- POLICE POWER -

WHO EXERCISES POLICE POWER?

GR No. 130239, April 15, 2005
MMDA vs. GARIN
FACTS:
Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his drivers license
was confiscated for parking illegally. Garin wrote to then MMDA Chairman Prospero
Oreta requesting the return of his license and expressed his preference for his case to
be file in Court. Without an immediate reply from the chairman, Garin filed for a
preliminary injunction assailing among others that Sec 5 (f) of RA 7924 violates the
constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing
MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and unlimited fines and penalties. RTC rule in his
favor, directing MMDA to return his license and for the authority to desist from
confiscating drivers license without first giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in
an appropriate proceeding. Thus this petition.
ISSUE: WON Sec 5(f) of RA 7924 which authorizes MMDA to confiscate and suspend or
revoke drivers license in the enforcement of traffic rules and regulations constitutional?
HELD:
The MMDA is not vested with police power. It was concluded that
MMDA is not a local government unit of a public corporation endowed with
legislative power and it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community.
Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power
vested in the legislature to make, ordain, establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances either with penalties of without, not
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for good and welfare of
the commonwealth and for subjects of the same.
There is no provision in RA 7924 that empowers MMDA or its council
to enact ordinance, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. It is an agency created for the
purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national
government agencies, Peoples Organizations, NGOs and private sector for the
efficient and expeditious delivery of services. All its functions are administrative in
nature. LAWS GR. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988 BALACUIT vs. CFI
FACTS:
Ordinance No. 640 was passed by the Municipal Board of the City of
Butuan on April 21, 1969 which penalizes any person group of persons, entity or
corporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or
other public exhibitions, games, contests or other performances to require
children between seven (7) and twelve (12) years of age to pay full payment for
tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the said ticket.
The petitioners Carlos Balacuit, Lamberto Tan, and Sergio Yu Carcel
are managers of the Maya and Dalisay Theaters, the Crown Theater, and the
Diamond Theater, respectively. Aggrieved by the effect of the said ordinance,
they filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and
Butuan City on June 30, 1969 praying that the subject ordinance be declared
unconstitutional and, therefore, void and unenforceable.
declaring Ordinance No. 640 as constitutional and valid. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the respondent court but was later on denied.
ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 640 is unconstitutional and an invalid exercise of police
power.
HELD:
(A)s to the question of the subject ordinance being a valid exercise of
police power, the same must be resolved in the negative. While it is true that a
business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within
the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and
its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with
the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not,
under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the
exercise of police power. police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control
and operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful
exercise by the citizens of their property rights. right of the owner to fix a price at
which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property
itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause. Hence, the
proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to
fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that
any person who did not approve could stay away.
The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it
contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or
unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial,
discriminating or in derogation of a common right.
Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of
petitioners for even if We could assume that, on its face, the interference was
reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it has been fully shown that it is
an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights of
citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under
the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No.
237 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby
rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and, therefore, null and
void. This decision is immediately executory. 146 SCRA 323; G.R. No. L-
63419; 18 Dec 1986 LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ FACTS: A motion to quash
the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was made,
contending that no offense was committed, as the statute is unconstitutional.
Such motion was denied by the RTC. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the
Supreme Court for relief. The Solicitor General, commented that it was
premature for the accused to elevate to the Supreme Court the orders denying
their motions to quash. However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to
intervene for the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash. ISSUE:
WON BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of police power of the
State. HELD:
The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is
not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment.
It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not
intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.
Subsequently, the respondent court rendered its decision

The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against
public order. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the
making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. An act may not be
considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the
harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as
malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power.
GR. No. 88265 December 21, 1989
DEL ROSARIO vs. BENGZON
FACTS:
This is a class suit filed by the officers of the Philippine Medical
Association, the national organization of medical doctors in the Philippines, on
behalf of their professional brethren who are of kindred persuasion, wherein the
Supreme Court is asked to declare as unconstitutional, hence, null and void,
some provisions of the Generics Act of 1988 (Republic Act No. 6675), and of the
implementing Administrative Order No. 62 issued pursuant thereto.
The said law requires the use of generic terminology or generic
names in writing prescriptions by medical, dental, and veterinary doctors.
Government health agencies and their personnel as well as other government
agencies are likewise obliged to use generic names in all transactions related to
purchasing, prescribing, dispensing and administering of drugs and medicines.
Certain penalties are imposed for violation of the said provisions of the law.
ISSUE: WON the Generics Act of 1998 and its implementing Administrative
Order No. 62 are unconstitutional. HELD:
The Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the
Generics Act. It, on the contrary, implements the constitutional mandate for the
State "to protect and promote the right to health of the people" and "to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost"(Section 15, Art. II and Section 11, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).
There is no merit in the petitioners' theory that the Generics Act
impairs the obligation of contract between a physician and his patient, for no
contract ever results from a consultation between patient and physician. A doctor
may take in or refuse a patient, just as the patient may take or refuse the doctor's
advice or prescription. As aptly observed by the public respondent, no doctor has
ever filed an action for breach of contract against a patient who refused to take
prescribed medication, undergo surgery, or follow a recommended course
treatment by his doctor ( p. 53, Rollo). In any event, no private contract between
doctor and patient may be allowed to override the power of the State to enact
laws that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order,
comfort, or general welfare of the community. This power can neither be
abdicated nor bargained away. All contractual and property rights are held
subject to its fair exercise. 152 SCRA 730; G.R. No. 78164; 31 July 1987
TABLARIN VS. JUDGE GUTIERREZ FACTS:
The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the
Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing
Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52,
series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the
NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding
with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as
scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court denied said petition on 20
April 1987. The
NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled. Republic Act 2382,
as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959"
defines its basic
objectives in the following manner:
"SECTION 1. Objectives. This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the
standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registration
of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine
in the Philippines."
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its functions
as specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:
"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of
medicine;
xxx (f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a
medical school and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from
said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating
fund of the Board of Medical Education;;
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical
schools:
"Admission requirements. The medical college may admit any student who has not
been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral
turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science
or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of
Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former
professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall
be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the
preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and
Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a
certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning
with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that: "2. The NMAT, an
aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of
applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the
quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff score for the successful
applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the
Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical
Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission
requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the
issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges.
ISSUE: WON Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS
Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.
HELD: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum
scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not
constitute an unconstitutional imposition.
The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable
power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests
and needs in a word,the public order of the general community. An important
component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the
population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of
governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some
consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of
passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and
the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This
question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the
practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable
method of protecting the health and safety of the public.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of
this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the
graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the
student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in
the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting
admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical
studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the
difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general,
and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic
development, are widely known. We believe that the government is entitled to
prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated
objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and
of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. We are entitled to
hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of
legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the
protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and
ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for
disease or trauma.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the
Order of the respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary
injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

GR No. 166494, June 29, 2007
CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP. vs. DSWD, ET. AL
FACTS:
Petitioners, belonging to domestic corporations and proprietors
operating drugstores in the Philippines, are praying for preliminary injunction
assailing the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257,
otherwise known as the Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003. On February
26, 2004, R.A. No. 9257, amending R.A. No. 7432, was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and it became effective on March 21, 2004.
Section 4(a) of the Act states: SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. The
senior citizens shall be entitled to the following: (a) the grant of twenty percent
(20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of services in
hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers,
and purchase of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or
enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of
senior citizens;
The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g)
and (h) as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services
rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction
from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is granted.
Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value
added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax
purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of
the National Internal Revenue Code, asamended. The DSWD, on May 8,
2004, approved and adopted the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA No.
9275, Rule VI, Article 8 which contains the proviso that the implementation of the
tax deduction shall be subject to the Revenue Regulations to be issued by the
BIR and approved by the DOF. With the new law, the Drug Stores Association of
the Philippines wanted a clarification of the meaning of tax deduction. The DOF
clarified that under a tax deduction scheme, the tax deduction on discounts
was subtracted from Net Sales together with other deductions which are
considered as operating expenses before the Tax Due was computed based on
the Net Taxable Income. On the other hand, under a tax credit scheme, the
amount of discounts which is the tax credit item, was deducted directly from the
tax due amount.
The DOH issued an Administrative Order that the twenty percent discount shall
include both prescription and non-prescription medicines, whether branded or generic. It
stated that such discount would be provided in the purchase of medicines from all
establishments supplying medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens.
Drug store owners assail the law with the contention that granting the discount would
result to loss of profit and capital especially that such law failed to provide a scheme to
justly compensate the discount.
ISSUE: WON Section 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act is unconstitutional or not
violative of Article 3 Section 9 of the Constitution which provides that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation and the equal protection
clause of Article 3 Section 1.
HELD:
The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to
the taking of private property for public use or benefit. This constitutes compensable
taking for which petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation. Just
compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss. The
word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation, and to convey the
idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full and ample.
The law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for medical and dental
services, and diagnostic and laboratory fees; admission fees charged by theaters,
concert halls, circuses, carnivals, and other similar places of culture, leisure and
amusement; fares for domestic land, air and sea travel; utilization of services in hotels
and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers; and purchases
of medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens. As a form of
reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments extending the twenty
percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of
eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an
exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and
flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits.
Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential, insistent and the least
limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs. It is [t]he power
vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.
ZONING & REGULATORY ORDINANCES
20 SCRA 849; G.R. No.L-24693; 31 July 1967
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSO. VS. MAYOR OF
MANILA
FACTS:
Petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association with one of its
members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and Go Chiu, the president and general manager of the
second petitioner, filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 against the
respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such charged
with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give
the necessary orders for the execution and enforcement of such ordinances. It was
alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and
protection of the interest of its eighteen members operating hotels and motels,
characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities
and regularly paying taxes. It was alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of
the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then
acting City Mayor, Vice- Mayor Herminio Astorga. After which the alleged grievances
against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being
beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it
regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any
other law, no reference is made to motels. it also being provided that the premises and
facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either
by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives. The
lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent
Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
ISSUE: Whether or Not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is unconstitutional,
therefore, null and void.
HELD:
A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental
character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping
condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to
stand, consistently with what has been the accepted standards of constitutional
adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of
any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged
statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The
presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the elected
representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in
the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular
municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject
and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has
in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the
people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when
there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of
police regulation.
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of
validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or
ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. The principle has been
nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v.
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. where the American Supreme Court through Justice
Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here
questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We
are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation
prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of
law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of
legislation of this character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the
absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No
such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding
the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of
validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.
123 SCRA 569 (1983)
CRUZ vs. PARAS
FACTS:
Petitioners were night club operators in Bocaue Bulacan, who filed on November 5,
1975, two cases for prohibition with preliminary injunction. They contended that the
enforcement of Municipal Ordinance no. 84, an ordinance prohibiting the operation of
nightclubs, cabarets, and dance halls in that municipality or the renewal of licenses to
operate them, should be stopped as the municipal has no power to prohibit a lawful
business and that such ordinance is violative to their right to due process and the equal
protection of the law, as the license previously given to petitioners was in effect
withdrawn without judicial hearing. The lower court upheld the validity of the ordinance in
the name of police power and dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan, represented by respondents,
can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit
of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses
HELD:
Supreme Court states that reliance on the police power is insufficient to justify the
enactment of the assailed ordinance. It is to be noted that the municipal council shall
enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by
law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and
safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort,
and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the
protection of property therein. However, it is only valid unless it contravenes the
fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or
unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial,
discriminating, or in derogation of common right.
A municipal corporation, therefore, cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs.
Nightclubs may be regulated but not prevented from carrying on their business. RA 938,
as originally enacted, granted municipalities the power to regulate the establishment,
maintenance and operation of nightclubs and the like. While it is true that on 5/21/54, the
law was amended by RA 979 w/c purported to give municipalities the power not only to
regulate but likewise to prohibit the operation of nightclubs, the fact is that the title of the
law remained the same so that the power granted to municipalities remains that of
regulation, not prohibition. To construe the amendatory act as granting municipal
corporations the power to prohibit the operation of nightclubs would be to construe it in a
way that it violates theconstitutionalprovision that "every bill shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." Moreover, the recently-enacted
LGC (BP 337) speaks simply of the power to regulate the establishment, and operation
of billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses and other forms of entertainment.
Certiorari granted.
120 SCRA 568 (1983)
VELASCO VS. VILLEGAS
FACTS:
Ordinance No. 4964 was enacted for a two-fold purpose. (1) To enable the City of
Manila to collect a fee for operating massage clinic separately from those operating
barber shops and (2) To prevent immorality which might probably arise from the
construction of separate rooms. However, petitioner argues that such ordinance
amounts to a deprivation of property of petitioners-appellants of their means of livelihood
without due process of law.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance was unconstitutional.
HELD:
Considering the two-fold purpose of the ordinance, it is clear that such law is a police
power measure. This Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the
general welfare clause. WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the lower court is affirmed.
234 SCRA 255 (1994)
MAGTAJAS VS. PRYCE PROPERTIES
FACTS:
On 1992, PAGCOR decided to expand its operation in Cagayan de Oro
City and to this end leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties.
Upon announcement of the opening of the casino, several organization in the
said area objected, including Cagayan de Oros sangguniang panglungsod who
later enacted Ordinance no. 3353. Such ordinance was entitled, AN
ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT AND
CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR
THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTION
THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF CASINO. Less than a month from the
passage of such ordinance, the sangguniang panglusod of Cagayan de Oro
adopted a sterner ordinance no. 3375-93 which was an AN ORDINANCE
PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND PROVIDING PENALTY
FOR VIOLATION THEREFORE.
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it
was joined by PAGCOR as intervener and supplemental petitioner. Their
challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the
ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement.
Reconsideration of this decision was denied on July 13, 1993.Cagayan de Oro
City and its mayor are now before the court in this petition for review. ISSUE/S:
1. WON the ordinances enacted by the sangguniang panglusod of Cagayan de Oro are
valid.
2. WON the Local Government Code should prevail over and above an existing statute
(in this case PD1869)
HELD:
First, it should be noted that the morality of gambling is not a
justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered
inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution
categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even
mentioning it at all. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may
prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some
forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider
sufficient.
Although it is true that local government units are authorized to
prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of
chance, it should be understood that, obviously, this provision excludes games of
chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The apparent
flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the
public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising
the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City.
On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code, the
proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both
by harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the case before us. The
proper resolution of the problem at hand is to hold that under the Local
Government Code, local government units may (and indeed must) prevent and
suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except only those allowed by
statutes like P.D. 1869.
Lastly, The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a
statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government.
Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by
Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that
the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived
their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners.
GR No. 110249, August 27, 1997
ALFREDOI TANO vs. GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES
FACTS:
15 Dec 1992: Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance
No. 15-92 which banned the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside the city from
1993-1998.
22 Jan 1993: Acting Mayor Lucero issued Office Order No. 23. It authorized officers
to inspect cargoes containing live fish and lobster that are shipped out of Puerto
Princesa. The purpose of the inspection is to check if the shipper had the required
mayors permit issued by their office.
19 February 1993: Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan enacted Resolution No.
33 which prohibited the catching, gathering, possession, etc. of live marine coral
dwelling aquatic organisms for a period of 5 yrs.
he respondents implemented the ordinances, depriving all the fishermen, marine
merchants, and shippers of the entire province of their only means of livelihood.
The petitioners directly invoked the original jurisdiction of the SC arguing as follows:
1. It deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them
from the practice of their trade, violating Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of
the 1987 Constitution.
2. Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayors
permit could be granted or denied;; ie. Mayor had absolute authority in issuing the
permit.
3. The Ordinance took away the right of the fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful
ways.
The respondents contended that it was a valid exercise of the Provincial
Governments power under the general welfare clause (Sec. 16 of the LGC). The
Ordinance, they argued, only covered live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms and
excluded those not dwelling in the coral reefs and that it shall only last for 5 years. The
court must also distinguish between catching live fish and selling it live and those who
have no intention at all of selling it live.
ISSUE: WON the questioned ordinances enacted in the exercise of powers under the
LGC relative to the protection and preservation of the environment are a valid exercise
of the police power of a municipal corporation.
HELD: Yes. Laws enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. Section 5 (c) of the
LGC explicitly mandates that the general welfare provisions of the LGC shall be liberally
interpreted to give more powers to the LGUs in accelerating economic development
and upgrading the quality of life for the people of the community. The LGC grants
municipalities the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters and to impose
rentals, fees, or
charges for their use. The sanggunians are directed to enact ordinances for the
general welfare of the LGU and its inhabitants.
The centerpiece of the LGC is decentralization. Indispensable to
this is devolution. One of these powers is the enforcement of fishery laws in
municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. The term municipal
waters includes not only streams, lakes, and tidal waters within the municipality,
but also marine waters included between two lines drawn perpendicularly to the
general coastline from points where the boundary lines of the municipality or city
touch the sea at low tide and a third line parallel with the general coastline and
15 km from it (Sec. 131 [r] LGC).
Two principal objectives of the Ordinances:
1. Establish a closed season for the species of fish covered therein for 5 years
(This falls within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws in municipal
waters);
2. Protect the coral in the marine waters of the city and the province from
further destruction due to illegal fishing activities (this falls within the
general welfare clause of the LGC and the express mandate there to
cities and provinces to protect the environment and impose appropriate
penalties for acts which harm the environment.
G.R. No. 118127 April 12, 2005
CITY OF MANILA vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR. FACTS:
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC)
is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and
lodging houses.
On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a RTC Petition with the lower court
praying that the Ordinance of the City of Manila be declared invalid and
unconstitutional.8
MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly
included in its enumeration of prohibited establishments, motels and inns such as
MTDC's Victoria Court considering that these were not establishments for
"amusement" or "entertainment" and they were not "services or facilities for
entertainment," nor did they use women as "tools for entertainment," and neither
did they "disturb the community," "annoy the inhabitants" or "adversely affect the
social and moral welfare of the community."
The Ordinance ordered the removal of motels, inns, massage parlors,
beer houses, nightclubs in the Ermita-Malate area.
MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and
unconstitutional for the following reasons:
1. The City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as Section
458 (a) 4 (iv)12 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code) grants
to the City Council only the power to regulate the establishment,
operation and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses,
lodging houses and other similar establishments
2. The Ordinance is void as it is violative of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 49913
which specifically declared portions of the Ermita-Malate area as a
commercial zone with certain restrictions
3. The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power as the
compulsory closure of the motel business has no reasonable relation to
the legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected
4. The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law by punishing the operation of
Victoria Court which was a legitimate business prior to its enactment
5. The Ordinance violates MTDC's constitutional rights in that: (a) it is
confiscatory and constitutes an invasion of plaintiff's property rights; (b)
the City Council has no power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a
nuisance per se nor does it have the power to extrajudicially destroy it;
and
6. The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law as no
reasonable basis exists for prohibiting the operation of motels and inns,
but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar
establishments, and for prohibiting said business in the Ermita-Malate
area but not outside of this area. Petitioners City of Manila and Lim
maintained that the City Council had the power to "prohibit certain forms
of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the
community" as provided for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local
Government Code.
Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of
Manila to protect the social and moral welfare of the community in conjunction with its
police power.
Hon. Laguio decided in favor of the private respondents and declared the Ordinance
null and void.
Petitioners filed an appeal with the lower court alleging that the following errors were
committed by the lower court in its ruling: (1) It erred in concluding that the subject
ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of
police power; (2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D.
499
31
which allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except those
specified therein; and (3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.
Petitioners contend that the assailed Ordinance was enacted in the exercise of the
inherent and plenary power of the State and the general welfare clause exercised by
local government units provided for in Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of
Manila and conjunctively, Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code.
34
They allege that the
Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power; it does not contravene P .D. 499; and that
it enjoys the presumption of validity.
ISSUE: WON the Ordinance of the City of Manila shows a valid exercise of police
power.
HELD: No. The Ordinance was nullified barring the operation of motels and inns within
the Ermita-Malate area. The exercise of police power by the local government is
valid
unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or
unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or
in derogation of a common right.
The Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs
personal privileges.
It is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and
explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten,
the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore
ultra vires, null and void.
Police power legislation of such character deserves the full endorsement of the
judiciary we reiterate our support for it. But inspite of its virtuous aims, the enactment of
the Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on. Local legislative
bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated
establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their transfer or conversion without
infringing the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of laws not
even under the guise of police power.
G.R. No. L-24670 December 14, 1979
ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs. FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO.
FACTS:
Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the public,
particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along EDSA. On March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as
vendor, and Augusto Padilla and Natividad Angeles, as vendees, entered into separate
agreements of sale on installments over two parcels of land of the Subdivision. On July
19, 1962, the said vendees transferred their rights and interests over the aforesaid lots in
favor of one Emma Chavez. Upon completion of payment of the purchase price, the
plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez. Both the
agreements (of sale on installment) and the deeds of sale contained the stipulations or
restrictions that:
1. The parcel of land shall be used exclusively for residential purposes, and she shall not
be entitled to take or remove soil, stones or gravel from it or any other lots
belonging to the Seller.
2. All buildings and other improvements (except the fence) which may be constructed at
any time in said lot must be, (a) of strong materials and properly painted, (b)
provided with modern sanitary installations connected either to the public sewer
or to an approved septic tank, and (c) shall not be at a distance of less than two
(2) meters from its boundary lines.
Eventually said lots were bought by defendant. Lot 5 directly from Chavez and Lot 6
from Republic Flour Mills by deed of exchange, with same restrictions. Plaintiff claims
that restriction is for the beautification of the subdivision. Defendant claimed of the
commercialization of western part of EDSA. Defendant began constructing a commercial
bank building. Plaintiff demand to stop it, which forced him to file a case, which was later
dismissed, upholding police power. Motion for recon was denied, hence the appeal.
ISSUE: WON Resolution No. 27 is a valid exercise of police power
HELD: Yes. Resolution is a valid exercise of police power. EDSA, a main traffic
artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area,
supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are
hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Health,
safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality are
justifications for this. It should be stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is
constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the
legitimate exercise of police power.
201 SCRA 13
PRESLEY vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION
FACTS:
A complaint for specific performance was filed by respondent against
Teofilo & Rollo Almendras (both deceased and substituted by petitioner) for
violating a Bel-Air Subdivision restriction that the subject house and lot shall be
used only for residential and not for commercial purposes, and for non-payment
of association dues to BAVA (respondent)
Deceased petitioners were the registered owners of the property
while Presley, as lessee of the property, is the owner and operator of Hot Pan
de Sal Store located in the same address.
The RTC rendered decision in favor of respondent which was
affirmed by the CA
Motion for reconsideration was denied hence this petition. ISSUES:
1. WON the ruling of respondent CA is in accordance with a recent consolidated decision
of the SC which applies in the case at bar in favor of the petitioner
2. WON the ruling of the CA adjudging the petitioner solidarily liable together with the
Almendrases (deceased) to pay the alleged unpaid association dues is patently
contrary to the evidence and facts
3. WON respondent court adjudging petitioner solidarily liable to pay attorneys fees is
without any legal or factual basis
Note: During the pendency of the case with this Court, petitioner Enedina Fox Presley
died on January 4, 1991. She was substituted by her two daughters as heirs, namely
Olivia V. Pizzaro and Consuelo V. Lacson.
HELD:
The issues raised in the instant petition have already been dealt with in the
consolidated cases decided by this Court promulgated
on December 22, 1988 Apparently, when the respondent court promulgated the
questioned decision on November 28, 1988 the Sangalang case had not yet been
decided by this Court, etc.
Apparently, when the respondent court promulgated the questioned decision on
November 28, 1988 the Sangalang case had not yet been decided by this Court.
The respondent court in the case at bar was not at all entirely wrong in upholding the
Deed of Restrictions annotated in the title of the petitioners. It held that the provisions of
the Deed of Restrictions are in the nature of contractual obligations freely entered into by
the parties. Undoubtedly, they are valid and can be enforced against the petitioner.
But they are, like all contracts, subject to the overriding demands, needs, and
interests of the greater number as the State may determine in the legitimate exercise of
police power. Our jurisdiction guarantees sanctity of contract and is said to be the 'law
between the contracting parties,' (Civil Code, supra, art. 1159) but while it is so, it cannot
contravene 'law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.' (supra, art. 1306).
Above all, it cannot be raised as a deterrent to police power, designed precisely to
promote health, safety, peace, and enhance the common good, at the expense of
contractual rights, whenever necessary.
With respect to the demand for payment of association dues in the sum of P3,803.55,
the records reveal that this issue is now moot and academic.
The demand for payment of attorney's fees is now without legal or factual basis.
Petition granted.
GR Nos. 142359 & 142980, May 25, 2004
PASONG BAYABAS FARMERS vs. CA
FACTS:
Lakeview Development Corporation (LDC) bought a parcel of land, issued it in the name
of its successor, the Credito Asiatic, Incorporated (CAI) and subsequently subdivided it
into two parcels
LDC/CAI undertook to develop its 75-hectare property into a residential and industrial
estate CAI embarked on the development of the housing project into three phases and
secured a locational clearance for the project from the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission (HSRC
CAI decided to continue with the development of its Hakone Housing Project but the
project was stymied by a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction
The plaintiffs alleged that they had reached an agreements with the respondent that they
would remain in peaceful possession of their farmholdings but notwithstanding such, the
defendant ordered the bulldozing of the property
In answer to the complaint, CAI denied that it allowed the plaintiffs to possess and
cultivate the landholding with fixed rentals Meanwhile, CAI and 6 of the 14 plaintiffs
entered into a compromise agreement which eventually led to all of the other plaintiffs
entering into an agreement with CAI
CAI was stymied anew when a Petition for Compulsory Coverage under Rep. Act No.
6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) was filed
before the DAR by seventeen (17) individuals who alleged that they are farmers who
have occupied a parcel of public agricultural land adjacent to Pasong Bayabas River
According to the petitioners, the said illegal bulldozing activities would convert the land
from agricultural to non-agricultural land, thereby depriving the members of the PBFAI of
their tenancy rights over the property. For this reason, the petitioners prayed that a
temporary restraining order be issued ex-parte to stop the bulldozing of the property, and
that a preliminary injunction or a status quo order be later issued to enjoin the same.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the property subject of the suit is covered by Rep. Act No. 6657, the Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL);
2. whether the DARAB had original and appellate jurisdiction over the complaint of the
petitioner PBFAI against the private respondent;
3. whether the petitioners-members of the PBFAI have a cause of action against the
private respondent for possession and cultivation of the property in suit;
4. whether the dismissal by the RTC of the complaint in Civil Case No. BCV-87-13 is a
bar to the complaint of the petitioners- members of the PBFAI; and
5. whether the appellate court committed a reversible error in dismissing the petition for
review in CA-G.R. SP No. 49363.
HELD:
The contention of the petitioners has no merit.
Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect only on June 15, 1988. But long
before the law took effect, the property subject of the suit had already been
reclassified and converted from agricultural to non- agricultural or residential
land.
With our finding that the property subject of the suit was classified as
residential land since 1976, the DARAB had no original and appellate jurisdiction
over the property subject of the action of the petitioner PBFAI and its members.
Since the members of the petitioner PBFAI were not the tenants of
the private respondent CAI, the petitioners and its members had no cause of
action against the private respondent for possession of the landholding to
maintain possession thereof and for damages.
When the complaint was filed, twenty-five (25) of the thirty -seven
(37) members of the petitioners had already executed separate deeds of
quitclaim in favor of the private respondent CAI over the portions of the
landholding they respectively claimed, after receiving from the private respondent
CAI varied sums of money. In executing the said deeds, the members of the
petitioner PBFAI thereby waived their respective claims over the property.
Hence, they have no right whatsoever to still remain in possession of the same.
Petition denied.
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES & REGULATIONS
127 SCRA 329, 1984 BAUTISTA vs. JUNIO
FACTS:
This prohibition proceeding filed by petitioners, spouses Mary
Concepcion Bautista and Enrique D. Bautista, for being allegedly violative of the
due process and equal protection guarantees 1 of the Constitution as it was
provided in LOI 869 that the use private motor vehicles with H and EH plates on
week-ends and holidays was banned from "[12:00] a.m. Saturday morning to
5:00 a.m. Monday morning, or 1:00 a.m. of the holiday to 5:00 a.m. of the day
after the holiday."
It was then alleged by petitioners that "while the purpose for the
issuance of the LOI 869 is laudable, to wit, energy conservation, the provision
banning the use of H and EH [vehicles] is unfair, discriminatory, [amounting to
an] arbitrary classification" and thus in contravention of the equal protection
clause. 5 Moreover, for them, such Letter of Instruction is a denial of due
process, more specifically, "of their right to use and enjoy their private property
and of their freedom to travel and hold family gatherings, reunions and outings on
week-ends and holidays," inviting attention to the fact that others not included in
the ban enjoying "unrestricted freedom." ISSUE: Whether or not the validity of
an energy conservation measure, Letter of Instruction No. 869, issued on May
31, 1979 the response to the protracted oil crisis that dates back to 1974 is
constitutional
'The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the
police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of
regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of
law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of
this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some
factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.'
It is true, of course, that there may be instances where a police power measure may,
because of its arbitrary, oppressive or unjust character, be held offensive to the due
process clause and, therefore, may, when challenged in an appropriate legal
proceeding, be declared void on its face. This is not one of them.
In the interplay between such a fundamental right and police power, especially so
where the assailed governmental action deals with the use of one's property, the latter is
accorded much leeway. That is settled law. What is more, it is good law. Due process,
therefore, cannot be validly invoked.
Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection
clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired
by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the
very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws
operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all
persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in
the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.
Absent therefore the alleged infringement of constitutional rights, more precisely the
due process and equal protection guarantees, this Court cannot adjudge Letter of
Instruction No. 869 as tainted by unconstitutionality.
Petition dismissed.
119 SCRA 597, 1982
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA VS. BOT
FACTS:
On 10 October 1977, the Board of Transportation (BT) issued Memorandum Circular 77-
42 phasing out old and dilapidated taxis; refusing registration to taxi units within the
National Capitol Region having year models over 6 years old. Pursuant to the above
BOT circular, the Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued
Implementing Circular 52, dated 15 August 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the
MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the National Capital Region (NCR),
to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be
allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. In accordance therewith,
cabs of model 1971 were phased-out in registration year 1978; those of model 1972, in
1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981. On 27 January
1981, Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI), including its members Ace
Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao, filed a petition with the BT (Case
80-7553), seeking to nullify Memorandum Circular 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to
allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model
1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the
time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation. On 16 February 1981,
TOMMI, et. al. filed before the BT a Manifestation and Urgent Motion, praying for an
early hearing of their petition. The case was heard on 20 February 1981. On 28
November 1981, TOMMI, et. al. filed before the same Board a Manifestation and Urgent
Motion to Resolve or Decide Main Petition praying that the case be resolved or decided
not later than 10 December 1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to avail of whatever
remedy they may have under the law for the protection of their interests before their
1975 model cabs are phased-out on 1 January 1982. TOMMI, et. al., through its
President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case, but was later informed that
the records of the case could not be located. On 29 December 1981, TOMMI, et. al.,
instituted a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
WON the implementation and enforcement of Memorandum Circular 77-42 violates the
petioners constitutional rights to (1) Equal protection of the law; (2) Substantive due
process; and (3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and
standard.
HELD:
Regarding the and Substantive Due Process, Presidential Decree
101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power to fix just and reasonable
standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be
furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor
vehicles. The overriding consideration in the issuance of Memorandum Circular
77-42 is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old
and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general
welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and
welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. The necessities imposed
by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate
even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded. Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the
Circulars is not violative of procedural due process. Previous notice and hearing
are not essential to the validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to
govern future conduct of a class or persons or enterprises, unless the law
provides otherwise. It is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and
recurring evaluation to determine its road-worthiness, not to speak of the fact that
it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and
even graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to all
vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that
reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis
have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment
obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and
comfortable service to the public specially considering that they are in continuous
operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift.
With that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the
requirement of due process has been met. alleged that the Circular in question
violates their right to equal protection of the law because the same is being
enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards the taxi industry. At
the outset it should be pointed out that implementation outside Metro Manila is
also envisioned in Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. In fact, the same is also
implemented in Cebu City. The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially
in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places,
are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. This is of
common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every
city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection
clause can hardly be successfully claimed.
The overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding
public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the
exercise, of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can
prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society may also
regulate property rights the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental
authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their
interests are disregarded". GR No. 158793, June 8, 2006 MIRASOL VS.
DPWH FACTS:
declaration of nullity of Department Order (DO) 74, DO 215 and the TRB Regulations
contravene RA 2000. Petitioners also sought to declare Department Order No. 123 (DO
123) and Administrative Order No. 1 (AO 1) unconstitutional.
Previously, pursuant to its mandate under R.A. 2000, DPWH issued on June 25,
1998 Department Order (DO) No. 215 declaring the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll
Expressway as limited access facilities. Pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2000,
a limited access facility is defined as "a highway or street especially designed for through
traffic, and over, from, or to which owners or occupants of abutting land or other persons
have no right or easement or only a limited right or easement of access, light, air or view
by reason of the fact that their property abuts upon such limited access facility or for any
other reason. Moreover, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on
motorcycles along the entire breadth of North and South Luzon Expressways and the
Manila- Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway under DO 215. On July 18, 2001, the
DPWH acting thru the TRB, issued Department Order No. 123 allowing motorcycles with
engine displacement of 400 cubic centimeters inside limited access facilities (toll ways).
DO 123, as petitioner contends, is violative of equal protection clause of the constitution.
Consequently, on March 10, 2003, the trial court issued the assailed decision
dismissing the petition but declaring invalid DO 123. Petitioners moved for a
reconsideration of the dismissal of their petition; but it was denied by the trial court in its
Order dated June 16, 2003.
ISSUE: WHETHER or not AO 1 AND DO 123 ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
HELD:
Under EO 546, it is the DOTC, not the DPWH, which has authority to
regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited access facilities. Thus, DO 74 and
DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to declare certain
expressways as limited access facilities. Under the law, it is the DOTC which is
authorized to administer and enforce all laws, rules and regulations in the field of
transportation and to regulate related activities.
Since the DPWH has no authority to regulate activities relative to
transportation, the TRB cannot derive its power from the DPWH to issue
regulations governing limited access facilities. The DPWH cannot delegate a
power or function which it does not possess in the first place. Since DO 74 and
DO 215 are void, it follows that the rules implementing them are likewise void.
DPWH has no authority to regulate limited access highways since EO 546 has
devolved this function to the DOTC. Thus, DO 123 is void for want of authority of
the DPWH to promulgate it.
Furthermore, the assailed portion of AO 1 states that on limited
access highways, it is unlawful for any person or group of persons to drive any
bicycle, tricycle, pedicab, motorcycle or any vehicle not motorized. Petitioners
attacked this exercise of police power as baseless and unwarranted.The use of
public highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an exercise of the
police power of the state. The police power is far-reaching in scope and is the
"most essential, insistent and illimitable" of all government powers. The tendency
is to extend rather than to restrict the use of police power. The sole standard in
measuring its exercise is reasonableness. What is "reasonable" is not subject to
exact definition or scientific formulation. No all-embracing test of reasonableness
exists, for its determination rests upon human judgment applied to the facts and
circumstances of each particular case.
AO 1 does not impose unreasonable restrictions. It merely outlines
several precautionary measures, to which toll way users must adhere. These
rules were designed to ensure public safety and the uninhibited flow of traffic
within limited access facilities. They cover several subjects, from what lanes
should be used by a certain vehicle, to maximum vehicle height. The prohibition
of Petitioners filed before the trial court a petition seeking the certain types of
vehicles is but one of these. None of these rules violates reason. The purpose of
these rules and the logic behind them are quite evident. A toll way is not an
ordinary road. The special purpose for which a toll way is constructed
necessitates the imposition of guidelines in the manner of its use and operation.
Inevitably, such rules will restrict certain rights. But the mere fact that certain
rights are restricted does not invalidate the rules.
The DPWH, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the toll ways
were not designed to accommodate motorcycles and that their presence in the
toll ways will compromise safety and traffic considerations. The DPWH points out
that the same study the petitioners rely on cites that the inability of other drivers
to detect motorcycles is the predominant cause of accidents. Arguably,
prohibiting the use of motorcycles in toll ways may not be the "best" measure to
ensure the safety and comfort of those who ply the toll ways.
However, the means by which the government chooses to act is not
judged in terms of what is "best," rather, on simply whether the act is reasonable.
The validity of a police power measure does not depend upon the absolute
assurance that the purpose desired can in fact be probably fully accomplished, or
upon the certainty that it will best serve the purpose intended. Reason, not
scientific exactitude, is the measure of the validity of the governmental regulation.
Arguments based on what is "best" are arguments reserved for the Legislatures
discussion. Judicial intervention in such matters will only be warranted if the
assailed regulation is patently whimsical. We do not find the situation in this case
to be so.
AO 1 is not oppressive. Petitioners are not being deprived of their
right to use the limited access facility. They are merely being required, just like
the rest of the public, to adhere to the rules on how to use the facility. AO 1 does
not infringe upon petitioners right to travel but merely bars motorcycles, bicycles,
tricycles, pedicabs, and any non-motorized vehicles as the mode of traveling
along limited access highways. Several cheap, accessible and practical
alternative modes of transport are open to petitioners. There is nothing
oppressive in being required to take a bus or drive a car instead of ones scooter,
bicycle, calesa, or motorcycle upon using a toll way.
Petitioners reliance on the studies they gathered is misplaced. Police
power does not rely upon the existence of definitive studies to support its use.
Indeed, no requirement exists that the exercise of police power must first be
conclusively justified by research. The yardstick has always been simply whether
the governments act is reasonable and not oppressive. The use of "reason" in
this sense is simply meant to guard against arbitrary and capricious government
action. Scientific certainty and conclusiveness, though desirable, may not be
demanded in every situation. Otherwise, no government will be able to act in
situations demanding the exercise of its residual powers because it will be tied up
conducting studies.
A police power measure may be assailed upon proof that it unduly
violates constitutional limitations like due process and equal protection of the law.
Petitioners attempt to seek redress from the motorcycle ban under the aegis of
equal protection must fail. Petitioners contention that AO 1 unreasonably singles
out motorcycles is specious. To begin with, classification by itself is not
prohibited.
A classification can only be assailed if it is deemed invidious, that is, it
is not based on real or substantial differences. As explained by Chief Justice
Fernando in Bautista v. Juinio: x x x To assure that the general welfare be
promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights
to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances
invoked the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental
act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was
prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no
support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on
all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the
same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred
and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed.
For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every
person under circumstances, which if not identical is analogous. If law be looked
upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be
treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group
equally binding the rest.
The real and substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of
transport sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll
ways. Amongst all types of motorized transport, it is obvious, even to a child, that a
motorcycle is quite different from a car, a bus or a truck. The most obvious and troubling
difference would be that a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned
than a four- wheeled vehicle. A classification based on practical convenience and
common knowledge is not unconstitutional simply because it may lack purely theoretical
or scientific uniformity.
Petitioners complain that the prohibition on the use of motorcycles in toll ways unduly
deprive them of their right to travel.
A toll way is not an ordinary road. As a facility designed to promote the fastest
access to certain destinations, its use, operation, and maintenance require close
regulation. Public interest and safety require the imposition of certain restrictions on toll
ways that do not apply to ordinary roads. As a special kind of road, it is but reasonable
that not all forms of transport could use it.
The right to travel does not mean the right to choose any vehicle in traversing a toll
way. The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. Petitioners
can traverse the toll way any time they choose using private or public four-wheeled
vehicles. Petitioners are not denied the right to move from Point A to Point B along the
toll way. Petitioners are free to access the toll way, much as the rest of the public can.
The mode by which petitioners wish to travel pertains to the manner of using the toll
way, a subject that can be validly limited by regulation.
Petitioners themselves admit that alternative routes are available to them. Their
complaint is that these routes are not the safest and most convenient. Even if their claim
is true, it hardly qualifies as an undue curtailment of their freedom of movement and
travel. The right to travel does not entitle a person to the best form of transport or to the
most convenient route to his destination. The obstructions found in normal streets, which
petitioners complain of (i.e., potholes, manholes, construction barriers, etc.), are not
suffered by them alone. 11/30/09
Finally, petitioners assert that their possession of a drivers license from the Land
Transportation Office (LTO) and the fact that their vehicles are registered with that office
entitle them to use all kinds of roads in the country. Again, petitioners are mistaken.
There exists no absolute right to drive. On the contrary, this privilege, is heavily
regulated. Only a qualified group is allowed to drive motor vehicles: those who pass the
tests administered by the LTO. A drivers license issued by the LTO merely allows one to
drive a particular mode of transport. It is not a license to drive or operate any form of
transportation on any type of road. Vehicle registration in the LTO on the other hand
merely signifies the roadworthiness of a vehicle. This does not preclude the government
from prescribing which roads are accessible to certain vehicles.
Therefore, the petition was partly granted. DOs 74, 215 and 123 of the DPWH and
the Revised Rules and Regulations on Limited Access Facilities of the Toll Regulatory
Board were declared void AO 1 of the DOTC valid.
124 SCRA 494, 1983
ANGLO-FIL TRADING VS. LAZARO
FACTS:
23 contractors, among them the Philippine Integrated Port Services, Inc. (PIPSI), Anglo-
Fil Trading Corporation, Aduana StevedoringCorporation, Anda Stevedoring
Corporation, Ben Paz Port Service, Inc., Manila Stevedoring and Arrastre Services, Inc.
(members of the Philippine Association of Stevedoring Operators and Contractors, Inc.
[PASOC]), competed at the South Harbor for the performance of stevedoring work. The
licenses of these contractors had long expired when the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA,
created by Presidential Decree 505 [11 July 1974], later superseded by Presidential
Decree 857 [23 December 197]5) took over the control and management of ports but
they continued to operate afterwards on the strength of temporary permits and hold-over
authorities issued by PPA. On 4 May 1976, the Board of Directors of PPA passed
Resolution 10, approving and adopting a set of policies on Port Administration,
Management and Operation. The PPA adopted as its own the Bureau of Customs policy
of placing on only one organization the responsibility for the operation of arrastre and
stevedoring services in one port. On 11 April 1980, President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Letter of Instruction 1005-A which, among other things, directed PPA to
expeditiously evaluate all recognized cargo handling contractors and port-related service
operators and to determine the qualified contractor or operator in order to ensure
effective utilization of port facilities, etc. This was followed by the Presidents
memorandum to Col. Eustaquio S. Baclig Jr. dated 18 April 1980, directing submission
of a report on the integration of the stevedoring operations in Manila South Harbor and
emphasizing the need for such integration as well as the strengthening of the PPA in
order to remedy the problems therein. On 28 April 1980, the committee submitted its
report recommending the award of an exclusive contract for stevedoring services in the
South Harbor to Ocean Terminal Services, Inc. (OTSI) after finding it the best qualified
among the existing contractors. The PPA submitted the committee report to the
President, who, on 24 May 1980, approved the recommendation to award an exclusive
management contract to OTSI. On 27 June 1980, PPA and OTSI entered into a
management contract which provided, among others, for a 5-year exclusive operation by
OTSI of stevedoring services in the South Harbor, renewable for another 5 years. The
Board of Directors of the PPA gave its approval on 27 June 1980. On 23 July 1980,
PIPSI instituted an action before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila against PPA
and OTSI for the nullification of the contract between the two, the annulment of the 10%
of gross stevedoring revenue being collected by PPA, and injunction with preliminary
injunction. An ex-parte restraining order was issued. On 21 August 1980. with leave of
court, Anglo-Fil, et al., filed their complaint in intervention. The motion was granted and
on 22 August 1980, the CFI issued another ex-parte restraining order in the case to
include Anglo-Fil et. al., under the benefits of such order. On 30 August 1980, the PPA
filed an urgent motion to lift the restraining orders in view of the long delay in the
resolution of the injunction incident and the countervailing public interest involved. On 1
September 1980, the CFI dissolved, lifted and set aside the restraining orders without
prejudice to the Courts resolution on the propriety of issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for. On 5 September 1980, PPA sent a letter to the General Manager
of PIPSI informing him that due to the lifting of the temporary restraining order, it was
withdrawing PIPSIs holdover authority to operate or provide stevedoring services at
South Harbor effective 7 September 1980. Anglo-Fil, et al., and PIPSI, therefore, filed
the petitions for certiorari with preliminary injunction alleging that the lifting of the
restraining orders ex-parte by the CFI was clearly effected with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether the issuance of a Permit to Operate (PTO) depended on the sound
discretion, and on the policies, rules and regulations implemented by the latter, or
whether the non-issuance thereof is an unlawful deprivation of property rights.
HELD:
From the viewpoint of procedure, there was no grave abuse of discretion or want of
jurisdiction when the CFI judge lifted ex-parte the temporary restraining order he had
earlier issued also ex-parte. Subsequent to the issuance of the questioned order, the
CFI heard the parties on the application for a writ of preliminary injunction and, after
hearing the parties evidence and arguments, denied the application for the writ. It is also
not grave abuse of discretion when a court dissolves ex-parte abuse of discretion when
a court dissolves ex-parte a restraining order also issued ex-parte. Further, the
contention that due process was violated resulting to a confiscatory effect on private
property is likewise without merit. In the first place, Anglo-Fil, et. al. were operating
merely on hold-over permits, which were based on PPA Memorandum Order 1 (19
January 1977). All hold-over permits were by nature temporary and subject to
subsequent policy guidelines as may be implemented by PPA. Such should have served
as sufficient notice that, at any time, PIPSIs and Anglo-Fil et.al.s authorities may be
terminated. Whether PIPSI, and Anglo-Fil, et. al. would be issued a Permit to Operate
(PTO) depended on the sound discretion of PPA and on the policies, rules and
regulations that the latter may implement in accordance with the statutory grant of
power. The latter, therefore, cannot be said to have been deprived of property without
due process because, in this respect, what was given them was not a property right but
a mere privilege and they should have taken cognizance of the fact that since they have
no vested right to operate in the South Harbor, their permits can be withdrawn anytime
the public welfare deems it best to do so. Thus, unless the case justifies it, the judiciary
will not interfere in purely administrative matters. Such discretionary power vested in the
proper administrative body, in the absence of arbitrariness and grave abuse so as to go
beyond the statutory authority, is not subject to the contrary judgment or control of
others. In general, courts have no supervisory power over the proceedings and actions
of the administrative departments of the government. This is particularly true with
respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, and to findings of fact.
G.R. NO. 145742 JULY 14, 2005
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY VS. CIPRES STEVEDORING AND ARRASTRE
INC. (CISAI)
FACTS:
Petitioner PPA is a govt. entity created by virtue of P.D. no. 857 and is tasked to
implement an integrated program for the planning, development, financing, and
operation of ports and port districts in the country. Respondent CISAI is a domestic
corporation primarily engaged in stevedoring, arrastre, and porterage business, including
cargo handling and hauling services in Negros Oriental and Dumaguete and Bais. Since
1976, CISAI had been granted permits to operate the cargo handling operations in
Dumaguete. In 1991, PPA awarded an 8-year contract to CISAI to pursue its business
endeavor. Upon this time, PPA Administrative Order No. 03-90 took effect providing for
the awarding of cargo handling services through public bidding.
Following the expiration of its contract, CISAI was able to continue with its business
by virtue of hold-over permits given by PPA. During this time, another administrative
order PPA AO No. 03-2000 took effect which amended PPA AO no. 03-90 expressly
provided that all contract for cargo handling services of more than 3 years shall be
awarded through public bidding. CISAI initiated an action for specific performance,
injunction with application for preliminary mandatory injunction, contending that PPAs
action was I derogation of their vested right over the operation of cargo handling
enterprise. The lower court granted CISAIs prayer for a temporary restraining order.
PPA filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by the trial court setting aside
the injunctive writ. CISAI filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, and the CA granted
the petition, ordering PPA to desist from conducting the scheduled public bidding for
cargo handling operations in the port of Dumaguete. Thus, this instant appeal.
ISSUE: WON CISAI have acquired a vested right to the cargo handling operations at the
Dumaguete Port.
HELD:
Supreme Court held that CISAI have no vested rights to the cargo handling operations
because the continuance of their business was due to hold over permits given by PPA,
and such may be revoked anytime by the granting authority. As held in the case of
Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation vs. Lazaro, hold over permits are merely temporary
subject to the policy and guidelines as may be implemented by the authority granting it.
Stevedoring services are imbued with public interest and subject to the states police
power, therefore, whatever proprietary right the CISAI may have acquired must
necessarily give way to valid exercise of police power. PPA, being created for the
purpose of promoting the growth of regional port bodies, it is empowered to make port
regulations. With this mandate, the decision to bid out cargo holding services is properly
within the province and discretion of PPA. As for CISAIs claim that PPA AO No. 03-
2000 violated the constitutional provision of non-impairment of contract, suffice it to state
that all contracts are subject to the overriding demands, needs, interests of the greater
number as the State may determine in the legitimate exercise of its police power.
Wherefore, Petition is granted.
G.R. No. 157036 June 9, 2004
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ VS. HON. ALBERTO ROMULO AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
PNP CHIEF HERMOGENES EBDANE
FACTS:
Chavez is a gun- owner who filed a petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to
enjoin the implementation of the Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the
Carying of Firearms Outside of Residence issued by PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane,
Jr. In January 2003, Pres. Arroyo delivered a speech before the members of the PNP
stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crime
incidents. She directed PNP Chief Ebdane to suspend the issuance of permits to carry
firearms outside of residence (PTCFOR). Thus, Chief Ebdane issued the assailed
Guidelines. Chavez contends that such guidelines was a derogation of his constitutional
right to life and to protect life as he, being a law- abiding licensed gun-owner is the only
class subject to the implementation while leaving the law-breakers (kidnappers, MILF,
hold-uppers, robbers etc.) untouched. Petitioner also averred that ownership and
carrying of firearms are constitutionally protected property rights which cannot be taken
away without due process of law.
ISSUES:
1. WON the citizens right to bear arms is a constitutional right
2. WON the revocation of the PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed Guidelines is a
violation of right to property
3. WON the issuance of said Guidelines is a valid exercise of Police power
HELD:
1. SC ruled that nowhere fond in our Constitution is the provision on bearing arms as a
constitutional right. The right to bear arms, then, is a mere statutory privilege
unlike in the American Constitution which was the law invoked by petitioner.
Right to bear arms is a mere statutory creation as was observed by the laws
passed to regulate the use, acquisition, transfer, importation of firearms; it cannot
be considered an inalienable or absolute right.
2. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain
privilege is neither a property nor property right. A license is merely a privilege to
do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the granting
authority and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property right nor
does it create a vested right. Such license may be revoked anytime when the
authority deems it fit to do so, and such revocation does not deprive the holder of
any property, or immunity.
3. The test to determine the validity of police measure , thus: The interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
exercise of the policepower; and The means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its
issuance was the need for peace and order in the society. Owing to the
proliferation of crimes, particularly those committed by NPA, which tends to
disturb the peace of the community, Pres. Arroyo deemed it best to impose a
nationwide gun ban. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the issuance of
guidelines is the interest of the public in general. Such means of revocation is,
thus, a valid exercise of police power.
Petition is hereby dismissed.


12
- EMINENT DOMAIN -
WHO EXERCISES THE POWER?

GR No 14355 Oct. 31, 1919
CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY CEMETERY
FACTS:
The City of Manila, in exercising the owner of Eminent Domain, presented a petition
in the Court of First Instance of said City raying that certain lands described therein, be
expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement, namely, the
extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila. Herein respondents contend that there are other
parcels of land offered for such improvement proposed by the City at a lesser cost and
that the chosen parcel of land by the City is a cemetery where the dead loved ones of
the Chinese community were buried. Herien respondents also averred that the City of
Manila will have to spend a great deal amount of money in the relocation and rebuilding
of sepulchres, tombstones and monuments of those affected by the expropriation should
they pursue to use the Chinese Cemetery. The trial judge, Hon. Del Rosario decided that
there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in question.
The City of Manila appealed contending that under the law, it has the authority to
expropriate any land it may desire and neither the court not the land owners can inquire
into the advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask concerning the necessities
therefore; and that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved.
ISSUE: May the courts inquire into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of the
expropriation?
HELD:
Section 241 of Act no. 190 provides that the govt. of the Phil islands, or of any
province or department thereof, or of any municipality, and any person, or public or
private corporation having, by law, the right to condemn private property for public use,
shall exercise that right in the manner prescribed under Sec. 242( a complaint in
expropriation proceeding shall be presented; that the complaint shall state with certainty
the right of condemnation, with a description of the property sought to be condemned
together with the interest of each defendant separately.). Section 243 provides that if the
court shall find upon trial that the right to expropriate the land in question exists, it shall
then appoint commissioners. Thus, Sec. 243 means that when the legislature conferred
upon the courts the right to ascertain upon trial whether the right exists for the exercise
of eminent domain, it intended that the courts should inquire into, and hear proof upon:
1. whether the purpose for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is public; and
2.whether the land is public or private. Supreme Court also averred that the exercise of
the right of eminent domain is necessary in derogation of private rights, and the rule in
that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. Therefore, if there is no greatest
necessity existing for an expropriation, it should not be made for such purposes until it is
fully established that such necessity exist. In the present case, even granting that a
necessity exist for the opening of Rizal St. through the cemetery, record shows that
adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge which will
answer every purpose of the City of Manila. The cemetery, then, still being under care
and maintenance of the living should be spared from such expropriation where there are
other lands offered for expropriation at a much lesser expense to serve the same
purpose. The judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed.
268 SCRA 368 (1997)
MODAY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
On July 23, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No. 43-89, "Authorizing the
Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare
Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National Highway Owned by Percival
Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports
Facilities."
In due time, Resolution No. 43-89 was approved by then Municipal
Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for
its approval. On September 11, 1989, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
disapproved said Resolution and returned it with the comment that "expropriation
is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for the
establishment of the government center."
The Municipality of Bunawan, herein public respondent, subsequently
filed a petition for Eminent Domain against petitioner Percival Moday before the
RTC at Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.
On March 6, 1991, public respondent municipality filed a Motion to
Take or Enter Upon the Possession of Subject Matter of This Case stating that it
had already deposited with the municipal treasurer the necessary amount in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and that it
would be in the government's best interest for public respondent to be allowed to
take possession of the property.
Despite petitioners' opposition and after a hearing on the merits, the
RTC granted respondent municipality's motion to take possession of the land.
Petitioners' motion for recon was denied by the trial court. Petitioners elevated
the case in a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the trial court, but was dismissed by appellate court. The CA held that the
public purpose for the expropriation is clear from Resolution No. 43-89 and that
since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur did not declare
Resolution No. 43-89 invalid, expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed.
Respondent appellate court also denied petitioners' motion for recon.
Meanwhile, the Municipality of Bunawan had erected three buildings
on the subject property: 2 wooden structures, and one made of concrete.
ISSUE: Whether or not the municipality to exercise the right to eminent
domain, since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved Resolution No. 43-89.
HELD:
On December 8, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining and restraining public respondent Judge Evangeline Yuipco from
enforcing her and respondent municipality from using and occupying all the
buildings constructed and from further constructing any building on the land
subject of this petition.
Acting on petitioners' Omnibus Motion for Enforcement of
Restraining Order and for Contempt, the Court issued a Resolution on March 15,
1995, citing incumbent municipal mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo for contempt,
ordering him to pay the fine and to demolish the "blocktiendas" which were built
in violation of the restraining order.
Former Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo paid the fine and manifested that
he lost in the May 8, 1995 election. The incumbent Mayor Leonardo Barrios, filed
a Manifestation, Motion to Resolve "Urgent Motion for Immediate Dissolution of
the Temporary Restraining Order" and Memorandum on June 11, 1996 for the
Municipality of Bunawan.
Petitioners contend that the CA erred in upholding the legality of the
condemnation proceedings initiated by the municipality. According to petitioners,
the expropriation was politically motivated and Resolution No. 43-89 was
correctly disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
The CA declared that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's reason for
disapproving the resolution "could be baseless, because it failed to point out
which and where are those available lots.'" Respondent court also concluded that
since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan did not declare the municipal board's
resolution as invalid, expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed. The
Court finds no merit in the petition and affirms the decision of the CA.
Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan
exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable
from sovereignty. It is government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a
compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose.
Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain
may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public
utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the
taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation.
The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of eminent
domain is not disputed as it is expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg.
337, the local Government Code in force at the time expropriation proceedings
were initiated. Section 9 of said law states: Sec. 9. Eminent Domain. A local
government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its
sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation
proceedings for public use or purpose.
Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337 provides: Sec. 153. Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Review. (1) Within thirty days after receiving copies of approved
ordinances, resolutions and executive orders promulgated by the municipal
mayor, the sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit
them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial fiscal, who
shall examine them promptly and inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing
of any defect or impropriety which he may discover therein and make such
comments or recommendations as shall appear to him proper.
(2) If the sangguniang panlalawigan shall find that any municipal
ordinance, resolution or executive order is beyond the power conferred upon the
sangguniang bayan or the mayor, it shall declare such ordinance, resolution or
executive order invalid in whole or in part, entering its actions upon the minutes
and advising the proper municipal authorities thereof. The effect of such an
action shall be to annul the ordinance, resolution or executive order in question in
whole or in part. The action of the sangguniang panlalawigan shall be final. xxx
xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal
Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action which does not render said resolution
null and void. The law, as expressed in Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on
the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the
Mayor to issue.
Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to
disapprove Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan
clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its
Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution, pursuant to the
earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No.
43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the
condemnation of petitioners' property.
As regards the accusation of political oppression, it is alleged that
Percival Moday incurred the ire of then Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo when he
refused to support the latter's candidacy for mayor in previous elections.
Petitioners claim that then incumbent Mayor C. Bustillo used the expropriation to
retaliate by expropriating their land even if there were other properties belonging
to the municipality and available for the purpose. Specifically, they allege that the
municipality owns a vacant seven-hectare property adjacent to petitioners' land,
evidenced by a sketch plan. The limitations on the power of eminent domain
are that the use must be public, compensation must be made and due process of
law must be observed. The Supreme Court, taking cognizance of such issues as
the adequacy of compensation, necessity of the taking and the public use
character or the purpose of the taking, has ruled that the necessity of exercising
eminent domain must be genuine and of a public character. Government may not
capriciously choose what private property should be taken. After a careful
study of the records of the case, however, we find no evidentiary support for
petitioners' allegations. The uncertified photocopy of the sketch plan does not
conclusively prove that the municipality does own vacant land adjacent to
petitioners' property suited to the purpose of the expropriation. In the questioned
decision, respondent appellate court similarly held that the pleadings and
documents on record have not pointed out any of respondent municipality's
"other available properties available for the same purpose." The accusations of
political reprisal are likewise unsupported by competent evidence. Consequently,
the Court holds that petitioners' demand that the former municipal mayor be
personally liable for damages is without basis. WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is hereby DENIED. The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals are AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the
Court is LIFTED.
GR No. 136349, January 23, 2006
M ASIKIP vs. CITY OF P ASIG
FACTS:
Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land with
an area of 4,521 square meters located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila.
In a letter dated January 6, 1994, the then Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig,
respondent, notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion
of her property to be used for the "sports development and recreational activities" of the
residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993
enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig.
Again, on March 23, 1994, respondent wrote another letter to petitioner, but this
time the purpose was allegedly "in line with the program of the Municipal Government to
provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community."
On May 2, 1994, petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the intended
expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area of
her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to "provide land opportunities to deserving poor
sectors of our community."
In its letter of December 20, 1994, respondent reiterated that the purpose of the
expropriation of petitioners property is "to provide sports and recreational facilities to its
poor residents."
Subsequently, on February 21, 1995, respondent filed with the trial court a
complaint for expropriation, docketed as SCA No. 873. Respondent prayed that the trial
court, after due notice and hearing, issue an order for the condemnation of the property;
that commissioners be appointed for the purpose of determining the just compensation;
and that judgment be rendered based on the report of the commissioners.
On April 25, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and on May 7, 1996, the trial
court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that there is a
genuine necessity to expropriate the property for the sports and recreational
activities of the residents of Pasig. As to the issue of just compensation, the trial court
held that the same is to be determined in accordance with the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner filed a motion for recon but it was denied by the trial court. Forthwith, it
appointed the City Assessor and City Treasurer of Pasig City as commissioners to
ascertain the just compensation. This prompted petitioner to file with the Court of
Appeals a special civil action for certiorari. On October 31, 1997, the Appellate Court
dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Petitioners Motion for Recon was denied.
ISSUE: What constitutes a genuine necessity for public use.
HELD:
Where the taking by the State of private property is done for the
benefit of a small community which seeks to have its own sports and recreational
facility, notwithstanding that there is such a recreational facility only a short
distance away, such taking cannot be considered to be for public use. Its
expropriation is not valid. In this case, the Court defines what constitutes a
genuine necessity for public use.
In the early case of US v. Toribio, this Court defined the power of
eminent domain as "the right of a government to take and appropriate private
property to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be
done only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation therefor." It has
also been described as the power of the State or its instrumentalities to take
private property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty and inherent
in government.
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of
the government. It delegates the exercise thereof to local government units, other
public entities and public utility corporations, subject only to Constitutional
limitations. Local governments have no inherent power of eminent domain and
may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute. Section 19 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160) prescribes the
delegation by Congress of the power of eminent domain to local government
units and lays down the parameters for its exercise, thus: "SEC. 19. Eminent
Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting
pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use,
purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of
just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
laws: Provided, however, That, the power of eminent domain may not be
exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That, the local
government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing
of expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of
at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on
the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally,
That, the amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be determined by the
proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the
property."
Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the
following areas of concern: (a) the adequacy of the compensation, (b) the
necessity of the taking, and (c) the public use character of the purpose of the
taking.
The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily
originates from "the necessity" and the taking must be limited to such necessity.
In City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, we held that the very
foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity
and that necessity must be of a public character. Moreover, the
ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow, the
taking of the land. In City of Manila v. Arellano Law College, we ruled that
"necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be
necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical
necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least
inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and the property owner
consistent with such benefit."
Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of Pasig has
failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioners
property. Our scrutiny of the records shows that the basis for the passage of the
Ordinance authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is
the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non- profit
organization, not the residents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members
of the said Association are desirous of having their own private playground and
recreational facility. Petitioners lot is the nearest vacant space available. The
purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity has not
been shown, especially considering that there exists an alternative facility for
sports development and community recreation in the area, which is the
Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of
Caniogan.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The
challenged Decision and Resolution of the CA are REVERSED. The complaint
for expropriation filed before the trial court by respondent City of Pasig, is
DISMISSED. GR No. 155746, October 03, 2004 LAGCAO vs. JUDGE
LABRA FACTS: In 1964, the Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the
City of Cebu. One of these lots was Lot 1029, situated in Capitol Hills, Cebu City,
with an area of 4,048 square meters. In 1965, petitioners purchased Lot 1029.
But then, in late 1965, the 210 lots, reverted to the Province of Cebu.
Consequently, the province tried to annul the sale of Lot by the City of Cebu to
the petitioners. This prompted the latter to sue the province for specific
performance and damages in the then CFI. On July 9, 1986, the court a
quo ruled in favor of petitioners and on June 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Pursuant to the ruling of the appellate
court, the Province of Cebu executed a deed of absolute sale over Lot 1029 in
favor of petitioners. After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take
possession of the lot only to discover that squatters already occupied it. Thus,
petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against the squatters. The MTCC,
rendered a decision on April 1, 1998, ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. On
appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCCs decision and issued a writ of execution
and order of demolition. However, when the demolition order was about to
be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters to the MTCC,
requesting the deferment of the demolition on the ground that the City was still
looking for a relocation site for the squatters. Acting on the mayors request, the
MTCC issued two orders suspending the demolition for a period of 120 days from
February 22, 1999. Unfortunately for petitioners, during the suspension period,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City passed a resolution which
identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279. Then, on
June 30, 1999, the SP of Cebu City passed Ordinance No. 1772 which included
Lot 1029 among the identified sites for socialized housing. On July, 19, 2000,
Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted by the SP of Cebu City authorizing the mayor
of Cebu City to initiate expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of Lot 1029
which was registered in the name of petitioners. The intended acquisition was to
be used for the benefit of the homeless after its subdivision and sale to the actual
occupants thereof. For this purpose, the ordinance appropriated the amount of
P6,881,600 for the payment of the subject lot. This ordinance was approved by
Mayor Garcia on August 2, 2000. On August 29, 2000, petitioners filed
with the RTC an action for declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 1843 for being
unconstitutional. The trial court dismissed the complaint filed by petitioners
whose subsequent motion for recon was also denied.
In this appeal, petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it
sanctions the expropriation of their property for the purpose of selling it to the squatters,
an endeavor contrary to the concept of "public use" contemplated in the Constitution.
They allege that it will benefit only a handful of people. The ordinance, according to
petitioners, was obviously passed for politicking, the squatters undeniably being a big
source of votes.
ISSUE: Whether or not the intended expropriation by the City of Cebu of a 4,048-
square-meter parcel of land owned by petitioners contravenes the Constitution and
applicable laws.
HELD:
Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain
and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. By virtue of
RA 7160, Congress conferred upon local government units the power to
expropriate. Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted pursuant to Section 19 of RA
7160: SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. - A local government unit may, through its
chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of
eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor
and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions
of the Constitution and pertinent laws xxx. (italics supplied).
Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of
petitioners lot was enacted by the SP of Cebu City to provide socialized housing
for the homeless and low-income residents of the City.
There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this
power: (1) no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws;
and (2) private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. Thus, the exercise by local government units of the power of
eminent domain is not absolute.
The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine
necessity and that necessity must be of public character. Government may not
capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property should be expropriated.
In this case, there was no showing at all why petitioners property was singled out
for expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular
choice or selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated no reason for the choice of
petitioners property as the site of a socialized housing project.
RA 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation of property
for purposes of urban land reform and housing. Sections 9 and 10 thereof
provide: SEC 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. - Lands for socialized
housing shall be acquired in the following order: (a) Those owned by the
Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; (b)
Alienable lands of the public domain; (c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle
lands; (d) Those within the declared Areas or Priority Development, Zonal
Improvement Program sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program
sites which have not yet been acquired; (e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of
Sites and Services or BLISS which have not yet been acquired; and (f)
Privately-owned lands. Where on-site development is found more practicable
and advantageous to the beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section
shall not apply. The local government units shall give budgetary priority to on-site
development of government lands. (Emphasis supplied). lands for purposes of
this Act shall include, among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land
assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint
venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however,
That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of
acquisition have been exhausted: Provided further, That where expropriation is
resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted
for purposes of this Act: xxx. (Emphasis supplied).
SEC. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. - The modes of acquiring
In the recent case of Estate or Heirs of the Late Ex-Justice Jose B.L. Reyes et al.
vs. City of Manila, we ruled that the above- quoted provisions are strict limitations on the
exercise of the power of eminent domain by local government units, especially with
respect to (1) the order of priority in acquiring land for socialized housing and (2) the
resort to expropriation proceedings as a means to acquiring it. Private lands rank last in
the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation
proceedings may be resorted to only after the other modes of acquisition are exhausted.
Compliance with these conditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards
of oftentimes helpless owners of private property against what may be a tyrannical
violation of due process when their property is forcibly taken from them allegedly for
public use.
We have found nothing in the records indicating that the City of Cebu complied
strictly with Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate
petitioners property without any attempt to first acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) of
Section 9 of RA 7279. Likewise, Cebu City failed to establish that the other modes of
acquisition in Section 10 of RA 7279 were first exhausted. Moreover, prior to the
passage of Ordinance No. 1843, there was no evidence of a valid and definite offer to
buy petitioners property as required by Section 19 of RA 7160. We therefore find
Ordinance No. 1843 to be constitutionally infirm for being violative of the petitioners right
to due process.
It should also be noted that, as early as 1998, petitioners had already obtained a
favorable judgment of eviction against the illegal occupants of their property. The
judgment in this ejectment case had, in fact, already attained finality, with a writ of
execution and an order of demolition. But Mayor Garcia requested the trial court to
suspend the demolition on the pretext that the City was still searching for a relocation
site for the squatters. However, instead of looking for a relocation site during the
suspension period, the city council suddenly enacted Ordinance No. 1843 for the
expropriation of petitioners lot. The unconscionable manner in which the questioned
ordinance was passed clearly indicated that respondent City transgressed the
Constitution, RA 7160 and RA 7279.
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
city or municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law. It must be in accordance with certain well-established basic principles
of a substantive nature. These principles require that an ordinance (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must
not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable.
Ordinance No. 1843 failed to comply with the foregoing substantive requirements. A
clear case of constitutional infirmity having been thus established, this Court is
constrained to nullify the subject ordinance. We recapitulate:
first, the questioned ordinance is repugnant to the pertinent provisions of the
Constitution, RA 7279 and RA 7160; second, the precipitate manner in which it was
enacted was plain oppression masquerading as a pro-poor ordinance;
third, the fact that petitioners small property was singled out for expropriation for the
purpose of awarding it to no more than a few squatters indicated manifest partiality
against petitioners, and
fourth, the ordinance failed to show that there was a reasonable relation between the
end sought and the means adopted. While the objective of the City of Cebu was to
provide adequate housing to slum dwellers, the means it employed in pursuit of such
objective fell short of what was legal, sensible and called for by the circumstances.
G.R. No. 152230. August 9, 2005
JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC. vs. MUNICIPALITY (now
CITY) OF PASIG, METRO MANILA
The assailed decision affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig,
Branch 160, declaring the respondent Municipality (now City) of Pasig as having the
right to expropriate and take possession of the subject property.
FACTS:
The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos
Street, a municipal road near the Pasig Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas
Bukid, Pasig, where 60 to 70 houses, mostly made of light materials, were
located. The road had to be at least three meters in width, as required by the Fire
Code, so that fire trucks could pass through in case of conflagration. Likewise,
the residents in the area needed the road for water and electrical outlets. The
municipality then decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791-square
meter property of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto
Ching Cuanco Kho.
On April 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an
Ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings
to acquire the said property and appropriate the fund therefore. The ordinance
stated that the property owners were notified of the municipalitys intent to
purchase the property for public use as an access road but they rejected the
offer.On July 21, 1993, the municipality filed a
complaint, amended on August 6, 1993, against the Ching Cuancos
for the expropriation of the property under Section 19 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code. The plaintiff alleged that
it already notified the defendants, by letter, of its intention to construct an access
road on a portion of the property but they refused to sell the same portion.
The plaintiff deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value of the
property based on the latest tax declaration covering the property. On plaintiffs
motion, the RTC issued a writ of possession over the property sought to be
expropriated. On November 26, 1993, the plaintiff caused the annotation of a
notice of lis pendens at the dorsal portion under the name of the Jesus Is Lord
Christian School Foundation, Incorporated (JILCSFI) which had purchased the
property. Thereafter, the plaintiff constructed therein a cemented road with a
width of three meters; the road was called Damayan Street.
In their answer, the defendants claimed that, as early as February
1993, they had sold the said property to JILCSFI as evidenced by a deed of sale
bearing the signature of defendant Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho and his wife.
JILCSFI averred, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that
the plaintiffs exercise of eminent domain was only for a particular class and not
for the benefit of the poor and the landless. It alleged that the property sought to
be expropriated is not the best portion for the road and the least burdensome to
it.
The intervenor filed a crossclaim against its co-defendants for
reimbursement in case the subject property is expropriated.
The petitioner asserts that the respondent must comply with the
requirements for the establishment of an easement of right-of- way, more
specifically, the road must be constructed at the point least prejudicial to the
servient state, and that there must be no adequate outlet to a public highway.
The petitioner asserts that the portion of the lot sought to be expropriated is
located at the middle portion of the petitioners entire parcel of land, thereby
splitting the lot into two halves, and making it impossible for the petitioner to put
up its school building and worship center. During the trial, the plaintiff
presented witnesses, who were residents of the town, testifying that it was they
who requested for the construction of the road.
The defendant, on the other hand, presented some residents who counterclaimed
that there are other roads leading to E. R. Santos Street.
On September 3, 1997, the RTC issued an Order in favor of the plaintiff. The RTC
held that there was substantial compliance with the definite and valid offer requirement
of Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, and that the expropriated portion is the most convenient
access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid.
Dissatisfied, JILCSFI elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision dated March 13, 2001, the CA affirmed the order of the RTC. The
appellate court upheld the public necessity for the subject property based on the findings
of the trial court that the portion of the property sought to be expropriated appears to be,
not only the most convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid, but also an
easy path for vehicles entering the area, particularly fire trucks.
Moreover, the CA took into consideration the provision of Article 33 of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, which regards the construction
or extension of roads, streets, sidewalks as public use, purpose or welfare.
ISSUE: WON the subject property which is intended to be used for public purposes may
be expropriated by the respondent.
HELD: No, the subject property, although intended for public cannot be expropriated by
the Municipality of Pasig.
The Supreme Court held that failed to show the necessity for
constructing the road particularly in the petitioners property and not
elsewhere.
As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, there is no showing in the
record that an ocular inspection was conducted during the trial. If, at all, the trial
court conducted an ocular inspection of the subject property during the trial, the
petitioner was not notified.
The petitioner was, therefore, deprived of its right to due process. In
this case, the petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection of the property,
any factual finding of the court based on the said inspection has no probative
weight. The findings of the trial court based on the conduct of the ocular
inspection must, therefore, be rejected.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The RTC is ordered to dismiss the complaint of the respondent without
prejudice to the refiling thereof.

G.R. No. 163130, September 7, 2007 SAN ROQUE REALTY AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
(through the Armed Forces of the Philippines) FACTS:
The subject parcels of land are located at Lahug, Cebu City and were part of Lot
No. 933. Lot No. 933 was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11946. It was
originally owned by Ismael D. Rosales, Pantaleon Cabrera and Francisco Racaza. On 5
September 1938, subject parcels of land, together with seventeen (17) others, were the
subject of an expropriation proceeding initiated by the then Commonwealth of the
Philippines docketed as Civil Case No. 781. On 19 October 1938, Judge Felix Martinez
ordered the initial deposit of P,500.00 as pre-condition for the entry on the lands sought
to be expropriated. On 14 May 1940, a Decision was rendered condemning the parcels
of land. However, the title of the subject parcel of land was not transferred to the
government.

Eventually, the land was subdivided and T.C.T. No. 11946 was
7
cancelled and new titles were issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu. Two parcels
covered by T.C.T. Nos. 128197 (Lot No. 933- B-3) and 128198 (Lot No. 933-B-4) were
acquired by defendant- appellee. In 1995, defendant-appellee begun construction of
townhouses on the subject parcels of land.
On 22 February 1996, plaintiff-appellant filed the present case
alleging that it is the owner of the subject parcels of land by virtue of the 1938
Decision in the expropriation case, thus, T.C.T. Nos. 128197 and 128198 are null
and void. It argued that defendant- appellee, had no right to possess the subject
properties because it was not its lawful owner.
In its Answer defendant-appellee claimed that it was a buyer in good
faith. It also claimed that there was no valid expropriation because it was initiated
by the executive branch without legislative approval. It also alleged that the
expropriation was never consummated because the government did not actually
enter the land nor were the owners paid any compensation
On August 25, 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the
Republic's complaint and upholding SRRDC's ownership over the subject
properties as supported by SRRDC's actual possession thereof and its
unqualified title thereto. The RTC ruled that SRRDC's ownership is borne out by
the original owner's title to Lot No. 933 and the subsequent transferees
respective titles all of which bore no annotation of the fact of expropriation and
did not indicate the Republic's favorable lien. It also found that there was no valid
expropriation since the records are bereft of a showing that consideration was
paid for the subject properties.
Aggrieved, the Republic appealed the decision to the CA insisting
on its absolute ownership over the subject properties grounded on the following:
(1) the CFI Decision in the expropriation case, Civil Case No. 781; (2) the ruling
of this Court in Valdehueza v. Republic and (3) the expropriated properties,
including Lot No. 933, are devoted to public use.
The CA reversed the RTC Decision on the finding that the appeal
from the CFI Decision in the expropriation case was never perfected by the
original owners of the subject properties and thus, the expropriation of Lot No.
933 became final and binding on the original owners, and SRRDC, which merely
stepped into the latter's shoes, is similarly bound. The CA further held that laches
and estoppel cannot work against the Republic despite its failure from 1940 to
register Lot No. 933 in its name, or to record the decree of expropriation on the
title. Accordingly, the CA found no necessity to rule on the applicability of
Valdehueza v. Republic in the case.
Hence, the instant petition. ISSUES: 1. Whether respondent,
claiming its right to eminent domain, was the dutiful owner of the subject
property, despite failure to register it.
2. Whether petitioner was a buyer of good faith
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of petitioner on both issues.
Time and again, the SC declared that eminent domain cases are to
be strictly construed against the expropriator. The payment of just compensation
for private property taken for public use is an indispensable requisite for the
exercise of the States sovereign power of eminent domain. Failure to observe
this requirement renders the taking ineffectual, notwithstanding the avowed
public purpose. To disregard this limitation on the exercise of governmental
power to expropriate is to ride roughshod over private rights.
From the records of this case and our previous findings in the
related cases, the Republic manifestly failed to present clear and convincing
evidence of full payment of just compensation and receipt thereof by the property
owners.
Section 251 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the law in force at the
time of the Commonwealthcase likewise provides for the recording of the
judgment of expropriation in the Registry of
Deeds. Said provision reads, to wit: SEC. 251. Final Judgment, Its Record and Effect.
The record of the final judgment in such action shall state definitely by metes and
bounds and adequate description. The particular land or interest in land condemned to
the public use, and the nature of the public use. A certified copy of the record of
judgment shall be recorded in the office of the registrar of deeds for the province
in which the estate is situated, and its effect shall be to vest in the plaintiff for the
public use stated the land and estate so described. (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing, it is clear that it was incumbent upon the Republic to cause the
registration of the subject properties in its name or record the decree of expropriation on
the title. Yet, not only did the Republic fail to register the subject properties in its name, it
failed to do so for fifty-six (56) years.
Another basic question is whether or not SRRDC is a buyer in good faith.
The CA found SRRDC wanting in good faith because it should be imputed with
constructive knowledge, or at least, sufficiently warned that the Republic had claims over
the property in view of indications that the subject land belonged to a military
reservation.
An innocent purchaser for value is one who, relying on the certificate of title, bought
the property from the registered owner, without notice that some other person has a right
to, or interest in, such property, and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of
such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in
the property.
In the instant case, the Republics adverse claim of ownership over the subject
properties may have given SRRDCs predecessors-in-interest, the sellers, voidable title
to the subject properties. However, we stress that prior to SRRDCs acquisition of the
subject properties, Lot No. 933 had already been subdivided and covered by separate
titles of the subsequent transferees. These titles, including the titles to the subject
properties, had not been voided at the time of the sale to SRRDC in 1994. As such,
SRRDC acquired good title to the subject properties, having purchased them in good
faith, for value, and without notice of the sellers defect of title, if any.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The August 15,
2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSEDand the August 25, 1998
Decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED. TCT Nos. 128197 and 128198, in
the name of petitioner San Roque Realty and Development Corporation, are upheld and
declared valid.
OBJECTS OF EXPROPRIATION
G.R. No. L-18841, January 27, 1969
RP vs. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY
FACTS:
Sometime in 1933, the defendant, PLDT, and the RCA Communications, Inc.,
entered into an agreement whereby telephone messages, coming from the United
States and received by RCA's domestic station, could automatically be transferred to the
lines of PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls collected by the PLDT for transmission from the
Philippines to the United States.
The arrangement was later extended to radio-telephone messages to and from
European and Asiatic countries. Their contract contained a stipulation that either party
could terminate it on a 24-month notice to the other. On 2 February 1956, PLDT gave
notice to RCA to terminate their contract on 2 February 1958.
Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own
Government Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by
renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. The
Bureau has extended its services to the general public since 1948, using the same trunk
lines owned by,
18
Both parties appealed. and rented from, the PLDT, and prescribing its (the
Bureau's) own schedule of rates. Through these trunk lines, a Government Telephone
System (GTS) subscriber could make a call to a PLDT subscriber in the same way that
the latter could make a call to the former.
On 5 March 1958, the plaintiff, through the Director of
Telecommunications, entered into an agreement with RCA Communications,
Inc., for a joint overseas telephone service whereby the Bureau would convey
radio-telephone overseas calls received by RCA's station to and from local
residents.
On 7 April 1958, the defendant Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company, complained to the Bureau of Telecommunications that said bureau
was violating the conditions under which their Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is
inter- connected with the PLDT's facilities, referring to the rented trunk lines, for
the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the use of government offices
but even to serve private persons or the general public, in competition with the
business of the PLDT; and gave notice that if said violations were not stopped by
midnight of 12 April 1958, the PLDT would sever the telephone connections.
When the PLDT received no reply, it disconnected the trunk lines being rented by
the Bureau at midnight on 12 April 1958. The result was the isolation of the
Philippines, on telephone services, from the rest of the world, except the United
States.
The Bureau of Telecommunications had proposed to the PLDT on 8
January 1958 that both enter into an interconnecting agreement, with the
government paying (on a call basis) for all calls passing through the
interconnecting facilities from the Government Telephone System to the PLDT.
The PLDT replied that it was willing to enter into an agreement on overseas
telephone service to Europe and Asian countries provided that the Bureau would
submit to the jurisdiction and regulations of the Public Service Commission.
On 12 April 1958, plaintiff Republic commenced suit against the
defendant, in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 35805),
praying in its complaint for judgment commanding the PLDT to execute a
contract with plaintiff, through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of
defendant's telephone system throughout the Philippines under such terms and
conditions as the court might consider reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary
injunction against the defendant company to restrain the severance of the
existing telephone connections and/or restore those severed.
PLDT, on the other hand denied any obligation on its part to
execute a contrary of services with the Bureau of Telecommunications; contested
the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to compel it to enter into
interconnecting agreements, and averred that it was justified to disconnect the
trunk lines heretofore leased to the Bureau of Telecommunications under the
existing agreement because its facilities were being used in fraud of its rights.
PLDT further claimed that the Bureau was engaging in commercial telephone
operations in excess of authority, in competition with, and to the prejudice of, the
PLDT, using defendants own telephone poles, without proper accounting of
revenues.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment that it could not
compel the PLDT to enter into an agreement with the Bureau because the parties
were not in agreement; that under Executive Order 94, establishing the Bureau of
Telecommunications, said Bureau was not limited to servicing government
offices alone, nor was there any in the contract of lease of the trunk lines, since
the PLDT knew, or ought to have known, at the time that their use by the Bureau
was to be public throughout the Islands, hence the Bureau was neither guilty of
fraud, abuse, or misuse of the poles of the PLDT; and, in view of serious public
prejudice that would result from the disconnection of the trunk lines, declared the
preliminary injunction permanent, although it dismissed both the complaint and
the counterclaims.
ISSUE: WON PLDT is compelled to enter into a contract compulsory rendering the
company to provide inter-connectivity services, despite its objection.
HELD:
The Supreme Court agreed with the court below that parties cannot
be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them as
to the principal terms and conditions of the contract. Freedom to stipulate such
terms and conditions is of the essence of our contractual system, and by express
provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence,
intimidation, or undue influence (Articles 1306, 1336, 1337, Civil Code of the
Philippines).
But the court a quohas apparently overlooked that while the Republic
may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the
exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone
company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that
of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the
payment of just compensation to be determined by the court.
While the defendant telephone company is a public utility
corporation whose franchise, equipment and other properties are under the
jurisdiction, supervision and control of the Public Service Commission (Sec. 13,
Public Service Act), yet the plaintiff's telecommunications network is a public
service owned by the Republic and operated by an instrumentality of the National
Government, hence exempt, under Section 14 of the Public Service Act, from
such jurisdiction, supervision and control.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance, now
under appeal, is affirmed, except in so far as it dismisses the petition of the
Republic of the Philippines to compel the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company to continue servicing the Government telephone system upon such
terms, and for a compensation, that the trial court may determine to be just,
including the period elapsed from the filing of the original complaint or petition.
And for this purpose, the records are ordered returned to the court of origin for
further hearings and other proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. No
costs.

G.R. No. L-14355, October 31, 1919 THE CITY OF MANILA vs. CHINESE
COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET AL.

FACTS: On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a
petition in the Court of First Instance of said city, praying that certain lands be
expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement namely, the
extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila. The defendant, the Comunidad de Chinos de
Manila [Chinese Community of Manila] opposed the expropriation alleging that
the Chinese cemetery has for its purpose the benefit and general welfare of the
Chinese Community of the City of Manila and that the expropriation, in fact, was
not necessary as a public improvement for other routes were available which
would fully satisfy the plaintiff's purposes, at much less expense and without
disturbing the resting places of the dead. The trial court decided that there was
no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in question, and
absolved each and all of the defendants from all liability under the complaint,
without any finding as to costs. The City of Manila then appealed the trial courts
decision. ISSUE: WON the Chinese Cemetery may be validly expropriated by
the City of Manila. HELD: The exercise of the right of eminent domain,
whether directly by the State, or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in
derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be
strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals with greater
tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and laws more sedulously, than
the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that
right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual
without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by
doubtly interpretation.
The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal
corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring
the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must
only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent
domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance
with the law. In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the
authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and,
second, the purpose must be public.
It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or private. The
former is a cemetery used by the general community, or neighborhood, or
church, while the latter is used only by a family, or a small portion of the
community or neighbourhood. Where a cemetery is open to public, it is a public
use and no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general
authority. And this immunity extends to the unimproved and unoccupied parts
which are held in good faith for future use. The cemetery in question is used by
the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the
definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public
property. The petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that the city
of Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property. In
the present case, even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the
street in question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the
same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands
have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of
the plaintiff.
For all of the foregoing, the judgment of the lower court should be and
is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
WHERE EXPROPRIATION SUIT IS FILED

G.R. No. 138896, June 20, 2000 RGY. SAN ROQUE vs. HEIRS OF PASTOR

FACTS:
Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Talisay,
Cebu (Branch 1) a Complaint to expropriate a property of the respondents. In an
Order dated April 8, 1997, the MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that "[e]minent domain is an exercise of the power
to take private property for public use after payment of just compensation. In an
action for eminent domain, therefore, the principal cause of action is the exercise
of such power or right. The fact that the action also involves real property is
merely incidental. An action for eminent domain is therefore within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not with this Court."
The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it, holding
that an action for eminent domain affected title to real property; hence, the value
of the property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be
filed before the MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the action should have been
filed before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less than
P20,000.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to this Court, raising a pure
question of law. ISSUE: Which court, MTC or RTC, has jurisdiction over cases
for eminent domain or expropriation where the assessed value of the subject
property is below Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos? HELD:
RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over expropriation case as provided
for by Section 19 (1) of BP 129, which states that RTCs shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;;....
If the issue is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in
the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where
the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where
the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought,
like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance)
and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage,
this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may
not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first
instance.
In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of
money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to
take private property for public useHence, the courts determine the authority of the
government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due
process. The subject matter of an expropriation suit is the governments exercise of
eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
REQUISITES OF TAKING
G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974
RP vs. CASTELVI
FACTS:
The Castellvi property had been occupied by the Philippine Air Force
since 1947 under a contract of lease. It was stipulated by the parties, that "the
foregoing contract of lease is 'similar in terms and conditions, including the date',
with the annual contracts entered into from year to year between defendant
Castellvi and the Republic of the Philippines. It is undisputed, therefore, that the
Republic occupied Castellvi's land from July 1, 1947, by virtue of the above-
mentioned contract, on a year to year basis (from July 1 of each year to June 30
of the succeeding year). Before the expiration of the contract of lease on June
30, 1956 the Republic sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused. When the
AFP refused to vacate the leased premises after the termination of the contract,
on July 11, 1956, Castellvi wrote to the Chief of Staff, AFP, informing the latter
that the heirs of the property had decided not to continue leasing the property in
question because they had decided to subdivide the land for sale to the general
public, demanding that the property be vacated within 30 days from receipt of the
letter, and that the premises be returned in substantially the same condition as
before occupancy .On January 30, 1957, Lieutenant General Alfonso Arellano,
Chief of Staff, answered the letter of Castellvi, saying that it was difficult for the
army to vacate the premises in view of the permanent installations and other
facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected and already established on
the property, and that, there being no other recourse, the acquisition of the
property by means of expropriation proceedings would be recommended to the
President. Defendant Castellvi then brought suit in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga to eject the Philippine Air Force from the land. While this ejectment
case was pending, the Republic instituted these expropriation proceedings.
The Republic argues that the "taking" should be reckoned from the
year 1947 when by virtue of a special lease agreement between the Republic
and appellee Castellvi, the former was granted the "right and privilege" to buy the
property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease.
Castellvi, on the other hand, maintains that the "taking" of property
under the power of eminent domain requires two
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation thus essential elements,
to wit: (1) entrance and occupation by condemn or upon the private property for more
than a momentary or limited period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as
to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. This
appellee argues that in the instant case the first element is wanting, for the contract of
lease relied upon provides for a lease from year to year; that the second element is also
wanting, that the contract of lease does not grant the Republic the "right and privilege" to
buy the premises "at the value at the time of occupancy."
ISSUE: WON the Taking of properties under expropriation commenced with the filing
of the action. (What are the requisites of Taking of property of eminent domain?)
HELD:
It is clear that the "taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes of
eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the
Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof. We find merit in
the contention of Castellvi that two essential elements in the "taking" of property
under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and
occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and
(2) that in devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted from the
property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the Republic
entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.
Untenable also is the Republic's contention that although the contract
between the parties was one of lease on a year to year basis, it was "in reality a
more or less permanent right to occupy the premises under the guise of lease
with the 'right and privilege' to buy the property should the lessor wish to
terminate the lease," and "the right to buy the property is merged as an integral
part of the lease relationship ... so much so that the fair market value has been
agreed upon, not, as of the time of purchase, but as of the time of occupancy".
We cannot accept the Republic's contention that a lease on a year to year basis
can give rise to a permanent right to occupy, since by express legal provision a
lease made for a determinate time, as was the lease of Castellvi's land in the
instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a demand (Article 1669,
Civil Code). Neither can it be said that the right of eminent domain may be
exercised by simply leasing the premises to be expropriated (Rule 67, Section 1,
Rules of Court).
To sustain the contention of the Republic is to sanction a practice
whereby in order to secure a low price for a land which the government intends
to expropriate (or would eventually expropriate) it would first negotiate with the
owner of the land to lease the land (for say ten or twenty years) then expropriate
the same when the lease is about to terminate, then claim that the "taking" of the
property for the purposes of the expropriation be reckoned as of the date when
the Government started to occupy the property under the lease, and then assert
that the value of the property being expropriated be reckoned as of the start of
the lease, in spite of the fact that the value of the property, for many good
reasons, had in the meantime increased during the period of the lease.
The lower court did not commit an error when it held that the "taking"
of the property under expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in
this case.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in
possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on August 10,
1959. The "taking" of the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the
just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959
when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.

G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY
vs.HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA
FACTS:
The city government of Quezon tried to enforce Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled
"ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND
WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR
THE VIOLATION THEREOF" through the passing of a resolution wchich reads:
RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does hereby request
the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial
park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6%
space intended for paupers burial. But Respondent Himlayang Pilipino questioned the
validity of the ordinance specifically its sec9 w/c provides that At least six (6) percent of
the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of
deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least
5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so
designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later
than six months from the date of approval of the application. . respondent alleged that
this is contrary to law and further contended that contends that the taking or confiscation
of property is obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use
of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the
owner of all beneficial use of his property and stressed that the general welfare clause is
not available as a source of power for the taking of the property in this case because it
refers to "the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use
of liberty and property. After the examining the facts, respondent court ruled that The
power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit and declared the ordinance null
and void.
ISSUE: WON the trial court is correct in declaring the ordinance null and void?
HELD:
SC ruled that police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or
restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It
does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases
where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the
purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for
instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.
It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon
City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of
his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation. There
is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total
area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the
promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people.
The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of
building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to
private cemeteries.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the
respondent court is affirmed.
TAKING: DEPRIVATION OF USE
104 PHIL 443 (1958)
RP vs. FAJARDO *no digested case submitted*
193 SCRA 1 (1991)
NAPOCOR vs. GUTIERREZ
FACTS:
Plaintiff National Power Corporation, a government owned and
controlled entity, planned to construct 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines but the
lines have to pass the lands belonging to defendants Matias Cruz, Heirs of Natalia Paule
and spouses Misericordia Gutierrez and Ricardo Malit and filed an eminent domain
proceedings against the defendants.
The defendant spouses were authorized to withdraw the fixed
provisional value of their land in the sum of P973.00 by the court after NPC
deposited the amount upon filing the complaint. The only controversy existing
between the parties litigants is the reasonableness and adequacy of the
disturbance or compensation fee of the expropriated properties. the court
appointed three commissioners in determining the fair and just compensation
due the defendants.
With the reports submitted by the three commissioners and on the
evidence adduced by the defendants as well as the plaintiff for the purpose of
proving the fair market value of the property sought to be expropriated, the lower
court rendered a decision that National Power Corporation has to pay defendant
spouses Ricardo Malit and Misericordia Gutierrez the sum P5.00 per square
meter as the fair and reasonable market value of the 760 square meters
belonging to the said spouses and that decision was affirmed by the court of
appeals. ISSUE: WHETHER PETITIONER SHOULD BE MADE TO PAY
SIMPLE EASEMENT FEE OR FULL COMPENSATION FOR THE LAND
TRAVERSED BY ITS TRANSMISSION LINES HELD:
While it is true that plaintiff are (sic) only after a right-of-way
easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary
rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that below
said transmission lines no plant higher than three (3) meters is allowed.
Furthermore, because of the high-tension current conveyed through said
transmission lines, danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath said
wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it all plaintiff only pays the fee
to defendants once, while the latter shall continually pay the taxes due on said
affected portion of their property...............n the case at bar, the easement of
right-of- way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain.
Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay
transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for
an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use.........For
these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just
compensation, which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to
make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just
compensation has always been understood to be the just and complete
equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by
reason of the expropriation
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 170945, September 26, 2006
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. MARIA MENDOZA SAN PEDRO
FACTS:
The National Power Corporation (NPC) is a government-owned- and-controlled
corporation created to undertake the development of hydro-electric generation of power
and the production of electricity from any and all sources; and particularly the
construction, operation, and maintenance of power plants, auxiliary plants, dams,
reservoirs, pipes, mains, transmission lines, power stations and substations, and other
works for the purpose of developing hydraulic power from any river, lake, creek, spring
and waterfalls in the Philippines and supplying such power
to the inhabitants thereof.# Under Republic Act No. 6395, as
amended, the NPC is authorized to enter private property provided that the owners
thereof shall be indemnified for any actual damage caused thereby.
For the construction of its San Manuel-San Jose 500 KV Transmission Line and
Tower No. SMJ-389, NPC negotiated with Maria Mendoza San Pedro, then represented
by her son, Vicente, for an easement of right of way over her property, Lot No. 2076.
The property, which was partly agricultural and partly residential land, was located in
Barangay Partida, Norzagaray, Bulacan and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00386. On
June 19, 1997, Maria
executed a Right of Way Grant# in favor of NPC over the lot for P1,277,886.90. The
NPC paid her P524,635.50 for the damaged improvements thereon.
The payment voucher for the residential portion of the lot valued at P6,000,000.00
(at P600.00 per square meter) was then
processed.# However, the NPC Board of Directors approved Board Resolution No. 97-
246 stating that it would pay only P230.00 per sq m for the residential portion and
P89.00 per sq m for the agricultural portion.
On July 12, 1999, Atty. Baltazar and Engr. Cruz submitted their
report,# recommending as payment for just compensation P800.00 per sq m for the
residential lot and P700.00 per sq m for the agricultural lot. On October 28, 1999, the
RTC rendered
judgment,# declaring as well-grounded, fair and reasonable the compensation for the
property as recommended by Atty. Baltazar and Engr. Cruz.
ISSUE: Whether or not the just compensation was achieved with regards to the fair
market value of the residential and agricultural property?
HELD:
The trial court fixed the just compensation for the property as follows:
(1) P499.00 per sq m on the 17,195 sq m agricultural portion of the subject land;
and (2) P800.00 per sq m on the 6,565 sq m residential portion of the lot.
Noticeably, the trial court did not blindly accept the recommendation of majority
of the commissioners of P800.00 per sq m for the residential lot and P700.00 per
sq m for the agricultural lot. Indeed, the trial court took into account the evidence
of the parties, in tandem with the findings and recommendation of the majority of
the commissioners. Considering that such valuation of the trial court as affirmed
by the CA is reasonable as it is and supported by the evidence on record, we find
no compelling reason to disturb the same.
The constant loud buzzing and exploding sounds emanating from the
towers and transmission lines, especially on rainy days; the constant fear on the
part of the landowners that the large transmission lines looming not far above
their land and the huge tower in front of their lot will affect their safety and health;
and the slim chance that no one would be interested to buy the remaining
portions on each side of the residential lot affected by the project, to the damage
of the landowners, both as to future actual use of the land and financial gains to
be derived therefrom, makes the instant case fall within the ambit of
expropriation. FACTS: Military airplanes are subject to rules of Civil
Aeronautics Board. Respondents own 2.8 acres near an airport outside of
Greensboro, North Carolina. It has on it a dwelling house, and also various
outbuildings which were mainly used for raising chickens. The end of the airport's
northwest-southeast runway is 2,220 feet from respondents' barn and 2,275 feet
from their house United States began operations in May, 1942, its four-motored
328 U.S. 256, May 27, 1946
UNITED STATES v. CAUSBY
heavy bombers, other planes of the heavier type, and its fighter planes have frequently
passed over respondents' land buildings in considerable numbers and rather close
together. They come close enough at times to appear barely to miss the tops of the trees
and at times so close to the tops of the trees as to blow the old leaves off. The noise is
startling. And at night the glare from the planes brightly lights up the place. As a result of
the noise, respondents had to give up their chicken business. As many as six to ten of
their chickens were killed in one day by flying into the walls from fright. The total
chickens lost in that manner was about 150. Production also fell off. The result was the
destruction of the use of the property as a commercial chicken farm. Respondents are
frequently deprived of their sleep and the family has become nervous and frightened.
Although there have been no airplane accidents on respondents' property, there have
been several accidents near the airport and close to respondents' place
The United States relies on the Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat.
568, 49 U.S.C. 171 et seq., 49 U.S.C.A. 171 et seq., as amended by the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973, 49 U.S.C. 401 et seq., 49 U. S.C.A. 401 et
seq. Under those statutes the United States has 'complete and exclusive national
sovereignty in the air space' over this country. the planes never touched the
surface would be as irrelevant as the absence in this day of the feudal livery of
seisin on the transfer of real estate.
The Fifth Amendment provides that 'private property' shall not 'be
taken for public use, without just compensation.' The Court holds today that the
Government has 'taken' respondents' property by repeatedly flying Army
bombers directly above respondents' land at a height of eighty-three feet where
the light and noise from these planes caused respondents to lose sleep and their
chickens to be killed ISSUE: Whether respondents' property was taken within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment by frequent and regular flights of army and
navy aircraft over respondents' land at low altitudes. prohibition imposed by the
Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public
use without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the
Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the
power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the information
operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and
ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.
ISSUE: Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.
HELD:
The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to
compel print media companies to donate Comelec space amounts to taking of private
personal property without payment of the just compensation required in expropriation
cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been established by
respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell
advertising space. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the
constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772
does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at
bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private property
of newspaper or magazine publishers.
G.R. No. 137152 January 29, 2001
CITY OF MANDALUYONG vs. FRANCISCO
FACTS:
The petitioner sought to expropriate the three (3) adjoining land with and area of 1,847
sq. meter registered under the name of the defendants namely Francisco, Thelma,
Eusebio, Rodulfo, Antonio, and Virginia wherein they constructed residential houses
several decades ago which they had leased out to tenants until the present. In 1983, the
lots were classified by the Board of the Housing and Urban Development Council as an
Area of Priority Development for Urban Land Reform under Proclamation Number of
then President Marcos. As a result of this classification, the tenants and occupants
offered to purchase the lots but the respondents refused to sell. On November 1996,
upon petition of the Kapitbisig, an association of tenants and occupants of the subject
land adopted a resolution authorizing Mayor Abalos of the City of Mandaluyong to initiate
action for expropriation of the subject lots and construction of a medium-rise
condominium for qualified occupants of the land. On January 1996, Mayor Abalos
allegedly sent a letter to the respondents offering to purchase the said property at P3,
000.00 per sq. meter; respondents did not answer the letter. Petitioner thus prayed for
the expropriation of the said lots and the fixing of just compensation at the fair market
value of P3, 000.00 per sq. meter.
The respondents except Eusebio Aguilar who died in 1995, claimed that they did not
received a copy of Mayor Abalos letter to purchase their lots. They alleged that the
expropriation of their land is arbitrary and capricious, and is not for a public purpose; the
subject lots are their only real property and are too small for expropriation, while
petitioner has several properties inventoried for socialized housing; the fair market value
of P3,000.00 per square meter is arbitrary because the zonal valuation set by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue is P7,000.00 per square meter. On 1997, Petitioner filed an
amended complaint and named as an additional defendant Virginia Aguilar and at the
same time, substituted Eusebio Aguilar with his five (5) heirs. Petitioner also reduced the
area sought to be expropriated to 1, 636 square meters. The Trial Courts decision was
in favor of the respondents, dismiss the amended complaint and declared respondents
as small property owners whose land are exempt from expropriation under RA 7279.
Also found out that the
HELD:
The Constitution entrusts Congress with full power to control all navigable airspace.
Congress has already acted under that power. It has by statute, 44 Stat. 568, 52 Stat.
973, provided that 'the United States of America is ... to possess and exercise complete
and exclusive national sovereignty in the [328 U.S. 256, 272] air space (over) the United
States.' navigable airspace which Congress has placed in the public domain is 'airspace
above the minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority.
Airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public domain.
The contribution of courts must be made through the awarding of
damages for injuries suffered from the flying of planes, or by the granting of
injunctions to prohibit their flying
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Court
of Claims so that it may make the necessary findings in conformity with this
opinion.
244 SCRA 272; G.R. No. 119694; 22 May 1995
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing
newspapers to provide free Comelec space of not less than one- half page for
the common use of political parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall be
allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable
them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their
platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the
Commission for dissemination of vital election information.
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit
organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to
declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground
that it violates the expropriation was not for public purpose for petitioners failure
to present evidence that the intended beneficiaries of the expropriation are
landless and homeless.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the respondents are qualified as small property owners and are thus exempt from
expropriation under RA no. 7972.
2. W/N the subject property is the only real property of respondents for them to comply
with the second requisite for small property owners.
HELD:
The acquisition of lands for socialized housing are governed with
several provisions of the law. Thus, Section 9 and 10 of RA No. 7279 provides
for the priorities in the acquisition of lands and enumerates the type of lands to
be acquired and the hierarchy in their acquisition, and the modes of land
acquisition or the process of acquiring lands for socialized housing, respectively.
Under Section 9, lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in
the following order: (1) government lands; (2) alienable lands of the public
domain; (3) unregistered or abandoned or idle lands; (4) lands within the
declared Areas for Priority Development (APD), Zonal Improvement Program
(ZIP) sites, Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) sites which have not yet
been acquired; (5) BAgong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS
sites which have not yet been acquired; and (6) privately-owned lands.
There is no dispute that the two lots in litigation are privately- owned
and therefore last in the order of priority acquisition. However, the law also
provides that lands within the declared APD's which have not yet been acquired
by the government are fourth in the order of priority. According to petitioner, since
the subject lots lie within the declared APD, this fact mandates that the lots be
given priority in acquisition.
Also, Lands for socialized housing under Section 10 are to be
acquired in the following modes: (1) community mortgage; (2) land swapping, (3)
land assembly or consolidation; (4) land banking; (5) donation to the government;
(6) joint venture agreement; (7) negotiated purchase; and (8) expropriation. The
mode of expropriation is subject to two conditions: (a) it shall be resorted to only
when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted; (b) parcels of land
owned by small property owners are exempt from such acquisition.
These means that the types of lands that may be acquired in the
order of priority in Section 9 are to be acquired only in the modes authorized
under Section 10.
Petitioner claims that it had faithfully observed the different modes
of land acquisition for socialized housing under R.A. 7279 and adhered to the
priorities in the acquisition for socialized housing under said law. It, however, did
not state with particularity whether it exhausted the other modes of acquisition in
Section 10 of the law before it decided to expropriate the subject lots. The law
states "expropriation shall be resorted to when other modes of acquisition have
been exhausted." Petitioner alleged only one mode of acquisition, i.e., by
negotiated purchase. Petitioner, through the City Mayor, tried to purchase the
lots from respondents but the latter refused to sell. As to the other modes of
acquisition, no mention has been made. The Resolution of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod authorizing the Mayor of Mandaluyong to effect the expropriation of
the subject property did not even state whether the city government tried to
acquire the same by community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or
consolidation, land banking, donation to the government, or joint venture
agreement under Section 10 of the law. The law expressly exempted "small
property owners" from expropriation of their land for urban land reform.
Under Section 3 of RA 7279, Small-property owners" are defined
by two elements: (1) those owners of real property whose
property consists of residential lands with an area of not more than 300 square meters in
highly urbanized cities and 800 square meters in other urban areas; and (2) that they do
not own real property other than the same.
In the case at bar involves two (2) residential lots Mandaluyong
City, a highly urbanized City. The lot totalled 1, 636 square meters was issued in
the names of the herein five (5) respondents. The respondents are co-owners of
the said lot. Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, every co-owner has the absolute
ownership of his undivided interest in the common property. The co-owner is free
to alienate, assign or mortgage his interest, except as to purely personal rights.
He may also validly lease his undivided interest to a third party independently of
the other co-owners. The effect of any such transfer is limited to the portion
which may be awarded to him upon the partition of the property. The partition in
1998, six (6) months after the filing of the expropriation case, terminated the co-
ownership by converting into certain and definite parts the respective undivided
shares of the co-owners. The rights of the co-owners to have the property
partitioned and their share in the same delivered to them cannot be questioned
for "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership." The partition
was merely a necessary incident of the co-ownership; and absent any evidence
to the contrary, this partition is presumed to have been done in good faith. Upon
partition, only Eusebio Aguilar was granted 347 square meters, which is 47 sq.
meters more than the maximum of 300 square meters allowed by law set by RA
7279 for small property owners. However, after Eusebio died, his five heirs
became co-owners of his 347 square meter portion. Dividing the 347 square
meters among the five entitled each heir to 69.4 square meters of the land
subject of litigation. The share of each co-owner did not exceed the 300 square
meter limit set in R.A. 7279.
The second issue is whether the subject property is the only real
property of respondents for them to comply with the second requisite for small
property owners which Antonio Aguilar testified that he and most of the original
co-owners do not reside on the subject property but in their ancestral home in
Paco, Manila. Respondents therefore appear to own real property other than the
lots in litigation. Nonetheless, the records do not show that the ancestral home in
Paco, Manila and the land on which it stands are owned by respondents or
anyone of them. Petitioner did not present any title or proof of this fact despite
Antonio Aguilar's testimony. Respondents claim that the subject lots are their
only real property and that they, particularly two of the five heirs of Eusebio
Aguilar, are merely renting their houses and therefore do not own any other real
property in Metro Manila.
Finally, this court notes that the subject lots are now in the
possession of respondents. Antonio Aguilar testified that he and the other co-
owners filed ejectment cases against the occupants of the land before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Mandaluyong. Orders of eviction were issued and
executed on September 17, 1997 which resulted in the eviction of the tenants
and other occupants from the land in question.

GR No. 155746, October 3, 2004 LAGCAO vs. JUDGE LABRA * repeated case *
GR No. 152230, August 09, 2005 JIL vs. MUNICIP ALITY OF P ASIG *
repeated case *

PRIORITY IN EXPROPRIATION

284 SCRA 716 (1998)
FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Filstream is the registered owner of the subject land which filed an ejectment suit against
the occupants of the parcels of land on the grounds of termination of the lease contract
and non-payment of rentals. The MTC rendered decision in favor of the petitioner and
ordered private respondents to vacate the premises and pay back rentals to the
petitioner. The RTC and CA affirmed this decision. It was at this stage that respondent
City of Manila approved an Ordinance authorizing Mayor Lim to initiate the acquisition by
negotiation, expropriation, purchased and other legal means certain parcels of land
which formed part of the properties of the petitioner then occupied by private
respondents. The said properties were to be sold and to be distributed to the qualified
tenants of the area pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of
Manila. The Trial Court issued a writ of possession in favor of the City of Manila.
ISSUE: W/N the City of Manila complies with the conditions under RA No. 7279 when it
expropriated petitioner Filstream properties.
HELD:
The court found nothing that would indicate that respondent City of
Manila complied with Section 9 and 10 of RA No. 7279. Under Section 9, lands
for socialized housing are to be acquired in the following order: (1) government
lands; (2) alienable lands of the public domain; (3) unregistered or abandoned or
idle lands; (4) lands within the declared Areas for Priority Development (APD),
Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) sites, Slum Improvement and Resettlement
(SIR) sites which have not yet been acquired; (5) BAgong Lipunan Improvement
of Sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and (6)
privately-owned lands.
The provisions are the limitations with respect to the order of priority
in acquiring private lands and in resorting to expropriation. Private lands rank the
last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. Expropriation
proceedings are to be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have
been exhausted. Compliance with these conditions must be deemed mandatory
because these are the only safeguards on securing the right of owners of private
property to due process when their property is expropriated for public use.
Petitioner Filstreams properties were expropriated and ordered
condemned in favor of the City of Manila sans any showing that resort to the
acquisition of other lands listed under Section 9 of R.A. no. 7279 have proved
futile. There was a violation of Petitioner Filstreams right to due process which
must accordingly be ratified. The state has the paramount interest in exercising
his power of eminent domain for the general welfare considering that the right of
the State to expropriate private property as long as it is for public use always
takes precedence over the interest of private property owners. But we must not
lost sight of the fact that the individual rights affected by the exercise of such
rights are also entitled for protection, bearing in mind that the exercise of this
right cannot override the guarantee of due process extended by the law to
owners of the property to be expropriated.
PUBLIC USE
G.R. Nos. L-60549, 60553 to 60555 , October 26, 1983
HEIRS OF JUANCHO ARDONA VS. REYES
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction challenging the
constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 564, the Revised Charter of the Philippine
Tourism Authority, and Proclamation No. 2052 declaring the barangays of Sibugay,
Malubog, Babag and Sirao including the proposed Lusaran Dam in the City of Cebu and
in the municipalities of Argao and Dalaguete in the province of Cebu as tourist zones.
The petitioners ask that we restrain respondent Court of First Instance
of Cebu and the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) from enforcing and implementing the
writs of possession issued in four (4) expropriation cases filed by PTA against the
petitioners.
The Philippine Tourism Authority filed four (4) Complaints with the Court of First
Instance of Cebu City for the expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated
in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, under PTA's express authority "to acquire
by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any private land within and
without the tourist zones" for the purposes indicated in Section 5, paragraph B(2), of its
Revised Charter (PD 564), more specifically, for the development into integrated resort
complexes of selected and well-defined geographic areas with potential tourism value.
The defendants filed their respective Opposition with Motion to Dismiss and/or
Reconsideration. The defendants, now petitioners, had a common allegation in that the
taking is allegedly not impressed with public use under the Constitution. They further
alleged, in addition to the issue of public use, that there is no specific constitutional
provision authorizing the taking of private property for tourism purpose.
ISSUE: Whether expropriation of several barangays for provocation of tourism and
construction of sports and hotel complexes constitutes expropriation for public use.
HELD: YES. The petitioners' contention that the promotion of tourism is not
"public use" because private concessioners would be allowed to maintain various
facilities such as restaurants, hotels, stores, etc. inside the tourist complex is impressed
with even less merit. The expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban
development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private
homeowners, commercial firms, entertainment and service companies, and other private
concerns. Private bus firms, taxicab fleets, roadside restaurants, and other private
businesses using public streets end highways do not diminish in the least bit the public
character of expropriations for roads and streets. The lease of store spaces in
underpasses of streets built on expropriated land does not make the taking for a private
purpose. Airports and piers catering exclusively to private airlines and shipping
companies are still for public use.
G.R. No. L-48685, September 30, 1987
SUMULONG VS. GUERRERO
FACTS:
The National Housing Authority (NIIA) filed a complaint for
expropriation of parcels of land covering approximately twenty five (25) hectares,
(in Antipolo, Rizal) including the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia
Vidanes-Balaoing with an area of 6,667 square meters and 3,333 square meters
respectively. The land sought to be expropriated were valued by the NHA at one
peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting the market value fixed by the provincial
assessor in accordance with presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of
property in expropriation proceedings.
Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession
of the properties. The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the
Philippine National Bank, representing the "total market value" of the subject
twenty five hectares of land, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1224 which
defines "the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing
upon payment of just compensation."
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they
had been deprived of the possession of their property without due process of law.
This was however, denied.
Hence, this petition challenging the orders of respondent Judge and
assailing the constitutionality of Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended.
ISSUE: Whether socialized housing constitutes public use for purposes of
expropriation.
HELD: YES.
This Court is satisfied that "socialized housing" fans within the
confines of "public use". As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the
power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at
least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the
expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to
individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of
utilities and other private enterprise to the government. is accurate to state then
that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare
satisfies the requirement of public use
In the case at bar, the use to which it is proposed to put the subject
parcels of land meets the requisites of "public use". The lands in question are
being expropriated by the NHA for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Housing
Project to provide housing facilities to low-salaried government employees.
G.R. No. 103125, May 17, 1993 PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR VS.
COURT OF APPEALS FACTS:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur
passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor
to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in
order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops
and a housing project for provincial government employees.
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through
its Governor, Hon. Luis R.Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for expropriation
against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin.
The Province of Camarines Sur then filed a motion for the issuance
of writ of possession, but the San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing of the
motion.
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground
of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. The trial court denied the
motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount
of P5,714.00, the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for
damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation
cases do not prosper. The trial court issued a writ of possession.
The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order,
authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of their property
and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied.
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins
asked: (a) that Resolution No. 129 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared
null and void; (b) that the complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that
the order denying the motion to dismiss and allowing the Province of Camarines
Sur to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the order
denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They
also asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the
writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction.
In its answer to the petition, the Province of Camarines Sur claimed
that it has the authority to initiate the expropriation and that the expropriations are
for a public purpose.
Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor
General stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337),
there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor
General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of
petitioners for use as a housing project.
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying
the admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to
suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall
have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert
the classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-
agricultural land.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the expropriation of property intended for the establishment of a pilot
development center and housing project of the Province of Camarines Sur is in
consonance with the public purpose requirement of the Constitution.
HELD: YES. The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned
resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would
insure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines
Sur. Once operational, the center would make available to the community invaluable
information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately,
the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing
project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution. As held in
Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461, "Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in
housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public
health, safety, the environment and in sum the general welfare."
252 SCRA 412, 1996
MANOSCA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
A petition for review on certiorari, from the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 15
January 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 24969 (entitled Alejandro Manosca, et al. v. Hon.
Benjamin V. Pelayo, et al.) Wherein, Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P.
Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area of about four hundred
ninety-two (492) square meters. When the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have
been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed
Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260,
declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was, on 06
January 1986, approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports. Later, the
opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked on the legality of the measure. Thus the
assailment of this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the public use requirement of Eminent Domain is extant in the
attempted expropriation by the Republic of a 492-square-meter parcel of land so
declared by the National Historical Institute (NHI) as a national historical landmark.
HELD:
The term public use, not having been otherwise defined by the constitution, must be
considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a public exigency. The
validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional purposes is beyond
question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public use should



26


thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that public use is strictly limited
to clear cases of use by the public has long been discarded.
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states: The taking to be valid
must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning
should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must
be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise,
expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of
the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just
noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines
what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small
lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the
exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government.
It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed
for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.
Chief Justice Fernando, writing the ponencia in J.M. Tuason & Co. vs.
Land Tenure Administration, has viewed the Constitution a dynamic instrument
and one that is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically so as to enable it
to meet adequately whatever problems the future has in store. Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, a noted constitutionalist himself, has aptly observed that what, in fact,
has ultimately emerged is a concept of public use which is just as broad as
public welfare. Petitioners, finally, would fault respondent appellate court in
sustaining the trial courts order which considered inapplicable the case of Noble
v. City of Manila. Both courts held correctly. The Republic was not a party to the
alleged contract of exchange between the Iglesia ni Cristo and petitioners which
(the contracting parties) alone, not the Republic, could properly be bound.
All considered, the Court finds the assailed decision to be in accord
with law and jurisprudence. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. GR No.
137285, January 15, 2001 ESTATE OF JIMENEZ VS. PEZA FACTS:
On May 15, 1981, private respondent Philippines Export Processing
Zone (PEZA), then called as the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA),
initiated before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite expropriation proceedings on
three (3) parcels of irrigated riceland in Rosario, Cavite. One of the lots, Lot 1406
(A and B) of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, with an approximate area of
29,008 square meters, is registered in the name of Salud Jimenez under TCT
No. T-113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite.
More than ten (10) years later, the said trial court in an Order dated
July 11, 1991 upheld the right of private respondent PEZA to expropriate, among
others, Lot 1406 (A and B). Reconsideration of the said order was sought by
petitioner contending that said lot would only be transferred to a private
corporation, Philippines Vinyl Corp., and hence would not be utilized for a public
purpose.
In an Order dated October 25, 19997, the trial court reconsidered
the Order dated July 11, 1991 and released Lot 1406-A from expropriation while
the expropriation of Lot 1406-B was maintained. Finding the said order
unacceptable, private respondent PEZA interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals.
Meanwhile, petitioner wrote a letter to private respondent offering
two (2) proposals, namely: 1. Withdrawal of private respondent's appeal with
respect to Lot 1406-A I consideration of the waiver of claim for damages and lass
of income for the possession of said lot by private respondent.

2. The swap of Lot 1406-B with Lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772 since private
respondent has no money yet to pay for the lot.
Private respondent's Board approved the "proposal" and the compromise agreement
was signed by private respondent through its then administrator Tagumpay Jadiniano
assisted by Government Corporate Counsel Oscar I. Garcia. Said
compromise agreement
9
dated January 4, 1993 is quoted hereunder:
1. That plaintiff agrees to withdraw its appeal from the Order of the Honorable Court
dated October 25, 1991 which released lot 1406-A from the expropriation proceedings.
On the other hand, defendant Estate of Salud Jimenez agrees to waive, quit claim and
forfeit its claim for damages and loss of income which it sustained by person of the
possession of said lot by plaintiff from 1981 up to the present.
2. That the parties agree that defendant Estate of Salud Jimenez shall transfer lot 1406-
B with an area of 13,118 square meters which forms part of the lot registered under TCT
No. 113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite to the name of the plaintiff and the same
shall be swapped and exchanged with lot 434 with an area of 14,167 square meters and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14772 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite
which lot will be transferred to the name of Estate of Salud Jimenez.
3. That the swap arrangement recognized the fact that the lot 1406-B covered by TCT
No. T-113498 of the state of defendant Salud Jimenez is considered expropriated in
favor of the government based on Order of the Honorable Court dated July 11, 1991.
However, instead of being paid the just compensation for said lot, the estate of said
defendant shall be paid with lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772.
4. That the parties agree that they will abide by the terms of the foregoing agreement in
good faith and the Decision to be rendered based on this Compromise Agreement is
immediately final and executory.
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for the approval of the said
compromise agreement entered into between the parties, consequent with the
withdrawal of the appeal with the Court of Appeals. In the Order dated August 23, 1993,
the trial court approved the compromise agreement.
However, private respondent failed to transfer the title of Lot 434 to petitioner inasmuch
as it was not the registered owner of the covering TCT No. T-14772 but Progressive
Realty Estate, Inc. Thus, on March 13, 1997, petitioner Estate filed a "Motion to Partially
Annul the Order dated August 23, 1993."
In the Order dated August 4, 1997, the trial court annulled the said compromise
agreement entered into between the parties and directed private respondent to
peacefully turn over Lot 1406-A to the petitioner. Disagreeing with the said Order of the
trial court,
respondent PEZA moved
13
for its reconsideration. The same proved futile since the trial
court denied reconsideration in its
Order
14
dated November 3, 1997.
On December 4, 1997, the trial court, at the instance of petitioner, corrected the Orders
dated August 4, 1997 and November 3, 1997 by declaring that it is Lot 1406-B and Lot
1406-A that should be surrendered and returned to petitioner.
On November 27, 1997, respondent interposed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari and prohibition seeking to nullify the Orders dated August 4, 1997 and
November 3, 1997 of the

27


court. Petitioner filed its Comment
17
on January 16, 1998. ISSUE: The petition
anchored on the following assignment of errors:
1. Whether or not, the Court of Appeals committed grave and reversible error in giving
due course to the special Civil Action filed by respondent PEZA in CA-G.R. SP. No.
46112 when it was made substitute for lost appeal in clear contravention of the
Honorable Courts ruling in Sempio v. Court of Appeals (263 SCRA 617) and Ongsitco v.
Court of Appeals (255 SCRA 703) .
2. Granting in Gratia Argumenti that the Special Civil Action of Certiorari is proper, the
Court of Appeals nevertheless wrongly interpreted the phrase Original Demand
contained in Article 2041 of petitioner estate is the return of the subject lot (Lot 1406-B)
which sought to be expropriated and not the determination of just compensation for the
lot. Furthermore, even if the interpretation of the court of appeals or the import of the
phrase in question is correct, it is Article 2039 of the Civil Code and not Article 2041
which is applicable to compromise agreements approved by the courts.
HELD:
This court therefore finds that the Court of Appeals did not err in
interpreting "original demand" to mean the fixing of just compensation. The
authority of respondent and the nature of the purpose thereof have been put to
rest when the Expropriation Order dated July 11, 1991 became final and was
duly admitted by petitioner in the compromise agreement. The only issue for
consideration is the manner and amount of payment due to petitioner. In fact,
aside from the withdrawal of private respondent's appeal to the Court of Appeals
concerning Lot 1406- A, the matter of payment of just compensation was the only
subject of the compromise agreement dated January 4, 1993. Under the
compromise agreement, petitioner was supposed to receive respondent's Lot No.
434 in exchange for Lot 1406-B. When respondent failed to fulfill its obligation to
deliver Lot 434, petitioner can again demand for the payment but not the return of
the expropriated Lot 1406-B. This interpretation by the Court of Appeals is in
according with Section 4 to 8, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
This court holds that respondent has the legal authority to
expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B and that the same was for a valid public
purpose. In Sumulong v. Guerrero
41
, this Court has ruled that, the "public use"
requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and
evolving concept influenced by changing conditions.
We have rules that the concept of just compensation embraces not
only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land,
but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without
prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as the
property owner is made to suffer the consequences of being immediately
deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before
actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. We find that
respondent capriciously evaded its duty of giving what is due to petitioner. In the
case at bar, the expropriation order was issued by the trial court in 1991. The
compromise agreement between the parties was approved by the trial court in
1993. However, from 1993 up to the present, respondent has failed in its
obligation to pay petitioner to the prejudice of the latter. Respondent caused
damage to petitioner in making the latter to expect that it had a good title to the
property to be swapped with Lot 1406-B; and meanwhile, respondent has been
reaping benefits from the lease or rental income of the said expropriated lot.
However, it is high time that the petitioner be paid what was due him eleven
years ago. It is high time that the petitioner be paid what was due him eleven
years ago. It is arbitrary and capricious for a government agency to initiate
expropriation proceedings, seize a person's property, allow the judgment of the court to
become final and executory and then refuse to pay on the ground that there are no
appropriations for the property earlier taken and profitably used. Though the respondent
has committed a misdeed to petitioner, we cannot, however, grant the petitioner's prayer
for the return of the expropriated Lot No. 1406-B. The Order of expropriation dated July
11, 1991, has long become final and executory.
In view of all the foregoing, justice and equity dictate that this case be
remanded to the trial court for hearing of the expropriation proceedings on the
determination of just compensation for Lot 1406-B and for its prompt payment to
the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby denied. The Regional
Trial Court of Cavite City is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of the
expropriation proceedings, docketed as Civil Case No. N-4029, regarding the
determination of just compensation for Lot 1406-B, covered and described in
TCT No. T-113498-Cavite, and to resolve the same with dispatch. GR No.
147511, January 20, 2003 REYES VS. NHA FACTS: In 1977,
respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed separate complaints for the
expropriation of sugarcane lands, particularly Lot Nos. 6450, 6448-E, 6198-A and
6199 of the cadastral survey of Dasmarias, Cavite belonging to the petitioners,
before the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, and docketed as Civil Case
Nos. T.G.-392, T.G.-396 and T.G.-417. The stated public purpose of the
expropriation was the expansion of the Dasmarinas Resettlement Project to
accommodate the squatters who were relocated from the Metropolitan Manila
area. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots
and the payment of just compensation. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court
in a decision rendered on October 29, 1987 in the case of NHA vs. Zaballero
2
and which became final on November 26, 1987. On February 24, 1989,
the expropriation court (now Branch 18, Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City)
issued an Order
4
the dispositive portion of which reads: "WHEREFORE,
and resolving thus, let an Alias Writ of Execution be immediately issued and
that: (1) The Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite is hereby ordered to
transfer, in the name of the plaintiff National Housing Authority, the following:
(a) Transfer Certificate No. RT-638 containing an area of 79,167 square meters
situated in Barrio Bangkal, Dasmarias, Cavite; (b) Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-55702 containing an area of 20,872 square meters situated in Barrio
Bangkal, Dasmarias, Cavite; (c) Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-639 and
RT-4641 covering Lot Nos. 6198-A and 6199 with an aggregate area of 159,985
square meters also situated in Barrio Bangkal, Dasmarias, Cavite. (2) Plaintiff
National Housing Authority is likewise hereby ordered, under pain of contempt, to
immediately pay the defendants, the amounts stated in the Writ of Execution as
the adjudicated compensation of their expropriated properties, which process
was received by it according to the records, on September 26, 1988, segregating
therefrom, and in separate check, the lawyer's fees in favor of Atty. Bobby P.
Yuseco, in the amount of P322,123.05, as sustained by their contract as gleaned
from the records, with no other deduction, paying on its own (NHA) account, the
necessary legal expenses incident to the registration or issuance of new
certificates of title, pursuant to the provisions of the Property Registration Law
(PD 1529); (3) Defendants, however, are directed to pay the corresponding
capital gains tax on the subject properties, directing them



28
additionally, to coordinate with the plaintiff NHA in this regard, in order to facilitate the
termination of this case, put an end to this controversy and consign the same to its final
rest."
ISSUE: The petitioners raise the following assignment of errors:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals had decided a question of substance not in accord
with justice and equity when it ruled that, as the judgment of the expropriation
court did not contain a condition that should the expropriated property be not
used for the intended purpose it would revert to the condemnee, the action to
declare the forfeiture of rights under the expropriation judgment can not
prosper;
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals decided a question of substance not in accord with
jurisprudence, justice and equity when it ruled that the non-payment is not a
ground for forfeiture;
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not declaring the judgment of expropriation
forfeited in light of the failure of respondent to use the expropriated property for
the intended purpose but for a totally different purpose."
HELD:
The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides for the exercise of the power
of eminent domain over private properties upon payment of just compensation.
More specifically, section 9, Article III states that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation. The constitutional restraints are
public use and just compensation.
Petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the eminent domain
provision of the Constitution by contending that the contract for low cost housing
is a deviation from the stated public use. It is now settled doctrine that the
concept of public use is no longer limited to traditional purposes. Here, as
elsewhere, the idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by
the public" has been abandoned. The term "public use" has now been held to be
synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and "public
convenience."
The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation
which circumscribes the scope of government activities and public concerns and
which possesses big and correctly located public lands that obviate the need to
take private property for public purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the
Philippines. We have never been a laissez faire State. And the necessities which
impel the exertion of sovereign power are all too often found in areas of scarce
public land or limited government resources.
The act of respondent NHA in entering into a contract with a real
estate developer for the construction of low cost housing on the expropriated lots
to be sold to qualified low income beneficiaries cannot be taken to mean as a
deviation from the stated public purpose of their taking. Jurisprudence has it that
the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for
a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners,
commercials firms, entertainment and service companies, and other private
concerns.
Moreover, the Constitution itself allows the State to undertake, for the
common good and in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program
of urban land reform and housing which will make at affordable cost decent
housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban
centers and resettlement areas.
11
The expropriation of private property for the
purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in furtherance of the
social justice provision under Section 1, Article XIII of the Constitution which
provides that:
"SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good.
To this end, the State shall require the acquisition, ownership, use
and disposition of property and its increments."
THEREFORE, The appealed judgment is modified as follows: 1.
Ordering respondent National Housing Authority to pay
petitioners the amount of P1,218,574.35 with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum
computed from the taking of the expropriated properties in 1997 until the amount due
shall have been fully paid;
2. Ordering petitioners to pay the capital gains tax; and 3. Ordering petitioners to
surrender to respondent National Housing Authority the owners' duplicate certificates of
title of the expropriated properties upon full payment of just compensation.
268 SCRA 368
MODAY vs. COURT OF APPEALS *repeated case*
GOVVERNMENT WITHDRAWAL
GR No. 154411, June 19, 2003
NHA vs. HEIRS OF ISIDRO GUIVELONDO
FACTS:
On February 23, 1999, petitioner filed with the RTC of Cebu City, an Amended
Complaint for eminent domain against respondents. It alleged that defendant
Associacion Benevola de Cebu was the claimant of a Lot located in Banilad, Cebu City;
that defendant Engracia Urot was the claimant of parcels of Lots, in the same area; that
defendant Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo were claimants of lots in Carreta, Mabolo, Cebu
City; and that the lands are in the urban center which petitioner intends to develop as a
socialized housing project.
On November 12, 1999, the Heirs of Guivelondo filed a Manifestation waiving their
objections to petitioners power to expropriate their properties. Thus the RTC issued an
order to that effect. Thereafter, the RTC appointed three Commissioners to ascertain the
just compensation of the properties of respondents. The Commissioners submitted their
report recommending the just compensation be fixed at P11,200.00 per square meter,
which was favored by the RTC.
Petitioner, however, filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the implementation of its
socialized housing project was rendered impossible because the value of the land
sought to be expropriated was too high, and the intended beneficiaries cannot afford.
The Motion was denied since the prior case was decided on already.
After petitioners appeal was denied by the CA, the Landbank executed garnishment
proceedings against the funds of NHA.
ISSUES:
1. WON THE STATE CAN BE COMPELLED BY THE COURTS TO CONTINUE WITH
THE EXERCISE OF ITS INHERENT POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN;
2. WON JUDGMENT HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND IF ESTOPPEL
APPLIES TO GOVERNMENT;
3. WON WRITS OF EXECUTION AND GARNISHMENT MAY BE ISSUED AGAINST
THE STATE.
HELD:
There are two (2) stages in every action for expropriation. The first is concerned with
the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent
domain. The second is concerned with the determination by the Court of the just
compensation.
The outcome of the first phase is final since it disposes of the case. On the other
hand, the second phase fixes the amount of just compensation. Both orders, being final,
are however, appealable. Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is
taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use can no longer be questioned.
In the case at bar, petitioner did not appeal the Order of the RTC, which declared the
lawful right to expropriate the properties hence the Order became final.
Socialized housing has been recognized as public use for purposes of exercising the
power of eminent domain. The need to



29
provide housing to the urban poor was not lost by fact that the land cost more than
petitioner had expected. The public purpose of is not diminished by the amount of just
compensation the court has fixed.
On the issue of the garnishment against petitioners funds, there is a
need to determine if it is a government entity. Generally, funds and properties of
the government cannot be the object of garnishment proceedings.
However, if the funds belong to a public corporation or a GOCC with
a personality of its own, then its funds are not exempt from garnishment.
Hence, it is clear that NHA is not exempt from garnishment.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for
review is DENIED. GR No. 106804, August 12, 2004 NPC & POBRE vs.
CA FACTS:
Petitioner NPC is a public corporation created to generate
geothermal, hydroelectric, nuclear and other power and to transmit electric power
nationwide. NPC is authorized by law to exercise the right of eminent domain.
Private respondent Pobre is the owner of property located in Tiwi,
Albay.
In 1963, Pobre began developing the Property as a resort-
subdivision, which he named as Tiwi Hot Springs Resort Subdivision.
On August 1965, the Commission on Volcanology certified that
thermal mineral water and steam were present beneath the Property. The
commission found it suitable for domestic use and potentially for commercial or
industrial use.
NPC then became involved with Pobres Property in three instances.
First was on February 1972 when Pobre leased to NPC for one year
eleven lots frof the subdivision. Second was sometime in 1977, the first time that
NPC filed its expropriation case against Pobre to acquire an 8,311.60 sqm
portion of the Property. On 1979, the trial court ordered the expropriation of the
lots upon NPCs payment of P25/sqm. NPC began drilling operations and
construction of steam wells. While the first case was pending, NPC dumped
waste materials beyond the site agreed upon by NPC with Pobre. It altered the
topography o the Property. No action was done on Pobres complaints, dumping
continued. Third was on September 1979, when NPC filed its second
expropriation case. NPC needed more lots for the construction and maintenance
of a Well Site. NPC immediately deposited P5,546.36 with the Philippine National
Bank. The deposit represented 10% of the total market value of the lots covered
by the second expropriation. NPC entered the 5,554 sqm lot upon the trial courts
issuance of a writ of possession to NPC.
Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint and claimed
that NPC damaged his Property. He prayed for just compensation of all the lots
affected.
On April 1987, the trial court decided in favor of Pobre, ordered the
whole property to be paid off by NPC.
NPC filed its motion for reconsideration of the decision, which was
denied by the trial courts. NPC appealed to CA. CA upheld the trial courts
decision and denied NPCs motion for reconsideration. ISSUES: WON, CA
erred:
1. In holding that NPC had taken the entire Property of Pobre;;
2. In not excluding from the Property portions of which NPC had previously
expropriated and paid for;
3. In holding that the amount of just compensation fixed by the trial court at
P3,448,450.00 with interest from September 1979 until fully paid, is just and
fair;
4. In not holding that the just compensation should be fixed at P25/sqm only as what
had been previously agreed upon;
Even before the first case, Pobre had established his property as a resort-
subdivision. NPC had wrought so much damage to the property that it made it
uninhabitable as a resort-subdivision. Questions of facts are beyond the pale of the SC
as a petition for review may only raise questions of law. NPC points out that it did not
take Pobres 68,969 sqm property. NPC argues that assuming that it is liable for
damages, the 8,311.60 sqm portion that it had successfully expropriated and fully paid
for should have been excluded from the 68,969 sqm property that Pobre claims NPC
had damaged.
It was clearly established that the property originally had a total area of 141,300 sqm.
Pobre identified the lots forming the 68,969 sqm property that comprised the
undeveloped area. NPC had the opportunity to object to the identification of the lots, but
failed to do so. Thus, the trial and appellate courts finding on the total land area NPC
had damaged cannot be disturbed.
When possession of the land cannot be turned over to the landowner because it is
not anymore convenient or feasible to do so, the only remedy available to the aggrieved
landowner is to demand payment of just compensation.
In this case, the property is no longer habitable as a resort- subdivision. The Property
is worthless is now only useful to NPC. NPC moved for the dismissal of the complaint for
the second expropriation on the ground that it had found an alternative site and there
was stiff opposition from Pobre. NPC abandoned the second expropriation case five
years after it had already deprived the Property virtually of all its value. NPC has
demonstrated its utter disregard for Pobres property rights.
Thus, it would now be futile to compel NPC to institute expropriation proceedings to
determine the just compensation for Pobres 68,969 square-meter Property. Pobre must
be spared any further delay in his pursuit to receive just compensation from NPC. Just
compensation is the fair and full equivalent of the loss.
The lesson in this case must not be lost on entities with eminent domain authority.
Such entities cannot trifle with a citizens property rights. The power of eminent domain
is an extraordinary power they must wield with circumspection and utmost regard for
procedural requirements.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. RECOVERY OF
EXPROPRIATED LAND
GR No. 158563, June 30, 2005
ATO vs. GOPUCO
FACTS:
Respondent was the owner of lots consisting of 995 sqm located in
the vicinity of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. The airport had been turned over by
the U.S. Army to the Philippines sometime in 1947 through the Surplus Property
Commission. In 1947, the Commission was succeeded by the Bureau of
Aeronautics, which was supplanted by the National Airport Corporation (NAC).
The NAC was then dissolved and replaced with the Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA).
Sometime in 1949, the NAC informed the various lot-owners
surrounding the Lahug Airport, including respondent, that the government was
acquiring their lands for purposes of expansion. Some landowners sold their
properties on the assurance that they would be able to repurchase the same
when these would no longer be used by the airport. Others, including
respondent, refused to do so.
Thus, on April 1952, the CAA filed a complaint with the Court of First
Instance (CFI) for the expropriation of the lots, which the CFI decided in favor of
CAA. No appeal was made.
Subsequently, when the Mactan International Airport began
operations, the Lahug Airport was ordered closed by then President Aquino. On
March 1990, respondent wrote the manager of the Lahug Airport, seeking the
return of his lot and offered to return the money previously paid. This letter was
ignored.


HELD:

30

On 08 May 1992, ownership of the Lahug lots were transferred to FACTS:

Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA). Respondent filed recovery of
ownership of his Lot with the RTC of Cebu and maintained that since the Lahug Airport
has been closed, the purpose of the property had ceased and title to the property had
therefore reverted to him.
Respondent however failed to present evidence on entering the
previous compromise agreement made.
Lastly, Gopuco asserted that there were several announcements that
the Lahug Airport was soon to be developed into a commercial complex, which
he took to be a scheme of the Province of Cebu to make permanent the
deprivation of his property.
The RTC dismissed the complaint and directed the respondent to pay
exemplary damages, litigation expenses and costs.
Aggrieved by the decision, respondent appealed to CA, which
overturned the RTC decision, ordered petitioners to reconvey lots to respondent
upon payment of the reasonable price as determined by it, and deleted the costs
of damages. ISSUES:
1. WON THE CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT HAS THE RIGHT TO
RECLAIM OWNERSHIP OF THE LOT.
2. WON THE CA ERRED IN DELETING THE AWARD OF LITIGATION EXPENSES
AND COSTS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERS.
HELD:
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple,
unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the
former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned
or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the
estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.
It was ruled that a compromise agreement, when not contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, is a valid contract which is
the law between the parties. Indeed, anyone who is not a party to a contract or
agreement cannot be bound by its terms, and cannot be affected by it. Since
respondent was not a party to the compromise agreements, he cannot legally
invoke the same.
Eminent domain is generally described as the highest and most
exact idea of property remaining in the government that may be acquired for
public purpose through a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State.
Also often referred to as expropriation or condemnation, it is, like police power
and taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty and need not be clothed with any
constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject
are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power.
The only direct constitutional qualification is thus that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. This prescription is
intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse. In this case, the
judgment on the propriety of the taking of the compensation received have long
become final. Neither has respondent, in the present case, adduced any
evidence at all concerning a right of repurchase in his favor.
The trial court was thus correct in denying respondents claim.
However, the petitioners claim of harassment or that the respondent acted in
bad faith is unfounded, the imposition of litigation expenses and costs has no
basis. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. GENUINE NECESSITY
G.R. No. 161656. June 29, 2005 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
VICENTE G. LIM
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) instituted a special civil action for
expropriation with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No.
781, involving Lots 932 and 939 of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for
the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. Lot 932 was
registered in the name of Gervasia Denzon under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
14921 with an area of 25,137 square meters, while Lot 939 was in the name of Eulalia
Denzon and covered by TCT No. 12560 consisting of 13,164 square meters.
After depositing P9,500.00 with the Philippine National Bank, pursuant to the Order
of the CFI dated October 19, 1938, the Republic took possession of the lots. Thereafter,
or on May 14, 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the
Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation.
The Denzons interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals but it was dismissed
For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, the Denzons successors-in-interest,
Francisca Galeos-Valdehueza and Josefina Galeos-Panerio, filed with the same CFI an
action for recovery of possession with damages against the Republic and officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines in possession of the property. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. R-7208.
In the interim, TCT Nos. 23934 and 23935 covering Lots 932 and 939 were issued
in the names of Francisca Valdehueza and Josefina Panerio, respectively. Annotated
thereon was the phrase subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation to
acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and 939 upon previous payment of a reasonable
market value.
The CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that
they are the owners and have retained their right as such over Lots 932 and 939
because of the Republics failure to pay the amount of P4,062.10, adjudged in the
expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on their land titles, they
were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic. In view of the
differences in money value from 1940 up to the present, the court adjusted the market
value at P16,248.40, to be paid with 6% interest per annum from April 5, 1948, date of
entry in the expropriation proceedings, until full payment.
After their motion for reconsideration was denied, Valdehueza and Panerio
appealed from the CFI Decision, in view of the amount in controversy, directly to this
Court. The case was docketed as No. L-21032. On May 19, 1966, this Court rendered its
Decision affirming the CFI Decision. It held that Valdehueza and Panerio are still the
registered owners of Lots 932 and 939, there having been no payment of just
compensation by the Republic. Apparently, this Court found nothing in the records to
show that the Republic paid the owners or their successors-in- interest according to the
CFI decision. While it deposited the amount of P9,500,00, and said deposit was
allegedly disbursed, however, the payees could not be ascertained.
Meanwhile, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim, herein
respondent, as security for their loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he
had the mortgage foreclosed in 1976. Thus, TCT No. 23934 was cancelled, and in lieu
thereof, TCT No. 63894 was issued in his name.
Respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 10, Cebu City, against General Romeo Zulueta, as Commander of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, Commodore Edgardo Galeos, as Commander of Naval
District V of the Philippine Navy, Antonio Cabaluna, Doroteo Mantos and Florencio
Belotindos, herein petitioners. Subsequently, he amended the complaint to implead the
Republic.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, thus declaring plaintiff Vicente Lim
the absolute and exclusive owner of Lot No.

31
932 with all the rights of an absolute owner including the right to possession. The
monetary claims in the complaint and in the counter claims contained in the answer of
defendants are ordered Dismissed.
Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, docketed
therein as CA-G.R. CV No. 72915. In its Decision dated September 18, 2003, the
Appellate Court sustained the RTC Decision, thus:
An action to quiet title is a common law remedy for the removal of
any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property. It is essential for the
plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or equitable title or interest in the real
property, which is the subject matter of the action. Also the deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as cloud on plaintiffs title must
be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy (Robles vs. Court of Appeals, 328 SCRA 97). In view of
the foregoing discussion, clearly, the claim of defendant-appellant Republic
constitutes a cloud, doubt or uncertainty on the title of plaintiff-appellee Vicente
Lim that can be removed by an action to quiet title.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and finding no reversible
error in the appealed May 4, 2001 Decision of Branch 9, Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-12701, the said decision is UPHELD AND
AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. ISSUE:
The basic issue is whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932
despite its failure to pay respondents predecessors-in-interest the just
compensation HELD:
From the taking of private property by the government under the
power of eminent domain, there arises an implied promise to compensate the
owner for his loss
Significantly, the above-mentioned provision of Section 9, Article III
of the Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power. This limiting function is
in keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of Rights against the arbitrary exercise
of governmental powers to the detriment of the individuals rights. Given this
function, the provision should therefore be strictly interpreted against the
expropriator, the government, and liberally in favor of the property owner.
Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings
does not vest the condemnor until the judgment fixing just compensation is
entered and paid, but the condemnors title relates back to the date on which the
petition under the Eminent Domain Act, or the commissioners report under the
Local Improvement Act, is filed.
Clearly, without full payment of just compensation, there can be no
transfer of title from the landowner to the expropriator. Otherwise stated, the
Republics acquisition of ownership is conditioned upon the full payment of just
compensation within a reasonable time
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 72915 is AFFIRMED G.R. No. 72126, January 29, 1988
MUNICIPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the resolution dated April 24,1985 by the
former Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, setting aside its earlier
decision dated January 10, 1985 and dismissing the special civil action for expropriation
filed by the petitioner.
with the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an application for a
permit to fence a parcel of land with a width of 26.8 meters and a length of 184.37
meters covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 215165 and 37879. The fencing of
said property was allegedly to enable the storage of the respondent's heavy equipment
and various finished products such as large diameter steel pipes, pontoon pipes for
ports, wharves, and harbors, bridge components, pre-stressed girders and piles, large
diameter concrete pipes, and parts for low cost housing.
The Municipal Council of Meycauayan, headed by then Mayor Celso R. Legaspi,
passed Resolution No. 258, Series of 1975, manifesting the intention to expropriate the
respondent's parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 37879.
An opposition to the resolution was filed by the respondent with the Office of the
Provincial Governor, which, in turn, created a special committee of four members to
investigate the matter.
The Special Committee recommended that the Provincial Board of Bulacan
disapprove or annul the resolution in question because there was no genuine necessity
for the Municipality of Meycauayan to expropriate the respondent's property for use as a
public road.
On the basis of this report, the Provincial Board of Bulacan passed Resolution No.
238, Series of 1976, disapproving and annulling Resolution No. 258, Series of 1975, of
the Municipal Council of Meycauayan. The respondent, then, reiterated to the Office of
the Mayor its petition for the approval of the permit to fence the aforesaid parcels of land.
However, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, now headed by Mayor Adriano D.
Daez, passed Resolution No. 21, Series of 1983, for the purpose of expropriating anew
the respondent's land. The Provincial Board of Bulacan approved the aforesaid
resolution on January 25, 1984.
Thereafter, the petitioner, on February 14, 1984, filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch VI, a special civil action for expropriation.
Upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00, which is the market value of the land,
with the Philippine National Bank, the trial court on March 1, 1984 issued a writ of
possession in favor of the petitioner.
The trial court issued an order declaring the taking of the property as lawful and
appointing the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan as court commissioner who shall hold the
hearing to ascertain the just compensation for the property.
The respondent went to the Intermediate Appellate Court on petition for review. The
appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. However, upon motion for
reconsideration by the respondent, the decision was re-examined and reversed. The
appellate court held that there is no genuine necessity to expropriate the land for use as
a public road as there were several other roads for the same purpose and another more
appropriate lot for the proposed public road. The court, taking into consideration the
location and size of the land, also opined that the land is more Ideal for use as storage
area for respondent's heavy equipment and finished products.
ISSUE: Whether the Municipality of Meycauayan was right to exercise its power of
eminent domain to expropriate the respondent's property for use as a public road?
HELD:
This Court held that the foundation of the right to exercise the power of eminent
domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character.
Condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a
genuine necessity of a public character. Consequently, the courts have the power to
inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine
whether there is a genuine necessity thereof. There is absolutely no showing in the
petition
Respondent Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation filed


32

why the more appropriate lot for the proposed road which was offered for sale has not
been the subject of the petitioner's attempt to expropriate assuming there is a real need
for another connecting road.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The questioned
resolution of the respondent court is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. L-51078, October 30, 1980
CRISTINA DE KNECHT, vs. HON. PEDRO JL. BAUTISTA
FACTS:
A petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed by Cristina de
Knecht against the Honorable Pedro JL. Bautista, as Judge presiding over
Branch III of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasay City), and the Republic of
the Philippines pines seeking that judgment be rendered annulling the order for
immediate possession issued by respondent court in the expropriation
proceedings and commanding respondents to desist from further proceedings in
the expropriation action or the order for immediate possession issued in said
action, with costs.
And that a restraint order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued
ex-parte enjoining respondents, their representative representative and agents
from enforcing the here questioned order for mediate posession petitioner
offering to post a bond executed to the parties enjoined in an amount to be fixed
by the Court to the effect that she will pay to such parties all damages which they
may sustain by reason of the injunction if the Court should finally decide she is
not entitled there.
Ten years ago, the government through the Department of Public
Workmen's and Communication prepared a to Epifanio de los Santos Avenue
(EDSA) to Roxas Boulevard; that the proposed extension, an adjunct of building
program, the project would pass through Cuneta Avenue up to Roxas Boulevard
that this route would be a straight one taking into account the direction of EDSA.
Then Secretary Baltazar Aquino of the Department of Public Highways directed
the City Engineer of Pasay City not to issue temporary or permanent permits for
the construction and/or improvement of buildings and other structures located
within the proposed extension through Cuneta Avenue.
Department of Public Highways decided to make the proposed
extension go through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets which are lined with
old substantial houses; that upon learning of the changed the owners of the
residential houses that would be affected, the herein petitioner being one of
them.
Petitioner filed a formal petition to President Ferdinand E. Marcos
asking him to order the Ministry of Public Highways to adoption, the original plan
of making the extension of EDSA through Araneta Avenue instead of the new
plan going through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets; that President Marcos
directed then Minister Baltazar Aquino to explain within twenty-four (24) hours
why the proposed project should not be suspended.
Minister Aquino submitted his explanation defending the new
proposed route; that the President then referred the matter to the Human
Settlements Commission for investigation and recommendation; that after formal
hearings to which all the parties proponents and oppositors were given full
opportunity to ventilate their views and to present their evidence, the Settlements
Commission submitted a report recommending the reversion of the extension of
EDSA to the original plan passing through Cuneta Avenue; and that
notwithstanding the said report and recommendation, the Ministry of Public
Highways insisted on implementing the plan to make the extension of EDSA go
through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets.
The Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for the issuance of a
writ of possession of the property sought to be expropriated on the ground that
said Republic had made the required deposit with the Philippine National Bank.
The respondent judge issued a writ of possession authorizing the Republic of the
Philippines to take and enter upon the possession of the properties sought be
condemned.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the plan to make the extension of EDSA to Roxas Boulevard through
Fernando Rein and Del Pan Street be made?
2. Whether the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in allowing the
Republic of the Philippines to take immediate possession of the properties
sought to be expropriated?
HELD:
From all the foregoing, the facts of record and recommendations of the Human
Settlements Commission, it is clear that the choice of Fernando Rein Del Pan Streets
as the line through which the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue should be extended to
Roxas Boulevard is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. The respondent
judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in allowing the Republic of the Philippines
to take immediate possession of the properties sought to be expropriated.
The petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby granted. The order authorizing the
Republic of the Philippines to take or enter upon the possession of the properties sought
to be condemned is set aside and the respondent Judge is permanently enjoined from
taking any further action except to dismiss said case.
GR No. 87351, February 12, 1990
RP vs. DE KNECHT *no case digest submitted*
G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006
LOURDES DE LA PAZ MASIKIP vs. HON. MARIETTA A. LEGASPI
FACTS:
Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a
parcel of land with an area of 4,521 square meters located at Pag-Asa,
Caniogan, Pasig City , Metro Manila. In a letter dated January 6, 1994, the then
Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig, respondent, notified petitioner of its
intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her property to be used
for the "sports development and recreational activities" of the residents of
Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993
enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig . Again, on March 23, 1994,
respondent wrote another letter to petitioner, but this time the purpose was
allegedly "in line with the program of the Municipal Government to provide land
opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community." On May 2, 1994,
petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the intended expropriation of her
property is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area of her lot is
neither sufficient nor suitable to "provide land opportunities to deserving poor
sectors of our community." In its letter of December 20, 1994, respondent
reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of petitioners property is "to
provide sports and recreational facilities to its poor residents."
Subsequently, on February 21, 1995, respondent filed with the trial
court a complaint for expropriation, docketed as SCA No. 873. Respondent
prayed that the trial court, after due notice and hearing, issue an order for the
condemnation of the property; that commissioners be appointed for the purpose
of determining the just compensation; and that judgment be rendered based on
the report of the commissioners.
On May 7, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to
Dismiss, on the ground that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate the
property for the sports and recreational activities of the residents of Pasig . As to
the issue of just compensation, the trial court held that the same is to be


33
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING OF RULE ON
ACTIONABLE DOCUMENTS TO THE DOCUMENTS ATTACHED TO RESPONDENT
CITY OF PASIG S COMPLAINT DATED 07 APRIL 1995 TO JUSTIFY THE COURT A
QUOS DENIAL OF PETITIONERS RESPONSIVE PLEADING TO THE
COMPLAINT FOR EXPROPRIATION (THE MOTION TO DISMISS DATED 21
APRIL 1995).
domain to local government units and lays down the parameters for its exercise, thus:
Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the following areas of
concern: (a) the adequacy of the compensation, (b) the necessity of the taking, and (c)
the public use character of the purpose of the taking.
In this case, petitioner contends that respondent City of Pasig


determined in accordance with the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court in its Order of July 31, 1996.
Forthwith, it appointed the City Assessor and City Treasurer of Pasig City as
commissioners to ascertain the just compensation. This prompted petitioner to file with
the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
41860. On October 31, 1997, the Appellate Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution dated November 20, 1998.
ISSUES: THE QUESTIONED DECISION DATED 31 OCTOBER 1997 (ATTACHMENT
"A") AND RESOLUTION DATED 20 NOVEMBER 1998 (ATTACHMENT "B") ARE
CONTRARY TO LAW, THE RULES OF COURT AND JURISPRUDENCE
CONSIDERING THAT:
I A. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT THERE IS GENUINE NECESSITY
FOR THE TAKING OF THE PETITIONERS PROPERTY. B. THERE IS NO
EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT THE PUBLIC USE REQUIREMENT FOR THE
EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN HAS BEEN COMPLIED
WITH. C. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT RESPONDENT CITY OF
PASIG HAS COMPLIED WITH ALL CONDITIONS PRECEDENT FOR THE EXERCISE
OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN. THE COURT A QUOS ORDER DATED 07
MAY 1996 AND 31 JULY 1996, WHICH WERE AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS, EFFECTIVELY AMOUNT TO THE TAKING OF
PETITIONERS PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW: II prescribes the
delegation by Congress of the power of eminent
failed to establish a genuine necessity which justifies the III condemnation of her
property. While she does not dispute the
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE RULE ON
HYPOTHETICAL ADMISSION OF FACTS ALLEGED IN A COMPLAINT
CONSIDERING THAT THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY PETITIONER IN THE
EXPROPRIATION CASE BELOW WAS THE RESPONSIVE PLEADING REQUIRED
TO BE FILED UNDER THE THEN RULE 67 OF THE RULES OF COURT AND NOT
AN ORIDNARY MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 16 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
intended public purpose, nonetheless, she insists that there must be a genuine necessity
for the proposed use and purposes. Evidently, there is no "genuine necessity" to justify
the expropriation.
The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from "the
necessity" and the taking must be limited to such necessity. In City of Manila v. Chinese
Community of Manila, we held that the very foundation of the right to exercise eminent
domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a
HELD: public character. Moreover, the ascertainment of the necessity
On the two main issues one substantive and one procedural
Petitioner filed her Motion to Dismiss the complaint for
expropriation on April 25, 1995. It was denied by the trial court on May 7,
1996. At that time, the rule on expropriation was governed by Section 3, Rule 67
of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:
"SEC. 3. Defenses and objections. Within the time specified in the
summons, each defendant, in lieu of an answer, shall present in a single motion
to dismiss or for other appropriate relief, all his objections and defenses to the
right of the plaintiff to take his property for the use or purpose specified in the
complaint. All such objections and defenses not so presented are waived. A copy
of the motion shall be served on the plaintiffs attorney of record and filed with the
court with proof of service."
The motion to dismiss contemplated in the above Rule clearly
constitutes the responsive pleading which takes the place of an answer to the
complaint for expropriation. Such motion is the pleading that puts in issue the
right of the plaintiff to expropriate the defendants property for the use specified in
the complaint. All that the law requires is that a copy of the said motion be served
on plaintiffs attorney of record. It is the court that at its convenience will set the
case for trial after the filing of the said pleading.
must precede or accompany and not follow, the taking of the land. Applying this
standard, we hold that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a
genuine necessity to expropriate petitioners property. Our scrutiny of the records shows
that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council dated November 20,
1994, the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993 authorizing the
expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound
Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of
Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous of
having their own private playground and recreational facility. Petitioners lot is the
nearest vacant space available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically
public.

34
The Court of Appeals therefore erred in holding that the motion to dismiss filed by
petitioner hypothetically admitted the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint,
"specifically that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioners property for
public use." What the trial court should have done was to set the case for the reception
of evidence to determine whether there is indeed a genuine necessity for the taking of
the property, instead of summarily making a finding that the taking is for public use and
appointing commissioners to fix just compensation.
Significantly, the above Rule allowing a defendant in an expropriation case to file a
motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer was amended by the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which took effect on July 1, 1997. Section 3, Rule 67 now expressly
mandates that any objection or defense to the taking of the property of a defendant must
be set forth in an answer.
The fact that the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision in CA- G.R. SP No. 41860
on October 31, after the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect, is of no moment. It is
only fair that the Rule at the time petitioner filed her motion to dismiss should govern.
The new provision cannot be applied retroactively to her prejudice.
We now proceed to address the substantive issue. The power of eminent domain is
lodged in the legislative branch of the government. It delegates the exercise thereof to
local government units, other public entities and public utility corporations, subject only
to Constitutional limitations. Local governments have no inherent power of eminent
domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute. Section 19 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160)
Unless the requisite of genuine necessity for the expropriation of ones property is
clearly established, it shall be the duty of the courts to protect the rights of individuals to
their private property. Important as the power of eminent domain may be, the inviolable
sanctity which the Constitution attaches to the property of the individual requires not only
that the purpose for the taking of private property be specified. The genuine necessity for
the taking, which must be of a public character, must also be shown to exist.
The petition for review is GRANTED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41860 are REVERSED. The complaint for
expropriation filed before the trial court by respondent City of Pasig , docketed as SCA
No. 873, is ordered DISMISSED.
JUST COMPENSATION: DEFINED
G.R. No. 146062, June 28, 2001
SANTIAGO ESLABAN, JR. vs. CLARITA VDA. DE ONORIO
FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Surallah,
South Cotabato, ordering the National Irrigation Administration (NIA for brevity) to
pay respondent the amount of P107,517.60 as just compensation for the taking
of the latters property.
Respondent Clarita Vda. de Enorio is the owner of a lot in Barangay
M. Roxas, Sto. Nio, South Cotabato with an area of 39,512 square meters. On
October 6, 1981, Santiago Eslaban, Jr., Project Manager of the NIA, approved
the construction of the main irrigation canal of the NIA on the said lot, affecting a
24,660 square meter portion thereof. Respondents husband agreed to the
construction of the NIA canal provided that they be paid by the government for
the area taken after the processing of documents by the Commission on Audit.
Sometime in 1983, a Right-of-Way agreement was executed between
respondent and the NIA (Exh. 1). The NIA then paid respondent the amount of
P4,180.00 as Right-of-Way damages. Respondent subsequently executed an
Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees whereby she waived any compensation for
damages to crops and improvements which she suffered as a result of the
construction of a right-of-way on her property (Exh. 2). The same year, petitioner
offered respondent the sum of P35,000.00 by way of amicable settlement
pursuant to Executive Order No. 1035, 18, which provides in part that
Financial assistance may also be given to owners of lands acquired
under C.A. 141, as amended, for the area or portion subject to the reservation
under Section 12 thereof in such amounts as may be determined by the
implementing agency/instrumentality concerned in consultation with the
Commission on Audit and the assessors office concerned.
Respondent demanded payment for the taking of her property, but
petitioner refused to pay. Accordingly, respondent filed on December 10, 1990 a
complaint against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, praying that
petitioner be ordered to pay the sum of P111,299.55 as compensation for the
portion of her property used in the construction of the canal constructed by the
NIA, litigation expenses, and the costs.
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor-General, filed an Answer,
in which he admitted that NIA constructed an irrigation canal over the property of
the plaintiff and that NIA paid a certain landowner whose property had been
taken for irrigation purposes, but petitioner interposed the defense that: (1) the
government had not consented to be sued; (2) the total area used by the NIA for
its irrigation canal was only 2.27 hectares, not 24,600 square meters; and (3)
respondent was not entitled to compensation for the taking of her property
considering that she secured title over the property by virtue of a homestead
patent under C.A. No. 141.
At the pre-trial conference, the following facts were stipulated upon:
(1) that the area taken was 24,660 square meters; (2) that it was a portion of the
land covered by TCT No. T-22121 in the name of respondent and her late
husband (Exh. A); and (3) that this area had been taken by the NIA for the
construction of an irrigation canal.
On October 18, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the defendant,
National Irrigation Administration, to pay to plaintiff the sum of One Hundred Seven
Thousand Five Hundred Seventeen Pesos and Sixty Centavos (P107,517.60) as just
compensation for the questioned area of 24,660 square meters of land owned by plaintiff
and taken by said defendant NIA which used it for its main canal plus costs.
On November 15, 1993, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on
October 31, 2000, affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
ISSUES:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION IS DISMISSIBLE FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY
WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5, RULE 7 OF THE REVISED RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE. 2. WHETHER OR NOT LAND GRANTED BY VIRTUE OF A
HOMESTEAD PATENT AND SUBSEQUENTLY REGISTERED UNDER
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1529 CEASES TO BE PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE VALUE OF JUST COMPENSATION SHALL BE
DETERMINED FROM THE TIME OF THE TAKING OR FROM THE TIME OF THE
FINALITY OF THE DECISION. 4. WHETHER THE AFFIDAVIT OF WAIVER OF
RIGHTS AND FEES EXECUTED BY RESPONDENT EXEMPTS PETITIONER FROM
MAKING PAYMENT TO THE FORMER.
HELD:
First. Rule 7, 5 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure provides
Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under
oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not
theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any
court, tribunal or quasi- judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a
complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn
that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report the
fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and
after hearing....
By reason of Rule 45, 4 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, in relation to
Rule 42, 2 thereof, the requirement of a certificate of non-forum shopping applies to the
filing of petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of the Court of Appeals, such as
the one filed by petitioner.
As provided in Rule 45, 5, "The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the
foregoing requirements regarding . . . the contents of the document which should
accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof."
The requirement in Rule 7, 5 that the certification should be executed by the plaintiff
or the principal means that counsel cannot sign the certificate against forum-shopping.
The reason for this is that the plaintiff or principal knows better than anyone else whether
a petition has previously been filed involving the same case or substantially the same
issues. Hence, a certification signed by counsel alone is defective and constitutes a valid
cause for dismissal of the petition.
In this case, the petition for review was filed by Santiago Eslaban, Jr., in his capacity
as Project Manager of the NIA. However, the verification and certification against forum-
shopping were signed by Cesar E. Gonzales, the administrator of the agency. The real
party-in-interest is the NIA, which is a body corporate. Without being duly authorized by
resolution of the board of the corporation, neither Santiago Eslaban, Jr. nor Cesar E.
Gonzales could sign the certificate against forum-shopping accompanying


TRIAL COURT RULING: In view of the foregoing, decision is
35
the petition for review. Hence, on this ground alone, the petition
should be dismissed.
Second. Coming to the merits of the case, the land under litigation,
as already stated, is covered by a transfer certificate of title registered in the
Registry Office of Koronadal, South Cotabato on May 13, 1976. This land was
originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. (P-25592) P-9800 which was
issued pursuant to a homestead patent granted on February 18, 1960. We have
held:
Whenever public lands are alienated, granted or conveyed to
applicants thereof, and the deed grant or instrument of conveyance [sales patent]
registered with the Register of Deeds and the corresponding certificate and
owners duplicate of title issued, such lands are deemed registered lands under
the Torrens System and the certificate of title thus issued is as conclusive and
indefeasible as any other certificate of title issued to private lands in ordinary or
cadastral registration proceedings.
The Solicitor-General contends, however, that an encumbrance is
imposed on the land in question in view of 39 of the Land Registration Act (now
P.D. No. 1529, 44) which provides:
Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of
registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a
certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same free from all
encumbrances except those noted on said certificate, and any of the following
encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely:
Third. Any public highway, way, private way established by law, or
any government irrigation canal or lateral thereof, where the certificate of title
does not state that the boundaries of such highway, way, irrigation canal or
lateral thereof, have been determined.
As this provision says, however, the only servitude which a private
property owner is required to recognize in favor of the government is the
easement of a "public highway, way, private way established by law, or any
government canal or lateral thereof where the certificate of title does not state
that the boundaries thereof have been pre-determined." This implies that the
same should have been pre-existing at the time of the registration of the land in
order that the registered owner may be compelled to respect it. Conversely,
where the easement is not pre-existing and is sought to be imposed only after
the land has been registered under the Land Registration Act, proper
expropriation proceedings should be had, and just compensation paid to the
registered owner thereof.6
In this case, the irrigation canal constructed by the NIA on the
contested property was built only on October 6, 1981, several years after the
property had been registered on May 13, 1976. Accordingly, prior expropriation
proceedings should have been filed and just compensation paid to the owner
thereof before it could be taken for public use.
Indeed, the rule is that where private property is needed for
conversion to some public use, the first thing obviously that the government
should do is to offer to buy it. If the owner is willing to sell and the parties can
agree on the price and the other conditions of the sale, a voluntary transaction
can then be concluded and the transfer effected without the necessity of a
judicial action. Otherwise, the government will use its power of eminent domain,
subject to the payment of just compensation, to acquire private property in order
to devote it to public use.
Third. With respect to the compensation which the owner of the
condemned property is entitled to receive, it is likewise settled that it is the
market value which should be paid or "that sum of money which a person,
desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not compelled to
sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefore." Further, just
compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the
land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for then the
property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived
of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually
receiving
the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Nevertheless, as noted in Ansaldo v.
Tantuico, Jr., there are instances where the expropriating agency takes over the
property prior to the expropriation suit, in which case just compensation shall be
determined as of the time of taking, not as of the time of filing of the action of eminent
domain.
Before its amendment in 1997, Rule 67, 4 provided: Order of condemnation.
When such a motion is overruled or when any party fails to defend as required by this
rule, the court may enter an order of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a
lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as
of the date of
the filing of the complaint. . . . It is now provided that SEC. 4. Order of
expropriation. If the objections to and the
defense against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, or
when no party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order
of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought
to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the
payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the
property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first.
A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any
party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from
determining the just compensation to be paid.
After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to dismiss or
discontinue the proceeding except on such terms as the court deems just and equitable.
(Emphasis added)
Thus, the value of the property must be determined either as of the date of the taking
of the property or the filing of the complaint, "whichever came first." Even before the new
rule, however, it was already held in Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgos that
the price of the land at the time of taking, not its value after the passage of time,
represents the true value to be paid as just compensation. It was, therefore, error for the
Court of Appeals to rule that the just compensation to be paid to respondent should be
determined as of the filing of the complaint in 1990, and not the time of its taking by the
NIA in 1981, because petitioner was allegedly remiss in its obligation to pay respondent,
and it was respondent who filed the complaint. In the case of Burgos , it was also the
property owner who brought the action for compensation against the government after
25 years since the taking of his property for the construction of a road.
Indeed, the value of the land may be affected by many factors. It may be enhanced
on account of its taking for public use, just as it may depreciate. As observed in Republic
v. Lara:
[W]here property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the
value thereof may be enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by
the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its value thereby; or there may have
been a natural increase in the value of the property from the time it is taken to the time
the complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of private property
should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his
compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the
actual value of his property at the time it is taken. This is the only way that compensation
to be paid can be truly just, i.e., "just" not only to the individual whose property is taken,
"but to the public, which is to pay for it" . . . .
In this case, the proper valuation for the property in question is P16,047.61 per
hectare, the price level for 1982, based on the appraisal report submitted by the
commission (composed of the provincial treasurer, assessor, and auditor of South
Cotabato) constituted by the trial court to make an assessment of the expropriated land
and fix the price thereof on a per hectare basis.14


Fourth. Petitioner finally contends that it is exempt from paying
36
any amount to respondent because the latter executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights
and Fees of any compensation due in favor of the Municipal Treasurer of Barangay Sto.
Nio, South Cotabato . However, as the Court of Appeals correctly held:
[I]f NIA intended to bind the appellee to said affidavit, it would not
even have bothered to give her any amount for damages caused on the
improvements/crops within the appellees property. This, apparently was not the
case, as can be gleaned from the disbursement voucher in the amount of
P4,180.00 (page 10 of the Folder of Exhibits in Civil Case 396) issued on
September 17, 1983 in favor of the appellee, and the letter from the Office of the
Solicitor General recommending the giving of "financial assistance in the amount
of P35,000.00" to the appellee.
Thus, We are inclined to give more credence to the appellees
explanation that the waiver of rights and fees "pertains only to improvements and
crops and not to the value of the land utilized by NIA for its main canal."15
The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION to the extent that the just compensation for the contested
property be paid to respondent in the amount of P16,047.61 per hectare, with
interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of taking
until full payment is made. Costs against petitioner. GR No. 146062, June 28,
2001 RP VS IAC FACTS:
A property consisting of 4 parcels of land with a total area of 9,650 square meters
was the subject of expropriation. Its previous owner, Avegon Inc., offered it for sale to
the City School Board of Manila on July 21, 1973 at P2, 300,000. The school board was
willing to buy at P1, 800,000 but the then Mayor of Manila intervened and volunteered to
negotiate with Avegon Inc. for a better price. On June 3, 1974, Avegon Inc. sold the
property and its improvements to Amerex Electronics Phils. Corporation for P1,
800,000.00. On August 29, 1975, the Solicitor General filed for the Department of
Education and Culture (DEC) a complaint against Amerex for the expropriation of said
property before the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 99190). The
complaint stated that the property was needed by the government as a permanent site
for the Manuel de la Fuente High School. The fair market value of the property had been
declared by Amerex as P2, 435,000, and the assessor determined the market value as
P2, 432,042. The assessed amount for taxation purposes is P1, 303,470 and was
deposited with the PNB on September 30, 1975. The Government was able to take
actual possession of the property on October 13, 1975. Amerex then filed a motion to
dismiss citing the issue on just compensation to be fixed at P2, 432,042, the market
value of the property determined by the assessor which was lower than Amerex's own
declaration. The motion to dismiss was opposed by the plaintiff saying that they can
present evidence of a much lower market value. Amerex then filed a motion to withdraw
the deposit of P1,303,470 with the PNB without the plaintiff opposing provided that an
order of condemnation be issued to allow plaintiff to present evidence on the matter of
just compensation. On March 12, 1976, the plaintiff filed a motion for leave of court to
amend its complaint stating that after it had filed the same, P.D. No. 464was amended
by P.D. No. 794 and that the amended complaint would state that the fair market value
of the property could not be in excess of P1,800,000, the amount for which defendant's
predecessor-in- interest had offered to sell said properties to the Division of Public
Schools of Manila and which amount was also the purchase price paid by Amerex to
Avegon Inc. This was denied by the lower court, but after the plaintiff filed a motion for
reconsideration, the lower court admitted the amended complaint on April 27, 1976.
Audited financial statements were submitted by Amerex and the statements yielded the
amount of P2, 258,018.48 as the total value of the property. On October 18, 1976, the
plaintiff filed a
motion to disqualify Engineer Aurelio B. Aquino as commissioner on the ground that he
could not be expected to be unbiased inasmuch as in the three appraisal reports
submitted by Amerex. Amerex opposed the motion to disqualify Aquino as
commissioner, and the court, in its order of November 5, 1976, denied it. The
commissioner then filed his appraisal for the fair market value of the property which is
P2, 258,018.57 for purposes of determining just compensation payable to defendant
AMEREX. The plaintiff objected the report and reiterated that the value should be only
P1, 800, 00.00. Basing it on the evidence, the court ruled to fix the market value at of
P2,258.018.57 for just compensation, hence the plaintiff elevated the case to the then
Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) for review.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent Court erred in not disqualifying Commissioner Aurelio B.
Aquino from membership in the Committee of Appraisal.
2. Whether or not respondent Court erred in totally disregarding petitioner's evidence
showing that the award of just compensation should be only P1, 800,000.00.
HELD:
1. No, the court did not err in not disqualifying Commissioner Aquino. The report of the
commissioners is merely advisory and recommendatory in character as far as the
court is concerned. The court may choose to take action or to set aside the report
or appoint new commissioners, hence it really does not matter if the
commissioner had a pre conceived and biased valuation of the property. The
determination of just compensation for a condemned property is basically a
judicial function and not bound by its Commissioners.
2. No, the Court did not err in disregarding 's evidence showing that the award of just
compensation should be only P1, 800,000.00. Petitioner failed to substantiate its
claim that the property is worth lower than P1, 800,000 basing it on the value
when it was first offered for sale to the City School Board of Manila. The
appraisal made by Ampil Realty and Appraisal Co., Inc. on June 5, 1975, which
date is nearest to that of the actual taking of the property, should be the basis for
the determination of just compensation the record being bereft of any indications
of anomaly appertaining thereto. Wenceslao Ampil, the president of said
appraisal firm, also had testified at the trial and therefore petitioner had the
opportunity to confront him and to question his report.
WHEREFORE, the just compensation of the property expropriated for the use of the
Manuel de la Fuente High School Don Mariano Marcos Memorial High School) is hereby
fixed at Two Million Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,400,000.00). After deducting the
amount of P1, 303,470.00 therefrom, the petitioner shall pay the balance with legal
interest from October 13, 1975.
December 19, 2005
RP VS GINGOYON
FACTS:
The construction of the NAIA 3 had spawned controversies that had its roots with the
promulgation of the Courts decision in Agan vs PIATCO (2003 decision), which nullified
the contract between the Government and the contractor (PIATCO) for being contrary to
law and public policy. At the time of the promulgation of the 2003 decision, the NAIA 3
facilities had already been built by PIATCO and were nearing completion. and several
respondents filed their respective motions for the reconsideration of the 2003 Decision
but were denied by the Court in its Resolution dated 21 January 2004. However, the
Court this time squarely addressed the issue of the rights of PIATCO to refund,
compensation or reimbursement for its expenses in the construction of the NAIA 3
facilities. After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have
remained in the possession of PIATCO. On December 21, 2004, the Governmentfiled a
Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay City Regional Trial Court (RTC).The



37


Government sought for the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take
immediate possession and control over the NAIA 3 facilities. The Government also
declared that it had deposited 3 Billion in cash with the Land Bank of the Philippines,
representing the assessed value for taxation purposes. This was the case now presided
by Honorable Gingoyon. On the same day that the complaint was filed, the RTC issued
an Order directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the Government, authorizing it
to "take or enter upon the possession" of the NAIA 3 facilities. This decision was based
on Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which prescribes that the
initial deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of
taxation, however this was amended by Republic Act No. 8974. RA 8974 provides that
as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value of the property as
stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or
structures using the replacement cost method. On the basis of RA 8974, the RTC
directed first, that the Land Bank of the Philippines, Baclaran Branch, immediately
release the amount of US$62,343,175.77 to PIATCO. Second, the Government was
directed to submit to the RTC a Certificate of Availability of Funds signed by authorized
officials to cover the payment of just compensation. Third, the Government was directed
"to maintain, preserve and safeguard" the NAIA 3 facilities or "perform such as acts or
activities in preparation for their direct operation" of the airport terminal, pending
expropriation proceedings and full payment of just compensation. The Government was
also not allowed to perform acts of ownership like leasing any part of NAIA 3 to other
parties. The Government then filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration on the
assailed January 4, 2005 order. On 7 January 2005, the RTC issued another Order, the
second now assailed before this Court, which appointed 3 Commissioners to ascertain
the amount of just compensation for the NAIA 3 Complex. And on the same day the
Government issued a Motion for Inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon. These motions were heard
by the RTC but were denied in an Omnibus Order dated January 10, 2005. Thus the
present petition for Certiorari for the nullification of the RTC orders dated January 4, 7
and 10, 2005 and for the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon from taking further action on the
expropriation case.
ISSUE:
Whether Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the expropriation
proceedings in this case
HELD:
Rep. Act No. 8974 applies in this case, particularly insofar as it
requires the immediate payment by the Government of at least the proffered
value of the NAIA 3 facilities to PIATCO and provides certain valuation standards
or methods for the determination of just compensation.
Since funds have been spent by PIATCO in their construction, for the
to take over the said facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as builder
of the said structures. The compensation must be just and in accordance with
law and equity for the government cannot unjustly enrich itself at the expense of
PIATCO and its investors.
Sec 2 Rule 67, states that plaintiff shall have the right to take or
enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the
authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value
of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the
orders of the court.
In contrast, Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8974 relevantly states: Upon
the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the defendant, the
implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property the amount
equivalent to the sum of one hundred percent of the value of the property based
on the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; and
the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under Section 7.
If Sec2 Rule 67 applies then PIATCO would be enjoined from
receiving a single centavo as just compensation before the
Government takes over the NAIA 3 facility by virtue of a writ of
possession. Hence the Court ruled that just compensation should be made
before the Government may take over the NAIA 3.
GR No. 148512, June 26, 2006
CMSR. OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS CENTRAL LUZON DRUG CORPORATION
FACTS:
From January 1995 to December 1995, Central Luzon Drug
Corporation has been granting 20% discount on the sale of medicines to qualified
senior citizens amounting to P219,778.00. Pursuant to Revenue Regulations No.
2-94 implementing R.A. No. 7432, which states that the discount given to senior
citizens shall be deducted by the establishment from its gross sales for value-
added tax and other percentage tax purposes, respondent deducted the total
amount of P219, 778.00 from its gross income for the taxable year 1995.
Subsequently on December 27, 1996, the Central Luzon Drug Corporation
claimed for a tax credit amounting to P150, 193.00 (P219, 778.00 20% sales
discount given to senior citizen P69, 585.00 income tax).
Since the Commissioner of Internal Revenue was not able to decide
the claim for refund on time, respondent filed a Petition for Review with the Court
of Tax Appeals (CTA) on March 18, 1998. However, this was dismissed by CTA
declaring that even if the 20% sales discount is granted to senior citizens as a
credit, this cannot be applied when there is no tax liability or the tax credit is
greater than the tax due. The respondent then filed with the CA a petition for
Review on August 3, 2000. The petition for the P 150, 193.00 tax credit was
granted and the decision of the CTA set aside, thus this instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether the 20% sales discount granted by respondent to qualified
senior citizens pursuant to Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432 may be claimed as a tax
credit or as a deduction from gross sales in accordance with Sec. 2(1) of
Revenue Regulations No. 2-94. HELD: The 20% sales discount given to
senior citizens may be claimed as a tax credit and not as a deduction from the
gross sales. Wherefore the petition is DENIED and the decision of the CA
is AFFIRMED. Legal Basis: Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432 provides: Sec.
4. Privileges for the Senior citizens. The senior citizens shall be entitled to the
following:
(a) The grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to
utilization of transportations services, hotels and similar lodging establishments,
restaurants and recreation centers and purchase of medicines anywhere in the country:
Provided, that private establishments may claim the cost as tax credit.
The above provision explicitly employed the word tax credit. Nothing in the
provision suggests for it to mean a deduction from gross sales. To construe it
otherwise would be a departure from the clear mandate of the law.
It is a fundamental rule in statutory construction that the legislative intent must be
determined from the language of the statute itself especially when the words and
phrases therein are clear and unequivocal. The statute in such a case must be taken to
mean exactly what it says. Its literal meaning should be followed to depart from the
meaning expressed by the words is to alter the


38
statute.
The tax credit benefit granted to the establishments can be deemed as their just
compensation for private property taken by the State for public use. The privilege
enjoyed by the senior citizens does not come directly from the State, but rather from the
private establishments concerned.
GR No. 148083, July 21, 2006
CMSR. OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS BICOLANDIA DRUG CORP. *no case digest
submitted*
The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees
constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this
court inutile in a matter which under the constitution is reserved to it for final
determination. The courts task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of
the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor and its choice must be
limited to the lower of the two. However, the strict application of the decrees during the
proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or a charade.the court cannot
exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair. The court is
empowered to appoint commissioners to assess the just compensation of these
properties under eminent domain proceedings in order for the owner of the property is
entitled to recover the fair and full value of the lot. In fine, the decree only establishes a
uniform basis for determining just compensation which the court may consider as one of
the factors in arriving at just compensation, as envisage in the constitution. The
executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a
party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights, no statute, decree or
executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the courts
findings. The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial
function.
We, therefore, hold that P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the courts discretion to
appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and
void.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The temporary restraining order issued on February 16, 1982 is LIFTED and SET
ASIDE.
263 SCRA 708
PANES vs. VISAYAS STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE *no case digest
submitted
195 SCRA 59
BELEN vs. CA
FACTS:
JUST COMPENSATION: COMPENSATION
149 SCRA 305 (1987)
EPZA vs. DULAY
FACTS:
DETERMINATION
OF JUST
On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued
Proclamation No. 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain
situated in the city of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu and covering a total
area of 1,193,669 square meters, more or less, for the establishment of an export
processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA).
Not all the reserved area, however, was public land. it included four
parcel of land registered in the name of private individual. The petitioner,
therefore offered to purchase the parcels of land from the respondent in
accordance with the valuation set forth in section 92, Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 464, as amended. The parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the
sale of the property.
The petitioner filed with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch Lapu-Lapu City, a complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of possession against the private respondent, to expropriate
the parcel of land in pursuant to P.D. 66, as amended, which empowers the
petitioner to acquire by condemnation proceedings any property for the
establishment of export processing zones in relation to Proclamation No. 1811.
On October 21, 1980, the respondent judge issued a writ of
possession authorizing the petitioner to take immediate possession of the
premises. On December 23, 1980, the private respondent filed its answer.
At the pre-trial conference, the respondent judge issued an order
stating that the parties have agreed that the only issue to be resolved is the just
compensation for the properties and that the pre-trial is thereby terminated and
the hearing on the merits is set on April 2, 1981.
The respondent judge issued the order appointing certain persons as
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the
properties sought to be expropriated.
Subsequently the three commissioners submitted their consolidated
report recommending a certain amount of P15.00 per square meter as the fair
and reasonable value of just compensation of the properties.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order and
objection to commissioners report on the grounds that P.D. No 1533 has
superseded Sections 5 to 8 Rule 67 of the rules of court on the ascertainment of
just compensation must not exceed the maximum amount set by P.D. No. 1533.
In addition the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
temporary restraining order, enjoining the trial court from enjoining the order.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 of the revised rules of court
had been repealed or deemed amended by P.D. NO. 1533 insofar as
appointment of commissioners are concerned. Stated in another way, is the
exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in P.D. NO.
1533 valid and constitutional?

A small portion of land measuring a hundred (100) square meters, more or less,
belonging to the Manotoc Services, Inc. was leased to Pedro M. Belen. That piece of
land is known as Lot No. 10, Block 18 and is situated at Sunog Apog, Tondo, Manila. On
it stood a house built by Belen.
Part of the land came to be occupied by Alfredo Juliano and his family in the early part of
1978; Juliano bought a house standing thereon, not belonging to Belen, and move in
without the latters knowledge. On learning of this, Belen had a talk with Juliano, and
they came to an agreement that Juliano could continue staying on the land temporarily
and would pay one half of the rental to Manotoc Reality, inc. Later a fire razed both
Belens and Julianos houses to the ground. Belen told Juliano not to build anything on
the land anymore. However, on julianos pleas, Belen acceded to Julianos continued
stay on the land on the explicit condition that his occupancy should not be longer than
two and a half years. When Juliano failed to leave the premises after the stipulated term
despite demand, Belen brought suit in the Metropolitan Trial Court sometime in
September, 1982, and succeeded in obtaining judgment dated September 5, 1984, a
order of the MTC to the defendant to vacate the subject lot and pay plaintiff the amount
of P3,000.00 as a attorneys fees, plus cost of suit.
Juliano appealed to the Regional Trial Court of manila. That court reversed the judgment
of the Metropolitan Trial Court, but the decision was made to rest on the expropriation of
the Manotoc Estate effected by Presidential Decree No. 1670, where the Manotoc
Reality Incorporated ceased to be the owner of the land. Belen has perfected an appeal
by certiorari to SC and prays for judgment on the following essential propostions that
Manotoc Reality Services has been denied of its right of just compensation, not having
receive any money as payment for the subject property, and the NHA not having taken
possession thereof in an appropriate action of eminent domain.
HELD:



39

ISSUE: Is the passage of Presidential Decree No. 1670 constitutional, whereas it
disregarded the right of compensation and due process of law?
HELD:
Presidential Decree No 1670, together with the companion decree,
numbered 1669 was struck down by this court as unconstitutional and therefore,
null and void. The Court found that both decrees, being violative of the
petitioners (owners) right to due process of law.
The court said on the determination of just compensation: The
decrees do not by themselves, provide for any form of hearing or procedure by
which the petitioners can question the propriety of the expropriation of their
properties or the reasonableness of the just compensation.
Having failed to provide for a hearing, the government should have
filed an expropriation case under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, PD 1670 being void ab initio, all acts done in reliance
thereon and in accordance therewith must also be viod ab initio, including
particularly the taking of possession of property by the National Housing
Authority and its attempts to convert the same into a housing project and the
selection of the beneficiaries thereof.
The decision of the Court of Appeals of October 2, 1986 and that of
Regional Trial Court thereby affirmed, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and the
decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court(Branch VII), Manila, rendered on
September 5, 1984 in Civil Case No. 078756-cv is REINSTATED AND
AFFIRMED, with cost against the private respondents. SO ORDERED. 227
SCRA 401 REPUBLIC VS CA *no case digest submitted* 206 SCRA 196
MANILA ELECTRIC CO. VS. PINEDA *no case digest submitted* 263
SCAR 758 DAR VS. CA *no case digest submitted* G. R. No. L-57524
January 8, 1986 REPUBLIC VS.,SANTOS FACTS: The case is an
expropriation case which involved the 66,096 square meters of land claimed by
44 persons, located in Paranaque and Muntinlupa, Rizal. The expropriation was
necessary for the widening of, and construction of interchanges in the Manila
South Diversion Road. The Appraisal Committee for the province of Rizal fixed at
forty pesos (P40) per square meter, or an amount of P2, 641,190. The
Government deposited that amount with the provincial treasurer who deposited it
in the Philippine National Bank but some of the respondents withdrew including
Maura Santos. The Court of First Instance at Pasig, Rizal in its order of June 19,
1969 granted the fiscal's motion fixing the provisional value at P2, 641,190.
Fourteen (14) claimants did not object to the valuation of P40 a square meter. As
to those who did not settle at the price of P40 a square meter, the trial court,
pursuant to section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, appointed three
commissioners to determine the just compensation: Benjamin Morales for the
court as chairman; Pacifico Javier, the provincial assessor, for the Republic, and
Pacifico I. Guzman for the claimants. The commissioners in their report dated
October 2, 1970 recommended that the just compensation for the lands should
be P100 a square meter except the land of Maura Santos with an area of 25,909
square meters. The trial court in its decision dated May 13, 1972 modified that
recommendation. It fixed P100 a square meter as the uniform price to be paid to
the claimants. The Court of Appeals in
its decision of June 29, 1981 in turn modified the trial court's decision and adopted the
commissioners' report and it added 6% legal rate of interest.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the just compensation to be paid by the Government is 40 or 100, as
recommended by the commissioners.
2. Whether or not the Appellate Court erred in not holding that the commissioners should
not have relied on the price of P100 for the land of Jose Alcaraz which was sold in
November, 1969 and on other irrelevant evidence.
3. Whether or not Appellate Court erred in disregarding the fact that 14 out of the 44
claimants already sold their lots to the Republic at P40 a square meter.
HELD:
We hold that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in relying on the
commissioners' report whose recommendation was not substantiated by trustworthy
evidence. As pointed out by the Assistant Solicitor General, the appraisal of P100 a
square meter for the land of Alcaraz was made about eight months after the filing of the
instant expropriation case. In Presidential Decree No. 1533 provides that just
compensation should be the value of the land "prior to the recommendation or decision
of the appropriate Government office to acquire the property." In the case, it should be
noted that the expropriation undeniably increased the value of the remainder of her land
with an area of 121,700 square meters. She was already paid P1, 036,360 for her
expropriated land.
Furthermore, the commissioners should not have glossed over the undisputed fact
that 14 claimants out of 44 had winningly sold their lands to the Government at P40 a
square meter as fixed by the provincial Appraisal Committee of which the provincial
assessor was a member. Evidently, they were satisfied that that was a reasonable price.
According to section 8 of Rule 67, the court is not bound by the commissioners' report. It
may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the
property essential to the exercise of his right of condemnation, and to the defendant just
compensation for the property expropriated.
As noted in the Velasquez case, the moment a parcel of land is sought to be
condemned, the price, for some occult reason, immediately soars far beyond what the
owner would think of asking or receiving in the open market. Owners ask fabulous prices
for it and neighbours look on with an indulgent smile or even persuade themselves that
the land is worth the price for which the owner holds out in view of the fact that it is
wanted by an entity whose financial resources are supposed to be inexhaustible.
Consequently, the petitioner should pay only P40 per square meter for the expropriated
lands. CMC (CMS) Investments, Inc. was paid P35 a square meter for its 530 square
meters. It is entitled to a deficiency on which 6% legal rate of interest per annum should
be paid from the time the petitioner took possession of its land up to the date of
payment. The decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are reversed and set
aside. The just compensation for the lands described in paragraph 2 of petitioner's
complaint is forty pesos (P40) per square meter.
GR No. 170422, March 07, 2008
SPS. LEE VS LBP *please read full text*
JUST COMPENSATION: WHEN DETERMINED
G. R. No. L-50147 August 3, 1990
ANSALDO VS. TANTUICO
FACTS:



40
Two lots of private ownership were taken by the Government and used for the widening
of a road for more than forty-three years, without benefit of an action of eminent domain
or agreement with its owners. The owners of the land are Jose Ma. Ansaldo and Maria
Angela Ansaldo, are covered by title in their names and have an aggregate area of
1,041 square meters. These lots were taken from the Ansaldos sometime in 1947 by the
Department of Public Work Transportation and Communication and made part of what
used to be Sta. Mesa Street and is now Ramon Magsaysay Avenue at San Juan, Metro
Manila. The said owners did not make any action until twenty six years later asking for
the compensation of their land. The case was referred to the Secretary of Justice who
rendered an opinion that the just compensation be made in accordance with Presidential
Decree 76 which provide that the basis for the payment of just compensation of property
taken for public use should be the current and fair market value thereof as declared by
the owner or administrator, or such market value as determined by the assessor,
whichever was lower. Commissioner of Public Highways requested the Provincial
Assessor of Rizal to make a redetermination of the market value of the Ansaldos'
property in accordance with PD 76. The new valuation was made, after which the
Auditor of the Bureau of Public Highways forwarded the Ansaldos' claim to the Auditor
General with the recommendation that payment be made on the basis of the current and
fair market value and not on the fair market value at the time of taking. The Commission
on Audit declined the recommendation and decided that the compensation be from the
actual time of the taking of the land.
ISSUE: (As to the precise time the just compensation be based) Whether or not the just
compensation be based on the time of the actual taking of the possession or PD 76.
HELD:
In the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, there
is a taking when the owner is actually deprived or dispossessed of his property;
when there is a practical destruction or a material impairment of the value of his
property or when he is deprived of the ordinary use thereof. There is a taking in
this sense when the expropriator enters private property not only for a
momentary period but for a more permanent duration, for the purpose of devoting
the property to a public use in such a manner as to oust the owner and deprive
him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. For ownership, after all, "is nothing
without the inherent rights of possession, control and enjoyment. Where the
owner is deprived of the ordinary and beneficial use of his property or of its value
by its being diverted to public use, there is taking within the Constitutional sense.
Under these norms, there was undoubtedly a taking of the Ansaldos' property
when the Government obtained possession thereof and converted it into a part of
a thoroughfare for public use.
It is as of the time of such a taking, to repeat, that the just
compensation for the property is to be established. As stated in Republic v.
Philippine National Bank;
When plaintiff takes possession before the institution of the
condemnation proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking
of said possession, not of filing of the complaint and the latter should be the basis
for the determination of the value, when the taking of the property involved
coincides with or is subsequent to, the commencement of the proceedings.
Indeed, otherwise, the provision of Rule 69, Section 3, directing that
compensation be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint' would
never be operative. As intimated in Republic v. Lara (supra), said provision
contemplates normal circumstances, under which the complaint coincides or
even precedes the taking of the property by the plaintiff.
The reason for the rule, as pointed out in Rpublic v. Larae, is that;
Where property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the
value thereof may be enchanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the
entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its value thereby;
or, there may have been a natural increase in the value of the property from the
time the complaint is filed, due to general
economic conditions. The owner of private property should be
compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation
shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his
property at the time it is taken. This is the only way that compensation to be paid can be
truly just i.e.,"just; not only to the individual whose property is taken but, to the public,
which is to pay for it.
Clearly, then, the value of the Ansaldos' property must be ascertained as of the year
1947, when it was actually taken, and not at the time of the filing of the expropriation
suit, which, by the way, still has to be done. It is as of that time that the real measure of
their loss may fairly be adjudged. The value, once fixed, shall earn interest at the legal
rate until full payment is effected, conformably with other principles laid down by case
law. The petition is denied and the challenged decision of the Commission on Audit is
affirmed, and the Department of Public Works and Highways is directed to forthwith
institute the appropriate expropriation action over the land in question so that the just
compensation due its owners may be determined in accordance with the Rules of Court,
with interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of taking until
full payment is made.
G.R. No. 170846 February 6, 2007
NAPOCOR, vs. TIANGCO
FACTS:
Respondents are owners of a parcel of land with an area of 152,187 square meters
at Barangay Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal.
NPC requires 19,423 square meters of the respondents aforementioned property,
across which its 500Kv Kalayaan-San Jose Transmission Line Project will traverse.
NPCs Segregation Plan# for the purpose shows that the desired right-of-way will cut
through the respondents land. Within the portion sought to be expropriated stand fruit-
bearing tress, such as mango, avocado, jackfruit, casuy, santol, calamansi, sintones and
coconut trees.
After repeated unsuccessful negotiations, NPC filed an expropriation complaint
against the land of the respondent in the RTC of Tanay, Rizal. The RTC issued a writ of
possession in favor of NPC after paying the deposit requirement.
The trial court rendered its decision on the value of the property using the 1984 tax
declaration. (which is incorrect as stated in the decision of the supreme court)
The respondents filed a motion for recon. but it was denied by RTC. So They filed
an appeal and the CA gave merit to the contention of the respondents and made its
revised valuation using the 1993 tax declaration (increasing the value of the property).
The case went up to the SC.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the property should be valued using the 1984 or the 1993 tax
declarations.
2. Whether or not Sec. 3-A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended by P.D. 938 will apply.
HELD
1. In eminent domain cases, the time of taking is the filing of the complaint, if there was
no actual taking prior thereto. Hence, in this case, the value of the property at the time of
the filing of the complaint on November 20, 1990 should be considered in determining
the just compensation due the respondents. Normally, the time of taking coincides with
the filing of complaint for expropriation as ruled in the case of Power Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, et al.The expropriation proceedings in this case having been initiated
by NPC on November 20, 1990, property values on such month and year should lay the
basis for the proper



41


determination of just compensation. 2. It should not apply in the case at bar, the
acquisition of such
easement is not gratis. The limitations on the use of the property taken for an indefinite
period would deprive its owner of the normal use thereof. For this reason, the latter is
entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the
monetary equivalent of the land taken.
G.R. No. 142971 May 07, 2002
CITY OF CEBU VS SPOUSES DEDAMO
FACTS:
On 17 September 1993, petitioner City of Cebu filed in Civil Case
No. CEB-14632 a complaint for eminent domain against respondents spouses
Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo. For the construction of a public road which shall
serve as an access/relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General
Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu
City. The lots are the most suitable site for the purpose
Deposited with the Philippine National Bank the amount of P51,156
representing 15% of the fair market value of the property to enable the petitioner
to take immediate possession of the property pursuant to Section 19 of R.A. No.
7160
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that their
purpose was not for public purpose but for the benefit of a private single entity,
Cebu Holdings. Also the respondents alleged that they dont have any other land
in Cebu City.
On 23 August 1994, petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ
of possession pursuant to Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160. The motion was granted
by the trial court on 21 September 1994.
14 December 1994, the parties executed and submitted to the trial
court an Agreement4 wherein they declared that they have partially settled the
case and in consideration thereof they agreed on some certain stipulations. One
of the stipulations was:
1. xxx 2.xxx 3.xxx 4.xxx 5.xxx 6.xxx 7. That the judgment sought to be rendered under
this agreement shall be followed by a supplemental judgment fixing the just
compensation for the property of the SECOND PARTY after the Commissioners
appointed by this Honorable Court to determine the same shall have rendered their
report and approved by the court.
The RTC rendered its decision on the value of the property
according to the assessed value of the commissioners. The petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration contending that the assessment of the property was
no accurate. The court adjusted its decision on the value based on the new
assessed value.
Petitioner elevated the case to CA. But the petitioner failed to
convince the CA and the latter affirmed the decision of the RTC. Still unsatisfied,
petitioner filed with us the petition for review in the case at bar. ISSUES:
1. Whether or not just compensation should be determined as of the date the filing of the
complaint.
2. Whether or not the basis of the just compensation is the value on the actual date the
filing of the complaint considering the agreement entered into by the parties.
HELD:
1. It asserts that it should be which in this case should be 17 September 1993 and not at
the time the property was actually taken in 1994, pursuant to the decision in
"National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals."
2. The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power Corp. vs. Court of
Appeals.10 We did not categorically rule in that case that just compensation
should be determined as of the filing of the complaint. We explicitly stated therein
that although the general rule in determining just compensation in eminent
domain is the

value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an
exception: where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken
and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings."
More than anything else, the parties, by a solemn document freely and voluntarily
agreed upon by them, agreed to be bound by the report of the commission and
approved by the trial court. The agreement is a contract between the parties. It has the
force of law between them and should be complied with in good faith. Article 1159 and
1315 of the Civil Code
Furthermore, petitioner did not interpose a serious objection.11 It is therefore too late for
petitioner to question the valuation now without violating the principle of equitable
estoppel. Records show that petitioner consented to conform with the valuation
recommended by the commissioners. It cannot detract from its agreement now and
assail correctness of the commissioners' assessment.
JUST COMPENSATION: MANNER OF PAYMENT
175 SCRA 343, 1989
ASSOC. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS vs. DAR *no case digest submitted*
249 SCRA 149, 1995
DAR vs. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Pedro Yap alleges that "(o)n 4 September 1992 the
transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of petitioner Yap were totally cancelled by
the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte and were transferred in the names of farmer
beneficiaries collectively, based on the request of the DAR together with a
certification of the Landbank that the sum of P735,337.77 and P719,869.54 have
been earmarked for Landowner Pedro L. Yap for the parcels of lands covered by
TCT Nos. 6282 and 6283, respectively, and issued in lieu thereof TC-563 and
TC-562, respectively, in the names of listed beneficiaries (ANNEXES "C" & "D")
without notice to petitioner Yap and without complying with the requirement of
Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 to deposit the compensation in cash and Landbank
bonds in an accessible bank. (Rollo, p. 6).
The above allegations are not disputed by any of the respondents.
Petitioner Heirs of Emiliano Santiago allege that the heirs of Emiliano
F. Santiago are the owners of a parcel of land located at Laur, NUEVA ECIJA
with an area of 18.5615 hectares covered by TCT No. NT-60359 of the registry of
Deeds of Nueva Ecija, registered in the name of the late Emiliano F. Santiago;
that in November and December 1990, without notice to the petitioners, the
Landbank required and the beneficiaries executed Actual tillers Deed of
Undertaking (ANNEX "B") to pay rentals to the LandBank for the use of their
farmlots equivalent to at least 25% of the net harvest; that on 24 October 1991
the DAR Regional Director issued an order directing the Landbank to pay the
landowner directly or through the establishment of a trust fund in the amount of
P135,482.12, that on 24 February 1992, the Landbank reserved in trust
P135,482.12 in the name of Emiliano
F. Santiago. (ANNEX "E"; Rollo, p. 7); that the beneficiaries stopped paying rentals to
the landowners after they signed the Actual Tiller's Deed of Undertaking committing
themselves to pay rentals to the LandBank (Rollo, p. 133).
The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except that respondent
Landbank claims 1) that it was respondent DAR, not Landbank which required the
execution of Actual Tillers Deed of Undertaking (ATDU, for brevity); and 2) that
respondent Landbank, although armed with the ATDU, did not collect any amount as
rental from the substituting beneficiaries (Rollo, p. 99).
Petitioner Agricultural Management and Development Corporation
42
(AMADCOR, for brevity) alleges with respect to its properties located in San
Francisco, Quezon that the properties of AMADCOR in San Francisco, Quezon
consist of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of 209.9215 hectares
and another parcel covered by TCT No. 10832 with an area of 163.6189 hectares; that a
summary administrative proceeding to determine compensation of the property covered
by TCT No. 34314 was conducted by the DARAB in Quezon City without notice to the
landowner; that a decision was rendered on 24 November 1992 (ANNEX "F") fixing the
compensation for the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of 209.9215
hectares at P2,768,326.34 and ordering the Landbank to pay or establish a trust account
for said amount in the name of AMADCOR; and that the trust account in the amount of
P2,768,326.34 fixed in the decision was established by adding P1,986,489.73 to the first
trust account established on 19 December 1991 (ANNEX "G"). With respect to petitioner
AMADCOR's property in Tabaco, Albay, it is alleged that the property of AMADCOR in
Tabaco, Albay is covered by TCT No. T-2466 of the Register of Deeds of Albay with an
area of 1,629.4578 hectares'; that emancipation patents were issued covering an area of
701.8999 hectares which were registered on 15 February 1988 but no action was taken
thereafter by the DAR to fix the compensation for said land; that on 21 April 1993, a trust
account in the name of AMADCOR was established in the amount of P12,247,217.83',
three notices of acquisition having been previously rejected by AMADCOR. (Rollo, pp. 8-
9)
The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except that respondent
Landbank claims that petitioner failed to participate in the DARAB proceedings (land
valuation case) despite due notice to it.
ISSUE: Petitioners submit that respondent court erred in (1) declaring as null and void
DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, insofar as it provides for the opening of
trust accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or in bonds, and (2) in holding that private
respondents are entitled as a matter of right to the immediate and provisional release of
the amounts deposited in trust pending the final resolution of the cases it has filed for
just compensation.
HELD:
Anent the first assignment of error, petitioners maintain that the word
"deposit" as used in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 referred merely to the act of
depositing and in no way excluded the opening of a trust account as a form of
deposit. Thus, in opting for the opening of a trust account as the acceptable form
of deposit through Administrative Circular No. 9, petitioner DAR did not commit
any grave abuse of discretion since it merely exercised its power to promulgate
rules and regulations in implementing the declared policies of RA 6657.
The contention is untenable. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as
follows:
Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands (e) Upon
receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or
no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank
designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in
accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land
and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . . . (emphasis
supplied)
It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in
"cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the
deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a "trust
account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made
express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can
be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity
in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term
"deposit".
absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the
judicial department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the
spirit of a legislative enactment.
18
In this regard, it must be stressed that the function of
promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of
carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative agencies is
thus confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that
administrative regulations cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment,
19
for settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an
implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails.
20

In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules
and regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in
allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for
his property because, as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific
that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". In the same vein,
petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these
implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law. Respondent
court therefore did not commit any error in striking down Administrative Circular No. 9 for
being null and void.
Proceeding to the crucial issue of whether or not private respondents are entitled to
withdraw the amounts deposited in trust in their behalf pending the final resolution of the
cases involving the final valuation of their properties, petitioners assert the negative.
The contention is premised on the alleged distinction between the deposit of
compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and payment of final compensation as
provided under Section 18
21
of the same law. According to petitioners, the right of the
landowner to withdraw the amount deposited in his behalf pertains only to the final
valuation as agreed upon by the landowner, the DAR and the LBP or that adjudged by
the court. It has no reference to amount deposited in the trust account pursuant to
Section 16(e) in case of rejection by the landowner because the latter amount is only
provisional and intended merely to secure possession of the property pending final
valuation. To further bolster the contention petitioners cite the following pronouncements
in the case of "Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform".
22

The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property
even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a
well-accepted principle of eminent domain.
The CARP Law, for its part conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of
the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or
the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible
bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership
is contemplated either.
Hence the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily
transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.
Notably, however, the aforecited case was used by respondent court in discarding
petitioners' assertion as it found that: despite the "revolutionary" character of the
expropriation envisioned under RA 6657 which led the Supreme Court, in the case of
Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (175
SCRA 343), to conclude that "payments of the just compensation is not always required
to be made fully in money" even as the Supreme Court admits in the same case "that
the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is money and no other"
the Supreme Court in said case did not abandon the "recognized rule . . . that title to the
property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only
The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not


43
upon full payment of the just compensation."
23
(Emphasis
supplied)
We agree with the observations of respondent court. The ruling in
the "Association" case merely recognized the extraordinary nature of the
expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation from
the traditional mode of payment of compensation and recognized payment other
than in cash. It did not, however, dispense with the settled rule that there must be
full payment of just compensation before the title to the expropriated property is
transferred.
The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of
compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and determination of just
compensation under Section 18 is unacceptable. To withhold the right of the
landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as
compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DAR's
valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of the
possession and use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent
domain. The irresistible expropriation of private respondents' properties was
painful enough for them. But petitioner DAR rubbed it in all the more by
withholding that which rightfully belongs to private respondents in exchange for
the taking, under an authority (the "Association" case) that is, however,
misplaced. This is misery twice bestowed on private respondents, which the
Court must rectify.
Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between provisional
compensation under Section 16(e) and final compensation under Section 18 for
purposes of exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the same. The
immediate effect in both situations is the same, the landowner is deprived of the
use and possession of his property for which he should be fairly and immediately
compensated. Fittingly, we reiterate the cardinal rule that: within the context of
the State's inherent power of eminent domain, just compensation means not only
the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but
also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without
prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property
owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his
land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the
amount necessary to cope with his loss.
24
(Emphasis supplied)
The promulgation of the "Association" decision endeavored to remove
all legal obstacles in the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program and clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer.
25
But despite this,
cases involving its implementation continue to multiply and clog the courts'
dockets. Nevertheless, we are still optimistic that the goal of totally emancipating
the farmers from their bondage will be attained in due time. It must be stressed,
however, that in the pursuit of this objective, vigilance over the rights of the
landowners is equally important because social justice cannot be invoked to
trample on the rights of property owners, who under our Constitution and laws
are also entitled to protection. JUST COMPENSATION: TRIAL WITH
COMMISSIONERS 206 SCRA 196, 1992 MERALCO vs. PINEDA
FACTS:
Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a domestic corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of Philippines. Respondent Honorable Judge
Gregorio G. Pineda is impleaded in his official capacity as the presiding judge of the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch XXI, Pasig, Metro
Manila. While private respondents Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Gil de Guzman, Lucito Santiago
and Teresa Bautista are owners in fee simple of the expropriated property situated at
Malaya, Pililla, Rizal.
On October 29, 1974, a complaint for eminent domain was filed by petitioner
MERALCO against forty-two (42) defendants with the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch XXII, Pasig, Metro Manila.
The complaint alleges that for the purpose of constructing a 230 KV Transmission
line from Barrio Malaya to Tower No. 220 at Pililla, Rizal, petitioner needs portions of the
land of the private respondents consisting of an aggregate area of 237,321 square
meters. Despite petitioner's offers to pay compensation and attempts to negotiate with
the respondents', the parties failed to reach an agreement.
Private respondents question in their motion to dismiss dated December 27, 1974 the
petitioner's legal existence and the area sought to be expropriated as too excessive.
On January 7, 1975, respondents Gil de Guzman and Teresa Bautista filed a motion
for contempt of court alleging, among other things that petitioner's corporate existence
had expired in 1969 and therefore it no longer exists under Philippine Laws.
But despite the opposition of the private respondents, the court issued an Order
dated January 13, 1975 authorizing the petitioner to take or enter upon the possession
of the property sought to be expropriated.
On July 13, 1976, private respondents filed a motion for withdrawal of deposit
claiming that they are entitled to be paid at forty pesos (P40.00) per square meter or an
approximate sum of P272,000.00 and prayed that they be allowed to withdraw the sum
of P71,771.50 from petitioner's deposit-account with the Philippine National Bank, Pasig
Branch. However, respondents motion was denied in an order dated September 3, 1976.
In the intervening period, Branch XXII became vacant when the presiding Judge
Nelly Valdellon-Solis retired, so respondent Judge Pineda acted on the motions filed with
Branch XXII.
Pursuant to a government policy, the petitioners on October 30, 1979 sold to the
National Power Corporation (Napocor) the power plants and transmission lines,
including the transmission lines traversing private respondents' property.
On February 11, 1980, respondent court issued an Order appointing the members of
the Board of Commissioners to make an appraisal of the properties.
On June 5, 1980, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
it has lost all its interests over the transmission lines and properties under expropriation
because of their sale to the Napocor. In view of this motion, the work of the
Commissioners was suspended.
On June 9, 1981, private respondents filed another motion for payment. But despite
the opposition of the petitioner, the respondent court issued the first of the questioned
Orders dated December 4, 1981 granting the motion for payment of private respondents,
to wit:
As prayed for by defendants Teofilo Arayon, Lucito Santiago, Teresa Bautista and Gil
de Guzman, thru counsel Gil de Guzman, in their Motion for Payment, for reasons
therein stated, this Court hereby orders the plaintiff to pay the movants the amount of
P20,400.00 for the expropriated area of 6,800 square meters, at P3.00 per square meter
without prejudice to the just compensation that may be proved in the final adjudication of
this case.
The aforesaid sum of P20,400.00 having been deposited by plaintiff in the Philippine
National Bank (Pasig Branch) under Savings Account No. 9204, let the Deputy Sheriff of
this Branch Mr. Sofronio Villarin withdraw said amount in the names of Teofilo Arayon,
Lucito Santiago, Teresa Bautista and Gil de Guzman, the said amount to be delivered to
the defendant's counsel Atty. Gil de Guzman who shall sign for the receipt thereof.
On December 15, 1981, private respondents filed an Omnibus Motion praying that
they be allowed to withdraw an additional sum of P90,125.50 from petitioner's deposit-
account with the Philippine National Bank.
By order dated December 21, 1981, the respondent court granted the Omnibus
Motion hereunder quoted as follows:


Acting on the Omnibus Motion dated December 15, 1981 filed by
44
Atty. Gil de Guzman, counsel for Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Lucito Santiago, Teresita Bautista
and for himself, and it appearing that there is deposited in the bank in trust for them the
amount of P90,125.50 to guarantee just compensation of P272,000.00, thereby leaving
a balance of P161,475.00 still payable to them, the same is hereby GRANTED.
Mr. Nazario Nuevo and Marianita Burog, respectively the Manager
and Cashier, Philippine National Bank, Pasig Branch, Pasig, Metro Manila are
hereby ordered to allow Sheriff Sofronio Villarin to withdraw and collect from the
bank the amount of P90,125.50 under Savings Account No. 9204 and to deliver
the same to Atty. Gil de Guzman upon proper receipt, pending final determination
of just compensation.
Private respondents filed another motion dated January 8, 1982
praying that petitioner be ordered to pay the sum of P169, 200.00.
On January 12, 1982 petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of
the Orders dated December 4, 1981 and December 21, 1981 and to declare
private respondents in contempt of court for forging or causing to be forged the
receiving stamp of petitioner's counsel and falsifying or causing to be falsified the
signature of its receiving clerk in their Omnibus Motion.
In response to private respondents' motion for payment dated
January 8, 1982, petitioner filed an opposition alleging that private respondents
are not entitled to payment of just compensation at this stage of the proceeding
because there is still no appraisal and valuation of the property.
On February 9, 1982 the respondent court denied the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration and motion for contempt, the dispositive portion of
which is hereunder quoted as follows:
Viewed in the light of the foregoing, this Court hereby adjudges in
favor of defendants Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Lucito Santiago, Teresita Bautista and
Atty. Gil de Guzman the fair market value of their property taken by MERALCO at
P40.00 per square meter for a total of P369,720.00, this amount to bear legal
interest from February 24, 1975 until fully paid plus consequential damages in
terms of attorney's fees in the sum of P10,000.00, all these sums to be paid by
MERALCO to said defendants with costs of suit, minus the amount of
P102,800.00 already withdrawn by defendants.
For being moot and academic, the motions for contempt are DENIED;
for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration of the orders of December 4,
1981 and December 21, 1981 is also DENIED.
Furthermore, the respondent court stressed in said order that "at this
stage, the Court starts to appoint commissioners to determine just compensation
or dispenses with them and adopts the testimony of a credible real estate broker,
or the judge himself would exercise his right to formulate an opinion of his own as
to the value of the land in question. Nevertheless, if he formulates such an
opinion, he must base it upon competent evidence." ISSUE: Whether or not the
respondent court can dispense with the assistance of a Board of Commissioners
in an expropriation proceeding and determine for itself the just compensation.
HELD:
The applicable laws in the case at bar are Sections 5 and 8 of Rule
67 of the Revised Rules of Court. The said sections particularly deal with the
ascertainment of compensation and the court's action upon commissioners'
report, to wit:
Sec. 5. Upon the entry of the order of condemnation, the court shall
appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall designate the time
and place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and
specify the time within which their report is to be filed with the court.
Sec. 8. Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to
in the preceding section, or even before the expiration of such period but after all
the interested parties have filed their objections
to the report or their statement of agreement therewith, the court may, after hearing,
accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith; or, for cause shown, it
may recommit the same to the commissioners for further report of facts; or it may set
aside the report and appoint new commissioners, or it may accept the report in part and
reject it in part; and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to
the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of condemnation, and to the
defendant just compensation for the property so taken.
We already emphasized in the case of Municipality of Bian v. Hon. Jose Mar Garcia
(G.R. No. 69260, December 22, 1989, 180 SCRA 576, 583-584) the procedure for
eminent domain, to wit:
There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation. The first is concerned with
the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain
and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends
with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the
plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public
use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint". An order of dismissal, if this be
ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and
leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of
condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the
proceedings before the Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise of the right of
condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard."
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination
by the Court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done
by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order
fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the
commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the
suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one
or another of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the
evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may
seek reversal of the order by taking an appeal therefrom.
Respondent judge, in the case at bar, arrived at the valuation of P40.00 per square
meter on a property declared for real estate tax purposes at P2.50 per hectare on the
basis of a "Joint Venture Agreement on Subdivision and Housing Projects" executed by
A.B.A Homes and private respondents on June 1, 1972. This agreement was merely
attached to the motion to withdraw from petitioner's deposit. Respondent judge arrived at
the amount of just compensation on its own, without the proper reception of evidence
before the Board of Commissioners. Private respondents as landowners have not
proved by competent evidence the value of their respective properties at a proper
hearing. Likewise, petitioner has not been given the opportunity to rebut any evidence
that would have been presented by private respondents. In an expropriation case such
as this one where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial
before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on
the issue of just compensation. Contrary to the submission of private respondents, the
appointment of at least three (3) competent persons as commissioners to ascertain just
compensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in
expropriation cases. While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be
disregarded and the court may substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter may
only do so for valid reasons, i.e., where the Commissioners have applied illegal
principles to the evidence submitted to them or where they have disregarded a clear
preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or
excessive (Manila Railroad Company v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286). Thus, trial with the aid
of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously
or for no reason at all. Moreover, in such instances, where the report of the



45
commissioners may be disregarded, the trial court may make its own estimate of value
from competent evidence that may be gathered from the record. The aforesaid joint
venture agreement relied upon by the respondent judge, in the absence of any other
proof of valuation of said properties, is incompetent to determine just compensation.
Prior to the determination of just compensation, the property owners
may rightfully demand to withdraw from the deposit made by the condemnor in
eminent domain proceedings. Upon an award of a smaller amount by the court,
the property owners are subject to a judgment for the excess or upon the award
of a larger sum, they are entitled to a judgment for the amount awarded by the
court. Thus, when the respondent court granted in the Orders dated December 4,
1981 and December 21, 1981 the motions of private respondents for withdrawal
of certain sums from the deposit of petitioner, without prejudice to the just
compensation that may be proved in the final adjudication of the case, it
committed no error.
Records, specifically Meralco's deed of sale dated October 30, 1979,
in favor of Napocor show that the latter agreed to purchase the parcels of land
already acquired by Meralco, the rights, interests and easements over those
parcels of land which are the subject of the expropriation proceedings under Civil
Case No. 20269, (Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXII), as well as those
parcels of land occupied by Meralco by virtue of grant of easements of right-of-
way (see Rollo, pp. 341-342). Thus, Meralco had already ceded and in fact lost
all its rights and interests over the aforesaid parcels of land in favor of Napocor.
In addition, the same contract reveals that the Napocor was previously advised
and actually has knowledge of the pending litigation and proceedings against
Meralco (see Rollo, pp. 342- 343). Hence, We find the contention of the petitioner
tenable. It is therefore proper for the lower court to either implead the Napocor in
substitution of the petitioner or at the very least implead the former as party
plaintiff.
All premises considered, this Court is convinced that the respondent
judge's act of determining and ordering the payment of just compensation without
the assistance of a Board of Commissioners is a flagrant violation of petitioner's
constitutional right to due process and is a gross violation of the mandated rule
established by the Revised Rules of Court. GR No. 129998, December 29,
1998 NPC vs. HENSON FACTS:
On March 21, 1990, the National Power Corporation (NPC) originally
instituted with the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial District, Branch 46, San
Fernando, Pampanga, a complaint for eminent domain, later amended on
October 11, 1990, for the taking for public use of five (5) parcels of land, owned
or claimed by respondents, with a total aggregate area of 58,311 square meters,
for the expansion of the NPC Mexico Sub-Station.
Respondents are the registered owners/claimants of the five (5)
parcels of land sought to be expropriated, situated in San Jose Matulid, Mexico,
Pampanga, more particularly described as follows:
Parcels of rice land, being Lot 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the subdivision plan
Psd-03-017121 (OLT) and being a portion of Lot 212 of Mexico Cadastre,
situated in the Barangay of San Jose Matulid, Municipality of Mexico, province of
Pampanga, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the North by Barangay Road Calle San
Jose; on the East by Lot 6, Psd-03-017121 (OLT) owned by the National Power
Corporation; on the South by Lot 101, Psd-03-017121 (OLT) being an irrigation
ditch; on the West by Lot 100, Psd-03- 0017121 (OLT) being an irrigation ditch
and Barrio road, containing an aggregate area of FIFTY EIGHT THOUSAND
THREE HUNDRED ELEVEN (58,311) square meters, which parcels of land are
broken down as follows with claimants: 1. Lot 1-A=43,532 sq. m.- Henson
Family 2. Lot 2-A=6,823 sq. m.- Alfredo Tanchiatco, encumbered with
Land Bank of the Phil. (LBP) 3. Lot 3-A=3,057 sq. m.-Bienvenido David, encumbered
with LBP 4. Lot 4-A=1,438 sq. m.-Maria Bondoc Capili, encumbered with LBP 5. Lot 5-
A=3,461 sq. m.-Miguel Manoloto and Henson Family Total A=58,311 sq. m.
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 557 in the name of Henson, et al.;
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7131/Emancipation Patent No. A-277216 in the name of
Alfredo Tanchiatco; Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7111/Emancipation Patent No. A-
278086 in the name of Bienvenido David; Transfer Certificate of Title No.
7108/Emancipation Patent No. A-278089 in the name of Maria B. Capili; Certificate of
Land Transfer No. 4550 in the name of Miguel C. Manaloto, and Subdivision Plan Psd-
03- 017121 (OLT), which is a subdivision of Lot 212, Mexico Cadastre as surveyed for
Josefina Katigbak, et al. Said five (5) parcels of land are agricultural/riceland covered by
Operation Land Transfer (OLT) of the Department of Agrarian Reform.
Petitioner needed the entire area of the five (5) parcels of land, comprising an
aggregate area of 58,311 square meters, for the expansion of its Mexico Subdivision.
On March 28, 1990, petitioner filed an urgent motion to fix the provisional value of the
subject parcels of land.3
On April 20, 1990, respondents filed a motion to dismiss.4 They did not challenge
petitioners right to condemn their property, but declared that the fair market value of
their property was from P180.00 to P250.00 per square meter.
On July 10, 1990, the trial court denied respondents motion to dismiss. The court did
not declare that petitioner had a lawful right to take the property sought to be
expropriated. However, the court fixed the provisional value of the land at P100.00 per
square meter, for a total area of 63,220 square meters of respondents property, to be
deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga. Petitioner deposited the amount
on August 29, 1990.
On September 5, 1990, the trial court issued a writ of possession in favor of
petitioner, and, on September 11, 1990, the courts deputy sheriff placed petitioner in
possession of the subject land.
On November 22, 1990, and December 20, 1990, the trial court granted the motions
of respondents to withdraw the deposit made by petitioner of the provisional value of
their property amounting to P5,831,100.00, with a balance of P690,900.00, remaining
with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga.
On April 5, 1991, the trial court issued an order appointing three (3) commissioners to
aid the court in the reception of evidence to determine just compensation for the taking
of the subject property. After receiving the evidence and conducting an ocular
inspection, the commissioners submitted to the court their individual reports.
Commisioner Mariano C. Tiglao, in his report dated September 10, 1992,
recommended that the fair market value of the entire 63,220 square meters property be
fixed at P350.00 per square meter. Commissioner Arnold P. Atienza, in his report dated
February 24, 1993, recommended that the fair market value be fixed at P375.00 per
square meter. Commissioner Victorino Orocio, in his report dated April 28, 1993,
recommended that the fair market value be fixed at P170.00 per square meter.
However, the trial court did not conduct a hearing on any of the reports.
On May 19, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment fixing the amount of just
compensation to be paid by petitioner for the taking of the entire area of 63,220 square
meters at P400.00 per square meter, with legal interest thereon computed from
September 11, 1990, when petitioner was placed in possession of the land, plus
attorneys fees of P20,000.00, and costs of the proceedings.
In due time, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On July 23, 1997, the
Court of Appeals rendered decision affirming that of the Regional Trial Court, except that
the award of
P20,000.00, as attorneys fees was deleted. ISSUE: The issue presented boils down to
what is the just



46
compensation for the taking of respondents property for the expansion of the NPCs
Mexico Sub-station, situated in San Jose Matulid, Mexico, Pampanga.
HELD:
The parcels of land sought to be expropriated are undeniably idle,
undeveloped, raw agricultural land, bereft of any improvement. Except for the
Henson family, all the other respondents were admittedly farmer beneficiaries
under operation land transfer of the Department of Agrarian Reform. However,
the land has been re-classified as residential. The nature and character of the
land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion to determine just
compensation to the landowner.
In this case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals fixed the value of
the land at P400.00 per square meter, which was the selling price of lots in the
adjacent fully developed subdivision, the Santo Domingo Village Subdivision.
The land in question, however, was an undeveloped, idle land, principally
agricultural in character, though re-classified as residential. Unfortunately, the
trial court, after creating a board of commissioners to help it determine the
market value of the land did not conduct a hearing on the report of the
commissioners. The trial court fixed the fair market value of subject land in an
amount equal to the value of lots in the adjacent fully developed subdivision. This
finds no support in the evidence. The valuation was even higher than the
recommendation of anyone of the commissioners.
On the other hand, Commissioner Atienza recommended a fair
market value at P375.00 per square meter. This appears to be the closest
valuation to the market value of lots in the adjoining fully developed subdivision.
Considering that the subject parcels of land are undeveloped raw land, the price
of P375.00 per square meter would appear to the Court as the just compensation
for the taking of such raw land.
Consequently, we agree with Commissioner Atienzas report that the
fair market value of subject parcels of land be fixed at P375.00 per square meter.
We also agree with petitioner that the area of the communal irrigation
canal consisting of 4,809 square meters must be excluded from the land to be
expropriated. To begin with, it is excluded in the amended complaint. Hence, the
trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in including the same in the area to be
taken.
The trial court erroneously ordered double payment for 3,611 square
meters of lot 5 (portion) in the dispositive part of its decision, and, hence, this
must be deleted.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly required petitioner
to pay legal interest on the compensation awarded from September 11, 1990, the
date petitioner was placed in possession of the subject land, less the amount
respondents had withdrawn from the deposit that petitioner made with the
Provincial Treasurers Office.
We, however, rule that petitioner is under its charter exempt from
payment of costs of the proceedings. G.R. No. 156093. February 2, 2007
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. DELA CRUZ FACTS:
NAPOCOR a government-owned and controlled corporation filed a complaint
for eminent domain and expropriation of an easement of right of way against
Spouses Norberto and Josefina Dela Cruz who are registered owners of the
parcels of land to be expropriated by NAPOCOR. After respondents filed their
respective answers to petitioners Complaint, petitioner deposited PhP 5,788.50
to cover the provisional value of the land, petitioner then filed an Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession, which the trial court granted.
The pre-trial was terminated in so far as respondent Ferrer was concerned,
considering that the sole issue was the amount of just compensation. Based on
the analysis of data gathered and making the proper adjustments with respect to
location, area, shape, accessibility, and the highest and best use of the subject
properties, it is the opinion
of herein commissioners that the fair market value of the subject real properties is
P10,000.00 per square meter, as of this date, October 05, 1999. Petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the abovementioned Order, but said motion was denied in the trial
courts. Significantly, petitioner did not file a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA
November 18, 2002 Decision, but it directly filed a petition for review.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner was denied due process when it was not allowed to present
evidence on the reasonable value of the expropriated property before the Board of
Commissioners.
2. Whether or not the valuation of just compensation herein was not based from the
evidence on record and other authentic documents.
HELD:
It is beyond question that petitions for review may only raise questions of law which must
be distinctly set forth. Court is mandated to only consider purely legal questions in this
petition, unless called for by extraordinary circumstances. petitioner raises the issue of
denial of due process because it was allegedly deprived of the opportunity to present its
evidence on the just compensation of properties it wanted to expropriate, and the
sufficiency of the legal basis or bases for the trial courts Order on the matter of just
compensation. because this case involves the expenditure of public funds for a clear
public purpose, this Court will overlook the fact that petitioner did not file a Motion for
Reconsideration and brush aside this technicality in favor of resolving this case.
Petitioner was deprived of due process when it was not given the opportunity to present
evidence before the commissioners. It is undisputed that the commissioners failed to
afford the parties the opportunity to introduce evidence in their favor and petitioner was
not notified of the completion or filing of the commissioners report, and that petitioner
was also not given any opportunity to file its objections to the said report. the fact that no
trial or hearing was conducted to afford the parties the opportunity to present their own
evidence should have impelled the trial court to disregard the commissioners findings.
The legal basis for the determination of just compensation was insufficient. it is not
disputed that the commissioners recommended that the just compensation be pegged at
PhP 10,000.00 per square meter. For compensation, to be just, must be fair not only to
the owner but also to the taker. it is clear that in this case, the sole basis for the
determination of just compensation was the commissioners ocular inspection of the
properties in question, as gleaned from the commissioners report. Clearly, the legal
basis for the determination of just compensation in this case is insufficient as earlier
enunciated. This being so, the trial courts ruling in this respect should be set aside.
Petition is granted.
G.R. No. 155605. September 27, 2006
LECA REALTY CORPORATION VS. REPUBLIC
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for eminent domain for the taking of some portions of their
properties. Attached to the complaint is was Resolution No. 94-1 of the City Appraisal
Committee of Mandaluyong, which was created to appraise the properties that would be
affected by the construction of the project in question. Commissioners submitted their
report dated January 8, 1998, and recommended the fair market value of properties of
Leca Realty Corporation and Leeleng Realty Inc.: P50,000 per sq.m., the
Commissioners took into consideration the following factors: property location,
identification[,] neighborhood data, community facilities and utilities, highest and best
use, valuation and reasonable indication of land values within the vicinity.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Republic is bound and put in estoppel by the gross
negligence/mistake of its agent/former counsel.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals incurred an error of law in affirming the amount fixed by
the trial court based on the report of the board of commissioners.



47


HELD:
There was no reason why the Republic could not have moved to reconsider the assailed
CA Decision or appealed it within the reglementary period. These procedural devices
(reconsideration and appeal) were not only available; they would have also constituted
plain, speedy and adequate remedies for questioning the alleged errors in the CA
Decision. Petitions must be filed within 60 days. In the present case, the Petition was
filed after over a year. The rule on non-estoppel of the government is not designed to
perpetrate an injustice. The request was predicated on the conclusion that the
"compensation costs as recommended by the commissioners and fixed by the court in
the above-mentioned Decision are reasonable and acceptable"; and that the "move will
hasten the legal process, thereby shorten the time of the proceedings and stop the
running of interest. The more critical issue is the determination of the amount of just
compensation for the expropriated property of Leca in GR 155605. The Republic avers
that the values arrived at in the Commissioners' Report were not supported by sufficient
evidence. Leca, alleges that the fair market value ascribed to its property was not
sufficient. As both the Republic and Leca correctly pointed out, however, the
Commissioners' Report relied heavily on newspaper advertisements of offers of sale of
properties in the vicinity. It must be noted, though, that the interest of Petitioner Leca is
distinct and separate from and will in no way affect the settled rights and interests of the
other parties that did not appeal the judgment of the trial court. WHEREFORE, the
Petition of Leca Realty Corporation is REMANDED to the trial court for the proper
determination of the amount of just compensation.
JUST COMPENSATION: LEGAL INTEREST FOR EXPROPRIATION CASES
G.R. No. 60225-26. May 8, 1992
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. ANGAS
FACTS:
National Power Corporation, a government-owned and controlled corporation and the
agency through which the government undertakes the on-going infrastructure and
development projects throughout the country, filed two complaints for eminent domain
against private respondents with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Lanao del Sur. The complaint which sought to expropriate certain specified lots situated
at Limogao, Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur was for the purpose of the development of hydro-
electric power and production of electricity as well as the erection of such subsidiary
works and constructions as may be necessarily connected therewith. a consolidated
decision was rendered by the lower court, declaring and confirming that the lots
mentioned and described in the complaints have entirely been lawfully condemned and
expropriated by the petitioner, and ordering the latter to pay the private respondents
certain sums of money as just compensation. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of
the lower court's alleging that the main decision had already become final and executory
with its compliance of depositing the sums of money as just compensation for the lands
condemned, with legal interest at 6% per annum; that the said main decision can no
longer be modified or changed by the lower court; and that Presidential Decree No. 116
is not applicable to this case because it is Art. 2209 of the Civil Code which applies.
ISSUE: Whether or not, in the computation of the legal rate of interest on just
compensation for expropriated lands, the law applicable is Article 2209 of the Civil Code
which prescribes a 6% legal interest rate or Central Bank Circular No. 416 which fixed
the legal interest rate at 12% per annum.
HELD:
the transaction involved is clearly not a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits
but expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public purpose, the payment of which is
without stipulation regarding interest,
and the interest adjudged by the trial court is in the nature of indemnity for damages.
The legal interest required to be paid on the amount of just compensation for the
properties expropriated is manifestly in the form of indemnity for damages for the delay
in the payment thereof. Therefore, since the kind of interest involved in the joint
judgment of the lower court sought to be enforced in this case is interest by way of
damages, and not by way of earnings from loans, etc. Art. 2209 of the Civil Code shall
apply. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. It was declared that the computation of
legal interest at 6% per annum is the correct and valid legal interest allowed in payments
of just compensation for lands expropriated for public use to herein private respondents
by the Government through the National Power Corporation.
G.R. No. 146733, January 13, 2004
WYCOCO V. JUDGE CASPILLO
FACTS:
Felciano Wycoco owned 94.1690 hectares unirrigated and
untenanted rice land- TCT No. NT.206422 and voluntarily offered to sell the land
to Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in line with the ( CARP) for P14.9M
A notice of intention to acquire 84.5690 hectares for P1, 342, 667.46
by the DAR sent to him. The amount raised to P2,594,045.39 and later modified
to P2,280,159.82 excluded the idle areas.
He refused and prompted the DAR to indorse the case to DARAB,
fixing the just compensation.
DARAB requested the LBP to open a trust account for Wycoco and
deposited the compensation offered by the DAR and the properties were
distributed to the beneficiaries.
On April 30, 93 he filed a manifestation in VOS case no. 232 NE 93.
While Cabanatuan Court acting as the Special Agrarian Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the RTC of Cabanatuan has jurisdiction over the case.
2. Whether or not there was a just compensation offered to the plaintiff.
HELD:
Point out that theres no need for Wycoco to present an evidence in
support of the land valuation in as much as it is in public knowledge that the
prevailing market value of agricultural lands in Nueva Ecija is from P135,000.00
to P150,000.00 per hectare. So the curt fixed the compensation of:
P142,500.00- per hectare 94.1690- hectares (land size) P13,428,082- total
compensation + actual damages P29,663,235.00 for unrealized profits and
P8,475,210.00 legal interest
This must be paid by DAR .
DAR and LBP filed a separate petition before the CA and dismissed
on May 29,97=Final execution June6,07 and Feb. 9,99 respectively. The
dismissal prompted Wycoco to file a petition for mandamus before SC praying
the execution of Cabanatuan courts decision and compelled Judge Caspillon to
inhibit himself from the hearing of the case.
CA modified the decision, deducted the compensation due to Wycoco
the amount corresponding to 3.372 hectares for it was found to have been
previously sold to Republic.
Sec 50and 57 of R.A. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform law of
1988)
DAR as an administrative agency cannot be granted jurisdiction over
the cases of eminent domain and over criminal cases. The valuation of property
in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the
Special Agrarian Courts and cannot lodge with administrative agencies.
Rule XIII Sec.II of New Rules of Procedures of DARAB
Sec.II... just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board


48
but shall be brought directly to the RTC designated as Special
Agrarian Court...
So RTC or Cabanatuan has jurisdiction over the case at bar
because it is the designated as SAC.
RTC should have allowed the parties to present evidences so a fair
compensation shall be determined. There are factors to be considered such as
the cost of acquisition, size, shape, location and tax declaration, for ignoring the
said factors, remand of the case for determination is necessary.
THIS CASE BE REMANDED TO RTC FOR THE DETERMINATION
OF JUST COPENSATION. JUST COMPENSATION: WRIT OF
POSSESSION G.R. No. 142304, June 20, 2001 CITY OF MANILA V.
OSCAR SERRANO FACTS:
Ordinance No. 7833, enacted by the City Council of Manila
authorizing the expropriation of certain properties in Manilas First District in
Tondo: TCT Nos. 70869,105201, 105202, and 138273 of the Register of the
Deeds of Manila, which are to be sold to qualified occupants pursuant to Land
Use Development Program of the City.
Lot 1-C One of the lots to be expropriated Consists of 343.10
square meters / 7 = produced 49 square meters for each person Covered by
TCT No. 138272 from TCT No. 70869 This lot belongs to Feliza De Guia, upon
her death, said lot was transferred to Alberto De Guia and then to Edgardo de
Guia heir of Alberto, after the formers death. The said lot was again transferred
to Lee Kuan Hui-TCT No. 217018 and subsequently sold to Demetria De Guia
TCT No. 226048. ISSUE: Whether or not the expropriation of the property is
proper in relation to R.A. 7279. HELD:
On Sept 26, 1997 the petitioner filed an amended complaint for
expropriation (RTC) to the supposed owners of the lots with TCT Nos. 70869
(including 1-c), 105201,105202 and 138273, the Serranos, heirs of late Demetria
De Guia.
RTC issued an order to the petitioner to deposite P 1,825,241.00
equivalent to the assessed value of the lot and the issuance of a writ of
possession in their favor.
CA reversed RTCs decision and rather favored the respondents, in
the reason that the petitioner failed to do the other modes of acquisition of
property, that is to tried first in the city government before it can resort to
expropriation, under R.A.7279
SC reinstated the decision of RTC, because in this case it is very
early to determine if the petitioner has been granted the right to expropriate the
property, since what has been issued by the RTC to them is just a writ of
possession, which is not a right of an ownership. Under R.A. 7279 there are
requirements that the petitioners need to complied with before expropriating a
property. To determine whether or not the petitioner complied it and the
expropriation of the property is proper in relation to R.A. 7279, further proceeding
must be made in RTC.
Thus the case was remanded back to RTC. G. R. No. 166429,
December 19, 2005 REPUBLIC VS. GINGOYON FACTS: A dispute
occurred after the contract between the government and PIATCO has been
nullified for its being contrary to law and public policy. PIATCO and other
investors who funded the facilities for NAIA 3
cannot operate it and the government as well cannot took it over, for doing so the
government would enrich itself unjustly by the PIATCO and other investors expense.
The government wanted to expropriate NAIA 3, but isnt it illogical that a government
would expropriate the property it already owned? So, the expropriation would only be
limited to the facilities and improvement that have been introduced to NAIA 3, with its
equivalent just compensation.
ISSUE:
1. Whether R.A. No.8974 or Rule 67 is applicable in property expropriation in the case at
bar.
2. Whether Judge Gingoyon can be compelled to inhibit himself in the case
HELD:
Prior to this case a decision to Agan v PIATCO has been rendered by
the court, the 2004 Resolution: the government should fully paid first the owner of
the properties subject for expropriation before it took the properties in its
possession and ownership. This decision is final and executor.
Rule 67 stated: SEC. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with
authorized government depository. - Upon the filing of the complaint or at any
time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the
right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he
deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the
assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank
subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu
thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government
bank of the Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the authorized
government depositary.
R.A. No. 8974 SEC. 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings.-
Whenever it is necessary to acquire real property for the right-of-way, site or
location for any national government infrastructure project through expropriation,
the appropriate proceedings before the proper court under the following
guidelines: a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the
defendant, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the
property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent (100%) of
the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the improvements and/or
structures as determined under Section 7 hereof; . . . c) In case the completion
of a government infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and importance, and
there is no existing valuation of the area concerned, the implementing agency
shall immediately pay the owner of the property its proffered value taking into
consideration the standards prescribed in Section 5 hereof.
Upon completion with the guidelines abovementioned, the court shall
immediately issue to the implementing agency an order to take possession of the
property and start the implementation of the project.
Before the court can issue a Writ of Possession, the implementing
agency shall present to the court a certificate of availability of funds from the
proper official concerned. . . .
Clearly that, applying Rule 67 would be a direct rebuke to 2004
Resolution in Agan and the court cannot sanction deviation from its own final and
executor orders. It would violate 2004 Resolution. Thus, it would be R.A.No.
8974 the applicable law for the expropriation- in which the government must pay
first the just compensation to the property owner before it can took and use it.
R.A. No. 8974 well complemented with 2004 Resolution.
Judge Gingoyon cannot be compelled to inhibit himself, for
incompetency may be ground for administrative sanction but not for inhibition,
which requires lack of objectivity or impartiality to sit on a case.




49
JUST COMPENSATION: EXPROPRIATION OF UTILITIES, LANDED ESTATES,
AND MUNICIPAL PROPERTY
G.R. No. L-12032, August 31, 1959
CITY OF BAGUIO vs. THE NATIONAL WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE
AUTHORITY
FACTS:
On April 25, 1956 a municipal corporation filed a complaint in the
Court of First Instance of Baguio for declaratory relief against defendant, a public
corporation created by Republic Act No. 1383, which contends that said Act does
not include within its preview the Baguio Workshop System. In which the said Act
is unconstitutional because it has the effect of depriving plaintiff of the ownership,
control and operation of said waterworks system without compensation and
without due process of law, and that it is oppressive, unreasonable and unjust to
plaintiff and other cities, municipalities and municipal districts similarly situated.
On May 22, 1956, defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that Republic Act No. 1383 is a proper exercise of the police power of the State,
that assuming that said Act contemplates an act of expropriation, it is still a
constitutional exercise of the power of eminent domain, that at any rate the
Baguio Waterworks System is not a private property but a "public works of public
service" over which the Legislature has control and that the provision of the said
Act being clear and unambiguous, there is no necessity for construction.
On June 21, 1956, the Court, acting on the motion to dismiss as well
as on the answer and rejoinder filed by both parties, denied the motion and
ordered defendant to file its answer to the complaint. On July 6, 1956, defendant
filed its answer reiterating and amplifying the ground already advanced in this
motion to dismiss, adding thereto that the action for the declaratory relief is
improper for the reason that the Baguio waterworks System has already been
transferred to defendant pursuant to Republic Act No. 1383 or, if such has not
been done, there has already been a breach of said Act. ISSUES:
1. Plaintiff's action for Declaratory relief is improper because there has already been a
breach by plaintiff of Republic Act No. 1383
2. Republic Act No. 1383 does not contemplates the exercise of the power of eliminate
domain but the exertion of the police power of the State; and
3. Assuming arguendo that Republic Act No. 1383 involves the exercise of the power of
eminent domain the same does not violate our Constitution.
HELD:
The decision maintain that the property held by a municipal
corporation units private capacity is not subject to the unrestricted control of the
legislature, and the municipality cannot be deprived of such property against its
will, except by the exercise of eminent domain with payment of full
compensation. (McQuillin Municipal Corporation, 2nd Ed., Vol. I, pp. 670-681).
In its private capacity a municipal corporation is wholly different. The
people of a compact community usually require certain conveniences which
cannot be furnished without a franchise from the State and which are either
unnecessary in the rural districts, such as a system of sewers, or parks and open
spaces, or which on account of the expenses it would be financially impossible to
supply except where the population is reasonably dense, such as water or gas.
But in so far as the municipality is thus authorized to exercise the functions of a
private corporation, it is clothed with the capacities of a private corporation and
may claim its rights and immunities, even as against the sovereign, and is
subject to the liabilities of such a corporation, even as against third parties. (19
R.C. L. p. 698)
The attempt of appellant in having waterworks considered as public
property subject to the control of Congress or one which

can be regulated by the exercise of police power having failed, that question that now
arises is: Does Republic Act No. 1383 provide for the automatic expropriation of the
waterworks in question in the light of our Constitution? In other words, does said law
comply with the requirements of section 6, Article XIII, in relation to section 1(2), Article
III, of our Constitution?
Section 6, Article XIII of our Constitution provides: SEC. 6. The State may, in the
interest of National Welfare and defense, establish and operate industries and means of
transportation and communication, and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to
public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the
Government. Section 1 (2), Article III, of our Constitution provides: (2) Private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. It is clear that the State
may, in the interest of National welfare, transfer to public ownership any private
enterprise upon payment of just compensation. At the same time, one has to bear in
mind that no person can be deprived of his property except for public use and upon
payment of just compensation. There is an attempt to observe this requirement in
Republic Act No. 1383 when in providing for the transfer of appellee's waterworks
system to a national agency it was directed that the transfer be made upon payment of
an equivalent value of the property. Has this been implemented? Has appellant actually
transferred to appellee any asset of the NAWASA that may be considered just
compensation for the property expropriated? There is nothing in the record to show that
such was done. Neither is there anything to this effect in Office Memorandum No. 7
issued by the NAWASA in implementation of the provision of the Republic Act No. 1383.
The law speaks of assets of the NAWASA by they are not specified. While the Act
empowers the NAWASA to contract indebtedness and issue bonds subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Finance when necessary for the transaction of its business
(sec. 2, par. (L), sec. 5, Act No. 1383), no such action has been taken to comply with
appellant's commitment in so far as payment of compensation of appellee is concerned.
As to when such action should be taken no one knows. And unless this aspect of the law
is clarified and appellee is given its due compensation, appellee cannot be deprived of
its property even if appellant desires to take over its administration in line with the spirit
of the law. We are therefore persuaded to conclude that the law, insofar as it
expropriates the waterworks in question without providing for an effective payment of
just compensation, violates our Constitution. In this respect, the decision of the trial court
is correct. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement
as to costs.



50

G.R. No. L-24440, March 28, 1968

THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE vs. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA
FACTS:
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to
be the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province. On 12 October 1936,
Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into
Zamboanga City. Section 50 of the Act also provided that "buildings and properties
which the province shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another place will be
acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor
General." The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and some
buildings constructed thereon, located in the City of Zamboanga and covered individually
by Torrens certificates of title in the name of Zamboanga Province. The lots are utilized
as the Capitol Site (1 lot), School site (3 lots), Hospital site (3 lots), Leprosarium (3 lots),
Curuan school (1 lot), Trade school (1 lot), Burleigh school (2 lots), burleigh (9 lots), high
school playground (2 lots), hydro-electric site (1 lot), san roque (1 lot), and another 23
vacant lots. In 1945, the capital of Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog and
on 16 June
1948, RA 286 created the municipality of Molave and making it the capital of
Zamboanga Province. On 26 May 1949, the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor
General, pursuant to CA 39, fixed the value of the properties and buildings in question
left by Zamboanga Province in Zamboanga City at P1,294,244.00. However, on 14 July
1951, a Cabinet Resolution was passed, conveying all the said 50 lots and buildings
thereon to Zamboanga City for P1.00, effective as of 1945, when the provincial capital of
the Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog.
On 6 June 1952, RA 711 was approved dividing the province of
Zamboanga into Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. As to how the
assets and obligations of the old province were to be divided between the two
new ones, Section 6 of the law provided that upon the approval of the Act, the
funds, assets and other properties and the obligations of the province of
Zamboanga shall be divided equitably between the Province of Zamboanga del
Norte and the Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the
Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Auditor General." On 11 January
1955, the Auditor General apportioned the assets and obligations of the defunct
Province of Zamboanga, apportioning 54.39% for Zamboanga del Norte and
45.61% for Zamboanga del Sur. On 17 March 1959, the Executive Secretary, by
order of the President, issued a ruling holding that Zamboanga del Norte had a
vested right as owner (should be co-owner pro-indiviso) of the properties
mentioned in Section 50 of CA 39, and is entitled to the price thereof, payable by
Zamboanga City. This effectively revoked the Cabinet Resolution of 14 July
1951. The Secretary of Finance then authorized the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue to deduct an amount equal to 25% of the regular internal revenue
allotment for the City of Zamboanga for the quarter ending 31 March 1960, then
for the quarter ending 30 June 1960, and again for the first quarter of the fiscal
year 1960-1961. The deductions, all aggregating P57,373.46 was credited to the
province of Zamboanga del Norte, in partial payment of the P704,220,05 due it.
However, on 17 June 1961, RA 3039 was approved amending
Section 50 of CA 39 by providing that "all buildings, properties and assets
belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of
Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City of
Zamboanga." On 12 July 1961, the Secretary of Finance ordered the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to stop from effecting further payments to
Zamboanga del Norte and to return to Zamboanga City the sum of P57,373.46
taken from it out of the internal revenue allotment of Zamboanga del Norte.
Zamboanga City admits that since the enactment of RA 3039, P43,030.11 of the
P57,373.46 has already been returned to it. ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Republic Act 3039 be declared unconstitutional for depriving plaintiff
province of property without due process and just compensation
2. Whether or not the City of Zamboanga be ordered to continue paying the balance of
P704,220.05 in quarterly installments of 25% of its internal revenue allotments to
Zamboanga del Norte.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Republic Act No. 3039
unconstitutional insofar as it deprives plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte of its private
properties, consisting of 50 parcels of land and the improvements thereon under
certificates of title (Exhibits "A" to "A-49") in the name of the defunct province of
Zamboanga; ordering defendant City of Zamboanga to pay to the plaintiff the sum of
P704,220.05 payment thereof to be deducted from its regular quarterly internal revenue
allotment equivalent to 25% thereof every quarter until said amount shall have been fully
paid; ordering defendant Secretary of Finance to direct defendant Commissioner of
Internal Revenue to deduct 25% from the regular quarterly internal revenue allotment for
defendant City of Zamboanga and to remit the same to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte
until said sum of P704,220.05 shall have been fully paid; ordering plaintiff Zamboanga
del Norte to execute through its proper officials the corresponding public instrument
deeding to defendant City of Zamboanga the 50 parcels of land and the improvements
thereon under the certificates of title (Exhibits "A" to "A-49") upon payment by the latter
of the aforesaid sum of P704,220.05 in full; dismissing the counterclaim of defendant
City of Zamboanga; and declaring permanent the preliminary mandatory injunction
issued on June 8, 1962, pursuant to the order of the Court dated June 4, 1962. No costs
are assessed against the defendants.
It is SO ORDERED.



51
- DUE PROCESS -
PURPOSE OF GUARANTY
110 US 516, 1884
HURTADO VS CALIFORNIA *no case digest submitted*
MEANING OF LIFE, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY
431 SCRA 534
CHAVEZ VS. ROMULO *no case digest submitted*
233 SCRA 163
LIBANAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN *no case digest submitted*
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
86 SCRA 275, 1978
VILLEGAS VS. HU CHONG TSAI PAO HO *no case digest submitted*
39 Phil 660; No. 14078; March 7, 1919
RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
FACTS:
The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein
non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands. It is resolved that under section
2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao
on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of
Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this
reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously
recommended by the provincial governor.
In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative
Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans
east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's
place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao,
Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order
shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with
section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.
Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as
necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as
the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized
customs among them.
It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed
their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.
It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their
liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are
said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their
will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff
in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation. ISSUES:
1. Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprives a person of his
liberty?
2. Thus, whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional?
HELD:



52

The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person
of his liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and
that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute
slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of
the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the non-
Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the
Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor- General
adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public
forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the
Manguianes. One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without
when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for
their own good and the general good of the Philippines.
Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the
individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general
well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases.
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of
law. Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty.
Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.
VOID FOR VAGUENESS/OVERBREADTH
292 SCRA 141 (1998)
BLAS OPLE VS RUBEN TORRES
FACTS:
On December 12, 1996 President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Administrative Order 308 entitled Adoption of National and Computerized
Identification Reference System. The purposes of the said order are: (a) it will
provide the Filipino and foreign residents with the convenience to transact
businesses with basic service and social security providers and other
government instrumentalities (b) it will reduce if not totally eradicate fraudulent
transactions and misrepresentations because it will require a computerized
system to properly and efficiently identify person seeking basic services on social
security.
Petitioner Senator Blas Ople prays to invalidate A.O. 308 for two vital
constitutional grounds: (a) it is a usurpation of power of Congress to legislate (b)
it intrudes the citizenrys protected zone of privacy. ISSUE: Whether or not
Administrative Order 308 is unconstitutional for being overbreadth? HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that it is inarguable that the broadness,
vagueness and overbreadth of A.O. 308 will put the peoples right to privacy in
clear and present danger.
Administrative Order 308 does not state: (a) what specific biological
characteristics will be gathered (b) what particular biometrics technology will be
employed (c) whether data is limited to use for identification purposes only (d)
how data will be handled (e)who shall control and access the data.
Thus A.O 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable
expectation of privacy because, as technology advances, the level of reasonable
expected privacy decreases. G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
The Office of the Ombudsman accuses President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada together with Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie Atong Ang, Edward Serapio,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro Eleuterio Tan, and Delia Rajsas of the crime of
plunder defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080 as amended by Sec. 12 R.A.
No. 7659.
During the term of President Estrada, he together with the individuals
mentioned above wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and
acquire by himself, directly or indirectly ill-gotten wealth amounting to four billion
ninety seven million eight hundred four thousand one hundred seventy three
pesos and seventeen centavos (4,097,804,173.17), thereby unjustly enriching
himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines.
Under RA 7080 An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder as amended by RA 7659 Section 2, the crime of plunder is defined as
an act of any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or
other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or a series of overt or criminal acts described in Section 1(d) hereof
in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (50,000,000)
and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death.
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property,
business, enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of
Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies,
nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination
or series of the following means or similar schemes: (1) Through
misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on
the public treasury; (2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift,
share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any
person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by
reason of the office or position of the public office concerned; (3) By the illegal
or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or
government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; (4) By
obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity
or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future
employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (5) By establishing
agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or
special interests; or (6) By taking advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at
the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
Petitioner Estrada questions the validity of the law for it is void for
vagueness. He bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition
of the terms and combination and series in the key phrase a combination or a
series of overt or criminal acts found in Section 1 par. d, and the word pattern
in Section 4. ISSUE: Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for it
suffers from the vice of vagueness? HELD:
vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the
statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct
to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. But the doctrine does not
apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which
nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are
apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be
"saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the
second whenever directed against such activities. With more reason, the doctrine cannot
be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether
the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that
the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute
to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to
suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the
metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid
merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its
provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to
provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.
GR No. 171390, May 3, 2006
DAVID VS. ARROYO *no case digest submitted*
GR No. 126858, September 16, 2005
ONG VS. SANDIGANBAY AN
FACTS:
Congressman Bonifacio Gallego executed a complaint against petitioner Ong, a former
Commissioner of the BIR claiming that petitioner has amassed properties worth
disproportionately more than his lawful income. The Director of the Fact Finding
Committee of the office of the Ombudsman ordered the conduct of investigation on the
matter; of which petitioner was required to submit counter affidavit and controverting
evidence. Petitioner filed a counter-affidavit submitting his Statements of Assets and
Liabilities, income tax return, bank certificates showing that he obtained a loan from
Allied Banking Corporation, certificate from SGV and company and other documents
explaining the sources of funds with which he acquired the questioned assets.
Ombudsman finds and recommend for recovery of ill-gotten wealth under Ra 1379, in
relation to RAs 3019 and 6770 against Ong and all other persons concerned.
ISSUE/S:
The Supreme Court ruled that a statute or act may be said to be


53
1. 2.
3.
WON, the right to preliminary investigation is withheld by RA 1379 from a co-respondent
Nelly Ong, who is not herself a public officer or employee. WON, petitioner is correct in
his contention that the office of the Ombudsman is disqualified to file a petition for
forfeiture considering of the duality of function, as investigator and prosecutor of the
case.
WON, petitioner is correct in the contention that RA1379 is unconstitutional since it
violates the presumption of innocence and the right against self incrimination.
HELD:
1. No, even if RA 1379 appears to be directed only against the public officer or employee
who has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out
of
proportion to his salary and his other lawful income and the income from legitimately
acquired property, the reality thst the application of the law is such that the conjugal
share of Nelly Ong stands to be subjective to the penalty of forfeiture grants her the
right, in line with the due process clause of the constitution, to a preliminary
investigation.
2. No, Supreme Court declared that the office of the Ombudsman has the correlative
powers to investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten
and/or unexplained wealth.
3. No, the court ruled that petitioner cannot invoked constitutional assurance against self
incrimination because such right is a prohibition against the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications to the accused. In this case,
petitioners are not compelled to present themselves as witnesses in rebutting the
presumption established by law. They may present documents evidencing the
purported bank loans, money market placements and other fund sources in their
defense.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS - PUBLIC REQUIREMENT
146 SCRA 446, 1986
TANADA VS. TUVERA *no case digest submitted*
263 SCRA 421, 1996
PITC VS. ANGELES *no case digest submitted*
GR No. 147096, January 15, 2002
REPUBLIC VS. EXTELCOM *no case digest submitted*
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS - IMPARTIAL COURT OR TRIBUNAL
141 SCRA 307, 1986
TANADA VS. PAEC *no case digest submitted*
119 SCRA 353, 1982
ANZALDO VS. CLAVE *no case digest submitted*
GR No. 159190, June 30, 2005
TEJANO VS. OMBUDSMAN *no case digest submitted*
273 US 510, 1997
TUMEY VS. OHIO *no case digest submitted*
262 SCRA 452, 1996
PEOPLE VS. COURT OF APPEALS *no case digest submitted*
268 SCRA 332, 1997
TABUENA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN *no case digest submitted*
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS - PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS - NOTICE & HEARING
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS - OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD
GR No. 170288, September 22, 2006
BUDIONGAN VS. DE LA CRUZ *no case digest submitted*
G.R. No. 114944. June 19, 2001
ROXAS VS VASQUEZ
FACTS:
A complaint was filed by the then DILG Secretary Rafael Alunan III before the
Ombudsman against certain officers of the Philippine National Police including herein
petitioners Police General Manuel C. Roxas and Police Colonel Ahmed S. Nacpil for
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
This was after the Commission on Audit discovered the irregularities in the bidding,
awarding and purchasing of sixty fire trucks.
After a review of the preliminary investigation conducted, an Information was filed by
the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan which excluded herein petitioners and three
others among the accused.
However, upon motion, a reinvestigation was conducted by the Office of the Special
Prosecutor. Without any notice to or participation of the petitioners, the Office of the
Special Prosecutor issued the first assailed Order, dismissing the charges against
Generals Flores and Tanchanco, and recommending that the petitioners together with
P/Lt. Col. Julian Kairan be likewise indicted.
Petitioners Roxas and Nacpil, together with Kairan, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, however it was disapproved. Thus, the Office of the Ombudsman filed
an Amended Information with respondent Sandiganbayan, impleading petitioners as
additional accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners indictment, on reinvestigation, was without notice
nor participation of petitioners, hence, null and void for being violative of their
constitutional right to due process.
HELD:
Neither do the lack of notice to, or participation of, petitioners at the
reinvestigation render the questioned issuances of respondent Office of the
Ombudsman null and void. This was firmly settled in the recent case of Espinosa
v. Office of the Ombudsman, where we held as follows --
xxx. And even without such notice, we agree with the observations of
the Sandiganbayan that under the Rules of Procedures of the Office of the
Ombudsman [Administrative Order No. 07], particularly Sec. 7, in relation to Sec.
4, while complainants in preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman
actively participated therein, their participation is no longer accorded to them as a
matter of right in the stage of the reinvestigation. In administrative proceedings,
moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied;
administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict
judicial sense. (underscoring ours)
At any rate, petitioners cannot argue that they have been deprived of
due process. The rule is well established that due process is satisfied when the
parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy or an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. In the case at bar, the record clearly shows that petitioners not
only filed their respective Counter-Affidavits during the preliminary investigation,
they also filed separate Motions for Reconsideration of the October 19, 1993
Order of the Ombudsman impleading them as accused in Criminal Case No.
18956.



54
A.M. No. RTJ-02-1674. January 22, 2004
MAROHOMBSAR VS JUDGE ADIONG
FACTS:
Herein complainant Bailinang P. Marohombsar was the defendant in
a civil case for injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction filed by Yasmira
Pangandapun questioning the legality of Marohombsars appointment as
provincial social welfare officer V of the DSWD-ARMM. Prior to Marohombsars
appointment, Pangandapun used to occupy said position as officer in charge.
Judge Adiong issued the temporary restraining order. During the
hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
none of the lawyers appeared. Hence, respondent considered it submitted for
resolution and issued the preliminary injunction the following day.
A complaint was thereafter filed against Judge Santos B. Adiong of
the RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, Lanao del Sur, Marohombsar for gross
ignorance of the law, abuse of discretion and conduct unbecoming of a judge in
connection with his issuance of a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
restraining order in the civil case involving herein complainant. ISSUE:
Whether or not the complainant was denied due process because the preliminary
injunction was issued without hearing. HELD:
In applications for preliminary injunction, the dual requirement of prior notice and
hearing before injunction may issue has been relaxed to the point that not all petitions for
preliminary injunction need undergo a trial-type hearing, it being doctrinal that a formal or
trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process. The
essence of due process is that a party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard
and to present any evidence he may have in support of his defense. In the present case,
complainant was able to move for a reconsideration of the order in question, hence her
right to due process was not in anyway transgressed. We have ruled that a party cannot
claim that he has been denied due process when he has availed of the opportunity to
present his position.
[180 SCRA 218; G.R. NO.84818; 18 DEC 1989]
PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ
FACTS:
Herein petitioner, Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation, is engaged in
providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for certain specified
lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose Alcuaz Commissioner of the
National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by
fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power
to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing.
ISSUE: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional because it violates procedural due
process for having been issued without prior notice and hearing and that the rate
reduction it imposes is unjust, unreasonable and confiscatory, thus constitutive of a
violation of substantive due process.
HELD:
The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all
the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains
exclusively to petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact,
although patently superficial, that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates
charged- based on an initial evaluation of petitioner's financial statements-without
affording petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects
of the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization
was offered nor were the attending
contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted respondents to impose as much as a
fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume that petitioner could
be in a better position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of its business
requirements. The rates it charges result from an exhaustive and detailed study it
conducts of the multi-faceted intricacies attendant to a public service undertaking of such
nature and magnitude. We are, therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to
petitioner's ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its rates would adversely affect
its operations and the quality of its service to the public considering the maintenance
requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the financial outlay involved.
Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the inspector
who issued the report on which respondent NTC based its questioned order.
While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the
application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not
exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the
requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may not
exercise the same in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order
as temporary in nature does not perforce entail the applicability of a different rule of
statutory procedure than would otherwise be applied to any other order on the same
matter unless otherwise provided by the applicable law.
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make
such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or
permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary
investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of respondents is
hereby SET ASIDE.
101 Phil 833 (1957)
SUNTAY VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:
On or about June 21, 1954, Emilio Suntay took Alicia Nubla from St. Paul's Colleges
in Quezon City with lewd design and took her somewhere near the U.P. compound in
Diliman, Quezon City and was then able to have carnal knowledge with her. Alicia Nubla
is a minor of 16 years. Alicias father, Dr. Antonio Nubla, filed a verified complaint
against accused in the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City. The complaint was
dismissed for lack of merit.
On January 10, 1955, the petitioner applied for and was granted a passport by the
Department of Foreign Affairs. He left the Philippines for San Francisco, where he
enrolled in school.
On 31 January 1955 the offended girl subscribed and swore to a complaint charging
the petitioner with seduction which was filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City
after preliminary investigation had been conducted. On 9 February 1955 the private
prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue an order "directing such government
agencies as may be concerned, particularly the National Bureau of Investigation and the
Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of having the accused brought back to the
Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law."
Hence, this petition to annul the order. ISSUES:
1. WON the Courts order for the cancellation of the petitioners passport is illegal.
2. WON the Secretary for Foreign Affairs can exercise his discretion of cancelling the
passport without hearing.
HELD:
The petitioner's contention cannot be sustained. The petitioner is charged with
seduction. And the order of the respondent Court



55
directing the Department of Foreign Affairs "to take proper steps in order that the
accused . . . may be brought back to the Philippines, so that he may be dealt with in
accordance with law," is not beyond or in excess of its jurisdiction. In issuing the order in
question, the respondent Secretary was convinced that a miscarriage of justice would
result by his inaction and as he issued it in the exercise of his sound discretion, he
cannot be enjoined from carrying it out.
Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the
withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where
the holder of a passport is facing a criminal a charge in our courts and left the
country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the
exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to
have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such
passport. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When
discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such
as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing
maybe dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his
passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of
the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be
deemed whimsical and capricious of because of the absence of such hearing. If
hearing should always be held in order to comply with the due process of law
clause of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte
would be violative of the said clause.
The petition is denied. 8 SCRA 244 (1963) DE BISSHOP VS
GALANG FACTS:
Petitioner-appellee George de Bisschop, an American citizen, was
allowed to stay in this country for three years as the prearranged employee of the
Bissmag Production, Inc., of which he is president and general manager. He
applied for extension of stay with the Bureau of Immigration, in a letter dated 10
July 1959. In view, however, of confidential and damaging reports of Immigration
Officer Benjamin de Mesa to the effect that the Bissmag Production, Inc., is more
of a gambling front than the enterprise for promotion of local and imported shows
that it purports to be, and that de Bisschop is suspect of having evaded payment
of his income tax.
The Commissioner of Immigration advised him that his application for
extension of stay as a prearranged employee has been denied by the Board of
Commissioners, and that he should depart within 5 days.
De Bisshop filed the present case for prohibition to desist from
arresting and detaining him. ISSUE: WON the Commissioners of Immigration
are required by law to conduct formal hearings on all applications for extension of
stay of aliens. HELD:
The administration of immigration laws is the primary and exclusive responsibility of
the Executive branch of the government. Extension of stay of aliens is purely
discretionary on the part of the immigration authorities. Since Commonwealth Act No.
613, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, is silent as to the
procedure to be followed in these cases, we are inclined to uphold the argument that
courts have no jurisdiction to review the purely administrative practice of immigration
authorities of not granting formal hearings in certain cases as the circumstances may
warrant, for reasons of practicability and expediency. This would not violate the due
process clause if we take into account that, in this particular case, the letter of appellant-
commissioner advising de Bisschop to depart in 5 days is a mere formality, a preliminary
step, and,
therefore, far from final, because, as alleged in paragraph 7 of appellant's answer to the
complaint, the "requirement to leave before the start of the deportation proceedings is
only an advice to the party that unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be compelled
to take steps for his expulsion". It is already a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a day in
court is not a matter of right in administrative proceedings.
The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with an administrative
proceeding and not with a judicial proceeding. As Judge Cooley, the leading American
writer on Constitutional Law, has well said, due process of law is not necessarily judicial
process; much of the process by means of which the Government is carried on, and the
order of society maintained, is purely executive or administrative, which is as much due
process of law, as is judicial process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial
proceedings, in administrative proceedings, it is otherwise since they rest upon different
principles. . . . In certain proceedings, therefore, of all administrative character, it may be
stated, without fear of contradiction, that the right to a notice and hearing are not
essential to due process of law.
161 SCRA 232 (1988)
VAR ORIENT SHIPPING CO., INC. VS. ACHACOSO
FACTS:
The petitioners filed a complaint with the Workers' Assistance and Adjudication
Office, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against the private
respondents Edgar T. Bunyog, Vedasto Navarro, Eugenio Capalad, Raul Tumasis,
Antonio Tanioan, Celestino Cason, Danilo Manela and Roberto Genesis, crew members
of the MPV "Silver Reefer," for having allegedly violated their Contracts of Employment
with the petitioners which supposedly resulted in damages arising from the interdiction of
the vessel by the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) at Kiel Canal,
Germany, in March 1986.
After joinder of the issues, the case was heard on March 4, 1987 where the parties
agreed to submit their respective position papers and thereafter the case would be
submitted for decision. Only the private respondents submitted a position paper.
Public respondent rendered judgment and dismissed the case for some of the
employees; other employees were entitled to payments by the complainant. A copy of
the decision was sent by registered mail and delivered by the postman to the petitioners'
counsel at his address, through the receptionist. According to Attorney Figura, he did not
receive the envelope containing the decision
Petitioners allegedly learned about the decision only when the writ of execution was
served. On November 23,1987, petitioners, through new counsel, filed an 'urgent Motion
to Recall Writ of Execution' on the ground that the decision had not been received by the
petitioners, hence, it was not yet final and executory.
Hence, this petition to annul the judgment by public respondent and the writ of
execution be set aside.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner was denied due process of law because Administrator
resolved the case without any formal hearing.
HELD:
Equally unmeritorious is the petitioners 'allegation that they were denied due process
because the decision was rendered without a formal hearing. The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
The fact is that at the hearing of the case on March 4, 1987, it was agreed by the
parties that they would file their respective memoranda and thereafter consider the case
submitted for decision. This procedure is authorized by law to expedite the settlement of
labor disputes. However, only the private respondents submitted memoranda. The
petitioners did not. On



56


June 10, 1987, the respondents filed a motion to resolve. The petitioners' counsel did not
oppose either the "Motion to Resolve" or the respondents "Motion for Execution of
Decision" dated October 19, 1987, both of which were furnished them through counsel. If
it were true, as they now contend, that they had been denied due process in the form of
a formal hearing, they should have opposed both motions.
The petition for certiorari is denied for lack of merit. PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS - ADMINISTRATIVE DUE
PROCESS
[GR 46496, 27 February 1940]
ANG TIBAY VS CIR
FACTS:
Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for
reconsideration of the CIR and to the motion for new trial of the National Labor
Union.
The Supreme Court found it not necessary to pass upon the motion
for reconsideration of the Solicitor-General, as it found no substantial evidence to
indicate that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union
affiliation or activity. The Court granted the motion for a new trial and the entire
record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen
the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth.
Principles behind the case:
1. The Court of Industrial Relations; Departure from rigid
concept of separation of powers
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically
stated in the law of its creation (CA 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of
the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive
organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting
only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by
the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from
perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises
judicial or quasijudicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers
and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any
question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting, employers and
employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulate the
relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103
(section 1). It shall take cognizance for purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and
settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or
lockout, arising from differences as regards wageshares or compensation, hours of labor
or conditions of tenancy or employment, between employers and employees or laborers
and between landlords and tenants or farm- laborers, provided that the number of
employees, laborers or tenants or farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such
industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by
any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary of Labor as
existing and proper to be death with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section
A, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor
to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement.
(Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall
investigate and study all pertinent facts related to the
2.
3.
industry concerned or to the industries established in a designated locality, with a view to
determining the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or locality
a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum canon or rental to be
paid by the inquilinos or tenants or lessees to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it
may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ
mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official
investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies
between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a
mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine
of the separation of governmental powers.
The CIR free from rigidity of certain procedure requirements, but not free to ignore
or disregard fundamental and essential requirements of due process involving
proceedings of administrative character. The fact, however, that the CIR may be said
to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can,
in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and
essential requirements of due Process in trials and investigations of an administrative
character.
Cardinal primary rights respected in administrative proceedings; Guidelines a.
Right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. The liberty and property of the
citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play. b. The tribunal
must consider the evidence presented, after the party is given an opportunity to present
his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts. The
right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to
consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom
the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration. c. Wile the
duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when
directly attached. This principle emanates from the more fundamental principle that the
genius of constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power
anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power. d. Not only must there be
some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be substantial.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. e. The decision
must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.
f. The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of
a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
g. The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved, and the reasons
for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.
New trial granted under circumstances
The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to
present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence
as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which

57
4.
created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to
grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely
affected by the result.
77 SCRA 321, 1977
MONTEMAYOR VS ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION
FACTS:
Petitioner was a professor at the Araneta University Foundation. On 7/8/74, he was
found guilty of making homosexual advances on one Leonardo De Lara by a faculty
investating committee. On 11/8/74, another committee was appointed to investigate
another charge of a similar nature against petitioner. Petitioner, through counsel, asked
for the postponement of the hearing set for 11/18 and 19, 1974, but the motion was
denied. The committee then proceeded to hear the testimony of the complainants and
on 12/5/74, submitted its report recommending the separation of petitioner from the
University. On 12/12/74, the University applied w/ the NLRC for clearance to terminate
petitioner's employment. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a complaint w/ the NLRC for
reinstatement and backwages. Judgement was rendered in petitioner's favor, but on
appeal to the Sec. of Labor, the latter found petitioner's dismissal to be justified. Hence,
this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of due process.
HELD:
The Constitution assures to workers security of tenure. In the case of petitioner, this
guarantee is reinforced by the provision on academic freedom. In denying petitioner's
motion for postponement of the hearing, the committee did not accord procedural due
process to the petitioner. This was, however, remedied at the mediation conference
called at the Dept. of Labor during w/c petitioner was heard on his evidence. There he
was given the fullest opportunity to present his case. Furthermore, with regards to
petitioners filing of MFR contending that the hearing in the NLRC did not conform to
their requirements of due process as the witnesses against him were not called so that
petitioner could cross-examine them, this cannot be given credit. Petitioner did not object
to the presentation of the testimony of the complainant and the witnesses at the school
investigation and did not assert his right to cross-examine them. Petitioner waived his
right to confront the witnesses, relying solely on the strength of his evidence. Nor was it
incumbent on resp. to present the witnesses in the NLRC. Petitioner's only right is to be
heard Petition dismissed.
11 SCRA 317, 1964
MERALCO VS PSC
FACTS:
Meralco made several applications for the revision and reduction of
its rate, which were approved by the Commission. On June 9, 1954, upon
petition of Dr. Pedro Gil, the Commission requested the Auditor General to cause
an audit and examination of Meralco's books of accounts. It was then examined
and a report was submitted to the commission.
Hearing was reset from May 30, 1956 to June 22, 1956. On said date,
the parties appeared and Atty. Venancio L. de Peralta, Technical Assistant and
Chief of the Finance and Rate Division of the Commission, who was duly
authorized to receive the evidence of the parties, announced that the hearing
was an "informal hearing", and its purpose was to hear any remarks or
statements of the parties and to define the issues "so that at the hearing we know
exactly what are disputed at this informal hearing".
After reports had been submitted with regards to the auditing,
Meralco was given by the Commission a period of 30 days within which to file an
answer, specifying its objections to the report of the GAO.
Without having (1) first reset the said 3 cases for hearing; (2) Without
having given the Meralco an opportunity, as requested by
it, to cross-examine the officers of the GAO who prepared the report dated May 11,
1956, on which report the Commission based its decision; and (3) Without having given
the Meralco an opportunity, as requested by it, to present evidence in support of its
answer to refute the facts alleged in said report and controverted by Meralco, on
December 27, 1957, the said Commission handed down a decision, wherein Meralco is
required to reduce its present authorized rates effective January 1, 1958 based on the
authorized rates.
Hence, the present petition for review with preliminary injunction which was issued by
this Court
ISSUE: Whether or Not there was a violation of due process, thus the decision of the
court is considered void.
HELD: The record shows that no hearing was held. On June 22, 1956, parties
appeared before "Attorney Vivencio L.
Peralta, Technical Assistant, and Chief, Finance and Rate Division, Public Service
Commission, who was duly authorized to receive the evidence of the parties", and the
record shows that the hearing held before the said Commissioner was merely an
informal hearing because, using his own words, "I said at the beginning that this is only
preliminary because I want that the parties could come to some kind of understanding.
The record further shows that after the "preliminary hearing" held on June 22, 1956,
no other hearing was held; the cases were never set for hearing; and Meralco was not
given an opportunity to present evidence to rebut the audit report
The decision therefore was null and void having been rendered without any hearing;
the Commission could not validly make findings of fact without affording petitioner the
right to cross- examine and confront witnesses, as well as the right to present its
evidence; the decision contained findings contrary to law and at any event, the decision
was based on obsolete allegations of fact, and since the submission of the audit report
of the GAO, on whose allegations the decision was predicated, there had occurred
recent developments which had substantially altered the situation of the Meralco and
which have to be taken into account by the Commission, in fixing just and reasonable
rates
It should be remembered that there should be no short cuts in the disposition of the
time-honored principle that no one should be deprived of his life, liberty and property,
without due process of law. Considering the fact that the reduction of rates herein sought
might involve huge amounts of money and the errors, alleged to have been committed, if
true, would affect likewise not only the right of the petitioner but also public interest, it
would have been a better part of valor and wisdom to have delayed a little bit the final
resolution of the controversy
"Even if the Commission is not bound by the rules of judicial proceedings, it must
how its head to the constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of right
without due process of law", which binds not only the government of the Republic, but
also each and everyone of its branches, agencies, etc. "Due process of law guarantees
notice and opportunities to be heard to persons who would be affected by the order or
act contemplated.
145 SCRA 100, 1986
ATENEO vs. CA
FACTS:
Carmelita Mateo, a waitress inside the university charged Juan
Ramon Guanzon, a boarder and first year student of the university with
unbecoming conduct committed on December 12, 1967 at about 5:15 in the
evening at the Cervini Hall's cafeteria
"Mr. Guanzon, a boarder at Cervini ... was asking for 'siopao.' I was at
the counter and I told him that the 'siopao' had still to be heated and asked him to
wait for a while. Then Mr. Guanzon started mumbling bad words directed to me,
in the hearing presence of other boarders. I asked him to stop cursing, and he
told me that was none of my business. Since he seemed impatient, I was going
to give back his money without any



58
contempt. He retorted that he did not like to accept the money. He got madder and
started to curse again. Then he threatened to strike me with his fist. I tried to avoid this.
But then he actually struck me in my left temple. Before he could strike again, his fellow
boarders held him and Dr. Bella and Leyes coaxed him to stop; I got hold of a bottle so I
could dodge him. It was then that Fr. Campbell arrived. The incident was hidden from Fr.
Campbell by the boarders. I could not tell him myself as I had gone into the kitchen
crying because I was hurt."
The university conducted an investigation of the slapping incident.
Based on the investigation results, Juan Ramon was dismissed from the
university. This triggered the filing of a complaint for damages by his parents
against the university in the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at
Bacolod City. The complaint states that Juan Ramon was expelled from school
without giving him a fair trial in violation of his right to due process and that they
are prominent and well known residents of Bacolod City, with the unceremonious
expulsion of their son causing them actual, moral, and exemplary damages as
well as attorney's fees.
In its answer, the university denied the material allegations of the
complaint and justified the dismissal of Juan Ramon on the ground that his
unbecoming behavior is contrary to good morals, proper decorum, and civility,
that such behavior subjected him as a student to the university's disciplinary
regulations' action and sanction and that the university has the sole prerogative
and authority at any time to drop from the school a student found to be
undesirable in order to preserve and maintain its integrity and discipline so
indispensable for its existence as an institution of learning.
After due trial, the lower court ruled in favor of the Guanzons and
ordered the university to pay them P92.00 (actual damages); P50,000.00 (moral
damages); P5,000.00 (attorney's fees) and to pay the costs of the suit
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals by the university, the trial court's
decision was initially reversed and set aside. The complaint was dismissed.
However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by the Guanzons, the
appellate court reversed its decision and set it aside through a special division of
five. In the resolution issued by the appellate court, the lower court's decision
was reinstated. The motion for reconsideration had to be referred to a special
division of five in view of the failure to reach unanimity on the resolution of the
motion, the vote of the regular division having become 2 to 1.
The petitioner now asks to review and reverse the resolution of the
division of five ISSUE/S:
1. WON Juan Ramon Guanzon was not accorded due process of law
2. WON respondents complaint for recovery of damages was premature because
administrative remedies have not yet been exhausted
3. WON private respondents are entitled to damages
HELD: Petition granted in favor of Ateneo. CA ruling reversed. 1. No, he was accorded
due process.
Exceptions to the rule on finality of factual findings of trial
courts and administrative agencies
The appellate court resolution invoked the rule that findings of facts
by administrative officers in matters falling within their competence will not
generally be reviewed by the courts, and the principle that findings of facts of the
trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal.
The court does not agree. The statement regarding the finality given
to factual findings of trial courts and administrative tribunals is correct as a
general principle. However, it is subject to well established exceptions. Factual
findings of trial courts are disregarded when - (1) the conclusion is a finding
grounded on speculations, surmises, and conjectures; (2) the inferences made
are manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) there is a misapprehension of facts;
and (5) the court, in arriving at its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same are contrary to the admissions of the parties or the evidence presented.
A similar rule applies to administrative agencies. By reason of their special
knowledge and expertise, we ordinarily accord respect if not finality to factual findings of
administrative tribunals. However, there are exceptions to this rule and judicial power
asserts itself whenever (1) the factual findings are not supported by evidence; (2) where
the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition, or collusion; (3) where the procedure which
led to the factual findings is irregular; (4) when palpable errors are committed; or when a
grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest
Why he is deemed to have been accorded due process When the letter-
complaint was read to Juan Ramon, he admitted the altercation with the waitress and his
slapping her on the face. Rev. Welsh (Dean of men) did not stop with the admission. He
interviewed Eric Tagle, Danny Go, Roberto Beriber, and Jose Reyes, friends of Juan
Ramon who were present during the
incident. The Board of Discipline was made up of distinguished members
of the faculty -Fr. Francisco Perez, Biology Department Chairman; Dr. Amando
Capawan, a Chemistry professor; Assistant Dean Piccio of the College; and Dr. Reyes
of the same College. There is nothing in the records to cast any doubt on their
competence and impartiality insofar as this disciplinary investigation is concerned.
Juan Ramon himself appeared before the Board of Discipline. He admitted the
slapping incident, then begged to be excused so he could catch the boat for Bacolod
City. Juan Ramon, therefore, was given notice of the proceedings; he actually appeared
to present his side; the investigating board acted fairly and objectively; and all requisites
of administrative due process were met.
The claim that there was no due process because the private respondents, the
parents of Juan Ramon were not given any notice of the proceedings will also not stand.
Juan Ramon, who at the time was 18 years of age, was already a college student,
intelligent and mature enough to know his responsibilities. In fact, in the interview with
Rev. Welsh, he even asked if he would be expelled because of the incident. He was fully
cognizant of the gravity of the offense he committed. When informed about the
December 19, 1967 meeting of the Board of Discipline, he was asked to seek advice
and assistance from his guardian and or parents. Juan Ramon is assumed to have
reported this serious matter to his parents. The fact that he chose to remain silent and
did not inform them about his case was not the fault of the petitioner university.
Moreover, notwithstanding the non-participation of the private respondents, the
university, as stated earlier, undertook a fair and objective investigation of the slapping
incident. Due process in administrative proceedings also requires consideration of the
evidence presented and the existence of evidence to support the decision (Halili v. Court
of Industrial Relations, 136 SCRA 112).
Carmelita Mateo was not entirely blameless for what happened to her because she
also shouted at Juan Ramon and tried to hit him with a cardboard box top, but this did
not justify Juan Ramon's slapping her in the face. The evidence clearly shows that the
altercation started with Juan Ramon's utterance of the offensive language "bilat ni bay,"
an Ilongo phrase which means sex organ of a woman. It was but normal on the part of
Mateo to react to the nasty remark. Moreover, Roberto Beriber, a friend of Juan Ramon
who was present during the incident told Rev. Welsh during the investigation of the case
that Juan Ramon made threatening gestures at Mateo prompting her to pick up a
cardboard box top which she threw at Juan Ramon. The incident was in public thus
adding to the humiliation of Carmelita Mateo. There was "unbecoming conduct" and
pursuant to the Rules of Discipline and Code of Ethics of the university, specifically
under the 1967- 1969 Catalog containing the rules and academic regulation (Exhibit 19),
this offense constituted a ground for dismissal from



59


the college. The action of the petitioner is sanctioned by law. Section 107 of the Manual
of Regulations for Private Schools recognizes violation of disciplinary regulations as
valid ground for refusing re-enrollment of a student (Tangonan v. Pao, 137 SCRA 245).
Before Juan Ramon was admitted to enroll, he received (1) the
College of Arts and Sciences Handbook containing the general regulations of the
school and the 1967-1969 catalog of the College of Arts and Sciences containing
the disciplinary rules and academic regulations and (2) a copy of the Rules and
Regulations of the Cervini-Elizo Halls of the petitioner university one of the
provisions of which is as follows: under the title "Dining Room" - "The kitchen
help and server should always be treated with civility." Miss Mateo was employed
as a waitress and precisely because of her service to boarders, not to mention
her sex, she deserved more respect and gracious treatment.
The petitioner is correct in stating that there was a serious error of law
in the appellate court's ruling on due process.
2. No, complaint was not premature.
The petitioner raises the issue of "exhaustion of administrative
remedies" in view of its pending appeal from the decision of the Ministry of
Education to the President of the Philippines. It argues that the private
respondents' complaint for recovery of damages filed in the lower court was
premature.
The issue raised in court was whether or not the private respondents
can recover damages as a result of the dismissal of their son from the petitioner
university. This is a purely legal question and nothing of an administrative nature
is to or can be done. The case was brought pursuant to the law on damages
provided in the Civil Code. The jurisdiction to try the case belongs to the civil
courts.
3. No, there is no basis for recovery of damages.
There is no basis for the recovery of damages. Juan Ramon was
afforded due process of law. The penalty is based on reasonable rules and
regulations applicable to all students guilty of the same offense. He never was
out of school. Before the decision could be implemented, Juan Ramon asked for
an honorable dismissal which was granted. He then enrolled at the De la Salle
University of Bacolod City and later transferred to another Jesuit school.
Moreover, his full and complete tuition fees for the second semester were
refunded through the representation of Mr. Romeo Guanzon, Juan Ramon's
father.
There was no bad faith on the part of the university. In fact, the
college authorities deferred any undue action until a definitive decision had been
rendered. The whole procedure of the disciplinary process was get up to protect
the privacy of the student involved. There is absolutely no indication of malice,
fraud, and improper or wilful motives or conduct on the part of the Ateneo de
Manila University in this case. 161 SCRA 7, 1988 ALCUAZ vs. PSBA
FACTS:
Students and some teachers of PSBA rallied and barricaded the
school because they wanted to admin to hear their grievances with regards to
not being able to participate in the policy-making of the school, despite the
regulations set by the admin with regards to protest actions
During the regular enrollment period, petitioners and other students
similarly situated were allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the second
semester of school year 1986-1987.
Court ordered the school authorities to create a special investigating
committee to conduct an investigation, who made recommendations which the
school adopted
A lot of procedural crap, petitioners and respondents filing and
answering the complaints
Petitioners claim that they have been deprived of due process when
they were barred from re-enrollment and for intervenors
teachers whose services have been terminated as faculty members, on account of their
participation in the demonstration or protest charged by respondents as "anarchic"
rallies, and a violation of their constitutional rights of expression and assembly.
Petitioners allege that they have been deprived of procedural due process which
requires that there be due notice and hear hearing and of substantive due process which
requires that the person or body to conduct the investigation be competent to act and
decide free from bias or prejudice.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not there has been deprivation of due process ? 2. WON there was
contempt of Court by the respondents
HELD:
1. NO. there was no deprivation of due process. There is no existing contract
between the two parties. Par 137 of
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools states that when a college student registers in
a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester. Likewise, it is
provided in the Manual, that the "written contracts" required for college teachers are for
'one semester. after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any
existing contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers. It is a time-
honored principle that contracts are respected as the law between the contracting
parties The contract having been terminated, there is no more contract to speak of.
The school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said students
and teachers. "The courts, be they the original trial court or the appellate court, have no
power to make contracts for the parties."
The Court has stressed, that due process in disciplinary cases involving
students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for
actions and proceedings in courts of justice.
Standards of procedural due process are: a. the students must be informed in writing
of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; b. they shall have the right to
answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired: c. they
shall be informed of the evidence against them; d. they shall have the right to
adduce evidence in their own behalf and e.the evidence must be duly considered
by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear
and decide the case.
Printed Rules and Regulations of the PSBA-Q.C. were distributed at the beginning of
each school
Enrollment in the PSBA is contractual in nature and upon admission to the School,
the Student is deemed to have agreed to bind himself to all rules/regulations
promulgated by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports. Furthermore, he agrees
that he may be required to withdraw from the School at any time for reasons
deemed sufficiently serious by the School Administration.
Petitioners clearly violated the rules set out by the school with regard to the protest
actions. Necessary action was taken by the school when the court issued a temporary
mandatory injunction to accept the petitioners for the first sem & the creation of an
investigating body.
The Court, to insure that full justice is done both to the students and teachers on the
one hand and the school on the other, ordered an investigation to be conducted by the
school authorities, in the resolution of November 12, 1986.
Findings of the investigating committee: 1. students disrupted classes
2. petitioners involved were found to be academically deficient & the teachers are found
to have committed various acts of misconduct.
The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency
and violation of disciplinary regulations has always been recognized by this Court Thus,
the Court has ruled


60
that the school's refusal is sanctioned by law. Sec. 107 of the Manual of Regulations
for Private Schools considers academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary
regulations vs as valid grounds for refusing re-enrollment of students. The opposite view
would do violence to the academic freedom enjoyed by the school and enshrined under
the Constitution.
Court ordinarily accords respect if not finality to factual findings of
administrative tribunals, unless : 1. the factual findings are not supported by
evidence; 2. where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; 3.
where the procedure which led to the factual findings is irregular; 4. when
palpable errors are committed; or 5. when a grave abuse of discretion,
arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.
Investigation conducted was fair, open, exhaustive and
adequate.
2. No. The urgent motion of petitioners and intervenors to cite respondents in contempt
of court is likewise untenable.
No defiance of authority by mere filing of MOR coz respondent
school explained that the intervenors were actually reinstated as such faculty
members after the issuance of the temporary mandatory injunction.
Respondent school has fully complied with its duties under the
temporary mandatory injunction The school manifested that while the
investigation was going on, the intervenors-faculty members were teaching and it
was only after the investigation, that the recommendations of the Committee
were adopted by the school and the latter moved for the dismissal of the case for
having become moot and academic. GR No. 89317, May 30, 1990 NON vs.
DANES FACTS:
Petitioner students of Mabini Colleges were not allowed to re- enroll
because they participated in student mass actions against their school the
preceding sem
On Feb 22, 1988, the date of the resumption of classes at Mabini
College, petitioners continued their rally picketing, even though without any
renewal permit, physically coercing students not to attend their classes, thereby
disrupting the scheduled classes and depriving a great majority of students of
their right to be present in their classes
Together with the abovementioned fact, the lower court considered
that in signing their enrollment forms, they waived the privilege to be re-enrolled.
The Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission of students xxx whose
activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the college
xxx
In addition the students signed pledges saying they respect their alma
matter, that they will conduct themselves in a manner that would not put the
college in a bad light.
Judge Dames decision considering these facts said that what the
students assert is a mere privileges not a legal right. Respondent Mabini College
is free to admit or not to admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the
academic freedom enjoyed by the school. ISSUE/HELD: WON the doctrine laid
down in Alcuaz insofar as it allowed schools to bar the re-admission or re-
enrollment of students on the ground of termination of contract should be
reversed. The re- admission or re-enrollment of students on the ground of
termination of contract should be reversed. YES RATIO:
re-admission. The refusal to readmit or to re-enroll petitioners was decided upon and
implemented by school authorities as a reaction to student mass action.
This is a case that focuses on the right to speech and assembly as exercised by
students vis--vis the right of school officials to discipline them.
The student does not shed his constitutionally protected rights at the schoolgate. In
protesting grievances disorder is more or less expected because emotions run high.
That the protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the
Consti is similarly available to students is well-settled in our jurisdiction. Right to
discipline cannot override constitutional safeguards. Citing Malabanan and Villar the
court reiterated that the exercise of the freedom of assembly could not be a basis for
barring students from enrolling. Under academic freedom, students my be barred from
re-enrollment based on academic deficiencies.
Permissible limitations on student exercise of constitutional rights within the school.
Constitutional freedom of free speech and assembly also not absolute. However,
imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process and
penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense committed. (procedural due
process: right to be informed in writing, right to ans the charges, right to be informed of
the charges against them, right to adduce evidence, and for this evidence to be duly
considered)
The nature of contract between a school and its students is not an ordinary contract
but is imbued with public interest. The Consti allows the State supervisory and regulatory
powers over all educational institutions. [see art XIV sec1-2, 4(1) ]. According to par 107
and 137 of the respondent schools manual, a student is enrolled not just for one sem
but for the entire period necessary for the student to complete his/her course. BP blg
232 gives the students the right to continue their course up to graduation.
Academic freedom not a ground for denying students rights. In Villar, the right of an
institution of higher learning to set academic standards cannot be utilized to discriminate
against students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for
otherwise there will be a violation of their right to equal protection.
School said most of them had failing grades anyway. In answer students say they are
graduating students and if there are any deficiencies these do not warrant non-
readmission. Also there are more students with sores deficiencies who are re-admitted.
And some of the petitioners had no failing marks.
The court held that the students were denied due process in that there was no due
investigation. In fact it would appear from the pleadings that the decision to refuse them
re-enrollment because of failing grades was a mere afterthought.
Discipline may be warranted but penalty shld be commensurate to the offense
committed with due process.
But penalty, if any is deserved should not anymore be enforced. Moot and academic.
Theyve already suffered enough.

In Alcuaz, it was said that enrollment is a written contract for one semester and contracts
are respected as the law between the contracting parties. At the end of each sem, the
contract is deemed terminated.
However, this case is not a simple case about a school refusing



61
- TAXATION -
PURPOSE
G.R. No. L-28896 February 17, 1988
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. ALGUE
FACTS:
The Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company (PSEDC) appointed Algue Inc. as
its agent, authorizing it to sell its land, factories, and oil manufacturing process. The
Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation (VOICP) purchased PSEDC properties. For the
sale, Algue received a commission of P125,000 and it was from this commission that it
paid Guevara, et. al. organizers of the VOICP, P75,000 in promotional fees. In 1965,
Algue received an assessment from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the
amount of P83,183.85 as delinquency income tax for years 1958 amd 1959. Algue filed
a protest or request for reconsideration which was not acted upon by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR). The counsel for Algue had to accept the warrant of distrant and
levy. Algue, however, filed a petition for review with the Coourt of Tax Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether the assessment was reasonable.
HELD:
Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected
without unnecessary hindrance. Every person who is able to pay must contribute
his share in the running of the government. The Government, for his part, is
expected to respond in the form of tangible and intangible benefits intended to
improve the lives of the people and enhance their moral and material values.
This symbiotic relationship is the rationale of taxation and should dispel the
erroneous notion that is an arbitrary method of exaction by those in the seat of
power.
Tax collection, however, should be made in accordance with law as
any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for government itself. For all the
awesome power of the tax collector, he may still be stopped in his tracks if the
taxpayer can demonstrate that the law has not been observed. Herein, the
claimed deduction (pursuant to Section 30 [a] [1] of the Tax Code and Section 70
[1] of Revenue Regulation 2: as to compensation for personal services) had been
legitimately by Algue Inc. It has further proven that the payment of fees was
reasonable and necessary in light of the efforts exerted by the payees in inducing
investors (in VOICP) to involve themselves in an experimental enterprise or a
business requiring millions of pesos.
The assessment was not reasonable. 177 SCRA 27, 1989
COMMISSIONER VS. MAKASIAR *no case digest submitted* TAX
EXEMPTIONS 33 PHIL 217, 1916 YMCA VS. CIR *no case digest
submitted* 51 PHIL 352, 1927 BISHOP OF NUEVA SEGOVIA VS
PROVINCIAL BOARD *no case digest submitted* 14 SCRA 292, 1965
LLADOC VS CIR *no case digest submitted*


107 SCRA 104, 1981
THE PROVINCE OF ABRA VS HONORABLE HAROLD M. HERNANDO
FACTS:
In this case the provincial city assessor of Abra filed a certiorari and
mandamus against the ruling made by Judge Harold M. Hernando of the Court of
First Instance of Abra, it was because respondent denied a motion for
declaratory relief by Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued desirous of being
exempted from a real estate tax followed by a summary judgment granting such
exemption without even hearing the side of the petitioner. Petitioner further
argued that clearly the judge ignored the pertinent provisions of the Rules of
Court and disregards the basic laws of procedure and basic provisions of due
process in the constitution. The important argument made by the petitioner is that
the judge failed to abide by the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 464 which
states that" No court shall entertain any suit assailing the validity of a tax
assessed under this Code until the taxpayer, shall have paid, under protest, the
tax assessed against him nor shall any court declare any tax invalid by reason of
irregularities or informalities in the proceedings of the officers charged with the
assessment or collection of taxes, or of failure to perform their duties within this
time herein specified for their performance unless such irregularities, informalities
or failure shall have impaired the substantial rights of the taxpayer; nor shall any
court declare any portion of the tax assessed under the provisions of this Code
invalid except upon condition that the taxpayer shall pay the just amount of the
tax, as determined by the court in the pending proceeding."
The judge responded by saying there is no dispute that the properties
including their procedure are actually, directly and exclusively used by the
Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. for religious or charitable purposes."
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the petition be granted since the judge
would not have made such a grave mistake if he had only made a clear
distinction between the present provisions of the constitution to the provisions of
the 1935 constitution regarding tax exemptions on land, buildings and
improvements. The main difference is that in order for a land, building, or
improvement to be tax exempt, there must be and exclusive, actual and direct
use of the enumerated for religious or charitable purposes. It is also a rule that
tax exemption is not favored nor presumed so that if granted it must be strictly
construed against the taxpayer. Affirmatively put, the law frowns on exemption
from taxation, hence, an exempting provision should be construed strictissimi
juris
The petition was also justly invoked on the grounds for the protection
of due process to clearly show if the respondents really did not violate any
constitutional provisions in regards to tax exemption but instead, what
respondent judge did was directly ruled on the case of declaratory relief on the
basis that it was exclusive, actual, and directly as sources of support of the
parish priest and his helpers and also of private respondent Bishop as compared
to the motion to dismiss the case due to lack of jurisdiction since the validity of a
tax assessment may be questioned before the Local Board of Assessment
Appeals and not with a court. There was also mention of a lack of a cause of
action, but only because, in its view, declaratory relief is not proper, as there had
been breach or violation of the right of government to assess and collect taxes on
such property. It clearly appears, therefore, that in failing to accord a hearing to
petitioner Province of Abra and deciding the case immediately in favor of private
respondent, respondent Judge failed to abide by the constitutional command of
procedural due process. 162 SCRA 106, 1988 ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE,
INC. VS. HON. JUAN P. AQUINO
62
FACTS:
This is a case for a review or certiorari on the decision made by the
defunct Court of First Instance of Abra Branch I, dated June 14, 1974, rendered
in Civil Case No. 656. In this case the court decided that the seizure and sale by
the Municipal Treasurer of Bangued, Abra and Provincial Treasurer of the said
province of the lot and building of Abra Valley College, Inc. to be valid since the
said school was not tax exempt. What transpired was the school was issued a
Notice of Seizure of the lot and building of the school covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. Q-83 duly registered in the name of petitioner for failure to
pay the amount of P5,140.31 back taxes by the respondent The "Notice of Sale"
was caused to be served upon the petitioner by the respondent treasurers on
July 8, 1972 for the sale at public auction of said college lot and building, which
sale was held on the same date. Dr. Paterno Millare, then Municipal Mayor of
Bangued, Abra, offered the highest bid of P6,000.00 which was duly accepted.
The certificate of sale was correspondingly issued to him.
After the sale Dr. Paterno filled a case for the dismissal of the case
and after exchange of pleadings the court ordered the respondent treasurers to
deliver the proceeds of the auction sale. Finally the parties involved entered into
a Stipulation of Facts administered by the court dismissing the notice of seizure
and notice of sale in favor of Dr. Paterno and relieving him of all the back taxes of
the school upon the payment of the auction price.
Despite the Stipulation of Facts the trial courts found out that the
school was recognized by the government offering Primary High School and
College courses and has a population of more than 100,000 students all in all;
that the school was situated right in the heart of town of Bangued, Abra a few
meters from the plaza and about 120 meters from the Court of First Instance
building; that the elementary pupils are housed in a two-storey building across
the street; that the high school and college students are housed in the main
building; that the Director with his family is in the second floor of the main
building; and that the annual gross income of the school reaches more than one
hundred thousand pesos. In light of the evidences it was left after the courts to
determine whether the said school was exclusively for educational purposes.
The succeeding Provincial Fiscal, Hon. Jose A. Solomon and his
Assistant, Hon. Eustaquio Z. Montero, filed a Memorandum for the Government
on March 25, 1974, and a Supplemental Memorandum on May 7, 1974, wherein
they opined "that based on the evidence, the laws applicable, court decisions and
jurisprudence, the school building and school lot used for educational purposes
of the Abra Valley College, Inc., are exempted from the payment of taxes.
The trial court disagreed because of the use of the second floor by
the Director of petitioner school for residential purposes. He thus ruled for the
government and rendered the assailed decision. After having been granted by
the trial court ten (10) days from August 6, 1974 within which to perfect its appeal
petitioner instead availed of the instant petition for review on certiorari with prayer
for preliminary injunction before this Court, which petition was filed on August 17,
1974. In the resolution dated August 16, 1974, this Court resolved to give DUE
COURSE to the petition Respondents were required to answer said petition. The
petitioners raised the arguments that the courts a quo: 1. made an error in
sustaining a valid seizure and sale of the college lot and building used for
educational purpose 2. Made an error in declaring that the college was not
exclusively for educational purposes merely because the college president
resides in it 3. made an error in declaring the college not tax exempt from
property taxes and in ordering petitioner to pay P5,140.31 as realty taxes. 4.
made an error in ordering the confiscation of the P6,000.00 deposit made in the
court by petitioner as payment of the P5,140.31 realty taxes. ISSUE: Whether
Abra Valley College Inc. subject to tax exemption as stated in the constitution
that a school should be exclusively for educational purpose despite the proof
that there are other purpose attached to the lot and building such as a residence
of the College
president?
HELD:
In the case at bar the Supreme Court used Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the
then 1935 Philippine Constitution, which expressly grants exemption from realty taxes
for "Cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all
lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or
educational purposes ... Relative thereto, Section 54, paragraph c, Commonwealth Act
No. 470 as amended by Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as the Assessment
Law, provides that churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all
lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific or
educational purposes
The Supreme court ruled that the exemption in favor of property used exclusively for
charitable or educational purposes is 'not limited to property actually indispensable but
extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of said purposes and that while this Court allows a more liberal and
non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase "exclusively used for educational purposes"
as provided for in Article VI, Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution,
reasonable emphasis has always been made that exemption extends to facilities which
are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main
purposes.
While the use of the second floor of the main building in the case at bar for residential
purposes of the Director and his family, they may find justification under the concept of
incidental use, which is complimentary to the main or primary purposeeducational, the
lease of the first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any
stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the conclusion that the
school building as well as the lot where it is built should be taxed, not because the
second floor of the same is being used by the Director and his family for residential
purposes, but because the first floor thereof is being used for commercial purposes.
However, since only a portion is used for purposes of commerce, it is only fair that half of
the assessed tax be returned to the school involved.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Abra,
Branch I, is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification that half of the assessed tax
be returned to the petitioner
101 PHIL 386, 1957
AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY vs. CITY OF MANILA
FACTS:
In this case the plaintiff is a foreign, non-stock, religious, missionary organization duly
registered in the Philippines and doing business through its agency here in Manila. In the
course of their ministry, their Philippine agency has been distributing and selling bibles
and/or gospel portions thereof (except during the Japanese occupation) throughout the
Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialect Upon knowledge the
acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting the
business of general merchandise since November, 1945, without providing itself with the
necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, requiring the plaintiff to secure, within
three days, the corresponding permit and license fees, together with compromise
covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total
sum of P5,821.45 To avoid the closing of its business as well as further fines and
penalties in the premises on October 24, 1953, plaintiff paid to the defendant under
protest the said permit and license fees in the aforementioned amount, giving at the
same time notice to the City Treasurer that suit would be taken in court to question the
legality of the ordinances under which, the said fees were



63
being collected which was done on the same date by filing the complaint that gave rise
to this action. The plaintiff prays that judgment be rendered declaring the said Municipal
Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364 illegal
and unconstitutional, and a refund should be made by the defendant of the payments
made and the legal costs. The defendant replied that, maintaining in turn that said
ordinances were enacted by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila by virtue of the
power granted to it by section 2444, subsection (m-2) of the Revised Administrative
Code, superseded on June 18, 1949, by section 18, subsection (1) of Republic Act No.
409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, and praying that the complaint
be dismissed, with costs against plaintiff. This answer was replied by the plaintiff
reiterating the unconstitutionality of the often-repeated ordinances
Before the trial the party submitted a stipulation of facts stating the
sales made by the petitioner from 1945 to 1953. When the case was set for
hearing the plaintiff argued that it never made any profit from the sale of its
bibles, which are disposed of for as low as one third of the cost, and that in order
to maintain its operating cost it obtains substantial remittances from its New York
office and voluntary contributions and gifts from certain churches, both in the
United States and in the Philippines, which are interested in its missionary work.
The defendant answered that due to the cross-examination of the lone witness of
plaintiff it was proven that the claim of plaintiff that if having no profit from the
sales is evidently untenable. This made the judge to dismiss the case for lack of
merit on the grounds thatfrom the repealed section (m-2) of the Revised
Administrative Code and the repealing portions (o) of section 18 of Republic Act
No. 409, although they seemingly differ in the way the legislative intent is
expressed, yet their meaning is practically the same for the purpose of taxing the
merchandise mentioned in said legal provisions, and that the taxes to be levied
by said ordinances is in the nature of percentage graduated taxes (Sec. 3 of
Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Sec. 1, Group 2, of Ordinance No. 2529,
as amended by Ordinance No. 3364).
Not satisfied with the decision, they took up the matter to the Court of
Appeals which was certified to the Supreme Court where the petitioner argued
these points 1. In holding that Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as respectively
amended, are not unconstitutional 2. In holding that subsection m-2 of Section
2444 of the Revised Administrative Code under which Ordinances Nos. 2592 and
3000 were promulgated, was not repealed by Section 18 of Republic Act No.
409; 3. In not holding that an ordinance providing for taxes based on gross sales
or receipts, in order to be valid under the new Charter of the City of Manila, must
first be approved by the President of the Philippines; and 4. In holding that, as
the sales made by the plaintiff-appellant have assumed commercial proportions,
it cannot escape from the operation of said municipal ordinances under the cloak
of religious privilege. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinances of the City of
Manila, Nos. 3000, as amended, and 2529, 3028 and 3364, are constitutional
and valid; and (2) whether the provisions of said ordinances are applicable or not
to the case at bar. HELD:
In the case at bar the Supreme court held that that Ordinance No.
3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff Society.
But as Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is not applicable
to plaintiff-appellant and defendant- appellee is powerless to license or tax the
business of plaintiff Society involved herein for, as stated before, it would impair
plaintiff's right to the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and
worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs, We find that
Ordinance No. 3000, as amended is also inapplicable to said business, trade or
occupation of the plaintiff.
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations, We
hereby reverse the decision appealed from, sentencing
defendant return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected from it. Without
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
DOUBLE TAXATION
95 PHIL 46, 1954
PUNZALAN VS MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA *no case digest submitted*
LICENSE FEES
GR No. 10448, August 30, 1957
PHYSICAL THERAPY ORG. VS MUNICIPAL BOARD *no case digest submitted*



64
- EQUAL PROTECTION -
SEXUAL DISCRIMNINATION
163 SCRA 386, 1988
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS vs. DRILON
FACTS:
The Department of Labor and Employment issued Department Order
No. 1, Series of 1988 in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC
AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS.
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc.
(PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino
workers, male and female, for overseas placement," challenges its Constitutional
validity.
On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents
Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the
respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq,
Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and
Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the
Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State. ISSUE:
WON Department Order No. 1 in the nature of a police power measure is valid
under the Constitution, assailing:
"discrimination against males or females;"
that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to
domestic helpers and females with similar skills;"
and that it is violative of the right to travel
it is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking
power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.
HELD:
The contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that
Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not
thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that
"equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity
of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1)
such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they
apply equally to all members of the same class.
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy
plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic
servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases,
physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by
migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by
testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government
action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon
to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the
Government's efforts.
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does
not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the
requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law." Department Order
No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to
"afford protection to labor," pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's
rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code. The petitioner assumes that
it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we
have
stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a
valid qualification thereto. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department
Order No.
1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the
domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully
delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor
and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof.
"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What
concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all,
decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and
daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home.
Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling
expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from
home. In this case, the Government has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot
seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its duty, it
has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield
to the loftier purposes targetted by the Government.
31
Freedom of contract and
enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this
jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling economic
way of life.
Petition dismissed. ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
99 PHIL, 1856
PEOPLE vs. HERNANDEZ
FACTS:
This is a case of kidnapping with murder involving the Huks,
members of the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan, the military arm of the
Communist Party of the Philippines.
Counsel for Faustino del Mundo, alias Commander Sumulong, admits
that the said accused ordered the killing of the victim, Marciano T. Miranda, 41,
the barrio captain of Barrio Balitucan, Magalang, Pampanga, who was an alleged
army informer and who was opposed to the candidacy of Rogelio Tiglao, a
provincial board member.
The kidnapping and killing were politically motivated. Miranda refused
to support Tiglao, the candidate for Congressman of the Huks. He supported
Rafael Lazatin, the Nacionalista candidate. ISSUE: Del Mundo contends that
he should be convicted only of homicide and sentenced to reclusion temporal
medium and that the trial court erred in convicting him of the said complex crime
and in sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. HELD:
Del Mundo did not testify in his defense. As already stated, the trial
court convicted him of kidnapping with murder together with Pangilinan,
Macasaquit and Cabrera, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and ordered him
to pay an indemnity of P17,000 to Miranda's heirs. Macalino and Meneses were
acquitted. Salas died during the pendency of the case. Only Del Mundo
appealed. His counsel de oficio contends that there was no intention to deprive
Miranda of his liberty and no premeditated plan to kill him.
That contention is not well-taken. The fact is that Miranda was forcibly
removed from his barrio and deprived of his liberty for several hours and was
then brought to another place where he was killed. While under interrogation, his
grave was already being prepared. The fatal blow, which was inflicted upon him,
caused him to fall into his grave.
petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the


We find that there was a conspiracy to liquidate Miranda and that
65


the kidnapping was utilized as a means to attain that objective. From the surrounding
circumstances, it maybe inferred that Del Mundo masterminded the kidnapping or
induced it and that, as observed by the Solicitor General, the killing was intended to
terrorize the supporters of Lazatin.
Miranda was a public officer. His kidnapping is covered by article
267(4) of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death for that offense.
The killing of Miranda was murder because his hands were bound
when he was mortally assaulted (U.S. vs. Elicanal, 35 Phil. 209 and other cases).
Even without taking into account evident premeditation, the death
penalty has to be imposed because article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
requires that the graver penalty for kidnapping, which is more serious than
murder, has to be meted out to Del Mundo
However, inasmuch as Del Mundo is now seventy-eight (78) years
old, the death penalty cannot be imposed upon him.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is modified in the sense that
the death penalty imposable on Del Mundo is commuted to reclusion perpetua
with the accessory penalties provided in article 40. In all other respects, the trial
court's judgment is affirmed. 85 PHIL 648, 1950 PEOPLE vs. ISNAIN
FACTS:
Accused was caught in the act of stealing coconut while his two other
companions managed to ran away.
Accused admitted to committing the said crime ISSUE: The only
question raised with much earnestness by his attorney de oficio is that article 310
of the Revised Penal Code classifying as qualified theft, the stealing of coconut is
unconstitutional, because it punishes the larceny of such products more heavily
than the taking away of similar produce, such as rice and sugar, and thereby
denies him the equal protection of the laws. HELD:
In the matter of theft of coconuts, the purpose of the heavier penalty
is to encourage and protect the development of the coconut industry as one of
the sources of our national economy.3 Unlike rice and sugar cane farms where
the range of vision is unobstructed, coconut groves can not be efficiently watched
because of the nature of the growth of coconut trees; and without a special
measure to protect this kind of property, it will be, as it has been in the past the
favorite resort of thieves.4 There is therefore, some reason for the special
treatment accorded the industry; and as it can not be said that the classification
is entirely without basis, the plea of unconstitutionality must be denied
The crime is punished by article 309, paragraph 5, in connection with
article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No.
417. (Republic Act No. 120, enacted after the offense, is not applicable.) The
penalty is prision correccional to its full extent. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence law, the appellant should be sentenced to imprisonment for not less
than 4 years and 2 months of arresto mayor nor more than 4 years and 2 months
of prision correccional. Thus modified, the appealed decision will be affirmed,
with costs. so ordered. GR No. 130716, December 09, 1998 CHAVES VS.
PCGG FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as "taxpayer, citizen and former government official
who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed
unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the
country's economy," alleges that what impelled him to bring this action were several
news reports bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997.
These news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos
assets
deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a
compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to
split or share these assets.
Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of
the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands
that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to
PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any
compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount
public interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would
be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people.
ISSUE: WON the government, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), be required to reveal the proposed terms of a compromise
agreement with the Marcos heirs as regards their alleged ill-gotten wealth.
HELD:
In general, writings coming into the hands of public officers in connection with their
official functions must be accessible to the public, consistent with the policy of
transparency of governmental affairs. This principle is aimed at affording the people an
opportunity to determine whether those to whom they have entrusted the affairs of the
government are honesty, faithfully and competently performing their functions as public
servants. Undeniably, the essence of democracy lies in the free flow of thought; but
thoughts and ideas must be well-informed so that the public would gain a better
perspective of vital issues confronting them and, thus, be able to criticize as well as
participate in the affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective
manner.
With such pronouncements of our government, whose authority emanates from the
people, there is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth is a
matter of public concern and imbued with public interest. We may also add that "ill-
gotten wealth," by its very nature, assumes a public character. Clearly, the assets and
properties referred to supposedly originated from the government itself. To all intents
and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. As such, upon reconveyance they
will be returned to the public treasury, subject only to the satisfaction of positive claims of
certain persons as may be adjudged by competent courts. Another declared overriding
consideration for the expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth is that it may be used for
national economic recovery. The foregoing disquisition settles the question of whether
petitioner has a right to respondents' disclosure of any agreement that may be arrived at
concerning the Marcoses' purported ill-gotten wealth. Petition granted.
111 SCRA 433, 1982
NUNEZ VS. SANDIGANBAY AN
FACTS:
Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding assails the validity of the
Presidential Decree creating the Sandiganbayan, He was accused before such
respondent Court of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents
committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases.
Upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash on constitutional and jurisdictional
grounds. Respondent Court denied such motion. There was a motion for reconsideration
filed the next day; it met the same fate. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition
ISSUE: WON Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, creating the respondent Court
is violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
HELD:


66
To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of
law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those
adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection
clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being
inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of
hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. To
quote from the Tuason decision anew "that the laws operate equally and
uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be
treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference
cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be
given to every person under circumstances which, if not Identical, are analogous.
The premise underlying petitioner's contention on this point is set
forth in his memorandum thus: " 1. The Sandiganbayan proceedings violates
petitioner's right to equal protection, because - appeal as a matter of right
became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; - appeal likewise was shrunk
and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial
evidence; and - there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the
Supreme Court, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa
indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts
and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the Court of Appeals and thereafter to the
Supreme Court." ,that is hardly convincing, considering that the classification
satisfies the test requiring that it "must be based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not
be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of
the class. The Constitution specifically mentions the creation of a special court,
the Sandiganbayan precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which
cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those
who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back
as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a
different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner
is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of
the Constitution. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. GR No. 142030,
April 21, 2005 GALLARDO VS. PEOPLE FACTS:
Atty. Victor dela Serna, for and in behalf of the Public Health Workers
(PHWs) of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao a sworn letter-complaint charging herein petitioners Mayor Gallardo,
the vice mayor, Sanggunian Bayan members, all public officers of the
Municipality of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, with violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 for their alleged refusal to appropriate in the municipal
budget the amount representing payment of the mandatory statutory obligations
of the Municipality of Bansalan accruing to the complaining PHWs in the nature
of unpaid salary differential and magna carta benefits.
The information filed with the Sandiganbayan stated that herein
petitioners caused undue injury to the Public Health Workers (PHWs) of the
Municipality of Bansalan, by refusing to perform their duties to include an
appropriation in the municipal budget for the payment of the mandatory statutory
obligations of the Municipality of Bansalan due to the complaining PHWs in the
nature of unpaid salary differential and magna carta benefits in the aggregate
amount of P3,833,798.10.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reinvestigation. The Sandiganbayan
granted the motion. A special prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case
but Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto disapproved the recommendation. The
Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners are denied due process and not accorded the equal
protection of laws.
HELD:
Petitioners claimed that they were denied due process because Ombudsman Aniano
A. Desierto disapproved the recommendation of the special prosecutor.
The Ombudsman, contrary to the investigating prosecutors conclusion, was of the
conviction that petitioners are probably guilty of the offense charged, and for this, he is
not required to conduct an investigation anew. Whatever course of action that the
Ombudsman may take, whether to approve or to disapprove the recommendation of the
investigating prosecutor, is but an exercise of his discretionary powers based upon
constitutional mandate.[17] Generally, courts should not interfere in such exercise.
The equal protection clause requires that the law operates uniformly on all persons
under similar circumstances or that all persons are treated in the same manner, the
conditions not being different, both in privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. It
allows reasonable classification. If the classification is characterized by real and
substantial differences, one class may be treated differently from another. Simply
because the respondent Ombudsman dismissed some cases allegedly similar to the
case at bar is not sufficient to impute arbitrariness or caprice on his part, absent a clear
showing that he gravely abused his discretion in pursuing the instant case. The
Ombudsman dismissed those cases because he believed there were no sufficient
grounds for the accused therein to undergo trial. On the other hand, he recommended
the filing of appropriate information against petitioners because there are ample grounds
to hold them for trial. He was only exercising his power and discharging his duty based
upon the constitutional mandate of his office. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED
for lack of merit
PUBLIC POLICY
[G.R. No. 157279. August 9, 2005.]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. GIOVANNI PALMA ET AL.
FACTS:
PNB was formerly a government owned and controlled corporation
but on 26 May 1996, it was already privatized and incorporated as a private
commercial bank.
R.A. 6758, 'An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position
Classification System in the Government' took effect on 1 July 1989 covering all
government owned corporations. Section 12 thereof provides for the
consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into standardized
salary rates, but
certain additional compensation were exempted from consolidation. In the present case,
the Salary Standardization Law clearly provides that the claimed benefits shall continue
to be granted only to employees who were "incumbents" as of July 1, 1989.
"The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued
Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10) to implement R.A.
6758. On 12 August 1998, the Supreme Court, in the case of Rodolfo S. de
Jesus, et al. of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) vs. Commission
on Audit held that DBM- CCC No. 10 was ineffective due to its non-publication in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.
"In view of the declaration made by the Supreme Court in the above-
mentioned case, a petition for mandamus was filed by respondents on 20
December 1999. Respondents alleged, that they are employees hired by PNB on
various dates after 30 June 1989; that from the dates of their respective
appointments until 1 January 1997 they were unjustly deprived and denied of the
allowances being enjoyed by other employees of PNB. According to
respondents, the declaration that DBM-CCC No. 10 was



67
ineffective paved the way to their entitlement to the allowances/fringe benefits. The
withholding of their entitlement to the same benefits is an unfair discrimination and a
violation of respondents' rights to the equal protection clause of the Constitution since
incumbents or employees of PNB who were already in the service as of 1 July 1989
received the benefits and allowances. To rectify the injustice against respondents issued
General Circular No. 1-312/97 on 14 March 1997, extending the benefits to respondents
effective 1 January 1997. But Respondents contend that extending to them the
allowances/fringe benefits meant that they are entitled to the payment of the same and,
hence, they should be given their allowances reckoned not only from 1 January 1997 but
from the date of their respective appointment, to which PNB did not accede to. The trial
court ruled in favor of the Respondents, and the Court of Appeals denied petitioners
appeal. Thus, this instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are entitled to the questioned fringe benefits
HELD:
The respondents were not entitled to the benefits because they were
hired only after JUNE 30 1989. An incumbent is a person who is in present
possession of an office.
Finally, to explain what July 1, 1989 pertained to, we held in the prior
cases as follows: The date July 1, 1989 becomes crucial only to determine that
as of said date, the officer was an incumbent and was receiving the RATA, for
purposes of entitling him to its continued grant." Respondents were not deemed
incumbents as defined by settled jurisprudence. Petitioner was correct in
contending that by extending the assailed benefits to respondents on January 1,
1997, it was not thereby admitting that the latter were priorly entitled to them. It
contends that its privatization on May 27, 1996 enabled it to grant benefits as it
deemed fit. It could not have granted them while it was still a government
agency, because RA 6758 barred such grant as an illegal disbursement of public
funds. It allegedly accorded them those benefits, not because it had finally
acceded to their interpretation of the law, but because it was only then that as
a private entity it could legally do so.
The collateral attack on the constitutionality of RA 6758 due to
alleged violation of the equal protection clause cannot prosper, because
constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly not collaterally. Furthermore,
the constitutional issue was not raised in the trial court; hence, it cannot now be
availed of on appeal to this Court. Besides, the arguments of respondents rest
upon the validity of Section 12 of RA 6758. How then can they now challenge the
very basis of their arguments?
A law is deemed valid unless declared null and void by a competent
court; more so when the issue has not been duly pleaded in the trial court. The
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity.
Respondents not only failed to challenge the constitutionality of RA 6758; worse,
they used it in seeking compensation from petitioner. The settled rule is that
courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. [G.R. No. 148208.
December 15, 2004.] CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas)
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS
and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FACTS: Almost eight years after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 7653 or the New Central Bank Act, petitioner Central Bank
Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against respondents
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) and the Executive Secretary of the Office of
the President, to restrain them from further implementing the last proviso in
Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional
because the classification of BSP employees provided
by law is unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, and violative of the equal protection clause
of the Constitution. The thrust of petitioner's challenge is that the assailed proviso makes
an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP
officers or those exempted from the coverage of R.A. No. 6758 or the Salary
Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG]
19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class).
Petitioner contended that the classification is "a classic case of class legislation,"
allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on
the SG of the BSP personnel's position. Petitioner further contended that the assailed
proviso is also violative of the equal protection clause because after it was enacted, the
charters of the Government Service Insurance System, Land Bank of the Philippines,
Development Bank of the Philippines and Social Security System were also amended,
and their respective personnel were all exempted from the coverage of the SSL. Thus,
within the class of rank-and-file personnel of Government Financial Institutions (GFI), the
BSP rank-and-file employees are also discriminated upon.
ISSUE: Whether or not a provision of law, initially valid, can become subsequently
unconstitutional, on the ground that its continued operation would violate the equal
protection of the law
HELD:
Supreme Court held that with the passage of the subsequent laws amending the
charter of seven (7) other governmental financial institutions (GFIs), the continued
operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, constitutes
invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of the BSP.
The Supreme Court struck down the assailed proviso and held that with the passage
of the subsequent laws amending the charter of seven (7) other governmental financial
institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, constitutes invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-
and-file employees of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. The disparity of treatment
between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other seven GFIs definitely bears
the unmistakable badge of invidious discrimination. No one can, with candor and
fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the subsequent blanket and total
exemption of the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was withheld from the BSP.
Alikes are being treated as unalikes without any rational basis. The Court emphasized
that the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be
allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every
person under circumstances which, if not identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon
in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same
fashion; whatever restrictions cast on some in the group is equally binding on the rest.
With the lack of real and substantial distinctions that would justify the unequal treatment
between the rank-and-file of BSP from the seven other GFIs, it is clear that the
enactment of the seven subsequent charters has rendered the continued application of
the challenged proviso anathema to the equal protection of the law, and the same
should be declared as an outlaw.
Wherefor, the continued operation and implementation of the last proviso of Section
15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is held unconstitutional.
[G.R. No. 56515. April 3, 1981.]
UNITED DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION (UNIDO), vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS:
Petitioner United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO), in two letter- requests to the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated March 10



68
and 17,1981, asked for exactly the same opportunity, the same prime time and the same
number of television and radio stations all over the country to be used in its campaign for
"NO" votes in the plebiscite for the amendments to the 1973 Constitution proposed by
the Batasang Pambansa as that utilized by President Marcos in his nationwide "Pulong-
Pulong sa Pangulo" in campaigning for "YES" votes on the proposed constitutional
amendments. The Commission, in its Resolution of March 18, 1981 denied petitioner's
"demand'' being of the view that the President's remarks on the proposed amendments
in the forementioned radio-television program carried live by twenty-six (26) television
and two hundred forty-eight (248) radio stations throughout the country were initiated
under his leadership and capacity as President/prime Minister in the exercise of his
constitutional prerogative to determine the program and guidelines of national policy
pursuant to Article IX, Section 2 of the Constitution and not as the head of any political
party. Petitioner's Motion for reconsideration proved futile, hence this present action,
assailing the Comelec's resolutions as contrary to the Constitution, unjust, unfair and
inequitable for violating the basic principles of equality, good faith and fair play, the same
not conducive to insure a free, orderly and honest elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC violated the equal protection clause for denying
UNIDO the same air time in Media as that of the President in campaigning for the NO
votes in the plebiscite for the amendments to the 1973 Contstitution.
HELD:
The Supreme Court, in dismissing the appeal, held that when the President spoke in the
nation-wide program "Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" on March 21, 1981, he did so in his
capacity as President- Prime Minister and not as the head of the KBL; and that what
petitioner asks cannot be granted for being beyond what the charter, the laws and
pertinent Comelec regulations contemplate, for being more than what the opposition is
duly entitled vis-a-vis the duty, obligation and/or privilege inherent in the head of state to
directly dialogue with the sovereign people when the occasion demands, for being
impractical under prevailing circumstance, and for its failure to join in the petition the
television and radio stations as indispensable parties, thereby depriving the Court of
jurisdiction to act.
Appeal dismissed.
227 SCRA 703 (1993)
PJA VS PRADO *no case digest submitted*
248 SCRA 700, 1995
OLIVAREZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN *no case digest submitted*
GR No. 127410, January 20, 1999
TIU VS. COURT OF APPEALS *no case digest submitted*
G.R. No. 132527. July 29, 2005
COCONUT OIL REFINERS ASSOCIATION, INC. et al vs. RUBEN TORRES, as
Executive Secretary, et al
FACTS:
On March 13, 1992, RA No. 7227 was enacted, providing for, among other things, the
sound and balanced conversion of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their
extensions into alternative productive uses in the form of special economic zones in
order to promote the economic and social development of Central Luzon in particular
and the country in general. The law contains provisions on tax exemptions for
importations of raw materials, capital and equipment. After which the President issued
several Executive Orders as mandated by the law for the implementation of RA 7227.
Herein petitioners contend the validity of the tax exemption provided for in the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Orders issued by President for
69


the implementation of the tax exemptions constitutes executive legislation.
HELD:
To limit the tax-free importation privilege of enterprises located inside the special
economic zone only to raw materials, capital and equipment clearly runs counter to the
intention of the Legislature to create a free port where the free flow of goods or capital
within, into, and out of the zones is insured. The phrase tax and duty-free importations
of raw materials, capital and equipment was merely cited as an example of incentives
that may be given to entities operating within the zone. Public respondent SBMA
correctly argued that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, on which
petitioners impliedly rely to support their restrictive interpretation, does not apply when
words are mentioned by way of example. It is obvious from the wording of RA No. 7227,
particularly the use of the phrase such as, that the enumeration only meant to illustrate
incentives that the SSEZ is authorized to grant, in line with its being a free port zone.
The Court finds that the setting up of such commercial establishments which are the
only ones duly authorized to sell consumer items tax and duty-free is still well within the
policy enunciated in Section 12 of RA No. 7227 that . . .the Subic Special Economic
Zone shall be developed into a self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and
investment center to generate employment opportunities in and around the zone and to
attract and promote productive foreign investments. However, the Court reiterates that
the second sentences of paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 of Executive Order No. 97-A, allowing
tax and duty-free removal of goods to certain individuals, even in a limited amount, from
the Secured Area of the SSEZ, are null and void for being contrary to Section 12 of RA
No. 7227. Said Section clearly provides that exportation or removal of goods from the
territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory
shall be subject to customs duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and
other relevant tax laws of the Philippines.
G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000
ISAE v. Hon. Leonardo A. Quisumbing
FACTS:
Private respondent, International School Inc. is a domestic educational institution
established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary
residents. The school hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty,
classifying them as foreign-hires and local-hires. The local-hire faculty members of said
International School, mostly Filipinos, complained against the better treatment of their
colleagues who have been hired abroad. These foreign-hires enjoy certain benefits not
accorded the local-hires which include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes,
home leave travel allowance and a salary rate 25% higher than that of the local- hires.
Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the school is
discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes
racial discrimination.
ISSUE: Whether or not the classification employed by the respondent school constitutes
racial discrimination.
Held: YES. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human
Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every
person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of
cooperatives from
ISSUES:
payment of real property tax.
1. WON the Local Government Code (under Sec. 193 and 234) violated the equal
protection clause since the provisions unduly discriminate against petitioners who
are duly registered cooperatives under PD 269, as amended, and no under RA
6938 or the Cooperatives Code of the Philippines?
2. Is there an impairment of the obligations of contract under the loan entered into
between the Philippine and the US


employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall
"ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront
to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial
obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to
unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.
In this case, the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent
school to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires
is an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the
services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of
according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and,
certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this
jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons
who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility,
under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the
School, its "international character" notwithstanding. If an employer accords
employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees
perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If
the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to
explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be
adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it
is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly. GR. No.
143076. June 10, 2003 PHILRECA vs. DILG FACTS: On May 23, 2003, a
class suit was filed by petitioners in their own behalf and in behalf of other
electric cooperatives organized and existing under PD 269 which are members of
petitioner Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA).
The other petitioners, electric cooperatives of Agusan del Norte (ANECO), Iloilo 1
(ILECO 1) and Isabela 1 (ISELCO 1) are non-stock, non-profit electric
cooperatives organized and existing under PD 269, as amended, and registered
with the National Electrification Administration (NEA). Under Sec. 39 of PD 269
electric cooperatives shall be exempt from the payment of all National
Government, local government, and municipal taxes and fee, including franchise,
fling recordation, license or permit fees or taxes and any fees, charges, or costs
involved in any court or administrative proceedings in which it may be party.
From 1971to 1978, in order to finance the electrification projects envisioned by
PD 269, as amended, the Philippine Government, acting through the National
Economic council and the NEA, entered into six loan agreements with the
government of the United States of America, through the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID) with electric cooperatives as
beneficiaries. The loan agreements contain similarly worded provisions on the
tax application of the loan and any property or commodity acquired through the
proceeds of the loan. Petitioners allege that with the passage of the Local
Government Code their tax exemptions have been validly withdrawn. Particularly,
petitioners assail the validity of Sec. 193 and 234 of the said code. Sec. 193
provides for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges granted to all persons,
whether natural or juridical, except cooperatives duly registered under RA 6938,
while Sec. 234 exempts the same
Governments?
HELD:
1. No. The guaranty of the equal protection clause is not violated by a law based on a
reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable must (a) rest on substantial
classifications; (b) germane to the purpose of the law; c) not limited to the existing
conditions only; and (d) apply equally to all members of the same class. We hold that
there is reasonable classification under the Local Government Code to justify the
different tax treatment between electric cooperatives covered by PD 269 and electric
cooperatives under RA 6938. First, substantial distinctions exist between cooperatives
under PD 269 and those under RA 6938. In the former, the government is the one that
funds those so-called electric cooperatives, while in the latter, the members make
equitable contribution as source of funds. a. Capital Contributions by Members
Nowhere in PD 269 does it require cooperatives to make equitable contributions to
capital. Petitioners themselves admit that to qualify as a member of an electric
cooperative under PD 269, only the payment of a P5.00 membership fee is required
which is even refundable the moment the member is no longer interested in getting
electric service from the cooperative or will transfer to another place outside the area
covered by the cooperative. However, under the Cooperative Code, the articles of
cooperation of a cooperative applying for registration must be accompanied with the
bonds of the accountable officers and a sworn statement of the treasurer elected by the
subscribers showing that at least 25% of the authorized share capital has been
subscribed and at least 25% of the total subscription has been paid and in no case shall
the paid- up share capital be less than P2,000.00. b. Extent of Government Control over
Cooperatives The extent of government control over electric cooperatives covered by
PD 269 is largely a function of the role of the NEA as a primary source of funds of these
electric cooperatives. Amendments were primarily geared to expand the powers of NEA
over the electric cooperatives to ensure that loans granted to them would be repaid to
the government. In contrast, cooperatives under RA 6938 are envisioned to be self-
sufficient and independent organizations with minimal government intervention or
regulation. Second, the classification of tax-exempt entities in the Local Government
Code is germane to the purpose of the law. The Constitutional mandate that every local
government unit shall enjoy local autonomy, does not mean that the exercise of the
power by the local governments is beyond the regulation of Congress. Sec. 193 of the
LGC is indicative of the legislative intent to vet broad taxing powers upon the local
government units and to limit exemptions from local taxation to entities specifically
provided therein. Finally, Sec. 193 and 234 of the LGC permit reasonable classification
as these exemptions are not limited to existing conditions and apply equally to all
members of the same class.
2. No. It is ingrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional prohibition on the impairment
of the obligations of contracts does not prohibit every change in existing laws. To fall
within the prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of the existing
contract, but the impairment must be substantial. Moreover, to constitute impairment, the
law must affect a change in the rights of the parties with reference to each other and not
with respect to non-parties. The quoted provision under the loan agreement does not
purport to grant any tax exemption in favor of any party to the contract, including the
beneficiaries thereof. The provisions simply shift the tax burden, if any, on the
transactions under the loan agreements to the borrower and/or beneficiary of the loan.
Thus, the withdrawal by the Local Government Code under Sec. 193 and 234 of the tax
exemptions previously enjoyed by petitioners does not impair the obligation of the
borrower, the lender or the beneficiary under the loan agreements as, in fact, no tax
exemption is granted therein.

70


GR Nos. 133640, 133661 and 139147, 25 November 2005,
RODOLFO S. BELTRAN vs. SECRETARY OF HEALTH
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994
was enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide an adequate
supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating
blood banks in the country. It was approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos on
May 15, 1994 and was subsequently published in the Official Gazette on August
18, 1994. The law took effect on August 23, 1994. On April 28, 1995,
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the
Department of Health (DOH).
Section 7 of R.A. 7719 provides, Phase-out of Commercial Blood
Banks - All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a period of two (2)
years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two (2)
years by the Secretary.
Section 23. Process of Phasing Out. -- The Department shall effect
the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks over a period of two (2) years,
extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years after the effectivity of R.A.
7719. The decision to extend shall be based on the result of a careful study and
review of the blood supply and demand and public safety.
Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of
1994, petitioners have already been operating commercial blood banks under
Republic Act No. 1517, entitled An Act Regulating the Collection, Processing
and Sale of Human Blood, and the Establishment and Operation of Blood Banks
and Blood Processing Laboratories.
The law, which was enacted on June 16, 1956, allowed the
establishment and operation by licensed physicians of blood banks and blood
processing laboratories.
On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to
petitioners, they filed a petition for certiorari with application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court assailing the constitutionality and validity of the aforementioned
Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Section 7 of RA 7719 constitutes undue delegation of legislative
powers
2. Whether or not Section 7 of RA 7719 and its implementing rules violate the equal
protection clause
3. Whether or not RA 7719 is a valid exercise of police power
HELD:
Petition granted. The assailed law and its implementing rules are
constitutional and valid.
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is
complete in itself.
It is clear from the provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended
primarily to safeguard the health of the people and has mandated several
measures to attain this objective. One of these is the phase out of commercial
blood banks in the country.
The law has sufficiently provided a definite standard for the guidance
of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the promotion of
public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary
blood donation. The Secretary of Health has been given, under Republic Act No.
7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act. In this regard, the
Secretary did not go beyond the powers granted to him by the Act when said
phase-out period was extended in accordance with the Act as laid out in Section
2.
What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws
is a question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can
be formulated. Class legislation,
discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited but classification on a
reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. The classification,
however, to be reasonable: (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make
real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited
to existing conditions only; and, (d) must apply equally to each member of the class.
We deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the
following reasons: First, it was based on substantial distinctions. Second, the
classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is
germane to the purpose of the law, that is, to provide the nation with an adequate
supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood
transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a commodity. Third,
the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment was
not solely to address the peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it
intended to apply only to the existing conditions. Lastly, the law applies equally to
all commercial blood banks without exception.
The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the
State. The health of the people is a primordial governmental concern. Basically,
the National Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the States police
power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety.
Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the
constitutionality of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome
the presumption of constitutionality of the law. As to whether the Act constitutes a
wise legislation, considering the issues being raised by petitioners, is for
Congress to determine. GR No. 158793, June 8, 2006 Mirasol v.
Department of Public Works and Highways FACTS:
On January 10, 2001, petitioners filed before the trial court a Petition
for Declaratory Judgment with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and
Injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 01- 034. The petition sought the
declaration of nullity of the following administrative issuances for being
inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act 2000, entitled "Limited Access
Highway Act" enacted in 1957: a. DPWH Administrative Order No. 1, Series of
1968; b. DPWH Department Order No. 74, Series of 1993; c. Art. II, Sec. 3(a)
of the Revised Rules on Limited Access Facilities promulgated in 199[8] by the
DPWH thru the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB).
Previously, pursuant to its mandate under R.A. 2000, DPWH issued
on June 25, 1998 Department Order (DO) No. 215 declaring the Manila-Cavite
(Coastal Road) Toll Expressway as limited access facilities.
Accordingly, petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8,
2001 wherein petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the said
administrative issuances. Moreover, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the
enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles along the entire breadth of North
and South Luzon Expressways and the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll
Expressway under DO 215.
On June 28, 2001, the trial court, thru then Presiding Judge Teofilo
Guadiz, after due hearing, issued an order granting petitioners application for
preliminary injunction. On July 16, 2001, a writ of preliminary injunction was
issued by the trial court, conditioned upon petitioners filing of cash bond in the
amount of P100,000.00, which petitioners subsequently complied with.
On July 18, 2001, the DPWH acting thru the TRB, issued Department
Order No. 123 allowing motorcycles with engine displacement of 400 cubic
centimeters inside limited access facilities (toll ways).

Upon the assumption of Honorable Presiding Judge Ma. Cristina
71


Cornejo, both the petitioners and respondents were required to file their respective
Memoranda. Petitioners likewise filed [their] Supplemental Memorandum. Thereafter, the
case was deemed submitted for decision.
Consequently, on March 10, 2003, the trial court issued the assailed
decision dismissing the petition but declaring invalid DO 123. Petitioners moved
for a reconsideration of the dismissal of their petition; but it was denied by the
trial court in its Order dated June 16, 2003.
Hence, this petition. ISSUES:
1. Whether DO 74, DO 215 and the TRB regulations contravene RA 2000
2. Whether AO 1 and DO 123 are unconstitutional
HELD:
The Supreme Court declared constitutional AO 1, issued by the then
Department of Public Works and Communications on February 19, 1968, that
bans the use of bicycles, tricycles, pedicabs, motorcycles, or any nonmotorized
vehicle on limited access highways. The Court explained that since the tollway is
not an ordinary road, the same necessitates the imposition of guidelines in the
manner of its use and operation.
On the other hand, the Court declared unconstitutional and in
violation of The Limited Access Highway Act (RA 2000) Department Orders 74
and 215 released by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) as
well as the Revised Rules and Regulations on Limited Access Facilities of the
Toll Regulatory Board (TRB). Department Orders 74 and 215, dated April 5, 1993
and June 25, 1998, respectively, declared the North and South Luzon (DO 74),
and the Manila-Cavite Toll Expressways (DO 215) as limited access facilities.
The Court explained that at the time DPWH issued these orders, it no longer had
authority to regulate activities related to transportation.
In contrast, AO 1 was issued in 1968 by the then Department of
Public Works and Communications when it had the authority to regulate limited
access facilities.
Likewise, the Court upheld the decision of the Makati City Regional
Trial Court, Branch 147 declaring DO 123, which limits access to the above
expressways to only 400cc motorcycles, as unconstitutional for want of authority
of the DPWH to promulgate the said order. G.R. No. 132875-76, February 3,
2000 People vs. Jalosjos FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo
Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is
pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed
to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted
in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty
and the need for his constituents to be represented. ISSUE: Whether or not
accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House
of Representatives HELD:
Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people.
However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having
been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of
the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The
privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting
an exemption as a

special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may
not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The accused-
appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of
Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent
members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of
more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To
allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5
days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-
appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes
of the correction system.

72
GR No. 179817, June 27, 2008
Trillanes vs Pimentel
FACTS:
At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers
led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the
Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of
the President and key national officials.
Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to
suppress the rebellion.
[1]
A series of negotiations quelled the teeming tension and
eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of the militant soldiers that evening.
In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood Incident,"
petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d'etat
defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati.
Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, threw his hat in
the political arena and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at
noon on June 30, 2007.
Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007, petitioner filed with the
RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to
Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests
The trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration in which he waived his requests in paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) to thus trim
them down to three.
[7]
The trial court just the same denied the motion.
The present petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the trial court, and for
prohibition and mandamus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend
Senate Sessions and Related Requests constitutional.
HELD:
The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one
from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement.
It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for
purposes of the administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides.
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.
It is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether
ascertained in a hearing of an


application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the
detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty.
He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against
him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on
recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive
detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage
in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in
detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.
Petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain
detention prisoners who have also been charged with non- bailable offenses, like
former President Joseph Estrada and former Governor Nur Misuari who were
allowed to attend "social functions." Finding no rhyme and reason in the denial of
the more serious request to perform the duties of a Senator, petitioner harps on
an alleged violation of the equal protection clause.
In arguing against maintaining double standards in the treatment of
detention prisoners, petitioner expressly admits that he intentionally did not seek
preferential treatment in the form of being placed under Senate custody or house
arrest, yet he at the same time, gripes about the granting of house arrest to
others.\
Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and
committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a
free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant
situation not only elevates accused-appellant's status to that of a special class, it
also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. G.R. No.
148571. September 24, 2002 USA vs PURGANAN FACTS:
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty,# the United States
Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government
Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597,
0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting
the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon
receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA)
transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant
to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition
Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and
was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila,
Branch 25.# The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with
the RTC a petition for his extradition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private
respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to
grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and
supporting evidence.
The Court held that private respondent was bereft of the right to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States
of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18,
2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition
In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the
issuance of an order for his immediate arrest pursuant to Section 6 of PD No.
1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed
before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,# which prayed that
petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. The RTC granted
the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In that
hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the
trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.
In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in
case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the
amount of P100,000. The Court directed the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and
fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash.# After he had
surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted
provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.
ISSUE: Whether or not being an elected member of the House of Representatives is
compelling enough for the Court to grant his request for provisional release on bail.
HELD:
After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the
applicants have a history of absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there
is no flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b) there exist special,
humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in the
requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be considered, under the principle of
reciprocity as a special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it
is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional
equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws. This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated
alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may
not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice
shall be displayed.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly [from] prison. The duties imposed by the
mandate of the people are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to
legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only
one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of
the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in
the physical absence of one or a few of its members.
A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty
lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained
by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or otherwise, insidious
discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are
germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
GR No. 147387, December 10, 2003
Farinas vs Executive Secretary
FACTS:
The petitioners come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No.
9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional
for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to
have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.


73
Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use
of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices,
while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective
officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent
capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the
certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act
No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section
67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which
imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any
person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-
owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates
against appointive officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who
runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso
facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials
continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or election for
another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus,
the limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto
resigned from their offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.
The respondents petitions contending, preliminarily, that the
petitioners have no legal standing to institute the present suit.
Invoking the enrolled bill doctrine. The signatures of the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House, appearing on the bill and the
certification signed by the respective Secretaries of both houses of Congress,
constitute proof beyond cavil that the bill was duly enacted into law.
The respondents contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, as it
repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is not a proscribed rider nor
does it violate Section 26(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. The title of Rep. Act
No. 9006, An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and
Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices, is so broad that it
encompasses all the processes involved in an election exercise, including the
filing of certificates of candidacy by elective officials. ISSUE: Whether or not
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. HELD:
The petitioners contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials gives undue benefit to
such officials as against the appointive ones and violates the equal protection
clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not
absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class
may be treated and regulated differently from the other.# The Court has
explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of
inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not
demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class, if it applies alike
to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials.
The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are
elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon
stringent conditions.# On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of
their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their
office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure# while others serve
at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that appointive
officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from
engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote.
Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political
offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect
to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for
any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the
Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected
officials vis-a-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant
distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly
treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in
constitutional law is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the
policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of
the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds,
the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional
limitations or the limits of legislative power.# No such transgression has been shown in
this case.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED
GR No. 1288845, June 01, 2000
INTL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS VS QUISUMBING *no case digest
submitted*



74
- THE NON IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE -
EMERGENCY POWERS
93 PHIL 68, 1953
RUTTER VS ESTEBAN *no case digest submitted*
ZONING AND REGULATORY ORDINANCES
154 SCRA 142, 1987
VILLANUEVA VS CASTANEDA *no case digest submitted*
G.R. No. 71169 December 22, 1988
SANGALANG VS IAC
FACTS:
Bel-Air Village is located north of Buendia Avenue extension (now
Sen. Gil J. Puyat Ave.) across a stretch of commercial block
Bel-Air Village was owned and developed into a residential
subdivision in the 1950s by Makati Development Corporation (hereinafter
referred to as MDC), which in 1968 was merged with appellant Ayala
constructed thereon,... The BUYER shall not erect...any sign or billboard on the roof...for
advertising purposes... restrictions shall run with the land and shall be construed as real
covenants until December 31, 2025 when they shall cease and terminate...These and
the other conditions were duly annotated on the certificate of title issued to Emilia.
In 1981, the Metropolitan Manila Commission (now Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority) enacted MMC Ordinance No. 81- 01, also known
as the Comprehensive Zoning Area for the National Capital Region. The
ordinance reclassified as a commercial area a portion of Ortigas Avenue from
Madison to Roosevelt Streets of Greenhills Subdivision where the lot is located.
On June 8, 1984, private respondent Ismael Mathay III leased the lot
from Emilia Hermoso and J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp.. The lease contract did not
specify the purposes of the lease. Thereupon, private respondent constructed a
single story commercial building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales
company. ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the restrictions must prevail over the ordinance, specially since these
restrictions were agreed upon before the passage of MMC Ordinance No. 81-01?
2. Whether or not respondent Mathay III, as a mere lessee of the lot in question, is a total
stranger to the deed of sale and is thus barred from questioning the conditions of
said deed
The lots which were acquired by appellees Sangalang and HELD:
spouse Gaston and spouse and Briones and spouse in 1960, 1957 and 1958,
respectively, were all sold by MDC subject to certain conditions and easements
contained in Deed Restrictions which formed a part of each deed of sale
The owner of this lot/s or his successors in interest is required to be
and is automatically a member of the Bel-Air Association and must abide by such
rules and regulations laid down by the Association in the interest of the
sanitation, security and the general welfare
On April 4, 1975, the municipal council of Makati enacted its
ordinance No. 81, providing for the zonification of Makati . Under this Ordinance,
Bel-Air Village was classified as a Class A Residential Zone, with its boundary in
the south extending to the center line of Jupiter Street
There is a perimeter wall then standing on the commercial side of
Jupiter Street the destruction of which opened the street to the public. ISSUE:
Whether or not the MMC Ordinance represents a legitmate exercise of police
power? HELD : Undoubtedly, the MMC Ordinance represents a legitimate
exercise of police power. The petitioners have not shown why we should hold
otherwise other than for the supposed "non-impairment" guaranty of the
Constitution, which, as we have declared, is secondary to the more compelling
interests of general welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious
or arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the judgments so
appealed. [G.R. No. 126102. December 4, 2000] ORTIGAS & CO. LTD.,
petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and ISMAEL G. MATHAY III,
respondents. FACTS:
On August 25, 1976, petitioner Ortigas & Company sold to Emilia Hermoso, a parcel
of land known as Lot 1, Block 21, Psd-66759, with an area of 1,508 square meters,
located in Greenhills Subdivision IV, San Juan, Metro Manila, and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 0737. The contract of sale provided that the lot: be used
exclusively...for residential purposes only, and not more than one single-family
residential building will be
The legal system upholds the sanctity of contract so that a contract is deemed law
between the contracting parties,# nonetheless, stipulations in a contract cannot
contravene law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Non impairment of
contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate
exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order, safety, and general welfare of the people.# Moreover, statutes in exercise of
valid police power must be read into every contract.
A real party in interest is defined as the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. It is noted that the lessee
who built the commercial structure, it is he and he alone who stands to be either
benefited or injured by the results of the judgment in Civil Case No. 64931. He avers he
is the party with real interest in the subject matter of the action, as it would be his
business, not the Hermosos.
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS
G.R. No. L-32312 November 25, 1983
AURELIO TIRO vs. HONORABLE AGAPITO HONTANOSAS
FACTS:
In Civil Case No. 11616 of the defunct Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Zafra Financing Enterprise sued Aurelio Tiro in his official capacity as
Superintendent of Schools in Cebu City. It appears that Zafra had extended
loans to public school teachers in Cebu City and the teachers concerned
executed promissory notes and special powers of attorney in favor of Zafra to
take and collect their salary checks from the Division Office in Cebu City of the
Bureau of Public Schools. However, Tiro forbade the collection of the checks on
the basis of Circular No. 21, series 1969, dated December 5, 1969, of the
Director of Public Schools.
Zafra sought to compel Tiro to honor the special powers of attorney;
to declare Circular No. 21 to be illegal; and to make Tiro pay attorney's fees and
damages. The trial court granted the prayer of Zafra but the claim for money was
disallowed on the ground that he acted in good faith in implementing Circular No.



75
21.
ISSUE: The core issue is whether or not Circular No. 21 is valid and enforceable and the
answer is definitely in the affirmative.
HELD:
The salary check of a government officer or employee such as a
teacher does not belong to him before it is physically delivered to him. Until that
time the check belongs to the Government. Accordingly, before there is actual
delivery of the check, the payee has no power over it; he cannot assign it without
the consent of the Government. On this basis Circular No. 21 stands on firm legal
footing.
Zafra's claim that the Circular impairs the obligation of contracts with
the teachers is baseless. For the Circular does not prevent Zafra from collecting
the loans. The Circular merely makes the Government a non-participant in their
collection which is within its competence to do. ADMIN REG - RENTAL
LAWS G.R. No. 77365 April 7, 1992 Caleon vs. Agus Development
Corporation FACTS: Respondent is the owner of a parcel of land which it
leased to petitioner Rita Caleon for a monthly rental of P180.00. Petitioner
constructed on the lot leased a 4-door apartment building. Without the consent of
the private respondent, the petitioner sub-leased two of the four doors of the
apartment for a monthly rental of P350.00 each. Upon learning of the sub-lease,
private respondent through counsel demanded in writing that the petitioner
vacate the leased premises. For failure of petitioner to comply with the demand,
private respondent filed a complaint for ejectment against the petitioner citing as
ground therefor the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, Section 5, which is
the unauthorized sub-leasing of part of the leased premises to third persons
without securing the consent of the lessor within the required sixty (60)-day
period from the promulgation of the new law (B.P. 25). The petitioner argued that
the said law cannot be applied because there is a perfected contract of lease
without any express prohibition in subleasing which had been in effect between
the parties long before the enactment of BP 25. ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioner violated the provisions of Section 5, Batas Pambansa Blg. 25
which is a ground for Ejectment.
2. WON Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 in application to the case at bar, is unconstitutional as
an impairment of the obligation of contracts.
3. WON the petitioner can invoke the promotion of social justice policy of the New
Constitution.
HELD:
The issue has already been laid to rest in the case of Duellome vs. Gotico where the
court ruled that the leased of the building naturally includes the lease of the lot, and the
rentals of the building to the lot. Under our Civil Code, the occupancy of a building or
house not only suggests or implies the tenancy or possession in fact on the land on
which they are constructed. In the case at bar, it is beyond dispute that petitioner in
leasing her apartment has also subleased the lot on which it is constructed which lot
belongs to private respondent. Consequently, she has violated the provisions of Section
5, Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 which enumerates the grounds for judicial ejectment, among
which is the subleasing of residential units without the written consent of the
owner/lessor.
Well settled that all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who
attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a
reasonable doubt.
In any event, it is now beyond question that the constitutional guaranty of non-
impairment of obligations of contract is limited by and subject to the exercise of police
power of the state in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare.
This power can be activated at anytime to change the provisions of the contract, or even
abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act
will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the
paramount police power.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 is derived from P.D. No. 20 which has been declared by
this Court as a police power legislation, applicable to leases entered into prior to July 14,
1971 (effectivity date of RA 6539), so that the applicability thereof to existing contracts
cannot be denied.
Finally, petitioner invokes, among others, the promotion of social justice policy of
the New Constitution. Like P.D. No. 20, the objective of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 is to
remedy the plight of lessees, but such objective is not subject to exploitation by the
lessees for whose benefit the law was enacted. Thus, the prohibition provided for in the
law against the sublease of the premises without the consent of the owner. As
enunciated by this Court, it must be remembered that social justice cannot be invoked to
trample on the rights of property owners, who under our Constitution and laws are also
entitled to protection. The social justice consecrated in our Constitution was not intended
to take away rights from a person and give them to another who is not entitled thereto.
The petition is denied for lack of merit. ADMIN REG - TAX EXEMPTIONS
G.R. No. 131359 May 5, 1999
MERALCO vs. Province of Laguna and Benito Balazo
FACTS:
Province of Laguna by virtue of existing laws issued resolutions
through their respective municipal councils granting franchise in favor of
petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) for the supply of electric light,
heat and power within their concerned areas.
On 1991, Republic Act No. 7160 was enacted to take effect on 1992
enjoining local government units to create their own sources of revenue and to
levy taxes, fees and charges, subject to the limitations expressed therein,
consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Pursuant to the provisions of
the Code, respondent province enacted an Ordinance imposing a tax on
business enjoying a franchise, at a rate of fifty percent (50%) of one percent (1%)
of the gross annual receipts, which shall include both cash sales and sales on
account realized during the preceding calendar year within this province,
including the territorial limits on any city located in the province.
Based on the ordinance, respondent Provincial Treasurer sent a
demand letter to MERALCO for the corresponding tax payment. Petitioner paid
the tax which is under protest. A formal claim for refund was thereafter sent by
MERALCO to the Provincial Treasurer of Laguna claiming that the franchise tax it
had paid and continued to pay to the National Government pursuant to P.D. 551
already included the franchise tax imposed by the Provincial Tax Ordinance.
MERALCO contended that the imposition of a franchise tax under Laguna
Provincial Ordinance, contravened the provisions of Section 1 of P.D. 551 which
provides, Any provision of law or local ordinance to the contrary notwithstanding,
the franchise tax payable by all grantees of franchises to generate, distribute and
sell electric current for light, heat and power shall be two per cent (2%) of their
gross receipts received from the sale of electric current and from transactions
incident to the generation, distribution and sale of electric current.*** Such
franchise tax shall be payable...be in lieu of all taxes and assessments of
whatever nature imposed by any



76
national or local authority on earnings, receipts, income and
privilege of generation, distribution and sale of electric current. The claim was
denied; respondents relied on a more recent law,
Republic Act No. 7160 than the old decree invoked by petitioner. Petitioner MERALCO
filed a complaint for refund.
ISSUE: WON Laguna Provincial ordinance is violative of the non- impairment clause of
the Constitution and of PD No. 551.
HELD:
Local governments do not have the inherent power to tax except to
the extent that such power might be delegated to them either by the basic law or
by statute. Under the now prevailing Constitution, where there is neither a grant
nor a prohibition by statute, the tax power must be deemed to exist although
Congress may provide statutory limitations and guidelines. The basic rationale
for the current rule is to safeguard the viability and self-sufficiency of local
government units by directly granting them general and broad tax powers.
Nevertheless, the fundamental law did not intend the delegation to be absolute
and unconditional; the constitutional objective obviously is to ensure that, while
the local government units are being strengthened and made more autonomous,
the legislature must still see to it that (a) the taxpayer will not be over-burdened
or saddled with multiple and unreasonable impositions; (b) each local
government unit will have its fair share of available resources; (c) the resources
of the national government will not be unduly disturbed; and (d) local taxation will
be fair, uniform, and just.
Indicative of the legislative intent to carry out the Constitutional
mandate of vesting broad tax powers to local government units, the Local
Government Code has effectively withdrawn under Section 193 of RA 7160, tax
exemptions or incentives enjoyed by certain entities.
In the recent case the Court has held that the phrase in lieu of all
taxes have to give way to the peremptory language of the Local Government
Code specifically providing for the withdrawal of such exemptions, privileges,
and that upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code all exemptions
except only as provided therein can no longer be invoked by MERALCO to
disclaim liability for the local tax. In fine, the Court has viewed its previous
rulings as laying stress more on the legislative intent of the amendatory law
whether the tax exemption privilege is to be withdrawn or not rather than on
whether the law can withdraw, without violating the Constitution, the tax
exemption or not.
While the Court has, not too infrequently, referred to tax exemptions
contained in special franchises as being in the nature of contracts and a part of
the inducement for carrying on the franchise, these exemptions are far from
being strictly contractual in nature. Contractual tax exemptions, in the real sense
of the term and where the non-impairment clause of the Constitution can rightly
be invoked, are those agreed to by the taxing authority in contracts, such as
those contained in government bonds or debentures, lawfully entered into by
them under enabling laws in which the government, acting in its private capacity,
sheds its cloak of authority and waives its governmental immunity. Truly, tax
exemptions of this kind may not be revoked without impairing the obligations of
contracts.
These contractual tax exemptions are not to be confused with
tax exemptions granted under franchises. A franchise partakes the nature
of a grant which is beyond the purview of the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution. Article XII, Section 11, of the 1987 Constitution, like its precursor
provisions in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, is explicit that no franchise for
the operation of a public utility shall be granted except under the condition that
such privilege shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress
as and when the common good so requires.
Petition is dismissed.
G.R. No. L-13307 February 3, 1919
La Insular vs. Machuca
FACTS:
La Insular is a commercial partnership engaged in the manufacture of cigars and
cigarettes in the city of Manila. On 1913, a contract was entered into between its general
agent and the two defendants, Manuel Nubla Co-Siong and Rafael Machuca Go-Tauco,
whereby the plaintiff became obliged to supply cigarettes daily to Manuel Nubla. The
price was fixed at 172 per box. Manuel is the principal obligor while Rafael Machuca
bound himself as surety, jointly and severally with Manuel Nubla. It appears that when
the contract was executed cigarettes were subject to a specific tax of the peso for each
thousand cigarettes. This tax was, under the law then prevailing, paid by the
manufacturer, and the liability for said tax naturally fell upon the plaintiff. By Act No.
2432, enacted December 23, 1914, the Philippine Legislature increased the specific tax
on cigarettes from P1 to P1.20 per thousand cigarettes, and by amendatory Act No.
2445, effective from January 1, 1915, it was declared that, as regards contracts already
made for future delivery, the burden of the increased tax should, unless the parties
should have otherwise agreed, be borne by the person to whom the article taxed should
be furnished.
After this provision become effective, the plaintiff continued, as before, to pay the
internal-revenue taxes and in order to reimburse itself to the extent of the outlay incident
to the increase in the tax added the amount of P10 per box to the price of the cigarettes.
The monthly statements thereafter submitted to the purchaser by the plaintiff showed
this increase; and as payments were from time to time made by Nubla, they were
credited by the plaintiff upon account, with the result that, upon the showing of the
plaintiff's books and assuming that Nubla had been properly charged with the increased
tax, all cigarettes delivered prior to August 1, 1916, had been fully paid for. During the
months of August and September, however, fifty-six cases of cigarettes were taken by
Nubla, for which no payment has been made; and for the recovery of the amount alleged
to be due for these cigarettes this action was instituted by the plaintiff in the Court of
First Instance. Judgment having been there rendered in favor of the plaintiff, both
defendants have appealed. The trial court ruled that as a surety, Machuras liability was
limited to the payment of the price stipulated in the original contract.
ISSUE: WON Legislative Acts mentioned altered the obligation of the contract in
question as to release the surety in his indebtedness.
HELD:
Article 1827 of the Civil Code declares that the liability of a surety is not to be
extended, by implication, beyond the terms of his contract. Well-recognized rule of
jurisprudence, that if any material alteration or change in the obligation of the principal
obligator is effected by the immediate parties to the contract, without the asset of the
surety, the latter is discharged. In order to effect a release of the surety, the change in
the contract must, as a general rule, be made by the principal parties to the contract.
Indeed, no valid or effective change in the contract can, generally speaking, be made by
any other person than the actual parties thereto. A recognized exception more
apparent than real is found in cases where sureties on official bonds have been held
to be released as a result of changes effected by the Legislature in the duration of the
official term or in the duties of the officer whose fidelity is intended to be secured by the
bond. The law is particularly watchful over the rights of sureties. To permit parties to alter
and modify their contracts as they please, and to hold the sureties answerable for the
performance of such parts as were not altered, would be transferring their responsibility,
without their consent, from one contract to another. The contract, by the modification and
alternation, becomes a new and different contract, and one for which the sureties never
become responsible.
Based on the recognized exemption, the Acts of the Legislature by which the
increased tax on cigarettes was imposed neither



77
impaired, in a constitutional sense, the obligation of the contract which is the basis of this
action nor changed that obligation in such sense as to occasion the discharge of the
surety.
The surety is clearly bound by the application of the payments made
by the creditor with the assent of the principal debtor, and no doubt that when
Manuel Nubla from time to time paid the bills submitted by the plaintiff, and
which, after January 1, 1915, showed an increased of P10 per case in the price
of the cigarettes, he very well knew that this additional amount was due to the
inclusion of the new tax paid by the plaintiff.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed. ADMIN REG - POLICE
POWER GR L-63419, 18 December 1986 LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ
FACTS:
Lozano vs. Martinez (GR L-63419), Lobaton vs. Cruz (GR L- 66839-
42), Datuin vs. Pano (GR 71654), Violago vs. Pano (GR 74524-25), Abad vs.
Gerochi (GR 75122-49), Aguiliz vs. Presiding Judge of Branch 154 (GR 75812-
13), Hojas vs. Penaranda (GR 75765-67) and People vs. Nitafan (GR 75789) are
cases involving prosecution of offenses under BP 22 which were consolidated
herein as the parties (defendants) thereto question the constitutionality of the
statute, BP 22.
The defendants in those cases moved seasonably to quash the
informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense,
the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent
trial courts, except in one case, which is the subject of G. R. No. 75789, wherein
the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The
parties adversely affected asked for relief. ISSUE: Whether BP 22 is
constitutional. HELD: YES. The language of BP22 is broad enough to cover
all kinds of checks, whether present dated or post dated, whether issued in
payment of pre-existing obligations or given in mutual or simultaneous exchange
for something of value. BP 22 is aimed to put a stop or to curb the practice of
issuing worthless checks, which is proscribed by the State because of the injury it
causes to public interests. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the
act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check which is dishonored upon
its presentation for payment. it is not the non-payment of an obligation which the
law punishes. The law publishes the act not as an offense against property but
an offense against public order. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of
police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt. The statute is not unconstitutional. G.R. No. L-20344
May 16, 1966 ILUSORIO VS. CAR FACTS:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 14 of Republic Act
No. 1199, as amended, upon the ground that it violates the freedom of contract
and impairs property rights, as well as the obligation of contracts.
Petitioners herein, Potenciano Ilusorio and Teresa Ilusorio, are co-
owners of a parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Bantug, Municipality of San
Miguel, Province of Bulacan. The main respondents herein have for years
worked on said land under the share tenancy system. Before the beginning of the
agricultural year 1960-1961, they gave notice to the petitioners, in conformity with
the provisions of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, that they
(respondents) wanted to change their tenancy contract from said system to
leasehold tenancy. The Ilusorios
having refused to agree thereto, said respondents and three other tenants whose
claims were dismissed by the Court of Agrarian Relations instituted this proceedings,
in said court, on November 16, 1960. The main defense set up by petitioners herein, as
respondents in said court, is that the aforementioned Section 14 of Republic Act No.
1199, as amended, is unconstitutional, which was rejected by the lower court. Hence this
appeal in which the Ilusorios maintain: (1) that said provision is unconstitutional; and (2)
that the lower court had acted arbitrarily in fixing the rentals collectible by them from
respondents herein at 20% of the average harvest for the agricultural years 1959-1960,
1960-1961, and 1961-1962.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the prohibition against impairment of contracts is absolute.
2. Whether R.A. 1199 is constitutional.
HELD:
1. NO. The prohibition contained in constitutional provisions against impairing the
obligation of contracts is not an absolute one. Such provisions are restricted to
contracts with respect property, or some object of value, and confer rights which
may be asserted in a court of justice, and have no application to statute relating
to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State,
and involving the public right and public welfare of the entire community affected
by it. They do not prevent proper exercise by the State of its police powers. By
enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals,
comfort, or general welfare of the community, even the contracts may thereby be
affected; for such matter cannot be placed by contract beyond the power of the
State to regulate and control them.
2. YES. Republic Act 1199m including Section 14 thereof, which permits the
tenants to change the nature of their relation with their landlord from
tenancy system to leasehold tenancy, is constitutional. It is a remedial
legislation promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the
Constitution and in the exercise of the police power of the State to promote
the common weal. It is a statute relating to public subjects within the
domain of the general legislative powers of the State and involving the
public rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it.
Republic Act 1199, like the previous tenancy law enacted by our law-
making body, was passed by Congress in compliance with the
constitutional mandate that "the promotion of social justice to insure the
well-being and economic security of all the people should be the concern
of the State" (Art. II, sec. 5) and that "the State shall regulate the relations
between landlord and tenant ... in agriculture ... ." (Art. XIV, see. 6).
G.R. No. L-32312 November 25, 1983
TIRO VS. HONTANOSAS
FACTS:
Zafra Financing Enterprise sued Aurelio Tiro in his official capacity as
Superintendent of Schools in Cebu City. It appears that Zafra had extended
loans to public school teachers in Cebu City and the teachers concerned
executed promissory notes and special powers of attorney in favor of Zafra to
take and collect their salary checks from the Division Office in Cebu City of the
Bureau of Public Schools. However, Tiro forbade the collection of the checks on
the basis of Circular No. 21, series 1969, dated December 5, 1969, of the
Director of Public Schools.
Zafra sought to compel Tiro to honor the special powers of attorney;
to declare Circular No. 21 to be illegal; and to make Tiro pay attorney's fees and
damages. The trial court granted the prayer of Zafra but the claim for money was
disallowed on the ground that he acted in good faith in implementing Circular No.
21.
Tiro now seeks in this petition for review a reversal of the trial court's
decision.



78

ISSUE: Whether Circular No. 21 impairs the obligation of contracts.
HELD: NO.
Zafra's claim that the Circular impairs the obligation of contracts with
the teachers is baseless. For the Circular does not prevent Zafra from collecting
the loans. The Circular merely makes the Government a non-participant in their
collection which is within its competence to do.
The salary check of a government officer or employee such as a
teacher does not belong to him before it is physically delivered to him. Until that
time the check belongs to the Government. Accordingly, before there is actual
delivery of the check, the payee has no power over it; he cannot assign it without
the consent of the Government. On this basis Circular No. 21 stands on firm legal
footing. 207 SCRA 748 CANLEON VS AGUS DEVELOPMENT CORP. *no
case digest submitted* GR No. 109405, September 11, 1998 BLAQUERA
VS ALCALA *no case digest submitted* 123 SCRA 713 GANZON VS
INSTERTO *no case digest submitted* ADMIN REG - EMINENT
DOMAIN POWER 156 SCRA 623 Kabilang vs. NHA FACTS: On May
21, 1986, petitioners filed an Amended Petition, accompanied by a motion to
admit said amended petition. In the Amended Petition, the petitioners (only four
of whom are original petitioners, the rest being newly impleaded) invoke as an
additional ground the alleged non-publication of P.D. No. 1808. On May 29,1981,
the Court admitted the Amended Petition and required respondents to comment
thereon. The Court further required the Republic of the Philippines to move in the
premises within ten (10) days from notice, considering the supervening events
that had transpired since the filing of the respective memoranda of the petitioners
and the respondent Republic of the Philippines. Respondent NHA submitted its
comment on June 11, 1986, stating that contrary to petitioners' allegation in the
Amended Petition, P.D. No. 1808 was published in the Official Gazette of
October 4, 1982 (Volume 78, No. 40, pp. 5481-4 to 5486-8) and reiterating its
arguments discussed in its comment dated September 4, 1981 on the original
petition and its later comment/opposition dated March 19, 1982. On July 2, 1986,
the NHA filed a manifestation by way of report on the current status of the subject
property, stating inter alia 1) that all available workable areas in the subject
property, totalling approximately 3.1 hectares and consisting of 378 lots
averaging 50 square meters each, have been substantially developed, except for
some minor repair work still to be undertaken; 2) that the NHA has already
invested P3 million representing the cost of implementing the development plans
in the workable areas of the project site; 3) that in accordance with the provisions
of P.D. No. 1808, the N HA has already deposited with the Philippine National
Bank the amount equivalent to the cost of all subdivision lots in the project site;
4) that 76 landowners have already withdrawn the corresponding compensation
for their respective lots, totalling Pl,919,402.44, while 72 landowners including
the petitioners Robidante L. Kabiling, et al. have not yet claimed the
compensation for their respective lots totalling Pl,581,676.52; and 5) that all titles
to the homelots, except the lost title of Cresencio Deboma, which is undergoing
reconstitution, have already been transferred to respondent NHA pursuant to the
provision of P.D. No. 1808.
ISSUE: The petitioners' challenge to the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1808.
HELD:
The stated objective of the decree, namely, to resolve the land tenure problem in the
Agno-Leveriza area to allow the implementation of the comprehensive development
plans for this depressed community, provides the justification for the exercise of the
police power of the State. The police power of the State has been described as "the
most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers.1 It is a power inherent in the State,
plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that
man in organizing the state and imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard
constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of
citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measure to ensure
communal peace, safety, good order and welfare.
The objection raised by petitioners that P.D. No. 1808 impairs the obligations of
contract is without merit. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of
contract is limited by and subject to the exercise of the police power of the State in the
interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare. For the same reason,
petitioners can not complain that they are being deprived of their property without due
process of law.
Nor can petitioners claim that their properties are being expropriated without just
compensation, since Sec. 3 of P.D. No. 1808 provides for just compensation to lot
owners who have fully paid their obligations to the City of Manila under their respective
contracts before the issuance of the decree. However, in accordance with our decision in
Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Hon. Ceferino Dulay, etc., et al., G.R. No. 59603,
April 29, 1987, which declared P.D. No. 1533 unconstitutional, those lot owners who
have not yet received compensation under the decree are entitled to a judicial
determination of the just compensation for their lots.
ADMIN REG - FRANCHISES, PRIVILEGES, LICENSES
GR No. 162243, November 29, 2006
ALVAREZ VS PICOP RESOURCES *no case digest submitted*


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