1995 and 1996, which
appeared to backfre.
progress toward unifcation. While President Ma has focused intensely on warming relations
with China during his frst term, he has repeatedly emphasized that the Taiwanese sense of
national identity is growing and that he could negotiate with China only if there is consensus
among the Taiwanese to do so. His 2011 suggestion of discussions of a peace agreement
drew heavy public criticism, which led him to be more cautious in his second term.
Beijings efforts to apply soft and hard strategies have not increased the prevalence of a
Chinese identity on Taiwan nor elevated the popularity of the KMT, the party more
associated with a Chinese identity. With the consolidation of a Taiwanese identity, both the
KMT and the DPP have moved toward the center on cross-Strait policy. To Beijing, a pro-
Beijing president could be extremely important in closing the identity gap, both broadly and
in terms of support for unifcation. Under Taiwans semi-presidential system, the president
wields unusual power over cross-Strait relations, and the next presidential election will
be in January 2016. While the DPP may have lost the 2012 presidential election because
of the lack of a clear China policy, Taiwanese do not seem pleased with Mas pro-China
attitude, which fails to refect the growing Taiwanese national identity on the island. Since
Ma assumed the presidency in 2008 and initiated liberalization measures with the Chinese
economy, Ma has seen only a drastic decline in his popularity in his second term, hitting
a record low 9 percent.
68
Beijing is very concerned about the outcome of the presidential
election in 2016, fearing that the consolidation of a Taiwanese national identity will lead to
the return of the DPP.
Assessment and Prospects
None of Beijings present strategies is reversing the trend toward local identity in either
Hong Kong or Taiwan. Rewarding businesses, individual leaders, or political parties who
appear sympathetic to Beijing, in the hope that they will thereby adopt a Chinese identity,
seems only to polarize both societies without narrowing the identity gap. At the same time,
mainland tourists pouring into both Hong Kong and Taiwan have created a host of social
problems. The daily problems created by tourists, students, and new immigrants in both
places and the experience Hong Kong and Taiwanese people have when they go to China
have actually intensifed the trends toward separate local identities.
Despite the recent consolidation of a Taiwanese national identity, there remains the risk
that national identity in Taiwan may become polarized once again if those who beneft
economically become more Chinese than those who feel left out, while those who are
disadvantaged by integration become more exclusively Taiwanese. The same dynamic
might be seen in Hong Kong. As the identity gap widens, Chinese leaders are becoming
increasingly frustrated that the economic benefts provided to Taiwanese have not
produced a greater sense of Chinese national identity or made them more committed to
unifcation, and have begun to suggest that their patience is limited. Some Taiwanese, on
the other hand, see ECFA and fnancial liberalization as a self-interested tactic that China
is using to promote unifcation, and fear that China might revoke that policy unless Taiwan
adopts a more accommodative position. This mutual mistrust creates the risk of growing
polarization within both Hong Kong and Taiwan, as well as polarization between each of
them and China.
tycoons normally favorable to Beijing still do not support. The growing dissatisfaction
with the pace of democratization and Beijings greater involvement in the city has certainly
contributed to people feeling more local and less Chinese.
The fve-month public consultative process on the nomination and the election process
started in December 2013. Although Article 45 claims that the ultimate aim is the selection
of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative
nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures, it is rather vague as to
the timing and the details.
61
The Basic Law is even more ambiguous with regard to the timing
and process to implement universal suffrage for the Legislative Council, in which a system
of functional constituencies leads to an overrepresentation of certain sectors. The city is
polarized between pro-Beijing and pro-democracy camps hurling insults and threats at each
other. With every suggestion made by pro-Beijing individuals or groups, especially regarding
the chief executive nomination procedures, there appears to be more support for protests.
With widespread support by students, two professors and a Baptist minister are organizing
Occupy Central, a large-scale sit-in scheduled for July 2014 if there is no acceptable plan
for the 2017 chief executive election. Beijing has denounced the leaders of the sit-in as
enemies of the state, and warned against foreign interference.
62
It has also incensed the
public by announcing that only candidates who love the country and love Hong Kong can
run for chief executive, and not those who confront the central government.
63
Studies have shown that before the handover and as recently as 2007, Hong Kong people did
not fully embrace the liberal values underlying a democratic system. Instead, they seemed
content with a relatively undemocratic governance structure as long as rule of law and a
market economy remained the foundation.
64
However, as identity has evolved, so have values
and views on democracy. In December 2013, polls found that over half the people were
dissatisfed with the pace of development of democracy in Hong Kong.
65
This increasing
impatience with the pace and extent of democratic reform suggests that Hong Kong people
are more committed to democratic values, further separating them from their mainland
Chinese compatriots, and strengthening the development of a separate Hong Kong identity.
Taiwans 2016 Presidental Electon
In late 2013, the pan-democrats in Hong Kong paid a visit to the DPP in Taiwan to exchange
views on democracy and advocate universal suffrage. Beijing was quite alarmed and pro-
Beijing media have described this as the collusion of secessionists.
66
While Hong Kong
simply demanded universal suffrage under the framework established by the Basic Law,
Taiwan is a fully functioning democracy with its own government and military. Further along
than the development of a Hong Kong identity, Taiwanese have adopted a primarily local
identity that has little in common with the national identity that Beijing wants, embracing
civic nationalism in the sense of cherishing democracy, rule of law, and freedom of speech.
67
At the 18
th
Party Congress, the CCP leadership emphasized consolidating political,
economic, cultural, and social foundations in order to create more favorable conditions for
peaceful reunifcation. In October 2013, at the APEC summit, Xi Jinping said to the Taiwan
representative, Vincent Siew, the Taiwan problem should not be handed down to future
generations, the frst time Chinese leaders have signaled their impatience with the lack of
Endnotes
1. Trade and Development Industry, the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, CEPA, http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/index.html; Hong Kongs Information
Services Department, Happy economic returns after 10 years of CEPA, September 2, 2013,
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201309/02/P201309020603.htm.
2. Unless otherwise indicated, all currencies are in USD. Hong Kong Trade Development
Council (HKTDC), Economic and Trade Information on Hong Kong, HKTDC
Research, March 5, 2014, http://hong-kong-economy-research.hktdc.com/business-news/
article/Market-Environment/Economic-and-Trade-Information-on-Hong-Kong/etihk/
en/1/1X000000/1X09OVUL.htm.
3. Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), Brief Summary, Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly,
No. 250 (February 21, 2014), http://www.mac.gov.tw/lp.asp?ctNode=5934&CtUnit=4152&Bas
eDSD=7&mp=3.
4. Hong Kong Tourism Board, Visitor Arrivals Statistics-Dec 2013, http://partnernet.hktb.com/
flemanager/intranet/ViS_Stat/ViS_Stat_E/ViS_E_2013/Tourism_Stat_12_2013_0.pdf; MAC,
Brief Summary.
5. MAC, Summary of Cross-Strait Exchange Statistics, December 2013, http://www.mac.gov.
tw/public/Data/422015502771.pdf.
6. Paola Subacchi and Helena Huang, Taipei in the RMB Offshore Market: Another Piece in the
Jigsaw, International Economics (June 2013), Chatham House Briefng Paper, 11, http://www.
chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/192599.
7. Syaru Shirley Lin, Taiwan and the Advent of a Cross-Strait Financial Industry paper
presented at the Conference on Taiwan Inclusive, The Miller Center of Public Affairs,
University of Virginia, November 15-16, 2013.
8. Jisi Wang, Chinas Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way,
Foreign Affairs (Mar/Apr 2011).
9. Xi Jinping zai shierjie quanguo renda yici huiyi bimuhui shang fabiao zhongyao jianghua,
China Radio International Online, March 17, 2013, http://big5.cri.cn/gate/big5/gb.cri.cn/27824
/2013/03/17/5311s4055400.htm.
10. Profle: Xi Jinping: Pursuing dream for 1.3 billion Chinese, Xinhuanet, March 17, 2013,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-03/17/c_124467411.htm.
11. Danny Gittings, Introduction to the Hong Kong Basic Law (Hong Kong: Hong Kong
12. The Basis for One China, de Facto and de Jure, Peoples Daily, http://english.peopledaily.
com.cn/features/taiwanpaper/taiwanb.html.
13. See the offcial DPP website, 2014 China Policy Review: Summary Report, January 2014,
http://dpptaiwan.blogspot.hk/2014/01/dpp-china-affairs-committee-releases.html.
14. Frank C.S. Liu and Francis L.F. Lee, Country, National, and Pan-national Identifcation in
Taiwan and Hong Kong: Standing Together as Chinese, Asian Survey, Vol. 53, No. 6 (Nov/
Dec 2013): pp. 1123-34.
15. BBC News, Tibetan immolations: Desperation as world looks away, December 2, 2013,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-25195006; Uighurs in China Say Bias Is
Growing, The New York Times, October 7, 2013; Timothy A. Grose, The Xinjiang Class:
Education, Integration, and the Uyghurs, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 1
(March 2010): pp. 97-109.
16. Eric Kit-wai Ma, Desiring Hong Kong, Consuming South China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong
University Press, 2001): pp. 163-86
17. Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme, The University of Hong Kong (POP),
Peoples Ethnic Identity, December 23, 2013, http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/
ethnic/index.html.
18. Hong Kong Transition Project, Hong Kong Baptist University, Constitutional Reform in Hong
Kong: Round Three, June 2013, http://www.hktp.org/list/.
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hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/trust/conocts/index.html.
Sanctions and legislation may deter pro-independence movements on Taiwan, but they are
not preventing protests in Hong Kong or promoting a Chinese identity in either region.
Propaganda promoting national identity and denigrating local identities as a form of false
consciousness is equally ineffective. Deeper social and economic integration is underscoring
differences rather than producing a common identity.
Given these trends, is a common Chinese identity conceivable any longer? An identity of
the sort Beijing prefers seems highly unlikely, given the consolidation of local identities
in both Hong Kong and Taiwan. A more plausible outcome would be the emergence of
mixed identities, wherein residents increasingly see themselves as both Hong Kongers
and Chinese or both Taiwanese and Chinese. Such mixed identities might emerge if the
three governments adopt measures that ensure that economic integration provides more
equitable benefts for all the residents of both regions, and if they seek policy solutions
for the social and economic woes resulting from the deepening integration of Hong Kong
and Taiwan with mainland China. Beijing could help the SAR government to control
immigration and tourism, and alleviate the shortage of affordable housing and reduce the
level of income inequality. In both regions, Beijing could consult with a wider range of
social and political groups, not just the business sector and sympathetic political leaders.
Even if these developments occur, China may fnd it impossible to reduce the level
of local identity among Hong Kong and Taiwanese people because neither incentives
nor coercion are suffcient. This echoes the conclusion Deepa Ollapally reached in her
chapter about India that identity matters, above and beyond material interests. In order to
bridge the gap, China may have to propose a new identity based on common civic value
rather than ethnicity, and develop a formula for governance that guarantees even greater
autonomy to Hong Kong and Taiwan. Similar to Jiyoon Kims fndings about Korean
national identity, this study highlights how civic values are more important than ethnicity
in creating a common Chinese identity, especially among the younger generations.
Unless China embraces the values that people in Hong Kong and Taiwan hold dear,
or at least respects them, neither Taiwanese nor the people of Hong Kong are likely to
become more Chinese. Conversely, by incorporating the civic values that Hong Kong
and Taiwanese people cherish, Beijing might be able to create a new and more inclusive
Chinesenational identity.
38. Syaru Shirley Lin, National Identity, Economic Interdependence, and Taiwans Cross-Strait
Policy: the Case of ECFA, in Richard Weixing Hu, ed., New Dynamics in Cross-Taiwan
Straits Relations: How far can the rapprochement go? (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 31-46.
39. Thung-hong Lin, China Impacts After the ECFA: Cross-Strait Trade, Income Inequality, and
Class Politics in Taiwan, in Wen-shan Yang and Po-san Wan, eds. Facing Challenges,
pp. 287-325.
40. ECFA website, http://www.ecfa.org.tw/RelatedDoc.aspx?pid=3&cid=5&pageid=0; David G.
Brown and Kevin Scott, China-Taiwan Relations: Relative Calm in the Strait, Comparative
Connections, Vol. 15, No. 3 (January 2014).
41. Mau-kuei Chang, Stephen Wing-kai Chiu, and Po-san Wan, Economic Integration and
Political Integration.
42. Thung-hong Lin, China Impact on Government Performance.
43. Thung-hong Lin, China Impacts After the ECFA.
44. David D. Yang, Classing Ethnicity: Class, Ethnicity, and the Mass Politics of Taiwans
Democratic Transition, World Politics, Vol. 59, No. 4 (2007): pp. 503-38.
45. Education Bureau, Legacy of the Virtues of Chinese Culture Fostering National Identity
website, http://www.edb.gov.hk/en/curriculum-development/4-key-tasks/moral-civic/national-
education.html.
46. Kin-man Chong, The Controversies from Civic Education to National Education, Hong Kong
Institute of Asia- Pacifc Studies Occasional Paper No. 227 (2013): p. 3.
47. Kin-man Chong, The Controversies from Civic Education to National Education, p. 13.
48. Fanny W.Y. Fung, State brainwashing perfectly all right, liaison offcial blogs, South China
Morning Post, May 21, 2011.
49. Karita Kan, Lessons in Patriotism, China Perspectives 4 (2012): pp. 64-65.
50. Kin-man Chong, The Controversies from Civic Education to National Education, pp. 16, 19.
51. Hu urges mainland, Taiwan to work together for rejuvenation of Chinese nation, Peoples
Daily, October 9, 2011.
52. Taiwan Affairs Offce, Wang Yi zai disijie haixialuntan dahuishang de jianghua, June 17,
2012, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201206/t20120617_2746389.htm.
53. Yojana Sharma, Opinion surveys land universities in political trouble, University
World News, January 29, 2012, http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.
php?story=2012012715574912.
54. Lau Nai-keung, Dont mix identity politics with identity analysis, please, China Daily, J une
25, 2013; Keung Kai-hing, HK independence attempt a display of political naivet, October
18, 2013, China Daily.
55. Hong Kong Man Seeking to Issue Book About Xi is Held in China, The New York Times,
January 28, 2014.
56. Eric Kit-wai Ma, Desiring Hong Kong, Consuming South China, p. 169.
57. Willy Lam, Li Keqiang Meets Hong Kong, The Wall Street Journal, August 15, 2011.
58. Timothy Ka-ying Wong and Po-san Wan, Hong Kong Citizens Evaluations of the One
Country, Two Systems Practice, pp. 270-83.
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National Peoples Congress On Issues Relating To The Methods For Selecting The Chief
Executive Of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region And For Forming The Legislative
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ersal%20suffrage.
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hk/press/main.php?id=938.
61. Gittings, Introduction to the Hong Kong Basic Law, pp. 107-14 and p. 324.
20. Timothy Ka-ying Wong and Po-san Wan, Hong Kong Citizens Evaluations of the One
Country, Two Systems Practice: Assessing the Role of Political Support for China, in Hsin-
huang Michael Hsiao and Cheng-yi Lin, eds., The Rise of China (London: Routledge, 2009):
pp. 27083.
21. Telephone Survey Research Laboratory, Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacifc Studies, Chinese
University of Hong Kong (HKIAPS), June 8-13, 2013, http://app3.rthk.org.hk/press/upload_
media/13724775600.pdf.
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Distribution, Trends in Core Political Attitudes Among Taiwanese, June 2013, http://esc.nccu.
edu.tw/english/modules/tinyd2/index.php?id=6.
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Chow, ed., National Identity and Economic Interest: Taiwans Competing Options and Their
Implications for Regional Stability (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012): pp. 187-202.
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and Hong Kong, paper prepared for Taiwanese Sociological Association Annual Meeting at
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Rigger 2006, Taiwans Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics and Taiwan Nationalism,
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de bianzheng: Taigang liangdi de bijiao yanjiu, paper prepared for Taiwanese Sociological
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p. 10.
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28. ESC, Important Political Attitude Trend Distribution.
29. Center for Survey Research, Academia Sinica, Taiwan Social Change Survey. All past surveys
can be found in the 2010 report, http://survey.sinica.edu.tw/ or https://srda.sinica.edu.tw/group/
sciitem/1/1363.
30. Waiting times at Hong Kong theme parks rise as tourism increases, South China Morning
Post, January 26, 2014.
31. Victor W.T. Zheng and Po-san Wan, The Individual Visit Scheme: A Decades Review:
Exploring the Course and Evolution of Integration between Hong Kong and the Mainland,
Hong Kong Institute of Asia- Pacifc Studies Occasional Paper No. 226 (2013). [In English/
Chinese]
32. Hong Kong Squirms in the shadow of China, its overpowering big brother, The Washington
Post, December 10, 2013.
33. Victor W.T. Zheng and Po-san Wan, The Individual Visit Scheme, p. 51.
34. Shih-Wen Chen, Civilised Tourism, The China Story, Australian Centreon Chinain the
World, October 18, 2013, http://www.thechinastory.org/yearbooks/yearbook-2013/forum-
dreams-and-power/civilised-tourism/; Chinese tourists damage historical sites: witnesses,
Taipei Times, October 12, 2013.
35. Tipping point: Hong Kongs alarming income inequality, HKBU Horizons, Issue 2 (2012-13),
http://cpro.hkbu.edu.hk/online_pub/nh_1213_2/nh1213_2_p12-17.pdf.
36. Kevin T.W. Wong and Jackson K.H. Yeh, Perceived Income Inequality and Its Political
Consequences in Hong Kong and Taiwan from 2003 to 2009, in Wen-shan Yang and Po-san
Wan, eds., Facing Challenges: A Comparison of Taiwan and Hong Kong (Taipei: Institute of
Sociology, Academia Sinica, 2013): pp. 237-66.
37. POP, Peoples Satisfaction with HKSARGs Handling of its Relation with the Central
Government, January 2, 2014, http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/sargperf/chirelation/
index.html.
62. Hong Kong activists test Chinas red lines over election with Occupy Central campaign, The
Washington Post, November 29, 2013.
63. Opponents of Beijing ineligible to be CE: top Chinese Offcial, South China Morning Post,
March 24, 2013.
64. Ma Ngok and Kin-man Chan, The State of Democratic Governance in Hong Kong, paper
presented at the 2007 Asian Barometer Conference, June 20-21, 2008 in Taipei; Hsin-chi
Kuan and Siu-kai Lau The Partial Vision of Democracy in Hong Kong: A Survey of Popular
Opinion. The China Journal, Vol. 34 (1995): pp. 239-64.
65. POP, Peoples Satisfaction with HKSARGs Pace of Democratic Development, January 2,
2014, http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/sargperf/demo/index.html.
66. Chan Wai-keung, Occupy campaigns oligarchic leadership, China Daily, October 31, 2013.
67. Malte Philipp Kaeding, Identity formation in Taiwan and Hong Kong: how much difference, how
many similarities, in Gunter Schubert and Jens Damm, eds., Taiwanese Identity in the Twenty-frst
Century: domestic, regional and global perspective (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 270.
68. Is Mas Taiwan presidency going down the drain, or can complaints lead to repairs?
South China Morning Post, January 14, 2014; Ma-Xi Meeting and National Identity
Survey, TVBS Poll Center, October 24-28, 2013, http://home.tvbs.com.tw/static/FILE_DB/
PCH/201311/20131106112520608.pdf.
Identty and Strategy in
Indias Asia-Pacifc Policy
Deepa M. Ollapally
Ollapally: Identty and Strategy in Indias Asia-Pacifc Policy | 137 136 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
policy and what values should be promoted. Indeed, Indias foreign policy has been described
by some as a moralistic running commentary.
4
The foreign policy consensus forged by the
frst prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, laid the foundation for such an approach, though since
the end of the Cold War, analysts have argued about whether his orientations were really along
idealpolitik lines.
The debate on Nehru comes down to whether Indian foreign policy has been realist or
idealist. This debate is not entirely about the past: many who argue that Indias orientation
has been realist are also proposing that it should adopt a more realistic and pragmatic strategy.
5

Indeed, their adumbration of the realist strands in Indias traditional approach, especially those
in Nehrus foreign policy, usually appears as a prelude to their advocacy of a much more power-
oriented stance for contemporary India. K. Subrahmanyam, considered an early leading Indian
realist strategist, has characterized Nehru as one of the most pragmatic and realist politicians.
6

The essence of the revisionist argument is that Indian foreign policy has been suffused with
unnecessary moralism which, according to these critics, is mistakenly traced back to Nehruvian
ideals.
7
By showing that Nehru was much more realist than he is generally given credit for, these
advocates seek to establish a case for greater realism in contemporary policy.
8
Some revisionists
have even argued that Gandhi was a realist.
9
The hallmark of Nehrus thinking was its eclectic
and expansive nature, thus leaving ample room for interpretation from different sides. With the
collapse of the Nehruvian consensus, foreign policy has become much more contested.
Divergent Domestic Foreign
Policy Conceptions
I have distinguished four separate schools to capture the various strands of current foreign policy
discourse and discussed them in detail: nationalists, great power realists, liberal globalists, and
leftists.
10
The frst group can be further broken down into soft, hard, and standard nationalists.
Table 1. Indian Foreign Policy Perspectves
Major Schools of Thought Goals & Attudes Roots
NATIONALISTS
Standard Natonalists
(1947-)
Aim for developed
country status
Pursue balanced growth
Nehruvianism with
pragmatst
elements
Sof Natonalists
(1947-)
No to idea of Great Power
Domestc consolidaton frst
South-South solidarity
Sof Nehruvianism
Gandhian
Indian civilizaton
Socialist theory
Hard Natonalists
(Post 1998)
Achieve global power
India First
Tight internal security
Kautlya (ancient Indias
Machiavelli)
Selectve Realist theory
Hindu natonalism
GREAT POWER REALISTS
(POST 1998)
Become global player Kautlya
Realist theory
LIBERAL GLOBALISTS
(POST 1991)
Aim for global Economic theory
LEFTISTS (1947-) Economic power Marxist theory
The major international structural changes over the last 25 yearsthe end of the Cold War
and rapid ascent of Chinahave direct impact on Indias national interests. The dominant
strategic theory of realism would predict that given the emergence of China as a great power
in the Asia-Pacifc, and the loss of its erstwhile partner, the Soviet Union, India would seek to
bolster its power through external or internal balancing. Given its asymmetrical power with
China, the unresolved border dispute, and the history of the 1962 war, realist logic sees India
and the United States as natural partners against a common threat from the rising power of
China. But at the end of the Cold War, India also faced an economic crisis that fundamentally
changed the outlook toward liberalization, which over time has pushed India closer to China,
as well as to the United States. Amidst these strategic and economic shifts, the question that
this chapter seeks to answer is the extent to which Indian foreign policy has been responsive
to realist expectations. The chapter concludes that realist explanations fall short on a range
of Indian foreign policy issues related to the United States and China, shortcomings that are
best understood by an examination of Indias national identity through its changing domestic
foreign policy discourse.
1
I begin by giving a brief overview of Indias strategic discourse, and the new identity debates
that are being spawned over Indian foreign policy as a rising power. I then turn to Indian
foreign policy toward the United States and China and lay out what realist expectations
would be. To assess the validity of the realist approach, I consider evidence from two specifc
issues that favor the realist approach in predicting Indian policy: reactions to the U.S. pivot or
rebalance; and reactions to a huge trade defcit with China. I view these two issues as critical
to the formulation of Indias Asia-Pacifc strategy. I then identify gaps in realist explanations
and bring in identity factors as revealed in Indias domestic discourse that, I argue, address
these gaps. In conclusion, I sketch out how domestic contestation over Indias foreign policy
interests may lead to several possible scenarios for Indias strategy toward the Asia-Pacifc.
Ambivalence in Strategic Purpose
Unlike other major powers, India does not have a well-articulated grand strategy or doctrine to
guide its foreign policy. Its rise has not been accompanied by White Papers, prime ministerial
doctrines, or any other clear and open statements by the government about what the objectives
are for Indias global role. This is not surprisingoffcial India rarely spells out its long-term
vision with discrete steps to be taken to achieve its goals. At the same time, Indias behavior on
the world stage leaves its policy preferences open and at times inconsistent and ambivalent: for
example, labeling itself a developing country at WTO negotiations while demanding a seat in
the exclusive U.N. Security Council as a permanent member; exhorting its pluralist democracy
model but unwilling to incorporate this value into its foreign policy; and wearing the mantle
of Asian leadership without offering any new big ideas or committing resources to that end.
The lack of purposive strategic thinking in Indian foreign policy has long been observed, and
often critiqued.
2
As Indias profle rises, the question of just what kind of power India wants
to be on the regional and global scenes is increasingly being questioned at home and abroad,
with pressure to defne its vision more clearly and defnitively. The push is to go beyond Indias
current position as an ambiguous rising power.
3
At the same time, Indian policymakers and
commentators have written extensively about what principles should drive Indian foreign
The global and regional balance of power and political competition between the United
States and China on the one hand, and India and China on the other, offer strong logic
for such a conclusion. Since the early 2000s, there has certainly been no dearth of such
thinking, especially from the American side beginning most publicly with statements from
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice but continuing uninterruptedly through to
the present. There has been some reciprocal thinking along these lines from India as well.
Behind such thinking is the concern about Chinas military and economic rise threatening
American supremacy in the Asia-Pacifc; and for India, resulting in the emergence of an
Asia that is China-centric and worse, China-controlled. At a bilateral level, the border
dispute is more fodder for realist arguments. Given the asymmetry of power in Chinas
favor vis--vis India, the expectation is that India would inexorably draw closer to the
United States on strategic matters, especially in the Asian context. Thus, the pivot would
elicit a strong response from India. Conversely, India would be expected to take a hard-
lineapproach in relations with China.
As a further test of realism in Indian foreign policy in Asia, Indias economic relations
with China, specifcally its rapidly growing trade defcit, is a good case for investigation.
Most realists would, more or less, ignore economic variables, seeing them as secondary
with no independent causal value for strategic decisions. However, proponents of realism
would, no doubt, adhere to economist Albert Hirschmans view that open trade and intensive
economic interdependence can negatively affect state security if it gives rise to relatively
big imbalances (such as trade defcits) which can then have undue infuence on political
relations.
14
The assumption for Indias relations with China is that India would not give
China any additional leverage through their economic interactions and leave itself even more
vulnerable to greater Chinese political infuence. An exploding trade imbalance in Chinas
favor since 2008 gives us the opportunity to assess Indias response in this connection. We
would expect India to take forceful action, in the economic and political spheres, to counter
this negative trend through economic retaliation, even trade wars of sorts. We would also
expect political relations to perceptibly decline as a result of the defcits.
Americas Rebalance and Indias Reactions
When U.S. policy was rolled out in 2011-12, the emphasis was on military initiatives in the
region. The Obama administration explicitly identifed the broad Asia-Pacifc region, from
India to New Zealand and the Pacifc Islands to northern Japan and the Korean Peninsula as
a geostrategic priority.

It gave India exceptional importance: in the 2012 defense guidelines
laying out the rebalance, India was the only country singled out as a strategic partner
by name while allied countries were simply grouped together under existing alliances.
According to the report, The United States is investing in a long-term strategic partnership
with India to support its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of
security in the broader Indian Ocean region.
15
There is no doubt that the United States
counted on India to be among the most receptive to this shift. Traditional alliances along with
the budding partnership with India would be used to offset Chinas rising military power and
assertiveness.
16
Thus, expectations were high in the Pentagon that India would be eager to
engage with the United States in this initiative.
17
These aggregations might not do justice to all of the opinions available and some viewpoints
might not fully ft these labels, just as there might be spillovers between the views in these
different strands. But they do represent a spectrum along which we can assess impact on
policy formulations. The thinking of these three schools may be briefy summarized. The
proponents of the realist school of thought tend to emphasize the following set of ideas.
First, they stress the importance of self-strengthening and self-reliance in the international
arena. According to them, the international system is anarchic; a country cannot rely on
international institutions for protection. They place a great deal of importance on the role
of great powers as actors in the global system and privilege hard power over ideology and
economics. Nationalists emphasize self-reliance and self-strengthening too. However, they
may embrace these goals not only as a means to the end of meeting foreign threats, but
also as an end in itself. In the Indian context, the soft nationalists are more inward looking
and prioritize domestic consolidation and economic development, whereas hard nationalists
are more global and security oriented through military means. Being nationalists, these
groups tend to be the most driven by ideological and value based arguments. The group
that I term standard-nationalists, occupies a spot between the soft nationalists and great
power realistsa centrist outlook probably best suited in many ways to ruling over the
huge diversity that comprises India. Proponents of the liberal-globalist school of thought
tend to favor international political and/or economic integration, stressing economic means
and institutional goals. They tend to argue for free trade and fewer restrictions on capital
movement. Globalists are relatively skeptical about military power as a tool of statecraft.
11
Although it is diffcult to assign relative weight to these perspectives, my interpretation is
that hard nationalists and leftists are less infuential than the other perspectives. However,
if Indian voters reject the ruling Congress Party in favor of the opposition Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP), a hard nationalist agenda will gain much greater traction. The BJPs hard
nationalism emphasizes Indian identity in exclusivist, Hindu religious terms. This could
very well have both internal and external repercussionson Indias pluralist democracy,
as well as on relations with neighboring Pakistan and Bangladesh. More broadly, the
idea of Indian civilizational supremacy forms a signifcant part of the BJPs narrative on
Indias rise and fall, and the notion of autonomy of action will be even more important.
12

I also see that a pragmatist strain, mostly made up of great power realists and liberal
globalists, has gained strength over the last two decades though it is not yet dominant.
13

When aligned with standard nationalists, this group occupies a strong middle ground.
Equally true is that the nationalist strain in general is proving to be much more enduring
than might have been envisioned.
Indias Relations with the U.S. and China:
Expectations from Realism
Realism gives little weight to domestic sources of foreign policy and has long been critiqued
in this regard. For realism, consideration of domestic debates would be exogenous to how
a country behaves in the international system. All you need to determine the direction of a
countrys foreign policy (if not specifc policies) is the strategic conditions a state faces. On
Indo-U.S. relations, from a conventional realist outlook, an almost foregone conclusion is
that India and the United States would fnd common strategic cause in the current period.
statecraft, would allow themselves to remain the objects of someone elses policy, no matter
how elegantly expressed? I think not. Instead, what is suggested is a real concert of Asian
powers, including the USA which has a major maritime presence and interests in Asia, to
deal with issues of maritime security in all of Asias oceans.
22
This push for a multipolar
Asia fts in well with Chinas vision, not the U.S. one.
Even the media which tends to have a strong nationalistic bent and is known for anti-China
rhetoric did not fully warm to the idea of India playing a role in Americas pivot. The
infuential Hindustan Times editorial cautioned that India is not yet big enough to be treated
as a viable balancing partner by smaller countries in the regionthe game is about trying
to preserve suffcient autonomy of action for other Asian countries that they can resist when
Beijing lapses into aggressive or bullying behavior. Others noted that the U.S. long-term
presence in Asia could not be taken for granted and that India should strengthen its own
military capability to play a role in regional stability.
23
The director-general of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), the most
infuential government funded foreign policy think tank in India and the forum where
Panetta delivered his speech, hardly found the rebalancing attractive. As he put it, The U.S.
will support Indias riseHowever, Indian planners would be cautious about an open U.S.
embrace as India does not want to be drawn into a U.S. containment policy, which is how
China perceives U.S. rebalancing.
24
It is clear that India does not want to become involved
in any confict not of its choosing; moreover, it is loathe to appear to be linked to U.S.
containment strategy in any way. Arun Sahgal, senior retired army offcer, writing soon
after Panettas speech, fnds that many would like India to follow an independent course in
concert with its concept of strategic autonomy. He adds, the challenge for India is how to
leverage its policy of engaging China with that of close strategic cooperation with the U.S.
while maintaining its strategic autonomy.
25
Instead of viewing American overtures as a strategic opportunity, India became consumed
with a debate about how the U.S. vision threatened its strategic autonomy. The reluctance
and even aversion to embracing the rebalance strategy in any meaningful way, thus, needs
further explanation.
Trade Deficit with China and
Indias Reactions
A second test for realism versus national identity is the response to a trade defcit with China.
It is diffcult not to be impressed by the exponential growth of Indias trade with China since
the late 1990s. The two resumed trade in 1978 (halted after the 1962 war), signing the Most
Favored Nation Agreement in 1984.
26
Trade did not take off until much later, but when it did,
it did so in stunning fashion. From a negligible $260 million as late as 1991, it increased to
$1.1 billion by 2003 and then exploded to $51.8 in 2008, with China overtaking the United
States as Indias largest trading partner in goods.
27
Almost as stunning is the huge growth in
Indias trade defcit with China. It was more than $27 billion in 2011 and in 2012 it continued
to rise to $29 billion. The defcit is close to $30 billion for 2013, despite a sharp decline
in trade. While a combination of factors such as a ban on iron ore mining in India (due to
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta made his frst trip to India in July 2012 as part of an
Asian tour to defne the new strategy. During two days of high-level visits, including meeting
with his counterpart A.K. Antony and Prime Minister Singh, Panetta described the role he
visualized for India: We will expand our military partnerships and our presence in the arc
extending from the Western Pacifc and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South
Asia. Defense cooperation with India is a linchpin in this strategy. India is one of the largest
and most dynamic countries in the region and the world, with one of the most capable
militariesIn particular, I believe our relationship can and should become more strategic,
more practical and more collaborative.
18
If realist sentiment was controlling, such a strong endorsement of U.S.-India defense ties
at the level of the secretary of defense should have received a warm welcome. Instead,
the Indian Defence Ministrys response to Panettas description of India as a linchpin
was practically a snub. Instead of welcoming his remarks as a historic gesture and
unprecedented opportunity for India, the Ministry quickly released a short statement that
Antony emphasized the need to strengthen the multilateral security architecture in the
Asia-Pacifc and to move at a pace comfortable to all countries concerned.
19
In a nod to
the United States, the statement also conveyed that India supports unhindered freedom of
navigation in international waters, but it insisted that it is desirable that contentious
bilateral issues be settled by the two nations themselves. The statement came just one day
after Beijing relayed its displeasure at the U.S. announcement, terming the prominence
given to the strengthening of military deployment and alliances as untimely.
20
This
outcome came despite the fact that Prime Minister Singh himself was seen as having moved
closer and closer to U.S. positions over his tenure.
Offcial Indian policy sentiments seemed to remain steadfast even just one month after the
start of the Sino-Japanese East China Sea confrontation. Indias ambassador to the United
States delivered a lecture at Brown University on Americas Asian Pivot, worth quoting
at length.
21
Speaking about Indias own history with the Asia-Pacifc, she said In our view,
more than geopolitical or geo-economic, this was a geo-civilizational paradigm--creative
space with revolving doors where civilizations coalesced and did not clash...We see that
as a rough guide to our future. On the pivot and Indias role, she clarifes that Many
observers are tempted to view the India-U.S. engagement in this region as directed at China.
I do not believe that such a construct is valid or sustainable On the desirability of what
regional analysts call an Asian concert of powers, she notes, This would require mutual
accommodation between the countries concerned. This is an inclusive balancing where
the U.S. simultaneously engages all the regional powers like China, India, Japan and Russia
working to see a multipolar order that reduces the risk of military confrontation. Rao was
effectively challenging the implicit, if not explicit, goal of the pivot.
Former Foreign Secretary and current National Security Advisor Shiv Shankar Menon also
weighed in on the idea of an Asian concert of powers and directly challenged the notion
of the United States as a sea-based balancer in the Indian Ocean. He asked pointedly:
Which major power would not like to play the role of the balancer, given the chance? For
a superpower that is refocusing on Asia but fnding the landscape considerably changed
while she was preoccupied with Iraq and Afghanistan, this would naturally be an attractive
option. But is it likely that two emerging states like India and China, with old traditions of
and fnancial services, it is also found among a cross section of businesses as well as among
sections of the strategic elite, political leadership, and even bureaucrats.
35
Overall, Indias reactions to the rebalance and trade defcit are not consistent with realist
expectations. India essentially spurned what realists would see as a strategic opportunity with
the United States rebalance, and meanwhile, took a much more relaxed view of what realists
(and more mercantilist economists) would see as a threat from the highly skewed trade
defcit with China. How might we explain these results? I suggest that we need to go beyond
strategic analysis to Indian national identity. By looking at the domestic identity discourse, we
gain a deeper understanding of the factors that drive India to unexpected policy orientations on
the United States and China, and in particular why realist propositions are weak in these cases.
Indias Identity Discourse and Impact
on U.S. and China Relations
Impact on Policy Towards the U.S.
The underlying dispute between the various schools of thought relates to Indias U.S. policy.
Indeed, it is diffcult not to suspect that all the other differences in perspective are subsumed
under this key issue: in other words, each of these perspectives appear to defne their position
on other issues on thebasis of wherethey think the United States stands on each issue.
36
Thus,
it is not surprising that the rebalance issue did not catch on as the United States expected,
but what explains Indias ambivalence, if not, antipathy? I suggest that it has little to do with
structural variables and much more to do with Indias dominant ideas, those ingrained in
public discourse and bureaucratic processes that make them survive. The most important of
these or key value in Indian foreign policy is the concept of autonomy in the global arena,
born out of a particular combination of colonial trauma and perceived civilizational status.
This value is most strongly ingrained in nationalist schools of thought, but it fnds some
resonance practically across the spectrum of domestic discourse. To the extent that an appeal
is made to what conforms to an established national identity, policy is not likely to be based
purely on economic or strategic interests. Entrenched assumptions about national identity
come with a longstanding view that it is the United States that poses a special danger of
undermining that identity.
37
The most serious opposition to closer U.S.-India relations comes, understandably, from
the leftists, but there is also signifcant opposition from both soft and hard nationalists.
Soft nationalists, like the left, oppose closer U.S. ties on ideological grounds.
38
For hard
nationalists, the United States is seen as a constraint on Indian power, which seeks to direct
Indian foreign policy towards U.S. rather than Indian interests.
39
Support for a closer, working
U.S. relationship comes mostly from great power realists and liberal globalists. The former,
pragmatic in foreign policy orientation, see closer U.S. ties as necessary for Indias rise.
40

The latter, interested in economic liberalization and trade for growth and dismissive of the
ideological concerns of both the left and the right, also see a U.S. partnership as necessary
for economic development.
41
If we look closely at the discourse surrounding the rebalance, we see a fairly consistent
reference to the autonomy value, suggesting that it remains at the top in the hierarchy of
corruption scandals) coupled with the global slowdown contributed to this outcome, the
ambitious goal of reaching $100 million by 2015 is elusive. During this same time period,
Chinas trade with the rest of Asia as well as with its major western trading partners picked
up, while trade with India remained in a slump.
28
Trade experts project that if an FTA were
executed between India and China to lift trade (something China has sought), the latter
will gain signifcantly more. Without a major improvement in the competitiveness of Indian
goods, any mutual reduction in tariffs by China and India would result in a much higher level
of increase in Chinese exports to India than Indian exports to China.
29
Other avenues for addressing the trade imbalance also face challenges. Indian leaders
have argued that the defcit is partly due to restricted market access in China. Two sectors
where India is viewed as competitive globallyinformation technology (IT) services and
pharmaceuticalshave not made much dent in the Chinese market.
30
Both are affected by
non-tariff trade barriers on Chinas part such as prolonged approval times for Indian drugs,
and in IT, burdensome security clearances. Stepped up Chinese FDI in India could allay
the huge trade imbalance, and this seems to be the latest measure that the two countries are
discussing. China has suggested the creation of a Chinese Industrial Park in India where
companies could operate together. China ranks 31
st
in terms of FDI investments into India,
which is seen as unsatisfactory given the trade volume. At the same time, Chinese entry
into certain sectors in India is also viewed as sensitive in political termsespecially the
telecommunications area. There is also resistance to giving Chinese frms a large physical
presence in India due to longstanding political mistrust. Overall economic relations are
also skewed in Chinas favor. In 2012, India was Chinas 15
th
largest trading partner with a
share of 1.72 percent, 7
th
largest export destination, and 19
th
among the countries exporting,
comprising 1.1 percent of total Chinese imports.
31
In the same year, China was Indias 2
nd

largest trading partner with a share of 8.31 percent, 4
th
largest export destination, and 1
st

among the countries exporting to India, comprising 8.32 percent of total Indian imports.
32
When we turn to Indias responses to this negative state of affairs, we fnd a mixed picture.
Most notably, government leadership consistently worked to keep the political fallout from
the trade defcit contained. In 2009, under questioning from parliamentarians on relations as
the swelling defcit drew high media attention, Singh tried to quell rising fears by putting it in
a broader context: I should say that China is our strategic partner. We have a multi-faceted
relationship with China. There is enough space I have said so often for both China and
India to develop and contribute to global peace, stability and prosperity. We do not see our
relations with China in antagonistic terms. We have a large trading relationship, we consult
each other on global issues, whether in the G-20 process on climate change or terrorism, and
we share a common commitment to maintain peace and tranquility on our border.
33
Even
with the downturn in trade during 2012 and 2013, Singh remained bullish on deepening
economic ties with China.
34
In this effort, an energetic partner for the government is Indian industryfrom business
associations to important companies that were global market leaders. The dominant view
seems to be that economic relations with China, including the trade defcit, need to be
managed rather than necessitating drastic measures which could stimulate greater trade
confict. While this is especially true in the case of business sectors that stand to gain from
increased economic activity with China such as information technology, pharmaceuticals,
Communist Party of India.
46
A more nuanced notion of China as an opportunity rather
than just a threat is discernible.
The Indian business opinion towards China seems to have remained rather consistently
favorable even with the emergence of the large trade defcits since 2008 and the ups and
down in political relations.
47
Many of the business leaders I interviewed hold this view,
and believe that there is a positive relationship between economic interaction and political
relations. As a general point, this belief was held even by heads of businesses that stood
to lose from Chinese competition. A representative view was that If theres a signifcant
amount of trade interdependence, it makes them less inclined or less able to have military
confict. This is especially good for India, being the weaker country. Not all saw this direct
correlation, but nearly all believe that economic relations between India and China will not
be negatively affected even if political relations go sour. Short of war, they were confdent
that economic ties would not be severely disrupted. Most refect a liberal-globalist outlook.
The most important factor for many business leaders is to have continuing leadership on
both sides who understand that countries cannot grow without putting economics ahead of
politics. As of now, the standard nationalists that run India seem to buy into this logic.
On the trade defcit, the liberal globalist counter-argument to the nationalist and realist views
is that a major reason for the defcit is internal to India: the lack of a strong manufacturing
base. They urge fast-track development of manufacturing and note that as China moves
up the value chain, Indian businesses can enter these vacated spaces. So it is up to India
to correct the course, not China or any other country. They also point out that India too is
generally gaining from trade: for example, the critical telecommunication products are cheap
due to Chinese cost effciencies; likewise with Chinese power plants. As one industry expert
said, China is subsidizing the Indian consumer. Other opinion shapers argue that while
the pattern of trade may be skewed, Chinese importsmachinery, chemicals, steel, and
electronic goodsplay an important role in Indias own industrialization process. Simply
put, a part of Indias industrialization and infrastructure development becomes viable only
if it can piggyback on the price competitiveness of Chinese industry.
48
Others, including
key national security offcials, say that the trade defcit with China could work the other way
around: China becomes export dependent, so India gains leverage.
Policy commentators and politicians, however, have shown susceptibility to nationalist and
realist sentiments on the trade imbalance. Parliamentary debates reveal rising concern beyond
just economics. Against this development, what is notable is the steady policy orientation
and commitment of the ruling Congress government to continue uninterrupted relations with
China along liberal globalist lines. In this effort, an energetic partner was Indian industry
from business associations to important companies that were global market leaders. The
industry associations in particular have emerged as key domestic actors since the mid-2000s
in helping to shape Indian government strategies. Their view is that India needs to manage
relations by trying to raise Chinese stakes in India, a strategy with which the ruling elite
seems to agree.
Nationalist and realist opinion in India envisions the widening trade gap in Chinas favor as
giving the Chinese yet another pressure point over India. In their view, Chinas economic
advantage is providing additional leverage in the political spherean arena where there
foreign policy drivers. And it seems to cut across a wide swathe of perspectives, leaving the
Indian realists who would like New Delhi to embrace the United States and the rebalance,
rather isolated.
Thus, there is little likelihood that the dispute over partnering with the United States will
end any time soon. But it should be noted that whatever the differences in the public debate,
Indian governments since the end of the Cold War have consistently sought closer relations
with the United States. At the same time, no group apart from the great power realists seems
inclined toward any serious military partnership with the United States. Thus, the notion of
India being amenable to any form of military burden sharing implied in the U.S. strategy
of rebalance, does not appear to have any prospect of realization.
Impact on Policy Towards China
In contrast to Indias relations with the United States, identity factors, arguably, played
a role in bridging the gap between India and China. Despite the strategic competition
between them, there are areas of convergence at the global and even regional levels in
their worldviews. Most importantly, these include elements that happen to coincide with
Indias core national identityforemost among them strategic autonomy and commitment
to sovereignty. These are based on long historical experiences of Western domination,
giving rise to what Manjari Miller has called a post imperial ideology for both India and
China. She declares that: the study of international relations is radically incomplete
if it fails to systematically account for colonialism and its legacy[and] states that have
undergone the traumatic transformative historical event of extractive colonialism maintain
an emphasis on victimhood and entitlement that dominates their decision calculus even
today.
42
Beyond the bilateral level, the two countries are key members in BRICS;
they, together with Russia, interact in the Trilateral Summits; and they tend to uphold
mechanisms promoting multipolarity and tend to be sovereignty hawks on the global stage.
India and China also share what might be called a developing country identity that
draws them together, especially on global economic issues.
43
One way in which Deng
Xiaoping set China on the path of sustained economic liberalization and engagement from
1978 onwards was to tie Chinese nationalism to the pursuit of wealth and commercial
achievement.
44
India too is increasingly incorporating the objective of achieving developed
country status in its global image makingthe standard nationalists, great power realists,
and liberal globalists all share this vision, which predisposes India to be receptive to
economic interdependence beyond purely functional reasons.
Political leaders from the different parties in India have been supportive of economic
initiatives toward China, even when the idea of deepening economic ties was frst raised
in the early 2000s. As far back as 2003 when Sino-Indian relations were being renewed
after the dip following Indias nuclear test, it was not hard to fnd members of parliament
urging more trade and economic ties with China.
45
There was no shortage of Congress
Party members praising the efforts of its rival ruling party Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
to step up economic engagement with China. Later under the Congress regime, it was
possible to fnd support for economic engagement with China from not only BJP and
Congress, but other regional parties as diverse as the Hindu nationalist Shiv Sena to the
Endnotes
1. The author gratefully acknowledges support from the Carnegie Corporation of NY and
MacArthur Foundation for research related to this work.
2. The frst commentator to argue forcefully that India lacked a strategic culture was the American
author George Tanham, leading to a brief burst of writings by Indian analysts, many pointing
to Indias discursive diplomacy versus western legalistic approaches, that outsiders did not
grasp. This initiative has not produced much enduring work. George Tanham, India Strategic
Thought: An Interpretive Essay (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1992). A good
compendium of writings on Indias strategic culture is Kanti Bajapi and Amitabh Matoo, eds.,
Securing India: Strategic Thought and Practice (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1996). See
also Deepa Ollapally, Indias Strategic Doctrine and Practice, in Raju G.C. Thomas and Amit
Gupta, eds., Indias Nuclear Security (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
3. For an extended discussion, see Deepa Ollapally and Rajesh Rajagopalan, India: Foreign
Policy Perspectives of an Ambiguous Power, in Henry R. Nau and Deepa M. Ollapally, eds.,
Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran,
Japan, and Russia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012): pp. 73-75. For internal
pressure to defne its strategic vision, see Satish Kumar, ed., Indias National Security Annual
Review 2010 (New Delhi: Routledge, 2011): p. 1.
4. D. Vasudevan, Tharoor Criticises Nehrus Moralistic Foreign Policy, DNA: Daily News and
Analysis, January 10, 2010, http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_tharoor-criticises-nehru-s-
moralistic-foreign-policy_1332933.
5. The best case is made by C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of Indias New
Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Viking, 2003).
6. Shekhar Gupta, Obama does not have much of an option but to make India its leading
partner (Interview with K. Subrahmanyam) Indian Express, October 26, 2010, http://www.
expressindia.com/latest-news/Obama-does-not-have-much-of-an-option-but-to-make-India-its-
leading-partner/702549/.
7. Deepa Ollapally and Rajesh Rajagopalan, The Pragmatic Challenge to Indian Foreign Policy,
The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Spring 2011): pp. 145-62.
8. C. Raja Mohan, Nehrus World View: More History And Less Politics Please, Indian
Express, January 11, 2010, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/nehrus-world-view-more-
history-and-less-politics-please/565669/0.
9. K. Subrahmanyam, Arms and the Mahatma: No Place for Pacifsm in Security, The Times of
India, May 8, 1997, as reproduced at http://www.hvk.org/articles/0597/0138.html.
10. Deepa Ollapally and Rajesh Rajagopalan, India. For previous attempts at such taxonomy, see
Kanti Bajpai, Indian Strategic Culture and the Problem of Pakistan, in Swarna Rajagopal,
ed., Security and South Asia: Ideas, Institutions and Initiatives (New Delhi: Routledge, 2006).
11. Nikola Mirilovic and Deepa Ollapally, Realists, Nationalists, Globalists and the Nature of
Contemporary Rising Powers, in Henry R. Nau and Deepa M. Ollapally, eds., Worldviews of
Aspiring Powers, pp. 211-15.
12. The BJPs election manifesto states, What is needed is to take lessons from history, recognize
the vitality and resilience of India, the power of its world-view and utilize its strength, which
drove it to glorious heights and analyse its weakness, which led to this abysmal fall. Bharatiya
Janata Party, Election Manifesto 2014, p. 2
13. Deepa Ollapally and Rajesh Rajagopalan, The Pragmatic Challenge to Indian Foreign Policy,
14. Albert O. Hirchman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1980).
15. US Department of Defense, Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21
st
Century
Defense, January 2012, p. 2.
16. See for example, The Washington Post, June 1, 2012.
17. I have discussed Indias response to the American rebalance elsewhere. See Indias Evolving
National Identity Contestation: What Reactions to the Pivot Tell Us, The Asan Forum, Vol.
2, No. 1 (January 25, 2014).
are still serious unresolved issues. So far, however, the center of gravity is on the liberal-
globalist side of opinion, especially given the continuing support of the standard nationalist
government and the tacit support from some great power realists and soft nationalists for
continuing to engage China.
Conclusion
Despite conditions in the U.S. rebalance and Chinas trade surplus favorable for a realist
response from India, actual policies did not match expectations. Realist expectations fell short
especially on the rebalance, but they were also weak on reactions to the defcit. What I would
term as Indias under-performance vis--vis the United States and over-performance
vis--vis China, cannot be adequately explained by realism. Rather, as domestic discourse
shows, Indias policy toward the Asia-Pacifc, exemplifed in the two key issues of the
rebalance (military driven) and trade defcit (economic), is imbued with identity conceptions
that militate against purely realist logic. What might this portend for Indias future strategy
towards the Asia-Pacifc region? I offer two possible scenarios apart from the status quo if
Indias chief foreign policy identity variablestrategic autonomyis the main driver.
If economic factors become more entrenched in Indias identity as seems to be occurring
now, it could give rise to a much more self-conscious economic identity that parallels Chinas
worldview. This would allow India to build up the idea of India as a global economic power,
which liberal globalists and standard nationalists desire. But it would also go some distance
to meet nationalist and realist goals of autonomy, if economics is viewed as a strategic
asset. Given the critical role of China in Indias current economic equation and what we can
gather from one of the most contentious economic issues with Chinathe trade defcitas
I have discussed, a major priority for Indian policy would be to maintain economic stability
in the Asia-Pacifc. In the event that BJP gains power, however, relations with China may
be in for a spell of uncertainty or worse. For example, the BJP has declared, There will
be special emphasis on massive infrastructure development, especially along the Line of
Actual Control in Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim.
49
This border dispute remains the most
sensitive aspect of India-China bilateral relations with the potential to destabilize, if not
derail, ties. At the same time, the BJPs prime ministerial candidate, Narendra Modi, has
been self-consciously running on an economic development plank to broaden his appeal,
which would require continuity in economic engagement with China. We would then expect
India (under Congress or BJP) to manage political confict with China in such a way as not to
jeopardize its economic ties. Any U.S. policy in the region would then be weighed by India
against that standard. On the politico-military side, the idea of a concert of powers in Asia
to maintain strategic stability might further infuence Indian policy. While this would include
the United States as an Asia-Pacifc power, it would differ from conventional balancing
to support what has been termed inclusive balancing, which would ft well with Indias
treasured value of keeping equidistance from great powerssomething that does not sit well
with the core idea of realism.
45. Budget (General) for the year 2003-2004 on 23rd April 2003, Parliamentary Debates.
46. Discussion Regarding Foreign Policy of the Government, Lok Sabha Debates, Government
of India, December 7, 2004.
47. For more information, see Deepa Ollapally, The India-China Divergence.
48. Editorial, The Times of India, October 17, 2013.
49. Bharatiya Janata Party, Election Manifesto 2014, p. 8.
18. Leon E. Panetta, Partners in the 21
st
Century, speech at the Institute for Defence Studies and
Analyses, New Delhi, June 6, 2012.
19. The Indian Express, June 7, 2012.
20. The Indian Express, June 7, 2012.
21. Nirupama Rao, Indias Ambassador to the U.S., Americas Asian Pivot: The View from
India, lecture delivered at Brown University, February 4, 2013.
22. Shiv Shankar Menon, Maritime Imperatives of Indian Foreign Policy, speech at National
Maritime Foundation, New Delhi, September 11, 2009.
23. Hindustan Times, November 20, 2011; and Times of India, November 22, 2011.
24. Arvind Gupta, Americas Asia Strategy in Obamas Second Term, IDSA Comment, March
21, 2013.
25. Arun Sahgal, India and the Rebalancing Strategy for Asia-Pacifc, IDSA Comment, July 9,
2012.
26. A more detailed account of India-China economic relations is found in Deepa Ollapally, The
India-China Divergence: Economic Ties and Strategic Rivalry, Orbis, forthcoming.
27. Embassy of India, Beijing, China. Indianembassy.org.cn.
28. The Hindu, December 13, 2013.
29. Jean Francois Huchet, Between Geostrategic and Economic Competition: Emergence of a
Pragmatic Inida-China Relationship, China Perspective, Vol. 3 (2008): p. 63.
30. S. Jaishankar, The Elusive Smoothness of the Silk Route, Op-Ed, The Hindu, July 13, 2003.
Jaishankar is the former Indian ambassador to China and current ambassador to the United
States.
31. Embassy of India, Beijing, China. Indianembassy.org.cn.
32. Export Import Data Bank, The Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Government of
India, http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/default.asp. In 2012, the UAE was Indias largest trading
partner for unique circumstances related to Indias energy exports from Iran.
33. Lok Sabha Debates, June 9, 2009.
34. Economic Times, October 22, 2013.
35. The author conducted a series of focused interviews in 2011 and 2012 across a broad spectrum
of the Indian economic and strategic elite, geared specifcally to accessing their views on
India-China economic relations. References here to business-based opinions unless otherwise
indicated are from these interviews, given under non-attribution rules. My fndings are
examined in more detail in The India-China Divergence.
36. Deepa Ollapally and Rajesh Rajagopalan, India, pp. 101-08.
37. Deepa Ollapally, Indias Evolving National Identity Contestation.
38. Paranjoy Guha Thakurta, Energy Security: Mani Shankar Aiyar Slams UPA for Bowing to
US, Rediff.com, October 1, 2010, http://business.rediff.com/slide-show/2010/oct/01/slide-
show-1-maverick-mani-slams-upa-for-bowing-before-us.htm.
39. Satish Chandra, Its a Sellout, Deccan Herald, July 23, 2009, http://www.deccanherald.com/
content/15317/its-sellout.html.
40. C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon.
41. Sanjaya Baru, Foreign Policy Challenges and Priorities Facing the Next Government, Center
for Advanced Study of India, March 29, 2009, http://casi.ssc.upenn.edu/iit/baru.
42. Manjari Chatterjee Miller, Wronged by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in
India and China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), p. 2.
43. David Shambaugh has argued that China has multiple identities including major power and
developing country. China: The Conficted Rising Power, in Henry Nau and Deepa Ollapally
eds., Worldviews of Aspiring Powers, pp. 55-61.
44. Christopher J. Rusko and Karthika Sasikumar, India and China: From Trade to Peace? Asian
Perspective, Vol. 31, No. 4 (2007): p. 106.
DIVERGENCE ON
ECONOMIC REGIONALISM
to pursue TPP. Looking in detail at how Japan is proceeding in the talks with the United
States, he evaluates developments in the RCEP and CJK FTA talks before recommending
that the best outcome would be to conclude all of these talks with agreements to eliminate
tariffs on some, but not all, sanctuary Japanese products.
If the emphasis for the United States is wide-ranging and high standards regionalism and for
Japan is multiple regional frameworks with some variation in standards, the objective for
South Korea, as discussed by Jin Kyo Suh, is balancing the United States and China in the
process of achieving economic regionalism. Suh sees the balance between TPP and RCEP as
having tilted with Japans avid pursuit of TPP. Concerned about then becoming marginalized,
ASEAN has stepped up its efforts to conclude RCEP, and China has forged ahead in its own
pursuit of RCEP as well as the CJK FTA. In these circumstances, Suh analyzes Koreas views
on all three frameworks. He concludes that it has the opportunity to be the lynchpin between
an integrated East Asian market centered on China and a pan-Pacifc market led by the
United States. For that to happen, Suh proposes a four-step sequence: 1) early conclusion of
the Korea-China FTA; 2) start of bilateral consultations with TPP members; 3) acceleration
of the CJK FTA; and 4) creation of a reduced form of RCEP. This is a multi-level agenda,
more ambitious than U.S. or Japanese goals, but it is also driven by a different geopolitical
agenda than the other two states profess.
Zhang Xiaotong assesses Chinese thinking on TPP and even more on TTIP (Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership)the FTA of trans-Atlantic scopeas well as on a Japan-
EU FTA. In combination, these three steps toward high-order agreements are described as
a rejection of multilateralism on the world stage in favor of selective regionalism driven by
clear geostrategic reasons as much as geo-economic ones for the United States and Japan
and geo-economic interests in the case of the EU. Zhang argues that China has been caught
by surprise and slowly is beginning to respond, still hesitating between multilateralism and
bilateralism. It has yet to make up its mind in the Asia-Pacifc region on which path to
prioritize. After assessing the various implications of the three mega-regional FTAs under
negotiation to which China is not a party, Zhang orders its preferences as CJK FTA, RCEP,
and last TPP. Specifying the costs from trade diversion effects resulting from each grouping
that omits China, Zhang points to signifcant effects that China would try to mitigate. Again,
technical economic assessments are combined with broader geostrategic considerations.
Chinese policy-makers are faced with three broad questions: multilateralism or bilateralism?
competing bilateralism or harmonious bilateralism? further reform or turning inward? Zhang
weighs the possible answers to each question, and broaches what is labeled the big question,
whether to join the camp led by the United States, the EU, and Japan, or to establish its own
camp of regional economic integration. If there seems to be no doubt that China prefers the
latter, its prospects are uncertain, beginning with whether it can succeed in establishing a
CJK FTA and RCEP. Zhang lists the variables as: Chinas capacity, its political will, and
how its interactions with Japan and the United States go forward. Yet, there is no hesitation
in acknowledging that an equally fundamental factor is whether the government can garner
suffcient domestic support for pushing through big FTAs and whether Chinas reformers can
establish a linkage between external pressure induced by the above-mentioned mega-FTAs
and Chinas own domestic reform agenda, still uncertain in its scope.
Introduction
For a time the endgame appeared to be under way in TPP (Trans-Pacifc Partnership)
negotiations and attention was shifting from the potential competition between TPP, RCEP
(Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership), and the CJK FTA (China-Japan-Korea
Free Trade Agreement) to the implications of a TPP agreement for various countries. The
United States continued to be the driving force, frst prodding all parties to move ahead and
then causing others to pause, as doubts were growing about whether Barack Obama would
challenge his base in the Democratic Party prior to Novembers mid-term elections and
press Congress for the critical TPA (trade promotion authority) that offers assurance to U.S.
partners of an up-or-down vote on any agreement that is reached. Japan clearly has emerged
as the second central force in these negotiations, whose bilateral talks with the United States
are the principal venue for deciding what the outcome will be. In the background, South
Korea looms as the foremost bridge to the countries not currently part of the 12-nation
negotiating group, declaring its interest in considering whether to join the talks even as it
weighs the implications for the CJK talks (or a narrower bilateral FTA with China) and for
RCEP. Japan too is perched between talks to bolster its place in East Asian and Asia-Pacifc
regionalism. In the early spring of 2014 negotiations had slowed, but debate continued in all
of these countries over the possible impact of a deal on TPP. President Barack Obamas late
April visit to Japan was faulted for not reaching a deal, but it gave new momentum to the
talks, increasing optimism that agreement is nearing.
The four chapters in Section III cover U.S., Japanese, Korean, and Chinese strategies about
economic regionalism. Matthew Goodmans analysis centers on the U.S. policy goals in East
Asia and how TPP fts into the multi-layered approach for achieving them. He showcases the
concept of regional economic integration, pursued through a trans-Pacifc orientation and a
preference for comprehensive liberalization and high standard rules of the road. Dispelling
myths about TPP, Goodman discusses its links to the overall Asian rebalance of the Obama
administration. In spite of growing doubts in early 2014 about Congress, he concludes that
the United States is likely to remain an activeeven an impatientparticipant in regional
economic integration because this is essential for both domestic economic growth and
international leadership. His analysis sets the terms for the discussions that follow on how
thinking is advancing in Japan, in the midst of what is called Abenomics; South Korea,
facing criticism in the U.S. Congress on implementation delays in the KORUS FTA that
could lead to tough demands before it would be allowed into TPP negotiations; and China,
uncertain about the geopolitical and economic impact.
Takashi Terada turns our attention to Japans thinking on TPP, RCEP, and the CJK FTA.
He argues that the U.S. push for TPP has energized all three of these negotiating efforts,
infuencing China to exert leadership and offering Japan a golden opportunity. Yet, he is
careful to point to challenges in Japanese domestic politics, above all opposition to the
liberalization of agricultural trade. Terada describes a process of FTA dominoes, which
can be best understood by assessing the economic power of FTA negotiating countries.
Moving from a proliferation of bilateral FTAs to the intertwining of varied frameworks for
multilateral FTAs, he concludes that states have entered a remarkable stage when economic
integration can quickly advance. Terada pays special attention to the role played by South
Koreas bilateral FTA with the United States and also the European Union in spurring Japan
The four chapters in Section III say little about the consequences of failed TPP talks. They
weigh the economic consequences of alternative agreements and TPP. There is descending
order of commitment to TPP: the U.S. role as the driving force, Japan as a country with a
strong need and interest, but uncertain will to overcome opposition from vested interests
and politicians; South Korea with a desire for balancing entry into multiple FTAs, partly
for geopolitical reasons; and China as the most suspicious of these countries, especially
concerned about geopolitical consequences but intent on realizing economic goals too.
The Asian countries are wary of U.S. loss of interest and also of being left behind in
a rule-making process and a tariff-reducing process, where ones competitors may gain
a substantial market advantage. All of the pieces point to the competitive nature of the
pursuit of FTAs, particularly with the higher stakes introduced by TPP in a region rife
with rivalry and eager to sustain a record of remarkable dynamism in trade in a new period
when a slowdown seems likely.
Asia-Pacifc Regional
Economic Integraton:
Mathew P. Goodman
Goodman: Asia-Pacifc Regional Economic Integraton | 159 158 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
investing in the United States directly employed some 900,000 Americans in 2012 with
several times that number of jobs supported indirectly by these operations.
11
Asians overwhelmingly welcome U.S. economic engagement in the region. First, the United
States has a lot to offer in commercial terms: the worlds largest market, investment capital,
technology, and innovative ideas. Second, as discussed further in the TPP section below,
Asian countries may chafe at specifc demands but broadly value U.S. leadership in shaping
the regions economic rules, which support policy discipline and reform at home. Finally,
the American military presence in the Asia-Pacifc, while generally welcome as a stabilizing
force, is seen as more acceptable if it forms part of broader U.S. participation in regional
affairs, particularly in the economic domain.
Economic engagement in the Asia-Pacifc also poses challenges. The United States has had
large and persistent trade imbalances with a number of major Asian countries, including
a $299 billion defcit with China in 2013.
12
American companies face an array of barriers
both at and behind the border in these countries, as well as policies that tilt the playing feld
toward domestic competitors. In addition, macroeconomic imbalancesincluding an excess
of savings in many Asian economiesproduce large fnancial fows from Asia to the United
States that bring near-term benefts but may pose longer-term risks to the U.S. economy.
These challenges require active U.S. policy engagement in the region.
U.S. Policy Objectives in Asia
Against this backdrop of opportunities and challenges, U.S. economic policy toward the
Asia-Pacifc region over the past several administrations has been driven by three broad
objectives. The frst is promoting growth and jobs. As one of the worlds largest and fastest-
growing economic areas, the region is an increasingly important source of demand for the
U.S. (and global) economy. Stronger demand and growing purchasing power in Asia mean
more U.S. exports, which in turn are a vital source of growth and jobs at home. For more
than 30 years, the U.S. Treasury Department has worked to promote the macroeconomic
objective of strong domestic-demand-led growth in large Asian surplus economies. Japan,
then the worlds second-largest economy, was the initial target in the 1970s-80s. Attention
has broadened in recent years to other large, emerging economies with persistent current-
account surpluses, notably China. With U.S. consumers and businesses forced to borrow
less and export more in the wake of the 2008-09 fnancial crisis, Treasury has argued that
large surplus economies need to consume and import more, or global growth will suffer. It
has persistently criticized Asian governments that impede current-account rebalancing by
intervening in foreign-exchange markets to keep their currencies weak. U.S. trade policy has
complemented the macroeconomic growth agenda, including through the George W. Bush
administrations initial negotiation of the KORUS FTA and the Obama administrations
launch of the TPP negotiations. Enforcement of existing trade agreements has also been
an increasingly important feature of trade policy in the past two administrations. These
efforts have been designed to reduce barriers to U.S. exports, enhance Americas own
competitiveness, and boost growth and jobs.
The second broad objective of U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacifc is upholding and updating the
rules of the international economy. The open, rules-based system of trade and investment
Americas economic engagement in the Asia-Pacifc predates the republic itself.
In February 1784, the merchant ship Empress of China set sail from New York to
Canton seeking to trade coins and ginseng for Chinese tea.
1
The proftable 15-month
expedition sparked a wave of American merchant trade in the region.
2
It was not long
before commercial considerations began to shape U.S. foreign policy in the region, as
epitomized in 1853 by Commodore Perrys arrival in Tokyo Bay in his black ships
seeking refueling rights for the American whaling feet and the opening of Japan to trade.
Over the ensuing 150 years, as trade and investment across the Pacifc have grown to
trillions of dollars a year, economic policy has become a central feature of broader U.S.
strategy in the Asia-Pacifc. Washington today pursues a robust, multilayered economic
policy in the region that is designed both to promote U.S. growth and jobs and to underpin
regional peace and stability.
While the United States has pursued an array of initiatives at the bilateral and multilateral
level to advance its economic interests in the Asia-Pacifc, for the past 25 years it has
invested particular time and energy in regional initiatives. Starting with its co-founding
of the Asia-Pacifc Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1989, Washington has been
an active participant in regional economic integration, bringing a distinct approach to the
effort. Like its recent predecessors, the Obama administration has put regional economic
integration at the center of its Asia-Pacifc strategy. Indeed, the overall success of the
administrations policy of rebalancing, or pivoting, to Asia rests on its ability to carry
out a successful regional economic strategy, in particular completion of a high-standard
Trans-Pacifc Partnership (TPP) trade agreement.
The Economic Pull of Asia
U.S. economic engagement in Asia is driven frst and foremost by the numbers. The 21
member economies of APEC account for roughly 55 percent of global GDP.
3
The region
contains the worlds three largest countries by GDPthe United States, China, and Japan
and, counting India, half of the top 20 economies. According to the IMF in its most recent
outlook, the Asia-Pacifc is the fastest-growing region of the world, with real GDP growth in
developing Asia expected to average 6.7 percent in 2014.
4
The APEC region also accounts
for 44 percent of world trade, with nearly $10 trillion worth of goods and services fowing
around the Pacifc last year.
5
U.S. exports to APEC economies, among which are six of its
top ten trading partners, equaled nearly $1.2 trillion in 2012, more than half of the U.S. total.
6

These have more than doubled over the past decade.
Financial fows across the Pacifc in the form of both direct and portfolio investment are also
substantial. The stock of U.S. FDI in Asia totaled more than $650 billion at the end of 2012,
an increase of some $45 billion that year.
7
In the same year, nearly $20 billion worth of FDI
fowed into the United States from Asia-Pacifc countries, adding to an accumulation of over
$400 billion invested here.
8
China and Japan each hold well over $1 trillion of U.S. Treasury
securities,
9
and Asians and Americans have trillions of dollars invested in each others stock
markets and other private fnancial instruments. This enormous volume of economic activity
across the Pacifc translates into jobs for Americans. According to one estimate, roughly 2.8
million American jobs were supported by exports to Asia in 2012.
10
Asia-Pacifc companies
addition to the longstanding Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), which
seeks to manage trade frictions and expand commercial opportunities between the two
countries, the George W. Bush and Obama administrations have established high-level
strategic dialogues to discuss broader, longer-term economic challenges and opportunities
in the bilateral relationship. Along the economic track of what is now known as the Strategic
& Economic Dialogue (S&ED), the Obama administration has sought to encourage more
balanced growth in China, promote fnancial liberalization and a more fexible currency
regime, and advance negotiations toward a bilateral investment treaty (BIT).
Other major Asian economies have also been the target of U.S. economic diplomacy over
the past two administrations. With South Korea, the KORUS FTA has been the organizing
principle for bilateral economic relations over the past decade. The Bush administration also
negotiated FTAs with Singapore and Australia, and economic dialogues have been held with
these and other important regional players such as India and Indonesia.
Engagement at the global level is another implicit element of Washingtons Asian economic
strategy. The Clinton and George W. Bush administrations worked to bring China into the
WTO to more deeply embed it in the global rules-based system. For its part, the Obama
administration embraced the G-20 as the premier forum for international economic
cooperation in 2009 and has worked within that group to encourage strong, stable, balanced
growth in Asia-Pacifc economies, which make up roughly half of the G-20s membership.
The United States engages bilaterally and through global institutions with most major
countries of the world, but what has made U.S. economic policy toward the Asia-Pacifc
distinct is that it invests heavily in engagement at the regional level.
REI: The U.S. Approach
Presidents since George H.W. Bush have deliberately sought to tap into and shape aspirations
in the Asia-Pacifc for regional economic integration. (The concept has such currency in
regional affairs that it has its own acronym: REI.) For a quarter century, APEC has been the
organizing framework for U.S. REI efforts. It was founded in 1989 when Secretary of State
James Baker embraced his Australian counterparts proposal to create a venue for foreign
ministers from across the region to discuss trade and investment liberalization. APEC does
not negotiate binding agreements but tries to develop consensus around voluntary efforts
to eliminate frictions in the regional trading system. Where member economies are ready
to move forward faster toward integration, APEC allows for this through a pathfnder
approach; TPP is effectively a pathfnder initiative among 12 of APECs 21 members. Rather
than create different tiers of members based on state of development, APEC offers less-
developed members help in building capacity and working toward more open trade.
APECs footprint and ambition have grown in a quarter century. From 12 founding members
in 1989, it now includes 21 economies from around the Pacifc Rim.
15
It was given top-level
political imprimatur in 1993 when Clinton invited his counterparts to a summit on Blake
Island off Seattle. In 2007 APEC set an ambitious vision for the endpoint of its REI efforts: a
Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacifc (FTAAP). While that goal remains a long way off, APEC
has done useful pick-and-shovel work in removing operational barriers to trade, and created
championed by Washington since World War II has produced broad benefts not only for the
United States but also for the rest of the world. But the prevailing rules are increasingly out of
step with the realities of todays global economy, which is characterized less by cross-border
trade per se than by integrated global value chains and digital connectivity. Asia is at the
center of these trends. Over the past decade, the United States has sought to address the gap
between rules and reality through the multilateral Doha Development Round negotiations
launched by the WTO in 2001. Washington has been seeking to establish new 21
st
century
disciplines on behind-the-border issues that affect global supply chains, such as intellectual
property protection, regulatory transparency, labor and environmental standards, and the
investment regime. It has used regional mechanisms like APEC to catalyze and reinforce
the multilateral efforts. As discussed further below, with the Doha Round foundering
after a decade of negotiations, the Obama administration shifted emphasis toward regional
approaches by launching the TPP negotiations in 2010.
The third objective of U.S. economic strategy in the Asia-Pacifc is supporting Americas
long-term presence in the region. The United States is a Pacifc power by nature, necessity,
and design. Some 7,600 miles of the countrys shores are lapped by the Pacifc Ocean, more
than three times the length of the Atlantic seaboard. The United States fought four hot wars
13

and one cold war in the Asia-Pacifc theater between 1898 and 1975. Largely as a legacy of
these conficts, roughly 100,000 American troops remain deployed in the Pacifc. The U.S.
military presence is a vital source of stability in a region fraught with unresolved historical
tensions and potential future conficts, from North Korea to the South China Sea, and the
United States is inextricably linked with the region through extensive trade and investment
ties. To support these enduring interests, successive administrations since World War II
have worked deliberately to embed the United States in the Asia-Pacifc through an array of
political, security, and economic arrangements. The network of alliances with Japan, South
Korea, Australia, and others, and the troops and ships deployed in the region, are the most
visible manifestation of that policy. Binding trade arrangements like the KORUS FTA and
TPP can be seen as the economic equivalent of Americas security alliances in the region;
that is, they enmesh the country in regional affairs and give all Asia-Pacifc countries an
increased stake in each others prosperity and security.
Levels of Engagement
In support of all three objectivesgrowth, rulemaking, and long-term presencerecent U.S.
administrations have pursued a multilayered approach to regional economic engagement,
involving policy initiatives at all levels: bilateral, global, and regional. Bilaterally,
administrations since the 1970s have conducted an active economic diplomacy with the
major countries of the region. For example, the United States and Japan have established a
plethora of bilateral processes to manage trade frictions and to encourage Tokyo to restructure
its economy to generate sustainable growth.
14
Many contentious issues discussed in those
forumsfrom restrictions on agricultural market access to allegedly favored treatment of
Japanese automakersremain at the heart of the TPP negotiations today.
As the relative weight of China in policy toward Asia has increased in both economic and
political terms, Washington has established similar bilateral arrangements with Beijing. In
by Congress. Thus, the U.S. insistence in the TPP negotiations on a high-standard, 21
st

century agreement refects the realities of trade politics at home.
The above two characteristics of the U.S. approach to REI explain its cool attitude toward
the other major track of trade negotiations in the region, the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP), which is purposefully Asia-centric, thus far not including
any countries from the eastern Pacifc. Insofar as it appears focused mainly on tariffs and
other border measures and is likely to contain numerous exceptions to full liberalization, it
does not pass the U.S. test of being high standard and 21
st
century.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership:
Facts and Myths
At least for now, Washington has put all its weight behind TPP as the centerpiece of its REI
strategy in the Asia-Pacifc region and its preferred path to APECs vision of an FTAAP.
In fact, as discussed below, TPP has moved to the heart of broader Obama administration
strategy in the Asia-Pacifc, but it did not start out that way. TPP was conceived in the
waning days of the George W. Bush administration, when the White House notifed
Congress of its intention to negotiate a trade agreement with four small, open APEC
economies: Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore. Known as the Pacifc-4 (P-4),
these countries had already reached their own FTA a few years earlier. In keeping with its
search for coalitions of the willing, the administration decided to dock onto this group of
pro-trade countries as the next step in its regional trade policy following initial completion
of the KORUS FTA in 2007.
After roughly a year of consideration, the Obama administration decided to embrace TPP
in late 2009 as an element though not yet a dominant one of its regional trade strategy
alongside a renegotiated KORUS. Australia, Peru, and Vietnam also joined the partnership,
and the eight original countries launched formal negotiations in March 2010. Malaysia
joined the talks later that year, Canada and Mexico came aboard in 2012, and Japan came to
the table in the summer of 2013, bringing the number of participants to 12.
As of this writing, TPP negotiators have held over 20 rounds of talks but have been unable
to reach fnal agreement. Although most of the agreements 29 chapters had reportedly
been closed by the middle of 2013, signifcant differences among the parties remained
on a number of contentious rulemaking issues, including intellectual property protection,
state-owned enterprise disciplines, and environmental standards. In addition, substantial
gaps remained on the market-access provisions, notably those revolving around Japans
restrictions on access to its agricultural market. Despite a renewed mandate at the October
2013 APEC Leaders Meeting in Bali to complete the negotiations by the end of the
year, TPP trade ministers were unable to reach agreement at their December meeting in
Singapore. However, by all accounts there remained a shared sense of determination in the
room to wrap up the talks as soon as possible, and Obamas planned trip to Asia in April
presented an early action-forcing event that was expected to put pressure on negotiators to
reach a fnal deal.
valuable networks among offcials across the region. It has also served as an incubator for
broader liberalization efforts at the regional and global level, e.g. APEC leaders agreed in
2011 to reduce tariffs on environmental goods below 5 percent by 2015, following years of
failure at the multilateral level to agree on the defnition of an environmental good.
Washingtons support for APEC refects two distinct characteristics of its approach to
regional economic integration: a preference for trans-Pacifc rather than Asia-centric
mechanisms, and an emphasis on comprehensive liberalization and high-standard
rulemaking. The trans-Pacifc nature of the U.S. approach to REI is, of course, largely
driven by geography: the United States is a Pacifc but not an Asian country, but higher-
level policy considerations also play a part. In promoting APEC, Baker was clearly
animated by concerns about East Asian aspirations for community building that would
exclude the United States; he later noted that such efforts would draw a line down the
middle of the Pacifc.
16
Strategic considerations in the Western Hemisphere have also played a part in U.S.
insistence on including Pacifc-facing Latin American countries in regional economic
integration efforts. Clinton invited the Mexican president to the Blake Island summit and
soon after championed Chile and Perus membership in APEC. It is no coincidence that the
TPP negotiations include all fve APEC economies in the Western Hemisphere: Canada,
Chile, Mexico, Peru, and the United States. In addition to strengthening political ties with
these countries, Washington wants to pull them into Asia-Pacifc REI efforts because of
their generally liberal views on trade and support for U.S positions.
The second distinguishing feature of the U.S. approach to regional economic integration
is its emphasis on comprehensive liberalization and high-standard rules of the road. This
has inspired Washingtons approach to APEC since the inception but took on new weight
with the launch of 21
st
-century treaty negotiations with Korea and the TPP partners. The
George W. Bush and Obama administrations have insisted on the broadest and deepest
possible liberalization, as well as state-of-the-art disciplines on trade and investment-
related policies both at and behind the border. By contrast, Asia-only integration
initiatives, including bilateral and sub-regional FTAs, have generally covered only border
measures and included numerous exceptions to full liberalization. A mix of economic and
political considerations lies behind this interest in removing most impediments to trade
and investment and imposing tough rules of the road to maximize economic effciency and
growth. Washington believes that the narrower and shallower agreements reached to
date in Asia have done little to improve effciency. The Obama administration also worries
that low-standard agreements may pose a threat to U.S. competitiveness. As U.S. Trade
Representative Michael Froman said in an interview in late 2013, A race to the bottom is
not a race we can win.
17
Domestic political support for trade agreements in the United States increasingly hinges on
not only breaking down barriers to U.S. exports but also advancing other policy objectives
such as enhanced labor rights, environmental regulation, and intellectual property
protection. These issues are among 147 negotiating objectives listed in trade promotion
authority (TPA) legislation tabled in both houses of Congress in January 2014. Without
substantial progress on these issues, it is unlikely that a fnal TPP deal will be approved
TPP and the Asia Rebalance
TPP exemplifes both key characteristics of U.S. REI strategy. It is trans-Pacifc in nature,
incorporating both Asian and Western Hemisphere countries, and it is explicitly designed to
produce, as Obama said in announcing his embrace of TPP in late 2009, the high standards
worthy of a 21
st
-century trade agreement.
22
TPP is also consistent with the three enduring
objectives of U.S. economic policy toward the Asia-Pacifc discussed earlier. Its explicit
aim is to stimulate American growth and jobs. According to the Offce of the U.S. Trade
Representative, Through this agreement, the Obama Administration is seeking to boost
U.S. economic growth and support the creation and retention of high-quality American jobs
by increasing exports in a region that includes some of the worlds most robust economies
and that represents more than 40 percent of global trade.
23
The welfare gains to the United
States and the world from a completed TPP agreement could be substantial. According to
one estimate, agreement among the 12 current members could generate annual income gains
for the United States of some $77 billion by 2025, and for the world as a whole of $223
billion.
24
These gains would be increased several-fold if TPP ultimately led to a broader
regional free trade area.
TPP is also aimed at strengthening the rules of the regional trading system. Establishing
new disciplines on an array of behind-the-border measures that impede trade and investment
such as excessive or non-transparent regulation, preferences for SOEs, and inadequate
intellectual property protection, Washington hopes through TPP to ensure open markets in
the region and a level competitive playing feld. An unstated objective is to do this on U.S.
terms before the lure of Chinas large market tilts the rulemaking table in Beijings favor.
Moreover, the administration clearly hopes that, if successful, TPP will become the driver
and de facto template for a new global system of rules on trade and investment. Having
failed to achieve this objective via the frst-best route of multilateral negotiations under the
Doha Round, it is trying to fnd another path to the multilateral summit by way of TPP and
a similar high-standard agreement under negotiation with the EU, the Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP).
Arguably the most important objective of TPP is to embed the United States more deeply in
regional affairs. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that TPP has become the sine qua non
of the Obama administrations strategy of rebalancing (or pivoting) to the Asia-Pacifc.
From its earliest days in 2009, it has put the Asia-Pacifc at the center of its foreign policy.
This was signaled at a symbolic level when Hillary Clinton made her frst overseas trip to the
region as secretary of state, and when President Obama received the Japanese prime minister
as the frst foreign visitor to the Oval Offce. Early substantive decisions then gave weight
to the policy, with the announcement in 2010 that the president would join a second regional
leaders forum alongside APEC, the East Asia Summit, and with the launch of TPP.
It was not until the fall of 2011 that the administration frst gave voice to the rebalance as
the defning feature of its policy and posture in the Asia-Pacifc. Hillary Clintons article
in Foreign Policy magazine said that the United States stands at a pivot point after a
decade fghting two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; going forward Washington would lock
in a substantially increased investmentdiplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwisein
the region.
25
She identifed six dimensions of what came to be known as the rebalance:
As this author has argued elsewhere, a number of myths cloud regional perceptions of
TPP.
18
One is that the negotiations are splitting Asia, since not all Asian economies are
eligible to join, while those that are eligible must choose between joining TPP, viewed as
led by the United States, and RCEP, the alternative track supposedly preferred by China.
On the frst point, as an initiative housed within APEC, TPP is an approved pathway to
FTAAP and is in principle open to any APEC economy willing to strive for high-standard
rules. Indeed, several APEC membersincluding Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan
have publicly expressed interest in joining TPP, and even China quietly began studying
the possibility after Japan joined in the summer of 2013. Conceptually there is no reason
that even non-APEC economies like India and Myanmar should forever be excluded from
TPP. The Obama administration has been preparing the ground for such an expansion. In
2012, it launched an Enhanced Economic Engagement (E-3) initiative with ASEAN. By
building capacity on TPP-related disciplines in smaller ASEAN membersnotably the
three non-APEC members, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos, E-3 is designed to bring all
10 members of the group into a high-standard trade arrangement with the United States.
As for having to choose between TPP and RCEP, the seven countries participating in both
negotiations clearly view the two approaches as compatible. Moreover, TPP and RCEP
could one day converge in a region-wide agreement, or at least become interoperable, with
potential annual gains to world income as high as $2.4 trillion by 2025.
19
In a November
2013 report, CSIS proposed that China, as APEC host in 2014, expand the forums existing
work on supply-chain connectivity in an effort to begin the process of stitching together
the quilt of trade agreements in the region and making them interoperable.
20
Another myth that until recently was popular in Beijing is that TPP is part of an effort
by Washington to contain China. Yet no Asia-Pacifc countryincluding the United
Stateswants to exclude China from regional integration; on the contrary, all want to
deepen their economic ties with the worlds second-largest economy. To be sure, one goal
of TPP is to create a level playing feld that, among other things, will allow other countries
to better compete with China; however, this is a far cry from containment.
In the frst half of 2013, elite opinion in Beijing began to shift from rejecting TPP outright
to seeking a better understanding of the negotiations. There were signssuch as Beijings
willingness to negotiate a comprehensive BIT on the terms proposed by Washington,
as well as the launch of a free trade zone in Shanghai in late September that Chinas
leadership was preparing the ground for eventual membership in a high-standard regional
agreement, if not TPP itself. This helps to dispel a third myth, i.e., that the high standards
Washington is espousing in TPP are too ambitious for Asia. All participants have made
clear that they believe there are substantial welfare gains to be had from a high-standard
agreement that opens up new market opportunities and helps each country address
structural impediments in its own economy. Vietnam, for example, is often thought to
be the main obstacle to agreement on TPPs state-owned-enterprise (SOE) chapter; yet
Hanoi clearly recognizes that its SOEs need discipline if the country is going to fully enjoy
the benefts of a market-based economy.
21
China, too, has made market discipline of its
SOEs an organizing principle of economic reforms announced in the fall of 2013. Its more
positive attitude toward TPP likely refects a calculated desire to use external pressure to
drive domestic reform, as it did with WTO accession over a decade ago.
3. U.S. Department of State, 21
st
Annual APEC Economic Leaders Meeting Fact Sheet,
October 8, 2013, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/10/215195.htm.
4. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, January 2014, https://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/update/01/.
5. According to StatsAPEC, the value of APEC members goods and commercial services imports
was roughly $10.5 trillion in 2012, while the value of the regions goods and commercial
services exports was nearly $10 trillion. See StatsAPEC, Key Indicators Database, APEC,
http://statistics.apec.org/index.php/apec_psu/index.
6. 2012 services data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, Private Services Trade by Area and
Country, U.S. Department of Commerce, http://www.bea.gov/international/international_
services.htm. 2012 goods data from U.S.-APEC Bilateral Trade and Investment, United
States Trade Representative (USTR), http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/japan-korea-apec/
apec/us-apec-trade-facts.
7. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Balance of Payments and Direct Investment Position Data,
U.S. Department of Commerce, http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_MNC.cfm.
8. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Balance of Payments and Direct Investment Position Data.
9. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities, November
2013, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Documents/mfh.txt.
10. Scot Marciel, Economic Aspects of the Asia Rebalance, Statement before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacifc Affairs, December
18, 2013, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2013/12/218291.htm.
11. Organization for International Investment (OFII), Insourcing Facts, August 2013, http://www.
ofi.org/resources/insourcing-facts. Estimate based on Asias share of overall U.S. inbound FDI
and OFII fgures for U.S. jobs created by inbound FDI.
12. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Balance of Payments and Direct Investment Position Data.
13. The Spanish-American War (1898), World War II (1941-45), the Korean War (1950-53), and
the Vietnam War (1965-75).
14. A catalogue of U.S.-Japan economic forums was included in a 2008 CSIS report. See Charles
W. Freeman and Matthew P. Goodman, Crafting Economic Strategy Toward Asia, CSIS, Oct.
2008, http://csis.org/fles/media/csis/pubs/081016_freeman_craftusecon_web.pdf. An updated
version of that report was released in January 2013. See Matthew P. Goodman, et al., Crafting
Asia Economic Strategy in 2013, CSIS, Jan. 2013, http://csis.org/fles/publication/130123_
Goodman_CraftingAsiaEconStrat_Web.pdf.
15. Because Chinese Taipei (Taiwan) and Hong Kong have their own seats in APEC, members are
known as economies rather than countries.
16. Cited in Claude Barfeld and Philip I. Levy, Tales of the South Pacifc: President Obama and
the Transpacifc Partnership, American Enterprise Institute, December 2009, http://www.aei.
org/fles/2009/12/18/09-IEO-Dec-g.pdf.
17. U.S. to China: Play by our Economic Rules, The Atlantic, November 13, 2013, http://www.
theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/11/us-to-china-play-by-our-economic-rules/281433.
18. Matthew P. Goodman, Global Economics Monthly: Five Myths about TPP, CSIS, April 30,
2013, http://csis.org/publication/global-economics-monthly-fve-myths-about-tpp.
19. Peter Petri, Michael G. Plummer, and Fan Zhai, The Trans-Pacifc Partnership and Asia-
Pacifc Integration: AQuantitative Assessment, Peterson Institute for International Economics,
November 2012.
20. Matthew P. Goodman and Scott Miller, Enhancing Value Chains: An Agenda for
APEC, CSIS, November 2013, http://csis.org/fles/publication/131125_Goodman_
EnhancingValueChains_WEB.pdf.
21. For example, see remarks by Deputy Minister Tran Quoc Khanh, head of Vietnams TPP
negotiation delegation, in Tran Quoc Khanh, TPP: opportunities, challenges to Vietnams
reform and development, Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,
Nov. 15, 2013, http://www.moit.gov.vn/en/News/441/tpp--opportunities--challenges-to-
vietnam%E2%80%99s-reform-and-development.aspx.
strengthening alliances; deepening relationships with emerging powers, including China;
engaging with regional institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based
military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights.
Insofar as these were longstanding elements of U.S. strategy in the region spanning several
administrations, the rebalance was nothing radically new. But the packaging by the Obama
administration clearly represented a signifcant raising of the stakes. To make good on that
rhetoric, the administration must put new, substantive meat on the bones of the rebalance and
ensure lasting follow-through. This is where the economic elements emphasized by Clinton
in her Foreign Policy article come into play. Americas security role in the region is enduring,
but in light of both budget realities and strategic force-posture considerations, a substantially
increased U.S. military footprint in the region is unlikely. Diplomatic endeavors, meanwhile,
come and go, but economic engagement holds the promise of introducing a new, substantive,
and enduring element to the overall rebalancing strategy. And TPP is the sharp end of the
spear of U.S. economic engagement in the region.
Thus, the stakes involved in TPP could not be higher for the Obama White House. Conclusion
of a deal is the sine qua non of success not only for the administrations regional economic
policy but for the entire Asia rebalancing strategy. In addition to its economic benefts, a
successful agreement would anchor the United States more frmly in the Asia-Pacifc and
bolster American leadership there. Without TPP, the rebalance would contain little of
substance that is new and would likely be perceived in the region as driven primarily by
military considerations.
Conclusion
Americas interests in the Asia-Pacifc are broad, deep, and enduring. None is more important
than the U.S. economic stake in the region. As Hillary Clinton explained in laying out the rationale
for the rebalancing strategy, Harnessing Asias growth and dynamism is central to American
economic and strategic interests and a key priority for President Obama. Open markets in Asia
provide the United States with unprecedented opportunities for investment, trade, and access to
cutting-edge technology. Our economic recovery at home will depend on exports and the ability
of American frms to tap into the vast and growing consumer base of Asia.
26
A successful economic strategy in the Asia-Pacifc is essential to sustaining American growth
and jobs into the 21st century. It is also central to Washingtons efforts to remain a champion
of the global rules-based order and underpins Americas long-term presence in the Asia-
Pacifc, which in turn contributes importantly to the regions security and prosperity. For all
these reasons, the United States is likely to remain an activeeven impatientparticipant
in regional economic integration efforts in the vital Asia-Pacifc region.
Endnotes
1. This paper is derived from a paper presented at a November 2013 seminar organized by the
China National Committee for Pacifc Economic Cooperation (CNCPEC) in Beijing, and from
testimony by the author before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on December 18,
2013.
2. Asia for Educators, Two Hundred Years of U.S. Trade with China, Columbia University,
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1750_us.htm.
22. White House, Remarks by President Barack Obama at Suntory Hall, news release, November
14, 2009, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-offce/remarks-president-barack-obama-suntory-hall.
23. Offce of the United States Trade Representative, Fact Sheet: The United States in the Trans-
Pacifc Partnership: Increasing American Exports, Supporting American Jobs, June 2012,
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-offce/fact-sheets/2012/june/us-tpp-increasing-american-
exports-supporting-american-jobs.
24. Peter A. Petri, Michael G. Plummer, and Fan Zhai, Adding Japan and Korea to the TPP,
March 7, 2013, http://asiapacifctrade.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Adding-Japan-and-Korea-
to-TPP.pdf.
25. Hillary Clinton, Americas Pacifc Century, Foreign Policy, November 2011, http://www.
foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacifc_century.
26. Hillary Clinton, Americas Pacifc Century.
Japan and Regional Integraton
Dominoes: Golden Opportunity or
Another Politcal Failure?
Takashi Terada
Terada: Japan and Regional Integraton Dominoes | 173 172 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
be replaced by the FTA countrys less competitive products thanks to the FTA, which will
negatively affect consumers of the FTA countries, while exports from the third country to
the FTA countries will be blocked and reduced.
1
While tariff-free privileges will be granted
to companies in the FTA countries, third country companies will be placed at a competitive
disadvantage, which will spur business and interest groups to lobby the government to
conclude an FTA, and as a result, FTA negotiations will begin, which in turn will cause a
domino effect of proliferating FTAs.
2
The crux of this argument is the difference in economic power of FTA negotiating countries.
As Bhagwati indicates, all countries do not wield an equal amount of power; one country
may be a major military or economic power, and thus have greater infuence on another, so
we often see a pattern where FTAs move forward due to the interest and infuence of such
hegemonic powers.
3
In the case of FTAs signed by powerful countries, since certain third
countries will have their market access inhibited, trade diversion concerns become clearer,
which motivate another country to conclude an FTA with the same major power. In this sense,
even if small and medium-sized countries conclude an FTA together, this will not necessarily
cause trade diversion concerns, and even if a major economic power were inhibited as a third
country, this major power can be said to have few motivations to conclude FTAs with these
small and medium-sized countries. In other words, the FTA domino effect will not occur.
Before the intertwining of frameworks took place, regional integration in East Asia and the
Pacifc was characterized by a proliferation of bilateral FTAs. They can be grouped into four
categories: 1) bilateral FTAs centered on Japan with individual countries of ASEAN; 2)
ASEAN+1 FTAs centered on ASEAN (with Japan, China, South Korea, India, and Australia/
New Zealand); 3) FTAs in Northeast Asia including Taiwan centered on China; and 4) FTAs
started by South Korea with the non-Asian large economies including the United States and
the EU. Each of the four types has its own central country (or region), but proliferation can
be explained using the domino theory.
For instance, the proliferation of bilateral FTAs centered on Japan with individual countries
of ASEAN was a result of major ASEAN members selection of Japan as their frst bilateral
FTA partner.
4
For example, Malaysian Trade Minister Rafdah Aziz sharply criticized
Singapores moves to conclude discriminatory FTAs with major powers outside the region
as an action that would damage the solidarity of ASEAN, and stated that Malaysia, unlike
Singapore, is not interested in having bilateral FTAs with anybody.
5
However, Malaysia
and Indonesia, both of which had been considered to be the most hesitant in the region
toward bilateral FTAs, began to study the strengths and weaknesses of the Japan-Singapore
FTA after the negotiations for a Japan-Singapore FTA started, and showed an interest in an
FTA with Japan. For Malaysia and Indonesia, Japan was already one of their most important
trade and investment partners, and was also the largest provider of economic assistance.
Both countries considered Japans huge market and purchasing power in recognizing the
importance of being able to access this market tariff-free through concluding an FTA, and
also anticipated that such an FTA would make it possible to shift capital and technology
from Japan to each. As a result, Prime Minister Mahathir announced that Malaysia had
begun negotiations with Japan for an FTA when he visited Japan in December 2002, while
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had agreed to negotiate Indonesias frst FTA with
Japan upon his visit to Japan in June 2005.
The re-election of Abe Shinzo as prime minister has led to a drastic change in the economic
landscape of Japan through the implementation of Abenomics. Abes decision to promote
monetary easing as a tool to help Japan overcome defation, which had stalled the Japanese
economy for more than a decade, greatly contributed to a 50 percent surge in the Nikkei stock
index and to a nearly 20 percent depreciation of the yen against the U.S. dollar by the end of
year 2013. A key remaining element of Abenomics is to participate in a regional integration
framework and utilize it as an effective vehicle to push a domestic reform agenda, including
agricultural liberalization, while expanding export markets for further economic growth.
Several such frameworks have emerged since 2010, and Japan has entered negotiations in all
of them, presenting a golden opportunity for its trade and investment. With ASEAN aiming
to establish an economic community in 2015, four frameworks are being negotiated in East
Asia and the Pacifc, including the three-way CJK FTA, the 16-nation RCEP, and a U.S.-led
TPP. Japan also began FTA negotiations with the EU in 2013, which has entered into TTIP
negotiations with the United States, possibly disseminating trade and investment policy
norms based on those of the developed countries.
A principal factor behind the emergence of the multiple regional integration initiatives is
the power competition between the United States and China. Though the United States long
remained on the sidelines of East Asian integration initiatives, it is now seeking high-quality
WTO-plus regional integration through TPP, while Chinas commitment to regional
integration frameworks such as RCEP is strongly oriented towards developing countries
and would allow for more exemptions in the form of tariff elimination duties, with few
deregulation requirements for the reform of domestic economic systems. As ASEAN has
also shown an interest in RCEP, in which the speed and level of liberalization would be
based on the standard that developing countries generally prefer, the dissimilarities in these
integration models in East Asia and the Pacifc make any future merger of TPP and RCEP
diffcult. This means that the Sino-U.S. competition over trade and investment rule-making
is likely to continue.
This article examines how these intertwined regional integration frameworks arose and what
kind of trade policy Japan has adopted under these circumstances through an analysis of
its views on the development of TPP, RCEP and CJK FTA, respectively. This profusion of
regional integration initiatives seems to present a golden opportunity for the Japanese
economy, but it results, as argued below, from the U.S. push for TPP. This caused China to
quickly make concessions that enabled trilateral FTA talks with Japan and South Korea, as well
as RCEP, to commence. While the emergence of multiple regional integration frameworks
is seen as desirable for Japan, it needs to surmount challenges in domestic politics including
agricultural liberalization to play a proactive role in any regional integration framework.
FTA Dominoes and Japans Regional
Integration Policy
A domino theory, often used to explain FTA proliferation, focuses on trade diversion from
the exclusive nature of FTAs. Benefts brought to a party through an FTA, such as the
elimination of tariffs, generally victimize a third country not included in the agreement. This
means a third countrys products that are more competitive in terms of quality and price will
submit to its rules.
11
Chinas large presence looms behind the U.S. intention to proceed with
economic leadership. It is seen as the shadow negotiating partner of the TPP. For example,
in April 2011, six industry groups sent a letter to U.S. Trade Representative Kirk requesting
that a punitive obligatory provision with legal binding force be added to the TPP in response
to overseas state-infuenced entities that improperly obstruct the economic activities of
private businesses. Although state-operated corporations exist in highly-liberalized countries
such as Singapore too, a U.S. business participant stated that limiting business practices
and subsidies to state-owned corporations through the TPP would act as a weight on the
active ties of Chinese businesses in the Asian market, and in the future, will provide a policy
framework that will be the cornerstone of trade negotiations at the bilateral, regional, and
global level with China.
12
In other words, there exists a sense of hope that the TPP will be a
means for applying legal shackles to China, whose business practices are not free capitalist
ones. The participation in TPP by Vietnam, another socialist country where state-operated
enterprises are rampant, is construed by the United States as playing the role of a virtual
China. With Japans economy twice the size of the then eight countries participating in TPP
negotiations with the United States, Japans potential entry was viewed as important for the
pacts emergence as the preeminent trade agreement in the Asia-Pacifc.
Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko announced Japans participation in the TPP in November
2011 by stating I have decided to enter into consultations toward participating in the Trans-
Pacifc Partnership negotiations with the countries concerned. Japan focused on the pacts
WTO-plus orientation with a belief that unless it joined soon, it would have no infuence in
shaping the agreement, including on matters of critical importance to Japanese companies
such as rules of origin and intellectual property rights.
13
The LDPs Abe made the fnal
decision on Japans participation in TPP soon after his meeting with Obama in February
2013. A key factor making it possible to commit to negotiations was Obamas assurance
of no preconditions for tariff elimination, interpreted in Japan as U.S. approval for the
maintenance of tariffs on sensitive agricultural products such as rice to be shielded from
TPPs free trade package.
Although Japan expected to work together with the United States to complete TPP
negotiations, it faced a dilemma stemming from American power. As a newcomer to the
negotiations, it was required to establish bilateral pre-negotiations with all existing members
individually to obtain approval for entry. This condition is a weapon the United States can
utilize to require any newcomer, even China, to deal with areas that are of specifc interest
to it, meaning, in effect, it has veto power over the newcomer. The United States established
three major conditions for Japans entry to the TPP, and one of them was that Japans state-
owned life insurance company, Kampo, should not expand its insurance operations. TPP is a
multilateral negotiation, and an agreement can only be reached through give and take among
all participating countries, but the preliminary negotiation is bilateral, unilaterally obliging
applicants to accept specifc demands by the existing members, especially the United States,
as a condition for entry to TPP.
Another feature of bilateralism in TPP is related to market access negotiations. Japans
expectations from a change from bilateral FTAs to regional integration is the expansion of
countries that are the subject of cumulative origin, which have the beneft of increasing the
number of goods for which no tariff is applied, simplifying the rules for that purpose, and
It was South Korea that spurred Japan to develop an interest in TPP centered on the United
States and an FTA with the EU, Japans two major trading partners apart from China. Although
South Korea is an exception to the above-mentioned explanation of FTA proliferation, its
decision to sign bilateral FTAs with the United States and the EU resulted in a situation
where Japan, which competes in major export goods, particularly automobiles and electric
appliances, was forced to follow suit. South Koreas FTA strategy targeted its large export
markets. Having FTAs with 45 countries including the United States, the economic territory
of South Korea is the best in the world,
6
said President Lee Myung-bak.
A source of real concern to Japanese industry was the FTA concluded between South Korea
and the EU. Japanese companies had yet to establish extensive production bases in the EU,
while the tariff rate on competing products was relatively high (LCD TVs at 14 percent,
automobiles at 10 percent). Preventing price disadvantages with South Korean competitors
was a major motivation for Japan to sign a similar FTA with the EU. The day after FTA
negotiations began between South Korea and the EU in May 2007 the Japanese Business
Federation (Keidanren) called for a Japan-EU EPA.
7
However, the EU judged that an FTA
with Japan would not be advantageous, and so did not respond to Japans requests for a long
period of time. Of the automobiles exported to the EU in 2009, Korean ones made up 12
percent of the total, while Japanese were 36 percent. It was felt that if tariffs were eliminated
for Japanese automobiles, which had advanced green technology such as hybrid vehicles, it
would be a threat to similar types of European cars. Also, along with the normalization of the
EU trade defcit with Japan (32.8 billion in 2008, 19.9 billion in 2009), about 70 percent
of EU exports were already tariff-free. As a result, the EU considered the benefts of an FTA
with Japan to be small.
8
However, after Japan showed an interest in TPP in October 2010, the
EUs attitude began to change. It was interested in regulatory easing in non-tariff barriers,
as seen in the lower level of inbound investment in Japan, and not being able to bid in
government procurement. Easing or eliminating domestic regulations is a major task in TPP
led by the United States, heightening EU expectations that it could also put the elimination
of non-tariff barriers for exports and investment on the negotiating table.
The EU has chosen potential Asian FTA partners who have participated in TPP talks, such
as Singapore, Malaysia, and Vietnam or signed an FTA with the United States such as South
Korea, so the EU FTA strategy can be seen to have the characteristic of chasing the US.
9

Accordingly, Japanese participation in TPP opened the path to an FTA with the United States
and the EU, signifying responsiveness to the requests made by exporting industries in Japan
to catch up to Koreas aggressive FTA policy.
Japan and TPP
The Obama administrations rebalancing to Asia stresses the importance of TPP as a major
trade policy. Secretary of State Clinton stated that the United States would strengthen its
economic leadership in order to maintain its strategic leadership in the Asia-Pacifc region,
10

signifying determination to incorporate as many countries as possible in TPP to build the
desired economic order in the region. Ian Bremmer writes, the United States encouraged
Japan to join hands with the U.S. and strive to nurture the TPP into a new WTO, with a
belief that if the TPP becomes a strong presence, China will eventually have no choice but to
Indonesian Trade Minister Gita stated that TPP is not a threat to ASEAN, and the selection of
an integration framework differs according to the conditions in each member of ASEAN, but
since TPP allows virtually no exceptions to tariff elimination, Indonesia would have many
problems; so there are no plans to participate.
15
This statement indicates that as a result of the
advent of TPP, countries sharing a vision for regional integration will proceed with domestic
reforms and a high level of liberalization as they participate, and the lowest common
denominator approach to liberalization will no longer be applied. This is encouraging for
Japans regional integration policy. Japan, especially METI, was well aware of the lowest
common denominator problem, where the actions of liberalization-oriented countries are
blocked by the least enthusiastic country, limiting regional integration in ASEAN. Japan
and China, which had until then been competing over whether ASEAN + 3 or ASEAN + 6
should be the framework for East Asian integration, set their dispute aside in August 2011
and jointly proposed the founding of a working group to promote the liberalization of trade
and investment in East Asia. This joint initiative stemmed from concerns on the part of
both large economies that while TPP negotiations were progressing (Japan had not been a
member yet at that time), East Asian integration frameworks would not make progress if left
up to ASEAN. ASEANs sense of urgency for the creation of a single market triggered by
the TPP development was welcomed by Japan.
RCEP, unlike TPP, places a higher priority on development, technical cooperation, and
fexibility on liberalization because it is based on ASEAN + 1 FTAs. Japans interest in
RCEP stems partly from its desire to be involved in the growth of the ASEAN economy, one
of the most potentially promising markets in the world. Abe sees it as a growth center of
the world and stressed that Japan has two major goals for its ODA to the region: ASEANs
own economic development and Japans renewed economic growth. This interest has also
been demonstrated by its private sector. According to a survey by the Japan External Trade
Organization (JETRO), by value, 17 percent of Japanese multinational companies overseas
deals in 2013 have been made in ASEAN member economies, compared with 3 percent in
2012.
16
Their FDI in ASEAN has also been rapidly growing, reaching $13 billion in the frst
nine months of 2013, more than the $10.6 billion for the whole period of 2012. Assistance
in ASEANs integration projects is relevant to Japans own interests. In sum, Japan does
not see ASEAN as a regional integration project similar to the EU or NAFTA, and thus it
is not interested in developing RCEP, based on ASEANs fexibility approach, into a rule-
making framework like TPP. Yet, Japan is well aware that RCEP cannot be an attractive
regional integration framework without ASEANs sound development. This is a rationale
behind Japans commitment to assisting ASEANs effort to promote regional integration or
the formation of a single market to attain higher economic growth.
Trilateral Cooperation and Japan
Japan has also participated in talks about a trilateral FTA with China and Korea. The growth
of Northeast Asian regionalism has become more sluggish because of Japans relationships
with both of them. Yet, at the 5th Trilateral Summit held in Beijing in May 2012, the Trilateral
Investment Treaty, after thirteen rounds of negotiations since 2007, was signed and it became
effective on May 17, 2014. Japan was deeply reluctant to sign a trilateral FTA without this,
while China long asserted the reverse sequence. This difference was one source of delay
ultimately contributing to an expansion in exports. Japans Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry also emphasizes this merit for companies which have expanded their supply-chain
networks in the region.
14
The different product coverage and distinctive time framework of
liberalization in a number of bilateral FTAs would make it diffcult for those multinational
companies as potential FTA users to identify which FTA or regional integration frameworks
could be most effective in cost-saving for their business. Thus, a spaghetti bowl effect,
meaning a large number of rules of origin with specifc standards and involving specifc
procedures, would follow, and different rules applied to a single commodity would emerge as
one of the most signifcant concerns. Yet, the United States has little intention to help address
this issue, and the market access negotiations in TPP have been established as bilateral rather
than multilateral tracks among 12 countries. This leads to preparation of more than 50 to 60
bilateral agreements, simply confusing multinational companies and greatly reducing the
TPPs usefulness and Japans interest.
TPP, China, and ASEAN: Better Emerging
Conditions for Japan
Japans inclination toward TPP contributed to China making concessions over the issues
long contested by Japan, culminating in the emergence of favorable trading circumstances
for Japans regional integration policy. The level of Chinas concerns about the negative
impact TPP might have on its regional integration policy is seen in the fact that as soon
as Japan expressed an interest in joining TPP, China quickly became more fexible in its
own talks with Japan. For example, China accepted a proposal from Tokyo to conclude a
trilateral investment agreement frst among China, Japan, and South Korea, a framework
that Beijing had previously resisted due partly to required protections for Japanese and
South Korean investors. China has also moved away from exclusive pursuit of an ASEAN
+ 3 regional framework, toward interest in the ASEAN + 6 framework, Japans preferred
arrangement. These two concessions led to the start of offcial negotiations for the trilateral
FTA and RCEP in 2013.
These concessions can be viewed as a way for China to limit Americas regional infuence, a
signifcant outcome of Washingtons push for, and Japanese participation in, TPP. The extent
of Chinas concerns is evident in the frequent requests it has made to participants, especially
the United States, to be open and transparent about the TPP negotiationssomething
that so far has not really happened. The dilemma that China faces is straightforward: to
join TPP is diffcult, because it includes a range of so-called 21
st
century issues such as
regulatory convergence, treatment of state-owned enterprises, the issue of supply chains,
and intellectual property rights. Yet, the cost of not participating could quickly escalate as
more countries, especially major economies like Japan, create a critical mass toward a truly
Asia-Pacifc trade arrangement.
The TPP development has also caused ASEAN to more strongly push for a single market
because TPP splits ASEAN. Since the Philippines has now studied all the pros and cons
of TPP, the likelihood of there soon being fve participating countries from ASEAN has
increased. This division would cast doubt on ASEANs ability to continue to place a
high priority on ASEAN centrality, adding to the impression of an ASEAN rift. The then
Korea nor the Japan-China bilateral investment agreement, Foreign Minister Kishida states
that the joint effort by Japan and Korea led to the inclusion of this IPR provision.
22
With
regard to the provisions of the ISDS, however, METIs brief on the trilateral investment
agreement elucidates that Article 9 (paragraph 2) covers exemptions from ISDS,
23
while
Yasushi Masaki, Deputy Director-General of the Economic Affairs Bureau of MOFA, states
that all breaches of duty qualify for arbitration.
24
Moreover this agreement did not establish
common rules for IPR among the three countries, as written in Article 9 (paragraph 2). In
short, though provisions for IPR should be seen as owing to Japans efforts, it is still unclear
whether they effectively protect the IPR of Japanese companies.
This treaty is not retroactive, on the basis of Article 27 (paragraph 7). Its effect is expected to
enable Japanese companies to claim compensation for lost investments as a result of damage
from anti-Japanese movements, based on Article 12, after the treaty comes into force.
Masaki stated that investors would be able to submit the issue to international arbitration if
property were destroyed by riot or fre.
25
An assessment of the effectiveness of this important
provision has to wait until the next incident.
What Japan sought to achieve in the trilateral investment treaty can be summarized as
binding China to the rule of law, increasing legal stability, and predictability for Japanese
investors as seen in the cases of national treatment, IPR, and ISDS. However, the contents of
the treaty reveal that Japan made compromises with China. This is a factor that makes Japan
more enthusiastic about TPP. Nevertheless, in spite of political and historical tensions that
are not easily resolved, both economic cooperation arrangements have continued to elicit
the cooperation of senior offcials. Japans expectations for trilateral cooperation remain
positive for maintaining dialogue with its nearest neighbors over their shared economic
interests, as a way of improving relations. In fact, in the midst of China and the ROKs
vehement criticism of Abes visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, the three countries negotiators
met to discuss the trilateral FTA in Malaysia on the occasion of RCEP negotiations in
January 2014. They agreed that trade negotiations and political issues should be separated,
adding that trilateral FTA negotiations would keep advancing,
26
refecting Japans approach
of separating politics from economics.
Regional Integration and Japans
Agricultural Liberalization Challenge
Agricultural liberalization is the unresolved issue for Japans further commitment to any
regional integration framework or FTA. Japan has established FTAs with ASEAN and seven
ASEAN member nations, but given its dominant trade and economic position it has an
overwhelming advantage over partner countries in terms of bargaining power. As a result,
in the majority of cases Japan has been able to shelve consideration of the elimination of its
agricultural tariffs, and it has in return used its economic power to offer benefts in the form
of economic cooperation. This pattern enabled Japan to conclude a series of bilateral FTAs
that have avoided any promise of agricultural liberalization. Moreover, in FTAs concluded
between Japan and ASEAN member nations, overall Japan has a lower percentage of items
for which tariffs have been eliminated, despite the other party being a developing country.
For this very reason, however, during negotiations over TPP blocs are likely to be formed
in commencing offcial FTA negotiations, and as mentioned earlier, Chinas concession
occurred only after Japans interest in TPP surfaced in 2011.
Japans interest in an investment treaty rather than an FTA in Northeast Asia was already
revealed in 2004 when Koizumi proposed at the Trilateral Summit in Bali in October 2004
that research on a trilateral investment arrangement be conducted through an industry-
government-academia collaboration. For Japan, an FTA has long been considered diffcult;
liberalization of agricultural products has been the chief stumbling block. This would be
the case in deals with China and Korea too, whereas the investment treaty is greatly desired
by the business community and, moreover, it entails no comparable political sensitivity.
However, China was hesitant to promote an investment treaty because of its content, such
as regarding national treatment, in which foreign companies receive equal treatment to
domestic companies in terms of taxation and bidding procedures. The investment chapter,
which all of Japans bilateral FTAs include, prohibits preference for local contents and
certain investment restrictions, as well as the protection of intellectual property. Cui Tiankai,
Director of Asian Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, thus said, a normal procedure
should frst be the trade liberalization, and then the investment arrangement.
17
Narrowing the gap among the three countries on trilateral cooperation was a lengthy process.
Offcial negotiations toward a trilateral investment treaty fnally commenced in March 2007,
but some events slowed progress on FTA negotiations, such as the China-Japan clash in the
East China Sea in September 2010 and the Great East Japan Earthquake in March 2011. This
impasse was fnally broken by the U.S. and Japanese push for TPP. China suddenly encouraged
Korea to pursue a China-Korea FTA during the visit of Lee Myung-bak in January 2012, which
thetwo sides had never seriously considered before,
18
partly as a means of pressuring Japan
into approaching the trilateral FTA more seriously, given the prospect of Japanese exports
being disadvantaged in the gigantic Chinese market because Korean manufacturing products
would enjoy non-tariff status, as already had happened in the EU and U.S. markets.
19
Japans expectations for the trilateral investment treaty seem overstated. According to METI,
while the treaty would accelerate investment among the three countries and contribute to their
economic growth, it was expected to achieve high-standard protection for investments through
clauses on the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR), prohibition of unauthorized
technology transfer and rejection of local content requirements, as well as the fulfllment of the
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) and fair and equitable treatment.
20
However, while
the treatys function of investment protection can go forward, investment liberalization would
be limited since the treaty could only apply to future investment. As for pre-establishment
national treatment, which eliminates barriers for newly arriving businesses, it cannot resolve
Japanese enterprises longstanding problems in China, including discriminatory requirements
for foreign investors on the need to establish a joint venture with their Chinese counterparts.
21

This passage remains in the treaty thanks to Chinas strong insistence.
The treatys effectiveness for the protection of IPR is unclear. Admittedly, Article 9 of
the trilateral investment treaty (paragraph 1) stipulates, Each Contracting Party shall, in
accordance with its laws and regulations, protect intellectual property rights and Each
Contracting Party shall establish and maintain transparent intellectual property rights
regimes. Although this provision had not been included in either the previous Japan-
Another major agricultural reform the Abe government seeks to implement in preparation
for its commitment to the conclusion of TPP concerns gentan, curtailing rice production
through a reduction in the acreage of rice paddies in exchange for subsidy payments. This
system has been in place for more than 40 years to maintain a higher price of rice through
limiting the crop. It sacrifces consumers interests, while stabilizing rice farmers income,
especially for small-scale, part-time farmers who usually work in factories, retail shops, or
local governments during the regular work week. This means that the portion contributed
by agriculture in their total income is rather small, and that agricultural liberalization,
especially in rice, would not deprive them of a primary source of income. In fact, their
annual income is slightly, but consistently higher than that of average non-agricultural
workers. Gentan can thus be regarded as a political tool for politicians to stably receive
votes and funds from those part-time farmers at a time of local and national elections. Abe
expressed his determination to carry out this agricultural reform in his keynote speech at
the Davos Forum,
31
indicating that gentan would be abandoned fve years from now. This
means that the LDP may be able to soothe part-time rice farmers resentment in the next
elections of both the Upper House and Lower Houseunlikely to be held for two and a
half yearsand not running the risk of losing their votes. This illustrates Abes lukewarm
commitment to farm reforms, anticipating the continued existence of the major obstacle to
Japans leadership in the multiple regional integration initiatives.
Given that market access is generally viewed as the heart and soul of the trade agreement,
as Tim Groser, New Zealand trade minister explains,
32
the stalled bilateral negotiation
on market access between Japan and the United States have served as the most serious
hurdle for the conclusion of TPP. If this trend continued, Japans strong resistance to tariff
reductions or elimination in fve sanctuary agricultural products, as well as Americas
resistance to proposals for the liberalization of the automobile sector, are possible reasons
for negotiations bogging down.
To move forward the TPP market access negotiations with the United States, Japan appears
to rely on the operational logic of the domino theory. Japans best interest in this sense was
to minimize the level of its agricultural liberalization, especially beef and pork products,
for which the United States has strongly demanded to eliminate or substantially reduce
tariffs, while gaining a timetable from the United States to lower current levels of tariffs
on imports of passenger cars (2.5 percent) and light trucks (25 percent). Japan decided to
complete a bilateral FTA with Australia, Americas largest competitor over beef in Japan,
ahead of the TPP by giving Australia preferential market access to its own beef market as
a way for getting concessions from the United States during the bilateral market access
negotiations. Under the agreement Japan promised Australia that the 38.5 percent tariff
on beef from Australia would be scaled down to 19.5 percent for frozen and 30.5 percent
for fresh meat. This Japanese tactic appeared to be effective as Wendy Cutler, Acting
Deputy USTR, acknowledged that an Australia-Japan FTA deal would possibly put U.S.
agricultural exporters at a disadvantage in the Japanese market.
33
Yet, the U.S.-Japan
bilateral deal was not concluded and the joint statement of April 25, 2014 failed to include
any sign of a breakthrough in the bilateral negotiations for TPP, despite the two ministers in
charge of the trade negotiations unprecedentedly spending more than 40 hours together over
a few weeks. A reason behind the failure of the domino logic is Japans persistent hesitation
between the numerous exporting nations that share a common objective of gaining access to
Japans agricultural markets.
The diagram below indicates the products that Japan has never touched in an FTA that it
has signed, and most are agricultural products. Of the 930 items for which tariffs were not
eliminated in FTAs Japan has so far concluded, 850 were agricultural, forestry, or fsheries
products, including rice. Farmers and the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives (known
as Zenchu), which have worked against FTAs in the past, have been particularly vehement
in their stance against TPP as, in principle, it would eliminate all tariffs.
27
Abe, who made a
decision on Japans participation in the wake of his talks with Obama in February 2013, has
encountered strong resistance from his own LDP, which became adamant in calling for the
complete protection of products categorized as sanctuary. Some LDP members urge the
cabinet to follow the Diet resolution on Japans participation in the TPP negotiations, which
stipulates that sensitive agriculture, forestry and fsheries productsincluding rice, wheat
and barley, beef and pork, dairy products, sugar and starch cropsare either to be excluded
from the negotiations or to be subject to renegotiation in order to maintain sustainable
domestic production. Even the gradual elimination of tariffs over a period of more than ten
years is unacceptable.
28
LDP Secretary General Ishiba Shigeru promised to protect these
fve sensitive products from tariff elimination by TPP in the course of the campaign for
Upper House elections in July 2013.
29
In TPP negotiations, nations who share some interest tend to form a coalition to realize
it. Japan is being pressured to concede agricultural protection, including the sanctuary
products, given the liberalization rates of the FTAs signed by TPP members such as the
United States, Australia, and New Zealand, which range from 95 to 100 percent. Japan
desperately needs farm reform in the process of signing TPP, and Japan is now preparing for
eliminating tariffs on almost all fsheries as a part of it.
30
99.4%
100%
97.9%
95.8%
93.5%
90.8%
89.7%
Total 9,018 items
A

l
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
o
n

l
e
v
e
l

e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d

i
n

T
P
P
+ rice
(58 items: polished rice 778%)
+ sugar, starch
(131 items: crude sugar 328%)
+ dairy products
(188 items: buter 360%)
+ wheat, barley, pork & beef
(209 items: barley 256%)
+ footwear, leather, fur, etc.
(95 items: fur coat: 20%)
Agricultural
products of a
sanctuary
(586 items)
Items whose
tarifs have never
been eliminated
(929 items)
+ Konnyku (devils tongue),
fshery products, pineapple, etc.
(248 items: elephant roots 990%)
Figure 1. Japans Agricultural Liberalizaton Within TPP
Source: Nihon Keisai Shimbun (September 5, 2013)
higher tariffs imposed by its larger trading partners such as China, India, and Indonesia,
which more heavily protect their markets, while TPP offers a rule-making, cutting-edge
mechanism through establishing more developed-nation-oriented trade and investment
rules. CJ K has adistinctivefunction for J apan dueto its frustrated relations with Korea
and China over history and territory issues; a political management mechanism through
enhancing ways for increasing mutual economic interdependence.
Yet, agricultural liberalization remains the largest barrier to Japans leadership role in any of
these regional integration frameworks, and its protective position over rice, sugar, pork/beef
or dairy products, together with Americas automobiles, have caused the delay in the TPPs
market access negotiations. If Abe, who enjoys relatively high public support and does not
need to hold national-level elections over the next few years, cannot carry out the elimination
of tariffs on some, not all, agricultural products categorized as sanctuary, there is little
hope for Japans regional integration policy.
Endnotes
1. J. Viner, The Customs Union Issues (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York,
1950).
2. Richard Baldwin, Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocs on the
Path to Global Free Trade, The World Economy, Vol. 29, No. 11 (2006): pp. 1451-1518.
3. Jagdish Bhagwati, Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Agreements Undermine
Free Trade (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008): pp. 43-47.
4. Japan has remained the only bilateral FTA partner for Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei, and
Vietnam.
5. Straits Times, March 15, 2001.
6. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, December 31, 2010.
7. Nippon Keidanren (2007) Nichi EU keizai renkei kyotei ni kansuru kyodo kenkyu o
motomeru, June 12, 2007.
8. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, November 29, 2010.
9. Kenneth Heydon and Stephen Woolcock, Stephen, The Rise of Bilateralism: Comparing
American, European and Asian Approaches to Preferential Trade Agreements (Tokyo: United
Nations University Press, 2009): p. 165.
10. Bangkok Post, November 17, 2012.
11. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, October 22, 2012.
12. Mireya Solis, Last train for Asia-Pacifc Integration?: U.S. Objectives in the TPP
Negotiations WOJUSS Working Paper Series, No. 2. 2011, Waseda University.
13. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), has asserted that if Japan fails to join
TPP, the country would lose 10.5 trillion yen in gross domestic product as of 2020 (about 2%
of GDP), while the Cabinet Offce has estimated that participation in TPP would boost Japans
real GDP by 2.5-3.2 trillion yen by 2018.
14. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (2012). Vietnam is importing almost all of its raw
silk, which is the starting material for textiles, from China, but, for example, this was not able
to satisfy the rules of origin of the ASEAN-India FTA. However, some suggest that if RCEP
comes into force, this problem would likely be solvable.
15. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, November 10, 2011.
towards agricultural liberalization. Japans promised tariff reduction on frozen beef is
limited to 19.5 percent with gradual implementation over 18 years. That is not considered
suffcient for American negotiators; a more substantial tariff cut under a shorter time frame
was presumably needed.
The delay in TPP negotiations has also infuenced the domino effect in regional integration
in East Asia and the Pacifc. Making two signifcant concessions to Japan with a view to
promoting its preferred regional integration frameworks after fnding potential harm to its
trade strategy caused by Japans participation in TPP, China is now taking a see how it goes
approach due to the stalled TPP negotiations.
34
This may signify Chinas disinclination toward
a regional integration framework involving Japan such as CJK FTA, consequently exerting
a negative impact on Japans golden opportunity in its regional integration strategy. Since
China also fnds it attractive to gain preferential market access to Japans agricultural sector,
one of the worlds largest agricultural import markets, Japans liberalization in this sector is
a decisive step in moving forward the negotiations on both TPP and CJK FTA.
Conclusion
After reviewing Japans interest in and approach to TPP, RCEP, and CJK, this article
concludes that they offer different potential benefts, given Japans relatively unique
economic structure in East Asia. Japans markets and exports differ substantially from those
of China and other countries of East Asia. It continues to specialize in high added-value
commodity exports, its international-oriented business sectors have expressed a great deal
of interest in the liberalization of services and investment in the region, its machinery and
automobile companies have extended their production networks broadly across East Asia and
the Pacifc, and the strong competitiveness of its manufacturing products, as demonstrated
by an average tariff rate of less than 3 percent at home, illustrates the openness of domestic
markets. Given the trade and market features that Japan enjoys, the cost of non-participation
in TPP would be high, failing to secure maximum trade and investment benefts as more
countries sign on to form a critical mass. Liberalization of the service and investment
sectors, for example, is quite unlikely to make signifcant progress under RCEP and CJK
FTA, partly because China and developing nations of ASEAN strongly resist this, which
would require transparency about business activities in state-owned companies.
Japan has a signifcant volume of trade with major Asian countries such as China,
India, Thailand, and Indonesia, which do not currently participate in TPP (South Korea
announced its interest in joining in December 2013), and many Japanese companies have
set up a wide range of production networks involving these countries. These non-TPP
members in Asia tend to protect some of their key industries (e.g., China imposes a 25
percent tariff on automobiles); so progress in RCEP or CJK FTA is also important as a tool
to open these key markets to Japanese exports. Accordingly, this complex profusion of
regional integration initiatives presents a golden opportunity for the Japanese economy.
The best scenario is obviously to conclude all of these agreements, increasing the coverage
ratio of Japans overall trade by regional integration partners, including the EU, from
approximately 20 to 85 percent. This fgure would surpass that of Korea. In summary,
RCEP provides Japan a market expansion traditional mechanism through eliminating
18. Asahi Shimbun, January 11, 2011.
19. The FTA discussion between Japan and Korea started as a symbolic policy in 1998, but the
negotiations came to a halt in 2004 when Koizumi Junichiro visited the Yasukuni Shrine,
amid strong opposition to Japans liberalization of fshery products and South Koreas concerns
about its trade defcit with Japan.
20. METI, Brief introduction of the China-Japan-Korea Investment Treaty, 2012, accessed at
http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2012/05/20120513001/20120513001-2.pdf.
21. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, March 27, 2012.
22. Statement by Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio, House of Representative on 24 June 2013,
accessed at http://www.shugiin.go.jp/itdb_kaigiroku.nsf/html/kaigiroku/000518320130614010.
htm.
23. METI, Brief introduction of the China-Japan-Korea Investment Treaty.
24. Statement by Masaki Yasushi in House of Representative, 24 June 2013, http://www.shugiin.
go.jp/itdb_kaigiroku.nsf/html/kaigiroku/000518320130614010.htm.
25. Statement by Masaki Yasushi in House of Representatives, 24 June 2013.
26. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, January 30, 2014.
27. Zenchu demonstrated its political clout on the issue just before the 2011 APEC meeting by
gathering as many as 11.7 million signatures for a petition opposing Japans participation in
TPP.
28. Resolution on Japans participation in the Trans-Pacifc Partnership (TPP) negotiations,
accessed at http://www.sangiin.go.jp/eng/report/standing-committee/20130617-TPP.pdf.
29. Asahi Shimbun, July 14, 2013.
31. Abe, Shinzo, A New Vision from a New Japan, a speech at World Economic Forum
2014 Annual Meeting on Jan. 22, 2014, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/96_abe/
statement/201401/22speech_e.html.
32. The Financial Times, February 25, 2014.
33. Inside U.S. Trade, March 14, 2014.
Korean Bridge: Balancing Asian
Economic Regionalism Between the
United States and China
Jin Kyo Suh
Suh: Balancing Asian Economic Regionalism | 189 188 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
From 2011, TPP was the leading trade policy initiative of the Obama administration. As a
core component of efforts to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacifc region, TPP negotiations
were accelerated. ASEAN also hastened RCEP negotiations with the goal of consolidating
the internal solidarity of the association. At frst, China was wary of RCEP, taking a strong
stance in favor of economic integration only within East Asia,
3
while seeking to prevent
direct confict with the United States by having ASEAN take the lead. Subsequently, China
sought to help ASEAN accelerate the progress of RCEP with broader scope, but not with
the United States. Since Japan showed strong leanings towards TPP from that time, China
shared ASEANs concerns about a centrifugal force arising to split asunder the economic
integration of East Asia. In addition to the U.S.-led TPP, the fact that preparations are
underway for negotiations for a CJK FTA has caused ASEAN to move up its proposal for
forming RCEP. Because of such concern, ASEAN has more vigorously promoted RCEP in
an effort to maintain its centrality in regional economic integration by not falling behind
the momentum elsewhere.
ASEANs efforts have apparently largely been for naught. The TPP alliance was expanded
and even strengthened by Japans participation. The CJK FTA negotiations, which remained
elusive until the end of 2012, were launched and even fnished their third formal meeting in
November 2013. Now there is doubt that ASEAN will preserve its centrality by shepherding
RCEP to a successful conclusion. Taking into account these new circumstances, it is time for
ASEAN to search for ways to preserve its centrality in economic integration and to discuss
its troubles frankly with large economies in the region as well as ASEAN member countries.
China is presumably much less comfortable with Japans participation in TPP, which it
has regarded as the U.S. effort to encircle it. It is obvious that the current TPP contains
many provisions that China would fnd unacceptable, at least in the near future, such as
state-owned enterprises (SOE) regulations and increased intellectual property rights (IPR)
protection. Although Chinas attitude towards TPP has softened in recent months, with some
offcials and analysts recently arguing that China should participate, this is unlikely in the
near future. Therefore, China has responded by forging ahead with RCEP and its own FTA
negotiations, including the CJK FTA. Development of RCEP could receive strong backing
from both China and ASEAN; however, prospects for the CJK FTA have turned darker.
The CJK FTA defnitely has large benefts for the three Northeast Asian countries and
signifcant implications for global multilateral trade. It can also be regarded as a stepping-
stone for successful conclusion of RCEP negotiations; however, there are signifcant hurdles
that make its expeditious completion or even bilateral FTAs between Japan and China or
between Japan and Korea extremely diffcult. In particular, historical issues and unsettled
territorial disputes continue to cause uncertainty in the future of CJK FTA negotiations.
4
Korea has dealt with the delicate balance between the United States and China. It signed the
KORUS FTA and is now negotiating a bilateral FTA with China. Moreover, Korea is playing
a major role in RCEP negotiations. With the KORUS FTA, and agreements with other TPP
partners (Australia, Canada, Chile, Peru, Singapore, and ASEAN) already in place,
5
Korea
was confdent that it could join TPP at a later date. However, Japans recent entry changes
its calculus. Entry into TPP would give Japan a stronger bargaining position in its other
The debate on TPP versus RCEP has been widely recognized as a struggle between the
United States and China for expanding their infuence in the Asia-Pacifc region, and it
is now commonplace for scholars to discuss the rivalry between the two agreements.
1

Both the TPP and RCEP agreements could invigorate the sluggish Asia-Pacifc economy
by promoting trade liberalization and economic integration; however, the story is not so
simple because they have been recognized as being a political tool as well as economic
drivers. An important change occurred on March 15, 2013 when Prime Minister Abe Shinzo
announced that Japan would formally seek to join the negotiations to establish TPP, in
which the United States leads. Japan became the 12
th
member of the negotiations at the
18
th
round on July 2013 and now leads the TPP negotiations with the United States. From
its perspective, Japans participation in TPP might be the best option for revitalizing its
economy and restoring its growth.
2
At the same time, it caused the equilibrium between the
competing TPP and RCEP to shift toward TPP.
TPP aims to be a 21
st
century trade agreement that sets the rules for trade and investment
in the Asia-Pacifc region going forward. Achieving this goal will require other major
economies in the region to join TPP with the intention of ultimately becoming a FTA
of the Asia-Pacifc (FTAAP). Japans participation in TPP will give added momentum
towards this goal. As the second largest economy in Asia and the third largest economy
in the world, Japans participation would be pivotal to enhancing the credibility and
viability of TPP as a regional FTA. With Japan, TPP covers roughly 40 percent of global
GDP as compared to 30 percent by RCEP countries. Furthermore, Japans entry into
the TPP talks gave further impetus to other countries. Korea expressed its interest in
joining the ongoing negotiations for TPP late last year. The Philippines and Thailand are
watching the TPP negotiations with an eye to joining. The TPP with Japan creates the
impetus for China, Korea, and ASEAN to reconsider Asia-Pacifc economic regionalism
and to modify their regional integration.
ASEAN is on the ropes and will again worry about the possibility of marginalization in the
process of Asian economic integration. The sudden rise of RCEP is, in fact, closely related
to the rise of the U.S.-led TPP, including the China, Japan, and Korea (CJK) FTA. ASEAN, a
group comprised of relatively small countries, entered into the ASEAN FTA (AFTA) in 1992
and began a step-by-step liberalization of trade. RCEP has built an ASEAN+1 FTA network
throughout greater Asia with ASEAN occupying the pivotal position. Most likely ASEAN
was able to take the helm of the region because RCEP was put forward in an effort to avoid
confict and rivalry between China and Japan and because stable economic growth makes it
an attractivecandidate.
From 2010, however, ASEAN was worried that the U.S.-led TPP could weaken ties in ASEAN
and might marginalize the association. Four of the ASEAN 10 (Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam,
and Malaysia) have already joined the TPP talks, causing concern that the association could
split into two: TPP-ASEAN and non-TPP ASEAN. The option of ASEAN joining the TPP
as a region would be possible, but those countries whose level of development are lagging,
such as Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, could not accept high-quality market access with
few exemptions and extensive regulatory alignment that TPP pursues.
further than the WTO in a range of areas, including intellectual property rules, services,
and non-tariff barriers such as standards. Additionally, it addresses so-called WTO-plus
issues by including commitments in areas such as investment access and protection, trade
facilitation, competition, and environmental and labor policy.
(2) TPP as a Mechanism for De Facto Isolation of China in East Asia. Koreas entrance
into TPP could cause serious imbalance in the two competing region-wide FTAs, as noted
above. Although the TPP seeks to be a living agreementmeaning that other countries
can join at any time and other areas of trade can be added to the agreement in the futurethe
high standards are thought to be too big a barrier for China to overcome in the foreseeable
future. While TPP does not intend to marginalize China in East Asia, it is also true that the
content of TPP is beyond Chinas acceptance limit.
Chinese leaders recognize that a series of policy changes are needed if they are to sustain
economic growth, ensure social stability, and restore the tarnished legitimacy of the
communist party. However, they fully understand that rapid market reform is not a feasible
pathway to this end. China cannot participate in TPP negotiations, at least in the near future,
because it could result in both rapid and unsettling reform of its fundamental economic and
social structure. Therefore, from Chinas point of view, the living agreement idea can be
seen as a purely rhetorical device. China may believe that Japans successful entry into the
TPP negotiations means that the United States has taken a step forward in encircling it. In
this situation, a decision by Korea to join TPP could be absolutely undesirable for China
and could provoke a serious imbalance in two competing mega region-wide FTAs: TPP
and RCEP. Already suffering from diminishing competitiveness, China is keen to avoid any
further hits to its trade position, which it would view through the lens of geopolitics as well
as economics. The impact could be dangerous for regional stability.
Table 1. TPP versus RCEP: GDP and Trade (Unit: Billion US Dollars, %)
TPP
RCEP
TPP11 TPP12 TPP13
GDP
22,824 27,831 29,029 20,983
(31.1) (37.9) (39.5) (28.6)
Trade
7,858 9,543 10,610 13,160
(21.2) (25.8) (28.7) (35.5)
Note: TPP11: Japan is excluded. TPP12: TPP11 + Japan. TPP13: TPP12 + Korea. The fgure in
parenthesis is both the GDP and trade share of each agreement, compared to world GDP and world
trade. GDP is based on the 2013 data, and trade is based on 2012 data.
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (October 2013); WTO, World Trade Statistics 2013
outstanding trade negotiations, such as RCEP and the accord with China and South Korea.
In fact, Japan is becoming a linchpin in the overall process of region-wide FTA formations,
which Korea had hoped to become after the KORUS FTA.
In summation, in regional context, there appears to be an economic and geopolitical contest
between TPP and RCEP. The CJK FTA is also inextricably connected to the regions strategic
environment and the alternative FTAs of TPP and RCEP. With those complicated competing
negotiations being pressed by the United States, China, Japan, and ASEAN, how these
agreements evolve over time will greatly affect the structure of the Asia-Pacifc economy
in the years ahead, and even the political relationship between the United States and China.
Because of Koreas wide-ranging FTA networks, its decisions on economic regionalism will
be an important signal of its vision for the future of Asia and the leadership it can exert. This
chapter examines its options and the various strategies that Korea could employ to balance
the pressures from China and the United States, while gaining the most economic beneft
from the potential regional integration. With this in mind, the following sections focus on
Korean thinking about both TPP and RCEP in terms of global trade fows and geopolitical
impact and consider Korean views of what is the right balance in Asia-Pacifc economic
regionalism between the two great powers.
Koreas Views on TPP and RCEP
TPP and Korea
(1) TPP as a New Global Standard for Future International Trade. TPP clearly has potential
to be a new global standard for international trade. With 29 chapters under negotiation, TPP
partners seek new disciplines on certain activities not heretofore addressed in both FTAs and
the WTO. For example, TPP deals with new issues such as regulatory coherence, supply chain
competitiveness, and small-and medium-sized enterprises. This is a major reason why TPP is
called a 21
st
century regional FTA. If concluded as envisioned, it could serve as a template for
a future global trade pact among WTO as well as APEC members.
Currently ranking as the 7
th
largest exporter and 12
th
largest economy in the world, Korea
cannot help having great interest in the new rules and standards under negotiation by current
TPP partners.
6
TPP will seriously affect Koreas exports to 12 TPP member countries as well
as to non-TPP countries. Furthermore, TPP could infuence the shape of Koreas trade policy
for the foreseeable future. Korea has a strong incentive to participate in the TPP negotiations
as soon as possible in order to put its own interests into the rule-making process on 21
st

century new trade issues before the negotiations are fnalized. Last December, Wendy Cutler,
acting Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, said it would be very diffcult for any country,
including Korea, to join the ongoing TPP negotiations, noting that the TPP talks are already
in the end game. However, given the substantive disagreements among TPP negotiators on
market access, intellectual property protection, and state-owned enterprises, it is conceivable
that the negotiations could extend into 2015.
Since Korea is already well prepared to embrace the rigorous standards of TPP, as they
closely refect provisions negotiated in the KORUS FTA and Korea-EU FTA, the adjustment
costs of membership are estimated as not very onerous. For instance, the KORUS FTA goes
elimination of tariffs on Japanese vehicles.
9
Such a big cost, although it may be smaller
than the long-run gains, would be one of the major hurdles for Korea to enter into the
gate of TPP. These domestic constraints have weighed heavily on the decision of whether
to join TPP.
(4) Uncertain Expected Gains from TPP. Korea is expected to reap signifcant long-term
benefts from joining TPP.
10
Furthermore, the benefts of membership are manifold: greater
bargaining power in ongoing negotiations with China and Japan to tackle non-tariff barriers,
the rationalization of its FTA noodle bowl of multiple trade rules, and the consolidation
of a forward-leaning alliance with the United States. However, there exist different views
on how much Korea would really gain. First, the KORUS FTA and other separate free
trade pacts with TPP countries will reduce the additional gains from the TPP pact. Second,
although members have agreed to pursue a single set of TPP rules of origin, they are pursuing
different approaches to developing a TPP tariff schedule. The United States has maintained
that it was negotiating market access bilaterally and only with the TPP partners with which it
did not have an FTA. Other participants have sought to negotiate plurilateral market access
schedules. Thus, without frm harmonization of TPP rules of origin, the TPP may end up
undermining the global trade system by adding more noodles to the bowl. Third, it is
unclear exactly how TPP will address supply chains. China is, in fact, at the center of Asias
trade growth and is a key link in global supply chains in Asia. The trade share of most Asian
countries with China is higher than 10 percent. Even the U.S. import share from China is
more than 19 percent. Therefore, the Asian supply chain without China would seem like an
agreement with a big hole.
Table 3. Koreas Merchandise Trade with Japan
(Unit: Billion US Dollars, %)
2000 2005 2010 2013
Total
Export 20.5 24.0 28.2 34.5
Import 31.8 48.4 64.3 60.0
Balance (A) -11.4 -24.4 -36.1 -25.3
Manufactured
products
Export 18.6 22.6 26.3 32.7
Import 31.4 48.0 63.7 59.6
Balance (B) -12.8 -25.4 -37.4 -26.9
Machine & Vehicles
Export 8.4 8.4 9.5 10.3
Import 17.3 21.3 24.5 21.9
Balance (C) -8.9 -12.9 -15.0 -11.6
B/A 1.13 1.04 1.04 1.07
C/B 0.70 0.51 0.40 0.43
Source: KITA (Korea International Trade Association), Trade Statistics (www.kita.net)
China is the most important trading partner of Korea. The bilateral trade agreement with China
covers a quarter of Koreas exports. The trade surplus with China amounted to more than
$53 billion in 2012, which is almost twice Koreas total trade surplus, similarly calculated
in 2013. In addition, China has infuence on North Koreas decision-making, which directly
relates to the national security of South Korea. These signifcant factors cannot be ignored.
As a middle power in this region, Korea needs to pursue a balanced position in the process
of Asia-Pacifc economic integration, not only economically but also politically. In other
words, Korea should prepare for entrance into the TPP negotiations but at the same time
should guarantee that its participation in TPP is not harmful to the interests of China.
Early conclusion of the bilateral FTA negotiations with China is one way to provide such
reassurance. Exerting maximum effort for RCEP negotiations to make rapid progress is
another. Both the bilateral FTA with China and RCEP could serve as a kind of insurance,
preparing for the non-participation of Korea in TPP, should it be found that the cost of
membership would be excessive.
(3) TPP as Requesting Expensive Entry Fees for Korea. Although the cost of TPP
membership is estimated as not onerous, that estimation does not take into full account
market access for goods. In its bilateral consultations with TPP partners, Korea may
liberalize its sensitive items (e.g., rice or certain manufacturing sectors such as vehicles)
further at the request of each of the current TPP countries.
7
This could impose costs many
are unwilling to bear. Korea has fnished the frst round of bilateral consultations with current
TPP members. It is said that Korea took a strong defensive position over manufactured
goods in the negotiations with Japan.
8
Currently Korean farmers strongly oppose its participation in TPP because they
recognize TPP to be the second KORUS FTA and the TPP pursues much more ambitious
liberalization targets. They seem to believe that the United States could demand the
full liberalization of the Korean rice market, which is excluded in the market access of
KORUS FTA. Many manufacturing enterprises think that TPP is a de facto bilateral FTA
with J apan and aredeeply concerned that their enterprises would beadversely affected
by Japanese competition. Thus, in return for entry into the TPP talks, Korea may have to
pay a signifcant price such as full liberalization of the agricultural market or immediate
Table 2. Koreas Merchandise Trade with China (2012-13)
Total (A) With China (B) (B/A)
2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013
Export 547,870 559,649 134,323 145,837 0.245 0.261
Import 519,584 515,561 80,785 83,037 0.155 0.161
Balance 28,285 44,088 53,538 62,799 1.893 1.424
Source: KITA (Korea International Trade Association), Trade Statistics
RCEP and Korea
(1) RCEP as a Strong Rival of TPP in Regional Integration in Asia. RCEP includes
more than 3.4 billion people, has a combined GDP of about $21 trillion, and accounts for
about 35 percent of world trade. If concluded successfully, RCEP would create the worlds
largest trading bloc and has major implications for not only the Asian economy but also the
world economy. In particular, it would be a powerful vehicle to support the spread of global
production networks and reduce the ineffciencies of multiple Asian FTAs that exist presently.
It is often said that the RCEP is less ambitious than TPP, because of the fexibility clause
built into its negotiating principles.
12
However, fexibility is RCEPs strength, allowing
common objectives to be pursued over different paths and the interests of the less-developed
members to be met. An important characteristic of Asian societies is their diversity. Cross-
cultural diversity adds to the exotic nature of Asia as a gigantic melting pot of diverse
Figure 2. RCEPs Share of the World: Populaton, GDP, and Trade
(unit %)
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
7 7
11
49
29
35 35
38
35
29
23
19 19
27
21
16
RCEP TPP EU NAFTA RCEP TPP EU NAFTA
RCEP TPP EU NAFTA RCEP TPP EU NAFTA
Populaton GDP
Import Export
Note: Intra-EU trade (both imports and exports) is excluded
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (Oct. 2013); WTO, World Trade Statistics 2013
Petri, Plummer, and Zhai estimated that RCEP would yield income gains by the year 2025
equivalent to 4.1 percent of GDP, which is almost two times higher than that of TPP.
11
Some
Korean scholars argue that Korea should be prioritizing the RCEP negotiations, including
CJK trilateral FTA negotiations. Koreas exports to the RCEP economies were $285 billion
in 2013, which is more than 50 percent of its total exports.
Table 4. Merchandise Trade of Major Asia Pacifc Countries with China
(Unit: %)
Export Share (to China) Import Share (from China)
Korea 26.1 16.1
Japan 18.1 21.7
ASEAN 11.4 14.8
Australia 29.5 18.2
New Zealand 15.0 16.4
India 5.0 11.0
United Sates 7.7 19.2
Note: The share is the percentage of exports (imports) going to (from) China to total exports
(imports) of a country or region. Figures of ASEAN, Australia, New Zealand, and India are 2012
statistics and other fgures are 2013 statistics.
Source: KITA (Korea International Trade Association), Trade Statistics, MOF (Ministry of Finance),
Trade Statistics of Japan, USDA, US Census Bureau, IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics
60%
50%
40%
30 %
20%
10%
0%
32.2
TPP EU ASEAN RCEP CJK
30.1
47.4
12.6 9.8
Trade Share (%) Export Share (%)
31.9 32.3
50.9
14.7
8.7
Note: Trade means the sum of exports and imports
Source: KITA (Korea International Trade Association), Trade Statistics
Figure 1. Koreas Trade and Exports: Shares to Selected Trade Groupings
(2013)
expand ASEANs role in coordinating regional free trade negotiations, RCEP could help
regionalize the sophisticated global production networks that make Asia the worlds factory.
It would also reduce the overlap among Asian FTAs, lest Asia becomes a confusing noodle
bowl of multiple trade rules.
TPP and RCEP may end up either providing ballast to the global trading systemand bringing
some coherence to the many regional FTAsor undermining it, by adding more noodles
to the bowl. To achieve the frst scenario, the agreements need to be complementary and
outward looking, i.e., they should minimize discrimination towards non-members and be
open to adding new members. The worst-case scenario is for these agreements to become
competing, exclusive blocs with very little overlap in membership. It is already clear that it
will be diffcult for China to join TPP given the high hurdles to membership, and the U.S.
Congress will not easily facilitate U.S. membership in RCEP.
Many analysts, noting the absence of China, regard TPP as a geopolitical club masquerading
as a free-trade one. Until recently, some Chinese leaders described TPP as a plot designed to
contain Chinas rise. In this situation it is not easy for Korea to decide to join TPP; however,
it does not want to be excluded in the rule-setting process for future global trade norms.
This leads to a dual track approach. On the one hand, Korea pursues entry into TPP. On
the other, it makes the utmost effort to conclude RCEP by 2015, based on the completion
of a bilateral FTA with China. This is almost the same idea as that of a new FTA roadmap
in June 2013, in which Korea plays the role of a linchpin between the integrated market of
East Asia centered around China and the pan-Pacifc market led by the United States. The
synergy effects of acting as a bridge in these mega trade negotiations could be substantial.
This could play out in threesteps.
Step 1-A: Early Conclusion of the Korea-China FTA. This could beacrucial precondition
for the successful conclusion of the RCEP talks as well as the CJK FTA negotiations. It
would also strengthen Koreas bargaining leverage when it starts to consult with existing
TPP partners on joining the negotiations, while serving as a kind of insurance, preparing
for non-participation in TPP, should the costs prove to be excessive. Since the KORUS
FTA has already come into effect, the completion of Korea-China FTA talks has added
signifcance for Korea.
Step 1-B: Start of Bilateral Consultations with TPP Members. Korea has already
expressed its interest in joining TPPits application for membership is really a matter of
time. Then, the faster it joins TPP, the lower the entrance fees. At present it is proceeding
with bilateral consultations with the current TPP countries simultaneously. A fnal decision
on entry would be subject to the results of the bilateral consultations as well as the progress
of the bilateral FTA negotiations with China. Korea has to keep open the possibility that it
will not join TPP after all. If the entry costs are small enough for Korea to bear, then Korea
should fnish the China-Korea FTA negotiations quickly and, at the same time, enter into
the TPP negotiations.
Step 2: Acceleration of the CJK FTA. This step is a natural result of step 1. In addition, the
CJK FTA could be a stepping-stone to reach a successful conclusion in RCEP negotiations.
Korea needs to accelerate the trilateral negotiations in a balanced manner. Agreement on
cultures. Thus, fexibility is an essential factor for allowing Asian countries to integrate.
Because of this, RCEP could be superior to TPP in regional economic integration.
13
Thelevel
of market access in RCEP could be lower than that in TPP, but RCEP could embrace more
economies. Thus, RCEP, if completed successfully, can be insurance to Korea and China,
including other ASEAN states outside TPP.
(2) RCEP Needs Strong Leadership Based on ASEAN Centrality. Flexibility could be a
beneft or a bane for RCEP. While it could help break deadlocks and fnd compromises among
disparate national interests, it could also limit change or curtail progress in achieving greater
liberalization. Unless there is enough political will to close potential loopholes disguised as
fexibility and pursue reforms deeper than those ever before attempted, RCEPs future as
a consolidated bloc remains uncertain. Strong leadership is indispensable to concluding the
negotiations successfully.
Leadership should be based on ASEAN centrality. China and Japan might not trust each
other, but ASEAN is believed to be impartial. In fact, Japan has been searching for a way to
manage the rise of China, largely through its relationship with the United States. ASEAN
fears Chinas military threat on the issue of the South China Sea, too. ASEAN knows that
being too close to China or the United States is harmful to its unity. It can retain centrality by
using the ASEAN Way of consultation and consensus to accommodate all the voices and
needs of its members. In this respect, Korea should play the key role of regional mediator
between China and ASEAN.
(3) RCEP as a Tool for Managing the Rise of China. ASEAN is concerned that China
will eventually dominate East Asia through a China-led East Asia Community. Some
countries, especially Myanmar and Vietnam, have actively engaged in strategic balancing
between China and the United States. They seek more robust economic and strategic
relationships with the United States to hedge against Chinas threat. Thus, RCEP based
on ASEAN centrality can be used to check the rise of China. ASEAN has long been
considered neutralit is not dominated by a great power. Fear of such domination may
prompt ASEAN to strengthen itself and maintain unity, safeguard the consensus principle,
and engage more carefully with regional powers.
Conclusion: Dual Track Approach
Initially a trade pact envisaged by Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore, TPP was
transformed in 2008 when the United States expressed its interest. It has expanded to 12
members. In particular, Japans entry into the negotiations brings a critical mass to a deal
that, if completed, would cover countries that account for two-ffths of global output. The
TPP agreement is ambitious in terms of not only its size, but also the scope and scale of its
liberalization. If the United States also concluded a FTA agreement with the EU, it would
have signed deals with countries accounting for two-thirds of global output. TPP, in other
words, could be part of a grand strategy to conclude an only slightly less ambitious version
of the Doha round by other means.
RCEP starts with fexibility in its guiding principles, allowing differential treatment for
developing countries while still aiming for a high-standard agreement. While it would
5. Recently Korea concluded bilateral FTA negotiations with Canada.
6. In this respect, other major developing countries, such as China, Brazil, and India, may have
the same view as Korea.
7. Rice has been excluded in every previous FTA agreement that Korea concluded.
8. The lack of market opening in agricultural goods and pervasive NTBs in Japan was considered
to be the reason for the Korea-Japan FTA negotiations breakdown. At the same time,
Koreas concerns with an increase in the trade defcit from trade with Japan and the fear of
manufacturing competition, especially for small and medium sized enterprises, are other major
reasons.
9. In past bilateral FTA talks, Japan requested the immediate elimination of Korean barriers to
manufactured goods as well as some exceptions or other protective measures for Japanese
agricultural goods.
10. Petri, Peter A., Michael G. Plummer, Fan Zhai. The Trans-Pacifc Partnership and Asia-Pacifc
Integration: A Quantitative Assessment, Policy Analyses in International Economics 98
(Washington: Peterson Institute for Economics, 2012).
11. The larger gains from RCEP refect the opening of China, with which there is no preexisting
FTA, and the benefts of eliminating the larger external barriers of many Asian countries.
12. The fexibility clauses said, RCEP will include appropriate forms of fexibility including
provision for special and differential treatment, plus additional fexibility to the least-developed
ASEAN Member States.
13. In this respect, RCEP member economies need to consider the expansion of RCEP to include
other economies such as Taiwan.
the Korea-China FTA could be a useful template for the CJK FTA talks. If Japan opened its
agricultural market in TPP, this could also be advantageous for accelerating negotiations
on the CJK FTA, as agricultural products are considered a diffcult problem for the three
states. However, the tension between China and Japan would make the CJK FTA diffcult in
the foreseeable future. Thus, Korea has to exert utmost effort for progress in the CJK FTA,
at the same time leaving room to bypass it in favor of the reduced form of RCEP directly
without the CJK FTA.
Step 3: Creation of a Reduced Form of the RCEP. RCEP is scheduled to conclude by the
end of 2015; however, it will not be easy. Large countries may be reluctant to respect the
central role of ASEAN. The fexibility clause could help break deadlocks, but could also
curtail progress in achieving greater liberalization. In addition, varying internal policies of
countries could prove to be diffcult to harmonize and consolidate under RCEP. RCEP could
still be put at risk because of tensions between its members, especially China and Japan.
The South China Sea dispute involving China and several ASEAN countries also could
reverberate in this manner.
In this situation, a more productive strategy is to see a streamlined trade agreement as one
of the several steps that will be needed for an RCEP that embraces a more comprehensive
program of regional economic integration and development. RCEP participants should not
have to wait for a single trade liberalization by all participants and for agreement on all new
rules before taking up the other opportunities for benefcial economic integration. RCEP can
seek to achieve a signifcant initial down payment on trade liberalization and lock in progress
towards ambitious end-point goals. The meaning of reduced form of RCEP can be either a
reduced number of participants or a reduced context of market liberalization.
Korea needs to attempt to handpick the best features of existing Asian FTAs and use them
as a basis for further negotiations for RCEP. Like early-harvest Bali packages in the Doha
Round, a reduced form of RCEP can also be a useful interim solution for the fnal agreement.
In this Asian track, Korea could play a balanced role among China, Japan, and ASEAN
nations. Furthermore, based on the FTAs with China and the United States, it could assume
a major role in linking RCEP with the U.S.-led TPP. These steps are not very different from
a new roadmap for trade policy announced by the Park Geun-hye administration, which
puts special emphasis on Koreas linchpin role in regional economic integration in East Asia
through a new FTA with China and the already signed agreement with the United States.
Endnotes
1. This article is revised from, Koreas Perspectives on the TPP, which was presented at the
Conference on the Trans-Pacifc Partnership and Taiwans Future Development Strategy at
Stanford University, October 11-12, 2013. I am grateful to John Dyck of ERS/USDA for
valuable comments.
2. According to many estimates, Japans economy would be about 2.5 percent larger in 2015 with
TPP than it would be without TPP.
3. In fact, China proposed the EAFTA (East Asia FTA), which is based on ASEAN+3, and
actively promotes the integration of Asia on this basis, not paying much attention to ASEANs
central position as the driver of Asian reorganization.
4. The tension between Japan and China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, including the tension
between Korea and Japan over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands would make the CJK diffcult to
achievein any case.
Chinas Choice: To Lead or to Follow
on Asian Economic Integraton
Zhang Xiaotong
Zhang: Chinas Choice to Lead or Follow on Asian Economic Integraton | 203 202 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Pacifc offensive, matched by the EUs looking-east strategy. Slowly, China has started
to respond, but it remains indecisive, hesitating between multilateralism and bilateralism.
It seems that China has yet to decide whether to fll the vacuum left by the U.S. strategic
withdrawal from the multilateral frontier. In the Asia-Pacifc region, China seems equally
uncertain about which path it should take:10+3, RCEP, APEC, or TPP. China might eventually
use all of them, but it is still an open question which path should be prioritized given Chinas
limited resources and capacity. The following three sections discuss the implications of TPP,
TTIP, and EU-Japan FTAs for China, mainly from the perspective of economics.
The Implications of TPP for China
In many ways, Chinas Asia-Pacifc strategy was a response to the overall context of the U.S.
pivot towards Asia and the U.S. discovery of TPP as a geostrategic vehicle for reasserting
its infuence in the Asia-Pacifc. Here, we focus our analysis on TPPs economic and rules-
setting impact on China. First, the completion of TPP would have a signifcant negative
impact on Chinas economy. Petris study shows that the presence of the TPP would have
reduced Chinas GDP by $1 billion in 2014, as much as $28 billion by 2020, and an even
larger $47 billion by 2025, ultimately lowering Chinas GDP by roughly 0.3 percent. Such
a negative impact mainly results from the trade diversion effects it causes. By 2025, those
effects would lead to a loss of 1.2 percent of Chinas exports, equivalent to $57 billion.
2
Second, TPP might have some positive effects on China since it is linked to Chinas new
reform and opening-up agenda. The 3
rd
Plenary Session of the 18
th
Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party laid out a reform blueprint, prioritizing the role of the market, calling
for SOE reform, more competition, fewer monopolies, and equal treatment of SOEs and
privately-owned enterprises. Labor rights, environmental standards, and intellectual property
protection are equally put onto the reform agenda. Taking services and investment rules as an
example, TPP adopts the pre-establishment national treatment and negative list approach, as
China is now doing in the process of building the Shanghai Free Trade Zone and negotiating
relatively ambitious bilateral investment treaties respectively with the United States and the
EU. The government is now pushing through a new round of administrative regime reform,
aimed at changing its role and further opening up China to the world.
Competition policy is another example showing the delicate link between the TPP and
Chinas reform agenda. TPP advocates competition neutrality, asking the host country
to restrain its own SOEs, reducing market distortions due to the privileges of SOEs, and
leveling the playing feld. For many years, Chinese SOEs have been seen as frst among
equals in Chinas corporate world. It is predictably a challenge for China to reform its
own SOE sector.
To summarize, TPP does potentially have trade diversion effects on China, as well as competition
pressure on China for further adjustment, coinciding with its new reform and opening-up
agenda. However, the interesting linkage between TPPs inductive role and Chinas reform
needs will not be automatically translated into reform achievements. The domestic resistance,
which Chinese reformers now face, is much stronger than in the early 1990s.
For many years, the major trading countries coexisted comfortably under a multilateral
trading system. Major trade liberalizations were agreed upon multilaterally. In most cases,
trade disputes were resolved peacefully under the WTO dispute settlement system. The
industrialized economies even reached a gentlemens agreement that no bilateral FTA should
be reached among them at the expense of the multilateral route of trade liberalization. All
this is about to end. Trading nations are now forging free trade alliances on their own,
fragmenting the world trading system and making trade diversions prevalent. Every country
is feeling less secure and going for more FTAs. This situation might give rise to a warring
states scenario (as in ancient China), which could replace the Congress of Viennas system
of international trade. China is now accelerating the pace of negotiating FTAs, in particular
in Asia, largely in response to developments in the negotiations of the TPP, TTIP, and other
regional initiatives for economic integration. This chapter discusses the internal and external
contexts that China faces, its responses so far, and its possible future behavior, with a focus
on the steps it is taking in Asian economic integration.
Context
We are probably now in a period of post-multilateralism, or of weak multilateralism. The Pax
Americana, which was secured frst by American hegemony and later by institutions such as
GATT/WTO, is largely gone. The rise of BRICS and the relative decline of the United States
and the EU, largely due to the global fnancial crisis and the Euro debt crisis, have changed
the balance of power of the WTO system. The 2003 Cancun WTO Ministerial Conference
started to witness the emergence of a new negotiating group consisting of India, Brazil,
China, and other developing countries, at loggerheads with the developed economies. One
negotiation after another failed, and one deadline after another was missed. The Doha Round
was frequently in crisis. Fundamentally, the changed relationship in relative power between
a large developing country group and the U.S.-EU-led developed economies has made the
existing WTO negotiating mechanism and even the negotiating agenda anachronistic. The
United States and the EU fnally decided to withdraw from the multilateral negotiating
table and move to the regional stage. The Asia-Pacifc is obviously the ideal choice since it
represents the most vibrant part of todays world economy.
For the United States, it is a strategic withdrawal from multilateralism, which is rooted
in its traditional instrumentalism vis--vis multilateralism.
1
The U.S. strategic shift from
multilateralism to bilateralism/regionalism was equally driven by its geostrategic interests.
The Asia-Pacifc region is equally important for economic and security objectives. As
President Obama made clear, he is a Pacifc president. For the EU, the shift is mainly driven
by geo-economic interests, as the Asia-Pacifc region is an essential part of the global supply
chain for European companies.
The U.S. pivot to Asia, and the EUs looking-East have caught China by surprise. For a
decade, it had been integrating with East Asia through two vehiclesthe China-ASEAN
FTA and the so-called 10+3 framework, namely ASEAN plus China, Japan, and South
Korea. If we decide that the United States had to withdraw from the multilateral front due to
the decline of its relative strength and its lack of capacity for providing global public goods,
the United States still had suffcient strengths and intellectual leadership to launch an Asia-
(electrical machinery, equipment and parts, telecommunications equipment, sound recorders,
television recorders), 71 (pearls, stones, prec. stones, precious metals, imitation jewelry,
coins), 73 (articles of iron or steel), and 94 (furniture, bedding, cushions, lamps and lighting
fttings, Nesol, illuminated signs, nameplates and the like, prefabricated buildings) is less
than 2 percent. Therefore, using the data in Table 1, we conclude that the trade diversion
effects would be marginal even though those chapters represent exports to the United States
worth more than $250 billion.
In the EU market, the tariff level for Chs. 29 (see above), 87 (see above), 39 (see above)
and 40 (rubbers and articles thereof) are high (more than 4 percent). Chinese exports
would face signifcant trade diversion once the tariffs were removed for U.S. exports to
the EU market under those chapters. We estimate that the affected value would be around
20.6 billion Euros. Since the tariff level for Chs. 84 (see above), 90 (see above) and 85
(see above) is between 2 percent and 4 percent, we believe that the trade diversion would
Table 1. Comparison Among Chinese, U.S. and European Exports in 2012
Export Share (to China) Import Share (from China)
HS2 China HS2 EU HS2 China HS2 U.S.
85 113,322 84 65,783 85 76556 84 38368
84 102,164 87 45,449 84 61964 27 19719
94 24,786 30 38,889 62 14738 30 19166
95 23,104 27 25,603 61 12495 90 19085
64 17,876 90 25,599 94 12260 88 15548
61 15,552 29 24,094 95 11386 85 14075
62 15,299 85 22,752 64 7788 29 10551
39 13,158 98 16,233 39 6619 71 9737
73 10,120 22 11,727 73 6528 87 8561
87 10,003 88 10,503 29 6396 39 5673
90 9,043 71 8,029 90 6328 38 4361
42 8,890 73 7,188 42 6081 97 2284
63 6,761 39 6,796 87 4698 99 1922
29 6,668 97 6,385 63 3104 73 1806
40 5,028 72 6,038 89 2953 33 1735
83 4,088 33 5,513 40 2859 40 1734
71 3,725 28 4,531 72 2637 8 1604
44 3,493 38 4,261 83 2596 26 1523
82 3,241 40 3,804 82 2344 28 1518
48 2,787 94 3,550 71 2292 48 1328
Data Sources: USITC, Eurostat
6
The Implications of TTIP for China
There are two types of implications of TTIP for China: 1) trade diversion effects, which
are mainly focused on the diversion of trade in goods; and 2) effects on rules.
Trade Diversion effects refer to trade that occurs between members of an FTA that replaces
what would have been imports from a country outside the FTA. In other words, if the United
States and the EU establish an FTA, Chinas exports would decline owing to being crowded
out by the increase of the EUs exports to the U.S. market or of U.S. exports to the EU.
Specifcally, we use ESI (Export Similarity Index) to calculate the competing relationship
between Chinese and European exports, as well as between Chinese and American exports.
The ESI range is between 0 and 100. The higher the ESI, the more competitive the relationship
is between Chinese and European or American exports. Using an ESI index based on the
2012 HS2 data of the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) and the Eurostat, we
found that the similarity index of Chinese and European exports in the U.S. market is 45,
while the similarity index of Chinese and American exports in the EU market is 46.4. This
result shows that Chinese exports are competing with European and American exports to
some extent. We also predict that, as Chinese products continue to climb the ladder of the
value chain, the similarities between Chinese products and American and European ones
would continue to increase, subsequently leading to more competition.
To further analyze the potential trade diversion effects, we looked into the top 20 categories
of Chinese exports to the United States and the EU by comparing them with the top 20
categories of European exports to the United States and U.S. exports to the EU, giving us a
deeper knowledge of the similarities. We found that in the U.S. market in 2012, 10 categories
of Chinese and European exports are the same (Chs 85, 84, 94, 39, 73, 87, 90, 29, 40, and
71 of the two-digit Harmonized System tariff code or HS 2), arranged in descending order.
3

The Top 20 categories represented 89.8 percent of Chinese exports to the United States, and
88.1 percent of European exports to the United States.
4
Equally, in the European market, we
found that nine categories of Chinese and American exports are the same (Chs. 85, 84, 39,
73, 29, 90, 87, 40, and 71 in order). The Top 20 categories represent 87.3 percent of Chinese
exports to the EU and 88.2 percent of U.S. exports to the EU.
5
The more detailed fndings
are summarized in Table 1.
For the competing categories of Chinese, European, and U.S. exports, there are potential
trade diversions, but the effects vary depending on the current tariff level. If the level is very
low, the trade diversion would be marginal even after trade in goods were fully liberalized. If
the tariff level is high, the trade diversion would be higher. Specifcally, in the U.S. market,
the tariff level for Ch. 40 (rubbers and articles thereof) is high. Chinese exports would face
signifcant trade diversion once the tariffs were removed for European exports of that chapter
to the U.S. market. We estimate that the affected value would be around $5 billion. The
tariff level for Chs. 87 (vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock), 90 (optical,
photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical
instruments, and accessories) 29 (organic chemicals) and 39 (plastics and articles thereof)
is between 2 percent and 4 percent, we would then reason that the trade diversion would
be considerable, affecting around $39 billion worth of Chinese exports. The tariff level for
Chs. 84 (nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances, computers), 85
as suggested by both parties, will develop a new generation of global trading rules concerning
state-owned enterprises, subsidies, intellectual property rights, public procurement, raw
materials, and environmental and labor standardsall areas for which China is most criticized
for not obeying global trading rules. Once the transatlantic community sets new rules, Chinese
exports would face new diffculties. Equally, China will fnd it more diffcult to negotiate new
trade deals with the United States and EU. These factors might lead to new fashpoints of
trade tensions. Here, we offer two examples of the potential rules effects resulting from the
conclusion of the TTIP: government procurement and state-owned enterprises.
Government Procurement
As the initial EU position paper on government procurement states, this negotiation (TTIP)
would present an important oppor tunity for the EU and the U.S. to develop together some
useful GPA plus elements to complement the revised GPA disciplines A model text
agreed between the EU and the U.S., being the two largest trading partners in the world,
could thus possibly set a higher standard that could inspire a future GPA revision.
9
China
committed itself to joining the Government Procurement Agreement when joining the WTO,
and in 2007 started the accession negotiations. Due to differences in the level of ambition,
Chinas several offers have fallen short of the expectations of GPA contracting parties. The
high ambitions set by the EU and the United States in their TTIP negotiations would make
Chinas accession to the GPA an even more daunting task.
State-Owned Enterprises
In the TTIP negotiations, the United States seeks to establish appropriate, globally
relevant disciplines on state trading enterprises, SOEs, and designated monopolies,
such as disciplines that promote transparency and reduce trade distortions.
10
Similarly,
the objective of the EU is to create an ambitious and comprehensive global standard to
discipline state involvement and infuence in private and public enterprises, building and
expanding on the existing WTO rules. The EU believes that could pave the way for other
bilateral agreements to follow a similar approach and eventually contribute to future
multilateral engagement.
11
China is well known for the signifcant role played by the SOEs
in its economy. Chinas model of economic growth is even described as state capitalism
(as opposed to free market capitalism).
12
It is foreseeable that China in the one camp and
the EU and the United States in the other might compete fercely for world market shares
based on their own economic growth model, and against that background, the debate on
the SOEs rules would be of even greater signifcance.
The Implications of the EU-JAPAN
FTA for China
The completion of the EU-Japan FTA would give the EU much better access to the Japanese
market, and vice versa, both of which mean disadvantages for Chinas market access to those
two markets. As Table 3 shows, the percentage of zero tariff imports of Japan from China
is 70.3 percent and from the EU is 48.7 percent. Once the EU-Japan FTA is completed,
the categories of European exports to Japan subject to zero tariff treatment will increase
signifcantly, exerting a huge impact on Chinese exports to Japan. Another look at the
be considerable, involving 145 billion Euros worth of exports to the EU. For Chs. 71 (see
above), 73 (see above) and 94 (see above) the tariff level is lowless than 2 percent
therefore trade diversion effects of Chinese exports to the EU would be only marginal,
affecting only 9 billion Euros, as calculated using the data in Table 1. Generally speaking,
TTIP-induced trade diversion effects on China would be more signifcant in the EU market
than in the U.S. market, largely because the EU market has, on average, higher levels of
tariffs than the U.S. market.
In addition to creating the above trade diversion effects, TTIP would also have trade
creation effects, which could beneft China. A study done by the Centre for Economic
Policy Research suggests, however,
8
that these effects could do no more than help China
to increase exports by 0.5 percent and its GDP by 4 to 5 billion Euros, equivalent to 0.02-
0.03 percent of its GDP. As Table 2 shows, the value of Chinese exports considerably
affected by TTIP trade diversion effects would be 199.6 billion Euros. Even if the actual
trade diversion were only 10 percent, the total value would be as high as around 20 billion
Euros, roughly 1 percent of total exports and 0.3 percent of Chinas GDP. Therefore, we
believe that the cost imposed by TTIP trade diversion on China is much larger than the
potential benefts of TTIPs trade creation.
Rules Effects might also worry the Chinese government, more specifcally, who controls the
rule-setting power. For decades, China has been pursuing a new international economic order
together with other developing countries. There is a strong groundswell within China to say
farewell to the old days when others set the rules. Through TTIP, the United States and EU,
Table 2. Implicatons of TTIP for Chinese Exports
U.S. Market EU Market
Import
Tarif
Rate
HS2
Chapters
Value of
Chinese
Exports
Afected
by TTIP
(billion
US$)
Impact Level
HS2
Chapters
Value of
Chinese
Exports
Afected
by TTIP
(billion
Euro)
Impact Level
>4% 40 5.028 Signifcant
29, 87,
39, 40
20.572 Signifcant
2%-4%
87, 90,
29, 39
38.872 Considerable 84, 90, 85 144.848 Considerable
<2%
84, 85,
71, 73, 94
254.117 Marginal 71, 73 8.820 Marginal
Data Sources: World Tariff Profles 2012, WTO; USITC
7
Table 4. The Top 8 Categories of Chinese and European Exports to Japan in 2011
Japanese Market (Unit: million JPY)
Categories China EU
Food 747,060 780,661
Raw Materials 183,140 212,978
Fossil Fuels 146,826 42,649
Chemical Products 1,059,309 2,028,857
Industrial Manufactured Products 1,807,126 478,143
Non-electrical Machinery 2,366,682 681,312
Electrical Machinery 3,635,148 547,548
Transport Equipment 277,630 768,974
Others 4,419,026 860,886
Data source: Bureau of Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
14
Table 5. Top 20 Categories of Chinese and Japanese Exports to the EU in 2011
EU Market (Unit: Million Euros)
HS2 China HS2 Japan
85 79,809 84 18,637
84 58,056 85 13,087
62 16,381 87 12,344
61 13,671 90 5,749
95 12,643 29 2,375
94 11,507 71 2,372
64 7,583 39 1,823
73 6,584 40 1,723
39 6,170 38 1,048
29 5,943 73 1,035
42 5,853 30 1,005
90 5,662 32 714
87 4,576 37 570
89 4,217 95 479
72 3,791 82 450
63 3,127 72 443
40 2,988 89 365
83 2,432 28 327
71 2,321 96 325
82 2,208 99 297
Data source: European Commission, Eurostat
15
treatment of Chinese and Japanese exports in the EU market shows that 49.6 percent of the
total value of Chinese exports are free of duties while the fgure for Japan is 44.0 percent.
With the completion of the EU-Japan FTA, a signifcant increase in the value of Japanese
exports subject to zero tariff treatment will be realized. Again, Chinese exports to the EU
will be put at a disadvantage.
Using an ESI index based on the 2011 HS2 data of Eurostat and Statistics Japan (Statistics
Bureau of Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications), we found that the
similarity index of Chinese and European exports in the Japanese market is 66, while the
similarity index of Chinese and Japanese exports in the EU market is 58. This shows that
Chinese exports are competing with European and Japanese exports respectively in the
Japanese and European markets to a great extent. As Chinese products continue to climb the
value chain, the similarities would continue to increase, leading to more competition.
To further analyze potential trade diversion effects, we looked into the top 20 categories
of Chinese exports to the EU and Japan by comparing them with the top 20 categories of
Japanese exports to the EU and of EU exports to Japan. We thereby gained more insight
into the similarities of Chinese products and Japanese and European ones. We found that in
the Japanese market in 2011, eight categories of Chinese and European exports represent
69.8 percent of Chinese exports to Japan and 86.4 percent of European exports to Japan.
Equally, in the European market, we found that 13 categories of Chinese and Japanese
exports, respectively Chs 85, 84, 95, 73, 39, 29, 90, 87, 89, 72, 40, 71 and 82, represent
87.0 percent of Chinese exports to the EU and 94.1 percent of Japanese exports to the EU.
For competing categories of Chinese, European, and Japanese exports, there are potential
trade diversions, but the diversion effects vary depending on the current tariff level. Again,
if it were very low, the trade diversion would be marginal even after trade in goods is
fully liberalized. If it were high, the trade diversion would be higher. Specifcally, in the
Table 3. Non-Agricultural Import Tarifs of Japan and the EU in 2010
Arithmetcally
average
Weighted
average
Percentage
of zero tarif
imports
(categories)
Percentage
of zero tarif
imports
(value)
JAPANESE IMPORTS OF NON-AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS FROM:
China 3.8 2.6 70.3 77
EU 3.7 1.6 48.7 72.8
EU IMPORTS OF NON-AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS FROM:
China 4.4 3.3 24.9 49.6
Japan 4.4 3.0 23.0 44.0
Data source: World Tariff Profles 2012, WTO, pp. 66-97
13
suggested that The regional trade arrangements that we are now discussing might be
multilateralized and it is necessary to agree on a set of multilateral rules for governing
various regional arrangements.
18
For many Chinese trade veterans, it is impossible to give
up the WTO as China is one of the biggest benefciaries of the WTO. They fought so hard
to make China join the WTO, and it is unthinkable to turn away from it.
Then, how can we explain the gap between Chinas offcial rhetoric and actual deeds?
There are at least two explanations. One is that China is responding to competing pressure
resulting from the FTA adventures of western powers, including Europe, the United States,
and Japan. Given the potential trade diversion effects and loss of rule-setting power, China
has to accelerate its own FTA efforts as a precautionary move. The second explanation is that
China is using the FTA as a geostrategic tool to consolidate its infuence in the Asia-Pacifc
region, as it is now negotiating FTAs respectively with Japan and Korea, Australia, and the
Gulf Cooperation Council. With those factors in mind, China will probably continue to build
its trade policy on two pillarsmultilateralism and bilateralism. Priority might be given to
bilateralism as the Doha Round is stuck. That being said, China prefers not to leave the world
with the impression that China has given up on the Doha Round.
Table 6. Implicatons of EU-Japan FTA for Chinese Exports
Japanese Market EU Market
Import
Tarif
Rate
Product
categories
Value of
Chinese
Exports
Afected
(billion
US$)
Impact Level
HS2
Chapters
Value of
Chinese
Exports
Afected
(million
Euro)
Impact Level
>4%
Food, fossil
fuel
9 Signifcant
29, 87,
89, 39, 40
23,896 Signifcant
2%-4% Chemicals 10.7 Considerable
82, 84,
90,85, 95
158,379 Considerable
<2%
Raw
materials,
non-electrical
machinery,
electrical
machinery,
transport
equipment
and industrial
manufactured
products
83.4 Marginal 71, 72, 73 12,696 Marginal
Data source: World Tariff Profles 2012, WTO, and Bureau of Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs
and Communications, complied by authors
Japanese market, the tariff level for food and fossil fuels is relatively high. We would
assume that trade diversion would be signifcant, affecting around 894 billion Yen (JPY)
(around $9 billion) worth of Chinese exports. The tariff level for chemical products is
moderate, affecting 1.0593 trillion JPY ($10.7 billion) worth of Chinese exports. The levels
for raw materials, non-electrical machinery, electrical machinery, transport equipment, and
industrial manufactured products are low. We assume marginal trade diversion effects, even
though total Chinese exports of those categories would be 8.270 trillion JPY ($83.4 billion).
In the EU market, the tariff levels for Chs. 29 (see above), 87 (see above), 89 (ships,
boats, and foating structures), 39 (see above), and 40 (see above) are highmore than
4 percent. Chinese exports would face signifcant trade diversion once the tariffs were
removed for Japanese exports to the EU market under those chapters. We estimate that
the affected value would be around 23.896 billion Euros. Since the tariff level for Chs. 82
(tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks of base metal, parts thereof of base metal), 84
(see above), 90 (see above) and 85 (see above) and 95 (toys, games and sports requisites,
parts and accessories thereof) is between 2 percent and 4 percent, we believe that the trade
diversion for those chapters would be considerable, involving 158.379 billion Euros worth
of Chinese exports to the EU. For Chs. 71 (see above), and 73 (see above), the tariff level
is lowless than 2 percent; therefore the trade diversion effect of exports to the EU would
be only marginal, affecting 12.696 billion Euros.
In general, the trade diversion effects on China would be roughly the same in the EU
market and the Japanese market, because both markets have, on average, a sizable tariff
rate compared to the U.S. market. As Table 6 suggests, the values of Chinese exports
signifcantly affected by the EU-Japan FTA trade diversion effects would be $258.7 billion
(around 200 billion Euros). Even if the actual trade diversion were only 10 percent, the
total value would be as high as 20 billion Euros, roughly 1 percent of Chinas total exports
and 0.3 percent of Chinas GDP.
Chinas Response So Far
Given the above contexts, Chinese policy-makers are faced with three broad questions:
Multilateralism or bilateralism? Competing bilateralism or harmonious bilateralism? Further
reform or turning inward?
Multlateralism or Bilateralism?
China is accelerating implementation of its FTA strategy. It recently concluded an FTA with
Switzerland, the frst major economy in Europe with which China signed a FTA. China
has made clear that FTA priority is given to a China-Japan-Korea FTA, a China-Australia
FTA, and Chinas FTA with the western Asia region.
16
It seems that China is giving priority
to bilateralism; however, the offcial rhetoric does not indicate this. One of its chief trade
negotiators announced that China would adhere to the position that multilateralism is the
main avenue of trade while regional (bilateral) trade arrangements are complementary.
17
As
Chinas former WTO ambassador Sun Zhenyu predicted, Multilateralism is the ultimate
direction. He commented that Now is a special period, and that The pendulum of
trade liberalization might swing back to multilateralism at the end of the day. He also
Faced with the options of RCEP, the China-Korea-Japan FTA, or TPP, China currently would
rank order its preferences as China-Korea FTA, RCEP, and fnally TPP. The China-Japan-
Korea FTA used to be a priority, but given the territorial disputes between China and Japan
and between Korea and Japan, the CJK FTA could not be advanced in a signifcant way in
the near future. The bigger question now facing China is whether to join the camp led by
the United States, the EU, and Japan, or to establish its own camp of regional economic
integration. China obviously prefers the latter, but whether it could succeed in a China-Korea-
Japan FTA and RCEP remains uncertain. The variables include Chinas capacity, political
will, and interactions with other negotiating parties, in particular Japan and the United States
in the background. It is equally fundamental whether the Chinese government could garner
suffcient domestic support for pushing through big FTAs and whether Chinas reformers
could establish a linkage between external pressure induced by the above-mentioned mega-
FTAs and Chinas own domestic reform agenda.
China is bound to lead in Asian economic integration, considering the fact that it is already
the worlds biggest trading nation (in goods) and the second largest economy. But it has a lot
of constraints, both internal and external. They restrict its capacity to convert its economic
strengths into regional infuence. A new development worthy of future investigation is
Chinas new initiatives for building two grand silk roads, one to Central Asia leading to
Europe, and the other with Southeast Asian countries leading to the Indian Ocean. They
represent both a new and old type of regional economic integration: old in the sense that
Chinas way of Asian economic integration is still traditional since it relies on aid and credit
in helping countries to build infrastructure and promote trade with China; new in the sense
that China is fnding the confdence to rediscover its role in Asia.
Endnotes
1. Liu Feng, Meiguo baquan yu quanqiu zhili, Nankai daxue xuekan, No. 3, 2012.
2. Petri, Peter A., Michael G. Plummer, Fan Zhai. The Trans-Pacifc Partnership and Asia-Pacifc
Integration: A Quantitative Assessment, Policy Analyses in International Economics 98
(Washington: Peterson Institute for Economics, 2012): pp. 41-44.
3. Http://dataweb.usitc.gov/scripts/INTRO.asp, last accessed on April 5, 2013.
4. Http://dataweb.usitc.gov/scripts/INTRO.asp, last accessed on April 5, 2013. Using the USITC
statistics, the authors fnd that the value of Chinas exports to the United States in 2012 was
$444,465 billion, of which, the value for the top 20 items was $399,108 billion, accounting for
89.8%. For the EU, its exports to the United States in 2012 were $389,103 billion, of which the
top 20 items accounted for 88.1%.
5. Http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database, last accessed on
April 5, 2013. Using the Eurostat statistics, the authors fnd that the value of Chinas exports to
the EU was 289.314 billion Euros, on which, the top 20 items accounted for 87.3%. For U.S.
exports to the EU, the fgure was 204.391 billion Euros, of which the top 20 exports accounted
for 88.2% of the total.
6. Http://dataweb.usitc.gov/scripts/INTRO.asp (accessed on April 5, 2013), http://epp.eurostat.
ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database (accessed on April 5, 2013).
7. The tariff data come from World Tariff Profles 2012 of the WTO, pp. 76 and 170. Other data
are derived using the data in Table 1.
8. Joseph Francois, Miriam Manchin, Hanna Norberg, Olga Pindyuk, Patrick Tomberger,
Reducing Transatlantic Barriers to Trade and Investment: An Economic Assessment, Centre
for Economic Policy Research, London, March 2013, pp. 82-83.
Competng Bilateralism or Harmonious Bilateralism?
Will the FTA initiatives by the United States, Japan, Korea, ASEAN, and other regional
players create tensions in trade relations with China? This question is particularly relevant
in the context of increasing U.S.-China strategic competition and Chinas territorial disputes
with Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and others. China is also deeply worried about the
economic implications of the TPP, TTIP, EU-Japan, and other regional economic initiatives
excluding China. Those implications range from trade diversion effects to setting up new
rules without Chinas participation.
Generally speaking, China is concerned with the latest trends of heightened bilateralism and
regionalism in the Asia-Pacifc region, which is no longer harmonious, but is generating
considerable tension. Chinas ideal of a harmonious world is colliding with the cold fact
of competing bilateralism. Against that background, Chinas possible responses might
be pragmatism in action combined with idealist rhetoric. A lack of multilateral governance
of world trade may lead to more bilateral trade tensions between China and its western
trading partners. China is now pushing through three overlapping regional initiatives of
economic integration China-Korea FTA, China-Japan-Korea FTA, and RCEP. It remains
unclear which among the three is given top priority. All three may be affected by prominent
hindrances, including territorial disputes.
Further Reform or Turning Inward?
TPP, TTIP, Japans FTA with the EU, together with FTAs launched by other western
economies are creating external pressure on Chinas domestic reform and opening-up. The
timing is opportune, considering the arrival of a new generation of more reform-oriented
top leaders. A good example is the fact that Li Keqiang took credit for launching the China-
Switzerland FTA when he was vice premier and concluding that FTA during his frst trip in
Europe in May 2013 after assuming the premiership.
It seems increasingly obvious that the new leadership is cleverly using external pressure for
pushing forward domestic reform. During his meeting with Obama, Xi Jinping announced that
China was studying pushing through a mid- and long-term comprehensive reform program,
19

which was fnally announced during the third plenary session of the 18
th
Congress. Lis
patronage of Chinas FTA with Switzerland might open a new era for FTA negotiations with
developed economies, including Australia frst and then the EU second. Lis predecessor
premier Wen Jiabao had already proposed a FTA feasibility study with the EU last year. The
conclusion of the trilateral China-Japan-Korea is also at the top of Chinas FTA strategy list.
All these FTAs are potential drivers for Chinas domestic reform.
Predictng Chinas Future Actons
China will defnitely seek to play a larger role in the Asia-Pacifc region, where it has the
most fundamental and essential interests. Regional economic initiatives will be dealt with by
the government from both strategic/political and economic perspectives. Both considerations
will be present when China negotiates regional and bilateral FTAs. The question is which
consideration prevails, the strategic and political or economic.
9. European Commission, Initial EU Position Paper on Public Procurement for the EU-US
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Agreement, Brussels, July 16, 2013, p. 1, see: http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/july/tradoc_151623.pdf.
10. The United States Trade Representative, Notifcation Letter to the Congress on the TTIP,
Washington D.C., March 20, 2013, p. 4.
11. European Commission, Initial EU Position Papers on the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Agreement, Brussels, July 2, 2013, p. 1.
12. Doug Bandow, State Capitalism vs. Free Markets, The Washington Times, June 28, 2010,
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/state-capitalism-versus-free-markets.
13. Http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/tariff_profles12_e.pdf (accessed on June 19, 2013).
14. Http://www.stat.go.jp/data/nenkan/15.htm (accessed on June 19, 2013).
15. Http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/setupModifyTableLayout.do (accessed on June 19, 2013).
16. Yu Jianhua, Speech by Yu Jianhua, Deputy China International Trade Representative at Boao
Forum, June 20, 2013, http://fnance.sina.com.cn/hy/20130620/092015853900.shtml.
17. Yu Jianhua, Zimaoqu tanpan ying zunzhong gefang huayuquan, http://fnance.sina.com.cn/
hy/20130620/092015853900.shtml (accessed on June 20, 2013).
18. Sun Zhenyu, Speech by Sun Zhenyu, Former Chinese Ambassador to the WTO at Boao Forum,
June 29, 2013, http://fnance.sina.com.cn/hy/20130620/160015859290.shtml.
19. Xi Jinping, Remarks by Chinese President Xi Jinping at His Meeting with the US President
Obama, June 9, 2013, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2013-06-09/050727357438.shtml.
NEW THINKING ON DIPLOMACY
TOWARD NORTH KOREA
to apply the pressure that many observers deem essential for those strategies to work. For
a time the situation in North Korea discouraged Beijing, giving it new incentive to expand
diplomatic cooperation with the other two countries. For a time, Pyongyang had decided to
be more forthcoming to Seoul, leading it to accelerate its diplomatic activities. There was
willingness in Washington to continue a wait-and-see outlook with more active diplomacy
likely as long as Seoul and, especially, Beijing saw hope ahead. Yet, by the spring of 2014,
the atmosphere had changed. Pyongyang was more defant. Beijing seemed to be less
inclined to cooperate with Washington, as bilateral relations deteriorated. Seoul was under
more pressure to tighten its alliance. Prospects for diplomacy had worsened.
The purpose of todays diplomacy, as has been the case for many years, is largely to fnd
common ground with Beijing to achieve meaningful denuclearization, marked by a reduction
of tensions with long-lasting promise. Seoul keeps adjusting its mix of carrots and sticks to
encourage Pyongyang to turn in this direction, but, more likely, to assure Beijing that a new
combination of pressure and incentives would not lead to regime collapse and a setback
to Chinas geopolitical objectives. Washington has more skepticism, even if it sees little
alternative to giving Beijing more time amidst the discomfort Beijing is showing over recent
trends in North Korea. A glimmer of hope is seen in Beijings attitude that it will not host Kim
Jong-un or reward him without a commitment to denuclearization. Thus, closest attention
centers on how Beijing will respond to the critical juncture before it. Zhu Feng describes its
policy at present as giving North Korea the cold shoulder. He suggests that Beijing will
walk a fne line, not thoroughly changing its policy by cutting off supplies of oil or food,
but distancing itself from Kim Jong-un, increasing diplomatic coordination with the other
two states, and keeping some pressure on Pyongyang while awaiting its next steps. This
is a formula for continued diplomacy, preparing for future provocative moves, but not for
optimism that Seoul or Washingtons diplomatic hopes should be raised very high. Beijing
may lean toward closer coordination, but it will insist on setting the terms for diplomacy
with the goal of restarting the Six-Party Talks on terms that will bring denuclearization back
into the picture without allowing room for various other aspirations favored in Seoul and
Washington to be easily realized.
Zhu Fengs relative optimism about Beijings interest in new and coordinated policy toward
North Korea appeared harder to sustain in the spring of 2014, as the Obama-Park summit
intensifed warnings to Pyongyang and was met with a vitriolic response. Sino-U.S. relations,
and Obama, were putting increased pressure on Park to do things that were not welcome in
Beijing. Prospects for new diplomacy were on hold, as observers anticipated a fourth nuclear
test by North Korea. Even so, there have been so many ups and downs in diplomacy toward
North Korea that reviewing the search for new diplomacy from 2013 under Park Geun-hye
and Xi Jinping, newly in power, as well as Barack Obama, deserves our attention.
Introduction
The fundamental question about the purpose of diplomacy regarding North Korea has come
into stark focus. For a time Park Geun-hye seemed to be redoubling her efforts to fnd a
diplomatic path forward to the taebuk, which some translate as jackpot of reunifcation.
These were accompanied by her peace and security initiative, proposed to diplomatic
partners as a blueprint. However much it needed to be jointly clarifed, for diplomacy in
Northeast Asia. Meanwhile, the U.S. position toward North Korea and, notably China,
hardened. Its diplomacy over two decades toward North Korea was, arguably, directed
mostly at China, but now doubts had increased that the limited cooperation realized in
managing North Korea warranted efforts to fnd common ground with China on maritime
disputes and on other tense questions, where U.S. allies and partners pressed for a more
vigorous response. Meanwhile, attention continued to center on how Chinese thinking about
diplomacy toward the North Korean challenge is evolving. While in the midst of the Ukraine
crisis Russia is less willing to cooperate with the United States on North Korea and Japan
has again put a spotlight on the abductions issue by resuming talks with North Korea after
it allowed a meeting of Yokota Megumis parents with a granddaughter, whom they had
never seen, the center of interest in diplomacy remains fxed on the Sino-Seoul-Washington
triangle. Any genuine new diplomacy would require joint agreement among two or more of
these countries that the time was ripe to proceed.
The three chapters of Section IV successively evaluate debates about how to deal with North
Korea in Seoul, Washington, and Beijing. Shin-wha Lee explains that Park was faced with
stark realities when she began her presidency at a low point in relations with Pyongyang,
but at the beginning of 2014 when Kim Jong-un was appealing for creating an atmosphere
of reconciliation and unity she had sought to reinvigorate her trustpolitik as a diplomatic
strategy, aiming to promote a culture of regional cooperation. Mark Fitzpatrick emphatically
acknowledges the growing danger from North Korea, but he concludes that diplomacy is
not meaningless. It can limit the dangers, he says, in combination with other policy tools
deterrence, interdictions, and also sanctions. Zhu Feng also makes the case for diplomacy
under troubled conditions. He sees a more proactive Chinese approach: irritated, quiet, and
more interested in cooperation with South Korea and the United States; yet, hesitant to apply
the pressure that would make a major difference. Zhu Feng makes it clear that China is in the
drivers seat as far as diplomacy is concerned: it has a strategy that prioritized North Korea
as a buffer state and counted on economic transformation through integration with Chinas
economy, giving China the leverage to press for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks.
After Jang Song-taeks purge amid signs that the North is walking away from economic
cooperation with China, it is not only worried that the economic strategy is failing, but that
the denuclearization one is also failing.
These three chapters taken together allow us to consider the overlap and disconnect among
the strategies of the three main actors in diplomacy with North Korea. Until the purge and
execution of Jang, the impression in the U.S. is that Beijing was pursuing its own strategy
with limited coordination with Seoul and Washington, although that had increased after the
February 2013 third nuclear test by North Korea. There was enough encouragement and
coordination for Barack Obama to agree to sustain his strategic patience and for Park
Geun-hye to detect an opening to pursue her new trustpolitik. Yet, Beijing was disinclined
South Koreas Search for a
New Diplomatc Strategy Toward
North Korea: Trustpolitk as a
Goldilocks Approach?
Shin-wha Lee
Lee: South Koreas Search for a New Diplomatc Strategy Toward North Korea | 223 222 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
emphasis on the importance of maintaining dialogue, honoring every promise that has already
been made, and abiding by international norms. Trustpolitik is known to be an expression
of Parks philosophy based on historical experience that sustainable cooperation among states
requires both trust and awareness of the realities of the peninsula and Northeast Asia. In
addition, the Dongbuka pyonghwa gusang (Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative:
NAPCI) was proposed as a roadmap to carry out trustpolitik at the regional level and shift
from current mistrust and rivalry driven by Asias Paradox (strengthening regional economic
interdependence, which is offset by an escalation in territorial and historical disputes) into a
new structure of trust-based cooperation and sustainable peace in the region.
5
The Park
administration has emphasized the difference between NAPCI and previous Northeast Asia
initiatives that were proposed since President Roh Tae-woo in the late 1980s, stating that
NAPCI intends to promote a culture of regional cooperation through building trust and aims to
accumulate habits and practices of dialogue and cooperation starting with soft security issues.
6
Parks approach has induced no real change in de facto nuclear North Korea. In fact, the
Norths pacifying gestures in 2014 (although it still fred missiles and slammed Parks
reunifcation speech in March) compared to 2013 seem not to be drawn from Parks resolute
and principled management, but are more closely related to the North Korean domestic
situation. In 2013, the second year of his reign, Kim Jong-un seemed to be desperate to achieve
real discernible results so as to legitimize the third generation of the Kim familys dynastic
rule. Because of this internal situation, Park had diffculties in pursuing her North Korean
policy. As quoted in a Daily NK interview with a North Korean expert, North Korea may
respond better to South Korean policy changes in 2014 as it aims to improve relations with
the U.S. and China.
7
Recently, Pyongyang has pursued the strategy of Tongnam Tongmi
(setting up a relationship with the United States through enhancing its relationship with South
Korea) instead of the long-held strategy of Tongmi Bongnam (trying to set up a relationship
with the United States while insulting and refusing a relationship with South Korea).
8
Against this backdrop, this chapter evaluates Parks North Korean policy through the lens
of both checkered inter-Korean relations and complex regional settings. She advocated
trustpolitik as an approach to assume a tough line against North Korea sometimes, and
a fexible policy open to negotiations other times. It has the appearance of a Goldilocks
approach, a middle-of-the-road policy, taking no aggressive actions and not being too
passive or too generous, which is similar to what many say about Obamas foreign policy.
9

Parks administration appears to have taken lessons from ineffective policies of her
predecessors, whether a progressive Sunshine Policy or Lee Myong-baks frosty responses
to North Koreas bad behavior which did not lead to peace and security on the peninsula.
After more than one year of promotional efforts, however, Parks catchphrases of
trustpolitik and NAPCI still suffer conceptual vagueness and lack tangible policy
guidelines. The essence of trustpolitik is subject to some interpretation and criticism for
not yet having much perceptible content. Also, Parks Goldilocks approach is subject to
criticism, as is Obamas, as unable to take any decisive move in either direction. The
challenging regional security situation limits Seouls strategic freedom of action, making
its North Korean policy reactive, rather than proactive, and heavily affected by the great
powers and Pyongyangs precarious actions, which, as earlier in the nuclear crisis, often
proved to be beyond a South Korean presidents grasp.
10
With the North Korean nuclear threat still lingering, the international communitys decades-
long effort to bring about peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was in vain.
Although there were only a few optimistic moments for establishing a peace regime on
the peninsula, no such mechanism has been created thus far. The Six-Party Talks last
push for a permanent peace regime in late 2007, which was facilitated by the September
19 Joint Statement and the February 13 Joint Agreement, was as close as we could come.
Kim Dae-jungs Sunshine Policy of engagement, Roh Moo-hyuns unreserved outreach
to North Korea, and Lee Myung-baks stern response to the Norths nuclear program and
provocations all proved to be fruitless to induce changes in North Korea. There seems to be
no escape from the treacherous repetitive patterns in dealing with Pyongyang. This is the
sobering legacy that Park Geun-hye inherited from her predecessors.
Park had to begin her presidency facing harsh realities. Even before she took offce in late
February 2013, North Korea launched a series of provocative actions: its third nuclear test,
another missile test, withdrawal from the 1953 armistice and the non-aggression pact with
the South, severance of the North-South military hotline, closure of the Kaeseong industrial
complex, massive cyber-attacks, and numerous rhetorical threats. In September, the factories
at Kaeseong restarted operations, and Pyongyang made several conciliatory gestures,
including resumption of the reunion program for families separated by the Korean War amid
talk of re-opening tours at Mt. Kumgang for South Koreans that stopped in 2008 when a South
Korean tourist was shot by a North Korean soldier. However, the North abruptly canceled
plans for the reunions, blaming the conservatives in the South for throwing obstacles in
theinter-Korean reconciliatory process.
1
A more surprising development unfolded in early
December 2013, when Jang Sung-taek, uncle of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, who was
second-in-command, was suddenly arrested and later reportedly executed. The year ended
with the lowest expectations for inter-Korean relations.
Beginning the year 2014, Kim Jong-un called for creating an atmosphere of reconciliation
and unity on the peninsula. Seoul replied that it wanted to see action not rhetoric and
stated that family reunions would be a frst step for forging inter-Korean reconciliation.
2

On February 12, the frst high-level talks in seven years were held at the truce village
of Panmunjom, with family reunions, South Korea-U.S. military exercises, and tours of
Mt. Kumgang on the agenda; however, Pyongyang demanded that Seoul postpone joint
military drills with the United States as a precondition for the reunions. Seoul refused,
claiming that the humanitarian agenda should not be linked to military issues. Later, both
sides agreed that they would suspend hostile rhetoric toward each other and resume the
reunions despite the upcoming joint exercise. Yet, on March 25, North Korea launched two
medium-range ballistic missiles. It also harshly criticized Parks Dresden Declaration of
March 28 on taking Germanys unity as an example and model for a peaceful reunifcation
of the peninsula and laying the groundwork for reunifcation through economic and cultural
exchanges and humanitarian aid as the psychopaths daydream and bits of useless junk.
3

Indeed, inter-Korean relations have long been a seesaw, with North Koreas repetitive cycle
of provocations followed by weak international sanctions and its conciliatory initiatives that
often ended abruptly with little progress.
4
Despite the strained relationship with North Korea during the frst months after her inauguration
in 2013, Park pursued Hanbando shinroe (Korea Peninsula trust-building process), putting
In retrospect, during the Cold War period, Korea tried to develop its strategic thought toward
regionalism, although it was somewhat restrained and distorted. Based on the frm bilateral
alliance structure with the United States, Korean diplomatic leverage and choices were
limited in the regions multilateral process. Its regional strategy was distorted to some extent
because the primary objective of its foreign policy was to gain relative predominance over
North Korea in ideological, political, diplomatic, and economic terms. Post-Cold War efforts
of regional cooperation among Northeast Asian countries have produced mixed outcomes,
or what Park called Asias paradox, with growing economic interdependence but little
political and security cooperation. This refects the fact that the functionalist approach does
Table 1. Comparison of South Koreas Successive Governments Regional
Initatves
Presidents Initatves Major Characteristcs
Roh Tae-woo
(1988-1993)
Nordpolitk
Opening to the former communist countries
and initatves for inter-Korean reconciliaton
Kim Young-
sam (1993-
1998)
Globalizaton
Advancing outreach to East Asia and the rest
of the world, with aims to have a positve
spillover efect on North Korea
Kim Dae-jung
(1998-2003)
East Asia Initatve
Taking initatve in the East Asian community
building process (e.g. East Asia Vision Group,
East Asia Study Group), seeking cooperaton
on traditonal security issues, and employing
a top-down approach based on politcal
agreements between heads of states
Roh Moo-hyun
(2003-008)
Northeast Asian
Cooperaton Initatve
Establishing Northeast Asia security and
economic communites that include regional
cooperaton on non-traditonal security
agendas, and seeking a balancing role in
internatonal relatons in Northeast Asia.
Lee Myung-
bak (2008-
2012)
Creatve, Pragmatc
Diplomacy
Strengthening relatons with key regional
powers, promotng conditonal engagement
with North Korea, and enhancing Korea's role
in the internatonal community
Park Geun-hye
(2013-present)
Trustpolitk; Northeast
Asia Peace and
Cooperaton Initatve
Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperaton
Initatve. Building trust between the two
Koreas by striking a balance between
sternness and fexibility, focusing on consistent
internatonal alliances against North Korea
(especially for the dismantlement of the
Norths nuclear program), promotng a
culture of regional cooperaton grounded in
trust, accumulatng practces and habits of
dialogue and cooperaton startng with sofer
issues, and building trust through concrete
cooperaton projects
Trustpolitik as Political Philosophy
and a Policy Tool
Since Park Geun-hye frst introduced the basics of trustpolitik in her article in Foreign
Affairs, A New Kind of Korea: Building Trust between Seoul and Pyongyang, in the
fall of 2011, it has been perceived by many as a rather ambiguous policy concept.
11
With
the launch of her regime, the South Korean foreign policy elite, especially the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MOFA), has been diligently explaining the meaning and signifcance of
this concept and converting it into a workable policy platform, making ever more detailed
policy explanations. According to Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se, trustpolitik is a vision,
philosophy, and policy by which South Korea, as a responsible middle power, can pursue
the Korean Peninsula trust-building process and NAPCI.
12
This catchword appears to
presuppose a philosophically driven policy initiative that is to encompass inter-Korean
and regional affairs all together.
As the name itself suggests, trust is the core concept of trustpolitik. Nations, as individuals,
need to trust each other in order to cooperate together. Though it may sound simple and
almost self-evident, this is exactly where contending theoretical paradigms of international
politics differ in their perspectives and prescriptions. Realists areinclined to seethenotion
of building trust among nations as either impossible or implausible, whereas liberals tend to
embrace it as both feasible and desirable. Minister Yun argues that trustpolitik is neither a
utopian idealism that shies away from realpolitik nor a nave political romanticism.
13
To those who advocate trustpolitik, Parks North Korean policy is a reasonable combination
of carrots and sticks. They evaluate the normalization of the Kaeseong industrial complex
after a fve-month shutdown by the North as a tangible outcome of Parks new policy
that sticks to a consistent stance, urging Pyongyang to respect international standards and
norms and abide by its promises, or otherwise pay a penalty for broken promises, which
is the key element of trustpolitik. It also demonstrates the possibility of a paradigm shift
in inter-Korean relations because it marks the frst time that Seoul has departed from its
past practice of either easily accepting or helplessly enduring North Koreas self-indulgent
behavior. Meanwhile, Seouls decision to allow humanitarian assistance to North Korea via
international organizations such as UNICEF is also in line with one of the central tenets of
trustpolitik. The policy supports the provision of assistance to the most vulnerable North
Koreans, such as infants and pregnant women, regardless of the political situation between
thetwo Koreas.
14
As far as the policy nametag is concerned, trustpolitik seems to echo Roh Tae-woos opportune
and fairly effective stratagem of nordpolitik; however, the two initiatives are readily
distinguishable. While nordpolitik mainly focused on geopolitically and diplomatically
encircling North Korea by taking advantage of the dissolution of the communist bloc in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, trustpolitik aims at laying a solid foundation for meaningful inter-
Korean rapprochement as well as regional cooperation. Also, interestingly, there appears to
be no geopolitical notion or regional focus in trustpolitik. Instead, it is to emphasize strong
philosophical principles that demonstrate South Koreas superior moral ground. This is quite
a departure from her predecessors rather grandiose diplomatic slogans.
North Korean media paid virtually no attention to Park after her inauguration in February
2013 and started to mention her more frequently only in the cabinets newspaper Minju
Choson in June and July, dropping again in August. Rodong Sinmun, which has abroader
domestic audience as the partys newspaper, included surprisingly few references to her.
Having criticized Lee immediately after his election, it took a wait and see attitude in
the case of Park. As South Korean-U.S.-Japanese joint naval drills involving a U.S. aircraft
carrier in South Korean waters heightened tensions with North Korea in October, references
to Park increased; however, Pyongyang clearly was less critical of her (See Figure 1).
This lesser attention given to Park in North Korean media may not be a surprise, given the
fact that Lee clearly took a harder line with the North, a policy the United States supported
at that time, and given Parks middle of the road policy. Yet, Pyongyangs response has
been less unforgiving even when Park clearly rejected the Norths requests, such as holding
the family reunions only after cancelling the Foal Eagle exercises. Arguably, Pyongyangs
reaction to Park is somewhat related to North Koreas memory of her father Park Chung-
hees statement of July 4, 1970 that led to an agreement with North Korean leader Kim
Il-sung, grandfather of Kim Jong-un, as well as to her 2002 visit to Pyongyang to meet
Kim Jong-il, father of Kim Jong-un. In addition, after a series of violent provocations and
threats until the frst half of 2013, Pyongyang seemed to employ conciliatory gestures and
policies in order to go forward with diplomatic engagement with Seoul, and ultimately with
Washington, which is known as the policy of Tongnam Tongmi. In February 2014, the two
Koreas held reunions of families separated by the Korean War, despite the Korea-U.S. joint
military exercise. Initially, the North demanded a delay in joint military drills until after the
reunion fnished, but the South refused and, in a very rare concession, the North agreed to
hold the family reunions as scheduled. This raised hopes for improved inter-Korean relations,
but Pyongyang has increased tensions again by testing short-range ballistic missiles and
rockets and rejected Seouls proposal to hold Red Cross talks to discuss arranging more
35
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Lee in Rodong Sinmun
Figure 1. North Korean Media Analysis: References to South Korean
Presidents (Jan 2012 to Nov 2013)
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Park in Rodong Sinmun Lee in Minju Choson
not work well in advancing the regional integration process in this region. Kim Dae-jung
and Roh Moo-hyun advocated open regionalism, assuring that Northeast Asian regional
cooperation will not be exclusive and discriminatory against countries outside the region,
but rather play a catalytic role for broader regional cooperation, which embraces the rest of
the region.
15
Yet, their respective regional strategies were considered to be an inward-looking
protectionist approach in economic terms, as well as heavily associated with their North
Korean policies.
16
During Lee Myung-baks administration, dealing with U.S. attitudes toward multilateral
initiatives such as ASEAN + 3 and the East Asian Summit (EAS), which did not include the
United States, was an arduous concern in strategic planning to develop regional cooperation.
As Washington expressed its continued reservations about evolving East Asia regionalism, it
was diffcult for Seoul to disregard its views because of the geopolitical reality in and around
the peninsula. Lee was eager to promote greater Asian diplomacy, through the expansion
of an Asian cooperative network based on open regionalism. His pledge for reconciliation
with Japan on the basis of trilateral cooperation involving the United States was an important
step toward regional cooperation, although his proposal did not come to fruition. Lees
so-called creative, pragmatic diplomacy gave priority to strengthening the U.S. strategic
alliance, emphasizing its usefulness for Koreas national interest, and his strategic thinking
on regionalism could not be developed at the cost of Seouls relationship with Washington.
17
In comparison, Park has sought a G-2 strategy of balanced and harmonious relations with
both the United States and China. While retaining South Koreas traditional alliance, Park is
attempting to develop a strategic partnership with China in dealing with the denuclearization
of the Korean Peninsula and trade. Her administration claims that successful summits with
both countries were possible due to a mutual sense of trust between the leaders.
18
How South
Korea, a middle power, can position itself well to secure its national interests in the face of
the rivalry between giant powers is a thorny task. As U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden in his
visit to Korea in December 2013 stated, Betting on the opposite side of the United States
would not be a great bet. Noticing Seouls growing ties with Beijing, he may be reminding
the Park administration that it wants Koreas support in Washingtons rebalancing foreign
policy.
19
Given this reality, Parks NAPCI attempts to refect on the lessons learned from the
previous administrations struggles for regional initiatives by emphasizing the importance of
making cooperation projects and dialogues executable and achievable.
20
As for the perception of Pyongyang toward South Korean presidents, it seems to have been
less critical of Park than Lee. According to a preliminary study on North Koreas media
content by Martin Weiser,
21
peaks in references to Lee in March and July/August 2012
coincided with military exercises that began in March and August and the celebration of the
end of the Korean War. Despite the ferce rhetoric in the spring of 2013 and the numerous
references to the Korean War in August, references to Park remained less frequent. This
trend in the coverage of South Korean presidents started in mid-2012, before Park took
offce, and might point at North Koreas willingness to engage the South after only a few
months of vitriol following the death of Kim Jong-il. This shows that the third nuclear crisis
was linked by North Korea more to the United States while paying less attention to Seoul for
a stern response by the UN. Still, North Korea closed the Kaeseong complex at the beginning
of April, not long after the war rhetoric rose sharply in March (See Figure 1).
Challenging Security Environment
in Northeast Asia
The world has witnessed a power shift in a changing world order, particularly since the 2008
global fnancial crisis. Northeast Asia seems to be at the forefront of the transition. Chinas
rising economic power is being rapidly converted to formidable military capabilities and
diplomatic infuence. Japans push for achieving a normal state is already causing increased
friction among the countries in the region. U.S. supremacy in the region is increasingly
questionable despite the American diplomatic and military rebalancing to Asia.
25
The
economic worries may, to some degree, be fading away, but the geopolitical challenges are
intensifying.
26
In South Koreas North Korean policy and regional diplomacy, the complex
and uncertain regional background needs to be carefully considered.
North Korea: Oscillatng Behavior Increases Uncertainty
Since the death of Kim Jong-il on December 17, 2011, there has been an apparent lack of
consistency in North Koreas behavior, recently even less predictable and more puzzling
than usual. Last year it took a series of provocative actions and then suddenly went on
a peace offensive. The periodic ups and downs in its rhetoric are now too frequent to
discern what it wants, let alone what it truly intends to do. Back in February 2012, there
was cautious expectation that the long overdue promises at the Six-Party Talks might be
fulflled step-by-step if the process resumed, as the Leap Day deal was reached between
the United States and North Korea. North Korea had pledged to allow the IAEA inspectors
to assess and monitor the Yongbyon nuclear facilities and suspend nuclear tests as well
as long-range missile launches in return for signifcant U.S. nutritional assistance.
27

However, the deal was soon nullifed by the Norths declaration that it would test a satellite
launch vehicle, (SLV), then the actual, if failed, launch, and later a more successful
December launch. In February 2013, just a week before Parks inauguration, North Korea
conducted its third nuclear test. Perhaps emboldened, Pyongyang threatened nuclear war
with not only South Korea but also Japan and the United States. Pyongyang appears not
to have the capability to actually carry out an attack on the United States, although it
threatened to conduct a preemptive attack against it and South Korea in response to the
two allies agreement of October 2013 on a new strategy for deterring nuclear and other
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) strikes by North Korea.
28
Taking a more positive
approach, from July 2013, North Korea appeared conciliatory for a time before turning
more belligerent again.
What caused North Korea to zigzag? 1) Chinas persuasion and pressure? 2) North Koreas
own economic necessity? or 3) Kim Jong-un regimes internal power struggle? All three
causes are intertwined to make coherent policy implementation more diffcult. As evidence
of the third argument, one need only cite the shocking news of Jang Sung-taeks purge, in
the aftermath of which, the domestic political situation appears even more complex and
uncertain. Now North Korea is tightening control over the deeply troubled population
because it senses that sympathy for Jang would endanger the regime. Mobilization to
denounce Jangs crimes reportedly took place nationwide. On the one hand, Kim Jong-un
has frequently visited military installations to show off his strong grip on the military.
On the other, Jangs personal networkincluding his relatives and subordinates in the
family reunions in March. Recently, the North Korean media have also noticeably raised its
criticism against Park, particularly in the wake of the Foal Eagle exercise, a two-month long
Korea-U.S. joint military drill aimed at improving combat readiness against North Korea,
and Parks Dresden Proposal.
In brief, trustpolitik, whether as Parks overarching political philosophy or as a policy tool
that is applicable both to inter-Korean relations and international diplomacy, is based on
the hope of establishing a community in which members feel a sense of trustworthiness
with each other. In implementing trustpolitik since she came to offce, Park has diligently
explained her political viewpoint related to NAPCI to other countries. She claimed that
the trust-building process on the peninsula and NAPCI are mutually reinforcing since
the regional objectives of peaceful cooperation are to increase common interest and trust
between the states involved, to offer opportunities for sustained dialogue and shared norms
to facilitate one countrys understanding of and predictability about another states actions,
and ultimately to foster a favorable environment for peaceful unifcation of the two Koreas.
NAPCI is also considered a useful means to indirectly send a strong message to North Korea
that the international community will respond to any military provocation.
22
Still, the Cold War structure in Northeast Asia remains. As the existing bilateral security
system is pivotal to regional peace and stability, the multilateral regional security system
should serve as a complement to the current bilateral structure. Given a clear lack of inter-
state trust due to historical animosity, geopolitical complexity, and competitive military
build-ups, Parks emphasis on trust among nations is not only pertinent but also imperative
to regional peace and security. However, given the realist assumption that nations have
no eternal friends or enemies but only have permanent national interests in international
relations, promoting a regional sense of sustainable trust among states, as well as managing
inter-Korean relations based on trust, sounds both nave and unfeasible. In an opinion poll in
February 2014, 71.3 percent of 150 experts on diplomacy and security who responded to the
survey said the Korean Peninsula trust-building process has no practical effect.
23
Park in her NAPCI called for the promotion of multilateral cooperation that begins with
less controversial regional common interests such as environmental problems, cross-border
crimes, and anti-terrorism. The main objective of NAPCI is to increase the habit of dialogue
and cooperation in these soft security sectors, which, in turn, would generate a spillover
effect to more sensitive issues such as arms control, alliances, and historical and territorial
disputes. Yet, critics argue that it is just an ambiguous goal that lacks concrete and practical
ways of implementation.
24
Furthermore, a functionalist approach envisioned in NAPCI
appears to not be effective in the case of Northeast Asia, where geopolitical complications
and urgency prevail, as shown in ongoing Sino-Japanese and Korean-Japanese bilateral
tensions that have frustrated trilateral meetings. Strengthening cooperation on softer issues
has not effectively generated necessary conditions for regional peace and security. Rather,
tensions over harder political and military issues have disturbed inter-state functional
cooperation already under way. Therefore, confdence-building measures on hard issues
through a political breakthrough at the highest level are urgently required to regain a sense
of momentum in support of bilateral and multilateral dialogue in the region.
Outside observers are closely observing the following issues in North Korea-China relations:
a Kim Jong-un visit to China, North Korean nuclear and missile tests, North Koreas
border control with China, the PLAs movements in the vicinity of the border area, Sino-
North Korean economic cooperation activities, and Beijings strategic calculations about
Pyongyang. Kim will eventually visit China in restoring the traditional comradeship with
his countrys only ally in the region, but North Korea is not expected to abandon its tandem
strategy of simultaneously pursuing nuclear armaments and economic revitalization under
his monolithic leadership.
34
It is, thus, important for Park to continue to keep warm ties with
Xi Jinping, coordinating her North Korean policy with him, as well as to urge China, as
North Koreas major sponsor, to play a greater role in solving the nuclear issue and involving
the international community.
From Japans perspective, North Korea will experience political instability for some time
due to Kim Jong-uns unfnished power consolidation, his arbitrary decision-making style,
and theapathetic attitudeof his senior subordinates, who arenow instinctively preoccupied
with self-preservation. At present, there is no reason to believe that Japan has changed its
policy, which basically aims to comprehensively resolve the North Korean nuclear and
missile problems, as well as the abduction issue by maintaining sanctions and allowing for
dialogue. Nevertheless, politicians in Tokyo, especially Abe and those around him, may hope
to quickly settle the abduction issue rather than merely participating in the painstakingly
slow multilateral process to produce a comprehensive resolution since he pledged to solve it
during his term in offce. It cannot be ruled out that Japan could try to strike a deal if it were
to directly reengage with the Kim Jong-un regime. Abe sent Iijima Isao, a special advisor to
the Cabinet Secretary, to Pyongyang in May 2013 to discuss the abduction issue with Kim
Yong Nam without careful prior policy consultations with the other Six-Party Talks partners.
This visit concerned both Seoul and Washington since any sudden progress in a Pyongyang-
Tokyo dialogue would be at odds with the close trilateral coordination on the North Korean
issue they have sought. Tokyos uncoordinated, unilateral approach undercuts hope of
making a breakthrough in the dormant Six-Party Talks on the denuclearization of North
Korea. The Korean Foreign Ministry openly stated that Iijimas visit was unhelpful.
35
Japans bilateral ties with South Korea and China, respectively, have been strained by the
Abe administrations increasingly aggressive and nationalistic posture on historical and
territorial issues. Abes comments about Japan becoming a normal state, changing its peace
Constitution, and revising two standing apologies to its neighbors (the Kono and Murayama
statements) undermine Japans standing in the region.
36
The United States is concerned about
the escalating tension between its major allies. North Korea is predictably tempted to take
advantage of Japans unilateral approach in order to drive a wedge between it and its allies.
Close consultations with the United States are necessary to urge Japan not to act unilaterally.
As for Russia, Putins absolute power and keen interest in the development of the Russian
Far East have not only put a spotlight on a strategic approach to Pyongyang, but also have led
to the pursuit of joint business opportunities in North Korea. Even after Jangs purge, there
is no signifcant sign of a setback to bilateral economic cooperation with North Korea, and
Pyongyang reportedly reaffrmed that Russian partners investments, including those in the
Rajin-Khasan joint logistics venture, will not be affected. Although Russian observers say
that Kim Jong-un needs more time to complete large-scale follow-up purges and generational
party, the cabinet, and affliated agencieswas arrested. Those in overseas missions
were summoned backall subject to varying severity of punishment from execution to
imprisonment, depending on their degree of intimacy with Jang. These developments are
indicative of North Koreas political instability.
In the midst of this purge, Pyongyang relaunched its peace offensive. Starting from the
New Years message, it removed harsh elements from its rhetoric and called for improving
inter-Korean relations and reciprocally stopping slander and mudslinging. Since Pyongyang's
"soft" gestures have often been followed by major provocations, discussion about how Seoul
should respond was cautious. The Norths tactics appeared to be an attempt to soften its
negative image in the United States and elsewhere.
29
Seen in the context of its prior zigzag
behavior, the pattern of provocation followed by conciliation is nothing new.
Recent Trends among the Surrounding Great Powers
There is widespread skepticism among U.S. policy elites about North Koreas credibility after
its abrogation of the Leap Day deal and the execution of Jang Sung-taek. Few think that
conditions are ripe for the resumption of denuclearization talks with North Korea, let alone
for its strategic turnabout. The United States will likely continue to put pressure on the North
over the nuclear issue while trying to induce China to play a constructive role.
30
Though it
is diffcult to determine whether Kim Jong-uns power basis has solidifed, the United States
continues to keep its eye on the possibility of new North Korean provocations, even as there
is mounting impatience for action both in the United States and from its partners in the region.
There is little chance for any U.S. reengagement in bilateral direct negotiations with the
North to succeed. After past failed bilateral attempts, it prefers multilateral negotiations.
Therefore, it is crucial for Park to strengthen policy coordination with Washington and seek
together to develop principles for a multilateral approach. She can be confdent now that
Washington will not give Pyongyang the impression that it can take advantage of occasional
bilateral contacts with the United States to try to drive a wedge between Seoul and it, as was
the case at the time of the South Korea-U.S. perception gap (and thus policy gap) over North
Korea under South Koreas progressive governments.
31
As for China, Beijing is inclined to see the purge of Jang Sung-taek as an internal problem
and take a business as usual position. Yet, Sino-North Korean economic cooperation is
troubled because many Chinese investors reportedly feel uneasy about their prospects since
many of their North Korean counterpartsmostly Jangs surrogateswere either purged or
replaced.
32
Also, Beijing seems noticeably irritated with recent developments, wary of losing
its leverage over the Pyongyang regime. Over the past few years, Chinas awareness of North
Korean affairs, especially internal political dynamics, has been found to be defcient, lacking
high-level channels with the leadership in Pyongyang.
33
While it is clear that neither Beijing
nor Pyongyang wants to damage their traditional relations, the former considers it essential
for the latter not to engage in belligerent behavior and worries about the immature nature
and unpredictability of Kim Jong-un. Though China expects Kim to stay in power for the
foreseeable future, it also predicts a certain degree of political and socio-economic instability
to ensue over the course of his power consolidation. Mending relations depends not only
on whether Pyongyang exercises self-restraint, but also on how quickly and smoothly Kim
fnishes the house-cleaning within his leadership.
Considering that the ultimate objective of Parks peace process and trustpolitik is peaceful
unifcation that would be daebak not only for the Koreas but for all of Northeast Asia, as
she said in Davos in late January, there is reason to pursue new approaches to North Korea.
First, the Souths strategic communications and policy coordination with the United States
and China are important to prepare for possible scenarios on the Korean Peninsula. For
this, information sharing with these states and international consensus on handling unstable
situations are desirable, deepening the 2+2 information-sharing formula between South
Korean and U.S. diplomatic and military authorities and more actively consulting with the
epistemic community at the regional level in analyzing North Koreas power restructuring
trends and developing indicators for measuring its instability would be instrumental.
Second, independent of North Koreas nuclear crisis, its human rights problems and
humanitarian crisis such as food shortages, political prisoners camps, and refugee issues
should be continually addressed on the international stage. The Park administration needs to
develop strategies for how to take full advantage of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human
Rights in North Korea, which released its report about "unspeakable atrocities" committed in
the country and called for the international community's responsibility to protect the North
Korean people from crimes against humanity,
43
the United Nations Human Rights resolution
targeting the North Korean regime, and other international human rights NGO activities.
Third, the administration should seek ways to effectively build an international consensus for
the eventual unifcation of the two Koreas. Employing various Track 1, Track 1.5, and Track
2 approaches is necessary, although, using direct government channels with China requires
caution. During 2013, Park had a total of 27 summit meetings, including the ones with four
great powers, and foreign ministers meetings were more frequent. It is important to develop
follow-up measures based on Parks linkage of trustpolitik and the peace process to NAPCI.
What I call Parks middle of the road policy needs to be reconsidered for its effectiveness.
If her North Korean policy takes the safe road of not rocking the boat, she needs to face
criticism, as Obama has, of being too wary and ineffectual in forging a breakthrough for rocky
inter-Korean relations. A step-by-step approach towards developing the Goldilocks diplomatic
strategy in the short and long-term should be clearly presented. The short-term should be a
stepping-stone approach. In retrospect, there has been a plethora of ambitious and grandiose
rhetoric in dealing with North Korean problems. To be fair, previous administrations in South
Korea and the United States alike made considerable efforts to bring about the denuclearization
of North Korea. However, with a lack of clear understanding about the desirable end state on
the Korean Peninsula and the methodology to arrive there, they hastily attempted a variety
of comprehensive solutions. For instance, the George W. Bush administration proclaimed
it was ready to take a bold approach to meet what it considered to be Pyongyangs needs,
including negative security assurance and economic incentives in exchange for North Korea
abandoning its nuclear weapons programs in a comprehensive fashion. Policy makers in
Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington each had their own initiatives, which were varied in name but
not-so-different in essencea package deal.
Roh Moo-hyuns peace regime and Bushs complete, verifable, and irreversible
denuclearization (CVID) are well-known examples. Although the merits of such deals
should not to be ignored, North Koreas notorious salami tactics proved to be particularly
tricky to overcome. The Lee governments Vision 3000 was not so different in this regard.
changes in the party, government, and the military, they are positive about the survival of his
regime and the health of the bilateral relationship between North Korea and Russia.
37
Since
North Korea is likely to increase contacts with the Russian side in order to reconfgure the
old northern triangle of North Korea, China, and Russia, there is a possibility of a Kim visit
to Russia for a summit with Putin, should he fnd it diffcult to visit Beijing frst. Therefore,
it is essential for Park to include Russia in her Northeast Asian regional strategy to address
North Korean questions, whether nuclear threats, humanitarian issues, or economic reforms.
Trustpolitik as a Workable Goldilocks
Strategy: What Should Be Done?
Through the catchword trustpolitik, Park has repeatedly expressed her desire to engage
in the peace process for improving inter-Korean affairs, an operable manifestation of
trustpolitik, which underscores South Koreas proactive diplomatic initiatives to create
favorable external conditions as a crucial prerequisite. Trustpolitik can be both a means
to achieve peace and security on the peninsula and an end goal to be fulflled by the peace
process. The Park administration also claims that whereas the policies of past governments
have gone from one extreme to another, her strategy is a policy of alignment, i.e., neither a
coercive policy nor an appeasement policy, but rather an effective and balanced combination
of contending or competing policy options, such as inter-Korean and foreign relations,
pressure and dialogue, and deterrence and cooperation, while separating humanitarian
issues from those related to politics and security.
With the possibility of increasing uncertainty and unrest in North Korea in recent months,
questions have been raised about South Koreas preparedness for contingency scenarios that
could include regime change. There have been lots of predictions about political instability
and regime collapse over the last 20 years, generating plans like CONPLAN 5029, a military
contingency plan drafted by South Korea and the United States in 1999 for responding to
sudden change, which was fnally developed into an operational plan in 2009.
38
Given geostrategic circumstances surrounding the peninsula and the unique resilience of the
North Korean leadership,
39
sudden collapse is unlikely in the foreseeable future, but there has
been much speculation about how the Kim Jung-un regime would collapse.
40
In this regards,
there has been more discussion about how to prepare for it instead of mere predictions
about thecollapseitself.
41
During her New Year press conference on January 6, 2014, Park
mentioned tongil daebak (unifcation being the jackpot), which generated a hot debate over
whether it would be a jackpot or crackpot. Due to the enormous economic burden (tongil
biyong unifcation costs), a growing number of South Koreans have begun to consider this
long-desired prospect as not only improbable, but also undesirable. Others claim that bundan
biyong (division costs) are equally exorbitant, if not greater, because North Koreas perilous
and unpredictable actions have often generated a Korea discount in the global market and
hurt South Koreas overall image in the international community. Ordinary South Korean
citizens also do not wish to tolerate any longer the uncertain environment arising from the
Norths provocations. Meanwhile, Pyongyang charged that Parks comment was fueled by
delusions about unifcation by absorption.
42
3. Pyongyang slams South Korean presidents reunifcation speech, South China Morning Post,
April 13, 2014, http://www.scmp.com/topics/korean-peninsula-0; Parks Dresden Doctrine
faces tough test? The Korea Times, Apr. 7, 2014, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/
nation/2014/04/180_154914.html.
4. Sanghee Lee, Thoughts on an Initiative Strategy, for the Comprehensive Management of
North Korea, Brookings, April 2010, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2010/04/
north-korea-lee.
5. Yoon Byung-se, President Parks Trustpolitik; A New Framework for South Koreas Foreign
Policy, Foreign Ministers speech, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, News
156th edition, October 1, 2013.
6. Tae-yul Cho, Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative and Trustpolitik, 2013 IFANS
Global Conference in Celebration of KGNDA 50th Anniversary, Presentation by H.E. Cho Tae-
yul, Vice Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea, November 14, 2013, http://www.mofat.
go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/korboardread.jsp?typeID=9&boardid=751&seqno=3
02001&c=&t=&pagenum=1&tableName=TYPE_SPEECH&pc=&dc=&wc=&lu=&vu=&iu=&
du=.
7. Sang Yong Lee, The Successes and Failures of Trustpolitik, DailyNK, January 2, 2014,
https://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?num=11336&cataId=nk00400.
8. Tongmi bongnam chuju hadeon Buk, Miwa hyopsang channel makhija tongnam
tongmiro seonwhoi Chosun Ilbo, March 10, 2014, http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_
dir/2014/03/10/2014031000293.html.
9. Aaron David Miller, The Goldilocks Principle, Foreign Policy, March 15, 2012, http://www.
foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/15/the_goldilocks_principle.
10. For a detailed discussion about developments in the North Korean nuclear crisis and the
responses of four countries, see Gilbert Rozman, Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear
Crisis: Four Parties Caught between North Korea and the United States (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, rev. ed. 2011).
11. Park Geun-hye, A New Kind of Korea: Building Trust Between Seoul and Pyongyang,
Foreign Affairs, September/October 2011.
12. Yoon Byung-se, Park Geun-hyes Trustpolitik: A New Framework for South Koreas Foreign
Policy, Global Asia, September 16, 2013, MOFA website http://www.mofa.go.kr/webmodule/
htsboard/template/read/engreadboard.jsp?typeID=12&boardid=14137&seqno=312848.
13. Yun Byung-se, Park Geun-hyes Trustpolitik.
14. Hyungjoog Park, Sunghun Chun, Yongho Park, et al. Trustpolitik: Park Geun Hye Jungbu
Kukaanbo Jeonryak: yronkwa shilje tamsaek yonku, Korea Institute for National Unifcation
(KINU) Policy Study Series, 13-05, November 2013.
15. Wonhyuk Lim, Regional Multilateralism in Asia and the Korean Question, Center for
Northeast Asian Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution, Aug. 2009, http://www.brookings.
edu/~/media/research/fles/papers/2009/8/korean%20peninsula%20lim/08_korean_peninsula_
lim.pdf.
16. Shin-wha Lee, The Evolution of Koreas Strategy for Regional Cooperation, IRI Review, Vol.
13, No. 1, March 2008.
17. Shin-wha Lee, The Evolution of Koreas Strategy for Regional Cooperation.
18. Yun Byung-se, "President Park Geun-hye's Trustpolitik: A New Framework for South Korea's
Foreign Policy," Sept. 30, 2013, Korea.net. http://www.korea.net/NewsFocus/Policies/
view?articleId=112986.
19. Biden says U.S. will continue betting on S. Korea, Peoples Daily Online, December 6, 2013,
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90777/8476976.html.
20. Cho Tae-yul, Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative and Trustpolitik, 2nd Vice
Ministers Presentation at 2013 IFANS Global Conference in Celebration of KNDA 50th
Anniversary, November 14, 2013.
21. Martin Weiser, Changing Rhetoric in North Korea, unpublished manuscript based on an
analysis of the North Korea media database Korea Press Media under the authors supervision.
22. Cho Tae-yul, Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative and Trustpolitik.
When the decades-long effort turned out to be a series of failures, it was clear to everyone
that a major paradigm shift or a game changer in dealing with the North was absolutely
necessary. Parks trustpolitik strives to avoid this past pattern.
Longer term planning should be related to preparation for unifcation, building an international
consensus for this. North Korean refugees and humanitarian issues should not be put aside.
South Korean decision makers may have to reconsider their previous low profle approach
to these issues. South Korea can take valuable lessons from German unifcation, where
the East German government did not merely change, it collapsed completely from within.
Purely in order to ease the suffering of partition, the two sides negotiated with one another.
They did not cooperate with one another, though the West was a dialogue partner for the
East. Similarly, as reconciliation with the North Korean dictatorship proceeds, a regime that
gravely represses its people must not be a collaborative partner. A national coalition cannot
be formed between a free market system and a dictatorship that, at least on the outside, calls
itself socialist. A unifcation strategy must be formed from this perspective. In educating
young South Koreans about unifcation, the Park administration must acknowledge that the
regime of Kim Jong-un does not represent the will of the North Korean people. They are
taking the people hostage, and are not to be viewed as a party for cooperation. In this way,
the next generation will take an interest in North Korean human rights and democratization.
Conclusion
When new South Korean presidents are elected, it has been common for North Korea to
make threats and provocations as it tests the new administration, but eventually the North
takes conciliatory measures that can easily turn into another round of hostile acts. The Park
administration has been prepared with a sustainable and resilient policy, both in its direct
dealings with the North and in its close consultations with the international community.
Nearly all previous efforts to reach an agreement with North Korea have failed to achieve
meaningful accomplishments because Seoul had adhered to a negotiating principle of
reaching a collective, comprehensive, and grand bargain, that was countered by North
Koreas salami tactics and other strategies to stall progress. Learning from these experiences,
Park has been trying to build trust between the two Koreas, but with Pyongyangs continuous
provocations, her approach has not been successful in achieving its objectives.
44
It is therefore better to strive for small but meaningful results in the short term, while also
building on these achievements to move forward towards the ultimate goal in the mid to
long term. In order to cultivate an environment for unifcation, Seoul needs to concentrate
on cooperating with the international community and building global consensus and support
for unifcation, while simultaneously dealing with issues in North Korea, not only traditional
military issues, but also human rights and humanitarian assistance.
Endnotes
1. North Korea Blames South, cancels family reunions, CNN, September 21, 2013, http://
edition.cnn.com/2013/09/21/world/asia/korea-family-reunions-cancel/.
2. North Korea says it wants atmosphere of reconciliation and unity, CNN, January 24, 2014,
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/23/world/asia/north-korea-reconciliation/.
42. Park looks to era of reunifcation: President proposes cross-border family reunions, calls on
Japan to adopt correct historical stance, The Korea Herald, January 5, 2014, http://www.
koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20140106000510.
43. United Nations Offce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Statement
by Mr. Michael Kirby Chair of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the
Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea to the 25th Session of the Human Rights Council,
Geneva, 17 March 2014, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.
aspx?NewsID=14385&LangID=E.
44. Sarah Teo, Tensions on the Korean Peninsula: Will Parks Trustpolitik Work? RSIS
Commentaries, 051-13, 2013.
23. Hanbano shinroe process, shinroereul ilta, Nael Shinmun, February 10, 2014, p. 1.
24. Kang Choi, Jiyoon Kim, Hankwon Kim, Youngshik Bong and Jaehyon Lee, Evaluating
President Park Geun-Hyes Foreign Policy in its 1st Year, Issue Briefs 2014-08, February 24,
2014, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies.
25. Mark Beeson, The United States and East Asia: The decline of long-distance leadership? The
Asia-Pacifc Journal, Vol. 43, No. 1 (October 26, 2009).
26. Gilbert Rozman, North Korea and Northeast Asian Security, East Asia Forum, October 4,
2011, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/10/04/north-korea-s-implications-for-northeast-asian-
security/.
27. The Leap Day Deal with North Korea: Cautious Optimism Is Warranted in Washington,
Center for American Progress, March 1, 2012, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
security/news/2012/03/01/11320/the-leap-day-deal-with-north-korea/.
28. NTI, North Korea Threatens Preemptive Attack on U.S., South Korea, Global Security
Newswire, October 7, 2013, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/n-korea-threatens-carry-out-
preemptive-attack-us-s-korea/.
29. Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).
30. Nile Gardiner, The Decline of U.S. Leadership Threatens Americas Position as the Worlds
Superpower, America at Risk Memo #AR 11-02 on Democracy and Human Rights, The
Heritage Foundation, May 9, 2011, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/05/the-
decline-of-us-leadership-threatens-americas-position-as-the-worlds-superpower.
31. Chang Hun On and Celeste Arrington, Democratization and Changing Anti-American
Sentiments in South Korea, Asian Survey, Vol. 47, No. 2 (March/April 2007).
32. Martin Sieff, Jang sung-taeks Execution Leaves Kim Jung-un Isolated, Unpredictable, Asia
Pacifc Defense Forum, December 19, 2013, http://apdforum.com/en_GB/article/rmiap/articles/
online/features/2013/12/19/korea-jang-execution.
33. Fire on the City Gate: Why China Keeps North Korea Close, International Crisis Group,
Media Release, December 9, 2013, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-
releases/2013/asia/fre-on-the-city-gate-why-china-keeps-north-korea-close.aspx.
34. Ken Gause, Leadership Transition in North Korea, Council on Foreign Relations, January
2012, http://www.cfr.org/north-korea/leadership-transition-north-korea/p27071.
35. South Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman Cho Tai-youngs briefng, May 2013.
36. Shinzo Abes Nationalist Strategy, February 13, 2014, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.
com/2014/02/shinzo-abes-nationalist-strategy/.
37. Russias Vladimir Putin Eyeing Closer Ties with North Koreas Kim Jong-un, International
Business Times, Mar. 31, 2014, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/russias-vladimir-putin-eyeing-closer-
ties-north-koreas-kim-jong-un-1442713
38. OPLAN 5029: Collapse of North Korea, Korea Military Options, GlobalSecurity.org,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oplan-5029.htm; Operation Plan 5029: Dont Let
Contingency Scenario Become Self-Fulflling Prophesy, The Korea Times, November 2, 2009;
Nile Bowie, Covert Ops & Washingtons Contingency Plans for North Korea, May 31, 2012,
Global Research, http://www.globalresearch.ca/covert-ops-washington-s-contingency-plans-
for-north-korea/31153.
39. Dae-yul Kwon, Conditions Unripe for North Korea Revolt, Asia Times, November 17, 2011.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/MK17Dg01.html.
40. Bruce Bennett, Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse (Santa Monica: RAND
Corporation, 2013); Han Yong-Sup, Politico-Military Repercussions of North Korean Crisis,
Seoul; Ilmin International Relations Institute, Working Paper Series No. 4, Sept. 2010; David
S. Maxwell, Catastrophic Collapse of North Korea: Implications for the United States Military,
Ft. Leavenworth, Kan.: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command
and General Staff College, May 1996.
41. John Feffer, Why North Korea 2013 is Not East Germany 1989, Issue Brief, 2014-01, The
Asan Institute for Policy Studies, January 2, 2014.
Mark Fitzpatrick
Fitzpatrick: What to Do about North Korea | 241 240 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
clips depicting attacks on the White House and New York City, the latter copied from a video
game. To drive home the point, North Korea released a staged photograph of leader Kim
Jong-un in a command center-like setting with a map supposedly showing target sites for a
missile strike on various cities in the continental United States.
North Korea has no missiles capable of hitting the American homeland, though it is working
toward this goal. The longest-range missile of known reliability, the Nodong; can reach
about 900 km with a 1,000 kg warhead. A Nodong variant that was displayed in a 2010
parade and has striking similarities to the Iranian Ghadr-1 might extend that reach to 1,600
km, but the operational status of this system is unclear. North Korea has also displayed
apparent mock-ups of two longer-range missiles that it has never tested. In April 2013, it
deployed two road-mobile Musudan missiles to the East Coast, but whether it ever intended
to test them or only to use them for political signaling is unclear. The United States estimates
that the Musudan has a potential range of 4,000 km, which would put Guam in reach. The
maximum range, however, may be closer to the 2,400 km of the Soviet R-27 system on
which it was apparently based.
5
Prototypes of another road-mobile system, designated Hwasong-13 by North Korea
and KN-08 by the U.S. military, were paraded in April 2012 and July 2013. The U.S.
Department of Defense assesses that they have a range of more than 5,500 km and would
be capable of hitting much of the continental United States if successfully designed and
developed but notes that, like the Musudan, their current reliability is low because they
have not been fight-tested.
6
Non-governmental Western experts are divided as to whether
the mock-ups represent real systems. Germans Marcus Schiller and Robert Schmucker
believe the systems displayed are technically infeasible.
7
Americans Jeffrey Lewis and
John Schilling contend that the mock-ups are consistent with a development program
for an intercontinental ballistic missile and argue that the space launch that North Korea
successfully carried out in December 2012 was almost as technically challenging as an
ICBM launch.
8
The 100-kg satellite put into (dysfunctional) orbit by the three-stage Unha-
3 is ten times lighter than a nuclear warhead, and the space launch did not test atmospheric
re-entry. Until North Korea successfully tests re-entry of a dummy nuclear warhead, it can
be argued that it does not have a reliable nuclear strike capability. Lewis cautions analysts
not to be too sanguine on this point, noting that China tested a missile-delivered warhead
in 1966 with its fourth test and ultimately solved engineering challenges related to re-entry
vehicles for intercontinental ballistic missiles by 1980.
9
Further missile developments can
be expected in 2014, drawing on the successful Unha-3 launch and the reports of fve
static engine tests in 2013, which might have been for the Hwasong-13, although this is
unknowable.
10
The main launch site at Sohae has been expanded to allow for launches of
rockets almost 70 percent longer than the Unha-3.
11
North Koreas missile systems can also be used to deliver chemical weapons far afeld, although
artillery is a more effective means of chemical warfare. With Syrias decision in 2013 to give
up its chemical weapons, North Korea became the only country presumed to have an active
chemical weapons program. Testimony from defectors and other evidence give South Korea
reason to estimate that the North has 2,500-5,000 tons of chemical agents,
12
which would be
two to four times the size of Syrias former stockpile. North Koreas chemical weapons are
thought to include sulfur mustard, chlorine, phosgene, sarin, and V-agents.
13
Over thepast
North Korea is the worlds most troublesome country, brutal at home and a bully abroad.
In 2013 it became even more dangerous, both to its neighbors and to its own people. Most
worrisome are the nuclear weapons that Pyongyang sees as vital for the preservation of the
regime. Although North Korea seems intent on never trading them away for economic or
political benefts, this does not mean that diplomacy is meaningless. In combination with
deterrence, interdictions, sanctions, and other policy tools, engagement can seek to limit the
dangers. The policy options for the United States are not new; nearly every policy choice
short of military preemption has already been tried. What is changed is the set of unfavorable
circumstances faced by Pyongyang: a pervasive market economy, an increasing fow of
outside information, widespread corruption, and the exposure of internal divisions that
reached to the leaders own relatives. Pressure on Pyongyang that sharpens its policy choices
also serves a longer-term goal of hastening internal change that can lead to unifcation.
A Dangerous Regime
The external threats posed by North Korea include progress in both the plutonium and
uranium paths to a nuclear weapon. Whether the DPRK has smaller, diversifed and precision
nuclear weapons, as claimed,
1
cannot be confrmed. Nor is it known whether the February
12, 2013 test, North Koreas third since 2006, was based on plutonium, as were the other two,
or highly enriched uranium (HEU). The radioactive isotopes collected in Japan two months
later had decayed too much to allow a determination. But each test brings Pyongyang closer
to having a deliverable nuclear weapon.
The Norths current plutonium holdings are suffcient for no more than about ten weapons.
The 5MWe reactor at Yongbyon which produced that plutonium before it was partially
disabled in 2007 appears to have been restarted in the autumn of 2013, although North
Korea has not yet announced this. Resumption of reactor operations will enable it to
annually add one to two weapons worth of plutonium to that stockpile, beginning in two to
three years when the fuel load is discharged, cooled, and then reprocessed. The facility for
producing enriched uranium appears to have doubled in size, based on overhead imagery
of theroof, and new activity is underway on other probablenuclear-related facilities at the
sprawling Yongbyon complex.
2
Construction of an experimental light-water reactor may
be completed by the end of 2014 or early 2015, giving North Korea another means of
producing plutonium for two or three weapons a year, although the main purpose is probably
electricity generation since the plutonium from such reactors is not ideal for weapons use.
In the summer and autumn, excavation work and two new tunnel entrances were observed
at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site.
3
In late March 2014, North Korea threatened to carry out
a new form of nuclear test.
4
Giving legal and political weight to the nuclear weapons program, meetings of the Workers
Party and Supreme Peoples Assembly in March and April 2013 decided that nuclear
weapons possession should be a matter of law and never traded away, and that the nuclear
and missile programs should be pursued simultaneously with economic development, a
policy known as the byungjin (progress in tandem) line. During the spring 2013 escalation
of tension following the UN Security Councils response to the third nuclear test, North
Korea threatened a pre-emptive nuclear strike on the United States and released YouTube
a press conference in Pyongyang at which he confessed to unspecifed anti-government
acts and asked for U.S. government help to win his release. The staged event appeared to be
North Koreas way of seeking U.S. engagement.
20
Even worse than the dangers that North Korea presents externally are the crimes the regime
commits against its own people. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay last
year noted that North Koreas deplorable human rights situation has no parallel anywhere
in the world.
21
In view of this deplorable picture, last March the UN Human Rights
Council established a Commission of Inquiry to investigate violations. After a year-long
investigation, including interviewing over 320 victims and witnesses, the Commission on
February 17, 2014, released a report which concluded that the systematic, widespread, and
gross human rights violations constituted crimes against humanity. Documenting in great
detail the unspeakable atrocities committed in the DPRK, the report said these crimes
entail extermination, murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions
and other sexual violence, persecution on political, religious, racial and gender grounds, the
forcible transfer of populations, the enforced disappearance of persons and the inhumane act
of knowingly causing prolonged starvation. Implying that Kim Jong-un and others should
be held accountable, the Commission noted that the main perpetrators are offcials who
are acting under the effective control of the central organs of the Workers Party of Korea,
the National Defence Commission and the Supreme Leader of the Democratic Peoples
Republic of Korea.

The headline recommendation was that these issues should be referred
to the International Criminal Court for action.
22
Hopes that the Swiss-educated young leader would bring North Korea closer to international
norms were dashed when the world saw how he dealt with his uncle and former regent,
Jang Song-taek, who apparently got caught on the wrong side of a struggle over control of
resources. Jangs summary execution showed the young leader to lead in the style not of
Gorbachev but of Stalin. Kim Jong-Un has picked up where his father and grandfather left
off, by overseeing a system of public executions, extensive political prison camps, and brutal
forced labor, commented Phil Robertson, deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch.
23
Policy Conundrum
In the quarter century since North Koreas quest for nuclear weapons became apparent, the
United States has tried every possible policy response, save one. There has been engagement
bilaterally and multilaterally, with talks variously involving three parties, four parties, six
parties, and eight parties. Sanctions of all forms have been applied. Policies of inducement,
concessions, disengagement, and threats have all had their day. Lack of consistency can be
faulted, but not lack of imagination. Nothing has persuaded North Korea to desist from its
nuclear pursuit. Temporary diplomatic successes, the best of them being the 1994 Agreed
Framework, have all been reversed through North Korean reneging.
24
The one option that has not been applied, military intervention, has been kept on the shelf
for fear of sparking a repeat of the devastation of the 1950-1953 Korean War. Despite
atrocious provocations over the years, North Korea has remained immune from U.S.
military reprisal because its artillery held Seoul hostage. The nuclear weapons that may
now accompany the conventional artillery reinforce the case for caution but do not account
decade there have been several unconfrmed reports of North Korean assistance to Syrias
chemical weapons program,
14
which came close to being corroborated in April 2013 when
Turkey detained a Liberian vessel en route to Syria from North Korea that was found to be
carrying a number of gas masks in addition to small arms and ammunition.
15
North Korea had also assisted Syrias misbegotten pursuit of a nuclear weapons program,
an effort that was abruptly halted in September 2007 by Israels bombing of the plutonium-
production reactor at Al Kibar. North Korea may also have cooperated with Irans illicit
nuclear program, although the evidence remains too sketchy to allow conclusions to be
drawn.
16
Similarly, there was reason to believe that North Korea may have been engaged
in nuclear cooperation with Burma; Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said as much in an
interview in 2009.
17
Whatever assistance North Korea was providing to it in the nuclear and
missile feld has apparently ceased as a result of Burmas move away from authoritarianism
and toward engagement with the United States and other Western countries. The drying up
of North Koreas markets for unconventional weapons sales is one of the bright spots in an
assessment of the troubles the North poses.
North Korea does continue, however, to sell conventional weapons in contravention of
Security Council resolutions. Panamas seizure of the Chong Chon Gang in July 2013
provided graphic proof of North Koreas determination to continue such sales. This is no
wonder. Military goods are among the few areas in which North Korea has a competitive
advantage; it is thought to have netted $100 million or more a year from such sales.
18
Cyber warfare is another area in which North Korea poses security threats. It is strongly
suspected of launching cyber attacks against South Korean television stations and banks in
March 2013, similar to earlier massive denial-of-service attacks in 2011 and 2009. North
Korea is reported to have a 3,000-person cyber army. The hermit nation has an asymmetric
advantage in the cyber realm because its governmental and military infrastructure relies on
computer systems to only a limited degree.
North Koreas troublesome behavior toward the South in 2013 included diatribes against
President Park Geun-hye and threats to turn Seoul into a sea of fre. In April that year, North
Korea abruptly withdrew workers from the Kaesong Joint Industrial Zone, halting for fve
months the most promising form of inter-Korea interaction. Just as Kaesong was coming
back on line on a reduced scale, the North abruptly refused to permit North-South divided
family reunions at the height of the Chuseok harvest festival holiday. A reunion event was
allowed in February 2014, but North Korea refused to regularize such meetings.
North Korea found still other ways to pose problems internationally. In April 2013, it
sentenced naturalized U.S. citizen and Christian missionary Kenneth Bae to 15 years of
hard labor for unspecifed hostile acts while he was visiting as a tourist the previous year.
U.S. efforts to win Baes release were rebuffed in August when a State Department offcial
was disinvited at the last minute, while Kim Jong-un instead entertained the famboyant
former U.S. professional basketball player Dennis Rodman.
19
In October, Merrill Newman,
an 85-year old U.S. Korean War veteran, was pulled off an airplane as he was about to depart
Pyongyang after a ten-day tourist visit. He was held for a month until he confessed to killing
North Korean soldiers and civilians 60 years earlier. In January 2014, Bae was put before
Whatever risks might be associated with new talks, they are less than those that come with
doing nothing.
31
Doing nothing is not how the Obama administration would characterize its North Korea
policy, of course. Although it is not talking to Pyongyang, it is sending signals. One signal
is a strengthened posture of deterrence, which serves at the same time as a means of
reassurance to Americas allies in the region. In October 2013, the United States and South
Korea announced a tailored deterrence strategy to deter North Korean use of nuclear and
chemical weapons and other forms of aggression.
32
In line with this strategy, U.S. and ROK
defense and foreign affairs offcials took part in the two-day Extended Deterrence Policy
Committee Tabletop Exercise in Hawaii in January 2014 to explore a range of possible
allianceresponses to anuclear crisis.
33
In February 2014, the Pentagon temporarily added an
800-person army regiment to the 28,500 U.S. military personnel stationed in South Korea.
The annual large-scale Foal Eagle joint military exercise was again held in South Korea
in MarchApril 2014. Last year, in light of North Koreas nuclear threats, the Pentagon
enhanced the exercise by sending nuclear-capable B-2 and B-52 bombers to fy near the
border and simulate bombing runs as much to reassure the South as to deter the North.
The United States also bolstered missile defenses in the region. UN sanctions against North
Korea were strengthened and China was persuaded to more strictly implement existing
international sanctions.
In return, China has encouraged the United States to return to the Six-Party Talks that began in
Beijing in 2003. Those talks broke down in 2008 over verifcation requirements for the partial
dismantling of its nuclear program that North Korea had agreed to undertake. In September
2013, Pyongyang sought to reconvene the talks without preconditions,
34
meaning without
meeting U.S. demands to recommit to the original denuclearization purpose of the talks and
to verifably halt the enrichment and plutonium-related activity. A DPRK diplomat told this
author bluntly in January that under these conditions, the Six-Party Talks are dead.
This does not mean that engagement with North Korea itself is dead. At least it should not
be. Washington should fnd other ways to talk to North Korea. The Obama administrations
mantra of not talking for the sake of talks has a nice ring to it, but the argument is not
compelling. Talking is useful for sounding out the other sides intentions and exploring
potential shifts. Keeping channels open will stand the United States in good stead in the
event of a crisis that requires immediate communication. Moreover, talking is cost-free, and
not a beneft bestowed on the other party. It is the essence of diplomacy. U.S. engagement
should be aimed at reaching the ear of the leader.
35
Although Dennis Rodman is nobodys
idea of the ideal envoy, the fact that he is the only American to have engaged personally with
Kim Jong-un is telling. Engagement should be coordinated with Seoul; the most important
dialogue channel is North-South. For Pyongyang, the road to Washington runs through
Seoul. The United States will not abandon its ROK ally or relegate it to a second-tier status
in negotiations, as North Korea repeatedly suggests.
Last year North Korea sought several times to arrange for informal discussions in the guise
of Track 1.5 talks in Beijing, Berlin, and London. Some of the American academics who
joined those talks reported afterwards that there was room to fnd common ground. The
idea that Pyongyang wants to be recognized as a nuclear power in diplomatic talks was
for the reason Pyongyang is not attacked. The reason, rather, is geography. Although a
U.S. military strike against North Korea remains an ever-present deterrent, the United
States has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with either nuclear or conventional
weapons, as it put in writing in September 2005.
25
In December 2009, after visiting Pyongyang in the Obama administrations frst high-
level contact with the nation, Special Envoy for North Korea Policy Steven Bosworth told
reporters this may be the time to exercise strategic patience.
26
Bosworths catchphrase has
characterized U.S. policy ever since, though U.S. offcials say it is not strictly accurate. U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacifc Affairs Daniel Russel explained in
answer to a question about strategic patience posed at an event at Chatham House in January:
...our strategy is not to succumb to impatience. Our strategy is to maintain
a very solid grasp on the things that we do control and where we do have an
ability both to shape North Koreas choices but also to avoid repeating chronic
mistakes that we have, frankly, made in the past. The essence of those mistakes
was to put hope over evidence the hope that this time maybe North Korea
would mean it...
27
To avoid repeating past mistakes, the Obama administration is determined not to return to
any negotiating table with North Korea until it takes actions to demonstrate a commitment
to denuclearization. Pyongyangs statements instead signal the opposite intention: to talk
to the United States as an equal nuclear-armed state and not to give up its nuclear weapons
until the United States does likewise.
28
Angered by the speed with which Pyongyang violated
the February 29, 2012 Leap Day deal, the Obama team has little interest in trying again.
Under that deal, in implicit exchange for 240,000 tons of food aid, North Korea agreed
to suspend nuclear tests, enrichment activity, and long-range missile launches. Although
the U.S. negotiators made clear that a space launch would be a deal breaker, the defnition
of long-range missile launches was not agreed in writing. Sixteen days later Pyongyang
announced its intention to put a satellite into space on the centennial of founding father Kim
Il-sungs birthday. The rocketand hopes for U.S.-DPRK rapprochementblew up shortly
after the launch. Although the next launch succeeded, relations with the United States and
the rest of the world have gone from bad to worse.
The policy conundrum is that as Washington remains patient, Pyongyang is pushing its
nuclear and missile program ahead on all fronts. Before long, it will undoubtedly demonstrate
a capability to reliably mount and deliver nuclear weapons to Japan and South Korea and
possibly further. As former Deputy Assistant of State Evans Revere put it, When that
occurs, it will dramatically mark the failure of years of efforts to end the North Korean
WMD program.
29
Arguing that the United States and its allies cannot afford to just sit back
and wait for that day, several private-sector experts advocate renewed engagement without
preconditions. Frank Jannuzi, Deputy Executive Director of Amnesty International USA,
for example, says: The smart choice is to be bold. Engage Pyongyang without delaynot
as a reward for bad behavior, but because it offers the best chance to gradually infuence
North Koreas conduct, encouraging it to respect international norms, protect the human
rights of its people, and abandon its nuclear weapons.
30
After meeting with North Koreans
in Europe, Bosworth and former Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci argued that:
past year, policy makers have emphasized that Washington is seeking to sharpen the choices
confronting the DPRK between isolation or integration.
43
Contrary to the byungjin policy
line of procuring both guns and butter, there is no scenario in which North Korea can create
a viable economic future for itself or its people and retain a nuclear weapons program,
Russel said in January 2014.
44
Sharpening the choices is ROK policy as well. President
Park said in Switzerland in January, unless North Korea changes voluntarily, we have to
create an environment where it cannot help but change.
45
When both governments agreed
in January to set up a consultative body to assess developments in North Korea, an unnamed
senior ROK offcial suggested that the purpose was not just to watch but also to induce faster
change in the regime.
46
A Nation Beset By Contradictions
As a nation, North Korea is beset by contradictions. For a nation that is chronically unable
to feed itself and is heavily reliant on China for oil, trade, and investment, the self-reliance
national ideology of juche is a meaningless slogan. Even in several areas away from the
border, the Chinese yuan is replacing the national currency. The communist system is
crumbling as market forces take over the economy. The public food distribution system
never fully recovered after its collapse in the famine years of the mid-1990s. A study of
defectors found that most of them had derived the bulk of their income in North Korea from
unoffcial economic activity.
47
Despite the states efforts to regain control of the economy,
the private markets are there to stay.
48
Because the markets are not fully authorized, bribery
is pervasive. In a ranking by Transparency International, North Korea is tied for the title of
most corrupt nation on earth.
49
Corruption and emphasis on wealth accumulation have strained the ideological
underpinnings of the state. Rampant smuggling of Chinese radios and South Korean-
origin DVDs and CDs has undermined the states control over information. Cognizant
North Koreans know their nation is far behind South Korea and a far cry from the socialist
paradise portrayed in government propaganda. Arch North Korea critic Josh Stanton is
not far from the mark when he suggests that: poverty doesnt cause revolutions; jealousy
does. Class envy is far more dangerous to Kim Jong-un than famine was to Kim Jong Il.
50

The economic reforms that the state does attempt to implement quickly fall victim to the
contradictions. The directive of June 28, 2012 sought to incentivize agriculture by allowing
family units to keep 30 percent of their production and to stimulate industry by giving
factory managers more freedom. Among other reforms, factories were required to make
their own production plans and procure their own inputs. The resultant infationary wage
increases, supply constraints, and resistance from entrenched forces within the state and
military created insurmountable problems.
51
In another heralded economic reform, North
Korea in November established 13 new special economic zones. Yet the abrupt closing of
the Kaesong Industrial Zone and the increased sanctions on North Korea will have scared
off all but the most risk-seeking of foreign investors. Apart from these new political risk
factors, conditions such as restrictions on the use of the Internet and inattention to the rule
of law make North Korea inhospitable to foreign investment. Foreign frms that have made
an impact, such as the Egyptian Orascom Telecom Holding, which now has two million
cell phone subscriptions, have had trouble repatriating profts.
52
Meanwhile the government
a misunderstanding, the North Korean participants reportedly said.
36
They could not
accept conditions in advance, but their nuclear weapons program would be on the table,
37

including a freeze of the nuclear program, postponement of missile tests, and re-entry of
IAEA inspectors: in short, a return to the Leap Day deal minus any moratorium on satellite
launches.
38
North Korea, of course, would want food aid on the order of the 2012 deal and
some political concessions.
39
The Obama administration is highly unlikely to pursue a comprehensive deal that does
not include space launches. To allow space launches after they have been denounced by
successive U.S. presidents and prohibited by two UN Security Council resolutions would
be politically infeasible, widely condemned across the political spectrum as rewarding bad
behavior. There is too much overlap between North Koreas military-use missiles and its
supposed space exploration. After successfully recovering the front section of the Unha-3
rocket, South Korea concluded that it was designed to accommodate a nuclear warhead.
So, what is there to talk about? Jannuzis suggestion for a Helsinki-like initiative to build
multiple bridges of discussion on a broad number of topics including energy security, health
policy, the rights of women and the disabled, etc.
40
is breathtakingly ambitious. He is under
no illusions about North Korean sincerity with regard to denuclearization. In Jannuzis view,
a multilateral process of engagement is frst needed to bring about fundamental changes in
thinking. The idea is akin to the Sunshine Policy that won President Kim Dae-jung the
Nobel Peace Prize in 2000 and was continued by his successor Roh Moo-hyun. The no-
strings attached assistance provided to North Korea under the Sunshine Policy contributed
to a conservative political backlash in South Korea because it failed to elicit any reciprocity
from Pyongyang regarding reducing the nuclear program or improving human rights. Little
appetite is likely to be found in either Seoul or Washington for another turn down this road.
There may be scope for discussion of discrete aspects of North Koreas strategic weapons
programs. Siegfried Hecker has suggested focusing on three nos: no more bombs (meaning
no more plutonium and no HEU); no better bombs (no nuclear testing and no missile tests);
and no nuclear exports, though he recognizes that each advancement of North Koreas nuclear
program pushes up against his frst red line.
41
North Korea should also be encouraged to end
its chemical weapons program and to adhere to the Chemical Weapons Convention. It is one
of only six states that prevents this treaty from becoming universal. The United States would
fnd it hard, however, to give up much in return for incomplete measures that North Korea, if
true to past form, is unlikely to honor for very long, especially with regard to the verifcation
measures that would be needed. Any pursuit of discrete measures must also be done in a
way that does not signal acceptance of the nuclear weapons program. What it can offer is
an improved relationship and integration into the international community on condition that
Pyongyang denuclearize. Secretary of State John Kerry said the United States is prepared to
sign a non-aggression pact.
42
In 2005 it put into writing a promise of no intention to attack or
invade into an agreement, and could do so again. North Korea could also be offered a process
leading to a peace treaty to formally end the Korean War once denuclearization is complete.
Above all, the United States can offer to help North Korea escape the contradictions that
will otherwise spell its demise. If North Korea continues its nuclear weapons development,
the United States will instead seek to make those contradictions more apparent. Over the
Korean regime in ways that intensify its contradictions. It is no wonder that the January
16 proposal that North Korea made to the South, in the name of the National Defense
Commission headed by Kim Jong-un, sought a halt to those exercises.
60
One should not be sanguine about the turmoil that would be unleashed by implosion of the
North Korean state. Bennetts 2013 study amply lays out the tremendous human, political,
and security problems that would ensue. There is every reason to hope that the collapse
will come about with a soft, rather than hard, landing. Peter Hayes, among others, makes a
reasonable argument for seeking to transform the DPRK inside-out via engagement aimed
at non-collapse.
61
This, in effect, is the consistent policy of China, which is wary of turmoil
on its northeast border and fears that U.S. policy aims at regime change. But those who prop
up the North Korean state prolong the suffering of its population, and the longer unifcation
is forestalled, the harder it will be to knit together the divergent Koreas.
The United States is genuinely in favor of Korean unifcation that would remove the
greatest and most longstanding threat to regional security. Unifcation as a democratic,
free-enterprise-based republic free of nuclear weapons would be a happy ending indeed to
the long-running North Korean tragedy.
62
Washington does not seek to overthrow the Kim
regime, nor should it. Yet the United States can help to foster the internal conditions that can
lead to a regime change, including by promoting a greater fow of information to the people
about the regimes human rights record and other failings. Washington is already doing this
through Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and independent broadcasters in South Korea.
Sanctions will be further strengthened if North Korea conducts another nuclear test or
long-range missile launch. In particular, Washington should consider the kind of secondary
sanctions that have been effectively employed against Iran. It is absurd that far tougher
sanctions have been imposed on Iran even though North Koreas record of nuclear non-
proliferation treaty and human rights violations is far worse. Third parties that do business
with North Korean entities involved in illicit nuclear or missile programs should themselves
face penalties. Any foreign banks that provide fnancial services for blacklisted North Korean
entities should face the threat of being declared an institute of primary money laundering
concern as was applied against Banco Delta Asia in Macao in 2005.
U.S. offcials insist that the policy of sharpening North Koreas choices is intended to persuade
it to give up its nuclear weapons. Privately, most of them would agree with the dominant
mood in the analytical community that North Korea will not willfully make that decision.
Offcials can never say so, but putting pressure on Pyongyang also serves a longer-term
goal of hastening an internal change that can lead to unifcation. The new U.S. diplomacy
toward North Korea is looking to the end game. The goal is not regime change per se, but
creating the foundation for peaceful unifcation of the Korean Peninsula.
allocates scarce resources to non-productive vanity projects such as equestrian parks, a
dolphinarium, skating rinks, and a ski resort, plus more monuments to Kim Il-sung and Kim
Jong-il. Yet under Kim Jong-un, less than ten km of new roads have been built.
53
North Korea is often called a failing state. Collapse may, indeed, come in the foreseeable
future, as predicted by Bruce Bennett at RAND,
54
or the present progressive form of the
verb failing could stretch out for many more years. It is incorrect, however, to call North
Korea an economic basket case. Visitors to Pyongyang report an uptick in consumerism:
more restaurants, cars, kiosks, and cell phones. Women wear more fashionable clothes, and
a housing boom is visible in the capital. Many analysts wonder where the money is coming
from. Rdiger Frank, one of the most astute foreign observers of North Korea, recalls a
similar pattern of consumer spending in his native East Germany that was untethered to
changes in economic policy and surmises that the DPRK may be living off its reserves.
Once they are depleted, trouble is inevitable, he notes, adding: We may be witnessing the
beginning of the long-predicted endgame for North Korea.
55
Fissures among the ruling elite became glaringly apparent over Jangs purge and kangaroo
trial. Foremost among his many alleged crimes was the claim of disloyalty to the state and
forming a faction to threaten Kim Jong-uns power. For a state that has unfailingly proclaimed
absolute unity, this was an extraordinary admission of internal divisions.
56
The byungjin line
is the most obvious contradiction. For countries in dire straits, the policy choice should be
guns OR butter, not more of both. As long as North Korea maintains its nuclear weapons,
it will remain cut off from most sources of foreign trade and investment. China continues
to offer a lifeline, but at reduced levels after the February 2013 nuclear test and subsequent
provocations. According to some reports, China stopped state investment in free-trade zones
and froze high-level visits.
57
China also began implementing UN sanctions more rigorously,
releasing a 236-page list of goods denied to North Korea and stepping up inspections of
North Korea-bound cargo.
58
It even went beyond the requirements of the UN sanctions by
cutting ties with the DPRKs Foreign Trade Bank and other bank outlets.
The rationale behind byungjin is that nuclear weapons save money by allowing deterrence to
be sustained with smaller conventional forces. The most militarized country on earth, North
Korea maintains the worlds fourth-largest army with the worlds 49th-biggest population.
Defense spending accounts for 22 percent of GDP, a huge drain on resources. The state
apparently wants to redeploy some of its forces to economically productive activities.
Indeed, this is already underway as soldiers are put to work in agriculture,
59
but whether
military spending is being cut cannot be confrmed.
Conclusion
The argument is made that if only the United States would stop its hostile policy and halt
large-scale military exercises, the DPRK would be able to relax its guard and lower its
military spending. These exercises are necessary, however, precisely because of North
Koreas provocations and threatening posture toward its neighbors with nuclear and other
unconventional forces. Regular exercises are an important means of maintaining deterrence
and the capability to properly respond to provocations and to quickly defeat aggression
should deterrence fail. It is all the better if such defensive exercises put pressure on the North
22. Offce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, North Korea: UN Commission
documents wide-ranging and ongoing crimes against humanity, urges referral to
ICC, 17 February 2014, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.
aspx?NewsID=14255&LangID=E.
23. Human Rights Watch, North Korea: Kim Jong-Un Deepens Abusive Rule, January 21, 2014,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/21/north-korea-kim-jong-un-deepens-abusive-rule.
24. Mark Fitzpatrick, North Korea: Is Regime Change the Answer? Survival: Global Politics and
Strategy, Vol. 55, No. 3 (2013): p. 9.
25. Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing, September 19, 2005,
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm.
26. Associated Press, US: Time for strategic patience with NKorea, December 12, 2009, http://
www.3news.co.nz/US-Time-for-strategic-patience-with-NKorea/tabid/417/articleID/133891/
Default.aspx.
27. Transatlantic Interests in Asia Q&A, Remarks, Daniel R. Russel, Assistant Secretary, Bureau
of East Asian and Pacifc Affairs, Chatham House, London, United Kingdom, January 13,
2014, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/01/219878.htm.
28. Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), DPRK Foreign Ministrys spokesman dismisses
U.S. wrong assertion, January 13, 2009, <http://www. kcna.co.jp/item/2009/200901/
news13/20090113-13ee.html>.
29. Evans J.R. Revere, Facing the facts: towards a new U.S. North Korea policy,
Brookings Institution, October 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/fles/
papers/2013/10/16%20north%20korea%20denuclearization%20revere/16%20north%20
korea%20denuclearization%20revere%20paper.pdf.
30. Frank Jannuzi, Putting People Before Plutonium, 38 North, December 11, 2013,
http://38north.org/2013/12/fjannuzi121113/.
31. Stephen Bosworth and Robert L. Gallucci, Reasons to Talk to North Korea, The New York
Times, October 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/28/opinion/reasons-to-talk-to-
north-korea.html?_r=3&.
32. Karen Parrish, U.S., South Korea Announce Tailored Deterrence Strategy, American Forces
Press Service, October 2, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120896.
33. Lee Chi-dong, S. Korea, U.S. discuss risk of nuclear crisis on peninsula,
Yonhap, January 16, 2014, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/search1/2603000000.
html?cid=AEN20140116004800315.
34.

Kim Deok-hyun, N. Korea urges resumption of nuclear talks without preconditions,
Yonhap, September 18, 2013, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/09/18/73/0301000
000AEN20130918002100315F.html.
35. Revere puts this point cogently. See Evans J.R. Revere, Facing the facts: towards a new U.S.
North Korea policy, p. 21.
36. Park Hyun, N. Korean offcials discuss return to six-party talks, Hangyoreh, October 4, 2013,
http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/605793.html.
37. Bosworth and Gallucci, Reasons to Talk to North Korea.
38. Sohn Je-mi, North Korea Suggests Restoring Feb. 29 Agreement through Talks with the U.S.,
Kyunghyang Shinmun, October 11, 2013, http://english.khan.co.kr/khan_art_view.html?code=7
10100&artid=201310111459147.
39. Andrei Lankov, Back from DC: Is a North Korea nuclear deal on the horizon? NK News,
October 14, 2013, http://www.nknews.org/2013/10/back-from-dc-north-korea-nuclear-deal-on-
the-horizon/.
40. Frank Jannuzzi, Putting People Before Plutonium.
41. Siegfried Hecker, North Korea reactor restart sets back denuclearization, Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, 17 October 2013, http://thebulletin.org/north-korea-reactor-restart-sets-back-
denuclearization.
42. Secretary of State John Kerry, Remarks With Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, Japanese
Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida and Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera, Iikura
Guest House, Tokyo, October 3, 2013, http://seoul.usembassy.gov/p_rok_k_100313.html.
Endnotes
1. KCNA NDC of DPRK Clarifes Principled Stand on DPRK-U.S. Relations, 12 October 2013,
http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2013/201310/news12/20131012-18ee.html.
2. David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, Increased Activity at the Yongbyon Nuclear
Site, 5 December 2013, http://www.isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Yongbyon_
FINAL.pdf
3. Nick Hansen, Two New Tunnel Entrances Spotted at North Koreas Punggye Nuclear Test
Site, 38 North, 23 October 2013, http://38north.org/2013/10/punggye102313/.
4.

ChoeSang-hun, North Korea Vows to Use New Form of Nuclear Test, The New York
Times, March 20, 2014.
5. International Institute for Strategic Studies, North Korean Security Challenges: A net
assessment (London: IISS, 2011): p. 142.
6. Offce of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the
Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea 2013, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_
Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf.
7. Markus Schiller, Robert H. Schmucker, and J. James Kim, Assessment of North Koreas
Latest ICBM Mock-Up Asan Institute for Policy Studies Policy Brief, 14 January 2014, http://
en.asaninst.org/assessment-of-north-koreas-latest-icbm-mock-up/.
8. Jeffrey Lewis and John Schilling, Real Fake Missiles: North Koreas ICBM Mockups
Are Getting Scary Good, 38 North, 4 November 2013, http://38north.org/2013/11/lewis-
schilling110513/.
9. Jeffrey Lewis, communication with author and North Koreas Nuclear Arsenal: Guide for
the Perplexed, Arms Control Wonk, 13 April 2013, http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/
archive/6539/north-koreas-nuclear-arsenal-guide-for-the-perplexed.
10. Nick Hansen, Probable Rocket Engine Test Conducted at Sohae, 38 North, September 23,
2013, http://38north.org/2013/09/sohae092313/. Markus Schiller, Robert H. Schmucker, and J.
James Kim, Assessment of North Koreas Latest ICBM Mock-Up.
11. 38 North, News Alert: North Korea Nears Completion of Larger Rocket Launch Pad,
February 6, 2014, http://38north.org/2014/02/sohae020614/.
12. Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, Defense WhitePaper 2008 (Seoul, 2009), p.
39, http://www.mnd.go.kr/cms_f le/info/mndpaper/e2008_all.pdf.
13. Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Koreas Chemical Warfare Capabilities, 38 North, October
10, 2013, http://38north.org/2013/10/jbermudez101013/.
14. IISS, North Korean Security Challenges, p. 182.
15. Barbara Demick, North Korea tried to ship gas masks to Syria, report says, Los Angeles
Times, August 27, 2013.
16. Mark Fitzpatrick, New clues--but no proof--on Irans illicit nuclear trade, The National,
September 6, 2011.
17. Interview with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, China Post, July 23, 2009, http://www.
chinapost.com.tw/asia/regionalnews/2009/07/23/217522/p2/Interview-with.htm.
18. Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009), May 2010,
para. 65, distributed in Security Council circular S/2010/571, November 5, 2010, http://www.
un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/571.
19. Rodmans time with the North Korean leader was unique. In July Kim Jong-un declined to
meet with Eric Schmidt, the chairman of Google, and former New Mexico Governor Bill
Richardson, who had previously visited as an unoffcial emissary. In October, Kim refused to
see visiting Mongolian President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj. Since he came to offce in December
2011, no foreign offcial has met Kim.
20. Doug Esser, Family of man held in NKorea worried, encouraged, AP, January 20, 2014,
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/family-man-held-nkorea-worried-encouraged.
21. UN rights chief calls for probe into deplorable N. Korea situation, AFP, January 14, 2013,
http://news.asiaone.com/print/News/AsiaOne%2BNews/Asia/Story/A1Story20130114-395477.
html.
43. See, for example, Testimony of Glyn T. Davies, Special Representative for North Korea
Policy, U.S. Department of State, Before the Senate Committee On Foreign Relations, March
7, 2013, U.S. Policy Toward North Korea, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Ambassador_Davies_Testimony.pdf.
44. Transatlantic Interests in Asia Q&A, Remarks, Daniel R. Russel.
45. Park says N. Korea must be forced to change, Yonhap, January 21, 2014, http://english.
yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2014/01/21/27/0301000000AEN20140121007900315F.html.
46. Park Hyun, S. Korea and US discuss new framework for dealing with North Korea,
Hankyoreh, January 9, 2014, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/619049.
html.
47. Think Tanks See Hope in N.Korean Capitalism, Chosun Ilbo, January 3, 2014, http://english.
chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/01/03/2014010300856.html.
48. See, for example, Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein, Food markets still vital in North Korea, Asia
Times, January 10, 2014, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/KOR-01-100114.html/.
49. Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2013, December 2013, http://cpi.
transparency.org/cpi2013/results/.
50. Josh Stanton, RANDs study of N. Korea collapse should be required reading at State,
USFK, One Free Korea blog, http://freekorea.us/2013/09/27/rands-study-of-n-korea-collapse-
should-be-required-reading-at-state-usfk/#sthash.a6rXhC27.dpuf.
51. Park Hyeong-jung, North Koreas New Economic Management System: Main Features and
Problems, Korea Focus, January 2014, http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/design3/essays/view.
asp?volume_id=146&content_id=105092&category=G; Stephan Haggard, Park Hyeong-jung
on the Course of Economic Reform (Parts I and II), North Korea Witness to Transformation
blog, January 8 and 9, 2014, http://blogs.piie.com/nk/?p=12681 and http://blogs.piie.com/
nk/?p=12683/.
52. Stephan Haggard, Orascom in North Korea: Dont Leave Me Hanging, North Korea Witness
to Transformation blog, December 10, 2013, http://blogs.piie.com/nk/?p=12505.
53. Kim Jong-uns Erratic Behavior Threatens Us All, Chosun Ilbo, December 18, 2013, http://
english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/12/18/2013121801758.html.
54. Bruce W. Bennett, Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse, RAND,
September 2013, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR331/
RAND_RR331.pdf.
55. Ruediger Frank, Exhausting Its Reserves? Sources of Finance for North Koreas
Improvement of Peoples Living, 38 North, December 12, 2013, http://38north.org/2013/12/
rfrank121213/.
56. Victor Cha and Ellen Kim, The Demise of Jang Song Thaek, Comparative Connections, Vol
15, No 3., US-Korea, January 2014, http://csis.org/publication/comparative-connections-v15-
n3-us-korea.
57. Author interviews in Beijing, October 2013.
58. International Crisis Group, Fire on the City Gate: Why China Keeps North Korea Close, Asia
Report, No. 254, December 9, 2013, p. 7, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-
east-asia/254-fre-on-the-city-gate-why-china-keeps-north-korea-close.
59. Numbers of Soldiers Put To Work Full-Time in Agriculture and Fisheries To Cut North
Korean Military and Defense Costs, Tokyo Shimbun, October 23, 2013.
60. KCNA, NDC of DPRK Advances Crucial Proposals to S. Korean Authorities, January 16,
2014, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2014/201401/news16/20140116-29ee.html.
61. Peter Hayes, Thinking about the Thinkable: DPRK Collapse Scenarios Redux, NAPSNet
Policy Forum, September 24, 2013, http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/thinking-
about-the-thinkable-dprk-collapse-scenarios-redux/#ixzz2rD8YQODd.
62. Mark Fitzpatrick, North Korea: Is Regime Change the Answer? Survival, Vol. 55, No. 3
(JuneJuly 2013): pp. 7-20.
Purge of Jang Song-Taek and its
Impact on Chinas Policy Toward
North Korea
Zhu and Beauchamp-Mustafaga: Purge of Jang Song-Taek | 257 256 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
The Xi Jinping administration quickly decided to let the young Kim know of Chinas
irritation. Previously every time there was something big happening, Beijing would
choose to send a high-ranking offciala special envoy from Chinas top leaderto visit
Pyongyang to inquire in person. Or, an important fgure from the North would quickly make
his way to Beijing, asking about Chinas response. Jangs execution did not elicit any offcial
communication between the two sides. The CCP International Department, a long-time
messenger between the two countries, seems quite idle these days. The irony usually is this:
there is no possible fow of assistance without the dispatching of a high-level offcial to
Pyongyang. Since Chinese Vice President Li Yuanchao visited Pyongyang to attend the 60th
anniversary of the end of the Korean War military parade in July 2013, the China-DPRK
offcial connection has been frozen.
2
Jangs execution immediately attenuated Beijings diplomatic passion to pursue its persuasion
campaign to achieve the restoration of the Six-Party Talks. Chinas chief representative
to the multinational talks, Ambassador Wu Dawei, engaged in shuttle diplomacy among
Washington, Seoul, and Moscow between September and November 2013 purporting to
persuade the parties to return to Beijing for talks with the DPRK on the denuclearization
process. So far in 2014, there seems to be little sign that Beijing will work on that pull-and-
push policy any longer unless Pyongyang sincerely shows the world community that it will
use nuclear abandonment to break its self-imposed isolation.
Without Beijings bundle of promised assistance, North Koreas economic situation will
quickly become desperate. The adverse consequences of Jangs execution have surfaced
recently. Because Jangs followers have been similarly purged, Jangs business empire,
tangible and intangible, has broken into pieces. Even with the authorization to Prime Minister
Park Bung-chul to fll the gap, it is most improbable that he could reestablish a massive
network quickly to replace Jangs. Therefore, most Chinese business people are not able to
contact their business partners in the North, and there is no way that they can maintain their
activities both in the border areas and within North Korea. There is no exact number for the
moment showing how hard the blow has been for China-North Korea underground trade and
business, but it is virtually certain that the trading volume in 2014 will register a sharp drop.
Jangs execution has suddenly resulted in a huge loss of Kim Jong-uns fnancial income.
Jang usually amassed money from his empire, and provided funding for the operation of
a goodly number of political activities and events to show people the benevolence of their
leader. But with Jangs execution, the money provided through his network is gone. Kim
Jong-un must know how it hurts. Whether this adversity will eventually be overcome might
depend on Chinas decision to sustain the survival of the North or just to leave it alone.
Five months after the initial media hype over the motivations and implications of Jangs
purge, the full fallout for China-North Korea relations remains a mystery, even to those in
Beijing and Pyongyang. Exasperated as the Chinese leadership may be, its top priorities
remain stability and denuclearization, and it is unlikely that Beijing will see this event as the
tipping point for a new strategic calculus in China-North Korea relations. However, Jangs
purge crystallizes Beijings belief that Kim Jong-un is more inexperienced, more reckless,
and less reliable than his father, Kim Jong-il. This lack of faith in the younger Kim is now
driving Chinese policy more than the previous core belief of North Korea as a strategic
On December 12 Jang Song-taek, largely considered the second most powerful man in
North Korea and a well-known China hand, was executed for treason and corruption,
leaving the Chinese government without its most trusted interlocutor and Chinese companies
without their most important business contact. Jang, who was referred to by the KCNA
as the despicable human scum Jang, who was worse than a dog, was publicly purged,
arrested, and executed in just four days for [perpetrating] thrice-cursed acts of treachery
in betrayal of such profound trust and warmest paternal love shown by the party and the
leader for him.
1
These salacious, headline-making accusations were likely less shocking
to Jangs Chinese counterparts than the fact that he was purged and executed so suddenly,
threatening their economic plans for North Korea and eliminating their bridge into their
reclusive neighbor. Jangs brutal purge presented Beijing with pressing questions and no
real answersdoes China understand Kim Jong-un; can China trust him; and do Chinas
interests still dictate support for Pyongyang?
Jangs Execution Irritates Chinese Leaders
and Disgusts the Chinese People
Jang Song-taeks execution surprised the world and China as well, but how this affects
China-DPRK ties has been persistently mysterious since then. Even months later the
implications remain truly hard to estimate, given Beijings unchangeable twin concerns
about North Korea: denuclearization and instability. It is becoming clearer that Beijing
might be more concerned with the reality that the young leader Kim Jong-un has proven
to be more inexperienced and less trustworthy than his father. This reality is driving the
policy balancing in Chinas DPRK policy more than its previous sputtering thinking about
a strategic buffer.
Jangs brutal purge is a loss for China. As broadly believed, he is a well-known China hand,
dominating most of the trading and economic transactions between Pyongyang and Beijing
when he was powerful. His execution left China without its most trusted interlocutor for its
economic counterparts and, perhaps, the trading partner with whom it was arguably best
acquainted. Beijings surprise at Kim Jong-uns relentlessness was quickly overshadowed
by the huge disappointment at its inability to know what had previously gone on between
Kim and Jang. Otherwise, Beijing would have perhaps sorted out some way to mitigate the
predicament. A few question marks arose shortly after Jangs execution, and there was no
way to gloss over themwhat is the real nature of the Kim Jong-un regime? Is it possible
for the regime to take Chinas interests seriously? And furthermore, should Chinas genuine
calculus be to continuously support Pyongyang as it is? Obviously, exploring such questions
has fueled Chineseire.
Beijings offcial response can be characterized as the desperation of quietness. Chinas
foreign ministry spokesman even emphasized that the execution is North Koreas internal
affair, and there is no appetite in China to intervene. But Chinas real response was a mixture
of growing irritation and mounting anxietyirritation at the young Kim for his indifference
to Jangs China association, and anxiety over Chinas lack of leverage to foresee North
Koreas domestic dynamics and, in a timely manner, to react.
walks away from economic cooperation with China. This suggests that despite the Chinese
governments nonchalance, Beijing is very worried about the message Jangs criminal
accusations were intended to send to China and the potential impact not only on Chinese
trade and investment with the North but also on denuclearization efforts.
Beijings New Approach to the Young
Leader: A Cold Shoulder
In response to Kim killing Chinas inside man, Beijing has adopted a new approach to
North Korean misbehaviorsilence. When North Korea has made pivotal decisions in the
past, China would either dispatch or receive a senior offciala special envoy from the top
leadersto communicate Chinas response in person. Yet since Jangs execution, there has
been no such offcial communication between the two sides. Indeed, the CCP International
Liaison Department has remained idle since political ties were frozen following Vice President
Li Yuanchaos visit to Pyongyang. Chinas vital assistance will likely not resume until a high-
level offcial visits either Beijing or Pyongyang; so the onus is on Kim to revive the relationship.
Beijings silence has only been broken by a feeting call for Kim to make his frst visit
to Beijing, likely for what would best be described by American diplomats as a frank
discussion to explain his actions. Following the KCNAs offcial announcement of Jangs
crimes on December 9, the Chinese state-run media made an immediate overture to Kim
for a visit to China. On December 10, Peoples Daily ran aGlobal Times editorial stating
that China should help bring about Kim Jong-uns visit to China as soon as possible.
8

The resumption of talk about a Kim visit reveals that the Chinese government is concerned
enough to want a face-to-face meeting with Kim, possibly after concluding that no one can
challenge Kim for power now that Jang is gone. However, it is unlikely he will be extended
such an honor unless Kim is prepared to come with a necessary concessiona readiness to
give up North Koreas nuclear weapons.
9
Chinese leaders are quickly growing tired of Kims antics and politics. Kim Jong-uns third
nuclear test last February and war-mongering threats last March and April outraged Chinese
leaders. Jangs execution undoubtedly only increased President Xi Jinpings abhorrence for
the young leader, as Xis strong advocacy for cleaning up Chinese domestic politics stands
in stark contrast to the Kim dynastys lavishness and malicious personal cult. Xis signature
theme, the China Dream, focuses on enhancing the lives of the people, relegating the
political darkness of North Korea to a bygone era. North Korea appears to increasingly
realize that its behavior has pushed China farther away, but instead of mending relations
with Beijing, Pyongyang has turned to other suitors. North Koreas recent overtures to South
Korea suggest Chinas tougher policy is already having an effect.
Old Strategy, New Tactics?
Beijing may be nearing a critical juncture for its North Korea policy. Although China has,
in the past, resisted altering its long-term strategic objectives on the Korean Peninsula in
response to short-term problems, the current recklessness exhibited by Kim over his frst two
years in power may begin to loom as a long-term problem for Chinese leaders as they judge
buffer. Under this new outlook, China may increasingly rely on threats and pressure rather
than incentives and reassurances to alter North Koreas behavior. Furthermore, Beijing may
be more interested in closer cooperation with the United States and South Korea now that
Kim has started to directly impact Chinese economic interests and appears willing to gamble
North Koreas political stability in his quest for greater personal power.
The Chinese governments offcial response has been one of studied calm, but other signs
point to a surprised and worried benefactor. After the KCNAs offcial statement on the
purge, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Hong Lei said the purge was
North Koreas internal affair and defended the economic relationship by saying it serves
the interests of both sides.
3
Anxiety about Chinas lack of intelligence on North Koreas
domestic dynamics, reinforced by Beijings surprise at Jangs purge, continues a disturbing
trend, both for Beijings own peace of mind and for the rest of the worldPyongyang does
not communicate crucial events to its only ally.
4
The surprise at Kims brutality was quickly
followed by Beijings disappointment at not being able to foresee and mitigate the impending
purge of its most reliable advocate within the Kim regime.
Fearing a Domino Effect on
Trade Relations
Beijing fears Jangs purge will damage the economic ties it has been steadily building with
North Korea, jeopardizing its economic interests and possibly Beijings behind-the-scenes
efforts for denuclearization. In contrast to the offcial line, Chinese commentary in the
mainland media reveals that Beijing is remarkably concerned for the future of China-North
Korea economic relations, especially the Rajin port after it was singled out by North Korea as
one of Jangs crimes.
5
This accusation is obviously targeted at China and suggests that North
Korea also knew that Jang was Chinas man in Pyongyang, and no longer approved. While
Jangs China ties may be a cover-up for the real domestic power struggle, the accusations
could also signal Pyongyangs intention to reduce its economic reliance on Beijing or create
negotiating leverage for a more equitable trade relationship going forward. In response to
this perceived threat to Chinese economic interests in North Korea, one prominent Chinese
scholar, Central Party School professor Zhang Liangui, even suggested that China should
rethink its policy on non-intervention.
6
Jangs purge has already affected Chinese traders and investors in North Korea, although
the true impact may never be known since so much trade goes unrecorded. Since the purge
extended to Jangs followers, his business empire, largely funded by trade with China,
has collapsed and Chinese businesses are having diffculty contacting their North Korean
business partners to maintain normal trade relations. This, in turn, means that the Kim regime
will be looking for new revenue streams, since Jangs network funded many of its activities.
Moreover, SIPRIs latest report on China-North Korea relations asserts that Chinas economic
push into North Korea is part of the Chinese governments strategy for denuclearization.
7
If
this is true, then Jangs purge not only cost Beijing its most trusted interlocutor and its biggest
supporter of Chinese trade and investment, but also threatens its plan for denuclearization.
Thus, Jangs purge may force China to change its denuclearization strategy if North Korea
Is it Likely that China Will Take a
Hands-Off Approach to North Korea?
Dramatically, Pyongyang seems to have turned to fattering the Chinese people rather
than Chinese leaders. A North Korean diplomat published a rare article in Global Times,
a notorious nationalist medium, to defend its policy of maintaining cemeteries of Chinese
war dead from the Korean War of 1950-53. DPRK Ambassador Cho openly called at a press
conference in Beijing for rebuking the United States and the ROK for their upcoming joint
military drill. What we can imagine is motivating this is Pyongyangs worry about the drift
of China away from it, and in trying to pull China back, it is resorting to traditional appeals to
the lips-and-teeth friendship and to the American conspiracy theory. I am deeply skeptical
how effective such tactics will be given Chinas increasing pluralism domestically.
It is quite likely that Beijing will continue to walk a fne line, and it is quite less likely
that Beijing will thoroughly change its policy course toward the DPRK, i.e., abandoning
Pyongyang by cutting off oil and food supplies. Actually, it is not realistic to expect Chinas
policy toward the DPRK to embrace such a completely dramatic change given the intensifed
geopolitical complexity in East Asia. Yet, a remarkable change in Chinas policy is that it
is more sensitive to Pyongyangs bad behavior and less entangled in its previous thinking.
Chinas posture toward the DPRK shows signs of recognizing the need to be forward leaning.
As long as the DPRK continues to be provocative, there is no way but to insist on a policy
adjustment more in line with the international community.
For the time being, the challenge is for the United States and South Korea to respond to
Beijings cold-shoulder towards DPRK with a greater effort to fnd a shared vision. It could
take the form of three-way consideration of how to deal with the endgame of the Kim Jong-
un regime. The DPRK has never been weaker due to Chinese abhorrence of it.
Secretary of State John Kerrys visit to Beijing in February 2014 presented an opportunity
for increased cooperation on North Korea policy as Beijing was giving a cold shoulder to
Pyongyang. One tangible sign of increased Chinese willingness to move forward on policy
would be its insistence on persuading Pyongyang to return to the Six- Party Talks without
increasing the assistance level to its troubled ally. To what extent Beijing would use its
leveragecutting off oil provisions and even reducing food assistanceto force the North
to recede seems uncertain for the time being. One of the obvious misgivings on Chinas
side is that it has no willingness to carry on prominent discussions planning for a North
Korea collapse scenario with the United States. Diplomatically, Beijings current stance
is to distance itself from the Kim Jong-un regime, and there is no doubt that it would not
welcome the young leaders visit until he could show real sincerity for abandoning nuclear
weapons. Instead, China will lean towards greater unity with Washington and Seoul on
denuclearization. How to force North Korea to return to the talks remains a big struggle for
Beijing, unless it is really ready to brandish its stick. At least this much is true: Beijing
has implemented trade sanctions against Pyongyang seriously and frmly since the third
nuclear test in February 2013.
he is not following the acceptable learning curve. Without Chinas continued assistance,
North Korea will likely perish sooner or later, but unconstrained support will enable the long-
stalled nuclear standoff to persist, and there will be no resolution to the growing uncertainty
inside North Korea. Jangs execution will not be the straw that breaks the camels back, but it
does serve as a clear signal that continued non-action in support of the North Korean regime
raises the stakes for the Chinese leadership.
Continuously resuscitating the North notably puts at risk for China not only the effects of the
long-stalled nuclear standoff, but also the consequences from growing uncertainty inside that
country. Kim Jong-uns third nuclear test last February and war-mongering threats last March
and April outraged Chinese leaders. Jangs execution forces Chinese leaders to be conscious
of the higher stakes at risk. Kim Jong-uns capricious nature compels Beijing to think about
alternatives that would be instinctively different from previous ones. For example, Chinas
three military exercises along the border with the DPRK in North Korea in less than two
months, culminating with 100,000 troops from the unit stationed closest to the border, are
presumably less focused on a scenario of an American military incursion, and more on that of
the DPRKs domestic implosion as a result of Kim Jong-uns mismanagement. Immediately
after news of Jangs purge, 3,000 troops from the 39
th
Group Army under the Shenyang
Military Region, the region responsible for North Korean contingencies and the Group Army
stationed closest to the border, exercised near Changbai Mountain. Then in late December,
the Chinese Navy drilled in Bohai Bay, the waters between China and North Korea. Finally,
in early January 2014, the PLA conducted a massive military drill, again near Changbai
Mountain, with 100,000 troops from the same 39
th
Group Army, among others.
10
For his personal popularity Xi Jinping chose to keep the DPRK far away. As long as Beijing
holds the line on giving North Korea the cold shoulder, the Kim Jong-un regime will
inevitably have to struggle to change its posture in order to secure its survival. Its recent
grappling to court the ROK is evidence that Chinas policy turn of being tough will, as
expected, have some bearing. Kim Jong-un might eventually want to visit Beijing to seek
some lenience; however, it is out of the question that he would be welcome if he only comes
with empty hands and no readiness to give up his nuclear weapons.
As Kim continues to ignore Chinas signs of increased frustration, Beijing is growing
increasingly comfortable favoring sticks above carrots to remind North Korea who is
the patron and who is the client. While Beijing is not considering a change in policy by
Western standards, namely abandoning North Korea, it is looking to use new tools to better
manage the relationship more in line with Chinas own interests. Chinas reaction to North
Koreas third nuclear test may have provided the frst glimpse of this tactical preference. The
Chinese government agreed to an unprecedented level of UN Security Council sanctions on
North Korea and even unveiled unilateral measures, including the Bank of Chinas decision
to end banking ties with North Koreas Foreign Trade Bank and the Chinese Ministry of
Commerces September 2013 announcement of an export ban on certain dual-use items.
11

One notable change is that Beijing is more responsive to Pyongyangs bad behavior and less
trapped in the view of North Korea as a buffer, i.e., Chinas North Korea policy is becoming
more proactive. As long as North Korea continues to be provocative, Beijing will fnd no
other option than to bring its policy more in line with the international community.
Endnotes
1. Traitor Jang Song Thaek Executed, Korean Central News Agency, December 13, 2013, http://
www.kcna.co.jp/item/2013/201312/news13/20131213-05ee.html.
2. Cary Huang, Li Yuanchao presses Kim Jong-un on six-party talks, South China Morning
Post, July 27, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1291427/vice-president-li-
yuanchao-urges-north-koreas-kim-enter-denuclearisation.
3. For the English translation of the MFA press conference, see: Foreign Ministry Spokesperson
Hong Leis Regular Press Conference on December 13, 2013, (Beijing, China: Ministry
of Foreign Affairs), December 13, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/
t1108768.shtml.
4. Diplomatic sources in Beijing confrm what South Korean offcials have said publiclythe
Chinese government was caught by surprise by the purge. This latest episode was merely
a disconcerting repetition of past missile and nuclear tests, as China was given little or no
advance notice, including the April 2012 missile test, when the United States knew of the
plans before China, and all three nuclear tests, when China was notifed roughly 30 minutes
in advance. See Peter Kim, North Korea didnt inform China of purge: defense chief, Korea
Observer, December 5, 2013, http://www.koreaobserver.com/seoul-denies-pyongyang-gave-
china-notice-purge-15209/.
5. According to the KCNA, Jang made no scruple of committing such act of treachery in May
last as selling off the land of the Rason economic and trade zone to a foreign country for
a period of fve decades under the pretext of paying those debts. See: Traitor Jang Song
Thaek Executed, Korean Central News Agency, December 13, 2013, http://www.kcna.co.jp/
item/2013/201312/news13/20131213-05ee.html.
6. Zhang Liangui: North Korea and the Situation in Northeast Asia After the Jang Song-thaek
Affair, Gongshi Wang, January 22, 2014, http://www.21ccom.net/articles/qqsw/qqgc/
article_2014012299465.html.
7. Mathieu Duchtel and Phillip Schell, Chinas Policy On North Korea: Economic Engagement
And Nuclear Disarmament, SIPRI Policy Paper no.40 (Stockholm: Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute), December 13, 2013, http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_
id=470.
8. For the original Global Times article, see North Korean stability suits Chinas interest, Global
Times, December 10, 2013, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/831109.shtml#.UvlHLOyrs1G.
For analysis of the Chinese media coverage, see Zachery Keck, Is Kim Jong-Un Headed For
China?, The Diplomat, December 10, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/is-kim-jong-un-
headed-for-china/.
9. China Stages Drills Near Korean Peninsula, Chosun Ilbo, December 9, 2013, http://english.
chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/12/09/2013120901600.html. Chinese Troops in Search
Drill Near N.Korean Border, Chosun Ilbo, December 26, 2013, http://english.chosun.com/site/
data/html_dir/2013/12/26/2013122601146.html. PLA mobilizes 100,000 troops for N Korean
border exercise, Want China Times, January 15, 2014, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-
subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20140115000029&cid=1101.
10. PLA Mobilizes 100,000 for N. Korean Border Exercise, Want China Times, January 15, 2014,
http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20140115000029&cid=1101.
11. Roger Cavazos, Peter Hayes, and David von Hippel, Technical Bulletin #59 on Prohibition
of Dual Use Exports to North Korea, NAPSNet Special Reports (Berkeley, CA: Nautilus
Institute for Security and Sustainability), September 26, 2013, http://nautilus.org/napsnet/
napsnet-special-reports/technical-bulletin-59-on-prohibition-of-dual-use-exports-to-north-
korea/.
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Contributors | 267 266 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Mark Fitzpatrick
Internatonal Insttute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
Mark Fitzpatrick is director of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme at the
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London. His IISS program focuses on
proliferation challenges posed by Iran, North Korea, Syria and other outlier states, and on
nuclear security and nuclear disarmament issues. He is the author of Overcoming Pakistans
Nuclear Dangers (2014) and The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Avoiding worst-case outcomes
(2008). He is also the editor of six IISS Strategic Dossiers on countries and regions of
proliferation concern, most recently on North Korea (July 2011) and Iran (February 2011).
He has lectured throughout the world and is a frequent media commentator on proliferation
topics. He is a founding member of the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium. He is also a member
of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
Weapons and the Policy Advisory Group of the United Nations Association of the UK.
Mr. Fitzpatrick joined IISS in October 2005 after a 26-year career in the U.S. Department of
State, including as deputy assistant secretary for Non-Proliferation (acting). His diplomatic
postings also included Vienna, in charge of liaison with the International Atomic Energy
Agency, as well as postings in Seoul, Tokyo (twice) and Wellington. He earned a Masters
degree in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and
he attended a one-year post-graduate study program (1990-1991) at the Japanese National
Institute of Defence, where his dissertation on Korean unifcation was published in journals
in Japan and South Korea.
Mathew P. Goodman
Center for Strategic and Internatonal Studies (CSIS)
Matthew P. Goodman holds the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Previously, Goodman was White House
coordinator for Asia-Pacifc Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the East Asia Summit
(EAS). He also served as director for international economics on the National Security
Council staff and was responsible for the G-20, G-8, and other international forums. Prior to
joining the White House, Goodman was senior adviser to the under secretary for economic,
energy, and agricultural affairs at the U.S. Department of State. He also worked with the
deputy secretary of state on the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review.
Before joining the Obama administration in August 2009, he worked for fve years at Albright
Stonebridge Group, where he was managing director in charge of the frms Asia practice.
From 2002 to 2004, he served at the White House as director for Asian economic affairs on
the staff of the National Security Council. From 1988 to 1997, he worked as an international
economist at the U.S. Treasury Department, including fve years at the U.S. embassy in
Tokyo, where he served as fnancial attach. His private-sector experience includes fve
years at Goldman, Sachs & Co., where he headed the investment banks government affairs
operations in Tokyo and London. Goodman holds an M.A. in international relations from the
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a BSc in economics from the
London School of Economics and Political Science.
Contributors
Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga
Research Fellow at U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga is a research fellow at the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission specializing in China and North Korea. Mr. Beauchamp-Mustafagas
academic interests include Sino-North Korea relations, Chinese foreign policy, Chinese
missile development, Chinese military capabilities, and North Korea sanctions.
He was a former research assistant at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in
London, a research associate for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in
Beijing, as well as a former intern for various think tanks and government institutions.
Mr. Beauchamp-Mustafaga has conducted signifcant research on China-North Korea
relations. He has studied China and Chinese for 12 years, lived in fve Chinese cities for
a total of three years, and attended seven Chinese universities on three U.S. Department
of State scholarships. He is written for China Hands, theYonsei Journal of International
Affairs, and the Associated Press.
Mr. Beauchamp-Mustafaga earned two Master of Science degrees, one in International
Affairs from Peking University, and the other in Chinese Foreign Policy from the London
School of Economics and Political Science. He also earned a Bachelor of Science degree
in Interntional Affairs and Chinese from George Washington Universitys Elliott School of
International Affairs.
Valery Denisov
MGIMO University
Valery Denisov is a leading Russian expert on Korea. He graduated from Moscow State
Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) in 1970 where he specialized in international
relations and Korean studies, and in 1983, from the Diplomatic Academy of the Soviet
Foreign Ministry. After earning his Candidate of Science degree in law and a doctorate
in history, Denisov worked as a Soviet and then Russian diplomat for more than 30
years. From 1996 to 2001, he was the Russian Ambassador to North Korea. In 2001, he
was appointed Ambassador at Large and Russias Foreign Ministry representative to the
Eurasian Economic Community. After retiring from the diplomatic service, Ambassador
Denisov taught Korean history and politics at MGIMO University. He currently works as a
senior research fellow at the Center for East Asian and Shanghai Cooperation Organization
Studies at MGIMO University.
He has authored and coauthored more than a hundred publications, including The Korean
Problem: Ways of Resolution, 1970-80s (1988), The Korean Problem: a New Perspective
(1995); Russia and Korea (2004), and numerous articles on the Korean Peninsula and the
situation in Northeast Asia.
Sung-Yoon Lee
Tufs University
Sung-Yoon Lee is the Kim Koo-Korea Foundation Professor of Korean Studies and assistant
professor at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He is an associate
in research at the Korea Institute, Harvard University, and a former research fellow of the
inaugural National Asia Research Program, a joint initiative by the National Bureau of Asian
Research and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
Lees essays on the international politics of the Korean Peninsula have been published in The LA
Times, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, Christian Science
Monitor, CNN.com, Asia Times, The Weekly Standard, Foreign Policy, Far Eastern Economic
Review, and Imprimus. Recent publications include North Korean Exceptionalism and South
Korean Conventionalism: Prospects for a Reverse Formulation? Asia Policy 15 (January
2013), Dont Engage Kim Jong UnBankrupt Him, Foreign Policy (January 2013), The
Pyongyang Playbook, Foreign Affairs (August 2010), Engaging North Korea: The Clouded
Legacy of South Koreas Sunshine Policy, Asian Outlook (AEI Press, April 2010), and Life
After Kim: Planning for a Post-Kim Jong Il Korea, in Foreign Policy (February 2010).
Lee has taught Korean history and politics at Bowdoin College, Sogang University, and Seoul
National University. He has testifed as an expert witness before a U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Foreign Affairs Hearing on North Korea policy and has advised senior offcials
in the U.S. government.
Lee is a frequent commentator on major international media organizations, including
BBC, PBS, NPR, PRI, CNN, ABC, NBC, CBS, FOX, and CBC.Syaru Shirley Lin
Chinese University of Hong Kong
Shirley Lin is a member of the founding faculty of the professional masters program in global
political economy at the Chinese University of Hong Kong and also teaches at the University
of Virginia. Her main research interests include theories of global political economy,
national identity and Asian regionalism and she is completing a book on the consolidation of
Taiwans national identity and its impact on Taiwans cross-Strait economic policy. She was
previously a partner at Goldman Sachs, where she was responsible for private equity and
venture capital investments in Asia, as well as the privatization of state-owned enterprises
in Greater China and Singapore. She graduated cum laude from Harvard College and earned
her Ph.D. in politics and public administration from the University of Hong Kong.
She has served on the boards of numerous private and public companies including Alibaba,
Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, Hung Hing Printing (Hong
Kong) and Impress (Japan). Her present board service includes Key Safety Systems (US),
Mercuries Life Insurance (Taiwan) and Langham Hospitality Investments (Hong Kong).
Shirleys philanthropic interests are in education for children throughout Asia and she serves
on the board of Excelsior Bi-Lingual Experimental School in Hunan, China.
Jiyoon Kim
The Asan Insttute of Policy Studies
Jiyoon Kim is a research fellow and the director of the Public Opinion and Quantitative
Research Center at the Asan Institute for Policies Studies. Dr. Kim received her B.A. in
Political Science and Diplomacy from Yonsei University, M.P.P. in Public Policy from the
University of California, Berkeley, and Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. Prior to joining the Asan Institute, she was a lecturer at Concordia
University and Yonsei University. She was also a postdoctoral research fellow at Universit
de Montral. Her research interests include elections and voting behavior, distributive politics
in multiethnic societies, American political development, political methodology, and Korean
politics. Recent publications include Political judgment, perceptions of facts, and partisan
effects (Electoral Studies, 2010), and Public spending, public defcits, and government
coalition (Political Studies, 2010). She also co-edited the volume of The Choice of Korean
Electorates: National Assembly Election 2012 and The Choice of Korean Electorates II:
Presidential Election 2012. Her chapter on Party System in Korea and Identity Politics
appeared in the book New Challenges for Maturing Democracies in Korea and Taiwan
(Stanford University Press, 2014) edited by Gi-Wook Shin and Larry Diamond.
Shin-wha Lee
Korea University
Shin-wha Lee is a professor of political science and international relations at Korea
University. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Maryland at College Park and
held a Post-Doctoral Fellowship at Harvard University. She was a research associate at
the World Bank; a visiting scholar at Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI); a special advisor to Secretary General Kof Annans Rwandan Independent
Inquiry at the United Nations; chairs advisor of East Asian Vision Group (EAVG); a
Korean delegate of the 2004 Korea-China-Japan Future Leaders Forum; a visiting scholar
at Princeton University; a full-time visiting professor at Columbia University; executive
committee member of Academic Council on the UN Studies (ACUNS); and vice president
for international affairs, Korea University. She received the Nakasone Yasuhiro Award of
Excellence in 2008 and is an international advisory member of Asia-Pacifc Center for
Responsibility to Protect (Australia) and GR:EEN (Global Re-ordering: Evolution through
European Networks). She is a consultant to the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Reunifcation, and Defense, as well as the National Assembly and Navy. Her numerous
published articles and books include Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and
Educational Frameworks in East Asia (2004), South Korean Strategic Thought toward
Asia (eds.)(2008), Northeast Asian Security Community: From Concepts to Practices
(2008), A New Paradigm and Tasks for Korean Foreign Policy (in Korean)(2010),
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) after Libya: Practical Implication for North Korea
(2013), International Legal Perspectives on North Korean Refugee Issues (2013), and
Providing for Peacekeeping Country Profle: South Korea (2014).
Gilbert Rozman
Princeton University
Having recently retired from teaching, Gilbert Rozman is the Emeritus Musgrave Professor
of Sociology at Princeton University, where he spent more than forty years on the faculty.
Since 2013 he also serves as the editor of The Asan Forum, a bi-monthly, on-line journal
on international relations in the Asia-Pacifc region. His academic interests have been
concentrated on four countriesChina, Japan, South Korea, and Russia, examining
issues such as regionalism, national identities, and mutual perceptions, while drawing
linkages to bilateral security issues. Recent publications include a fve-volume series on
strategic thinking in the countries of Northeast Asia and a three-volume series comparing
national identities and examining their impact on bilateral relations, the most recent of
which areThe Sino-Russian Challenge to the World Order: National Identities, Bilateral
Relations, and East vs. West in the 2010s. Rozman moved to Washington as a fellow
at the Woodrow Wilson Center and continues to immerse himself in the policy-oriented
environment of think tank and university seminars, contributing regularly to a column in
The Asan Forum called Washington Insights. He also keeps abreast of foreign language
sources through the cycle of Country Reports in the journal, which rotate from Japan to
China to Korea to Russia over each two-month period.
Jin Kyo Suh
Korea Insttute for Internatonal Economic Policy (KIEP)
Dr. Suh is a senior research fellow of the Korea Institute for International Economic
Policy (KIEP), a leading institute in Korea that advises the government on all major
international economic policy issues. He is a policy advisor of the Ministry of Trade,
Industry, and Energy and also a news commentator of the Korean Broadcasting System
(KBS), Koreas leading public service broadcaster and the most infuential media
organization in the country.
Dr. Suh has published a wide range of books, reports, and opinion pieces in Korean on trade
policies, including agricultural market liberalization policies, and has deeply engaged in
forming national strategies on multilateral and regional trade negotiations since 1990. He
has continuously attended the WTO Ministerial Conference as an advisor of the Korean
delegation since 2001.
He has both a Ph.D. and a M.S. in agricultural and resource economics from the University
of Maryland, College Park and an M.A and a B.S. in agricultural economics from Korea
University in Seoul.
Alexander Lukin
Russian Ministry of Foreign Afairs/Moscow State Insttute of Internatonal Relatons
Alexander Lukin is vice president at the Diplomatic Academy in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Russia and director of the Center for East Asian and Shanghai Cooperation
Organization Studies at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations.
Alexander Lukin received his frst degree from Moscow State Institute of International
Relations in 1984, a doctorate in politics from Oxford University in 1997, a doctorate in
history from the Russian Diplomatic Academy in 2007, and a degree in theology from St.
Tikhons Orthodox University in 2013. He worked at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Soviet
Embassy to the PRC, and the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.
From 1990 to 1993 he served as an elected deputy of the Moscow City Soviet (Council)
where he chaired the Sub-Committee for Inter-Regional Relations.
He co-authored Three Journeys through China with Andrei Dikarev (Moscow, 1989),
wroteThe Political Culture of the Russian Democrats (Oxford University Press, 2000),
The Bear Watches the Dragon: Russias Perceptions of China and the Evolution of
Russian-Chinese Relations since the Eighteenth Century (M.E. Sharpe, 2003) as well as
numerous articles and policy papers on Russian and Chinese politics. He has also written
on the international situation in East Asia, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and
Russian-Chinese relations. He is a member of the Russian National Committee of the
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacifc (CSCAP) and the Russian National
Committee for BRICS Studies.
Deepa M. Ollapally
George Washington University
Deepa M. Ollapally is research professor of international affairs and associate director of
the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George
Washington University. Her areas of research and teaching are: Asian regional security;
Indo-US relations; politics of South Asia; and identity politics in the international
system. She was a South Asia specialist at the U.S. Institute of Peace from 1998-2003,
and taught at Swarthmore College from 1990-1997. She was head and fellow of the
Strategic Studies Unit at the National Institute of Advanced Studies in Bangalore, India
during 1996-1998. She is author and co-editor of the book Worldviews of Aspiring
Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan and Russia
(Oxford University Press, 2012). She also published The Politics of Extremism in South
Asia (Cambridge University Press, 2008) and Confronting Confict: Domestic Factors
and U.S. Policymaking in the Third World (Greenwood Press, 1993). She has published
extensively in journals such as Foreign Affairs, Asian Survey, The National Interest and
Political Science Quarterly. Dr. Ollapally has received major grants from the MacArthur
Foundation, Carnegie Corporation, Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation and Asia
Foundation for projects related to India and Asia. She served on the board of directors of
Women in International Security, Washington D.C., and is an advisory council member
for Women in Security, Confict Management and Peace, Delhi. She holds a Ph.D. in
Political Science from Columbia University.
Zhang Xiaotong
Wuhan University
Dr. Zhang Xiaotong is executive director of the Wuhan University Centre for Economic
Diplomacy, executive director of Wuhan University-University of the West Indies Centre
for Caribbean Studies, and associate professor of the School of Political Science and
Public Administration, Wuhan University. He previously worked at the U.S. Desk of
Chinese Ministry of Commerce, and served as Trade Attach at the Chinese Mission to
the European Union in Brussels between 2004 and 2010. He obtained a Ph.D. on political
science at Universit Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) in Belgium. His major research interests
include economic diplomacy, European studies and U.S.-China relations. He recently
published Brussels Diary, a biography about his working experiences as a trade diplomat,
and is working on an English book, Chinas Economic Diplomacy in the 21st Century. He is
also founder of thepeer-review electronic Journal of Economic Diplomacy. Dr. Zhang is a
frequent speaker at the OECD, European Parliament, Chatham House and an invited lecturer
at the London School of Economics.
Zhu Feng
Nanjing University
Dr. Zhu Feng is executive director of the China Center for Collaborative Innovation of the
South China Sea Studies, Nanjing University, and will be Dean of Institute of International
Studies, Nanjing University in August 2014. He is also a professor at the School of
International Studies, Peking University. Dr. Zhu is also senior research fellow of the Center
for Peace and Development of China, a senior research fellow of the Center for Contemporary
World Affairs, and sits on editorial boards of several scholarly journals.
Previously, Dr. Zhu served as vice president of the Institute of International & Strategic
Studies (IISS) of Peking University. He has also been a research fellow at the Center for
Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) and Harvard University, a visiting scholar at
Durham University (UK), and a visiting professor at the University of Wellington. He began
his college studies at the Department of International Politics of Peking University and
received his Ph.D. from Peking University.
His recent books are International Relations Theory and East Asian Security (Beijing:
Peoples University Press, 2007), Chinas Ascent: Power, Security and the Future of
International Politics (co-edited with Robert S. Ross, Cornell University Press, 2008),
Chinas Rise: Theoretical and Practical Examination (Shanghai: Shanghai Peoples Press,
2009), China-Japan Defense Exchange and Security Cooperation: the Past, Present and
Future (co-edited with Akiyama Masahiro, Tokyo Aiji Press, 2011). His upcoming book is
US-China and the World Order (co-edited with John Ikenberry and Wang Jisi, Palgrave, 2014).

Takashi Terada
Doshisha University
Takashi Terada is a professor of international relations at Doshisha University in Kyoto,
Japan. He received his Ph.D. from Australian National University in 1999. Before taking
his current position in April 2012, he was an assistant professor at the National University
of Singapore (1999-2006) and associate and full professor at Waseda University (2006-
2011). He also has served as a visiting professor at University of Warwick, U.K. (2011
and 2012) and a Japan Scholar at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,
Washington D.C. (2012). His areas of specialty include international political economy
in Asia and the Pacifc and theoretical and empirical studies of regionalism and regional
integration, and Japanese foreign policy and politics. His articles have been published by
major international academic journals including The Pacifc Review, Contemporary Politics,
Studia Diplomatica, Australian Journal of International Affairs, International Negotiation,
and Asia Pacifc Economic Papers. He regularly consults on national and international
affairs for the Japanese, Australian and Singapore governments. He completed a major
book project in 2013 published by University of Tokyo Press in Japanese concerning power
struggles over regional integration in the Asia-Pacifc with a focus on role of the US, China
and Japan. He is the recipient of the 2005 J.G. Crawford Award.
Sue Mi Terry
Columbia University
Sue Mi Terry is a senior research scholar at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute
at Columbia University. From 2001-2008, Dr. Terry worked as senior analyst for the
Directorate of Intelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In that role, she
regularly monitored and assessed political and economic developments in North Korea
and East Asia. In 2008, she was Director of Korea, Japan, and Oceanic Affairs at
the National Security Council (NSC). At the NSC, she played an integral role in the
formulation and implementation of U.S. policy towards Northeast Asia, while bridging
the gap between two U.S. Presidents during the critical transition period of 2008-2009.
Dr. Terry served as Deputy National Intelligence Offcer for East Asia at the National
Intelligence Council (NIC) in the Offce of Director of National Intelligence during 2009-
2010. In September 2010, Dr. Terry joined the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) as
the National Intelligence Fellow. Dr. Terry switched careers into the private sector in late
2011 and currently works as Managing Director at Gerson Global Advisors, a strategic
investment and advisory frm based in New York. In this role, she co-heads the Sovereign
Advisory business and is primarily responsible for developing and managing the frms
strategy, activities, and client relations in Asia, Australia, and New Zealand. Dr. Terry
holds a M.A. degree and a Ph.D. in international relations from the Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.
ASIAS SLIPPERY SLOPE: TRIANGULAR TENSIONS,
IDENTITY GAPS, CONFLICTING REGIONALISM, AND
DIPLOMATIC IMPASSE TOWARD NORTH KOREA

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South Koreas Triangular Relatons
Sue Mi Terry
The Seoul-Beijing-Tokyo Triangle: Terra-centric
Nordpolitk vs. Oceanic Realpolitk
Sung-Yoon Lee
Gilbert Rozman
Natonal Identty Approaches to
East and South Asia
Japans Natonal Identty Gaps: A Framework for
Analysis of Internatonal Relatons in Asia
Gilbert Rozman
Natonal Identty and Attudes Toward North
Korean Defectors
Jiyoon Kim
Bridging the Chinese Natonal Identty Gap:
Alternatve Identtes in Hong Kong and Taiwan
Syaru Shirley Lin
Identty and Strategy in Indias Asia-Pacic Policy
Deepa M. Ollapally
Divergence on Economic Regionalism
Asia-Pacic Regional Economic Integraton:
Mathew P. Goodman
Japan and Regional Integraton Dominoes:
Golden Opportunity or Another Politcal Failure?
Takashi Terada
Korean Bridge: Balancing Asian Economic
Regionalism Between the United States and China
Jin Kyo Suh
Chinas Choice: To Lead or to Follow on
Asian Economic Integraton
Zhang Xiaotong
New Thinking on Diplomacy Toward North Korea
South Koreas Search for a New Diplomatc
Strategy Toward North Korea; Trustpolitk
as a Goldilocks Approach?
Shin-wha Lee
Mark Fitzpatrick
Purge of Jang Song-Taek and its Impact on Chinas
Policy Toward North Korea
ASIAS SLIPPERY SLOPE: TRIANGULAR
TENSIONS, IDENTITY GAPS,
CONFLICTING REGIONALISM, AND
DIPLOMATIC IMPASSE TOWARD
NORTH KOREA
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF:
GILBERT ROZMAN
Vol. 25
2014
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF: GILBERT ROZMAN, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
JOINT
U.S.KOREA
ACADEMIC
STUDIES
1800 K Street NW, Suite 1010
Washington, DC 20006
www.keia.org | @KoreaEconInst
t. 202.464.1982

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