Brasil SOI 2AC

Really bad da, no Uniqueness, extremely weak link, and plenty of ! defense

Uniquness

NO UNIQUENESS- Snowden and NSA Scandal has drained US-Brasilia relations. They
just snubbed a multi-billion dollar fighter jet deal with Boeing in response
Winter Dec. 20
th
(Brian Winter Insight: How U.S. spying cost Boeing multibillion-dollar jet contract
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/us-boeing-brazil-insight-idUSBRE9BJ10P20131220) Reuters
News DOA: 1.16.2014 EJMG
(Reuters) - Dilma Rousseff was thoroughly charmed. Brazil had been struggling for years to decide which company to
choose for a $4 billion-plus fighter jet contract, one of the world's most sought-after defense deals
and one that would help define the country's strategic alliances for decades to come. But Rousseff, the
leftist president known for being sometimes gruff and even standoffish with foreign leaders, was thrilled after a 90-minute meeting in Brasilia on May 31
with U.S. Vice President Joe Biden. After Biden's reassurances that the United States would not block crucial transfers of technological know-how to Brazil if it
bought the jets, she was closer than ever to selecting Chicago-based Boeing to supply its fighter, the F/A-18 Super Hornet. "She's
ready to sign on the dotted line," one of her senior aides told Reuters at the time. "This is going to happen soon." And then along came Edward
Snowden. Documents leaked by the former National Security Agency contractor, released in the
weeks after Biden's visit, ended up enraging Rousseff and completely changing her plans, several
Brazilian officials told Reuters. On Wednesday, she surprised the defense and diplomatic worlds by tapping
Sweden's Saab to supply the jets, a move aides said was made in part as a deliberate snub to the
United States. The decision was one of the biggest and most expensive consequences yet of the NSA
revelations, which have strained Washington's relations with countries around the world. Anger over espionage was not the only reason for Rousseff's
decision. Saab's Gripen jet offered the best combination of price, transfers of technology to Brazilian companies and low maintenance costs compared with the
other two finalists, Boeing and France's Dassault Aviation, Defense Minister Celso Amorim told reporters on Wednesday. Still, the NSA revelations
were clearly the determining factor for Rousseff, the Brazilian officials told Reuters, for reasons that were both political and deeply
personal. A former guerrilla who had fought a U.S.-backed military dictatorship in the 1960s, Rousseff had spent the first two years of her presidency edging closer
to Washington, fending off pressure from leftist elements of her Workers' Party and scheduling a rare state visit to the White House for last October. Snowden's
documents, many of which were published by Brazil-based U.S. journalist Glenn Greenwald, revealed that Washington had spied on Rousseff's personal
communications, those of state-run oil company Petrobras - which Rousseff once chaired - and countless Brazilian citizens. Rousseff could not
understand why Washington would spy on an ally with no history of international terrorism, aides
said. She reacted by canceling her White House trip, despite attempts by U.S. President Barack Obama
to ease her concerns, including a one-on-one meeting on the sidelines of a G20 meeting in Russia. This
week, she made a decision she believed would hit the United States where it hurt most - its
pocketbook. Defense analysts struggled to recall a major contract decided on such grounds. "The irony is that we expected politics to play a big role, but
always on the selling side, not on the downside," said Richard Aboulafia, an aerospace analyst with the Teal Group. "Then things went horribly
wrong with this NSA story."

Also, Brasil never really liked us: No relations nowBrazil gains international clout by
disagreeing with the US publicly. Pref our warrants
Hakim, 2012 (Peter, President Emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue, April 09, PBS Newshour, US,
Brazil Disagree More Than They Agree, Analyst Says, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/jan-
june12/brazil_04-09.html, DVO)

MARGARET WARNER: A country once best known by Americans for postcard-perfect beaches and a passion for the game of soccer, Brazil has
emerged as a powerhouse competitor in the global economy, achieving the number six world GDP ranking this year. Along with Russia, India
and China, it's part of the so- called BRIC club of rapidly developing economies. Now this country of 200 million, Latin America's largest, is
demanding to be taken more seriously on the world political stage as well. And, today, President Dilma Rousseff was given a
cordial welcome by President Obama at the White House. PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: I'm -- feel very fortunate to have such a capable and far-sighted
partner as President Rousseff. DILMA ROUSSEFF, President of Brazil (through translator): The U.S.-Brazil bilateral relations are, for Brazil, a very important
relationship, not only from a bilateral but also from a multilateral perspective. MARGARET WARNER: But though the hemisphere's two
biggest democracies should be natural allies, they often don't see eye to eye. PETER HAKIM, president emeritus,
Inter-American Dialogue: It would certainly be hard to say the U.S. and Brazil are adversaries or in conflict, but the fact is, they disagree more
than they agree. MARGARET WARNER: Peter Hakim is senior fellow and president emeritus at Inter-American Dialogue in Washington. PETER
HAKIM: Americans and Brazilians love to talk about a strategic relationship. Yet, the U.S. rarely consults
with Brazil on the important global issues.MARGARET WARNER: That shouldn't be surprising, given Brazil's
history of being a thorn in the U.S. side. In 2010, then President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva tried to broker a deal with
Turkey on Iran's nuclear program and derail Secretary of State Clinton's push for U.N. sanctions
against Tehran. Brazil has staked out positions contrary to Washington's on Cuba, climate change, and
the 2009 coup in Honduras as well.PETER HAKIM: Brazil is in many respects still learning what it means to be a global
power. And the way it's been successful, ironically, is not by joining with the United States, which would have been one
route, but rather in opposition to the United States, that it sort of has gained its international prestige precisely by showing its
independence of the United States.
Brasil cant compete anyway-- Infrastructure gaps require investment that limits
economic competitiveness means Brazil not on the rise in the SQ you dont have
uniqueness
Brands Assistant Professor of Public Policy at Duke University and former defense analyst 2010
(Hal DILEMMAS OF BRAZILIAN GRAND STRATEGY Strategic Studies Institute Monograph
August 2010 http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1017.pdf

Infrastructural deficiencies pose an additional challenge. Brazils ability to export efficiently, as well as to develop its large internal market, is
hindered by the immense difficulty of transporting goods across the countrys rough terrain. The rail system is underdeveloped, and as of 2004,
only some 10 percent of the countrys 1.74 million kilometers of roads were paved (and more than half of that 10 percent were one-lane
roads). The ports are outdated and over-saturated, despite the modernization program launched under President Cardoso, meaning that stocks
often sit on the docks for 3 weeks or more before being shipped. All this deters export-oriented firms from expanding and thereby creating new
jobs and greater prosperity.75 Economists generally agree that addressing these problems will require sizable investments in education and
infrastructure and, more importantly, major structural reforms designed to spur innovation, decrease regulation, and lessen the burdens of
doing business. Unfortunately, the current characteristics of the political system conspire against such
measures. The electoral system over-represents small parties with parochial interests, making it all the more diffi cult to forge the broad
coalitions necessary to support sweeping structural changes. Corruption remains rampant, as illustrated by two massive payoff
scandals during President Lulas first term, and powerful interests such as government bureaucracies and state-owned companies like
Petrobras have a vested interest in preserving the status quo.76 All this has weakened the impetus for structural reform, and according to one
leading survey, Brazil is actually getting worse in terms of economic competitiveness. Brazil fell from 127th to
129th in ease of doing business from 2009 to 2010, and it suffered similar declines with respect to ease of paying taxes and ease of
starting a business.77 The macroeconomic consequences of this weakness have so far been mitigated by large government stimulus packages,
but Brazils declining competitiveness and failure to implement the required reforms speak ill of
its long-term economic prospects. If Brazil cannot achieve and sustain higher levels of growth, it
could eventually face several barriers to its geopolitical designs. Low growth rates would mean
fewer resources for military modernization, development projects, and diplomatic initiatives
abroad. They could also sap the national confidence that President Lula has tapped into, causing Brazilian politicians to argue that the
country should concentrate on getting its own affairs in order. This may already be happening, in fact; Jos Serra, the presidential candidate put
forward by the centrist Brazilian Social Democratic PartyPSDBhas argued for a more restrained foreign policy and greater attention to
economic and political problems at home. Finally, because robust economic growth will be necessary to bring
about additional reductions in poverty, a Brazil that lags in these categories could face resurgent
class and social cleavages that might limit its internal cohesionand thus its geopolitical
potential.78 Oil money may ease some of these potential dislocations, but given price volatility, relying primarily on an expected petroleum
windfall is a gamble, not a strategy.
Finally-Alt Cause. Multiple challenges to Brazil leadership including current US
economic engagement in region
Christensen, Aalborg University , 2013
Steen Fryba Brazils Foreign Policy Priorities, Third World Quarterly, 34:2, 271-286, taylor and francis,
accessed tm 7/15
The above discussions show a number of Brazilian successes in its South American regional strategy. However, relations with the
South America countries have not been without problems. Argentina has strongly opposed Brazils
bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council,62 and Brazil has faced a number of economic tensions and
conflicts in its relations with neighbouring countries. Bolivias nationalisations in the energy sector, which affected the
partially state-owned Brazilian energy giant Petrobrs, is perhaps the most noteworthy example.63 The Brazilian government accepted the
nationalisations and Lula noted Bolivias sovereign right to its own natural resources, focusing on negotiating adequate compensation while
avoiding a diplomatic escalation with Bolivia.64 However, domestically, the governments soft diplomatic strategy
towards Bolivia and other South American governments, particularly Argentina, and its positive relations with the
Venezuelan and Cuban governments, have been criticised by the opposition and independent critical analysts as
not being in Brazils interests but representing an ideological preference for relations with ideologically similar governments on the political
left.65 Brazil faces several other challenges to its leadership in the region, for example the bilateral
free trade agreements between the USA and Colombia, Peru and Chile, and the creation of a group
called the Pacific Alliance by these latter three countries and Mexico in June 2012. Some analysts
argue that Brazils South America strategy has failed because of its hegemonic approach to the
region and its aims of becoming a central player in the global political system. 66 Other analysts argue that
Brazils prioritisation of South America has been unsuccessful because of the difficulties encountered in the region and because there is a
growing sentiment among Brazilian elites that the country should not let itself become restricted by the region in its foreign policies.67
Link

1. Not specific, make the negative prove that a water bank and data sharing with
mexico will trigger Brasil anger

2. No Brink, Mexico is the US #2 trading partner, we do plans all the time with
them, where is the brink? Hint: the negative team doesnt have one, and We
engage with Mexico all the time, US-Mexco high level economic dialogue now-
makes the link non-unique
Christopher 9/20/13, Woodrow Wilson Institute- Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars (Christopher, Biden Kicks-off US-Mexico Economic Dialogue, 9/20/13,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/biden-kicks-us-mexico-economic-dialogue)
Five years ago, the United States and China launched the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, a reflection of the growing complexity and
enormous importance of US-China relations. Earlier this year at their meeting in Mexico City, President Obama and
President Pea Nieto agreed to a similar initiative, the US-Mexico High Level Economic Dialogue (HLED), for
much the same reasons, and Vice President Biden is in Mexico today to officially launch the initiative. Before looking at the content of the
Dialogue, lets take a quick look at why this matters: Mexico is the United States second largest export market (Canada
is first), and since 2009, exports to Mexico have grown faster than exports to any of our other top
trading partners. Some six million US jobs depend on trade with Mexico. Investment and financial flows between
the two countries are also important, but the massive trade relationship is still the centerpiece of the economic
relationship. In addition to being big, trade with Mexico is also unique. Imports from China contain, on average,
four percent US content. This is because most of the parts and materials in Chinese goods are either produced domestically in China or
regionally in Asia. Imports of final goods from Mexico, on the other hand, contain an average of forty percent US
content. US inputs are widely used in Mexican factories, which means any growth in Mexicos
manufacturing sector fuels growth in the US, and vice versa. A look at the chart below shows how closely linked
industry on both sides of the border have become, and also how quickly production in Mexico has expanded in the years since the Great
Recession. Pillar 1. Promoting Competitiveness and Connectivity: Whats important here is the decision to put these two issues together. Back
in the Nineties, NAFTA eliminated most tariffs on trade within the region and thereby stimulated a huge increase in commerce. The
construction of transportation infrastructure, the highways and border crossings on which this trade travels, have lagged way behind the
growing flows of goods and people. Increased border security following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 made the border an even greater
bottleneck, and at this point infrastructure and border crossing issues have become a big drag on the competitiveness of manufacturers in the
region. This is the local version of the worldwide transition from trade policy based on tariff reductions to one based on non-tariff barriers and
the building of robust supply chains. Connectivity also refers to other areas of joint opportunity like telecommunications and electricity. Pillar 2.
Fostering Economic Growth, Productivity and Innovation: As technology and advanced manufacturing techniques have evolved, they have
lowered the portion of production costs devoted to unskilled labor, and although many may still think of Mexican industry in terms
Maquiladoras along the border pumping out cheap electronics, Mexico has slowly but surely climbed up the rungs of the value-added ladder,
from sewing t-shirts and cobbling shoes to building cars and airplanes. So at this point, whether in the United States or Mexico, the formula for
creating good, high-paying jobs is based on building human capitalincreasing the knowledge and skills of workers. Instead of line workers, the
US and Mexico need highly-skilled programmers, designers and engineers, and since our manufacturing sectors are deeply interconnected, we
need them not only in the US or Mexico. We need them in both countries. Closely connected to the HLED is an initiative
that hits at the heart of these issues. The Mexico-United States Entrepreneurship and Innovation
Council (or MUSEIC) is coordinated by the two governments but involves private sector
representatives from both countries. Meeting regularly to discuss ways in which entrepreneurship
and innovation affect competitiveness, sub-committees deal with a range of issues from tech clusters
to the role of women in business. And the talks are not just at the abstract level: a meeting of the sub-
committee on financing issues in July resulted in the signing of 35 deals between participants. The Vice
President will also touch on the theme of educational cooperation during his visit, an issue to which the Mexican government has attached
great importance. Increasing university level exchanges between the two nations and improving human capital formation in both countries will
be a crucial component in securing future competitiveness. Despite the depth of US-Mexico ties, there are currently less than 14,000 Mexican
students studying in American universities, and Mexico ranks ninth among countries that send students to the United States for undergraduate
education and tenth for graduate education, far below Turkey, Iran, and other smaller and more distant countries. Increasing educational
exchange would help both countries achieve their human capital goals. Pillar 3. Partnering for Regional and Global Leadership: In this context,
trade is an especially relevant topic. The United States and Mexico are each in the midst of negotiating super-
regional trade agreements, and given the integrated nature regional production, the US and Mexico
have a great number of shared interests in these negotiations. It makes sense, then, for the two
countries to negotiate as a bloc. Both countries are already parties to the negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, making it
the perfect venue to begin such an approach. Mexico and the US would each also do well to consider inviting the other into the Pacific Alliance
and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, respectively. Within these three pillars, a number of specific programs will be developed.
Some will be the next stage of ongoing projects, but several will be brand new. The topics of innovation and entrepreneurship, for example, are
being added to the bilateral agenda for the first time. Domestic factors, like the economic reform agenda in Mexico and the battle over the
budget in the United States, will always be the main determinants of each countrys economic competitiveness, but the new ideas
being generated through the HLED, backed-up by the leadership of Vice-President Biden and the
strong momentum behind the recent growth in US-Mexico trade, could provide both nations with a
significant boost.

3. The plan is Bi-Lateral and on the border region, THERE IS LITERALLY NO WAY
BRASIL COULD HELP WITH THIS

4. Mexico is voluntarily saying yes to the plan, again, this means there is no link

Impact

Prolif/Instab
No impact--Latin American instability wont spill overno nukes, no history of cross-
border conflicts.
Cardenas, 2011 (Mauricio, March 17, Director of the Latin American Initiative at Brookings Institution,
Think Again: Latin America, Foreign Policy Magazine,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/17/think_again_latin_america?page=0,3, DVO)
Violence in Latin America is strongly related to poverty and inequality. When combined with the insatiable
international appetite for the illegal drugs produced in the region, it's a noxious brew. As strongly argued by a number of prominent regional
leaders -- including Brazil's former president, Fernando H. Cardoso, and Colombia's former president, Cesar Gaviria -- a strategy based
on demand reduction, rather than supply, is the only way to reduce crime in Latin America. Although some
fear the Mexican drug violence could spill over into the southern United States, Latin America poses little to no threat to
international peace or stability. The major global security concerns today are the proliferation of
nuclear weapons and terrorism. No country in the region is in possession of nuclear weapons -- nor has
expressed an interest in having them. Latin American countries, on the whole, do not have much history of engaging in cross-
border wars. Despite the recent tensions on the Venezuela-Colombia border, it should be pointed out that Venezuela has never
taken part in an international armed conflict. Ethnic and religious conflicts are very uncommon in
Latin America. Although the region has not been immune to radical jihadist attacks -- the 1994 attack on a Jewish Community Center in
Buenos Aires, for instance -- they have been rare. Terrorist attacks on the civilian population have been limited to a large extent to the FARC
organization in Colombia, a tactic which contributed in large part to the organization's loss of popular support.

Treaty of Tlatelolco stops any south american proliferation
Graham Allison Director at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Douglas Dillon
Professor of Government, Faculty Chair at Dubai Initiative at Harvard Kennedy School 10
Foreign Affairs 89 no. 1, "Nuclear Disorder: Surveying Atomic Threats," Jan/Feb 2010
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19819/nuclear_disorder.html [Lockwood]
Looking elsewhere, Brazil is now operating an enrichment facility but has signed the Treaty of
Tlatelolco, which outlaws nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and has accepted
robust legal constraints, including those of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of
Nuclear Materials. Other than South Africa, which retains the stockpile of 30 bombs' worth of highly
enriched uranium that was once part of its nuclear program, it is difficult to identify other countries
that might realistically become nuclear weapons states in the foreseeable future. Such arguments for
skepticism have a certain plausibility. The burden of evidence and analysis, however, supports the view
that current trends pose unacceptable risks. As the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the
Strategic Posture of the United States, which was led by former Secretaries of Defense William Perry and
James Schlesinger, concluded in 2009, "The risks of a proliferation 'tipping point' and of nuclear
terrorism underscore the urgency of acting now."

Brazil wont prolif empirics
Graham 9 associate editor at The Atlantic. (David, Not-Quite-Nuclear Nations, 8/27/9,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/08/27/not-quite-nuclear-nations.html/, HW)
During a military junta in the late 1970s, Brazil began work on a secret nuclear-weapons program parallel to
its civilian power program, but So Paolo decided that nuclear weapons wouldn't help against an
internal leftist threat, which was then considered the nation's biggest strategic challenge. Although Brazil has the technical
capacity to produce weapons, it has signed several treaties pledging not to do so.