1

WHERE THE LAW SPEAKS IN CLEAR AND CATEGORICAL LANGUAGE,

THERE IS NO ROOM FOR INTERPRETATION, VACILLATION, OR
EQUIVOCATION, THERE IS ROOM ONLY FOR APPLICATION
DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 102858 (July 28, 1997)
FACTS
Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original
registration of a land title. During the pendency of the said petition, he died
and his heirs were represented by Josefa Abistado as a guardian ad litem in
order to continue the petition. It was found that the applicant had been in
open, continuous and exclusive possession of the subject land since 1938.
The reason for the dismissal is that the applicant failed to publish the notice
of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to a law.
The CA set aside the decision of the trial court. Thus, Petitioner brought the
case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in
an original land registration case is mandatory or directory.
HELD: It is mandatory.
The law used the term shall in prescribing the work to be done by the
Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latters receipt of the court
order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an
imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. While
such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its
import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, it is held
that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal
mandatory meaning in order to uphold the norms of due process.
The application for land registration filed by private respondents must be
dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal
requisites shall have been duly complied with.
* CHAPTER 1*
WHEN THE LAW IS CLEAR, IT IS NOT SUSCEPTIBLE OF INTERPRETATION. IT
MUST BE APPLIED REGARDLESS OF WHO MAY BE AFFECTED, EVEN IF THE
LAW MAY BE HARSH OR ERRONEOUS
OLIVIA AND HERMES PASCUAL VS. ESPERANZA PASCUAL -BAUTISTA, ET.AL
G.R. No. 84240 (March 25, 1992)
FACTS
Don Andres Pascual died intestate (without a will) He was survived by Adela
Pascual - spouse, 6 children of Wenceslao Pascual, 7 children of Pedro
Pascual both full brother of the deceased and the petitioners. Petitioners
are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter
being the full blood brother of the deceased Don Andres Pascual, who died
intestate without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or
spurious children. Petitioners motion and motion for reconsideration
manifesting their hereditary rights was denied by RTC Pasig and likewise
dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Art. 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines can be
interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of
the deceased.
HELD:
Petitioners do not fall within the purview of Art. 992 of the Civil Code.
Being acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, their illegitimacy is
2

not due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when such children where
under conception. Illegitimate children in Art. 992 refer to both natural and
spurious child.Art. 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, An illegitimate
child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit
in the same manner from the illegitimate child
* CHAPTER 1*
THE FIRST AND FUNDAMENTAL DUTY OF THE COURTS IS TO APPLY THE
LAW
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MAPA
G.R. No. L-22301 (August 30, 1967)
FACTS
Defendant was accused of illegal possession of firearms. He invokes in his
defense that he was an appointed Secret Agent of the provincial Governor
of Batangas. He sought to be acquitted as the case of People v.
Macarandang used the same defense providing evidences of his
appointment.
ISSUE: Whether or not a Secret Agent falls among those authorized to
possess firearms.
HELD: No. The court held that the law cannot be any clearer. The law does
not contain any exception for secret agent therefore holding this position
would not constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for a crime of
illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions.
No provision is made for a secret agent.
* CHAPTER 1*
THE DUTY OF THE COURTS IS TO APPLY THE LAW DISREGARDING THEIR
FEELING OF SYMPATHY OR PITY FOR THE ACCUSED
PEOPLE VS. PATRICIO AMIGO
G.R. No. 116719 (January 18, 1996)
FACTS
The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision finding the Patricio Amigo -
Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and
sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua.Accused-Appellant argues
that error was committed by the trial court in imposing or meting out the
penalty of reclusion perpetua against him despite the fact that Sec. 19 (1),
Art. 3 of the 1987 Constitution was already in effect when the offense was
committed. Accused-Appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution
and prior to the promulgation of RA 7659, the death penalty had been
abolished and hence, the penalty that should have been imposed for the
crime of murder committed by Accused-Appellant should be reclusion
temporal in its medium period to 20 years of reclusion temporal.
According to the Accused-Appellant reclusion perpetua is too cruel or harsh
to be his punishment He pleads for sympathy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 19 (1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution means
to require a corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of
the prohibition against the death penalty.
HELD:
Courts are not the forum for sympathy DURA LEX SED LEX applies. The
only remedy to change or alter the penalty lies upon the clemency from the
executive or through an amendment of the law to be done by the
legislative. Decision Affirmed.
*CASES - CHAPTER 1*
3

LEGISLATIVE INTENT IS DETERMINED PRINCIPALLY FROM THE
LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE

SOCORRO RAMIREZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS & ESTER GARCIA
G.R. No. L-16696 & L-16702 (January 31, 1962)

FACTS
A civil case was filed by Petitioner (Socorro Ramirez) alleging that
Private Respondent (Ester Garcia), in a confrontation in the latters
office allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her. contrary to
morals, public policy and good customs
Petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event to support her
claim.
The act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal.
The respondent filed a criminal case for violation of R.A. 4200 An Act
to Prohibit and Penalize Wiretapping and other Related Violations of
Private Communications, and Other Purposes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the facts charged against him constituted an
offense.
HELD: Yes. The law makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by
all the parties in any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder.
The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be
penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different
from those involved in the private
communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of
the qualifier "any".

* CHAPTER 3*
PLAIN MEANING RULE OR VERBA LEGIS

GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE & RADIO COMMUNICATIONS VS.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMMISSION AND IMELDA
SALAZAR
G.R. No. 82511 (March 3, 1992)

FACTS
Petitioner placed Respondent Imelda Salazar under preventive
suspension because it appeared that she had full knowledge of the
loss and whereabouts of an air conditioner that Delfin Saldivar had
stolen from the company but failed to inform her employer.
Respondent Salazar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and for
other damages.
On appeal, the Respondent Court affirmed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter with respect to the reinstatement of Private Respondent but
limited backwages to 2 years and deleted award for moral damages.

ISSUE
1. Whether or not the Labor Tribunal committed grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the reinstatement of Respondent Salazar.
2. Whether or not there existed independent legal grounds to hold
Respondent Salazar answerable as well and, thereby, justify her
dismissal.
HELD: The Labor Code clearly provides that an employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement and
to his full back wages. An exception to this is when the reinstatement
may be inadmissible due to strained relations between the employer
and the employee.
The position of Private Respondent as systems analyst is not one that
may be characterized as such. Moreover, Petitioner merely
insinuated that since Respondent Salazar had a special relationship
with Saldivar, she might have had direct knowledge of Saldivars
questionable activities.

* CHAPTER 3*
WHEN THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW IS CLEAR, IT SHOULD BE
GIVEN IN NATURAL MEANING

FELICITO BASBACIO VS. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 109445 (November 7, 1994)
4


FACTS
Petitioner filed a claim on RA 7309, which provides for compensation
of persons unjustly accused, convicted, and
imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of
acquittal.
Petitioner and his son-in-law Balderrama were charged with murder
and frustrated murder for killing Boyon and wounding his wife and
son, due to a land dispute and thus imprisoned.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Petitioner was acquitted on the
ground that conspiracy between him and his son-in-law was not
proven. What was proven was that he was at the scene of the crime
with Petitioner when the shooting happened and left the place with
his son-in-law.
Petitioner claims he was unjustly accused and is entitled to
compensation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner is entitled to compensation
pursuant to RA 7309.
HELD: No, he is not. For one to be unjustly accused one must be
wrongly accused from the very beginning, unjustly convicted (when a
judge knowingly and deliberately rendered an unjust judgment,
whimsical and capricious devoid of any basis for judgment) and
imprisoned.
Petitioner was acquitted because the prosecution was unable to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that Petitioner was guilty. Thus, he
does not fall under RA 7309.
judge knowingly and deliberately rendered an unjust judgment,
whimsical and capricious devoid of any basis for judgment) and
imprisoned.
Petitioner was acquitted because the prosecution was unable to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that Petitioner was guilty. Thus, he
does not fall under RA 7309.


IN INTERPRETING A STATUTE, CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN THAT
EVERY PART BE GIVEN EFFECT

JMM PROMOTIONS AND MANAGEMENT INC. VS. NLRC AND
ULPIANO L. DELOS SANTOS
G.R. No. 109835 (November 22, 1993)

FACTS
JMM Promotions paid license fee amounting to P30, 000 and posted a
cash bond of P100, 000 and a surety bond of P50,000, as required by
the POEA Rules.
When JMM Promotions appealed to NLRC regarding a decision
rendered by POEA, the NLRC dismissed the petition for failure to post
the required appeal bond as required by Art. 223 of the Labor Code.

ISSUE: Is JMM Promotions still required to post the required appeal
bond, as required by Art. 223 of the Labor Code, considering it has
already posted a cash bond and surety bond, as required by the
POEA?
HELD: Yes. The POEA Rules regarding monetary appeals are clear. A
reading of the POEA Rules shows that, in addition to the cash and
surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an amount
equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal
from a decision of the POEA.
* CHAPTER 3*


RADIOLA-TOSHIBA PHILS. INC. V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT
G.R. No. 75222 (July 18, 1991)
FACTS
The levy on attachment against the subject properties of spouses
Carlos and Teresita Gatmaytan was issued on March 4, 1980 by the
Court of First Instance of Pasig.
The insolvency proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Angeles
City was commenced more than four months after the issuance of the
said attachment.
5

Under the circumstances, Petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Phils.
Contended that its lien on the subject properties overrode the
insolvency proceeding and was not dissolved thereby.

ISSUE: Whether or not the levy on attachment dissolved the
insolvency proceedings against Respondent spouses even though it
commenced four months after said attachment.
HELD: No. Sec. 32 of the Insolvency Law is clear that there is a cut off
period one month in attachment cases and thirty days in judgments
entered in actions commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings.
Also, there is no conflict between Sec. 32 and Sec. 79. Where a statute
is susceptible to more than one interpretation, the court should adopt
such reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the
provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each
other.

* CHAPTER 3*

A CONSTRUCTION THAT GIVES TO THE LANGUAGE USED IN A
STATUTE A MEANING THAT DOES NOT ACCOMPLISH THE
PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE STATUTE WAS ENACTED, SHOULD BE
REJECTED

MANUEL T. DE GUIA VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 104712 (May 6, 1992)
Petitioner Manuel De Guia is an incumbent member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Paranaque having been
elected in January 1988 local election
De Guia prays for reversal of the position of the respodent
Petitioner contends that under Par (d) of Sec. 3 of RA 7166, members
of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be
elected at large.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 3 of RA 7166 should be interpreted to
mean that elective officials of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod and
Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large.
HELD: No. paragraph (d) Sec.3 of the RA 7166 refers only to elective
officials of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod of single district cities and
elective officials of the Sangguniang Bayan for municipalities outside
Metro Manila.
The law specifically stated that provinces with only one legislative
district should be divided into two and therefore should necessarily
be elected by districts. Par (d) should be interpreted in line with the
rest of the statute and to follow the interpretation of the petitioner
there would have been
no reason for the RA to single out the single district provinces. The
court realized that the language of the law in this case seems abstruse
and the key to determine what legislature intended is the purpose or
reason which induced it to enact the statute. The explanatory note in
the proposed bill provided that the reason for the division into two
legislative districts is to reduce the number of candidates to be voted
for in the 1992 elections.

* CHAPTER 3*
BETWEEN TWO STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS, THAT WHICH
BETTER SERVES THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW SHOULD PREVAIL

SPS. SALENILLAS V. COURT OF APPEALS & WILLIAM GUERA
G.R. No. 78687 (January 31, 1989)

FACTS
On December 4, 1973, the property of Petitioners was mortgaged to
Philippine National Bank as security for a loan of P2,500.
For failure to pay their loan, the property was foreclosed by PNB and
was bought at a public auction by Private Respondent.
Petitioner maintains that they have a right to repurchase the
property under Sec.119 of the Public Land Act. Respondent states
that the sale of the property disqualified.
Petitioners from being legal heirs vis--vis the said property.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioners have the right to repurchase the
property under the said Act.
2. Whether or not the prescription period had already prescribed.
6

HELD: The provision makes no distinction between the legal heirs.
The distinction made by Respondent contravenes the very purpose of
the Act. Petitioners contention would be more in keeping with the
spirit of the law.
With regard to prescription, the Monge case involved a pacto de retro
sale and not a foreclosure sale and so the rules under the transaction
would be different. For foreclosure sales, the prescription period
starts on the day after the expiration of the period of redemption
when the deed of absolute sale was executed. The five year period for
the petitioners to repurchase their property had not yet prescribed.

* CHAPTER 3*
WHEN THE REASON OF THE LAW CEASES, THE LAW ITSELF
CEASES

B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR ET.AL VS. B/GEN. DEMETRIO
CAMERA ET.AL
G.R. No. 93177 (August 2, 1991)

FACTS
The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
facing prosecution for their participation in the failed coup detat on
December l to 9, l989.
In connection with their prosecution, a Pre-Investigation Panel and a
Court Martial was formed. During their trial, petitioners invoked their
right to peremptory challenge. The same was denied by the Court
Martial on the ground that the right was discontinued when martial
law was declared under a Presidential Decree.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was substantial compliance in the conduct of
pre-trial investigation.
2. Whether or not there was a legal basis for the GCM No. 14 to deny
the right of petitioners to invoke a peremptory challenge.
3. Whether or not there was a legal basis for the Regional Trial Courts
to grant bail and order for the release of petitioners.
HELD: The right to peremptory challenge was suspended when
Martial Law was declared. But when the same was lifted, the right to
peremptory challenge was effectively revived.
The reason being, the right was suspended due to the creation of
military tribunals to try cases of military personnel and other cases
that may bereferred to them, so when martial law was lifted.

Petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to allow the
petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under Art.
18 of the Articles of War.

* CHAPTER 3*
DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATIONS. WHAT IS IMPLIED IN
A STATUTE IS AS MUCH A PART THEREOF AS THAT WHICH IS
EXPRESSED

LYDIA CHUA VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL
IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION
G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992)

FACTS
RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary
separation as well as for involuntary separation due to
reorganization. Section 2 covers those who are qualified:

Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive officials and
employees of the National Government. The benefits authorized
under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and
emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least
a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the
date of separation

Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of the
benefits of the program, filed an application on January 30, 1989 with
Respondent Administration, which, however, denied the same.
Recourse by the petitioner to Respondent Commission yielded the
same result.
7


ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners status as a co-terminus employee
is excluded from the benefits of RA 6683 (Early Retirement Law).
HELD: The petition is granted. The Early Retirement Law would
violate the equal protection clause of the constitution if the Supreme
Court were to sustain Respondents submission that the benefits of
said law are to be denied a class of government employees who are
similarly situated as those covered by the said law. The court applied
the doctrine of necessary implication in deciding this case.
Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of
law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

* CHAPTER 3*
CITY OF MANILA & CITY TREASURER VS. JUDGE AMADOR GOMEZ
OF THE CFI OF MANILA AND ESSO PHILIPPINES
G. R. No. L-37251 (August 31, 1981)

FACTS
The Revised Charter of Manila took effect on June 18, 1949. It fixes
the annual realty tax at one and one-half percent. The Special
Education Fund Law (RA 5447), which took effect on Jan. 1, 1969,
imposed an annual additional one percent tax and fixes the total
realty tax at three percent.
With the three percent maximum limit set by RA 5447, the municipal
board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7125, effective beginning the
third quarter of 1972, imposing an additional one-half percent realty
tax. Respondent Corporation paid the tax, but protested the
Ordinance; the Court of First Instance of Manila ruled that the tax
ordinance is void as it is not authorized by the city charter or by any
law, and that the city of Manila should reimburse Respondent
Corporation said tax.
ISSUE: Whether or not the tax ordinance is valid.
HELD: The Court holds that the doctrine of implications in Statutory
Construction sustains the City of Manilas contention that the
additional one-half percent realty tax is sanctioned by the provision
of the Special Education Fund Law that the total real property tax
shall not exceed a maximum of three per centum.
While the 1949 Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty tax at one
and one-half percent, the 1969 Special Education Fund Law fixed
three percent as the maximum real property tax. The obvious
implication is that an additional one-half percent tax could be
imposed by municipal corporations. Inferentially, that law fixed at
two percent the realty tax that would accrue to the city or
municipality. The fact that the 1974 Real Property Tax Code specially
fixes the real property tax at two percent confirms the prior intention
of the lawmaker to impose two percent as the realty tax proper. That
was also the avowed intent of the questioned ordinance.

* CHAPTER 3*

THE RULE OF CASUS OMISSUS PRO OMISSO HABENDUS EST
CAN OPERATE AND APPLY ONLY IF AND WHEN THE OMISSION
HAS BEEN CLEARLY ESTABLISHED

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GUILLERMO MANANTAN
G.R. No. L-14129 (July 31, 1962)

FACTS
Defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged of violation of Section
54 of the Revised Election Code in the province of Pangasinan.

SECTION 54, ELECTION CODE: No justice, judge, fiscal.
Treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the
Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural
police force, and no classified civil service officer or employee shall
aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in any
election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to
preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer

CFI of Pangasinan ordered the dismissal of the case, Solicitor General
appealed.

8

ISSUE: Whether or not a justice of the peace is included in the
prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code
HELD: Yes. Justice of Peace is included in the prohibition of Section
54 of the Revised Election Code.
There was no necessity anymore to include justices of the peace in
the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more
generic and broader term judge.

It was a term not modified by any word or phrase and was intended
to comprehend all kinds of judges.

Order of dismissal is set aside. Case remanded for trial on the merits.

* CHAPTER 3*

STARE DECISIS. FOLLOW PAST PRECEDENTS AND DO NOT
DISTURB WHAT HAS BEEN SETTLED. MATTERS ALREADY
DECIDED ON THE MERITS CANNOT BE RELITIGATED AGAIN AND
AGAIN

J.M. TUASON AND CO. INC., ET AL. VS. HON. HERMINIO MARIANO,
MANUELA AQUIAL & SPS. JOSE AND SATURNINA CORDOVA
G.R. No. L-33140 (October 23, 1978)

FACTS
Plaintiffs Aquial (herein Respondents) claimed ownership of a parcel
of land located in QC having an area of 383 hectares.
They alleged that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in
OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was
registered in the names of Defendants Tuason (herein Petitioners)
pursuant to a decree issued on July 6, 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the
Court of Land Registration.
Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived
therefrom be declared void due to certain irregularities in the land
registration proceeding.
The Tuasons prayed that the petition be dismissed on the ground
that the court has no jurisdiction over the case, improper venue,
prescription, laches and prior judgment. Respondents Cordova
spouses were allowed to intervene in the case since they were able to
purchase 11 hectares from the Aquials.

ISSUE: Whether or not OCT No. and the titles derived therefrom can
be questioned at this late hour by respondents Aquial and Cordova
HELD: OCT No. 735 is valid. The validity of OCT No. 735 was already
decided upon by the Supreme Court in the cases of Benin vs. Tuason,
Alcantara vs. Tuason and Pili vs. Tuason. The ruling in these cases
was also applied in other cases involving the validity of OCT No. 735.

Considering the principles of Stare Decisis, it becomes evident that
respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in Civil
Case No. 8943 without eroding the long settled holding of the courts
that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.

Trial Court directed to dismiss Civil Case No.8943 with prejudice.

*CASES - CHAPTER 3*
LEGISLATIVE INTENT
For construction purposes does not mean the collection of the
subjective wishes, hopes and prejudices of each and every member of
the legislature, but rather the objective footprints left on the trail of
legislative enactment.

VERBA LEGIS
If the language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity, and
expresses a single, definite and sensible meaning which the
legislature intended to convey.

CASUS OMISSUS
When a statute makes specific provisions in regard to several
enumerated cases or objects, but omits to make any provision for a
case or object which is analogous to those enumerated, or which
stands upon the same reason, and is therefore within the general
scope of the statute, and it
9

appears that such case or object was omitted by inadvertence or
because it was overlooked or unforeseen.

STARE DECISIS
A point of law already established will, generally, be followed by the
same determining court and by all courts of lower rank in subsequent
cases where the same legal issue is raised. (Settled point)

CHAPTER 4
WHEN THE LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, COURTS SHOULD NOT
DISTINGUISH. THE RULE, FOUNDED ON LOGIC, IS A COROLLARY
OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT GENERAL WORDS AND PHRASES OF A
STATUTE SHOULD ORDINARILY BE ACCORDED THEIR NATURAL
AND GENERAL SIGNIFICANCE

PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE CO., INC. VS. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. L-72005 (May 29, 1987)

FACTS
Sycwin Coating& Wires Inc, filed a complaint for a collection of
money against Varian Industrial Corporation.
During the pendency, Respondent attached some of the properties of
Varian Industrial Corp upon the posting of a supersedes bond. The
latter in turn posted a counter bond through Petitioner so the
attached properties were released.
Sycwin filed a petition for execution pending appeal against the
properties of Varian, which was granted. However, the writ of
execution was returned unsatisfied as Varian failed to deliver the
previously attached personal properties upon demand. Sycwin
prayed that Petitioner Corporation be ordered to pay the value of its
bond which was granted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the counter bond issued was valid.
HELD: The counter bond was issued in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule
57 of the Rules of Court. Neither the rules nor provisions of the
counter bond limited its application to a final and executory
judgment.
It applies to the payment of any judgment that may be recovered by
Plaintiff. The only logical conclusion is that an execution of any
judgment including one pending appeal if returned unsatisfied may
be charged against such counter bond.

The rule therefore, is that the counter bond to life attachment shall be
charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned
unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and executory judgment but also
the execution of a judgment of pending appeal.

* CHAPTER 4*

THE RULE IS WELL-RECOGNIZED THAT WHERE THE LAW DOES
NOT DISTINGUISH, COURTS SHALL NOT DISTINGUISH

JUANITO PILAR VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G. R. No. 115245 (July 11, 1995)

FACTS
On March 2, 1992, Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province
of Isabela.
He withdrew his certificate of candidacy. As a result, Respondent
Commission imposed a fine of P10,000 pesos


for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures.
Petitioner contends that it is clear from the law that the candidate
must have entered the political contest, and should have either won
or lost.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner can be held liable for failure to file a
statement of contributions and expenditures since he was a non-
10

candidate, having withdrawn his certificate of candidacy three days
after its filing.
HELD: Yes. Sec. 14 of RA 7166 states that every candidate has the
obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures.
As the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the
candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term
every candidate must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate
who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his
candidacy. Sec. 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to all
candidates who filed their certificate of candidacy.

* CHAPTER 4*
IF THE LAW MAKES NO DISTINCTION< NEITHER SHOULD THE
COURT

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JUDGE ANTONIO EVANGELISTA
AND GUILDO S. TUGONON
G.R. No. 84332-33 (May 8, 1996)

FACTS
Private Respondent Guildo Tugonon was charged and convicted of
frustrated homicide. Sentenced with prision correccional (CA-
Affirmed)
Private Respondent filed a petition for probation. However, Chief
Probation and Parole Officer Isaias Valdehueza recommended denial
of Private respondents application for probation on the ground that
by appealing the sentence of the trial, he had already waived his right
to make his application for probation.
Judge Antonio Evangelista set the case for repromulgation.
The RTC set aside the Probation Officers recommendation and
granted Private Respondents application on April 23, 1993.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Respondent Judge committed a grave
abuse of discretion by granting private respondents application for
probation.
HELD: Yes. Private Respondent filed his application for probation on
December 28, 1992, after PD 1990 had taken effect. It is thus covered
by the prohibition that no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from
the judgment of conviction and that the filing of the
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. Having
appealed from the judgment of the trial court and applied for
probation only after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his conviction;
Private Respondent was clearly precluded from the benefits of
probation.

* CHAPTER 4*

WHEN THE LAW DOES NOT MAKE ANY EXCEPTION, COURTS
MAY NOT EXCEPT SOMETHING UNLESS COMPELLING REASONS
EXIST TO JUSTIFY IT

CECILIO DE VILLA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 87416 (April 8, 1991)

FACTS
Petitioner was charged with a violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks
Law) for issuing a worthless check.
However, he contends that the check was drawn against a

dollar account with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not
covered by the said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Makati Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction over the case in question.
HELD: The Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction. The
determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the
issuance of the check. The offense was committed in Makati and
therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction in
the Makati Regional Trial Court. The Court acquires jurisdiction over
the case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a
complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action.
With regard to Petitioners allegation that the check is not covered by
11

BP 22, it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency
involved in the case. Thus, the Court revealed that the
records of Batasan, Vol. III unmistakably show that the intention of
the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the
subject thereof.
* CHAPTER 4*

GENERAL TERMS MAY BE RESTRICTED BY SPECIFIC WORDS,
WITH THE RESULT THAT THE GENERAL LANGUAGE WHICH
INDICATES THE STATUTES OBJECT AND PURPOSE. THE RULE IS
APPLICABLE ONLY TO CASES WHEREIN, EXCEPT FOR ONE
GENERAL TERM, ALL THE ITEMS IN AN ENUMERATION BELONG
TO OR FALL UNDER ONE SPECIFIC CLASS

COLGATE-PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. PEDRO JIMENEZ
G.R. No. L-14787 (January 28, 1961)

FACTS
Petitioner Corporation engages in manufacturing toilet preparations
and household remedies.
Importation of materials including stabilizers and flavors is among
those Petitioner imports.
For every importation, Petitioner pays the Central Bank of the
Philippines 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for
the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges pursuant
to RA 601, the Exchange Tax Law.
Under such law, it was also provided that:


Foreign exchanged used for the payment of cost, transportation
and/or other charges incident to the importation into the Philippines
of stabilizer and flavors shall be refunded to any importer making
application therefore.

The petitioner therefore seeks a refund of the 17% special excise tax
ISSUE: Whether or not the imports of dental cream stabilizers and
flavors are subject to a 17% transportation tax exemption under the
Exchange Tax Law.
HELD: No. The refusal to deny refund was based on the following
argument: All the items enumerated for the tax exemption fall under
one specific class, namely:
food products, books supplies/ materials and medical supplies. The
stabilizers and flavors the petitions refer to are items which must
fall under the category of food products. Because such items will be
used for toothpaste, it is not a food product and therefore not subject
to exemption.

Petitioners arguments effected the grant of the refund:
RA 601 does not categorize the exceptions as stated above. Though
stabilizers and flavors are preceded by items that might fall under
food products, the following which were included are hardly such:
fertilizer, poultry feed, vitamin concentrate, cattle, and industrial
starch. Therefore, the law must be seen in its entire context, not the
parts and categorizations posited by the respondent.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. EUTROPIO MIGRINIO
AND TROADIO TECSON
G.R. No. 89483 (August 30, 1990)

FACTS
Acting on information received, which indicated the acquisition of
wealth beyond his lawful income, the Philippine Anti-Graft Board
required Private Respondent to submit his explanation or comment,
together with his supporting evidence.
Private Respondent, a retired lt. colonel, was unable to produce his
supporting evidence, despite several postponements, because they
were allegedly in the custody of his bookkeeper who had gone
abroad. The anti-graft Board was created by the PCGG to investigate
the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both
retired and in active service.

12

ISSUE: Whether or not Private Respondent may be investigated and
prosecuted by the Board, an agency of the PCGG, for violation of RA
3019 and 1379.
HELD: No. Applying the rule in statutory construction, the term
subordinate as used in EO 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a
close association or relation with former President Marcos and/or his
wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close
associate in EO 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy,
agent, or nominee in EO 2.

* CHAPTER 4*

RULE OF EJUSDEM GENERIS MERELY A TOOL OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION RESORTED TO WHEN LEGISLATIVE INTENT IS
UNCERTAIN

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES
G.R. Nos. L-47757-61 (January 28, 1980)

FACTS
The issue is whether or not P.D. 772, which penalizes squatting and
similar acts, applies to agricultural lands.
The lower court denied the motion and ruled that agricultural land is
not part of P.D. 772 on the basis of Ejusdem Generis (of the same kind
or species) since its preamble does not mention the Secretary of
Agriculture.
The order of dismissal by Echaves was then appealed to the Supreme
Court, thus bringing the case at hand.

ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. 772 applies to agricultural lands
HELD: The Supreme Court held the same ruling that the lower court
did, declaring that P.D. 772 does not apply to pasture lands because
its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in
urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in
squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals.
But the Supreme Court disagreed to the lower courts usage of the
maxim Ejusdem Generis because the intent of the decree is
unmistakable. It stated that the rule of Ejusdem
Generis is merely a tool for statutory construction which is resorted
to when the legislative is uncertain.

* CHAPTER 4*
THE FAMILIAR RULE OF EJUSDEM GENERIS

MISAEL VERA VS. HON. SERAFIN CUEVAS, INSTITUTE OF
EVAPORATED FILLED MILK MANUFACTURERS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., AND CONSOLIDATED MILK COMPANY
PHILIPPINES INC., AND MILK INDUSTRIES, INC.
G.R. Nos. L-33693-94 (May 31, 1979)


FACTS
Commissioner of Internal Revenue is requiring the plaintiffs-private
respondents to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk
products which do not bear the inscription required by Sec. 169 of
the tax code within 15 days from receipt of the order.
Section 169 Inscription to be placed in SKIMMED MILK

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 169 of the tax code applies to filled
milk
HELD: No. Skimmed milk is different from filled milk.
Skimmed milk is milk in whatever form from which fatty part has
been removed. Filled milk on the other hand, is any milk, whether or
not condensed, to which had been added or which has been blended
or compounded with any fat or oil other than milk fat.
It cannot be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both
to skimmed milk or filled milk.

* CHAPTER 4*
THE EXPRESS MENTION OF ONE PERSON, THING, ACT OR
CONSEQUENCE EXCLUDES ALL OTHERS EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST
EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS
13


SAN PABLO MANUFACTURING CORPORATION VS.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 147749 (June 22, 2006)

FACTS
SPMC domestic corporation engaged in the business of milling,
manufacturing and exporting of coconut oil and other allied products.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed and ordered SPMC to
pay P8,182,182.85 representing the deficiency millers tax and
manufacturers sales tax.
SPMC opposed the assessments but the commissioner denied its
protest

ISSUE: Whether or not SPMC is exempted from the payment of 3%
millers tax.
HELD: Court of Tax Appeals correctly ruled that SMCPs sale of crude
coconut oil of UNICHEM was subject to the 3% millers tax.
Sec. 168 of the 1987 Tax Code provides: Percentage tax upon
proprietors operators of rope factories, sugar central and mills,
coconut oil mills, palm oil mills, cassava mills and desiccated coconut
factories shall pay a tax equivalent to three percent (3%)

* CHAPTER 4*
WHERE A PARTICULAR WORD IS EQUALLY SUSCEPTIBLE OF
VARIOUS MEANINGS, ITS CORRECT CONSTRUCTION MAY BE
MADE SPECIFIC BY CONSIDERING THE COMPANY OF TERMS IN
WHICH IT IS FOUND OR WITH WHICH IT IS ASSOCIATED

DRA. BRIGIDA BUENASEDA VS. SECRETARY JUAN FLAVIER
G.R. No. 106719 (September 21, 1993)

FACTS
The Private Respondents filed an administrative complaint with the
Ombudsman against the Petitioner for the violation of the Anti-graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
In response, the Ombudsman filed an order directing the preventive
suspension of the Petitioners, who were employees of the national
center for mental health.
The Respondent argue that the preventive suspension laid by the
Ombudsman under Sec. 24 of RA 6770 is contemplated in by Sec.
13(8) of Art. 9 of the 1987

Constitution, while the Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman can
only recommend to the Heads of Departments and other agencies the
preventive suspension of officials and employees facing
administrative investigation conducted by his office.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to
preventively suspend government officials working in other offices
other than that of the Ombudsman pending the investigation of
administrative complaints.
HELD: Yes. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend the
employees of the said institution may it be in punitive or preventive
suspension. Sec. 13(3) of the Constitution refers to suspension in its
punitive sense, as the same speaks of penalties in administrative
cases, while Sec. 24 of RA 6770 grants the Ombudsman the power to
preventively suspend public officials and employees facing
administrative charges.
This statute is procedural and may arise in order to facilitate a speedy
and efficient investigation on cases filed against the officers. A
preventive measure is not in itself a punishment but a preliminary
step in an administrative investigation.

* CHAPTER 4*

NEGATIVE WORDS AND PHRASES REGARDED AS MANDATORY
WHILE THOSE IN THE AFFIRMATIVE ARE MERE DIRECTORY

MANOLO P. FULE VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-79094 (June 22, 1988)
FACTS
Petitioner, an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation, issued and
made out check No. 26741 in favor of Roy Nadera.
14

Said check was dishonored for the reason that the said checking
account was already closed, thus in violation of BP 22, the Bouncing
Checks Law.
Upon the hearing, prosecution presented its evidence and the
Petitioner waived his right. Instead, he submitted a memorandum
confirming the Stipulation of Facts.
He was convicted by the trial court, and on appeal, the Appellate
Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the
RTC based on the Stipulation of Facts that was not signed by the
Petitioner or his counsel.
HELD: The CA erred. Case is re-opened to receive evidence of
Petitioner. Sec. 4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides, No
agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial
conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless
reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel. Because of the
word shall, in its language, the rule is mandatory.
Negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while
those in the affirmative are merely


directory. Therefore, the signature of the Petitioner and the counsel is
mandatory. Also, penal statues are to be liberally construed in favor
of the accused.
* CHAPTER 4*
USE OF WORD MAY IN THE STATUTE GENERALLY CONNOTES A
PERMISSIBLE THING WHILE THE WORD SHALL IS IMPERATIVE

PURITA BERSABAL VS. HON. JUDGE SERAFIN SALVADOR
G.R. No. L-35910 (July 21, 1978)

FACTS
Private Respondents filed an ejectment suit against the Petitioner.
The subsequent decision was appealed by the Petitioner and during
its pendency, the court issued an order stating that counsels for
both parties are given 30 days from receipt of this order within which
to file their memoranda in order for this case to be submitted for
decision by the court.
After receipt, Petitioner filed a motion ex parte to submit
memorandum within 30 days from receipt of notice of submission of
the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing of the
case which was granted by the court. But the Respondent judge
issued an order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute
Petitioners appeal.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration citing the submitted ex
parte motion but the court denied it.

ISSUE: Whether or not the mere failure of an Appellant to submit the
mentioned memorandum would empower the CFI to dismiss the
appeal on the ground of failure to prosecute.
HELD: The court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on
the mere failure of an Appellant to submit his memorandum. The law
provides that Courts shall decide cases on the basis of the evidence
and records transmitted from the city courts: Provided, parties may
submit memoranda if so requested. It cannot be interpreted
otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is optional.

* CHAPTER 4*


JENETTE MARIE CRISOLOGO VS. GLOBE TELECOM AND CESAR
MAUREAL
G.R. No. 167631 (December 16, 2005)

FACTS
Jenette Crisologo was an employee of Globe Telecom
Petitioner was promoted as Director of Corporate Affairs and
Regulatory matters.
She separated from the company.
Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and reinstatement at
the National Labor Relations Commission.

15

Respondent company filed an action for the recovery of the executive
car issued to Ms. Crisologo and other companys possessions.
ISSUE: Whether or not despite the wrong remedy resorted by the
appellant, such as a petition for review on certiorari, the Supreme
Court may refer the case to the Court of Appeals.
HELD: It is on score that the court is inclined to concur with
petitioners argfument that even the remedy resorted was wrong, the
Court may refer the case to the Court of Appeals under rule 56,
Section 6 paragraph 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Motion for reconsideration granted, Petition reinstated, Case referred
to Court of Appeals.

* CHAPTER 4*
THE WORD MUST IN A STATUTE LIKE SHALL IS NOT ALWAYS
IMPERATIVE AND MAY BE CONSISTENT WITH AN EXERCISE OF
DISCRETION

LOYOLA GRAND VILLAS HOMEOWNERS (SOUTH) ASSOCIATION,
INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 117188 (August 7, 1997)

FACTS
The Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association Inc. (LGVHAI) was
registered with Respondent Home Insurance

and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) as the sole homeowners
organization in the said subdivision but it did not file its corporate
bylaws.
Later, it was discovered that there were two other organizations
within the subdivision: the North and South Associations.
Respondent HIGC then informed the president of LGVHAI that the
latter has been automatically dissolved because of non-submission of
its by-laws as required by the Corporation Code.
This resulted in the registration of Petitioner association. LGVHAI
complained and got a favorable result from Respondent HIGC
declaring the registration of Petitioner association cancelled and
Respondent CA subsequently affirmed the said decision.
Petitioner association filed a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws
within one month from the date of its incorporation results in its
automatic dissolution.
HELD: No. The legislatures intent is not to automatically dissolve a
corporation for its failure to pass its by-laws. The word must in a
statute is not always imperative but it may be consistent with an
exercise of discretion. The language of the statute should be
considered as a whole while ascertaining the intent of the legislature
in using the word must or shall.
A WEEK MEANS A PERIOD OF SEVEN CONSECUTIVE DAYS
WITHOUT REGARD TO THE DAY OF THE WEEK ON WHICH IT
BEGINS

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 98382 (May 17, 1993)
FACTS
To secure payments of his loans, Private Respondent mortgages two
lots to Petitioner bank.
For failure to pay the obligation, Petitioner bank extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgaged property and won the highest bidder at the
auction sale.
A final deed of sale was registered in the Bulacan Registry of Property
in favor of the Petitioner bank and later sold the said lots to a third
party.
The notices of sale of Appellants foreclosed properties were
published on March 28, April 11 and April 12, 1969 issues of the
newspaper Daily Record.
The date March 28, 1969 falls on a Friday, while the dates April 11
and 12 fall on a Friday and Saturday, respectively. Section 3 of Act No.
3135 requires that the notice of auction

sale shall be published once a week for at least three consecutive
weeks.
16

ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioner bank complied with the
requirements of weekly publication of notice of extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgages.
HELD: It must be conceded that that Article 13 is completely silent as
to the definition of what is week. In Concepcion v. Andueta, the
term week was interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting
of seven consecutive days. The Defendant-Appellee bank failed to
comply with the legal requirement of publication.
* CHAPTER 4*

ALU-TUCP VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSIONS AND
NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION
G.R. No. 109328 (August 16, 1994)

FACTS
Petitioners were employed by the National Steel Corporation for
their five year expansion program.
The workers contend that they should be considered regular workers
as opposed to project workers, as the NSC and NLRC ruled.
ALU-TUCP claims that they have been working in NSC for more than
6 years and that their work is necessary for the business, and that
would have been more than enough to consider them as regular
employees.
Petitioners contentions stemmed from Art. 280 of the Labor Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners should be considered regular
employees. HELD: No. The provision calls for casual employees.
Since Petitioners were considered project employees, this provision
does not apply to them. Moreover, the fact that they have been
working in NSC for more than a year does not mean they are
automatically converted into regular employees. (They were hired as
project employees for the 5-year expansion program. Once that
project is done, their services will no longer be needed.)

* CHAPTER 4*
THE TERM INSULATING OIL COMES WITHIN THE MEANING OF
THE TERM INSULATOR AND QUALIFIES THE MANILA ELECTRIC
COMPANY FOR TAX EXEMPTION

ACTING COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS. MANILA ELECTRIC
COMPANY AND COURT OF TAX APPEALS
G.R. No. L-23623 (June 30, 1977)

FACTS
RA 1394 exempted payment of special import tax for spare parts
used for industries and also insulators from all taxes of whatever
nature.
Respondent contends that their insulating oils are exempt from taxes.

ISSUE: Whether or not insulating oil is an insulator making
Respondent exempt from paying its taxes.
HELD: No, insulating oil is different from insulators. The Supreme
Court looked into the definition of insulating oils under Materials
Handbook by George J. Brady, 8th Edition. The court found out that
insulating oils are used for cooling as well as insulating. And there is
no question that the insulating oil that Respondent is importing
is used for cooling instead of insulating. The law frowns on
exemption from taxation; hence an exempting provision must be
construed stictissimi juris.

* CHAPTER 4*
SK ELECTION CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A REGULAR ELECTION
FOR PURPOSES OF RECALL UNDER SEC. 74 OF THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991

DANILO E. PARAS VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)

FACTS
A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent
Punong Barangay.
17

The recall election was deferred due to Petitioners opposition that
under Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place within one
year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one year
immediately preceding a regular local election.
Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first
Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SK election is a local election.
HELD: No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to its context, and it must be considered together and kept
subservient to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to
subject an elective local official to recall once during his term, as
provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a
law, determines its construction.
In interpreting the phrase regular local election to include SK
election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a
recall election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a
statute, the Court assumed that the legislature intended to enact an
effective law. An interpretation should be avoided under which a
statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningless,
inoperative or nugatory.

* CASES - CHAPTER 4*
EJUSDEM GENERIS
General rule of statutory construction that where the general words
follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular
or specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in
their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or
things of the same general kind or class.

EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS
Express mention and Implied exclusion. General rule of statutory
construction (to be applied under proper conditions and with
important limitations) that the express mention of one person, thing,
or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others.

NOSCITUR A SOCIIS
Associated Words. When a word used in a statute is ambiguous or
vague, its meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the
company in which it is found and the meaning of the terms which are
associated with them.

AND
Conjunction connecting words or phrases expressing the idea that
the latter is to be added to or taken along with the first.

OR
Disjunctive particle used to express an alternative or to give a choice
of among two or more things.

PROVISO
Clause or part of a clause in the statute, the office of which or which is
either to except something from the enacting clause, or to qualify or
restrain its generality, or to exclude some possible ground of
misinterpretation of its extent.

CHAPTER 5

ARIS (PHIL.) INC. VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. No. 90501 (August 5, 1991)

FACTS

Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Sec. 12 of RA 6716 to Art.
223 of the Labor Code, and Transitory Provisions of the said Interim
Rules on the basis of being in violation of due process and non
retroactivity of laws, respectively.

ISSUE: Whether or not the amendments introduced by Sec. 12 of RA
6715 to Art. 223 of the Labor Code, and Transitory Provisions of the
said Interim Rules are constitutional.
HELD: Yes on both counts.
The provision concerning the mandatory and automatic
reinstatement of an employee whose dismissal is found unjustified by
the labor arbiter is a valid exercise of the police power of the state,
18

and the contested provision is then police legislation. The
questioned Interim Rules can be given retroactive effect for they are
procedural or remedial in character.

* CHAPTER 5*
ALL LAWS ARE PRESUMED VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL UNTIL
OR UNLESS OTHERWISE RULED BY THE COURT

HON. ALFREDO S. LIM VS. FELIPE G. PACQUING
G.R. No. 115044 (January 27, 1995)

FACTS
Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority to
regulate Jai-Alai from local governments to the Games and
Amusements Board (GAB).
The City of Manila passed an Ordinance No. 7065 authorizing the
mayor to allow the Associated Development Corporation (ADC) to
operate a JAI-ALAI.
Then President Marcos issued a PD 771 revoking all powers and
authority of local governments to grant franchise, license or permit,
to Jai-Alai and other forms of gambling.
Then President Aquino issued an E.O. No. 169 expressly repealing PD.
No. 810 which revokes and cancels the franchise granted to the
Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation.
In 1998, ADC tried to operate a Jai-Alai, but the Games and
Amusement Board intervened and invoked P.D. 771 which expressly
revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of
gambling issued by local governments.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the franchise granted by the City of Manila to ADC
is valid in view of E. 0. No. 392 which transferred from local
governments to the GAB the power to regulate Jai-Alai.
2. Whether or not the ADC is correct in assailing that P.D. 771 is
violative of equal protection and non-impairment clauses of the
Constitution.
HELD: R.A. 409 provides that Congress did not delegate to the City of
Manila the power to franchise the operation of Jai-Alai. And E.O. 392
removes the power of local governments to issue license and permit.
All laws are presumed valid and constitutional. PD 771 was not
repealed or amended by any subsequent law. It did not violate the
equal protection clause of the Constitution because the said decree
had revoked all franchises issued by the local governments without
exceptions.
* CHAPTER 5*
IN CASE OF DOUBT IN THE INTERPRETATION OR APPLICATION
OF LAWS, IT IS PRESUMED THAT THE LAWMAKING BODY
INTENDED RIGHT AND JUSTICE TO PREVAIL

KAREN SALVACION VS. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 94723 (August, 21, 1997)

FACTS
An American tourist raped 12 year old girl. In order to pay for moral
damages, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati sent a notice of garnishment to
China Bank in order to draw from the Americans bank account to pay
the fees. China Bank responded by invoking Sec. 113 of Circular 960
of Central Bank, which states that foreign currency deposits shall be
exempt from attachment, garnishment or any other process of any
court.
Respondent Bank states that though the law is harsh, such is the law
and stood firm on the policy.

ISSUES: Whether or not Section 13 of Central Bank Circular 960 and
Section 8 of RA 6427, as amended by PD 1246 should be made
applicable to a foreigner.
HELD: Central Bank contends that the reason for the exemption is to
encourage the deposit of foreign currency. RA 6424 was enacted
during a period of economic crisis, where foreign investments were
minimal. As, some time has already passed since the crisis that
enacted RA 6424, the economy has now somewhat recovered from
the financial drought. Hence, the Court ruled that it is unthinkable
that the guilty would be acquitted at the expense of the innocent,
stating that if Circular 960 is to be followed, justice would be
19

undermined, stating Art. 10 of the Civil Code, in case of doubt as to
the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

* CHAPTER 5*
A LAW SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED SO AS TO CAUSE AN
INJUSTICE

CARLOS & CASIMIRA ALONZO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT AND TECLE PADUA
G.R. No. L-72873 (May 28, 1987)

FACTS

Five siblings inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land
registered in the name of their deceased parents.
Two siblings sold their share to the same vendee. By virtue of such
agreements, the Petitioners occupied after the said sales, 2/5 of the
lot, representing the portions bought. They subsequently enclosed
their portion with a fence and built a semi-concrete house.
One of the sisters filed a complaint invoking the right to redeem the
area sold.
The trial court dismissed this complaint because the time had lapsed,
not having been exercised within 30 days from notice of the sales.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a valid notice.
2. Whether or not Art. 1088 of the Civil Code was interpreted
correctly.
HELD: Although there was no written notice, there was actual
knowledge of the sales satisfying the requirement of the law. It is
unbelievable that the co-heirs were unaware of the sale, with the
erection of a permanent semi-concrete structure. While Art. 1088 of
the Civil Code stresses the need for a written notice of sale; the
Petitioners claimed that because there was no written notice, despite
their obvious knowledge of it, the 30-day period for redemption had
not yet begun. The intent of the lawmakers was to ensure that the
redemptioner was properly notified of the sale and
to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day
period of redemption. The co-heirs in this case were undeniably
informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given to them.

* CHAPTER 5*
IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EXPRESS REPEAL, A SUBSEQUENT LAW
CANNOT BE CONSTRUED AS REPEALING A PRIOR LAW UNLESS
AN IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCY AND REPUGNANCY EXISTS
IN THE TERMS OF THE NEW AND OLD LAWS

ACHILLES BERCES VS. SEC. TEOFISTO GUINGONA JR., ET. AL.
G.R. No. 112099 (February 21, 1995)

FACTS
Petitioner filed two administrative cases against Respondent mayor
of Tiwi, Albay for 1) abuse of authority; and 2) dishonesty, with the
Sangguiniang Panlalawigan. Respondent mayor was convicted, and
accordingly, suspended in both cases.
Respondent mayor appealed to the Office of the President and prayed
for stay of execution under Sec. 67(b) of the LGC.
The Office of the President stayed execution, citing Sec. 68 of RA 7160
and Sec. 6 of A.O. No. 18. According to Petitioner, the governing law is
RA 7160, which contains a mandatory provision that an appeal shall
not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory.
Petitioner further contends that A.O. No. 18 was repealed by RA
7160.
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 7160 repealed A.O. No. 18.
HELD: No. Sec. 530(f), RA 7160 did not expressly repeal Sec. 6, A.O.
No. 18 because it failed to identify or designate the laws on executive
orders that are intended to be repealed. If there was any repeal, it
was by implication which is not favored. In the absence of an express
repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law
unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists
between the two. There is none in this case. The first sentence of Sec.
68 provides that an appeal shall not prevent a decision from
becoming final or executory. It gives discretion to
20

reviewing appeals to stay execution. The term shall may be read
mandatory or directory, depending upon consideration of the entire
provision where it is found.
* CHAPTER 5*
ANTONIO A. MECANO VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 103982 (December 11, 1992)

FACTS
Petitioner seeks to nullify the decision of the Commission on Audit
(COA) embodied in its Endorsement denying his claim for
reimbursement under Sec. 699 of the Revised Administrative Code
(RAC), as amended.
Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI). He was hospitalized for cholecystitis from March 26 to April 7,
1990, on account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization
expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA.
However, the reimbursement process was stalled because of the
issue that the RAC Sec. 699 was repealed by the Administrative Code
of 1987.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner can claim from the COA.
2. Whether or not Sec. 699 of RAC was repealed by the Administrative
Code of 1987.
HELD: Petition was granted. The question of whether or not
petitioner can claim from COA is rooted on whether or not Sec. 699 of
the RAC has been repealed. The Court finds that that section although
not included in the reenactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 is
merely under implied repeal, and the Court considers such implied
repeal as not favorable. Also the Court finds that laws must be in
accord with each other. The second sentence of Art. 173 of the Labor
Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that "the payment
of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits
as provided for in Sec. 699 of the RAC , whose benefits are
administered by the system (SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the
government.
* CHAPTER 5*

DANILO E. PARAS VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)
(LAST CASE CHAPTER 4)

* CHAPTER 5*
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. ESSO STANDARD
EASTERN, INC. AND COURT OF TAX APPEALS
G.R. No. L-28502-03 (April 18, 1989)

FACTS
Respondent overpaid its 1959 income tax. It was accordingly granted
a tax credit by Petitioner on August 5, 1964.
Respondents payment for 1960 was found to be short. Petitioner
demanded payment of the deficiency tax together with interest for
the period of April 18, 1961 to April 18, 1964.
On August 10, 1964, Respondent paid under protest the amount
alleged to be due. It protested the computation of interest, arguing
that it was more than what was properly due, claiming that it should
only be required to pay interest for the amount of the difference
between the deficiency tax and Respondents overpayment.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Respondent shall pay the deficiency tax of P367,
994 with interest.
2. Whether or not Respondent is entitled to a refund.
HELD: The government already had in its hands the sum of P221, 033
representing the excess payment of Respondent. Having been paid
and received by mistake, the sum belonged to Respondent and the
government had the obligation to return such amount, which arises
from the moment that payment is made, and not from the time that
the payee admits the obligation to reimburse.
Since the amount of P221, 033 was already in the hands of the
government as of July, 1960, whatever obligation Respondent might
subsequently incur in favor of the government would have to be
reduced by that sum, in respect of which no interest could be
charged.

21

It is well established that to interpret words of the statute in such a
manner as to subvert these truisms simply cannot and should not be
countenanced. Nothing is better settled than the rule that courts are
not to give words a meaning which would lead to absurd and
unreasonable consequences. Moreover, a literal interpretation is to
be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. Statutes
should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the
legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or absurd
conclusion.

* CHAPTER 5*
PRESUMPTION AGAINST UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES WERE
NEVER INTENDED BY A LEGISLATIVE MEASURE
CESARIO URSUA V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 112170 (April 10, 1996)

FACTS
Petitioner was charged before the Office of the Ombudsman.
He was requested by his lawyer to personally procure the complaint
from the Ombudsman because the law firms messenger, Oscar Perez,
had to attend some personal matters.
At the Office of the Ombudsman, he wrote his name at the logbook as
Oscar Perez. Petitioners real identity was eventually discovered by
the employees of the Ombudsman. He was charged and convicted for
violation of C.A. No. 142.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts committed by the petitioner were
among the evils sought to be remedied by C.A. No. 142
HELD: Petitioner was acquitted. Statutes are to be construed in the
light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied. The court may consider the spirit of the statute where the
literal meaning would lead to injustice and absurdity. Likewise, C.A.
No. 142 is a penal statute that should be construed strictly against the
state, and in favor of the accused.
*CASES - CHAPTER 5*
PRESUMPTION
The Courts will presume that it was the intention of the legislature to
enact a valid, sensible and just law, and one should change the prior
law no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific
purpose of the act in question.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST CONSTITUTIONALITY
Laws are presumed constitutional. To justify nullification of a law,
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution, not
a doubtful and argumentative implication.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST INJUSTICE
Interpret and apply the law independently of, but in consonance with,
justice.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST IMPLIED REPEALS
Legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on
the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST INEFFECTIVENESS
It is presumed that the legislature intends to impart its enactments
such a meaning as will render them operative and effective, and to
prevent persons from eluding or defeating them.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST ABSURDITY
Statutes must receive a sensible construction such as will give effect
to the legislative intention so as to avoid an unjust or absurd
conclusion.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.









22

SUBTITLE OF THE STATUTE AS INTRINSIC AID IN DETERMINING
LEGISLATIVE INTENT

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA AND LORNA PEDROSA
G.R. No. 127325 (March 19, 1997)


FACTS
On December 6, 1996, Private Respondents filed with Respondent
Commission a petition to amend the Constitution through a system of
initiative Sec. 2, Art. 17 of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners filed a
special civil action for prohibition based on the argument that the
constitutional provision on peoples initiative can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has
been passed.
RA 6735 provides for three systems of initiative: initiative on the
Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to
provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the
other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in
Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the
matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to
some future law.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 is an adequate statute to implement
Section 2, Article 17 of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD: No. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum
(Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution.
This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main
thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local
laws.
If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the
implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution,
it could have provided for a subtitle therefore, considering that in the
order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the
right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and
local laws.

*CHAPTER 6*
THE INTENT OF THE LAW AS CULLED FROM ITS PREAMBLE AND
FROM THE SITUATION, CIRCUMSTANCES AND CONDITIONS IT
SOUGHT TO REMEDY, MUST BE ENFORCED

FLORENCIO EUGENIO VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FRANKLIN
DRILON AND PROSPERO PALMIANO
G.R. No. 109404 (January 22, 1996)

FACTS
Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from Petitioner,
two lots.
Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because
of nondevelopment on the property. Petitioner then sold one of the
two lots to spouses Relevo and the title was registered under their
name.
Respondent prayed for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot
to him.
Applying P.D. 957 The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers
Protective Decree, the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission
ordered Petitioner to complete the development, reinstate Private
Respondents purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund
him of the payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold to
the spouses.
Petitioner claims that the Exec. Sec. erred in applying P.D. 957 saying
it should have not been given retroactive effect and that non-
development does not justify the non-payment of the amortizations.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Secretary acted with grave
abuse of discretion when he decided P.D. 957 will be given
retroactive effect.
HELD: No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave
abuse of discretion and P.D. 957 is to given retroactive effect so as to
cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976.
23

P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but
such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable
intent of the law. The intent of the statute is the law.

*CHAPTER 6*
PREAMBLE USED AS A GUIDE IN DETREMINING THE INTENT OF
THE LAWMAKER PEOPLE VS. ECHAVEZ (Chapter 4)

INTRINSIC AIDS
Those aids within the statute. Resorted only if there is ambiguity in
the statute.

SAMPLE OF INTRINSIC AIDS
Title
Preamble
Context or Body of the Statute
Chapter & Section headings
Punctuation
Interpretation Clause

IT IS A WELL-ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE THAT WHERE A STATUTE
IS AMBIGUOUS, COURTS MAY EXAMINE BOTH THE PRINTED
PAGES OF THE PUBLISHED ACT AS WELL AS THOSE EXTRINSIC
MATTERS THAT MAY AID IN CONSTRUING THE MEANING OF THE
STATUTE, SUCH AS THE HISTORY OF ITS ENACTMENT, THE
REASONS FOR THE PASSAGE OF THE BILL AND PURPOSES TO BE
ACCOMPLISHED BY THE MEASURE

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS. ESSO STANDARD EASTERN INC.
G.R. No. L-28329 (August 17, 1975)

FACTS
Petitioner contends that the special import tax under RA 1394 is
separate and distinct from the customs duty prescribed by the Tariff
and Customs Code, and that the exemption enjoyed by Respondent
from the payment of customs duties under the Petroleum net of 1949
does not include exemption from the payment of the special import
tax provided in RA 1394.

ISSUE: Whether or not the exemption enjoyed by Respondent from
customs duties granted by RA 387 should include the special import
tax imposed by RA 1394, or the Special Import Tax Law.
HELD: Petitioner took exception to the finding of the CTA that "The
language of RA 1394 seems to leave no room for doubt that the law
intends that the phrase 'Special Import Tax' is taken to include
customs duties". In order to determine the true intent of
the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute
should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the
whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts. In fact every statute should receive such
construction as will make it harmonize with the pre-existing body of
laws.
Antagonism between the Acts to be interpreted and existing or
previous laws is to be avoided, unless it was clearly the intention of
the legislature that such antagonism should arise and one amends or
repeals the other, either expressly or by implication.

Another rule applied by this Court is that the courts may take judicial
notice of the origin and history of the statutes which they are called
upon to construe and administer, and of facts which affect their
derivation, validity and operation. The Court examined the six
statuettes repealed by RA 1394.

*CHAPTER 7*
CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION PLACED UPON A
STATUTE BY EXECUTIVE OFFICERS CHARGED WITH
IMPLEMENTING AND ENFORCING THE PROVISIONS OF THE
STATUTES SHOULD BE GIVEN CONTROLLING WEIGHT< UNLESS
SUCH INTERPRETATION IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU) VS.
BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS
G.R. No. L-43760 (August 21, 1976)

24

FACTS
Petitioner lost to National Federation of Free Labor Unions (NAFLU)
in the certification elections for the exclusive bargaining agent of the
employees in Philippine Blooming Mills, Company, Inc. Tallied votes
are as follows: NAFLU 429 PAFLU 414 Spoiled Ballots 17 (not
counted) Abstained 4 Total Ballots 864 (Note: NAFLU didnt obtain
the majority vote, which is 432.)
Petitioner contends that the spoiled should be considered as in the
ruling in a previous case. Respondent answered that the ruling in the
previous case was based on the Industrial Peace Act, which has been
superseded by the present Labor Code and as such cannot apply to
the case at bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Respondent acted with grave abuse of
discretion by not allowing the spoiled ballots to be considered as in
the previous case of Allied Workers Association of the Philippines vs.
CIR.
HELD: There was no grave abuse of discretion made by Respondent
since the basis of the ruling in the Allied Workers case has been
superseded by the present Labor Code. Also, the Rules and
Regulations implementing the present Labor Code has been already
been made known to public and as such has the enforcing power in
the case at bar.

*CHAPTER 7*
INDIVIDUAL STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON THE
FLOOR DO NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT LEGISLATIVE INTENT

CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO. INC., VS. HON. PEDRO
GIMENEZ
G.R. No. L-17931 (February 28, 1963)

FACTS
Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues. It
sought the refund of the margin fees relying on RA 2609 (Foreign
Exchange Margin Fee Law) stating that the Central Bank of the
Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange
transactions. However, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in
audit and approved the said refunds upon the ground that
Petitioners separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in
accord with the provisions of Sec. 2, par. 18 of RA 2609.
The pertinent portion of this statute reads: The margin established
by the Monetary Board shall be imposed upon the sale of foreign
exchange for the importation of the following: XVIII. Urea
formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardwood when
imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.

ISSUE: Whether r not urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law
from the payment of the margin fee.
HELD: The term urea formaldehyde used in Sec. 2 of RA 2609 refers
to the finished product as expressed by the National Institute of
Science and Technology, and is distinct and separate from urea and
formaldehyde which are separate chemicals used in the manufacture
of synthetic resin. The one mentioned in the law is a finished product,
while the ones imported by the Petitioner are raw materials. Hence,
the importation of urea and formaldehyde is not exempt from the
imposition of the margin fee.

*CHAPTER 7*
KILOSBAYAN, INC. VS. MORATO
G.R. No. 118910 (November 16, 1995)

FACTS
Petitioners seek for reconsideration of Kilosbayan, et al. v. Guingona.
The Court has determined that Petitioner has no standing to sue but
did not dismiss the case.
Petitioners insist that the PCSO cannot hold and conduct charity
sweepstakes, lotteries and other similar activities in collaboration or
joint venture with any other party because of the clause except for
the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A) in
paragraph (B) of Sec. 1 of RA 1169 as amended by BP 42.

ISSUE: Whether or not under its charter (RA 1169, as amended) the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office can enter in any form of
25

association or collaboration with any party in operating an on-line
lottery.
HELD: No. Petitioners interpretation fails to take into account not
only the location of the phrase in paragraph (B), when it should be in
paragraph (A) had that been the intention of the lawmaking
authority, but also the phrase by itself. What the PCSO is prohibited
from doing is from investing in a business engaged in sweepstakes,
races, lotteries and other similar activities. It is prohibited from doing
so whether in collaboration, association or joint venture with
others or by itself.
*CASES - CHAPTER 7*

EXTRINSIC AIDS
Existing aids from outside sources. Resorted after exhausting all the
available intrinsic aids and still there remain some ambiguity in the
statute.

SAMPLE OF EXTRINSIC AIDS
History of the enactment of statutes
Opinions and rulings of government officials
Actual proceedings of the legislative body
Reports and recommendations of legislative committees
Public policy
Judicial construction
Construction by the
26