Understanding Unipolarity: A Realist Perspective

Afrimadona
Tulisan ini mencoba memperdebatkan kembali hakikat system
internasional pasca Perang Dingin. Secara teoretis, perdebatan tentang
hakikat system internasional sesungguhnya bukanlah isu yang sudah basi.
beberapa pemikir dari aliran neoclassical realis seperti William Wohlforth
dan Stephen Brooks bahkan sedang menjalankan sebuah proyek besar
untuk memahami hakikat system internasional masa kini dan bagaimana
kita menyikapinya. Begitu pula dengan jurnal World Politics edisi !
bulan "anuari #!!$ yang secara ekslusif membahas persoalan ini. Dalam
tulisan ini, penulis mencoba masuk dalam ranah perdebatan tentang
system internasional ini yang di %ndonesia masih jarang diperbincangkan.
Penulis mencoba melihat hakikat system internasional masa kini dari
perspektif &ealism. Seperti apakah penjelasan &ealis tentang hakikat
system internasional sekarang' inilah pertanyaan besar yang dicoba untuk
dija(ab dalam tulisan ini. Dalam tulisan ini penulisan berargumen bah(a
rangkaian dari berbagai )arian realisme *classical realisme, neorealisme
dan neoclassical realism+ ternyata bisa memberikan argument teoretik
yang cukup komprehensif dalam memahami hakikat system
internasional.
,ey(ords- .nipolarity, Balancing, /lassical &ealism, 0eorealism dan
0eoclassical &ealism
Introduction
This essay attempts to re)isit the debate on the nature of the international system
occurring in the late 1$$!s.
1
2ore than one decade after the heated debate, this essay
(ants to re3e)aluate (hat sort of international system (e li)e in today. %s it still a (orld
of 4radically unbalanced po(er5 in (hich one po(erful state can lay do(n the la( to the
less po(erful, to ske( the terms of cooperation in its o(n fa)our, to impose its o(n
)alues and (ays of doing things and to undermine the procedural rules on (hich stable
and legitimate cooperation must ine)itably depend' %f so, (hat effects (ill it pose for the
international system' And (hat should the less po(erful do about it' These are three
6uestions that (ill be focus of this essay.
1
%n the debate, %& scholars (ere di)ided into t(o camps- those (ho argue for unipolarity and those (ho
think of multipolarity. They also debated (hether or not the system is stable and durable. See Wohlforth
*1$$$+, 7untington *1$$$+, 2astanduno *1$$8+, 9ayne *1$$8+
1
%n ans(ering the 6uestions, % make three propositions that (ill be my thesis
statement in the essay. :irst, the current system is unipolarity (here the .nited States
*.S+ has preponderant material capabilities that enable it to manipulate global order in
achie)ing its interests e)en at the e;pense other. Second, this structural change from
bipolarity to unipolarity has caused the change in American beha)iour indicated by its
increasing tendency to(ards unilateralism. 7o(e)er, to some e;tent, this unilateral
character is imprudent so that in the long run it can endanger the international system.
Third, to control American unilateralism, t(o options a)ailable for the less po(erful- soft
balancing to shape American leaders5 perception about their relati)e po(er in the long3
term and e;ploiting the domestic politics to influence foreign policy3making process.
% (ill de)elop these three propositions by the guide of realist theories as
conceptual approach. All the propositions abo)e actually can be e;plained by realism.
<et, if (e disentangle each proposition, they ha)e to be approached by a particular
theory. The first proposition can be e;plained by neorealist theory. The second one can be
e;plained by all realist theories. And the third one can be e;plained by neoclassical realist
theory emphasi=ing the role of domestic politics and the perceptions of the leaders in
shaping foreign policy.
These three propositions (ill also be manifest in the sections of the essay. The
first part of the essay is de)oted to the e;ploration of realist theories and ho( it is
rele)ant to the problem addressed here. This is follo(ed by description of the
international system and its effects on state beha)iour and global stability. %n this section,
% (ill limit my focus on the change in American international beha)iour because of
systemic change at the turn of 1$$!s and its likely conse6uences for the stability of the
system. %n the last section, % (ill analyse some options a)ailable for the less po(erful to
deal (ith it.
Realism: Classical, Neo-realist and Neoclassical Theories
%n the field of international relations, realism is a political theory that emphasi=es the
primacy of po(er and security in all political life.
#
The importance of po(er and security
deri)es from the assumptions of 7obbesian nature of the (orld. There are three
propositions ad)anced by Thomas 7obbes that ha)e become the basis of realism- *1+.
#
See >ilpin *1$?- @!A+.
#
2en are e6ual. *#+. They interact in anarchy. *@+. They are dri)en by competition,
diffidence and glory.
@
These three conditions (ill ultimately lead human beings to 4a (ar
of all against all5.
B

&ealists adopt these hobbesian assumptions on human nature to analyse state
beha)iour in international politics. Applying these three assumptions to international
politics, realist scholars belie)e that the conduct of diplomacy is ultimately constrained
by these conditions of human nature.
A
The assumption that states are e6ual in their global
standing entitles them to compete on e6ual basis for resources pro)ided by nature. With
the absence of an international go)ernment to regulate this competition, the chance for
conflicts is higher. All states are free to do (hate)er they percei)e as essential to (in this
competition. And because states are free to do e)erything to(ards one another, the
absence of an authority to regulate their relations make states accumulate po(er *defined
as material and non3material capabilities+ to protect themsel)es. They ha)e to focus on
their o(n sur)i)al in the system because there is no one (ill guarantee their sur)i)al.
Anarchic international system is a self3help system that states ha)e to accept as an
una)oidable reality.
.p to this point, (e need be clear that realism has three main assumptions shared
by all its strands. This is commonly called 4three Ss5 namely, statism, sur)i)al and self3
help.

State is the main actor in an anarchic international system. Anarchy re6uires them
to be concerned (ith their o(n sur)i)al because no one (ill guarantee it e;cept they
themsel)es. The logical implication of this assumption is that state needs to accumulate
po(er as much as possible to ensure their security.
While they ha)e shared assumptions on the nature of state and the international
system, they di)erge on (hat shapes state beha)iour in their interaction (ith others. 7ere,
they are di)ided into three strands- classical realism, neo3realism and neo3classical
realism. The first strand, classical realism, belie)es that state beha)iour is shaped by the
leaders controlling the state. Taking hobbesian assumption directly to e;plain state
beha)iour, they argue that state5s dri)e for po(er and their (ill to dominate are rooted in
@
Donnelly *#!!A- @#+.
B
%bid,
A
Thompson *1$?A- #!+ as 6uoted by Donnelly *#!!A-@!+

Dunne and Schmidt *#!!8- 1@+.

@
the fla(ed characters of human beings represented by their leaders.
8
>erman foreign
policy in the 1$@!s for e;ample can be e;plained by 7itler5s ambitious character (hose
dri)e for more po(er created World War %%.
%t is note(orthy that classical realists concede the causal relations bet(een the
change in relati)e po(er of a country and the moti)ation of the country5s leader.
Thucydides5 account of the Peloponnesian (ar indicates this. To him, the gro(th of
Athenian po(er has encouraged the leaders to make inflated estimates of their ability to
control e)ents and this ultimately moti)ated them to con6uer others.
?
Similarly, this
change in relati)e po(er unfa)ourable to Sparta has caused fear on the part of its leaders
and this moti)ated them to balance Athenian po(er that subse6uently (as misinterpreted
by Athena as a challenge to its domination. %t is the conjunction bet(een the t(o most
fundamentals of human moti)ations, ambition and fear, that had led these t(o countries
to the (ar.
$

Analysis on human nature as the causes of state beha)iour brings classical realists
to study the ethical element of international relations. Because the beha)iour of a state
depends on that of its leaders, it is important for leaders to be prudent in their pursuit of
national interests. Prudence here is not construed as total conformity to international
norms and morality. %t only necessitates leaders to act 4in (ays that are compatible (ith
international order5.
1!
/lassical realists are a(are that o)er(helming po(er can cause
hubris and easily leads leaders to act (ithout any consideration of moral and ethical
principles. 7o(e)er, this imprudence (ill (eaken influence that in turn also undermines
po(er. After all, to classical realists, po(er and influence is different. %nfluence is the
inter)ening )ariable that relates po(er and outcomes. &a( attributes of po(er cannot
automatically generate outcomes. %t has to be transformed into political influence through
(hich control o)er others can be e;erted. And because influence is a psychological
relationship, psychological sensiti)ity to others5 needs for self3esteem is important.
11
Therefore, prudence is indispensable.
8
This argument is actually implied in 2orgenthau5s classic (ork, Politics Among Nations in (hich he
states that politics, like society in general, is go)erned by objecti)e la(s that ha)e their roots in human
nature5 *C1$B?D 1$AA- B+.
?
0ed 9ebo( *#!!8+
$
Dunne and Schmidt *#!!8+
1!
%bid, p. 1$
11
0ed 9ebo( *#!!8- A$+.
B
While classical realists argue that state beha)iour is shaped by its leader5s
characters, the second strands, neo3realists, contend that it is international structure rather
than leaders5 beha)iour that determines state beha)iour.
1#
There are t(o structural
)ariables affecting state beha)iour- the lack of an o)erarching authority abo)e states and
distribution of po(er in the system.
1@
To neorealists, of the t(o )ariables affecting state
beha)iour, the latter is more important. %ndeed, it is the key independent )ariable. This is
because anarchy is a constant nature of the international system so that it can be taken for
granted.
1B
This ultimately lea)es us (ith distribution of capabilities as the only )ariable
that determines state beha)iour. The change in distribution of capabilities (ill determine
the form of the structure (hether it is unipolarity, bipolarity or multipolarity. And this
ultimately influence state beha)iour.
1A
1#
%n fact, the emergence of neorealism is as a response to the (eaknesses of classical realism. 0eorealists
represented by ,enneth Walt= 6uestion the historical facts that despite )ariation in leaders5 characters,
many states demonstrate similar beha)iour (hen faced (ith the same structural constraints. They detect the
logical fallacy inherent in classical realist thinking especially 2orgenthau5s as a result of reductionist
e;planation about international outcomes. /lassical realism thinks that causes mo)e in one direction, from
human characters to states to the outcomes that their acts and interactions produce. The conse6uence of this
e;planation is that moti)es and interactions (ill be considered to be consistent (ith the outcomes they
produce. E)il human (ill produce e)il beha)iour ultimately leading to (ar. %n reality, ho(e)er this is
fre6uently not the case because international systems impose constraints on states actions. %n the absence of
systemic prere6uisites for stability, e)en a conser)ati)e nation (ith peace3lo)ing leader (ould not be able
to stabilise an international order. See Walt= *1$??- 1A311+F and >addis *1$$#G1$$@- @13@#+
1@
These t(o )ariables stem from the definition of structure de)ised by ,enneth Walt=. To him, there are
three elements of the structure- *1+. ordering principle, *#+. Differentiation of units and *@+ distribution of
capabilities. To Walt= under anarchic en)ironment, all units *states+ perform similar functions. This is
because they do not (ant to depend on one another. .nder anarchy (here there is no central authority
abo)e states, states are compelled to stand on their o(n feet. Dependence on others (ill endanger their
sur)i)al. By assuming that state is similar, t(o )ariables are left here- *1+ and *@+. See 7olsti *1$$A+F and
Dunne and Schmidt *#!!8- 1$+.
1B
This does not mean that neorealists ignore the possibility of hierarchy in the international system. %ndeed,
they admit it. 7istory also demonstrates that some sorts of hierarchical order had e)er e;isted in the (orld
like &oman empire. 7o(e)er, because their presence is )ery rare in history, it can be assumed that anarchy
rather than hierarchy is the ordering principle of the (orld. See Walt= *1$8$+
1A
7o(e)er, to pro)e the proposition that distribution of capabilities can influence state beha)iour, se)eral
assumptions must be met. *1+. State5s interest is sur)i)al, thus ma;imi=ing its security. *#+. state is unitary
and rational calculating any costs and benefits of all possible alternati)es under structural constraint. *@+.
They li)e in anarchy. 7o(e)er, if there is one or more of these assumptions do not hold, the hypothesis
may not be pro)ed. :or e;ample, if the distribution of capabilities does not make other states concerned
(ith their security, or structural constraint make the cost of balancing too high, then balancing cannot
occur. This can e;plain (hy band(agoning rather than balancing sometimes e;ist in the international
system. *"er)is 1$?8- ?A?+. See also &andall Sch(eller5s study on band(agoning *1$$B+. %n the study,
Sch(eller argues that states concerned (ith sur)i)al (ill tend to balance. /on)ersely, those (hose moti)e
is profit instead of security tend to band(agon. This study to some e;tent supports Walt= proposition that
distribution of capabilities (ill tend to encourage balancing if security becomes the foremost concern of
states.
A
7o(e)er, ho( the change in distribution of capabilities can precisely shape state
beha)iour is not clear in neorealism. This lack of clarity stems from its ignorance of the
state le)el )ariable. After all, in neorealist theory, states are assumed to be similar so that
they can focus on ho( structural )ariable can influence state beha)iour. %solating state
le)el )ariable is important for them to e;amine clearly the relations among these
)ariables *distribution of capabilities and state beha)iour+. %t means that ho( the change
in distribution of capabilities is transformed to be state policy is not the scope of the
theory. This is admitted by Walt= himself (hen he makes clear that his theory is a theory
of international politics and not a theory of foreign policy.
1

This neglect of state le)el process brings about the emergence of the third strand,
neoclassical realism. Although neoclassical realists agree that relati)e material po(er
establishes the basic parameters of a country5s foreign policy, they contend that the
impact of such po(er capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and comple; because
systemic pressures must be translated through inter)ening )ariables at the unit le)el.
18
There are t(o inter)ening )ariables offered by these scholars- the perceptions of states5
leaders of their countries5 relati)e po(er and domestic politics.
1?

:irst, because foreign policy choices are made by state5s leaders and elites, their
perceptions matter more. There are t(o inseparable issues (ith (hich leaders are
concerned and shape their perceptions- threat and relati)e po(er. States (hose leaders
percei)e that a change in distribution of material po(er could threaten their countries (ill
balance against those rising ad)ersaries. 7o(e)er, (hat to be emphasi=ed here is that this
balancing essentially results from leaders5 perception of the threat posed by the change
that is, ho( dangerous such change of relati)e po(er to their countries5 security is. The
implication of this premise is that if a state does not see such changes as a threat, it is
)ery likely that it (ill not react radically to balance it. Thus, as Stephen Walt argues,
states essentially (ill balance against the most threatening states rather than the most
po(erful states.
1$
To Walt, states5 threat perception can be influenced by fi)e factors-
1
Walt= *1$8$+
18
>ideon &oss *1$$?- 1B8+
1?
Tim Dunne and Brian /. Schmidt *#!!A- 181+
1$
This argument actually can e;plain (hy to some e;tent accrual of a state5s material capabilities does not
create balancing act by others during the course of history. This e;planation does not re6uire us to rela; one
of the most important realist assumptions that is, state5s ultimate goal is security or sur)i)al. By
maintaining this assumption, (e can still e;plain anomaly in state beha)iour. See Stephen Walt *1$?8+

aggregate po(er, pro;imity, ideology, intention and offensi)e capability.

#!
7o(e)er,
because threat mostly stems from po(er, especially relati)e po(er in the system, it makes
sense that the threat posed by great po(er is more formidable than that posed by small
one. %t is note(orthy that balance of po(er arises from states5 balancing beha)iour
against threat.
#1
%t is a states5 action in response to the threat posed by rising ad)ersaries.
The second inter)ening )ariable introduced by neoclassical realists is domestic
structure. 7ere, they find the concept of state strength. State strength here is defined as
the ability of a state to mobili=e and direct the resources at its disposal in the pursuit of
particular interests.
##
States ability here is manifest in their leaders5 degree of freedom to
e;tract and direct national resources as they might (ish. %n other (ords, a strong state is a
state (hose leaders can freely mobili=e and allocate national resources in an attempt to
achie)e foreign policy goal. This indicates that different types of states posses different
capacities to translate the )arious elements of national po(er into state po(er. This
argument apparently does not assume units are alike. &ather, they regard states are
different. Thus, countries (ith comparable gross capabilities but different state structures
are likely to act differently. The implication of this argument is that in democratic states,
foreign policy (ill reflect public interests rather than leaders5 because the mobili=ation of
national resources to achie)e foreign policy goals can only be done (ith the appro)al of
the public. /on)ersely, in authoritarian countries, foreign policy can reflect leaders5
interests because the leaders ha)e greater freedom to mobili=e national resources to
achie)e foreign policy goals e)en (ithout the appro)al of their people.
Because all these strands collecti)ely can e;plain the nature of the international
system and state beha)iour, % (ill use them all to e;plain the issue addressed in this essay.
All the three strands (ill be used to e;plain the .S beha)iour since the end of the /old
War and its effects on the system. While neoclassical realism (ill be used to e;plain the
nature of American foreign policy and the strategies a)ailable to the less po(erful to deal
(ith changing American beha)iour. The ne;t sections (ill address them.
#!
%bid, p. A
#1
,ai 7e *#!!- 1@+
##
:areed Hakaria in Dunne and Schmidt *#!!A- 181+
8
Unipolarity and why it matters
Ine great consensus among %& scholars about the end of the /old War at the turn of
1$$!s is that a great change in international distribution of capabilities has occurred. The
change in this distribution of capabilities has created structural change indicated by the
collapse of the bipolar structure. 2any interpretations put for(ard to e;plain (hat kind of
system (e are li)ing no( is. Some of them argue that it is multipolarity.
#@
While some
others maintain that it is unipolarity.
#B
The others percei)e it as uni3multipolarity.
#A

To kno( (hat kind of structure it is no( depends on definition of the respecti)e
structures and the conformity of their measures to the facts. 7ere, % argue that the current
system is unipolarity (here the .S has preponderant material capabilities that enable it to
manipulate global order in achie)ing its interests e)en at the e;pense other. %n de)eloping
my argument, % (ill use the definition of unipolarity inherent in the logics of structural
realism.
4.nipolarity is a structure in (hich one state5s capabilities are too great to be
counterbalanced5
#
Different from hegemony, unipolarity only entails po(er position
operationalised mostly by its material capabilities.
#8
/on)ersely, hegemony entails mostly
non3material capabilities manifest in authoritati)e and legitimate foreign policy.
7o(e)er, it is (orth mentioning that hegemony presupposes the presence of unipolarity.
7egemony cannot e;ist (ithout being a unipolar po(er. But, being a unipolar does not
automatically become a hegemon.
#?
%n brief, unipolarity indicates capabilities (hile
hegemony follo(s from foreign policy.
&egarding these material capabilities, (e can see ho( unbalanced the capabilities
o(ned by the .S compared to others. The .S is e;cellent in all the standard components
of national po(er.
#$
%n terms of economic strength, it is still the biggest economy in the
(orld indicated by its >DP amounted to .SJ1@,?11,#!! millions. This is about three
#@
Those (ho argue for multipolarity are represented here by ,egley and &aymond *1$$#+ and 0arramore
*#!!?+.
#B
:or those (ho argue for unipolarity, (e cite here Wohlforth *1$$$+F Wohlforth and Brooks *#!!#+F amd
,rauthammer *1$$!G1$$1F #!!#G#!!@+.
#A
:or the argument about uni3multipolarity, see 7untington *1$$$+.
#
Wohlforth *1$$$- $+.
#8
/apabilities here include population and si=e of territory, resources, economic strength, military
capability and competence *Walt= 1$8$- 1@1+. %t is seen here that most factors are material.
#?
See 2oe *#!!B-#+F and Wilkinson *1$$$+.
#$
Books and Wohlforth *#!!#+.
?
times that of "apan, the second largest economy in the (orld, four times that of >ermany
and /hina, and si; times that of .nited ,ingdom and :rance.
@!
%n terms of military
e;penditure, in #!! it spent .SJ A#8,! millions or just B percent of >DP. This
increased to .SJ A8?,@1A millions in #!!8.
@1
Projection for #!!? .S military e;penditure
compared to the rest of the (orld conducted by /hristopher 7ellman, re)eals that its
military spending accounts for B? percent, or almost half, of the (orld5s total military
spending. %t is more than the ne;t B highest spending countries in the (orld combined.
/ompared (ith its potential ri)als, /hina and &ussia, it spent A.? times more than the
former and 1!.# times more than the latter. %t is also $?. times more than %ran, its 2iddle
Eastern enemy and almost AA times the spending on the si; KrogueL states.
@#
%n terms of Po(er /apabilities */IW+ as percentage of hegemon, in this case the
.S, only /hina that approaches its po(er capabilities that is, ?$.#8. &ussia only accounts
for @.BB and its ally, "apan has @@.?8.
@@
This 6uantitati)e data is supported by 6ualitati)e
description about its military might like its nuclear superiority, dominant air force and
e;cellent blue3(ater na)y.
@B

%n the element of 4competence5, it also demonstrates its superiority. %t is the
(orld5s leading po(er in the e;ploitation of the military applications of ad)anced
communication and information technology. %t also becomes the (orld5s most
important financial centre symboli=ed by its 4Wall Street5 (hose inde; influences the
le)el of economic transactions (orld(ide. &ecently, its leadership in coordinating
global interest rate cuts follo(ing the collapse of global capital market reinforces this
further.
@A
%n short, the .S is predominant in all categories simultaneously. This is
surely has no precedence in the modern era of international relations.
@

@!
See >ross Domestic Products #!!8 a)ailable at
http-GGsiteresources.(orldbank.orgGDATASTAT%ST%/SG&esourcesG>DP.pdf
@1
S%P&% military e;penditure database, a)ailable at http-GGmile;data.sipri.orgGresult.phpB
@#
See /hristopher 7ellman *#!!- 8!A+ a)ailable at http-GG(((.fcnl.orgGno(GpdfG#!!Gmar!.pdf
@@
7ere % use the dataset from /orrelates of War Projects */IW+ for #!!A. %t can be e;tracted from
http-GG(((.correlatesof(ar.orgG/IW#M#!DataG/apabilitiesGnmc@3!#.htm the data is in the form of inde;
called Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score. % did simple statistical calculation on this
inde; to sho( the comparison of po(er capabilities among four states- .SA, "apan, /hina and &ussia. This
method is inspired by Wohlforth *1$$$- 1#+.
@B
Brooks and Wohlforth *#!!#- #1+.
@A
See, 2ark 9andler, K&ich 0ations Pushing for "oint :inancial &escue, New York Times, Ict 1!, #!!?.
a)ailable at http-GG(((.nytimes.comG#!!?G1!G11GbusinessG11global.html'
@
Brooks and Wohlforth *#!!#- #@+.
$
%n the area of soft po(er, it also arguably performs (ell. %ts popular culture is
adopted by many young people around the (orld. %ts 7olly(oods mo)ies are
consumed by millions of (atchers. %t e)en becomes a benchmark for the 6uality in
entertaining industry. %ts science and education are also praised (orld(ide.
@8
%ts
uni)ersity curriculum is adopted by many uni)ersities around the (orld especially in
de)eloping countries. Being a graduate of an %)y 9eague uni)ersity is a great pride
for many people. Despite many criticisms against its ideology, in many things, it still
becomes trendsetter for the (orld.
All these capabilities ultimately endo( the .S (ith the structural opportunity
to achie)e global primacy and establish (orld3scale hegemony.
@?
The fact that it has
unmatched capabilities and huge structural opportunities has subse6uently changed its
beha)iour in interaction (ith other states. :riendly America gradually changes into
lordly America. As predicted by classical realists, o)er(helming po(er easily
produces hubris and arrogance.
@$
The first indication for this is re)ealed in the initial
draft of the Pentagon5s Defence Planning >uidance *DP>+ for :iscal <ear 1$$B31$$$
clearly stating the necessity to th(art any challenge for American leadership in the
international order. %t also emphasi=es the imperati)e to deter any potential
competitors from being e)en a regional po(er let alone the global one.
B!
This is
further affirmed one decade later in the comment of .S Secretary of Defence, Donald
&umsfeld that the .S can (in the (ar in t(o theatres simultaneously.
B1

The change in American beha)iour as a result of the change in global
distribution of po(er is manifest in its post /old War grand strategy.
B#
This change
deri)es from t(o factors- the change in the perception of American leaders about the
country5s position in the global system and flo(ing from that, the change in American
strategic goals from attaining po(er to preser)ing po(er. 7o(e)er, the difference in
this strategic goal only created slight changes in American grand strategy shortly after
@8
See Presto(it= *#!!@- #$3@!+.
@?
:akiolas and :akiolas *#!!8-@+.
@$
0ed 9ebo( and ,elly *#!!1+.
B!
Patrick E. Tyler, K.S Strategy Plan /alls for %nsuring 0o &i)als De)elop,L New York Times, 2arch ?,
1$$#, p. A1. a)ailable at http-GG6uery.nytimes.comGgstGfullpage.html'
resN$E!/EAD1E@?:$@BA@A8A!/!A$B$A?#!
B1
K&umsfeld Says .S /an Win War in T(o TheatreF %ra6, 0. ,orea listed as ThreatsL, Washington Times,
Dec #B, #!!#.
B#
2antanduno *1$$8+F Posen and &oss *1$$G1$$8+.
1!
the /old War. %kenberry5s analysis on American post3(ar grand strategy suggests that
its /old War strategies, realist and liberal grand strategies, ha)e created positi)e
effects on the (orld. &ealist strategy apparent in the American3led alliance system,
for instance, has 4helped generate unprecedented le)els of integration and cooperation
among countries of Western Europe, 0orth America and 0ortheast Asia.5
B@
Similarly,
its liberal strategy created a positi)e agenda for American leadership. Though it used
its po(er to achie)e national interests, it did so 4in a (ay that helped deepen the
fabric of international community.5
BB
This strategy, to a significant e;tent, helped
create the (orld order and produce mutually beneficial relations bet(een the .S and
the rest of the (orld.
After the /old War (hen the American unipolar status becomes ob)ious, its
grand strategy begins to change. <et, its change is slo( and gradual. 2aintaining
po(er as stated in DP> abo)e by ensuring no potential challengers arising is the main
priority. 7o(e)er, engagement strategy is still used to dampen any potential
challenges. Therefore, it is difficult to see differences in grand strategies before and
after the /old War. But, one indication of significant change began to be clear in the
mid31$$!s (hen it (anted to e;pand 0ATI despite great concern from &ussia.
BA
While the .S officials attempted to ensure &ussia that it (as not a rene(ed
containment policy, they publicly stressed that 4&ussia does not hold a )eto o)er
0ATI e;pansion.5
B
During this period (hen the .S has been confident enough (ith
its unipolar status, its international beha)iour becomes increasingly unilateral.
7untington listed these unilateral policies at length such as pressuring other countries
to adopt its )alues, pre)ent others from obtaining military capabilities, sanction those
(ho do not meet the standard of democracy and human rights it has stipulated, and
promoting arms sale abroad (hile banning others from doing so. These unilateral
policies are also clear (ith regard to its actions in multilateral forums.
B8

B@
%kenberry *#!!A- 1@?+.
BB
%bid, p. 1@$.
BA
As argued by Posen, 0ATI e;pansion is actually dri)en by the need to maintain .S po(er in Europe
rather than by threat posed by &ussia. See Posen &oss *1$$G1$$8- 118+.
B
2astanduno *1$$8- 81+.
B8
7untington *1$$$- @?+. %ndeed, 2adeleine Albright once stated it, 4(e (ill beha)e multilaterally (hen
(e can and unilaterally (hen (e must.5 *As 6uoted in /o;, #!!#- #8+. This is an affirmation of American
unilateralism in its foreign policy.
11
The unilateral character of the .S foreign policy becomes clear along (ith the
rise of >eorge W Bush to the presidency. E)en before his coming to po(er, he has
declared that hegemony is his primary grand strategic aim. During his campaign, he
proclaimed that he (as resolute not to adhere to agreements or e)en to recognise
current international commitments or legally binding obligations that might run
counter to .S national interests.
B?
Shortly after coming to po(er, he realised his
(ords by launching a series of unilateral policies. The (ithdra(al from ,yoto
Protocol on global (arming, the abandonment of the Anti3Ballistic 2issile Treaty, the
refusal to go along (ith the establishment of the international /riminal /ourt in
&ome, and the suspension of missile talks (ith 0orth ,orea are but a fe( e;amples
of this unilateral character. This has actually sent signal to its public and the (orld
that 4he is taking the .S do(n a dangerous path.5
B$

The September 11 terrorist attack *$G11+ more )i)idly re)eals American
unilateralism. The (ay it responded to this attack has aroused many concerns around
the (orld about the future of (orld order. Shortly after the attack, the Bush
Administration launched the >lobal War on Terror. The essence of this (ar is that the
.S is entitled to attacking any places in the (orld it deems as the basis of terrorist
groups (ithout considering the so)ereignty of the states in (hich the basis e;ists.
.nilateral action in the form of pre3empti)e strike is regarded as the only option to
attain and consolidate security simply because terrorist groups cannot be deterred.
A!
The implication of this policy is formidable. T(o countries regarded as rogue states
become the )ictims. %t attacked Afghanistan and %ra6 and toppled the regimes in those
t(o countries. %t in)aded those countries and attempted to rebuild them according to
its )alues and ideals rather than those of the countries themsel)es. This dangerous
policy has created ci)il (ars in the t(o countries and e)entually trapped itself into the
protracted conflicts there.
What are the implications of this change in the .S beha)iour from a benign
post3(ar superpo(er to unilateral superpo(er' :or the (orld, American unilateralism
is dangerous because it can cause instability and global insecurity. 0eo3realism
B?
:akiolas and :akiolas *#!!8- ?+.
B$
Burbach and Tarbell *#!!B- 1#31#8+.
A!
:akiolas and :akiolas *#!!8- $+.
1#
predicts that unipolarity (ill stimulate balancing beha)iour by others. 7o(e)er, the
facts sho( other(ise. Wohlforth and Brooks note three factors that impede
counterbalancing by others. :irst, the .S has good geo3strategic position. 7istory
sho(s that counterbalancing in the past all emerged against 4centrally located land
po(ers that constituted e;istential threats to nearby major states.5
A1
Second, it has
much larger material capabilities than all other states. %ts currently dominant military
po(er and technological po(erhouse can undermine others5 moti)ation to challenge
it. Third, American primacy is an accomplished fact rather than a re)isionist
aspiration. Because historically counterbalance (as directed against re)isionist rather
than status 6uo states, it is less likely to see others (ill counterbalance.
A#
%n short,
there may not be counterbalancing posed by other states against it.
While counterbalancing in traditional sense like military might (ill be less
likely in the near future, this does not mean that balancing beha)iour in other forms
(ill not occur. &eus3smit identifies three forms of balancing that may arise due to this
unilateralism. :irst is 4autonomy balancing5 (here its allies (ill gradually lessen their
dependence on the .S. To some e;tent, European .nion *E.+ has done this.
A@
Second
is 4threshold balancing5 (here any countries that feel threatened by the .S are forced
to guarantee their security (ith rudimentary nuclear capacity. 0orth ,orea and %ran
are t(o e;amples of these. :inally, there (ill be long3term tendency for some
countries to increase their military capabilities to meet the potential threat posed by
American unilateralism.
AB
This surely (ill make the (orld unsafe and insecure.
:urthermore, the prospect for unsafe and insecure (orld is heightened by the
terrorists5 increasing capability to retaliate. Though they may not ha)e as much
resources as the .S thus, cannot counterbalance it as such, its ability is formidable
enough to arouse fear and insecurity for all.
The negati)e conse6uences for the .S are much bigger. /lassical realists
predict that attainment of interests done in a (ay incompatible (ith international
order (ill result in self3defeating situation. After all, classical realists posit that (hile
po(er is important to produce outcomes, it does so through influence. And because
A1
Wohlforth and Brooks *#!!A- A11+.
A#
%bid,
A@
To kno( European perception of the American unilateralism, see .sernia *#!!- 1@!31A?+.
AB
&eus3Smit *#!!@- B#$+.
1@
influence is a psychological relationship, it entails legitimacy and authoritati)e
po(er.
AA
.sing classical realist insight, (e can argue that unilateralism (ill make
American po(er unsustainable in the future. This is because unilateralism diminishes
legitimacy and its authoritati)e po(er. When these t(o important resources of po(er
decline, the cost of e;ercising po(er becomes more and more e;pensi)e.
A
And
because the .S is not po(erful enough to control all the problems in the (orld alone,
this (ill enmesh itself in difficulties and in the long3run, it may lead to its demise.
To conclude, unipolarity matters because it can incline the unipolar po(er to
unilateralism that e)entually, leads to self3defeating results for itself and destabili=ing
conse6uences for the (orld. The implication of unipolarity as e;plained abo)e is
actually deri)ed from realist logic that predict beha)ioural change of the states due to
change in distribution of po(er. %n the ne;t part, (e (ill analyse some options
a)ailable to the less po(erful to deal (ith this big problem.
hat the !ess Power"ul can do#
7a)ing kno(n the global implications of American unilateralism, the ne;t 6uestion is
(hat can (e do about it' Se)eral options de)ised by analysts to constraint .S
unilateralism. Due to limited space, % (ill pick up t(o strategies only that can be
e;plained by neoclassical realist theory. % (ill start (ith t(o )ariables that determine
foreign policy in neoclassical perspecti)e- perception of leaders and domestic politics.
To neoclassical realist, perception of leaders is important in translating structural
factors to foreign policy outcomes. 9eaders5 perception about their countries5 relati)e
po(er in the international system (ill influence the (ay they see problems thus,
influence the policies they de)ise to sol)e them. The implication of this proposition is
that to change a policy of a country, the perception of its leaders needs be changed in the
first place. The strategy of changing the leaders5 perception can be done by sho(ing them
that the cost of particular policies is higher thus, deterring them from adopting such
policies. Ine strategy that the less po(erful can de)ise here is the so3called soft
AA
Analysis that legitimacy is an important source of po(er is actually also implied in classical realist
(orks. See 0ed 9ebo(5s interpretation of Thucydides and 2orgenthau5s (orks *0ed 9ebo( #!!1F#!!8+.
7ere, he analyses such concept as hegemonia *rule based on consent of others+ as opposed to arche *control
e;ercised through threat and bribes+. 7e also finds the concept of peitho *persuasion+ in Thucydides5 (ork.
A
According &eus3Smit, 4legitimacy is an inherently social phenomenon. Ine5s actions are not legitimate
unless they are recognised as such by other social actors5 *#!!@- B#+.
1B
balancing. Different from hard balancing (hich attempts to balance a unipolar po(er
directly through military means, soft balancing is aimed at 4making a superior state5s
military force harder to use5 as the instrument of foreign policy.
A8
Because this strategy
can increase the cost of using some resources, especially military resources as instrument
of foreign policy, it can constrain the policy3makers from de)ising particular policies.
<et, (e need be clear that the instruments used in this strategy are non3military means.
&obert Pape proposes some mechanisms that can be done in this strategy. :irst, it
can use entangling diplomacy that is, making good use of rules and procedures of
important organi=ations to delay superior state5s plan for a unilateral policy, thus it can
make the issue irrele)ant along (ith the loss of momentum. %n case of military threat to a
(eaker country, this entangling diplomacy can be used to delay the country5s plan of
attack thus, gi)ing more time for the po(erless ad)ersary to prepare for the (ar. Though
the po(erless ad)ersary may not e)entually (in the (ar, at least it can increase the cost
of the (ar for the po(erful states. The attempt of :rance, S(eden and some other E.
states to delay the .S decision to launch (ar against %ra6 using institutional rules and
procedures in the .nited 0ations *.0+ is a stark e;ample of this strategy.
A?
:urthermore,
%ran5s manoeu)re in the .0 regarding its nuclear problem to some e;tent can also reflect
this strategy.
Second, the less po(erful can strengthen their economic relati)e capabilities by
building regional groupings that e;clude the superior state. This strategy is based on
premise that most militarily superior state gains its strength from its possession of
economic strength. By e;cluding the superior state from trade or economic cooperation,
its economy can gradually be (eakened. /hina and 2alaysia5s initiati)e to form East
Asian /ommunity e;cluding the .S is an e;ample of this strategy.
Third, major po(ers can sho( a signal of resol)e to balance the superior state by
coordinating their actions to oppose the superior state5s policies. This strategy to some
e;tent can restrain aggression by superior state and coordinate e;pectation of mutual
balancing beha)iour. %n the long3term, this strategy can increase trust in each other5s
(illingness to cooperate against the superior state5s ambition. This is important 4to
demonstrate resol)e in a manner that signals a commitment to resist the superpo(er5s
A8
Pape *#!!A- @+.
A?
ibid, p. @?3@$F see also Walt *#!!B- 18+
1A
future ambition5.
A$
The success of this strategy is indicated not only by (hether or not the
superpo(er abandon the policies opposed, but also by (hether more states join a soft
balancing coalition against the superpo(er. Again, the .S (ar against %ra6 can represent
this strategy.
All soft balancing strategies abo)e do not directly challenge the .S military
pro(ess indeed. 7o(e)er, it can complicate calculation of leaders regarding some policy
options. 7a)ing kno(n that the possibility of implementing some policies is limited and
they are constrained by others in doing so, the leaders e)entually can change their
perception on their country5s relati)e po(er in the (orld. This can ha)e long3term effects
regarding the tendency to unilateralism. Pape summarises the effects of this strategy
arguing, 4they all make it more difficult for the .nited States to e;ercise that po(er. They
impose immediate costs and constraints on the application of ..S. po(er by entangling
the .nited States in diplomatic maneu)ers, reducing the pressure on regional states to
cooperate (ith its military plans, and bolstering the claims of target states that ..S.
military threats justify the acceleration of their o(n military programs. They also
establish a ne( pattern of diplomatic acti)ity- cooperation among major po(ers that
e;cludes the .nited States.5
!
7o(e)er, (hat to be remembered here is that some soft
balancing strategy assume that norm of multilateralism is strong enough to enable the
strategies to (ork (ell. This is (hy balancing strategy in economic issues can (ork
better than in security ones.
1
Ither strategy attributable to neoclassical realist logic is e;ploiting .S domestic
constraint on policy3making process. As a democratic country, the go)ernment is
constrained by the so3called checks and balances mechanism. This mechanism is in turn
super)ised by strong public control through increasing popular participation in the
process. As Wang "isi obser)es,
Oalthough the president enjoys so3called Kking5s po(erL in foreign relations, he is still
restricted by forces from the /ongress, the 0ational Security /ouncil, the State Department
, the Defense Department, and other e;ecuti)e organi=ations (hen it comes to issues such
as (aging large scaled (ars, defense budget, military strategy, and major foreign policy
initiati)es, thus making it impossible for him to proceed at (ill, to take actions entirely
according to his indi)idual desires and political interest. As a (hole, America5s foreign
policy ser)es its long3term national interest, unlike 0a=i >ermany under 7itler or %ra6
A$
%bid, p. @8.
!
%bid, p. B!.
1
See %kenberry *#!!@+.
1
under Saddam 7ussein (hose foreign policies (ent to the fanatic e;treme, and became
short3sighted and irrational.
#

Wang "isi5s obser)ation indicates ho( limited the ability of leaders to mobili=e national
resources for particular polices is. As a democracy, po(er is concentrated in many parties
thus complicate the policy3making process. %n democracy like the .S, the role of public
opinion is )ery big. Popular )oice and media ha)e strong influence on the policy3making
process. Any policies can easily be canceled if public and congress are opposed to them.
American retreat from Pietnam War is a notable e;ample of the po(erful impact of
media and popular )oice on foreign policy.
Ibser)ing the reality of .S domestic politics, (e can see that internal di)ision
has fre6uently coloured the process of making important decisions. This is because most
American public still hold humanitarian )alues. :oreign policy sur)eys sho( that .S
citi=ens remain casualty3a)erse unless )ital .S interests such as pre)enting terrorism
seem to be at stake. And e;cept for a brief period of bipartisanship after September 11,
the country has al(ays been di)ided in many issues regarding its international role.
%nternal di)isions fre6uently pre)ent the .S from acting as 6uickly, decisi)ely, or
forcefully as its material resources (ould allo(. This reality does not go unnoticed by
other nations- (hat seems like democratic debate to .S citi=ens may appear to others as a
lack of resol)e or an opportunity for political manipulation, further complicating the
e;ecution of .S foreign policy.
@
With this internal political reality, the tendency of
American imperious beha)iour can be controlled. %n fact, it is its o(n people that can
restrain its aggressi)eness more po(erfully.
Conclusion
Departing from realist theories, this essay analyses ho( a change in international
distribution of capabilities has changed states5 beha)iour as (ell. The end of the /old
War lea)ing the .S as the only superpo(er in the international system has changed its
beha)iour from a benign hegemon to imperious superpo(er. Along (ith the (idening
gap bet(een its material po(er and that of the rest of the (orld, its unilateral tendency
also increases. Beginning in the /linton5s era in the mid31$$!s, this unilateral character
#
Wang *#!!@- $+.
@
Talmadge *#!!#+.
18
becomes more apparent in the Bush administration. This surely poses greater
conse6uences for the (orld as (ell as itself. While neorealist theory fail to pro)e that
unipolarity can stimulate balancing actions by others, classical realists can e;plain the
conse6uences of unipolarity and unilateralism (ell. :inally, neoclassical realism offers
some strategies that can be done by the less po(erful to deal (ith American unilateralism
in this unipolar era.
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ed, America 4nrivale: The %uture o# the Balance o# Power. *%thaca, 0<- /ornell
.ni)ersity Press, #!!#+.
Curriculum Vitae

0ame - Afrimadona
Education - 3 Sarjana %lmu Politik *S%P+ dalam bidang 7ubungan
%nternasional, .ni)ersitas >adjah 2ada *.>2+, 1$$$3
#!!@.
3 2aster of Arts *2A+ dalam bidang 7ubungan
%nternasional, >raduate Studies in %nternational Affairs,
Department of Politics and %nternational &elations,
&esearch School of Pacific and Asia Studies *&SPAS+,
Australian 0ational .ni)ersity *A0.+, #!!83 #!!$
%nterests - %nternational &elations Theory and &esearch 2ethods in
#1
%&
Iccupation - 9ecturer in %nternational &elations Departments at .P0
KPeteranL "akarta, .%0 Syarif 7idayatullah "akarta,
.ni)ersitas Prof. Dr. 2oestopo *Beragama+ and
.ni)ersitas Budi 9uhur "akarta.
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