board Facts: Petitioner GMA Network, Inc. operates and manages the UHF television station, EMC Channel 27. On January 7, 2000, respondent MTRCB issued an order of suspension against petitioner for airing "Muro Ami: The Making" without first securing a permit from it as provided in Section 7 of PD 1986. 3
The penalty of suspension was based on Memorandum Circular 98-17 dated December 15, 1998 4 which provided for the penalties for exhibiting a program without a valid permit from the MTRCB. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the suspension order and, at the same time, informed MTRCB that Channel 27 had complied with the suspension order by going off the air since midnight of January 11, 2000. It also filed a letter-protest which was merely "noted" by the MTRCB thereby, in effect, denying both the motion for reconsideration and letter- protest. Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari which was dismissed in the now assailed June 18, 2001 decision. The January 7, 2000 suspension order issued by MTRCB was affirmed in toto. Hence, this recourse. Issue: Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was enforceable and binding on petitioner Held: The court held that while MTRCB had jurisdiction over the subject program, Memorandum Circular 98-17, which was the basis of the suspension order, was not binding on petitioner. The Administrative Code of 1987, particularly Section 3 thereof, expressly requires each agency to file with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of the Philippines Law Center three certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Administrative issuances which are not published or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced. 9
Memorandum Circular No. 98-17, which provides for the penalties for the first, second and third offenses for exhibiting programs without valid permit to exhibit, has not been registered with the ONAR as of January 27, 2000. 10 Hence, the same is yet to be effective. 11 It is thus unenforceable since it has not been filed in the ONAR. 12 Consequently, petitioner was not bound by said circular and should not have been meted the sanction provided thereunder. 56. Republic v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp.
FACTS: Pilipinas Shell corporation engaged in the business of refining oil, marketing petroleum, and other related activities Department of Energy government agency under the direct control and supervision of the Office of the President mandated to prepare, integrate, coordinate, supervise, and control all plans, programs, projects, and activities of the Government relative to energy exploration, development, utilization, distribution, and conservation Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) created under PD 1596 for the purpose of minimizing frequent price changes of crude oil and petroleum LOI No. 1431 directed the utilization of the OPSF to reimburse oil companies the additional costs of importation of crude oil and petroleum LOI No. 1441 mandated the Board of Energy to review and reset prices of domestic products every two months to reflect the prevailing prices of crude oil and petroleum EO No. 137 amended PD 1965, expanding the sources and utilization of the OPSF The Office of Energy Affairs (now DOE) informed Pilipinas Shell that the latters contributions to the OPSF were insufficient. The OEA Audit Taskforce noted an underpayment of 14M. As a consequence, a surcharge of 11M was imposed upon Pilipinas Shell. The surcharge was imposed pursuant to a Department of Finance Circular. The Circular is the contested issuance in the case. The OEA wrote another letter to Pilipinas Shell, advising the latter of its additional underpayment of the foreign exchange risk fee in the amount of 10M. Additionally, a surcharge of 2M was imposed. Pilipinas Shell wrote a letter to the OEA, justifying that its calculations for the transactions (for which DOE claimed underpayment) were based on a valid interpretation of a Department of Finance Order and a Department of Energy Circular. Pilipinas Shell paid the OE the full principal amount, but not the surcharges. The OEA wrote a letter to Pilipinas Shell, notifying it that it is required to pay the OPSF a total of P18M for surcharges on the late payment of foreign exchange risk charges. The DOE reiterated its demand for Pilipinas Shell to settle the surcharges due, else, the DOE would proceed against Pilipinas Shells Irrevocable Standby Letter of Credit to recover its unpaid surcharges. Pilipinas Shell filed a Notice of Appeal before the Office of the President. The Office of the President affirmed the conclusion of the of the DOE. While it admitted that the implementation of the Department of Finance Circular was contingent upon its publication and filing with the ONAR, Pilipinas Shell failed to adduce evidence of lack of compliance with such requirements. Pilipinas Shells Motion for Reconsideration was denied. CA reversed and ruled that the Department of Finance Circular was ineffective for failure to comply with the requirement to file with ONAR. Even if the Circular was issued by then Acting Secretary of Finance long before the Administrative Code of 1987, Sec. 3 of Chapter 2, Book 7 thereof specifies that rules already in force on the date of the effectivity of the Administrative Code must be filed within three months from the date of the effectivity of the Code, otherwise, such rules cannot be the basis of any sanction.
ISSUE: Did the Department of Finance Circular comply with the requirements for publication and filing? NO
RATIO: Taada v. Tuvera All statutes shall be published as a condition for their effectivity. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever delegated by the legislature/ Constitution. Administrative regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. Sec. 3, Chapter 2, Book 7, Administrative Code of 1987 Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three months from the date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. As per the Taada ruling, the Department of Finance Circular is one of those issuances which should have been published before becoming effective since it is intended to enforce PD 1956. The circular should also comply with the requirement under Sec. 3, Chapter 2, Book 7 of the Administrative Code filing with the ONAR in the University of the Philippines Law Center for rules that are already in force at the time the Administrative Code became effective. These requirements of publication and filing were put in place as safeguards against abuses on the part of lawmakers, and as guarantees to the constitutional right to due process and information on matters of public concerns, and therefore, require strict compliance. Here, the Certifications prove that the Department of Finance Circular and its amendatory rule have not been filed before said office. Moreover, the Department of Energy was unable to controvert Pilipinas Shells allegation that neither of the circulars were published in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation.Thus, failure to comply with the requirements of publication and filing render the Department of Finance Circular ineffective. National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v. Energy Regulatory Board Both the requirements of publication and filing of administrative issuances intended to enforce existing laws are mandatory for the effectivity of said issuances. The Department of Energy insists that the registration of the Department of Finance Circular with the ONAR is no longer necessary since Pilipinas Shell knew of its existence, despite its non-registration. However, strict compliance with the requirements of publication cannot be annulled by a mere allegation that parties were notified of the existence of the implementing rules. In National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms, the Court ruled that the fact that the parties participated in the public consultation and submitted their respective comments is not compliance with the rule. The Department of Energy avers that the Department of Finance Circular gains its vitality from the subsequent enactment of an Executive Order which reiterates the power of the Secretary of Finance to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement the Executive Order. However, the power of the Secretary of Finance to promulgate rules and regulations is not under dispute. The issue is the ineffectivity of his administrative issuance for non-compliance with the requisite publication and filing.
RULING: CA affirmed.The Department of Finance Circular is ineffective.
57. PEOPLE VS. QUE PO LAY FACTS: Appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Central Bank Circular No. 20. Appellant appeals on the claim that the said circular had no force or effect because the same was not published in the official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to said appellant. The Solicitor General counters that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect. ISSUE: Whether or not circulars and regulations should be published in order to have force and effect. HELD: Yes, circulars and regulations especially like Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. Before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties. 58. People vs. Maceren Facts: On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz using a device or equipment to catch fish thru electric current which thereby destroy any aquatic animals within its current reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace. The municipal court quashed the complaint and the CFI affirmed such dismissal. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not the 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission is valid. Held: No. The court held that the that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512. The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. 73. YNCHAUSTI STEAMSHIP COMPANY vs. THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONER and THE BOARD OF APPEAL Facts: The petitioner is a shipping company now operating the steamship Venus, which was formerly used on the Manila-Vigan-Currimao- Aparri route. At its request and by virtue of a decision of the Public Utility Commissioner October 13, 1920, authority was given to take the steamship Venus from that route and use it on the Manila-Iloilo route on certain November 10, 1920, the petitioner applied to the Commissioner to change the sailing schedule of the steamship, so as to leave Manila Wednesday at 4 p. m. and Iloilo Saturday p.m November 18, 1920, the petitioner applied to the Commissioner for a temporary permit to use the sailing date proposed in the change pending the hearing, and the Commissioner then issued a temporary permit for two trips, the first on November 24, and the second on December 1, 1920, which was later extended until the final decision was rendered. As a result on July 27, 1922, the Public Utility Commissioner rendered a decision in which the temporary permit was revoked, and it was ordered that the steamshipVenus strictly comply with the decision of the Commissioner rendered on October 13, 1920, in case No. 1947. His decision was later affirmed by the Board, from which petitioner appeals to this court, claiming that the respondents erred: Issue: WON the Public Utility Commissioner is empowered by law to control the sailing schedules of ships operating as common carriers in the inter-island trade in the manner attempted in this case. RULING: The legal force and effect of the argument for the petitioner is that section 19 above quoted is not a delegation of legislative authority, and, for such reason, is invalid. The language of the section is clear, positive and certain. It expressly says that no public utility by land or water shall ever make any permanent change in its time tables, its service or sailing schedules without the approval of the Commission first had and obtained. That carries with it and implies legislative power vested in the Commission to fix sailing schedules as a condition precedent to the granting of a license to do business; otherwise, that portion of section 19 would be a nullity. It is clear that the Legislature intended to vest that power in the Commission. The remaining question is whether or not the Legislature itself has the power to fix the sailing schedules. In a certain sense the waterways of the Philippine Islands correspond to its roads and highways. No case direct in point has been cited by counsel on either side, and in so far as we are advised, the important question here has never been decided by any court, hence, it is one of first impression in this court. The whole tenor and trend of modern legislation is to vest the Public Utility Commission with power to regulate and control the operation of public utilities under reasonable rules and regulations in the interests of the public. That was the purpose of the amendment. Here, as elsewhere, the Commission is vested with a large, discretionary, administrative power, and, as a general rule, courts will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion when it is just and reasonable and founded upon a legal right. In the instant case, a large amount of testimony was taken upon all of the questions of fact involved. Upon which the Commissioner found against the petitioner. The Legislature has, in legal effect, vested the Commissioner with power to fix sailing schedules of ships and after an exhaustive hearing, the Commissioner found that it would be against the interest of the public to grant the proposed change in the sailing schedule of the steamship Venus. We are not prepared to say that the law is unconstitutional. Neither can we say, as a matter of law, that the findings of the Commissioner are not sustained by the evidence, or that they were made "in excess of the jurisdiction conferred upon them by law." The writ is denied and the ruling of the Commissioner sustained. 74. VIGAN ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY, INC. vs. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION G.R. No. L-19850 January 30, 1964
FACTS: This is an original action for certiorari to annul an order of respondent Public Service Commission ordering the reduction of rates of Vigan Electric Light Co. PSC averred that Vigan Electric making a net operating profit in excess of the allowable return of 12% on its invested capital, and that it is in the public interest and in consonance with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3043 that reduction of its rates to the extent of its excess revenue be put into effect immediately. Vigan Electric contended that the reduction of rate is unconstitutional because it has been ordered without notice and hearing, thus issued without due process of law. In defense, PSC maintains that rate-fixing is a legislative function; that legislative or rule-making powers may constitutionally be exercised without previous notice of hearing; and that the decision in Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil., 635) in which we held that such notice and hearing are essential to the validity of a decision of the Public Service Commission is not in point because, unlike the order complained of which respondent claims to be legislative in nature the Ang Tibay case referred to a proceeding involving the exercise of judicial functions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress validly delegated legislative power to the PSC?
HELD: No. Congress has not delegated, and cannot delegate legislative powers to the Public Service Commission. Consistently with the principle of separation of powers, which underlies our constitutional system, legislative powers may not be delegated except to local governments, and only to matters purely of local concern. However, Congress may delegate to administrative agencies of the government the power to supply the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy laid down by it which is complete in itself. Such law is not deemed complete unless it lays down a standard or pattern sufficiently fixed or determinate, or, at least, determinable without requiring another legislation, to guide the administrative body concerned in the performance of its duty to implement or enforce said Policy. Otherwise, there would be no reasonable means to ascertain whether or not said body has acted within the scope of its authority, and, as a consequence, the power of legislation would eventually be exercised by a branch of the Government other than thatin which it is lodged by the Constitution, in violation, not only of the allocation of powers therein made, but, also, of the principle of separation of powers. Although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines may partake of a legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact based upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a functionpartaking of a quasi-judicial character the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing.
75. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs Alcuaz By virtue of RA 5514, Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation was granted a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select, station or stations and associated equipment and facilities for international satellite communications. Under this franchise, it was likewise granted the authority to construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals. Under Sec 5 of the same law, PhilComSat was exempt from the jurisdiction, control and regulation of the Public Service Commission later known as the National Telecommunications Commission. However, EO 196 was later proclaimed and the same has placed PhilComSat under the jurisdiction of NTC. Consequently, PhilComSat has to acquire permit to operate from NTC in order to continue operating its existing satellites. NTC gave the necessary permit but it however directed PhilComSat to reduce its current rates by 15%. NTC based its power to fix the rates on EO 546. PhilComSat assailed the said directive and holds that the enabling act (EO 546) of respondent NTC empowering it to fix rates for public service communications does not provide the necessary standards constitutionally required hence there is an undue delegation of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC. PhilComSat asserts that nowhere in the provisions of EO 546, providing for the creation of respondent NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of EO 196, placing petitioner under the jurisdiction of respondent NTC, can it be inferred that respondent NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. PhilComSat subsequently clarified its said submission to mean that the order mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial power to respondent NTC, the exercise of which allegedly requires an express conferment by the legislative body. ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power. HELD: Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non-confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. In the case at bar, the fixed rate is found to be of merit and reasonable. 76. MIAA vs Airspan Corp Facts: Petitioner issued Resolution No. 97-51[3] announcing an increase in the rentals of its terminal buildings, VIP lounge, other airport buildings and land, as well as check-in and concessions counters. Business concessions, particularly concessionaire privilege fees, were also increased. On April 2, 1998, petitioner passed Resolution No. 98-30[4] adopting twenty percent (20%) of the increase recommended by Punongbayan and Araullo,[5] to take effect immediately on June 1, 1998. Thus, petitioner issued the corresponding Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1998 to reflect the new schedule of fees, charges, and rates.[6] On February 5, 1999, petitioner issued Resolution No. 99-11,[7] which further increased the other airport fees and charges, specifically for parking and porterage services, and the rentals for hangars. Accordingly, petitioner amended Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1998. Respondents requested that the implementation of the new fees, charges, and rates be deferred due to lack of prior notice and hearing. The request was denied. Petitioner likewise refused to renew the identification cards of respondents personnel, and vehicle stickers to prevent entry to the premises. ISSUE: WON Petitioner MIAA can validly raise without prior notice and public hearing the fees, charges, and rates subject of its Resolutions Nos. 98-30 and 99-11? RULING: Under the original Charter of the MIAA, petitioner was given blanket authority to adjust its fees, charges, and rates. However, E.O. No. 903 limited such authority to a mere recommendatory power. Hence, petitioners Charter itself, as amended, directly vests the power to determine revision of fees, charges, and rates in the ministry head and even requires approval of the Cabinet. Worth noting, its Charter, established MIAA as an attached agency of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications (now Department of Transportation and Communications). Hence, the ministry head who has the power to determine the revision of fees, charges, and rates of the MIAA is now the DOTC Secretary. Clearly, petitioner has no authority to increase its fees, charges, or rates as the power to do so is vested solely in the DOTC Secretary, although petitioners prerogative to recommend possible increases thereon is of course recognized. As an attached agency of the DOTC, the MIAA is governed by the Administrative Code of 1987. The Administrative Code specifically requires notice and public hearing in the fixing of rates. It follows that the rate increases imposed by petitioner are invalid for lack of the required prior notice and public hearing. They are also ultra vires because, to begin with, petitioner is not the official authorized to increase the subject fees, charges, or rates, but rather the DOTC Secretary. 77. Gonzalo Sy Trading vs Central Bank Facts: The petitioner-appellant is a trading company engaged in the importation of fresh fruits like oranges, grapes, apples and lemons from the different parts of the world for the last nineteen years. It wrote to the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of the Philippines, Mr. Amado R. Brias requesting authority to import from the country of Japan on "no- dollar" basis fresh fruits in the total amount of US$715,000.00. Mr. Julian D. Mercado, the Executive Assistant to Deputy Governor Brias denied the request Petitioner-appellant sought a reconsideration of the denial thru Deputy Governor Amado R. Brias explaining that their case is a very special one and different from regular importation. The Monetary Board of the Central Bank issued Resolution No. 2038 approving petitioner-appellant's request for Special Import Permit on No- Dollar Basis. Thereafter petitioner-appellant made his first importation from Japan. Petitioner-appellant requested from Deputy Governor Amado R. Brias "an amendment of the country of origin of our importations to include other countries except communist countries" since the fresh fruits from Japan "are seasonal (and) our shippers cannot fully fill up our requirements to comply with their total commitments to us without procuring from other sources like Australia, Taiwan, U.S.A. and other countries with whom we have trade relations." Then, on April 17, 1970, the Assistant to the Governor, Mr. Cesar Lomotan, informed the Prudential Bank and Trust Company that the authority granted to petitioner-appellant under MB Resolution No. 2038 was intended only for the Christmas season of 1968 and does not extend through 1969. Petitioner-appellant notified Mr. Cesar Lomotan that the Prudential Bank and Trust Company refused to issue them any release certificate for their importations. On June 10, 1970, Deputy Governor Amado R. Brias wrote petitioner-appellant that its request cannot be given due course, inviting attention to the basic letter of November 19, 1969, informing it that the Special Import Permit was intended only for the Christmas season of 1968 and does not extend through 1969. The Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, Mr. Jose T. Viduya, issued warrants of seizure and detention. On July 30, 1970, the Collector of Customs issued a notice for the auction sale of the confiscated June 1970 shipment. Whereupon, petitioner- appellant, along with another importer, Tomas Y. de Leon, commenced an injunction suit before the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Commissioner and Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila. .ISSUE: WON the permit granted to petitioner is valid RULING: We rule that the Special Import Permit granted to petitioner- appellant on November 19, 1968, allowing it to import fresh fruits from Japan on a "no-dollar" basis, has already lost its validity when the questioned importations of June and September, 1970 were made. It is one of the first principles in the field of administrative law that a license or a permit is not a contract between the sovereignty and the licensee or permitee, and is not a property in any constitutional sense, as to which the constitutional prescription against impairment of the obligation of contracts may extend. A license is rather in the nature of a special privilege, of a permission or authority to do what is within its terms. It is not in any way vested, permanent, or absolute. A license granted by the State is always revocable. As a necessary consequence of its main power to grant license or permit, the State or its instrumentalities have the correlative power to revoke or recall the same. And this power to revoke can only be restrained by an explicit contract upon good consideration to that effect. The absence of an expiry date in, a license does not make it perpetual. Notwithstanding that absence, the license cannot last beyond the life of the basic authority under which it was issued. The series of correspondence exchanged between petitioner-appellant and respondent-appellee in the case at bar plainly reveals that the Special Import Permit granted to petitioner-appellant covers only the Christmas season of 1968. As reflected in its first letter, dated September 28, 1968, the cause or the compelling reason why petitioner-appellant sought for the Special Import Permit on No-Dollar Basis was because the importation of fresh fruits calls for 175% Special Time Deposit for 120 days and "(w)ith the fast approaching Christmas season," petitioner-appellant "cannot cope with the demands of [its] buyers of fresh fruits under this requirement imposed on importers." Upon denial of its request, petitioner-appellant explained to Deputy Governor Amado R. Brias in its letter of October 22, 1968 that their "..., case is a very special one" and that "... this item of fresh apples is very much needed in the coming Christmas season ..." Complementary to this letter, petitioner-appellant pointed out to the Monetary Board in its letter of November 6, 1968 that "the items called for such as apples, oranges and grapes are perishable in nature and cannot be stored for a longer period of time, and the main purpose of this importation is to serve the requirements during the Christmas Season." As a result, the conclusion becomes inevitable that the Special Import Permit thus granted lasts only until the Christmas Season of 1968.
103.GUYS WALA AKONG MAKITANG CASE NIYA. PURO DOCTRINE LANG. -_- 104. CERVANTES VS. AUDITOR-GENERAL G.R. No. L-4043 May 26, 1952 FACTS: Cenon Cervantes, Manager of the National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation (NAFCO) receiving P15,000 salary a year, assailed the decision of the Auditor General denying his claim for quarters allowance. By a resolution of the Board of Directors of NAFCO, Cervantes was granted quarters allowance of not exceeding P400 a month effective the first of August, 1949. The resolution was disapproved by the Control Committee of the Government Enterprises on strength of the recommendation of the NAFCO auditor, concurred in by the Auditor General, because of the following reasons: (1) that quarters allowance constituted additional compensation prohibited by the charter of the NAFCO, which fixes the salary of the general manager thereof at the sum not to exceed P15,000 a year, and (2) that the precarious financial condition of the corporation did not warrant the granting of such allowance. The President promulgated Executive Order No. 93 creating the Government Enterprises Council creating the Control Committee of the Government Enterprises pursuant to Republic Act No. 51 approved by Congress authorizing the President of the Philippines, among other things, to effect such reforms and changes in government owned and controlled corporations for the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operation. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 51 is unconstitutional on the ground that it is an undue delegation of legislative power. HELD: No. The rule is that so long as the Legislature "lays down a policy and a standard is established by the statute" there is no undue delegation. (11 Am. Jur. 957). Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing the President of the Philippines, among others, to make reforms and changes in government- controlled corporations, lays down a standard and policy that the purpose shall be to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the free and independent government of the Philippines and to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operations. The standard was set and the policy fixed. The President had to carry the mandate. This he did by promulgating the executive order in question which, tested by the rule above cited, does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power. 105. People v. Jolliffe Facts: esiding in Hongkong, the son of a former Chancellor of the West China Union University and had been Trade Commissioner for Canada in Shanghai & Hongkong. He was from a reputable family & is quite well-known. He made several trips to Manila, sometimes for business trips, sometimes to meet his wife & children who would be passing through. know if he was going to be paid. He was paid in gold which he hid under his shirt. When he was going to his hotel room, he was accosted by a woman secret service agent, Amanda Arimbay, and was brought to a search room. He tried to prevent the gold from being found but eventually, 4 pcs of gold bullion and a 100$ travellers check was found on him. He offered to settle the case by bribing the agents.
o He was arrested for violating RA 265: An Act Establishing The Central Bank Of The Philippines, Defining Its Powers In The Administration Of The Monetary And Banking System, Amending The Pertinent Provisions Of The Administrative Code With Respect To The Currency And The Bureau Of Banking, And For Other Purposes o Sec 34 of said act states: Whenever anyone wilfully violates this Act or any order, instruction, etc. legally issued by the Monetary Board, he/she shall be punished by a fine and by imprisonment. o Note that when he was arrested, there was already CB Circular 21: Any person desiring to export gold bullions must obtain a license from the Central Bank.
legation of legislative power.
Issue/Held: Is CB Circular 21 valid? YES. Ratio: Re: Delegation of Legislative Power to local govts. HOWEVER, it is one thing to delegate the power (1) to determine what the law shall be; and another thing (2) to delegate the authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself. law authorizing the delegation furnishes a reasonable standard which sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to act so that it may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will.
Re: Application to this case the President the power: o To subject to licensing all transactions in gold and foreign exchange to protect the international reserve of the Central Bank during an exchange crisis and to give the Monetary Board and the Government time to take constructive measures to combat such crisis. o The Board is also authorized to take such appropriate remedial measures to protect the international stability of the peso, whether the international reserve is falling, as a result of payment or remittances abroad which, in the opinion of the Monetary Board, are contrary to the national welfare. the law creating the Central Bank, which are (Sec 2 RA 265): o To maintain monetary stability in the Philippines; o To promote a rising level of production, employment and real income in the Philippines. to vest in the delegated authority the character of administrative details in the enforcement of the law and to place the grant of authority BEYOND the category of a delegation of legislative powers
Appeal denied. 106. Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil 635 Facts: Ang Tibay was a manufacturer of rubber slippers.
There was a shortage of leather soles, and it was necessary to temporarily lay off members of the National Labor Union.
According to the Union however, this was merely a scheme to systematically terminate the employees from work, and that the shortage of soles is unsupported. It claims that Ang Tibay is guilty of ULP because the owner, Teodoro, is discriminating against the National Labor Union, and unjustly favoring the National Workers Brotherhood, which was allegedly sympathetic to the employer.
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and to the motion for new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.
Issue: Whether or not special courts like Court of Industrial Relations should observe due process.
Held: Yes. The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.
There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. 107. ASPREC VS. ITCHON FACTS -Private respondent Jacinto Hernandez (Hernandez) filed an administrative complaint against Cleto Asprec for unprofessional conduct with the Respondent Board of Examiners for Surveyors. Allegedly, Hernandez and Asprec entered into an agreement wherein Asprec would survey Hernandez lot in Camarines Sur and would deliver to the latter a plan approved by the Director of Lands w/n 3 months after completion of the survey, and procure the issuance of a CTC to the lot w/n 6 months after the plans approval. However, even if Hernandez paid the agreed amount, Asprec did not deliver the plan, and the alleged plan duly delivered and approved was for one Damian Alhambra, and the plan submitted was merely a certified copy of the plan. It should also be noted that during the proceedings in the Board of Examiners, Asprec/his counsel had many times been absent, late, sickwhich caused the delay of the proceedings. -Respondent Board: For Hernandez: (1) no actual survey of the land made; (2) money was paid; Asprec was guilty of deceit and thus violated the Code of Ethics for surveyors, his certificate of registration as private land surveyor REVOKED and required to be surrendered. -Asprec filed petition with the CFI of Camarines Sur for certiorari to annul the orders revoking his surveyors certificate of registration; mandamus to compel the Board to conduct a formal hearing of the complaint against him; and prohibition, to stop execution of the orders to surrender said certificate. The preliminary injunction prayed for was rejected below -CFI: dismiss with costs ISSUES 1. WON Asprec was denied due process in not being able to participate in the hearing 2. WON the proceedings before the Board, being quasi-criminal in nature, was valid granted Asprec absented himself from it 3. WON the decision of the Board rendered upon a motion for judgment on the pleadings valid (other issues were more on Civpro than Admin so not included) HELD 1. NO Ratio. Presence of a party at a trial is not always the essence of due process. Really all that the law requires to satisfy adherence to this Constitutional precept is that the parties be given notice of the trial, an opportunity to be heard. Reasoning. Petitioner has had more than ample opportunity to defend himself before the Board. As he and counsel did not appear at the last and stipulated date of hearing, he cannot look to the law or to a judicial tribunal to whipsaw the Board into giving him a new one. He cannot raise his voice in protest against the act of the Board in proceeding in his and his counsel's absence. And this because without cause or reason, without any excuse at all, counsel and client have chosen to shy away from the trial. 2. YES Ratio. Where the respondent in a petition for contempt failed to appear on the date set for the hearing, of which he was previously notified, it was held that he was not deprived of his day in court when the judge ordered him arrested unless he pay the support he was adjudged to give, he having been given an opportunity to be heard. Similarly, the defendant's failure to appear with the counsel of his choice at the trial, notwithstanding repeated postponements and the warning that failure to so appear would be deemed a waiver of the right to present evidence in his defense and the case will be submitted for decision on the evidence submitted by the prosecution, was a sufficient justification for the court to proceed and render judgment upon evidence before it. 3. YES Ratio. A rule so long respected, because it is buttressed upon reason and authority, is that technical rules of court practice, procedure and evidence are not to be applied with rigidity in administrative proceedings. We should have in mind the nature of administrative bodies, the character of the duties they are required to perform, the purposes for which they are organized, the persons who compose them. Here, we are concerned with members of a board of surveyors technical men but not necessarily trained law men. In this posture, it is quite reasonable to assume that their proceedings may not be conducted with that degree of exactness or with such scrupulous observance of the complex technical rules expected in a legal battle before a court of justice. Their acts should not be measured by the same yardstick exacted of a judge in a court of law. So much leeway is given an investigating administrative body. Reasoning. The plan allegedly made by Asprec was not the plan of an original survey but a mere copy from another plan. Both the plans were submitted to the Board. So it is, that when counsel for Hernandez manifested that all the evidence against petitioner was submitted to the Board and that for that reason he was resting his case, he evidently had in mind the admissions in the pleadings and the plans and decisions and report here noted. And, the motion for judgment on the pleadings was a mere follow-up of the manifestation just adverted to. As the trial court well observed, counsel for respondent Hernandez did not present a motion for judgment on the pleadings in the strict sense of the word, but "a motion which for lack of another expression, he called a motion for judgment on the pleadings." Lack of observance of this technicality which does not quarrel with a fair concept of justice should be overlooked. Disposition. Upon the view we take of this case, the decision is hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioner.