CIVIL LAW FAMILY PERSONS

Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals and Santos

GR No. 112019 / 58 SCAD 17

Januray 4, 1995

FACTS:

Lt. Leouel Santos married private respondent Julia Bedia on Sept. 20, 1986 in Illoilo MTC and later by
church wedding. They lived with the latters parents and eventually gave birth to Leouel Santos, Jr. on
July 18, 1987. The relationship turned sour when they began quarelling over frequent interferrence of
Julias parents and the issue of liveing independently from the in-laws.

On May 18, 1988, Julia left for the United States (US) to work as nurse despite Leouels protestations.
Seven months thereafter or on January 1, 1989, she called up from the US with the promise of returning
home soon, but she never did. Given the chance, Leouel went to the US for a training program
sponsored by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from April to August 1990. He desperately tried
to locate her there but failed.

He then filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the nullification of their marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code, on the ground of psychological incapacity. Summons was served by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental. In her answer, Julia claimed that it was Leouel who
was irresponsible and incompetent. The RTC in November 1991 dismissed the case for lack of merit. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision.

Irrelevant facts: Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz,
Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr.
The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the
frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the
couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple
should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment
on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage may be declared a nullity prusuant to Artcile 36 of the Family Code.

HELD:

Article 36 cannot be taken and construed independently, but must stand in conjunction with existing
precepts of laws on marriage. Thus correlated, psychological incapacity should refer no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The law does not evidently envision an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with
the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate.

The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists and persons with expertise in psychological
disciplines might be helpful or even desirable in establishing the parameters of psychological incapacity.

Marriage is not just and adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that
innate in our society, then enshrined in the Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Section 1 of the
Family Codethe Constitution is no less emphatic.

BEATRIZ WASSMER vs. FRANCISCO VELEZ

No. L-20089

December 26, 1964

FACTS:

Respondent Francisco Velez and petitioner Beatriz Wassmer were lovers who set their marriage
for Sept. 4, 1954. On Sept. 2, however, Francisco left for Cagayan de Oro, leaving Beatriz with a note
that his mother was approved to the marriage. A day before the supposed wedding, on Sept. 3,
Francisco telegrammed Beatriz that nothing changed and that he assured her of his return and love.
Francisco did not appear after all nor words were heard from him again; despite the fact that
preparations were all made. They applied for a marriage license on Aug. 23, and was issued thereof;
invitations were printed and distributed to friends and relatives; dresses and other apparel were already
bought; the two bought a matrimonial bed; bridal showers were given and gifts received.

Beatriz then filed damages for breach of promise to marry.

ISSUE:

Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong.

HELD:

Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding
and go through all the preparations and publicity, and to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to
be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to customs for which
Francisco must be held answerable for damages in accordance with Art. 21 of the Civil Code.

Under Art. 2232 of the Civil Code, the conditions precedent is that the defendant acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.

When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under Article 21, moral damages may be
awarded under Art. 2219 (10) of the Civil Code. Exemplary damages may also be awarded under Art.
2232 of the Code where it is proven that the defendant clearly acted in wanton, reckless and oppressive
manner.




CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GINA LAO-TSOI

GR NO. 119190 January 16, 1997

FACTS:
Ching married Gina on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Intramuros, Manila as
evidenced by their marriage contract. After the celebration they had a reception and then
proceeded to the house of the Ching Ming Tsois mother. There they slept together on the
same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.

Ginas version:
That contrary to her expectations that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love that
night of their marriage, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, Ching however just went to bed,
slept on one side and then turned his back and went to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse between
them that night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honey moon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first
week as husband and wife they went to Baguio City. But they did so together with Chings mother, uncle
and nephew as they were all invited by her husband. There was no sexual intercourse between them for
four days in Baguio since Ching avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on
a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed
since May 22, 1988 (day of their marriage) until March 15, 1989 (ten months). But during this period
there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Gina claims that she did not even see her
husbands private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag.
Results were that Gina is healthy, normal and still a virgin while Chings examination was kept
confidential up to this time.
Then Gina claims that her husband is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She
said she had observed him using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. She
also said her husband only married her to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and
to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man

Chings version:
He claims that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies
with Gina. He does not want their marriage annulled for reasons of (1) that he loves her very much (2)
that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable (3) since the relationship
is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and
that according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not
be cured.
Ching admitted that since his marriage to Gina there was no sexual contact between them. But, the
reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with
his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his
hands.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ching is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage

RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering
as VOID the marriage entered into by Ching and Gina on May 22, 1988. No costs.

RATIO:
The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or
her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. If a spouse, although physically capable but
simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children basedon the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.
Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage.
In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill this marital obligation
is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observer mutual love,
respect and fidelity, the sanction therefore is actually the spontaneous, mutual affection between
husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298).
Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner
in marriage is to say I could not have cared less. This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self.
The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy that brings spouses
wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a
function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.




IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. ISAGANI BOBIS

GR No. 138509

July 31, 2000

FACTS:

On October 21, 1985, respondent Isagani Bobis contracted a first marriage with Ma. Dulce Javier. With
said marriage not yet annulled, nullified nor terminated, he contracted a second marriage with herein
petitioner Imelda Marbella (on Jan. 25, 1996), and a third marriage with certain Julia Hernandez,
thereafter.

Petitioner then filed a case of bigamy against respondent on Feb. 25, 1998, at the RTC of Quezon City.
Thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage
license. He then filed a motion to suspend the criminal proceeding for bigamy invoking the civil case for
nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The RTC granted the motion,
while petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.

HELD:

Any decision in the civil case the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during
the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination
of the criminal charge. It is therefore not a prejudicial question. Respondent cannot be permitted to
use his malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.

A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. It
must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also
that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the civil
case. Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue
raised in the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may
proceed. Its two essential elements are (a) the civil action involves an issue raised in the criminal action;
and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

In the case at bar, the respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of
his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for
bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is
disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by
simply claiming that the first marriage is void and the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a
prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the
absence of a requisiteusually the marriage licenseand thereafter contract a subsequent marriage
without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void.
Such scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v. Relova,
22 SCRA 731(1968):

Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, [as] only
competent courts have such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity of the first marriage is beyond
question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.

A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused but
simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further
prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have
hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the
information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented single evidence on the indictment
or may not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on the ground of
prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal
suit.

Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be successfully invoked as an
excuse. The contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been
complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the
Revised Penal Code. The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every person is presumed to know
the law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial declaration of nullity when he entered into the
second marriage, why should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in order to delay
his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own disobedience of the law? If he wants to
raise the nullity of the previous marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense when he presents his
evidence during the trial proper in the criminal case.

The elements of bigamy are (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) that the first
marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not
been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) that he contracts a subsequent marriage; and (4) the
subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. The
exceptions to prosecution for bigamy are those covered by Article 41 of the Family Code and by PD 1083
otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.




BAKSH vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 97336

February 19, 1993

FACTS:

Petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh was an Iranian citizen, exchange student taking a medical
course in Dagupan City, who courted private respondent Marilou Gonzales, and promised to marry her.
On the condition that they would get married, she reciprocated his love. They then set the marriage after
the end of the school semester. He visited Marilous parents to secure their approval of marriage. In
August 1987, he forced her to live with him, which she did. However, his attitude toward her changed
after a while; he would maltreat and even threatened to kill her, from which she sustained injuries. Upon
confrontation with the barangay captain, he repudiated their marriage agreement, saying that he was
already married to someone living in Bacolod.

Marilou then filed for damages before the RTC. Baksh denied the accusations but asserted that
he told her not to go to his place since he discovered her stealing his money and passport. The RTC ruled
in favor of Gonzales. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUES:


1. Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong.
2. Whether or not Art. 21 of the Civil Code applies to this case.
3. Whether or not pari delicto applies in t his case.
HELD:

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.

This, notwithstanding, Art. 21 is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this
jurisdictions by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.

Art. 21 defines quasi-delict:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the (Civil Code).

It is clear that petitioner harbors a condescending if not sarcastic regard for the private
respondent on account of the latters ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as
perceived by him, dishonorable employment. From the beginning, obviously, he was not at all moved by
good faith and an honest motive. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words
directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he
loved her and would want her to be his life partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted
satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage,
she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino concept of
morality and so brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said
that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code
which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith
in the exercise of his right and in the performance of his obligations.

No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.

She is not in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means in equal fault. At most, it could
be conceded that she is merely in delicto.

Equity often interfered for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has
been brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original
wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by fraud.

Mercado vs. Tan

In the case of Mercado vs. Tan,[1] the accused argued that he already obtained a judicial declaration of
nullity of his first marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio. He
argued that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all and, hence, there is no first
marriage to speak of. The accused also quoted the commentaries of former Justice Luis Reyes that "it is
now settled that if the first marriage is void from the beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy charge. But if
the first marriage is voidable, it is not a defense." The Supreme Court, in dismissing the argument of the
accused, stated:

In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration
of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void
only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second
marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code.

That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To
repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay
in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous
marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We
cannot allow that.



REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS & RORIDEL OLAVIANO
MOLINA

G.R. No. 108763
February 13, 1997

The respondent preferred to spend more time with his friends than his family on whom he squandered his
money, depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was dishonest to his wife regarding his
finances, and lived with a mistress with whom he has a child. Roridel filed a case for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage by virtue of her husbands psychological incapacity.

ISSUE: Whether or not Reynaldo is psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to

private respondent, thus a valid ground to render the marriage void.

HELD: NO. Marriage is valid.

RATIO:
They seem to have a difficulty or outright refusal or neglect in performing their obligations. Theyre not
incapable of doing them.

Failure of their expectations is not tantamount to psychological incapacity. Mere showing of

irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological

incapacity.

SC enumerated the guidelines in invoking the psychological incapacity under Article 36:

1. the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belong to the plaintiff

2. the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
a. medically or clinically identified
b. alleged in the complaint
c. sufficiently proven by experts and
d. clearly explained in the decision.

3. the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage
4. Psychological Incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the

essential obligations of marriage.

6. the essential obligations must be those embodied by Art 69 to 71 (husband and wife) of FC as

well as Art 220, 221 and 335 (parents and children)

7. interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the

PI while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts

8.the trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and Solicitor General to appear as

counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the SC issues a certification. (last

sent not anymore needed pursuant to SC resolution A.M. No. 02-11-10)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 108763. February 13, 1997]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to
those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely,
psychological incapacity. Since the Codes effectivity, our courts have been swamped
with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this
Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case
of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying
said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the
herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled --
exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration -- Article 36 as the
most liberal divorce procedure in the world. Hence, this Court in addition to resolving
the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January
25, 1993 Decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals
[2]
in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in
toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,
[3]
Benguet,
which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina
void ab initio, on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel
O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo
Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on
April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church
[4]
in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was
born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with
his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his
parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their
finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986,
Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole
breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel,
as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel
resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a
few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned
them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of
complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually
quarrelsome individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would
be to the couples best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to
free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel
could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their
misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridels strange behavior of
insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridels
refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridels
failure to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St.
Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born
on July 29, 1986;
3.That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her
friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a
social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General
Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits A to
E-1. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial
conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage
void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in
toto the RTCs decision. Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that the Court of Appeals made an
erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase psychological incapacity (as
provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to
the facts of the case, adding that the appealed Decision tended to establish in effect
the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture.
In denying the Solicitor Generals appeal, the respondent Court relied
[5]
heavily on
the trial courts findings that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their
opposing and conflicting personalities. Then, it added its own opinion that the Civil
Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) intended to
liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and family rights x x x. It
concluded that:
As a ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychological incapacity as a broad
range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he
or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse,
as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal
objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to
cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then
there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing
and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the
findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of
Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that opposing and conflicting
personalities is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground
is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and
duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of
performing such marital responsibilities and duties.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals,
[6]
this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose
C. Vitug, ruled that psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity x x x and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist
at the time the marriage is celebrated. Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding
judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of
Manila,
[7]
Justice Vitug wrote that the psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a
difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of irreconciliable differences and conflicting personalities
in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties
failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not
physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband
could not get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the
problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of
Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not
psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:
[8]

COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it
is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for
each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were
constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage
celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-
nuptial impressions of thoughtfulness and gentleness on Reynaldos part and of being
conservative, homely and intelligent on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation
is not indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows loves
temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts
of this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of
the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts in interpreting and
applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend
Oscar V. Cruz,
[9]
Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno,
[10]
a
member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to
thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during
the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written
memoranda.
From their submissions and the Courts own deliberations, the following guidelines
in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed
down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
[11]
recognizing
it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable,
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code
[12]
echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis,
[13]
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.
[14]

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize
our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve
such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such
appellate tribunal. Ideally -- subject to our law on evidence -- what is decreed as
canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family
Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive
effect. Here, the State and the Church -- while remaining independent, separate and
apart from each other -- shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal
of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be,
to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the
petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing
guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and
remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur
Padilla, J., See Separate Statement.
Romero, J., See Separate Statement.
Vitug, J., Please see Concurring opinion.



[1]
Rollo pp. 25-33.
[2]
Sixteenth Division composed of J. Segundino G. Chua, ponente and chairman; JJ. Serafin V.C.
Guingona and Ricardo P. Galvez, concurring.
[3]
Presided by Judge Heilia S. Mallare-Phillipps.

[4]
Solemnized by Fr. Jesus G. Encinas.
[5]
The Court of Appeals reproduced in its Decision a substantial portion of the RTC Decision as follows:
To sustain her claim that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his marital
obligations, petitioner testified that he is immature, irresponsible, dependent, disrespectful, arrogant, a
chronic liar, and an infidel. These characteristics of respondent are based on petitioners testimony that
the former failed to be gainfully employed after he was relieved from the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel sometime in February, 1986, leaving petitioner as the sole breadwinner of the
family. Also when they were separated in fact, respondent practically abandoned both petitioner-mother
and son except during the first few months of separation when respondent regularly visited his son and
gave him a monthly allowance of P1,000.00 for about two to four months. Respondent is likewise
dependent on his parents for financial aid and support as he has no savings, preferring to spend his
money with his friends and peers. A year after their marriage, respondent informed petitioner that he
bought a house and lot at BF Homes, Paraaque for about a million pesos. They then transferred there
only for the petitioner to discover a few months later that they were actually renting the house with the
respondents parents responsible for the payment of the rentals. Aside from this, respondent would also
lie about his salary and ability. And that at present, respondent is living with his mistress and their child,
which fact he does not deny.
It is unfortunate that the marriage between petitioner and respondent turned sour if we look at the
background of their relationship. During their college days, when they were still going steady, respondent
observed petitioner to be conservative, homely, and intelligent causing him to believe then that she would
make an ideal wife and mother. Likewise, petitioner fell in love with respondent because of his
thoughtfulness and gentleness. After a year, however, they decided to break their relationship because of
some differences in their personalities. Almost five (5) years later, while they were working in Manila,
petitioner and respondent rekindled their love affair. They became very close and petitioner was glad to
observe a more mature respondent. Believing that they knew each other much better after two years of
going steady, they decided to settle down and get married. It would seem, therefore, that petitioner and
respondent knew each other well and were then prepared for married life.
During their marriage, however, the true personalities of the parties cropped-up and dominated their life
together. Unexpectedly on both their parts, petitioner and respondent failed to respond properly to the
situation. This failure resulted in their frequent arguments and fightings. In fact, even with the intervention
and help of their parents who arranged for their possible reconciliation, the parties could not come to
terms.
It seems clear at this stage that the marriage between the parties broke-up because of their opposing and
conflicting personalities (sic). Neither of them can accept and understand the weakness of each other. No
one gives in and instead, blame each other for whatever problem or misunderstanding/s they encounter.
In fine, respondent cannot solely responsible for the failure of other (sic) marriage. Rather, this resulted
because both parties cannot relate to each other as husband and wife which is unique and requisite in
marriage.
Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and woman with the basic objective of
establishing a conjugal and family life. (Article 1, Family Code). The unique element of permanency of
union signifies a continuing, developing, and lifelong relationship between the parties. Towards this end,
the parties must fully understand and accept the (implications and consequences of being permanently)
united in marriage. And the maintenance of this relationship demands from the parties, among others,
determination to succeed in their marriage as well as heartfelt understanding, acceptance, cooperation,
and support for each other. Thus, the Family Code requires them to live together, to observe mutual
(love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. Failure to observe) and perform these
fundamental roles of a husband and a wife will most likely lead to the break-up of the marriage. Such is
the unfortunate situation in this case." (Decision, pp. 5-8; Original Records, pp. 70-73)
[6]
240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995.
[7]
Quoted from Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code, First Edition, 1988.
[8]
TSN, April 6, 1991, p. 5.
[9]
The National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reviews all decisions of the marriage tribunals of each
archdiocese or diocese in the country. Aside from heading the Appellate Tribunal, Most. Rev. Cruz is
also incumbent president of the Catholic Bishop's Conferrence of the Philippines, Archbishop of Dagupan
Lingayen, and holds the degrees of Doctor of Canon Law and Doctor of Divinity. Archbishop Cruz was
also Secretaary General of the Second Plenary Council of the Philippines -PCP II- held from January 20,
1991 to February 17, 1991, which is the rough equivalent of a parliament or constitutional convention in
the Philippine Church, and where the ponente, who was a council member, had the privilege of being
overwhelmed by his keen mind and prayerful discernments.
[10]
Justice Puno was a former member of the Court of Appeals, retired Minister of Justice, author, noted
civil law professor and law practitioner.
[11]

ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino Family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the state.
Section 3. The state shall defend;
(1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands
of responsible parenthood;
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and specialprotection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation , and other conditions prejudicial to their development;
(3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income;
(4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of
policies and programs that affect them.
Section 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the state may also do so through
just programs of social security."
[12]
"Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and
an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this code."
[13]
Salita vs. Magtolis 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994.
[14]
This text is taken from the Memorandum of Archbishop Cruz. On the other hand, the text used un Santos vs. CA
reads:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
The differrence in wording between this and that in Arch. Cruzs Memorandum is due to the fact that the
original Canon is written in Latin and both versions are differently-worded English translations.




G.R. No. 112019 January 04, 1995 (Santos vs. Santos)

Plaintiff Leouel Santos married defendant Julia Bedia on September 20, 1986. On May 18 1988, Julia left
for the U.S to work as a nurse. She only called up Leouel seven months after she left with promise to
return after her contract expires on July 1989. She didnt come back. Leouel had a military training in the
US and he looked for Julia but he never found her. In 1991, Leoul filed a complaint for voiding the
marriage under Article 36 of FC.

ISSUE: Does the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more

than five years constitute psychological incapacity?

HELD:NO. Dismissed.

RATIO:

SC defined psychological incapacity as to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes

a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.

For psychological incapacity to be proven, there must be a real inability to commit oneself to the

essential obligations of marriage. Mere difficulty of assuming these obligations which could be

overcome by normal effort does not constitute incapacity.

Dr. Veloso of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal gave 3 characteristics of psychological incapacity:

1.gravity that would really render one incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties in marriage

2. juridical antecedence means it should be rooted in history, existing prior to the marriage

3. incurability including cure that is beyond the partys means. Circumstances of the case at bar do

not amount to psychological incapacity.





BRENDA B. MARCOS vs. WILSON G. MARCOS

G.R. No. 136490, 19 October 2000, 343 SCRA 755

Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging that the
husband failed to provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage for psychological incapacity.



ISSUE:

Is there a need for Personal Medical Examination of Respondent to prove psychological incapacity?

Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity

HELD: No. The SC rules in the negative.

RATIO:

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by

the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be

examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration.

Although SC is sufficienty convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family

and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of this acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his defects
were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.

Article 36 is NOT to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in

psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction,
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. At best the evidence
presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.




NOEL BUENAVENTURA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH
BUENAVENTURA

G.R. Nos. 127358 and G.R. Nos. 127449

March 31, 2005

Noel deceived Isabel into marrying him by professing true love instead of revealing to her that he was
under heavy parental pressure to marry and that because of pride he married defendant-appellee; Wife
claimed that she suffer mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights not only in those
years the parties were together but also after and throughout their separation. Noel filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that both he and his wife were psychologically
incapacitated.

ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded by reason of the performance or non-performance

of marital obligations.

HELD:No. Moral and Exemplary damages are deleted.

RATIO:
The acts or omissions of petitioner constitute psychological incapacity. A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.

It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the
control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the same set of
acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding
moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be
predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was
done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet
willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case




Balogbog vs. CA G.R. NO. 83598 March 7, 1997

I. CASE TITLE:
LEONCIA and GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG (Younger siblings of the deceased Gavino Balogbog.
The two questioned the validity of Gavinos marriage and thus contesting the inheritance claims
posed by Gavinos sons on a third of their parents Basilio and Genoveva Balogbogs estate) vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RAMONITO BALOGBOG AND GENERESO BALOGBOG
(legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and are defending the validity of their parents
marriage and thus be entitled to inherit a third of the estate of their grandparents Basilio and
Genoveva Balogbog)
G.R. NO. 83598 March 7, 1997

II. FAMILY CODE:
ARTICLE 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and woman
entered into in accordance with the law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequence and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements
may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

III. QUOTED:
However, in the case of Balogbog vs. Court of Appeals where it was contended that a particular
marriage should have been proven in accordance with Articles 53 and 54 of the Spanish Civil
Code of 1889 because this was the law in force at the time of the alleged marriage, the Supreme
Court ruled that Articles 53 and 54 of the Spanish Civil Code never took effect in the Philippines
because they were suspended by the Spanish Governor General of the Philippines shortly after
the extension of the Spanish Civil Code to this country. In such a case the Supreme Court said
that: since this case was brought to the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be
determined in accordance with the present Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights and
the rules of evidence. (page 108)

IV. FACTS
Nature of the case: Ramonito and Generoso filed action for partition and accounting against their
aunt Leoncia and uncle Gaudioso for partition and accounting of their grandparents estate at the
Court of First Instance of Cebu City. This was granted. Leoncia and Gaudioso appealed to the
Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed the lower courts decision. Thus, they are now at the
Supreme Court for certiorari hopefully over turn the CA and lower courts decision in favoring
their nephews.
The facts: Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog contends are the children of Basilio Balogbog and
Geneveva Arnibal who died in 1951 and 1961 respectively. They had an older brother Gavino
but he died in 1935 pre-deceasing their parents. In 1968 however, Ramonito and Generoso
Balogbog filed an action for partition and accounting against Leoncia and Gaudioso claiming
that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such they were
entitled to the one-third share in the estate of their grandparents.
But Leoncia and Gaudioso said they dont know Ramonito and Generoso and proceeded to
question the validity of the marriage between their brother Gavino and Catalina. This despite
how Gaudioso himself admitted during a police investigation proceeding that indeed Ramonito is
his nephew as the latter is the son of his elder brother Gavino.
To prove the validity of their parents marriage, Ramonito and Generoso presented Priscilo
Trazo, 81 years old then mayor of Asturias from 1928 to 1934 and Matias Pogoy who both
testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and that they have three
children. Catalina herself testified that she was handed a receipt presumambly the marriage
certificate by Fr. Jomao-as but it was burned during the war.
Leoncia for part claimed that her brother Gavino died single at the family residence in Asturias.
She obtained a certificate from the local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect that the office
did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina. The certificate was prepared by
Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga who testified that there was no record of marriage
of Gavino and Catalina in the Book of Marriages between 1925 to 1935/
She and Gaudioso contended that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been proven
in accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in force at
the time of the alleged marriage was celebrated. Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under
the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the
Civil Registry, unless the books thereof have not been kept or have been lost, or unless they are
questioned in the courts, in which case any other proof, such as that of the continuous possession
by parents of the status of husband and wife, may be considered, provided that the registration of
the birth of their children as their legitimate children is also submitted in evidence.

V. ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino and Catalinas marriage is valid.

VI. RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals
in rendering Gavino and Catalinas marriage as valid and thus entitle Ramonito and Generoso a
third of their grandparents estate.

VII. APPLICATION:
The Supreme Court held that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 889 of Spain did not take
effect, having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the
extension of that code of this country. Consequently, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force.
Since this case was brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be
determined in accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the
former Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights, and the rules of evidence. Under the
Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband
and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the
contrary.
Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it
is not proof that no marriage took place other evidence may be presented to prove marriage. In
this case, Leoncia and Gaudioso claim that the certification presented by Ramonito and Generoso
(to the effect that the record of the marriage had been lost or destroyed during the war) was
belied by the production of the Book of Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer of
Asturias. Leoncia and Gaudioso argue that this book does not contain any entry pertaining to the
alleged marriage of Gavino and Catalina. This contention has no merit. In Pugeda vs. Trias, the
defendants, who questioned the marriage of the plaintiffs produced a photostatic copy of the
record of marriages of the Municipality of Rosario, Cavite for the month of Jaunary 1916, to
show that there was no record of the alleged marriage. Nonetheless, evidence consisting of the
testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage. Indeed, although a marriage
contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to present it is not proof that no
marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented it to proof marriage. Here, Ramonito and
Generoso proved through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929,
that they have three children, one of whom died in infancy, that their marriage subsisted until
1935 when Gavino died, and that they are recognized by Gavinos family and by the public as
the legitimate children of Gavino.


Republic v. CA and Molina
GR 108763, 13 February 1997
En Banc, Panganiban (p): 8 concur, 3 concur in result

Facts: Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a
son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility on the early stages of the
marriage, observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with
them, from his dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances.
Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987,
Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a
week later. The couple are separated-in-fact for more than three years.

On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo
Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker,
and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any
evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered
judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court
of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTCs decision. Hence, the present recourse.

Issue: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity

Held: The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize
the application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity
as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she
regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her
conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage; where said conduct,
observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very
objectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage.

The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer
to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is
celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a difficulty, if not outright
refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.

The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The
burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically
or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the
decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the
incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough;
(6) the essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards
husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their children; (7)
interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the
trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision; concluding that
the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to


SongDiary
Succession
ACAIN VS IAC
GRN 72706
OCTOBER 27, 1987
PARAS, J.:

FACTS:

Constantitno filed for probate of the will of his decased brother Nemesio. The spouse and adopted child of
the decedent opposed the probate of will because of
preterition. RTC dismissed the petition of the wife. CA reversed and the probate thus was dismissed

ISSUE: Whether or not there was preterition of compulsory heirs in the direct line thus their omission
shall not annul the institution of heirs.

RULING:

Preterition consists in the omission of the forced heirs because they are not mentioned there in, or trough
mentioned they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. As for the widow there is no
preterit ion because she is not in the direct line. However, the same cannot be said for the adopted child
whose legal adoption has not been questioned by the petitioner. Adoption gives to the adopted person the
same rights and duties as if he where a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a
legal heir hence, this is a clear case of preterition.

The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of
the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal
heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing was
written. No legacies and devisees having been provided in the will, the whole property of the deceased has
been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters.

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Civil Law
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ase-digest-succession.html
NUGUID VS NUGUID

GRN L-234417 SCRA 449

JUNE 23, 1966

SANCHEZ, J.:

FACTS:
Rosario Nuguid , single, died in December 30, 1962.She was without descendants but was survived by her
parents and siblings. On May 18, 1963, Remedios Nuguid, her sister filed in CFI a holographic will
allegedly executed by Rosario on November 17, 1951 or 11 years ago, said will instituted Remedios as the
universal heir thereby, compulsory heirs, the ascendants of the decedent, filed their opposition to the
probate proceeding. They contend that they were illegally preterited and as a consequence, the institution
is void. The courts order held that the will in question is a complete nullity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the compulsory heirs were preterited , thereby rendering the holographic will void.
Whether the court may rule on the intrinsic validity of the will.


RULING:
The statute we are called upon to apply in article 854 of the civil code which states:
The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct time, whether living
at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of
heir; but the d and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious

The forced heirs, parents of the deceased, were received nothing by the testament. The one-sentence will
institutes petitioner as the universal heir. No specific legacies or bequest are therein provided for. It is in
this posture that we say that the nullity is complete.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are
expressly disinherited as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition
depriving any compulsory heir his/her share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.
On the second issue, the case is for the probate of the will and the courts area of inquiry is limited to the
extrinsic validity of the will comes after the will has been duly authenticated. However if the case is to be
remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. The practical conditions: time, effort, expenses
and added anxiety, induced us to abelief that we might as well meat head-on the issue of the validity of the
provisions of the will in question.

DE PAPA ET AL VS CAMACHO
GRN L-28032
SEPTEMBER 24, 1986

NARVASA, J.:

FACTS:
Plaintiffs and respondents of this case are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being aunt and uncles of the
respondent.Camacho inherited her property from her mother Trinidad, a descendant of Dizon, first
degree cousin of defendants.

ISSUE:
Whether or not uncles and aunts, together with niece who survived the reservista would be considered
reservatorios.

RULING:
The court ruled that the uncles and aunts shall not share in the reserveable property, since, under the law
of intestate succession a descendants uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestate so long as nephews
and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to inherit.The rule on proximity applies.
(The relatives in the direct ascending shall exclude relatives in the collateral line.)


MANG-OY VS CA
G.R.144 SCRA 35
SEPTEMBER 12, 1986

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS:
Old Tumpao begot 3 children (respondents) with his first wife. Upon her death, he took himself a second
wife but without issues. However she had adopted 2 children according to the practice of Igorots. On
September 4, 1937, Old Tumpao executed what he called last will and testament which were read to and
thumb mark affixed by all of the beneficiaries who at the time were already occupying the portions
respectively allotted to them. After the death of Old Tumpao, the parties remained to be in possession of
the lots assign to them which was in accordance of the wishes of old Tumpao which was also agreed upon
by the parties in a public document.

On November 4, 1960, respondents executed an extra-judicial partition in which they divided the
property of Old Tumpao among the three of them only. Petitioners sued for reconveyance , sustained by
trial court but reversed by CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the will and testament of Old Tumpao be duly allowed even without being proved in the
court

RULING:
In accordance with the rules of court, no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved
or allowed in court.

However the document maybe sustained by art 1056 of the Old Civil Code which was the law in force at
the time the document was made. The law says: If the testator should make a partition of his properties
by an act inter vivors, or by will such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of
the forced heirs.

Such partition is not governed by the rules of wills or donation inter vivos, which is a consequence of its
special nature. Thus, the last will and testament of Old Tumpao is sustained by the provision of Art 1056,
Old Civil Code, which became a binding law when the beneficiaries, parties herein, agreed and confirmed
with the disposition made by Old Tumpao.