1

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in
his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity
as Director, Malacaang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6,
Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners
seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication
in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303,
312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491,
503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836,
923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279,
1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180,
187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251,
253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343,
346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498,
501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713,
726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.

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c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538,
1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-
1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787,
1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-
1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892,
1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-
2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-
528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609,
611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107,
120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground
that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted
that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by
the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the
requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties"
within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some
other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay
the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
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Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right
and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for
their petition to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a
private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved,
or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large,"
and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved
[Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the
object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the
real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show
that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as
such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party
to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the
position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr.
Justice Grant T. Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is
a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the
general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for
the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in
mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does
not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United States,
inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we
have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the
people in cases of this character.

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The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned
case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein
is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not
allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to
initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered
to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement
for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus
submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they
are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point
stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a
long line of decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those
cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication
is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but
not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws
with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the
conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative
orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient
importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be
published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines
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shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may
authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It
would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken
so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power
heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the
debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready access to the
legislative recordsno such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus,
without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been
promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of
such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se
comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines
dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the
Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated
by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation
or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this
category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. 6

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It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said
in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the
land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the
official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and
instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the
possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those
presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or
implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this
Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter
Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and
hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago,
1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to
the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual
existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The
effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with
respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of
status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in
the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These
questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and
federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

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Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party
under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared
unconstitutional by this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the
Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees
sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to
1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject
matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But
whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever
been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice
Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal]
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this
holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment
that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until
the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though
some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

Relova, J., concurs.

Aquino, J., took no part.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
8

G.R. No. 18081 March 3, 1922
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF CHEONG BOO, deceased.
MORA ADONG, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CHEONG SENG GEE, opponent-appellant.
Kincaid, Perkins & Kincaid and P. J. Moore for petitioner-appellant.
Carlos A. Sobral for opponent-appellant.
MALCOLM, J .:
The two question presented for determination by these appeals may be framed as follows: Is a
marriage contracted in China and proven mainly by an alleged matrimonial letter, valid in the
Philippines? Are the marriage performed in the Philippines according to the rites of the
Mohammedan religion valid? As the decision of the Supreme Court on the last point will affect
marriages consummated by not less than one hundred and fifty thousand Moros who profess the
Mohammedan faith, the transcendental importance of the cause can be realized. We proposed to
give to the subject the serious consideration which it deserves.
Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands, on August 5,
1919. He left property worth nearly P100,000. The estate of the deceased was claimed, on the
one hand, by Cheong Seng Gee, who alleged that he was a legitimate child by a marriage
contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Dit in China in 1895. The estate was claimed, on the other
hand, by the Mora Adong who alleged that she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in
1896 in Basilan, Philippine Islands, and her daughters, Payang, married to Cheng Bian Chay, and
Rosalia Cheong Boo, unmarried.
The conflicting claims to the estate of Cheong Boo were ventilated in the Court of First Instance
of Zamboanga. The trial judge, the Honorable Quirico Abeto, after hearing the evidence
presented by both sides, reached the conclusion, with reference to the allegations of Cheong
Seng Gee, that the proof did not sufficiently establish the Chinese marriage, but that because
Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the Philippine Islands as the son of the deceased, he
should share in the estate as a natural child. With reference to the allegations of the Mora Adong
and her daughters Payang and Rosalia, the trial judge reached the conclusion that the marriage
between the Mora Adong and the deceased had been adequately proved but that under the laws
of the Philippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful marriage; accordingly, the daughters
Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The order of the trial judge, following
these conclusions, was that there should be a partition of the property of the deceased Cheong
Boo between the natural children, Cheong Seng Gee, Payang, and Rosalia.
From the judgment of the Judge of First Instance both parties perfected appeals. As to the facts,
we can say that we agree in substance with the findings of the trial court. As to the legal issues
submitted for decision by the numerous assignments of error, these can best be resolved under
two heads, namely: (1) The validity of the Chinese marriage; and (2) the validity of the
Mohammedan marriage.
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1. Validity of the Chinese Marriage
The theory advanced on behalf of the claimant Cheong Seng Gee was that Cheong Boo was
married in the city of Amoy, China, during the second moon of the twenty-first year of the
Emperor Quang Su, or, according to the modern count, on February 16, 1985, to a young lady
named Tan Dit. Witnesses were presented who testified to having been present at the marriage
ceremony. There was also introduced in evidence a document in Chinese which in translation
reads as follows:
One hundred
years of life
and health for
both.
Your nephew, Tan Chao, respecfully
answers the venerable Chiong Ing,
father of the bridegroom, accepting his
offer of marriage, and let this document
serve as proof of the acceptance of said
marriage which is to be celebrated
during the merry season of the flowers.
I take advantage of this occasion to
wish for your and the spouses much
happiness, a long life, and prolific
issue, as noble and great as that which
you brought forth. I consider the
marriage of your son Boo with my
sister Lit Chia as a mandate of God and
I hope that they treat each other with
great love and mutual courtesy and that
both they and their parents be very
happy.
Given during the second moon of the
twenty-first year of the reign of the
Emperor Quang Su.
Cheong Boo is said to have remained in China for one year and four months after his marriage
during which time there was born to him and his wife a child named Cheong Seng Gee. Cheong
Boo then left China for the Philippine Islands and sometime thereafter took to himself a
concubine Mora by whom he had two children. In 1910, Cheong Boo was followed to the
Philippines by Cheong Seng Gee who, as appears from documents presented in evidence, was
permitted to land in the Philippine Islands as the son of Cheong Boo. The deceased, however,
never returned to his native hearth and seems never to have corresponded with his Chinese wife
or to have had any further relations with her except once when he sent her P10.
The trial judge found, as we have said, that the proof did not sustain the allegation of the
claimant Cheong Seng Gee, that Cheong Boo had married in China. His Honor noted a strong
inclination on the part of the Chinese witnesses, especially the brother of Cheong Boo, to protect
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the interests of the alleged son, Cheong Seng Gee, by overstepping the limits of truthfulness. His
Honor also noted that reliable witnesses stated that in the year 1895, when Cheong Boo was
supposed to have been in China, he was in reality in Jolo, in the Philippine Islands. We are not
disposed to disturb this appreciation of fact by the trial court. The immigration documents only
go to show the relation of parent and child existing between the deceased Cheong Boo and his
son Cheong Seng Gee and do not establish the marriage between the deceased and the mother of
Cheong Seng Gee.
Section IV of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) provides that "All marriages contracted
without these Islands, which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were
contracted, are valid in these Islands." To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this
comity provision, it is first necessary to prove before the courts of the Islands the existence of the
foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by
convincing evidence.
As a case directly in point is the leading one of Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion ([1910]), 16 Phil.,
137; [1913], 228 U.S., 335). Here, the courts of the Philippines and the Supreme Court of the
United States were called upon to decide, as to the conflicting claims to the estate of a Chinese
merchant, between the descendants of an alleged Chinese marriage and the descendants of an
alleged Philippine marriage. The Supreme Courts of the Philippine Islands and the United States
united in holding that the Chinese marriage was not adequately proved. The legal rule was stated
by the United States Supreme Court to be this: A Philippine marriage, followed by forty years of
uninterrupted marital life, should not be impugned and discredited, after the death of the husband
and administration of his estate, though an alleged prior Chinese marriage, "save upon proof so
clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of such
impediment." Another case in the same category is that of Son Cui vs. Guepangco ([1912], 22
Phil., 216).
In the case at bar there is no competent testimony as to what the laws of China in the Province of
Amoy concerning marriage were in 1895. As in the Encarnacion case, there is lacking proof so
clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of the alleged
prior Chinese marriage. Substitute twenty-three years for forty years and the two cases are the
same.
The lower court allowed the claimant, Cheong Seng Gee, the testamentary rights of an
acknowledged natural child. This finding finds some support in Exhibit 3, the affidavit of
Cheong Boo before the American Vice-Consul at Sandakan, British North Borneo. But we are
not called upon to make a pronouncement on the question, because the oppositor-appellant
indicates silent acquiescence by assigning no error.
2. Validity of the Mohammedan Marriage
The biographical data relating to the Philippine odyssey of the Chinaman Cheong Boo is fairly
complete. He appears to have first landed on Philippine soil sometime prior to the year 1896. At
least, in the year las mentioned, we find him in Basilan, Philippine Islands. There he was married
to the Mora Adong according to the ceremonies prescribed by the book on marriage of the
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Koran, by the Mohammedan Iman (priest) Habubakar. That a marriage ceremony took place is
established by one of the parties to the marriage, the Mora Adong, by the Iman who solemnized
the marriage, and by other eyewitnesses, one of whom was the father of the bride, and another,
the chief of the rancheria, now a municipal councilor. The groom complied with Quranic law by
giving to the bride a dowry of P250 in money and P250 in goods.
The religious rites began with the bride and groom seating themselves in the house of the father
of the bride, Marahadja Sahibil. The Iman read from the Koran. Then the Iman asked the parents
if they had any objection to the marriage. The marital act was consummated by the groom
entering the woman's mosquito net.
From the marriage day until the death of Cheong Boo, twenty-three years later, the Chinaman
and the Mora Adong cohabited as husband and wife. To them were born five children, two of
whom, Payang and Rosalia, are living. Both in his relations with Mora Adong and with third
persons during his lifetime, Cheong Boo treated Adong as his lawful wife. He admitted this
relationship in several private and public documents. Thus, when different legal documents were
executed, including decrees of registration, Cheong Boo stated that he was married to the Mora
Adong while as late as 1918, he gave written consent to the marriage of his minor daughter,
Payang.
Notwithstanding the insinuation of counsel for the Chinese appellant that the custom is prevalent
among the Moros to favor in their testimony, a relative or friend, especially when they do not
swear on the Koran to tell the truth, it seems to us that proof could not be more convincing of the
fact that a marriage was contracted by the Chinaman Cheong Boo and the Mora Adong,
according to the ceremonies of the Mohammedan religion.
It is next incumbent upon us to approach the principal question which we announced in the very
beginning of this decision, namely, Are the marriages performed in the Philippines according to
the rites of the Mohammedan religion valid? Three sections of the Marriage Law (General Order
No. 68) must be taken into consideration.
Section V of the Marriage Law provides that "Marriage may be solemnized by either a judge of
any court inferior to the Supreme Court, justice of the peace, or priest or minister of the Gospel
of any denomination . . ." Counsel, failing to take account of the word "priest," and only
considering the phrase "minister of the Gospel of any denomination" would limit the meaning of
this clause to ministers of the Christian religion. We believe this is a strained interpretation.
"Priest," according to the lexicographers, means one especially consecrated to the service of a
divinity and considered as the medium through whom worship, prayer, sacrifice, or other service
is to be offered to the being worshipped, and pardon, blessing, deliverance, etc., obtained by the
worshipper, as a priest of Baal or of Jehovah; a Buddhist priest. "Minister of the Gospel" means
all clergymen of every denomination and faith. A "denomination" is a religious sect having a
particular name. (Haggin vs. Haggin [1892], 35 Neb., 375; In re Reinhart, 9 O. Dec., 441; Hale
vs. Everett [1868], 53 N. H. 9.) A Mohammedan Iman is a "priest or minister of the Gospel," and
Mohammedanism is a "denomination," within the meaning of the Marriage Law.
12

The following section of the Marriage Law, No. VI, provides that "No particular form for the
ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare, in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife." The law is quite
correct in affirming that no precise ceremonial is indispensable requisite for the creation of the
marriage contract. The two essentials of a valid marriage are capacity and consent. The latter
element may be inferred from the ceremony performed, the acts of the parties, and habit or
repute. In this instance, there is no question of capacity. Nor do we think there can exist any
doubt as to consent. While it is true that during the Mohammedan ceremony, the remarks of the
priest were addressed more to the elders than to the participants, it is likewise true that the
Chinaman and the Mora woman did in fact take each other to be husband and wife and did
thereafter live together as husband and wife. (Travers vs. Reinhardt [1907], 205 U.S., 423.
It would be possible to leave out of view altogether the two sections of the Marriage Law which
have just been quoted and discussed. The particular portion of the law which, in our opinion, is
controlling, is section IX, reading as follows: "No marriage heretofore solemnized before any
person professing to have authority therefor shall be invalid for want of such authority or on
account of any informality, irregularity, or omission, if it was celebrated with the belief of the
parties, or either of them, that he had authority and that they have been lawfully married."
The trial judge in construing this provision of law said that he did not believe that the legislative
intention in promulgating it was to validate marriages celebrated between Mohammedans. To
quote the judge:
This provisions relates to marriages contracted by virtue of the provisions of the Spanish
law before revolutionary authorized to solemnized marriages, and it is not to be presumed
that the legislator intended by this law to validate void marriages celebrated during the
Spanish sovereignty contrary to the laws which then governed.
What authority there is for this statement, we cannot conceive. To our mind, nothing could be
clearer than the language used in section IX. Note for a moment the all embracing words found
in this section:
"No marriage" Could more inclusive words be found? "Heretofore solemnized" Could any
other construction than that of retrospective force be given to this phrase? "Before any person
professing to have authority therefor shall be invalid for want of such authority" Could
stronger language than this be invoked to announce legislative intention? "Or on account of any
informality, irregularity, or omission" Could the legislative mind frame an idea which would
more effectively guard the marriage relation against technicality? "If it was celebrated with the
belief of the parties, or either of them, that he had authority and that they have been lawfully
married" What was the purpose of the legislator here, if it was not to legalize the marriage, if
it was celebrated by any person who thought that he had authority to perform the same, and if
either of the parties thought that they had been married? Is there any word or hint of any word
which would restrict the curative provisions of section IX of the Marriage Law to Christian
marriages? By what system of mental gymnastics would it be possible to evolve from such
precise language the curious idea that it was restricted to marriages performed under the Spanish
law before the revolutionary authorities?
13

In view of the importance of the question, we do not desire to stop here but would ascertain from
other sources the meaning and scope of Section IX of General Order No. 68.
The purpose of the government toward the Mohammedan population of the Philippines has, time
and again, been announced by treaty, organic law, statutory law, and executive proclamation.
The Treaty of Paris in its article X, provided that "The inhabitants of the territories over which
Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured Instructions to the Philippine
Commission imposed on every branch of the Government of the Philippine Islands the inviolable
rule "that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed ... That no form of religion and no
minister of religion shall be forced upon any community or upon any citizen of the Islands; that,
upon the other hand, no minister of religion shall be interfered with or molested in following his
calling, and that the separation between state and church shall be real, entire, and absolute." The
notable state paper of President McKinley also enjoined the Commission, "to bear in mind that
the Government which they are establishing is designed . . . for the happiness, peace, and
prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands" and that, therefore, "the measures adopted
should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices. . . . The
Philippine Bill and the Jones Law reproduced the main constitutional provisions establishing
religious toleration and equality.
Executive and legislative policy both under Spain and the United States followed in the same
path. For instance, in the Treaty of April 30, 1851, entered into by the Captain General of the
Philippines and the Sultan of Sulu, the Spanish Government guaranteed "with all solemnity to
the Sultan and other inhabitants of Sulu the free exercise of their religion, with which it will not
interfere in the slightest way, and it will also respect their customs." (See further Decree of the
Governor-General of January 14, 1881.) For instance, Act No. 2520 of the Philippine
Commission, section 3, provided that "Judges of the Court of First Instance and justices of the
peace deciding civil cases in which the parties are Mohammedans or pagans, when such action is
deemed wise, may modify the application of the law of the Philippine Islands, except laws of the
United States applicable to the Philippine Islands, taking into account local laws and customs. . .
." (See further Act No. 787, sec. 13 [ j]; Act No. 1283, sec. 6 [b]; Act No. 114 of the Legislative
Council amended and approved by the Philippine Commission; Cacho vs. Government of the
United States [1914], 28 Phil., 616.) Various responsible officials have so oft announced the
purpose of the Government not to interfere with the customs of the Moros, especially their
religious customs, as to make quotation of the same superfluous.
The retrospective provisions of the Philippine Marriage Law undoubtedly were inspired by the
governmental policy in the United States, with regard to the marriages of the Indians, the
Quakers, and the Mormons. The rule as to Indians marriages is, that a marriage between two
Indians entered into according to the customs and laws of the people at a place where such
customs and laws are in force, must be recognized as a valid marriage. The rule as to the Society
of Quakers is, that they will be left to their own customs and that their marriages will be
recognized although they use no solemnization. The rule as to Mormon marriages is that the
sealing ceremony entered into before a proper official by members of that Church competent to
contract marriage constitutes a valid marriage.
14

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but, it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance
of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus
hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of
law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.:"
(Sec. 334, No. 28.) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage. (U. S. vs.
Villafuerte and Rabano [1905], 4 Phil., 476; Son Cui vs. Guepangco, supra; U.S. vs.
Memoracion and Uri [1916], 34 Phil., 633; Teter vs. Teter [1884], 101 Ind., 129.)
Section IX of the Marriage Law is in the nature of a curative provision intended to safeguard
society by legalizing prior marriages. We can see no substantial reason for denying to the
legislative power the right to remove impediments to an effectual marriage. If the legislative
power can declare what shall be valid marriages, it can render valid, marriages which, when they
took place, were against the law. Public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriages and
should retard acts intended to invalidate marriages. (Coghsen vs. Stonington [1822], 4 Conn,
209; Baity vs. Cranfill [1884], 91 N. C., 273.)
The courts can properly incline the scales of their decisions in favors of that solution which will
mot effectively promote the public policy. That is the true construction which will best carry
legislative intention into effect. And here the consequences, entailed in holding that the marriage
of the Mora Adong and the deceased Cheong Boo, in conformity with the Mohammedan religion
and Moro customs, was void, would be far reaching in disastrous result. The last census shows
that there are at least one hundred fifty thousand Moros who have been married according to
local custom. We then have it within our power either to nullify or to validate all of these
marriages; either to make all of the children born of these unions bastards or to make them
legitimate; either to proclaim immorality or to sanction morality; either to block or to advance
settled governmental policy. Our duty is a obvious as the law is plain.
In moving toward our conclusion, we have not lost sight of the decisions of this court in the
cases of United States vs. Tubban ([1915]), 29 Phil., 434) and United States vs. Verzola ([1916,
33 Phil., 285). We do not, however, believe these decisions to be controlling. In the first place,
these were criminal actions and two Justice dissented.. In the second place, in the Tubban case,
the marriage in question was a tribal marriage of the Kalingas, while in the Verzola case, the
marriage had been performed during the Spanish regime by a lieutenant of the Guardia Civil. In
neither case, in deciding as to whether or not the accused should be given the benefit of the so-
called unwritten law, was any consideration given to the provisions of section IX of General
Order No. 68. We are free to admit that, if necessary, we would unhesitatingly revoke the
doctrine announced in the two cases above mentioned.
We regard the evidence as producing a moral conviction of the existence of the Mohammedan
marriage. We regard the provisions of section IX of the Marriage law as validating marriages
performed according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion.
15

There are other questions presented in the various assignments of error which it is unnecessary to
decide. In resume, we find the Chinese marriage not to be proved and that the Chinaman Cheong
Seng Gee has only the rights of a natural child, and we find the Mohammedan marriage to be
proved and to be valid, thus giving to the widow and the legitimate children of this union the
rights accruing to them under the law.
Judgment is reversed in part, and the case shall be returned to the lower court for a partition of
the property in accordance with this decision, and for further proceedings in accordance with
law. Without special findings as to costs in this instance, it is so ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Street, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.



















16

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALFONSO PATALIN, JR., ALEX MIJAQUE, AND NESTOR
RAS, accused-appellants.



D E C I S I O N

MELO, J.:

Accused-appellants Alex Mijaque and Alfonso Patalin, Jr. were charged before Branch 25 of the Regional
Trial Court of the 6th Judicial Region stationed in Iloilo City, with the crime of robbery.* The Amended
Information dated October 11, 1985 charged:

That on or about August 11, 1984, in the municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above named two (2) accused, conspiring, confederating and
cooperating with three (3) others whose identities are still unknown and who are still at large, armed
with bladed weapons by means of force, violence and intimidation, taking advantage of the nighttime to
better realize their purpose, and in the dwelling of the offended party, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away, with intent to gain, cash amount of Three
Hundred (P300.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, owned by the victim Corazon Aliman and the following
personal property: one (1) adjustable wrench, one (1) vise grip, one (1) screw driver, one (1) pair of levis
pants, one (1) travelling bag and one (1) wallet containing ten (P10.00) pesos, with a total value of Four
Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, owned by the victims Reynaldo Aliman and Josephine
Belesario, the over all total of cash and personal property being SEVEN HUNDRED (P700.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, without the consent of the above-mentioned offended parties and to their damage
and prejudice in the aforestated amount; that by reason or on the occasion of said Robbery, the above
named two (2) accused did then and there hack victim Reynaldo Aliman twice hitting him and inflicting
wounds which required medical attendance of more than thirty (30) days, as well as inflict physical
injuries to the other victims Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belesario causing them to sustain injuries
requiring medical attendance for several number of days.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

17

(pp. 92-93, II Record.)

In a Second Amended Information also dated October 11, 1985 and docketed as Criminal Case No.
18305, accused-appellants Alex Mijaque, Alfonso Patalin, Jr., and Nestor Ras were charged before the
same court with the crime of robbery with multiple rape, thusly:

That on or about August 11, 1984, in the municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named three (3) accused, with deliberate intent, and
without any justifiable motive, conspiring, confederating and working together with Richard Doe, Philip
Doe and Robert Doe who are still at large, all armed with firearms and other deadly weapons, thereby
performing [sic] themselves into a band, entered the dwelling of Jesusa Carcillar, and once inside, with
intent to gain and with violence against, and/or intimidation of persons, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos in cash, one (1) ring
worth Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, one (1) pair of earrings worth One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos,
and one (1) Seiko wrist watch worth Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos, making a total of Six Thousand
Five Hundred (P6,500.00) Pesos, against the will and/or consent of the owner; that on the occasion
thereof, the above-named three (3) accused, conspiring and working together with their companions
who are still at large, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with Perpetua Carcillar, Juliana Carcillar, Rogelia Carcillar and
Josephine Belesario, against their will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

(pp. 90-91, II Record.)

Upon arraignment on November 12, 1985, accused-appellants entered a plea of not guilty to both
crimes charged (p. 103, II Record).

After trial on the merits, a joint judgment was rendered, disposing:

Wherefore, premises considered there being sufficient and satisfactory proof showing that the accused
in these two cases are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges filed against them, they are
hereby sentenced as follows:
18


a) In Crim. Case No. 18376 for Robbery with Physical Injuries, accused Alfonso Patalin, Jr. and Alex
Mijaque are penalized to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Ten (10) years, and One
(1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months of Reclusion
Temporal, as maximum, to indemnify Corazon Aliman the amount of P700.00 representing the value of
her property robbed from her and also to indemnify Reynaldo Aliman the amount of P8,000.00
representing the expenses he incurred for his medication and hospitalization due to the wounds he
suffered.

b) In Criminal Case No. 18305 for Robbery with Multiple Rapes, accused Alfonso Patalin, Jr., Alex
Mijaque and Nestor Ras are sentenced to a death penalty and to indemnify the members of the Carcillar
family the amount of P6,500.00 representing the cash and articles taken from them.

In both cases the accused are also ordained to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

(p. 80, Rollo.)

The trial court arrived at the aforestated conclusion based on the following findings:

Criminal Case No. 18376

The crime of robbery (with physical injuries) was indeed committed by accused-appellants Alfonso
Patalin, Jr. and Alex Mijaque, as well as by their unidentified companions, based on the positive
identification made by complaining witness Corazon Aliman, and corroborated by her son Reynaldo and
the latters half sister Josephine Belisario (p. 77, Rollo).

Criminal Case No. 18305

19

Accused-appellants Alfonso Patalin, Jr., Alex Mijaque, and Nestor Ras, as well as an unidentified
companion, acted in concert to commit the crime of robbery with multiple rape. They were positively
identified by the following witnesses: Juliana Carcillar who was raped twice by Alex Mijaque; Josephine
Belisario who was raped once by Alex Mijaque; Rogelia Carcillar who was raped by Alex Mijaque; and
Perpetua Carcillar, who was raped by Nestor Ras, after Alfonso Patalin, Jr. failed in his attempt to rape
her. Accused-appellant Patalin was likewise identified by Reynaldo Aliman who personally knew him as
a former barangay-mate for along time, as well as by Corazon Aliman, mother of Reynaldo. The
identification of accused-appellants was facilitated and aided by a bright full moon and due to the fact
that they tarried in the crime scene for a long period of time, thus allowing their victims to imprint in
their memory the countenance or visage of accused-appellants. Said positive and clear identification by
the complaining witnesses, who were not shown to have any ill motive to falsify the truth and to
implicate accused-appellants, prevails over the latters defense of denial. Band, nocturnity, and
dwelling, were likewise appreciated against accused-appellants (pp. 78-79, Rollo).

The errors assigned by accused-appellants in their individual briefs are summarized as follows: (1) The
trial court erred in finding that accused-appellants are responsible for the crimes charged; (2) The trial
court erred in convicting accused-appellant Patalin notwithstanding the fact that the latter was arrested
without a warrant; (3) Assuming without conceding that accused-appellants (Patalin and Ras) committed
the crimes charged, the trial court erred in imposing the penalty of death as the same was suspended
upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution (pp. 86, 146, 204, Rollo).

The prosecutions version of the August 11, 1984 incident, based on the testimony of prosecution
witnesses Dr. Edgardo Carmelo, Dra. Leticia Sitchon Santiago, Reynaldo Aliman, Corazon Aliman,
Josephine Belisario, Juliana Carcillar, Rogelia Carcillar, and Perpetua Carcillar, is summarized in the
Solicitor Generals consolidated Brief, as follows:

At about 7:30 in the evening of August 11, 1984, while Reynaldo Aliman, his half sister Josephine
Belisario, and their mother Corazon Aliman were having a conversation inside their house at Barangay
Lumanay, municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo, appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr., who was outside
the fenced perimeter of said house, called out Reynaldo Aliman by his nickname and asked the latter to
let him and the other persons with him in (pp. 5-6, TSN, Dec. 16, 1986).

Reynaldo Aliman opened the window and, because of the moonlight, saw appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr.
with (2) other persons. Appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr. asked again Reynaldo Aliman to let them in (pp. 7-
8, ibid.). Reynaldo Aliman opened the gate and Alfonso Patalin together with his companions, one of
whom is appellant Alex Mijaque, entered the premises (pp. 8, 10-11, ibid.). Immediately upon entering,
20

appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr. pointed the beam of his flashlight at Reynaldo Aliman. At this juncture,
appellant Alex Mijaque hacked Reynaldo Aliman twice with a bolo hitting the latter at the neck, right
arm, and the chest (pp. 14-16, ibid.). Thereupon, Reynaldo Aliman immediately ran away (p. 17, ibid.).

Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belisario, who went to the balcony of their house, witnessed the hacking
incident and the former shouted for help (p. 6, TSN, July 21, 1987; pp. 8-9, TSN, June 30, 1988). Two of
the assailants, one of whom is appellant Alex Mijaque, pushed Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belisario
inside their house, covered their mouth and told them not to make any noise. Later, appellant Alex
Mijaque dragged Josephine Belisario to the house of the latters aunt (sister of Corazon Aliman) which is
beside their house. The other man stayed put and while holding a double-bladed knife, threatened to
kill Corazon Aliman if the latter will not give him money. After Corazon Aliman gave him three hundred
pesos (P300.00) cash, he ransacked the house and took one (1) wrist watch, one (1) vise grip, one (1)
screw driver, one (1) pair of Levis trousers, one (1) travelling bag, and one (1) wallet containing ten
pesos (P10.00); the total value thereof is seven hundred pesos (P700.00) inclusive of the three hundred
pesos (P300.00) cash. Thereafter, the man also dragged Corazon Aliman to her sisters house (pp. 6-8,
TSN, July 21, 1987; pp. 11-12, TSN, June 30, 1988).

Josephine Belisario, who was dragged by Alex Mijaque to her aunts house which is just twenty (20)
meters away, saw six (6) persons, one of whom is appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr., outside the house of her
aunt. Josephine Belisario was forced to call out her aunts name and ask that the door be opened for
her. While the door was being opened, it was kicked by one of the six (6) persons. Alfonso Patalin
immediately went in, boxed the aunt of Josephine Belisario on the body and announced that they are
staging a hold-up. The other companions of appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr., including appellant Alex
Mijaque, who were armed with knives, a bolo, and a gun also went in and restrained Josephine
Belisarios cousins, namely Rogelia, Juliana, Perpetua, Roy, and Victoriano, who are all surnamed
Carcillar (pp. 11-15, TSN, June 30, 1988; p. 11, TSN, June 29, 1989). Josephine Belisario together with
her aunt and cousins were all forced to lie face down on the floor of the sala (p. 15, TSN, June 30, 1988;
p. 7, TSN, Feb. 15, 1990). Appellant Alfonso Patalin got hold of Mrs. Carcillar (Josephine Belisarios aunt
and the mother of her cousins), kicked and boxed the latter and exclaimed: Money, money. It is
money we want. Appellant Alfonso Patalin forced Mrs. Carcillar into a room where the latter gave him
money (p. 16, TSN, June 30, 1988; pp. 7-8, February 15, 1990). Then, appellants and their companions
seized the following personalities of the Carcillars: (1) one Seiko 5 wristwatch worth three thousand
pesos (P3,000.00), (2) two (2) pairs of ladys rings worth two thousand (P2,000.00), (3) one (1) pair of
earrings, and (4) two (2) travelling bags (p. 9, TSN, February 15, 1990).

Rogelia Carcillar was brought outside their house by appellant Alex Mijaque who was armed with a
butchers knife and threatened to kill her if she will not lie down. Because of fear, she did as she was
told (pp. 10, 16-17, TSN, February 15, 1990). Appellant Alex Mijaque forcibly removed her underwear
21

and placed himself on top of Rogelia. She tried to resist but appellant Alex Mijaque pressed the tip of
his knife at the formers neck and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her (pp. 11-12, ibid.).
Thereafter, appellant Alex Mijaque brought her inside the house and ordered her to lie face down on
the floor again (pp. 13-14, ibid.). Then, one of the companions of appellant Alex Mijaque who was
armed with a gun took her outside and brought her to a place not far from where she was raped (p. 14,
ibid.). This man, at the point of a gun, threatened to kill her if she will not obey his orders. Rogelia
Carcillar, who feared for her life, was left with no choice but to obey the mans orders. There, she was
raped for the second time by this gun-wielding man (pp. 15-16, ibid.). While Rogelia Carcillar was being
raped, appellant Alfonso Patalin was also outside the house standing on guard (p. 18, ibid.).

Juliana Carcillar was likewise brought outside the house by appellant Alex Mijaque who, with his knife,
tried to rape her but he initially failed because of her resistance. This angered appellant Alex Mijaque
and he tried to kill Juliana Carcillar by stabbing the latter but was prevailed upon not to do so by one of
his companions (pp. 12-15, TSN, June 29, 1989).

Appellant Alex Mijaque, after delivering fist blows on the body of Juliana Carcillar, turned her over to
one of his companions who was in the garden outside the house and armed with a gun. This man
threatened her with the gun and mauled her. She was overpowered and he undressed her. He inserted
his finger on her sex organ and eventually succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her (pp. 15-17,
ibid.). Then, this companion of appellant Alex Mijaque brought Juliana Carcillar back inside the house
and ordered to look for money. When she told him that they have no more money, he kept on harming
her. In the course thereof, he found and took a Seiko wristwatch owned by Perpetua Carcillar. Then, he
brought her outside the house again where he had a brief conversation with appellants Nestor Ras and
Alfonso Patalin. She was then brought back inside the house and ordered to lie face down on the floor
again. While at this position, appellant Alex Mijaque approached her and brought her outside the
house. She refused to obey appellant Alex Mijaques order to lie down on the ground so he pushed her
downwards. Her strength gave out and he succeeded in raping her twice. She was then brought back
inside the house (pp. 18-21, TSN, June 29, 1989).

Josephine Belisario, while laying face down on the floor of the sala, was dragged by appellant Alex
Mijaque inside one of the rooms. He threatened her with his knife and was able to undress her. He
fondled her breasts, pulled her pubic hair and eventually succeeded in having sexual intercourse with
her. She was then left inside the room. Two companions of appellant Alex Mijaque came in bringing
with them her cousins Rogelia and Perpetua Carcillar. One of them saw Josephine Belisario and brought
her to another room. The man demanded money from her but she was not able to give him money.
The man was also carrying a knife and threatened her with the same. She resisted when he was forcing
her to lie down on the bed but her strength finally gave out. He likewise succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her. After raping her, the man took a piggy bank which was at the foot of the bed and
22

brought her back to the room where she was first raped. Her aunt and cousins were also inside the said
room (pp. 17-25, TSN, June 30, 1988).

Perpetua Carcillar suffered the same fate. While laying face down on the floor of the living room, she
was pulled by the heir by appellant Alfonso Patalin and ordered to stand up. When she stood up, she
realized that her sister were no longer there. Appellant Alfonso Patalin, armed with a double-bladed
knife, brought her outside the house, ordered her to undress and lie down. Because of fear, Perpetua
Carcillar, who was then only thirteen (13) years old, obeyed appellant Alfonso Patalin. He tried to force
his penis into her vagina but did not succeed. Then, appellant Alfonso Patalin handed her over to
appellant Nestor Ras, a member of their group who was only about two (2) arms length away. Appellant
Nestor Ras, armed with a double-bladed knife which he was pointing at Perpetua Carcillar, ordered her
to lie down. He fondled her breasts, kissed her, and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her.
After raping her, appellant Nestor Ras brought her back inside the house. When she was returned inside
the house, the intruders were still demanding for money from her mother and were taking turns in
beating the latter (pp. 4, 15-23, TSN, July 12, 1990).

Appellants left, together with the other assailants, taking with them the valuables stated earlier after
threatening them not to report the matter to the police or else they will return and kill all of them (p. 19,
TSN, February 15, 1990).

Reynaldo Aliman was brought to Ricardo Ladrido Memorial Hospital where he received first aid. He was
then brought to West Visayas Medical Center located in Manduriao, Iloilo (pp. 18-20, TSN, December 16,
1986) and was treated by Dr. Edgardo Carmelo (p. 4, TSN, May 14, 1986). Reynaldo Aliman sustained
the following injuries: (1) hack wound, mid forearm, area ulnar side middle third forearm, and (2) hack
wound, left side of neck (pp. 5-6, ibid; Exhibit A). Reynaldo Aliman was confined in the hospital for
almost three (3) months and he spent more than eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00) for medicines, food
and other expenditures (p. 19, TSN, December 16, 1986).

Dr. Leticia Sitchon Santiago examined and treated Josephine Belisario two days after she was raped. A
hematoma, about 3x4 inches in diameter, was found on the left shoulder of Josephine Belisario which
could have been caused by forcing the latter to lie down on the ground. Josephine Belisario vagina
admits two (2) fingers. Further, hematoma was noted in the hymen at nine oclock and three oclock
positions and fresh lacerations was also noted at nine, eleven, and three oclock positions. These are
indications that a foreign object, which could be a human penis, was inserted in the vagina and caused
the lacerations of the hymen (pp. 6-9, TSN, September 3, 1986).

23

Rogelia Carcillar, Juliana Carcillar and Perpetua Carcillar were also examined and treated by Dr. Leticia
Santiago but such was conducted three days after the incident (p. 17, ibid).

A hematoma was noted in the occipital region of the head of Rogelia Carcillar (p. 18, ibid). Her vagina
admits two fingers snugly and the perineum has a lacerated wound which is one centimeter in length
(pp. 18-19, ibid; pp. 2-3, TSN, November 10, 1986). Fresh lacerations were likewise noted in her hymen
at eight, eleven and three oclock positions (p. 3, TSN, November 10, 1986). Dr. Santiago further
testified that a foreign object was inserted in the vagina of Rogelia Carcillar (p. 19, TSN, September 3,
1986; p. 3, TSN, November 10, 1986).

Juliana Carcillar, 22 years old, sustained a hematoma in the forehead, left and right side of the face,
upper right arm, uppermost and lower portions of the left thigh, occipital region of the head and left
side of the mouth. She also sustained the following injuries: (1) cm. lacerated wound on the left side
of the lower lip, (2) bite mark with hematoma on the left shoulder, (3) 1 cm. incised wounds on the right
index finger and right thumb, (4) 4 inches incised wound on the right forearm, and (5) multiple abrasions
at the back including the portion below the waistline, her vagina admits two fingers and fresh
lacerations in the hymen were noted at eight, eleven, and four oclock positions (pp. 10-15, TSN,
November 10, 1986).

Perpetua Carcillar, 13 years old, sustained a 1 centimeter lacerated wound on the perineum which was
also swollen. Her vagina admits two fingers snugly (pp. 8-9, ibid). A fresh laceration at six oclock
position and a hematoma also at six oclock position were noted on her hymen (Exhibit C, p. 15, Record).

(pp. 300-311, Rollo.)

Denial and alibi were set up by accused-appellants based on their testimony and that of their witnesses,
Alejandro Tabucan, Felizardo Lebona, Rhodora Losaria, and Cristina Gumban. The denials, together with
other arguments, are summarized as follows:

Alfonso Patalin

Accused-appellant Alfonso Patalin alleges that his name was only included by Jesus Larang, whom he
described as the landlord of Jesusa Carcillar and the Carcillar sisters, to force him to reveal the names of
24

the persons who staged the robbery and rape. Verily, he declared on the stand that when the victims
saw him at the police station, two of them (Josephine Belisario and Reynaldo Aliman) even smiled at him
(tsn, August 13, 1993, pp. 10-11, 19-20).

In his brief, he argues that he was not positively identified, rationalizing that when prosecution witness
Josephine Belisario was asked on the stand if she recognized the person who called *her+ brother
Reynaldo, said witness responded that she did not know the person who called her brother, and that
she only recognized the callers voice (tsn, August 11, 1988, pp. 30-31). Further, accused-appellant
Patalin also alleges that he was arrested without a warrant.

Alex Mijaque

Accused-appellant Alex Mijaque argues that in the sworn statement of Reynaldo Aliman (p. 3, II Record),
there is no mention of his name nor that of accused-appellant Patalin as the perpetrators of the crimes
charged. Moreover, during the preliminary examination in the lower court, accused-appellant Mijaque
was also not named as one of the malefactors. He likewise points out that in the police blotter, the first
report mentioned that the alleged offenders were unknown persons. No rape was reported. In the
second report, it was blottered that the alleged offenders were four unidentified persons. Again, no
rape was reported. Accused-appellant Mijaque likewise takes note of the report given by Rogelia
Carcillar who merely narrated the robbery but did not report any rape.

According to this accused-appellant, the police authorities of Iloilo, Manduriao (also referred to in the
record as Mandurriao) received a complaint from a resident thereat that his television set was stolen
previous to the incidents herein involved. Accused-appellant Mijaque was suspected as the thief and
was picked up by the agents of the Manduriao Police Station without any warrant of arrest and was
thence detained for three days without any complaint (p. 93, Rollo). Meanwhile, the robbery at
Lambunao, Iloilo was being flashed at all police stations in Iloilo. The arresting officers of the Manduriao
Police Station, so accused-appellant Mijaque contends, in order to save themselves from charges of
arbitrary detention, immediately referred him for custodial investigation in regard to the Lambunao
robbery. Consequently, three days after his confinement, a criminal complaint for robbery with physical
injuries and another for robbery with rape was filed against him by the Chief of Police of Lambunao,
Iloilo.

Nestor Ras
25


The third accused-appellant, Nestor Ras, argues that his name was never mentioned by Dr. Edgardo
Carmelo, and that Josephine Belisario was merely led by the public prosecutor into mentioning his
name. He also states that the witnesses declarations as regards his identification are confusing and
inconsistent (pp. 208-210, Rollo).

Further, it is contended that Rogelio Carcillar himself, when asked by the public prosecutor about what
happened to his sister Perpetua Carcillar, testified that Nothing happened to them (p. 210, id). And
when Perpetua Carcillar and the other female prosecution witnesses reported the alleged incident to
the police authorities, they never mentioned that they were raped.

As mentioned, all three accused-appellants, aside from denying the charges, also presented their
respective alibis. Accused-appellant Patalin testified that he was at home with his parents, wife, and
children, at Pandan, Lambunao (tsn, August 13, 1993, pp. 16-17) at the time of the incident. As
corroborative witness, he presented Felizardo Lebona, the person in charge of the plantation where he
was working, who testified that accused-appellant Patalin did not leave the plantation house from
August 9 to 12, 1984 (tsn, October 15, 1993, pp. 4-5).

For his part, accused-appellant Mijaque insists that he had no opportunity to get out of the farm where
he was working which was located in Manduriao, Iloilo (tsn, May 6, 1993, p. 6). In July, 1985, he was
arrested for theft of a television set and detained in the Lambunao jail for investigation. Although three
of the herein complainants were brought in front of his detention cell, he was not identified. Instead,
the policemen pointed to him and said, That is Alex Mijaque who raped you. If you will not include
him, he will file a case against you. Moreover, he testified that he was mauled in jail (tsn, July 29, 1993,
pp. 10-13). Defense witness, Alejandro Tabucan, neighbor of accused-appellant Mijaque, corroborated
the latters alibi that on August 11, 1984, they had a drinking spree from 6 oclock in the evening to 12
oclock midnight, and accused-appellant Mijaque was not able to leave the premises in Manduriao.
Tabucan also said that he saw Mijaque still asleep the following morning (tsn, August 6, 1993, pp. 4-5,
10).

Lastly, accused-appellant Nestor Ras declared that he was in the province of Antique (particularly, in
Igbangkal, Dao) on August 11, 1984 (tsn, December 17, 1993, p. 4). As corroborative witness, he
presented Cristina Gumban, a vendor who testified that on August 11, 1984, she bought cassava and
sweet potatoes from accused-appellant Ras in Igbangkal, Dao, Antique from 3 oclock to 5 oclock in the
afternoon, and that he saw Ras put the purchased items in a sack (tsn, March 4, 1994, p. 4).
26


We are not persuaded by the above posturings and are compelled to affirm.

Of primordial consideration in appellate matters is the legal principle that the assessment of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimony is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its
unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and
attitude under grilling examination (People vs. Ombrog, 268 SCRA 93 [1997]). We generally uphold and
respect this appraisal since, as an appellate court, we do not deal with live witnesses but only with the
cold pages of a written record (People vs. Herbieto, 269 SCRA 472 [1997]).

A close examination of the record convinces us of the prosecution witnesses credibility, particularly the
ravished victims, who, for approximately two agonizing hours, were subjected to a hellish nightmare
occurring in the very privacy of their own homes.

As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General in its consolidated brief, the defense was not able to
prove any motive on the part of the private complainants to falsely testify that they were robbed and
raped by accused-appellants. In fact, two of the rape victims, Josephine Belisario and Rogelia Carcillar,
were even married to first cousins of accused-appellant Patalin (pp. 327-328, Rollo), and would not
ordinarily turn against a relative although this be by mere affinity unless they really suffered the fate
they narrated.

Accused-appellants rely on the delay or vacillation on the part of the complaining witnesses. As
discussed above in their individual defenses, they emphasize that Reynaldo Aliman failed to mention the
names of the perpetrators in his sworn statement; that on August 11, 1984, Reynaldo instructed a
relative, Jesus Larang, to report the hacking and robbery incidents at the Lambunao Police Department,
as well as the robbery committed in the Carcillar household, and that the police blotter stated that the
alleged offenders were unknown persons but contained no report of any rape; and that Rogelia
Carcillars report did not mention that she was raped.

Time and again, we have ruled that delay in lodging a criminal accusation does not impair the credibility
of a witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained (People vs. Bugarin, 273 SCRA 384 [1997]). An
examination of Reynaldo Alimans sworn statement (p. 3, I Record) shows that he clearly identified one
of the callers as accused-appellant Alfonso Patalin. Anent his failure to mention accused-appellant
Mijaques name, he explained on cross-examination that he did not know yet the name of the person
27

who attacked him with the bolo at the time he executed his sworn statement (tsn, Dec. 16, 1986, pp. 35,
38-39). It was only later that he found out that the name of his assailant was Alex Mijaque. As regards
Jesus Larang, the fact that he mentioned unknown persons in his report does not affect Reynaldos
categorical and positive identification of accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque as the perpetrators of
the hacking and robbery incidents at his home.

Anent the rape victims, it was clearly explained that their assailants told them not to report the matter
to the police, otherwise, the assailants will return and kill them (tsn, Feb. 15, 1990, p. 19). The victims
were overcome by fear and shame (ibid., p. 31). Besides, the delay in reporting the multiple rapes was
not procrastination as this was only 3 days from the date of the incident (tsn, June 30, 1988, p. 22), a far
shorter period than those mentioned in People vs. Gecomo (254 SCRA 82 [1996]) where we held that a
delay of 17 or 35 days, or even 6 months, by a victim of rape in reporting the attack on her honor, does
not detract from the veracity of her charge.

The defense also notes certain inconsistencies in the testimony of the complaining witnesses, as follows:
(1) Juliana Carcillar testified earlier that the only light in the house came from a kerosene lamp placed on
a small table which was extinguished as a result of it being knocked down, thus placing the house in
darkness, while on the other hand, Perpetua Carcillar, earlier said that although there was no more light
in the house coming from the lamp, yet she could still see because the light of the moon still illuminated
their house, allegedly through the plastic roofing; and (2) the prosecution witnesses could not agree
concerning the date they went to San Dionisio, Iloilo to identify accused-appellant Nestor Ras, as well as
the date when Ras was arrested.

Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses, when referring only to minor details and collateral
matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their
testimony, and do not impair the credibility of such witnesses where there is consistency in relating the
principal occurrence and the positive identification of the assailant (Sumalpong vs. Court of Appeals, 268
SCRA 764 [1997]). In fact, honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen rather
than destroy the credibility of a witness to a crime, especially so when the crime is shocking to the
conscience and numbing to the senses (People vs. Agunias, 279 SCRA 52 [1997]).

With respect to the defenses of denial and alibi, significantly, these defenses, if unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving, deserve no weight in law, and cannot be given
evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People vs.
Gayon, 269 SCRA 587 [1997]). Positive identification, where categorical and consistent and without any
showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and
28

denial (People vs. Javier, 269 SCRA 181 [1997]). Verily, even if the defense of denial is supported by the
testimony of friends of the accused, it deserves the barest consideration (People vs. Gamiao, 240 SCRA
254 [1995]). It will be given weight only if it would preclude any doubt that the accused could not have
been physically present at the place of the crime or its vicinity at the time of commission (People vs.
Daquipil, 240 SCRA 314 [1995]; People vs. De Roxas, 241 SCRA 369 [1995]; People vs. Morin, 241 SCRA
709 [1995]; People vs. Rivera, 242 SCRA 26 [1995]; People vs. Dela Iglesia, 241 SCRA 718 [1995]; People
vs. Umali, 242 SCRA 17 [1995]; People vs. Dayson, 242 SCRA 124 [1995]; People vs. Espinosa, Jr. 243
SCRA 7 [1995]; People vs. Parica, 243 SCRA 557 [1995]; People vs. Escoto, 244 SCRA 87 [1995]).

Accused-appellant Mijaque testified that on August 11, 1984, he was in Manduriao, Iloilo. The overland
travel time from the town of Manduriao to Lambunao is approximately one hour and twenty minutes.
Accused-appellant Patalin testified that he was in Barangay Pandan, which is merely adjacent to
Lambunao. Lastly, accused-appellant Nestor Ras testified that he was in Antique, a province neighboring
Iloilo, which is approximately two hours away therefrom via overland transportation. The defense tried
to corroborate these alibis by presenting witnesses who testified on details which happened ten years
prior to the date their testimony was given, and hence of naturally doubtful credibility.

Mutatis Mutandi People vs. Queliza (279 SCRA 145 [1997]), considering that the places where accused-
appellants alleged they were at could be traversed by motorized vehicles, it was not impossible that
accused-appellants could not have been at the crime scene by 7 oclock or 7:30 o'clock in the evening on
August 11, 1984. More importantly and damming yet is the positive identification of their presence
thereat by the victims.

The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling in Criminal
Case No. 18376 considering that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime and the evidence
shows that accused-appellants took advantage of the darkness to successfully consummate their plans
(People vs. Apduhan, Jr., 24 SCRA 798 [1968]). Dwelling is clear from the abuse of confidence which the
victims reposed in the offenders by opening the door to them, as well as the violation of the sanctity of
privacy in the victims homes. He who goes to anothers house to slander him, hurt him, or do him
wrong, is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere (Reyes, The Revised Penal Code Criminal
Law, Vol. I, 1993 ed., citing the dissenting opinion of Justice Villareal in People vs. Ambis, 68 Phil. 635
[1939] and Viada, 5th ed., Vol. II, pp. 323-324). We further affirm the trial courts finding on the
presence of the aggravating circumstance of band considering that Reynaldo Aliman testified that
accused-appellants Patalin and two other companions (one of whom was later identified as accused-
appellant Mijaque) entered his home (tsn, p. 7, Dec. 16, 1986). This was corroborated by Josephine
Belisario who even saw four (4) persons enter their gate, one of whom was accused-appellant Patalin
(tsn, p. 10, June 30, 1988). These same aggravating circumstances likewise attended the commission of
the crime of robbery with multiple rape in Criminal Case No. 18305 and this was clearly testified to by
29

the victims thereof who stated that five persons, including accused-appellant Patalin, armed with a bolo,
a knife, and a long gun, entered their dwelling that unfortunate night (tsn, June 29, 1989, p. 10; February
15, 1990, p. 5).

With respect to accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaques defense that they were arrested without
warrants, suffice it to say that any objection, defect, or irregularity attending an arrest must be made
before the accused enters his plea (Padilla vs. CA, 269 SCRA 402 [1997]). As correctly pointed out in the
Peoples consolidated brief, the record shows no objection was ever interposed prior to arraignment
and trial (p. 324, Rollo).

It is indubitable that there was conspiracy in the commission of the crimes in both Criminal Cases No.
18376 and 18305. In the first criminal case, the evidence clearly shows that accused-appellants Patalin
and Mijaque, together with unidentified companions, committed the crime charged. Said culprits
shared the common criminal objective of robbing the victims and inflicting wounds upon Reynaldo
Aliman on the occasion of the robbery. In the second case, all three accused-appellants (together with
unidentified companions), who were positively identified by the victims themselves, undoubtedly had
the common criminal design of robbing the household of Jesusa Carcillar, and of committing multiple
rape on the occasion of the robbery. Accused-appellant Mijaque dragged Josephine Belisario to her
aunts house and the other culprits followed suit. Accused-appellant Patalin boxed Jesusa Carcillar and
announced that they were staging a hold-up. After robbing the household, they proceeded in ravishing
the four young female victims, Rogelia, Juliana, Josephine, and Perpetua, one after the other, thus truly
exhibiting their concerted acts.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons came to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it (People vs. Abarri, 242 SCRA 39 [1995]). It cannot be merely presumed.
Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt.

In the case at bar, although there was no proof of previous actual agreement among accused-appellants
adduced at the trial

...direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. It need not be shown that the parties actually came
together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The existence of the
assent of minds which is involved in a conspiracy maybe, and from the secrecy of the crime, usually
must be, inferred by the court from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, apparently
30

indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons
aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that
their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, then a conspiracy maybe inferred
though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved (People vs. Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868;
See also People vs. Viray, 147 SCRA 146; People vs. Balignasay, G.R. No. 76743, May 22, 1992; People vs.
Galit, 230 SCRA 486)...

(People vs. Miranday, 242 SCRA 620 [1995]).

Verily, the participation of each of the accused-appellants was exhibited by the straightforward
testimony of the victims themselves.

This brings us to the crucial issue raised by accused-appellants on the death penalty. At the time the
crimes charged were committed in 1984, robbery with rape was punishable by death (Art. 294, Revised
Penal Code). However, by virtue of the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specifically Paragraph (1),
Section 19 of Article III thereof, the death penalty was abolished. Hence, the argument that it could not
be imposed upon accused-appellants. Said provision reads as follows:

Sec. 19 (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted.
Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua.

The constitutional abolition of the death penalty immediately took effect upon the ratification of the
1987 Constitution. However, said provision left the matter open for Congress to revive capital
punishment at its discretion, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Simply stated, it did not
prevent the legislature from reimposing the death penalty at some future time (Bernas, The 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., pp. 507-508).

Congress eventually restored the death penalty by virtue of Republic Act No. 7659 or the Death Penalty
Law which took effect on January 1, 1994.

31

Accused-appellants are of the position that since the Constitutions abolition of the death penalty had
retroactive effect, being beneficial to the accused, the restoration or imposition of the death penalty on
January 1, 1994 would no longer cover them notwithstanding the fact that the decision was rendered by
the trial court on June 14, 1995, when the Death Penalty Law had already taken effect.

Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code provides that no felony shall be punishable by any penalty not
prescribed by law prior to its commission. At the time of the commission of the crime in 1984, as held
by the trial court, robbery with rape, if committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, was punishable by reclusion perpetua to death (Article 294[2], Revised Penal Code [as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 767]).

True, in 1987, the Constitution abolished the death penalty subject to Congress future restoration
thereof for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. At the time of such ratification, the instant
case was still at its trial stage. No penalty had as yet then been imposed. Considering that the provision
provides that *a+ny death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua, it is clear
that the framers intended said provision to have a retroactive effect on cases pending without any
penalty of death having been imposed yet. Consequently, upon ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
any death penalty already imposed is automatically without need for any executive action
commuted (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed.,
p. 508).

The instant case poses the following issue: When the death penalty was abolished in 1987 and was
retroactively applied to herein accused-appellants, did they gain a vested right thereto so that any
future act restoring the death penalty would no longer cover them? An affirmative answer would free
accused-appellants from the fatal clutches of the death penalty.

Ours is a government of laws and not of men. The idea that an individual may be compelled to hold his
life (or lose it), or the means of living, at the mere will of another, is intolerable in any country where
freedom prevails (Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil 778 [1919]). Before us is a heinous crime indeed
where People were harmed, robbed, ravished, and abused in the defaced sanctity of their own homes.
It is but human nature to feel some measure of loathing, disgust, and hatred for the offenders
considering the inhuman aspect of the crime committed. However, the ascendancy of the law is
axiomatic in our type of government. Every official act must be based on and must conform to the
authority of a valid law, lacking which the act must be rejected (Cruz, Phil. Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 51).
The nobility of our intention is insufficient.

32

There is no doubt that the abolition of the death penalty in 1987 retroactively affected and benefited
accused-appellants. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that *p+enal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal . . .
although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the
convict is serving the same.

A statute is penal when it imposes punishment for an offense committed against the state (Aquino, The
Revised Penal Code, Vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 5). The above-cited provision of the Constitution is penal in
character since it deals with the penalty to be imposed for capital crimes. This penal provision may be
given retroactive effect during three possible stages of a criminal prosecution: (a) when the crime has
been committed and the prosecution began; (b) when sentence has been passed but the service has not
begun; and (c) when the sentence is being carried out (Gregorio, Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review,
1988 ed., p. 167, citing Escalante vs. Santos, 56 Phil 483 [1932]).

In the light of the discussion above, there is no question that the abolition of the death penalty benefits
herein accused-appellants. Perforce, the subsequent reimposition of the death penalty will not affect
them. The framers of the Constitution themselves state that the law to be passed by Congress
reimposing the death penalty (Republic Act 7659) can only have prospective application (Bernas, The
1987 Constitution the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 508, citing I RECORD, p.
748; Bernas, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 1995 ed., p. 227, citing I Record, p. 747-748).

There is no question that a person has no vested right in any rule of law which entitles him to insists that
it shall remain unchanged for his benefit, nor has he a vested right in the continued existence of a
statute which precludes its change or repeal, nor in any omission to legislate on a particular matter.
However, a subsequent statute cannot be so applied retroactively as to impair a right that accrued
under the old law (Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1986 ed., p. 264, citing Benguet Consolidated Mining
Co. vs. Pineda, 98 Phil 711 [1956]; Laurel vs. Misa, 76 Phil 372 [1946]). Courts have thus given statutes
strict construction to prevent their retroactive operation in order that the statutes would not impair or
interfere with vested or existing rights. Clearly, accused-appellants right to be benefited by the
abolition of the death penalty accrued or attached by virtue of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.
This benefit cannot be taken away from them.

Since the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested
(Benzonan vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 515 [1992]), the rule in statutory construction is that all
statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of
33

the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the
language used (Balatbat vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 419 [1992]).

By analogy, we apply the rule in labor law which provides that benefits accruing to workmen under the
old law cannot be taken away from them by a succeeding law. In the case at bar, there is greater reason
to apply this principle since the very taking of life is involved and is at issue.

As regards accused-appellants civil liability, the trial court, in Criminal Case No. 18376, correctly
awarded P700.00 to Corazon Aliman representing the total value of the cash and personal property
forcibly taken, and P8,000.00 to Reynaldo Aliman representing expenses incurred for medication and
hospitalization. However, in Criminal Case No. 18305, the trial court failed to order indemnification for
the multiple rapes. Thus, in line with the pronouncement in People vs. Victor (G.R. No. 127903, July 9,
1998) wherein we said:

One other point of concern has to be addressed. Indictments for rape continue unabated and the
legislative response has been in the form of higher penalties. The Court believes that, on like
considerations, the jurisprudential path on the civil aspect should follow the same direction. Hence,
starting with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the
circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by the present amended law, the indemnity
for the victim shall be in the increased amount of not less than P75,000.00. this is not only a reaction to
the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an
expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity.

accused-appellants should be made to pay P375,000.00 as indemnification for five counts of rape
(considering that Juliana Carcillar was twice raped by accused-appellant Mijaque) in addition to the sum
of P6,500.00 representing the value of the cash and articles that were taken from the victims. In line
with the recent ruling in People vs. Prades (G.R. No. 127569, July 30, 1998), moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape, or a total of P250,000.00 is likewise awarded. Lastly, so
that the instant case may serve as an object lesson to the public, exemplary damages in the amount of
P10,000 per count of rape is further awarded (People vs. Burce, 269 SCRA 293 [1997]).

Because of the findings of conspiracy, accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are jointly and severally
liable for the amounts awarded in Criminal Case No. 18376; whereas all three accused-appellants are
solidarily liable for the amounts awarded in Criminal Case No. 18305.
34


WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence on record, the Court
hereby AFFIRMS said judgment, with the following modifications:

(a) In Criminal Case No. 18376, for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, considering that the
aggravating circumstances of band, nighttime, and dwelling attended the commission of the crime,
accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from
six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum;

(b) Accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are jointly and severally held liable for the amounts awarded
by the trial court in said criminal case, particularly, the amount of P700.00 representing the total value
of the cash and articles taken from Corazon Aliman, and P8,000.00 representing the expenses incurred
by Reynaldo Aliman for medication and hospitalization;

(c) In Criminal Case No. 18305, the penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and

(d) Aside from the amount of P6,500.00 already awarded by the trial court to the Carcillar family
representing the value of the cash and articles taken, the victims in Criminal Case No. 18305 are hereby
awarded an additional P75,000 as indemnity for each count of rape, P50,000.00 for each count of rape
as moral damages, and P10,000 for each count of rape as exemplary damages, for which amounts all
three accused-appellants are jointly and severally liable.

SO ORDERED.

Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., on leave.


35

G.R. No. L-15127 May 30, 1961
EMETERIO CUI, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, defendant-appellee.
G.A.S. Sipin, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.
E. Voltaire Garcia for defendant-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J .:
Appeal by plaintiff Emeterio Cui from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
absolving defendant Arellano University from plaintiff's complaint, with costs against the
plaintiff, and dismissing defendant's counter claim, for insufficiency of proof thereon.
In the language of the decision appealed from:
The essential facts of this case are short and undisputed. As established by the agreement
of facts Exhibits X and by the respective oral and documentary evidence introduced by
the parties, it appears conclusive that plaintiff, before the school year 1948-1949 took up
preparatory law course in the defendant University. After finishing his preparatory law
course plaintiff enrolled in the College of Law of the defendant from the school year
1948-1949. Plaintiff finished his law studies in the defendant university up to and
including the first semester of the fourth year. During all the school years in which
plaintiff was studying law in defendant law college, Francisco R. Capistrano, brother of
the mother of plaintiff, was the dean of the College of Law and legal counsel of the
defendant university. Plaintiff enrolled for the last semester of his law studies in the
defendant university but failed to pay his tuition fees because his uncle Dean Francisco
R. Capistrano having severed his connection with defendant and having accepted the
deanship and chancellorship of the College of Law of Abad Santos University, plaintiff
left the defendant's law college and enrolled for the last semester of his fourth year law in
the college of law of the Abad Santos University graduating from the college of law of
the latter university. Plaintiff, during all the time he was studying law in defendant
university was awarded scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his semestral
tuition fees were returned to him after the ends of semester and when his scholarship
grants were awarded to him. The whole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff to
defendant and refunded to him by the latter from the first semester up to and including
the first semester of his last year in the college of law or the fourth year, is in total
P1,033.87. After graduating in law from Abad Santos University he applied to take the
bar examination. To secure permission to take the bar he needed the transcripts of his
records in defendant Arellano University. Plaintiff petitioned the latter to issue to him the
needed transcripts. The defendant refused until after he had paid back the P1,033 87
which defendant refunded to him as above stated. As he could not take the bar
examination without those transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum under
protest. This is the sum which plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant in this case.
36

Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the scholarship grants as above stated, he was made
to sign the following contract covenant and agreement:
"In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby waive my
right to transfer to another school without having refunded to the University (defendant)
the equivalent of my scholarship cash.
(Sgd.) Emeterio Cui".
It is admitted that, on August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No.
38, series of 1949, on the subject of "Scholarship," addressed to "All heads of private schools,
colleges and universities," reading:
1. School catalogs and prospectuses submitted to this, Bureau show that some schools
offer full or partial scholarships to deserving students for excellence in scholarship or
for leadership in extra-curricular activities. Such inducements to poor but gifted students
should be encouraged. But to stipulate the condition that such scholarships are good only
if the students concerned continue in the same school nullifies the principle of merit in
the award of these scholarships.
2. When students are given full or partial scholarships, it is understood that such
scholarships are merited and earned. The amount in tuition and other fees corresponding
to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when
they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be
offered merely to attract and keep students in a school.
3. Several complaints have actually been received from students who have enjoyed
scholarships, full or partial, to the effect that they could not transfer to other schools since
their credentials would not be released unless they would pay the fees corresponding to
the period of the scholarships. Where the Bureau believes that the right of the student to
transfer is being denied on this ground, it reserves the right to authorize such transfer.
that defendant herein received a copy of this memorandum; that plaintiff asked the Bureau of
Private Schools to pass upon the issue on his right to secure the transcript of his record in
defendant University, without being required to refund the sum of P1,033.87; that the Bureau of
Private Schools upheld the position taken by the plaintiff and so advised the defendant; and that,
this notwithstanding, the latter refused to issue said transcript of records, unless said refund were
made, and even recommended to said Bureau that it issue a written order directing the defendant
to release said transcript of record, "so that the case may be presented to the court for judicial
action." As above stated, plaintiff was, accordingly, constrained to pay, and did pay under
protest, said sum of P1,033.87, in order that he could take the bar examination in 1953.
Subsequently, he brought this action for the recovery of said amount, aside from P2,000 as moral
damages, P500 as exemplary damages, P2,000 as attorney's fees, and P500 as expenses of
litigation.
37

In its answer, defendant reiterated the stand it took, vis-a-vis the Bureau of Private Schools,
namely, that the provisions of its contract with plaintiff are valid and binding and that the
memorandum above-referred to is null and void. It, likewise, set up a counterclaim for
P10,000.00 as damages, and P3,000 as attorney's fees.
The issue in this case is whether the above quoted provision of the contract between plaintiff and
the defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transfer to another school without
refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash, is valid or not. The lower court
resolved this question in the affirmative, upon the ground that the aforementioned memorandum
of the Director of Private Schools is not a law; that the provisions thereof are advisory, not
mandatory in nature; and that, although the contractual provision "may be unethical, yet it was
more unethical for plaintiff to quit studying with the defendant without good reasons and simply
because he wanted to follow the example of his uncle." Moreover, defendant maintains in its
brief that the aforementioned memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is null and void
because said officer had no authority to issue it, and because it had been neither approved by the
corresponding department head nor published in the official gazette.
We do not deem it necessary or advisable to consider as the lower court did, the question
whether plaintiff had sufficient reasons or not to transfer from defendant University to the Abad
Santos University. The nature of the issue before us, and its far reaching effects, transcend
personal equations and demand a determination of the case from a high impersonal plane.
Neither do we deem it essential to pass upon the validity of said Memorandum No. 38, for,
regardless of the same, we are of the opinion that the stipulation in question is contrary to public
policy and, hence, null and void. The aforesaid memorandum merely incorporates a sound
principle of public policy. As the Director of Private Schools correctly pointed, out in his letter,
Exhibit B, to the defendant,
There is one more point that merits refutation and that is whether or not the contract
entered into between Cui and Arellano University on September 10, 1951 was void as
against public policy. In the case of Zeigel vs. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 245 Ill.
180, 19 Ann. Case 127, the court said: 'In determining a public policy of the state, courts
are limited to a consideration of the Constitution, the judicial decisions, the statutes, and
the practice of government officers.' It might take more than a government bureau or
office to lay down or establish a public policy, as alleged in your communication, but
courts consider the practices of government officials as one of the four factors in
determining a public policy of the state. It has been consistently held in America that
under the principles relating to the doctrine of public policy, as applied to the law of
contracts, courts of justice will not recognize or uphold a transaction which its object,
operation, or tendency is calculated to be prejudicial to the public welfare, to sound
morality or to civic honesty (Ritter vs. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139; Heding vs.
Gallaghere 64 L.R.A. 811; Veazy vs. Allen, 173 N.Y. 359). If Arellano University
understood clearly the real essence of scholarships and the motives which prompted this
office to issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949, it should have not entered into a contract of
waiver with Cui on September 10, 1951, which is a direct violation of our Memorandum
and an open challenge to the authority of the Director of Private Schools because the
contract was repugnant to sound morality and civic honesty. And finally, in Gabriel vs.
38

Monte de Piedad, Off. Gazette Supp. Dec. 6, 1941, p. 67 we read: 'In order to declare a
contract void as against public policy, a court must find that the contract as to
consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some established interest of society, or
is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the
security of individual rights. The policy enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is
sound policy. Scholarship are awarded in recognition of merit not to keep outstanding
students in school to bolster its prestige. In the understanding of that university
scholarships award is a business scheme designed to increase the business potential of an
education institution. Thus conceived it is not only inconsistent with sound policy but
also good morals. But what is morals? Manresa has this definition. It is good customs;
those generally accepted principles of morality which have received some kind of social
and practical confirmation. The practice of awarding scholarships to attract students and
keep them in school is not good customs nor has it received some kind of social and
practical confirmation except in some private institutions as in Arellano University. The
University of the Philippines which implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the
Constitution with reference to the giving of free scholarships to gifted children, does not
require scholars to reimburse the corresponding value of the scholarships if they transfer
to other schools. So also with the leading colleges and universities of the United States
after which our educational practices or policies are patterned. In these institutions
scholarships are granted not to attract and to keep brilliant students in school for their
propaganda mine but to reward merit or help gifted students in whom society has an
established interest or a first lien. (Emphasis supplied.)
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be entered
sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the
legal rate from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this case, as well as the costs, and
dismissing defendant's counterclaim. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Parades, Dizon, De Leon and
Natividad, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., reserves his vote.








39

ANG PING and CARMEN PIMENTEL, petitioners,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, Branch 40; and JULIO and ZENAIDA KO,
respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J .:
The issue in this petition is whether or not the execution of a final judgment in an
ejectment case which has gone all the way to the Supreme Court may be stayed by a
trial court on the ground of a supervening event, namely a decision by a regional trial
court ordering the nullification of sale and title and granting legal redemption in favor of
the private respondents.
On November 13, 1985, in G. R. No. 70581, (Ang Ping, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al.), we issued a resolution which reads in part:
On October 25, 1983, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila rendered
judgment in an ejectment case filed by the petitioners Ang Ping and
Carmen Pimentel against private respondents Julio Ko and Zenaida Ko.
The trial court ordered the respondents to vacate the disputed premises,
pay P5,000.00 a month in rentals from March 1, 1981 until they vacate
minus whatever payments may have been made in the meantime, and
pay P3,000.00 attorney's fees and costs.
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, the decision was affirmed
in toto on March 26, 1984.
On July 5, 1984, RTC Judge Conrado T. Limcaoco partially granted a motion for
reconsideration by reducing to P500.00 monthly rentals, the rate of monthly rentals
agreed upon from June, 1979 or earlier when the respondents and their parents were
leasing the premises from Uy Chaco Sons and Co., Inc. The Regional Trial Court of
Manila sustained the MTC findings that B.P. No. 25 is not applicable because (1) the
monthly rental is more than then P300.00 rental covered by the law and (2) the
respondents use the (sic) commercial reasons and not for a residence. The Urban Land
Reform Law, P.D. 1517 was likewise not deemed applicable, a finding impliedly
accepted by the respondents when they abandoned this ground.
In their petition for review filed with the Intermediate Appellate Court, the
respondent questioned the validity of the October 25, 1983 decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court on the ground that it was released only on
January 24, 1984 when Judge J. Cesar Sangco had already retired. (p. 9,
Rollo)
40

We resolved affirmatively the issue of whether or not the October 25, 1983 decision of
Judge J. Cesar Sangco in the ejectment case was valid. Instead of remanding the case
for a re-promulgation of the same judgment, this Court affirmed the decisions of the
courts below as modified, i.e. reducing the P5,000.00 per month rentals to their pre-
litigation level of P500.00 per month.
After a motion for reconsideration was denied and entry of judgment was made, the
petitioners returned to the metropolitan trial court where they filed a motion for execution
of the judgment. The private respondents opposed the motion on the ground that a
complaint for annulment of sale which they filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila
had, in the meantime, been decided in their favor.
The Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 13911 declared null and void the
sale by the earlier owner, T & C Corporation, to the petitioners on grounds of equity
under Article 19 of the Civil Code and ordered the petitioners to sell 190 square meters
of the land they had purchased to the respondents upon Julio Ko's paying them
P190,000.00. The petitioners filed a motion to set aside and/or reconsider the decision.
According to a manifestation filed September 1, 1987, the motion for reconsideration
was denied, whereupon the matter was raised to the Court of Appeals where the case is
now pending.
Going back to the ejectment case, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila denied the
respondents' opposition and granted the motion for execution.
On April 28, 1986, respondents Julio and Zenaida Ko filed a petition for certiorari with
prayer for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction to stop the
implementation of the writ of execution in the ejectment case. It is the preliminary
injunction issued by Branch 40 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No.
86-35622 which is now before us.
The bases for the decision in the ejectment case are summarized by the Regional Trial
Court of Manila as follows:
Defendants contend that they cannot be ejected because: (1) they are
subsisting lessees at the time of the purchase of the property in question
by the plaintiffs from T & L Development Corporation, under Sec. 5 of B.P.
No. 15; (2) plaintiffs' need of the leased premises is not for use as a
residential unit as required by said law, but as an office and bodega; and
(3) since they were not given an opportunity to exercise their right of first
refusal before the leased premises were sold to the plaintiffs, the sale
thereof to the latter is null and void and in fact filed a complaint for
annulment thereof on that ground.
As to the first two grounds the basic issue is whether or not B.P. No. 25 is
applicable to this case. The coverage of said law is defined in Sec. 7
41

thereof according to which said law applies only to "All residential units the
total monthly rental of which does not exceed three hundred pesos
(P300.00) as of the effectivity of this Act ..." The undisputed fact is that at
the time of the purchase of the premises in question defendants were
paying a monthly rental of P500.00. Moreover, it is even doubtful whether
the leased premises may be considered as a residential unit under Sec.
2(b) of B.P. No. 25, considering that defendants are undeniably using the
same for commercial purposes because it is there where they do business
under the name of Johnson Blacksmith & Machine Shop.
As to the third ground, while it is not necessary to resolve it, it is just as
obvious that P.D. 1517 is likewise not applicable, as correctly pointed out
by counsel for the plaintiff and as indicated by the plaintiff and as indicated
by defendants' abandonment of this ground.
Since neither B.P. No. 25 nor P.D. 1517 are applicable, the settled rule
that a month to month contract of lease is a contract for a fixed period,
expires at the end of every month and may be terminated on any month,
applies. Plaintiff did so when it served notice of termination thereof dated
February 20, 1981, effective 30 days thereafter.
Premises considered the court finds and so declares that plaintiffs have
satisfactorily established their causes of action. (Annex J, Rollo, p. 75-76)
(Rollo, pp. 5-6).
On the other hand, the decision in Civil Case No. 139111, nullifying the sale in favor of
petitioners Ang Ping and Carmen Pimentel is based on a finding that justice and equity
would be served by allowing Julio and Zenaida Ko to buy the properties already sold to
the petitioners.
Among the findings in Civil Case No. 139111 are:
(1) Julio Ko has been operating his Johnson Blacksmith and Machine Shop in the
disputed premises since 1965.
(2) The respondents have religiously paid the monthly rentals of P500.00 for the
premises.
(3) The respondents were never informed that T & L Development Corporation intended
to sell the premises. They claimed a right to priority in the purchase of the lot and the
corresponding part of the building and on April 24, 1981 deposited with Equitable
Banking Corporation the amount of P192,161.78 in trust for Ang Ping for the redemption
or repurchase of the lot and apartment door sold to Ang Ping and Carmen Pimentel.
The court stated that there is nothing legally wrong in an owner of a leased property
selling it without notifying the tenant. However, it found a failure of the owner and the
42

buyers to observe honesty and good faith because other tenants were informed of the
proposed sale but not Julio and Zenaida Ko.
The petitioners raise two grounds for the allowance of their petition, namely:
A
The respondent court gravely abused its discretion and/or acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the temporary restraining order of April
28, 1986 and the Order of May 16, 1986, denying petitioners' Motion to
Dismiss and directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to
stop the implementation of the writ of execution issued by the MTC of
Manila (Rollo, p. 13)
B
The respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction, thereby depriving the petitioners of the fruits of their legal
victory through the implementation of the final and executory decision. (pp.
13 and 18, Rono)
The petitioners contend that the decision of Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila in the nullification of sale and title and reconveyance case does not as yet confer
on the respondents any enforceable right whereas this Court has already entered
judgment in the ejectment case.
The petitioners also point out that we were fully aware of the pending nullification and
reconveyance case because the same was brought to our attention in G.R. No. 70581.
Yet, we denied a motion for reconsideration of our decision in the petition for review of
the ejectment case.
We agree with the petitioners.
The principle enunciated in Ramirez v. Bleza (106 SCRA 187) applies. We ruled in
Ramirez:
Moreover, the pendency of Civil Case No. R436, an "accion publiciana",
where ownership is concededly the principal issue, (Rollo, p. 59.) before
the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro, does not preclude nor bar
the execution of the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. R184, where the
action was for forcible entry and the only issue involved was the material
possession or possession de facto of the land under litigation. Such action
which involves the title over the premises is entirely independent from
forcible entry. (at p. 194)
43

Justice Ramon C. Aquino was more emphatic in his concurrence:
I concur. Respondent judge of first instance acted with grave abuse of
discretion in preventing the execution of the final and executory judgment
of the municipal court in the ejectment case on the flimsy pretext that
another possessory action was pending in his court involving the same
land.
The judgment of the municipal court is res judicata as to the issue of
possession de facto but it not conclusive as to the title or ownership (Sec.
7, Rule 70, Rules of Court; Pealosa v. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303).
Possession and ownership of a parcel of land may be held by different
persons. The winning party is entitled to the execution of the municipal
court's final judgment as to possession. The enforcement of that judgment
would not cause "chaos and confusion". (id. at p. 195).
In De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals (133 SCRA 520), we had a similar ruling:
We find no merit in petitioners' aforesaid submission. An unlawful detainer
action has an entirely different subject from that of an action for
reconveyance of title. What is involved in unlawful detainer case is merely
the issue of material possession or possession de facto; whereas in an
action for reconveyance, ownership is the issue. So much so that the
pendency of an action for reconveyance of title over the same property
does not divest the city or municipal court of its jurisdiction to try the
forcible entry or unlawful detainer case, nor will it preclude or bar
execution of judgment in the ejectment case where the only issue involved
is material possession or possession de facto. (Ramirez v. Bleza, L-
45640, July 30, 1981, 106 SCRA 187).
This is so because:
The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or
detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession
only and in no case bind the title or affect the ownership of
the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action
between the same parties respecting title to the land or
building nor shall it be held conclusive of the facts therein
found in case between the same parties upon a different
cause of action involving possession. (Section 7, Rule 70,
Rules of Court).
The rationale is that forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are
summary proceedings designed to provide for an expeditious means of
protecting actual possession or the right to possession of the property
44

involved. (Republic v. Guarin, supra). It does not admit of a delay in the
determination thereof. It is a "time procedure" designed to remedy the
situation. (Mabalot v. Madela, Jr., 121 SCRA 347). Procedural technicality
is therefore obviated and reliance thereon to stay eviction from the
property should not be tolerated and cannot override substantial justice.
(Dakudao v. Consolacion, 122 SCRA 877). So much so that judgment
must be executed immediately when it is in favor of the plaintiff in order to
prevent further damages arising from loss of possession. (Salinas v.
Navarro, 126 SCRA 167). (At pp. 527-528).
As early as 1922, this Court declared in Shioji v. Harvey (43 Phil. 333) that "the only
function of a lower court, when the judgment of a higher court is returned to it, is the
ministerial one of issuing the order of execution. A lower court is without supervisory
jurisdiction to interpret or to reverse the judgment of the higher court."
This is especially true where it is a Supreme Court decision or resolution which states
with finality how the particular case before it has been resolved. We ruled in Tugade v.
Court of Appeals (85 SCRA 226):
Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. It
could not have ruled in any other way on the legal question raised. This
Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to obey. It is as simple as that. There
is relevance to this excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera (L-31589, July 31,
1970, 34 SCRA 98). "The delicate task of ascertaining the significance
that attaches to a constitutional or statutory provision, an executive order,
a procedural norm or a municipal ordinance is committed to the judiciary.
It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that appertaining to the other
two departments in the maintenance of the rule of law. To assure stability
in legal relations and avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice. It
does so with finality, logically and rightly, through the highest judicial
organ, this Court. What it says then should be definitive and authoritative,
binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial hierarchy. They
have to defer and to submit." (ibid., 107. The opinion of Justice Laurel in
People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937] was cited.) The ensuing paragraph of
the opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the point: Such a thought was
reiterated in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in
these words: "Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the
Supreme Court, by tradition and in our system of judicial administration,
has the last word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable
controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all
other courts should take their bearings." (Justice J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus
in Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila [Branch VI], L-26364, May 29,
1968, 23 SCRA 948, 961.) (at pp. 230-231).
We refrain from expressing any opinion on the merits of the decision in the nullification
of sale and reconveyance of property case. The merits will have to be threshed out by
45

the proper court on a full consideration of the evidence and the law upon which it is
based. Our decision here is limited to the execution of the decision in the ejectment
case.
From the foregoing, it is plain that the law is on the side of the petitioners. The injunction
was improperly issued.
Do the equities of the case warrant a disregard of established precedents? It is true that
the private respondents would suffer painful consequences if they are ejected now only
to be reinstated if they eventually win the nullification of sale case. However, the
petitioners are also suffering an injustice. The ejectment case in their favor was decided
as early as 1983. The regional trial court affirmed the decision. The Intermediate
Appellate Court ruled that the promulgation of the trial court's decision was defective
and ordered it repromulgated but this Court set aside the appellate decision and
reinstated the metropolitan trial court and regional trial court decisions.
There being no final decision in the annulment of sale case, the petitioners have equal
chances with the private respondents of also winning that case. The private
respondents cannot claim to have overriding considerations of equity on their side,
sufficient to stop the execution of a final judgment in the ejectment proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The orders dated April 28, 1986 and
May 16, 1986 of the respondent court are SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court is
ORDERED to immediately execute the decision in the ejectment case. No motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration of this decision will be granted.
SO ORDERED.










46

G.R. No. L-6355-56 August 31, 1953

PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro for appellant.
Manuel O. Chan for appellees.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring section 13 of
Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as Collector of
Internal Revenue to re-fund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia the sum of P1,744.45, representing the
income tax collected on his salary as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to Justice
Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46, representing the income tax collected on his salary from
January 1,1950 to October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and from October 20,
1950 to December 31,1950, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, without special pronouncement
as to costs.

Because of the similarity of the two cases, involving as they do the same question of law, they were
jointly submitted for determination in the lower court. Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg presiding, in a rather
exhaustive and well considered decision found and held that under the doctrine laid down by this Court
in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice
Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and therefore was in violation of the
Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes.

We see no profit and necessity in again discussing and considering the proposition and the arguments
pro and cons involved in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, which are raised, brought up and
presented here. In that case, we have held despite the ruling enunciated by the United States Federal
Supreme Court in the case of O 'Malley vs. Woodrought 307 U. S., 277, that taxing the salary of a judicial
officer in the Philippines is a diminution of such salary and so violates the Constitution. We shall now
47

confine our-selves to a discussion and determination of the remaining question of whether or not
Republic Act No. 590, particularly section 13, can justify and legalize the collection of income tax on the
salary of judicial officers.

According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, our
decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress, because
immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590. To bring home his point, the
Solicitor General reproduced what he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House
Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.

For purposes of reference, we are reproducing section 9, Article VIII of our Constitution:.

SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good
behavior, until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of
their office. They shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office. Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate
Justice, fifteen thousand pesos.

As already stated construing and applying the above constitutional provision, we held in the Perfecto
case that judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income tax on their salaries, because the
collection thereof by the Government was a decrease or diminution of their salaries during their
continuance in office, a thing which is expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Thereafter, according to
the Solicitor General, because Congress did not favorably receive the decision in the Perfecto case,
Congress promulgated Republic Act No. 590, if not to counteract the ruling in that decision, at least now
to authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers. We quote
section 13 of Republic Act No. 590:

SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be
considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be dimunition of
his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.

So we have this situation. The Supreme Court in a decision interpreting the Constitution, particularly
section 9, Article VIII, has held that judicial officers are exempt from payment of income tax on their
48

salaries, because the collection thereof was a diminution of such salaries, specifically prohibited by the
Constitution. Now comes the Legislature and in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, says that "no salary
wherever received by any public officer of the Republic (naturally including a judicial officer) shall be
considered as exempt from the income tax," and proceeds to declare that payment of said income tax is
not a diminution of his compensation. Can the Legislature validly do this? May the Legislature lawfully
declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a
decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise? To determine this
question, we shall have to go back to the fundamental principles regarding separation of powers.

Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned the power to
make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution of carrying out of the
provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the
Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution.
Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and
ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order
to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give
way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch may not limit or restrict
the power granted to the courts by the Constitution. (Bandy vs. Mickelson et al., 44N. W., 2nd 341, 342.)

When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the Constitution, it
is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because they cannot shrink from it without
violating their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental
law of the state is imperative and unceasing; and, as Chief Justice Marshall said, whenever a statute is in
violation of the fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to the
Constitution. Any other course would lead to the destruction of the Constitution. Since the question as
to the constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter, the courts will not decline the exercise of
jurisdiction upon the suggestion that action might be taken by political agencies in disregard of the
judgment of the judicial tribunals. (11 Am. Jur., 714-715.)

Under the American system of constitutional government, among the most important functions in
trusted to the judiciary are the interpreting of Constitutions and, as a closely connected power, the
determination of whether laws and acts of the legislature are or are not contrary to the provisions of the
Federal and State Constitutions. (11 Am. Jur., 905.).

49

By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act NO. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary
of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or
ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be diminished during their continuance in
office," found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This
act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-
defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.

The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory
of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative
definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise,
the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. (11 Am. Jur., 914, emphasis
supplied)

The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a constitutional provision, validate it so as to
prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate
the constitutional inhibition. (11 Am. Jur., 919, emphasis supplied)

We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the
power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the
interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative
department. If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the
Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by
interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial
processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final court determination of a case based on a
judicial interpretation of the law of the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a
subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative department.
That would be neither wise nor desirable, besides being clearly violative of the fundamental, principles
of our constitutional system of government, particularly those governing the separation of powers.

So much for the constitutional aspect of the case. Considering the practical side thereof, we believe that
the collection of income tax on a salary is an actual and evident diminution thereof. Under the old
system where the in-come tax was paid at the end of the year or sometime thereafter, the decrease
may not be so apparent and clear. All that the official who had previously received his full salary was
called upon to do, was to fulfill his obligation and to exercise his privilege of paying his income tax on his
salary. His salary fixed by law was received by him in the amount of said tax comes from his other
sources of income, he may not fully realize the fact that his salary had been decreased in the amount of
50

said income tax. But under the present system of withholding the income tax at the source, where the
full amount of the income tax corresponding to his salary is computed in advance and divided into equal
portions corresponding to the number of pay-days during the year and actually deducted from his salary
corresponding to each payday, said official actually does not receive his salary in full, because the
income tax is deducted therefrom every payday, that is to say, twice a month. Let us take the case of
Justice Endencia. As Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, his salary is fixed at p12,000 a year, that is
to say, he should receive P1,000 a month or P500 every payday, fifteenth and end of month. In the
present case, the amount collected by the Collector of Internal Revenue on said salary is P1,744.45 for
one year. Divided by twelve (months) we shall have P145.37 a month. And further dividing it by two
paydays will bring it down to P72.685, which is the income tax deducted form the collected on his salary
each half month. So, if Justice Endencia's salary as a judicial officer were not exempt from payment of
the income tax, instead of receiving P500 every payday, he would be actually receiving P427.31 only,
and instead of receiving P12,000 a year, he would be receiving but P10,255.55. Is it not therefor clear
that every payday, his salary is actually decreased by P72.685 and every year is decreased by P1,744.45?

Reading the discussion in the lower House in connection with House Bill No. 1127, which became
Republic Act No. 590, it would seem that one of the main reasons behind the enactment of the law was
the feeling among certain legislators that members of the Supreme Court should not enjoy any
exemption and that as citizens, out of patriotism and love for their country, they should pay income tax
on their salaries. It might be stated in this connection that the exemption is not enjoyed by the members
of the Supreme Court alone but also by all judicial officers including Justices of the Court of Appeals and
judges of inferior courts. The exemption also extends to other constitutional officers, like the President
of the Republic, the Auditor General, the members of the Commission on Elections, and possibly
members of the Board of Tax Appeals, commissioners of the Public Service Commission, and judges of
the Court of Industrial Relations. Compares to the number of all these officials, that of the Supreme
Court Justices is relatively insignificant. There are more than 990 other judicial officers enjoying the
exemption, including 15 Justices of the Court of Appeals, about 107 Judges of First Instance, 38
Municipal Judges and about 830 Justices of the Peace. The reason behind the exemption in the
Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Federal Supreme Court and this Court, is to preserve
the independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal but of the other courts, whose present
membership number more than 990 judicial officials.

The exemption was not primarily intended to benefit judicial officers, but was grounded on public
policy. As said by Justice Van Devanter of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Evans vs. Gore
(253 U. S., 245):

The primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was not to benefit the judges, but, like the
clause in respect of tenure, to attract good and competent men to the bench and to promote that
51

independence of action and judgment which is essential to the maintenance of the guaranties,
limitations and pervading principles of the Constitution and to the administration of justice without
respect to person and with equal concern for the poor and the rich. Such being its purpose, it is to be
construed, not as a private grant, but as a limitation imposed in the public interest; in other words, not
restrictively, but in accord with its spirit and the principle on which it proceeds.

Having in mind the limited number of judicial officers in the Philippines enjoying this exemption,
especially when the great bulk thereof are justices of the peace, many of them receiving as low as P200
a month, and considering further the other exemptions allowed by the income tax law, such as P3,000
for a married person and P600 for each dependent, the amount of national revenue to be derived from
income tax on the salaries of judicial officers, were if not for the constitutional exemption, could not be
large or substantial. But even if it were otherwise, it should not affect, much less outweigh the purpose
and the considerations that prompted the establishment of the constitutional exemption. In the same
case of Evans vs. Gore, supra, the Federal Supreme Court declared "that they (fathers of the
Constitution) regarded the independence of the judges as far as greater importance than any revenue
that could come from taxing their salaries.

When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly ask for exemption from payment of income
tax on his salary, as a privilege . It is already attached to his office, provided and secured by the
fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but based on public interest, to secure and preserve his
independence of judicial thought and action. When we come to the members of the Supreme Court, this
excemption to them is relatively of short duration. Because of the limited membership in this High
Tribunal, eleven, and due to the high standards of experience, practice and training required, one
generally enters its portals and comes to join its membership quite late in life, on the aver-age, around
his sixtieth year, and being required to retire at seventy, assuming that he does not die or become
incapacitated earlier, naturally he is not in a position to receive the benefit of exemption for long. It is
rather to the justices of the peace that the exemption can give more benefit. They are relatively more
numerous, and because of the meager salary they receive, they can less afford to pay the income tax on
it and its diminution by the amount of the income tax if paid would be real, substantial and onerous.

Considering exemption in the abstract, there is nothing unusual or abhorrent in it, as long as it is based
on public policy or public interest. While all other citizens are subject to arrest when charged with the
commission of a crime, members of the Senate and House of Representatives except in cases of treason,
felony and breach of the peace are exempt from arrest, during their attendance in the session of the
Legislature; and while all other citizens are generally liable for any speech, remark or statement, oral or
written, tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person or to
blacken the memory of one who is dead, Senators and Congressmen in making such statements during
their sessions are extended immunity and exemption.
52


And as to tax exemption, there are not a few citizens who enjoy this exemption. Persons, natural and
juridical, are exempt from taxes on their lands, buildings and improvements thereon when used
exclusively for educational purposes, even if they derive income therefrom. (Art. VI, Sec. 22 [3].) Holders
of government bonds are exempted from the payment of taxes on the income or interest they receive
therefrom (sec. 29 (b) [4], National Internal Revenue Code as amended by Republic Act No. 566).
Payments or income received by any person residing in the Philippines under the laws of the United
States administered by the United States Veterans Administration are exempt from taxation. (Republic
Act No. 360). Funds received by officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Army who served in the
Armed Forces of the United States, allowances earned by virtue of such services corresponding to the
taxable years 1942 to 1945, inclusive, are exempted from income tax. (Republic Act No. 210). The
payment of wages and allowances of officers and enlisted men of the Army Forces of the Philippines
sent to Korea are also exempted from taxation. (Republic Act No. 35). In other words, for reasons of
public policy and public interest, a citizen may justifiably by constitutional provision or statute be
exempted from his ordinary obligation of paying taxes on his income. Under the same public policy and
perhaps for the same it not higher considerations, the framers of the Constitution deemed it wise and
necessary to exempt judicial officers from paying taxes on their salaries so as not to decrease their
compensation, thereby insuring the independence of the Judiciary.

In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect
that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates
the Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of
statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in enacting
a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not
violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later
interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs
counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land.

In the views of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with no
pronouncement as to costs.

Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, and Labrador, JJ., concur.



53

G.R. No. L-62577 September 21, 1987

ESTELITA, ROBERTO, LEONARD, REYNALDO, ELY, MYRNA, MICHAELANGELO, ROMEO and LEONOR, all
surnamed ROSALES, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF LANAO DEL NORTE, BRANCH III, Presided by the HONORABLE MAGADAPA
I. RASUMAN, CITY COURT OF ILIGAN CITY, Presided by the HONORABLE POMPEYO L. PALARCA AND
GREGORIO ORELLANA, respondents.



CRUZ, J.:

The basic issue in this case is whether or not the contract of lease between the petitioners and the
private respondent has already expired according to their stipulations. However, that is not what we are
called upon to decide at this time. What is raised in this petition is a question of procedure, viz., which of
two cases involving the same parties and the same subject shall have precedence over the other. That is
what we shall determine now.

The antecedents are as follows: The petitioners and the respondent entered into a contract of lease
over the former's property for the expressed period of three years beginning March 1, 1977. 1 On
January 12, 1980, the petitioners advised the private respondent that he would have to vacate the
leased premises on March 1, 1980, not only because of the lapse of the agreed term but also because he
had subleased the property in violation of their agreement. 2 The private respondent objected, claiming
that his verbal agreement with them was for a period of ten years, which was the reason he had
introduced permanent and costly improvements in the building, and moreover they had also consented
to his sublease of the property. 3 As no agreement between the parties appeared in sight, the private
respondents beat his adversaries to the draw, so to speak, by filing on February 21, 1980, with the Court
of First Instance of Iligan City an action 4 for the continued enforcement of the lease contract and for
damages. 5 The said court on February 28, 1980, one day before the expiration of the lease, issued a
restraining order that maintained the status quo between the parties. 6 Ten days later, the petitioners
filed their own complaint, this time for unlawful detainer, 7 with the City Court of Iligan City. 8 This was
followed two days later with a motion to dismiss the private respondents' complaint before the Court of
First Instance on the ground inter alia of the pendency of the ejectment case, and for the lifting of the
54

temporary restraining order. 9 For his part, the private respondent moved to dismiss the ejectment suit
also on the ground of lis pendens, his argument being that the case he had filed earlier should be
decided first before the petitioners' complaint could be entertained. 10

In the Court of First Instance, the petitioners' motion was in effect denied with its Order dated May 27,
1981, that the "determination of the said motion is hereby deferred until the trial. " 11 The motion for
reconsideration was denied in an Order dated September 14, 1982. 12 In the City Court, the petitioners
fared no better when the ejectment case was on April 24, 1980, "ordered held in abeyance until the case
in the Court of First Instance is finally resolved." 13 The motion for reconsideration was denied in an
Order dated October 4, 1982. 14 Thus failing in both courts, the petitioners have come to this Court,
praying for a reversal of the said orders on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.


Specifically, the petitioners ask us to enjoin the trial of the enforcement suit before the Court of First
Instance and to order the City Court to proceed with the ejectment case.

The facts of this case are practically the same as those of Pardo vs. Encarnacion 15 decided in 1968,
which is itself a reaffirmation of several earlier decisions. The present case must be examined in
accordance with these precedents.

In Pardo, the lessor and the lessee had stipulated on an initial period of twelve years for their lease,
subject to extension by another eight years upon subsequent agreement of the parties. Negotiations for
this purpose having failed, the lessee filed in the Court of First Instance of Cavite an action for the
renewal of the lease at a reduced rental. This the lessor sought to dismiss by questioning the jurisdiction
of the court and the venue of the case. One day after the expiration of the lease, the lessor commenced
an ejectment case in the City Court of Quezon City, and this time it was the lessee who moved to
dismiss, on the ground of the pendency of his own complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cavite. The
City Court ruled it had jurisdiction. However, in a petition for certiorari and prohibition, the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City issued a temporary restraining order that maintained the status quo between
the parties pending action on the petition on the merits. Eventually, the Court of First Instance of Cavite,
resolving the challenge to its own jurisdiction, declared it was competent to proceed with the specific
performance case filed by the lessee. The lessor then came to us.

Speaking for a unanimous Court, Justice Angeles declared:
55


The lessor, Carmen Pardo de Tavera, has brought the case directly to this Court on petition: (a) for
certiorari to annul the order of the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, declaring
itself with jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case No. N-872, and to likewise annul the orders of the
respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City in its Civil Case No. Q-10710 restraining
the Quezon City Court from trying the ejectment case and denying the lessor's motion to dismiss; (b) for
prohibition, to restrain the respondents judges of said Courts of First Instance from further proceeding
with the aforesaid cases before them; and (c) for mandamus, to order the respondent judge of the
Quezon City court to proceed with the hearing of the unlawful detainer-ejectment case pending therein
until its final termination.

We find the petition to be meritorious.

The provision of the lease contract entered into between petitioner and respondent is apparently clear
that unless the lessor and lessee agreed to a renewal thereof at least thirty days prior to the date of
expiration, the lease shall not be renewed. The facts on record show that despite the exchange of
communication, proposals and counter-proposals, between the parties regarding a renewal of the lease,
they were not able to arrive at an agreement within said period for while the lessor wanted an increased
rental the lessee, on the other hand, proposed for a reduction. With this failure of an agreement, it is to
be presumed that the lessee was aware that an ejectment case against him was forthcoming. Whether
or not the case filed before the Cavite Court of First Instance, just one day before the expiration of the
lease contract, was an anticipation to block the action for ejectment which the lessor was to take against
the lessee, the fact, however, is that the lessee was not disposed to leave the premises. At any rate,
while the said case before the Court of First Instance of Cavite appears to be one for specific
performance with damages, it cannot be denied that the real issue between the parties is whether or
not the lessee should be allowed to continue occupying the land as lessee.

The situation is not novel to Us.

It has been settled in a number of cases that the right of a lessee to occupy the land lease as against the
demand of the lessor should be decided under Rule 70 (formerly Rule 72) of the Rules of Court.

There is no merit to the contention that the lessee's supposed right to a renewal of the lease contract
can not be decided in the ejectment suit. In the case of Teodoro vs. Mirasol, supra, this Court held that
56

"if the plaintiff has any right to the extension of the lease at all, such right is a proper and legitimate
issue that could be raised in the unlawful detainer case because it may be used as a defense to the
action." In other words, the matter raised in the Court of First Instance of Cavite may be threshed out in
the ejectment suit, in consonance with the principle prohibiting multiplicity of suits. And the mere fact
that the unlawful detainer-ejectment case was filed later, would not change the situation to depart from
the application of the foregoing ruling.

It is to be noted that the Rules do not require as a ground for dismissal of a complaint that there is a
prior pending action. They provide that there is pending action, not a pending prior action. The fact that
the unlawful detainer suit was of a later date is no bar to the dismissal of the present action (Teodoro,
Jr. v. Mirasol, supra.). 16

Precedents are helpful in deciding cases when they are on all fours or at least substantially identical with
previous litigations. Argumentum a simili valet in lege. Earlier decisions are guideposts that can lead us
in the right direction as we tread the highways and byways of the law in the search for truth and justice.
These pronouncements represent the wisdom of the past. They are the voice of vanished judges talking
to the future. Except where there is a need to reverse them because of an emergent viewpoint or an
altered situation, they urge us strongly that, indeed, the trodden path is best.

We have reviewed the ruling announced in the abovementioned cases and we see no reason to deviate
from it. Its logic remains valid and no change in the law or in the condition of the times calls for its
revision or reversal. It is still sound doctrine and so we continue to apply it, remembering that via trita
est tutissima

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and judgment is hereby rendered: a) SETTING ASIDE the Orders of
the respondent Court of First Instance dated February 28, 1980, May 27,1981, and September 14,1982,
in Civil Case No. 1352-80 and of the respondent City Court dated April 24, 1980 and October 4, 1982, in
Civil Case No. 8174-AF; b) DIRECTING the respondent Court of First Instance to dismiss Civil Case G.R.
No. 1352-80; and c) ORDERING the respondent City Court to commence hearing Civil Case No. 8174-AF
without further delay. No costs. It is so ordered.




57

G.R. No. 74122 March 15, 1988

GUILLERMO NACTOR, SPS. ANSELMO & ELENA NACTOR, PRECILIANO NACTOR, JOSE NACTOR & GLORIA
NACTOR assisted by her husband MANUEL CLAYTOS, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, * HON. NICOLAS A. GEROCHI, JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 139 & SPS. CLARO & MAGDALENA MELCHOR respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside or reverse the decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court ***(now Court of Appeals) dated January 30,1986 in ACG.R. SPNo.07595 entitled
Guillermo Nactor, et al. vs. Nicolas A. Gerochi, Jr. affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Region, Br. 139 in Civil Case No. 9307 on June 4,1985, which in turn affirmed in toto the
appealed decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Civil Case No. 25607 dated September 5,1984.
Respondent Court of appeals dismissed the petition seeking to set aside the Omnibus Order of the
Regional Trial Court not only because the decision of the said court had already become final but also
because on the merits of said decision, the affirmance thereof was in complete accord both with the
facts and the law on the matter.

The antecedent facts of this case as found by the Metropolitan Trial Court are as follows:

Sometime in 1962, the herein plaintiffs-respondents (Spouses Melchor) allowed Guillermo Nactor (one
of the defendants-petitioners) to build a shanty on their property as at that time they were intending to
go abroad. Guillermo Nactor occupied the premises without any contract and without any rental, but
with the understanding that he would watch over the property of the plaintiffs so as to prevent
squatters from entering the said property. Instead of complying with the said agreement, Guillermo
Nactor allowed his relatives to build houses inside the said property without the knowledge and consent
of the Melchor spouses, so that when the latter returned to the Philippines, they discovered that many
people were squatting inside their property. Hence, they lost no time in demanding that Guillermo
Nactor and his group vacate the property in question. When petitioners refused to vacate the premises,
the Melchor spouses filed a complaint with the Barangay, which was later elevated to the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 64, Makati, Metro Manila. The trial court decided the case in favor of the Melchor
spouses on September 5, 1984, the dispositive portion of the decision reading as follows:
58


WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants and any and all persons claiming
right/title under them to vacate the lot at 7713 St. Paul Street, Barangay San Antonio Village, Makati,
Metro Manila and surrender peaceful occupation and possession thereof to plaintiffs and to pay jointly
and severally to the latter a monthly rental of P100.00 from the date of the filing of the complaint on 30
August 1983 until they finally vacate the premises and to demolish and/or transfer all the improvements
they have introduced thereon. Defendants are likewise ordered to pay the Plaintiffs P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees and litigation expenses plus costs of suit. (Rollo, p. 17)

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Makati affirmed in toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial
Court on June 4,1985, with the following observations and conclusions:

After a careful perusal of the evidence on record and the supporting arguments proffered by plaintiffs-
appellees in their memorandum, this court finds no cogent reason to disturb the decision of the Court a
quo, to which reference is hereby made.

Furthermore, as admitted by the defendants, particularly, defendant-appellant Guillermo Nactor, that
his occupancy of the said land was by mere tolerance and generosity of plaintiffs-appellees, allowing
him to have a temporary place to build his abode, while the couple-plaintiffs-appellees--were still
abroad.

Evidently, while the actual physical possession might have been temporarily transferred to defendant-
appellant Guillermo Nactor as a caretaker thereof for almost 20 years, the legal and juridical possession
thereof remains in the hands of plaintiffs-appellees, more especially so that the land in question of
within the protective mantle of indefeasibility of the torrens system.

Acts merely tolerated, and those executed clandestinely and without the knowledge of the possessor of
a thing or by violence, do not affect possession (Art. 537, New Civil Code; Mercedes vs. Go Bio, et al., 78
Phil. 279).

Acts of possessory character executed in virtue of license or by mere tolerance of the owner shall not be
available for the purpose of possession.' (Art. 1119, New Civil Code) (Emphasis supplied)

59

To deny plaintiffs-appellees of their right to physically repossess the said land as uncontested and
uncontroverted lawful owners thereof, would be tantamount to extending premium, if not license, to a
pretender of lawful possession' arising only from the charity and benevolence of its owners.

This Court, both in law and equity, under these antecedents, and after having extended benevolence to
defendants-appellants for so long, should now allow plaintiffs the full enjoyment and use of their
property.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO, with costs
against defendants-appellants. (pp. 17-18, Rollo).

The defendants-petitioners moved for reconsideration on June 24,1985, which motion was denied by
respondent Judge, in an Omnibus Order dated October 22,1985, for having been filed after the decision
had become final and executory. Simultaneously, on motion of plaintiffs-appellees, a writ of execution
was issued.

The motion for reconsideration having been denied, defendants-petitioners filed a petition for review
on certiorari on October 31, 1985 with the Court of Appeals.

On January 30, 1986, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, the
pertinent portion of the affirmance reading:

The petition is thus without merit. Not only had the respondent Judge's decision become final, and
beyond the respondent Judge's competence to vary, set aside or modify, but that on the merits of the
said decision, the affirmance thereof by the respondent Judge is in complete accord both with the facts
and the law applicable on the matter. No reversible error has, therefore, been committed.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED, with costs."

The defendant-petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration dated February 22,1986 which motion was
denied on March 21, 1986 for lack of merit.
60


Hence, this petition.

In the resolution dated June 11, 1986, the Second Division of this Court, before acting on the petition,
required the petitioners to comply with the rules by submitting to the court proof of service of the
petition on the Intermediate Appellate Court and the adverse party and to sign the petition, the
verification and the jurat (Rollo, p. 22). However, before petitioners could comply with said requirement
which were filed on August 26, 1986, (Rollo, pp. 40-47; 56) respondents filed their comment dated June
30,1986 (Rollo, p. 23). In the Resolution of October 15,1986, the court required the petitioners to file a
reply to the comment of counsel for respondent (Rollo, p. 58). On October 28, 1986, respondents filed
an urgent Motion for Exigent Resolution and Refutal to the Petition for Review on certiorari (Rollo, p.
59).

The resolution of November 10, 1986, gave due course to the petition and required both parties to file
their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 67). On that same date, however, the petitioners thru counsel
filed their manifestations/explanation (Rollo, p. 68) stating that they are therewith submitting the
attached Supplemental Reply to the comment of counsel for the respondents (Rollo, p. 78, Annex "D").
Respondents filed their memorandum on December 15, 1986 (Rollo, p. 91), and a motion for early
conclusive resolution and/or final resolution on February 19, 1987 (Rollo, p. 98), followed by another
motion reiterating early conclusive resolution and/or final decision by the same respondents on March
23, 1987 (Rollo, p. 100).

On April 8,1987, petitioners filed their comment on the motion for early resolution while respondents
filed their urgent ex-parte motion to withdraw deposit and [rayed that the amount be released through
their authorized representative and attorney-in-fact (Rollo, p. 107). A special power of attorney was
attached thereto (Rollo, p. 110). In the resolution of June 3,1987, the court required the private
respondents to file a reply to the comments on the motion for early resolution filed by counsel for
petitioners and petitioners to comment on the urgent ex-parte motion of private respondents to
withdraw deposit. The latter was filed on July 3,1987 (Rollo, p. 114).

Petitioners raised the following assignments of error:

I

61

THE DECISION ERRED IN RULING THAT THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED ON THE 24 OF JUNE
1985 IS ALREADY LATE BY ONE DAY, THE PRECEDING DAY, JUNE 23 BEING A SUNDAY.

II

THE DECISION ERRED IN BINDING THEREIN THE DEFENDANTS IN THE FORCIBLE ENTRY CASE WHICH WAS
PREVIOUSLY DISMISSED.

III

THE DECISION ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION.

Otherwise stated, the issues raised in this case are two fold: (1) as regards the timeliness of the motion
for reconsideration filed and (2) the lack of cause of action on the part of the complainants and lack of
jurisdiction to try the case on the part of the court a quo.

Petitioners contend that the motion for reconsideration was filed on time with the Regional Trial Court
on June 24, 1985 because the fifteenth day, June 23, 1985 is a Sunday. There is merit in this contention.

Pertinent thereto, Section 39 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, B.P. 129 provides:

The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards judgments, or decisions of any court in all
cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award judgment or
decision appealed from: ...

On the other hand, the rule on the computation of periods for filing of pleadings is now embodied in
Article 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:

Art. 13. ...
62


In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included.

and also in the Revised Administrative Code which likewise provides:

Section 13. Computation of time in computing any fixed period-of time, with reference to the
performance of an act required by law or contract to be done at a certain time or within a certain limit
of time, the day or date, or day from which the time is reckoned, is to be excluded and the date of
performance, included, unless otherwise provided.

However, in case the last day is a Sunday or a legal holiday, it is understood that where the time refers
to a period prescribed or allowed by the Rules of Court, by an order of the court, or by any other
applicable statute, the last day should really be the next day, provided said day is neither a Sunday nor a
legal holiday. The law cannot require compliance on a day when entities supposed to receive pleadings
or documents are closed in view of the holiday.

Thus, as authoritatively formulated by this Court, the computation of the appeal periods is to the effect
that the first day shall be excluded but the last day of the period so computed is to be included unless it
is a Sunday or a legal holiday in which event the time shall run until the end of the next day which is
neither a Sunday nor a holiday (Kabigting v. Acting Director of Prisons, 6 SCRA 281 [1962]; De las Alas v.
Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 200 [1978]. Accordingly, in said cases, the period to perfect an appeal is
extended ipso jure to the first working day immediately following.

It will be noted, however, that petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the Regional Trial
Court in its Omnibus Order, not only because said motion was purportedly filed late but also for lack of
merit. Thus, in said Order, the Court ruled as follows:

In passing though, even a careful consideration of the grounds relied upon by defendants-appellants in
their Motion for Reconsideration as well as the opposition thereto by plaintiffs-appellees, thru counsel,
this Court finds no cogent reason to alter its aforesaid decision sought to be reconsidered, as the main
grounds relied upon by defendants-appellants had been amply discussed in the decision of this Court in
affirmance of the one rendered by the court a quo." (Original Records, p. 20).

63

On review, the Court of Appeals was even more specific in denying the petition which seeks, to set aside
aforesaid Order, not only because the decision of the Regional Trial Court has ostensibly become final
but for lack of merit.

All these notwithstanding, petitioners would have this Court review the findings and conclusions of the
court a quo which have been affirmed in toto not only by the Regional Trial Court but also by the Court
of Appeals, on the basis of technicalities obviously resorted to only for purposes of delay.

Petitioners allege that it is only Guillermo Nactor whose entrance into the premises was with the
knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs who can be bound by the judgment in the unlawful detainer
case but not the rest of the defendants whose occupancy was termed by the plaintiffs as unlawful
and/or illegal, without any written consent and/or authority from them. They claim that such
defendants should therefore be charged with forcible entry, but without compliance with the Rules on
Forcible Entry cases among which are, a written demand to vacate which must be definite, petitioners
claim that the complaint is devoid of a sufficient cause of action and invests upon the court no
jurisdiction to try and decide the case (Rollo, pp. 10-11).

Such allegation is untenable.

Aside from the findings of the trial court itself, that there is no contract at all between the plaintiffs and
defendants and that the occupation of the property by the latter was only by tolerance of the former,
such fact was confirmed by the testimony of the principal defendant Guillermo Nactor, whose testimony
was quoted in the decision of the court a quo as follows:

Q. You mean to tell the Honorable Court all the defendants in this case were allowed to silly in this
place?

A. Yes, Sir, spouses Melchor told us that we can stay there so that nobody will stay in the place. (TSN
dated May 9, 1984):

It will likewise be noted that defendants, all surnamed Nactor are the relatives of Guillermo Nactor who
was the caretaker thereof. It is obvious that they gained access to the property through him and
occupied the same under his responsibility. Consequently, if Guillermo Nactor has admittedly lost the
64

right to stay on or occupy the property in question, with all the more reason have the rest of the
defendants who are only occupying the property under him, no right to stay on the premises.

Thus, the trial court in unmistakable language, in ordering that the property be vacated and possession
thereof surrendered peacefully to the plaintiffs, included all the defendants and any and all persons
claiming right/title under Guillermo Nactor.

While it is true that the instant case was tried by the court a quo on the basis of the unlawful detainer
charge instead of forcible entry for the rest of the defendants excluding Guillermo, it is an elementary
rule of procedure that what is controlling is not the caption of the case which does not materially alter
the situation but the allegations therein that determine the nature of the action and even without the
prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may nevertheless be granted by the court if the facts alleged
in the complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant (Ras v. Sua, 25 SCRA 155-159 [1968]). Besides
since the rest of the petitioners were on the property under the apparent protection of Guillermo, an
unlawful detainer case (and not necessarily one of forcible entry) may properly be used against them.

Still further, petitioners claim that they fall within the protective mantle of P.D. No. 1517 "Urban Land
Reform" as per Proclamation Nos. 1767 and 1967, as amended by Proclamation No. 2284, However, the
records show that the property in question is outside the DECLARED URBAN LAND REFORM ZONE"
(ULRZ), and situated on the northeast side along Saint Paul Road, has never been within the areas
covered by "BOUNDARY DESCRIPTION PURSUANT TO PROCLAMATION NO. 1967," as certified by the
Human Settlements Regulation Commission. (Annexes "A" and "A-l," Rollo, pp. 28 & 29).

In resume, petitioners did not dispute the fact that private respondents are the lawful owners of the
property in question, that Guillermo Nactor and the rest of the defendants are occupying the property
only by tolerance of the owners and that under whatever remedy private respondents may avail
themselves of, to enforce their rights, petitioners have to vacate the property because they have no
right to stay therein. The main thrust therefore, of their objection is not on the merits of their claim but
on the technicality that the nature of the action taken by the private respondents is erroneous. That the
position of petitioners is totally devoid of merit, is shown by the fact that the end result would be the
same.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

65

G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance
of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No.
37089 therein.1wph1.t

The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first
wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis
(who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his
second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter
S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all
taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be
divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b)
P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis,
or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to
his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis,
Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal
shares.1wph1.t

66

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was
admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the
amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate
children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling
P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released
from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions
filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its
"Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter
alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting
to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the
amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor
pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament divided the residuary
estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first
and second marriages.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to
the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children
and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by
the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on
April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account,
report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the
national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964,
oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply Texas law or
Philippine law.
67

In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by
this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent
where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not
disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law
of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law,
but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex
rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi
would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of
proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants'
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even
mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in
intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the
amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity
to succeed. They provide that

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely,
Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article"
68

when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing
without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It
must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself
which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent,
Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be
governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it
has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national
law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to govern his Texas estate
and the other his Philippine estate arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his
Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine
will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision
in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law
and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those
matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that
under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of
the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law,
the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So
ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.






69

G.R. No. 132344 February 17, 2000
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner, vs.ROMEO A. JADER, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
May an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a student into believing
that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case? This is
the issue in the instant petition for review premised on the following undisputed facts as
summarized by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals (CA),
1
to wit:
Plaintiff was enrolled in the defendants' College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. In the first
semester of his last year (School year 1987-1988), he failed to take the regular final
examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade (Exhibits
"2", also Exhibit "H"). He enrolled for the second semester as fourth year law student
(Exhibit "A") and on February 1, 1988 he filed an application for the removal of the
incomplete grade given him by Professor Carlos Ortega (Exhibits "H-2", also Exhibit
"2") which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after payment of the required fee.
He took the examination on March 28, 1988. On May 30, 1988, Professor Carlos Ortega
submitted his grade. It was a grade of five (5). (Exhibits "H-4", also Exhibits "2-L", "2-
N").1wphi1.nt
In the meantime, the Dean and the Faculty Members of the College of Law met to
deliberate on who among the fourth year students should be allowed to graduate. The
plaintiff's name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for graduation for the
Degree of Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) as of Second Semester (1987-1988) with the
following annotation:
JADER ROMEO A.
Def. Conflict of Laws x-1-87-88, Practice Court I Inc., 1-87-88 C-1 to submit
transcript with S.O. (Exhibits "3", "3-C-1", "3-C-2").
The 35th Investitures & Commencement Ceremonies for the candidates of Bachelor of
Laws was scheduled on the 16th of April 1988 at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, and in the
invitation for that occasion the name of the plaintiff appeared as one of the candidates.
(Exhibits "B", "B-6", "B-6-A"). At the foot of the list of the names of the candidates there
appeared however the following annotation:
This is a tentative list Degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who
satisfactorily complete requirements as stated in the University Bulletin and as
approved of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (Exhibit "B-7-A").
The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies at F. dela Cruz Quadrangle, U.E., Recto
Campus, during the program of which he went up the stage when his name was called,
escorted by her (sic) mother and his eldest brother who assisted in placing the Hood, and
70

his Tassel was turned from left to right, and he was thereafter handed by Dean Celedonio
a rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the Law Diploma. His relatives took pictures
of the occasion (Exhibits "C" to "C-6", "D-3" to "D-11").
He tendered a blow-out that evening which was attended by neighbors, friends and
relatives who wished him good luck in the forthcoming bar examination. There were
pictures taken too during the blow-out (Exhibits "D" to "D-1").
He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of absence
without pay from his job from April 20, 1988 to September 30, 1988 (Exhibit "G") and
enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far Eastern University. (Exhibits "F" to "F-2").
Having learned of the deficiency he dropped his review class and was not able to take the
bar examination.
2

Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock,
mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights
when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latter's negligence. He
prayed for an award of moral and exemplary damages, unrealized income, attorney's fees, and
costs of suit.
In its answer with counterclaim, petitioner denied liability arguing mainly that it never led
respondent to believe that he completed the requirements for a Bachelor of Laws degree when
his name was included in the tentative list of graduating students. After trial, the lower court
rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of THIRTY
FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY PESOS (P35,470.00) with legal rate
of interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid, the amount of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees and the cost of suit.
Defendant's counterclaim is, for lack of merit, hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
3

which on appeal by both parties was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) with modification.
The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the lower Court's Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that defendant-appellee, in addition to the sum
adjudged by the lower court in favor of plaintiff-appellant, is also ORDERED to pay
plaintiff-appellant the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS for moral
damages. Costs against defendant-appellee.
SO ORDERED.
4

71

Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner UE elevated the case to this Court
on a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, arguing that it has no liability to
respondent Romeo A. Jader, considering that the proximate and immediate cause of the alleged
damages incurred by the latter arose out of his own negligence in not verifying from the
professor concerned the result of his removal exam.
The petition lacks merit.
When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution, a contract of education is
entered into between said institution and the student. The professors, teachers or instructors hired
by the school are considered merely as agents and administrators tasked to perform the school's
commitment under the contract. Since the contracting parties are the school and the student, the
latter is not duty-bound to deal with the former's agents, such as the professors with respect to
the status or result of his grades, although nothing prevents either professors or students from
sharing with each other such information. The Court takes judicial notice of the traditional
practice in educational institutions wherein the professor directly furnishes his/her students their
grades. It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice
and information to each and every student as to whether he or she had already complied with all
the requirements for the conferment of a degree or whether they would be included among those
who will graduate. Although commencement exercises are but a formal ceremony, it nonetheless
is not an ordinary occasion, since such ceremony is the educational institution's way of
announcing to the whole world that the students included in the list of those who will be
conferred a degree during the baccalaureate ceremony have satisfied all the requirements for
such degree. Prior or subsequent to the ceremony, the school has the obligation to promptly
inform the student of any problem involving the latter's grades and performance and also most
importantly, of the procedures for remedying the same.
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination,
particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be
said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a
successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the
Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of
another, even though the forms and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all
information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious.
5
It is the school that
has access to those information and it is only the school that can compel its professors to act and
comply with its rules, regulations and policies with respect to the computation and the prompt
submission of grades. Students do not exercise control, much less influence, over the way an
educational institution should run its affairs, particularly in disciplining its professors and
teachers and ensuring their compliance with the school's rules and orders. Being the party that
hired them, it is the school that exercises general supervision and exclusive control over the
professors with respect to the submission of reports involving the students' standing. Exclusive
control means that no other person or entity had any control over the instrumentality which
caused the damage or injury.
6

The college dean is the senior officer responsible for the operation of an academic program,
enforcement of rules and regulations, and the supervision of faculty and student services.
7
He
72

must see to it that his own professors and teachers, regardless of their status or position outside
of the university, must comply with the rules set by the latter. The negligent act of a professor
who fails to observe the rules of the school, for instance by not promptly submitting a student's
grade, is not only imputable to the professor but is an act of the school, being his employer.
Considering further, that the institution of learning involved herein is a university which is
engaged in legal education, it should have practiced what it inculcates in its students, more
specifically the principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code
which states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the
untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically
in statutory law.
8
In civilized society, men must be able to assume that others will do them no
intended injury that others will commit no internal aggressions upon them; that their
fellowmen, when they act affirmatively will do so with due care which the ordinary
understanding and moral sense of the community exacts and that those with whom they deal in
the general course of society will act in good faith. The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is
justifiable reliance under conditions of civilized society.
9
Schools and professors cannot just take
students for granted and be indifferent to them, for without the latter, the former are useless.
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not
wait for the latter to inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights
or welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim
for damages.
10
Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a
conscious knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce them would make the
erring party liable.
11
Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in the
performance of its obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign
ignorance that respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is
precisely the immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. It failed to act
seasonably. Petitioner cannot just give out its student's grades at any time because a
student has to comply with certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court on the
submission of requirements for taking the bar. Petitioner's liability arose from its failure
to promptly inform respondent of the result of an examination and in misleading the
latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements for the course. Worth quoting
is the following disquisition of the respondent court:
It is apparent from the testimony of Dean Tiongson that defendant-appellee
University had been informed during the deliberation that the professor in
Practice Court I gave plaintiff-appellant a failing grade. Yet, defendant-appellee
still did not inform plaintiff-appellant of his failure to complete the requirements for
73

the degree nor did they remove his name from the tentative list of candidates for
graduation. Worse, defendant-appellee university, despite the knowledge that
plaintiff-appellant failed in Practice Court I, again included plaintiff-appellant's
name in the "tentative list of candidates for graduation which was prepared after
the deliberation and which became the basis for the commencement rites
program. Dean Tiongson reasons out that plaintiff-appellant's name was allowed
to remain in the tentative list of candidates for graduation in the hope that the
latter would still be able to remedy the situation in the remaining few days before
graduation day. Dean Tiongson, however, did not explain how plaintiff appellant
Jader could have done something to complete his deficiency if defendant-
appellee university did not exert any effort to inform plaintiff-appellant of his
failing grade in Practice Court I.
12

Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own negligence that
led to the delayed relay of information to respondent. When one of two innocent parties
must suffer, he through whose agency the loss occurred must bear it.
13
The modern
tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is abuse of right, even
when the act is not illicit.
14
If mere fault or negligence in one's acts can make him liable
for damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith
make him liable. A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate
exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith, but not when
he acts with negligence or abuse.
15

However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for the
latter's actual damages, we hold that respondent should not have been awarded moral
damages. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals' findings that respondent suffered
shock, trauma and pain when he was informed that he could not graduate and will not
be allowed to take the bar examinations. At the very least, it behooved on respondent to
verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for
the bar examinations. As a senior law student, respondent should have been
responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, specifically those pertaining to his
academic achievement, are in order. Given these considerations, we fail to see how
respondent could have suffered untold embarrassment in attending the graduation rites,
enrolling in the bar review classes and not being able to take the bar exams. If
respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon
himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements including his school
records, before preparing himself for the bar examination. Certainly, taking the bar
examinations does not only entail a mental preparation on the subjects thereof; there
are also prerequisites of documentation and submission of requirements which the
prospective examinee must meet.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY respondent the sum of Thirty-five
Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of 6% per
annum computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the amount of
74